Crime and Policing Bill
Monday 10th March 2025
(1 year, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Yvette Cooper)
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
The Crime and Policing Bill will make our streets safer, put neighbourhood policing back at the heart of communities after years of neglect, give law enforcement the powers it needs to protect the public and tackle the most serious violence, help communities to take back their town centres from thieves and thugs, and support the Government’s safer streets mission—a mission for the whole country—to halve knife crime and violence against women and girls in a decade and to rebuild confidence in policing and the criminal justice system by tackling the local crimes that most undermine our communities.
Across our countries, we have strong communities, a British tradition of respect for the rule of law and for each other, and a British policing tradition that goes back to Peel of policing by consent, with the police embedded in communities and residents pulling together to prevent and tackle crime. Yet, in recent years those traditions have become badly frayed. Too many town centres, neighbourhoods and public spaces are plagued by antisocial behaviour, and shoplifting and street theft have soared, while neighbourhood police have been heavily cut back. Too many families are forced to endure the agony of an empty chair at the dinner table night after night, having lost a loved one to knife crime, but it is easier than ever for children to get hold of lethal weapons online. There are barely any penalties for gangs who recruit children into crime—they get away with it.
Too many women and girls still face stalking, spiking, violence and abuse, and feel unsafe on the streets and in their homes, even now, nearly 50 years on from the first Reclaim the Night marches in Leeds. Too many children still experience sexual abuse and exploitation—including by grooming networks on the streets and online—and online abuse is getting worse and worse, yet the child protection reforms that we and others called for 10 years ago are still not in place. Trust in the police is undermined by vetting failures and abuses of power, but the action promised several years ago to raise standards is still not in place.
Across the country, too many of us just hear the same thing: people do not see the police on the streets any more, they worry that respect for law and order has disappeared, and they fear that if something goes wrong, no one will come and nothing will be done. That is why it is time for change and for the measures that we are setting out in the Bill. Safety and security are the bedrock of opportunity and the underpinning of every strong community. The safer streets mission is at the heart of our plan for change, because everyone has the right to live in freedom from fear.
Wendy Morton (Aldridge-Brownhills) (Con)
The right hon. Lady makes an important point about neighbourhood policing. Does she agree that local police stations should be integral to this plan?
Yvette Cooper
Local police stations are a matter for local forces, but they can be a central part of neighbourhood policing, which, sadly, has been heavily cut back in recent years. In fact, in many areas of the country, neighbourhood policing has been cut by a third or nearly half. At the heart of the Government’s plan is rebuilding neighbourhood policing.
We plan to put 13,000 more neighbourhood police and police community support officers back on the beat over the course of this Parliament, kick-started with £200 million of funding in the next financial year. We will reverse the damage done by the Conservative Government through years of cuts to community police. There are half as many PCSOs as there were 14 years ago, and many thousands fewer neighbourhood police officers. Some 54% of people say that they never see an officer on the beat—that figure has doubled since 2010, as too many neighbourhood police have just disappeared.
Yvette Cooper
I will give way first to my hon. Friend and then to the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty).
Chris Vince
A report by Harlow council in 2023 stated that fewer than half of residents in Harlow felt safe going outside after dark. Does my right hon. Friend see the neighbourhood policing guarantee as part of the way of solving that problem?
Yvette Cooper
My hon. Friend is right: neighbourhood policing is crucial, but neighbourhood policing teams have been decimated, and even those that remained were often abstracted or merged with other teams. That has been deeply damaging. It is crucial to get those neighbourhood police back on the streets, back into our town centres, and back into our communities. I give way to the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty), who I hope will apologise for the scale of cuts that his party’s Government brought in.
Ben Obese-Jecty
The right hon. Lady mentioned 13,000 neighbourhood police, but 3,000 of those will be new warranted officers; I believe that 3,000 will be operational police officers brought back from other places. When will police forces find out what their share of those police officers will be? How will the 3,000 officers currently in other roles be reassigned, given that operational matters are the responsibility of chief constables, not the Home Secretary?
Yvette Cooper
We have started with £200 million of funding for the next financial year to kick-start the drive to put 13,000 more neighbourhood police and police community support officers back on the beat. Already, police forces have been working with the Home Office on plans for recruiting new police officers and new PCSOs, and for redeploying existing police officers and backfilling by recruiting other officers to take their posts. We will set out in due course plans for the next financial year and that £200 million.
The cuts to neighbourhood policing over the past decade were even worse than we had thought. The previous Conservative Government were so indifferent to neighbourhood policing that they did not even keep a proper count of who was doing that work. Too often, they treated neighbourhood police officers just the same as 999 response officers or local detective teams, and Home Office guidance allowed forces to report some of their response officers as neighbourhood police. The last Government did not have proper checks in place, and as a result, hundreds, even thousands, of officers and PCSOs were miscounted. Later this month, the Home Office and the National Police Chiefs’ Council will have to publish revised force-by-force figures, so that communities can see properly what is happening in their area. This Government take seriously neighbourhood policing, which must be community-led policing in our towns and on our streets.
Paul Holmes (Hamble Valley) (Con)
I thank the Home Secretary for giving way; it is courteous of her. On miscounting numbers, can I drill down on the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty)? Of the 13,000 new neighbourhood officers that the Home Secretary claims she is recruiting, 3,000 will be diverted from the existing workforce, so they are not new, are they? Will she also confirm that her police funding settlement will lead to 1,873 officers being withdrawn?
Yvette Cooper
Sadly, I did not hear an apology for the previous Conservative Government’s massive cuts to neighbourhood policing, which meant that many towns and cities right across the country saw neighbourhood police numbers slashed in half. Communities were badly let down. I am sure that the next Conservative Member to intervene will begin their question with a huge apology for the damage that their party and Government did.
Yvette Cooper
I am really pleased that the hon. Member is ready to give an apology for the deeply damaging legacy of his party in government.
Paul Holmes
I thank the Home Secretary for giving way, but I think she should apologise for not answering the question. There were record levels of policing under the last Government; 20,000 extra police officers were recruited. I ask her again: she said that she is recruiting 13,000 new neighbourhood police officers, but will she confirm that 3,000 of those will be diverted officers? They are not new, are they?
Yvette Cooper
Still no apology for the deep damage the Conservatives have done. Let us be clear: they halved the number of PCSOs, and they cut the number of neighbourhood police officers, probably by more than 10,000, but we cannot be precise about that, because their measuring of neighbourhood police officers was so ropey and all over the place that we cannot be certain what the cuts were precisely.
This Government are committed to increasing neighbourhood policing and PCSOs by 13,000. In the first year, the neighbourhood policing increase will be funded by £200 million. That funding is already delivering plans from police forces across the country, which we will set out in due course, to increase the recruitment of new police officers and PCSOs, and redeploy some police officers, whose posts will then be backfilled through the recruitment of other new police officers and staff—[Interruption.] Conservative Members should hugely welcome these measures, because they mean that we will get police back on the streets, and into our communities and neighbourhoods, for the first time in years.
Anna Dixon (Shipley) (Lab)
Antisocial behaviour is breaking communities in places like Windhill, Baildon, Cottingley and Denholme. It is a direct result of the cuts made to neighbourhood policing by the Conservative party. When I speak to local residents, they express concerns about the misuse of fireworks, drug dealing, fly-tipping and the dangerous use of e-bikes and scooters. Will the Secretary of State reassure me and my residents that as part of the safer streets mission, the new neighbourhood police will tackle antisocial behaviour in communities like mine, as a matter of urgency?
Yvette Cooper
My hon. Friend is exactly right that we need the police back on the streets. Let us be honest: everyone can see this in their community. People know. Conservative Members may think that everything was hunky-dory at the end of their 14 years in government, but communities across the country can see the reality. As part of our neighbourhood policing guarantee, we need to get more boots on the beat, and we need more town centre patrols by officers who know the community and are trusted by them to go after local perpetrators and prevent persistent crime. These are not outlandish demands—they are just the basics. We need a return to the Peel principles that lie at the heart of British policing, including the principle that the police are the public and the public are the police. We need trusted officers in the community, working to keep people safe.
The Bill gives neighbourhood police more powers to tackle the local crimes that undermine and damage communities: antisocial behaviour, street theft, shoplifting, harassment in our town centres. In too many areas, those powers were too often weakened. Travelling around the country, I and many others will have heard the same story too many times—shop owners who say that thieves have become increasingly brazen; crime driven by organised gangs; elderly shoppers who say that they do not go into town any more because they do not feel safe; people who have had their phones stolen in the street, with all the details of their life ripped away from them; and residents driven mad by the soaring number of roaring off-road bikes and scooters driven in an antisocial and intimidating way.
In the two years before the election, shop theft went up by more than 60%. Snatch theft, mainly the theft of mobile phones, went up by more than 50% in two years. Thousands of such crimes were reported every single day, yet the police have been left with too few powers to act. Too often, because of changes made by the Conservative Government 10 years ago, they have been left with weakened powers to tackle those antisocial behaviours and crimes.
Jo White (Bassetlaw) (Lab)
I welcome the introduction of a new offence of assaulting a shop worker. I have been in shops in Worksop where I have seen shop workers who are absolutely fearful of what will happen next, and I have seen food stolen before my eyes. Does the Secretary of State agree that local shops must become no-go areas for lawbreakers?
Yvette Cooper
My hon. Friend is right. The Bill introduces stronger action on retail crime. I thank the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers, the Co-op, the British Retail Consortium, the Association of Convenience Stores and more for their determined campaigning over many years to protect shop workers. They are the staff who kept their shops open and kept our local communities going through the pandemic, but in recent years they have had to face a truly disgraceful escalation in threats, abuse and violence. Our party has campaigned on this measure for very many years. Through the Bill, we will introduce a specific offence of assaulting a retail worker, sending the message loud and clear that these disgraceful crimes must not be tolerated, because everyone has a right to feel safe at work.
Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)
The Home Secretary has talked about neighbourhoods and communities, but I have not heard her talk about the rural communities that I represent, and the rural crime force. What will the Bill deliver for them? I am very lucky to be in Leicestershire, where we have a rural crime team, which saw crime drop by 24% in its last report, but machinery being taken has a massive impact. Can she talk me through any measures that are being brought forward that will benefit my community?
Yvette Cooper
The hon. Member is exactly right to draw attention to that. Our rural communities see different kinds and patterns of crime, but it is very often driven by organised gangs who think that rural communities will be a soft touch. We have sometimes seen that with GPS machinery for factories; we believe that stronger action is needed there. The Minister for Policing, Fire and Crime Prevention is working with the National Police Chiefs’ Council on a new rural crime strategy. I know that she would be happy to follow up on any specific issues that the hon. Gentleman wants to raise.
Too often, crimes are dismissed as low level, even though they leave residents in a living nightmare and corrode community life, so here are the things that this Labour Government’s Crime and Policing Bill will change. We are introducing new respect orders that the police and courts can use to ban repeat offenders from town centres, or to put new requirements on repeat perpetrators in order to prevent them causing havoc in the community—for example, requirements to take up drug or alcohol treatment.
Currently, the police cannot immediately seize bikes or vehicles that are being used in a dangerous, intimidating or antisocial way. They give a warning and have to hope that they catch the same person again, but that means that there can be two, three, four or endless strikes against the person, and the bike will still be on the road. Frankly, one strike should be enough. Under the Bill, if the police find somebody using a bike or a vehicle in a dangerous or antisocial way, they can seize it straightaway and get that dangerous, damaging bike off the road.
We will give the police stronger powers to tackle the rising amount of snatch theft. We will all know constituents, friends or family members who have had their phone stolen, and who could track it, maybe through Find My iPhone or a similar service, but when they told the police where their phone was, nothing was done. We will give the police new powers, so that where they have electronic evidence from tracking technology on the location of stolen goods, they can enter and search premises without waiting for warrants to be put in place. Ministers are also working with tech companies and the police to pursue stronger action on designing out and disincentivising phone theft, so that we can go after the criminal gangs making people’s lives a misery by stealing phones on the street.
We will take stronger action on shoplifting. Some 10 years ago, the Conservative Government introduced a new £200 rule, categorising shop theft below that amount as low value. That sent the signal, which has shaped the police response ever since, that such crime should not be taken seriously. It became a Tory shoplifters’ charter—a signal to thieves and gangs across the country that they could operate with impunity, wandering from shop to shop and stealing away because nothing would be done. That kind of crime spreads. It creates a sense of lawlessness, and huge anger and frustration among the law-abiding majority, who see criminals getting away with it and respect for the law hollowed out. This Government will finally end the damaging £200 rule.
Amanda Martin (Portsmouth North) (Lab)
Does the Secretary of State agree that this is not just about the shoplifting, but about the fear it creates in our communities, including among our shopworkers? Our local corner shops and accessible shops are there for elderly people who cannot always get out to the big supermarkets or other people who have difficulty doing so, and shoplifting has put them in fear as well.
Yvette Cooper
My hon. Friend is right. This is about the fact of the crime—the disrespect—but also the sense of fear that it can create and the huge frustration among shopworkers about the crimes that they see.
I am glad to see some signs of a change in heart on the Conservative Benches, with Conservative Members recognising how damaging their approach to town centre crime has been. The shadow Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), has written on Facebook that the police
“must have ZERO TOLERANCE to shoplifting and phone theft in Croydon…otherwise it will escalate. Stealing, even less than £200, is illegal…The police must focus ruthlessly on catching criminals and always pursue every line of inquiry.”
Who would have thought it? If that is what the right hon. Gentleman now believes, why on earth did he not take the opportunity during the two years that he was the policing Minister to scrap the £200 threshold, which sent all the wrong signals to the police?
We do know one part of the shadow Home Secretary’s remedy for the disappearance of neighbourhood police and the soaring levels of town centre crime. He has said that
“The wider public do have the power of citizen’s arrest and, where it’s safe to do so, I would encourage that to be used…including potentially a physical challenge”,
otherwise it “will just escalate.” Putting aside the intriguing suggestion that the shadow Home Secretary wanders around with handcuffs in his pocket, I wonder whether he has misunderstood the Peel principle that the police are the public and the public are the police. What that principle means is neighbourhood police in the community, not leaving the community to pick up arms because the neighbourhood police have gone. As for Reform Members, it looks as if they are too busy dealing with their own internal antisocial behaviour to even show up. This Government will be tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime, something that has not happened for far too long.
Alongside the action on community crimes, the Bill introduces much stronger measures on some of the most serious crimes of all, including the knife crime that is destroying young lives—teenagers and young people who do not get to achieve their ambitions or fulfil their dreams, with parents and families left bereft.
Yvette Cooper
I will give way first to my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton West (Warinder Juss), and then I will give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Reading Central (Matt Rodda).
Warinder Juss
Last year, only four in 10 knife possessions resulted in any formal criminal justice outcome. Does the Home Secretary agree that by increasing police powers to seize, retain and destroy knives that may be legally owned but may be used in committing a crime, we will reduce the number of people carrying knives?
Yvette Cooper
My hon. Friend makes a really important point. We need to prevent people—especially young people—getting access to those dangerous weapons in the first place, but also to make sure that there are proper interventions, including referrals to youth offending teams. We must not have a system that simply shrugs its shoulders when young people are caught carrying knives.
Knife-enabled offences recorded by the police rose by 9% in the two years up to last summer. Many people in this House will know the story of Ronan Kanda, who was just 16 when he was stabbed to death with a ninja sword just yards from his home. He was killed by two other teenagers who had bought, not just that sword, but more than 20 other lethal weapons online with no questions asked and no proper checks. It is because of the tireless campaigning of Ronan’s mum Pooja that we have already launched plans to ban ninja swords, following this summer’s implementation of the zombie knife ban, and commissioned Commander Stephen Clayman to do an end-to-end review of knife sales. That review was published a few weeks ago, and it is driving some of the new measures we are introducing as part of this Bill.
Yvette Cooper
I will give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Reading Central, and then I will give way to the hon. Member for Huntingdon, but let me just make a couple of other points first. The Bill increases the maximum penalties for offences relating to the sale and possession of offensive weapons from six months to two years’ imprisonment. Following the Clayman review, we will also bring forward amendments to the Bill in this House to introduce stricter age verification checks, with a stringent two-step age verification system for online knife sales, so that customers have to submit photo ID at the point of purchase and again on delivery. It will be a legal requirement to hand a package containing a knife to the buyer alone.
Matt Rodda
I thank the Home Secretary wholeheartedly for her work on this important matter. In my constituency, 13-year-old Olly Stephens was attacked and brutally murdered by two other boys. They had seen hundreds of images of knives online on 11 different social media platforms. I warmly welcome in particular the consultation that she has announced to look into the potential penalties for tech executives who fail to act responsibly in this important area.
Yvette Cooper
My hon. Friend raises an important point, and he has raised the terrible case of the killing of Olly Stephens with me before. I know how incredibly devastating that has been for the whole community. He is right that the online system has made it far too easy for young people to get hold of lethal weapons. There is also the content that too many of our young people are seeing online. That is why the measures as part of the Online Safety Act 2023 to strengthen the requirements on tech companies around material visible to children will be important, too. Those are expected in the summer.
My hon. Friend is also right that we will bring forward amendments during the Bill’s passage to give effect to our manifesto commitment to introduce personal liability measures for senior managers of online platforms that fail to take action on illegal content concerning knives and offensive weapons. We will introduce a requirement for sellers to notify bulk or suspicious sales of knives to the police. We have seen cases where young people were able effectively to become arms traders, buying huge numbers of illegal weapons that should not have been sold to them and then distributing them in the community.
Ben Obese-Jecty
Knife crime is a grave issue, and I welcome any measures that can help to reduce it. I have a debate next Thursday on knife crime, and I hope to see good representation from all parts of the House in debating how we can reduce the number of children and young people involved in knife crime, whether as victim or perpetrator. The question I would like to ask is about knife sales online. Some 52% of fatal stabbings involve a kitchen knife, and only 3.6% involve a zombie knife. I appreciate that measures are in place to reduce the ability of people to obtain kitchen knives online, but everybody has a drawer full of knives at home. How can we take measures to reduce that?
Yvette Cooper
The hon. Member makes an important point. We know there is an issue with young people being able to get some of these lethal weapons. It becomes part of what they want to do, and part of the search for status is to carry particular kinds of weapons, but he is right that people can get access to dangerous knives in different ways. We need stronger prevention across the board. That is why the Young Futures programme we are working on is particularly important.
Catherine Atkinson (Derby North) (Lab)
The Government’s commitment to introducing a Young Futures programme to prevent young people from being drawn into crime is welcome, especially as youth services and hubs were hollowed out under the Conservatives. Does the Home Secretary agree that prevention must be at the centre of the mission to tackle knife crime in our communities and our country?
Yvette Cooper
My hon. Friend is right. To tackle this devastating crime, we must address prevention, whether online or in the community, and access to weapons. There is also the response when young people are found carrying knives, and the wider punishment and response as part of the youth justice system. There are the interventions to turn things around, too. We must also tackle the criminal gangs drawing young people into crime and violence in the first place. That includes drawing them into county lines, drug running and the kind of criminal activity that leads to violence, to the carrying of knives and to dangerous crimes at a later stage. For the first time, under the Bill, there will be a specific offence of child criminal exploitation, because gangs should never be able to get away with exploiting young people in that way.
Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith and Chiswick) (Lab)
The hon. Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty) mentioned kitchen knives, which are the main weapons that are used. Will the Home Secretary look into the issue of pointed kitchen knives, which cause so many deaths? Existing knives can be blunted or rounded at the ends if there are incentives for that to be done, and manufacturers can be persuaded to sell knives with rounded ends, as some already do.
Yvette Cooper
That is an interesting point. It has been raised with us by the coalition against knife crime that we have formed, bringing together campaigning families and campaigning networks and organisations, and as a result it is being examined further.
A range of measures in the Bill, along with amendments that will be tabled, make up Ronan’s law. Pooja, Ronan’s mother, has said:
“I wish this was done years ago, and my son would be with me today.”
We are taking action in memory of Ronan, but also as a tribute to Pooja and all Ronan’s family who have campaigned so hard to keep other children safe.
The Bill also introduces stronger measures to tackle violence against women and girls, and the abuse and exploitation of children. According to the Crime Survey for England and Wales, one in four women have experienced domestic abuse, one in four have suffered sexual assault, and one in five have been stalked. Those are the most traumatic and appalling crimes, and it is high time we treated this as the national emergency that it so clearly is. Decade after decade, we have uttered warm words in the House, but too little has changed. It is imperative that we take action, not just through the Bill but across the board. This is part of our ambition to halve violence against women and girls within a decade, an integral part of the safer streets mission, because no one should live in fear.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
Those of us who represent Northern Ireland constituencies are very pleased to know about the 51 clauses that will affect Northern Ireland through a legislative consent motion. It is important to recognise the benefits that that will have not just here, but in Northern Ireland. However, there are one or two others that we might like to see in the future. Has the Home Secretary had an opportunity to speak to the policing and justice Minister in Northern Ireland about that?
Yvette Cooper
We have had discussions with Northern Ireland Ministers, and I am happy for them to continue.
I am very conscious of the time, and I know that many Members wish to speak, so I want to make some progress now. Through the Bill we will protect people better by making stalking protection orders more widely available and introducing a new criminal offence of administering a harmful substance, for instance by spiking. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion) has long campaigned for our measures to strengthen the management of offenders in the community and introduce enhanced notification requirements for registered sex offenders, as well as a bar on their changing their names when there is a risk of sexual harm.
We are also taking stronger measures to protect our children, which is one of the most fundamental responsibilities of all. The Bill will create a new duty to report child sexual abuse, backed up by criminal sanctions for those who seek to cover up abuse by preventing or deterring someone from carrying out the duty. That was recommended by the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse, and the Prime Minister and I both called for it more than a decade ago. The Bill will make grooming an aggravating factor in the sentencing of child sexual offenders, because these are the most vile and damaging of crimes, and will introduce new criminal offences to combat the use of artificial intelligence technology in the making or sharing of child sexual abuse material, and stronger action against those who organise grooming online, where the scale of abuse and crime is increasing steeply.
Tessa Munt (Wells and Mendip Hills) (LD)
I thank the Secretary of State greatly for giving way. I recognise what clauses 45 to 54 say about the mandatory duty in England to report child sexual abuse, and I wonder if I might draw her attention to the fact that there are exceptions dating back to 1603, under canon law, for confessions relating to treason. There is also precedent in section 38B of the Terrorism Act 2000, relating to terrorism, which covers faith leaders. Will the Minister meet me to discuss how we might help the various churches, faith leaders and volunteers in England to make sure that they mandatorily report when they come across this stuff in confession?
Yvette Cooper
The Policing Minister is happy to meet the hon. Member to discuss the detail. It is imperative that all institutions and organisations across communities take responsibility for tackling these appalling and damaging crimes.
We are also introducing measures around national security, including a new youth diversion order to help manage the increasing number of young people being investigated or arrested for terrorism-related activity. Counter-terror police have said that their case load of young people has trebled in just three years, and more action is needed.
There are further measures, which I am sure we will discuss later in this debate and in Committee, to strengthen standards in policing and ensure that chief officers and local policing boards have the right to appeal the result of misconduct boards to police appeals tribunals, to make sure that those who are not fit to serve can be removed from policing and that the standards of police officers, who do an incredible job across the country, can be maintained.
On accountability, we will bring forward amendments to establish a presumption that firearms officers who are charged with offences relating to, and committed during, their duties will have their anonymity preserved during the court process so that we can maintain their confidence, as well as the confidence of communities, in the work that they do.
Safety from harm is not a privilege; it is a fundamental right that should be afforded to everyone, no matter their circumstances. No one should be left to live in fear because of crime and antisocial behaviour in their community. Under this Government, safer streets is a mission for us all, to draw our communities together. We are putting police back on the beat, introducing respect orders and taking action on off-road bikes, shoplifting, street theft, stalking, spiking, grooming and child abuse, knife sales, terrorism and serious crime. We are taking stronger action against criminals, delivering stronger support for victims, restoring respect for the rule of law and restoring police to our streets. Ultimately, we are building a better, fairer Britain that is founded on safety and security for all. I commend this Bill to the House.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
Before I call the shadow Secretary of State, I inform the House that because many people wish to contribute, Back Benchers will have a time limit of five minutes to begin with.
Chris Philp (Croydon South) (Con)
Let me start by paying tribute to the brave police officers up and down the country who, on a daily basis, put themselves in the line of danger to protect us and our constituencies. Every morning when an officer puts on their uniform, they do not know what they might encounter during their working day—they do not know whether they might be attacked—yet they take that risk to protect us. I am sure the whole House will want to join me in expressing our thanks and gratitude to those brave men and women for the work that they do on our behalf every single day.
When I was the Policing Minister a year or two ago, I was moved at the national police memorial service—I think it was held in Cardiff that year—marking the memory of the officers who had lost their lives in the line of duty. I remember meeting their families, whose lives had been devastated by losing a wife or husband, son or daughter, father or mother. I am sure that all of us have come across such cases in our constituencies. I am thinking particularly of Sergeant Matt Ratana, who lost his life in the Croydon custody centre a few years ago—I attended his memorial service—and all of us will be thinking of PC Keith Palmer, who lost his life not far from here, protecting us in Parliament. We owe them all a debt of gratitude.
I would like to start by addressing one or two of the broader points the Home Secretary raised in her speech before turning to the substance of the Bill. The first point is about the question of police officer numbers, which she spoke about quite extensively. I noticed that she picked out one particular subset of police officer numbers, and I wondered why she kept doing so. I think I know why: it is because the total of police officers last March—on 31 March—stood at a record ever number. There were 149,679 police officers, which is more than we have ever had at any point in our country’s history.
Mr Jonathan Brash (Hartlepool) (Lab)
Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
Chris Philp
What an appealing choice! I give way to the hon. Member for Stockport (Navendu Mishra).
Navendu Mishra
The shadow Home Secretary is making an important point, but does he accept that, between 2010 and 2024, the population of the UK increased and so did the complexity of crime? I often meet police officers in my constituency and across Greater Manchester who are stressed out and working very long hours, often covering for other officers. Does he accept that the argument he is making is slightly flawed because the population has increased, the complexity of crime has increased and the amount of time officers spend on tackling crime has changed?
Chris Philp
As I said, there was a record ever number of police officers, but if the hon. Gentleman wants to measure police officer numbers against demand, one of the relevant metrics to consider—
Chris Philp
I am just going to answer the question, if I may.
One of the relevant metrics to consider is the overall volume of crime that the police have to investigate. That might be the number that one looks at in deciding whether police numbers need to go up.
Chris Philp
I am just going to actually make the point first, if I may.
According to the crime survey for England and Wales, which the Office for National Statistics says is the only statistically meaningful measure of crime, between 2010 and 2024—just to pick a couple of arbitrary dates at random—overall crime fell from 9.5 million to 4.7 million incidents, or a reduction of 51%. So over that period, we saw a 51% reduction in overall crime, but an increase in the number of police officers to that record number. Those are the facts.
Emily Darlington (Milton Keynes Central) (Lab)
Does the shadow Home Secretary recognise that the number of reported crimes involving sexual violence went up by 300% under his Government? When he talks about police numbers, would he also like to mention how many police officers left because of conditions in their police force and because of mental health and physical health issues?
Chris Philp
Attrition in the police forces is something we need to take very seriously. I am trying to recall the numbers, but from memory, each year approximately 3% to 4% of police officers leave owing to retirement, and a further approximately 3% to 3.5% leave before their retirement age. A 3% non-retirement rate of leaving is of course much lower than in most professions, but I am sure we would all like it to be lower. The last Government started doing work on mental health support for police officers, which I am sure the current Government will continue.
Let me say a word about the future, because having hit record ever police officer numbers, I am rather anxious to make sure—
Chris Philp
I am going to make some progress, but then I will give way.
I am rather anxious to make sure that those record ever numbers are maintained. The funding settlement for the police, announced by the Home Secretary and the Policing Minister a few weeks ago, increased by £1.089 billion, and they made a big play of that figure. However, when we go through the funding pressures that police forces across England and Wales face and add them all up, including the £230 million extra that police forces will have to pay in national insurance, the funding pressures add up not to £1.089 billion, but to £1.205 billion. The funding pressures in the coming financial year, which starts in just a few weeks’ time, are about £116 million more than the funding increase. There is a gap, and the consequence is that the 43 police forces across England and Wales may have to cut 1,800 officers to make up that funding shortfall.
Chris Philp
The hon. Gentleman is showing extreme enthusiasm, which I feel should be rewarded.
Mr Brash
I thank the shadow Home Secretary for giving way. He makes play of the numbers from 2010 and 2024. As a former councillor, I can tell him that the ward I represented in 2010 had a full-time police officer and two full-time PCSOs. When his Government left office in June 2024, the ward had one part-time PCSO and was a third larger. Would he care to apologise to the people of Hartlepool for that disgraceful record?
Chris Philp
I will not apologise for delivering record police numbers. If the hon. Gentleman’s local force is not deploying those officers in the best way, he should take that up with his local police and crime commissioner. In the light of the number of Members who want to speak, I ought to get on to the Bill.
When I first picked up this Bill, I must confess to experiencing a frisson of excitement. The Home Secretary had been in opposition for 14 years—not quite long enough, but still 14 years—and I thought that, during those 14 years, she must have come up with lots of good new ideas. I picked up the Bill, excited to find out what new things it might contain. But as I turned the pages to scrutinise its contents, a strange feeling of familiarity came over me—almost a sense of déjà vu. I had seen quite a few of its measures somewhere before, mostly in the last Government’s Criminal Justice Bill.
The Government’s press release, which they modestly issued on First Reading a couple of weeks ago, highlighted 35 headline measures. I checked to see how many had been copied and pasted from the previous Government, and the answer was about 23 of them. Two thirds of this Bill has apparently been copied and pasted from the previous Government. Now, I know the Home Secretary works closely with the Chancellor of the Exchequer and views her as something of a role model, but emulating her copy-and-pasting is probably not the best thing to do.
These new measures—the spiking offence, the intimate image offence, the duty to report, the new criminal offence of possessing a bladed article with intent, and the new maximum penalty for selling dangerous weapons to under-18s—are all good measures introduced by the last Government. Of course, they would have been legislated for by now if not for the unfortunate early general election—[Interruption.] Yes, it was unfortunate. I congratulate the Home Secretary on using the ctrl-C and ctrl-V functions on her Home Office computer to emulate so many of the previous Bill’s measures.
Neil Coyle
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that it increasingly sounds like he is saying that—on police powers, on the measures in this Bill, on police officer numbers and on resources—the voters got it wrong? That sounds incredibly insulting to the public. Frankly, an apology would be better. Is he aware that, in Southwark, we had fewer officers at the time of the last election, which he says came too soon? It did not come soon enough for my electors, who still have fewer police officers in 2025 than they had in 2010.
Chris Philp
The Metropolitan police, as a whole, does in fact have record officer numbers, but it could have had about an extra 1,500 officers had its police and crime commissioner, Sadiq Khan, bothered to recruit them. In fact, Sadiq Khan was the only police and crime commissioner in the country to miss his recruitment target.
Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)
Does my right hon. Friend agree that the record of Conservative police and crime commissioners is unlike that of some police and crime commissioners representing other parties in this House? In Devon and Cornwall, Alison Hernandez has overseen the reopening of 14 police front desks. Perhaps police and crime commissioners representing other parties might like to take lessons from that.
Chris Philp
My hon. Friend is quite right. Conservative police and crime commissioners do tend to have much better track records on keeping police stations open and delivering lower crime figures.
I want to ask the Home Secretary some questions, and maybe the Policing Minister will respond to them at the end of the debate. Some measures that were in the previous Government’s Criminal Justice Bill have disappeared from this Government’s Bill, and I would be genuinely interested to hear the Government’s thinking on them.
One area that is conspicuously missing from this Bill is the measures on nuisance begging. The previous Government intended to repeal the Vagrancy Act 1824 using a statutory instrument once new replacement measures—contained in the old Bill—were on the statute books. I see that the new Bill, tabled by this Government, does not contain those nuisance begging measures.
Could the Policing Minister, either by intervening now, or in her winding-up speech, tell the House what the Government’s plans are around repealing the 1824 Act—or not—and around nuisance begging? Of course, were they to repeal that Act using a statutory instrument without introducing any new measures, there would be a lacuna in the criminal law. I am sure the whole House would appreciate an update.
Secondly, the previous Government’s Criminal Justice Bill contained a measure to compel perpetrators who had just been convicted of a criminal offence to appear in the dock for sentencing, with a power to use reasonable force to do so. There had been some distressing cases in which someone who had been convicted then refused to appear in the dock to face justice. That measure, as far as I can see, is not in the new Bill, and I would appreciate knowing the Government’s thinking on that.
The third omission I have noticed so far relates to the new offence of assaulting an emergency worker—also announced by the previous Government, I might add. The criminal behaviour order for people who assault a shop worker is welcome, but the previous Bill, as announced, contained a measure that said if someone repeatedly assaulted a retail worker—I think it was three times or more—they would be subject to electronic monitoring: a tag. I do not see that particular provision in this Bill. Again, I would be interested in the Policing Minister’s views on that.
I turn now to a matter that the Home Secretary made a great deal of in her speech, which is the change made in 2014 around shop theft involving goods worth £200 or less. Listening to the Home Secretary and Government communications around this matter, one might think it had ceased to be a criminal offence in 2014. That is, of course, not the case. Shoplifting goods of any value, including under £200, was and always has been a criminal offence, subject to section 1 of the Theft Act 1968.
Dan Aldridge (Weston-super-Mare) (Lab)
Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
Chris Philp
I am just going to develop a point, and then I will be happy to take interventions—particularly from the Home Secretary.
In 2014, it was changed from being an either-way offence to a summary-only offence. Either-way means the offence can be tried in the magistrates court or the Crown court; summary-only means magistrates court only. It was still a criminal offence, and people could still be convicted and sentenced to up to a year in prison for committing it—it certainly was not decriminalised. In fact, the Government’s own impact assessment says that about 90% of the charges for shoplifting involved goods under £200 and were tried in a magistrates court. If it was ineffective, why did 90% of charges relate to goods under £200?
The Home Secretary claims that this alteration will herald some sort of extraordinary change in the way shoplifting is treated, but I would respectfully refer her to page 28 of her economic note 1007, which I am sure Members present have all read—silence. Paragraph 144 says that the central scenario in the Government’s impact assessment assumes that the number of charges, with this change, will remain constant. According to the Government’s own impact assessment, there will be no change in the number of charges as a result of this alteration. The Home Secretary points to this matter as some kind of silver bullet, but I am afraid to say that her own impact assessment says something very different indeed.
The measure has potentially adverse consequences too. This is a serious point, and I genuinely ask the Home Secretary to think about it carefully. When the offence is made either-way, rather than summary only, lots of people who are charged will elect to have a Crown court jury trial instead of a magistrates court trial. A magistrates court trial, for a not guilty plea, is generally heard in six to eight weeks—it is relatively quick—but a Crown court jury trial could take a year and a half to be heard.
The first adverse consequence that I would caution about is that, instead—[Interruption.] I am making a serious point, so it would be good for hon. Members to think about it. Instead of those cases being heard in the magistrates court in six to eight weeks, there could be a delay of one and a half years. I am sure that that is not the Government’s intention, but that is what could happen if the change is made.
The second adverse consequence is that if lots of shoplifting cases that are currently heard in the magistrates court end up in the Crown court before a jury, valuable and scarce Crown court jury trial time that should be used for serious cases such as rape, murder and grievous bodily harm will be taken up with shoplifting. I understand that the Home Secretary wants to send a signal—I really do—but I ask the Government to reflect carefully on the potential unintended consequences. That is a serious point, and I ask the Government to consider it. The change may end up having the opposite effect from what they intend.
The Home Secretary raised one or two other things that I would like to talk about, the first of which is knife crime. There are some measures in the Bill that are designed to address knife crime. We will support those measures; I am sure that all hon. Members want to fight the scourge of knife crime, which is responsible for about a third of all homicides. Almost all hon. Members will have encountered a constituency case; I will never forget attending the funeral of 15-year-old Elianne Andam in Croydon. She was murdered at 8.30 am on the morning of 27 September 2023 on Wellesley Road in central Croydon by a 17-year-old perpetrator with a knife. I will never forget seeing the grief that her parents and her little brother Kobi suffered. I am sure that we would all want to fight knife crime for that reason.
In addition to the measures in the Bill, which we will support, I would be grateful if the Policing Minister could confirm that the patrolling of hotspots, started under the last Government, will continue in areas where knife crime is a problem, and that the funding will continue. That could make an important difference.
It is also important that stop-and-search powers are used. In my view, taking knives off the street is the most important thing. In London, in the past, stop and search took about 400 knives a month off the streets—knives that could have been used to kill someone like Elianne. I am concerned that stop-and-search numbers are down due to misplaced concerns about community tension. I encourage the Government to get police forces to use stop and search more, and to amend legislation, including PACE—the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—code A, to make the use of stop and search easier.
I spoke to a police officer in Croydon last Sunday, and he said that he felt that the police were worried about misconduct proceedings if they used the power of stop and search. I would like to make it easier for police officers to use those powers to protect the public. I would like to hear the Government’s views on that, but we are minded to table amendments in this area to give the police more confidence to use stop-and-search powers to save the lives of people like Elianne.
When I was Policing Minister about a year ago, I provided some funding to invest in exploring new technology to scan for knives at a distance of perhaps 10 metres—not very far. That would mean that people walking down the street in areas where knife crime is a problem could be scanned and, if they had a knife concealed on their person, it would be identified. About a year ago, that technology was emerging and I put the money behind it to develop it to the point where it could be deployed. I was told by the company doing that, and by Home Office officials, that by about spring 2025, a version of that technology would be available that could be used experimentally on the street.
I would be grateful to know, perhaps in an intervention from the Policing Minister now, whether that work has been carried forward and whether that scanning technology is ready to deploy. It could, I think, help to take knives off our streets and save lives. I would be happy to take an intervention now.
The Minister for Policing, Fire and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)
indicated dissent.
Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
It seems to me that the Government’s good work in this Bill in criminalising the possession of knives with intent will be undermined if the police have to wait for someone to take out the knife and commit an attack before they can discover whether they have a knife. Surely, if there is a separate offence arising from mere possession, as my right hon. Friend says, it is particularly important to enable the police to discover that someone possesses that knife before they have had a chance to do harm with it.
Chris Philp
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. If we are to prosecute these offences, put more potential perpetrators in prison and, critically, protect the public, we need to detect more of the knives that are routinely carried on our cities’ streets. That means more stop and search and the use of knife-scanning technology of the kind I just described to identify those knives before they are used. My right hon. Friend put it very powerfully.
The Opposition may also be minded to table amendments on the setting up of a statutory national inquiry into rape gangs. For some reason the Government have only set up local inquiries in five areas. Some local authorities are refusing to hold inquiries, which is scandalous. About 50 towns are affected, so inquiries into just five of them is not good enough. Moreover, those local inquiries do not have the statutory powers under the Inquiries Act 2005 to compel witnesses to give evidence. The chairs of the Manchester local inquiry resigned last year because, even then, public authorities were covering this up. We need a national statutory inquiry, and we intend to amend the Bill to achieve that if the Government will not agree to one. Local councils and councillors, the police and the Crown Prosecution Service were all involved to a greater or lesser extent in ignoring or even covering up these terrible offences. We need to get to the truth.
Amanda Martin
Thank you for giving way. We as a Government are taking very seriously the culture of child grooming and gangs. In your previous role as Minister for crime and policing—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
Order. You said “your”—I was not the Minister. A short and sharp intervention, please.
Amanda Martin
In the right hon. Member’s previous role he attended 352 meetings. Could he please explain why not one of those was on child grooming?
Chris Philp
The hon. Lady will know that child grooming falls under the portfolio of the Safeguarding Minister who, during the Conservatives’ time in office, had dozens of meetings on that topic. I had multiple meetings on Operation Soteria, which is designed to combat rape and serious sexual assault.
I think that you, Madam Deputy Speaker, are keen to move on to Back-Bench speeches, since there is so much interest in this Bill.
Mr Richard Holden (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)
There are a lot of really good things in this Bill that my right hon. Friend has not mentioned, particularly around tackling violence against women and girls, with the legislation on stalking. Some of that work was carried out cross-party over the past few years, such as on increasing the age of consent for marriage from 16 to 18, and tackling forced marriage issues, hymenoplasty and virginity testing, which I helped put through in the last Parliament. Does my right hon. Friend agree that we should try to convince the Government to introduce legislation around first cousin marriage—a very serious issue—and include in this legislation some of the sexual offences that relate to that?
Chris Philp
I support my hon. Friend’s proposals around first cousin marriage. The health implications are deeply alarming. We could take that forward in the Bill and put it to a vote of the House.
Lastly, will the Policing Minister provide an update on the use of technology to combat crime, particularly the use of retrospective and live facial recognition, which enables the police to catch criminals who would otherwise not be caught? She knows that I support that strongly, and I would gladly support her if she wants to continue that work.
Chris Philp
I have to finish now.
I am glad to see so many familiar clauses in the Bill. The Opposition broadly support the intent of the Bill, but what really matters is delivery—making sure that those record police numbers mean that we catch criminals and increase the conviction rate. Those police numbers and the results that they deliver are the yardstick by which the Government will be measured. I look forward to scrutinising the Bill as it passes through the House, and to tabling constructive amendments during its various stages.
Several hon. Members rose—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
There is a five-minute time limit. I call the Chair of the Justice Committee.
Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith and Chiswick) (Lab)
I cannot possibly do justice to the Bill’s many needed and well-crafted measures in the few minutes I have, so I will just talk about its effect on the justice system and raise a couple of specific concerns.
The Bill introduces a number of new criminal offences—I have counted 27—and makes changes to existing offences. The Bill is being considered at a time when there is significant uncertainty about how the criminal justice system will operate in the future. There are two reasons for that. First, the criminal justice system is in a bad way. Last summer, prisons reached bursting point, and emergency measures were needed to ensure that convicted offenders could be sent to prison, rather than released. Secondly, in December, it was announced that the Crown court backlog had reached a record level of 73,105 cases, despite the previous Government setting a target of reducing it to 53,000 cases by now.
In response to both those crises, the Government have commissioned wide-ranging reviews: one on the criminal courts, chaired by Sir Brian Leveson, and one on sentencing, chaired by David Gauke. Both reviews are likely to have a significant effect on the justice measures in the Bill. The new criminal offences in the Bill will come into effect at a time when the criminal justice system is in flux. Parliament will be asked to consider whatever proposals the Government decide to take forward from the reviews. We are legislating to create a number of new offences, but it is difficult for anyone to know what their effect will be. Those are both problems left for the Government by the previous Government, but those difficult matters need to be addressed, as both issues are going on at the same time.
I turn briefly to knife crime, which I mentioned in my intervention. Between April 2023 and March 2024, 262 people were killed by sharp instruments. Home Office statistics can identify the type of sharp instrument in 169 of those cases; in 165 of them, it was a knife. Where the type of knife was identified, 109 were kitchen knives. In other words, two thirds of the identified knives used to kill people in that year were kitchen knives. There is a growing campaign to phase out kitchen knives with pointed tips as an everyday household item, and to introduce kitchen knives with rounded tips. Pointed knives are much more likely to pierce vital organs and sever arteries, and those injuries are far more likely to be fatal. Of course, there are millions of pointed knives in drawers all over the country.
The safer knives group, of which I am a member, supports a pilot scheme in which pointed kitchen knives would be converted into safer, rounded-tip knives. The Government could encourage manufacturers to replace pointed knives with rounded knives and discourage the sale of pointed knives by creating a price differential. They could also support the launch of a knife modification scheme to change pointed knives to rounded knives and collect more data on the types of knives used in any knife-related crime. That is now happening for homicides, but we ought to extend it. I am pleased to say that not all of that requires legislation—we do not need to add to the weight of the Bill—but those are all matters that need consideration. I am grateful for the indication that the Home Secretary gave earlier.
Finally, I will speak about something that should be in the Bill but is not: the law as it applies to Gypsy and Traveller communities, who face many inequalities and prejudice. They were seemingly sanctioned by the previous Government by the inclusion of part 4 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, which gave the police extra powers to ban Gypsies and Travellers from an area for 12 months, along with powers to arrest and fine them, and even seize their homes. A High Court ruling in 2024 determined that those powers were incompatible with the European convention on human rights. The Bill is the first vehicle that could rectify that injustice. Will the Minister, in winding up, indicate whether the Government will attend to that? They clearly have to, because of the determination of the High Court, so the sooner that is done, the better. The future of a very vulnerable community that is very much discriminated against depends on this. I hope the Government will, as they are doing in so many other ways, correct the faults of their predecessor.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, Lisa Smart.
Lisa Smart (Hazel Grove) (LD)
There are elements of this Bill that we Liberal Democrats welcome; there are also some that we would not spend this much parliamentary time on, and some that we raise a weary Liberal eyebrow at, while we dust off the well-worn reasons why civil liberties really do matter to all of us. The biggest disappointment for us is the missed opportunities—the topics not covered and the chances not taken. We welcome the opportunity to scrutinise the Bill as it works its way through Committee and beyond. We will push the Government to go further in some areas; in others, we will suggest that they take themselves off for a little lie down in a quiet room, as they seem to have got themselves a little overwrought.
The key thing that Lib Dems will be pushing for is a serious commitment to restoring proper community policing, because without that, we simply will not deliver the frontline policing that my constituency and communities across the country need and deserve. We all agree that everyone should feel safe in their own home and their neighbourhood, but after years of Conservative mismanagement, that is not the reality in too many of our communities. The previous Government gutted neighbourhood policing by slashing over 4,500 police community support officers since 2015. It should come as no surprise that 6,000 cases are closed every day without a suspect even being identified, or that just 6% of reported crimes result in a charge.
Dan Aldridge
It is really important that we reflect on the impact of that under-investment in neighbourhood policing, and specifically on the cultural feeling of insecurity, and people’s feeling that crime will not be responded to. That has pervaded every society. I hear that on the doorsteps every time I go out. It will take a long time for us to get back from that.
Lisa Smart
I completely agree with the hon. Member that while crime stats are important, the way people feel about crime also is hugely important for all our communities. The issues are felt acutely in constituencies like mine. In Hazel Grove, in towns and villages such as Marple and Romiley, shop workers report that they face a real surge in shop theft. Many tell me that they have no expectation that the police will respond. Even charity shops have been burgled. These organisations just cannot afford to absorb the losses.
Another persistent concern raised by my constituents is the blight of illegal off-road bikes. I know that problem is felt in all our constituencies. From Offerton to High Lane, residents feel intimidated by this antisocial and often dangerous behaviour. Local officers tell me that although they do not lack the power to act, they lack the tools, resources and capacity to enforce existing laws, so we will scrutinise the Government’s proposals on this, especially as they relate to under-18s. The new Government must return to the neighbourhood policing model, with bobbies on the beat who are visible, trusted and properly resourced. Any element of the Bill that does that will receive Lib Dem support.
What else do we support in this Bill? Part 4 deals with the criminal exploitation of children and others, and it is welcome. Part 5 seeks to update the law on sexual offences. These parts will of course need close scrutiny to make them as effective as they can be, but they have Lib Dem support.
If this were a Lib Dem Bill, we would not be talking quite as much about criminalising those who climb on specific war memorials, and we would protect the important right to protest, rather than making it harder for this right to be exercised. We are surprised and more than a little bit disappointed that there is no mention in the Bill of bringing in domestic abuse aggravated offences. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Eastbourne (Josh Babarinde) for the work he has done in this area. We all agree that domestic abuse devastates lives, and that the criminal justice system must properly recognise its severity. Too many abusers escape appropriate justice because domestic abuse is prosecuted under general offences such as common assault or grievous bodily harm, which fails to capture the full nature of the crime. We urge the Government to back this change and ensure that victims and survivors receive the protections that they need and deserve. I am sure that my hon. Friend will have more to say on the matter in due course.
Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)
I want to be clear about what the hon. Member said a moment ago. Is she saying that climbing on and desecrating our war memorials is acceptable behaviour, and that she would be happy for that to carry on? That seems to be what she is saying. I am sure that is not the case, but I would love to hear her clarification.
Lisa Smart
It is always a genuine pleasure to be intervened on by the hon. Gentleman, and I am grateful to him for rising to his feet. What I said was that if this was a Lib Dem Bill—I look forward to one coming forward in the fullness of time—we would not spend as much time talking about this as a criminal act. There are many priorities for the Government, and I will talk about a number of measures that we were disappointed not to see included in this 340-page Bill, at the expense of the issue he raises.
For example, we have waited with bated breath for the new Government to crack down on water companies that pollute our rivers with impunity. Nowhere is that issue clearer than in my community; sewage has been dumped in our rivers, and part of the Chadkirk country estate, a beloved green space in my constituency, was turned into a sewage swamp after heavy rainfall in the new year. The field beside Otterspool Road, which the council planned to transform into a well-kept community meadow, was flooded with raw sewage. Current laws allow the water companies to get away with that. Liberal Democrats will continue to push to make sewage dumping a specific criminal offence, so that water company executives can be held accountable for the damage they do to our communities.
The Government’s failure to reference rural crime even once in the Bill is unacceptable. I heard the Home Secretary’s response to the intervention by the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth (Dr Evans), who is no longer in his place, and it is indeed welcome that a rural crime strategy is on the way, but we Lib Dems will push for a commitment to this issue in the Bill. Rural crime is not an inconvenience; it is a growing crisis. The National Farmers Union reported that the cost of rural crime soared to over £52 million in 2023, with organised gangs targeting farm machinery, vehicles and GPS equipment, yet fewer than 1% of police officers are in dedicated rural crime teams. I heard that for myself when I met a dozen local farmers at Far Benfield farm in Cowlishaw Brow last week. I clearly heard about the impact that organised fly-tipping and organised equipment theft has on farming families.
Finally, there is a gap in the Bill where a discussion of regulating or legislating for live facial recognition should be. The Liberal Democrats have been clear that the technology is a threat to privacy, is discriminatory and does not make our streets safer. The previous Government pushed ahead with its use, despite serious concerns from human rights organisations, legal experts and even their own independent biometrics commissioner. The police should focus on evidence-based crime prevention, not rolling out flawed and biased surveillance technology. Any use of it by the police must be transparent, unbiased and regulated. We can see police forces coming up with their own rules within which to operate. It is long past time for the Government to set the framework.
Chris Philp
The system being used is not biased. It has been tested by the National Physical Laboratory, and the bias problems that existed seven or eight years ago have been resolved. The hon. Lady says that the technology is unregulated; it is not. A Supreme Court case set out the parameters, and they are now enshrined in authorised professional practice, which is national College of Policing guidance.
Lisa Smart
I do not recall hearing a question from the shadow Home Secretary, but I am sure that he would welcome the matter being further clarified in the legislation. He said at the Dispatch Box that live facial recognition is not mentioned in the Bill. I agree. I am sure that we would both welcome scrutinising it, perhaps from different starting points, but ending up with a situation in which our police forces were confident that they knew exactly what the rules were, and exactly how to make best use of any new technology coming through.
The Government and this Bill have the potential to deliver real change, but only if the Government listen. That means a return to proper neighbourhood policing, to giving rural police the resources that they desperately need, and to protecting civil liberties. It is time for the Government to show that they are serious about preventing crime and enabling our police to act when crime has been committed. All our communities across the whole country deserve nothing less.
Several hon. Members rose—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
The time limit on speeches is five minutes.
Shaun Davies (Telford) (Lab)
There are many areas in which the British people have had to put up with decline and decay over the past 14 years, but the breakdown of law and order might be the most profound. Victims have felt unprotected, criminals have gone unpunished and crimes have simply gone unchecked. Meanwhile, the law-abiding majority has looked on in horror and police officers have felt frustrated without the tools to act. I am delighted to support the Bill, which will start to turn the tide on 14 years of neglect.
I welcome the Government’s plans to introduce 13,000 extra neighbourhood police officers and put a named officer in every community; to introduce respect orders and real punishments for the so-called low-level crime, such as antisocial behaviour and off-road bike crime, that has plagued our communities because of the Tory amnesty; and to protect retail workers, including by scrapping the Tory shoplifter’s charter, which decriminalised theft below £200. I remember speaking to shop workers in my constituency during the general election campaign. They talked about yobs walking into shops, nicking items off the shelves and walking straight out, because they knew that the police would take no action.
I welcome the Government’s plans to create a new duty to report child sexual abuse, and increase sentencing for the monsters who organise child grooming; to crack down on knife crime and the sale of weapons to under-18s; to give police the power to seize and destroy bladed articles; and so much more—all within months of the Home Secretary taking office.
I urge the Government to go further, however, by strengthening neighbourhood policing, which is at the heart of their mission to take back our streets. The increased powers for police officers to tackle antisocial behaviour are among the most important measures in the Bill, but we must not stop there. PCSOs and local authority enforcement officers do vital work to support the police and be friendly faces in our communities. They, too, should be given powers to deal with low-level antisocial behaviour and the yobs on our streets.
We can also make our streets safer by introducing stand-alone deportation orders for foreign national offenders who endanger public safety. The Government have deported more than 3,000 criminals since taking office, but often after several thousands of pounds have been spent in the criminal justice system.
I also welcome clause 105, which requires registered sex offenders to notify the authorities if they change their name. That is, again, about helping the public to feel safe and secure, as they will know that someone convicted of sex offences is not hiding among them, and victims will know that perpetrators are not repeating their crimes somewhere and going undetected because of that ridiculous legal loophole.
When we were elected, we promised our constituents that we would help them to take back control of their streets. The first priority of any Government is to keep their citizens safe—at home, at the border and around the world—and it has been a source of national shame that we have not done that for the past 14 years. There is a lot of work to do to restore public trust, but through the Bill we will make vital first steps towards protecting victims, punishing criminals and preventing crime.
Let me finish on this note. The shadow Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), said that the general election was unnecessary or regrettable, but my Telford constituents voted for change, and I urge the Government to get on with it.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)
I will be as brief as possible because I know that others want to get in.
Let me start with a general point. I have sat here long enough—not today, of course, but over the years—to know that every Government come in with a criminal justice Bill, then another a year later, and then another, before the next Government come in and start with a criminal justice Bill. I will not get into a political knockabout on that, but, as Members who have been here long enough will know, the reality is that there is always a reason why we need another criminal justice Bill, and so it goes on. To be a little more rational about it, if passing laws did the job of ending crime, we would have managed it long ago. This is about how we deal with the things that get behind the crime.
The Centre for Social Justice recently published a good report called the “Lost Boys”. It is about the generation, particularly post-covid, of young boys who have become dysfunctional with serious mental health problems, and who often end up on the street being sucked into gangs. The attitude and behaviour of those boys gives rise to the violence and subsequent murders that take place on the street. Putting a knife into someone’s hand does not make them a murderer; putting a knife into the hands of someone who has already been broken in the wrong attitude—that is where murder and violence come from. I recommend that Ministers read that report, because it makes staggering reading for us all.
Those young boys are becoming men. They will live in and out of prisons, and violence, drug taking and drug abuse will be a part of their lives, as will abuse towards women. It is boys and men who are responsible for the crime. Young women and girls are a tiny proportion of the criminals—the problem lies with men and boys. That is critical. If we want to get ahead of this problem and solve knife crime, we must understand that crime is committed in the heads and brains of those young boys, who are subsequently men, and the knife is only the final act. I say to those who recommend the rounding of blades, well perhaps, but a young guy will just go and grind that rounded blade into a sharp point and get on with it if that is what they want to do. Nothing will get in the way of that. I simply make that observation.
It is right that the Government are tackling assault on retail workers. I have struggled endlessly to get the police on to the streets and to arrest people who are shoplifting. People are not shoplifting for a sandwich; they are stripping stores of thousands of pounds’ worth of goods. It is a serious offence of antisocial behaviour, and anything more that the police can do to crack down on that is important, because it is the first crime that most of our constituents notice, and indeed fear. Shoplifters threaten people in the shops and those serving them, and it is important that we get on top of the issue.
I tabled an amendment to the previous criminal justice Bill on cycling and dangerous cycling. Has that gone? I have also spoken to the Department for Transport, and we need to sort out e-bikes and those dangerous fast bikes and cyclists on the road who commit offences.
Sir Julian Lewis
It would also help if it were made mandatory for all cyclists to have a bell, so that they could at least warn pedestrians of their approach.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
I take my right hon. Friend’s point into consideration. The point I was making is that we have had deaths on the street yet cyclists could not be prosecuted for having killed someone, because we are still using a piece of legislation from the mid-19th century to address offensive and wild carriage driving. That is not acceptable and it hardly ever convicts anybody, so I encourage the Government to look again at dangerous cycling, because people genuinely abuse the Road Traffic Act 1988 and nothing ever seems to be done to them. That is particularly true for e-bikes, which are very dangerous when used on pathways. Even if people are not committing a criminal offence, they are causing major danger. Antisocial behaviour is a big thing which our constituents notice; they feel threatened by people who ride those bikes on the pavements. It may seem a small thing, but it is not.
I will end by congratulating the Government on introducing the offence of cuckooing. The Home Secretary will know that I tabled an amendment to the previous criminal justice Bill, and I am pleased that the Government have picked that up and put it into this Bill. There are big issues regarding people who feel threatened by brutal individuals who take over their houses and commit criminal offences from there. In the end, some of those threatened people get arrested themselves, having had no control over that house. Many of them have mental health problems; many are stuck in backrooms and abuse themselves. Having such an offence allows the police—I have said this all along—to move into the house if they have a suspicion that such things are taking place and deal with the issue straightaway. I congratulate the Government on that. The previous Government accepted my amendment. Hopefully, we can all join forces.
I have one question for the Minister responding to the debate. Offenders often use coercion, grooming and manipulation. The Bill refers to an absence of consent. Does she think that an absence of consent alone will be good enough to convict people who have carried out coercion, grooming and manipulation? That is the point I am slightly concerned about. I raise it with the Minister and I hope she can respond at the end of the debate. At the end of it all, a criminal justice Bill is a good thing.
Kim Johnson (Liverpool Riverside) (Lab)
This is a huge Bill with more than 300 pages of measures, but I wish to focus on the extra powers it contains to police protests, and particularly clauses 86 and 95, about which civil liberties organisations such as Liberty, Amnesty International and Big Brother Watch, as well as trade unions, have raised loud alarm bells. I also wish to take the opportunity to recognise more broadly the dangerous direction of travel of the increasing criminalisation of legitimate and peaceful protest in this country which, as many will recognise, is being mirrored around the world.
In recent years we have seen the introduction of a vast swathe of anti-protest measures, including new police powers that have been used increasingly to clamp down on freedom of assembly and expression. Those powers are being extended yet again in the Bill. The Tories’ controversial Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, the Public Order Act 2023 and the “serious disruption” regulations all brought in wide-ranging new powers. Those include allowing the police to impose “conditions” on any protest that is deemed to be disruptive or to cause “serious annoyance” to the local community, and sentences of up to 10 years in prison for damaging memorials such as statues. Those of us who fought those measures tooth and nail have now seen our fears realised, with clampdowns on the right to protest peacefully.
Last month the aggressive policing of the national Palestine protest led to the arrest of an estimated 77 protesters. Even Members of this House were called in for police questioning, as was an 87-year-old Holocaust survivor who was carrying flowers to lay for the dead children of Gaza. We cannot underestimate the chilling impact that that heavy-handed policing of peaceful protests will have on our basic rights and freedoms. From striking workers to the national Palestine demos and farmers’ protests, huge demonstrations and protests are becoming more commonplace across the political spectrum, as people across the country and beyond feel that they are losing their voices in their workplaces and the political sphere. Instead of continuing down that dangerous road, we should be taking the opportunity that the Bill presents to roll back some of those powers, defend our civil liberties, and restore our proud traditions of freedom of speech, expression, and assembly.
Kim Johnson
No, I am not taking interventions—sorry.
In this country we have a proud tradition of standing up for what we believe in, but that has increasingly come under threat, and measures in the Bill continue on that trajectory. I hope that the Minister and Government will take those points on board and consider amendments in Committee to roll back some of the draconian anti-protest legislation and restore our civil liberties—moves on which I am sure we can find common ground across the House.
Lastly, I want to turn to the provisions in the Bill that will further criminalise Roma and Traveller communities, and the impact that certain clauses will have on Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities such as those living on the Tara Park site in my Liverpool Riverside constituency. In particular, I want to raise concerns around clause 3 in part 1 of the Bill, which extends police dispersal powers and, as the Traveller movement has stated, risks leading to even more heavy-handed policing of Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities. As with the anti-protest provisions in the Bill, we must see such measures in the broader context of the increasing criminalisation of already marginalised communities. As such, I hope the Government will go back to the drawing board and consider using the Bill to repeal section 60C to 60E of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. This Bill is the first under Labour of its kind for a generation. Let us use it as an opportunity to protect our most marginalised communities and defend civil liberties.
Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak, Madam Deputy Speaker. I want to thank Surrey police for all they do to keep us safe in Reigate and Banstead. I welcome much of what is in the Bill and I will not repeat what has already been said. Instead, I will focus my remarks on what I believe is required to tackle the scourge of commercial sexual exploitation in this country.
It is easy for people to think that sexual exploitation does not affect them and that it does not happen in their neighbourhood, but it is more common than many realise. It is happening behind closed doors on very normal, everyday streets. Sexual exploitation, often of young women, is an awful crime that destroys lives before they have barely had a chance to begin. Exploited repeatedly, day in, day out, those young people are treated as merchandise, with the sole purpose of turning a profit for pimps and traffickers. It is incumbent upon us to break the business model, starting by outlawing the advertising of individuals for prostitution. Classified ad sites, like Vivastreet, are rife with it. They are the Etsy of sexual exploitation, fuelling sex trafficking by providing a convenient centralised platform for sex buyers to access what they want in their local area. Buying sexual services can be as easy as ordering a pizza.
Although prostitution is legal, pimping, which is the provision of a prostitute to perform a sex act with a customer for gain, is not. There are often tell-tale signs on the adverts, like the same phone number being used for multiple ads, that the women are not acting freely and willingly, and that they are under the control of a pimp, who is profiting from their exploitation. Such sites have had years to get to grips with it, but still not enough is being done to weed out those adverts.
However, we must take some responsibility too. Hon. Members will no doubt be staggered to hear that such advertising of prostitution is entirely legal, because legislation has not kept pace with technology. Advertising prostitution in a phone box is illegal under section 46 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, yet when the same advert is online, it is not illegal. That is utterly absurd. In 2023, the Home Affairs Committee cited evidence in its report on human trafficking that 75% of victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation are advertised online. The cross-party group concluded:
"Websites advertising prostitution significantly facilitate trafficking for sexual exploitation.”
I strongly urge Ministers to take this opportunity to close that loophole.
There is a similar issue with the regulation of online pornography compared with offline pornography. Our current laws have not been updated quickly enough to recognise the huge shift online and the need to apply the same standards across the board. A survey by the Children’s Commissioner in November 2022 found that one in 10 children had seen pornography by the age of nine, with half having seen it before they turned 13. The impact of that travesty can be clearly seen, with 47% of young people between the ages of 16 and 21 stating that girls “expect” sex to involve aggression.
Huge damage is being done to young women and men by this damaging content, which normalises and sexualises the choking and strangling of women during sex—illegal in offline pornography but not online pornography. Although not illegal per se, degrading acts, like spitting on women, are commonplace in online porn, so is it any wonder that we are seeing such disdain for and poor treatment of girls in our society? If we are serious about tackling the issue and halving violence against women and girls, we must crack down on online porn and ensure it is regulated to the same standards as that which is offline.
The independent pornography review, led by Baroness Bertin, recommended that there be parity of regulation between online and offline pornography, which I very much welcome. The main statutory regulator of offline pornography is the British Board of Film Classification. It is responsible for classifying pornographic content before it can be published and ensuring it does not contain illegal content. Any such offline illegal content cannot be sold or supplied in the UK, and the same rule should apply online. That simple change could be transformational if effectively executed and properly enforced, although I recognise the technical and practical challenge of trying to regulate the worldwide web.
I thank the Secretary of State for listening to my two asks. I look forward to hearing from her whether she is receptive to accepting amendments to ban online prostitution adverts, and to bringing the regulation of online pornography in line with that for offline pornography.
Jonathan Hinder (Pendle and Clitheroe) (Lab)
When I was serving as a police officer, the demands on policing were changing rapidly, and they continue to do so. During my time in the police service, we saw big increases in the reporting of domestic violence and sexual offences. Neighbourhood policing was decimated as the police scrambled to keep up with the huge increase in the reporting of these high-harm, previously hidden offences that are now, thankfully, no longer tolerated in our society.
However, at just that time, the Conservatives were busy slashing police budgets. The policing workforce shrank by 20,000 officers across the country, a statistic that hon. Members will be very familiar with. Less talked about, but just as important, was the fact that our already ancient technology systems fell further behind the criminals we seek to catch. The police national computer, the database that holds arrest and conviction data for offenders across this country, celebrated its 50th birthday last year. The call handling system used by my old force, the country’s biggest, was 40 years old last year. I welcome this Government’s focus on policing, which is vital in creating a fairer country where everyone feels safe and secure in their local community. The Bill signals our commitment to rebuild neighbourhood policing, and to modernise our police service in order to provide the tools required to keep up with changing crime patterns.
I welcome the modernisation of our criminal law in the Bill. The legislation finally takes stalking seriously, makes it easier to tackle spiking and provides common sense powers to go after the thieves using tracking data. I also welcome the focus on shoplifting and antisocial behaviour in our town centres, with the introduction of new respect orders for persistent offenders, as promised in our election manifesto. Every frontline police officer knows that a huge proportion of crime is committed by a tiny proportion of the population. Through a relentless focus on those individuals, we can make small towns, like those I represent in Nelson, Colne, Clitheroe and Barnoldswick, safe and welcoming for the law-abiding public once again.
I hope the Bill is the start of a debate about what we want our police to do and where our services are best placed to act. We need our officers to have the backing of this place to tackle both the high-harm offences, such as serious violence, domestic violence and sexual offences, but also the common, lower level crimes that blight our communities. If everything is a priority, then nothing is; if we can be clear-eyed about where the police should focus their time and efforts, then we can set them up to succeed and we can rebuild the public’s confidence that the police can keep them safe.
Josh Babarinde (Eastbourne) (LD)
I will use my time to talk about domestic abuse. My mum and I know all too well what domestic abuse looks like, but I am sorry to say that the law does not go far enough to recognise that crime. Currently, there is no specific offence of domestic abuse in the law, which leaves many survivors without the respect and protection that they deserve. Instead, many domestic abusers are convicted of offences such as actual bodily harm, grievous bodily harm, assault or battery that do not reflect the full gravity of the crime. Someone could be convicted of ABH for domestic abuse, but they could also be convicted of ABH for a brawl in a pub with a stranger they had not met before.
The Domestic Abuse Act 2021 went some way towards recognising domestic abuse in the law. It defined it formally and created a number of offences, such as coercive and controlling behaviour, but it did not provide a specific offence of domestic abuse, leading to all sorts of problems. For example, the Government’s early release scheme, which they had to implement in light of the state that the last Government left our prisons in, let out as many as 3,000 people early. The Government made a commitment to try to exclude domestic abusers from being released early, but it was not possible to comprehensively do that, in the words of the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, the right hon. Member for Birmingham Ladywood (Shabana Mahmood), because people can be excluded from early release only on the basis of the offence that they committed and nothing else. Well, there is no offence of domestic abuse in the law, so many domestic abusers—people who were convicted of ABH, say—were released early.
One survivor affected by that situation is Elizabeth Hudson. Her abuser, her ex-husband, held a knife to her throat, among many other terrible incidents at home. He was convicted of actual bodily harm, and he qualified for early release under the standard determinate sentences 40% scheme. Were we to create a specific offence of domestic abuse, we could exclude those people from such a scheme. Specifically, if we created an offence of domestic abuse-aggravated GBH, ABH, assault, battery, criminal damage or whatever it may be, in exactly the same way that we have racially and religiously aggravated hate crimes, we would be able to protect survivors.
Another advantage of being able to recognise domestic abuse in that way—which this legislation, in all its 106,220 words, does not yet do—is that we could properly cohort those individuals. I asked the Ministry of Justice how many domestic abusers are in prison at the moment and what their reoffending rate is. That is very simple and basic. The response was:
“It is not possible to robustly calculate the number of domestic abusers in prison or their reoffending rate. This is because these crimes are recorded under the specific offences for which they are prosecuted”—
that is, there is no specific offence of domestic abuse to convict those people of. In the light of those challenges, the likes of Refuge, ManKind, Women’s Aid and many more organisations—whether it is lawyers, academics or survivors themselves—are backing my proposals to create a set of domestic abuse-aggravated offences in the law.
I also extend my thanks to those Members on the Government Benches who have privately written to me to express their support for the proposals that I am championing and for proposals that I hope the Government will accept in their Crime and Policing Bill throughout its passage. We need to ensure that we properly respect and protect survivors in Eastbourne and beyond, and I hope that Members across this House will work with me to help to make that a reality—my door is always open.
Lee Barron (Corby and East Northamptonshire) (Lab)
Our communities deserve to feel safe on our streets, in our homes and in our shops. While I am referring to shops, it is only right to place on record the tireless campaigning that USDAW has done to get a specific offence for an assault on shop workers. That just shows the best of our movement.
The profile, perception and presence of the police need to be restored. We need police on our streets; they need to have the powers to do their jobs, and people need to feel safe again. Our police station in Corby was closed down in 2017. The perception was that the police were gone and that their presence was disappearing, because all people did was drive through what used to be their police station and the profile that went with that. Where something was formally opened, all of a sudden it was shut. Our dedicated response unit was moved out at the same time, and all we had left was a police hub on the upper floor of a public building that was sometimes open only two days a week. We had people on bail being told to take selfies and send them to a number to demonstrate and prove they met the conditions of their bail. That is not good enough for the people of Corby and East Northants.
Many people have lost faith. Why? Because for more than a decade, they have been let down. They call 999 and no one shows up. They report a crime and nothing happens. They see criminals getting away with it again and again. Here is the truth: when policing is cut, crime goes up, and everybody pays the price. Thousands of officers were ripped off our streets, police stations were closed down, PCSOs were cut and entire towns were left without proper policing. That is not good enough for the people of Corby and East Northants. People feel like the system has given up and do not feel safe in their communities.
The Bill toughens up policing so that crime has real consequences again. It gives the police stronger powers to tackle antisocial behaviour by introducing respect orders and strengthening existing powers, as well as removing the need for the police to issue a warning before seizing vehicles being used antisocially. The Bill is a key part of delivering the Government’s safer streets mission. Alongside it, the Government will recruit 13,000 extra neighbourhood police officers, ensuring that every community has one. The 2025-26 final police funding settlement also provides up to £19.6 billion for policing in England and Wales, including £193 million for Northamptonshire forces—an increase of more than £11 million.
As I said, this is about profile, perception and presence. That is why I am not only urging Members to back the Bill, but leading the campaign to bring a police station and dedicated response unit back to Corby. The Government have ensured that the money is there to use, and there is consensus in the constituency on the need. We have businesses lined up to support us and massive support from people in the constituency, who have signed a petition for the return of their dedicated response unit and police station. With this Government and this Bill, and the funding that they have provided, now is the time for us to deliver.
Jim Allister (North Antrim) (TUV)
There is much that is good and necessary in the Bill, and I welcome the fact that 51 of its 137 clauses will apply to Northern Ireland. I have some disappointment about some of the clauses from which Northern Ireland is excluded—in particular clause 90, which relates to the desecration of war memorials. We have had a spate of such incidents in Northern Ireland; therefore, I am disappointed that that clause does not apply to it.
In relation to the all-important matter of child sexual abuse, part 5 of the Bill applies to Northern Ireland, with the exception of clause 36. I ask the Minister to look at why that is, because to apply the rest without clause 36 is quite incongruous. In clause 37 and so on, we will rightly make it illegal to have a paedophile manual to describe how to make child sexual abuse images, yet clause 36, which makes it an offence to possess a child sexual abuse image generator, does not apply to Northern Ireland. How can that be right? There is a logic that is absent there: clause 36 must apply if the rest of the part is to apply. I trust that that is an oversight that will be rectified.
In clause 123, we have hidden away something of particular interest to many in Northern Ireland: for the first time, it will be an offence to put something on a lamp post or to have a banner that glorifies a proscribed organisation. That is a good and necessary thing. I welcome the fact that that is the intent. The explanatory notes tell us that that is exactly the purpose of the clause: it would, for example,
“enable the seizure of a flag or poster which arouses reasonable suspicion the individual who displayed it was a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation”.
That is good, but it focuses attention on the failure of the Bill to deal with the inadequacy of the offence of glorification of terrorism, which is too limp and largely unused.
We will arrive at a situation in which somebody cannot legally put something on a lamp post or put up a banner that says, to use the republican mantra, “Up the Ra”, which means, “Up the IRA”—that organisation that murdered thousands of our citizens—and that is good, but under the glorification of terrorism legislation, they can say it.
That hideous, horrible republican mantra, “Up the Ra”, which is a chorus from a republican song that glorifies terrorism with lyrics like, “The Brits will never leave until they’re blown away. Ooh ah up the Ra! SAM missiles in the sky,” is glorification of terrorism—of course it is. Yet under our legislation, it is not defined as glorification of terrorism, because a person has to be advocating that which they would emulate and encouraging others to engage in terrorism. Some might think that is the case. If we took the offence described in clause 123 and made it apply to “that which promotes the interests of a proscribed organisation”, we would have done the right thing, but that language needs to be transferred across to the glorification of terrorism legislation. Why should it be right for it to be illegal to have a banner that says “Up the Ra” but legal to address thousands of kids and sing “Up the Ra”, as happens every August in Northern Ireland? That disparity needs to be reconciled and dealt with.
Dr Lauren Sullivan (Gravesham) (Lab)
I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in today’s debate on this incredibly important Bill. Like many of my constituents, I welcome the measures the Government are taking to tackle serious crime and antisocial behaviour in order to make our streets safer. I pay tribute to the police—another public service that has been undervalued and underfunded for well over a decade. They put their lives on the line to keep us safe and uphold the law. Many measures in the Bill will directly impact them and my constituents, many of whom have become known to me through casework.
When I have knocked on doors in my constituency, residents have told me about the nuisance of off-road bikes that have blighted our streets and, often, our green public spaces—our parks—and intimidated the public. Often, those bikes and their owners were known to the police, but they lacked the powers to do anything other than give the owners a simple warning. I am pleased that the Bill would enable the seizure of vehicles that are being used antisocially.
The other issue that I heard about most often on the doorstep was fly-tipping—the disrespectful fly-tipping that is engaged in by so many organised criminals. A few years ago, Gravesham borough council started a fly-tipping enforcement team. It investigated many people and took many to court. Three years on, 386 community protection warnings have been issued, we have put people in prison, and 50 fly-tipping fines have been issued. That is incredible; it is what should be happening across the country, and I am grateful that the Bill looks to strengthen antisocial behaviour powers to deal with fly-tipping. That is incredibly welcome.
As a new MP, I hold many surgeries—as do many Members present—and I have been shocked by the terrible experiences that some of my constituents have had to face. I pay tribute to them for having the courage to come forward and tell their stories. I have heard from women dealing with stalking by an ex-partner who have changed their life routine for fear of attack and, as such, I welcome the Bill’s strengthening of stalking protection orders. I have heard from a retired paramedic, Peter Sheehan, who was violently assaulted after simply asking people in his woodland to stop their dogs tearing up the forest floor—it was a simple ask. After three years of legal issues, the man who seriously assaulted Peter was given a two-year suspended sentence and fined £750. The impact on Peter, who already suffers post-traumatic stress disorder from his work as a paramedic, was significant, and that money still has not been received.
We must let people who have experienced crime see the justice they deserve. Their trust in the criminal justice system must be restored, and they must know that if they call the police, they will come. There are consequences for crime, and this Bill is the first step towards backing people, not criminals.
Wendy Morton (Aldridge-Brownhills) (Con)
There is much in this Bill that I welcome, because of course it was announced by the last Government. However, this Government need to go further, and we will push them to do so.
A major part of the Bill is its increased focus on neighbourhood policing, which is commendable. I have always advocated in this Chamber for greater levels of neighbourhood policing on our streets and more visible policing in our communities. I pay tribute to my own neighbourhood policing team in Aldridge-Brownhills, who serve my local community day in, day out. They are truly locally based officers who care about our local community, and I thank them for all they do on our behalf.
Sadly, my neighbourhood policing team will soon find itself without a permanent, dedicated home, because the Labour police and crime commissioner has decided to sell off the family silver right across the west midlands. As well as selling off the police station in Aldridge in my patch, he is selling our next nearest police station in Sutton Coldfield. He has already sacrificed the next nearest one in Kingstanding—that building is going to become a Domino’s Pizza takeaway. The Government want more police officers. That is great, but in the west midlands, their own police and crime commissioner does not want to house them. It is unacceptable that police stations across the west midlands are slowly being phased out, diminishing the role of neighbourhood policing, all at a time when more power is being sucked towards central Birmingham and the PCC headquarters at Lloyd House.
Wendy Morton
I will not, because of time.
That headquarters has benefited from a staggering £33 million-worth of upgraded decoration as a result of local communities losing their local police stations—including the former Brownhills police station—in phase 1 of the closure programme. Surely, that is not right.
I draw the Minister’s attention to several written parliamentary questions to which I do not believe I have received a full answer—in particular, my question concerning the funding of the proposed 13,000 new neighbourhood police officers. While those new officers are welcome, as I have stated, the Government have not yet fully said how they will be funded after the first year, so I would be grateful for clarity on that. It is imperative that there is certainty that those are fully funded new officers who will be added to base budgets for future years, not a one-off Government expenditure, after which the local taxpayer will pick up the tab through an increase in the precept.
The Government face similar questions regarding their decision to fund national insurance increases. Once again, they have been circumspect in their responses to my questions in Westminster Hall and to written parliamentary questions. It is very important that the Minister comes clean today and clarifies that the grant given to police authorities to cover the Chancellor’s job tax is not just a one-off, but will be added to those authorities’ base budgets. As the Minister is very aware, if that is not the case, this will be yet another stealth tax by the back door by this Government, punishing our constituents.
There is so much in the Bill that I would like to talk about, but before I conclude I will touch briefly on knife crime. I welcome the Government’s commitment to halving knife crime, which comes on the back of a series of measures passed by the last Conservative Government. Sadly, in 2017, my constituent James Brindley lost his life to knife crime in Aldridge. Since then, his parents have dedicated their lives to helping eradicate the scourge of knife crime. They have established the James Brindley Foundation to help educate young people across the borough of Walsall to turn their backs on carrying a knife. Back in August 2022, I was really proud to be present at the unveiling of one of a number of knife bins across the borough, funded through that foundation with help from local businesses and sponsors. James’s parents have a simple ask, and I will be a bit cheeky and press the Minister on it today: will she work with her colleagues in the Department for Education to see whether knife crime prevention could be considered for inclusion in the national curriculum?
My constituents demand safety, which is why the last Conservative Government fully funded 20,000 new police officers. We welcome the 13,000 new police officers, but my constituents want them to be fully funded and housed in the neighbourhood. The Bill fails to give all the guarantees that I am looking for. On that basis, I hope the Minister can provide me with some clarity when she sums up the debate.
Several hon. Members rose—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)
Order. We have a very oversubscribed debate, so it is unlikely that everybody will get to speak. I am bringing in a four-minute time limit with immediate effect, just to try to get more people in.
David Taylor (Hemel Hempstead) (Lab)
Much within the Bill will bring significant positive changes to communities like mine in Hemel Hempstead, where crime and, in particular, antisocial behaviour continue to be a major issue. Under consecutive Conservative Governments, criminals got an easy ride. The Conservatives left a great mess, and this Bill helps to fix that.
I could speak at great length on many parts of the Bill, but I will focus on two that are almost always at the top of my postbag in Hemel Hempstead: antisocial behaviour and the current epidemic of shoplifting. I recently met a couple called Gary and Margaret—not their real names—whose case shocked me. For two years, Gary and Margaret have been harassed, including verbal abuse, trespassing and the damaging of their property, by an offender who lives on their street. The family feel unsafe and isolated, with the harassment worsening the mental health of their eight-year-old son, who suffers from severe anxiety and is too scared to play outside. They inform me that they have been in constant communication with the council and the police, but have faced rejection from the local council’s antisocial behaviour department, which stated that they would not intervene due to the low-level nature of the antisocial behaviour.
It is not just antisocial behaviour affecting people in Hemel Hempstead; we also face an epidemic of violence against retail staff, as other Members have mentioned. I met employees from the Co-op in Queens Square in Adeyfield, and I have also met people from the post office in the same square. I was grateful to those from the Co-op for the time they took to show me their store, including their CCTV room, but I was shocked by what I saw there: an entire table of CD after CD, each containing evidence of shoplifting in the store, with many people brazenly walking out of the shop, not even attempting to conceal their theft. What is more disturbing is what one of the store employees told me. A shoplifter had been caught, and the store had managed to get the police and the criminal justice system to take the case to court. That brave employee had been to court to testify against the shoplifter. Unfortunately, the case was thrown out and the perpetrator let off and able to walk free. Even more shockingly, the employee had to sit on the same bus home as the person she had just given evidence against.
Thankfully, provisions in the Bill will make a difference for that employee, for Gary and for others who have been the victims of crime and antisocial behaviour. First, clause 1 and respect orders will give the police and local authorities what they need. I have in the past asked for Hemel Hempstead to be considered for a respect order pilot, and I hope the Minister will forgive me for making another pitch for that today.
It disgusts me that hard-working people in Hemel Hempstead pay for their shopping while others can simply storm out without paying. It disgusts me that people in my constituency have to put up with antisocial behaviour on an almost daily basis, while the perpetrators walk away with impunity. I have been out with the police for ride-alongs, the purpose of which is to see at first hand the challenges that the police are facing. I have had meetings with Police Federation reps, so I am well aware of the extra equipment and support that they need. I will continue to do everything I can to support those brave police officers facing antisocial behaviour, and I am strongly in favour of this Bill, which I believe will give the police extra powers to do more to crack down on these yobs.
There is much more I would like to say, but much like our police force under George Osborne and Theresa May, I have had to subject my speech to brutal cuts, so I will finish there.
Nick Timothy (West Suffolk) (Con)
There is much in the Bill with which my party agrees. In fact, many of its provisions were written by my party in government, so it was strange to hear the more partisan remarks from the Home Secretary earlier in the debate. After decades in which crime was falling, that happy trend has sadly begun to reverse. The Home Secretary noted that overall crime increased by 12% in the last year, but she did not admit that it is still far lower than when Labour was last in office. However, there is obviously much to be done.
The sentencing guidelines published last week explicitly instruct judges that a pre-sentence report will normally be considered necessary if the perpetrator of a crime is from an ethnic minority, cultural minority, faith minority community or is female, transgender, a drug addict or a victim of modern slavery, trafficking, or exploitation. The guidelines are clear that minorities should receive lesser punishments than white people, especially white men. The provisions about slavery, trafficking and exploitation are an invitation for lawyers to help illegal immigrants to escape the reach of the law.
That is not the first official direction to tell judges to put identity politics before the once sacred principle of equality before the law. Last July, the Judicial College’s “Equal Treatment Bench Book” said that
“in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently.”
Putting that principle into practice, the bench book warns, for example, that the
“family impact of custodial sentences was particularly acute for black mothers, as far more black…families…are headed by a lone parent”.
Similar attitudes exist in policing. The “Police Race Action Plan”, published by the College of Policing, promised to stop the over-policing of black communities and complained that such communities are over-policed, but under-protected. The action plan noted that black people are more likely than white people to be murdered and to be victims of knife crime, but it failed to add that black people are more likely to commit these crimes, too.
Madam Deputy Speaker
Order. I remind the hon. Gentleman that we are talking about the Second Reading of the Crime and Policing Bill and its contents.
Nick Timothy
Indeed. I find it baffling that we are debating the future of the criminal justice system and not talking about the erosion of the principle of equality before the law. Disparities in policing and criminal justice do exist—
Madam Deputy Speaker
Order. I remind the hon. Gentleman again that, in order to speak in this debate, he needs to stay in scope of the content of the Bill in front of us.
Nick Timothy
Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I was going to turn to some specific measures in relation to police reform and the Bill. According to the Government’s impact assessment, the Bill will
“provide an additional 13 to 55 prison places”,
yet the Government expect to see 5,000 additional crimes recorded by the police annually, resulting in 400 prosecutions and 300 convictions per year. Those numbers do not add up, unless the Government intend to continue their policy of releasing prisoners early.
Passing legislation is not a substitute for genuine and sophisticated police and criminal justice reform, and I will make some suggestions to the Government. First, we should abolish the National Police Chiefs’ Council, which represents centralised unaccountable power, and transfer its functions to more accountable entities. The College of Policing should be directed by the Home Secretary to ensure that forces focus more clearly on crime fighting. We need to reduce the size of the Met in London, with its national responsibilities transferred to the National Crime Agency. The Government need to give police chiefs the ability to clear out failing officers and recruit talent from all walks of life.
In the Met, there should be fewer deputy assistant commissioners and fewer commanders. Training needs to be professionalised and better recorded, and workforce planning needs to be improved. There should be better use of productivity-improving technology and streamlined processes from arrest to prosecution. We need to reform the police grant to make sure that forces focus on strategic threats. New technologies mean that fraud, identity theft and cyber-crimes will present a huge challenge. We can no longer expect police forces to recruit generalist officers, hoping that they can all offer the perfect blend of leadership, empathy, strength and investigatory skill. Instead, we need greater specialisation.
As I said, it seems crazy that we are debating this Bill without debating whether we remain equal before the law. There is much to be welcomed in the Bill, but I hope we will see far greater energy in the undeniably tough job of police reform.
Sarah Smith (Hyndburn) (Lab)
Crime in Hyndburn and Haslingden is currently out of control. Robbery has skyrocketed in my constituency by 75% in the past year, which is far worse than the already shocking 17% increase that we have seen across Lancashire. Shoplifting has soared by 70%, which, again, is significantly worse than the 23% rise across the county. Those numbers are not just statistics; they represent victims—business owners whose livelihoods are threatened, families who feel unsafe and communities torn apart by lawlessness. Indeed, just last week local businesses in Accrington saw around 10 break-ins. Almost half of my constituents—44%—will experience violent crime. That is unacceptable, and I am speaking here today because I refuse to accept it any longer. Just over the weekend, an awful video has sadly been circulating on social media of yet another terrible incident of violent crime in Hyndburn.
This Government’s Crime and Policing Bill is the biggest crackdown on crime in decades. We are taking back our town centres from thugs and thieves and restoring respect for law and order, giving our communities and police the tools they need to fight back. For too long the crimes that have made Accrington’s town centre almost lawless, the so-called low-level offences, have been ignored. When shoplifting, antisocial behaviour and street crime go unpunished, our high streets suffer, our economy declines, and our community starts to lose hope. Accrington was once a thriving hub. It has been neglected for too long, but these new powers for the police are key to turning that around.
The Bill delivers real action. The police will no longer need a warrant to search premises when stolen goods are tracked electronically, and there will be no more safe havens for criminals. Respect orders will clamp down on public drinking and drug taking, ensuring that our streets are no longer places of disorder. Officers will have the power to seize nuisance vehicles—such as the off-road bikes I saw on Friday tearing up our parks in Rishton—on the spot. Crucially, the days of treating thefts under £200 with effective immunity are over. Stealing is stealing, and criminals will be held to account. It is also welcome that the Government listened to the campaign organised by the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers and other shop workers for the introduction of a new offence of assaulting a shop worker in this vital Bill.
The Labour Government are not just tough on crime; they are investing in solutions. I welcome the provision of 13,000 new police officers to ensure that every community has its named police officer. This is part of the Government’s £200 million investment, which will deliver a 6.6% funding uplift in Lancashire. Enough is enough: the people of Hyndburn and Haslingden deserve safe streets, a thriving town centre, and the right to live without fear. The Bill delivers that, and I am proud to support it.
Luke Taylor (Sutton and Cheam) (LD)
Crime and policing in London is at a crisis point. Figures show that Government funding for the Metropolitan police has fallen by more than £1 billion in real terms since 2010, and those cuts mean that we do not just need more bobbies back; we need more beats. Park police no longer patrol, and now we see the prospect of safer schools officers across London being moved out of schools, where they would be working with young people at risk of gangs or county lines, to back-fill neighbourhood policing teams. Community policing is in tatters, officer numbers are insufficient, and PCSO numbers in London have fallen by more than 3,000 in the last 15 years, from 4,247 in 2008 to just 1,215 in 2023, which means that almost three out of every four officers have been lost in that time.
While we Liberal Democrats broadly welcome many aspects of the Bill, we are fundamentally concerned about the likelihood that without enough officers on the ground, community policing will continue to suffer. Over the years, successive Labour and Conservative Governments have introduced their own versions of a crime and policing Bill, but London nevertheless recorded more than 15,000 knife crime incidents, nearly half a million thefts and more than 24,000 cases of sexual violence last year. It is simply common sense that if we want to get a grip on these awful incidents, which undermine the very fabric of a trusting society, we must restore community policing.
For Londoners, that means sorting out recruitment in the Met across the whole of London. It means ending the practice of abstracting police officers from outer boroughs to assist inner ones, and instead focusing on recruiting more officers to be visible, engaged, and dedicated to protecting the communities that they serve. I cannot see the many welcome parts of this Bill being implemented effectively in my constituency and across London if that is not the case. The Bill, in its current form, should go further and faster in restoring proper community policing, reforming stalking laws to support victims, and implementing a meaningful public health approach to knife crime. I have spoken about both those issues a number of times in the House, and have received very positive responses from the Minister.
I am encouraged to see that assaults against retail workers are to be treated as the grave crimes that they are, but these provisions should go further to protect tradespeople from harm wherever they work. Tool theft is a devastating crime that cost tradespeople millions last year. Research from NFU Mutual shows that one in three tradespeople now live in constant fear of violent thieves. Some have been brutally attacked with crowbars and other weapons, just for trying to protect their tools from being ripped out of their vans. At a “Stop Tool Theft” rally in Parliament Square last month, organised by Trades United, I spoke to many tradespeople who had suffered thefts and attacks, and heard that they would not now let their vehicles out of their sight for fear of becoming victims. There have been discussions of better measures on the part of vehicle manufacturers to reduce the number of thefts, such as better locks and keyless systems security, but the descriptions of people literally cutting off the tops of vans to steal the tools inside demonstrate that such measures can only go so far to stop the thefts.
However, these attacks on tradespeople are more than just theft; they are an assault on their hard work and hard-earned livelihoods. It is time to acknowledge the escalating danger that they face and provide stronger legal safeguards to protect their livelihoods and wellbeing, and I hope the Government will take note of that in Committee.
Tonia Antoniazzi (Gower) (Lab)
This Labour Government have made the unprecedented commitment to halve violence against women and girls in a decade. I know that my colleagues on the Front Bench take it extremely seriously, and I agree with them that it will require a transformative approach. I welcome the measures in the Bill to tackle intimate image abuse, stalking, spiking and the sexual exploitation of children, which mark the beginning of the Government’s work to make good their ambition by giving victims the protections that they deserve and need.
In that spirit, I believe that the Bill presents an opportunity for the House to tackle commercial sexual exploitation—a key form and engine of violence against women and girls—in giving victims of the sex trade the measures and protections that they need, and I intend to table the appropriate amendments to reflect that. The majority of people exploited through the sex trade are women and girls, while the overwhelming majority of people who pay to exploit them sexually are men. Extensive evidence shows that most women exploited through this insidious trade were highly vulnerable before their involvement and suffer acute harms as a result, including a disproportionate risk of violence. I know that my right hon. Friend the Policing Minister, who chaired the Home Affairs Committee in the last Parliament, has done some excellent work in this area.
Sadly, the demand for sexual exploitation is not being deterred, and victims themselves face the threat of criminal sanctions. The Bill gives us an opportunity to change that: to end impunity for punters who pay to abuse women, to take concrete action against pimping websites, and to remove the threat of criminal sanctions from victims to offer those vulnerable women the support that they need. The Bill does much for victims of crime and abuse, and it is evidence of the Government treating violence against women and girls as the emergency that it is. I believe that by strengthening the response to commercial sexual exploitation we can make significant headway in halving that violence.
Speaking of highly vulnerable women—whose plight drives much of the work that I do—I want to say something about abortion. The law underpinning abortion dates back to 1861, before women even had the right to vote. Under that cruel and outdated law, about 100 women have been investigated by the police in the past five years alone, and another woman is set to go on trial in April. The women caught up in this law are very vulnerable and often desperate, but they are subject to the same laws that apply to violent partners who use physical abuse, coercion or poisoning to end a pregnancy without consent. The law should be a tool to protect those women, not to punish them for the effects of the abuse that they have suffered.
Westminster voted to repeal the laws criminalising women in Northern Ireland in 2019, but they remain in place in England and Wales. There should be parity in the law across the UK so that my constituents have the same rights as my colleagues’ constituents in Northern Ireland. Abortion remains a free vote issue, and I recognise that any changes in the law in this area must be led by Back Benchers. My right hon. Friend the Minister was committed to this change before the election last year, and Members on both sides of the House supported her amendment to remove these women from the criminal law. I hope that the Bill will give us an opportunity to revisit this issue in the same collegiate way.
Gideon Amos (Taunton and Wellington) (LD)
I welcome many of the measures in the Bill, particularly those concerning knife crime and the protection of shop workers who all too often bear the brunt of antisocial behaviour. However, one of the biggest deterrents for criminals is the certainty of being caught, and reductions in police numbers nationally are as wrong as they are locally. In Avon and Somerset, the former Conservative police and crime commissioner cut PCSOs by a further 80 last year—a massive 28% reduction—and closed our Taunton police station.
I welcome clause 4’s provisions on public space protection orders, which I will come on to. I welcome the commitment to deliver 13,000 extra officers of various kinds, but worrying for me is the fact that my constituents have come to see me about their relatives who are serving police officers. Civilians have been replaced by officers in uniform doing the same civilian jobs, just so that it can be claimed that police numbers have increased. I hope the Minister will make sure that that does not continue to occur with the new recruitment, which is very welcome. Unless officers are seen in our communities and on the streets, they will not deter or catch the criminals we need them to catch.
Last autumn, I was contacted by businesses in Castle Green in Taunton, which are at their wit’s end because of the antisocial behaviour in the historic centre of our county town. I contacted the chief constable straightaway. I am really grateful to Avon and Somerset officers for the efforts they have put in, as I am to the chamber of commerce in Taunton, which has raised the general issue of town centre crime and convened the safe streets forum that I attended last week, but it is clear that we need to deter antisocial behaviour and crime where it is taking place. That is proven by the fact that Lib Dem-run Taunton town council has just appointed a street marshal, who is on duty in our town centre. I spent the afternoon with Nick last Friday. He is doing an excellent job and covering a huge range of work, from people climbing all over the rooftops to retrieving thousands of pounds’ worth of stock by simply asking the person responsible to hand it over. He must have been quite persuasive in asking the individual to do that.
I congratulate Nick, our street marshal, but when I returned to Castle Green with him, it was clear that the antisocial behaviour problems there have become intractable. I therefore suggest that we need to work with Somerset council to get a public space protection order, and I hope the Government will support its enforcement. Too many of our great community events are marred by the antisocial few, and we need to tackle that. We need the public space of Castle Green, with its superb independent market, our famous Castle Hotel, the scheduled ancient monument, which is the castle itself, and the Museum of Somerset where soon people will be able to see the Chew valley hoard of silver coins from the Norman conquest. I cannot use those coins to pay for the enforcement of the public space protection order, but I hope it will have Government support so that we can ensure that key public spaces are not subject to conquest by those who would disobey the law, wreak havoc among local people, damage livelihoods and tarnish the generally superb reputation of our county town.
Chris McDonald (Stockton North) (Lab)
I promised my constituents more police officers in Stockton, Billingham and Norton, and we are delivering on that. I promised a crackdown on antisocial behaviour on the high streets, and we are delivering on that. I promised a named police officer in every neighbourhood, and we are delivering on that. This is a serious Government rolling up their sleeves and getting on with delivering on the issues that matter most to the people to Teesside.
I have visited corner shops picking up the pieces after being attacked by balaclava-clad thugs. I have spoken to unions and retail workers about the devastating impact of shoplifting, theft and assaults on shop workers. Our high streets should be thriving, but too often they are overshadowed by antisocial behaviour that keeps families away. Crime erodes confidence in our communities, leaving people feeling unsafe in their neighbourhoods and making it harder for businesses to thrive, and nowhere is this more obvious than in the illegal use of off-road bikes. For too long, these bikes have been a menace as they maraud through estates, intimidate residents and are used by criminals to evade police. People have had enough.
I promised to come down hard on crime, increase police numbers, and make our high streets and communities safe, and that is exactly what we are doing. With £2.4 million invested in neighbourhood policing, Cleveland police, under our Labour police and crime commissioner Matt Storey, are delivering on that promise with 40 new officers on our streets, increasing the visible police presence in our communities. They are using new tactics to stop crime in its tracks, deploying police drones to track off-road bikes in real time. If criminals think they can evade justice, they are wrong. Their bikes will be tracked, seized and taken off our streets.
Luke Myer (Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland) (Lab)
My hon. Friend is giving an excellent speech about the challenges we face on Teesside. Just today, I heard from James in Easterside, who said that in two hours there was not 15 minutes when an illegal off-road bike, quad or e-scooter did not pass. Does my hon. Friend agree that we need to seize such bikes, crush them and make our streets safe again?
Chris McDonald
I am sure that James in Easterside will be pleased to learn that Cleveland police have seized 359 vehicles linked to crime and dangerous driving since January alone, which is already making a big difference. Crime across Cleveland is now at its lowest level in five years following a more than 9% reduction, which means nearly 6,000 fewer victims of crime. This is what a proactive police and crime commissioner, a Labour Member of Parliament and a Labour Government working together looks like. We are putting police back at the heart of our communities, and ensuring that they have the necessary powers and the backing of a justice system that actually works.
We are introducing respect orders to tackle the worst antisocial behaviour offenders, and stamping out issues such as public drinking and drug use to ensure that our town centres are free from harm and nuisance. New offences, such as child criminal exploitation and cuckooing, will crack down on drug dealing. We will protect our high streets by ending the effective immunity for anyone caught shoplifting goods worth below £200 and introducing a new criminal offence to better protect retail workers from assault.
Stockton, Billingham and Norton deserve safer streets, and we are delivering. It should be clear to my residents that this Government and I, as their MP, are on the side of law and order. Although we are seeing green shoots of progress, there is still much more to do to reclaim our streets and town centres. The job is not done yet, but we are making real progress. Together, we will take back our streets and ensure that our towns are places of pride.
Monica Harding (Esher and Walton) (LD)
Today’s legislation contains welcome provisions to address some of the behaviours that plague my constituents, which were allowed to flourish under the previous Conservative Government. My constituents will welcome a serious and renewed focus on combating shoplifting and antisocial behaviour, because the Conservatives decimated our police community support officers—in Surrey, they fell by 29% between 2015 and 2022—and eroded the close relationship between the police and the communities they serve. Ultimately, the provisions in this Bill that are intended to make places such as Esher and Walton safer must be backed by a genuine and sustained commitment to community policing, and by giving officers the time and resources to build trust and understanding with those they protect.
In the past 12 months, arrests made by Surrey police for shop thefts have more than doubled. This is not merely a case of officers solving a higher percentage of crimes; in fact, the number of thefts detected by the police has also more than doubled. Surging levels of shoplifting are utterly corrosive for high streets in places such as Esher and Walton. They impose costs on retailers and may undercut residents’ faith in law enforcement and the ability of politicians to get things done, so I hope the Government will pursue this issue with urgency.
The same is true when antisocial behaviour is not dealt with. I have received far too many emails and letters from constituents struggling with the conduct of neighbours. In such cases, the actions of a few can impose severe strains on so many. As one constituent wrote to me, there is an issue of fairness: ordinary people come for a quiet life, have work to do and have been left exhausted by noise, disruptions and even threatening behaviour coming from a small group. I recognise that this Bill accordingly highlights housing providers as relevant agencies with a role to play in tackling antisocial behaviour. However, when people feel threatened, there is no substitute for recognisable neighbourhood police with deep links to the community. Given the criminal sanctions attached to breaches of a respect order, can the Minister assure the House that community police will receive funding in line with the vital role they have to play in ensuring that the Government’s new orders do not become meaningless?
Finally, I will address the protection of police officers. The police deserve protection from abuse. The Public Order Act 1986 was enhanced in 1998 to allow racially and religiously motivated abusive language or behaviour that is directed at emergency workers to be treated as an aggravating factor. However, there is a loophole in the legislation such that if this particular form of abuse occurs when both parties are in the perpetrator’s private dwellings, it is not treated as an aggravating factor. That is wrong. It leaves the mistaken impression that there are some circumstances in which the racial abuse of emergency workers is acceptable, and it fails to deter such behaviour. Will the Minister therefore commit to re-examining that issue and exploring the possibility of finally removing the anomaly?
Matt Bishop (Forest of Dean) (Lab)
I have shared before with the House that I used to be a police officer, and I worked for three forces across England and Wales. That has given me a strong understanding of the challenges faced by both officers and the public in tackling crime. It is partly due to this experience that I fully support the Bill and the Government’s commitment to making our communities safer.
In my constituency of the Forest of Dean, crime and antisocial behaviour have a direct impact on families, businesses and communities. It is crucial that our police forces have the right powers, support and resources to tackle these issues effectively. The Bill empowers our officers, giving them the tools and the confidence that they need to make swift decisions and restore public trust. Those are things I wish I had had more of when I was serving. The Bill also addresses persistent antisocial behaviour with the introduction of the respect order, which will help restore order and send a strong message to offenders. It strengthens measures against theft, allowing police to enter properties without a warrant to search for stolen goods that have trackers on them.
Another key aspect of the Bill is its focus on domestic abuse. In Gloucestershire as a whole, a third of all arrests made in January related to domestic abuse, and I think we would all agree that this is unacceptable. The Bill includes crucial provisions to support victims and improve the management of such offenders, which is vital for both victims and law enforcement.
Another important factor for me is that the Bill focuses on tackling child sexual abuse. By introducing the mandatory duty to report, it will ensure that no case is overlooked. Having worked in the police but also in schools, I have seen at first hand how important it is to act quickly when it comes to protecting children from sexual exploitation. Another mantra of mine, which I hope is reflected in the Bill, is that prevention is always better than detection. That applies to any crime, but it is especially true of this hideous one of child sexual exploitation. The duty to report will help ensure that children are less vulnerable.
Finally, I urge all Members to support the Bill. It will not only empower our police, but support victims, take strong action against those who endanger our constituents’ safety and that of our children, and drive real change in our streets.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
It is a pleasure to speak in this debate, and I thank all right hon. and hon. Members for their contributions.
On the whole, the Bill is to be welcomed. A number of the provisions are already in place in Northern Ireland, such as the offensive weapons penalty, and there are others that the Northern Ireland Executive is in the process of introducing. In my intervention on the Home Secretary, I welcomed the 51 clauses that require a consent motion, because they are the sort of provisions that we want in Northern Ireland as well. On the things that are outstanding, the Home Secretary kindly said that she would, through the Minister and the Assembly, take them further, so that is also good news.
There are other measures that I agree with and some that I believe do not go far enough, such as the provisions on policing and investigation. I think of the absolutely heartbreaking interview with David Amess’s daughter about the refusal to carry out a public inquiry into her father’s murder by an ISIS supporter. David Amess was my friend, as he was to many in this House, and we are the poorer for his passing. With all due respect, I believe that the decision not to carry out an inquiry is the wrong decision. I hope this Bill, and perhaps the clauses on investigation in part 13, may lead to further powers being available for families to seek an inquiry into why the police have ceased their investigations. David Amess’s family deserve that inquiry and this House deserves that inquiry, but I will leave it at that.
I welcome the shoplifting provisions, and I very much welcome those on knife crime, which has been a scourge across this great nation, and the Government have accepted the need for such legislation. I wish the tightening of the provisions on child sexual exploitation was not necessary, but it certainly is. Between 2022 and 2023, recorded crimes relating to child pornography were up by 40.6%, which is a shocking figure. As a father and a grandfather, such statistics upset me, but as a parliamentarian, such statistics galvanise me to ensure that we shut down this horrific industry, including by jailing all those involved in sharing videos or producing them. None of those crimes are victimless, and we must take strides to address that. Consequently, I welcome those provisions.
No Bill can ever be perfect, and there are amendments to be made, but it is clear that our system currently allows too many criminals to slip through loopholes, and the police need greater powers of investigation and of drug testing as well. Security must, however, be balanced with—and the Bill should not impinge on—the existing rights of British citizens. The right to protest is a vital mechanism for freedom of speech, but it must be safe protest. I speak as someone who has protested for nearly all my life, and we have lived in a nation and a country where protesting became the name of the game. I have to say that those were always peaceful protests—I underline that very quickly—but a balance must be struck. I look forward to the Minister outlining how we can protect our freedoms in this Bill, such as the right to have a religious belief and to express it in a balanced way, and not be persecuted or discriminated against for that reason.
We also need protection for our service personnel, including by providing support in relation to the vexatious allegations that we are seeing in Northern Ireland. We will not recruit police services or armed forces personnel if they know they will be abandoned and hung out to dry at the first hint of an allegation. The Bill must strengthen that protection. That is one of the things I look forward to trying to do.
There is much in the Bill that we should welcome, and the Home Secretary and the Government are definitely on the right road. We will also see a difference in Northern Ireland, and the Bill is good news for everyone in this great United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Sam Carling (North West Cambridgeshire) (Lab)
I enormously welcome this Bill, in which there is so much that will make a real, positive difference for my constituents in North West Cambridgeshire. Due to time constraints, I will have to skip through a lot of the praise I had for the Bill and move straight to an area where I would like to have a conversation and a dialogue with the Minister about what we can do, and that is the area of mandatory reporting.
I enormously welcome the fact that this Bill will finally introduce a statutory duty to report the possible sexual abuse of children when those who have responsibility for children are made aware of it. It has been a long road. In March 2018, the previous Conservative Government said the case for mandatory reporting had “not currently been made” and that they would not introduce the policy. The independent inquiry into child sexual abuse, chaired by Alexis Jay, showed how misjudged that position was.
Luke Myer
I thank my hon. Friend for supporting me in my debate last week on Professor Jay’s recommendations for the Church of England. Does he agree with me that, alongside the Government implementing those recommendations, it is critical that faith organisations implement them as well?
Sam Carling
I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend, and I thank him for that intervention. As a society, we must move towards ensuring that children are protected.
When it comes to the detail, I am not fully sure that the Bill, as currently drafted, delivers on the Government’s pledge to implement the IICSA recommendations. That is mainly because, on my reading, it does not create criminal sanctions for non-compliance, which was a key part of the 13th IICSA recommendation. The only consequences spelled out in the Bill for failure to report are that someone could be referred to as their professional regulator, where relevant, or to the Disclosure and Barring Service, which, to quote the Bill’s explanatory notes, will
“consider their suitability to continue working in regulated activity with children.”
That is all really positive, but we have to go a little bit further. As currently drafted, is the Bill enough to tackle the chronic under-reporting of sexual abuse identified by the Jay inquiry?
The new offence of stopping someone else from reporting child sexual abuse is very welcome. For example, it should stop managers pressuring people who work under them not to report such abuse, but I do not think that it will cover such cases in religious groups. As an example, I would like to talk about the religious organisation in which I was raised, the Jehovah’s Witnesses. Most people know very little about them, but they are a very insular religious community with a deep distrust, in many cases, of secular authorities, much of which comes from the fundamental nature of some of their beliefs. Witnesses have a mindset in which the first port of call for any issues with another member of the faith is their local congregation’s body of religious elders, who are men—always men—appointed from within their ranks. The organisation denies that it stops these elders from referring allegations of sexual abuse to the police, but numbers speak louder than words.
Almost 10 years ago, the Jehovah’s Witnesses were one of the case studies examined by an Australian royal commission on institutional responses to child sexual abuse. The commission found that, in Australia alone, allegations had been documented by religious elders against 1,006 individuals, and not a single one was reported to the police. In the UK, elders sometimes say that it is a victim’s absolute right to go to the police, which is often the organisation’s response to such criticism. But behind the scenes, they heavily discourage it, telling victims that publicity would bring reproach on God’s name.
This secretive attitude is best exemplified by a recent speech by a member of the religion’s governing body: “Suppose that someone is convicted and put in jail, or someone is found guilty by men, as Jesus was. It does not mean that he is guilty in the sight of God.” I should flag that he was not specifically referring to child sexual abuse, but that attitude is pervasive. I describe this example to highlight just how critical it is that the duty to report is backed up by criminal consequences for ignoring it, because some of these organisations will do anything to avoid compliance.
Is the Minister willing to meet me to discuss this issue in more depth, and how we can address it? I would also appreciate it if she could comment on the scope of the individuals that the Bill places under a duty to report. I am not convinced at the moment that many religious leaders—who often hold very significant power and influence, as I have outlined—will be included. This goes back to the IICSA report, which recommended that the duty to report should fall on anyone who works in regulated activities, but also on anyone in a position of trust over a child, as defined by the Sexual Offences Act 2003. On my reading, the Bill does the former but not the latter, as currently drafted, and addressing this by using both criteria could significantly strengthen the legislation.
I welcome this Bill, which contains very powerful provisions to progress measures outlined in the manifesto on which Labour Members stood to make our streets safer and tackle crime. I look forward to voting for it this evening.
Tristan Osborne (Chatham and Aylesford) (Lab)
I rise to support this Bill, which will provide the necessary tools to restore public confidence in law and order. As a former warranted police officer, council portfolio-holder for enforcement and chair of Medway community safety partnership, I have been working with and within my community to challenge many of the issues that this Bill will counter. I thank Kent police and Kent county council staff for all the work they do every weekend, every day and every hour to help and support our residents.
However, this Bill does not come without context. For over a decade, the previous Government chipped away at our criminal justice system. They cut police funding. We all remember the Police Federation’s “Cuts Have Consequences” campaign, and the previous Government slashed officer numbers before recruiting more officers to lower levels per capita. They slashed PCSO numbers and weakened council enforcement teams. Court delays skyrocketed. Probation was privatised, then nationalised and then privatised again. Legal aid was gutted. Prisons were left full. These reckless acts have fuelled antisocial behaviour and shattered public confidence in law enforcement.
Josh MacAlister (Whitehaven and Workington) (Lab)
Does my hon. Friend share my shock that Cumbria police did not hand out a single penalty notice for disorder in 2023? That is down from 1,000 issued in 2010. Does he also share my enthusiasm for this Bill’s measures to introduce respect orders?
Tristan Osborne
I could not concur more. Police funding and police officer numbers have resulted in fewer fines being issued for many types of crime. In fact, the Bill will give the police more powers to challenge nuisance biking and other offences. The Bill is an absolutely necessary first step.
Clive Jones (Wokingham) (LD)
On Saturday, I visited quite a few retailers in Wokingham. There was no police presence at all in the town, despite crime occurring hourly in our shops. Someone is always shoplifting. Thames Valley police has only 198 police officers per 100,000 people, which is well below the national average of 245. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that is not enough?
Tristan Osborne
I agree that insufficient police numbers in recent years resulted in a shoplifters’ charter under the last Government, when people were allowed to shoplift up to a set amount.
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Tipton and Wednesbury (Antonia Bance) for her Westminster Hall debate last week, and I thank my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Luke Akehurst) for his ten-minute rule Bill on nuisance biking. The number of reckless bikers and boy racers who tear through our streets and churn up our parks has significantly increased in previous years. Under the previous Government, the weak section 59 of the Police Reform Act 2002 effectively allowed these bikers to get away with a slap on the wrist.
I welcome the measures in this Bill that will allow these vehicles to be seized, which will send a message that those who are caught with these vehicles will lose that asset immediately. Kent police called for these powers when I went on an operation in November and witnessed the cat-and-mouse tactics of perpetrators and the resources needed to impose these extremely weak penalties.
Knife crime has surged since 2010 and disproportionately affects younger people. The Bill gives the police new stop-and-search powers in high-crime areas, allowing law enforcement to be much more proactive in intercepting potential threats. I welcome this measure, specifically in areas of high knife crime in the urban centres of Chatham and Aylesford.
The digital age has produced new avenues for crime. As many colleagues have mentioned, that includes child sexual exploitation, as well as exploitation and violence against women. The Bill will introduce more powers to challenge stalkers and strengthen protections against child sexual exploitation. I am a former teacher, and I had to look at safeguarding cases involving online activity on a weekly basis. Without these additional powers, it will be increasingly difficult to catch the malign influences that are harming our young people.
I believe that the Bill will also enhance police transparency and accountability. It improves police training, focusing on de-escalation techniques and mental health awareness. It equips officers with the skills necessary to handle a wide range of situations with sensitivity and professionalism. We know police officers do this every day, but we also know that the diversity of challenges they face requires new training.
As colleagues have said so eloquently, domestic violence is often a hidden crime that leaves victims feeling trapped and powerless to escape. The Bill strengthens the legal framework for protecting victims by introducing new provisions for protective orders, including the ability to ban a perpetrator from returning to a victim’s home even before their trial. It also mandates better support for victims, offering increased access to legal and social services.
This Bill is not just about laws; it is about lives, safer streets, protecting communities, and justice that truly serves the people. It represents a forward-thinking, balanced approach to law and order and public safety. It provides our police with the powers they need to combat crime, supports our justice system to deliver fair and effective sentences, promotes greater community engagement and, most importantly, ensures that victims of crime and our communities receive the care and protection they deserve.
Callum Anderson (Buckingham and Bletchley) (Lab)
I am pleased to support the Bill, which will be welcomed in urban and rural communities across Buckingham and Bletchley. Given the time constraints, I will focus my remarks on part 3, on the protection of retail workers.
I have a particular interest in Britain’s 3.5 million retail workers, not least because my mum is one of them, having worked on the shop floor at Morrisons for over 20 years. During that time, she has seen it all—the good, the bad and the ugly. In my conversations with her, particularly over the last decade, two themes have become much more prevalent, and they have already been raised by Members on both sides of the House.
The first theme is the increasingly casual and habitual nature of shoplifting and other retail crime. Data from the British Retail Consortium suggests that this is already costing businesses across the country more than £2 billion a year. In the Thames Valley police area, retail crime rose by over a third between April 2023 and February 2024. This year alone, the Co-op store in Winslow has faced two violent raids aiming to remove its cash machine. This is not just petty crime; too often, it is organised. It is this kind of emboldened criminality that must be stopped. Such activity is not just a blot on a company’s balance sheet; it punishes good-faith customers and demoralises the workers, who take pride in the work that they do. That is why I welcome the repeal of section 176 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, to finally call time on Britain’s open invitation to criminals to steal goods worth £200 or less.
Secondly, I want to touch on the growing occurrence of abuse and the threat of violence faced by too many shop workers in their workplace. In a 2024 survey of USDAW members, more than two thirds of retail workers revealed they had been verbally abused, almost half had been threatened, and one in five had been physically assaulted while doing their job. That is clearly totally intolerable. Nobody in this country should go to work fearing for their own physical safety. I believe that we in this House, with our security guards and our armed police, have a particular duty to ensure that those who work in our shops feel just as safe as we do.
Callum Anderson
I will not, just because there is so little time and too many people want to speak.
That is why the Bill’s introduction of the new offence of assaulting a retail worker is so important. It is also why I welcome the new respect orders, which will give the courts the power to ban repeat offenders from retail premises. Ultimately, this is a Bill that delivers for retail workers and ensures they are given the respect and dignity they deserve. That is why I will be supporting it tonight.
Sarah Hall (Warrington South) (Lab/Co-op)
I begin by declaring an interest: I am proud to be married to a serving Cheshire police officer.
In the year ending September 2024, there were 1 million incidents of antisocial behaviour, 490,000 shop theft offences and more than 55,000 knife or sharp instrument offences. Those are not just numbers; they are real people, real businesses and real communities who were let down by the previous Government.
In my constituency, Cheshire police officers continue to go above and beyond. Day in, day out, they put themselves on the line to protect us, despite rising demand and the failure of the previous Government to support them. I thank them for their dedication, service and unwavering commitment to keeping my constituency, towns and villages safe.
Cheshire police has led the way in tackling some of the key issues that we are discussing today. In February, the force received praise following an inspection by His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services, which commended it
“on its excellent performance in keeping people safe, reducing crime and giving victims an effective service.”
I am in no doubt that that success is down to the leadership of Chief Constable Mark Roberts and the hard work of Cheshire police officers, staff and volunteers.
I welcome the tough new actions against perpetrators of stalking. The Bill takes a range of new measures to strengthen enforcement and better protect victims, such as making it easier for courts to issue stalking protection orders, introducing a new offence of spiking, and improving information sharing with victims. I pay tribute to Cheshire police’s Detective Sergeant David Thomason for his many years of work in this area, including the creation of Cheshire’s anti-stalking unit, which sees police, mental health professionals, outreach workers and victim advocates working together to protect victims of stalking and give them enhanced support, as well as to tackle the behaviour of stalkers and the root causes of their offending. DS Thomason has long been a leading advocate in this area, and I am delighted to see the Government give stalking the attention it rightly deserves.
The theme of this year’s National Stalking Awareness Week is “Health response: spotting stalking”. Like other forms of violence against women and girls, stalking is a public health issue and requires a whole-system approach. Through training, guidance and improved referral pathways, the goal is to support the healthcare sector and ensure that no victims of stalking fall through the gaps. Will the Minister say what action is being taken to ensure collaborative working with healthcare colleagues and the delivery of a whole-system approach?
As a member of USDAW and a Labour and Co-operative MP, I also welcome the new offence of assaulting a retail worker, which will give workers in shops up and down the country the protection they need. This is an area I have long campaigned in. I have spoken to many retail workers in my constituency, including at the local Co-op store in Latchford, where I heard about the devastating impact that assault and abuse have had on their lives. For too long, retail staff have been working in fear of the next incident of abuse, threat or violence, and the Bill provides a great opportunity to make a real difference to the retail industry and to workers’ lives.
This Labour Government are delivering where the Conservatives failed. This is a Bill that takes crime seriously. It is a Bill to rebuild public confidence, make our streets safer and give our police the power, support and resources they need to protect our communities.
Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)
The 317 pages of the Bill make satisfying reading for this former Crown prosecutor—satisfying because I know it is packed full of measures that will make the streets safer for my constituents. Amber Valley is a brilliant place to live, but sadly it is not without incidents of antisocial behaviour. That is an important issue to my constituents, which is why I will focus what little time I have this evening on part 1 of the Bill.
I have heard the concerns of residents in our towns and villages about cars and off-road bikes being driven in an antisocial manner. I have listened to the frustrations of police officers, who explain to me how they are hamstrung, unable to do anything but issue warnings. The Labour-controlled borough council has made good use of the public spaces protection orders available to it, including by issuing fines for car cruising across Amber Valley and dispersing troublemakers in Heanor marketplace. The Bill will mean that troublemakers can be dispersed for longer and that the police will finally have the power to immediately seize and crush their cars and bikes, giving residents confidence that the police will, at long last, have the tools they need to crack down on such antisocial behaviour.
Antisocial behaviour comes in many forms and is often a legacy of Tory austerity. Youth provision has been drastically cut back by Conservative-controlled Derbyshire county council. Youth services are a crucial pillar in Amber Valley, linking young people with the wider community and the neighbourhood police, as I saw recently at the Railway Carriage in Ironville. This environment helps to steer young people away from choosing crime. This Labour Government understand that we need to give our young people chances, which is why, alongside the Bill, we are working at pace towards our opportunity mission, providing more apprenticeships and skilled jobs for our young people.
We know that antisocial behaviour is often committed by a small number of repeat offenders, young and older alike. The Bill will make it possible for individuals who persistently commit antisocial behaviour to be made subject to a respect order without waiting for them to be convicted of a criminal offence, thus speeding up the response, not least because it will avoid the huge backlogs in the Crown courts that we inherited from the Tories.
We must not forget that people who repeatedly act in an antisocial manner often have underlying issues or trauma driving their behaviour. Whether with alcohol awareness classes for those who persistently drink and are aggressive in our parks, or drug treatment orders for those who steal to fund their habit, these tough new orders will tackle the root causes of such behaviour. The 13,000 additional police officers and respect orders are central to our safer streets mission, but the orders will work only if the resources are available to support offenders to deal with their issues and change their behaviour, and I urge the Government to ensure that such provision is in place.
Antisocial behaviour is often described as low-level crime, but it does not feel low level to the people who have to endure it. The people of Amber Valley can be confident that this Government have acted on their concerns and that the antisocial behaviour will be stopped. I wholeheartedly support the Bill.
Leigh Ingham (Stafford) (Lab)
I speak in full support of the Bill, which is a crucial piece of legislation that will help to deliver on the Government’s safer streets mission. I was incredibly proud to stand on a platform of securing the safety of my constituents. It is the first responsibility of any Government to keep their communities safe, whether nationally or internationally. Our communities deserve safety, security and respect.
Too often, antisocial behaviour, violent crime and lawlessness undermine the very fabric of our society. I have seen that recently in Wildwood and Highfields and Western Downs in my constituency of Stafford, Eccleshall and the villages, where confidence in public services has been eroded by antisocial behaviour. The Bill takes decisive action to restore public confidence in policing and protect those most vulnerable to crime.
The Bill strengthens police powers to tackle persistent offenders, introducing respect orders to hold perpetrators accountable and removing the bureaucratic barriers that delay much-needed enforcement. Whether it is vandalism or the reckless use of vehicles, our response must be swift and effective.
Furthermore, we cannot discuss crime prevention without addressing our duty to young people. Too many of our youth are drawn into criminal activity, whether through exploitation, gang violence or knife crime. Blame is often put in the wrong place; we need to tackle the adults who exploit those young people. The Bill introduces tougher measures to combat child criminal exploitation, ensuring that those who manipulate and abuse young people face the full force of the law.
At the same time, we must invest in preventive measures —education, youth services and intervention programmes that divert young people away from crime and towards opportunity. In my professional career, I worked with children and young people, and I know how amazing they are when they are given a chance. The Government will make sure that no children are left behind.
Another key pillar of the Bill is community policing. Our police officers do an extraordinary job under immense pressure, yet public confidence has eroded. The Bill equips our police with the tools they need—greater powers to tackle serious crime, retail theft and violent offenders—while ensuring robust accountability. By supporting our frontline officers, we send a clear message that law and order remain at the heart of our national priorities.
I was particularly pleased to see the named police officer guarantee, as my constituents in rural villages and settlements often tell me that they struggle to feel connected to the police, with long waits for their calls and a lack of oversight or regular patrols in their area. That is why I recently asked the Home Office in oral questions whether rural communities such as Tyrley in my constituency would receive the named police officer guarantee; I was delighted that the Policing Minister confirmed that they would. The Government are committed to delivering the safety for rural communities that we so desperately need.
The Bill protects victims, punishes criminals and strengthens the foundations of a safer society. It ensures that our high streets, our towns and villages, and our homes are protected from those who seek to harm or exploit. I urge hon. Members to support it in delivering justice, security and respect for all.
Ruth Jones (Newport West and Islwyn) (Lab)
I speak in support of the Bill, not just because it is the biggest package of measures on crime and policing for decades, with 50 new laws to cut crime and make our streets safer, but because those new measures will tackle antisocial behaviour, shop theft and street crime head on by giving the police and our communities new powers to take back town and city centres, such as Newport, from thugs and thieves. Those are great reasons to welcome the Bill, but I also welcome it because it contains some of my own work.
Last year, I introduced my first private Member’s Bill to the House: the Community and Suspended Sentences (Notification of Details) Bill, which sought to amend the 2020 sentencing code to create a duty on offenders to notify the responsible officer of any change of name or contact details if they are sentenced to a community order, a suspended sentence order, a youth rehabilitation order or a referral order. Too often, at the moment, such offenders are able to change their names and slip under the radar to avoid scrutiny, and potentially go on to reoffend. Chapter 4 of part 5 of the Bill means that my private Member’s Bill has been noted and incorporated into the legislation. I am pleased that the Government are committed to utilising good ideas from all areas, including the Back Benches.
I do not wish to praise only the elements of the Bill that I contributed to, because it will seek to address some other serious issues. I particularly welcome the introduction of respect orders to stamp out issues such as public drinking and drug use. That will be particularly welcome in Cross Keys in my constituency, where residents’ lives are blighted by such antisocial behaviour outside their homes and along the canal—a natural beauty spot that is also suffering from individuals drinking and taking drugs during the day in full view of passersby.
Another issue that affects my constituents is off-road biking, which is dangerous and causes a great deal of damage to our beautiful countryside. I welcome the police’s new powers as a result of the Bill to seize vehicles and to stop off-road biking and the dangerous use of e-scooters on pavements. Removing the need for police to issue a warning before seizing off road bikes and e-scooters is particularly welcome, and great news for the people of Argoed and those living near Mynydd Maen in my constituency.
I must also mention the need to protect shop workers, because shop staff are a particularly targeted and vulnerable group. In introducing the new offence of assaulting a retail worker, the Government are showing that they are serious about tackling issues in communities to take back our shops and streets by confronting violence and antisocial behaviour head on.
As chair of the all-party parliamentary group on safeguarding in faith communities, I am also pleased to see a new duty in England for adults working in relevant activities to report instances of child sexual abuse, as already mentioned. The Government are working hard to implement the recommendations of the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse, after years of inaction by the previous Government.
Finally, I am also pleased to see the new offence for spiking, which is predominantly an offence committed by men against women. Violence against women and girls is endemic in our society, and we need to take it seriously and tackle it directly. I am sad to say that that has not always been the case. There have been some solid campaigns, such as StopTopps, but placing the emphasis on the potential victim cannot solve the issue. The Bill makes a difference, and I thank the Front-Bench team for their diligence in bringing it forward. I could go on, but I am mindful of time and the need to get other speakers in, so I close by welcoming the Bill and urging all those involved to get it through the necessary stages and on to the statute book as quickly as possible.
David Baines (St Helens North) (Lab)
On Friday, I attended an event organised by Age UK Mid Mersey at the Mansion House in Windle in my constituency, taking questions from service users and volunteers. It was no surprise to me that crime and policing, and specifically the threat of antisocial behaviour, was raised by those present. Older people told me that they were scared to leave their home, especially after dark. For their sake, and for all those in our communities, we need to take our streets back. The Bill is a step towards doing that.
Many of the Bill’s welcome measures are aimed at tackling what, for too long and by too many, has been thought of as low-level crime. Antisocial behaviour, whether public drinking, drug use, vandalism or off-road bikes tearing up sports pitches and parks, is completely unacceptable. It blights our communities and can ruin lives. People in St Helens North have great pride in where they live, but that has been tested too often by a mindless minority.
In recent weeks in Blackbrook, I have heard reports of some young people targeting buses and shops with objects, even causing some buses to be diverted. They are a minority, and I know most young people will be just as appalled by that sort of behaviour as most people of any age, but it is totally unacceptable. The introduction of respect orders will help to address some of that by targeting repeat offenders and ensuring that they face real consequences. Most of all, restoring neighbourhood policing will send a message that we will not stand for it.
Another crime that for too long has been seen as low level and has been effectively decriminalised is shoplifting. My mum was a shop worker, working in what was then the Co-op on West End Road in Blackbrook. She regularly encountered shoplifting—and, I am sad to say, much worse. She was assaulted at work, as were many other women she worked with. When it comes to violence against shop workers, we need the police and businesses to take every possible step to protect workers and customers, and to punish those responsible. I strongly welcome the proposals in the Bill.
People in St Helens North deserve and demand to feel safe. The Bill contains many steps in the right direction to ensure that crime does not dictate the way that we live our lives, and that those responsible face the consequences of their irresponsible actions. Our police must have the resources and the powers to tackle antisocial behaviour and violent crime—both prevention and punishment. It is about protecting our communities and ensuring that they are places to live, work and raise a family in peace. That is all most of us want, and we need to deliver it.
David Smith (North Northumberland) (Lab)
I rise to support the Bill, much of which is fulfilling Labour’s mission to make our streets safer by dealing with what sometimes is called low-level criminality but, in reality, are crimes that make people feel unsafe in their own community. Whether shoplifting, public drug and alcohol abuse, online harms or antisocial behaviour, law breaking must always be dealt with and never ignored.
I warmly acknowledge, in particular, the proposed changes to the law on retail crime. Sadly, law breaking is commonplace in retail. Many years ago, when I was a student working at a clothing shop in the centre of Glasgow, my colleagues and I had to deal with threats, intimidation and even the prospect of being stabbed with needles. I have seen at first hand how that kind of intimidation can affect people in their working environment. I went to the Co-op in Morpeth in my constituency recently, where I heard from USDAW colleagues and Co-op staff that the situation facing retail workers has only become worse, with workers at times facing industrial levels of shoplifting and threats of physical harm. That is why I welcome the removal of the Tories’ de facto £200 floor on shoplifting prosecution, as well as the new offence of assaulting a retail worker. As hon. Members have said, no one should have to fear for their safety in order to make a living.
However, I would welcome assurances from the Minister about some of the processes outlined for the new respect orders. The Bill defines antisocial behaviour as
“conduct that has caused, or is likely to cause, harassment, alarm or distress to any person”.
I ran a homelessness charity, and I can envisage a possible scenario in which a tenant with the potential to be troublesome is issued with a respect order that would bar them from entering the tower block in which they live. Let us imagine that they do not have alternative accommodation, so they enter the flat anyway. Upon doing so, they could be arrested, charged, put on trial and issued with a prison term. This hypothetical tenant may not be a saint, but it would be a surreal outcome in which a criminal is made out of someone who is simply trying to go home. I would appreciate some alleviation of my concerns on this matter.
Sticking with antisocial behaviour, I also know from my time working in homelessness that, alongside law and order, we need other tools to help those with multiple and complex needs. A Northumbria University research report that I commissioned in 2022 demonstrated that 94% of those facing homelessness have experienced serious trauma during their lives. That trauma underlies the often chaotic and unpleasant behaviours that we see in our towns and cities. Some of those who are causing misery to others are themselves deeply traumatised by the abuse, violence and neglect that they have experienced or continue to experience.
We should remember that being homeless itself is a trauma. We can most successfully address that behaviour by taking a trauma-informed approach and by offering appropriate support services. It is not about being soft—crime is crime—but if we genuinely want to stop the cycle of offending, we need multiple options at our disposal, including supportive options. When we witness antisocial behaviour, we should of course firmly say, “You must not do that or there will be consequences.” But we should also ask, “What happened to you that led you to this point in your life?”
Even as we pursue a much-needed focus on antisocial behaviour and crime, I would welcome clarification that traumatised people who are often stuck in a loop of failed systems will receive the support that they need. The Bill will do a lot of good, and I am sure that the Minister will be able to put my concerns to rest.
Lizzi Collinge (Morecambe and Lunesdale) (Lab)
The measures in this Bill are very much needed by my constituents. One of the first pieces of casework I dealt with as an MP was of young children riding recklessly around on small motorbikes with no helmets. My constituent Helen was at her wits’ end with the dreadful noise and the fear that one of the children or a passing pedestrian might get hurt. I recently asked for an update, and her husband Malcolm told me that although there has been some relief recently, they are concerned that the lighter nights will bring more problems. What frustrates them is the wait for a police response.
Recently in Morecambe we had a gang of lads causing havoc on the Branksome estate. Following reports of them threatening people and causing damage, the police gave chase and seized one of the bikes. Earlier that day, a town centre playground was taken over by people on bikes, with reports that they were being “purposefully menacing” and that their bikes had damaged the grassy area near the playground. It was simply luck that no one was hurt.
In Morecambe, local organisations are coming together to tackle the menace of antisocial behaviour. The Safe Morecambe initiative—which brings together Morecambe police, the Morecambe business improvement district, the city council, the town council and other key stakeholders—was formed last November. Its members collaborate to ensure a safe and welcoming environment for residents, businesses and visitors. I met one of them, Tim Barbary, to discuss the coalition, and I will continue to support them, including by supporting the continuation of Operation Centurion, for which I am glad to say that funding has continued.
Our high street in Morecambe has also been badly affected by theft. The Conservatives wrote off a lot of this as low-level, but it is not. Certain parts of Morecambe and some rural areas have suffered terribly with fly-tipping. I am glad to see all these issues covered in the Bill, and that the Labour Government are focused on the issues that matter to my constituents. The Bill will make it easier to seize bikes and scooters that are being used antisocially. It will enable stronger action on all types of antisocial behaviour. It will provide for statutory guidance on fly-tipping and an extra 13,000 police officers on the ground.
Finally, I would like to flag the decimation of youth services under the last Conservative Government, which has meant that so many young people, especially those struggling without strong family role models, have been left not only to be sucked into the grip of antisocial behaviour but in many cases to be groomed into far more serious criminality. I have already expressed interest in my constituency becoming a pilot area for the national youth strategy programme, as I believe that good youth services not only ensure that young people are able to reach their potential, but have a wider knock-on effect on our constituencies.
All in all, I am very pleased that this Labour Government are taking the concerns of my constituents in Morecambe and Lunesdale seriously, taking strong action to tackle the blight of the misuse of bikes and scooters, taking theft on our high streets seriously again, getting tough on fly-tippers and clamping down on the wider antisocial behaviour that we see in our constituencies.
Pam Cox (Colchester) (Lab)
I am pleased to speak in support of the Government’s Crime and Policing Bill, the most comprehensive package of such measures that we have seen for decades. As a member of the Justice Committee, I know that it will play a crucial part in tackling the serious violence and high-harm offences that have plagued our communities for far too long.
I will focus my contribution on knife crime. In my own constituency we have seen at first hand the impact of knife crime on our streets and the fear that local people feel as a result. However, we are also witnessing some remarkable local initiatives that are making a real difference in our fight against it. Last year, the Knife Angel, a 27-foot-tall sculpture made from over 100,000 seized knives, visited Colchester. It was a powerful symbol of our city’s commitment to tackling knife crime. Standing underneath our iconic Jumbo water tower, the Knife Angel serves as a poignant reminder of the lives lost and the urgent need for action. It brought our community together, fostering the shared determination to address this issue head on. I pay tribute to the Daily Gazette in Colchester for its campaign that ran alongside that striking exhibit.
I also pay tribute to the work of Essex police in tackling knife crime. Its violence and vulnerability unit brings together partners from across the county. It uses data evaluation, targeted interventions and communication campaigns to support young people to stay safe and to keep them away from the exploitation and vulnerabilities that can draw them into crime, as we have heard so many Members talk about today.
Finally, let me highlight the incredible work of a man named Peter Dutch and the ALB—the anti loo roll brigade—in Colchester. On another occasion I will happily explain the story behind that name. It has been pivotal in recent months in diverting young people away from trouble and is building local alliances to provide counselling, youth projects and other positive alternatives to crime. These local initiatives in Colchester exemplify the kind of community-driven efforts that are essential for tackling knife crime. The Bill will provide the necessary national tools that we also need to amplify those efforts and make our streets safer. I urge Members across the House—there are not so many on the Opposition Benches right now—to join me in supporting the Bill.
Lee Pitcher (Doncaster East and the Isle of Axholme) (Lab)
Ensuring the safety and security of our communities is one of the most fundamental duties of government. When that duty is neglected, the consequences are real, widespread and deeply felt by everyone—especially the most vulnerable in our society. In recent years, that neglect has reached the point where local authorities such as Doncaster city council have had to step in to take up the slack. I recognise the work it has done, which has included funding additional police and expanding CCTV networks to support the police in their work.
From walkarounds with the police, councillors and businesses in areas such as Thorne, I know the impact that rampant crime is having on our high streets and town centres. Shop owners and workers feel under constant fear of attack. That is wrong. That is not good enough for the people of Thorne, not good enough for the people of Doncaster East and definitely not good enough for the people of the Isle of Axholme. I am proud to be part of a Government who will clean up our streets and rid them from the thieves and the thugs.
I am glad to see that, with the Bill, the Government are taking antisocial behaviour seriously. It is too easy to write off ASB as nuisance or annoyance, but it is very much more than that. Continual antisocial behaviour can go on for months or even years, making people’s lives miserable. It was described to me at a recent surgery as a “living torture”. The introduction of respect orders is a welcome addition to the tools available to authorities to tackle persistent antisocial behaviour and take strong preventive action. I particularly welcome the provisions in the Bill that will allow for the instant seizure of motorbikes without the need for previous warnings.
Like many of my hon. Friends, I represent a rural area. I know from speaking to farmers in the Isle of Axholme how unsafe they can feel when they know that help is a long way off. I have heard from farmers in Hatfield about the attacks on animals that they have suffered from recently. The new powers in the Bill to track stolen farm equipment will help both to deter criminals and to stop them in their tracks before they can profit from their crimes. I ask the Government to keep in mind as the Bill progresses through Parliament how those ambitions will be successful in a rural context.
Finally, I turn to fly-tipping. Every part of my constituency suffers from fly-tipping, which is often done by organised professional groups making money by passing themselves off as legitimate waste removal companies. They will stop fly-tipping only when it stops being profitable for them. A boost to the use of powers to seize vehicles linked to fly-tipping and to issue fixed penalty notices for fly-tippers is a good step in the right direction and certainly very welcome. At home, at work and at leisure, my constituents in Doncaster East and the Isle of Axholme should feel safe and be safe 24/7. For that reason, I hope that every hon. Member in the House will join me in voting for the Bill tonight.
Emily Darlington (Milton Keynes Central) (Lab)
I pay tribute to all the amazing speeches we have heard from Labour Members. It can be seen from how many of us are still here, hours into the debate—in contrast to the Opposition—how seriously the Government and the Labour party take law and order. I absolutely agree with all those speeches, but because of time I will focus on violence against women and girls.
Women in Milton Keynes are scared of going out, scared of going to the police and scared of going home, which is still the most dangerous place for a woman. Violence against women and girls slowly became consequence-free under the previous Government. Under the Conservatives, only 2% to 4% of reported rapes ever made it to trial. Convictions for domestic abuse halved under the Conservatives, and femicides, of which there have been 95, including two in my own constituency over Christmas, have continued to happen and not been taken seriously enough.
I am really proud of the Bill’s and the Government’s commitment to protect women and girls and halve violence against women and girls. I pay tribute to the Milton Keynes portion of Thames Valley police, who have been central to ensuring that Milton Keynes becomes the first white ribbon city, despite the Conservative police and crime commissioner,
I want to talk about stalking and how important our measures are on that. If I had had time, I would have shared my own story of how I was stalked. My stalking happened in person, but more and more of it is happening online. I am interested in hearing from the Minister about how the Bill will help to tackle that.
Spiking unfortunately continues to rise. Just two weeks ago, a young woman in my constituency approached me after being spiked at a Slug and Lettuce on her 20th birthday —she ended up in hospital. We have talked a lot about measures to protect women from being spiked, but what are we doing to tackle the availability of the drugs used in spiking?
Finally, I want to talk about being online. Hon. Members on the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee will have heard the weak and disappointing answers from representatives of the major social media firms which are using the umbrella of “freedom of speech” to allow threats to women in online spaces to continue. They are also using that to spread pretty radical pornography. I want to understand how the Bill will fit with the cross-Government plans to tackle violence against women and girls.
In my last few seconds, I will highlight two laws that are still on the statute book that I would like the Bill to repeal: the Abortion Act 1861, which was raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Gower (Tonia Antoniazzi); and the Vagrancy Act 1824. Both of them target the most vulnerable in our society and should be repealed.
Danny Beales (Uxbridge and South Ruislip) (Lab)
Crime and antisocial behaviour affect the whole community in which they take place. They erode social cohesion, trust and pride in a place, driving people away from our town centres and making them feel insecure in their own streets and workplaces and even in their own homes. I am therefore pleased to speak in support of the Crime and Policing Bill, which is the largest package of measures on crime and policing for decades.
Crime and antisocial behaviour increased under the previous Government, despite what the shadow Home Secretary said. The reality is known by my constituents. In the year ending September 2024, the Home Office recorded the highest ever increase in shoplifting offences. USDAW found that one in five shop workers had been physically assaulted in a year. Instances of theft from a person increased by 22%. In my community of Uxbridge and South Ruislip, I have heard from many constituents who are worried about rising levels of crime—knife crime, shoplifting, burglary, phone theft and car theft, to name but a few. On Sunday alone, 21 constituents wrote to me to share their concerns about burglary in South Ruislip. The news is deeply distressing to my constituents, many of whom feel unsafe in their own homes and believe that the police do not have the resources needed to protect them. That simply cannot go on.
Increases in antisocial behaviour are a symptom of a society in distress. Far too often it was dismissed by the last Government as low-level crime—they were unwilling and unable to act. I welcome the measures in the Bill to introduce respect orders on the worst offenders, banning persistent offenders from our town centres. That is welcome news for many of my constituents who have contacted me about such activities in Uxbridge town centre and Yiewsley high street.
Critically, the Bill will also keep my constituents safe and protect them from armed burglary. It will create a new power for the police to seize, retain and destroy bladed articles and create a new criminal offence of possessing a bladed article with the intent to cause harm. It will also ban the possession and distribution of electronic devices, which are far too often used in vehicle theft, and create a new targeted power for the police to enter premises and search and seize electronically tracked stolen goods, from mobile phones to stolen vehicles, ending the terrible situation that my constituents have reported where they can track their stolen phone or electronic item but the police are unable to go in and get it. I hope, too, that we will look at international vehicle crime and tougher measures at our ports, to stop the rapid removal from the country of stolen vehicles.
As well as tough laws, the police must also have the resources they need to apply them and a return to proactive neighbourhood policing. Although the uplift in police funding, including to London police forces, in the last year, is incredibly welcome, significant pressures on London policing remain, so I hope we can continue in this Parliament to increase the resources of the Metropolitan police. Unfortunately, my predecessor, while Mayor of London, closed a number of police stations and police counters. I welcome the present Mayor of London’s commitment to keep Uxbridge police station open, and I hope we can work together to reopen the front counter and the custody suite.
I strongly support this Bill and the new measures and increased police powers, along with the uplift in funding already agreed by this new Government. These measures will help to restore trust in the police and improve the safety of my constituents, and I wholeheartedly support them.
Mary Kelly Foy (City of Durham) (Lab)
This Bill presents an opportunity to confront the challenges facing our communities, protect the most vulnerable and ensure that justice serves everyone. I welcome the Government’s commitment to tackling violence against women and girls, to tackling antisocial behaviour and to halving knife crime. This is a positive step forward, strengthening protections for the public and addressing some of the damaging policies of the previous Government. I must therefore turn my attention to the impact of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022.
In its rush to extend police powers, this legislation has had a devastating effect on Gypsy and Traveller communities. The Act introduced a new criminal offence related to trespass, and granted sweeping powers to ban those communities from areas for up to 12 months, as well as powers to fine, arrest, imprison and seize the homes of Gypsies and Travellers. Under these provisions, sanctions can be enforced based on damage, disruption or distress, often rooted in subjective perceptions of harm. This means that entire communities could face eviction or banishment from areas, with little regard for the cultural context or the lack of alternative places to settle.
These measures are a grave injustice and an affront to the rights and dignity of those who follow centuries-old ways of life. It is concerning that, in the supposed pursuit of law and order, the previous Government overlooked fundamental human rights protections. I must stress that the impact of these measures is not theoretical; it is real and it is being lived. It is affecting families, children and entire communities. Human rights bodies have raised their concerns. The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, in its formal recommendation, has called for the repeal of the provisions in question and, importantly, the High Court, in its ruling in 2024, found that certain provisions in the Act were incompatible with the European convention on human rights. This Parliament has a duty to address these human rights violations and to correct the injustices done.
The Crime and Policing Bill offers us the opportunity to right the wrongs of the past, to restore fairness and to ensure that we have laws that respect the rights of all people, regardless of their heritage or way of life. This Bill could be the means by which we address the discrimination faced by Gypsies and Travellers. We need bold action to ensure that their traditions are protected. All people and all communities have the right to fair treatment. If we really want to stand for justice and human dignity, that must apply to all, so as chair of the all-party parliamentary group for Gypsies, Travellers and Roma, I urge the Government to undo the harm of the previous legislation. Let us stand for equality under the law and protection for all who live in the United Kingdom.
Tracy Gilbert (Edinburgh North and Leith) (Lab)
I declare an interest as a member and former employee of the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers. I welcome the Bill brought forward by the Government. I want to discuss three broad areas: antisocial behaviour; retail crime; and measures to end commercial sexual exploitation.
Antisocial behaviour has been an increasing concern for my constituents in Edinburgh North and Leith. Over the past few months, they have relayed to me their concerns over a group of young people who have been dubbed the “baby gang”. Their name might not seem threatening, but their actions are. The actions of the “baby gang” have alarmed my constituents and made them afraid. The tragedy is that many of the gang members are only in their mid-teens. During the general election campaign, constituents told me repeatedly how they were fed up with off-road bikes being used in parks and on pavements. That is why I am so pleased to see that the Bill will include provisions to tackle not only antisocial behaviour but the use of off-road motorbikes used in this manner. These issues are devolved to the Scottish Parliament, so I hope that the Scottish Government —although they are not represented here tonight—will look closely at these measures.
On retail crime, I congratulate the Government on the measures in the Bill to tackle the unacceptable attacks and assaults on shop workers. The provisions in part 3 of the Bill replicate legislation that has already been brought forward by a Member of the Scottish Parliament, my colleague Daniel Johnson MSP, when he secured the Protection of Workers (Retail and Age-restricted Goods and Services) (Scotland) Act 2021. We are beginning to see the positive impact of the legislation and the effects it has had in shops and supermarkets across Scotland, which is evidenced in the data. In USDAW’s latest Freedom from Fear research, 77% of shop workers across the UK reported abuse, 53% reported being threatened and 10% reported being assaulted. The data from Scotland is lower, demonstrating that within only a few years the introduction of a specific crime is helping to create a safer working environment for shop workers. I am proud that this Bill will extend this protection, because protection at work should not be limited by postcodes.
The Bill has no specific measures to reduce prostitution or sex trafficking. In 2023, the Home Affairs Committee found that legislation was needed in this area, as a report from the inquiry on human trafficking found that the collaboration between the National Crime Agency and the Home Office on pimping websites had produced no evidence of improvement. I believe that the Bill should go further in tackling this exploitation. It could afford the Government the opportunity to take the actions required to reduce demand and to tackle pimping websites. I would be grateful to hear from the Minister whether the Government would look favourably on amendments that seek to make profiting from the prostitution of another person a criminal offence. This Bill will go a long way in reducing crime, and I hope that when we next consider it in this place, it will contain measures that reduce the commercial exploitation of women.
Josh Fenton-Glynn (Calder Valley) (Lab)
Antisocial behaviour ruins lives. On Friday, I held an event at the Field Lane estate in Calder Valley, the first in a series of events across my constituency to listen to members of the community about antisocial behaviour, and their stories were heartbreaking. Families are being terrorised by problem residents, children are scared to go to school and residents fear for their property and personal safety. All the while, people have no trust that making reports to the police will bring an end to the fear their families are facing. Sadly, this lack of trust became all too common a feature in communities under the last Government. They know that, no matter how many reports they make or how much evidence they have, the police will either not turn up or turn up late and then not take people seriously, after the last Government hollowed out our policing services.
Phil Brickell (Bolton West) (Lab)
Does my hon. Friend agree that it is vital for Members from the previous Government to be here to listen to the testimonies of our constituents about how the last Government failed them on so many facets of tackling crime?
Josh Fenton-Glynn
I absolutely agree that the last Government failed people on tackling crime, particularly due to its hollowing out of the police. Indeed, in West Yorkshire alone, within just six years of the Conservatives taking office, over 1,200 police officers had been let go, and 1,000 of those were in frontline roles, leaving their numbers even more depleted than the Opposition Benches. When the numbers rose back again, it was just not the same because the previous Government failed to recognise that police are more than just a number on a spreadsheet. They got rid of 1,200 officers who knew their communities, who added local intelligence and understanding of the local nuances, and who had experience supporting those neighbourhoods. We lost the heart of neighbourhood-based policing—the best tool to combat antisocial behaviour—and one of the best reassurances that evidence can have. The lack of local knowledge is why we have seen over 3,000 reports of antisocial behaviour in Calder Valley in three years, ruining lives. The lack of trust in police is why I know that so many more incidents simply go unreported.
After 14 years of the last Conservative Government allowing antisocial behaviour and other crime to grow unchecked, I am proud that this Labour Government are restoring respect for law and order, standing with and bringing communities and police closer together, with named officers in every community, backed by £2 million of funding to kickstart recruitment for the new neighbourhood police officers. The Government will end the impunity that criminals feel they can operate under by giving officers stronger powers to tackle antisocial behaviour, violent crime and persistent offenders who make people’s lives a misery. Against a backdrop of the lack of trust in our police service that was allowed to fester over 14 years, this Bill is an important step in the process of rebuilding trust and confidence and why, on behalf of my constituents from Calder Valley, who have suffered because of antisocial behaviour, I am backing the Bill to take action today.
Josh Simons (Makerfield) (Lab)
In Ashton, Orrell, Platt Bridge, Hindley and Hindley Green, one issue dominates life for so many: antisocial behaviour. For months, I have been promising my constituents the measures in the Bill, and I thank the Home Office team for the hard work required to bring it to the House so quickly. To my mind, the Bill is one of the strongest examples of this Labour Government delivering for working people on the issues they care about.
The Bill takes tough action against serious crime—drugs, knife crime and terrorism—but I want to talk about a different, more everyday type of crime. These are the crimes that make life demoralising and sometimes frightening for many people, and that shape how people feel about their town centre, community and security. It is the fly-tipping in Bickershaw that makes parents stop their kids playing outside. It is teenagers throwing mud at cars in Hindley, and groups intimidating people by the shops in Winstanley.
Some of the toughest calls I have received in this job have been people ringing to tell me that thugs have destroyed a local sports club: Ashton Town—an arson attack—Hindley FC, and Wigan Cosmos, as well as St Jude’s pitches being destroyed in minutes by vandals on dirt bikes. Those clubs are great community assets where kids that I represent learn to become Wigan Warriors, or the elderly play walking football—places where people feel pride in their communities. I have supported fundraisers to help those clubs, working with local councillors and Warriors players to help St Jude’s build a fence to keep the bikes out, but local residents should not have to reach into their already stretched pockets. Our streets should not feel so unsafe that people resort to self-protection. We are one of the world’s largest economies and greatest democracies. That is why I welcome the measures in the Bill, such as new powers to seize bikes that wake people up at night, as they did to me this Saturday. Every time one of those bikes tears past me in the town centre, I hold on to my kids that bit tighter.
The Bill matters because it is about standing up for the good, hard-working people who love their towns and want to feel pride in them again. It is about what it means to feel respect for those who we stand by and live near, and it shows that the Labour Government will not tolerate those who make others’ lives a misery.
The respect orders, for example, are wisely named, because vandalism, thuggery and mindless destruction are about a lack of respect for our public spaces and for each other. The Bill empowers groups in society—police, councils, housing associations—with restoring that respect, asking them to say, “Enough is enough” and to take control of their communities.
I want to make a wider point about respect in our society. Often when I am travelling on the bus or train, someone is playing videos loudly on their phone without headphones. That is not illegal, but it is off-putting, because it forces whatever that person is doing on to everyone else, as if they somehow own our shared public space. It demonstrates a lack of respect for our public realm and for those around us.
In the end, the strength of our communities and our country depends on the respect, and even the love, we have for one other. That is what resilience is in a community. Over the last 14 years, the Conservative Government have allowed that respect to erode. Too many no longer trust that the law will be upheld and applied equally and fairly to everyone, and that erodes people’s trust in one another. That is why antisocial behaviour is significant: it is about treating one another with a lack of respect, as if we do not care about the things we have in common. Only by rebuilding and reinvesting in our public realm, and restoring the strength and integrity of institutions such as the police, will we rebuild that respect and trust.
The Bill takes a vital step. It shows that we stand with law-abiding, hard-working people. It sends a strong message to those who fail to recognise their responsibility. Respect must return to our streets, and this Bill will start to make that happen.
Jessica Toale (Bournemouth West) (Lab)
I thank my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary and the whole ministerial team for bringing forward the Bill and making significant progress on our mission to make our streets safer.
I want to cover three areas in which we promised change and we are delivering. The first is antisocial behaviour. We have heard much about it from across the House today, but it continues to blight my town centre. I hear time and again from constituents in Bournemouth West about how unsafe they feel, and antisocial behaviour is reportedly turning potential retailers away from the town centre. It is not just a question of low-level inconvenience; it is a matter of people’s everyday quality of life and the economic health of our towns. The rise in street crime and shoplifting, and the persistent nuisance, has made many people feel that they cannot enjoy the place they live in the way they used to.
I have spoken to retail workers and bosses from the Co-op and other retailers, who have had to deal over and over again with the same people coming into their stores, sweeping stock from the shelves and putting their staff at risk. The Conservatives should be ashamed of that record. After 14 years, our communities have been left vulnerable, and an epidemic of crime and antisocial behaviour has been ignored for far too long. We are taking action where the last Government failed to by removing the £200 shoplifting threshold, introducing 13,000 neighbourhood police officers and increasing police funding—including 6.5% more for Dorset police—and introducing respect orders, which will give police and local authorities new powers to tackle the worst offenders and prevent them from entering our towns and district centres.
Like many others, I also welcome the steps in the Bill to immediately seize those awful off-road bikes and dangerous scooters that cause such a nuisance, in particular up Kinson Road and Leybourne Avenue in my constituency. Students at Bishop Aldhelm’s primary school told me this morning that those nuisance bikes are destroying our woodlands and protected heathland.
Secondly, the Bill addresses serious crime and violence, such as knife crime. We see knife crime far too often in Bournemouth. Less than two weeks ago, there was a brutal double stabbing, and it was one in a long line of horrific attacks, including three fatalities in the past two years. I welcome the work this Government are doing to prevent such attacks with the creation of new offences, but despite the collaborative work of the police, the council and local charities, I also want to see a violence reduction unit in my local area.
The Bill is not just about punishing offenders; it also provides much-needed support for those who want to turn their lives around. Some amazing work is happening in my constituency, particularly through Changes Are Made, which provides positive outlets for young people. I encourage the Home Secretary to look for opportunities to support activities like those and to collaborate with effective charities through the Young Futures programme.
Finally, it is about time that we strengthened laws to protect women and girls. Just last week, I held an event to better understand women’s perception of their own safety in the town centre and to highlight the ways in which policing, the council, businesses and design can contribute to it. I welcome the creation of new spiking and stalking offences. It is shameful that previous Governments failed to make those changes.
I am proud of the Bill and the direction that the Labour Government are taking. We are not just talking about crime, but taking decisive action to reduce it. Although it may be unrealistic to expect Conservative Members to take responsibility and apologise for their failures—they would have to be in the Chamber to do that—perhaps they could join my constituents, who want to see cross-party support for these long-overdue changes, in welcoming the Bill.
Connor Naismith (Crewe and Nantwich) (Lab)
I begin my remarks by reflecting on the non-attendance throughout the debate of Reform MPs. It appears that they spend more time these days litigating against each other than they do legislating in this place.
When I knock on doors in Crewe and Nantwich or sit in my constituency surgery, I too often meet people who live in perpetual fear in their own community. The thing that those people have in common is that they want to see neighbourhood policing restored, and I am proud that this Government are committed to doing that. Anybody with a set of eyes could see that neighbourhood policing was decimated under the previous Government, despite what the shadow Home Secretary said earlier.
Connor Naismith
I will not, because I am conscious that others wish to get in.
My constituents also tell me that they want to feel as if the police are equipped with the powers that they need to grip the problems that leave people fearful on the streets or, worse, in their homes. Rising antisocial behaviour has been a scourge on our streets, affecting my constituents’ businesses, their livelihoods and even their health.
A young woman contacted me recently about the young males who make her and her children’s lives a misery by bomb-knocking and kicking her door in the evenings, and shouting “bitch” as they pass her home. My constituent Steve told me at my constituency surgery over the weekend that his family’s life is being made a living hell by a small number of social housing tenants, and the housing provider has so far failed to take any action to address that. That is why I fully support the introduction of respect orders, which will allow a number of agencies, including housing providers, to place restrictions on that kind of behaviour.
I declare an interest: I started my working life as a shop worker, first in Woolworths—yes, I am old enough—and then in betting shops, a part of the retail sector that has, unfortunately, never been a stranger to violence and intimidation for workers. However, as I found out when I met James, the manager of my local Co-operative store in Crewe, brazen crime and the intimidation of shop workers have become commonplace, even in our local convenience stores.
I believe that the Bill will make a lasting difference to the lives of my constituents. Business owners, workers and decent law-abiding people just want to live in a community where they feel safe. These powers are ambitious, and we must ensure that they deliver real, lasting change for the people who need it most.
Adam Thompson (Erewash) (Lab)
I am proud to speak in firm support of the Bill. Many of my constituents feel that crime, especially day-to-day antisocial behaviour, has grown exponentially over recent years. It impacts every part of my constituency, from the town centres in Ilkeston and Long Eaton, to villages such as Draycott and suburban estates such as Cotmanhay. The Bill is about making people feel safe, so that Erewash residents from Sawley to Shipley View can live their lives free from the fear of crime.
As our local police forces were gutted by austerity under the previous Government, so-called low-level offences such as antisocial behaviour, shoplifting and even burglary were increasingly ignored and functionally decriminalised by the Conservative party. Shoplifting was functionally decriminalised under the negligence of the previous Government, who set guidelines stating that it should not be dealt with if goods worth less than £200 were stolen. Although major supermarkets and surviving high street chains might be able to stomach that volume, our small businesses cannot. How were those businesses meant to grow, how were investments meant to be made, how were town centres meant to thrive and how were people meant to feel safe when criminals and thieves were given impunity by the previous Government’s shoplifters’ charter? The Bill repeals that thieves’ charter, which will surely come as a relief to business owners and the hard-working, law-abiding majority of constituents in Erewash and across the country.
Knife crime has more than doubled in Derbyshire in the past decade. The recent horrific stabbing and subsequent death of a teenager in my constituency has rightly given rise to a lot of anger in my community—some of which ended up being directed at me, as people asked bluntly, “What are you going to do about this?” That is why I will be very proud to vote for the Bill, which creates a new offence of possession of a bladed item with intent to cause harm. It will give our police the new and stronger powers that they need to seize, keep and destroy knives confiscated from private properties.
Finally, on violence against women and girls, 13,000 stalking and harassment offences were recorded in Derbyshire in 2024—the highest figure in the east midlands —along with more than 3,400 sexual offences. In that time, one of my great friends and constituents reported to police that she had been followed and had sexual abuse shouted at her. That abuse happened in broad daylight and in public, on West Park in Long Eaton. The Government’s mission is to halve violence against women and girls in a decade. If we are to do that, our police will need the measures in the Bill.
If we have now entered the decade of national renewal that the Government promised, yes we need to get the economy growing again, yes we need to get Britain building again, and yes we need to get the NHS back on its feet, but we must also ensure that crime is punished and that the police are given the powers that they need to properly enforce against offenders. We must take back our streets and excise the rot. If we restore social order and respect for our communities, we can fix broken Britain.
Alison Hume (Scarborough and Whitby) (Lab)
I warmly welcome the clauses in this landmark Bill that will give greater protection to victims of stalking—including guidance for police about disclosing the identity of online stalkers to victims—and clarify what constitutes stalking so that the police have no excuse not to pursue incidents.
Some 91% of victims surveyed by the Suzy Lamplugh Trust had suffered from mental health problems as a result of being stalked. Being stalked is also an indicator of being at high risk of domestic homicide. It is vital that victims feel safe to report what they are suffering, which is why I welcome the opening of the purpose-built Acer House centre for victims of rape and sexual assault in York and North Yorkshire. It has been designed in consultation with victims to provide a safe and supportive environment in which evidence can be collected, and people can receive immediate health care and a medical examination if needed.
According to Women’s Aid, stalking by ex-partners accounts for the largest group of stalking victims, with the vast majority of victims being women. As with domestic abuse in general, rates of prosecution and conviction are shockingly low. In the year to March 2024, North Yorkshire police recorded 1,045 stalking offences, but only 75 resulted in a charge or summons. In just over half the original cases, the victim chose not to pursue the case. Work by the Suzy Lamplugh Trust helps to explain why, and argues that victims have been let down at every stage by the police, the CPS, and the courts. The trust’s super-complaint against the police in 2022 found that they were not even identifying stalking cases, and even when they were, they often did not properly investigate. The trust recommended that stalking protection orders should be applied for and put in place at as early a stage as possible.
After years of failure under the Tories, this Bill cannot come soon enough for victims of stalking. New domestic abuse protection orders have been piloted, which victims can apply for themselves. Stalking victims also feel that their lives are controlled by someone else, so giving them the chance to apply for a stalking protection order would hand power back to them. I am so pleased that the Government are considering wider changes to stalking protection orders, and I invite the Minister to comment on whether they will look at allowing victims to apply for them. To conclude, on behalf of my constituents in Scarborough and Whitby I am proud to support the Bill.
Mrs Sureena Brackenridge (Wolverhampton North East) (Lab)
I firmly support the Bill—the most substantial of this Parliament so far. It will make streets in Wolverhampton North East and across the country safer, and it is frankly shocking that many of the proposed laws are not already in place. Just a glance on social media will show doorbell footage of where our streets have become a hunting ground for criminals. It is incredible that today criminals can carry sophisticated car theft devices such as signal jammers, keyless repeaters and signal amplifiers, but unless they are caught using those tools in the act, they cannot be arrested. That ends with the Bill, because simply possessing such tools will be a criminal offence. This is long overdue. More than 700,000 vehicles were broken into last year, with 40% of cases involving those high-tech devices.
The Bill will introduce around 50 new laws, finally cracking down on crime and antisocial behaviour. Some of the changes prompt a question about why such laws were not already in place. Violent attacks on shop workers will now be a stand-alone offence, and shoplifting will no longer be dismissed as a low-value crime, with a £200 loophole fuelling an epidemic of theft. New powers will ensure that repeat offenders are banned from retail areas more quickly, and that they will stay away. Illegal off-road bikes? Immediate seizure. No more warnings, no more second chances. If someone rides illegally, they will lose their bike, and instead of that bike being auctioned off and falling back into the hands of yobs, it will be crushed.
Just last Friday I went out on a walkabout with the neighbourhood police in Wednesfield high street. Wednesfield is a safe area, with lower crime than other high streets in Wolverhampton and Willenhall, but I was appalled to hear from shop workers about the brazen thefts that they endure. I spoke to a young lady who had just turned 19 and is petrified every time shop theft happens—and in her shop it happens every day. Theft has become so normalised that staff are struggling to report every incident because they simply cannot keep up. USDAW, the retail workers union, has been calling for stronger protection for years. It welcomes the Bill, stating:
“Tougher laws are needed to protect shop workers, and we welcome this legislation as a vital step in tackling retail violence.”
West Midlands police now has 540 fewer officers than it did in 2010.
Alex Ballinger
My hon. Friend and neighbour from the west midlands talks about there being 540 fewer officers in our area between 2010 and 2024, and I was also concerned to see that the highest level of knife crime in the country was reached in our part of the west midlands. Does she agree that since the Labour party has been elected, we have started to bring knife crime down, and does she welcome the fact that we are now on a trajectory to improve that situation?
Mrs Brackenridge
I certainly do support that. The west midlands is no longer the knife-crime capital of the world thanks to the effective work of the police, in partnership with local authorities, the combined authority, our violence reduction units, a lot of dedicated volunteers and our fantastic schools.
When it comes to reversing the decimation of neighbourhood policing, I am delighted that Wednesfield and Heath Town have recently received an extra police officer and PCSO, and Willenhall has received a new PCSO, but that is just the beginning. Labour is turning this situation around and we will rebuild neighbouring policing, because that is how to prevent crime before it happens: good, old-fashioned community intelligence and presence.
The Bill will make my constituents safer, and ensure that they feel safer. To the criminals who are getting away with stealing cars, intimidating shop staff, tearing up our green spaces with illegal bikes and terrorising our communities: enough is enough. I wholeheartedly support the Bill.
Mr Jonathan Brash (Hartlepool) (Lab)
Perhaps the most pernicious effect of 14 years of Conservative Government is how they systematically undermined security in every part of our society, whether it was national security through the hollowing out of our armed forces, financial security with our economy crashed and wages stagnating, or security in our communities. Town centres are plagued by antisocial behaviour, off-road bikes terrorise estates and shoplifting is out of control. This Bill seeks to deal with those issues.
The consequence of that insecurity can be devastating. It breeds fear, anxiety and division, and it opens up a political space into which populists, with no real answers, can enter to further their own selfish ambitions. Speaking of populists with no answers, Reform Members have not spent a second in the Chamber during today’s debate about antisocial behaviour in our communities.
For far too long, the entrance to Hartlepool’s shopping centre on York Road, known locally as “the ramp”, has been plagued by individuals who seek to intimidate and disrupt the daily lives of decent, hard-working people. I am fed up of hearing families and pensioners tell me that they are too scared to walk through our town centre. Whatever the personal challenges of that small minority of disruptive individuals, they have no right to make the people of Hartlepool feel unsafe in their community.
As chair of the Safer Hartlepool Partnership, I have proposed a comprehensive action plan for the police and council to implement, including a range of targeted interventions designed to tackle the issue head-on, which the Bill enhances and extends. One key measure is the use of public space protection orders that allow us to prohibit certain behaviours in and around a particular geographic area. The Bill reinforces that tool by increasing the maximum fine for violating such an order from £100 to £500, ensuring stronger deterrents against antisocial behaviour.
I am also pushing for the greater use of enforcement powers, including dispersal orders, which the Bill extends from 48 hours to 72 hours, and community safety accreditation schemes, which grant police enforcement powers to council, shopping centre and other security teams, helping to free up police resources that, again, the Bill extends and strengthens.
The introduction of respect orders, which are new civil behavioural orders that allow courts to ban adult offenders from engaging in specific antisocial activities, will be a huge tool in Hartlepool. Breaching a respect order will be a criminal offence, enabling police to swiftly intervene and prevent further disruption. Importantly, those orders can also include positive requirements, compelling offenders to address the root causes of their behaviour, an approach that will be particularly useful in the communities that I represent where drug-related issues are often at the heart of the problem.
I welcome the Bill’s measures about off-road bikes, which terrorise many communities in Hartlepool. I have already spoken to the Minister about further powers that I would like to see included in the Bill to enhance it. The Bill also tackles wider issues, such as closure orders, shoplifting, fly-tipping and child protection. Those are not easy problems to fix, but with this Bill, we now have the toughest set of enforcement powers ever introduced by a Government. It is our duty to ensure that we use them.
Deirdre Costigan (Ealing Southall) (Lab)
The legacy of the Conservative Government’s 14 years in power is one of failure to keep us safe, and it is felt every day in my constituency of Ealing Southall. On Guru Nanak Road, King Street and Western Road in Southall, drug dealing is a common sight and makes the area feel unsafe for everyone. The police do not have enough resources, so the Singh Sabha gurdwara has had to employ its own patrols, at a cost of thousands of pounds, to keep its worshippers safe.
Hanwell clock tower has become a magnet for street drinkers. The police try to move them on, but they just do not have the powers under the weak laws left by the Conservatives. In west Ealing, drug dealers openly ply their trade, even sitting in residents’ front porches when they are out, while the police cannot do much about it. Across London, it is not safe to take a phone call on the street, as people are liable to have their phone snatched. On top of that, fly-tipping increased by one third under the previous Government, making local neighbourhoods feel neglected and unloved—of course the drug dealers, phone thieves and street drinkers moved in.
Under the last Labour Government, there were six police and community support officers for every single ward in Ealing Southall, but the Conservatives cut £1 billion from policing in London, so we are lucky to have a couple of local officers per ward. They are not dedicated to the area, like they used to be—they get pulled to Brent, Harrow or central London. Under the previous Labour Government, the police also had stronger powers; the Conservatives actually reduced police powers. Labour has already started the work to bring back neighbourhood policing and to recruit 13,000 new officers, with £320 million of extra funding for police in London. We will ensure that police officers get back out on the streets, instead of doing admin work like they were doing under the previous Government.
This Bill will give those new officers the tough powers they need to tackle antisocial behaviour and crime, with 50 new laws to make our streets safer. Our new respect orders will mean that the police can stop street drinkers from congregating at Hanwell clock tower and stop drug dealers from coming into west Ealing and Southall. If people break respect orders, the police will now be able to arrest them immediately and take them to court, where they can face up to two years in prison. The police will be able to drug test more people on arrest, and respect orders will require that drinkers and drug users access rehab services to break the cycle of dependency.
The Bill will also give police the power to search a property without a warrant where they have evidence that there is a stolen electronic device inside. I had my own phone stolen a while back; I could see on the internet that it was in east London, but the police could not do anything about it. This law will now mean that police can use “find my phone” apps to go after phone thieves and get stolen property back.
I am delighted that as part of this Bill, the Secretary of State will issue statutory guidance to local councils to help to ensure a more consistent approach to fly-tipping. Ealing Council is the No. 1 borough in the country when it comes to issuing fixed-penalty notices against fly-tippers, but it needs help to do more. Under the Conservatives, fly-tipping was allowed to spiral and was seen as a low-level crime, but it blights communities. I know that this Labour Government are looking at further steps we can take to punish fly-tippers and to reduce waste in the first place.
After 14 years of the Conservatives leaving local people in Ealing Southall to put up with open drug taking, street drinking and snatch thefts, Labour is giving the police back the power and the resources to take the tough action needed to make our streets safe again.
Steve Yemm (Mansfield) (Lab)
This Bill will be very much welcomed back in my constituency, with this Government introducing 50 new laws that will help to cut crime and make my area’s streets safer. They include measures to tackle antisocial behaviour and stop theft, particularly in shops, and to tackle street crime head on, giving the police in our communities new powers to take back town centres from thugs and thieves and tackling knife crime, violence against women and girls, cyber-crime, child sexual abuse and terrorism.
That said, I am particularly pleased to see that this Bill deals with one particular issue. Illegal off-road bikes and e-scooters are a significant concern to many people in Mansfield. Antisocial behaviour connected to their inappropriate use was raised with me time and time again on the doorstep during the election campaign, and it is now raised in my casework inbox. I will share one such example, from a constituent who recently contacted me about this issue:
“Only yesterday whilst out with my husband doing ‘grandparent school duties’ we were yet again placed in a serious and dangerous situation. Several youths appeared out of nowhere wearing balaclavas weaving around our vehicle before racing off in different directions. The silence of them means you have no awareness of them before they appear in front of your car”.
Many constituents report similar concerns, and are exasperated that nothing can be done to deal with the issue. Enough is enough, and I am delighted to announce after discussions I have had with local officers in Mansfield that the police are launching a crackdown over the coming weeks to tackle antisocial behaviour in my constituency related to off-road bikes and e-scooters.
As part of this crackdown, officers are appealing to the public to come forward via a new dedicated police email address—set up with my office and by the 101 phone line— to report any illegal bike-related antisocial behaviour. Using that information, officers will take significant enforcement action to target those who are terrorising our communities in Mansfield. I will be working closely with the police during that campaign, and will be holding a public meeting with them on 21 March to explain how it will work. I would be delighted to update the Home Secretary on its progress. More information will be released by my office in the coming days, but this crackdown will rely on my constituents acting as the eyes and ears on the ground. Without their reports, the project will not be a success, so I urge local people in Mansfield to get involved.
To conclude, my message to those causing misery in Mansfield is this: “We see you. The police are coming for you, and our communities will not let you get away with it any longer.”
Baggy Shanker (Derby South) (Lab/Co-op)
I encourage all hon. Members to visit us in Derby and in Derby city centre. They will find a city that is firmly on the up, with a bright future ahead. Our city centre regeneration projects are full steam ahead. We are creating fantastic cultural and community hubs in Derby, whether that is our multimillion-pound revamp of our market hall, the completion of the Becketwell Live arena or the University of Derby’s new business school, all of which are set to open their doors in the coming months. I want everyone in our community to be able to take a walk around our city and feel proud and safe.
However, although we are rightly excited about the future that Derby holds, we have to acknowledge the problems that the city centre faces. Our pride is tested when we see fly-tipping on the side of the road. It is tested again when we are worried about walking on the pavement because e-scooters are being used antisocially, and it is tested further for shop workers who are worried about going to work because the previous day they were threatened during a shoplifting incident. Lots of fantastic work is under way on these issues at a local level, such as the work of our police and crime commissioner, Nicolle Ndiweni-Roberts, and of Derbyshire constabulary. They are clamping down on illegal e-scooters, seizing and disposing of more than 200 since last November alone. However, I and my constituents know that more needs to be done so that they can feel proud and safe in the city we call home.
For that reason, I welcome the measures introduced in today’s Bill, which will go further to protect city centres such as Derby and their residents from antisocial behaviour and crime. Whether they are employees at our central Co-op in Osmaston or at the Asda superstore in Sinfin, it is right that this Bill will introduce specific measures to protect them from retail crime. Shockingly, 18% of shop workers were assaulted in 2023. Nobody should fear going into work, which is why I am pleased that this Bill will make assaulting a shop worker a stand-alone offence.
Ben Coleman (Chelsea and Fulham) (Lab)
May I associate myself with my hon. Friend’s remarks? Does he find it as absurd as I do that under the Conservatives there was effective immunity from shoplifting goods under £200? That meant that shoplifting rose by 60%. Does he therefore welcome the fact that that effective immunity is ending, and that we are introducing a new criminal offence that will protect shop workers from being attacked and assaulted, including those in my constituency who have complained about that?
Baggy Shanker
I thank my hon. Friend for that timely intervention. It is important that the £200 limit is being scrapped. I have spoken to many shop workers across Derby who have said that, literally on a daily basis, people are walking into the shops, loading their bags and walking straight out, almost apologetically.
This Bill also introduces tougher action on knife crime, more power to support councils to tackle fly-tipping and measures to let police seize vehicles such as e-scooters much faster if they are being used for antisocial purposes. The Bill will tackle violence against women and girls by introducing a specific new offence for spiking.
I want every single person in Derby—I am sure everybody in this House wants this for every single person across the country—to feel safe and to enjoy our city and the places where they live. This Bill represents a huge step forward in achieving that, and that is why I fully support it.
Peter Swallow (Bracknell) (Lab)
After 14 years of Conservative Government, antisocial behaviour has become far too common. Last year, 36% of people reported experiencing antisocial behaviour. Police powers to tackle criminal behaviour have been consistently weakened. Our communities have been left exposed, and we have heard many powerful examples of that from Members across the House today. That is why the measures in this Bill are so badly needed.
Shoplifting, casual drug taking, reckless driving and neighbourhood intimidation may not seem overly significant on their own, but when committed persistently, these low-level acts of antisocial behaviour make our communities that bit less safe, one crime at a time. Speaking to residents on the doorsteps in Jennett’s Park in Great Hollands recently, I heard how a spate of car thefts was making people lose sleep at night. Bracknell Forest is an incredible place to live, with a comparatively low crime rate, but whether it is drug taking in our underpasses, motorised bikes being driven around our footpaths or shoplifting targeting our shops, our community is feeling the effects of the Tories’ weak response to crime and antisocial behaviour.
Last year, shoplifting in Bracknell and Wokingham went up by 46%. That is not just in the town centre, but across Bracknell Forest, including in Sandhurst, where one local convenience store has been repeatedly targeted and their staff threatened. I have seen it myself, sitting in a café of a local supermarket with the manager and watching as a shoplifter walked out of the shop. They were known to the staff, but there was little they could do to stop the frequent thefts.
I thank Thames Valley police for the work they are doing to tackle this endemic shoplifting, and I am pleased to say that the precipitous rise is now slowing down. However, the police need the right powers in place if they are to get to grips with the problem. That is why it is so welcome that the Crime and Policing Bill will introduce tough new respect orders to ban repeat offenders from antisocial hotspots. We are introducing a new criminal offence to protect retail workers from abuse, thanks to the fantastic campaigning by the Co-op party and USDAW. This Bill will scrap the Tory shoplifters’ charter, which meant that, under the previous Government, anyone caught shoplifting goods below £200 could escape prosecution.
Many of my constituents are also concerned by the increasing numbers of casual drug users on our streets. In September, a mother wrote to me with concerns about brazen drug dealing going on near the town centre and the impact that has on vulnerable groups in the area. I have also heard concerns from local parents that drug dealers are targeting young people as they leave school. That is why it is so important that the Crime and Policing Bill will introduce new police powers to make drug-testing suspects on arrest easier, and respect orders to allow police to crack down on those repeat offenders frequenting the same spots. These new powers are an important step in delivering Labour’s safer streets mission.
Sam Rushworth (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)
My hon. Friend is doing a great job in explaining some of the new powers that the Bill will give our police. Police officers in my area to whom I have spoken find it absurd that it has taken until now to do so. Does my hon. Friend agree that these measures are such common sense that no reasonable party in the House should vote against them?
Peter Swallow
Absolutely—and it would be great to see more Opposition Members here to support the measures. The powers introduced by the Bill are indeed welcome, but under the last Government we saw a reduction in the use of powers that already existed. In 2010, Thames Valley police issued more than 6,000 antisocial behaviour notices—penalty notices for disorder—but in 2023 they issued only 412, which is a 93% decrease.
As I have said, these new powers are an important step in the delivery of Labour’s safer streets mission, but as well as giving police the right powers to crack down on antisocial behaviour—as my hon. Friend mentioned—we need to give them the right resources. That is why it is so important that this Government have increased police funding by more than £1 billion, and the budget of Thames Valley police has been increased by 6.6%. Our safer streets mission will see 13,000 additional police officers on Britain’s streets, along with a named, contactable officer in each community. That will help people to feel safe in their communities again. The Tories introduced chaos on our streets and in our communities, and Labour will do the hard work that is needed to bring back order and security.
Amanda Martin (Portsmouth North) (Lab)
As the daughter and niece of retired police officers and with a cousin, Alex, currently serving for the same constabulary, I want to start by saying a huge thank you to Hampshire police.
It is a privilege to speak in this debate on a Bill that seeks to strengthen law enforcement and restore public confidence in policing. It is about the real experience of our constituents who have suffered as a result of crime and antisocial behaviour, and feel that the system is failing them. For example, in the first nine days of the financial year, the store manager of a Tesco Express in my constituency logged 22 incidents of shoplifting, trespass, verbal abuse and threats of violence. The Bill will ensure that the police have a mandate to act swiftly, especially in instances of repeat and organised retail crime, regardless of the value of the stolen goods.
Another constituent’s car has been vandalised twice, and one incident was so severe that the car was written off. Vandalism is not a minor inconvenience; it is costly and distressing, and leaves people feeling unsafe in their own communities. Car theft also continues to plague my constituents. One resident’s car has been stolen four times, and the daughter of another has had her moped stolen twice, even having to recover it herself on one occasion. That is not to mention the number of “tradies” who are subject to tool theft. The Bill will empower police forces to take property crimes more seriously, make it easier to track and recover stolen vehicles, and more importantly, ensure that victims of theft receive timely police responses.
The Scottish estate in Cosham, the London Road in Northend, Allaway Avenue in Paulsgrove and Tangiers Road in Baffins are just four of the many places where e-scooters, bikes and cars race deafeningly and dangerously in my constituency. I am pleased that the Bill removes the need of the police to issue a warning before seizing vehicles being used antisocially. This is the start of a real crackdown on vehicles being used to intimidate pedestrians and increasingly commit crime.
Antisocial behaviour is destroying the quality of life for so many people. One of my constituents, an 80-year-old woman, has suffered relentless harassment from a neighbour. Her garden has been vandalised, furniture has been thrown, and she has been physically intimidated. The Bill gives the police stronger powers to tackle antisocial behaviour, and strengthens the use of existing antisocial behaviour powers.
The shadow of knife crime hangs over my constituency. In the past two months alone, and even today, there have been two stabbings and an attempted murder involving two teenagers. Parents are writing to me, terrified for their children’s safety and demanding action. Some have even raised concerns about the advertising of chefs’ knives on television. I welcome the fact that this Bill provides the police with the powers they need to take knives off our streets, enforce tougher penalties for possession and intervene early to prevent young people from being drawn into violent crime, because knife crime kills.
Finally, a father has reached out to me to say he is deeply concerned about the safety of women and girls in Portsmouth. His 15-year-old daughter, who loves running, has been catcalled and harassed multiple times, and she has not reported it because she believes it would waste police time. As we know, low-level crime against women can be a gateway to more serious crimes, and I welcome the fact that this Bill brings in new protections for women.
This is not a Portsmouth-specific issue, and it is not a Labour issue, which is why it is shocking to see the lack of Opposition Members in this place today. All our constituents deserve to live in safe communities, and they deserve their MPs to make changes and put those changes into action.
Phil Brickell (Bolton West) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to speak in support of this vital Bill, which will see the Labour Government deliver on the promise made at the last election to return our town centres to our constituents and make our streets safe. This Bill addresses pressing issues that have long plagued our society, and its provisions are both timely and necessary, particularly on the sexual abuse of children, knife crime and economic crime.
First, on child sexual abuse, the NSPCC has found that over 100 child sexual abuse image crimes are recorded by the police every day. That is a horrifying statistic, and it should focus the minds of all of us in this place, which is why supporting victims and survivors is rightly the cornerstone of this Bill. I very much welcome the steps taken to ensure that our criminal justice system, which was neglected for far too long under previous Conservative Governments, is better equipped to handle such cases effectively.
Secondly, the Bill’s measures on knife crime, which has devastated families and communities across the country, will also safeguard our children.
Natasha Irons (Croydon East) (Lab)
I am one of the MPs for Croydon, a place that continues to pay the price for the previous Government’s inaction on knife crime and youth violence. Does my hon. Friend agree that when it comes to youth violence, we have to focus on prevention, and does he welcome the introduction of the Young Futures programme so that we can prevent young people from getting drawn into crime in the first place?
Phil Brickell
I absolutely agree that prevention is fundamental, especially when it comes to youth crime.
The senseless killing of seven-year-old Emily Jones in Queen’s park, Bolton, in 2020 was horrifying. Knife crime incidents have been on the rise in towns such as Bolton for a number of years, so we owe it to Emily and her family, and to all those who have been affected by knife crime, to take bold action and to take it now. To this end, I am pleased to see that the Bill introduces tougher sentencing for repeat offenders and strengthens the police’s powers to seize dangerous weapons before they are used to cause harm.
Thirdly, a number of the crimes that I have detailed are enabled by economic crimes, such as money laundering and fraud. Indeed, we heard earlier from the shadow Home Secretary about crime statistics. What I would say to those on the Opposition Benches is that we have seen a fraud epidemic over the last few years, and cases were allowed to spiral out of control under previous Conservative Administrations. Frankly, they were ignored by the shadow Home Secretary when he was a Minister. Indeed, April 2022 to March 2023 saw 3.5 million cases of fraud in this country—40% of all crime, according to the ONS.
By removing the ability of criminals to launder their ill-gotten gains in the clean economy, we can remove the primary incentive for the behaviour that drives so much of the criminal activity that we have been debating tonight. Indeed, having spent almost 15 years tackling economic crime, I particularly welcome the new provision in the Bill to cap court costs for enforcement agencies, which the Conservative party never addressed. Too often, our law enforcement bodies face intolerable financial risks when pursuing the recovery of ill-gotten gains from deep-pocketed crooks with expensive lawyers. One minor mistake by the National Crime Agency or the Serious Fraud Office can wipe out a whole year’s budget.
That has had a chilling effect on the risk appetite of agencies to tackle those suspected of serious and organised crime, which drives so much of the criminality that we are debating tonight. By introducing cost protection in clause 103, the Government are rightly levelling the playing field for enforcement agencies and those who are charged. This will send a powerful message about the rule of law in this country, which is that no matter how rich or well connected someone is, if they are engaged in criminal behaviour, justice will be done.
We are in a very challenging place when it comes to the public finances, and the tax burden bequeathed by the Conservative party to my constituents is already far too high, which brings me to a specific proposal that I would urge the Minister to consider as the Bill progresses through this place. Economic crime costs us around £300 billion every year, yet less than 1% of police resources are dedicated to tackling it, so why not make the criminals pay? A cross-governmental economic crime fighting fund would use the reinvested proceeds of regulatory and criminal fines, asset recoveries and deferred prosecution agreements to provide sustainable funding and increased firepower for our enforcement agencies’ capabilities. I hope the Minister will respond to this ask for a sustainable and innovative solution in her wind-up.
The Bill provides a much-needed shake-up for crime and policing in this country. It will return our streets and town centres to our constituents and deliver justice where too often it was denied.
Damien Egan (Bristol North East) (Lab)
I am very happy to be able to speak and to add my support to this Bill, and I appreciate the depth and ambition of the measures that have been brought forward.
When I meet my local police officers in Bristol and South Gloucestershire, I see a committed group of men and women completely dedicated to public service, but I also see that morale is low. Police numbers in Avon and Somerset have fallen, with the number of PCSOs dropping from 424 in 2010 to 255 today. After 14 years of cuts, officers question if they are appreciated. For our police, I hope that this Bill is seen as a demonstration of the confidence that we have in them and the respect we have for the difficult job they do.
I welcome the steps taken to let police get on with their jobs, including searching premises where phones are geolocated, confiscating illegal road bikes and introducing respect orders, as well as lifting the £200 cap on when officers will investigate shoplifting. There are also the new protections for shop workers such as the women I have met working in Boots in Kingswood and the PDSA—People’s Dispensary for Sick Animals—charity shop in Kingswood, which are just two of the shops blighted day in and day out by shoplifters.
On a different aspect of the Bill, we have seen the struggles and confusion in relation to policing public order at protests. Protest is a cornerstone of our democracy, but we have seen examples of protests that have become hateful, have incited violence and have become violent. Fines for climbing on war memorials and banning face coverings will help maintain public order, and I hope the police know that they have our support to act when they see wrongdoing. As the Bill progresses, I would ask Ministers to consider how robust the exemptions are for face coverings, as they may be open to misuse. For example, the health exemptions could have very broad interpretations.
On knife crime, officers in my patch certainly welcome the changes, but they are concerned about how unscrupulous knife manufacturers could adapt to selling knives that, while technically legal, still glamorise violence. In the past year, I have got to know a woman called Hayley Ryall, the mother of Mikey Roynon from Kingswood, who was tragically killed at a birthday party when he was stabbed by three young men in June 2023. Mikey was a beautiful young man, and he was just 16 when he was killed. With the ongoing trials of serious violence reduction orders in Thames Valley, the West Midlands, Merseyside and Sussex coming to their conclusion this year, Hayley has asked me when a decision will be made on the wider roll-out of serious violence reduction orders and when that will take place.
All these measures will only have the full effect if we have the officers on our streets to police them. Avon and Somerset recently received a £27 million uplift in funding, and I look forward to seeing this money used for more recruitment and to support our existing officers. There is much to fix—we all know that—and these measures go a good way to putting the balance of power back towards law and order.
Sean Woodcock (Banbury) (Lab)
I rise to support the Bill and to commend the Government for bringing forward such a robust response to the scourge of retail crime that affects communities across our country, including my constituents in Banbury, Chipping Norton, Charlbury and the villages of north and west Oxfordshire.
In my constituency, shoplifting offences increased by 25% between March 2022 and March 2024. This is a deeply concerning trend, not only for shopkeepers but for the local communities they serve. Shoplifting costs the average UK convenience store £6,259 a year. These costs are often passed on through the prices that customers pay, or are reflected in the serious questions that those shops face about their viability. The importance of our local shops’ financial viability is particularly pronounced in rural areas such as Hook Norton, Enstone and Bloxham in my constituency, where they are not just businesses but essential services that form part of the fabric of the community.
This Bill sends a clear and powerful message that rising rates of shoplifting will not be tolerated under this Government. The removal of the effective immunity for shop thefts under £200 will help to deter petty thieves and repeat offenders who have exploited that loophole. By closing the gap, the Bill ensures that every crime, no matter how small and seemingly petty, will be taken seriously.
The measures outlined in the Bill are precisely what shopkeepers in my constituency have been calling for. Not only does the Bill clamp down on shoplifting, but it introduces a new offence of assaulting a retail worker. This provision stands firmly by those who serve our communities day in and day out. Shop workers deserve to feel safe in their workplace, and this new offence rightly acknowledges the seriousness of the threats and violence they face on a daily basis.
This comprehensive and well-considered Bill delivers on this Government’s promise to make our streets safer and to protect the people who keep our communities running. I commend the Home Secretary, the ministerial team and the Government for their decisive action, which will benefit rural communities, as well as communities the length and breadth of the country. I urge all hon. Members to support it.
Mr Calvin Bailey (Leyton and Wanstead) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to speak in support of the Bill, which responds to the concerns of many in Leyton and Wanstead.
In October, my Adjournment debate highlighted the terrible impacts of antisocial behaviour in Leytonstone, including in the Avenue Road estate, Selby Road and the surrounding area. Despite good engagement from the police and council leaders, residents still face hotspots of drug injecting, vandalism and abuse in public spaces. This creates fear and makes families feel that their streets no longer belong to them. The response of the Minister for Policing, Fire and Crime Prevention was encouraging, committing to the respect orders now in this Bill, and I thank her for her visit to Leyton and Wanstead last November.
This Bill addresses key issues. The new legislation on cuckooing in chapter 2 of part 4 will tackle homes used for drug taking, which are particularly seen in areas such as Leytonstone. Respect orders will enhance local initiatives such as mandatory drug programmes, Project Adder and addressing public drinking in areas such as Jubilee Road.
Part 3 delivers on our pledge to introduce a special offence for assaults on shop workers, and it strengthens penalties for shoplifting. Persistent, violent shoplifting has taken hold. A staff member at Church Lane Sainsbury’s in Leytonstone said, “Each and every day it’s going mad. Shoplifters roam the streets from six in the morning every day. We are losing more than £500. Our safety is on the line.” In South Woodford, the Co-op has repeatedly been attacked. When a constituent stepped in to help, they were threatened with a glass bottle. The nearby Boots has faced repeated thefts, with some shoplifters returning four or five times a day.
Constituents describe the fear of retail staff and sadness that children might grow up seeing this situation as normal. It is not normal. We must ensure that our children do not grow up thinking that the high street is a criminals’ playground. We must ensure that no shop worker faces daily threats. We must acknowledge the role that USDAW has played in addressing these issues. I ask the Minister to provide a view on how the law may be extended to protect transport workers, as proposed by the Transport Salaried Staffs Association in its recent report, which highlights the extent of the violence its members face.
I welcome the measures enabling police to target locations storing stolen goods, which often double as hubs for drug dealing. The Bill will enable more effective, co-ordinated police responses, but we must go further. The return of 13,500 police officers is vital, as are our named neighbourhood police officers, but we must also reduce the high abstraction rates that remove those officers from our streets. That is what the people of Leyton and Wanstead deserve, and I hope the Government will go further in this regard. I am proud to support the Bill today.
Jon Pearce (High Peak) (Lab)
In High Peak, our five major towns—Buxton, Glossop, New Mills, Chapel-en-le-Frith and Whaley Bridge—have all been affected in different ways by the crimes the Bill seeks to address. Our town centres are the hearts of our community. At their best, they bring people together and create a sense of pride and belonging. When antisocial behaviour, theft and shoplifting are allowed to take root, it affects not just the victims, but the whole community. Sadly, the previous Government all too often wrote those crimes off as low level and left our communities feeling powerless. This Bill is for all the people I have met on the doorstep and who have come to my surgeries in High Peak—people who wanted a Government on their side, who would take these crimes seriously.
This Bill is for the retail workers and business owners who have to deal with shoplifting day in, day out. The previous Government effectively decriminalised shoplifting of goods worth less than £200, but this Bill will end the Tory shoplifters’ charter and go further by introducing a new criminal offence to better protect retail workers from assault.
This Bill is for all those who want our streets to be safer and pride to be restored to our communities. At the end of February, Derbyshire police had to put in place a dispersal order for two whole days in Glossop in order to tackle antisocial behaviour. The Bill will extend those powers to 72 hours. Through the new respect orders, it sends a clear message to persistent troublemakers: “We see you, we will disrupt you, and we will make your life as difficult as you have made the lives of others.”
Ben Coleman
Does my hon. Friend agree that it is good news that at last we have a Government who are doing something about the scourge of off-road bikes and dangerous e-scooters on the pavements and in our parks by giving the police new powers to seize those vehicles immediately, instead of letting the problem continue? Although this should have happened much sooner, it will make the lives of my residents in Chelsea and Fulham, and people across the country, happier and safer.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
Order. By way of being helpful, I remind right hon. and hon. Members that when they make interventions, they should address them to the Chair, and not to other Members, so there can be no confusion in the debate.
Jon Pearce
Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention. I thoroughly agree that the new powers will be hugely helpful, both in his constituency and in my own.
This Bill is for our children and the most vulnerable in our communities. The hottest circle of hell is reserved for anyone who exploits and abuses a child. The independent inquiry into child sex abuse, which was set up by the Conservatives in 2015, took seven years to complete and cost £200 million, made 20 recommendations. Shamefully, the previous Government did not implement a single one. This Bill will right that wrong. We will introduce statutory reporting for instances of child sex abuse, grooming behaviour will be an aggravating factor, and there will be new powers to search for instances of child sex abuse on digital devices of individuals arriving in the UK.
We will go further by going after the gangs that seek to exploit children for criminal purposes. It is estimated that 14,000 children are at risk or involved in criminal exploitation, and sadly, some of those victims are in High Peak. From police and schools, I have heard heartbreaking stories of children being forced into drug dealing, of homes being taken over by drug dealers, and of young lives ruined. The weak laws that the previous Government left us meant that authorities were powerless to act in many cases. Our new laws will make it a criminal offence for adults to use children to commit criminal offences such as drug running, organised robbery and the new offence of cuckooing. The vile gangs that exploit children in High Peak for criminal gain are the lowest of the low, and I will be supporting Derbyshire police to use the full extent of the new laws to drive them out of our communities.
This Bill is for women and girls. For International Women’s Day, I held a joint event with Crossroads Derbyshire, an incredible charity that works to support domestic abuse survivors. Crossroads has a new stalking advocacy service, funded by the Labour police and crime commissioner’s office. The Bill will strengthen the police’s response to stalking and give victims the right to know the identity of online stalkers. Let the message go out from here today to stalkers: “There will be no hiding place for you on our streets or online.”
This Bill is for everyone who believes in the rule of law and that there should be zero tolerance for those who threaten our security and safety. It is for those who want to take back control of our streets and communities.
Alex Ballinger (Halesowen) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to speak in this debate as the son of a local bobby—my mum worked for 20 years in the local police, serving her community, and I could not be more proud of her. My father, too, was a local bobby, as was his father before him, so my family have something of a reputation.
I am, of course, delighted to see the Government’s recommitment to neighbourhood policing after 14 years of neglect. My mum often spoke about the importance of a neighbourhood police officer understanding her community, who the troublemakers are, how to calm tensions and how to make people feel safe. For people across my constituency, feeling safe is what they care about most. They do not feel safe when they see rising rates of knife crime among our young people, or antisocial behaviour on our high streets. They worry that they never see the police on the streets any more.
How we got into this situation is no mystery. Cuts to neighbourhood policing by the last Government left a huge gap in our communities. Before the recent uplift, the west midlands had 700 fewer police officers than it did under the last Labour Government in 2010. People in Halesowen want to feel safe in their homes, on their streets and in their public spaces. They want to trust that the police have the resources, funding and support necessary to do their job.
Two of my constituents, Mr and Mrs Lobodzic, have been in touch to tell me about the impact that antisocial behaviour has had on their lives. Residents of Cradley Heath, they have been subject to harassment, intimidation and unchecked antisocial behaviour, and they have felt unsafe in their own home. The lack of accountability for those responsible has left them feeling hopeless and abandoned. The Bill takes the essential steps needed to address antisocial behaviour such as that experienced by my constituents.
The new respect order can be imposed on individuals who have engaged in, or threatened to engage in, antisocial behaviour. Importantly, breaching a respect order now constitutes a criminal offence. For my constituents in Halesowen, that will provide much-needed reassurance that their concerns are being taken seriously, and that those who disrupt the peace will face real consequences. Deputy Chief Constable Andy Prophet, who leads on antisocial behaviour for the National Police Chiefs’ Council, said:
“Respect orders will give the police and councils the ability to crack down on those who persistently make our streets and public spaces feel unsafe.”
Although those measures are promising, it is important that they go hand in hand with another critical demand from my constituents: the visible presence of police officers. People want to see their local officers regularly patrolling their streets, just as my mum used to do. That is why I am pleased to see, alongside the Bill, the introduction of the neighbourhood policing guarantee, which will ensure the deployment of an additional 13,000 police officers, PCSOs and special constables into neighbourhood policing roles. By reinforcing community policing, we will not only deter and prevent crime, but strengthen the response to emergencies and enhance trust between the police and the public.
In Halesowen we are fortunate to have dedicated and exemplary police officers such as Sergeant Nichola Chester, and PCSOs such as Nathan Fung, as members of our excellent but stretched neighbourhood team. It is vital that their efforts are bolstered with the resources and manpower that they need to maintain safety and security. The Bill is a critical step towards achieving that goal.
The people of Halesowen deserve to live without fear, to walk our streets with confidence and to know that their Government are steadfast in their commitment to their safety. The Bill, with its focus on tackling antisocial behaviour and reinvigorating neighbourhood policing, represents a decisive step in the right direction, and I am pleased to support it.
Jas Athwal (Ilford South) (Lab)
I rise to support the Government’s Crime and Policing Bill. The last time I addressed the House on policing I shared the fact that the borough of Redbridge, which I led, once had five police stations, but after a decade of Conservative cuts only one remains standing. That is not just a fact but a direct reflection of how the Conservative party deprioritised policing and failed to protect our residents, friends and neighbours. When we deprioritise policing, we do more than weaken law enforcement; we allow crime to spiral out of control, we expose our communities to harm and we erode the very fabric of our society.
The Bill is a crucial step in reversing 14 years of neglect and ensuring tougher consequences for criminal behaviour. It tackles a wide range of issues, from knife crime to terrorism, but I want to focus on a matter that affects our daily lives: antisocial behaviour. For too long it has been treated as low-level or even trivial crime, but in Ilford South and across the UK it is anything but trivial. It erodes community trust and often paves the way for more serious criminal activity. We see antisocial behaviour on the ground, in the nitrous oxide canisters littering our streets. We see it in our local shops, where retail workers face shoplifters daily. We see it on our streets, where young girls, often in school uniform, endure harassment from men much older than them.
Antisocial behaviour is not just an inconvenience but a warning sign. Last year, two teenagers stabbed staff members at Goodmayes station. They were also charged with a prior robbery incident at a nearby Tesco. That is what happens when we turn a blind eye to so-called low-level crime: it escalates, posing an even bigger threat to our communities. That is why I welcome the Bill. It makes a clear statement that antisocial behaviour will no longer be tolerated.
I am particularly pleased to see the scrapping of the effective immunity for shoplifting of goods under £200, and stronger protections for retail workers against assault. When workers in our shops, supermarkets and local businesses cannot feel safe, and we cannot feel safe doing our weekly shopping, the system has failed. By ending the decriminalisation of so-called low-level theft, we are ensuring that our local town centres are protected to thrive. Safety is about not just theft of property but the right to go about our daily lives and walk our streets without fear or intimidation.
When I was leader of Redbridge council, we took decisive action to make our streets safe for women and girls. We were the first council to use public spaces protection orders to punish those catcalling and harassing women and girls. I am pleased to see the strengthening of those protection orders in the Bill, and the introduction of respect orders, which will ensure that communities across the country have the power to tackle nuisance, harassment and intimidation on our streets.
We all deserve to feel safe in our homes, on our streets, in our shops and in our schools. The Bill begins to turn our promise into reality.
Lillian Jones (Kilmarnock and Loudoun) (Lab)
In common with hon. Members from across the House, this debate is of paramount importance to the people in my constituency. The Labour Government have inherited a shameful legacy from the Conservative party, which had 14 years to address criminality and antisocial behaviour but instead left our communities feeling unsafe.
The situation in Scotland has frightening similarities, with the SNP Government failing communities across Scotland. Since the SNP introduced its under-22 bus pass initiative, many of my constituents have told me that they are now afraid to visit Kilmarnock bus station or even use local bus services. This is not about demonising young people—far from it, as they are more likely to be victims of crime and antisocial behaviour than the perpetrators of it—but it is wrong to ignore the significant minority who make life a misery for others. Scotland badly needs Labour’s respect orders to effectively tackle the minorities’ behaviour that has been intimidating our communities for far too long.
Labour’s respect orders will deliver stronger powers for our police in Scotland, helping them to keep our communities safe, but, yet again, Scotland is being let down by the SNP and its inaction. Similarly, the bus pass scheme, which should be something to be celebrated, has created a situation where people of all ages are now thinking twice about using their local bus services. As my friend the Scottish Labour leader Anas Sarwar said,
“under-22s that are found to have repeatedly acted violently on buses”
should have their free bus passes taken off them. That should be obvious—rights should come with responsibilities —and it is shameful that there is currently no mechanism to withdraw a free bus pass from someone who has been abusing one. That needs to change.
It is totally unacceptable to see chronic antisocial behaviour continue with no effective action from the SNP. The Crime and Policing Bill demonstrates that Labour is on the side of law-abiding people, and I will be proud to vote for the Bill at the conclusion of the debate.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
That brings us to the Front-Bench contributions.
Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)
I take this opportunity to thank our brave, hard-working police officers, PCSOs, police staff and volunteers for the huge sacrifices they make to keep our streets safe. I thank all hon. Members across the House for their considered and concise contributions.
The Bill covers a wide array of offences, and we all welcome that. Tackling criminality means equipping the police and enforcement agencies with the powers that they need to lock up dangerous perpetrators to make our streets safer. The Bill contains meaningful and impactful provisions, particularly in relation to knife crime, car theft, retail crime, the sharing of intimate images, child sexual abuse, drug testing and cuckooing among many others.
It is generous of the Government to hold the previous Conservative Government’s work in such high esteem: in fact, about two thirds of the measures in the Bill are copied straight from the previous Government. As was said—I think on several occasions—it is a copy-and-paste job that even the Chancellor would blush over. I thank my right hon. Friends the Members for Braintree (Mr Cleverly) and for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), alongside many other past and current Members of the House, for their significant work in ensuring that those offences are included in the scope of the Bill. That work will ultimately have a positive impact on the lives of all our constituents. Time does not allow me to talk through all the measures in the Bill [Hon. Members: “Oh.”] I know that hon. Members are disappointed, but I will focus on a few important provisions.
First, let me turn to retail crime. As hon. Members across this House may know, having served as the chair of the all-party parliamentary group on the future of retail and as a former Woolies worker—no one ever questions whether I am old enough—I have been very involved in the campaign to protect our retail workers. I have joined the likes of the hon. Member for Nottingham North and Kimberley (Alex Norris), Paul Gerrard from the Co-op, Helen Dickinson and the team at the British Retail Consortium, the Association of Convenience Stores, USDAW, numerous retailers and others who have worked to deliver more protection for our retail workers.
Back in 2021—during my slightly rebellious phase—I tabled an amendment that helped us to make an assault on a person providing a service to the public a statutory aggravating offence. More recently in April 2024, alongside a suite of measures designed to tackle retail crime, we saw the last Government agree to the creation of a stand-alone offence of assaulting a retail worker. I am glad that that will be taken up by the incumbent Government and hope that it will have a real impact and improve the lives of these important key workers in high streets and stores across the country.
I have two concerns, however, about the Bill regarding retail crime. First, the previous Government’s plans had proposed to make it mandatory for the courts to impose at least a curfew requirement, an exclusion requirement or an electronic monitoring requirement on repeat offenders convicted of shoplifting or the new offence of assaulting a retail worker and sentenced to a community order or a suspended sentence. That had been welcomed by retailers, but the Bill does not include any provisions to this effect. I urge the Government to look again at this, to ensure that we are doing all we can to protect retail workers and avoid what appears to be the watering down of potential protections.
Secondly, on the plans to remove the £200 threshold for shoplifting, while the rhetoric sounds positive, it is untrue to say that theft under £200 was ever decriminalised. In fact, the Government’s own impact assessment tells us that 90% of charges for shoplifting relate to property worth less than £200. There is a fear that measures will lead to further delays to justice being done while not leading to tougher or longer sentences. Victims of retail crime deserve swift justice, not year-long delays while perpetrators continue to offend.
I turn now to further legislative steps that I hope Members across the House will find difficult to oppose. One hugely important measure is the introduction of a statutory aggravating factor, requiring sentencing courts to treat grooming behaviour as an aggravating factor when considering the seriousness of child sexual offences. The Opposition believe that the Government should go further and establish a national statutory inquiry, but it is right that they have brought forward this measure from the Criminal Justice Bill. It recognises the severity of the offence and ensures that third parties involved in the heinous practices of these rape gangs face justice and punishment. We must take every step possible to protect the most vulnerable and ensure that stronger laws are in place so that the terrible crimes of the past cannot be repeated.
Another key measure in the Bill, contained in clauses 96 to 100, expands the ability to conduct drug tests upon arrest. The expansion of the drug testing on arrival programme, introduced by the previous Conservative Government, has already demonstrated the sheer number of individuals found to be under the influence of substances when arrested. Between March 2022 and September 2024, police forces reported a total of 154,295 tests to the Home Office. Of these, 86,207, or 56%, were positive for cocaine, opiates or both. It is therefore right that we expand the drug testing programme to cover as wide a range of class B and C drugs as possible, allowing the police to access the information they need to manage offenders appropriately within the criminal justice system.
I also welcome the efforts to tackle off-road bikes. Having seen their impact on my constituents, I hope that during the passage of the Bill we might consider going even further, maybe even considering suggestions made by Government Back Benchers. We must use this opportunity to ensure that the police have the powers they need, and to examine where further powers are required to ensure that the law truly serves the victims of crime and provides a level of openness and transparency for our police forces so that people can have confidence in our justice system.
Additionally, we should all want to see the police doing what they do best: on the beat, preventing and investigating crime. Their time should not be wasted on matters that the public do not consider a priority. Time and again, we see reports of police officers being sent to respond to incidents that are not criminal in nature while serious offences on our streets go unchallenged. The measures in this Bill to tackle antisocial behaviour signal an understanding that removing crime from our streets must be a priority. However, we must consider whether more can be done legislatively to ensure that police time is used effectively.
I must stress that all the well-meaning measures contained in the Bill are meaningless without a well-funded police force. Forces are—[Interruption.] Forces—some led by Labour police and crime commissioners—are raising legitimate concerns about the level of funding they will receive from the Government. Any reduction in police numbers undermines every element of this Bill, weakening the police’s ability to tackle crime across the country. The head of the Metropolitan police has raised his concerns about potential job losses in our capital city—a city where 30% of England and Wales’s knife crime occurs.
I should note at this point that it is very welcome to see the Government reintroducing many of the measures on tackling knife crime put forward in the Criminal Justice Bill by the previous Conservative Government, including a power to retain and destroy bladed articles on private property and to increase the maximum penalty for the sale of dangerous weapons to under-18s. Given that the financial pressures faced by police forces amount to an estimated £118 million shortfall, there is a real concern that the Government’s actions will contribute to a decline in police numbers. The Government’s police funding increase masks the Chancellor’s national insurance hike on our police forces and their failure to build police pay awards into the baseline.
Moving forward, we will have ample opportunities as a House to scrutinise the legislation and consider potential improvements. Reading the impact assessments and economic notes accompanying the Bill reveals uncertainty about the effects of its various measures. Notably, there is a lack of clarity regarding the number of individuals expected to be imprisoned for certain offences, with significant variation in the estimates provided. The Government must back our police over the criminals and demonstrate the political will to do so. They must provide police with the resources and robust powers they need to keep officers on the beat, deliver swift justice for victims and, in turn, make our streets safer. This Bill is a step forward. Across the House, we all need to support our police officers to tackle the heinous crimes—
Neil Coyle
Thank you. On swift justice, will the Opposition Front Bench bring forward amendments regarding the shadow Home Secretary’s position on citizen’s arrest? How many amendments can we expect to see about how the police should respond to citizen’s arrests?
Matt Vickers
What the shadow Home Secretary was doing in office was putting more police on the country’s streets than ever before—149,679 police officers. We hope the Government will maintain that as we move forward, but there are lots of question marks around that.
We all need to support our police officers to tackle the heinous crimes that we have heard about in the debate. I hope the Government remain open to considering measures proposed by Opposition and Government Members who are committed to robustly tackling the very behaviours that this legislation seeks to prevent.
The Minister for Policing, Fire and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)
It is an honour and privilege to wind up the debate on what is, as the Home Secretary set out in her opening speech, a critically important Bill. It is critically important for all sorts of reasons, many of which have been highlighted during the debate. It has been a wide-ranging discussion, which is unsurprising given the Bill’s scope and breadth.
There have been many excellent and powerful contributions, particularly from the Government Benches, with over 57 Back-Bench speakers. There is a thread that binds all the Bill’s measures together: this Government’s unwavering commitment to the security of our country and the safety of our communities and people we all represent. We are on the side of the law-abiding majority, who have had enough after 14 years of Conservative Governments.
This Bill will support and progress our safer streets mission, which is integral to the Government’s plan for change. We are determined to rebuild neighbourhood policing, restore confidence in the criminal justice system and reduce the harm caused by crime. We have already taken action to strengthen the response to threats, including knife crime, antisocial behaviour and violence against women and girls, but to deliver the change that the British people want and deserve, we must go further, and this Bill will allow us to do that.
It is evident from the debate that there is broad cross-party support for many of the Bill’s measures. It has been helpful to have the insights and experience of hon. Members who have previously served as police officers—my hon. Friends the Members for Pendle and Clitheroe (Jonathan Hinder) and for Forest of Dean (Matt Bishop)—as well as the wise words from a former Crown prosecutor who now sits on the Government Benches, my hon. Friend the Member for Amber Valley (Linsey Farnsworth).
Many of my hon. Friends welcomed the commitment to neighbourhood policing, the focus on antisocial behaviour, the introduction of respect orders and the new powers for vehicles being used for antisocial behaviour. In fact, there is a very long list of those Members: my hon. Friends the Members for Telford (Shaun Davies), for Hemel Hempstead (David Taylor), for Hyndburn (Sarah Smith), for Stockton North (Chris McDonald), for Chatham and Aylesford (Tristan Osborne), for Morecambe and Lunesdale (Lizzi Collinge), for Ealing Southall (Deirdre Costigan), for Bracknell (Peter Swallow), for Portsmouth North (Amanda Martin), for Halesowen (Alex Ballinger), for Gravesham (Dr Sullivan), for Ilford South (Jas Athwal), for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Lillian Jones), for Erewash (Adam Thompson), for Bournemouth West (Jessica Toale), for Doncaster East and the Isle of Axholme (Lee Pitcher), for Calder Valley (Josh Fenton-Glynn), for Makerfield (Josh Simons), for Uxbridge and South Ruislip (Danny Beales), for City of Durham (Mary Kelly Foy), for Edinburgh North and Leith (Tracy Gilbert), for Crewe and Nantwich (Connor Naismith), for Hartlepool (Mr Brash) and for Mansfield (Steve Yemm). They all spoke with great passion about their constituencies and the effect that antisocial behaviour has had on their communities.
Similarly, many hon. Friends spoke about retail crime and the ending of the shoplifters’ charter, and welcomed the new offence that will better protect retail workers. We heard about that from my hon. Friends the Members for Banbury (Sean Woodcock), for Derby South (Baggy Shanker), for Buckingham and Bletchley (Callum Anderson), for St Helens North (David Baines), for Wolverhampton North East (Mrs Brackenridge) and for High Peak (Jon Pearce).
Members spoke eloquently in support of the new offences to tackle child criminal exploitation, stalking, cuckooing, spiking and knife crime, including my hon. Friends the Members for Warrington South (Sarah Hall), for Stafford (Leigh Ingham), for Colchester (Pam Cox), for Milton Keynes Central (Emily Darlington), for Scarborough and Whitby (Alison Hume), for Bolton West (Phil Brickell) and for Leyton and Wanstead (Mr Bailey).
I also pay tribute to the Members who have campaigned on these issues for some time, including the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) and my hon. Friends the Members for Rotherham (Sarah Champion) and for Newport West and Islwyn (Ruth Jones). The measures for which they have been campaigning are in the Bill. I say to the right hon. Gentleman, who we recognise is a doughty campaigner, that we are certainly considering dangerous cycling in detail.
In the limited time available to me, I will focus on a few of the points raised throughout the debate, but there will clearly be opportunities during line-by-line scrutiny in Committee to debate all the matters raised this evening fully and properly. I will start with the shadow Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), who asked a number of questions—some of which were not a surprise, given his focus on technology in particular. In his speech, he seemed to be suffering from amnesia about what has happened to policing and crime over the past 14 years. It is worth gently reminding him that, in the period from April to June last year, when his Government were still in post and, in fact, he was Policing Minister, police numbers were going down. I just thought that I would gently remind him of that, because he obviously needs a bit of help to recall what was happening on his watch. Of course, neighbourhood policing was decimated under the previous Government.
Let me get to some of the specific questions that the shadow Home Secretary wanted me to answer. We all agree that rough sleeping and nuisance begging are complex issues. We are working closely with the Deputy Prime Minister and her Department to ensure that such individuals, who are often vulnerable, are appropriately supported—that is set against our commitment to stand by the police and effectively tackle crime and antisocial behaviour. As it stands, the Vagrancy Act 1824 remains in force, and we know that police forces in many areas also use the ASB powers to tackle the antisocial behaviour associated with begging and rough sleeping.
The shadow Home Secretary also asked about the provisions to compel offenders to attend sentencing hearings. As announced in the King’s Speech in 2024, those measures will be introduced in the forthcoming victims, courts and public protection Bill.
Dame Diana Johnson
I would really like to get on actually. The shadow Home Secretary had quite a lot of time at the beginning of the debate, and I would like to respond to the Back Benchers who have spent many hours in the Chamber in order to make their points. However, in response to a question that he asked about knife scanning technology, the Home Office is still working with industry partners to develop systems that are specifically designed to detect at a distance knives concealed on a person. That work is part of the Innovation competitions that were launched last year, and phase one is expected to be delivered by the end of May, resulting in the first prototype systems.
Facial recognition was mentioned by the shadow Home Secretary and a number of hon. Members, and such technology is an important tool to help the police to identify offenders more quickly and accurately. It is showing significant potential to increase police productivity and effectiveness, and it could substantially contribute to our safer streets mission. We need to support the police by ensuring that they have clarity, especially where there is a balance to strike between ensuring public safety and safeguarding the rights of individuals. I will be considering the options for that, alongside broader police reforms that will be in the White Paper later in the spring.
Public order, particularly the issue of protest, was raised by a number of hon. Members including my hon. Friends the Members for Liverpool Riverside (Kim Johnson) and for Bristol North East (Damien Egan), and the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Lisa Smart). The right to peaceful protest is a fundamental part of our democracy, and we are fully committed to protecting and preserving that right. However, it is vital that we strike the right balance between the right to protest and the rights of the wider community. I am sure we will debate that issue more fully in Committee. We will also be carrying out expedited post-legislative scrutiny of the Public Order Act 2023, beginning in May. That process will look at how the legislation has operated since coming into force, and we will consider carefully the outputs of that review.
My hon. Friend the Member for Gower (Tonia Antoniazzi) asked me to confirm that any amendments to the Bill on the subject of abortion will be subject to a free vote. All women have access to safe legal abortions on the NHS up to 24 weeks, including taking early medical abortion pills at home where eligible. We recognise that this is an extremely sensitive issue, and there are strongly held views on all sides of the discussion. My hon. Friend will understand that whipping on the Government Benches is a matter for the Government Chief Whip.
My hon. Friend the Member for North West Cambridgeshire (Sam Carling) spoke knowledgably about the issue of mandatory reporting. He referred particularly to religious groups and spoke about the Jehovah’s Witnesses, and he asked for a meeting to discuss the matter further. The purpose of mandatory reporting is obviously to improve the protection of children, and our aim is to create a culture of support, knowledge and openness when dealing with child sexual abuse. That is why we consider it more appropriate for those who fail to discharge their duty to face referral to the Disclosure and Barring Service, and professional regulators where applicable. Those bodies can prevent individuals from working with children, potentially losing their livelihood, which is a serious consequence. The strongest possible sanctions will apply to individuals where deliberate actions have been taken to obstruct a report being made under the duty. Anyone who seeks to prevent a reporter from carrying out their duty to report will face the prospect of up to seven years’ imprisonment.
My hon. Friends the Members for Gower and for Edinburgh North and Leith (Tracy Gilbert), and the hon. Member for Reigate (Rebecca Paul) asked whether the Bill could be used to reform our prostitution laws. I assure hon. Members that the Government are committed to tackling the harms and exploitation that can be associated with prostitution, and ensuring that women who want to leave prostitution are given every opportunity to find routes out. The Government are closely monitoring new approaches that are being developed in Northern Ireland and parts of mainland Europe, working closely with the voluntary and community sector, and the police, to ensure that the safeguarding of women remains at the heart of our approach.
The repeal of part 4 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 was also raised regarding unauthorised encampments, including by my hon. Friends the Members for City of Durham (Mary Kelly Foy) and for Liverpool Riverside. I thank my hon. Friends for raising that issue. The Government are considering the High Court’s decision and will respond in due course.
The hon. and learned Member for North Antrim (Jim Allister) raised questions about the application of certain provisions in the Bill to Northern Ireland. I assure him and the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon), who raised similar questions, that we are continuing to discuss with the Minister for Justice in Northern Ireland whether further provisions in the Bill should apply to Northern Ireland.
Questions about domestic abuse were raised by the Liberal Democrat home affairs spokesperson, the hon. Member for Hazel Grove, and by the hon. Member for Eastbourne (Josh Babarinde). As was discussed in the debate, domestic abuse covers a wide range of behaviours and is already considered by the courts as a factor that increases the seriousness of offending, which may lead to an increase in the length of a sentence. I am sure that the Minister for Safeguarding would be happy to talk to the hon. Member for Eastbourne about his specific concerns about the current legislation.
In conclusion, this is a wide-ranging and ambitious Bill. It has the straightforward purpose of making our country safer. It will achieve that by restoring neighbourhood policing, by giving law enforcement stronger powers to combat threats that ruin lives and livelihoods, and by rebuilding public confidence in the criminal justice system. It is clear that people around the country want change. They want to feel protected by a visible, responsive police service; they want to know that when our laws our broken, justice will be sought and served; and they want to have a sense of security and confidence, so that they can go about their lives freely and without fear. That is why we have put the safer streets mission at the heart of our plan for change, and it is why we have brought forward this Bill, which I wholeheartedly commend to the House.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time.
Crime and Policing Bill: Programme
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),
That the following provisions shall apply to the Crime and Policing Bill:
Committal
(1) The Bill shall be committed to a Public Bill Committee.
Proceedings in Public Bill Committee
(2) Proceedings in the Public Bill Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion on Tuesday 13 May 2025.
(3) The Public Bill Committee shall have leave to sit twice on the first day on which it meets.
Proceedings on Consideration and Third Reading
(4) Proceedings on Consideration shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which those proceedings are commenced.
(5) Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.
(6) Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings on Consideration and Third Reading.
Other proceedings
(7) Any other proceedings on the Bill may be programmed.—(Taiwo Owatemi.)
Question agreed to.
Crime and Policing Bill (First sitting)
Thursday 27th March 2025
(1 year, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 27 March 2025 - (27 Mar 2025)
The Chair
We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we begin, I remind Members to switch electronic devices to silent, please. Tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings.
Today, we will first consider the programme motion on the amendment paper. We will then consider a motion to enable the reporting of written evidence for publication and a motion to allow us to deliberate in private about our questions before the oral evidence sessions. In view of the time available, I hope that we can take those matters formally, without debate.
I first call the Minister to move the programme motion standing in her name, which was discussed yesterday by the Programming Sub-Committee.
The Minister for Policing, Fire and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)
Good morning, Dr Allin-Khan. I am minded that we have a busy day ahead of us, so I will move the preliminary motions formally. Time Witness Until no later than 12.15 pm National Police Chiefs’ Council; Police Superintendents’ Association; Police Federation of England and Wales Until no later than 12.45 pm Oliver Sells KC; Rt Hon Sir Robert Buckland KBE KC Until no later than 1.00 pm Spike Aware Until no later than 2.40 pm The Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers; Co-operative Group Limited; British Retail Consortium Until no later than 3.10 pm The Victims’ Commissioner for England and Wales; The Suzy Lamplugh Trust Until no later than 3.40 pm Internet Watch Foundation; Action for Children Until no later than 4.10 pm Local Government Association; Neil Garratt AM Until no later than 4.50 pm The Police and Crime Commissioner for Humberside; The Police and Crime Commissioner for Thames Valley; The Police, Fire and Crime Commissioner for Essex; The Association of Police and Crime Commissioners Until no later than 5.05 pm Dr Lawrence Newport Until no later than 5.20 pm The National Farmers’ Union of England and Wales Until no later than 5.35 pm Stand with Hong Kong Until no later than 5.55 pm Home Office; Ministry of Justice
Ordered,
That—
1. the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 11.30 am on Thursday 27 March) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Thursday 27 March;
(b) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 1 April;
(c) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 3 April;
(d) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 8 April;
(e) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 24 April;
(f) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 29 April;
(g) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 1 May;
(h) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 8 May;
(i) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 13 May;
2. the Committee shall hear oral evidence on Thursday 27 March in accordance with the following Table:
3. proceedings on consideration of the Bill in Committee shall be taken in the following order: Clauses 1 and 2; Schedule 1; Clauses 3 to 5; Schedule 2; Clause 6; Schedule 3; Clauses 7 to 30; Schedule 4; Clauses 31 and 32; Schedule 5; Clauses 33 to 38; Schedule 6; Clauses 39 to 45; Schedule 7; Clauses 46 to 56; Schedule 8; Clauses 57 to 68; Schedule 9; Clauses 69 to 82; Schedule 10; Clauses 83 to 90; Schedule 11; Clauses 91 and 92; Schedule 12; Clauses 93 to 96; Schedule 13; Clauses 97 to 102; Schedules 14 and 15; Clauses 103 to 124; Schedule 16; Clauses 125 to 130; new Clauses; new Schedules; Clauses 131 to 137; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
4. the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Tuesday 13 May.—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
Resolved,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
The Chair
Copies of written evidence that the Committee receives will be made available in the Committee Room.
Resolved,
That, at this and any subsequent meeting at which oral evidence is to be heard, the Committee shall sit in private until the witnesses are admitted.—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
The Chair
We are now sitting in public again and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we start hearing from the witnesses, do any Members wish to make a declaration of interest in connection with the Bill?
Matt Bishop (Forest of Dean) (Lab)
I declare my former occupation as a police officer. I am a member of NARPO, the National Association of Retired Police Officers.
The Chair
If any interests are particularly relevant to a Member’s questioning or speech, they should declare them again at the appropriate time.
Examination of Witnesses
Chief Constable Tim De Meyer, Dan Murphy KPM and Tiff Lynch gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the Police Superintendents Association of England and Wales, and the Police Federation of England and Wales. We must stick to the timings in the programme motion that the Committee has agreed. For this session, we have until 12.15 pm. Will witnesses introduce themselves briefly for the record?
Chief Constable De Meyer: I am Tim De Meyer, chief constable of Surrey and the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for disclosure.
Tiff Lynch: Good morning. I am Tiff Lynch, acting national chair of the Police Federation of England and Wales.
Dan Murphy: Morning. I am Dan Murphy, assistant national secretary of the Police Superintendents Association.
Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)
Q
Chief Constable De Meyer: The NPCC does not see any measures that have been omitted, save perhaps for the provision on begging, which was in an initial draft, but we understand there were concerns in respect of how that might be enforced. Overall, the NPCC is extremely supportive of the Bill. It seems to us that it brings a lot of laws up to date and frames the law in a way that is much more consistent with the way that a lot of crimes are now committed. It generally enables much earlier intervention and prevention on the back of the new or adapted offences that are created.
Matt Vickers
Q
Chief Constable De Meyer: The point in respect of begging is that, although we were generally supportive of the inclusion of nuisance begging in the provisions, it would require a certain amount of judgment in how to enforce that. That was the only point that NPCC colleagues noted was in the original provisions but is not here. Other than that, they are extremely supportive.
Tiff Lynch: In relation to the overarching Bill, we concur with Chief Constable De Meyer. We are supportive of new legislation that brings us up to societal issues. I do not want to sound like a broken record throughout all the questions, but our main concerns are the infrastructure that sits behind the legislation; the demand that is placed upon the officers we represent, who will be out there on the streets enacting this legislation; resourcing; and the learning, training and development of the officers who will be required to carry it out.
Dan Murphy: The Police Superintendents Association also supports the Bill and the provisions within it. With any legislation, there will obviously need to be clarity through the courts, training or the guidance that comes with the Bill. I have read with interest the debates for and against some of the clauses. On the power of entry, electronic devices and public order, some of the definitions are not defined within the legislation. There is a specific concern that I have read—it might not be a concern—about mandatory reporting in clauses 45 to 54 and whether the covert nature of policing would be dealt with through an exception or some kind of exemption with regard to that route.
Matt Vickers
Q
Dan Murphy: I think it gives you the tools to do the job, but whenever you enter private homes, you only have to look at the case law on warrants, where we have full powers, to see that they are challenged regularly. We need to make sure we are trained and get it right. As this is a new bit of legislation, I am sure there will be challenges either way as and when it is used.
Matt Vickers
Q
Dan Murphy: I think there is a role for the Government and Parliament to communicate that it is a power that has been given to policing. It is not something that policing is searching for and trying to use. The public need to understand that it has been given to us for a reason, and we are using it.
Tiff Lynch: I would go one step further in relation to the public having knowledge of the powers. That also gives our police officers confidence that the Government are behind them when they are enforcing these laws, and the knowledge that they are supported in what they are doing.
Chief Constable De Meyer: We know that the ability to track mobile devices is not sufficiently accurate at the moment for it to be relied upon without some form of corroboration. Therefore, one understands why things are more tightly framed. Where there is good intelligence for its use, this ability to enter swiftly to search for stolen goods without the need to get a warrant will mean that we are able to recover stolen property more swiftly, and that investigations are less likely to be frustrated. To ensure legitimacy in the eyes of the public, that obviously needs to be carried out carefully, but overall it will make it less likely that property, whether electronic property or property linked to rural crime, can be swiftly disposed of. Our current inability to deal expeditiously with those sorts of crimes can adversely impact public confidence. Overall, it is a very positive operational thing.
Dame Diana Johnson
Q
Chief Constable De Meyer: The requirement of belief is obviously a relatively high bar; for example, it is above suspicion. I think that that reflects the need to ensure that a new power such as this is applied carefully and with appropriate corroboration. Crucially, an inspector is going to be readily operationally available for an officer in this sort of dynamic circumstance, so the officer will be able to make contact with and get the authorisation from them. It seems to me that the thrust of the power is very much towards enabling the police to recover property quickly, so belief is a good safeguard and the inspector is appropriately senior and accessible. I would agree on those two points.
Dame Diana Johnson
Does any other panel member want to comment?
Dan Murphy: I think we need to make sure that we have the right training and guidance. Because of the power that we have, we should expect challenge. There will be challenge. My “reasonable grounds to believe” may be different from those of somebody else around the table. To form that belief, we would have gone through a process of using proportionate, necessary and justified means, and looking at the intelligence and evidence in front of us, but that is different for everyone. There is not a black and white answer to how that will be decided.
Dame Diana Johnson
But do you think that inspector-level authorisation is the appropriate level?
Dan Murphy: Yes.
Tiff Lynch: Good morning, Minister. I agree with both Chief Constable De Meyer and Dan Murphy in relation to the authorisation level. Again, I would say that we have to manage the expectations of victims of crime as to how speedy the recovery of technical equipment will be, given that we have identified locations and given that demand is already being placed on officers who are out there. It is also about managing expectations.
Dame Diana Johnson
Q
Chief Constable De Meyer: We think that the new powers—placing, as they will, requirements on those who have committed ASB, including positive requirements to carry out certain actions—will give us rather more flexibility in dealing with this type of behaviour. They are also preventive and, in some cases, restorative. We think the deterrent value will be greater, and making the breach of the order a criminal offence will allow us to quickly arrest where there has not been compliance. Overall, the NPCC thinks that this will enable earlier intervention. We know that antisocial behaviour has a very serious effect on community confidence and on people’s ability to engage in educational, social and economic life, so anything that enables us to deal more swiftly with problems when they are in their infancy is to be welcomed.
Tiff Lynch: Without repeating, we agree. Perpetrators can be required to address the root cause of the problems, once they have been dealt with. Again, I come back to resource and demand. Certainly on the arrest element, perpetrators going into custody places a huge demand on the custody department and police officers. We need the infrastructure that is placed behind it. We are already seeing, certainly on custodial sentences, a backlog of cases in the criminal justice system, and then prison spaces overcrowding. We need to have the infrastructure behind this to make it effective and believable.
Dame Diana Johnson
Q
Tiff Lynch: Yes, it does, but I come back to the time required for the follow-on processes. Once you have dealt with a perpetrator, there are hours spent with paperwork and systems following that. That could wipe out our neighbourhood officers in one shift. Sadly, until we get that infrastructure and the systems that back up any law—certainly with these new laws—demand and all the other priorities could wipe out those additional officers in one shift.
Dame Diana Johnson
Q
Dan Murphy: It has come under the banner of antisocial behaviour, which it is. A lot of antisocial behaviour issues that police deal with are for those who are under the age of 18. This applies to those 18 and over. The power is good, but if the public think we will be able to use this for teenagers, there will be a mismatch. I think the power of arrest is good, but I note that there is a requirement to give a warning if there is a positive requirement in the respect order. The public might think that since the respect order has been issued, we can just go out and arrest the person, but we cannot. There are a few caveats, which are obviously to make the law fair and ensure people subject to it understand what is happening. I think the power of arrest will be extremely useful, but as Tiff said, someone has to make that arrest and then someone has to put a case file together to prove the breach, so there is work to be done and resource to be put into this. It does need to be resourced if it is going to be successful, but the main point is that it is for over-18s.
Dame Diana Johnson
Q
Chief Constable De Meyer: When I appear at community events, I often find that the £200 point is a source of great confusion and misunderstanding. To resolve that ambiguity is extremely welcome, as it has wrongly been supposed that shoplifting under that threshold is legal, which plainly is not the case. To resolve that ambiguity is a good thing.
The specific offence of assaulting a retail worker acknowledges the vital role that retail workers play in community and local economic life, and the disproport- ionate likelihood of their being assaulted in the course of their work. By creating this offence, it enables us to identify much more precisely the extent of the problem and to deal with the crime in circumstances that the law much more closely reflects. It is certainly welcome from our perspective.
Tiff Lynch: I would like to focus on the assaults on retail workers offence. We support this. Nobody should go to their place of work with the expectation that they will be assaulted—absolutely nobody. Again, it comes down to resourcing, but it is worth mentioning that the same principle was applied for the assaults on emergency workers offence only a few years ago, which was championed by the Police Federation of England and Wales. Unfortunately, due to the backlog within the criminal justice system, we have now seen that that legislation is not being used effectively. Actually, with the assaults on emergency workers legislation, they are now reverting to the assaults on police constables legislation. If we bring in this law, we need to see strong execution of it and support for retail workers in the same way as for emergency service workers.
Dame Diana Johnson
Mr Murphy, do you have a view on this?
Dan Murphy: No, nothing further.
Dame Diana Johnson
Q
Tiff Lynch: It is simply about time and the length of investigations. For far too long, the length of the investigations has been an issue for police conduct. We expect that officers who do not uphold the warrant they carry should be exited from the organisation swiftly. Those referrals will cut down the time it takes to deal with those investigations dealt with. Essentially, that will prevent any disillusionment from the public, the complainant or the victim, but also the officer concerned.
Dame Diana Johnson
So your view is that it will speed up proceedings.
Tiff Lynch: One would hope so.
Dame Diana Johnson
But you support the change in threshold.
Tiff Lynch: Yes.
Dame Diana Johnson
Would either of the other members of the panel like to say anything on that?
Dan Murphy: I agree with all that. The Police Superintendents Association supports that change.
Luke Taylor (Sutton and Cheam) (LD)
Q
Obviously, protesting—being able to exercise our rights in a democracy to demonstrate our displeasure with something—is incredibly important. What is your understanding of the definition of a protest? In what situations would these measures be imposed on a protest? How would somebody at one of those protests—the Chinese protests are a good example—be treated by officers if a designation was put in place and they were concealing their identities?
Chief Constable De Meyer: It is extremely challenging to give a definitive answer, as the question implies.
On the point about the definition of protest, first, there is of course no single definition of protest. A broad range of activities could qualify as a protest—one person, a gathering, a vigil, a march, the playing of music, chanting or other sorts of activities. It is a very challenging area of law and operational policing.
On the point about concealing identity and the potential threat to safety in respect of transnational repression, I am afraid that, again, my response is going to be not quite as definitive as might be hoped for. We would have to apply the same judgment as we do in other areas of public order operational life, such as in relation to searching. That means if an offence is suspected, it is for the officer to engage with the individuals in question and to carry out a dynamic investigation of what is going on, seeking expert tactical advice where appropriate, or senior authority as well.
It is important to point out that the provision does not say that the power has to be used; it is what may be done, not what must be done. It does very much come down to circumstances and the engagement and judgment of the officer. The advice will be vital. One would expect sensitivities such as this to be addressed through the training of the various public order operatives—the gold commanders, the silver commanders, the bronze commanders and the public order officers themselves. Inevitably, there will be some learning through case law as well.
Tiff Lynch: I agree with the chief constable. I come back to what I said earlier about training and learning the law. Our police officers who are out there during protests work within the confines of the law. They utilise the national decision-making model. It is all about what they see in front of them on the day. We pride ourselves on people being able to protest lawfully, within the confines of the law. How the officers act on the day, depending on what they are presented with, will be determined on the day.
Dan Murphy: It is a long time since I ran a public order operation. To me, as a police officer and a commander—we have talked about neighbourhood policing—it is about talking to people. If you are presented with what you as a commander think is a protest that you can justify, if you have a protest that is not going to cause any particular problems, why would you go down this route, even as a preventive thing? If you have people present who are covering their faces and you think it might raise an issue, you could just send an officer to go and speak to them and say, “Would you mind identifying yourself, so that we know who you are?” You deal with it by talking to people.
Luke Taylor
Q
Chief Constable De Meyer: It is an extremely good point in respect of the judgment that the officer would exercise. There have plainly been circumstances where people have concealed their identity as a means of escaping detection and frustrating the efforts of the authorities to identify those responsible for offences within protests, and their doing so meant that we were not able to prevent further criminal activity. So I think the powers are necessary, but they are to be exercised with caution and good judgment.
The Chair
Many Members have caught my eye. I will only be able to get everybody in if Members keep their questions very brief.
David Burton-Sampson (Southend West and Leigh) (Lab)
Q
“with intent to use unlawful violence”.
Can you explain how operationally that bridges the gap between the current legislation on simple possession and using a bladed article or offensive weapon to threaten or harm somebody? How is this going to help us to drive down knife crime?
Chief Constable De Meyer: This allows for greater sanctions against those who are evidenced as having caused harm or are known to be intending to cause harm. The important point here—it goes to the point I made at the beginning—is that the law will now more closely reflect the circumstances of the case, because regard can be had to the totality of the circumstances when the investigation is being carried out, when the case is being presented at court, and ultimately when the sentence is being passed if the person is convicted. Rather than relying only on the simple act of possession, the investigation and the court can have regard to the intent of the individual and the much greater seriousness of the circumstances that that implies.
It also means we will be much better able to deliver what we term “sustained public protection”. Rather than simply bringing someone to justice for possessing a knife without being able to produce evidence as to what their intention might have been, we can now adduce that evidence and, one imagines, come up with a tougher sentence that has much more preventive power.
The Chair
If the witnesses are in broad agreement, it is fine if only one person answers, unless there is something else you want to raise.
Harriet Cross (Gordon and Buchan) (Con)
Q
“‘anti-social behaviour’ means conduct that has caused, or is likely to cause, harassment, alarm or distress to any person.”
My direct question would be: is it therefore being restricted to just a “person”, or does it include instances of neighbourhood or property nuisance, where there is a large-scale impact but no single person can be identified as the recipient?
Dan Murphy: On your first point, it would obviously capture more incidents and issues if the threshold was set at a lower age, but do we want to be criminalising children with this type of offence? There is a balance, and it is a matter for Parliament and society as to whether they would like to lower that age. I can understand why it has been set at 18, but I wanted to make the point that, as it is set at 18, that power could not be used for young people.
On harassment, alarm and distress, that is a person-specific issue, compared with a community or area. In policing, if we could have something that captured that as well, we would welcome it—again, it is an extension of powers. You are putting me on the spot here, as I am thinking, “How would you prove that? Who would be your witness or injured party for a community?” I think what is provided at the moment is useful. Would it be good if it could be widened? Yes. Practically, could it be widened? I think we would probably need a whole other Committee and some lawyers to discuss that one.
Matt Bishop
Q
Chief Constable De Meyer: It is important to point out how rare it is in this country for a firearms officer to discharge their weapon; reassuringly, it is rarer still that someone dies as a result. Obviously, it is right that there is a proper investigation wherever that happens, but I do not think it is in the interest of public safety for an officer doing such an important job to feel inhibited from doing what might be necessary, and what they are trained to do, in rare and extreme circumstances, because they are concerned that their name will be made public in a subsequent investigation, with all the risk to them personally that that entails. I cannot say for certain, and colleagues here would give a better indication as to the extent that such a measure might assuage their concerns, but it seems to me to be a necessary and sensible move.
Tiff Lynch: Without repeating what Chief Constable De Meyer has said, certainly we were pleased with the Home Secretary’s announcement on the granting of anonymity to firearms officers in those situations, particularly with NX121 and the case that followed.
Our firearms officers are volunteers. That is key and it really needs to be noted. They put themselves and their lives at risk to protect society. In these cases, for their families and their own wellbeing, and because of what may follow, it is absolutely right for them to be granted anonymity for a required period of time. To answer your question specifically about reassuring our firearms officers out there today, there is some reassurance, but again, it is a matter of time passing until they actually feel that that will continue.
Dan Murphy: It is definitely a step in the right direction. Firearms officers, like all police officers, are interested in actions rather than words. They would like to see a difference, so once they start seeing that difference, it will make a difference to them. I know that there will be some announcements on the accountability review soon. I think Dame Diana is involved in that, and I know the Government are looking at it. We are really encouraged that there may be some more positive steps that will lead to actions that support officers who put themselves in those more difficult situations.
Matt Vickers
Q
Tiff Lynch: In relation to the powers, this is something that I find myself repeating not in this forum but in other interviews: you can bring in many laws and powers, but we need to have the infrastructure and the resources to use them. We have officers out there with casefiles that are getting longer and longer. There is only so much that can be highlighted as a priority, because if everything is a priority, nothing is a priority. Yes, we support the laws. It is for Government to make the laws and for us to carry them out. We will do so, but it is about managing expectations not just from policing but from society.
Matt Vickers
Q
Dan Murphy: If you have someone who is a prolific offender, and the police are constantly dealing with them and there are constant victims, the best place for that person is in prison. Getting them into prison is sometimes not easy, but I think that is the answer.
The Chair
Just a reminder that we need to keep things really short if we want to get everybody in. It may not be possible to do so.
Dr Lauren Sullivan (Gravesham) (Lab)
Q
Chief Constable De Meyer: ASB or counter-terrorism?
Dr Sullivan
A bit of both. We have the youth injunctions, which could help with ASB in our communities, but how do the youth diversion orders intersect with that?
Chief Constable De Meyer: I agree that there is an intersection between the two. Counter-terrorism policing is certainly extremely supportive of youth diversion orders. Interestingly and worryingly, there has been a significant increase in the number of young people featuring in the casework of counter-terrorism policing. In 2019, just 4% of those arrested for counter-terrorism offences were aged under 18, but by 2023 that had become 19%. That poses serious challenges in respect of not just the threat but the caseload. Naturally, counter-terrorism policing wants wherever possible to avoid criminalising at a very young age people who might themselves have been exploited by extremists.
It is felt that these orders will divert a young person away from being labelled a terrorist, if I can put it that way, and engaging in further offending. They open up the possibility of some supportive and some prohibitive measures, so there is both a carrot and a stick. They enable colleagues to manage the risk at a much earlier stage than is currently the case.
On the matter of Prevent, which is of long standing, it has been essentially voluntary for young people. There has not been any need to compel their involvement in the necessary diversion. We see this measure as a means of introducing just about the right amount of compulsion to the Prevent set of activities, without making it entirely mandatory.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
Q
Chief Constable De Meyer: It is important to emphasise, first of all, that we will not have to exercise the power. It is a power that is available to us that we may use, and not one that we must necessarily use. That having been said, one accepts entirely the potential for people on one side of a debate to suggest that the power ought to have been used and that it has not been used on another side. I can only say that it is for commanders in each individual circumstance to ensure that they abide by the principle of policing without fear or favour, impartially. It is difficult for me to say much more than that, because there are so many circumstances in which it might come to pass, but I do recognise the difficulty.
Tiff Lynch: It is down to interpretation. It is also relevant to communication and how the general public have an understanding of what police officers are out there doing. We are seeing actions of police officers at these protests being placed all over social media. It is a snippet of information, and as a result you get misinformation and disinformation, which then heightens society’s frustration. I think there is a role to be played by everyone, certainly within Government, to communicate those powers and actions to the public so that everyone has that clear understanding. Then it is important, again, to have the support, certainly for the officers we represent, out there on the frontline, in doing what they are doing.
The Chair
I am afraid this will probably have to be the last question to this set of witnesses.
Keir Mather (Selby) (Lab)
Q
Chief Constable De Meyer: I agree entirely with the point in respect of rural crime. We need to acknowledge how important the rural economy and the custodians of our countryside are, and policing needs to do more to bring offenders to justice.
If I am not mistaken, one provision in the Bill relates to the point about the swift recovery of electronic devices. I think that that enables us to act more swiftly in respect of the proceeds of some rural crime offences as well. This is a category of crime where the proceeds are often disposed of very quickly to other parts of the country and, indeed, overseas. Very often, of course, those pieces of equipment or devices have a tracking capability, so anything that enables us more swiftly to respond and recover that property gives us a much better chance of bringing those offenders to justice than has been the case in the past. It is also likely to have a considerable deterrent value for organised crime groups, and opportunistic criminals too.
Dan Murphy: There is provision for seizing vehicles without giving notice. Without going into detail, I think that that will definitely assist.
David Taylor (Hemel Hempstead) (Lab)
Q
Tiff Lynch: Neighbourhood policing is the bedrock of policing; that is something I have always believed, and we have discussed it privately. The police officers and police community support officers out there work with communities, and this Bill—I come back to what I said before—will go some way towards bringing us into line with how society is changing, so that we can actually use laws to keep the public safe. But, again, it comes down to the investment that is made in policing so that we are able to enact those laws, and when I talk about investment, that is about people, systems and infrastructure.
The Chair
That brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions of this panel. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our witnesses for their evidence.
Examination of Witnesses
Oliver Sells KC and Rt Hon Sir Robert Buckland KBE KC gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from the right hon. Sir Robert Buckland KBE KC and Oliver Sells KC. Again, we must stick to the timings in the programme motion that the Committee has agreed. For this evidence session, we will have until 12.45 pm. Those who want to ask questions should catch my eye. I will try to prioritise those I was not able to get in last time. Could the witnesses briefly introduce themselves for the record?
Sir Robert Buckland: I am Sir Robert Buckland, former Member of this place, and former Lord Chancellor and Justice Secretary, Solicitor General, Secretary of State for Wales and Minister of State for prisons.
Oliver Sells: I am Oliver Sells. I practised in the world of criminal justice for many years, and I have sat at the Old Bailey for many years.
Dame Diana Johnson
Q
Sir Robert Buckland: There is a lot to welcome in every crime Bill, particularly given the need to update the response of police and law enforcement to the growing risks posed by technology. We are now living in an age with the extrinsic challenge of technologies, right through from digital to artificial intelligence and machine learning. It is absolutely reasonable for the public to expect that the police and our other law enforcement agencies are up to speed, most notably on the seizure of mobile telephone devices and the analysis of evidence.
There is a growing crisis—we see it in our court backlogs —which is, sadly, largely caused by the failure of the system to deal at speed with the vast amount of data that needs to be analysed in order to build up a case or properly challenge it in accordance with tried and tested rules. I should have added that I am back at the Bar and that I was a part-time judge, and I obviously make any appropriate declarations.
There is a lot to welcome in the Bill. I am pleased to see the child criminal exploitation offence, although I might want to say more about that if we can have that conversation. As with all Bills with a wide scope of this nature, one is always left thinking what else we can do. I am sure that lots of challenges will be posed as the Bill goes through both Houses, and hopefully you will adopt some of the suggestions made by the many people who take a great interest in this legislation.
Dame Diana Johnson
Q
Sir Robert Buckland: I noted the way in which it is defined. I entirely understand that there needs to be clarity about the criminal activities of children but, on the position of children who are exploited—you will be familiar with this from our work when I was here—I do not think it will always be exploitation that results in their commission of a criminal offence. The forced labour, sexual exploitation and financial abuse of children will often not involve them committing a criminal offence at all.
I am not being glib here. I see this particular offence being characterised as a Fagin-type offence, rather than something wider that could actually serve to protect children, and allow the police and enforcing authorities to take that early action where they see children at risk. That is why I think some of the ideas from Every Child Protected Against Trafficking and others about expanding the definition, so that you are clearly defining what exploitation is, rather than just leaving it to the courts to decide, would be a real opportunity seized. I think you might miss it if you restrict clause 17 in those terms.
Dame Diana Johnson
Q
Sir Robert Buckland: I am very supportive of that proposal. I signed an amendment with the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith). I had a lot of evidence of cuckooing issues in my constituency, including the exploitation of vulnerable people—often adults with a learning disability —and vulnerable people being befriended by unscrupulous criminals and having their premises used and abused for the supply of drugs and other criminal activities. I strongly support the measures on cuckooing.
Dame Diana Johnson
Q
Oliver Sells: I think it is a very important measure. The range of novel criminal offences is exponential, in my experience. We are seeing a complete change in the criminal code and conduct in relation to SIMs and the use of people in those contexts.
I particularly want to refer to the backlog in the criminal courts. I feel very strongly for victims of serious crime. Most of the crimes that I try are serious sexual offences, where young female or male complainants are waiting to give evidence in their cases for two or three years, routinely. That is a completely unacceptable situation, and Parliament and this Committee should be focusing all their laser energy on reducing the backlog in the Crown court, because that is where this is.
They should be looking at productivity, because it is too low, if I am honest. I also think you should be looking at the number of courts sitting. I looked today; you can go online and look at the central criminal court and the percentage of the courts there that are sitting on a routine basis. In my judgment, now, it is too low, whatever the complex reasons may be.
One of the clauses I wanted particularly to speak about today was clause 16, on theft from shops. I recognise that there is a great public anxiety about this particular issue. Shoplifting has become endemic and almost non-criminal at the same time. It is a curious dichotomy, it seems to me, but I do not think for a moment—I am sorry to be critical—that making theft from a shop, irrespective of value, triable either way is the right answer. What that will do, inevitably, is push some of these cases up into the Crown court from the magistrates court.
I understand the reasons behind it and the concerns of the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers and the like. However, I think it is the wrong way. One of the things we must do now in this country is reinforce the use and the range of magistrates courts, and bring them back to deal with serious low-level crimes that are very frequent in their areas. They know how to deal with them. They need the powers to deal with them. I still do not think their range of powers is strong enough. You need to take cases such as these out of the Crown court, in my judgment. I think it is a serious mistake. I can see why people want to do it, because they want to signify that an offence is a very important in relation to shop workers. I recognise that; I have tried many cases of assaults on shop workers and the like, which come up to the Crown court on appeal, and we all know the difficulties they cause, but you will not solve the problem.
I also think you need to look more widely. This Bill does begin to look at where the line is to be drawn between the magistrates courts and the Crown court and at what offences should be triable in the magistrates court. I am going to range a little wider into the third tier, which has been suggested as a proposal. I am not convinced there is a need for a third tier myself. I think you need to enhance the first tier, magistrates courts, which is, in effect, small local juries. The composition of magistrates courts has changed completely in the last five or 10 years. You are now getting people who are local, experienced, young—a range of people. They are perfectly able to try these cases, in my judgment. You should take it out of the Crown court and leave the Crown court for really serious offences. That is my view.
Matt Vickers
Q
Sir Robert Buckland: There are a couple of things, Mr Vickers. First of all, just to build on Mr Sells’s point on clause 16, I understand the huge concern about shoplifting and the perception among many shop proprietors in our towns and cities that, in some ways, it was almost becoming decriminalised and that action has to be taken. But the danger in changing primary legislation in this way is that we send mixed messages, and that the Government are sending mixed messages about what its policy intentions are.
Sir Brian Leveson is conducting an independent review into criminal procedure. We do not know yet what the first part of that review will produce, but I would be very surprised if there was not at least some nod to the need to keep cases out of the Crown court, bearing in mind the very dramatic and increasing backlog that we have. I think that anything that ran contrary to that view risks the Government looking as if it is really a house divided against itself.
It seems to me that there was a simpler way of doing this. When the law was changed back in 2014, there was an accompanying policy guideline document that allowed for the police to conduct their own prosecutions for shoplifting items with a value of under £200, if the offender had not done it before, if there were not other offences linked with it, if there was not a combined amount that took it over £200 and if there was a guilty plea.
What seems to have happened in the ensuing years is that that has built and developed, frankly, into a culture that has moved away from the use of prosecuting as a tool in its entirety. I think that that is wrong, but I do think that it is within the gift of Ministers in the Home Office and of officials in the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice to say, “That guidance is superseded. We hope, want and expect all offences to be prosecuted.” That would then allow offences of under £200 to be prosecuted in the magistrates court. There is nothing in the current legislation that prevents any of that, by the way, and I think it would send a very clear message to the police that they are expected to do far more when it comes to the protection of retail premises.
On clause 14, which covers assault on retail workers, I was a little surprised to see that there had been a departure from what was a rather interesting amendment tabled in the previous Session to the 2023-24 Criminal Justice Bill by, I think, the hon. Member for Nottingham North and Kimberley (Alex Norris); in fact, I think it was supported by you and others. It sought to amend the law to increase protections for shop workers, but with an important expansion: the offence would be not just an assault, but a threatening or abuse offence as well, which would encompass some of the public order concerns that many of us have about shop premises, corner shops and sole proprietor retail outlets. Yet, we have gone back here to a straight assault clause, which in my mind does not seem to add anything to the criminal code at all.
We have existing laws of assault, which was often the argument of Ministers, including me, when we debated these issues in the past. Again, it seems to me that the opportunity to widen the offence to cover different types of abuse against important retail workers is being missed at the moment. If I was advising the Government, which of course I am not, I would ask them to look again at the clause and to consider expanding it to make it much more meaningful for the people I think all of us want to protect.
Matt Vickers
Q
Sir Robert Buckland: Again, it is a missed opportunity. I think that, accompanying that type of behaviour, is a natural community concern about the prevalence of people who are—well, they are worse than nuisances—real menaces to the wellbeing of the local community. An attack on a shop, in my view, is an attack on the wellbeing of the whole local community. Given how important the local shop is as a lifeline for many people, including older and vulnerable customers, any attack on it that means that its services are lost, even temporarily, is a very serious attack on the community. Therefore, using this opportunity to increase the suite of preventive measures available would seem a very sensible thing to do, and I hope the Government will consider accepting any amendments that will no doubt be tabled with that aim in mind.
Matt Vickers
Q
Sir Robert Buckland: That is a very difficult issue that I looked at carefully when I was in the Government. One of the challenges, of course, is that the offences might be prolific but the sentences they carry often do not even cross the custody threshold.
There are two ways of looking at this. First, the community-based intensive intervention solution seems to be working, particularly in the case of young offenders, and we should look at expanding it to apply to adult offenders as well. There would, of course, be a huge concomitant cost, particularly for the probation service and all the agencies tasked with the intensive supervision of, perhaps, a drug or alcohol addiction. That is the sort of work that will take them off the streets and get them cleaned up, without sending them to a meaningless short-term sentence.
At the other end, there are people committing hundreds of offences, for whom the law cannot as yet provide a cumulative answer. It is difficult for me to suggest on the hoof how we would encompass a sentencing option that allows a roll-up, so that there was a longer term of imprisonment for someone prolific. The danger is that there is always a cliff edge: if someone has committed 24 rather than 25 offences, why should there be such a differential? The long-term answer lies in prevention. I strongly endorse the intensive community-based approach, which is not currently available to the courts.
Matt Vickers
Q
Oliver Sells: Could I touch on a subject that troubles me? It is implicit in the Bill, and it is not necessarily a popular view. The trend towards sentencing inflation has created a growing prison population of particularly young serial offenders who are serving longer and longer sentences. That is causing difficulties with the cost of the prison population and with what to do with people we cannot send to prison. The courts struggle the whole time not to send people to prison unless it is absolutely necessary. The idea that we could, for instance, abolish short sentences—there is a proposal for their removal—seems to me to be very double-edged indeed. We need to be very careful.
The courts, including the magistrates court, must have the powers to move swiftly. This is one of the problems in our system, particularly in respect of the kind of crime we are talking about. When I started out at the Bar, cases were dealt with overnight, and the next day were done and dusted in the magistrates court. It was effective and speedy. Speedy justice is much more effective than slow justice. We have created a situation and a structure, over many years now, where there is almost an acceptance of delay in the system, and I do not accept that at all. If you go to a magistrates court, you will see so many cases adjourned because it is not ready. They are piffling reasons, on the whole—complete nonsense, in my view. When a case is prepared overnight, it should be in the court within a matter of days and dealt with straight away. I do not think we have really understood that in the Bill. It is not quite there yet, in my view.
Sir Robert Buckland: With its wide scope, the Bill is an opportunity for the Government to act on, for example, the recommendations of Jonathan Fisher KC on the overdue reform of disclosure. The disclosure rules were created back in 1996 and are no longer fit for proper purpose. Anything the Bill can do to help to future-proof the use of assistive technologies would be a great opportunity for Ministers and officials. I am convinced that the use of assistive technology—I use the word “assistive” because it is technology not to replace the judge or the jury but to assist them in their deliberations, as well as assisting disclosure officers and the police in their investigations—is absolutely right.
The Chair
Thank you, Sir Robert. We have already used two thirds of the time allotted for our eminent witnesses. As time is fleeting, I request that people keep their contributions as short as possible so that we can cover the greatest amount of content and allow Committee members to ask a question.
Anna Sabine (Frome and East Somerset) (LD)
Q
Oliver Sells: Oh dear. I do not think time permits me to answer that question in the way that I would like. Goodness gracious!
Anna Sabine
Give it your best shot.
Oliver Sells: I will give you the short answer. Yes, there are a whole load of things, but I do not have time to spell them out for you now. I do not think people understand that the courts want to strive to get cases through but are struggling to do so. There is an enormous amount of good will, both in the magistrates court and the Crown court.
Let me give you one example: prison transport. Why are we so reliant on defendants being brought long distances from prison every day to Crown courts? I see no justification for that in many cases. I have recently tried cases in which the defendant was sitting in Reading prison and the complainant was giving evidence on her phone in a Tesco car park. There is nothing wrong with that at all in my view; it is perfectly satisfactory and prevents all the difficulties and delay of people coming to court.
If I had my way, I would change very radically the procedural rules in the Crown court and the magistrates court. We are too slow and too timid, and I think there is a form of institutionalised idleness in some parts of the sector.
Matt Bishop
Q
Sir Robert Buckland: Thank you for asking that question, because how to deal with what were unacceptable figures was a real judgment call on my part. I thought it was far better, as the responsible Secretary of State, to fess up and apologise, frankly, for the way in which things had happened.
It was through nobody’s deliberate fault, but you may remember the case of a young man called Liam Allan, who was accused of rape and was about to face trial when the disclosure of very important text messages totally undermined the prosecution case, and rightly it was dropped. That, and other cases of that nature, had a bit of a chilling effect—to use a well-worn phrase in these precincts—on prosecutors’ appetite for risk when it came to rape. We then entered a sort of cul-de-sac, whereby, because of concerns about disclosure and the threshold, we saw fewer and fewer cases being brought.
The situation was compounded by the fact that many complainants and victims, when faced with the rather Manichean choice between giving over your phone for months or carrying on with your phone—which is, let us face it, the basis of your life—were saying, “No, thank you. I don’t want any more of this. Frankly, I don’t want to be put through the mill again, bearing in mind the trauma I’ve already suffered,” so the attrition rates were really high.
I therefore thought it was very important that we, the police and the CPS really looked again at the way in which the cases were investigated. That is why I thought it was important that we had things such as the 24-hour guarantee on the return of phones, and Operation Soteria, which was the roll-out operation, refocusing the way in which the police and the CPS worked together on cases to yield results. I am glad to say that we have seen a progressive increase in the number of cases brought. I do not think we are there yet, and we still have to give it a bit of time and a lot more will to get to a position where we can look back.
Let us go back to the Stern review, which was done over 10 years ago. Baroness Stern produced an impressive piece of work that acknowledged the fact that there are many victims and complainants who do not want to through prosecution, and want other means by which they can come to terms with, and get to support for, their trauma. Until we get the prosecution element right and we see the right balance, I do not think we can offer a wide range of different options so that victims feel that they are respected and listened to, that action is taken early, and that they are not having to relive the trauma all over again in a way that, frankly, causes the attrition rates.
From what I see in the Bill, there are certain measures and initiatives that will help in that process, but it does require—and I emphasise this—a huge amount of political will, and the attention of this place, to make sure that the authorities are doing what you want, on behalf of your constituents, them to do.
Harriet Cross
Q
Oliver Sells: I am not sure I am able to answer that question. I have not considered the matter in great detail, and when I have not considered something I tend not to answer the question. You must forgive me if I pass that one on to a politician who no doubt has no such inhibitions.
Sir Robert Buckland: No, I have never had any inhibitions, as I think you all well know!
We have to go back to the fundamentals. We should not be bringing prosecution cases unless there is a reasonable prospect of conviction and it is in the public interest. That is the very simple test for prosecutors. You need the evidence, and that is the task that can often be very difficult for the investigating authorities. I will labour the point, because it is really important. We are faced with extrinsic challenges, in which digital and assistive technologies are being used on a scale and at a pace that are at once awe-inspiring and terrifying. Unless we can enable our police and investigative agencies to have the same level of firepower, we are never going to win, and we are going to have increasing difficulty in piecing together cases that can then be prosecuted. I think particularly about fraud and the use of blockchain and virtual technology. I want to make sure that in all the work that is being done to try to improve our response to fraud—whether by the Serious Fraud Office, the CPS or the City of London police—we are really on it when it comes to technology.
As Ministers will know, the Criminal Justice Board is the ideal forum for this work to be prioritised in. Ministers can make it the board’s priority and give tasks to all the arms of the criminal justice system to get it right. We did it with rape and we have done it with other types of criminality. I think this is the moment—if it is not being seized already—at which the Lord Chancellor and the Home Secretary can really step up and make sure that our response to cyber-crime is not just as good as but ahead of the trends that we now see, not just here but internationally. The extrinsic threats are a wake-up call.
Keir Mather
Q
Sir Robert Buckland: Well, we do not have all day, Mr Mather, but there is a lot I can say. The Bill is a relative minnow compared with the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, which was the combined Bill that I worked on with the then Home Secretary.
The important thing is to make sure that legislative and political intent do not run too far ahead of operational reality. I will give the example of when we changed the law on stalking. This is going back a bit now, when I was still a Back Bencher. Dame Diana was certainly involved; it was a cross-party achievement. We did it in record time and got the law changed within months—it was an incredible achievement—but the police were not operationally ready. I still see evidence even now, 10 years on, of a lack of training about and awareness of the tell-tale signs of stalking.
The message I give to you all—particularly the parliamentarians who are cutting their teeth on this Bill—is to make sure that you read the impact assessments, that Ministers can answer your questions about operational reality, and that the police chiefs, the CPS and all the agencies that have the job of doing this are ready and resourced to make the legislative intent a reality. Otherwise, your constituents are going to be coming back to you in a few years, saying, “Why haven’t there been any prosecutions under this new offence?”
The Chair
Order. That brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our witnesses for their evidence.
Examination of Witness
Colin Mackie gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from Spike Aware UK. Once again, we must stick to the timings in the programme motion. The Committee has agreed that, for this session, we will have until 1 o’clock. Could you please introduce yourself for the record?
Colin Mackie: Good afternoon. I am Colin Mackie. I am the chair and co-founding member of Spike Aware UK.
Matt Vickers
Q
How important are the measures in the Bill, and why? Is there anything that you think the Government should be doing beyond what is in the Bill?
Colin Mackie: I think this is majorly important. It is a giant step forward. Up until now, spiking has been a very grey area. It is charged as assault, theft, poisoning or whatever; it has been such a grey area that it has been hard to process it. That has the knock-on effect of putting victims off coming forward, because they do not know where they are going to go or what is going to be talked about, and they are unsure. Perpetrators of spiking feel, “Well, nothing’s really happening over this. I don’t hear of anybody getting charged for it, and it’s only a bit of fun; we don’t think we’re going to do any harm,” so they carry on doing it.
Having a stand-alone offence is beneficial for the victims, and I also think it is beneficial for the police. I feel that once a law is in place, you are going to get a co-ordinated response from police. Currently, victims in Newcastle are treated differently from victims in Newquay, and it is the same across the whole country. That is one of the major problems that victims tell us about all the time: some forces are great, while others are not so good. I have had one victim tell me that the police said they did not have the manpower or the time to go in and check the CCTV at the club where they were spiked. Another victim told me that uniformed officers turned up and were not sure how to deal with it, but half an hour later, the CID were there and straight into the club. We cannot have that inconsistency; we need to move forward with that.
You were asking earlier, “What can we do to help?” In bringing in the Bill, we have to involve A&E, because A&E has a big part to play in this as well. All too often, as you know, it is the job of the police to gather the evidence, but a spiking victim is likely to appear at a hospital—at A&E—unconscious or confused and not sure what is going on. They are not going to think about asking for a police officer to attend—they are not in a state to do that—so unless they have a family member or a friend there, that is not going to happen. By the time they get maybe two days down the line and think, “Yeah, this is what’s happened to me; I want to report this,” there is a good chance that a lot of the evidence has gone. We need that in the Bill as well: for A&E to play a bigger part by gathering evidence and holding it for the police. Then, if the victim wants to take it forward, it is there.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)
Q
You mentioned that you welcome the clarification in the Bill, which will create a specific offence of spiking by using the word “spiking”. Can you expand on why that will make such a difference for victims? You mentioned some of the issues with the police using different types of offences. Why will it make such a difference to have a specific offence?
Colin Mackie: A victim will recognise that spiking is an offence when they approach the police. Currently they are not sure if they can report it. They are nervous and they are not sure if it is an offence. That has been a big thing that we get fed to us. Away from just the girls, there is a lot of spiking going on with boys now. Males are being spiked as well. It is possible that anybody could be spiked. That is a big thing, because we find that a lot of males think it is a girls’ problem. They think it is tied in with a sexual assault or whatever. If you just say “spiking” males will think, “Yeah, I have been spiked,” and that is it—it is the fact that they have been spiked.
A lot of spiking is now taking place and nothing else is happening. People are not being sexually assaulted or robbed; they are just being spiked. It is what we call prank spiking. People are doing it because they can. I think the ability for someone to come forward and just say, “Yes, I have been spiked and there is a law on spiking,” is the way forward.
Alex Davies-Jones
Q
Colin Mackie: We certainly want to get the night-time industry more involved and get stewards more aware, because all too often one of the first things said to someone who has been spiked or their friends is, “They’re drunk. I want them out the club. They’ve had too much to drink.” When we talk to nightclubs, bars and so on, we say to the stewards, “Listen to what their friends are saying. Don’t make the assumption that that person’s drunk just because they look drunk. If their friends are saying, ‘We’ve had one or two drinks,’ take on board what they’re saying. Don’t just think, ‘Oh, no, I’ve got to get this person out of here.’” They have a duty of care to look after people, and we want them to take on that responsibility.
Just at the weekend, I was reading an article on the BBC and it was talking about nightclubs in general and how footfall is falling. One of the examples was that youngsters are stopping going to nightclubs because of the fear of spiking. The industry has to look at the bigger picture and realise that if it puts in lids and deterrents, better security and better CCTV, and, as we hope with this Bill, if we start to see people being prosecuted, the numbers will come back up. People will have the confidence to come out. If they think they are going to a venue where they feel they are going to be safe, they are more likely to come, whereas currently they are walking away and finding something else to do. It is going to affect the night-time industry as well, so it really has to take it more seriously.
Luke Taylor
Q
I have a broader question. Do the measures included in the Bill cover all the issues that you see around the offence? Do you think the Bill is a comprehensive measure to enable action to be taken to combat the horrible offence of spiking?
Colin Mackie: It is moving forward to that level where I think it is good. I would like to see a wee bit more on the sentencing side of it. Just listening to the previous witnesses, I know that there is a backlog through the courts and everything, and I can see that being a problem. If the people who want to report spiking, especially young women, think it is going to last two years, how much of a deterrent is it going to be for them to come forward if they think it is going to drag on? That is one bit: when it comes to the sentencing and how quickly it will be processed, will that put people off reporting it?
David Burton-Sampson
Q
Colin Mackie: It is certainly very important, because girls are still are the highest target in the group. People want to go out and enjoy themselves, and women should be able to have a night out with friends and be confident that they are safe. If they want to leave that drink for second, they should be able to. They should not have to worry that someone will add something to their drink if they go to dance, go to the toilet or are distracted. This measure is a great way of moving forward, because in the future you want all youngsters to be able to say, “I’m going for a night out, and I want to have a nice, safe night out.” That is the way forward—it has to be the way forward.
Joe Robertson
Q
Colin Mackie: Revenge, possibly. A girl could spike another girl because she is jealous, for example, about something that has already happened. An ex-boyfriend, in particular—or an ex-girlfriend, in some cases—could spike someone. To me, revenge is another possibility.
Joe Robertson
Q
Colin Mackie: Pranking is probably the one. That is what people will do—it is totally random, and there is no reason for a lot of what they do. They pick a victim out. I have spoken to police officers, and one of the things they say is that prank spiking is growing a bit because drugs have become so easily accessible and cheap. I spoke to a group from Australia who said spiking had dropped slightly because the police had done a blitz on drugs, so the price of drugs had gone up; when the price of drugs went up, spiking came down. There is always a chance that it happens just because people can easily access these drugs and they will use them.
The Chair
I am afraid that this will probably have to be the final question to this witness.
Dr Sullivan
Q
Colin Mackie: That is what I would like to see happen once a person appears there. I have spoken to some medics about this. Again, it goes back to listening to what friends say: if they say that their friend has had only one or two drinks, but they are unconscious, hallucinating and obviously under the influence of something, you have to gather that early doors. If you do not do it, you are going to lose that evidence, which is so vital.
Again, it is about giving people the confidence that, if they get taken to A&E, they are going to be taken seriously. They are not going to be two days down the line saying, “I just wish someone had taken the sample then.” Some may suspect that they know who did it, but it may be two or three days down the line before they say, “I think it was that person, and it happened at that bar around that time,” and that evidence has gone. You really want to gather it there. When someone appears in A&E having suffered sexual assault, you gather the evidence quite quickly. I would like to see the same happening with spiking.
The Chair
That brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our witness for his evidence, which has been very helpful.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Keir Mather.)
Crime and Policing Bill (Third sitting)
Tuesday 1st April 2025
(1 year, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 1 April 2025 - (1 Apr 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 12 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 12 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 12 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 12 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
Good morning, everyone. Before we begin, I have a few preliminary reminders for the Committee. Please will everyone switch electronic devices off or to silent? I am afraid that no food or drinks are permitted in the sittings, except for water, which is provided. Hansard colleagues will be grateful if Members could email their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk or pass their written notes to the Hansard colleague in the room, to my left.
We will now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection and grouping list for today’s sittings is available in the room and on the parliamentary website. It shows how the clauses, schedules and selected amendments have been grouped together for debate. The purpose of grouping is to limit, in so far as that is possible, the repetition of the same points in debate. The amendments appear on the amendment paper in the order in which they relate to the Bill.
A Member who has put their name to the lead amendment in a group is called to speak first or, in the case of a stand part debate, the Minister will be called first. Other Members are then free to indicate that they wish to speak in the debate by bobbing—please do bob, because if you do not, I will not see you. At the end of a debate on a group of amendments, I shall call the Member who moved the lead amendment, or new clause or new schedule, again. Before they sit down, they will need to indicate whether they wish to withdraw the amendment, or to seek a decision. If any Member wishes to press any other amendment in a group to a vote—that includes grouped new clauses and new schedules—the Member needs to let me know.
I remind Members of the rules on the declaration of interests as set out in the code of conduct.
Clause 1
Respect orders
Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 31, in clause 1, page 1, line 13, leave out “18” and insert “16”.
This amendment would lower the age to 16 at which a court can impose a respect order on a person to prevent them from engaging in anti-social behaviour.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard.
We welcome this Bill, the many of the last Government’s measures it takes forward, and the opportunity to constructively debate and potentially improve it in the coming weeks.
The clause establishes the legal framework for courts to impose respect orders on individuals aged 18 or older who have engaged, or threatened to engage, in antisocial behaviour, where the court considers it just and convenient to make such an order for the purpose of preventing the respondent from engaging in antisocial behaviour. Antisocial behaviour has serious and far-reaching consequences. It can fracture communities, erode trust among neighbours and make people feel unwelcome or unsafe in their own local areas. For women and girls, it can create a climate of fear, making something as simple as walking home at night a distressing and dangerous experience. It also takes a significant toll on businesses, discouraging customers from visiting high streets and town centres, and ultimately harming local economies and livelihoods. Left unchecked, antisocial behaviour can strip communities of their vibrancy and sense of security, turning once thriving areas into places that people avoid.
We must do everything we can to tackle antisocial behaviour, and the proposed respect orders can be a useful tool. Past Governments have made many and varied efforts to tackle the scourge of antisocial behaviour. Both respect orders and antisocial behaviour orders aim to prevent antisocial behaviour that causes harassment, alarm or distress to others. The Bill defines antisocial behaviour for respect orders, in proposed new section A1 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, as
“conduct that has caused, or is likely to cause, harassment, alarm or distress to any person.”
That mirrors the definition for ASBOs under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. In some ways, ASBOs were effective in targeting repeat offenders, providing a quicker alternative to prosecution and offering communities reassurance. However, their breach rates—as high as 50%—suggested that they lacked deterrent power, with some offenders even seeing them as a badge of honour.
The civil injunctions introduced by the 2014 Act also target antisocial behaviour. They use a similar definition, but have a broader scope, including, for example, conduct capable of causing nuisance or annoyance in housing contexts. Civil injunctions have been more successful than ASBOs in reducing breaches, likely due to their more tailored restrictions and integrated support options. Unlike ASBOs, which often acted as punitive measures, injunctions take a preventive approach by aiming to stop antisocial behaviour before it escalates. They also incorporate positive requirements, such as attending rehabilitation programmes, which help individuals address the root causes of their behaviour rather than simply penalising them.
Many would argue that that shift towards early intervention and rehabilitation contributed to the greater effectiveness of civil injunctions in managing antisocial behaviour. Antisocial behaviour can be committed by young teenage offenders, and while some cases are minor, others can have a serious impact on communities and make lives a misery for residents, denied peace in their own homes and communities. Just look at Witham library in Newland Street, which has reportedly hired a private security guard owing to a rising number of incidents, which have been blamed on local teenagers. Now, Essex county council is considering stepping up its response by issuing bodycams to librarians to deter antisocial behaviour further.
I draw attention to proposed new section A1(3), which requires that prohibitions and requirements avoid interference with the respondent’s work or education. Will the Minister outline how courts are expected to strike a balance between preventing antisocial behaviour and ensuring that individuals can continue their employment or studies? What factors will be taken into account when determining the appropriate restrictions, and how will the courts ensure that any conditions imposed remain proportionate and effective in addressing antisocial behaviour while safeguarding access to work and education?
Proposed new section A1(8) of the 2014 Act, alongside proposed new section 1A(9) introduced by schedule 1, provides that an application for a respect order may be treated as an application for a housing injunction and vice versa. That appears to be a sensible addition to allow the court flexibility. However, it would be useful for the Minister to clarify whether the Government expect one of the tools to be used more frequently than the other. Additionally, will the “harassment, alarm or distress” threshold allow the orders to be applied sufficiently broadly among housing providers?
Proposed new section B1 sets out the relevant authorities that can make applications for respect orders to the High Court or county court. Those include local authorities, housing providers, the chief officer of police for a police force area, or the chief constable of British Transport police and several other appropriate bodies. It is encouraging to see housing providers recognised as registered authorities, in particular when it comes to addressing antisocial behaviour.
The Chair
Order. Forgive me for interrupting, shadow Minister. To be clear, we are talking about amendment 31, rather than the clause as a whole.
The Chair
We will deal with clause stand part later; we are talking about the amendment at this point. That is to save us the repetition, the point that I made earlier. Thank you, shadow Minister.
Matt Vickers
Opposition amendment 31 would lower to 16 the age at which a court can impose a respect order on a person to prevent them from engaging in antisocial behaviour.
Harriet Cross (Gordon and Buchan) (Con)
Last Thursday, in the evidence session, we heard that a large number of under-18s engage in antisocial behaviour. Does the shadow Minister agree with me and some of the witnesses we heard from that, without the age being reduced to 16, the measure will have less impact, given where a lot of the antisocial behaviour in our communities is coming from?
Matt Vickers
My hon. Friend is entirely right. When you speak to some of the people who are at the sharp end of this antisocial behaviour, many of them will tell you that it is inflicted by those under 18. We heard witnesses’ concerns about where the line should be drawn. Obviously, there is a balance with respect to criminalising young people, but there is a point at which there have to be real consequences, and communities need to know that there are consequences, for those youngsters who engage in this behaviour.
Dr Lauren Sullivan (Gravesham) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard.
Over the past 14 or 15 years, young people have not had diversionary activities. Youth centres across the country have closed in their tens of thousands. Will the shadow Minister reflect on the fact that young people need diversionary activity, so that they are not lured into antisocial behaviour?
Matt Vickers
With a lot of these things, we need that diversionary activity and to find meaningful things for youngsters to spend their time doing. It is a big, complex mix, and we will probably address this again when we talk about knife crime. It is a big part of what we do, but there have to be sanctions for young people as well. It is not just about the young people committing antisocial behaviour; it is about the communities and the other young people that might have the antisocial behaviour—which often leads to crime—inflicted on them. It is about putting that ladder in there so that people know that, as their behaviour gets worse, the consequences and sanctions get bigger.
This is not just about punishment; but is about intervention, responsibility and, ultimately, protecting both young people and the communities in which they live. At 16, young people can work, pay taxes and make important life decisions. They are entrusted with responsibilities, and it is only right that they are also held accountable for their actions. If an individual is engaging in persistent antisocial behaviour, the courts must have the tools to intervene early, before those patterns escalate into more serious criminality.
Mr Alex Barros-Curtis (Cardiff West) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard. Will the shadow Minister clarify whether it is the Conservative party’s position that we should criminalise 16-year-olds but not give them the vote?
Matt Vickers
Well, yes. The Government seem to think that we should not criminalise 16-year-olds but they should have the right to vote. I think it is the other way around: responsibilities come after people show their part in the world. I think we should be voting at 18, which allows people to become informed and knowledgeable about the process and the world around them.
If you go back to families in my constituency, some of the antisocial behaviour that they are suffering at the hands of 16-year-olds has real consequences for them, and there should be real consequences for those who inflict it upon them.
The Chair
Order. I hope Members will forgive me for saying this, but can we try not to use the word “you”? I have heard three different speakers say “you”. All speeches need to come through the Chair, and there is a reason for that—those are the courtesies of the House. Forgive me for saying that, but I think it will help the whole Committee.
Matt Vickers
I am on a mission: there will not be another infringement, Mr Pritchard.
Antisocial behaviour can devastate communities, causing distress and insecurity for residents. We cannot stand by and allow that to continue unchecked. Lowering the age to 16 would mean that we can address these issues sooner and ensure that young people receive the support and guidance—and, potentially, sanctions and deterrents—they need to change course.
Respect orders are not simply punitive measures. They come with conditions that promote rehabilitation, and provide access to education, counselling and the opportunity to turn things around. As the Minister will know, this is as much about deterrence as it is about enforcement. When young people know that there are consequences for their actions, they are less likely to engage in behaviour that harms others. By making the amendment, we would strengthen our communities, support young people and ensure that respect for others remains at the heart of society. During the evidence sessions, we heard the views of witnesses about the 16 to 18 age bracket, and I would welcome further explanation from Ministers on why 18 has been chosen as the minimum age.
The Minister for Policing, Fire and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)
Good morning, Mr Pritchard; it is a pleasure to serve under you today.
The Bill will start to implement our safer streets mission alongside our commitment to the 13,000 additional police officers and police community support officers in our communities. Before I respond to amendment 31, it may assist the Committee if I say a little about why we are introducing respect orders. My doing so now may obviate the need for a separate debate on clause stand part.
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for setting out the history of successive Governments’ attempts to deal with antisocial behaviour. Tackling antisocial behaviour is a top priority for this Government and a key part of our safer streets mission. Last year, over a third of people experienced or witnessed some form of ASB, and there were 1 million police-recorded incidents. Existing powers in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 do not always go far enough to tackle antisocial behaviour. That is why we committed in our manifesto to introduce the respect order to crack down on those making our neighbourhoods, town centres and communities feel unsafe and unwelcoming.
The respect order partially replaces the existing civil injunctions power for persons aged 18 or over. It enables civil courts to make respect orders on application from a relevant authority in respect of individuals who have engaged in ASB. Authorities that can apply include the police, local authorities and registered housing providers, among others. Respect orders will contain prohibitive conditions set by the court to stop offenders engaging in a particular behaviour. They can also include rehabilitative positive requirements, such as attending an anger management course, to help to tackle the root cause of offending.
I mentioned that the existing ASB powers do not always go far enough. Breach of a respect order, in contrast to the power it replaces, will be a criminal offence and therefore arrestable. That is not the case for the current civil injunction, which may include a power of arrest only in certain circumstances, where it is specified by the court or where there has been the use or threat of violence or significant risk of harm. I have heard from one local authority of a civil injunction that was breached over 100 times, with the police unable to take quick action to stop breaches because they had to reapply to the courts to arrest the offender. That is not acceptable and the respect order will fix it.
As a criminal offence, breach of a respect order will be heard in the criminal courts. This will allow judges to issue a wider range of sentences—including community orders, fines and up to two years’ imprisonment—than they can currently for civil injunctions. This is an important change. Community sentences enable judges to make ASB offenders repay, often visibly, their debt to their community.
I assure the Committee that there are safeguards in place to ensure that the orders are used appropriately. These are not unilateral powers for the police and local authorities; the terms of an order must be agreed by the courts. For a respect order to be issued, two tests must be met. First, the court must be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the respondent has engaged in or threatened to engage in ASB. ASB is defined as
“conduct that has caused, or is likely to cause, harassment, alarm or distress”.
That is a well-established definition. Secondly, the court must be satisfied that issuing a respect order is just and convenient—again, an established test for the courts.
As a further safeguard, we are introducing a new requirement for relevant authorities to carry out a risk assessment checklist prior to applying for a respect order. This will help to ensure proportionate use. We will pilot respect orders to ensure that they are as effective as possible before rolling them out across England and Wales. More details on the pilots and their location will be provided in due course. New part A1 of the 2014 Act, inserted by clause 1, also makes provision for interim respect orders, for the variation and discharge of orders, and for special measures for witnesses in proceedings—for example, to enable them to give evidence from behind a screen.
Amendment 31 would reduce the age at which an offender can receive a respect order from 18 to 16, as the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton West, outlined. As I have indicated, the respect order is intended as a powerful deterrent for addressing the most harmful adult perpetrators of ASB. Unlike the equivalent current power—the civil injunction—breach of a respect order is a criminal offence with criminal sanctions, and the Government do not believe that it is right to criminalise children unnecessarily, which is why we committed in our manifesto to introduce respect orders for adults only. However, we know that in some cases tough measures, including behavioural orders, can be useful for dealing with younger offenders.
I absolutely agree with the shadow Minister that there should be consequences for the actions that cause distress and harm to local communities if they are committed by, for example, a 16-year-old. Stakeholders have told us that the current civil injunction can be a very useful tool for this cohort. It enables youth courts to impose behavioural requirements on younger offenders, but without resulting in criminalisation. That is why we have retained that element of the existing civil injunction and renamed it the youth injunction. This will enable youth courts to continue to make orders against younger offenders—aged 10, when criminal responsibility kicks in, to 18—where the court deems it necessary. I am content that this provision covers the need for powers to deal with youth ASB. On that basis, I invite the shadow Minister to withdraw the amendment.
Matt Vickers
I beg to move amendment 33, in clause 1, page 2, line 29, at end insert—
“(9) If a court makes a respect order against a person (P) more than once, then P is liable to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale.”
This amendment means that if a person gets more than one Respect Order, they are liable for a fine.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 32, in clause 1, page 8, line 2, at end insert—
“(4) A person who commits further offences under this section is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 5 years or a fine (or both).”
This amendment sets out the penalties for repeated breaches of a respect order with a prison sentence of up to 5 years.
Matt Vickers
Amendment 33 would impose a financial penalty on those who receive multiple respect orders. This is about fairness, accountability and ensuring that our justice system is taken seriously.
A respect order is not a punishment; it is an opportunity. It gives individuals a chance to correct their behaviour and change course before more serious consequences arise, but what happens when someone repeatedly ignores that chance? What message do we send if the courts impose an order only for it to be disregarded time and again, with no further repercussions? The amendment would ensure that those who continue to defy the law will face meaningful consequences.
Antisocial behaviour has real victims. It disrupts neighbourhoods, damages businesses and makes people feel unsafe in their own communities. We cannot allow repeat offenders to believe they can break these orders without consequence. A fine is a clear, tangible penalty that reinforces the message that respect orders must be obeyed. We already have fines in place for many other public order offences. They are nothing new. The amendment would bring respect orders in line with other legal measures, ensuring that persistent offenders face escalating consequences.
Crucially, funds from the fines could be reinvested in tackling the very issues that led to the order in the first place, helping communities affected by antisocial behaviour. This is a common-sense amendment. It would give our justice system the tools that it needs to properly enforce respect orders.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
Does my hon. Friend agree that without this amendment the power of a respect order would be greatly diminished? As we have seen with antisocial behaviour orders and convictions for relatively minor offences, repeat offending is the problem. Without the weight of this amendment sitting behind respect orders, they are sufficiently diminished in value as a stand-alone.
Matt Vickers
We saw what happened with ASBOs: people started wearing them as a badge of honour. This amendment could strengthen respect orders, providing real sanctions and consequences for people who fail to engage with what is on offer and with the opportunity to change their behaviour. It is the right thing to do not only by the people who commit offences and need setting in a new direction but for the communities who suffer at their hands. Those communities want to see that there are real consequences for them, and that such people do not think that they are above the law and can get away with anything. It is entirely right to strengthen respect orders further.
David Burton-Sampson (Southend West and Leigh) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the fact that breaches of respect orders will result in a criminal offence that is triable either way is enough of a deterrent? The consequences of breaches will be much greater than they are now.
Matt Vickers
We need to give the justice system and agencies all the powers that they can have, because at the end of the day, it is their discretion that will determine which of these things are applied. If someone breaches an order more than once, and they are subject to several respect orders, which is what the amendment relates to, there should be a stepladder of consequences. We should give the agencies and the Ministry of Justice all the tools and powers that they can use to deter people from committing another offence or indeed being subject to yet another respect order.
This is a common-sense amendment. It gives our justice system the tools that it needs to enforce respect orders properly, protects communities from persistent offenders and upholds the principle that the law must be respected.
Dame Diana Johnson
Amendment 33 would make a person who has been given more than one respect order liable for a fine of up to £1,000. It is unlikely that a person would be given more than one respect order. An order may be given for a specified period of time or may state that it has effect until further notice. In practice, if changes are needed to a respect order after it has been approved, the applicant would return to court for the order to be varied if, for example, it was considered necessary to include additional requirements or prohibitions, or to extend the period for which a prohibition or requirement has effect. However, a person may be given a separate order where they have engaged in antisocial behaviour that meets the legal test for use of another ASB power—for example, a housing injunction or a criminal behaviour order. Respect orders are preventive orders. They seek to prevent further antisocial behaviour by helping to address the root causes of the person’s behaviour.
Harriet Cross
Respect orders are indeed meant to be preventive, and everyone on the Committee wants them to work, but part of prevention is deterrence. Knowing that it will hit them in their pocket if they get a respect order is a huge deterrent for people who otherwise, as the shadow Minister said, wear these things as a badge of honour. It is not that people will receive multiple respect orders at the same time; they may receive them sequentially. They may have had one in the past, but it has lapsed or they have served it—whatever word is used—and then, down the line, they get another one and then another. A fine would ensure that respect orders have a direct financial impact on them, to prevent them from getting into a cycle of receiving one after another.
Dame Diana Johnson
As my hon. Friend the Member for Southend West and Leigh pointed out, respect orders deter people from carrying on with their behaviour because a breach can lead to arrest, being brought before a criminal court and, potentially, imprisonment. My expectation is that, if there is a need to make changes to a respect order, the requirements will be changed and the prohibitions will be extended on the respect order that has already been issued, so I am not sure that I take the point about multiple respect orders. What we all want is that, when a respect order is issued, the individual will comply with it and no further steps are necessary by anybody because they will have stopped the antisocial behaviour and dealt with their underlying problems. Simply fining someone for receiving further orders would be a punitive measure and unlikely to help that individual change their behaviour.
Amendment 32 would increase the maximum prison term available for repeated breaches of respect orders to five years. Currently, the maximum sentence for breaching a respect order is up to two years’ imprisonment upon conviction in the Crown court. We believe that is the appropriate level of sanction, and it is in line with the current civil injunction that it replaces.
As I said, respect orders take a fundamentally preventive approach, and it is appropriate that the sentence reflects that. If the offender abides by the terms of the order, there will be no further sanctions. However, it is right that custodial sentences are still available for those who continue to cause havoc to our communities. Other powers, such as criminal behaviour orders, are available on conviction for any criminal offence in any criminal court, and they carry a longer sentence of up to five years’ imprisonment. In the light of that, I hope that the shadow Minister will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Matt Vickers
I thank the Minister for her response. As we know, a small number of people are responsible for the vast majority of crimes. It is right that we put these ladders in place for the communities out there who are frustrated because they do not think the system has consequences for the same young people who are offending again and again, and creating lots of havoc on our streets. We would like to press the amendment to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Matt Vickers
Amendment 32 sets out proposed penalties for repeated breaches of a respect order, with a prison sentence of up to five years. It would strengthen the enforcement of respect orders by introducing clear and proportionate penalties.
The Chair
Order. It may have been a slip of the tongue, but we are meant to be discussing amendment 30. The shadow Minister mentioned amendment 32, which we will vote on later. I just want to make sure he is speaking to the right amendment.
Matt Vickers
Thank you, Mr Pritchard.
I beg to move amendment 30, in clause 1, page 2, line 30, leave out from “behaviour” to the end of line 31 and insert
“has the same meaning as under section 2 of this Act.”
This amendment would give “anti-social behaviour” in clause 1 the same definition as in section 2 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014.
The 2014 definition of antisocial behaviour, as outlined in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, provides a crucial framework for tackling the real, everyday issues that affect communities across the country. It recognises that antisocial behaviour is about not just criminal activity but the negative impact that certain behaviours have on the lives of ordinary people. By encompassing actions that cause harassment, alarm or distress, the definition offers a broad, flexible approach that allows authorities to respond effectively to a wide range of disruptive activities.
The definition also strikes a vital balance between protecting individual freedoms and ensuring the safety and wellbeing of the wider community. It does not overreach, but rather targets conduct that directly harms or threatens public peace, whether it be noise disturbances, vandalism or other forms of nuisance. That makes it a vital tool for local police forces, housing authorities and community groups to act swiftly and proportionately. Rather than offering an overtly wide-ranging definition, it draws a clear connection between antisocial behaviour and housing-related issues. The definition acknowledges the complex nature of the problems. It ensures that disruptive behaviour in homes, whether public or private, is tackled with the same urgency as antisocial behaviour and actions in public spaces.
Dame Diana Johnson
Amendment 30 would expand the legal definition of antisocial behaviour for respect orders, which is currently drafted as behaviour
“that has caused, or is likely to cause, harassment, alarm or distress to any person.”
The amendment seeks to include housing-related definitions of antisocial behaviour, including causing “nuisance or annoyance”, as in section 2 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. The test for nuisance and annoyance is a lower level of behaviour than that causing harassment, alarm or distress. That is appropriate in a housing context where a victim cannot easily escape from ASB that is occurring in the area where they live. We know that ASB can have devastating consequences in such situations, undermining the victim’s safety and security in their home. That is why we have retained the test for the new housing injunction in clause 2.
The respect order goes further than the civil injunction, as I have set out, in making a breach a criminal offence and enabling a wider range of sentencing options. It is appropriate that the legal test should be behaviour that is causing, or likely to cause, harassment, alarm or distress. It is also important to be mindful that the respect order sits alongside a suite of powers available to the police and local authorities to tackle ASB, which are designed to apply to the different scenarios and harm types that the amendment aims to capture. I hope I have assured the shadow Minister of our reasoning in setting the bar for a respect order at the level of harassment, alarm or distress, and that he will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Matt Vickers
I thank the Minister for her response, but I would like to press the amendment to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Matt Vickers
I beg to move amendment 34, in clause 1, page 4, line 18, at end insert—
“D1 Power to move person down list for social housing
A respect order may have the effect of moving any application the respondent may have for social housing to the end of the waiting list.”
This amendment would mean that a person who receives a respect order would move to the bottom of the waiting list for social housing, if applicable.
Amendment 34 would mean that a person who receives a respect order would move to the bottom of the waiting list for social housing, if applicable. This is a crucial measure that can play an essential role in ensuring that the allocation of social housing is fair, responsible and aligned with the values of respect and community responsibility. The key benefit of the provision is that it provides an additional incentive for individuals to behave in a way that upholds community standards.
David Burton-Sampson
On that point, does the shadow Minister not believe that everybody has the right to decent housing?
Matt Vickers
I do. At the moment there are huge challenges around housing. People who live in social housing want to live next to someone who treats them with the dignity and respect that they deserve. That is fair on the people who might be their neighbours and fair on the other people in that list. There is a list for a reason, and the people who misbehave should feel the consequences of doing so.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Jess Phillips)
As a constituency Member of Parliament, the shadow Minister will have handled cases where people want their neighbours to move because of the neighbours’ antisocial behaviour. Would he be willing to tell his constituents that those neighbours cannot move because they are at the bottom of the list?
Matt Vickers
Well, I will give the Ministers the reasons for it. We are talking more broadly about the powers and sanctions given to help us to tackle antisocial people who create havoc on some estates and cause absolute uproar. No one wants such people to move in next to them. Does the Minister want the empty house next door to be occupied by someone who is committing antisocial behaviour and failing to comply with the responsibility of being a civilised member of society?
Matt Vickers
They are not going to jump the queue ahead of law-abiding citizens who do the right thing. That is what the queue is about, and there is a queue because there is not space.
Matt Vickers
We are saying that they will not get ahead of others. They will join the back of the queue; they will be put down the list. The people who behave, who are responsible, who are fair, and who play by the rules will carry on in their place while others are moved down the list for misbehaving.
Luke Taylor (Sutton and Cheam) (LD)
The shadow Minister talks about the victims of antisocial behaviour and the offenders. I completely agree with his desire to provide an incentive for those are offending, but offenders often live with their families and children, who are often equally the victims of the antisocial behaviour. Does he agree that to punish offenders’ children and partners in a way that makes their housing situation more precarious and denies them a good home and an aspirational move to a better area, is an inappropriate punishment for an individual and becomes, effectively, a group punishment?
Matt Vickers
In my part of the world, the antisocial behaviour is more often wreaked by young people. Parents should be responsible for those young people, and there should be consequences so that people help their families to fall in line and behave. I think this is the right thing to do. Those on a housing list who play by the rules should carry on, while those who misbehave, who do not play by the rules and cause absolute hell for other people, should be pushed to the bottom of the list. I stand by that.
Luke Taylor
I am not sure that the shadow Minister understands the severity of the difficulties that families find themselves in. I have a certain sympathy with wanting to sound like there is a serious consequence for families and individuals who are breaching orders, but this amendment is an extreme measure that would lead to misery for whole families. It seems an overreaction and an extreme punishment for a whole family to suffer in that circumstance.
Matt Vickers
There are decisions to make about the extremity of the consequences and sanctions, but there is a choice. Is it about the victims who suffer sleepless nights and all this havoc, whose windows have gone through, who are abused and are petrified to live in their own home, or are we on the side of the families who wreak this behaviour and the young people who terrorise others? There is a choice there.
Joe Robertson
Government Members’ interventions suggest that they may have misread and misunderstood the amendment. They seem to think it means that someone with a respect order would be removed from the housing list. That is not what the amendment says; it is about prioritisation within the waiting list. These waiting lists are based on a set of a criteria that lead to a prioritisation. It seems to me uncontroversial—although it is possible to disagree with it, of course—to add another criterion to compiling a housing waiting list: does someone have a respect order? The amendment is not a mandatory provision. It states:
“A respect order may have the effect of moving any application”
down the list. The provision is discretionary, which addresses the point made by the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam. It may be that an overriding need of the family would mean that the power would not be used. There is nothing mandatory about this. It is entirely consistent with how waiting lists are compiled.
Matt Vickers
My hon. Friend makes a very valid point. The fact that housing authorities are made a relevant authority by the Bill is really powerful. We should give all these agencies—the housing associations, the police and the justice system—all the tools, the carrots and the sticks, that they need to manage and induce the correct behaviour. This measure would do that.
Jess Phillips
How does the shadow Minister not see that, if my neighbour is an absolute nightmare who engages in antisocial behaviour, I would not report them or want them to get a respect order if I thought that would make it less likely that they could move? I would want them to move, so I would not want them to be at the bottom of the social housing waiting list.
Matt Vickers
We have some really good people working in housing authorities across the country who will use all the powers we give them in a meaningful, proportionate and sensible way to get the best possible outcomes for their tenants and communities. This power would be one string on that bow. As we have said, using it would not be mandatory; it would be an option available to them.
I am glad that the Government have said that housing authorities should be a relevant authority that should be able to bring forward orders, including respect orders. That is a really powerful thing, and we should give them all the powers they need and let them get on with the job that they are qualified to do—working hard to deliver for those communities.
Dr Sullivan
To take a slightly different tack, does the shadow Minister recognise that some landlords, social landlords and councils evict tenants who exhibit the kind of antisocial behaviour he describes, which is an absolute travesty and a blight on some communities, but that if they get a respect order and these people are placed at the bottom of the list, they will not be able to be evicted. That will hamper some of our councils from moving tenants on and addressing the various issues he has raised.
Matt Vickers
As I have said, this is not a mandatory measure. It is something that housing authorities and local enforcement agencies would be able to use at their discretion, looking at all of the facts surrounding the case, to try to get the best possible outcome for communities and tenants, many of whom are suffering sleepless nights and are miserable in their own home as a result of the behaviour of some awful people. It is right that there are consequences for these people and that we empower the agencies to deal with them as they see fit.
Jess Phillips
Have any particular social housing providers or local authorities requested the amendment from the shadow Minister?
Matt Vickers
As yet, they have not—I do not know. The Minister is very good at these questions, is she not? She does not like the “name a business” questions, but I suppose we can play it both ways. The reality is that I speak to housing associations that are deeply frustrated about their lack of powers and ability to tackle some of these issues. We would give them and other agencies this power as an option; its use would not be mandatory or stipulated. It is a very sensible thing to do. We should support and empower the authorities and agencies in every way we can.
Jess Phillips
The shadow Minister is right; I am very good at those questions. He made a good point about how we need to trust the experts, and I wondered where this amendment had come from if the experts are not the ones calling for it. I have tabled a lot of Opposition amendments in my time, and I was usually working with a team of experts.
Matt Vickers
How many housing authorities did we invite to the evidence session?
Matt Vickers
We did not invite any to the evidence session. I think the amendment would be welcomed, but I am sure we will hear from the relevant agencies and authorities in due course.
Jess Phillips
When tabling amendments to Government Bills in opposition, I never relied only on evidence given in evidence sessions. I believe the shadow Minister has an email address where those people could have lobbied him—it happens to us all the time. Have any housing or antisocial behaviour experts got in touch with him and said this is an appropriate action?
Matt Vickers
I am sure they will be in touch and can ask them that question, but I think empowering these organisations in this way is really powerful and will really help them to deal with some of the horrific antisocial behaviour their tenants are subjected to.
Harriet Cross
On this amendment and amendment 31, on reducing the age threshold to 16, we heard from the experts and people who gave evidence that we should reduce it to 16 because that is where most of the criminality of the antisocial behaviour comes from. By that same argument, because we are not hearing from housing authorities or experts does not necessarily mean that this is not a good amendment.
Matt Vickers
Some of the real experts in this Bill are the people on housing lists, feeling that they are waiting to get a house while others are getting ahead of them in the queue. This is an essential measure.
David Taylor (Hemel Hempstead) (Lab)
I have listened intently to the remarks, and I must say it is astounding to hear the shadow Minister suddenly become a champion for social housing. The problems due to antisocial behaviour in my constituency are, first, that families are stuck next to a problem family and cannot move because the Conservative party sold off so much council housing in my constituency and, crucially, did not replace it with new council housing stock; and secondly, my housing associations do not have enough resources from the local police, because the Conservative party slashed police numbers.
Matt Vickers
Police numbers are at a record level. There are more police on the streets of the UK than ever before. There is more funding going into the police than ever before. We toughened up sentencing for some of the worst offences. I am sure the hon. Member has lots of views on social housing, but in terms of this amendment, I think the right thing to do is to empower the agencies and ensure that some of the frustrated people in his constituency who want to move house can move ahead of those committing antisocial behaviour.
Matt Bishop (Forest of Dean) (Lab)
I will just draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that one of my other former roles was as a tenancy enforcement caseworker for a social housing company. I can assure the Committee that I would not be asking for this amendment. I think it would have a detrimental effect, and would actually cause more antisocial behaviour further down the line.
Matt Vickers
I thank the hon. Member for his evidence.
The amendment is a crucial measure that could play an essential role in ensuring that the allocation of social housing is fair, responsible, and aligned with the values of respect and community responsibility. The key benefit is that it provides an additional incentive for individuals to behave in a way that upholds community standards. When someone is found to have caused disruption or engaged in antisocial behaviour that harms others, placing them at the bottom of the waiting list for social housing serves as a tangible consequence of their actions. It encourages personal responsibility and reinforces the idea that those who choose to respect the rules and the people around them should be rewarded, while those who engage in disruptive behaviour should face appropriate consequences.
Moreover, this approach supports the integrity of the social housing system. Social housing is in high demand, and it is vital that we prioritise those who are not only in need, but demonstrate a commitment to being good tenants and positive members of the community. By introducing this measure, we would ensure that social housing was allocated in a manner that rewards responsible behaviour, thus safeguarding the quality of life for everyone in the community. Importantly, it would allow local authorities to manage the housing waiting list in a way that aligns with the broader objectives of social housing policy, promoting both fairness and the values that underpin our society. It is a sensible, measured approach that encourages respect for others and the community as a whole.
Dame Diana Johnson
Well, Mr Pritchard, that was a lively exchange. Clearly the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Yardley, has had her three Weetabix this morning.
We all recognise how devastating antisocial behaviour where you live can be, and I fully understand and appreciate the passion the debate on amendment 34 has prompted this morning. As the shadow Minister pointed out, amendment 34 would enable local authorities or housing providers to move a person who receives a respect order to the bottom of the waiting list for social housing. It is for local authorities to decide who should qualify for social housing. It might be helpful for hon. Members to know that many councils already consider antisocial behaviour or other criminal behaviour before allocating a social home. They may either decide that a person with a history of antisocial behaviour does not qualify to go on the housing register, or accept the person on to the register but award them lower priority.
I note what the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam, said about the effect that this amendment could have on other family members not associated with the antisocial behaviour. We need to consider the potential consequences of removing access to social housing. The respect order is intended to tackle the most harmful adult perpetrators of ASB, but also aims to prevent further ASB from occurring and help people to address the root causes of their behaviour. That is why respect orders may contain positive as well as prohibitive requirements.
Luke Taylor
To pick up the point on the root cause of antisocial behaviour, does the right hon. Lady agree that being in unsuitable housing, and then being trapped in unsuitable housing through a measure like this, may well make antisocial behaviour even worse, leading to further reactions and disruption within communities?
Dame Diana Johnson
The hon. Gentleman has made his point; I am not sure that I will respond to it. However, the point he made earlier about the need to ensure that innocent people are not caught up in this is one that I am willing to accept.
We do not want to create further issues for individuals who have respect orders by removing access to social housing entirely, which may increase the risk of reoffending and reduce the likelihood of rehabilitation. I hope that, as I have explained that there is already the power for local authorities to choose to take into account the antisocial behaviour or criminal records of potential tenants, the shadow Minister will be willing to withdraw the amendment.
Matt Vickers
I thank the Minister for her response. I am glad that we provoked a bit of passion and got people engaged in the debate. I would like to press the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Dame Diana Johnson
As we have talked at length about the respect orders, I will not say anything further at this stage.
Matt Vickers
It is encouraging to see housing providers recognised as registered authorities in proposed new section B1 of the 2014 Act, particularly when it comes to addressing antisocial behaviour, which continues to plague many residents in housing communities. Registered housing providers, including housing associations and local authority landlords, serve as the backbone of the social housing sector, ensuring that tenants have access to safe, stable and well-managed homes. Their role extends beyond simply providing houses; they are legally and morally responsible for fostering strong, liveable communities where residents feel secure and supported. As designated authorities with specific legal powers, these providers are uniquely positioned to tackle antisocial behaviour head-on. This responsibility is crucial in preventing communities from becoming blighted by persistent nuisance and intimidation or criminal activity.
Rather than leaving tenants to endure these issues alone, or to rely solely on already overstretched police and council services, housing providers have the tools to intervene directly, whether through tenancy enforcement, mediation or legal action. By taking a proactive stance against antisocial behaviour, registered housing providers help maintain the quality of life for all residents, ensuring that social housing remains a place not just to live, but to thrive. Their ability to act swiftly and decisively is vital in upholding community standards and reinforcing the fundamental principle that everyone deserves to live in a safe and respectful environment.
Response times can still lag, and not all providers have the resources or the will to tackle complex cases effectively. Victims of persistent antisocial behaviour often face a daunting process: logging multiple complaints, gathering evidence and navigating bureaucracy. How will the Government ensure that all housing providers have the capacity to utilise these powers effectively?
The Environment Agency is listed as a relevant authority with the power to issue a respect order. Could the Minister clarify the specific role that the agency will play in enforcing these orders? Under what circumstances would the Environment Agency be expected to exercise this power, and what specific outcomes do the Government seek to achieve by including it? Could the Minister provide a concrete example of how the Environment Agency might use a respect order in practice? Proposed new section C1 of the 2014 Act sets out that the respect order
“may have the effect of excluding the respondent from the place where the respondent normally lives”
and that a condition the court considers is that
“the anti-social behaviour in which the respondent has engaged or threatens to engage consists of or includes the use or threatened use of violence against other persons, or…there is a significant risk of harm to other persons from the respondent.”
What implications could that have for respondents who have been issued with an order? Where will they live? What role will their local authority have in supporting them?
David Taylor
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard. In Hemel Hempstead, antisocial behaviour is regularly at the top of my inbox. Ahead of joining the Committee, I carried out information-gathering exercises in addition to my regular surgery and casework, including a recent public event alongside the police and the Police Federation. I found that hundreds of people are unable to go about their daily lives because of antisocial behaviour. A rot was allowed to set in by the Conservatives when they were in government, with crime doubling in my constituency between 2014 and 2024. A retired police officer locally has pinpointed the fact that the cuts that were made to neighbourhood policing during that time is having a massive and detrimental effect on policing in Hemel Hempstead.
I have spoken before about a family who live locally who have suffered from terrible antisocial behaviour, and I will refer to them again today. This family, who have a boy, have been harassed for more than two years, including verbal abuse, trespassing, damage to property and their neighbours generally causing them distress. What is really disturbing is that the child does not feel comfortable going out to play in their local neighbourhood because of the impact that the abuse from those terrible neighbours has had on his mental health. The family have recorded these incidents on their Ring doorbell device, and the recordings have been submitted to the police and local authority. However, despite multiple reports to the council, the police and other agencies, no resolution has been reached. They are currently unable to move away to another area because of the lack of social housing, which I mentioned earlier. It is not okay that the son is fearful of going outside, and that the anxiety is so bad that he cannot sleep alone. I have met the family and have had to console them as they have broken down in tears owing to the stress. It is unacceptable.
In reading the Bill, I have been applying a simple test: what will each clause mean for Hemel Hempstead residents? I strongly believe that clause 1 will have a considerable impact on residents. Why? First, unlike previous measures, respect orders come with criminal penalties for breaches, which paves the way for the police to immediately act when individuals are in breach. It will help to ensure that residents such as the family I referenced will not suffer prolonged harm from persistent offenders, and that authorities have the tools to act decisively.
Secondly, residents have informed me that when antisocial behaviour injunctions and other parts of enforcement measures have been applied, they were too slow to be enforced, so lacked any real deterrent. In contrast, the measures introduced in clause 1 simplify the legal framework, providing enforceable rules that local authorities, housing providers and the police can use. Further, one of the problems reported to me by the family is that the neighbours’ drug use is the driver of much of the antisocial behaviour.
Jo Platt (Leigh and Atherton) (Lab/Co-op)
I thank my hon. Friend for giving way; he is very kind. In my constituency, ASB is conducted by people who have alcohol and drug problems. Does he agree that the fact that the new respect orders have positive requirements, such as attending drug or alcohol support services, will get to the root of the problem?
David Taylor
My hon. Friend makes an important point. I have spoken about members of my family who have suffered drug abuse; sometimes that did lead to antisocial behaviour and they suffered the penalties of it. It is right that we need to look at dealing with some of the root causes.
This issue is a scourge in my community and it has been for many years. I recall another couple who came up to me at a community event just before Christmas. They said that they lived on a completely normal street but then, at one point, a house on the street turned into a drug den, where there was a drug dealer. They told me, “It is striking. This is just a normal street and all of a sudden, we are dealing with people coming at all hours of the day, leaving drugs and paraphernalia all over the place. There is swearing and antisocial behaviour.” A neighbour went out to confront the people coming to buy the drugs, and one of them turned on the neighbour and drove at him with their vehicle—that is how bad some of these offences are.
I therefore welcome that the new respect orders allow courts to impose restrictions and positive obligations, which my hon. Friend referenced. As a result, offenders can be required not just to stop harmful behaviour but to engage in programmes of drug rehabilitation, which I hope will get to the root cause of this problem.
The overarching issue with antisocial behaviour in Hemel Hempstead is that it has been ignored in the past, with one resident telling me that authorities do not really think it is that bad. The new respect orders send a strong message that such behaviour will have real consequences, therefore restoring trust in policing and the justice system. I have made the case several times that Hemel would very much welcome being included in the pilot for the new respect orders, should the Bill pass, and I reiterate that today. I thank the Government for taking seriously the plight of antisocial behaviour, as demonstrated by clause 1, and I hope that we can work together to ensure that it is enforceable as quickly as possible, and to bring about real change for residents across our country and in my Hemel Hempstead.
Jack Rankin
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard. As members of the Committee have said, antisocial behaviour really is one of the scourges of our communities right across the country. Although it might often be described as low-level, compared with more serious crimes, it is deleterious to community cohesion, and it clearly has significant effects on people’s mental health.
I was looking at some YouGov statistics earlier: 28% of people in the country at some point felt unsafe where they live because of antisocial behaviour; 14% said that antisocial behaviour where they live has affected their mental health; and 15% have said that they have been scared at some points to visit their local shop. That is reflected in my surgeries, as I am sure it is in the surgeries of Members across the House.
Last month, I went to Eton town council. Eton is a prosperous place, as people might recognise, but even for Eton as a town, there were two primary issues that the council brought up with me relating to antisocial behaviour. That included from the night-time economy, whether that is shop windows being smashed, indecent exposure or laughing gas. We also have problems with BB guns being shot at swans—indeed, youths not too far in the past killed a swan. What we find, in many instances, is that an incredibly small number of individuals create havoc for a whole town, so I welcome clause 1 and the powers that respect orders will give the authorities. The clause can give them more teeth to get at the repeat offenders who are causing this kind of damage across our town.
I know it is not necessarily appropriate at this point for me to speak to the amendments, but I would like to say two sentences on amendment 31, if you would allow me, Mr Pritchard. I think this behaviour is often done by 16 to 17-year-olds, so it is a bit of a shame that that has been put to one side.
The Chair
Order. I think the hon. Gentleman was seeking advice, so may I kindly offer it? Please stick to the particular issue in the clause.
Jack Rankin
On the more substantive point, there were some missed opportunities to toughen the clause up a bit. The perception of respect orders is that they could become ASBO mark 2. I recognise that they are a little tougher than past measures, but there is bit of a missed opportunity.
David Burton-Sampson
As other Members have said, antisocial behaviour is out of control. Around 35% of respondents to the crime survey for England and Wales in March 2024 said they had witnessed or experienced antisocial behaviour in their area. We must remember that a significant amount of antisocial behaviour goes unreported, so the reports that we get are probably a misrepresentation of the level of antisocial behaviour that is actually out there. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead that it is an indictment of the previous Government’s record that action was not taken on this issue, but I am glad that the hon. Member for Windsor welcomes the respect orders and can see that this Government are starting to take control of antisocial behaviour.
Joe Robertson
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard. Like every Member in the Committee and across the House, my constituency struggles with antisocial behaviour, particularly but not exclusively in towns. Individual instances of antisocial behaviour often are referred to—perhaps correctly—as low-level crime, but the problem is the combination of those activities, the hyper-prolific nature of antisocial behaviour, whereby a few individuals cause a huge amount of the problems, and the knock-on effect for the rest of the people living in those neighbourhoods, who are law-abiding citizens trying to go about their daily lives. Antisocial behaviour also feeds into the fear of crime, which is relevant—not just the level of crime, but fear of it among a given population.
In the town of Sandown in my constituency on the Isle of Wight, antisocial behaviour feeds into a major regeneration issue, as the state of some key buildings, which have been left to deteriorate, attracts antisocial behaviour. That is not to say that there is any justification for criminality or antisocial behaviour, but it would be false to assume that the physical environment in which people live does not have an effect, particularly on younger people who may be struggling to fill their time, as they look for work or further education opportunities.
I welcome the new respect orders, in line with most of the things that have been said today, because of the beefing up of the current rules and the attempt to add weight to the deterrent available to law enforcement. However, as the measure includes criminal sanctions for an offence that can be tried and heard in the Crown court, the Government have to be alive to the potential—indeed, the almost certainty—that it will increase the workload of the courts. It is all very well for Members such as the hon. Member for Southend West and Leigh to talk about the previous Government not having done enough, but to assume that words, even good words, in a Bill will solve everything on their own, I suggest might be a little simplistic. The Government will have to do more.
David Taylor
The hon. Member is being a bit unfair. The Bill is not being presented in isolation. As a Government, we are also recruiting 13,000 new officers, a starting point to getting neighbourhood policing back in a fit and proper state. Does he not welcome that move?
Matt Vickers
Recruiting 13,000 police officers sounds really good, but about a third of them will be special constables and about a third redeployed from other parts of the police force. When someone rings 999, because they want that emergency response service, they may wait even longer, because the response police officers will have been moved into neighbourhoods.
Matt Vickers
The Government are redeploying them, so they are taking them from somewhere. We would welcome any information about where the Government will or will not redeploy them from, but this is important. The Government cannot say 13,000 more are arriving, when it is about 3,000 more.
Joe Robertson
My hon. Friend makes a good point. To respond to the hon. Member for Hemel Hempstead, we can debate policing all he likes—indeed, the previous Government increased police numbers—but the point I was making was about the courts, because we are talking about increasing the burden on Crown courts. I am not making a point against him or the hon. Member for Southend West and Leigh, but I am sure they would both agree that the Government have to address the pressure on the court system. I support this provision, but although Bills such as this are well intended, they will add pressure to the prison population and the court systems if the Government do not make further provision.
Matt Bishop
Perhaps the hon. Member can offer some thoughts as to why we might have huge backlogs in the court system.
Joe Robertson
I am slightly surprised that such an uncontroversial point is being met with such incredulity and that I am being asked to provide the hon. Member’s Government with solutions. He has to get used to the fact that his Government are in power now. They will have to find their own solutions.
Matt Vickers
I would never seek to defend anything that any Government have ever done—people do get things wrong—but the previous Government were right to toughen up sentences for the worst and most violent offences. It was right that we put people away for longer. It was right that we did not release people during the pandemic, or at anything like the levels that some other countries did. It was right, therefore, that the Government had the biggest prison-building programme since the Victorian era. It is right that we put those people in prison. It is right that in another Bill Committee I have been saying for weeks that foreign national offenders should be removed without the need for a 12-month prison sentence in the meantime. We have got to where we have got to for lots of reasons. I think tougher sentences were a good thing, and that it was right that we did not release people early and that we built more prison places than have been built since the Victorian era.
Several hon. Members rose—
The Chair
Order. We need to warm up, because it is cold, so people bobbing up and down is fantastic, but may we stick to what we are supposed to be debating, however excitable the other things make us?
Joe Robertson
Thank you for that advice, Mr Pritchard. I am too generous in giving way, but the shadow Minister put it much better than I could myself.
Matt Bishop
I thank the hon. Member for giving way. To clarify, I did not ask for solutions; our Government have the solutions.
Joe Robertson
I think we will have to leave the debate about which Government have the solutions to another day, but I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention.
I repeat my point, which I do not think is controversial and would hope is accepted: the Labour party will have to pay extra attention to court backlogs when provisions such as this, which I support, are introduced.
Dame Diana Johnson
We have had a wide-ranging debate on clause 1, moving from the specifics of the respect order through to policing numbers. I am very proud that we will have 13,000 additional police officers and PCSOs by the end of this Parliament. I have to say that the idea that there was the largest prison-building scheme since the Victorian times under the previous Conservative Government is utter bunkum—they built 500 places. That is why we are in the position we are in at the moment. I know that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East is a new Member, but those of us who have been in the House a little while remember what 14 years of Conservative government have delivered for this country. That is why this Government are determined to start to deal with some of the problems around antisocial behaviour, crime and the fact that we do not have enough prison places.
Getting back to clause 1 of this important Bill, I am pleased that there is acceptance across the House of the need for respect orders and a general welcoming of them. The shadow Minister asked some very detailed questions, which I will come to in a moment, but I want to comment on the speech made by my hon. Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead. The horrific case in his constituency of a child who cannot go out to play and the stress that antisocial behaviour puts on the family is clearly totally unacceptable. That is why respect orders will play their part, along with the housing civil injunctions, in tackling some of these problems.
My hon. Friend the Member for Leigh and Atherton made an important point about individuals with addiction problems and how it is absolutely vital that respect orders deal with the requirements to get to grips with antisocial behaviour and whether an addiction issue is driving it. I was pleased that the hon. Member for Windsor talked about the antisocial behaviour that occurs even in some of the more prosperous areas of the country—he talked about Eton. My hon. Friend the Member for Southend West and Leigh made an important point about prevention, the work around youth hubs and the prevention partnerships that we will be introducing.
At the very start of the debate on the amendments, the shadow Minister asked whether respect orders would interfere with individuals’ work commitments. I can reassure him that it will be for the court, which is judicially independent, to set the conditions of a respect order. Courts are well practised in navigating types of circumstances, such as where a person works or lives, and we expect the courts to consider those issues when making respect orders. For example, a court is unlikely to prevent the respondent from entering a defined area if they need to access it to attend work.
The shadow Minister asked how the Environment Agency will use respect orders. The Environment Agency can play a role, particularly where an environmental ASB offence is committed, for example vandalism of local open spaces or parks, or things like that.
The shadow Minister was particularly concerned about without-notice applications for respect orders. We know that courts can issue without-notice respect orders when the matter is urgent—the shadow Minister referred to that. Courts are familiar with doing that and have done it for a very long time with civil injunctions.
The shadow Minister also asked about the burden of proof required for the courts to approve a respect order and how much police will work with communities to ensure that repeated reporting and gathering of evidence has the desired effect. The court must be satisfied that, on the balance of probabilities, the respondent has engaged in, or threatened to engage in, conduct that has or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress. The court must also be satisfied that it is just and convenient to grant the respect order for the purposes of preventing the respondent from engaging in antisocial behaviour. That is the same legal test as for the current injunction.
I was pleased that the shadow Minister welcomed the fact that housing bodies will be able to seek orders from the courts; I think that is welcome across the House. Police are just one of the number of agencies, including councils and housing authorities, that can apply for respect orders. It is expected that a multi-agency approach will be taken when applying for respect orders. We are also introducing mandatory checklists for the relevant agency to complete prior to applying for a respect order, to ensure proportionate use.
Dame Diana Johnson
I beg to move amendment 6, in clause 2, page 10, line 36, leave out
“Schedule 1 amends Part 1 of”
and insert
“Part 1 of Schedule 1 amends”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 24.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 7 and 8.
Clause stand part.
Government amendments 24 to 28.
Schedule 1.
Dame Diana Johnson
Clause 2 introduces schedule 1, which makes consequential amendments to part 1 of the 2014 Act to provide for youth and housing injunctions. The purpose of the amendments in this group is to retain the existing civil injunction for cases that will not be covered by the respect order, namely those of offenders under 18 and housing-related nuisance ASB. Although in some cases powers are needed to address the behaviour of younger offenders, the Government do not want to unnecessarily criminalise children, as I said previously. Practitioners have told us that the existing injunction can be a useful power for addressing persistent ASB committed by under-18s and so it will remain in place for that cohort, operating in the same way as the civil injunction, although it will be renamed the “youth injunction”.
Harriet Cross
For clarity, will the threshold at which a youth injunction is given be at the same sort of level as for a respect order, but with the age element added in, or will there be a different threshold for the level of antisocial behaviour, or the sort of disruption caused?
Dame Diana Johnson
We are retaining the existing provisions for civil injunctions. As I set out previously, the balance of probabilities, the test and the categorisation of the antisocial behaviour will all remain the same. We are just renaming it a “youth injunction” because we are focusing the respect order on the persistent antisocial behaviour of adults over 18. The youth injunction remains exactly as it is in law now.
I am conscious of the profound problems that housing-related nuisance ASB can cause, as we have heard again in this debate. The housing injunction therefore retains the lower legal threshold of
“conduct capable of causing nuisance or annoyance”
in a housing context—as previously discussed. Again, we heard from practitioners that the existing power is effective and proportionate for housing-related ASB, and the housing injunction therefore retains the effect of the current power in that context.
Government amendments 6 to 8 and 24 to 28 make further technical and consequential amendments to existing antisocial behaviour legislation as a result of the introduction of respect orders. In relation to the 2014 Act, that means ensuring that definitions of antisocial behaviour are captured accurately elsewhere, under the existing powers, to account for the new respect orders and injunctions in part 1 of the Act. Consequential amendments are also needed to the Housing Acts 1985 and 1988 so that the breach of a respect order, a youth injunction or a housing injunction continues to be a ground for possession under those Housing Acts, as is the case with the current civil injunction.
We know that taking possession of a property is an important tool for landlords to use to provide swift relief to victims when antisocial behaviour or criminality has already been proven by another court. It is therefore right to retain that tool with the new respect order. In addition, amendment 28 amends the Localism Act 2011 to ensure that landlords can refuse to surrender and grant tenancies on the basis that a tenant, or a person residing with the tenant, has been issued with a respect order.
Finally, amendment 28 also amends the Police Reform Act 2002 to ensure that constables in uniform can continue to require a person engaging in antisocial behaviour to give their name and address. I commend the provisions to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
Clause 2 amends the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 to provide for the granting of youth and housing injunctions; I thank the Minister for outlining that. Clause 2 will limit powers under section 1 of the 2014 Act so that injunctions can be granted only to individuals aged 10 to 17. Will the Minister confirm the rationale behind that age restriction?
The clause also introduces a new type of injunction for adults aged 18 and over, specifically aimed at preventing behaviour that causes nuisance or annoyance related to housing. It shifts the approach to tackling community-specific antisocial conduct, rather than broader public disorder. How do the Government justify treating adult antisocial behaviour differently depending on whether it is housing-related or not? Is the Minister concerned that limiting injunctions for housing-related issues to adults might create enforcement gaps? What mechanisms are in place to ensure that local authorities and housing providers have the necessary resources to enforce housing-related injunctions effectively? Realising that Ministers are keen to hear exactly who wants what measures in the Bill, can she name any housing associations who specifically asked for this measure?
Dame Diana Johnson
A number of the points that the shadow Minister has raised were discussed earlier. We have set out very clearly why we believe that the respect orders should only apply to adults, because we are talking about the most serious antisocial behaviour. We believe that children and young people up to the age of 18 should not be caught by a respect order because of the criminalisation attached—if it is breached, they can be immediately arrested and brought before the criminal courts. That is why we have retained what is working well with the civil injunctions and renamed them the youth injunction and the housing injunction. On the latter, again, we heard very passionate contributions about how antisocial behaviour where people live, next to their home, and caused by neighbours, can absolutely destroy people’s lives, causing stress, distress and mental health issues, as well as sometimes breaking up families. That is why the threshold for the housing injunction is lower than that for the respect order, but for the threshold we are using what is already on the statute books and I think it is right that it is at that lower level.
On the question about whether any social housing authority has supported the plans for housing injunctions, there is a genuine view in the sector that this is a positive step to enable them to deal with the antisocial behaviour that housing authorities often have to deal with. I am very conscious that the antisocial behaviour charity Resolve has much welcomed the work that has gone into the Bill on both the respect orders and the civil injunctions. Resolve would say that there is a general view that this is a positive way forward. The approach that seems sensible is using what works well now, and keeping that—as I have said, that is why the housing and youth injunctions are doing that and are adapting it—while bringing in this tougher response through the respect order, and getting that on the statute books to deal with people who persistently engage in antisocial behaviour, to try to get to the root cause of what they are doing. I hope that deals with the questions posed by the shadow Minister.
Amendment 6 agreed to.
Amendments made: 7, in clause 2, page 10, line 37, leave out “(injunctions)”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 6.
Amendment 8, in clause 2, page 11, line 2, at end insert—
“(1A) Part 2 of Schedule 1 contains consequential amendments of other Acts.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 28.
Clause 2, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1
Amendments of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014
Amendments made: 24, in schedule 1, page 148, line 4, leave out paragraph 1 and insert—
“Part 1
Amendments of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014
1 The Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 is amended as set out in this Part.”
This amendment, which is consequential on Amendment 28, makes the existing text of Schedule 1 become Part 1 of that Schedule.
Amendment 25, in schedule 1, page 150, line 4, leave out from “for” to end of line 5 and insert
“‘section 1’ substitute ‘this Part’.”
This amendment ensures that the definition in section 2(1)(b) of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, as amended by the Bill, applies to applications for youth injunctions as well as applications for housing injunctions.
Amendment 26, in schedule 1, page 152, line 37, at end insert—
“(za) in the words before paragraph (a), for ‘section 1’ substitute ‘this Part’;”.
This amendment ensures that the consultation requirement under section 14(3) of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, as amended by the Bill, applies to applications to vary or discharge housing injunctions as well as youth injunctions.
Amendment 27, in schedule 1, page 153, line 33, at end insert—
“19A In section 101 (the community remedy document), in subsection (9), for the definition of ‘anti-social behaviour’ substitute—
‘“anti-social behaviour” means—
(a) conduct that has caused, or is likely to cause, harassment, alarm or distress to any person, or
(b) housing-related anti-social conduct as defined by section 2 (ignoring subsection (2) of that section);’.
19B (1) Section 102 (anti-social behaviour etc: out-of-court disposals) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1), in paragraph (c), for ‘an injunction under section 1’ substitute ‘a respect order under section A1 or an injunction under Part 1’.
(3) In subsection (6), for the definition of ‘anti-social behaviour’ substitute—
‘“anti-social behaviour” means—
(a) conduct that has caused, or is likely to cause, harassment, alarm or distress to any person, or
(b) housing-related anti-social conduct, as defined by section 2 (ignoring subsection (2) of that section);’.”
This amendment inserts into Schedule 1 provision making amendments to the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 that are consequential on the amendments made to that Act by clause 1 and by the other provisions of Schedule 1.
Amendment 28, in schedule 1, page 153, line 38, at end insert—
“Part 2
Consequential amendments of other Acts
Housing Act 1985
21 (1) Section 84A of the Housing Act 1985 (absolute ground for possession for anti-social behaviour) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (4)—
(a) for ‘section 1’ substitute ‘Part 1’;
(b) after ‘2014’ insert ‘or a respect order’.
(3) In subsection (9), for the definition of ‘relevant proceedings’, substitute—
‘“relevant proceedings” means—
(a) proceedings for an offence under section I1 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014,
(b) proceedings under Schedule 2 to that Act, or
(c) proceedings for contempt of court;
“respect order” means an order under section A1 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014;’.
22 In Schedule 3 to that Act (grounds for withholding consent to assignment by way of exchange), in Ground 2A, in the definition of ‘relevant order’, for ‘an injunction under section 1 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014’ substitute—
‘a respect order under section A1 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014;
an injunction under Part 1 of that Act;’
Housing Act 1988
23 (1) In Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1988 (grounds on which court must order possession of dwelling-houses let on assured tenancies), Ground 7A is amended as follows.
(2) In condition 2, in the words before paragraph (a)—
(a) for ‘section 1’ substitute ‘Part 1’;
(b) after ‘2014’ insert ‘or a respect order’.
(3) In the list of definitions for the purposes of Ground 7A, for the definition of ‘relevant proceedings’ substitute—
‘“relevant proceedings” means—
(a) proceedings for an offence under section I1 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014,
(b) proceedings under Schedule 2 to that Act, or
(c) proceedings for contempt of court;
“respect order” means an order under section A1 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014;’.
Police Reform Act 2002
24 In section 50 of the Police Reform Act 2002 (persons engaging in anti-social behaviour), for subsection (1A) substitute—
‘(1A) In subsection (1) “anti-social behaviour” means—
(a) conduct that has caused, or is likely to cause, harassment, alarm or distress to any person, or
(b) housing-related anti-social conduct, as defined by section 2 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (ignoring subsection (2) of that section).’
Localism Act 2011
25 In Schedule 14 to the Localism Act 2011 (grounds on which landlord may refuse to surrender and grant tenancies under section 158), in paragraph 6(4), in the definition of ‘relevant order’—
(a) after paragraph (e) insert—
‘(ea) a respect order under section A1 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014,’;
(b) in paragraph (f), for ‘section 1 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014’ substitute ‘Part 1 of that Act’.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This amendment inserts into Schedule 1 a new Part 2 containing amendments of Acts other than the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 in consequence of the amendments made to that Act by clause 1 and by the other provisions of Schedule 1 (which would by virtue of Amendment 24 become Part 1 of that Schedule).
Schedule 1, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 3
Maximum period for certain directions, notices and orders
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dame Diana Johnson
Clause 3 provides for extensions to the maximum timeframes for dispersal directions and closure orders under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, and I will address each of these in turn.
The clause extends the maximum period for which a dispersal order can be in place from 48 to 72 hours and introduces a mandatory review at 48 hours. We know that the dispersal power is an effective tool that police can use in a range of situations to move on individuals who are committing, or who are likely to commit, antisocial behaviour. Despite that, feedback from police and from police and crime commissioners has highlighted operational challenges in implementing this power.
Under current legislation, the police can issue a dispersal order to require a person to leave an area for a maximum of only 48 hours. That makes no allowance or and allows no extensions for weekends or bank holidays, when incidents of antisocial behaviour are often high. The 48-hour window also allows little time for relevant authorities to identify the root causes of the issue in order to implement longer-term solutions. Extending the timeframe of the dispersal power to up to 72 hours will ensure that police can effectively cover these problem periods, such as bank holidays. It will also give local agencies more time to come together to develop long-term solutions to tackle antisocial behaviour.
Harriet Cross
Although I completely agree with the need to extend the power, why was 72 hours chosen? Was there work or analysis behind that figure?
Dame Diana Johnson
I am very pleased to hear that the shadow Minister supports the 72-hour limit, because it was in the Criminal Justice Bill that her Government brought forward and that, because of the general election, never got on to the statute books. Work was done with stakeholders on what would be required. Clearly we do not want to extend it too far, but 72 hours seemed to be the best period of time to take into account what I was just saying about weekends and bank holidays in particular.
Let me move on to closure orders. The clause extends the timeframe that the relevant agencies, after issuing a closure notice, can apply to a magistrates court for a closure order from 48 hours to 72 hours. Again, that is based on feedback from practitioners who have noted operational challenges in applying for a closure order. The 48-hour window is not always enough time to prepare evidence and serve it to the courts, particularly on weekends or bank holidays. The closure order is an important power that agencies can use to provide immediate respite to the local community, so we must ensure that it is practicable and viable for practitioners to use.
Extending the timeframe to 72 hours will allow practitioners adequate time to gather evidence and inform interested parties. It also allows respondents more time to seek legal advice, in turn reducing the number of cases adjourned by the courts. In short, the provisions will help to address operational challenges, allowing local agencies to tackle antisocial behaviour more efficiently and effectively.
Matt Vickers
Clause 3 sets out the maximum period for certain directions, notices and orders. On exclusion directions, the Bill amends section 35 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 whereby a police officer could direct a person to leave a specified area for up to 48 hours. The Bill extends this to 72 hours. If an exclusion period exceeds 48 hours, a police inspector must review the direction as soon as possible after the 48-hour mark to ensure its necessity.
Closure notices allow the police to shut down premises that cause nuisance or disorder, and could previously last 24 hours before requiring further action. The Bill extends that to 48 hours. The maximum period for an initial closure notice before a magistrates court order will be required has been extended from 48 to 72 hours. Those efforts will give greater flexibility for police and officers will have more time to manage antisocial behaviour without requiring immediate escalation to the courts. That will allow for a stronger deterrent, meaning that longer exclusion periods and closure notices could have a greater impact in preventing repeated antisocial behaviour.
In 2023, the previous Government ran a consultation on proposals to strengthen powers available to address antisocial behaviour under the 2014 Act. It is true that the Government have opted to reintroduce some of these provisions into the Crime and Policing Bill. However, I would be grateful for an understanding of why certain measures have not been taken forward. For example, provisions to remove the need for authorisation by a senior police officer for a dispersal order have not been reintroduced. Although a Member could argue that a mandatory review by an inspector for exclusion periods of over 48 hours ensures accountability, why was the decision made to require an inspector’s review for exclusion directions only after 48 hours, rather than immediately on extending them?
The Bill also removes provisions to grant senior police officers the power to make public space protection orders, meaning that it arguably becomes harder in certain instances to control disorder. In November 2024, an extraordinary and unprecedented legal order was enacted, imposing a complete closure on an entire housing estate of 376 properties. That sweeping measure was introduced as a direct response to escalating concerns over severe and persistent antisocial behaviour and rampant drug dealing that had reached intolerable levels. The closure order strictly prohibited non-residents from gathering or loitering in key communal areas, including stairwells, landings, bridges and spaces near bin chutes, as well as within open areas adjacent to residential properties. The decision was driven by an urgent need to restore safety and security for the law-abiding residents, whose daily lives had been severely disrupted by the ongoing disturbances. Authorities deemed that intervention necessary to curb the relentless activities of those engaged in criminal behaviour and to ensure that the estate could once again become a liveable and peaceful environment for its rightful occupants.
The Bill has notably failed to carry forward provisions to lower the minimum age for issuing a community protection notice to 10 years old. Why has that decision been made? As the Minister will be well aware, antisocial behaviour is frequently perpetrated by individuals under the age of 18, often causing significant disruption and distress within communities. Local residents, businesses and authorities alike have long struggled with the challenges posed by persistent youth-related disorder. Given that reality, is the Minister fully confident that the removal of this provision will not inadvertently weaken the ability of law enforcement and local councils to tackle antisocial behaviour committed by teenagers? Without appropriate measures in place, there is a real risk that communities will continue to bear the brunt of unchecked disorder and that would undermine efforts to create safer and more harmonious neighbourhoods. What safeguards are in place to prevent these extended powers from being misused or disproportionately applied to certain groups or businesses? What role will local authorities and community organisations play in reviewing the effectiveness of these measures?
Dame Diana Johnson
The shadow Minister asked a number of questions about measures that were in the Criminal Justice Bill and are not in the Crime and Policing Bill. Clearly, what we are referring to was, and it is the same, as I understand it. We carefully considered the merits of all the measures that were in the Criminal Justice Bill on a case-by-case basis, and we reintroduced the ones that we thought had clear operational benefits, would help to cut crime and antisocial behaviour and would rebuild confidence in the criminal justice system.
The shadow Minister asked about the requirement for dispersal orders to be authorised by an inspector. The Criminal Justice Bill included a measure to remove the current requirement for an inspector to authorise a dispersal order. When considering that measure and what it would deliver, we were concerned that restricting people’s freedom of movement is a serious matter and that it is important that the dispersal order is used proportionately and reasonably. Ensuring that that power is authorised by an officer of at least the rank of inspector provides an additional safeguard and ensures that the power is used only to stop activities that are causing antisocial behaviour.
The Criminal Justice Bill sought to reduce the age that someone can receive a community protection notice from 16 to 10. We take the view that the breach of a CPN is a criminal offence and this Government, as I have said a number of times, do not wish to risk funnelling children into the criminal justice system unnecessarily by lowering the age at which someone can receive a CPN to 10 years of age. As we have discussed, the civil injunction will remain in place to be used against those under the age of 16—
Crime and Policing Bill (Fifth sitting)
Thursday 3rd April 2025
(1 year, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 3 April 2025 - (3 Apr 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
Before we begin, I have a few preliminary reminders for the Committee. Please switch electronic devices to silent. No food or drink is permitted during sittings of the Committee, except for the water provided. Hansard colleagues would be grateful if Members could email their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk or pass them to the Hansard colleague in the room.
Clause 14
Assault of retail worker
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 29, in clause 15, page 25, line 11, at end insert—
“(4) If the offender has previous convictions for an offence under section 14 of the Crime and Policing Act 2025 (assault of a retail worker) or for shoplifting under section 1 of the Theft Act 1968, the court must make a community order against the offender.”
This amendment clause would require the courts to make a community order against repeat offenders of retail crime in order to restrict the offender’s liberty.
Clause 15 stand part.
New clause 20—Assault of wholesale worker—
“(1) A person who assaults a wholesale worker at work commits an offence under this section.
(2) ‘Wholesale worker at work’ means a person who—
(a) is working on or about wholesaler premises, and
(b) is working there for or on behalf of the owner or occupier of those premises, or is the owner or occupier of those premises.
(3) In subsection (2), ‘wholesaler premises’ means—
(a) premises used in any way for the purposes of the sale of anything by wholesale, and here ‘working’ includes doing unpaid work.
(4) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or to a fine (or both).
(5) In subsection (4), ‘the maximum term for summary offences’ means—
(a) if the offence is committed before the time when section 281(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (alteration of penalties for certain summary offences: England and Wales) comes into force, 6 months;
(b) if the offence is committed after that time, 51 weeks.
(6) In section 40(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (power to join in indictment count for common assault etc), after paragraph (ac) insert—
‘(ad) an offence under section 14 of the Crime and Policing Act 2025 (assault of wholesale worker);’.”
New clause 26—Requirements in certain sentences imposed for third assault of retail worker offence—
“(1) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows.
(2) In section 208 (community order: exercise of power to impose particular requirements), in subsections (3) and (6) after ‘and sections 208B’ (inserted by section (Requirements in certain sentences imposed for third shoplifting offence) of this Act) insert ‘and 208B’.
(3) After sections 208B insert—
‘208B Community order: requirements for third or subsequent assault of retail worker offence
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a person is convicted of an offence under section 14 of the Crime and Policing Act 2025 (assault of retail worker) (“the index offence”),
(b) when the index offence was committed, the offender had on at least two previous occasions been sentenced in respect of an offence under section (Assault of retail worker) of the Crime and Policing Act 2025 committed when the offender was aged 18 or over, and
(c) the court makes a community order in respect of the index offence.
(2) The community order must, subject to subsection (3), include at least one of the following requirements—
(a) a curfew requirement;
(b) an exclusion requirement;
(c) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if—
(a) the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which—
(i) relate to any of the offences or the offender, and
(ii) justify the court not including any requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2), or
(b) neither of the following requirements could be included in the order—
(i) an electronic compliance monitoring requirement for securing compliance with a proposed curfew requirement or proposed exclusion requirement;
(ii) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.
(4) Nothing in subsection (2) enables a requirement to be included in a community order if it could not otherwise be so included.’
(4) After section 292A (inserted by section (Requirements in certain sentences imposed for third shoplifting offence) of this Act) insert—
‘292B Suspended sentence order: community requirements for third or subsequent assault of retail worker offence
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a person is convicted of an offence under section (Assault of retail worker) of the Crime and Policing Act 2025 (assault of retail worker) (“the index offence”),
(b) when the index offence was committed, the offender had on at least two previous occasions been sentenced in respect of an offence under section (Assault of retail worker) of the Crime and Policing Act 2025 committed when the offender was aged 18 or over, and
(c) the court makes a suspended sentence order in respect of the index offence.
(2) The suspended sentence order must, subject to subsection (3), impose at least one of the following requirements—
(a) a curfew requirement;
(b) an exclusion requirement;
(c) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if—
(a) the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which—
(i) relate to any of the offences or the offender, and
(ii) justify the court not imposing on the offender any requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2), or
(b) neither of the following requirements could be imposed on the offender—
(i) an electronic compliance monitoring requirement for securing compliance with a proposed curfew requirement or proposed exclusion requirement;
(ii) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.
(4) Nothing in subsection (2) enables a requirement to be imposed by a suspended sentence order if it could not otherwise be so imposed.’”
This new clause imposes a duty (subject to certain exceptions) to impose a curfew requirement, an exclusion requirement or an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement on certain persons convicted of an offence under section 15, where the offender is given a community sentence or suspended sentence order.
The Minister for Policing, Fire and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)
It is good to see you in the Chair, Dr Allin-Khan. Clause 14 provides for a new criminal offence of assaulting a retail worker. This will send a clear message to retailers and perpetrators alike that we take any form of violence in a retail setting extremely seriously, and it fulfils our manifesto commitment.
I know that all Members will have experiences and information from their constituencies on the unacceptable rise in assaults on retail workers. I visited a shopkeeper on Beverley Road in my constituency who had been assaulted by a customer who was buying some alcohol and disputed its price. The customer hit the shopkeeper around the head around 50 times in an unprovoked assault, which was recorded on CCTV, so I was able to see it. It was really shocking to see. Many shop workers go to work every day with the fear of that happening. I pay tribute to Navin Sharda, that shopkeeper who was so badly assaulted.
Police recorded crime figures show that shoplifting offences increased by 23% in the 12 months to September 2024, and the British Retail Consortium’s 2025 crime report showed that there were around 737,000 incidents of violence and abuse—about 2,000 a day—in 2023-24. Figures published by the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers in March 2025 show that 77% of workers said that they had been verbally abused in the 12 months to December 2024, 53% had received threats of violence, and 10% were physically assaulted during the year. Those statistics demonstrate that there are unacceptably high levels of retail crime across the country, and more and more offenders are using violence and abuse against shop workers to commit those crimes.
As well as carrying out their role of selling goods, retail workers are in some cases asked by us to restrict the sale of dozens of age-restricted items. That is an act of public service. In carrying it out, they are putting themselves at risk, as a declined sale may, sadly, cause someone to become violent and abusive.
Harriet Cross (Gordon and Buchan) (Con)
It is obviously the case that retail workers have to stop the sale of certain products at times, whether it is because the customer is under age or for other reasons. Of course, delivery drivers have to do exactly the same thing if they get to a house and, for example, an under-18-year-old would be in receipt of alcohol or a knife, even if it is for legitimate purposes. Does the Minister therefore agree that delivery drivers face the same risks as retail workers?
Dame Diana Johnson
What we do know, from the statistics that I have just read out, is that there is a wide body of evidence to confirm what is happening to retail workers on retail premises. We know that, because that information and evidence has been collated for some time. I accept that there are questions and concerns about delivery drivers, but I do not think we are in the position to know the extent of assaults on delivery drivers. I am not disputing that they take place—they do—but we have been very clear, and it was our manifesto commitment, that we will deal with assaults on retail workers by legislating for that. The clause is about that.
Everyone has the right to feel safe at work. The new offence, which is for retail workers and premises, sends a strong message that violence and abuse towards retail workers will not be tolerated. In a later debate, perhaps, I will come on to some of the other protections that all workers have, and how they can be used. This new offence will carry a maximum prison sentence of six months and/or an unlimited fine.
Reflecting on the need to take a tough stance with meaningful criminal justice consequences, clause 15 provides that the new offence will come with a presumption for a court to make a criminal behaviour order. Such an order may prohibit the offender doing anything described in it, which might include a condition preventing specific acts that cause harassment, alarm or distress, or preventing an offender from visiting specific premises. Breach of a criminal behaviour order is in itself a criminal offence, attracting a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment.
Clauses 14 and 15, taken together, will significantly help better protect retail workers. On that basis, I am sure that they will be welcomed across the Committee. The hon. Member for Stockton West, who leads for the Opposition, has tabled amendment 29 and new clause 26 in this group. I plan to respond to those when winding up the debate.
Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Allin-Khan.
The Bill rightly seeks to improve protections for our amazing retail workers and looks to tackle retail crime. I pay tribute to the amazing retail workers across the country for their work, and to the many people who have been involved in the campaign to provide greater protections for them.
Retail is the biggest private sector employer in our economy. It directly employs nearly 3 million people and sits at the heart of all our communities. Clause 14 amends section 40 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and creates a stand-alone offence of assaulting a retail worker in their place of work. It defines “retail premises” as a place
“used wholly or mainly for the purposes of the sale of anything by retail,”
including not only buildings, but stalls and vehicles. It also defines what it is to be a “retail worker at work”, which is
“working on or about retail premises, and”
being there
“for or on behalf of the owner or occupier of those premises”.
It confirms that a person who commits the offence will be liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences. I am glad that the offence also includes those doing unpaid work in a retail setting.
Clause 15 amends part 11 of the sentencing code to create a duty to make a criminal behaviour order for the offence of assaulting a retail worker. It confirms that that will apply where someone is convicted of the new offence under clause 14; where
“the prosecution makes an application to the court for a criminal behaviour order to be made against the offender”;
and where
“the offender is aged 18 or over at the time the prosecution makes the application”.
It also sets out that such an order will not apply where the court imposes a custodial sentence, or makes a youth rehabilitation order, a community order, or a suspended sentence for that specific offence or
“any other offence of which the offender is convicted by or before it”.
Until this point, police have had to rely on several criminal offences through which to prosecute violence and assault against retail workers, including assault, unlawful wounding or grievous bodily harm under the common law or the Offences against the Person Act 1861; harassment or putting people in fear of violence under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997; and affray, or threatening or abusive behaviour under the Public Order Act 1986. Things changed and progress was made by section 156 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, as a result of debates on this important subject during the Act’s passage through Parliament. That added section 68A to the Sentencing Act 2020, requiring the courts to treat an offence as aggravated if the victim of the offence had been
“providing a public service, performing a public duty or providing services…goods or facilities”
to the public.
In recent years, a variety of businesses and organisations have called for a stand-alone offence. In July 2020, USDAW launched a petition calling for a specific offence of abusing, threatening or assaulting a retail worker. The petition received 104,354 signatures, which triggered a Westminster Hall debate. As a member of the Petitions Committee, I had the privilege of leading the debate and speaking on behalf of the petitioners. At that time, we were gripped by the pandemic, which helped to focus minds on the incredibly important role that our retail workers were performing as a result of it. The debate was well attended, with Members from all parties speaking passionately in support of our retail workers.
Several retailers were in support of a stand-alone offence, including Morrisons, Sainsbury’s, Tesco and the Co-op. In May 2021, Helen Dickinson, chief executive of the British Retail Consortium, called for a stand-alone offence to provide colleagues with the protections they needed. In June 2021, the Home Affairs Committee held its own inquiry on violence and abuse towards retail workers, concluding that the patchwork of existing offences did not provide adequate protection. The Committee said:
“The Government should consult urgently on the scope of a new standalone offence.”
As hon. Members may know, having served as the chair of the all-party parliamentary group on the future of retail and as a former Woollies worker, I have been very involved in the campaign to protect our retail workers. It was a privilege to join the likes of the Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, the hon. Member for Nottingham North and Kimberley (Alex Norris), Paul Gerrard from the Co-op, Helen Dickinson and the team at the British Retail Consortium, Edward Woodall of the Association of Convenience Stores, USDAW, numerous retailers and others who have campaigned over recent years to deliver more protection for our retail workers.
When I first arrived in the House, in my slightly rebellious phase, I tabled an amendment on this issue to the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill—now the 2022 Act—which was supported by Members from both sides of the House. As I have mentioned, that helped us to make assault on a person providing a service to the public a statutory aggravating offence. More recently, in April 2024, alongside a suite of measures designed to tackle retail crime, the last Government agreed to create a stand-alone offence of assaulting a retail worker. The stand-alone offence aims to protect our retail workers by providing a deterrent to those who might commit retail crime, and it also has an important role to play in increasing transparency and accountability, which I will say more about later.
The changes to sanctions and recording are not the only answer to this problem; it is important that the police and retailers take action more broadly to tackle it. The last Government introduced a retail crime action plan in October 2023. My right hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), who was then the Policing Minister and is now the shadow Home Secretary, launched it at a meeting of senior police leaders and 13 of the UK’s biggest retailers.
The plan included a police commitment to prioritise urgently attending the scene of a shoplifting incident where it involved violence against a shop worker, where security guards had detained an offender, or where attendance was needed to secure evidence. Attendance was to be assessed on risk, with prolific or juvenile offenders being treated with elevated priority. The police reaffirmed their pledge to follow up on any evidence that could reasonably lead to a perpetrator being caught, and forces stepped up targeted hotspot patrols in badly affected areas.
The plan set out advice for retailers on how to provide the best possible evidence for police to pursue any case. They are required to send CCTV footage of the whole incident and an image of the shoplifter from the digital evidence management system as quickly as possible after the offence has been committed. Where CCTV or other digital images are secured, police are required to run them through the police national database, using facial recognition technology to further aid efforts to identify and prosecute offenders, particularly prolific or potentially dangerous individuals.
The plan also created a specialist police team to build a comprehensive intelligence picture of the organised crime gangs that drive a huge number of shoplifting incidents across the country, in an effort to target and dismantle them. This initiative was branded Pegasus and is a business and policing partnership that has improved the way in which retailers are able to share intelligence, with the police gaining a greater understanding of the approach being taken by these organised crime gangs and identifying more offenders.
The initiative was spearheaded by Katy Bourne, the business crime lead for the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners. It is the first national partnership of its kind, and was backed financially by the Home Office, John Lewis, the Co-op, Marks & Spencer, Boots, Primark and several others, which pledged more than £840,000 to get it off the ground. Pegasus helped to identify high-harm offenders who were linked to organised crime groups, and has resulted in numerous arrests of individuals who are often responsible for tens of thousands of pounds in thefts.
Harriet Cross
Does my hon. Friend agree that that sort of approach is important in tackling repeat offenders with whom retail workers will be very familiar? They know who the offenders are in their area, because they see them every day. That sort of approach would help tackle those offenders and give reassurance to retail workers that they will not see these people back time and again.
Matt Vickers
The use of facial recognition in this setting is incredible. Anybody who has been out with the police force in their area and looked at it will know that the benefits are huge. It delivers great efficiency to the police, who can check thousands of people in minutes. The ability to take a face and work out who the person is and what they have done or have not done is game-changing in this and many other settings.
Jack Rankin (Windsor) (Con)
I have lots of sympathy with my hon. Friend on that point, but will he comment on the tension with civil liberties?
Matt Vickers
We have talked about the failure rate of modern facial recognition technology, and the number of instances in which it gets it wrong is minute. Every study we do on modern kit tells us that it results in very little error. It is virtually foolproof. There have been all sorts of noises about previous incarnations of the technology, but the most modern technology that we are using with our police forces now comes with very little fault and can be game-changing for the police.
The commitment to invest in facial recognition was a four-year investment. We have now seen a change of Government, but I know the Minister understands the huge value that facial recognition can have to the police, so I wondered whether the incumbent Government will continue with the specific funding commitment in full. Yes, lots of work has gone in and this offence will not solve all problems or necessarily have an immediate impact, but it represents a huge and important step forward. I am glad it has been taken forward by the incumbent Government and hope it will have a real impact to improve the lives of those important key workers in high streets and stores across the country.
Our retail workers define what it means to be a key worker: essential to the everyday lives of everyone. They often work the longest hours, not necessarily for the best pay, but are relied on by the public to keep their lives and the country going. For those living alone and isolated, they may be the only regular interaction they have. Our stores and town centres sit at the heart of our communities and give us a sense of place and identity. When they become dangerous and lawless, it is the saddest of signs and has real consequences for society.
According to the British Retail Consortium crime survey 2025, there are 2,000 incidents of assault on retail workers—not every month, not every week, but every single day. That figure has gone up by 50% in the last year, totalling 737,000 incidents in a year. More worryingly, 45,000 of those incidents were violent—equivalent to more than 124 incidents a day. There were over 25,000 incidents involving a weapon—that is 70 a day—and, devastatingly, that figure was up by 180% on the previous year. The survey went on to say,
“61% of retailers rate the police response to retail crime overall as poor or very poor, the same as last year, but over a third (39%) rated it as fair, good or excellent, including 3% as excellent for the first time in some years”.
In response to the report, British Retail Consortium chief exec, Helen Dickinson said,
“Behind these numbers lies a harsher truth for the people who work in our industry. Colleagues have been punched, stabbed, spat on, while having racist, misogynistic, and generally vile abuse hurled at them. These incidents can inflict serious mental and physical trauma that lasts a lifetime. The idea that any retail workers might be going to work fearing for their safety, never knowing the next time another incident may occur, should deeply concern all of us. Violence and abuse should never be part of the job.”
A colleague survey by the Association of Convenience Stores found that 87% of store colleagues had experienced verbal abuse, with over 1.2 million incidents, and 59% of retailers believe that antisocial behaviour, in or around their store, has increased over the past year. The association’s crime report also found that only 36% of crime is reported by retailers. Retailers said that they do not always report crime, and the top three reasons were, first,
“No confidence in a follow up investigation”,
secondly,
“The time it takes to file and process reports”
and thirdly,
“Perceived lack of interest from police”.
Retail workers are ordinary people going to work to earn a living, and they should be able to do so without fear of crime. Very often, they are students getting their first job stacking shelves or the semi-retired keeping themselves active, topping up their incomes to get something nice for their grandkids. To demonstrate the impact and consequences of retail crime and the value of the measures being debated, I want to share the views of some of those amazing frontline retail workers. Joshua James, an independent retailer, said:
“The high levels of verbal abuse and antisocial behaviour we are experiencing in store is both upsetting for our team members and negatively impacting their morale. Our main priority will always be their safety and that is why we have had to resort to tactics including implementing safety and preventative technologies and adjusting procedures to help the team feel safer at work. The sad truth behind this is it’s a selfish approach, as we know when these individuals stop targeting us, it’s only because they have moved onto another store.”
Amit Puntambekar from Nisa Local in Fenstanton described how he feels about the support he does not receive from the police:
“When your staff are threatened with a hammer, when someone threatens to kill you who lives near your shop and the police don’t take it seriously, what’s the point?”
In recent years during this campaign, I have had people ask me, “Why should things be different if you assault a retail worker as opposed to any other member of the public?” Retail workers are not assaulted because they wear a Tesco uniform or an Aldi shirt. They usually get assaulted for upholding the rules, which are often set by Parliament, but if they do not uphold those rules, they can face serious sanctions and consequences—for example, for failing to verify age for the purchase of knives or alcohol. Parliament and the Government impose statutory duties on our retail workers, and it is only right that we back them with statutory protections.
The Association of Convenience Stores 2025 crime survey found the top three triggers for assaults on retail workers were: encountering shop thieves; enforcing an age-restricted sales policy; and refusal to serve an intoxicated customer—which, of course, is another responsibility imposed on them by Parliament.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
My hon. Friend paints a disturbing picture of this significant problem, in many cases using the statistics. I worry that perhaps there is not the awareness within the general public—although there certainly will be among some people—of this crime compared with other crimes. Of course, this law will help to address that, but does he agree that we all share responsibility to ensure that there is better public awareness of this issue so that we can all play our small part in better supporting retail workers?
Matt Vickers
Hugely so. The likes of the BRC have run many campaigns to try to get people to shop in a more friendly and responsible way. The reality is that these places are at the heart of the community. If things are going to pot in the high street and the local shop, that undermines all the societal norms that young people might see when they go to the shop—and they then start to live in a different kind of world. There are obviously huge consequences. My hon. Friend is right; it is down to everybody to see this issue for the problem that it is.
Retailers and people who work in the sector say that it does not feel like the police see this problem as a priority. It always seems to be the last on the list. We understand that the police have a huge number of competing priorities on their time and energy, but when it comes down to it, this is a really big deal to the people who get assaulted in their workplace and have to go back there the next day, knowing that they might have to face that self-same crime.
Assaulting a retail worker, alongside assaulting the many other workers who provide a service to the public, is already a statutory offence. New clause 20 makes the case for wholesale workers to be added to the protections in the Bill. Many of us will have heard the case for similar protections for retail delivery drivers who face assault. The Federation of Wholesale Distributors is leading that campaign, stressing the urgent need for the inclusion of all wholesale workers in the stand-alone offence of assaulting or abusing a retail worker.
The Federation of Wholesale Distributors is the member organisation for UK food and drink wholesalers, operating in the grocery and food service markets, supplying retail and caterers via collect, delivery and online. Its members supply to up to 330,000 food service businesses and 72,000 retail grocery stores, supporting local high streets and businesses, large and small, across the UK.
The wholesale sector generates annual revenues of £36 billion, employs 60,000 people, and produces £3 billion of gross value added to the UK economy annually. Approximately £10 billion of that trade goes through cash and carry depots, where staff are increasingly vulnerable to criminal activities, particularly involving high-value goods, such as alcohol and tobacco. According to the FWD’s most recent crime survey, 100% of wholesalers surveyed identified crime as one of their foremost concerns, primarily attributed to what they perceive as “inadequate police responsiveness”. It argues:
“Despite substantial investments in crime prevention measures, wholesalers require stronger support from both the Government and law enforcement.”
Although it welcomes the Government’s commitment to tackling retail crime, it remains
“deeply concerned that the Bill does not extend protections to the majority of wholesale workers.”
The Bill’s current definition excludes 98% of wholesalers—those operating on a business-to-business basis—from the proposed protections. As a result, a significant number of wholesale workers remain unprotected.
Wholesale workers play a vital role in local economies and essential supply chains, ensuring the distribution of food and drink to businesses, hospitals, schools and care homes. It is argued that by leaving them out of the protections in the Bill, their safety, and the sector’s resilience, are compromised. They suggest a more inclusive definition under the stand-alone offence would better safeguard vulnerable workers and strengthen the wholesale sector. I am very keen to understand whether the Minister has considered the proposal on wholesale workers, what her perspective and thoughts on the matter are, and whether she will consider adding it during the passage of the Bill.
Joe Robertson
Of course, I agree with my hon. Friend’s comments about delivery drivers. I do not wish to criticise the Minister this early in the day, but it seems to me that the excuse for not extending the provisions is that this was not in the Labour manifesto. I am not sure she needs to worry about that; it is not something that the public worry about. If it is the right thing to do, she should include them. Does my hon. Friend have anything further to say on that?
Matt Vickers
I very much agree. Delivery drivers go out to alien environments—they could be delivering at the end of some lane in the middle of the countryside somewhere with no one in sight—so they are at substantial risk. I am sure the Minister will tell me that the proposal was not in the previous Criminal Justice Bill, but it has come forward and USDAW has made a good case. We should definitely listen and consider it, and I hope the Minister will give us her thoughts about where we should go with that.
As well as suggesting widening the scope of the provisions to include retail home delivery drivers, USDAW has submitted written evidence suggesting that the Bill could be improved in other ways by widening its scope to include incidents of abuse and threats, and an aggravating factor for incidents following retail workers enforcing statutory requirements, such as age-related restrictions. That would mirror what USDAW considers to be the successful Scottish provisions. Will the Minister comment on those ideas—in particular, an aggravating factor for incidents that come as a result of the enforcing of statutory requirements, and the inclusion of abuse and threats?
During evidence, we heard some queries about whether the inclusion of the assault clause in the Bill is necessary. The former Lord Chancellor highlighted that there has been a departure from what he described as a
“rather interesting amendment tabled in the previous Session to the 2023-24 Criminal Justice Bill by, I think, the hon. Member for Nottingham North and Kimberley (Alex Norris)”.
He said:
“It sought to amend the law to increase protections for shop workers, but with an important expansion: the offence would be not just an assault, but a threatening or abuse offence as well, which would encompass some of the public order concerns that many of us have about shop premises, corner shops and sole proprietor retail outlets. Yet, we have gone back here to a straight assault clause, which in my mind does not seem to add anything to the criminal code at all.” ––[Official Report, Crime and Policing Public Bill Committee, 27 March 2025; c. 18, Q28.]
That lack of a significant change is noted in the economic note, which states:
“The impact of this new offence is limited as assault on retail workers is already an offence covered under wider assault charges and these cases would have been prosecuted, processed, and determined in the same way without the new offence. Increased costs are only expected through the additional consequence of CBOs for offenders and their possible breaches…There is no definitive evidence that the creation of this new offence will lead to an increase or decrease in the number of assaults on retail workers. The timing of any possible effects is also uncertain”.
That is not to speak against the measure.
Joe Robertson
Does my hon. Friend agree that delivery drivers are particularly vulnerable, given that they often work on their own in an unfamiliar place, and go to addresses they have not been to before, so there are some very strong stand-alone arguments for including them within the protections of the Bill in a stronger, more effective way?
Matt Vickers
My hon. Friend makes a valid point. People often order stuff to be delivered to their house; an Uber Eats driver might turn up at whatever time of the night. The people who arrive tend to turn up when people are not at work, so they could be there of an evening, when it is dark or at inconvenient times, when the risk is probably higher. They could be in any setting, and it will be unfamiliar to them but familiar to whoever they happen to be visiting. We have to give some thought to this issue, and I am interested in what the Minister will have to say on it.
This is not to speak against the measure, but is the Minister confident that it is drafted in a manner that will reduce assaults against shop workers, as well as abuse and threats? Could it be broader, to encompass antisocial behaviours that have no place on our streets? I am delighted that the incumbent Government are continuing with the proposals of their predecessor in creating this stand-alone offence, but we wish to make some proposals for improving it.
First, amendment 29 would require the courts to make a community order against repeat offenders for retail crime in order to restrict the offenders’ liberty. A huge amount of such crime is committed by repeat offenders. I would be grateful if the Minister could give us her perspective on the proposal.
We are grateful that the proposals from the last Government’s Criminal Justice Bill are being brought forward in this Bill, but I was disappointed that the new legislation does not include the mandatory requirement for a ban, electronic tag or curfew to be imposed on those committing a third offence of either shoplifting or assaulting a retail worker. Many retailers believe that this would ensure that the response to third offences would be stepped up, and would provide retail workers with much-needed respite from repeat offenders. To this end, we tabled new clause 26. Again, I would be grateful for the Minister’s view on it, and for her rationale for what some might consider a watering-down of the sanctions.
I note that clause 15 sets out that those under the age of 18 will not be subject to a criminal behaviour order. Will the Minister comment on the frequency of involvement in retail crime by under-18s? Why are criminal behaviour orders not necessary to deter them?
One of the points made about the stand-alone offence, over and above the sanction and the consequence, is that it is about increasing police response time, as well as accountability and transparency. By having a stand-alone offence, we will have data on where and how often these things occur, and we can then measure where the police are and are not taking the required action. On that basis, has the Minister given any thought to how to manage that data, how we might hold to account police forces with the greatest volume of such offences and how we can look at ensuring that all police forces have a consistent response?
Anna Sabine (Frome and East Somerset) (LD)
I will make a slightly shorter speech. [Hon. Members: “Hear, Hear!”] I welcome the Government’s measures to protect retail workers against assault. I have seen the evidence of this challenge at first hand in my constituency. In Frome, we have an amazing small independent shop and art gallery that has been repeatedly targeted by groups of young people who are spray painting graffiti on the windows and shouting abuse at retail workers and shoppers. This is part of a wider picture of antisocial behaviour that is happening on our high streets, and that neighbourhood police are working so hard to tackle. As we said in previous discussions, we need to support neighbourhood police and resource them to do so.
Retail workers are on the frontline of the much wider antisocial behaviour we see in our towns and cities. As we know, high street businesses are critical not only to our economic success, but to the wellbeing of the places we live and work in. It is vital that they can recruit and retain staff who can come to work without fear of being threatened or assaulted. However, the Minister should consider that it is not only retail workers who are victims of assaults; bank branch workers in customer-facing roles should have the same level of protection.
At a recent constituency breakfast, I spoke with a representative from Barclays bank. He told me that there were more than 3,500 incidents of inappropriate customer behaviour against Barclays staff in 2024, with more than 90% involving verbal abuse, as well as many other incidents of smashed windows and graffiti. Bank branch staff across the UK would be grateful if the Minister could extend to them the protections being provided to retail workers.
Jo Platt (Leigh and Atherton) (Lab/Co-op)
It is an honour to serve under your chairship, Dr Allin-Khan. I rise to speak briefly to clauses 14 and 15. I draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that I am a Co-operative member and a Labour and Co-operative MP who has long campaigned for stronger protection for retail workers.
Retail crime is not just a statistic; it has real and lasting consequences for workers, businesses and our communities. In Leigh and Atherton I have seen at first hand the toll that it takes. This month I visited one of our anchor stores in Leigh town centre and spoke to a security guard who had been threatened with assault while simply doing his job protecting staff, stock and the business. He told me it is not just about one incident, but the daily reality of intimidation, threats and the fear that one day those threats will turn into something worse. And he is not alone.
With my office based on the high street, I see the challenges up close. Local businesses have told me they face verbal abuse, harassment and physical threats daily. Many have even stopped reporting incidents because they feel they are not being heard.
Dr Lauren Sullivan (Gravesham) (Lab)
Building on what my hon. Friend was just saying about the town centre, I had an incident in a village convenience store in my area. The member of staff often works on their own and they were assaulted fairly recently when over £1,000 was taken. Those workers are cornerstones in our communities and drive people to hospital if necessary. Violence is seen too often in our communities, and we need to send a strong message to those who seek to cause harm and those who need protecting.
Jo Platt
I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend. Threats, abuse and violence should never be accepted as part of the job. Nationally, the scale of the problem is alarming. USDAW’s latest survey found that 69% of retail workers had been verbally abused in the past year, 45% had been threatened and 17% had been assaulted. Some have been hit with trolleys and baskets, and female staff have reported appalling levels of harassment, which cannot go on. That is why clauses 14 and 15 are so important. They will provide retail workers with the legal protections they deserve and ensure that those who abuse, threaten or assault face real consequences.
Crucially, the Bill also extends the protections to volunteers, many of whom play a vital role in the Leigh and Atherton charity sector. No one who gives their time to help others should have to fear for their safety. The campaign started on the shop floor and now it has reached the Floor of Parliament. As a Co-operative member, I welcome the provisions as the result of years of determined campaigning. With this Bill we take an essential step towards making our town centres safer and showing shop workers that they are respected, protected and valued. Tackling retail crime is a vital step in rebuilding pride and belonging in all our communities.
Joe Robertson
It is a pleasure to serve on the Committee under your chairship, Dr Allin-Khan. There is agreement in this room about the problem that the Bill seeks to address. I commend my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West for his excellent but all too brief speech a few moments ago. If I may, I will start by citing Matthew Barber, the police and crime commissioner for Thames Valley police. Referring to the legislation that already exists, he rightly states:
“It is an offence to assault a retail worker. In the same way that it is an offence to assault any member of the public. Indeed current legislation already allows for someone’s role as a retail worker to be considered as an aggravating factor”.
There are four areas of law whereby a retail worker who has been assaulted might currently have protection. There is assault, unlawful wounding or grievous bodily harm under the common law or the Offences against the Person Act 1861—notice how old that law is; I do not think this room has changed much since then—harassment or putting people in fear of violence under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997; affray or threatening or abusive behaviour under the Public Order Act 1986; and robbery under the Theft Act 1968.
The point that retail workers are in a particularly vulnerable situation has been clearly articulated. That is why these laws, which are good at achieving the aims that they were originally passed for, can leave defects when it comes to ensuring the protection of retail workers.
Joe Robertson
I am glad that my hon. Friend the Member for Windsor, from a sedentary position, has endorsed my constituency, which is not only a tourist destination but a place that has a much higher population in summer, and retail workers are at the frontline in towns such as Ryde, Sandown, Shanklin and Ventnor. Although we are a small coastal community—we do not have big towns or a big population centre—retail crime is still a problem. It is a crime that I imagine affects all constituencies in the UK to a greater or lesser extent, and we certainly should not think of it as a city or large town-only issue. In fact, I ponder whether it can be, in some cases, more impactful in smaller communities, where people might be more likely to know each other and there is a sense of intimidation from such behaviour.
Retail crime can also lead to a more destructive environment or a sense of lawlessness if it goes unchecked, as well as all sorts of knock-on effects with antisocial behaviour. We definitely see some of that in my constituency, where certain prolific individuals feel that if the police have not responded the first few times, they are likely not to respond again. Certainly in my anecdotal experience, it is actually a few prolific offenders who are particularly responsible for a large number of these incidents. I urge the Government to take all views of the Committee into account, as we all want to achieve the same objectives.
Luke Taylor (Sutton and Cheam) (LD)
As I am interested in moving on, because I was sent by my residents to get on with business, I will not be eking this out because we did not do our homework or table our amendments in time.
I agree with the hon. Member for Gordon and Buchan about delivery workers and retail workers, in the broader sense of the word. There is an opportunity here to reflect the Protection of Workers (Retail and Age-restricted Goods and Services) (Scotland) Act 2021, which covers retail workers when they are in people’s homes. We heard evidence from Christopher Morris and Graham Wynn that there is a really good chance to do that here. I understand the Minister’s explanation that there is a lot in the Bill, and that we need to ensure that it is neat and firm and delivers what it is supposed to deliver, but I again urge us to take this opportunity if we can.
I will now mention something that is very important to my residents, and that we have been looking at—tool theft, and how we can stretch the definition of retail workers and place of work. Again, I understand the Minister’s reluctance. I am sure that it is not because she has any lack of desire to solve issues in that space; the question is just about the Bill’s ability to do so. I understand that, but given the campaigning that a number of her colleagues have done in that space, I think there is a real opportunity here to do what we can to include the protection of hard-working tradespeople, and not only when they are in people’s homes.
The example that I gave in the evidence session was of retail workers delivering a dishwasher and installing it in somebody’s home. The question was whether, in somebody’s home, they would be classed as a retail worker under the measures in the Bill. There is a real opportunity to include those people and, if possible, to extend the provision to tradespeople who are doing work in people’s homes and then have tools and equipment necessary for their jobs subject to theft. They are also, as we are hearing, quite often subject to assault while defending their tools, and there is a real risk that they are criminalised for acting to protect their livelihood, because obviously this is not just theft—I mean “just” in the broadest possible terms. It is not having one’s phone stolen or, as heartbreaking as it is—I have suffered it myself—having one’s bike stolen. This is someone’s livelihood—their ability to support their family; so whatever we can do to extend the scope of the measure to protect those incredibly hard-working tradespeople and workers, we should do.
Luke Taylor
Absolutely, and I congratulate the hon. Member for Portsmouth North on that. I was at the reception that she held on the Terrace last week, and it was good to see the backing of industry for that campaign.
The Chair
Order. We need to stick within the scope of the Bill. If we could stay on topic, that would be brilliant.
Luke Taylor
I will finish my remarks by again encouraging the Minister to consider what we can do, and to take every opportunity available to include in the Bill the measures that I have mentioned.
David Burton-Sampson (Southend West and Leigh) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Allin-Khan. I refer Members to my declaration of interests.
I will keep this brief. The abuse of shop workers is simply unacceptable. People who are at work and offering an essential service to the public, and who are normally at the lower end of the salary scale, should not be subjected to such violence and intimidation when simply doing their job. USDAW’s “Freedom From Fear” report shows that in the last 12 months 77% of shop workers were verbally abused, 53% were threatened and 10% were assaulted. I know about this issue from my early career, when I was a store manager for a food store. I was abused on a number of occasions and once had a blade pulled on me when I was attempting to stop a shoplifter. This has been going on for years and it needs to stop.
During the pandemic, as we all know, we started off clapping the doctors and nurses and we eventually spread that out to everybody who was keeping our essential services going, including our shop workers. It is shameful that despite the petition launched in July 2020 and signed by 104,354 people, which the hon. Member for Stockton West pointed to, and the Westminster Hall debate, the former Conservative Government refused to recognise abuse of a shop worker as a separate offence until they were dragged, kicking and screaming, by the industry and the Labour Opposition at the time. It is therefore interesting to hear the Conservatives waxing lyrical about this issue today, despite the fact that we had to pull them to this point. It is equally admirable to see the Government bringing this action forward.
Many shop workers are pleased that the Government’s respect orders will support this new legislation and give them more protection. As a package, this is a positive move forward that will support my former colleagues and all retail workers. I fully support clauses 14 and 15.
Jack Rankin
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Allin-Khan, but not quite as much of a pleasure as listening to something akin to the Gettysburg address from my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Jess Phillips)
That was short.
Jack Rankin
That was the joke. I am sure that my wife, who will be listening in, will be delighted that I will not be home for dinner tonight.
I welcome this legislation and congratulate the Government on bringing it forward. I understand that it is similar to the Bill brought forward by the previous Conservative Government, so I am glad that we can speak on a cross-party basis in support of making assaults on retail workers and shopkeepers a specific offence in the law. My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East talked about the current legislation, but it is nevertheless an important signal to make it a specific offence.
The National Police Chiefs’ Council, supported by the previous Government, introduced a retail crime action plan, and a group of retailers made considerable resources available for Project Pegasus to address organised crime. Although I am hearing from my local retailers and local police that there are early signs that those initiatives are beginning to deliver results, it is clear that we need to go much further to achieve the objectives set out in the RCAP. Clauses 14 and 15 are an important step in that direction.
As the Minister said on Tuesday, it is important that we listen to experts in this area. Committee members have been inundated with written evidence, alongside the oral evidence we heard, from people directly affected. It is worth getting some of that on the record, because they are the experts and we should take a steer from them. Paul Gerrard, the campaigns and public affairs director of the Co-op Group, said:
“The Co-op sees every day the violence and threats our colleagues, like other retail workers, face as they serve the communities they live in.
We have long called for a standalone offence of attacking or abusing a shopworker and so we very much welcome the government’s announcement today.
The Co-op will redouble our work with police forces but these measures will undoubtedly, when implemented, keep our shopworkers safer, protect the shops they work in and help the communities both serve.”
That is a thumbs-up from the Co-op.
Simon Roberts, the chief executive of Sainsbury’s, said something similar:
“There is nothing more important to us than keeping our colleagues and customers safe.”
I am sure we all second that. He went on:
“Alongside our own security measures like colleague-worn cameras, in-store detectives and security barriers, today’s announcement is a vital next step in enabling our police forces to clamp down further.
We fully endorse and support this legislative focus and action on driving down retail crime.”
The Minister and the Government can be confident that these measures are hitting the spot and have the support of experts.
I want to draw out some statistics, particularly from the British Retail Consortium, for which I have a lot of respect. Helen Dickinson, the chief executive, said:
“After relentless campaigning for a specific offence for assaulting retail workers, the voices of the 3 million people working in retail are finally being heard.”
However, she went on to say:
“The impact of retail violence has steadily worsened, with people facing racial abuse, sexual harassment, threatening behaviour, physical assault and threats with weapons, often linked to organised crime.”
That is not something that any of us should tolerate. As well as giving police forces and the justice system more powers, it is important that we in this House speak with one voice to say that that is unacceptable.
The British Retail Consortium’s most recent annual crime survey covers the period from 1 September 2023 to 31 August 2024. The BRC represents over 1.1 million employees, and the businesses they work for have a total annual turnover of over £194 billion. Therefore, that survey really is, in a meaningful sense, one that covers the entire industry.
The statistics are awful, to be honest. Violence and abuse have clearly spiralled, rising by over 50% in that year, which was part of an overall rise of 340% since 2020. Indeed, there are now over 2,000 incidents every single day, which is the highest figure ever recorded in that crime survey. Of those 2,000 incidents daily, 124 are violent and 70 include the use of a weapon.
That means that 70 shop workers a day in this country are being threatened with a weapon. We should just think about that; I cannot imagine how I would feel if a member of my family was threatened in that way. It means that 70 people—each one a constituent of one of us—are threatened every single day. Only 10% of incidents of violence and abuse resulted in police attendance, and only 2% resulted in conviction. Only 32% of incidents of violence and abuse were reported to police by retailers, which I am afraid to say speaks to people’s lack of faith in the effectiveness of the current system.
I am sure it is true that Members on both sides of the House hear about these incidents happening on all our high streets through our surgeries, our other contact with constituents and our correspondence. My constituency is a cross-county constituency. Matt Barber, who we heard from last week and who has been quoted a couple of times in today’s debate, is the police and crime commissioner for Thames Valley, an area that includes about two thirds of my constituency. It covers Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire, which obviously is a relatively prosperous area.
Nevertheless, Matt Barber published a retail crime strategy and one of his top priorities was acknowledging the importance of the issue. He set out a series of actions to tackle shoplifting, retail crime and violence towards shop workers, including bolstering the operational capacity of Thames Valley police through the creation of a business crime team within the force to identify prolific offenders and improve investigation. That action, combined with an increase in the visible presence of police officers and police community support officers in retail spaces through Operation Purchase, is paying some dividends. We have seen an increase of over 90% in charges for shoplifting in the Berkshire part of my constituency.
Acknowledging how difficult and time-consuming it can be for retailers to report retail and shoplifting offences, Mr Barber also rolled out Disc, which is an information-sharing and reporting platform that allows retailers to report and access information about crimes such as shoplifting and antisocial behaviour. The Disc app has been rolled out quite effectively, particularly in Windsor town centre. It is available free of charge for businesses across Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire and Milton Keynes, and I urge the businesses in the Berkshire part of my constituency to use it. Frankly, any local businesses in that geographical area should use it, because the more retailers that use it and feed in that vital intelligence, the better the policing response will be. That will be even more important once this critical legislation is passed, because it will give police the specific powers to deal with such offences.
The other third of my constituency is in Surrey, where there is a different police and crime commissioner; that is a bit of a ball-ache for a constituency MP, but we plough on. The police and crime commissioner for Surrey, Lisa Townsend, and the chief constable of Surrey police, Tim De Meyer, who we heard from at the evidence session last week, are currently asking members of the Surrey business community to have their say on the impact of retail crime. They have launched a retail crime survey, which is open for responses until 14 April. I urge businesses in Virginia Water and Englefield Green to contribute to that important initiative. I therefore welcome clauses 14 and 15.
I turn to the two amendments tabled by the Opposition. Amendment 29 requires courts to make a community order against repeat offenders of retail crime to restrict the offender’s liberty, and new clause 26 imposes a duty to impose a curfew requirement, an exclusion requirement, or an electronic monitoring device on people convicted of assaulting retail workers where they have been given a community or suspended sentence. Given what we have heard Committee members, and in written and oral evidence, about the scale and impact of these crimes, ensuring that repeat offenders are given a real deterrent, as put forward in these provisions, seems like an infinitely logical improvement to the Bill. The provisions work hand in glove with the Government to give retail workers the real protections they need.
The BRC’s crime survey calls specifically for dissuasive sentences, as there is an intrinsic link between the police response and the response of the courts. Sentencing is an issue when, I am afraid to say, those involved are repeatedly given light sentences.
I have a couple of questions for the Minister to respond to when she touches on these provisions. We have heard about the cost of crime prevention measures that retailers are incurring, some of which includes hiring private security guards to protect stores. Can the Minister confirm that those workers will also be covered by the legislation, including when they do the very difficult job of trying to apprehend people who are committing offences?
I second what the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset said; it is my understanding that the legislation excludes those who work in high street banks. Like other Committee members, I am frequently contacted by constituents who are worried about the loss of banks on the high street. I am concerned that excluding that group of people will result in the loss of yet more face-to-face banking services on our high streets. Presumably, that group has been affected by similar rises in violence and in the number of assaults on staff. For example, Barclays bank reports that in 2024 there were over 3,500 instances of inappropriate customer behaviour against its staff, with more than 90% involving verbal abuse.
I commend the Opposition’s amendments to the Committee, and encourage the Government to consider them so that we can tackle the important crime of assaulting shop workers.
Dame Diana Johnson
I thank the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton West, for his extensive speech in this short debate, setting out in great detail the background and history of how we have reached the position that we are in today. I feel that with some of the contributions we visited every retail outlet in the country. As the shadow Minister asked me a number of questions, I will deal with those at the outset. It is a shame that, despite what he said, the fact is that in 14 years the previous Government did not deliver on introducing this provision.
On what the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East said, the reason I pointed out that this was a manifesto commitment was to show that this Government, in our first Home Office Bill, are actually delivering on what we said we would do. I will go on to deal with some of the points that he and other hon. Members raised.
Joe Robertson
I wish to clarify for the Minister that I am criticising not the Government’s commitment to bring forward the Bill but the suggestion that something cannot go into the Bill because it was not in the Labour manifesto. I am sure that she is about to address that point.
Dame Diana Johnson
The hon. Member is right that I will address that point in due course.
The shadow Minister referred to live facial recognition, but there are some provisions on that—new clauses 19 and 29—which I think will provide the best opportunity to discuss those points. He will know of my commitment to using live facial recognition where appropriate, with the necessary policing safeguards.
In response to the remarks about the offence set out in Scottish legislation on abuse, threats and aggravating factors, it is fair to say that, as the Minister, I am looking carefully at what other countries have legislated for. I keep that under review and will continue to do so throughout the course of the Bill’s passage.
Matt Vickers
That point has been mentioned several times. We heard what Rob Buckland thinks about extending the offence beyond assault, because the Bill refers specifically to assault. The hon. Member for Nottingham North and Kimberley had tabled an amendment to the previous Bill to provide a broader definition that would cover abuse as well as assault. Does the Minister feel that there is a question mark around that point, or does she feel that it has been misunderstood by the people commenting on it?
Dame Diana Johnson
I will come on to that point in more detail in a moment; I just want to deal with the point raised by the hon. Member for Windsor about security staff. The offence will cover security staff who are employed directly by retailers and those employed by a third party on behalf of a retailer.
I want to move on to amendment 29 and new clause 26 tabled by the shadow Minister, which seek to make further provision on the sentencing of repeat offenders convicted of assaulting a retail worker. As I have tried to set out repeatedly, we take prolific offending extremely seriously, and it is helpful to have this opportunity to set out our approach.
As the Committee will be aware, sentencing in individual cases is a matter for our independent judiciary, which takes into account all the circumstances of the offence and the offender, and the statutory purposes of sentencing. The courts have a broad range of sentencing powers to deal effectively and appropriately with offenders, including discharges, fines, community sentences, suspended sentences and custodial sentences where appropriate. Previous convictions are already a statutory aggravating factor, with sentencing guidelines being clear that sentencers must consider the nature and relevance of previous convictions, and the time elapsed since the previous conviction, when determining the sentence.
The Ministry of Justice continues to ensure that sentencers are provided with all tagging options, to enable courts to impose electronic monitoring on anyone who receives a community-based sentence, if the courts deem it suitable to do so. Additionally, although electronic monitoring is available to the courts, it may be not the most appropriate requirement to be added to an offender’s sentence. Many prolific offenders have no fixed abode and live complex, chaotic lifestyles. Imposing an electronic monitoring requirement would likely set up those individuals to fail, instead of helping to improve outcomes for perpetrators of crime and the public.
We cannot consider this issue in isolation. That is why the Government have delivered on a manifesto commitment—we are really quite keen on that—to bring sentencing up to date and ensure that the framework is consistent by launching an independent review of sentencing, chaired by the former Lord Chancellor, David Gauke. The review is tasked with a comprehensive re-evaluation of our sentencing framework, including considering how we can make greater use of punishments outside prison, and how sentences can encourage offenders to turn their back on a life of crime. The review has been specifically asked to consider sentencing for prolific offenders, to ensure that they commit fewer crimes. We look forward to considering the recommendations of the review, following which we will set out our plans for the future of sentencing. It is vital that we give the review time to finalise its recommendations, including on prolific offenders, and that we consider them.
We had quite a lot of discussion about wholesale workers, delivery drivers and bank workers. However, despite the Opposition raising those issues, they did not table any amendments on them. New clause 20, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Neath and Swansea East (Carolyn Harris), relates to wholesale workers, and I will discuss it in a moment, but first, a number of Members raised the issue of delivery drivers. We know the really important, dedicated work that delivery drivers do, particularly when we recall what happened during the pandemic. These drivers often deliver items to the most vulnerable in our society, including the elderly, frail and disabled. However, my approach in the Bill is that we must be sure that the new offence that we are creating is proportionate and can be used without creating legal ambiguity.
Any ambiguity in identifying whether an individual is a retail worker will lead the courts to take the case forward as a common assault, as happens at the moment, meaning that the specific recording that the shadow Minister is keen on would, importantly, not be attributed to a retail worker. Delivery drivers cover a wide range of sectors and roles, which is likely to cause issues with defining what a delivery driver is, and therefore with the courts’ ability to use the Bill as we want them to. However, we will use this parliamentary process to scrutinise the provisions in the Bill, as we are doing today, and will consider carefully any amendments that are tabled, as well as any evidence that is put forward in support of them.
On bank staff, it is worth the Committee knowing that officials in the Home Office are meeting with Barclays next week. I am happy to look into what comes out of that meeting. Again, I think we can all agree that bank staff do important work in our communities. As I have said, they are protected by other legislation and a statutory aggravating factor, as public workers. I will come on to discuss that in a moment.
New clause 20 would provide for an offence of assaulting a wholesale worker. Of course, violence and abuse towards any public-facing worker, including wholesale workers, is unacceptable. Everyone has a right to feel safe at work. I, like others present, know the dedicated work that many in the wholesale sector do to ensure that goods are in our supermarkets, so that we always have access to the things that we need in a timely way. However, I do not agree that the offence of assaulting a retail worker provided for by clause 14 should be extended to all wholesale workers.
As we heard in oral evidence—we also have clear evidence from the British Retail Consortium, USDAW and the Association of Convenience Stores’ report—there has been a very worrying increase in violence and abuse towards retail workers. The police have already taken action to assist in tackling retail crime, and I welcome the positive impact that has had on charge rates, with a 52% increase in charge volumes for shop theft in particular. In 2023, as has been referred to already, the National Police Chiefs’ Council published the retail crime action plan. Through that plan, all police forces in England and Wales have committed to prioritise police attendance at a scene where violence has been used towards shop staff, where an offender has been detained by store security, and where evidence needs to be secured and it can only be police personnel. Clearly, that commitment, and other work undertaken by retail, is not preventing this crime, so we want to go further. This new offence of assaulting a retail worker will send the very strong message that violence and abuse towards retail workers will not be tolerated,
On wholesale workers, bank staff and others, assault is already a crime. Everyone is protected from assault; it is criminalised under the Criminal Justice Act 1988, in which common assault has a sentence of six months in prison. The Offences against the Person Act 1861 covers more serious violence, such as actual bodily harm and grievous bodily harm. However, this new offence will help to ensure that assaults on retail workers are separately recorded so that we know the true scale of the problem, enabling the police to respond accordingly.
Going back to why I am concerned about wholesale workers and others, any ambiguity in identifying whether an individual is a retail worker will likely lead the courts to take the case forward as common assault, meaning the specific recording attributed to a retail worker will not occur, which again goes back to the issue of data and recording. I stress that wholesale workers who are working in premises that provide retail sales to the public will be covered by the new offence in clause 14.
In order to help those in the wholesale sector, banking and other areas, including delivery drivers, there is the statutory aggravating factor for assaults against any public-facing worker in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. That aggravating factor ensures that the courts treat the public-facing nature of a victim’s role as an aggravating factor when considering the sentence for an offence, and it sends a very clear message that violence and abuse towards any worker will not be tolerated.
In order to have a proper picture of what is happening, it is critical that incidents of violence and abuse are always reported to the police, no matter in what sector. I encourage businesses to raise awareness of the legislative changes that have been introduced to their organisations to encourage that reporting. I think it is fair to say that the reason the retail sector has been so powerful in making the case to both the previous Government and this Government is because they have that information and data, as they are reporting it. That is why they have been able to get to the point where this clause is now in the Bill.
I think new clause 20 on wholesale workers is currently unnecessary, although I absolutely recognise the intent of my hon. Friend the Member for Neath and Swansea East in tabling it. Again, I echo how unacceptable violence and abuse is towards anybody. In the light of the explanation that I have given in response to the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Stockton West, I hope that he will agree not to press them to a vote.
Matt Vickers
I welcome the Minister’s comments, which were thoughtful, considered and knowledgeable, as ever. I also welcome her commitment to further the use of facial recognition technology, as well as data, to maximise its benefits. I did not get a commitment on whether the funding would continue, as it was set aside in previous years.
Dame Diana Johnson
I am happy to confirm that the £3 million allocated for the financial year 2024-25 has been continued. We have used that to buy 10 vans to help us with the roll-out of live facial recognition, about which I understand the shadow Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Croydon South, is particularly concerned and anxious, so I can reassure him on that. We are now going through a spending review, and bids will be made for the technological tools that we want our police forces to have to catch criminals and keep us safe and secure.
Matt Vickers
I am confident that the Minister understands the huge value that this equipment can have, and I am sure that she will put up a good fight in any Treasury discussions.
Clearly, this is a huge issue to communities across the country. Some of the experiences faced by retail workers are horrific, and MPs are all too familiar with them. There are 2,000 incidents a day involving somebody’s mother, father, daughter, son or grandparent—ordinary people wanting to earn a living, and having to return to the scene of a crime day after day. It is easy to see the challenge the Minister faces in determining the breadth and limits of the Bill, with bids for the inclusion of high-street bank workers, delivery drivers and wholesale workers. I hope that, despite the competition, she will continue to look at how those workers can be better supported and protected.
Regarding tool theft, I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Portsmouth North and the Gas Expert, Shoaib Awan, for leading a huge campaign. I do not quite understand how the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam was planning to slot the issue into the Bill, but he will be glad to know that some of us have done the homework, and there are some meaningful amendments to be considered later in the Committee’s scrutiny. In fact, I declare an interest: my dad is a builder.
Amendment 29 and new clause 26 seek to strengthen the Bill to deter those who would do harm to our retailers and retail workers, and we intend to divide the Committee on them—although I understand that the new clause will be decided on later.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 15
Assault of retail worker: duty to make criminal behaviour order
Amendment proposed: 29, in clause 15, page 25, line 11, at end insert—
“(4) If the offender has previous convictions for an offence under section 14 of the Crime and Policing Act 2025 (assault of a retail worker) or for shoplifting under section 1 of the Theft Act 1968, the court must make a community order against the offender.”—(Matt Vickers.)
This amendment clause would require the courts to make a community order against repeat offenders of retail crime in order to restrict the offender’s liberty.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 25—Requirements in certain sentences imposed for third or subsequent shoplifting offence—
“(1) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows.
(2) In section 208 (community order: exercise of power to impose particular requirements), in subsections (3) and (6) after ‘subsection (10)’ insert ‘and sections 208A’.
(3) After that section insert—
‘208A Community order: requirements for third or subsequent shoplifting offence
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a person is convicted of adult shoplifting (“the index offence”),
(b) when the index offence was committed, the offender had on at least two previous occasions been sentenced in respect of adult shoplifting or an equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence, and
(c) the court makes a community order in respect of the index offence.
(2) The community order must, subject to subsection (3), include at least one of the following requirements—
(a) a curfew requirement;
(b) an exclusion requirement;
(c) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if—
(a) the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which—
(i) relate to any of the offences or the offender, and
(ii) justify the court not including any requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2), or
(b) neither of the following requirements could be included in the order—
(i) an electronic compliance monitoring requirement for securing compliance with a proposed curfew requirement or proposed exclusion requirement;
(ii) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.
(4) In subsection (1)(b), the reference to an occasion on which an offender was sentenced in respect of adult shoplifting does not include an occasion if—
(a) each conviction for adult shoplifting for which the offender was dealt with on that occasion has been quashed, or
(b) the offender was re-sentenced for adult shoplifting (and was not otherwise dealt with for adult shoplifting) on that occasion.
(5) In this section—
“adult shoplifting” means an offence under section 1 of the Theft Act 1968 committed by a person aged 18 or over in circumstances where—
(a) the stolen goods were being offered for sale in a shop or any other premises, stall, vehicle or place from which a trade or business was carried on, and
(b) at the time of the offence, the offender was, or was purporting to be, a customer or potential customer of the person offering the goods for sale;
“equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence” means—
(a) in Scotland, theft committed by a person aged 18 or over in the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of “adult shoplifting”, or
(b) in Northern Ireland, an offence under section 1 of the Theft Act (Northern Ireland) 1969 committed by a person aged 18 or over in those circumstances.
(6) Nothing in subsection (2) enables a requirement to be included in a community order if it could not otherwise be so included.
(7) Where—
(a) in a case to which this section applies, a court makes a community order which includes a requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2),
(b) a previous conviction of the offender is subsequently set aside on appeal, and
(c) without the previous conviction this section would not have applied,
notice of appeal against the sentence may be given at any time within 28 days from the day on which the previous conviction was set aside (despite anything in section 18 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968).’
(4) After section 292 insert—
‘292A Suspended sentence order: community requirements for third or subsequent shoplifting offence
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a person is convicted of adult shoplifting (“the index offence”),
(b) when the index offence was committed, the offender had on at least two previous occasions been sentenced in respect of adult shoplifting or an equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence, and
(c) the court makes a suspended sentence order in respect of the index offence.
(2) The suspended sentence order must, subject to subsection (3), impose at least one of the following requirements—
(a) a curfew requirement;
(b) an exclusion requirement;
(c) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if—
(a) the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which—
(i) relate to any of the offences or the offender, and
(ii) justify the court not imposing on the offender any requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2), or
(b) neither of the following requirements could be imposed on the offender—
(i) an electronic compliance monitoring requirement for securing compliance with a proposed curfew requirement or proposed exclusion requirement;
(ii) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.
(4) Section 208A(4) (occasions to be disregarded) applies for the purposes of subsection (1)(b).
(5) In this section “adult shoplifting” and “equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence” have the meaning given by section 208A.
(6) Nothing in subsection (2) enables a requirement to be imposed by a suspended sentence order if it could not otherwise be so imposed.
(7) Where—
(a) in a case to which this section applies, a court makes a suspended sentence order which imposes a requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2),
(b) a previous conviction of the offender is subsequently set aside on appeal, and
(c) without the previous conviction this section would not have applied,
notice of appeal against the sentence may be given at any time within 28 days from the day on which the previous conviction was set aside (despite anything in section 18 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968).’”
This new clause imposes a duty (subject to certain exceptions) to impose a curfew requirement, an exclusion requirement or an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement on certain persons convicted of shoplifting, where the offender is given a community sentence or suspended sentence order.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)
I thank the hon. Member for Stockton West for tabling new clause 25. As he will be aware, under the previous Government shop theft was allowed to increase at an alarming rate—it was up 23% in the year to September 2024—and more and more offenders are using violence and abuse against shop workers, as we have just debated.
This Government have committed to taking back our streets and restoring confidence in the safety of retail spaces, which is why we have brought in measures to address what is essentially immunity for so-called low-value shop theft, which the previous Conservative Government introduced. Shop theft of any amount is illegal, and by repealing section 22A of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, we will help to ensure that everyone fully understands that.
Under section 22A, theft of goods worth £200 and under from shops is tried summarily in the magistrates court. The previous Government argued the legislation was introduced to increase efficiency, by enabling the police to prosecute instances of low-value theft. However, it has not worked. Both offenders and retailers perceive this effective downgrading of shop theft as a licence to steal and escape any punishment. Clause 16 therefore repeals section 22A.
Let me be unequivocal: shoplifting of any goods of any value is unacceptable, and it is crucial that the crime is understood to be serious. With this change, there will no longer be a threshold categorising shop theft of goods worth £200 and under as “low-value”. By removing the financial threshold, we are sending a clear message to perpetrators and would-be perpetrators that this crime will not be tolerated and will be met with appropriate punishment. The change also makes it clear to retailers that we take this crime seriously and they should feel encouraged to report it.
I turn to the shadow Minister’s new clause 25. The Government take repeat and prolific offending extremely seriously. I remind the Committee that sentencing in individual cases is a matter for our independent judiciary, who take into account all of the circumstances of the offence, the offender and the statutory purposes of sentencing. The courts have a broad range of sentencing powers to deal effectively and appropriately with offenders, including discharges, fines, community sentences, suspended sentences and custodial sentences where appropriate. In addition, as the Minister for Policing, Fire and Crime Prevention has already said, previous convictions are already a statutory aggravating factor. Sentencing guidelines are clear that sentencers must consider the nature and relevance of previous convictions, and the time elapsed since the previous conviction, when determining the sentence.
The Ministry of Justice continues to ensure that sentencers are provided with all tagging options, to enable courts to impose electronic monitoring on anyone who receives a community-based sentence if they deem it suitable to do so. It is important to note that electronic monitoring is already available to the courts when passing a community or suspended sentence. However, it may not always be the most appropriate requirement for an offender’s sentence. We believe that the courts should retain a range of options at their disposal, to exercise their discretion to decide on the most appropriate sentence and requirements.
We cannot consider this issue in isolation. This is why we have launched an independent review of sentencing, chaired by former Lord Chancellor David Gauke, to ensure that we deliver on our manifesto commitment to bring sentencing up to date and ensure the framework is consistent. The review is tasked with a comprehensive re-evaluation of our sentencing framework, including considering how we can make greater use of punishment outside of prison and how sentences can encourage offenders to turn their backs on a life of crime. The review has been asked specifically to consider sentencing for prolific offenders, to ensure that we have fewer crimes committed by those offenders. It is vital that we give the review time to finalise its recommendations, including on prolific offenders, so that we are able to set out our plans for the future of sentencing in the round.
On this basis, I commend clause 16 to the Committee and ask the hon. Member for Stockton West not to move his new clause when it is reached later in our proceedings.
Matt Vickers
Shop thefts are on the increase, with recorded crime data showing 492,124 offences in the year—a 23% increase on the previous year. The British Retail Consortium 2025 retail crime report suggests that despite retailers spending a whopping £1.8 billion on prevention measures, such crime is at record levels, with losses from customer theft reaching £2.2 billion.
As things stand, shop theft is not a specific offence but constitutes theft under section 1 of the Theft Act 1968. It is therefore triable either way—that is, either in a magistrates court or the Crown court. Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980, inserted by the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, provides that where the value of goods is £200 or less, it is a summary-only offence. Clause 16 amends the 1980 Act, the 2014 Act and others to make theft from a shop triable either way, irrespective of the value of the goods.
David Burton-Sampson
It was actually former Prime Minister Theresa May, when Home Secretary in 2013, who said that the new low-level threshold would “free up resources” and that
“Having to pass low-level offences to the Crown Prosecution Service wastes police time.”—[Official Report, 10 June 2013; Vol. 564, c. 75.]
I am not sure how shop workers and owners who have been subject to low-level crime over the last 10 years would feel about that. How does the hon. Gentleman feel about it?
Matt Vickers
I will probably come on to this later, but quick justice is effective justice. We do not want prolific offenders waiting for court dates in the Crown court, when we could be dealing with them more quickly.
There are two big debates about how this should play, and I am sure we will hear them at length in the Committee. There is a real issue with whether something that goes to the magistrates court is dealt with quickly or otherwise, but a lot of this is about perception and the £200. According to the impact assessment produced by the Government for the Bill, 90% of the offences of shop theft charged are for goods with a value under £200, so it is a myth that people are not being charged for offences under £200. Maybe we need to be telling retailers and police that, but people are still being charged for offences relating to goods of low value, and rightly so. If someone steals, there should be consequences, but it should be dealt with more quickly than waiting for a date in the Crown court.
We heard during the evidence sessions concerns about the impact that making theft from a shop triable either way will have. Giving offenders a choice between the Crown court and magistrates court will mean that they can opt for delays, and it will potentially result in a lower conviction rate. There are huge concerns that that could add to the backlog and further frustrate the system, and that the individuals concerned could continue to commit such crimes while awaiting justice. Oliver Sells KC said:
“Speedy justice is much more effective than slow justice.”––[Official Report, Crime and Policing Public Bill Committee, 27 March 2025; c. 20, Q29.]
A number of our witnesses seemed to share the perspective that delays to justice could come at a great cost. Does the Minister agree that, should the change lead to lengthy delays in justice, it could be counterproductive? Will she commit to reviewing the impact of the measure after a given time?
The change seems to be based entirely on a misperception that action is not taken on shoplifting of goods under £200 in value. The Government’s own impact assessment for the Bill confirms that the vast majority of shoplifting offences charged—in fact, 90%—are for goods under £200 in value. Matthew Barber, police and crime commissioner for Thames Valley, has submitted written evidence to the Committee on specifically this issue, in which he states:
“The current legislation means that in most circumstances theft below £200 will be dealt with at Magistrates Court. The idea that below £200 the police do not investigate or prosecute, let alone the courts convict, has been described as an urban myth. It is actually a clear message that has been promoted by the Home Secretary herself, despite evidence to the contrary. Many cases of shoplifting below £200 will be investigated by the police, arrests made and charges brought. Magistrates can convict and sentence for these offences and they do. Within current guidance there are also provisions that allow a case to be referred to the CPS for prosecution in the Crown Courts. This helps to deal with prolific offenders in particular.
So what is the problem that the Government is seeking to solve? If it is one of perception, then surely that is a perception in large part of their own making. At the time the changes were brought in it was estimated that it would remove approximately 50,000 cases from the CPS and Crown Courts. I do not know if the Home Office or the Ministry of Justice have made an assessment of the expected increase in cases going to the higher courts, but with the passage of time, increased reporting, and better policing of this crime it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that this proposed legislation could put 100,000 additional cases into an already overheated Crown Court system. In the majority of those cases I would hazard that offenders are likely to receive sentences that could have been delivered more swiftly and cost effectively by magistrates.
I am not suggesting that the proposed law will directly hinder the police in their work or directly lead to worse outcomes, however I can see no likely benefit to come from additional cost and delays being introduced to the system.”
Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Keir Mather.)
Crime and Policing Bill (Sixth sitting)
Thursday 3rd April 2025
(1 year, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 3 April 2025 - (3 Apr 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are considering the following:
New clause 25—Requirements in certain sentences imposed for third or subsequent shoplifting offence—
“(1) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows.
(2) In section 208 (community order: exercise of power to impose particular requirements), in subsections (3) and (6) after ‘subsection (10)’ insert ‘and sections 208A’.
(3) After that section insert—
‘208A Community order: requirements for third or subsequent shoplifting offence
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a person is convicted of adult shoplifting (“the index offence”),
(b) when the index offence was committed, the offender had on at least two previous occasions been sentenced in respect of adult shoplifting or an equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence, and
(c) the court makes a community order in respect of the index offence.
(2) The community order must, subject to subsection (3), include at least one of the following requirements—
(a) a curfew requirement;
(b) an exclusion requirement;
(c) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if—
(a) the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which—
(i) relate to any of the offences or the offender, and
(ii) justify the court not including any requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2), or
(b) neither of the following requirements could be included in the order—
(i) an electronic compliance monitoring requirement for securing compliance with a proposed curfew requirement or proposed exclusion requirement;
(ii) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.
(4) In subsection (1)(b), the reference to an occasion on which an offender was sentenced in respect of adult shoplifting does not include an occasion if—
(a) each conviction for adult shoplifting for which the offender was dealt with on that occasion has been quashed, or
(b) the offender was re-sentenced for adult shoplifting (and was not otherwise dealt with for adult shoplifting) on that occasion.
(5) In this section—
“adult shoplifting” means an offence under section 1 of the Theft Act 1968 committed by a person aged 18 or over in circumstances where—
(a) the stolen goods were being offered for sale in a shop or any other premises, stall, vehicle or place from which a trade or business was carried on, and
(b) at the time of the offence, the offender was, or was purporting to be, a customer or potential customer of the person offering the goods for sale;
“equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence” means—
(a) in Scotland, theft committed by a person aged 18 or over in the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of “adult shoplifting”, or
(b) in Northern Ireland, an offence under section 1 of the Theft Act (Northern Ireland) 1969 committed by a person aged 18 or over in those circumstances.
(6) Nothing in subsection (2) enables a requirement to be included in a community order if it could not otherwise be so included.
(7) Where—
(a) in a case to which this section applies, a court makes a community order which includes a requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2),
(b) a previous conviction of the offender is subsequently set aside on appeal, and
(c) without the previous conviction this section would not have applied,
notice of appeal against the sentence may be given at any time within 28 days from the day on which the previous conviction was set aside (despite anything in section 18 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968).’
(4) After section 292 insert—
‘292A Suspended sentence order: community requirements for third or subsequent shoplifting offence
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a person is convicted of adult shoplifting (“the index offence”),
(b) when the index offence was committed, the offender had on at least two previous occasions been sentenced in respect of adult shoplifting or an equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence, and
(c) the court makes a suspended sentence order in respect of the index offence.
(2) The suspended sentence order must, subject to subsection (3), impose at least one of the following requirements—
(a) a curfew requirement;
(b) an exclusion requirement;
(c) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if—
(a) the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which—
(i) relate to any of the offences or the offender, and
(ii) justify the court not imposing on the offender any requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2), or
(b) neither of the following requirements could be imposed on the offender—
(i) an electronic compliance monitoring requirement for securing compliance with a proposed curfew requirement or proposed exclusion requirement;
(ii) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.
(4) Section 208A(4) (occasions to be disregarded) applies for the purposes of subsection (1)(b).
(5) In this section “adult shoplifting” and “equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence” have the meaning given by section 208A.
(6) Nothing in subsection (2) enables a requirement to be imposed by a suspended sentence order if it could not otherwise be so imposed.
(7) Where—
(a) in a case to which this section applies, a court makes a suspended sentence order which imposes a requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2),
(b) a previous conviction of the offender is subsequently set aside on appeal, and
(c) without the previous conviction this section would not have applied,
notice of appeal against the sentence may be given at any time within 28 days from the day on which the previous conviction was set aside (despite anything in section 18 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968).’”
This new clause imposes a duty (subject to certain exceptions) to impose a curfew requirement, an exclusion requirement or an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement on certain persons convicted of shoplifting, where the offender is given a community sentence or suspended sentence order.
I remind hon. Members of the usual rules: no hot drinks in the Committee Room, please, and phones off. You may take your jackets off if you wish.
Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. In the majority of these cases, I would hazard a guess that offenders are likely to receive sentences that could have been delivered more swiftly and cost-effectively by magistrates. I am not suggesting that the proposed law will directly hinder the police in their work, or directly lead to worse outcomes; however, I can see no likely benefit to come from additional costs and additional delays being introduced to the system.
Shoplifting cases below £200 can be—and are—dealt with effectively by the police. If that is not case in some areas, it should be a matter for operational improvement, not new legislation. Does the Minister know a single police force in the country that has a policy of not pursuing shoplifters for products under £200 in value? Also, do the Government believe that trying crimes under £200 as summary offences, or in the magistrates court, meant that they were effectively decriminalised? If so, why is the offence of assaulting a retail worker a summary-only offence?
I am sure we can play the politics of the backlog in the Crown court and have a long discussion about the cause and effect. I know that Government Members appreciated my brevity this morning, so I am keen to focus on the important measures in the Bill. The backlogs are real, and making them worse will have real consequences. At the end of September 2024, the backlog stood at an unprecedented high of 73,105 open cases. The Public Accounts Committee report examined that issue, with the Ministry of Justice acknowledging that
“unless action is taken, the backlog will continue to increase for the foreseeable future, even with the courts system working at maximum capacity.”
During oral evidence, there were significant discussions about the impact of clause 16, particularly on the Crown court. Oliver Sells spoke about the clause during the evidence session and he stated:
“I recognise that there is a great public anxiety about this particular issue. Shoplifting has become endemic and almost non-criminal at the same time. It is a curious dichotomy, it seems to me, but I do not think for a moment—I am sorry to be critical—that making theft from a shop, irrespective of value, triable either way is the right answer. What that will do, inevitably, is push some of these cases up into the Crown court from the magistrates court.
I understand the reasons behind it and the concerns of the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers and the like. However, I think it is the wrong way. One of the things we must do now in this country is reinforce the use and the range of magistrates courts, and bring them back to deal with serious low-level crimes that are very frequent in their areas. They know how to deal with them. They need the powers to deal with them. I still do not think their range of powers is strong enough. You need to take cases such as these out of the Crown court, in my judgment. I think it is a serious mistake. I can see why people want to do it”––[Official Report, Crime and Policing Public Bill Committee, 27 March 2025; c. 17, Q25.]
Harriet Cross (Gordon and Buchan) (Con)
At the evidence session last Thursday, the witnesses that we spoke to about this issue said that the magistrates court was the most appropriate place for these cases to be heard. Given they are the people who know the system best, we should certainly take that evidence onboard.
Matt Vickers
I think the measure probably comes from a very good place, if the Government really believe that police forces are not taking the action that they should on the theft of goods whose value is under £200, which people have described as being decriminalised. I do not think there is any evidence for that actually being the case, because 90% of such charges relate to goods under the value of £200. All police forces in the country, as far as I understand, have a policy of still going after people, even if the value of the goods is under £200. I do not know that this clause will solve the problem, but it could well create a problem in pushing so much to the Crown court.
Jack Rankin (Windsor) (Con)
I understand the point that the shadow Minister is making, which is supported by the shadow Whip, my hon. Friend the Member for Gordon and Buchan. However, is the point not that this perception does exist? Whether it is true in reality, the perception of this decriminalisation is powerful in and of itself. Is the Government’s move here not to remove that perception, and is that not desirable?
Matt Vickers
It is good to get rid of the perception, but it is all about the real-world consequences. As it stands, if there is such a perception, we need to smash it. People need to know that 90% of such charges relate to goods under the value of £200; it needs to be pushed out that this is a thing. When we look at retail crime overall, the biggest problem, which we tried to solve with our amendment to clause 15, is not only changing perceptions but ensuring that police forces realise that retail crime has huge consequences and needs to be prioritised. That is the fundamental problem, so it is about ensuring that the priorities are right. I do not think that changing the legislation in this space will solve that problem.
I want to go back to Oliver Sells, because I think he is a fascinating guy. He said:
“I think it is a serious mistake. I can see why people want to do it, because they want to signify that an offence is a very important in relation to shop workers. I recognise that; I have tried many cases of assaults on shop workers and the like, which come up to the Crown court on appeal, and we all know the difficulties they cause, but you will not solve the problem.”––[Official Report, Crime and Policing Public Bill Committee, 27 March 2025; c. 17, Q25.]
Sir Robert Buckland, the former Lord Chancellor, added:
“First of all, just to build on Mr Sells’s point on clause 16, I understand the huge concern about shoplifting and the perception among many shop proprietors in our towns and cities that, in some ways, it was almost becoming decriminalised and that action has to be taken. But the danger in changing primary legislation in this way is that we send mixed messages, and that the Government are sending mixed messages about what its policy intentions are.
Sir Brian Leveson is conducting an independent review into criminal procedure. We do not know yet what the first part of that review will produce, but I would be very surprised if there was not at least some nod to the need to keep cases out of the Crown court, bearing in mind the very dramatic and increasing backlog that we have. I think that anything that ran contrary to that view risks the Government looking as if it is really a house divided against itself.
It seems to me that there was a simpler way of doing this. When the law was changed back in 2014, there was an accompanying policy guideline document that allowed for the police to conduct their own prosecutions for shoplifting items with a value of under £200, if the offender had not done it before, if there were not other offences linked with it, if there was not a combined amount that took it over £200 and if there was a guilty plea.
What seems to have happened in the ensuing years is that that has built and developed, frankly, into a culture that has moved away from the use of prosecuting as a tool in its entirety. I think that that is wrong, but I do think that it is within the gift of Ministers in the Home Office and of officials in the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice to say, ‘That guidance is superseded. We hope, want and expect all offences to be prosecuted.’ That would then allow offences of under £200 to be prosecuted in the magistrates court. There is nothing in the current legislation that prevents any of that, by the way, and I think it would send a very clear message to the police that they are expected to do far more when it comes to the protection of retail premises.”––[Official Report, Crime and Policing Public Bill Committee, 27 March 2025; c. 18, Q26.]
The economic note for the legislation estimates that repealing the existing provision will result in approximately 2,100 additional Crown court cases in the first instance. It further states that, in the low scenario, cases entering the Crown court will not see an increase in average prison sentence length. In the high scenario, it assumes that these cases will now receive the average Crown court prison sentence, leading to an increase of 2.5 months per conviction. The central estimate falls between those extremes at 1.3 months, based on the assumption that cases involving theft under £200 are unlikely to receive the same sentences as those over £200.
That is reflected in a relatively wide range of possible prison sentences between the low and high estimates. What level of confidence can the Minister therefore provide on the number of people who will end up in prison, or end up in prison for longer, as a result of this move to the Crown court? Given that evidence, does this move, which appears to have a limited effect or outcome, outweigh the risk of prolonging the time it takes for victims to get justice, in the Minister’s view?
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)
Let me address some of the points made by the shadow Minister, specifically on perception. There is a misconception that the threshold is used by police forces to determine whether to respond to reports of shoplifting, and that is simply not true. Police forces across England and Wales have committed to follow up on any evidence that could reasonably lead to catching a perpetrator, and that includes shoplifting; however, as we have heard, the measure has impacted the perception of shop theft among retailers, and would-be perpetrators who believe that low-value shoplifting will go unpunished and that the offence is not being taken seriously. The clause will send a clear message to those planning to commit shop theft of goods worth any amount that this crime will not be tolerated and will be met with appropriate punishment.
Let me turn to the impact on our courts. It was quite heartening to finally hear the Opposition mention their concern about the impact on our Crown court backlogs, given how we got there in the first place. The Government recognise that the courts are under unprecedented pressure, and we have debated why that is on separate occasions; however, we do not anticipate that the measure will add to that impact. The vast majority of shop theft cases are currently dealt with swiftly in the magistrates court, and we do not expect that to change as a result of implementing the measure. Even with the current £200 threshold in place, defendants can elect for trial in the Crown court, but they do so infrequently. Removing the threshold and changing low-value shop theft to an either-way offence will not impact election rights, and is therefore unlikely to result in increased trials in the Crown court.
Separately, as the shadow Minister noted, in recognition of the courts being under unprecedented pressure due to the inheritance we received from the Tory Government, we have commissioned an independent review of the criminal courts, led by Sir Brian Leveson. It will recommend options for ambitious reform to deliver a more efficient criminal court system and improved timeliness for victims, witnesses and defendants, without jeopardising the requirement for a fair trial for all involved.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
I want to understand the logic of what the Minister is saying. She seems to be saying that the change to allow cases to be heard in the Crown court will be a deterrent, but she does not envisage an increase in cases being heard in the Crown court. Is she aware—I am sure she is—that it is up to the defendant to elect where their case is heard, and that the conviction rate is actually lower in the Crown court? I am concerned about the unintended consequences that more cases could be heard in the Crown court, which is more expensive, and involves a judge and a jury, for stealing perhaps a bottle of wine. It is quite extraordinary.
Alex Davies-Jones
I recognise the hon. Member’s concerns; he has pre-empted my next point. To confirm, it is already currently an electable either-way offence and the vast majority of cases are tried in the magistrates court, but I will come to the modelling and the percentages right now.
Based on current data from the magistrates courts, an average of 5% of individuals in the last three years charged with shop theft—of any value—proceed to trial or are committed for sentencing in the Crown court. Around 88% of shop theft cases involved goods valued at £200 or less. For cases of theft over £200, approximately 40% of cases went to the Crown court. We have modelled a low, central and high scenario within the published economic note on this measure. The low scenario assumes that 1% of charges for shop theft under £200 would proceed to the Crown court, with the central and high scenarios assuming 8% and 14% respectively. It is also important to note that we have expanded the sentencing powers of the magistrates court and extended sitting time in the Crown court to reduce the backlog. The increased sentencing powers in magistrates courts have freed up the extent of 2,000 further sitting days in Crown courts to enable them to be used for the most serious cases, which is what they are they for.
Alex Davies-Jones
I will not give way because I am conscious of time.
Let me turn to the final point on the impact on prison places, because the shadow Minister also raised concerns about that. Again, it is important to note that the Opposition are now raising concerns about the impact on our prisons after the inheritance we received from them. Prisons almost ran out of places last summer, which was a complete dereliction of duty and responsibility; they ran the prison system to the point of our entire criminal justice system collapsing. We, as a Government, have taken action to address that, and have carefully assessed how the change can be managed to ensure that we do not place further pressure on our prisons. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 16 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
Just before we proceed, I am conscious that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East stood up, very late. I cannot make an exception, though he is pretty new here. When the Chair has called the Minister to wind up, there are then no further speeches. Prior to that, Members may intervene as often as they like. I am afraid we do have to stick by the rules.
Clause 17
Child criminal exploitation
Harriet Cross
Amendment 1, tabled by the hon. Member for Neath and Swansea East (Carolyn Harris), seeks to increase the increase the penalty on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for life. That would bring the punishment for child criminal exploitation in line with the maximum sentences for crimes such as murder, hostage taking, armed robbery, or possession of a class A drug with intent to supply. Life imprisonment is typically reserved for the most serious crimes, where society wishes to ensure public safety, deliver justice for victims and sufficiently punish perpetrators. Amendment 1 seems a reasonable amendment considering the devastating impact that CCE has on individual children, communities and crime levels across the UK.
Child criminal exploitation is a coward’s crime committed by those willing to engage in criminal activities such as drug and weapon dealing yet unprepared to get their own hands dirty. They instead prefer to put children, often very vulnerable and impressionable ones, in harm’s way, exposing them to crime and in many cases sentencing them to a life of crime. The impact on these children is multifaceted, up to and including their own death. Of course, consideration is needed of the impact of life imprisonment on prison places and resources, but it is vital where there is a need to, first, properly punish and, secondly, deter perpetrators of child criminal exploitation with a sentence commensurate to the scale of the crime.
Matt Vickers
This amendment would significantly increase the maximum penalty for offences outlined in clause 17 by removing the existing penalties in subsections (3)(a) and (3)(b) and replacing them with stricter sentencing provisions. The amendment would introduce life imprisonment as the maximum penalty for those convicted on indictment in the Crown court, while maintaining the ability of the magistrates court to impose a sentence up to the general limit, a fine, or both for summary convictions.
The effect of the amendment would be to significantly strengthen the legal consequences for those found guilty of child criminal exploitation, the worst of the worst offences. By allowing for life imprisonment, the amendment underscores the grave nature of these offences, bringing them in line with other serious criminal acts that warrant the highest level of sentencing. Punitive measures play a crucial role in both deterring criminal behaviour and ensuring the protection of society, particularly when dealing with serious offences, such as child criminal exploitation. Strong sentencing frameworks serve as a clear warning that such crimes will not be tolerated, dissuading potential offenders from engaging in illegal activities due to the fear of severe consequences. By imposing harsh penalties, including lengthy prison sentences, the justice system sends an unambiguous message: those who exploit, coerce or harm others, especially vulnerable individuals such as children, will face the full force of the law.
The amendment would act as a preventive mechanism, discouraging not only the individuals directly involved in criminal activity but those who may be considering engaging in similar offences. Punitive measures are essential for protecting victims and the wider public. By ensuring that offenders face substantial consequences, the justice system helps to incapacitate dangerous individuals, preventing them from reoffending and reducing the risk to others. That is particularly important in cases where offenders pose a long-term threat, such as organised criminal networks involved in child exploitation.
Furthermore, the retention of the magistrates court’s ability to impose a lesser penalty ensures there is proportionality in sentencing, allowing for differentiation between varying levels of criminal involvement. This approach ensures that although the most serious offenders may face life imprisonment, lesser offenders are still subject to significant penalties without overburdening the Crown court system. Ultimately, the amendment seeks to deliver a strong message of deterrence, making it clear that child criminal exploitation will not be tolerated and that those who commit such offences will face the harshest legal consequences available under UK law.
Joe Robertson
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. Speaking to the last clause we debated, the Under-Secretary of State for Justice talked about the deterrent value of making the offence triable either way. A significant part of the amendment is about the deterrent value of the length of prison sentence available for someone convicted of child criminal exploitation—a horrendous crime. The adult involved uses and exploits the child, and also exploits the way the police operate by putting the criminal activity in the child’s hands. Time and again, the criminals use this as a way to avoid arrests for moving drugs around the countryside or a town, because they believe the police will not arrest a child who is perpetrating the criminal activity because they are being instructed to do so. This activity has increased in recent years—so far it has not been a criminal offence—and helps the movement of drugs. Not only does it have an impact on the children involved, but it means that drug use and drug dealing proliferates in hotspots and more generally. It can also include the movement of offensive weapons, which is another area where activity in certain hotspots has got worse.
If the new provision, which I support, is to have the added desired weight and deterrent effect to stop people engaging in child criminal exploitation, it needs the amendment that the hon. Member for Neath and Swansea East tabled to increase the length of sentencing. Only then will the police feel emboldened to go after those horrendous criminals who exploit children. I urge the Minister to consider the amendment, which would have the biggest possible deterrent effect, and use the arguments of her hon. Friend to ensure that the provisions are as strong as possible.
The Minister for Policing, Fire and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)
Good afternoon, Sir Roger. Looking at amendment 1 before we go on to discuss clause stand part—
Dame Diana Johnson
Yes, that is what I meant, Sir Roger. I am sorry to cause confusion.
Amendment 1 seeks to increase the maximum penalty for the new offence of child criminal exploitation in clause 17 from 10 years’ imprisonment to life imprisonment. I fully support a maximum penalty that reflects the seriousness of the offence, which holds people who criminally exploit children to account and acts as a clear warning to would-be perpetrators who might target children for their own criminal gain. However, a maximum penalty must be fair and proportionate. A life sentence is an extremely high bar, reserved for the gravest offences such as murder and rape. Ten years’ imprisonment is a very serious maximum penalty that reflects the significant physical, psychological and emotional harm done to the child. It reflects the damage done to a child’s life chances by inducing them into a criminal lifestyle, and to their welfare by subjecting them to coercive behaviours that may be traumatic and long-lasting.
To be clear, the penalty imposed for the child criminal exploitation offence does not punish perpetrators for conduct that would amount to a separate offence. It does not punish the perpetrator for the offence that they intend the child to commit—for example, drug supply. Harmful acts done to a child as part of their exploitation that would amount to a separate offence can be punished under those offences in addition to the child criminal exploitation offence. For example, an assault against a child to ensure their compliance that amounts to causing grievous bodily harm with intent to do so will be subject to the maximum penalty for that offence, which is life imprisonment.
When deciding what sentence to impose, the courts are required to take into account the full circumstances of the offence and the offender. This includes the culpability of the offender, the harm they caused, and any aggravating or mitigating factors, to ensure that the overall sentence imposed on the offender is just and proportionate. Looking at the sentencing framework across the criminal law in England and Wales, the Government are of the view that a 10-year maximum penalty for child criminal exploitation is appropriate and comparable to offences that involve similar behaviours.
Jo Platt (Leigh and Atherton) (Lab/Co-op)
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Chair
Order. Let me explain the situation. The amendment has been moved on behalf of a Member who is not present. Once it is moved, it becomes the property of the Committee. The mover of the amendment has indicated that she does not wish to press it. My Question to the Committee therefore has to be the following: is it your pleasure that the amendment be withdrawn?
The Chair
Order. That Question was not divisible, so the moment anybody objects, I have to put the substantive Question to the Committee.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
This is an unusual situation, but for future guidance, Ms Platt, you would be on safer ground if, under those rather bizarre circumstances, you abstained. It would not have affected the outcome of the Division—but we are where we are.
Dame Diana Johnson
I beg to move amendment 10, in clause 17, page 26, line 29, at end insert—
“(4) In Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (offences to which defence in section 45 does not apply), after paragraph 36C insert—
‘Crime and Policing Act 2025 (c. 00)
36D An offence under any of the following provisions of the Crime and Policing Act 2025—
section 17 (child criminal exploitation)’.”
This amendment excepts the offence of child criminal exploitation from the defence in section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
New clause 8—Definition of Child Exploitation—
“(1) For the purposes of this Act, ‘child exploitation’ means any act, recruitment, or conduct by a person (A) aged over 18 involving a person (B) under the age of 18 that—
(a) takes advantage of the child (person (B)) for financial, sexual, labour, or other personal gain; and
(b) causes, or is likely to cause, physical, psychological, emotional, or economic harm to the child (person (B));
(2) Child exploitation includes, but is not limited to—
(a) Sexual Exploitation: The involvement of a child in sexual activities for gain;
(b) Labour Exploitation: The recruitment of a child into any form of work that is hazardous or interferes with their education and development;
(c) Criminal Exploitation: The use of a child to commit or facilitate criminal activities; and
(d) Economic Exploitation: The use of a child’s labour, image, or creative work for commercial gain without appropriate compensation or safeguards, including online influencer exploitation, or child performers being denied legal protections;
(3) A child (person (B)) is deemed unable to provide valid consent to any act constituting exploitation under this section.”
Dame Diana Johnson
Clause 17 provides for a new offence of child criminal exploitation. The offence will criminalise any adult who exploits a child by intentionally using them to commit criminal activity, and will carry a maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment. Child criminal exploitation is a form of child abuse that is often committed by criminal gangs, which prey on the vulnerability of a child to groom and manipulate them into committing crimes, such as county lines drug running, organised robbery and many more offences. Perpetrators expose victims to violence, threats and intimidation, causing serious physical, psychological and emotional harms, which have devastating and long-lasting impacts on their childhood, as well as their future life chances.
Harriet Cross
Clause 17 creates a new stand-alone offence to prosecute adults committing child criminal exploitation, to prevent exploitative conduct committed by adults against children from occurring or re-occurring. Child criminal exploitation is a heinous crime targeting young, vulnerable and impressionable children in a range of ways, which too often leads to the child being criminalised, endangered, injured or even killed.
The 2018 serious violence strategy defined child criminal exploitation as occurring where
“an individual or group takes advantage of an imbalance of power to coerce, control, manipulate or deceive a child or young person under the age of 18… The victim may have been criminally exploited even if the activity appears consensual. Child Criminal Exploitation does not always involve physical contact; it can also occur through the use of technology.”
As per that definition, the criminal exploitation of children often sees them coerced, compelled, groomed or forced to take part in the supply of drugs and transportation of the associated money and weapons for the perpetrator. In England, the latest children in need census data for assessments in the year ending 31 March 2024 recorded 15,750 episodes in which child criminal exploitation was identified as a concern. There were 10,180 episodes in which children being part of a street or organised crime gang was identified as being a concern.
Perhaps the example of child criminal exploitation that is referred to most frequently involves county line gangs. County lines is a risky, violent and exploitative form of contraband distribution, largely and mainly of drugs. County lines commonly uses children, young people or even vulnerable adults, who are perceived as being either indebted to or misled by those running the operation. They are instructed to deliver and/or store drugs, weapons, and money for dealers or users locally, across established county lines, or on to anywhere that can be considered as “not their turf”.
Police data published by the National County Lines Co-ordination Centre in its county lines strategic threat risk assessment showed that 22%—more than one in five—of individuals involved in county lines in 2023-24 were children, which is equivalent to 2,888 children. The risk assessment also found that most children involved in county lines are aged 15 to 17, and that they are mainly recorded as undertaking the most dangerous runner or workforce roles in the drugs supply chain and linked to exploitation. However, such exploitation can be difficult to identify, so we welcome any move to crack down on child criminal exploitation, shine a light on this crime, and better equip those working on the frontline to identify, tackle and prevent more children from being exploited for criminal intent.
Clause 17 makes it an offence for anyone over the age of 18 to engage
“in conduct towards or in respect of a child, with the intention of causing the child to engage in criminal conduct”,
or where the child is under 13 or where the perpetrator
“does not reasonably believe that the child is aged 18 or over.”
A person who commits an offence will be tried with child criminal exploitation being an either-way offence and will be liable for an imprisonment or a fine, or both.
I ask the Minister to reflect on the suitability of using the age of 13 and under. Why was that age chosen, rather than an older age—say, 15 or 16? What discussions has she had with the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Assembly in the light of the fact that CCE—especially county lines—does not recognise or care about internal land or maritime borders?
Matt Bishop (Forest of Dean) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. As we have heard from both sides of the Committee, child criminal exploitation is one of the most appalling forms of abuse, in which children are manipulated or coerced into engaging in criminal activity, often by criminal gangs. Victims are frequently subjected to violence, threats and intimidation, leaving them vulnerable to long-term harm. The impact is devastating, and indeed, robs them of their safety and reduces their life chances.
As has been said, clause 17 specifically targets adults who exploit children for criminal activities. It ensures that if a child is manipulated into criminal acts—or even consents to such acts—the responsible adult can still be held criminally accountable. I am pleased that the clause is included within the Bill. It is not just another provision but a decisive measure that will significantly strengthen the ability of our police forces to tackle the grave issue of adult exploitation of children in criminal contexts.
The clause aligns with the broader aims of the Bill, which focuses on addressing the intent behind criminal activity—an essential step in ensuring that those with malicious intent cannot evade justice. The Government’s commitment to closing loopholes that have, for far too long, allowed individuals to evade justice is commendable. We have witnessed far too many cases where the exploitation of children has gone unchallenged, simply because the law has not been robust enough to confront it directly. With this clause, we are making it clear that any adult seeking to exploit children for criminal purposes will face the full force of the law.
The provision represents a significant step forward, not only in terms of the legal framework, but in our ongoing efforts to protect young people from exploitation. It is a win for justice, a win for vulnerable children and a win for the nation, as we take a stronger stance against those who would harm our future generations. Furthermore, we are providing a path to redress for victims. I have said before in this place that prevention is always better than detection, but those children who have already been subjected to this horrific exploitation will now have the opportunity to see justice, too.
Clause 17 marks a crucial turning point in our fight to protect children from exploitation. It holds offenders accountable, provides a framework for justice, and sets the stage for a more comprehensive and co-ordinated approach to safeguarding young people. This is a significant step towards the protection of our children, and one that we should all support.
Matt Vickers
I join the Minister in thanking and congratulating those who have campaigned to deliver this important change. Clause 17 rightly introduces a new criminal offence targeting adults who exploit children by coercing or encouraging them to engage in criminal activities. It is designed to address the growing problem of gangs, drug networks and other criminal groups using children to carry out illegal acts such as drug trafficking, theft or violence.
Child criminal exploitation is a scourge on our society —one that ruins lives, fuels violence and allows dangerous criminals to operate in the shadows, free from consequence. For too long, gangs and organised crime groups have preyed on the most vulnerable in our communities, grooming children, exploiting them and coercing them into a life of crime. These criminals do not see children as young people with futures; they see them as disposable assets, easily manipulated, easily threatened, and, in their eyes, easily replaced.
This exploitation is frequently linked to county lines drug trafficking, where children are exploited and coerced into transporting drugs across different regions. According to the Home Office, a key characteristic of county lines operations is
“the exploitation of children, young people and vulnerable adults,”
who are directed to transport, store or safeguard drugs, money or weapons for dealers or users, both locally and across the country.
Child exploitation is linked to a broad range of criminal activities, from local street gangs operating on a postcode basis to highly sophisticated organised crime groups with cross-border operations. The UK Government’s serious and organised crime strategy estimates that organised crime, including county lines drug networks, costs the country £47 billion annually. A single county line can generate as much as £800,000 in revenue each year.
Under the previous Conservative Government, the Home Office launched the county lines programme in 2019 to tackle the harmful drug supply model, which devastates lives through exploitation, coercion and violence. County lines gangs often target the most vulnerable people, manipulating and coercing them into debt and forcing them to transport and sell drugs. A key part of the county lines programme lies in victim support, to ensure that young people and their families have the support they need as they escape the gangs. More than 2,000 county lines were dismantled between June 2022 and December 2023, as the Government hit their target of closing thousands of those criminal networks early.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Jess Phillips)
When thousands of county lines were being shut down, can the hon. Member tell me how many people in the same period were sentenced for the modern slavery crimes that they should have been in the closure of all those lines? In fact, was anybody?
Matt Vickers
The Minister would have a better chance of knowing that than even me. But I will tell her what: one case is one too many, and that is why I am glad to see the Bill, which will bring forward measures to tackle just that.
Between April 2022 and September 2023, more than 4,000 arrests were made, while 4,800 vulnerable people caught up in those vile operations were offered support to turn their lives around. Between April and September 2023, over 700 lines were dismantled, 1,300 arrests made and 1,600 victims were supported.
I would like to mention a story that was included in the Home Office’s press release on the work, which I found inspiring. Liam, not his real name, turned his back on county lines criminality due to Catch22’s work. Liam was referred to Catch22 by social services after a raid at his home found his mother and brother in possession of class A and class B drugs, alongside £3,000 in cash. A subsequent raid found 11 bags of cannabis and weapons. Care workers were concerned that Liam was going down the same path as his family, and referred him to Catch22 for support. Liam was resistant to support at first, but the people at Catch22 were able to build a relationship with him and help him to understand the dangers of getting involved in county lines and drug use, and how to recognise and avoid criminal exploitation.
Liam never missed a session with Catch22, and his attendance and performance at college subsequently improved. He has now moved on to a construction college, knowing that support is there if he is struggling. Liam is just one of hundreds of young people who, since 2022, have been supported by Home Office-funded victim support services, which ensure that vulnerable, hard-to-reach people can, with support, make different choices and turn their backs on a life of criminality.
Action for Children warns that the crisis of child exploitation is worsening, while the absence of a legal definition means that there is no unified data collection across the UK. The available evidence highlights the scale of the issue. In 2023, the national referral mechanism, which identifies potential victims of modern slavery and criminal exploitation, received 7,432 child-related referrals, an increase of 45% since 2021. Criminal exploitation was the most common reason for referral—there were 3,123 cases, with more than 40% linked to county lines activity.
Additionally, between April 2022 and March 2023, 14,420 child in need assessments in England identified criminal exploitation as a risk, up from 10,140 the previous year. Children as young as 11 or 12 years old are being recruited by gangs, forced to transport drugs across the country, and coerced into shoplifting, robbery and even serious violent offences. These children are often threatened, beaten and blackmailed into compliance. Once they are caught in the system, it is incredibly difficult for them to escape. The clause says it is child criminal exploitation if
“the person engages in conduct towards or in respect of a child, with the intention of causing the child to engage in criminal conduct (at any time), and
(b) either—
(i) the child is under the age of 13”.
Can the Minister explain why there is a cut-off at the age of 13?
Jess Phillips
I want to reassure the hon. Member on the delay, which has been halved since its peak in 2022, since this Government came to office.
Matt Vickers
I welcome any progress that the Minister might make in that space, and I look forward to her doing even more with the measures that we are putting through today.
Matt Vickers
Well, okay, we are not—I take your word for it.
The review also highlighted that, in Scotland, the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Scotland) Act 2015 requires the Lord Advocate to issue instructions that prosecutors should have a presumption against the prosecution of exploited children. However, that addresses only criminal offences linked to exploitation and does not offer protection at an earlier stage.
We welcome that the Bill makes it absolutely clear that adults who encourage or coerce a child into criminal activity will face serious consequences. They will no longer be able to hide behind children, using them as pawns while evading justice themselves.
The Jay review was also clear that the current approach is far too lenient on exploiters. The number of prosecutions in England and Wales under the Modern Slavery Act remain strikingly low. Only 47 prosecutions were brought under that Act between January and June 2023, resulting in just 24 convictions. That stands in stark contrast to the scale of enforcement activity under the county lines programme, which has led to the arrest of 15,623 adults and children in England and Wales since 2019.
A similar trend is evident in Scotland: between 2020-21 and 2022-23, 116 individuals reported to the Crown court for offences under the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Scotland) Act. Of those, 92 cases were escalated to petition or indictment, while only two were prosecuted on summary complaint. In the first half of 2023, 24 individuals were reported for offences under the Act, with 13 of those cases proceeding to petition or indictment.
Those figures highlight a significant gap between the scale of child exploitation-related crime and the relatively low number of prosecutions and convictions. While thousands of individuals have been arrested in connection with county lines activity, very few cases progress to successful prosecution under modern slavery legislation. That suggests a need for stronger enforcement mechanisms, improved evidence gathering and greater legal support to bring more offenders to justice.
The Minister will no doubt be aware that both Catch22 and Action for Children, two leading organisations in youth support and child protection, have welcomed the measures set out in this chapter. They recognise the importance of tackling child criminal exploitation and holding those responsible to account. However, both organisations have emphasised that legislative action alone is not enough and have called on the Government to go further by introducing a comprehensive national strategy to address child criminal exploitation.
Paul Carberry, the chief executive of Action for Children, said that Action for Children
“strongly welcome both the new offence of criminally exploiting children and the new prevention orders in today’s Crime and Policing Bill, which we called for in our Jay Review last year.
These measures will help to protect children across the country who are being preyed upon by criminals and put in danger. But we need to go further. The government’s proposals will only protect children who have already been exploited.
That’s why we need a comprehensive national strategy that ensures that children at risk of criminal exploitation are identified and safeguarded at the earliest opportunity.”
Members will have read the written evidence submitted by Every Child Protected Against Trafficking, a leading children’s rights organisation working to ensure that children can enjoy their rights to protection from trafficking and transnational child sexual exploitation. It campaigns for and supports children everywhere to uphold their rights to live free from abuse and exploitation through an integrated model involving research, policy, training and direct practice. Its vision is to ensure that:
“Children everywhere are free from exploitation, trafficking and modern slavery”.
In regard to clause 17, Every Child Protected Against Trafficking said:
“We welcome the introduction of a specific offence of Child Criminal Exploitation (CCE) and the Government’s commitment to tackling this serious child protection issue. Recognising CCE in law is a vital step towards improving protection for children and ensuring that those who exploit children for criminal gain are held to account. However, more remains to be done to ensure that this legislation is as effective as possible. To strengthen this legislation, we call for sentencing parity with the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and the introduction of a clear statutory definition of child exploitation, ensuring a unified and robust approach to tackling this abuse.”
What are the Minister’s thoughts on whether the measures set out by Action for Children would be a good step to achieving that? What further steps might she consider? A national strategy could provide a cohesive, long-term framework for tackling the root causes of exploitation, ensuring that law enforcement, social services, education providers and community organisations work together to protect vulnerable children. It would focus on not just prosecution but prevention, early intervention and victim support, ensuring that children caught up in criminal exploitation receive the help they need to escape and rebuild their lives. Has the Minister given serious consideration to those proposals?
Turning to clause 17, any adult who deliberately causes, encourages or manipulates a child into committing a crime, whether through grooming, coercion, threats or exploitation, will face severe legal consequences, including a prison sentence of up to 10 years. This provision aims to crack down on those who prey on vulnerable children, by using them to carry out criminal activities, while evading direct involvement themselves.
Tougher sentences are essential to deterring crime, ensuring justice for victims and reinforcing public confidence in the legal system. When penalties are lenient, criminals may feel emboldened because they believe that the risk of punishment is minimal compared with the potential gains of their illicit activities. A strong sentencing framework sends a clear message that crime will not be tolerated and that those who break the law will face severe consequences.
This is particularly crucial in cases of serious offences, such as child exploitation, drug trafficking and violent crime, where the harm caused to victims and communities is profound and long lasting. Studies have shown that the certainty and severity of punishment play a significant role in influencing criminal behaviour: individuals are less likely to engage in unlawful acts if they know that they will face lengthy prison sentences or substantial financial penalties.
Additionally, tougher sentences serve as a crucial tool for incapacitation, by preventing repeat offenders from causing further harm. For example, in the context of organised crime, longer prison terms disrupt criminal networks and limit their ability to recruit new victims. Beyond deterrence and public safety, stricter sentencing also upholds the principles of justice by ensuring that punishment is proportionate to the severity of the offence. It provides closure to victims and reassures society that the law is being enforced effectively.
Although rehabilitation remains an important component of the criminal justice system, it must be balanced with punitive measures that deter crime and protect the most vulnerable, particularly children, who are often targeted for exploitation. Strengthening sentencing laws is not just about punishment; it is about preventing crime, protecting communities and ensuring that justice is delivered with the seriousness it demands.
But do not just take my word for it. The written evidence submitted by Every Child Protected Against Trafficking raises a key concern about
“the disparity in sentencing between offences prosecuted under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and those brought under the proposed CCE offence, which risks undermining the severity of this form of exploitation. The proposed sentencing for Child Criminal Exploitation is 10 years, shorter than the penalties under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 which are life imprisonment, creating a perverse incentive where those who exploit children for criminality may face a lesser sentence than those prosecuted under modern slavery legislation. This undermines the severity of the offence and risks weakening deterrence against those that systematically exploit children.”
What assessment has been made of the Bill’s potential deterrent effect? Does the Minister believe that the 10-year maximum sentence is sufficient to dissuade criminal networks from exploiting children?
Every Child Protected Against Trafficking also states:
“Enforcement of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, as noted by the Home Affairs Committee 2023 report on Human Trafficking, ‘remains woefully inadequate’, with worryingly low levels of law enforcement responses to them in comparison to the number of children who are exploited”.
It also highlights that, as we have already discussed, child trafficking
“remains a low-risk, high-profit crime, and the persistently low prosecution and conviction rates for child trafficking and exploitation offences do not converge with the high numbers of children being referred into the NRM. Data provided by some police forces to the Insight team of the Modern Slavery and Organised Immigration Crime Unit (MSOIC Unit) showed that in October 2024, police in England and Wales were dealing with at least 2,612 live modern slavery investigations with most of these (59%) primarily involved tackling criminal exploitation. In November, the CPS provided data to the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner on human trafficking flagged offences cross-referenced with child abuse-flagged offences for England and Wales which showed a decrease in prosecutions and convictions between 2021 and 2023. In 2021, there were 32 prosecutions and 23 convictions, this decreased to 19 prosecutions and 15 convictions in 2022. Prosecutions remained the same in 2023 with 13 convictions.”
I would therefore be grateful if the Minister could elaborate on her confidence in the effectiveness of the measures in clause 17.
Jess Phillips
Does the hon. Member recognise that the reason why this Bill is going on to the statute book is because of the woeful record of criminalising those people? When exactly did his party change its mind on this? Every time I tabled such an amendment, as I did on a number of Bills when the Conservatives were in government, they said “No”.
Matt Vickers
I realise that, in some of these very sensitive areas, some people still want to play politics and talk about the history of one party or another. This is a really serious thing with really serious consequences, particularly in my part of the world, so I will leave the Minister to form her own opinions about the ups and downs of it. I support this, and I am keen to see it progress.
Every Child Protected Against Trafficking said:
“Data provided by some police forces to the Insight team of the Modern Slavery and Organised Immigration Crime Unit…showed that in October 2024, police in England and Wales were dealing with at least 2,612 live modern slavery investigations with most of these (59%) primarily involved tackling criminal exploitation. In November, the CPS provided data to the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner on human trafficking flagged offences cross-referenced with child abuse-flagged offences for England and Wales which showed a decrease in prosecutions and convictions between 2021 and 2023. In 2021, there were 32 prosecutions and 23 convictions, this decreased to 19 prosecutions and 15 convictions in 2022. Prosecutions remained the same in 2023 with 13 convictions.”
As such, I would be grateful if the Minister could elaborate on her confidence in the effectiveness of the measures set out in clause 17, particularly on the introduction of a distinct offence of child criminal exploitation.
Jess Phillips
On a point of order, Sir Roger. Is there something in Standing Orders about repetition and the length of speeches? I think the shadow Minister, perhaps unintentionally, has read out the same page twice. I am just trying to help him out.
The Chair
Order. I am quite sure the Minister was not suggesting that anybody was out of order, because if they had been out of order, I would have said so.
Matt Vickers
Given the historically low number of prosecutions in this area, does the Minister believe that the new offence will provide the necessary legal framework to improve enforcement, to increase accountability for perpetrators, and to ensure that more cases result in successful prosecutions? Furthermore, what additional steps, if any, does she perceive being necessary to support the implementation of the provision and enhance its impact?
Jack Rankin
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. I rise to support clause 17, which creates the new offence of child criminal exploitation. For too long, we have all heard about the scourge of county lines gangs and the harm being done to children. They are usually already the most vulnerable children in society, before being used by adults to undertake and engage in criminal activity. It is right and proper that we make this a separate criminal offence.
Specific guidance, “Criminal exploitation of children and vulnerable adults: county lines,” was published by the Government of the former right hon. Member for Maidenhead. It was primarily aimed at frontline staff in England and Wales who work with children, young people and vulnerable adults—including professionals working in education, health, adult and children’s social care, early help family support, housing, the benefits system, policing, prisons, probation, youth justice, multi-agency partnerships and related partner organisations in, for example, the voluntary sector. It is a long list, but it speaks to the level of complexity involved in crimes of this nature and the continued importance of agencies working together.
Organised crime groups are, by their very nature, well resourced—the clue is in the name. They are organised and often sophisticated in entrapment. While I welcome the new law in clause 17, it is not a fix-all solution. It remains the case that continuing effort is needed across the state and society to spot the signals, and we must work together to bring down the gangs targeting our children. That is just as important as ever.
Exploiting a child into committing crimes is abusive. Children who are targeted may also be groomed, physically abused, emotionally abused, sexually exploited or trafficked. As organisations such as the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children point out, however, because children involved in gangs often commit crimes themselves, sometimes they are sadly not seen by adults and professionals as victims, despite the significant harm that they have experienced. We make progress on that here today. This legislation seeks to address that issue and recognise it in law, so I wholeheartedly welcome this clause, which will make it an offence for an adult to use a child in this way.
The national statistics are stark. Action for Children’s “Shattered Lives, Stolen Futures”, a review by Alexis Jay of criminally exploited children, highlights the extent of this issue. In 2023, 7,432 children were referred to the national referral mechanism, a framework for identifying and referring potential victims of modern slavery and criminal exploitation. That represents an increase of 45% since 2021. Over the same period, 14,420 child in need assessments in England recorded criminal exploitation as a risk of harm—an increase from 10,140 in 2022.
Over the five years between April 2018 and March 2023, 568 young people aged 16 to 24 were violently killed in England and Wales, the vast majority of them by being stabbed. Police data published by the national county lines coordination centre in its county lines strategic threat risk assessment showed that 22% of individuals involved in county lines are children, equivalent to 2,888 children in 2023-24. The 2023-24 risk assessment also states that most children involved in county lines are aged just 15 to 17, and they are mainly recorded as being in the most dangerous “runner” or “workforce” roles within the drugs supply chain and linked to exploitation.
Victims may be subject to threats, blackmail and violence. They may be arrested, including for crimes committed by others, under the law of joint enterprise. They often find it hard to leave or cut off ties with those who are exploiting them, and their safety, or that of their friends and family, may be threatened. They are at risk of physical harm, rape and sexual abuse, emotional abuse, severe injury or even being killed, and they are at risk of abusing drugs, alcohol and other substances. That all has a long-term impact on these children’s education and employment options. There is clearly a need to protect children from the imbalance of power exercised by these criminals.
I want to highlight some of the excellent work taking place in my own constituency to prevent children from becoming involved in county lines and criminal exploitation. In 2022, Trevelyan middle school in Windsor carried out some excellent pupil-led work to address the evils of county lines child exploitation. It produced its own hard-hitting film about one child’s journey into slavery and exploitation. The film, titled “Notice Me!”, was made available to schools across the local area as a learning tool to help pupils understand the process, the risks and the realities of county lines operations.
One scene showed how county lines gangs will promise children all kinds of luxuries, only to trap them into failing and place them forever in their debt. Another scene showed the grim reality that for children who find themselves in the world of county lines, it is the gangs themselves that they are most afraid of, not the prospect of arrest. However, the film also has a message of hope. It seeks to educate children and young adults alike about the warning signs that someone might be involved, such as disappearing for stretches of time or coming home with unexplained bruises or odd equipment.
Alongside the film, a scheme of lessons for pupils to study in school included video inputs from a range of partners, as well as both a pupil and a parent guide to county lines. The guides included inputs from many experts in the field, including those working on the frontline and tackling the issue every day. It is, of course, important and welcome that our schools are raising awareness of this important issue and working together to help to prevent children falling prey to criminal gangs, but where prevention fails, I welcome these specific measures. The addition of the child criminal exploitation offence to the list of criminal lifestyle offences in schedule 2 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 is very welcome. The practical effect of the change is that a person found guilty of the new offence will automatically be considered to have a criminal lifestyle, and a confiscation order can be made accordingly under that Act. Ultimately, all their assets will potentially be seen as derived from crime and subject to confiscation, reflecting the serious nature of such offending.
I hope that that will be a significant deterrent to the masterminds of these gangs. In March this year, the British Transport police, working with Thames Valley police and Northamptonshire police, made multiple arrests in a two-day raid on a county lines operation. Three active deal lines were identified and £25,000 in cash was seized, alongside £9,000-worth of class A drugs and 14 kg of cannabis, with a street value of around £210,000. I thank all the officers involved in that successful operation. The values involved in this criminal activity are high, as we have heard throughout the Committee, and such operations are evidence that if resourced properly, police can break the back of the issue. Let deliver justice to victims by charging criminals for related offences, such as child exploitation, that are so common in the drug trade. In seats such as mine in the home counties, the county lines trade continues to pose risks, and I support measures that strengthen the hand of the police in tackling it.
Finally, given the vulnerabilities of who are children affected by child criminal exploitation, and because of the nature of abuse that children may suffer when they are involved in these gangs—I went through some of it earlier—I particularly welcome the fact that the Bill will ensure the victims are automatically eligible for special measures, such as giving pre-recorded evidence, or giving evidence in court from behind a screen, in proceedings relating to the offences. I hope such measures will result in more successful prosecutions of this crime.
Joe Robertson
I, too, support clause 17, which will create an offence of child criminal exploitation. Under this provision, any adult over the age of 18 would commit an offence should they do anything to a child with the intention to cause the child to engage in criminal activity. An offence will be committed where the adult reasonably believes that the child is under 18, but an offence is automatically committed where the child is under 13. An offence under this provision does not require the child to commit any offence; it only requires that the adult intended them to.
One strength of clause 17 is that it does not require the child to go on and commit the offence that the perpetrator intended them to. The criminal activity is the adult engaging with that child with the intention of causing the criminal offence. As the Minister set out clearly when she introduced the clause, it does not matter whether a child goes on to be convicted, because that is a separate offence relating to the adult’s activity.
The second strength in the provision is the explanation of what child criminal exploitation is, and I am not persuaded that new clause 8 improves that. The Bill makes it very clear that the offence is engaging the child
“with the intention of causing the child to engage in criminal conduct”.
Criminal conduct is clearly defined in clause 17(2) as
“conduct which constitutes an offence under the law of England and Wales”.
It is clear and in plain English. There is no ambiguity about the key words: “criminal conduct”, “intention of causing”, “child” and
“the person engages in conduct”.
Dame Diana Johnson
The debate on this group has been very full, and it is good to know that there is cross-party support for clause 17, which introduces the offence of child criminal exploitation.
The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton West, highlighted that the Modern Slavery Act, which the previous Government relied on to deal with the problem, has been failing for many years. The statistics that he cited on the very limited number of prosecutions that went through the courts emphasise how sad and unfortunate it is that this bespoke offence was not put on to the statute books years ago. Given the cross-party support for it today, I am surprised that such support did not exist years ago under the previous Government.
I will deal with some of the questions about clause 17, particularly on the age limit of 13. I think it is clear that it is never reasonable to consider a child under the age of 13 as an adult. There is crossover from the approach taken around child sexual exploitation, and it would almost always be obvious when a child is under the age of 13. I hope that explains why that age limit was set.
On the question of what is happening in Scotland and Northern Ireland, I have said in previous debates that we are in discussion with the devolved authorities, particularly with the Scottish Government and Northern Ireland’s Department of Justice, about the application of the CCE provisions to Scotland and Northern Ireland. I hope that offers reassurance.
The hon. Member for Gordon and Buchan asked how many defendants had relied on the section 45 defence under the Modern Slavery Act in respect of CCE offences. Obviously, we will not have had a CCE offence until this Bill gets on to the statute book, so the answer to that question is none. The comparator offence in terms of modern slavery and human trafficking is also excepted from the defences listed in section 45. The purpose of amendment 10 is to ensure that those prosecuted for this serious offence cannot benefit from the section 45 defence.
The shadow Minister asked how the new offence will change the dial on the systems response to CCE. I take his point: introducing the bespoke, stand-alone offence of CCE, as well as CCE prevention orders, will raise the national consciousness of the issue and finally—I emphasise that word—place it on a level playing field with other harms. That said, we do understand that the offence on its own is only part of the answer, and that is why we are working across Government to identify opportunities to improve the systems response and drive change and transformation.
I do not wish to try your patience, Sir Roger, by going into the issue about the sentence that should be given for the new offence, as we discussed whether the maximum sentence should be life imprisonment in the debate on previous group. The Safeguarding Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Yardley, is undertaking a full review of the NRM, as well as looking at the Modern Slavery Act more generally, because it does not always work as effectively as we would like.
In terms of what else we can do, I want to highlight another manifesto commitment: the creation of Young Futures. That is about recognising those children who are vulnerable and who might need extra support. We will create youth hubs and prevention partnerships, which are about the cohort of very vulnerable young people who might be getting themselves into difficult situations and who are perhaps on the verge of getting involved in criminality. That will involve identifying who they are, working with them and putting in place a plan of action to ensure that they are diverted away from involvement in the gangs that we know prey on very vulnerable young people. On that basis, I commend clause 17 and amendment 10 to the Committee.
Amendment 10 agreed to.
Clause 17, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 18
Power to make CCE prevention order
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clauses 19 to 30 stand part.
Schedule 4.
Clause 31 stand part.
Dame Diana Johnson
Clauses 18 to 31 and schedule 4 introduce child criminal exploitation prevention orders, which will be available on application to the courts, on conviction and at the end of criminal proceedings when there has not been a conviction. The provision for on-conviction orders is made by amendment of the sentencing code by schedule 4.
Harriet Cross
Clause 18 creates a new regime for child criminal exploitation prevention orders. A CCEPO is a new civil order that enables prohibitions or requirements to be imposed by courts on individuals involved in CCE to protect children from harm from criminal exploitation by preventing future offending.
A CCEPO will be obtained via a number of routes, including an order from a magistrates court following an application by a chief officer of the police—including the British Transport police and the Ministry of Defence police—or the director general of the NCA. An order may also be made by a court—for example, a magistrates court, the Crown court or, in limited cases, the Court of Appeal—on its own volition at the end of criminal proceedings in situations where the defendant has been acquitted of the offence, the court has made a finding that the defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity, or the defendant is under a disability such that they are unfit to be tried but has done the act charged.
CCEPOs will be reserved for defendants aged 18 and over where the court is satisfied that they have engaged in CCE. According to subsection (5), for a court to hand down a CCEPO, it must also consider that there is a risk that the defendant will seek to cause children, or any particular children, to engage in criminal conduct. Will the Minister confirm whether a defendant can therefore be given a CCEPO only if it is considered that they will repeat offend—that is, re-engage in CCE—or can a CCEPO be handed down regardless of the potential for or expectation of future offending? Is having previously engaged in CCE enough of an indicator to suggest a risk of future offending?
Clause 19 details what a CCEPO is and what it does and does not do. The nature of any condition imposed is a matter for the court to determine. These conditions could include limiting a defendant’s ability to work with children, contact specific people online or in person, or go to a certain area, as well as requiring them to attend a drug awareness class. The conditions may also require the defendant to comply with a notification order, as detailed in clause 24, which I will address later.
We must be clear that no one can accidentally engage in child criminal exploitation. Those receiving a CCEPO will have knowingly endangered, threatened, misled and vilified children in pursuit of their own criminality, and there will be a risk to the public that they will do so again. These people are ruthless and the full force of the law is needed to prevent future offending.
Subsection (4) states:
“A prohibition or requirement applies throughout the United Kingdom”.
I welcome that, but can the Minister detail how this will be enforced across the devolved nations? If extra resource is required, will it be made available to the devolved nations? What conversations has she had with our devolved Parliaments, Assemblies and police forces about this?
Subsection (7) provides that where a person is made subject to a new CCEPO, any existing CCEPO will cease to exist. We strongly believe that anyone being handed multiple concurrent or successive CCEPOs must be subject to stronger conditions and punishments—otherwise, what is to deter them from reoffending? Will the severity of successive CCEPOs be at the discretion of the court? How does the initial CCEPO lapsing on receipt of the second deliver justice for victims of the initial offence for which a CCEPO was handed down? What is the punishment for breaking the terms of a CCEPO, and how will it be enforced? How long can CCEPOs be handed down for? The Bill prescribes a minimum of two years. What is the escalation should a single defendant receive repeated CCEPOs?
Clause 20 sets out the practical mechanisms for obtaining these new prevention orders. It sensibly restricts the power to apply for a CCEPO to our law enforcement bodies—chiefly, the police and the National Crime Agency. That is appropriate, because decisions to seek an order will rely on police intelligence about who is grooming children into crime, and we would not want just anyone to be able to drag individuals to court without solid evidence. Placing this responsibility with senior officers looks as though it will ensure that applications are vetted by those with the expertise to judge the risk someone poses.
I note that the clause specifically includes British Transport police and MOD police alongside regional forces. That is welcome; exploitation is not confined by geography—for example, gangs use railways to move children along county lines. The British Transport police must be empowered to act if it identifies a predator using the train network to recruit or deploy children. Likewise, the National Crime Agency might come across sophisticated networks exploiting children across multiple force areas. Clause 20 lets those forces and the NCA go to court directly. Crucially, if they do so, they must inform the local police force for the area where the suspect lives, so that there is no gap in knowledge. That co-ordination will be vital, as local officers will likely be the ones monitoring the order on a day-to-day basis.
Joe Robertson
I thank my hon. Friend for her quick canter through the clauses, particularly the provisions on interim orders and without-notice orders. I worry that once someone has an interim order, given some of the court backlogs, it may take some time for them to come back to the court for a full order. Does she share that concern?
Harriet Cross
Of course. In all cases, it is a balance between getting an interim order in place to protect children in the immediate term, and ensuring that we get true justice through the system. It is something that we need more information on, but we also need a balance, and, on balance, the interim orders seem reasonable.
Another point is the serving of the interim order. If the person was not in court when the order was made—for example, if it was made after a without-notice application—it will kick in only once it is served. That is understandable; we cannot expect someone to comply with an order that they do not know about. However, I wonder whether there are provisions to use all reasonable means to serve it quickly, potentially with police involvement to hand it to the person if needed, since a child’s safety could hinge on getting a bit of paper into the right hands.
Interim orders seem to be a sensible procedural tool. They align with how other orders, such as interim injunctions, work, and they will ensure continuity of protection. However, I reiterate that interim measures should not become semi-permanent due to procedural or court delays. The ultimate goal is to get to a full hearing and a long-term solution. Interim orders are the bridge to that, but they need to be a short, sturdy bridge, not a lingering limbo.
Can the Minister address what guidance or expectations will be set to ensure that, where an interim CCEPO is issued, the full hearing occurs as soon as possible? Is there an envisaged maximum duration for an interim order before it is reviewed? Clause 22(3) limits interim orders to prohibitions and the notification requirement. Can the Minister clarify why? Is it primarily because positive requirements, such as attending a course, might be burdensome to enforce in the short term? The explanatory notes mention that an interim order can be varied or discharged, just like a full order. Can the Minister confirm that if circumstances change—for example, if new evidence shows the risk is either higher or lower—the police or subject can apply to adjust the interim order even before the final hearing? Lastly, if an interim order is made in the absence of the defendant, what steps will be taken to ensure that it is served promptly?
Clause 23 empowers courts to consider making a CCEPO at the conclusion of certain criminal proceedings, even if the police have not applied for one. Effectively, it provides for judicial initiative, allowing courts to consider a CCEPO even without a formal application. This is quite a significant provision. It means that, if someone is prosecuted for drug trafficking involving children, for example, and they escape conviction—perhaps the jury was not 100% satisfied or there was a technicality—the court does not have to throw its hands up on the case. It can say that it has heard enough to worry that the person might exploit children, so it will consider a prevention order.
The Chair
Order. It is slightly earlier than I intended, but I am going to suspend the Committee until 5.10 pm, after which we shall suspend every two hours for 15 minutes.
Dame Diana Johnson
The hon. Member for Gordon and Buchan raised a number of very interesting points of detail. I do not want to detain the Committee any further this afternoon by addressing each and every one of the very important questions that she posed, but I hope that she will take my assurance that I will reflect on all her points and consider them as part of the implementation planning for the new clauses. I commend clauses 18 to 31 and schedule 4 to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 19 to 30 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 4 agreed to.
Clause 31 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Keir Mather.)
Crime and Policing Bill (Seventh sitting)
Tuesday 8th April 2025
(1 year, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 8 April 2025 - (8 Apr 2025)
The Chair
We continue line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill. Before we begin, I shall make a few preliminary announcements, which I am sure you are all familiar with by now. Please switch all electronic devices to silent. No food or drinks are permitted during sittings, other than the water provided. It would be helpful if colleagues could hand over their speaking notes for Hansard by email or by handing them to one of the Clerks in the room.
Clause 32
Controlling another’s home for criminal purposes
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Schedule 5.
Amendment 5, in clause 33, page 36, line 29, after subsection (5) insert—
“(6) For the purposes of section 33(5)(b), B shall be presumed to lack capacity to give consent if they—
(a) would be deemed to lack capacity under the provisions of Section 2 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005; or
(b) are otherwise in circumstances that significantly impair their ability to protect themselves from exploitation, unless the contrary is established.”
Clauses 33 and 34 stand part.
The Minister for Policing, Fire and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair this morning, Ms Lewell. It might be helpful to the Committee to hear about amendment 5 before I respond.
Anna Sabine (Frome and East Somerset) (LD)
Cuckooing is the offence of exercising control over the dwelling of another person to carry out illegal activities. As this legislation is drafted, the person whose dwelling it is has to not have given consent for it to be an offence of cuckooing. Amendment 5 would strengthen protections for vulnerable individuals by modifying clause 33 to clarify when a person is presumed unable to give valid consent in certain situations involving potential exploitation.
Cuckooing is pervasive in our society. Last week, my hon. Friend the Member for Dorking and Horley (Chris Coghlan) was in the news discussing a young man with autism who was found dead in his flat after a criminal had moved into his flat and stabbed him. Despite attempting suicide, being a victim of theft, being rescued by the emergency services after accidentally causing a fire, and being assaulted and exploited on numerous occasions, mental capacity assessments were not carried out because the authorities assumed he had capacity. His mother visited him as often as she could, asked the police for welfare checks and urged the authorities to help. My hon. Friend is campaigning with cross-party MPs to amend the Mental Health Bill.
Given that the Crime and Policing Bill will provide a new offence for cuckooing, that case shows that we also need to strengthen the protections for vulnerable individuals who may be mentally incapacitated or in vulnerable situations, as amendment 5 would do. It would shift the burden of proof, so if someone were deemed to be in an impaired state, they would automatically be presumed unable to give informed consent unless proven otherwise. It would expand the definition of vulnerability to cover not only legal mental incapacity, but those in exploitative situations such as coercion, abuse or extreme distress.
The amendment would help to prevent the exploitation of vulnerable individuals, especially in criminal policing or safeguarding contexts. It also aligns with broader safeguarding laws and human rights protections, and would make it harder for perpetrators to claim that a victim gave valid consent when actually in a compromised state. I urge the Committee to support amendment 5.
Dr Lauren Sullivan (Gravesham) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Lewell. It is a privilege to support the Government’s action to tackle cuckooing through the Bill. As the Member of Parliament for Gravesham, this issue strikes close to home, because people in my constituency who are struggling with addiction, mental health issues or past trauma are being preyed on. Criminals take over their homes, exploit their vulnerabilities and use their properties to conduct criminal activities, in particular drug dealing. These are not abstract concerns. People living real lives in real streets in Gravesham are trapped by fear in what should be the safest place they know—their own homes.
The introduction of the new offence is not only welcome, but essential. For the first time, the Bill offers a clear and focused legal mechanism to tackle an abhorrent practice that existing legislation cannot fully capture. I place on record my strong support for the Government’s action. I will also highlight why the offence is necessary, the real-world impact of the practice on victims, and how the Government’s work helps to close a dangerous and damaging gap in the law that has persisted for far too long.
Why does this offence matter? Cuckooing is one of the most insidious and devastating forms of criminal exploitation in our communities today. It targets those who are already vulnerable, whether due to substance misuse, disability and mental health, poverty, homelessness or previous victimisation. The offender may initially appear as a friend or helper, and may offer company, drugs, money or protection. Very quickly, however, the true nature of that relationship emerges through control, coercion, fear and potentially violence.
Victims find themselves trapped, as they are often too frightened, ashamed or traumatised to seek help. We have heard from frontline services such as Kent police and Gravesham borough council’s community safety unit that victims do not even recognise that they are victims at all. They may blame themselves. They may have rationalised the situation and believe that they have no other choice.
At present, the law does not make it easy to intervene early or decisively. Police often find themselves attending reports of suspicious activity, but have no obvious offence to charge without the victim’s co-operation or an underlying crime, such as drug possession, being proven. The new offence addresses that critical gap. It criminalises the very act of exerting control over someone else’s home for the purpose of criminal activity, without them having to verbalise their non-consent and without demanding that underlying offences must first be proven. The offence acknowledges that controlling a person’s home is itself serious and harmful abuse. It also empowers police, local authorities and safeguarding teams to take earlier, firmer action to protect victims before exploitation escalates further. The Bill listens to communities and acts on their behalf.
The Bill defines such control clearly. Clauses 32 to 34 are framed to show real understanding of the complexities involved. The Bill clearly defines “control” to include subtle and partial takeovers, such as deciding who enters the property, what it is used for and whether the resident can use their own home. The Bill also covers a wide range of structures, including houses, flats, caravans, tents and vehicles, reflecting the reality of vulnerable people. It ensures that supposed consent must be freely given and informed by someone over the age of 18 with full capacity, protecting those most at risk of coercion. The Bill is future-proofed by clause 34, which allows the Home Secretary and the devolved Ministers to add new crimes to the relevant offence list as patterns of exploitation evolve over time—we know that they evolve over time.
To understand why the offence is so urgently is needed, we must listen to survivors. Take the story of James, which was shared by the Salvation Army. James was a young man struggling with addiction. He thought he had made friends, but soon those friends took over his flat. They brought drugs and violence into his home. Strangers came and went at all hours. James was trapped—afraid to leave, but no longer safe inside. When help finally reached him, James was a shell of himself. He had lost control of his life, his space and his dignity. He said later:
“It’s scary. Your house is taken over. You don’t know who’s knocking on your door. People coming to your door every two minutes. Threatening people in your home. Threatening me in my home. It totally takes over your life.”
James’s story is heartbreaking, but far from unique. Housing teams and police officers in Gravesham have listed multiple cases where individuals were forced into drug addiction by their own exploiters to increase their dependency. Homes have been used to store class A drugs without the tenant’s knowledge, which is a clear breach of tenancy guidelines and puts them at risk of eviction. Sheds and garages become secondary sites of exploitation.
That is the story of James and many others in Gravesham, but the national statistics show the sheer scale of the problem. One in eight people across the UK has seen signs of cuckooing in their community. During just two weeks of national police action, nearly 1,700 cuckooed addresses were visited and hundreds of victims exposed. In 2021 alone, 33% of all modern slavery referrals include criminal exploitation, much of it linked to cuckooing. County lines exploitation, where cuckooing is rampant, now accounts for a staggering 16% of national referral mechanism cases.
This change to the law is not only needed; it is desperately needed. I could go on, but I know other hon. Members wish to speak. I am proud to stand here to support the new measures on cuckooing. Hopefully, we may now put those criminals behind bars, where they belong.
Harriet Cross (Gordon and Buchan) (Con)
I rise to speak to clauses 32 to 34 and amendment 5. Clause 32 in part 4 of the Bill seeks to address cuckooing by introducing a new criminal offence targeting those who exert control over another’s home for criminal purposes. Cuckooing is a deeply exploitative crime that targets some of the most vulnerable people in society, including the elderly, those with disabilities and individuals struggling with addiction or mental health issues. Criminals manipulate or threaten people to take over their home, or do it forcibly, using the home as a base for illegal activities such as drug dealing, human trafficking or weapons storage. Victims often live in fear and isolation, unable to escape due to coercion or physical violence.
In 2022, London saw a significant rise in the number of recorded cuckooing incidents, with 316 cases reported, marking a stark increase from just 79 in 2018. That alarming trend in the city underscores the increasingly widespread nature of criminal exploitation targeting vulnerable individuals. The impact extends beyond individuals, affecting communities by increasing crime rates, disrupting social housing and straining law enforcement resources. Cuckooing is not just a property crime; it is a form of exploitation that strips people of their safety, dignity and control over their lives, making it essential to impose strict penalties and provide robust support for victims.
Clause 32 is a welcome step forward in tackling the exploitative nature of cuckooing and the vulnerable individuals impacted by it. However, while the clause’s intentions are commendable, it is crucial that we examine the provisions thoroughly, not only to understand its strengths but to ensure that it does not inadvertently create unintended legal or practical challenges. The clause seeks to criminalise the act of exercising control over another person’s dwelling without their consent with the intent of using a dwelling to facilitate specific criminal activities. That is designed to target individuals who exploit vulnerable occupants by taking over their homes to conduct illegal operations.
Looking at the key provisions of clause 32, an individual commits an offence if they exercise control over another person’s dwelling without legitimate consent and intend to use it for criminality. The clause is accompanied by schedule 5, which lists the criminal activities associated with cuckooing, such as drug offences, sexual exploitation and the possession of offensive weapons. The Secretary of State holds the authority to amend this schedule as necessary. For consent to be considered valid, the occupant must be over the age of 18, possess the mental capacity to consent, be fully informed and provide consent freely without coercion or manipulation. Consent obtained through deception or intimidation is not deemed valid.
On conviction, the offence carries significant penalties. On summary conviction, an individual may face imprisonment of up to six months, a fine or both. On indictment, the penalty can extend to imprisonment of up to five years, a fine or both. The primary objective of clause 32 is to safeguard individuals from criminals who commandeer their houses for illegal purposes. By establishing a specific offence of cuckooing, the legislation aims to deter perpetrators and provide law enforcement with clear authority to intervene and prosecute these exploitative practices.
Although the intentions behind clause 32 are commendable, we must look at areas of possible contention. On determining genuine consent, assessing whether consent is freely given with full understanding can be complex. Vulnerable individuals may be subject to subtle forms of coercion or manipulation that are not immediately evident, making it challenging to establish the presence of genuine consent. Furthermore, effective enforcement of the clause requires adequate training and resources for law enforcement agencies to identify instances of cuckooing, to support victims and to gather sufficient evidence for prosecution. Without proper investment, the practical application of the law may be hindered.
There is a concern that victims of cuckooing might themselves be implicated in criminal activities conducted in their dwellings. It is crucial to ensure that the law distinguishes between perpetrators and victims, providing support and protection to the latter, rather than subjecting them to prosecution. Criminal networks may adapt their methods to circumvent the provisions of clause 32. Continuous monitoring and potential amendments to the legislation may be necessary to address emerging forms of exploitative activities efficiently.
Clause 32 represents a significant step forward in addressing the pernicious issue of cuckooing. By criminalising the exploitation of individuals through the unauthorised control of their homes for illicit purposes, the clause aims to detect vulnerable members of society and uphold the integrity of private dwellings. Careful attention must, however, be given to the implementation of the provision, ensuring that genuine consent is accurately assessed, enforcement agencies are adequately resourced, victims are protected from criminalisation, and the law remains responsive to the evolving tactics of criminal enterprises. Through vigilant application and ongoing evaluation, clause 32 can serve as a robust tool in the fight against the exploitation of vulnerable individuals and for the preservation of community safety.
Clause 33 is interpretative, as its primary objectives are to provide clear definitions for terms in the Bill. It ensures that all stakeholders have a consistent understanding of the terminology. Although the intention behind the clause is to provide clarity, certain challenges may arise. If a term is defined too broadly, it may encompass behaviours or actions beyond the intended scope, leading to potential overreach. Conversely, overly narrow definitions may exclude certain areas from being covered, creating loopholes. Differences in interpretation can arise between various stakeholders, especially if definitions are not comprehensive, which can lead to the inconsistent application of the law across different jurisdictions.
For example, a dwelling is defined as being any structure or part of a structure where a person lives, including yards, garages, gardens and outbuildings. The definition also extends to temporary or moveable structures such as tents, caravans, vehicles and boats. Through the wide definition of dwelling, including not just the traditional home but temporary and moveable structures, the clause ensures that cuckooing can be addressed in a wider range of living situations. That is particularly important, given that vulnerable people may live in non-traditional housing and still fall victim to such exploitation.
Clause 34 grants the Secretary of State the authority to amend the definition of “relevant offence” through a statutory instrument. This provision is designed to provide flexibility and responsiveness to the legal system, enabling it to evolve with the changing landscape of criminal activity and societal needs. The primary purpose of clause 34 is to offer the Government the flexibility to adapt the law where needed. As we know, crime is constantly evolving; new tactics, methods and forms of criminal activity emerge regularly. In recent years, we have seen a rise in cyber-crime, human trafficking, online fraud and terrorist activity. Those types of crime often involve technologies or methods that are not always immediately recognised or understood by the legislation at the point it is being made.
Laws must remain relevant and effective to protect the public. For example, if new criminal activities or trends emerge that were not originally accounted for in the Bill, clause 34 allows for a quick amendment to qualify what is a relevant offence. That flexibility means that rapid changes can be made without having to wait months for a new Act of Parliament to be passed. Over time, societal attitudes, technologies and criminal methods change, so what is considered a relevant offence now may not necessarily apply in future. Clause 34 allows the legal framework to be adjusted to ensure that the law can keep pace with such changes.
In addition to providing flexibility, clause 34 ensures that the law remains consistent in its approach to new forms of crime. Although the definition of “relevant offence” can change, the core intention is to maintain fairness, clarity and public safety. By allowing for a timely and consistent updating of legal definitions, clause 34 helps to ensure that criminal offences are properly recognised across the country. That is important because inconsistent definitions for offences can create legal confusion and undermine effective enforcement across jurisdictions. A standardised approach ensures that law enforcement agencies in different areas can uniformly apply the law, thereby strengthening the overall criminal justice system.
Matt Bishop (Forest of Dean) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Lewell. As we have heard today, and for those who have encountered it in their constituencies, cuckooing is one of the most horrific crimes that can be inflicted upon victims. During my time as a police officer, I dealt with several cases of cuckooing, but I often found that those responsible were not held to account as effectively as they should have been. Not only did I deal with that in my time as an officer; since my election to this place, I have had reports to my office of such cases still ongoing.
A person’s home should be a place where they feel safe and secure. When that home is taken over and used for criminal activity, it causes significant harm not only to the resident but, in many cases, to their wider family. At its core, cuckooing is the sinister practice of criminals taking control of someone’s home to use it as a base for illicit activities, such as drug dealing, storing weapons or trafficking illegal goods. The victims of this crime are often left powerless in the face of ruthless exploitation. They are often vulnerable and too scared to speak out.
Perpetrators of cuckooing prey on vulnerable individuals through intimidation, coercion and, sometimes, outright violence to seize control of the victim’s home. They exploit personal struggles such as poverty, mental health issues, addiction and more, which make their victims particularly susceptible to manipulation. Once the criminals have taken control, the victim’s once-safe home is turned into a place of fear and abuse.
Before the Bill, cuckooing was not classified as a specific crime in England and Wales. That created a major gap in the law that I found extremely frustrating when serving as an officer. Perpetrators knew that they could, in effect, get away with this act, even if they were also committing other offences. Those responsible were typically prosecuted for offences such as drug trafficking or unlawful possession of firearms. However, the long-lasting harm and trauma that they inflicted on their victims often went unrecognised by the justice system.
Cuckooing is a distinct crime. I am pleased that it is finally receiving its own legal recognition and that victims are finally being given the justice that they deserve. I therefore welcome the inclusion of this offence in the Bill. The new legislation is a significant step forward, providing a clear legal framework that targets those who exploit vulnerable individuals by taking control of their homes. By making cuckooing a specific offence, the law will empower the police to take more decisive action against those who engage in this abhorrent practice. That shows that, once again, this Government are putting victims at the heart of all we are doing.
Jack Rankin (Windsor) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Lewell. In the previous sitting I touched on the scourge of county lines gangs and the wider pernicious rise of serious, organised criminal gangs in the context of exploiting children. This morning as we focus on clause 32 on cuckooing, it is clear that other vulnerable members of our communities require further protection from these criminals. I am pleased to support the clause, which makes controlling another person’s home for criminal purposes a specific offence.
We are seeing cases not only of children, but increasingly of those with mental health or addiction issues, being used by organised criminal groups, usually using high levels of violence and intimidation, to protect their county lines and to control them. One form of control exploits vulnerable people by using their home as a base for dealing drugs—the process known as cuckooing. Drug dealers can even sometimes entice a vulnerable person into allowing their home to be used for drug dealing by giving them free drugs or offering to pay for food or utilities.
As we have said, these criminals are organised and can therefore be very selective about who they target as cuckoo victims—often, those who are lonely, isolated or drug users. They might operate from a property only for a short amount of time, frequently moving addresses in order to reduce the chances of being caught. Regardless of how long they are there, measures that add a deterrent to this practice are to be welcomed as a further step towards smashing the county lines gangs. I question whether amendment 5 is necessary since the Bill refers to a person’s capacity to give consent as well as making informed decisions. I welcome the Minister’s comments on that amendment.
On clause 33, I question whether restricting the Bill as written to dwelling structures used by a person as their home or living accommodation may give rise to some future loopholes. A garage or outhouse arguably may be used by the person for their business or for storage. Can the Minister give assurances that the clause accounts for the sometimes fine line, especially in cases of garages and outbuildings that may be used for non-domestic purposes but are still used for cuckooing?
Jo Platt (Leigh and Atherton) (Lab/Co-op)
I, too, rise to speak on clauses 32 to 34. In Leigh and Atherton we have seen at first hand how cuckooing can tear apart the fabric of our community. Vulnerable residents, often facing significant personal challenges, find their homes taken over by criminals. That not only puts them in danger, but creates that ripple effect of fear and instability throughout our neighbourhoods. By making it an offence to exercise control over another person’s dwelling for criminal purposes, these clauses are a critical step towards tackling this heinous crime.
The broad definition of criminal activities linked to cuckooing, such as drug offences, sexual offences and the use of offensive weapons, is particularly important for our community. It means that no matter how these criminals try to exploit vulnerable people, the law will be able to address it. This adaptability is crucial as we work to stay one step ahead of those who seek to harm our residents. One of the most vital aspects of the Bill is the clear protections that it offers. We have seen in our community how criminals can manipulate and coerce individuals into giving up control of their homes. By ensuring that a person cannot consent to the control of their home if they are coerced, under age, or not fully informed, the Bill removes those legal loopholes that criminals could exploit.
The Bill’s provisions for future-proofing are essential. Criminals are always finding new ways to exploit vulnerable people, and it is crucial that our laws can adapt to these changes by allowing for the list of specified offences to be amended, so that the law remains effective in combating cuckooing, no matter how it evolves. More locally in Leigh and Atherton, we have seen the devastating effects of cuckooing on individuals and families. It is also important to acknowledge that the perpetrators of cuckooing are usually involved in other criminal activity as well—it is wide-reaching.
The community response to cuckooing has been strong, with our local organisations and local authorities working together to support victims and prevent further exploitation. The Bill will enhance those efforts by providing clear legal definitions and protections and making it easier to identify and prosecute those responsible for cuckooing. These clauses are about not just creating new offences, but protecting our communities and the most vulnerable among us. By addressing the specific ways that criminals exploit individuals, and providing clear protections and support for victims, we can make a real difference. I urge my fellow Committee members to support these clauses and help us to take a stand against cuckooing and the harm that it causes in our communities.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve on this Committee with you in the Chair, Ms Lewell, and I agree with many of the comments made so far this morning.
Cuckooing, as we have heard, is a practice typically linked to the grim reality of county lines drug supply, where illegal drugs are trafficked from one area to another, often by children or vulnerable individuals coerced into these activities by organised crime, but is by no means exclusively linked to that activity. In 2023-24, estimates showed that around 14,500 children were identified as at risk from or involved in child criminal exploitation, with cuckooing included as an activity within that—and that number is likely to be a significant underestimate, as many exploited children are not known to the authorities.
The Centre for Social Justice has rightly pointed out that the act of taking over someone’s home not only is a serious violation in itself, but brings with it a cascade of harmful consequences: escalating antisocial behaviour, increasing fear in communities and strain on already overburdened services and the ability of police forces to intervene and investigate. The practice disproportionately targets those who are already vulnerable—individuals who may be struggling with addiction, mental health issues or disabilities, who are often isolated and unaware of the full extent of the abuse that they are suffering, and who find it difficult to understand or even recognise what is happening to them in the place where they live.
I have two issues with the way that clause 32 is drafted, and I wonder whether the Minister can help. The offence is set out in clause 32(1), and states that
“person A commits an offence if—”
setting out three limbs to the test for this offence: that
“A exercises control over the dwelling of another person (B),”
and
“B does not consent to A exercising that control for that purpose”,
and that
“A does so for the purpose of enabling the dwelling to be used in connection”—
this is important—
“with the commission (by any person) of one or more relevant offences”.
Those offences are then set out in schedule 5, and they are a reasonably small list. For example, an offence
“under section 33 or 33A of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 (keeping a brothel)”,
or offences relating to flick knives. I will not list them all.
My question to the Minister is this: why is cuckooing restricted to only a certain specified number of offences taking place in the home? Bearing in mind that A is exerting control over that home, which B does not consent to, I wonder why there is not scope here to say that all criminal offences carried out in that home where that coercive control relationship is taking place could amount to cuckooing.
My second question to the Minister is about the drafting in relation to exercising control. Since an offence only takes place if A is exercising control over the dwelling of person B, the Bill helps us with what exercising control means. Clause 33(4) states:
“The circumstances in which A exercises control over B’s dwelling include circumstances where A exercises control…over any of the following”,
and it then lists paragraphs (a) to (d). For example, paragraph (a) states:
“who is able to enter, leave, occupy or otherwise use the dwelling or part of the dwelling”,
while paragraph (b) covers:
“the delivery of things to, or the collection of things from, the dwelling”.
I will not go through all the paragraphs (a) to (d), but it is not clear from the drafting of clause 33(4) whether they provide an exhaustive list of things that amount to control over a dwelling, or whether they are merely an indicative list.
David Burton-Sampson (Southend West and Leigh) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell. This Government are taking strong new action to make cuckooing a specific offence, protecting the most vulnerable people whose homes are used by others to commit criminal activity. After the last Tory Government’s dereliction of law and order, a Labour Government will finally deliver and get the job done. We have already discussed in depth the plans to toughen up on child criminal exploitation, and that certainly extends into the world of cuckooing. The exploitation of children and vulnerable people for criminal gain is sickening, and it is vital that we do everything in our power to eradicate it.
Cuckooing is a particularly insidious and damaging form of victimisation, causing untold harm. One Essex mother has recounted how a gang from outside the county occupied her flat and used it as base from which to deal drugs. The gang took her car and she became a prisoner in her own home, scared for her own safety and too frightened to call the police. She said that they took the whole property over and were running a drug house, with people coming all hours of the day and at weekends, so they would be up all night. When she left her bedroom, she was threatened and felt that there was nothing she could do. It has destroyed her confidence. That is the reality of cuckooing.
There can be no doubt that this is a serious and hugely damaging crime. Charities have welcomed the introduction of this new stand-alone law focused on exploitative adults. It will shift the focus on to the perpetrator, not victims, and will help protect thousands of vulnerable people—young people and adults—identified as being at risk of criminal exploitation. We need to break the cycles of harm, punish the exploiters, prioritise the victims and put safety first. Simply charging people with drug possession ignores the core truth that these abusers are exploiting at-risk people.
The former Conservative Government did not take cuckooing seriously. Although they explored making cuckooing an offence under the antisocial behaviour action plan in March 2023, they determined that existing offenses were sufficient to respond to people engaged in cuckooing. It was only after Labour tabled an amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill in 2023-24 that the Conservatives agreed to work with the Opposition to introduce a new amendment. This Government are funding 13,000 extra neighbourhood police officers, with a named officer in every community. Having more officers on the ground will also go a long way to help deal with this appalling exploitation of vulnerable people.
Cuckooing is a growing concern in many areas, including in Southend-on-Sea. Essex police has highlighted cuckooing as a key issue relating to county lines drugs operation. These people exploit the vulnerable, as we have said, including children and those with mental health issues or addictions. The safeguarding efforts of the Essex constabulary, who police my constituency, include highlighting initiatives, training, audits and vital partnership collaboration to ensure the protection of vulnerable individuals.
The hard work of Essex police has made Southend and the surrounding areas safer to live. The force takes a robust approach to criminals who are intent on supplying drugs to vulnerable people and causing harm to our communities, and has trained more than 450 police and partner agency staff to recognise the signs of cuckooing. Leaflets and posters describing the signs of cuckooing and how to get help have been sent to victims, their neighbours, community partners and police stations. Huge efforts have been made to deal with the increase in cuckooing.
A key objective for the force is to ensure that children and vulnerable individuals receive proper support and safe-guarding. Triage teams have been created and information sharing with social services and other agencies has improved, but it is a huge challenge for our police forces, taking up significant amounts of manpower.
Southend-on-Sea city council has been working to raise awareness of county lines activity too—in particular, how criminal gangs exploit young people to transport drugs and the dangers of cuckooing. The council’s #SeeTheSigns campaign aims to raise awareness and prevent recruitment into these terrible networks and to avoid people’s homes being taken over.
Neighbourhood policing has always been the cornerstone of our proud British tradition of policing by consent, yet the previous Government let the number of officers in local roles collapse, with dire consequences. We even heard from the hon. Member for Gordon and Buchan that it is difficult with current resources, so thank goodness this Government are increasing the resource. We are delivering the police and the police community support officers in local communities equipped with tougher powers to crack down on the exploitation of vulnerable people.
My local force is appealing for anyone who feels that cuckooing is happening to them, or to someone they know, to please tell them, so that the police can make sure they are safe and deal with those who are exploiting them. This is often a hidden crime, harmful and dangerous. Everyone deserves to feel safe in their own home, not held hostage and deprived of their basic freedoms. Cuckooing is an appalling crime; it victimises people and it must stop. I am incredibly grateful for the work of the police and other agencies in ensuring swift interventions, ensuring a positive outcome for residents, and I thank them for all they do.
Community vigilance and support is vital in tackling such issues. If residents see frequent visitors at unsociable hours, changes in a neighbour’s daily routine, unusual smells coming from a property, suspicious or unfamiliar vehicles often outside an address, they should report it to the police. We need this stand-alone law. Cuckooing is an absolutely horrendous business, so I welcome clauses 32 to 34, and I commend the Government for the actions being taken.
Mr Alex Barros-Curtis (Cardiff West) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell; after some excellent contributions on this set of clauses, I hope not to disappoint you. It will not surprise you to hear that I support clauses 32 to 34 and schedule 5.
As we have heard from Members on both sides of the Committee, cuckooing destroys lives, destroys homes and serves as one of the most egregious examples of exploitation, especially of children, in society currently. It is a despicable and offensive practice, wherein criminals exploit the most vulnerable in our communities by taking over their homes for illegal activities, so I commend the Government for creating a new bespoke criminal offence to tackle the practice of home takeover.
For too long, as my hon. Friends have said, cuckooing has been a subversive injustice in our towns. As the Government state in the papers supporting the Bill, unfortunately there is no centrally held data; I hope that, after the implementation of the criminal offence of cuckooing, we will begin to see such data for all the home nations.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Southend West and Leigh said, many people may not even notice it is happening, at least to begin with. There are several signs to look out for that may indicate someone is a victim of cuckooing: frequent visitors at unsociable hours, changes in a neighbour’s daily routine, unusual smells coming from the property, and suspicious or unfamiliar vehicles outside an address—individually they seem innocuous, but in reality they are insidious and malign.
Drug dealers, human traffickers and violent gangs all can prey on children, the elderly, the disabled and the most vulnerable in our society. They force their way into their victims’ homes, using manipulation, threats, coercion and violence to turn their homes into drug dens, bases for exploitation and centres of criminality. As both the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East and my hon. Friend the Member for Southend West and Leigh said, that is typically across county lines.
The victims are left terrified in their own homes, their mental and physical wellbeing deteriorating in the very place that they are meant to feel most safe. Neighbours suffer as their streets are blighted by crime and antisocial behaviour, and are unable to feel safe in their own community. As was eloquently expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Forest of Dean, despite their tireless efforts, our law enforcement officers have lacked the legislative tools to tackle cuckooing effectively.
Clauses 32 to 34 and schedule 5 will change that. Those vital clauses will introduce the specific criminal offence of cuckooing, ensuring that those who invade and exploit vulnerable people’s homes can face the severest of consequences. By making cuckooing a distinct offence, we send a clear message that we will not stand idly by while criminals hijack the homes of the weak and defenceless. I pay tribute to all the campaigners and organisations who have researched and campaigned for the creation of this specific offence over many years.
The clauses will give police officers greater powers to intervene early, ensuring that victims are safeguarded and perpetrators are brought to justice; they will enable faster action by enabling authorities to have the necessary powers to arrest criminals, and they will allow homes to be returned to their rightful residents without the current muddy legal waters that are delaying and frustrating justice, as my hon. Friend the Member for Forest of Dean said.
The clauses should be seen not in isolation, but as part of a package of measures to protect children and vulnerable people. Last week, we discussed child criminal exploitation and the offence that the Bill will create in that regard. These are all essential legislative components of the Government’s safer streets mission, which should be supported across the House. I think we have seen a demonstration of that with the comments from both sides of the House in respect of these clauses. I reiterate my support for the clauses and welcome that cross-party support. Making cuckooing a stand-alone criminal offence, with a maximum penalty of five years in prison, sends the clearest signal that we are on the side of victims in furtherance of our safer streets mission.
Dame Diana Johnson
This has been an excellent short debate on this group of clauses on cuckooing. I note the cross-party support for introducing this new law. We have had some really good contributions. I noted particularly the contributions from my hon. Friend the Member for Gravesham, who talked about James’s story, and my hon. Friend the Member for Southend West and Leigh, who spoke very personally about the effects on individuals who find themselves victims of cuckooing. My hon. Friend the Member for Leigh and Atherton talked about the effect it has on communities. My hon. Friend the Member for Forest of Dean talked about his experience as a police officer, recognising the gap in the law and how justice could not be delivered for victims of cuckooing, while my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff West talked about the subversive injustice of cuckooing in our communities.
Many contributions covered what cuckooing means for local communities and what they should be looking out for. I noticed my hon. Friend the Member for Gravesham’s comments about one in eight people saying that they have seen signs of cuckooing in their areas; it is a problem in many communities.
Joe Robertson
I thank the Minister for that clear explanation in response to both my queries. I say again that it would be usual in drafting to say, “include, but are not limited to”, just to make it absolutely clear to legal practitioners that it is not an exhaustive list, so I put that on the record again. I am sure the Minister’s officials are listening, and I would be pleased if she could perhaps go away and think about a small amendment there.
Dame Diana Johnson
I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is trying to help the Government to ensure that this legislation is as good as it can be, so we will reflect on what he says.
I want to make some general observations and comments on this grouping. Clauses 32 to 34 and schedule 5 provide for the new offence of controlling another’s home for criminal purposes, commonly known as cuckooing. As I am sure we all agree, cuckooing is a truly abhorrent practice whereby criminals target and take over the homes of vulnerable people for the purposes of illegal activity. It is often associated with antisocial behaviour and the exploitation of children and vulnerable people used by criminal gangs inside properties.
Currently, a range of offences can be used to prosecute criminal activity commonly associated with cuckooing. For example, the inchoate offences under sections 44 to 46 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 may apply where cuckooing amounts to an act of
“encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence”.
Any criminal activity carried out from the cuckooed property would also already be an offence. For example, where a cuckooed property is used to supply illegal drugs, offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 may apply.
It is the Government’s view, however, that the existing legal framework does not reflect the harm caused to victims when their home—a place where they should feel safe—is taken over by criminals. I know that this view is shared by many parliamentarians from across the House. I pay particular tribute to the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), who has championed the issue of cuckooing for some years. I also pay tribute to the organisation Justice and Care for all the work that it has done to highlight this particular issue, and recognise our former colleague Holly Lynch, who campaigned on this issue when she was a Member of the House.
Children in particular are often exploited by criminals. By introducing the offence of cuckooing, alongside the new offence of child criminal exploitation, our aim is to improve identification of such children and to strengthen the response for both adult and child victims of exploitation. I want to make clear that we expect the cuckooing offence to be used to pursue the criminals orchestrating the cuckooing, and that the victims of exploitation, including children and vulnerable people, found in properties should be safeguarded—I will say a little more about the role of children in a moment.
Clause 32 outlines that it will be an offence to control a person’s dwelling in connection with specified criminal activity without that person’s consent. The specified criminal activity is set out in schedule 5 to the Bill, reflecting the types of criminal activity that cuckooing is typically used to facilitate, as we were just discussing—for example, drugs offences, sexual offences and offensive weapons offences, among others. The offence will carry a maximum penalty on conviction on indictment of five years’ imprisonment, a fine or both.
Clause 33 provides interpretation of the terms used in clause 32 to clarify what is meant by “dwelling”, “control” and “consent”. Clause 33 also provides examples of how an individual may exercise control over another’s dwelling, including controlling who is able to enter, leave or occupy the dwelling, the delivery of things to the dwelling and the purposes for which the dwelling is used. It should be noted that the person exercising the control does not need to be present in the dwelling, thereby enabling prosecution of gang leaders who are directing the cuckooing from afar.
Clause 33 also sets out that a person cannot consent to control of their dwelling if they are under 18 years old, they do not have the capacity to give consent, they have not been given sufficient information to enable them to make an informed decision, they have not given consent freely or they have withdrawn their consent. The consent of an occupant may not freely be given where it is obtained by coercion, manipulation, deception or other forms of abusive behaviour, taking into account the vulnerability of an individual.
We recognise that criminal gangs may adapt cuckooing to other crime types. Therefore, as I said, clause 34 provides that power for the Home Secretary and for the relevant Ministers in Scotland and Northern Ireland to amend the list of specified offences in schedule 5 to future-proof the offence. Such regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure, which may help with scrutiny, as mentioned by the hon. Member for Gordon and Buchan.
I will say a few words about the issue of children and cuckooing. Police and stakeholders tell us that children, in particular those exploited by county lines gangs, are used as runners, to deliver drugs to cuckooed properties, and sometimes as sitters, to sell drugs from the properties. It is absolutely right that children who have been exploited and groomed into criminality should be treated first and foremost as victims, as I said a few moments ago. That does not in itself override the age of criminal responsibility, where the law holds children over a certain age to be responsible for their actions. I believe that allowing those two principles to exist alongside each other will provide the best protection and outcomes for vulnerable victims of this terrible crime.
The non-consensual control of someone’s home, the place in which they deserve to feel completely safe and secure, is a cruel and harmful violation. Therefore, where there is evidence that a child has been involved in an offence against, for example, a vulnerable or elderly person, and it is evident that they have chosen to do so and have not been manipulated or coerced, it is right that the police should be able to take action. That does not mean, however, that the police will seek charges against under-18s irrespective of any history of exploitation. I am clear that decisions as to whether to charge someone should be taken on a case-by-case basis. As with all offences, the police have operational discretion, and the Crown Prosecution Service’s public interest test will apply.
We will also issue guidance to support implementation of the cuckooing offence, including on how police should respond and identify exploitation when children are found in connection with cuckooing. As we have previously debated, the Bill provides for the new offence of child criminal exploitation to strengthen the response to perpetrators who groom children into criminality. It is intended to improve identification of, and access to support for, victims.
Amendment 5, which the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset spoke to, seeks to further define “capacity to consent” as set out in clause 33(5)(b). The amendment would set out that a person lacks capacity to consent to the control of their dwelling for a criminal purpose if they either lack capacity under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 or are in circumstances that
“significantly impair their ability to protect themselves from exploitation.”
I agree it is important that the offence can be used to prosecute perpetrators who have preyed on those who, due to a health condition or wider vulnerabilities, do not have the capacity to provide valid consent. However, I want to clarify that we have intentionally avoided using references to the Mental Capacity Act 2005. We believe that may cause confusion in this context, as that Act is designed to apply in a civil law context and has a central purpose of empowering people whose capacity is called into question, rather than identifying those who lack capacity.
Furthermore, the formulation of the amendment starts from the presumption that a person lacks capacity to consent if they are in circumstances that significantly impair their ability to protect themselves. That may imply that vulnerable people inherently lack capacity, which we think would set an unhelpful precedent. I reassure the Committee that the clause as drafted already allows for a broad interpretation of capacity. Our intention is to provide flexibility for the court to interpret capacity as relating to any impairment that may impact the person’s ability to consent. That could include circumstances where a person is unable to consent to the control of their dwelling for a criminal purpose due to disability, illness and/or the effects of substance misuse. That applies to both permanent and short-term lack of capacity.
Where a person has been subjected to coercion, deception or manipulation and is as a result less able to protect themselves against cuckooing, that is already covered by the definition of consent under clause 33(5), which provides that consent is valid only if freely given and sufficiently informed. As I have already stated, we intend to issue guidance to support the implementation of the offence and will ensure that it covers the issue of consent to assist police in identifying victims and the type of evidence that points towards ability to consent. I hope that, with those reassurances, the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset will be content not to press the amendment to a vote.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 32 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 5 agreed to.
Clauses 33 and 34 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 35
Protections for witnesses, and lifestyle offences
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dame Diana Johnson
The clause provides for the offences of child criminal exploitation and cuckooing to be designated “lifestyle offences” under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, and for victims and witnesses of both offences to be automatically eligible for special measures when giving evidence in court. Child criminal exploitation and cuckooing are abhorrent practices whereby perpetrators exploit vulnerable victims to further their own criminal lifestyle. As such, we want to ensure that special measures are in place to make it easier for victims of these new offences, who are likely to be vulnerable, to give evidence during court proceedings.
Clause 35 therefore amends the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 to provide for victims of these crimes to be automatically eligible for provisions such as the screening of the witnesses from the accused or giving evidence by video link or in private. Similarly, we want to ensure that perpetrators of child criminal exploitation or cuckooing are not able to profit from the harm that they have caused. Clause 35 therefore amends schedule 2 to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to add both offences to the list of lifestyle offences. This means that when a person is convicted of these offences, their assets will be considered to have potentially derived from crime and may be subject to confiscation.
Harriet Cross
The clause introduces provisions relating to protections for witnesses and the concept of lifestyle offences. The provisions seek to enhance both the effectiveness of our justice system and the protection of vulnerable individuals, but there are also some important concerns that must be carefully considered.
The core purpose of the clause lies in two key areas: providing stronger protections for witnesses involved in criminal investigations and prosecutions; and addressing lifestyle offences, which are crimes that become part of an individual’s habitual way of life, often tied to organised criminality or repeat offenders. One of the main aims of the clause is to offer greater safety and security for witnesses. We all know that witnesses are an essential part of our criminal justice process. Without them, many crimes would go unpunished and justice could not be served. However, witnesses, especially those in cases involving organised crime or serious offences, often face significant risks, including intimidation, threats of violence and retaliation.
The clause seeks to address those dangers by providing stronger legal protections for witnesses, ensuring that they feel safe enough to come forward and testify. This provision is particularly crucial in cases involving organised crime, gang violence or terrorism, where a witness might be particularly vulnerable. The protections include mechanisms to ensure that witnesses’ identities are kept confidential, and in extreme cases, provisions for relocation or even new identities. By making it safer for witnesses to testify, we ensure that those who know the truth can stand up for justice without fear for their life.
Furthermore, the clause allows for alternative means of giving evidence, such as by video link or in written statements, in cases where giving testimony in person would put the witness at risk. The protections are a vital step towards maintaining the integrity of the legal system, particularly when individuals are reluctant to engage due to fears of reprisals. It is the Government’s intention that by ensuring witness safety, the overall effectiveness of criminal investigations and prosecutions will be enhanced.
The second intention behind the clause is to address lifestyle offences—a term that refers to crimes associated with the habitual behaviour of certain offenders. These offences often form part of a broader pattern of criminal activity and are typically linked to individuals involved in organised crime, or those who consistently engage in criminal behaviour as a way of life. The inclusion of lifestyle offences in the Bill aims to target those who commit repeated or ongoing crimes, to disrupt their criminal activities.
The idea behind lifestyle offences is to shift the focus from seeing crime as an isolated act, to understanding that certain individuals or groups are involved in criminal activity as part of their everyday life. Many offenders are involved in organised crime networks, such as drug trafficking, money laundering or human trafficking, and their activities extend far beyond a one-time offence. The intention is to create legal measures that are specifically tailored to address the ongoing nature of their offending. This is not just about punishing individuals for one-off crimes, but intervening in the criminal lifestyles that perpetuate organised crime, breaking the cycle of repeat offending and reducing long-term harm.
By addressing those crimes within the framework of lifestyle offences, the Bill seeks to prevent future crimes and provide opportunities for rehabilitation. It aims to provide intervention strategies for offenders whose lifestyle choices revolve around illegal activity, encouraging them to turn away from crime. This approach seeks to address not just the symptoms of criminal behaviour, but the root causes, whether related to socioeconomic factors, addiction or mental health.
Although the protections for witnesses and the focus on lifestyle offences are both positive steps, several issues must be considered carefully to ensure that the clause is applied fairly and effectively. One significant concern is the potential for overreliance on witness protection schemes. Although it is essential that we offer the best protection possible for vulnerable witnesses, there is a danger that we could rely too heavily on these measures, which may not always be the most appropriate solution.
Witness protection, particularly when it involves relocation or changes of a person’s identity, can be extremely resource-intensive. It is also crucial that the system is not misused. Witnesses should not be encouraged to give evidence under duress or false pretences simply because they are promised protection. The integrity of the justice system must remain intact, and there is a risk that overusing or misusing witness protection could undermine its integrity. I would be grateful for the Minister’s comments on that.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Jess Phillips)
Could the hon. Lady give us an example of the sort of case she is concerned about?
Harriet Cross
It is not beyond belief that, for example, a witness involved in a rival gangs situation could be coerced or forced to give evidence for a gang-related offence, whether or not it is necessarily true. Witnesses can be vulnerable in many different many ways. Witnesses can be completely innocent, but they can also be part of the crime. We need to ensure that the witness protection system is protected, because that is the best way to ensure that our criminal justice system is protected.
Jess Phillips
I understand the premise of witness protection and the clause that is in the Government Bill. The hon. Lady has raised a concern about witness protection being used to affect the independence of the judiciary. I wondered whether she had an example of that.
Harriet Cross
I do not have a specific example, but it is not beyond the realms of possibility. None of what we are dealing with is necessarily a reaction to individual cases. We create law in order to pre-empt things that may happen. It is reasonable for the Opposition to pre-empt something that may happen to ensure that it is considered when drafting a Bill. It is a completely reasonable concern for the Opposition to raise.
Finally, there are concerns about potential for witness protection schemes to undermine the right to a fair trial. If a witness is protected to such an extent that their testimony cannot be scrutinised or cross-examined fully, it could raise issues about the fairness of the trial. Clause 35 does aim, however, to offer much-needed protections for witnesses, particularly those involved in cases of organised crime or serious criminal activity. The inclusion of lifestyle offences recognises the ongoing nature of certain types of criminality, targeting habitual offences and providing opportunities for intervention.
Dame Diana Johnson
I am grateful for the very thorough speech that the hon. Member for Gordon and Buchan just made. I am a little concerned that she may have misunderstood what the clause attempts to do, which is to support victims and those who are vulnerable in their ability to give evidence in court, such as by enabling them to give it by video link or behind a screen, because we know that it can be quite intimidating to be in court. As the hon. Lady said, if there are people who victims are concerned or frightened about, and they worry there will be repercussions, then putting in those measures seems to be a sensible way forward.
I have not come across the specific issue with witness protection that the hon. Lady mentioned. She referred to people being relocated and moved away. The provisions within this part of the Bill are reasonable measures to address the vulnerabilities of people who may find themselves subject to child criminal exploitation or cuckooing. We are not doing anything in this clause that goes beyond what is already in place for other vulnerable witnesses in court. It is not doing anything in addition to what is already accepted as good practice for those with vulnerabilities.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 35 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 36
Child sexual abuse image-generators
Jess Phillips
I beg to move amendment 11, in clause 36, page 40, line 33, at end insert—
“(3A) In Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (offences to which defence in section 45 does not apply), in paragraph 33 (offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003), after the entry for section 41 insert—
‘section 46A (child sexual abuse image-generators)’.”
This amendment excepts the offence about child sexual abuse image-generators from the defence in section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.
Jess Phillips
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell.
Clause 36 criminalises artificial intelligence image generators used by offenders to create the most severe child abuse imagery. Child sexual abuse offenders use fine-tuned AI models to generate photorealistic child sexual abuse material. These images often depict the most severe and graphic forms of abuse, and can feature real children. Child sexual abuse offenders also sell those models to other offenders, making significant profits.
Our law is clear that AI-generated child sexual abuse material is illegal, but the fine-tuned models that facilitate the creation of child sexual abuse material are not currently. The Government are therefore making it illegal to possess, make, adapt, supply or offer to supply a child sexual abuse image generator, and that offence will be punishable by up to five years in prison.
Government amendment 11 is a consequential amendment that adds the new image generator offence to schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015—I feel like this will get said a lot over the next few weeks—thereby removing the offence from the ambit of the statutory criminal defence in section 45 of the 2015 Act. We believe that introducing this new offence will give law enforcement the powers it needs to combat the use of AI to create the most severe forms of child sexual abuse material.
Harriet Cross
Clause 36 introduces a new criminal offence targeting what are termed child sexual abuse image generators. Simply put, it will make it illegal to make, possess or distribute any tool—an AI model, computer program or digital file—designed to create indecent images of children. It addresses what has been up to now a concerning gap in the legislation. We know that technology is advancing to the point at which artificial intelligence can produce realistic child abuse images without any child being photographed.
If someone deliberately develops or shares software to generate child sexual abuse material, they are enabling heinous crimes, so it is right that clause 36 makes that explicitly illegal and punishable. The clause introduces new sections to the Sexual Offences Act 2023. It defines a CSA image generator in deliberately broad terms, covering any program or data created for producing child sexual abuse images. That breadth is essential to prevent offenders from evading liability through technical arguments about, for example, what constitutes a photograph in the digital age. Whether it is an AI model trained on abusive images, a computer-generated image rendering program or any digital template for indecent images of children, it will fall within this ban.
Government amendment 11 ensures that the offence is added to schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act. That is an important safeguard to prevent offenders from claiming that they were victims of trafficking to escape liability for creating these abhorrent tools. It is entirely appropriate that this offence, like other serious sexual offences against children, should be exempt from the slavery defence. Although we must of course protect genuine victims of trafficking, that exemption is necessary to prevent abuse by removing the defence in cases involving the deliberate facilitating of child sexual abuse.
Clause 36 is a proactive step taken against emerging threats. The previous Conservative Government started focusing on the dangers of AI-generated child abuse images, and I am pleased that the current Government are continuing with that.
David Burton-Sampson
The former Conservative Member for Chelmsford tabled an amendment on this matter to the Criminal Justice Bill, which Labour supported in opposition, but unfortunately it was not added. Is the hon. Lady now happy that this measure is being added to the Crime and Policing Bill?
Harriet Cross
Yes, I think I just said that. I am pleased that the Government are continuing with this measure.
The clause aligns with the Conservative approach to zero tolerance for child exploitation technology. We built the foundations of that in 2015 through the paedophile manuals offence, and the law is now being updated for the digital age.
I have two quick questions for the Minister. What plans are in place to identify and intercept CSA image generators online once this offence is enacted? Will there be proactive efforts, working with internet companies, for example, and internationally, to root out these tools before they are spread? How do the Government plan to ensure that legitimate AI research and development is not inadvertently captured by this offence, while ensuring that all genuinely harmful tools are prohibited?
Jess Phillips
I am pleased that the hon. Lady supports the measure, and that there has been a change of heart, as has been pointed out, on the Opposition Front Bench. Although they are not in this group, if she looks at the series of clauses that relate to AI child sexual abuse material, she will see that there is quite a lot in them specifically on the Home Secretary having the power to allow certain AI companies to use such technology to discover child abuse. We do not want to inhibit GCHQ or—I wish I knew the name of some big, lovely, benevolent AI company; I am sure one exists. They might develop materials that would help us, because so much of how we find child sexual abuse material online is through things like the caching of images. An image database that the Government fund is used to identify known child sexual abuse material that can then be searched for online.
I have no technical knowledge of AI; as I stray into this area, I can picture my husband’s eyes rolling firmly into the back of his head, as a man who works in tech. However, I know that on CSAM we always look proactively for—I am already going to say something that might be totally stupid—a certain kind of code and a certain kind of people, based on intelligence, and we have intelligence officers who work undercover in this space to go out and look for them. I hope that answers the hon. Lady’s questions.
I give credit to the Internet Watch Foundation and the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, which have campaigned fiercely over the years for these measures to become law. They have been trying to sound the alarm on AI imagery, which uses real children and has real-world consequences. It is very easy for people to think that because an image is not of a real child, it does not cause real problems. Those organisations have been sounding the alarm, so I give credit to them.
Amendment 11 agreed to.
Clause 36, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 37
Possession of advice or guidance about creating etc CSA images
Jess Phillips
I beg to move amendment 12, in clause 37, page 42, line 11, at end insert—
“(6) In Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (offences to which defence in section 45 does not apply), for paragraph 35A (offences under the Serious Crime Act 2015) substitute—
‘35A An offence under any of the following provisions of the Serious Crime Act 2015—
section 69 (possession of paedophile manual)
section 75A (strangulation or suffocation).’.”
This amendment excepts the offence of possession a paedophile manual from the defence in section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
Government amendments 20 to 22.
Jess Phillips
Clause 37 amends section 69 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 to criminalise the possession of advice or guidance on using artificial intelligence to create child abuse imagery. So-called paedophile manuals that contain guidance for offenders about how to abuse children sexually or create indecent photographs or pseudo-photographs are illegal under the existing offence in the 2015 Act. However, the Act does not cover guidance for offenders about how to use AI to create illegal images of children, because back in 2015 we did not know what “AI” meant.
Our law is clear that AI-generated child sexual abuse material is illegal. Clause 37 strengthens that law to include guidance on using AI to create child sexual abuse images. As now, the maximum penalty for the expanded offence is three years’ imprisonment and a fine. Government amendment 12 adds the paedophile manual offence to schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act, thereby removing the offence from the ambit of the statutory criminal defence in section 45 of that Act. Amendments 20 to 22 are consequential on amendment 12. We believe that this extension of the paedophile manuals offence will close a legislative gap and give law enforcement the powers that it needs to combat the use of AI to create the most severe forms of child sexual abuse material.
Harriet Cross
Clause 37 strengthens the existing law to address evolving predator behaviours. It extends section 69 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, the offence commonly known as possessing a paedophile manual, to explicitly include any advice or guidance about creating child sexual abuse material. The current law, which was pioneered by the Conservative Government in 2015, rightly criminalises possession of written materials that facilitate child abuse. As depraved individuals find new ways to offend—perhaps sharing online how-to guides on generating child abuse images—we must ensure that the law clearly encompasses those too, and that is what clause 37 does.
From the Opposition’s perspective, closing this loophole is entirely sensible. It would be inconsistent for our legal system to prosecute someone for possessing instructions on how to groom a child, and yet provide no recourse against someone with detailed guidance on creating computer-generated child abuse images. The two things are equally repugnant and dangerous.
Government amendment 12 will ensure that the offence is added to schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act, which will mean that the defence for slavery and trafficking victims does not apply. It is completely right that someone who possessed a guide to creating child abuse images should not be able to claim that they had it because they were being coerced. That complements the approach taken in amendment 11 to clause 36.
In 2015 the Conservative Government set the maximum sentence for the paedophile manual offence at three years. Given that we are expanding the offence, and given public abhorrence of the facilitation of child abuse, did the Government consider increasing the maximum penalty? If not, does the Minister still feel that three years remains sufficient deterrent and punishment?
Clause 37 is a targeted tightening of the law. It aligns with the previous Conservative Government-led efforts to eliminate materials to facilitate abuse. I expect that all Committee members will agree that those who seek out and hoard advice on creating indecent images of children are among the lowest of the low, and we must remove any ambiguity that they could hide behind in the face of prosecution.
Jess Phillips
The shadow Minister posed a question about sentencing. Clause 37 amends section 69 of the Serious Crime Act, in which, as she pointed out, the previous Government set the maximum sentence at three years and an unlimited fine. I do not want to cut across the sentencing review—the Ministry of Justice would not thank me for that—but it is really important that, as part of that review, consideration is given to how sentencing in cases of sexual violence, abuse and other areas of interest to me and everyone else in the House came about. At the moment, we are simply amending the existing law to include AI manuals in the previous Government’s measure on hard-copy manuals.
Amendment 12 agreed to.
Clause 37, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 38
Online facilitation of child sexual exploitation and abuse
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Schedule 6.
Clauses 39 and 40 stand part.
Government amendment 13.
Clause 41 stand part.
Government amendment 18.
Jess Phillips
Online child sexual abuse offending is often underpinned by networking between offenders. Offenders create groups on both the clear and the dark web to facilitate their crimes against children. These groups can legitimise or escalate the abuse of children and allow offenders to commercialise child sexual abuse. Offenders within the groups assist each other in evading detection by law enforcement.
Clause 38 creates a new offence of carrying out relevant internet activity with the intention of facilitating child sexual exploitation and abuse, punishable by up to 10 years’ imprisonment. Schedule 6 specifies the offences that constitute child sexual exploitation and abuse. Under clause 39, this offence will apply to activities carried out outside the UK. Under clause 40, it will also extend to corporate bodies, including the relevant persons who control them, which will ensure that offenders who commercialise child sexual abuse cannot evade liability by conducting their crimes through a company. Clause 41 ensures that any individual convicted of the offence will be subject to requirements to notify certain information to the police, to enable them to manage the risk of the sex offender reoffending.
As with earlier Government amendments, amendment 13 will add the clause 38 offence to schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act—I often used to think that I could replace myself as a parent with a tape recording of me saying a wide variety of things about shoes, like, “Tidy your shoes” or “Clean them up”; maybe I could be replaced as a Minister with a tape recording of me saying, “This will amend schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act”—thereby removing the offence from the ambit of the statutory criminal defence at section 45 of that Act. Amendment 18 is consequential on amendment 13.
This new offence will give law enforcement agencies the power they need to prosecute some of the most prolific and powerful offenders who facilitate child sexual abuse, with a maximum penalty that fits the severity of the crime.
Harriet Cross
Clause 38 establishes a new offence addressing those who intentionally facilitate child sexual exploitation and abuse online. It marks an important development in the approach to child protection, targeting individuals who, while perhaps not directly abusing children themselves, none the less provide the digital infrastructure that enables others to commit such abuse. In essence, if someone runs or substantially assists an internet service with the intention of facilitating child sexual abuse, they will commit a serious crime under the clause. The maximum penalty is 10 years’ imprisonment, reflecting the gravity of the conduct.
The clause defines the offence as engaging in “a relevant internet activity” such as providing an online service, administrating or moderating a website or chat group, controlling who can access certain content, or helping users share material, with the intention of facilitating child sexual abuse or exploitation. For example, someone who runs a hidden online forum specifically for paedophiles to exchange images or grooming tips, or a web administrator who knowingly allows child abuse live streams on their platform, will be committing a distinct criminal offence.
The clause plugs a gap. While existing laws might catch some of those behaviours, a clear, dedicated offence of online facilitation will send a strong signal and make prosecution more straightforward. Regrettably, it is evident that online platforms have become primary channels through which predators identify vulnerable children and distribute unlawful material. Law enforcement often finds that behind instances of abuse there are online platforms—sometimes private networks—that give offenders the means to commit or plan their crimes. Frankly, it is not enough to punish the individual abuser; we have to go after the enablers—the people who provide the online meeting places or technical help for abusers— too. Clause 38 will drag them into the light of criminal liability. Ten years in prison and a heavy fine should make any would-be facilitator think twice about operating an abuse forum or an encrypted sharing site for paedophiles.
Jack Rankin
When it comes to child sexual abuse, I can only wholeheartedly support measures that bring legislation up to date and reflect the increasingly digital world in which we live, so that those individuals who commit the most despicable crimes have nowhere to hide from the law. I rise to support the Government in all the offences included in chapter 1 of part 5.
It is horrifying to read about the increasing proliferation of this most heinous crime. The Internet Watch Foundation, to which the Minister has already paid tribute, conducted a study between March and April last year, which identified nine deepfake videos on just one dark web forum of dedicated child sexual abuse material. None had been found when the analysts investigated the forum in October the year before. IWF analysts say that the deepfakes are especially and increasingly convincing, and that free, open-source AI software appears to be behind many of the deepfake videos.
The methods shared by offenders on the dark web are similar to those used to generate deepfake adult pornography. Even more horrifying is that, as the same analyst said, what they found was the worst quality that fully synthetic video will ever be: advances in AI will soon render videos more life-like, in the same way that still images have become more photorealistic. There is no time to waste.
The new offence in clause 36, which the Committee unanimously agreed should stand part of the Bill, will make it illegal to adapt, possess, supply or offer to supply a CSA image generator. It is clearly necessary. I also welcome clause 39, which applies the law to British nationals who are not in the country, especially given the digital nature of this specific type of crime and the fact that criminals are working internationally.
In February, at least 25 arrests were made during a worldwide operation led by Europol against child abuse images generated by artificial intelligence. The suspects were part of a criminal group whose members engage in distributing fully AI-generated images of minors. The operation was one of the first involving such child sexual abuse material. The lack of national legislation against these crimes made it “exceptionally challenging for investigators”, according to Europol. These measures change that, and I welcome our law enforcement agencies being able to work more closely together on this most despicable crime.
Joe Robertson
I also rise to support the clauses. As we have heard, artificial intelligence poses one of the biggest threats to online child safety in a generation. It is too easy for criminals to use AI to generate and distribute sexually explicit content of children.
As the UK’s frontline against child sexual abuse imagery, the IWF was among the first to sound the alarm about AI being used in this way. In October 2023, the IWF revealed the presence of more than 20,000 AI-generated images, 3,000 of which depicted criminal child sexual abuse activities. The creation and distribution of AI-generated child sexual abuse is already an offence under UK law, but AI’s capabilities have far outpaced our laws. My concern is that they will continue to do so. We must continue to keep the law in this area under review.
Offenders can now legally download the tools that they need to generate these images and produce as many as they want offline, with the high level of anonymity that can be achieved through open-source technology. Herein lies a problem: software created for innocent purposes can be appropriated and used for the most grim and hideous purposes. It is all very well making the activity illegal—I support the Government in tackling it—but the Government must also take steps, as indeed they are, to limit, curtail and disrupt criminals’ access to the tools used to carry out their crimes. The Government would do so with regard to any other crime, and it so happens that this is a particularly evil crime that uses cutting-edge and developing technology.
I am concerned about detection in this area. The Minister has been asked to confirm—I am sure she will—that social media companies carrying out lawful activity will not be captured by this law. I do not think it is controversial to say that, in other areas, social media companies have not lived up to their responsibilities to detect crime, support law enforcement agencies in detecting crime and detect criminals who are using their platforms to enhance and enable their own criminal activities.
I hope and am sure that the Government are bringing pressure to bear on social media companies to help with detection of these crimes. It is all very well for social media companies, which are probably exclusively very large, international or multinational companies, to say that they are not the perpetrators of crime, but they do provide platforms and they have huge capabilities to enable detection. I would expect them to step up and put all the resources that they have into detecting or helping law enforcement to detect these vile and horrible crimes.
Jess Phillips
I completely agree with the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East that there is a real responsibility on our tech giants. The hon. Member for Windsor talked about the Internet Watch Foundation; the basis of its model is a partnership with social media firms whereby they provide it with huge amounts of the data, so they are not without efforts in the space of child abuse detection—they have been partners in it for many years. However, I think that it is uncontroversial to say that more needs to be done. We as policymakers and lawmakers have to keep a constant eye on how things change.
The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Gordon and Buchan, asked a series of questions. She asked, “What if someone uses electronic services without the knowledge of the service provider?” An individual must have the intention of facilitating child sexual exploitation and abuse to be convicted under this offence. Where an internet service is used without the knowledge or intention of a service provider to carry out child sexual exploitation and abuse, the service provider will not be criminally responsible.
The shadow Minister also asked about the interplay with the Online Safety Act. These criminal offences are designed to ensure that we can better counter the threat of AI-generated CSAM offences. Offences that criminalise the individual user are not in scope of the Online Safety Act. However, the interplay would be in relation to the content created where these measures are in scope. Companies and platforms would then fall under the OSA. I hope that that answers the hon. Lady’s questions.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 38 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 6 agreed to.
Clauses 39 and 40 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 41
Notification requirements for offence under section 38
Amendment made: 13, in clause 41, page 46, line 7, at end insert—
“(6) In Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (offences to which defence in section 45 does not apply), in paragraph 36D (inserted by section 17), after the entry for section 17 insert—
“section 38 (online facilitation of child sexual exploitation and abuse)”.”—(Jess Phillips.)
This amendment excepts the offence of online facilitation of child sexual exploitation and abuse from the defence in section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.
Clause 41, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Keir Mather.)
Crime and Policing Bill (Eighth sitting)
Tuesday 8th April 2025
(1 year, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 8 April 2025 - (8 Apr 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)
I beg to move amendment 14, in clause 42, page 46, line 31, at end insert—
“(7) In Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (offences to which defence in section 45 does not apply), in paragraph 33 (offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003), after the entry for section 10 insert—
‘section 11 (engaging in sexual activity in presence of child)’.”
This amendment excepts the offence of engaging in sexual activity in the presence of a child from the defence in section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.
Alex Davies-Jones
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell.
The clause makes a series of important changes to the existing criminal law by amending a number of serious sexual offences in the Sexual Offences Act 2003. Consequently, I am delighted to talk about the clause, to explain what it does and its importance, and to give a little of the interesting history behind the law in the area, which I hope will inform the Committee.
The key legislation, which we will debate throughout the passage of the Bill, is the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which followed a full and extensive consultation entitled, “Setting the Boundaries”, and significantly modernised and strengthened the laws on sexual offences in England and Wales, mainly to provide extra protection for children from sexual abuse and sexual exploitation. The 2003 Act amalgamated and replaced elements of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, the Indecency with Children Act 1960 and the Sex Offenders Act 1997.
The 2003 Act was the first major overhaul of sexual offences legislation for more than a century, and it set out a strong, clear and modern approach to this sensitive area of the law. The Act set clear limits and boundaries about behaviour with children, and reflects what we know today about the patterns and impact of sexual abuse in childhood. It was designed to meet the 21st-century challenges of protecting children, and applies to issues such as internet pornography and grooming children for sexual abuse. The Act also contained measures against abuse by people who work with children, and updated the laws on sexual abuse within families, acknowledging that children can be at risk from within families.
All those measures were designed to provide a clear and effective set of laws to deter and punish abusers, giving the police and the courts the up-to-date offences that they needed to do their job, while ensuring that children have the strongest possible protection under the law. The Act widened the definition of some offences —for example, bringing the non-consensual penile penetration of the mouth within the definition of rape under section 1 of the Act. It created new offences for behaviour that was not previously covered specifically by an offence—for example, the paying for the sexual service of a child and voyeurism. It also extended the age covered by certain offences against children from 16 to 18 and, importantly, gave additional protection to vulnerable adults. The Act provides rightly robust sentences that reflect the seriousness of the offending.
“Setting the Boundaries” was a groundbreaking review, covering some of the most heinous and disturbing areas of offending. The then Home Secretary, Jack Straw, who commissioned the review, stressed that point when he wrote in the review’s foreword:
“Rape and other sexual offences of all kinds are dreadful crimes which deeply affect the lives of victims and their families, and whole communities. Modernising and strengthening the law can make a direct contribution to our aim of creating a safe, just and tolerant society. We give particular priority to the protection of children, and welcome the emphasis the review has given to increasing this protection and also that of vulnerable people.”
He went on to say that he
“set up the review to consider the existing law on sex offences, and to make recommendations for clear and coherent offences that protect individuals, especially children and the more vulnerable, from abuse and exploitation, and enable abusers to be appropriately punished.”
The review’s
“recommendations also had to be fair and non-discriminatory in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act.”
Today, the Government remain of the view that our priority is to ensure that the public, including society’s most vulnerable, are given the full protection that the law is capable of offering. It is vital that society is protected from the scourge of sexual abuse, manipulation and exploitation in all of its forms. Children, of course, require additional protection from that awful offending. It is vital that we ensure that the criminal law is kept fully up to date in this area to ensure the safety of vulnerable young people.
With regards to children, the review itself acknowledged:
“The criminal law performs a vital role in society by setting standards of acceptable and unacceptable conduct. In making certain types of sexual behaviour criminal, the law provides protection, and supports and maintains the boundaries of acceptable behaviour in the family and community. Children need particular protection in the field of sexual relations because they are physically and emotionally dependent and not yet fully physically or psychologically mature. The law has long held that children are not, and should not, be able to consent to any form of sexual activity in the same way as adults.”
Indeed, the response to the review’s initial invitation to contribute ideas as of January 1999 overwhelmingly supported increasing the level of protection from sexual abuse available to children.
In addition, the review found that:
“The victims of sexual violence and coercion are mainly women. They must be offered protection and redress, and the law must ensure that male victims/survivors are protected too…The law must make special provision for those who are too young or otherwise not able to look after themselves and offer greater protection to children and vulnerable people within the looser structures of modern families.”
That still remains the case. We must continue to ensure that the criminal law keeps up to date with developments, and ensure that police, prosecutors and the courts are fully equipped to deal with this grave offending. We need to offer full protection to victims of such appalling abuse and exploitation.
The review recommended that as a matter of public policy the age of legal consent should remain at 16. However, to provide further protection for younger children, the review recommended that the law:
“setting out specific offences against children should state that below the age of 13 a child cannot effectively consent to sexual activity”.
As a result, the 2003 Act contains a range of offences that target specifically those who sexually abuse children under the age of 13 years. For example, sections 5 to 8 of the 2003 Act provide a range of offences capturing sexual activity with a child under 13, and it is very clear that consent in these offences is irrelevant. A child under 13 does not, under any circumstances, have the legal capacity to consent to any form of sexual activity.
Those under-13 offences overlap to a very significant extent with the child sex offences at sections 9 to 15 of the 2003 Act, which are designed to protect children under 16. This is to ensure that the criminal law provides the youngest and most vulnerable in society with protection from sexual abuse, and in doing so provides higher maximum sentences for these very serious offences. Under-13 offences are offences of strict liability as to age. The prosecution must prove only two facts: first, that there was intentional sexual activity, and secondly, the age of the complainant at the date of the sexual activity—for example, by a certified copy of a birth certificate, together with evidence of identity.
The principle of strict liability as to age for victims under 13 years old is reflected in the terms of other sexual offences in the 2003 Act. That includes section 11 of the Act, the offence of engaging in sexual activity with a child. That particular offence is one that will be directly amended and affected by provisions proposed in clause 42. While the 2003 Act—and the many amendments and additions to that legislation over the years, rightly championed by Members across this House—provided robust offences to deal with sexual abuse, we are introducing provisions to tighten up the law further to ensure additional protection for those who need it.
Broadly, we are amending and thereby strengthening the current suite of offences that apply where a person engages in sexual activity in the presence of a specified individual, for example child or, in certain circumstances, a person with a mental disorder. Our provisions will amend and toughen up the following offences in the Sexual Offences Act 2003: section 11, “Engaging in sexual activity in presence of child”; section 18, “Abuse of position of trust: sexual activity in presence of child”; section 32, “Engaging in sexual activity in presence of person with mental disorder impeding choice”; section 36, “Engaging in sexual activity in presence, procured by inducement, threat or deception, of person with mental disorder”; and section 40, “Care workers: sexual activity in presence of person with mental disorder”.
For example, it is currently a criminal offence under section 11 of the 2003 Act for a person, “A”, to intentionally engage in sexual activity to gain sexual gratification when a child under the age of 16, “B”, is present or is in a place from which A can be observed, but currently only when A knows or believes that B is aware—or intends that they be aware—that A is engaging in the sexual activity. This offence carries a maximum 10 years’ imprisonment and sexual offender management requirements. Significantly, this offence does not allow a defence of reasonable belief in age if the child is under 13.
The issue of concern here, and with the range of similar offences that I have listed, is the requirement that the defendant should know or believe that the victim is aware of his behaviour, or intend that the victim should be aware of the relevant activity. These requirements may initially appear reasonable. However, they mean this offence would not, for example, capture those who commit sexual activity in the presence of a child for sexual gratification, and who obtain such gratification from the presence of the child—even if the child is apparently unaware of the activity happening in their presence. If the defendant is performing a sexual act in the presence of a child who is asleep and gains sexual gratification from that mere presence, he cannot be charged under the existing section 11 offence; nor, for example, could he be charged for his behaviour if the child was pretending to be asleep—even pretending out of sheer terror—while aware of the appalling behaviour being carried out, if the defendant believed the child to be asleep and therefore unaware of what was going on.
I am sure hon. Members will agree that the criminal law being unable to prosecute such behaviour in this example scenario is unacceptable. The Government strongly believe this flaw must be rectified as a matter of urgency, to ensure that children and other specific groups of the most vulnerable in our society are protected by the criminal law and not denied justice should they become victims of such behaviour.
These amendments are not mere technicalities, nor are they addressing pseudo-philosophical “What if?” scenarios. They are a direct and swift response to concerns expressed by those on the frontline: the police, who have to come face-to-face with the consequences of this disturbing and damaging offending.
We have listened carefully to those on the frontline who are dealing with this awful behaviour. They have provided us with evidence of the difficulties in prosecuting a small number of nevertheless worrying cases, in which it was clear that the perpetrator engaged in the sexual activity because they obtained sexual gratification from a child’s mere presence, but where there was insufficient evidence that the perpetrator knew, believed, or intended that the child was aware of the sexual activity.
These things are happening now. Such offenders are slipping through the net. It may only be in small numbers, but that is irrelevant when dealing with this level of offending and exploitation. This disturbing, unpleasant and damaging behaviour must not go unchecked by the justice system or by the law. It must not go unpunished. Our provisions will ensure that the law is able to make sure that it does not.
We believe it is entirely wrong that, for example, a defendant masturbating while standing next to a child’s bed—to obtain sexual gratification from the child’s presence—cannot be convicted if they successfully argue they did not believe the child was aware of the sexual activity. In such a case we think it is entirely right that the person should be guilty of a criminal offence. We also want to ensure that these behaviours are capable of being prosecuted in future. This is not just to bring offenders to justice but, importantly, to be able to manage these sexual offenders when they are eventually released into the community, and to prevent further offending, where there is specifically potential for further sexual offences against children or vulnerable adults.
It is clear that some people may legitimately engage in sexual activity in the presence of a child—say a couple who live in a one-bedroom flat and by necessity have to sleep with a baby or very young child in the room. Others may have to have a young child in the room for the monitoring of health problems and so forth. We can all think of legitimate examples. I must make it clear that we do not want to criminalise those people who engage in sexual activity in the presence of a child but not for the purposes of obtaining sexual gratification from the child’s presence. In those circumstances, the presence of the child is purely incidental. We have deliberately drafted our provisions to ensure that those people will not be criminalised.
To exclude such behaviour from being captured within the relevant range of offences, we have retained the requirement for a direct link between the purpose of obtaining sexual gratification and the activity occurring in the child’s presence. I hope that that assures hon. Members that our provisions have been carefully crafted to rightly exclude those who may legitimately engage in sexual activity when a child is merely present. The Government’s intention with this clause is to capture the criminally culpable, not the innocent.
Government amendment 12 seems a relatively modest amendment but, again, it is an important one. It adds the offence of sexual activity in the presence of a child at section 11 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to schedule 4 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. The effect of this amendment is to thereby remove the section 11 offence from the ambit of the statutory criminal defence available at section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. I hope that I have convinced hon. Members of the importance of these provisions and of the necessity for swift action on our part.
Sexual offending, particularly against children and the most vulnerable, is a deeply distressing area of the law, and one that I know affects even legislators when considering reform, as we are today in this Committee. Over the years, the nature of sexual abuse, offending, manipulation and exploitation has changed, and it continues to change. Alongside the changing nature of offending, with which the law must keep up, gaps in the existing law are coming to light, highlighting those cases where serious offenders may be able to slip through the net of even the most well-intentioned and crafted drafting.
Harriet Cross (Gordon and Buchan) (Con)
As we have heard, clause 42 effectively incorporates provisions that had been included in the Criminal Justice Bill and is a key provision concerning sexual offences, specifically focusing on the offence of engaging in sexual activity in the presence of a child.
The clause makes an important amendment to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which forms a core legislative framework addressing sexual offences in the UK. In particular, clause 42 expands on the existing provisions to enhance the protection of children from sexual exploitation and harm.
Under the Sexual Offences Act, certain sexual offences are committed when a child is involved, such as sexual activity involving children, or causing or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity. However, one area that has been highlighted for reform involves situations where a child might be exposed to sexual activity in a way that, while not directly involving them in the act, still results in harm.
Prior to the introduction of clause 42, the law did not adequately address situations where a child was the passive observer of a sexual activity. For instance, in scenarios where an adult or adults engage in sexual activity with each other in the presence of a child, the law might not have captured this activity as an offence, despite the potential psychological harm to the child. Clause 42 seeks to close this gap by making it an offence for an adult to engage in sexual activity in the presence of a child. This means that any sexual activity taking place in the physical presence of a child, even if the child is not directly involved in the sexual conduct, could now result in criminal liability.
The clause expands the scope of existing sexual offence laws to include situations that may not necessarily involve the direct participation of the child, but still expose the child to inappropriate activity or material that could be damaging to their wellbeing.
Clause 42 also sees parallel offences involving sexual activity in the presence of a person with a mental disorder, impeding their choice, and similar provisions in the Sexual Offences Act. Those individuals, too, might not fully understand the sexual nature of what the offender is doing. Previously, there might have been the same issue with the law of requiring awareness. Clause 42 offers a broad safeguard for those who cannot consent or comprehend.
The clause seeks to offer further protection for children by recognising the potential harm caused by exposure to sexual activity, even if it is not directed at them. The law would now acknowledge that witnessing such an act could have a detrimental impact on the child’s emotional, physiological, psychological or developmental health.
Although we support the clause, I seek clarity from the Minister on a couple of points. In situations where sexual activity takes place in private or behind closed doors, it might be difficult to establish whether a child was present or the extent of their exposure to the activity. Proving the impact on the child could also be challenging, particularly where psychological harm or emotional distress is not immediately apparent. What discussions has the Minister had on that matter? I note that, as we have discussed a number of times today, Government amendment 14 carves out an important exception of the offence from the defence in section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.
Clause 42 represents an important development in child protection law. At present, as the Minister has said, an offence is committed only where a person knows or believes that the child or person with a mental disorder is aware of the activity, or where a person intends that the child or person with a mental disorder be aware of the activity.
The provisions will amend these offences to capture situations where, for the purpose of sexual gratification, a person intentionally engages in sexual activity in the presence of a child, even if they do not intend for the child to be aware of the activity. The examples covered by this amendment are clearly heinous, and we welcome the clause.
Alex Davies-Jones
I welcome the hon. Lady’s comments and the fact that the Opposition welcome the clause to close this loophole to protect children and the most vulnerable.
Hopefully I have outlined how we carefully crafted the clause to ensure that we do not capture those who innocently engage in sexual activity in the presence of a child, and not for the purposes of sexual gratification. We do not want to criminalise those who have to share a bedroom with a baby, a young child or somebody with a health condition, and are not seeking sexual gratification from engaging in sexual activity in the presence of a child. We have worked very closely with partners and stakeholders to ensure the law is crafted carefully so that we do not criminalise those people. The clause seeks to criminalise only those perpetrators who seek to gain sexual gratification from the presence of a child, whether the child knows or not.
I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.
Amendment 14 agreed to.
Clause 42, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 43
Child sex offences: grooming aggravating factor
Harriet Cross
I beg to move amendment 42, in clause 43, page 48, line 23, at end insert—
“70B Group-based sexual grooming of a child
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a court is considering the seriousness of a specified child sex offences,
(b) the offence is aggravated by group-based grooming, and
(c) the offender was aged 18 or over when the offence was committed.
(2) The court—
(a) must treat the fact that the offence is aggravated by group-based grooming as an aggravated factor, and
(b) must state in court that the offence is so aggravated.
(3) An offence is ‘aggravated by group-based grooming’ if—
(a) the offence was facilitated by, or involved, the offender, who was involved in group-based grooming, or
(b) the offence was facilitated by, or involved, a person other than the offender grooming a person under the age of 18 and the offender knew, or could have reasonably been expected to know that said person was participating, or facilitating group-based grooming, or
(c) the offender intentionally arranges or facilitates something that the offender intends to do, intends another person to do, or believes that another person will do, in order to participate in group-based grooming.
(4) In this section ‘specified child sex offence’ means—
(a) an offence within any of subsections (5) to (7), or
(b) an inchoate offence in relation to any such offence.
(5) An offence is within this subsection if it is—
(a) an offence under section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978 (taking etc indecent photograph of child),
(b) an offence under section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (possession of indecent photograph of child),
(c) an offence under any of sections 5 to 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape and other offences against children under 13),
(d) an offence under any sections 9 to 12 of that Act (other child sex offences),
(e) an offence under section 14 of that Act (arranging or facilitating commission of child sex offence),
(f) an offence under any of sections 16 to 19 of that Act (abuse of position of trust),
(g) an offence under section 25 or 26 of that Act (familial child sex offences), or
(h) an offence under any of sections 47 to 50 of that Act (sexual exploitation of children).
(6) An offence is within this subsection if it is—
(a) an offence under any of sections 1 to 4 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape, assault and causing sexual activity without consent),
(b) an offence under any of sections 30 to 41 of that Act (sexual offences relating to persons with mental disorder),
(c) an offence under any of sections 61 to 63 of that Act (preparatory offences), or
(d) an offence under any of sections 66 to 67A of that Act (exposure and voyeurism),
and the victim or intended victim was under the age of 18.
(7) An offence is within this subsection if it is an offence under section 71 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sexual activity in a public lavatory) and a person involved in the activity in question was under the age of 18.
(8) For the purposes of this section—
(a) ‘group-based grooming’ is defined as a group of at least three adults whose purpose or intention is to commit a sexual offence against the same victim or group of victims who are under 18, or could reasonably be expected to be under 18.”.
This amendment would introduce a specific aggravating factor in sentencing for those who participate in, or facilitate, group-based sexual offending.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
New clause 47—National statutory inquiry into grooming gangs—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 3 months of the passing of this Act, set up a statutory inquiry into grooming gangs.
(2) An inquiry established under subsection (1) must seek to—
(a) identify common patterns of behaviour and offending between grooming gangs;
(b) identify the type, extent and volume of crimes committed by grooming gangs;
(c) identify the number of victims of crimes committed by grooming gangs;
(d) identify the ethnicity of members of grooming gangs;
(e) identify any failings, by action, omission or deliberate suppression, by—
(i) police,
(ii) local authorities,
(iii) prosecutors,
(iv) charities,
(v) political parties,
(vi) local and national government,
(vii) healthcare providers and health services, or
(viii) other agencies or bodies, in the committal of crimes by grooming
(f) identify such national safeguarding actions as may be required to minimise the risk of further such offending occurring in future;
(g) identify good practice in protecting children.
(3) The inquiry may do anything it considers is calculated to facilitate, or is incidental or conducive to, the carrying out of its functions and the achievement of the requirements of subsection (2).
(4) An inquiry established under this section must publish a report within two years of the launch of the inquiry.
(5) For the purposes of this section—
‘gang’ means a group of at least three adults whose purpose or intention is to commit a sexual offence against the same victim or group of victims;
‘grooming’ means—
(a) activity carried out with the primary intention of committing sexual offences against the victim;
(b) activity that is carried out, or predominantly carried out, in person;
(c) activity that includes the provision of illicit substances and/or alcohol either as part of the grooming or concurrent with the commission of the sexual offence.”
This new clause would set up a national statutory inquiry into grooming gangs.
New clause 48—Annual statement on ethnicity of members of grooming gangs—
“The Secretary of State must make an annual statement to the House of Commons on the ethnicity of convicted members of grooming gangs.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to make an annual statement to the House on ethnicity data of convicted members of grooming gangs.
New clause 49—Publication of sex offender’s ethnicity data—
(1) The Secretary of State for the Home Office must publish—
(a) quarterly; and
(b) yearly;
datasets containing all national data pertaining to the ethnicity of sex offenders.
(2) For the purposes of this section, a ‘sex offender’ is anyone convicted of—
(a) an offence under section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978 (taking etc indecent photograph of child),
(b) an offence under section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (possession of indecent photograph of child),
(c) an offence under any of sections 5 to 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape and other offences against children under 13),
(d) an offence under any sections 9 to 12 of that Act (other child sex offences),
(e) an offence under section 14 of that Act (arranging or facilitating commission of child sex offence),
(f) an offence under any of sections 16 to 19 of that Act (abuse of position of trust),
(g) an offence under section 25 or 26 of that Act (familial child sex offences), or
(h) an offence under any of sections 47 to 50 of that Act (sexual exploitation of children),
(i) an offence under any of sections 1 to 4 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape, assault and causing sexual activity without consent),
(j) an offence under any of sections 30 to 41 of that Act (sexual offences relating to persons with mental disorder),
(k) an offence under any of sections 61 to 63 of that Act (preparatory offences), or
(l) an offence under any of sections 66 to 67A of that Act (exposure and voyeurism),
(m) an offence under section 71 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sexual activity in a public lavatory) and a person involved in the activity in question was under the age of 18.”
This new clause would introduce a requirement that ethnicity data of sex offenders be published on a quarterly and a yearly basis.
Harriet Cross
Clause 43 establishes a new statutory aggravating factor in sentencing. Where an adult offender commits a specified child sexual offence and that offence involves or was facilitated by the grooming of a child, courts will be required to treat that as an aggravating factor. This provision is a powerful statement that grooming, the insidious process in which predators prepare and manipulate children for abuse, makes a crime even more heinous, and the Opposition support it. In fact, the clause is substantially the same as a provision in the Criminal Justice Bill and aligns with key recommendations of the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse. Courts already often consider grooming as an aggravating factor, but putting it on a statutory footing ensures consistency and emphasis.
The clause sets out a list of specified child sexual offences, including the crimes of sexual assault of a child, rape and causing a child to engage in sexual activity, among others. If an offender being sentenced for one of these offences is 18 or over and the evidence shows that they groomed the child—for example, by establishing an emotional connection, buying gifts, building dependencies or systematically desensitising the child—the judge must regard that as making the crime more serious. It does not dictate the extent of the sentence, but it mandates that sentencing guidelines account for the aggravating factor.
Child grooming offenders may pose as friends, mentors or even pseudo-parental figures to their victims. By the time they commit the sexual abuse, they have already isolated the child from help and normalised horrendous behaviour. It is calculated evil on every level and deserves a heavy hammer of justice, so clause 43 ensures that judges explicitly account for that aspect when allowing justice to be served.
Clause 43 is one of several measures implementing the IICSA recommendations. Mandatory reporting, which we will come to when we debate clause 45 onwards, is another. It is heartening to see progress on these fronts. The Conservative party has remained committed to enacting all reasonable recommendations from the child abuse inquiry. We want to live up to the promise to survivors that their testimonies will spur real change. This aggravating factor is one such change, so I commend the Government for including it. We will do everything we can to support its swift passage.
Amendment 42 would create a specific aggravating factor for group-based sexual grooming. It addresses a particularly abhorrent phenomenon, which we have seen in places such as Rotherham, Rochdale and Telford, where groups of at least three adults work together to systematically groom and abuse children. Such group-based offences show a truly chilling level of organisation and premeditation.
The amendment would ensure that courts treat group-based grooming as an aggravating factor when sentencing offenders who have participated in or facilitated that type of group-based sexual offending. This would send a clear message that gangs who collaborate to abuse children will face enhanced punishments, reflecting the organised nature of their crimes.
Amendment 42 defines group-based grooming as involving at least three adults whose purpose is to commit sexual offences against the same victim or group of victims under the age of 18. It would apply in three scenarios: where the offender participated in group-based grooming; where an offence was facilitated by another person’s grooming that the offender knew about; or where the offender arranged or facilitated another person’s participation in group-based grooming.
The Opposition support clause 43, as I said. We will watch to ensure that it is implemented efficiently—for instance, we will check whether sentences for grooming-related offences increase as expected. The feedback loop is crucial, because it should not be just words on paper; it must translate to tangible justice.
New clause 47 states that, within three months of the Bill’s passage, the Secretary of State must set up a statutory inquiry into grooming gangs to seek to identify: common patterns of behaviour between grooming gangs; the type, extent and volume of crimes committed by grooming gangs; the number of victims of crimes committed by grooming gangs; the ethnicity of members of grooming gangs; and any failings, by action, omission or deliberate suppression, by a range of bodies or organisations.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Jess Phillips)
I just wonder what exactly the hon. Lady is outlining. I forgot to bring the report with me—I left it on my desk downstairs. What is she seeking to add with new clause 47 that was not in Alexis Jay’s two-year report into grooming gangs? It sounds exactly the same to me, so I wonder what was missing from the report that she thinks the new clause would achieve.
Harriet Cross
As the Minister will realise, there is a lot in that report. The reason for putting something in a Bill is to enshrine it in law. It makes it an absolute duty on us, as elected representatives, and the Government to ensure that these things happen. It is an important provision, and I fully support the idea of making sure it is in the Bill.
New clauses 48 and 49 look at the ethnicity of grooming gang members. We cannot be squeamish or sensitive when it comes to protecting our children. Without adequate data, we cannot act with full understanding of what is happening across the country and where resources would be most effectively targeted.
Jess Phillips
I just want the hon. Lady to know that she is stepping on the toes of the statutory inquiry, which has already asked for better data collection on exactly these things. I am not sure why she seeks a provision that will say the same thing as the report in February 2022. Nothing was done about it then, so why does she want something else to say it again?
Harriet Cross
The Minister seems to be on the same ground as us. She has said many times that she agrees with the implementation of what Alexis Jay suggested, and there should therefore be no issue with it being included in the Bill—she should be welcoming this at every step. As I said, grooming is one of the most insidious and harmful forms of child exploitation. We welcome clause 43, and we hope that our amendments will be supported to ensure that this type of crime is tackled as strictly as possible.
Jack Rankin (Windsor) (Con)
I rise to express my strong support for clause 43, which is an essential provision that strengthens our ability to combat the abhorrent crimes of child sexual exploitation, particularly by making grooming an aggravating factor. For too long, this country has witnessed devastating failures in the protection of our most vulnerable. Clause 43 represents not just a legal tool but a moral commitment to never again allow these failures to go unanswered.
Let us remember the victims in Rotherham, where at least 1,400 children were sexually exploited over a 16-year period. Vulnerable girls were raped, trafficked, threatened and dismissed, and perhaps most disturbing was the silence of those in authority who feared speaking out. Clause 43 confronts that silence.
Jess Phillips
I do not ask this to catch out the hon. Gentleman, but has he read either of the two independent inquiries specifically into Rotherham? One was written by Alexis Jay and the other by Dame Louise Casey for the previous Government. What does the hon. Gentleman think will be found for the Rotherham victims that was not found in either of the two independent inquiries or in the statutory grooming gang inquiry undertaken by Alexis Jay? We say, “Never again,” but we still have not implemented the recommendations of those inquiries.
Jack Rankin
I have read the Jay report but not the other report. I am speaking to clause 43, not the amendments, so I am supporting the Government in my remarks—the Minister can get me later.
Clause 43 is intended to compel transparency. It holds those in positions of power accountable when they turn away, and it provides law enforcement with the tools it needs to intervene earlier, investigate more thoroughly and prosecute more decisively.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
My hon. Friend has articulated this well. Is it not the point that people in positions of power and authority are doing nothing? That is one of the huge controversies around this that needs to be tackled, and I welcome the Bill’s attempt to do so.
Jack Rankin
I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend. In Rochdale, we saw young girls dismissed as making “lifestyle choices”. These were children, some as young as 12, and they were failed not just by their abusers but by institutions that were supposed to protect them.
The grooming gangs in Telford, Oxford and Huddersfield were not isolated incidents. They were systematic failures enabled by cultural sensitivities being prioritised over child safety. They were worsened by fragmented communication between agencies, and clause 43 addresses those issues head on. We owe it to the survivors—those who were silenced, ignored and blamed—to send a message: you were failed, but future children will not be. We will stand up, we will speak out and we will legislate.
That is also the intent of Opposition amendment 42, which aims to help this legislation to have the most meaning. Each of the cases I have described involved group-based grooming. This is not about politicising tragedy; it is about preventing future tragedy with legislation that matches the problems we know exist. It is a constructive amendment that helps to avoid our repeating the mistakes of the past. I urge my colleagues on the Committee to support that amendment and help deliver the justice that these victims have waited too long to see.
Mr Alex Barros-Curtis (Cardiff West) (Lab)
As has been said by Members on both sides of the Committee, and as was mentioned in the IICSA statement that my hon. Friend the Safeguarding Minister made on the Floor of the House an hour or so ago, clause 43 will introduce a new aggravating factor to be applied when the courts consider the seriousness of a specified child sexual offence and where the offence being considered was facilitated by, or involved the grooming of, a person under 18. The clause is to be welcomed, and I note what the Opposition have said about it. However, new clauses 47 and 48 are not to be welcomed, and I will go into my reasons for that.
First, though, I want to put it on the record that, prior to my election, I worked with core participants in the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse, in the first module, which involved the heinous part of child migration in the whole sorry saga of this scandal. The Child Migrants Trust did fantastic work to expose that scandal. I just wanted to put on the record my involvement in helping the trust with some of its work at that time, and to commend it—particularly Margaret Humphreys, its founder—for the fantastic work it does; and to commend every former child migrant, and the families of former child migrants, for their bravery in speaking out about the experience they went through.
I admit that I thought new clauses 47 and 48 were missing a name—that of the acting lead of the Conservative party, the right hon. Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick), because we know that they reflect his driving ambition. I feel a sense of déjà vu because I am almost certain that the Opposition tabled identical new clauses in Committee on the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill. I am therefore somewhat surprised that they failed to copy and paste the amendments to table them on time last week. Fortunately, we are able to talk about them today.
I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Derby North (Catherine Atkinson) for the forensic way she went through, line by line, the equivalents to new clauses 47 and 48 in that Bill Committee, and for exposing the politics behind them—how this was not about getting a new national statutory inquiry, as was claimed. She exposed how, line by line, the Opposition are repeating and duplicating the work already done by IICSA and previous inquiries, including Rotherham, and the newly announced local-led investigations, on which my hon. Friend the Safeguarding Minister gave an update just an hour ago on the Floor of the House. She outlined how the Opposition are undermining the work that the Conservative party sat on for 20 months. When the Conservative Government got the IICSA final report in October 2022, with 20 concluding recommendations—107 in total—they did nothing with them.
The faux outrage, the politicking and the weaponisation of the new clauses is infuriating. I should not be infuriated, because it is for the victims to be infuriated; they are being used for politics so that the populist Opposition can squeeze out votes. The Opposition are haemorrhaging votes, and they are trying to court and carry votes.
We had the sorry sight of the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill. In the eight or nine short months that I have had in this place, I have never been as angry as I was on Second Reading when, through a wrecking amendment—which is now being replicated with new clauses 47 and 48—the Conservatives had the audacity to claim that we, the Labour party, which had been in power for just a couple of months, were doing nothing to protect our children, when for 20 months they had sat on their hands with the 20 concluding recommendations from IICSA and did nothing. Not only that, they go out and curry favour with the populist right. They go out placing Facebook ads and Twitter posts calling us defenders of paedophiles, and we are meant to believe that they genuinely believe this—new clauses 47 and 48 are about politics.
I give credit to the hon. Member for Gordon and Buchan, who has received this hospital pass, for saying that it is heartening to see progress being made on this issue. I only wish that she had been in the Chamber an hour ago, when she could have heard the sorry contributions from nearly all Opposition Members in response to the Safeguarding Minister’s update on the action plan. They focused on one specific element, no doubt for their clickbait Facebook and Twitter posts, and everything else that the right hon. Member for Newark will end up doing later. I look forward to being ridiculed and criticised for defending paedophiles because I am standing here criticising the Opposition’s politicisation of new clauses 47 and 48, but we do what is right for the victims, not what is right for the Tories.
Joe Robertson
Does the hon. Gentleman really believe that the inquiries and reports on this issue to date have gone far enough into looking at the allegations of walls of silence within the authorities—councils, the police and so on? Is there not a role for a further inquiry that deals particularly, but not only, with that issue?
Mr Barros-Curtis
When work has not been done to implement any of the recommendations of all the preceding investigations, and when the Government have announced locally led work on grooming gangs, on which the Safeguarding Minister gave an update in the House but an hour ago, it is imperative that we get on with implementing the Bill, as well as the other legislation and work to which the Government have committed. We must get laws on the statute book and get policies, training and funding in place. We must do the things that we have committed to, which the Tories should have done when in government.
As I said, my hon. Friend the Safeguarding Minister, in her update just a moment ago, announced £5 million of national funding to support locally led work on grooming gangs. We should not duplicate work that is already done; we should get on with the recommendations that we have before us already. I am grateful for what the hon. Member for Gordon and Buchan said, but I just wish that had been reflected in the House but an hour ago.
Matt Bishop (Forest of Dean) (Lab)
I have dealt with many victims in these cases and heard what they want. Does my hon. Friend agree that what they really want is action, rather than just more inquiries with no action taken on their recommendations?
Mr Barros-Curtis
I completely agree, and I will take that as my cue to stop talking. My hon. Friend is right that we need action, so I will step down from my soapbox and move to conclude my remarks.
I do not doubt that Opposition Members are committed to doing what is right by victims. However, what is not right by victims is the politicisation and weaponisation of such a heinous issue, as has been done by some Opposition Front Benchers—not those here in the Committee, but some in the shadow Cabinet.
As the Ministers have said today, we should be working together, listening to victims, learning from their experiences, bringing about a culture change so that this can never happen again, and putting in place frameworks, rules, laws and policies to ensure that, if it does, the perpetrators are prosecuted to the fullest extent. I submit that new clauses 47 and 48 should not be moved, so that we can move forward with practical measures that do not duplicate work and get on with the important work of safeguarding and protecting our children.
Luke Taylor (Sutton and Cheam) (LD)
I will be brief. I very much welcome clause 43.
On new clause 47, the Liberal Democrats welcome anything that will deliver justice to the victims of these horrific crimes and help take meaningful action to stop the crimes from occurring again. The Government should waste no time in launching inquires, where required, and clearly set out when areas beyond those included in the pilots that ask for a local inquiry can get one. However, we must focus on implementing the conclusions of the Jay report. That has to be our priority. The conclusions and recommendations are there, but they were not taken forward under the previous Government. We just need to get those in place. We also need a timetable for when they will be taken forward, so that there is no delay to justice for victims.
I join the hon. Member for Cardiff West in his dismissive and quite angry analysis of new clauses 48 and 49, which are clearly merely race-baiting measures to chase headlines, and encourage Conservative Members not to move them.
Alex Davies-Jones
I thank the Opposition Front Benchers for tabling amendment 42 and new clauses 47 to 49. I also thank hon. Members for their contributions to the debate—in particular, the hon. Member for Windsor, who gave a thoughtful contribution, and my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff West, a good friend who has worked his entire career to ensure that victims get the justice they deserve. His passionate contribution to the debate reminds us all exactly why we are here in this place: to deliver for victims of these heinous crimes, to make sure that the perpetrators receive the full force of the law, and to ensure that any gaps in legislation and recommendations of inquiries are followed through with. That is exactly what we are doing today.
Before I respond to the amendments, I will explain the rationale for clause 43. I am pleased to speak to it, and I know that its provisions have been welcomed by hon. Members across the House. In recent years, there have been a number of high-profile cases involving so-called grooming gangs—groups of offenders involved in heinous child sexual exploitation—including those in Rotherham, Telford, Newcastle, Rochdale and Oxford. In February 2022, the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse recommended
“the strengthening of the response of the criminal justice system by…amending the Sentencing Act 2020 to provide a mandatory aggravating factor in sentencing those convicted of offences relating to the sexual exploitation of children.”
The Government want to ensure that the sentencing framework reflects the seriousness of child sexual abuse and exploitation. In January, the Home Secretary committed to
“legislate to make grooming an aggravating factor in the sentencing of child sexual offences, because the punishment must fit the terrible crime”.—[Official Report, 6 January 2025; Vol. 759, c. 632.]
Clause 43 will require courts to consider grooming an aggravating factor when sentencing for specified child sex offences, including rape and sexual assault. It will capture offenders whose offending is facilitated by, or involves, the grooming of a person under 18. The grooming itself need not be sexual.
The measure will capture models of exploitation not currently directly addressed by existing culpability factors. It will create an obligation on courts to aggravate sentences where the offence has been facilitated by grooming undertaken by either the offender or a third party, for example where an offender assaults a victim who has been groomed by another member of a grooming gang. It will also capture instances where grooming is undertaken against a third party, for example where a victim has been groomed to recruit others.
The measure requires the courts to consider grooming an aggravating factor when sentencing in relation to any of the listed child sex offences. However, I must be clear that it will be in the court’s discretion to consider grooming an aggravating factor when sentencing for any offence, where it is relevant to the offending, regardless of the age of the victim.
I understand that the Opposition’s intention with their amendment 42 is to require courts to consider group-based grooming as a specific aggravating factor when sentencing sexual offences committed against children. Clause 43 already requires courts to consider grooming an aggravating factor when sentencing for specified child sex offences. This includes, but is not limited to, offences facilitated by or involving the group-based grooming of a child. An aggravating factor makes an offence more serious and must be considered by the court when deciding the length of the sentence.
The Sentencing Council’s overarching guidelines make
“offence committed as part of a group”
an aggravating factor. That means that, when sentencing for grooming gang offences, a court will be able to aggravate the offence to take into account the grooming behaviour, and then additionally aggravate the offence to take into account the fact that the offending was committed as part of a group. An aggravating factor for group-based grooming, as proposed in amendment 42, would be likely to have a more limited application, as the court could not apply the factor unless it was satisfied that the offender was a member of a group, which may be difficult to prove.
Clause 43 will go further than existing sentencing guidelines, by capturing models of group-based exploitation that are not currently directly addressed by grooming high-culpability factors. It will create an obligation on courts to aggravate sentences in instances where the offence has been facilitated by grooming undertaken by either the offender or a third party, for example where an offender assaults a victim who has been groomed by another member of a grooming gang or group. It will also capture instances where grooming is undertaken against a third party, for example where a victim has been groomed to recruit others. For that reason, I urge Opposition Members not to press amendment 42.
New clause 47 seeks to establish a statutory national inquiry into grooming gangs. It therefore seeks to revisit the questions considered by the seven-year-long independent inquiry into child sexual abuse. During the passage of the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill, the Opposition tabled similar amendments—maybe even identical ones—on the basis that the independent inquiry “barely touches on” grooming gangs.
IICSA, as is common practice for a public inquiry, involved a series of smaller inquiries and investigations of different strands. One of those inquiries was on child sexual exploitation by organised networks—the entire focus of that inquiry was grooming gangs. It took two years and reported three years ago, in February 2022. It is clear from cross-refencing new clause 47 with the scope of the previous investigations into grooming gangs that it seeks to revisit questions already examined by the inquiry. For example, subsection (2)(a) of the new clause seeks an inquiry into grooming gangs to
“identify common patterns of behaviour and offending”.
However, the scope of the previous grooming gangs inquiry states that it will investigate “the nature” of sexual exploitation by grooming gangs. I could go on and on.
If we continue to call for inquiry after inquiry along the same lines, we will undermine the whole system of public inquiries, including public trust in them and public tolerance for the resources of the state that they demand. Therefore, rather than engage in gesture politics by re-running inquiries without the evidence and data that we need, it makes sense to take the Government’s approach, with Baroness Louise Casey’s audit there to fill in the gaps that have already been identified by the previous inquiry. That audit is well under way, as we heard today in the Chamber from my hon. Friend the Safeguarding Minister, and it will report in due course.
The Government are also setting up a new victims and survivors panel, not just to guide Ministers on the design, delivery and implementation of the plans of IICSA, but to produce wider work on child sexual exploitation and abuse. Elsewhere in the Bill, we are making it mandatory to report child sexual abuse, and we will be making it an offence to prevent such reports from being made, as well as introducing further measures to tackle those organising online child sex abuse. As I have set out, we are legislating to make grooming an aggravating factor in sentencing for child sexual offences.
New clause 48 seeks to identify the ethnicity of members of grooming gangs and require regular reporting on the same. The 2022 inquiry into grooming gangs identified widespread failure to record the ethnicity of perpetrators and victims, and inconsistency of definitions in the data, which has meant that the limited research available relies on poor-quality data. The child sexual exploitation police taskforce already collects and publishes ethnicity data on group-based child sexual exploitation. However, we are committed to improving that data, and we have asked the taskforce to expand the ethnicity data that it collects and publishes. Baroness Casey’s audit will also look to uncover the gaps in current knowledge and understanding of grooming gang crimes, including ethnicity, which will inform our future work.
Finally, new clause 49 would require ethnicity data on sex offenders to be published on a quarterly and yearly basis. The ethnicity of those convicted of sex offences is already available in the “outcomes by offence” data tool. The data is published by the Ministry of Justice quarterly, and it is available in the public domain. The new clause would, in effect, require the duplication of data that is already available pertaining to the ethnicity of convicted sex offenders.
In conclusion, not only are new clauses 47 to 49 unnecessary, but they detract from the Government’s vital work to tackle the crimes of grooming gangs and other sex offenders. On that basis, I respectfully ask the hon. Member for Gordon and Buchan not to move them when they are reached later in our proceedings.
Harriet Cross
I will keep my comments brief. I thank everyone who has contributed; I appreciate that this issue raises tensions. I know that no matter what side of the House we are on and no matter what angle we come at this from, everyone wants what is best for children and to prevent any sort of gang-based grooming or sexual violence against them. Any approach we can take to prevent that is one that we should consider. I listened to every word that the hon. Member for Cardiff West said and I understand it, but anything we are able to do to make a difference, I want done. I do not care which side of the House does it—I really do not.
Mr Barros-Curtis
I reiterate that I am grateful for the tone that the hon. Lady adopted when she congratulated Ministers on the progress that has been made. It is just a shame that other members of her team, so to speak, did not do the same in the Chamber earlier. The Government are committed to this cause, as I would expect every Member of the House to be. Perhaps she will reflect, in discussion with her team, on what my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Justice said about redundancies in the new clauses, and their duplicating work that has already been done or detracting from work that is under way, but I just put it on the record that I think we are all singing from the same hymn sheet on this point.
Harriet Cross
I thank the hon. Member for that.
We will press amendment 42 to a vote. Although I heard what the Minister said on the matter, we feel that the wording of the clause is not conclusive. It refers to “offender” in the singular, not to “offenders” in the plural, and we want to make sure that anything involving a gang or group is reflected in the law.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 28—Power to deport foreign nationals for possession of child sexual abuse images—
“(1) The Protection of Children Act 1978 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 1 (Indecent photographs of children) after subsection (4) insert—
‘(4A) Where a person is a foreign national and is charged with—
(a) an offence under subsection (1), or
(b) is found to be carrying an electronic device storing child sexual abuse images under section 164B of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979,
the Secretary of State must make a deportation order in accordance with section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007.”
This new clause would make foreign nationals found in possession of child sexual abuse images subject to automatic deportation.
Jess Phillips
Many individuals who pose a direct risk to children travel frequently across the UK border to commit child sex abuse offences abroad. Before the development of digital media, child sexual abuse material would typically be present in physical form, such as printed photographs or DVDs. Border Force officers did and do have the power to search for that material under existing legislation, namely the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979. Child sexual abuse material is now usually held digitally on devices such as phones, tablets and laptops, which are almost always password-protected. Currently, Border Force officers can compel individuals to present these devices but cannot compel them to unlock the devices so that the contents can be inspected. As I am sure everybody would agree, that is nonsense. Clause 44 will give Border Force officers the power to require an individual who is reasonably suspected of child abuse offences to unlock their devices in furtherance of a search. If they refuse, they can now be arrested for the existing offence of wilful obstruction.
The Home Office maintains a database of all known CSAM, known as the child abuse image database. Clause 44 allows officers to scan the contents of an unlocked device to detect the presence of the hashes, or digital fingerprints, of these images. The scan will be limited to this. Therefore, there is no risk of collateral intrusion. When they unlock phones, it will be to look for child abuse material; it will not be to look at anything else they might have been buying off Amazon. That is the purpose of the clause. It was very strongly requested by law enforcement and Border Force. Their hands have been tied for a while on this.
Harriet Cross
Clause 44 provides Border Force officers with a new power to scan electronic devices for child sexual abuse images at UK borders under specific conditions. The measure addresses the documented issue of certain offenders transporting indecent images of children on various devices when entering or leaving the country. Currently, detecting the contraband at the border is challenging without seizing devices and performing time-consuming forensic examinations. Clause 44 streamlines the process by allowing officers to act when they have reasonable grounds to suspect someone has child abuse imagery. I note that clause 45(1) references reasonable grounds. Can the Minister expound further on which instances will be classed as reasonable grounds?
I draw attention to new clause 28, which seeks to strengthen the UK’s response to foreign nationals found in possession of child sexual abuse images by mandating their deportation. Any foreign national charged with an offence under section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978, which criminalises the possession, making or distribution of indecent images of children, or found carrying an electronic device containing such images would automatically be subject to deportation.
Possession of child sexual abuse images is a serious, awful and heinous crime.
Joe Robertson
Does my hon. Friend agree that the mandatory requirement to deport foreign nationals would need to be implemented in a proper and sensitive way? Criminals leaving the country should be handed over to law enforcement in the country they go to, if appropriate, rather than just released into the world.
Harriet Cross
Yes, absolutely. I do not think any Member present wants to act unlawfully or be seen to do so in any way. We want to ensure that if someone is deported, it is done properly and efficiently so that the deportation works as planned.
Every image represents a real child who has been subject to abuse, and the act of possessing, viewing or sharing such material fuels a cycle of harm and victimization. This crime is not victimless. Children depicted in these images are subject to unimaginable trauma, and the continued circulation of such material prolongs their suffering and prevents them from fully recovering from their abuse, if that is at all possible.
The psychological and emotional harm caused by these crimes extends far beyond the individual victims. Families and communities are devastated when offenders are discovered, and public trust is severely damaged when such crimes occur. Law enforcement agencies worldwide are engaged in an ongoing battle against child exploitation, investing significant resources into identifying offenders, rescuing victims and preventing further harm.
Given the severity of the crime, strong legal measures are necessary to deter offenders and hold them accountable. Those found in possession of child sexual abuse images must face strict penalties. Given the severity of the crime and its devastating impact on victims, I hope the Government will support new clause 28 and share in our strong belief that foreign nationals convicted of possessing child sexual abuse images should never be allowed to remain in the UK.
Jess Phillips
I will first answer the hon. Lady’s question about how Border Force officers will decide what reasonable grounds of suspicion are. Officers will rely on various indicators of reasonable suspicion. Those could include whether the individual is a registered sex offender—which is quite clear—frequent travel to destinations included on the list of countries under section 172 of the Police, Crime and Sentencing Act 2022, or the presence of child abuse paraphernalia in their luggage. Unfortunately, I have seen some of the seizures in such cases, and some really horrendous stuff gets found in people’s luggage, so if someone had some of those terrible things—child-like dolls, for example—that would be reasonable suspicion.
For the purposes of this clause specifically, I give particular thanks. My right hon. Friend the Minister for Policing, Fire and Crime Prevention thanked Holly Lynch earlier, and I thank a former Conservative Member of Parliament. Pauline Latham was a brilliant campaigner, a brilliant woman, who I worked alongside many times on issues such as this. She tried to get this clause into a number of different private Members’ Bills and so on. She was definitely trying to help, but the previous Government, I am afraid to say, were resisting this clause, perhaps because of time—we have already had this Bill once, and I am not sure why the clause was being resisted, but that is what I found when I entered the Home Office. I am therefore proud to commend the clause to the Committee, and I thank Pauline Latham for always speaking up frankly—regardless of who she was speaking up to—about what was right.
New clause 28 seeks to extend the automatic deportation provision in section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007 to foreign nationals charged with an offence under section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978, or found in possession of sexual abuse images. Where foreign nationals abuse this country’s hospitality by committing crimes, it is right that we consider taking deportation action against them. I could not disagree with the sentiment of the hon. Member for Gordon and Buchan, although I would not put it down to just those who use child abuse imagery, rather than those who might have had contact offences with children or those who commit domestic abuse, for example. To see that in such small isolation is fairly problematic for a system that needs some serious attention.
The UK has existing powers to deport foreign nationals who commit sexual offences. Under the UK Borders Act, a foreign national must be deported if they are convicted of any offence in the UK and sentenced to at least 12 months’ imprisonment, unless an exception applies. As someone who has worked in the field for many years, however, I recognise that some of the most heinous crimes—the ones that worry us the most and those that the Government are really keen to tackle—are those that frequently get a sentence of less than 12 months. My hon. Friends at the Ministry of Justice are looking, in the sentencing review, at how and why we have a situation where some of the worst crimes against the vulnerable end up with such small sentences.
I therefore recognise the point that the hon. Lady is making. However, I would say that that is automatically the case with more than 12 months; where that threshold is not met, a foreign national can already be deported on the grounds that their deportation is conducive to the public good, under section 3 of the Immigration Act 1971. The power to deport under the 1971 Act can also be used to deport a foreign national even where they have not been convicted of an offence.
The hon. Member for Isle of Wight East—is that like “Wicked”, with a Wicked Witch of the West and of the East? [Interruption.] Oh, the hon. Gentleman is the Good Witch. He certainly made an important point about child abuse, especially online, which new clause 28—this comes from a very good place—seeks to determine: it is not that child abuse knows any border, but child abuse imagery especially knows no border. The idea that British children would be made safer by deporting somebody to another country is not something I would recognise. The system of then handing people over, so that actually people serve their sentences here, is probably something that we would be keen to see.
The power to deport can be used when somebody has not been convicted of an offence, so actually the powers in the new clause already exist. The Government take the matter of foreign nationals committing criminal offences in the UK extremely seriously. We deport foreign national offenders in appropriate cases, including all offenders sentenced to more than 12 months. New clause 28 is therefore unlikely to result in any more deportations, given these existing powers.
The Government do, however, recognise that the automatic deportation regime does not capture some offenders, who get shorter sentences. I recognise that and it bothers me. We intend to bring forward proposals later this year to simplify the deportation regime and address lower-level offending. I am not calling child sex abuse lower-level offending, but if we think of the most famous case of child sex abuse offending that we have had in recent years, I believe it resulted in a suspended sentence of eight weeks. While I certainly do not think it is lower-level offending, that is often is how it is treated.
At this time, we do not advocate taking a piecemeal approach to making changes in the Bill that would mandate the deportation of every foreign national charged with an offence under section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978. However, this is absolutely something that we are keenly looking at, and I imagine that when there is future legislation, largely on immigration, we will have these debates again.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 44 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 45
Duty to report suspected child sex offences
Harriet Cross
I beg to move amendment 43, clause 45, page 50, line 8, leave out subsection (7).
This amendment would keep an individual under the duty to report child abuse despite the belief that someone else may have reported the abuse to the relevant authority.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 46, clause 45, page 50, line 20, at end insert—
“(10) A person who fails to fulfil the duty under subsection (1) commits an offence.
(11) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.”
This amendment would implement part of recommendation 13 of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse that a failure to report a suspected child sex offence should be a criminal offence.
Amendment 47, clause 45, page 51, line 5, at end insert “or
(c) an activity involving a ‘position of trust’ as defined in sections 21, 22 and 22A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.”
This amendment would implement part of recommendation 13 of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sex Abuse that any person working in a position of trust as defined by the Sexual Offences Act 2003, should be designated a mandatory reporter.
Clause stand part.
Schedule 7.
Clause 46 stand part.
Amendment 48, clause 47, page 52, line 11, at end insert—
“(7) The sixth case is where P witnesses a child displaying sexualised, sexually harmful or other behaviour, physical signs of abuse or consequences of sexual abuse, such as pregnancy or a sexually transmitted disease, to an extent that would cause a reasonable person who engages in the same relevant activity as P to suspect that a child sex offence may have been committed.
(8) The seventh case is where P witnesses a person (A) behaving in the presence of a child in a way that would cause a reasonable person who engages in the same relevant activity as P to suspect that A may have committed a child sex offence.
(9) A failure to comply with the duty under subsection (1) is not an offence where the reason to suspect that a child sex offence may have been committed arises from subsection (7) or subsection (8).”
This amendment would implement part of recommendation 13 of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sex Abuse that there should be a duty to report where a person recognises the indicators of child sexual abuse. Failure to report in these instances would not attract a criminal sanction.
Clause 47 stand part.
Harriet Cross
Clause 45, alongside clauses 46 and 47 and schedule 7, introduces a duty to report suspected child sex offences, and in doing so fulfils a major recommendation of the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse. In essence, clause 45 will require professionals and volunteers working in roles closely connected to children to notify the authorities if, in the course of their work or duties, they have reason to suspect that a child has been sexually abused.
Time and again, inquiries into abuse scandals—whether involving institutions, schools, churches, sports clubs or grooming gangs—have found that people around the victim knew or suspected something was going wrong but did not report it, perhaps out of fear, confusion, misplaced loyalty or uncertainty. Clause 45 sends an unequivocal message: if you know or suspect a child is being sexually abused, you must tell the police or a local authority.
Opposition amendment 43 would remove subsection (7) of clause 45, which currently exempts someone from reporting if they believe that another person has already made the notification. Our amendment would maintain every individual’s duty to report suspected abuse, regardless of whether they think someone else has already done so. This is a sensible amendment and seeks to avoid incidences or suspected incidences of child sexual abuse slipping through the net on account of someone assuming, even in all good conscience, that someone else has already reported the matter. We cannot be careful enough, and repeated notifications of the same offence can only add to the evidence base for such a crime. Too much information is always better than no information. We cannot stand back and leave a child’s safety to chance or hope that someone else has taken the appropriate action.
The notification may be made to a relevant police force, local authority or both, as soon as is practicable. It is detailed in clause 46 that
“‘Relevant local authority’ means—
(a) if a relevant child resides in England or Wales, the local authority in whose area the child is believed to reside, or
(b) if the person making the notification does not know the local authority area in which any relevant child resides, such local authority as the person making the notification considers appropriate.”
That is a sensible approach. The first port of call is to report to the local authority that will be reasonably responsible for the vulnerable child; that is the obvious and correct place to start. However, where the notifying adult is unsure or unaware of the vulnerable child’s living arrangements, it is still vital that notification is made to a local authority, no matter where in the country the child lives, as local authorities are better placed than the notifying person to direct the report to the appropriate channels. A similar provision is outlined in clause 46 relating to the definition of a “relevant police force.” Again, we consider that to be a sensible approach.
Matt Bishop
Clause 45 demonstrates, once again, that this Government are serious about protecting children from what I think we would all agree is one of the most hideous of crimes—child sexual abuse. The impact of such abuse can last a lifetime, but far too often the voices of victims remain unheard.
Having worked closely with vulnerable children and witnessed the devastating consequences of abuse, I am extremely supportive of the inclusion in the Bill of the duty to report child sexual abuse. The clause places a clear legal responsibility on professionals such as teachers, healthcare workers, social workers and others to report any suspicion or knowledge of child sexual abuse. It ensures that when these individuals encounter children at risk, they cannot remain silent. They must act, safeguarding the child and ensuring that the abuse is reported to the relevant authorities as soon as possible.
For too long, we have seen cases where abuse has gone unnoticed or unaddressed because there was no legal duty to act. That gap in the law has allowed perpetrators to evade detection and left children vulnerable to further harm. By making it clear that silence is no longer an option, this provision empowers professionals to intervene early and prevent further abuse.
David Burton-Sampson (Southend West and Leigh) (Lab)
Does my hon. Friend agree that although it is crazy that this was not a mandatory requirement in the first place, it is great to see a further recommendation from the IICSA report now being acted on and hopefully becoming law?
Matt Bishop
I absolutely, wholeheartedly agree with my hon. Friend. It is crazy that it was not mandatory in the beginning but, as he says, we have all taken steps to make sure that it is now.
On a few occasions in my past career, I would speak to professionals after an abuse case had been alleged, and found out that they had no idea what had been happening. On other occasions, professionals had been suspicious for a long time but did not think that they had the evidence to act. Often, the abuse would then go unreported for many months—in some cases years. Some professionals—not all, but some—chose not to report through naivety or because of concern about the repercussions for themselves, and some just chose not to report at all. So, it is important to note that this clause does not criminalise those who are unaware of abuse, but rather holds accountable those who fail to report when they have a reasonable suspicion. This legal clarity will encourage professionals to act decisively and without fear, knowing that they have a duty to protect children. The provision will strengthen our child protection system and ensure that those in positions of trust cannot ignore their responsibility to act when they suspect abuse. This is a vital step in ensuring that no child falls through the cracks, and that those who seek to harm them are held accountable.
In conclusion, the duty to report child sexual abuse is a necessary and positive change. It will protect children, support professionals in their efforts to safeguard the vulnerable, and help bring perpetrators to justice. I fully support the clause and believe that it represents a significant step forward in safeguarding our future generations.
Jack Rankin
I rise to speak to clause 45 and the principle running through the clauses that follow it. Clause 45 introduces a mandatory duty to report child sexual abuse by establishing a legal obligation for individuals engaged in regulated activities with children, such as teachers and healthcare professionals, to report known instances of child sexual abuse to the police or local authorities.
Will the Minister consider the British Medical Association’s written evidence, which raised concerns about the scope of this duty? I disagree with the BMA, having read its evidence, but I want to explore it a little, so I hope the Minister might comment on it.
The BMA is worried that the Bill might compel healthcare professionals to disclose patient information to the police, potentially undermining the trust inherent in the doctor-patient relationship. In my view, that perspective seems to neglect the existing legal frameworks that already permit such disclosures in specific circumstances, particularly when public safety is at risk. In fact, the General Medical Council’s guidance allows for breaching confidentiality to prevent serious harm or crime, indicating that the Bill’s provisions are not as unprecedented as the BMA might suggest.
Furthermore, the BMA’s apprehensions do not sufficiently consider the potential benefits of the Bill in facilitating a more integrated approach to preventing serious violence. By enabling appropriate information-sharing between healthcare providers and law enforcement, we can create a more robust system for identifying and mitigating threats to public safety. The BMA’s focus on confidentiality, in my view, should be weighed against the imperatives of protecting individuals and communities from harm.
Most importantly—I was concerned to read this, and I would welcome the Minister’s comments—the BMA says it is concerned that 15-year-olds who are engaged in what it terms “consensual sexual activity” with someone over the age of 18 will be “flooding the system”. My understanding of the law is that 15-year-olds cannot consent to sexual activity with 18-year-olds, and I find it concerning that a professional body is choosing to interpret this country’s laws on sexual consent in this way. Perhaps the Minister might comment on that in her closing remarks. The age at which I understand people can legally consent to sexual activity is 16 in this country. The BMA should know that, understand the law and have a duty to uphold it.
The independent inquiry into child sexual abuse was clear on this recommendation, and the Crime and Policing Bill seeks to enhance public safety through judicious information-sharing. The existing ethical and legal safeguards governing medical confidentiality remain intact, and it is crucial that GPs and medical professionals take seriously their duty towards children, as that is what 15-year-olds are.
The international experience of mandatory reporting laws has already demonstrated the effectiveness of including reasonable suspicion as a trigger for reporting. For instance, the introduction of such laws in Australia led to increased reporting, without a corresponding rise in malicious reports. This suggests that professionals can responsibly handle the duty to report suspicions, contributing to more robust child protection systems.
Amendment 43 could address the under-reporting of child sexual abuse. Research has indicated that child sexual abuse is significantly under-reported, with many victims not disclosing their experience at the time of abuse. The independent inquiry into child sexual abuse highlighted that a cultural shift is needed to make discussions about child sexual abuse less taboo. By tabling amendment 43, our intention is to signal our commitment to fostering an environment in which suspicions are taken seriously and professionals are encouraged to report concerns without fear of reprisal.
I commend amendment 43 to the Committee.
Luke Taylor
We welcome the clauses in this group, but I have a simple question about clauses 45 and 47. Why does the Bill not go further than the Conservative Government’s Criminal Justice Bill did in 2024? It could include the IICSA recommendation that observing recognised indicators of child sexual abuse be a reason to suspect. Can the Minister give an explanation of why that key finding of the Jay report is not included in the Bill and whether opportunities are being missed to go that little bit further?
I also agree with amendment 43. Obviously, in some recent high-profile cases, the belief that something had been reported by another person was notoriously used to explain why there had not been further reporting. This would provide a backstop to prevent that explanation from being used to absolve an individual of their responsibilities.
Jess Phillips
I feel quite proud to commend this clause about mandatory reporting. For much of my professional life and a huge amount of our political lives, we have been trying to get mandatory reporting across the line, so it is a proud moment. Clauses 45 and 47 and schedule 7 introduce the new mandatory duty to report child sexual abuse, building on the recommendation of the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse, and I will come on to answer the questions that have been asked of me.
The inquiry gathered evidence from many victims and survivors who made disclosures or presented information to a responsible adult with no action being subsequently taken to inform the relevant authorities. A common reason for those failures was the prioritisation of protecting an individual or institution from reputational damage over the safety and wellbeing of children. Many victims who spoke to the inquiry set out the inadequate and negative responses to their disclosures, which meant that they never wanted to talk about their experiences again. The inquiry’s final report recommended that certain individuals in England should be subject to a mandatory duty to report child sexual abuse when they become aware of it. Clauses 45 to 47 give effect to such a duty.
When adults undertaking relevant activity with children have reason to believe that child sexual abuse has occurred, either by being told about it by a child or perpetrator or by witnessing the abuse themselves, the new duty requires that they report it promptly to the police or local authority. Clause 45 applies to the new duty, while clauses 46 and 47 define key practical considerations to whom reports should be made and incidents that qualify as giving a reporter sufficient reason to suspect that abuse has occurred.
I will now turn to the amendments in this group, although I do not think some of them will be pressed. Amendment 43 proposes to remove the qualification that, once relevant information has been passed on to the authorities, further duplicate reports are not required. We do not believe that this amendment is necessary. In designing the duty, we have sought to minimise any disruption to well-established reporting processes. Clause 45(7), which this amendment seeks to remove, ensures that a reporter will not have to make a notification under the duty if they are aware that a report has already been made.
Subsection (7) means that, for example, an inexperienced volunteer or newly qualified professional can refer an incident to their organisation’s designated safeguarding lead for an onward notification to be made to the local authority or the police. The duty will be satisfied when a mandated reporter receives confirmation that the report has been made on their behalf, and it remains on them until that point.
I will answer some of the questions that have been asked, specifically those on guidance for the duty and the people within local authorities whom we are talking about. The Government will set out clear guidance on the operation of the duty, but we will also work with regulators and professional standard-setting bodies to ensure that the new duty is clearly communicated ahead of implementation.
Harriet Cross
I do not have much to say, other than to welcome the clause. It was part of the Criminal Justice Bill, so we are very happy to see it replicated here. I appreciate what the Minister said, but we will be pressing our amendment to a vote, because no matter how many people think that an offence has or has not been reported, we can never be too careful. Over-reporting is so much better than under-reporting, so anything that ensures it gets reported at any time is vital. Otherwise, I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Windsor for his contribution.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Jess Phillips
Clauses 48 to 51 establish a limited number of situations in which the mandatory duty to report can be disapplied to avoid unintentional consequences for child safeguarding.
Clauses 48 and 49 set out that consensual relationships between young people should not be considered child sexual abuse in the absence of coercion or significant differences in age or maturity, and that an exception can therefore be made to the duty in such circumstances. This avoids situations such as two kissing teenagers having to be reported to the authorities by a teacher who knows them both well. That is not something I want to have to deal with—teenagers kissing in halls. I suppose it is better working here. Well done to the teachers of the world. For the record, I do not want to see anyone kissing in the corridors—teenagers or otherwise.
Nor do we want to discourage young people from accessing services that are designed to offer support in addressing their own harmful sexual behaviour. Clause 50 gives reporters some discretion in this area, by making it clear that a disclosure by a child can be dealt with outside of the mandatory duty to report.
We know that, notwithstanding the introduction of this duty, young people may need some safe spaces to explore disclosures at their own pace or with a trusted adult. Clause 51 therefore confers a regulation-making power on the Home Secretary to exempt specific services from the duty on the exceptional basis where their function relates to the safety or protection of children, and where confidentiality is considered absolutely essential. This may be required to prevent services that provide confidential support and advice to children from closing ahead of the duties’ commencement, leaving significant gaps in safeguarding provision.
Harriet Cross
As we have heard, clause 48 introduces a carve-out to the reporting duty. It recognises that not all sexual activity involving under-18s is a cause for alarm or state intervention. Specifically, it lets professionals refrain from reporting consensual sexual activity between older teenagers when they believe there is no abuse or exploitation at play. It is basically a Romeo and Juliet exemption.
Sexual activity for under-16s is, as we know, illegal in law but without this clause, a teacher who learns of two 15-year-olds in a consensual relationship would legally be bound to report that as a child sexual offence. The clause empowers the teacher to use their professional judgment, but the exemption applies only where the reporter is satisfied that the relationship really is consensual and not appropriate to report given the circumstances.
The bar for not reporting should be high. As a safeguard, the clause explicitly says to consider the risk of harm. If there is any indication of harm or imbalance, the duty to report remains. For example, if a 14-year-old girl is sexually involved with a 17-year-old boy, even if she says she has consented, a teacher or adult might rightly feel uneasy about the power dynamic and the possible impact of grooming. The adult might decide that it is appropriate to report in that case. On the other hand, two 14-year-olds would likely fall under the exemption.
The exemption is not about condoning under-age sex; it is about proportionality. We know that in reality about one third of teens have some form of sexual contact before the age of 16. We do not want to criminalise young people unnecessarily or deter them from seeking healthcare or advice. For example, if a 15-year-old girl is pregnant by her 16-year-old boyfriend, without this exemption a doctor might feel compelled to report the boyfriend to the police. Clause 48 means that the doctor can exercise their judgment and focus on providing healthcare instead of a police report, as long as the relationship seems consensual and caring.
That approach aligns with what many safeguarding experts recommend: to include a competent, consensual peer exemption so that mandatory reporting does not overreach. It mirrors, for instance, the approach in some Australian states where similar laws exist. Those states carve out consensual peer activity from mandatory reporting to avoid inundating child protection with consensual cases.
Clause 49 is a twin provision to clause 48, addressing the fact that young people sometimes arrange sexual encounters with each other or share things such as intimate images. By the letter of the law, those actions can be offences, but it is not the intention of the mandatory reporting regime to treat those young people as perpetrators or victims of sexual abuse if it was consensual or equal. Clause 48 says that if a child is essentially facilitating a consensual act with another child of a similar age and there is no sign of harm or coercion, a professional is not obliged to report it.
Clause 50 acknowledges that children are sometimes the ones committing sexual harm and that in certain cases, the best way to protect everyone is to allow those children to seek help rather than immediately branding them as criminals. In short, if a teenager confides that they have done something sexually wrong with another teen, a teacher or counsellor can handle that sensitively without jumping straight to calling the police—as long as everyone involved is over the age of 13 and there is no acute risk requiring immediate intervention.
The guardrails are important. The exemption kicks in only if the other child involved in the incident is 13 years old or over. If a teenager admits harming a younger child who is 12 years old or under, that is considered so serious and a younger child so vulnerable that it must be reported.
The exemption is not a green flag to do nothing, but it gives an option to not report to the police. The expectation is that professional judgment will take precedent. How does the Minister envisage that professionals will handle such disclosures in practice? Obviously, if a child confesses to something such as date rape, even if that is not reported to the police, the school or agency must ensure that the victim is safe and supported. How will those situations be monitored?
Jess Phillips
The term “guardrails” is a really good one; we are trying to put those guardrails in. What I find alarming, not just in the IICSA report but in many serious case reviews—for example, about the murder of Sara Sharif—is that there is sometimes a lack of professional curiosity and/or that some of these things are repeatedly not in place. As somebody who has had teenagers come forward and tell me that they have been gang raped or raped by their boyfriend, or tell me about a date rape situation, I am a bit flabbergasted that professionals do not already know to report that. If that person was a child, I would always have reported it. For me, it is not difficult to manage from a professional perspective, and the reality is that the child knows that the professional is likely to have to report it. In most professional practice, that would still be the case today.
When the hon. Lady asks how professionals will manage the example that she gave, I very much hope that mandatory reporting—I cannot stress enough that I do not want loads of people to go to prison because of mandatory reporting—is used to make a system in children’s safeguarding and working with children that is open and transparent, rather than one where people worry about getting in trouble for the thing that they have done. The training and the guidance that will accompany mandatory reporting will be that guide for professionals, and we will take the time to make sure that the Bill commences only once that guidance is absolutely right.
I find it shocking that people who work with children might need to be told that they have a safeguarding duty if a child reports something such as a date rape to them—it is not the same for adults. I have never worked anywhere where that would not have resulted in a safeguarding referral. I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 48 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 49 to 51 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 52
Preventing or deterring a person from complying with duty to report suspected child sex offence
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Jess Phillips
Clause 52 introduces a separate criminal offence reserved for anyone who deliberately prevents or deters an individual from carrying out the duty through, for example, destroying or concealing evidence or applying pressure on an individual to prevent them reporting. The offence is punishable by up to seven years’ imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine. That will ensure that those with the greatest responsibility for organisational failures or cover-ups face the appropriate penalty for their action.
Hon. Members on both sides of the House have raised concerns about the lack of a criminal offence for people who fail to report. We do not think it appropriate or proportionate to create such a sanction, which may create a chilling effect where people are reluctant to volunteer with children or to enter certain professions because they fear being criminalised for making a mistake in an area that many people find very difficult to understand.
The purpose of mandatory reporting is to improve the protection of children while helping to create a culture of knowledge, confidence and openness among those most likely to be alerted to child sexual abuse. Its introduction is not intended to criminalise those working and volunteering with children, often in challenging circumstances, but we are determined for it to set high, consistent standards in identifying and responding to such abuse wherever it is found. That is why we consider it more appropriate for those who fail to discharge their duty to face referral to the Disclosure and Barring Service and the professional regulators where applicable. Those bodies can prevent individuals from working with children, so they potentially lose their livelihood, which is still a very serious consequence. That approach will reserve the greatest impact for the right cohorts of people.
Harriet Cross
Clause 52 makes it a serious criminal offence to cover up child sexual abuse by blocking a report. If any person—be it a headteacher, coach, priest or director of a care home—tries to stop someone else reporting suspected abuse, that person can be prosecuted and potentially imprisoned for up to seven years. We know from countless inquiries in the past that often the issue was not that frontline staff did not suspect; it was that they were silenced or ignored by those higher up.
Clause 52 squarely targets that kind of misconduct. Instead of being able to threaten or cajole an employee into staying silent, now the one doing the threatening will face severe consequences. The clause is not aimed at someone who, for example, in good faith decides to wait until tomorrow, when the child is in a safer place, to file a report. There is a defence precisely for making suggestions about timing when motivated by the child’s best interests. That covers a situation where, for example, immediate reporting might tip off an abuser and endanger a child. A supervisor might decide to first secure the child before reporting. That is okay—they can argue that that is in the child’s best interests, not an attempt at covering up. But anything beyond those well-intentioned timing considerations—any attempt to outright stop a report or permanently delay it—has no defence.
Clause 52 will apply not just within organisations but potentially to abusers themselves. If an abuser tries to threaten a mandated reporter into silence, that is also preventing a report. The clause should create a cultural backstop: everyone in an organisation will know that ordering a cover-up could land them in prison. It should therefore act as a strong deterrent.
Jess Phillips
I thank the hon. Lady for her support.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 52 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 53
Modification of Chapter for constables
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendment 15.
Clause 54 stand part.
Jess Phillips
The duty to report will apply to the police in a slightly different way, as they are both a category of reporter and a potential recipient of reports under the duty. There are also scenarios in which a police officer may encounter child sexual abuse in the course of a covert investigation, or be required to review a large volume of child sexual abuse material. Clause 53 therefore provides for some modifications to the new duty to ensure operational flexibility for police officers.
Clause 54 provides the ability to future-proof the mandatory reporting duty against the emergence of new functions or settings that it may be appropriate for the Government to consider. That is essential in recognition of the unique nature of child sexual abuse as a constantly evolving threat, including through the utilisation of technology and the internet.
Finally, Government amendment 15 adds the offence of preventing a report to schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015, removing the offence from the ambit of the statutory criminal defence in section 45 of that Act.
Harriet Cross
Clause 53 acknowledges that police officers operate under a different framework when it comes to responding to crimes. Quite sensibly, it modifies the mandatory reporting duty to fit their role. After all, we would not expect a police officer to file a report with themselves. If an officer learns of abuse, they are already empowered, and indeed obliged by their oath, to take investigative action directly.
The Bill here is technical, but the result is likely that a constable who has reason to suspect child abuse is considered to have complied with the duty so long as they handle it through the proper police channels, for example by recording it on their system, notifying their child protection unit or initiating an investigation. They would not have to make a separate notification to, for example, the local authority, as a teacher or doctor would. The police already have established protocols for involving social services in joint investigations.
Clause 54 is essentially a future-proofing and housekeeping part of the chapter. It gives the Secretary of State the ability, with Parliament’s approval, to amend the reporting regime as necessary. It also ties up loose ends by integrating new offences into related legislation. The regulation-making power means that if a list of relevant activities needs to be expanded, that can be done relatively easily. Of course, it is important that any changes undergo parliamentary scrutiny. Although we want flexibility, we must also ensure democratic oversight, given the sensitivity of the obligations. I note amendment 15, as I have the other Government amendments.
Jess Phillips
I am going to miss making amendments to put things in the schedule to the Modern Slavery Act when this is all done. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to
Clause 53 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 54
Powers to amend this Chapter, and consequential amendment
Amendment made: 15, in clause 54, page 55, line 31, at end insert—
“(3) In Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (offences to which defence in section 45 does not apply), in paragraph 36D (offences under the Crime and Policing Act 2025) (inserted by section 17), after the entry for section 38 (inserted by section 38), insert—
‘section 52 (preventing or deterring a person from complying with duty to report suspected child sex offence)’.”—(Jess Phillips.)
This amendment excepts the offence of preventing or deterring a person from complying with the duty to report a suspected child sex offence from the defence in section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.
Clause 54, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 55
Guidance about disclosure of information by police for purpose of preventing sex offending
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Jess Phillips
Clause 55 creates a power for the Secretary of State to issue statutory guidance to the police regarding their disclosure of information to prevent sexual offending.
Currently, the child sex offender disclosure scheme, also known as Sarah’s law, is the only guidance for the disclosure of information to prevent sexual harm. The clause will place the scheme on a statutory footing, bringing it in line with the domestic violence disclosure scheme. In so doing, it will help ensure greater consistency in the operation of the scheme across police forces. The Secretary of State will be able to use the power in clause 55 to issue further statutory guidance regarding the police’s disclosure of information to prevent sexual harm to other kinds of victim or in other circumstances.
Harriet Cross
Clause 55 includes guidance for disclosure of information to the police for the purpose of preventing sexual offending. It is vital that the police are able to obtain all information as quickly as possible to ensure that offences are prevented. Prevention is always better than cure, and that goes as much for sexual offences as it does for any other offence. We welcome this provision, in order to ensure that sexual offences can be prevented and to give police the necessary powers.
Jess Phillips
I thank the hon. Lady for her comments, and I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 55 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Keir Mather.)
Crime and Policing Bill (Ninth sitting)
Thursday 24th April 2025
(1 year ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 24 April 2025 - (24 Apr 2025)
The Chair
We continue line-by-line scrutiny of the Crime and Policing Bill. Before we begin, I have a few preliminary reminders for the Committee. Please switch electronic devices to silent. No food or drink is permitted during sittings of this Committee, except for the water provided. Hansard colleagues would be grateful if Members can email their speaking notes to hansardnotes@ parliament.uk or alternatively pass on their written speaking notes to the Hansard colleagues in the room.
Clause 56
Offences relating to intimate photographs or films and voyeurism
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Dr Allin-Khan. I am very pleased to be able to speak to these provisions.
We live our lives surrounded by technology that allows us to take photographs or record film at the click of a button. Laptops, tablets, smartphones, smart TVs and minute cameras and recording devices have revolutionised our lives, but they do not come without the very real risk that they can be used for nefarious purposes, such as taking intimate images of a person without their knowledge or consent.
The scale of this problem is growing. When the Law Commission carried out its detailed review of the law in this area in 2020 to 2022, it found that the police recorded at least 28,201 reports of disclosing private sexual images without consent between April 2015 and December 2021. Only three years later, a Women and Equalities Committee investigation showed that the Revenge Porn Helpline went from receiving 3,200 cases in 2020 to 22,276 in 2024. Those figures include only those reporting to the helpline. As we are all aware, many, many more individuals may not report.
I have huge respect for the work of the Revenge Porn Helpline, which is committed to supporting victims. The Government and the wider violence against women and girls sector have moved away from using the terminology “revenge porn”. Let us be clear: it is not revenge. Nothing a victim could ever do justifies any kind of abuse. It is not an act of revenge; it is an act of abuse. It is also not pornography. The participant is not consenting, and the subject never intended it to be available for public viewing. It is non-consensual intimate image abuse.
The Government share the Women and Equalities Committee’s concerns. We have committed to halving violence against women and girls, who make up the majority of victims of intimate image abuse. Taking an intimate image of someone without their consent is a violation. Victims can experience significant harm and trauma. It can impact every aspect of their lives, from their physical and mental health to their relationships and careers. It is therefore vital that our legal framework deals effectively with that behaviour.
That type of offending needs to be seen as part of the wider landscape of sexual violence and sexual offending. It may be carried out by those who are also committing the most abhorrent physical sexual offences. That was so in the case of Gisèle Pelicot, whose husband was caught because he was taking photographs under women’s clothing—an act similar to those covered by the upskirting offence in England and Wales. As is evident in that case and many others, intimate image abuse can be the beginning of an escalation, or can go hand in hand with those already perpetrating violent sexual crimes. If we can catch it early, perhaps we can prevent or stop further abuse in its tracks.
We know that there is a relationship between online and offline violent misogyny. We also know that many perpetrators start their campaigns of abuse with apparent low-level sexual offences. Sarah Everard’s murderer had indecently exposed himself before he went on to brutally rape and murder her. The escalation is clear in both the online and the offline world. The Pelicot case shows that intimate image abuse cannot be viewed in isolation; it is part of wider violence against women and girls. That is why the Government, in this clause, are cracking down on the perpetrators of violence against women and girls in all its forms. Those perpetrators need to be stopped and held accountable for their crimes. As Gisèle Pelicot said:
“it’s not for us to have shame—it’s for them”.
Existing law does address some of that behaviour, but it is far from comprehensive and effective. The previous Government introduced some new offences in this area to tackle sharing intimate images without consent, but they did not go far enough. They did not have the bravery or political will to take a real stand against this type of abuse, introducing offences on intimate image abuse in their Criminal Justice Bill, which they allowed to fall in favour of attempting to re-elect a failing Prime Minister and a failing Government. This has gone on long enough. That is why, in our first year in office and in our first crime and justice Bill, we are now doing what they should have done and are addressing the taking of those images, the first step in this type of offending.
The clause and schedule we are discussing build on what we have already done in the Data (Use and Access) Bill, fulfilling our manifesto commitment to ban the creation of sexual deepfakes. In that Bill, we introduced a new offence of creating purported intimate images—more commonly known as deepfakes—without consent, or reasonable belief in consent. We have also introduced an offence of requesting the creation of such an image without consent or reasonable belief in consent. Those new offences will tackle a rapidly proliferating area of offending, providing further protection for victims.
The taking of real intimate images needs to be tackled as well, however. The taking of intimate images without consent is not new. It has been possible for many years, from analogue cameras through digital cameras to the ease of the smartphone. The law has rightly criminalised some of that behaviour, but changing technology has made it even easier to take such images. Only last week, The Sunday Times reported on the widespread practice of individuals installing covert cameras in order to secretly record intimate images of women getting changed at swimming pools. Some of that behaviour is already covered by existing offences, but we want to ensure that the law is consistent and comprehensive, and captures all the behaviour that it should, giving the police and the Crown Prosecution Service the tools to tackle it.
At the moment, taking such images is covered by the offence set out in section 67 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. It is part of a wider set of offences in sections 67 and 67A, which cover “observing” and “recording” of individuals in certain intimate circumstances without their consent. Section 67(3) provides for an offence of recording images of a person “doing a private act” if the person recording it intends that he, or a third party, will gain sexual gratification from looking at the image, and the person recording knows that the person in the photo does not consent to being recorded with that intention. That means that the prosecution has to prove the perpetrator’s intent and that they knew that the person in the photo had not consented to being recorded for that purpose.
The voyeurism offences also include the so-called upskirting offence in section 67A of the 2003 Act, which covers recording images, without consent or reasonable belief in consent, of a person’s genitals or buttocks, or underwear covering them, under a person’s clothes. The offence has different intent elements from the section 67 offence and a different definition of the photographs taken. Those differences were among many issues looked at by the Law Commission, which in 2019 was asked to review in detail the law on taking, making and sharing intimate images without consent. The commission submitted a final report in 2022, “Intimate image abuse”, which recommended a comprehensive suite of intimate image abuse offences to ensure that the law was consistent and coherent. We agree that that is what is needed. Consistent law will be easier to understand and to work with, ensuring that perpetrators are brought to justice.
As I mentioned, the previous Government made some changes on sharing offences, but they left the law in a mess. We now have a situation where the offences relating to taking and to sharing intimate images without consent are not consistent. Different definitions of the images are covered and they include different intent elements. The Government will not tolerate that.
To address such offending properly and consistently, we will repeal two of the existing voyeurism offences, relating to
“recording a person doing a private act”
and
“recording an image beneath a person’s clothing”—
the so-called upskirting offence—and replace them with three new criminal offences to tackle the taking or recording of intimate images without consent.
The base offence will be of taking or recording an intimate image without consent or a reasonable belief in consent. That offence carries no requirement to prove that the taking or recording was done for a particular reason. There will also be two more serious offences of taking or recording an intimate image without consent and with the intent to cause alarm, distress or humiliation, or without consent or reasonable belief in consent for the purpose of obtaining sexual gratification.
Consent must be at the heart of this new offence. It is the key element, and one that is long overdue. Previously, the onus was on the defence to prove that the accused intended to cause harm. Now, we are moving to a consent-based model that centres the autonomy of the victim. Consent is the most important element of any law of this nature. I am not interested in what consenting adults get up to in the privacy of their own relationship; what this Government are interested in is that, where consent is not given, the perpetrators are punished appropriately and the victim receives the justice they deserve for the violation and abhorrent abuse that they have experienced.
Crucially, these offences will all use the definition of a person in an “intimate state”, which covers images in which the person’s buttocks, genitals or breasts are exposed or covered with underwear; images depicting the person engaging in a sexual act of a sort not usually seen in public; and images showing the person using the toilet. That is broader than the current definition and provides a consistent definition across all the intimate image abuse offences, providing a package of offences.
These changes are important and overdue, but we will not stop there. One of our other concerns about the current law relates to people installing equipment in order for them, or someone else, to take an intimate image without consent. Section 67(4) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 makes it an offence for someone to install equipment, or construct or adapt a structure, or any part of a structure, to enable someone to commit the offence of observing a person doing a private act. That means that I commit an offence if I drill a hole in a changing room wall to allow myself or someone else to spy on people getting changed for sexual gratification, knowing that those getting changed do not consent to being observed for this purpose. That is currently an offence even if I never actually use the hole to spy on those people—merely adapting the structure is sufficient.
However, the offence in section 67(4) of the 2003 Act is limited to installing equipment or adapting structures in relation to observing victims, not recording photographs or videos of them. That means that if I install a spy camera in the wall of a changing room so that I, or someone else, can remotely take photographs or videos of people getting changed, I am not committing that offence. I would have to have actually taken the photographs for that offence to have been committed. That cannot be right.
The new offence to be inserted at section 66 of the 2003 Act will change that. To address concerns about the increasing use of spy cameras to record people in public bathrooms, changing rooms, hotel rooms or holiday lets, it will be an offence to install equipment with the intention to enable anyone, whether the installer or a third party, to commit one of the taking offences. To address the harmful and culpable nature of that behaviour in and of itself, it will not be necessary for any images to have been taken using the equipment.
These offences will build on the sharing offences in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to provide a holistic package of offences using the same definitions and core elements. That addresses the criticisms of the patchwork nature of the existing law, which has resulted in gaps in protection for victims. On top of that, we know that being a victim of one of these crimes can be humiliating and degrading, and that victims can be overwhelmed by shame and embarrassment despite having done nothing wrong. It is therefore vitally important that victims will automatically be eligible for lifelong anonymity.
We are also ensuring that those convicted of the new offences of taking or recording an intimate image for sexual gratification, or installing with the intent to enable the commission of that offence, may be subject to notification requirements. That means that they can be monitored in the community, helping the police to keep the public safer from these predators. The courts can already deprive offenders of the images and the devices on which they are held upon conviction for non-consensual sharing of an intimate image. We will update the sentencing code to give courts the same powers, upon conviction, for intimate images taken without consent. I am grateful to the Law Commission for its extensive review of the law relating to intimate images and its well-considered recommendations upon which these new provisions are based.
I also extend my gratitude to all those who took the time to contribute their views, knowledge and experience, particularly the victims. The courage needed to speak out about these crimes cannot be overestimated, and we are indebted to those brave victims who have shared their experiences so powerfully. We are also grateful to the bodies representing the police, prosecutors and legal practitioners. This allowed us to hear from experts in this area, from those supporting and campaigning on behalf of victims.
Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)
It is a pleasure to have you in the Chair, Dr Allin-Khan. Clause 56 introduces schedule 8, which sets out new or amended provisions concerning criminal offences related to the taking, sharing or misuse of intimate photographs without consent, as well as acts of voyeurism. We very much welcome the measures being brought forward.
Many members of the public may be surprised that there is currently no single criminal offence that covers intimate image abuse. In July 2022, the Law Commission completed its review of the laws surrounding the taking, creation and distribution of intimate images without consent. It described the current legal framework as fragmented and outdated, highlighting the fact that existing offences had not kept pace with advances in technology or changes in patterns of sexual offending.
The then Conservative Government intended to use the Criminal Justice Bill to introduce a range of complementary offences to tackle the taking or recording of such images, as well as installing equipment to enable a person to commit a taking or recording offence, before the Bill fell ahead of the 2024 general election. As such, we welcome clause 56 and the measures in schedule 8. Schedule 8 is intended to strengthen legal protections against such offences, reflect modern technology and behaviours, and ensure that victims of these deeply intrusive acts are better safeguarded and supported through the criminal justice system.
These offences aim to address harmful behaviours such as secretly filming or photographing someone in a sexual or private context without their knowledge or consent. There are three main offences: one for taking or recording an intimate image without consent; one where the act is done to cause distress or humiliation; and another where it is done for sexual gratification. The legislation also provides certain exemptions, including where the person had a reasonable belief in consent, or where images were taken for legitimate purposes, such as medical care or by family members in certain situations. It also clarifies that images taken in public, where a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy, are generally excluded.
The new offences carry different penalties depending on the intent behind the act. The general offence is punishable by up to six months imprisonment or a fine, while the more serious offences, involving intent to harm or sexual gratification, carry a maximum sentence of two years. Clause 56 also introduces offences for installing or maintaining equipment, such as hidden cameras, with the intent to commit these acts. This ensures that preparatory behaviour intended to facilitate such invasions of privacy is also criminalised. Overall, the clause rightly strengthens the legal framework around image-based abuse and helps to protect people from intimate violations in both private and public settings.
Being filmed or photographed in an intimate or vulnerable situation without consent is a deep violation of privacy and dignity. Victims often experience long-lasting emotional and psychological effects. In some cases, the fear of images being shared online can lead to isolation, damage to personal relationships, and even job loss or reputational harm. We know how much that particularly impacts specific groups—research suggests that up to 90% of victims of intimate image abuse are women. By criminalising not only the taking and sharing of intimate images without consent, but the installation of equipment intended to facilitate such acts, the law sends a clear message that those behaviours are unacceptable and will not be tolerated.
These changes also help to close existing legal gaps, offering victims stronger protection and greater confidence that their experiences will be taken seriously. Importantly, the new offences allow for appropriate punishment that reflects the severity of the harm caused while also deterring future offenders. This is a vital step in modernising the law to reflect the realities of abuse in the digital age.
It would be useful to understand whether the voyeurism element of these proposals is sufficient in cases of extortion. The National Crime Agency and other organisations have launched campaigns to highlight the dangers of extortion involving intimate images. The Law Commission’s study highlights reports of its prevalence among young men, with some estimates suggesting that young men account for 90% of victims. In cases where consent is initially given, does existing law sufficiently protect individuals who are subsequently extorted? It may be the case that this clause is not the place to address that, and that the Government feel that sufficient powers already exist. I am keen to hear the Minister’s views on that.
Dr Lauren Sullivan (Gravesham) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Allin-Khan.
I rise in full support of the Government’s action to tackle internet image abuse through clause 56 and schedule 8. As the Member of Parliament for Gravesham, I have heard how digital abuse and coercion are becoming increasingly common in our schools, in our relationships and even in our homes. This measure is not just a policy update; it is a legal correction, a turning point in how the law confronts modern abuse. It stands in defence of dignity, particularly for women and girls who have borne the brunt of silence, shame and victim-blaming for far too long.
The abuse we are addressing through this Bill is often hidden, carried out online without witnesses but with devastating consequences. Victims are often blamed, disbelieved or told that they brought it on themselves. Clause 56 and schedule 8 will take a powerful step in changing that narrative, and I place on record my strong support for the Government’s proposals. I also want to highlight why these offences are so necessary, how the cultural context has changed, what impact this Bill will have on real people, and why this is a turning point in our fight to end violence against women and girls.
As the Minister described, clause 56 and schedule 8 add the base offence of taking and recording intimate images without consent, regardless of motive, to the offences of doing so with intent to cause alarm, distress or humiliation, and of doing so for the purpose of sexual gratification. These offences are key to reflect the reality of modern abuse. The base offence rightly does not require intent, because the harm is real whether or not it was intended.
Unfortunately, we live in a world in which private moments can be turned into weapons, where trust can be shattered with a click and where a single image taken without consent or shared perniciously can spiral into shame, harassment and lifelong trauma. The Law Commission describes our current legal framework as a “patchwork,” unable to keep up with the evolution of technology or the disturbing ways in which people are exploiting it, and the Law Commission is right. Until now, there has been no clear, single criminal offence of taking or recording intimate images without consent. Offences exist for sharing such images, but even then the law requires intent to cause distress or humiliation to be proven. The result is that many perpetrators escape justice while victims suffer in silence. This Bill changes that.
For the first time, we have a clear set of offences that target the taking of intimate images without consent whatever the intent behind the action, whether it is humiliation, distress or sexual gratification, and the installation of the hidden recording devices that enable abuse. It addresses that breakdown in trust.
The Kaspersky report “The Naked Truth” sets out the scale of the challenge. In a global survey of 9,000 people, 22% of respondents had saved explicit images of themselves on their devices and 25% had shared images with people they were dating—among 16 to 24-year-olds that figure rose to 34%. It is this younger generation who we must protect. Some 46% of people globally are either survivors or know somebody who has been a victim of intimate image abuse. That number rises to 69% for 16 to 25-year-olds. We really must act now to prevent this from continuing.
The need for reform has been recognised for some time, but the legislative space did not allow it to move forward. This Labour Government are now picking up the mantle and delivering on that commitment. Clause 56 and schedule 8 build on the groundwork of the Online Safety Act 2003, which acknowledges image sharing. The Bill addresses the act of recording, closing another legal gap. This Government will not stop there: deepfakes and AI-generated sexually explicit images will also be addressed in clause 135 of the Data (Use and Access) Bill. That shows a serious, layered, long-term response to a serious, layered, long-term problem.
We owe it to the survivors, to the next generation, and to every woman and girl who has ever been told that she should have known better. This Government will not look away; we will act, protect, and make it clear that everyone has the right to their own body, their privacy and their peace of mind.
Luke Taylor (Sutton and Cheam) (LD)
The Liberal Democrats are very supportive of clause 56 and schedule 8, which tidy up existing measures, including those previously implemented by the Liberal Democrats. That includes our campaign to ban revenge porn—we note the excellent points made by the Minister, the hon. Member for Pontypridd, regarding both “revenge” and “porn”—which elevated the taking of intimate images to a criminal offence in 2015, with sentences of up to two years in prison for those convicted.
We also note the work of my hon. Friend the Member for Bath (Wera Hobhouse) on the Voyeurism (Offences) Act 2019, so shamefully blocked by the hon. Member for Christchurch (Sir Christopher Chope) in 2018, which made upskirting a specific crime. We congratulate the Government on bringing forward measures to combat these upsetting, intrusive and insidious crimes.
David Burton-Sampson (Southend West and Leigh) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Allin-Khan.
Violence against women and girls is not just a societal problem—it is a national emergency. I am proud of the action that this Labour Government are taking in our Crime and Policing Bill to tackle it. Tough new action is needed, and we are bringing it. The Labour Government have set out an unprecedented ambition, as we heard from the Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypridd, to halve violence against women and girls within a decade. We will use every lever available to deliver this change.
The commitment goes beyond promises. One of the deliverables is the inclusion of new offences for the taking of intimate images without consent, as we have heard. These steps are crucial in addressing the evolving nature of sexual offences, which have outpaced existing laws. We must address this issue—it demands action and our unwavering commitment. Unlike the last Tory Government, which failed to keep up with developments in technology and sexual offending, we are taking tough action against perpetrators and ensuring that protections are better for victims—that is paramount. The consequences of this abuse can be life-changing and tragic. We must take the steps outlined in clause 56 and schedule 8 to ensure that we do not miss the opportunity to protect people from this rapidly growing harm.
The Women and Equalities Committee, which I sit on, has heard evidence from victims of non-consensual intimate image abuse. They have described the far-reaching and continuing impact that the abuse has had on their lives, confidence and relationships. I have heard from the witnesses how this has affected them. Unless we meet the victims and hear it from the horse’s mouth, the deep impact on them does not become real. Many of them are still suffering today. It has even pushed some to the brink of suicide. TV personality and campaigner Georgia Harrison told our predecessor Committee what happened in her case. She said:
“It impacted me in every way you could imagine. So I always sort of compare it to grief: you have to actually grieve a former version of yourself, you feel like you lose your dignity and a lot of pride, there is so much shame involved in it...It got to the point where I was so emotionally affected by what happened to me that I ended up being physically ill as well, to the point where I was in hospital”.
Jack Rankin (Windsor) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Allin-Khan, and to follow the powerful and well-researched contribution from the hon. Member for Southend West and Leigh.
In the digital age, the non-consensual capture and distribution of intimate images and the act of voyeurism have become all too common. Clause 56, which seeks to confront these violations and better protect individuals’ privacy and dignity, is one that I am happy to support, and I thank the Minister for so clearly setting out the case. The clause expands existing laws to criminalise the non-consensual taking of intimate images, including instances such as downblousing, the creation and distribution of digitally altered images such as deepfakes without consent, and the installation of equipment intended to capture intimate images without consent. All are in response to the recommendation from the Law Commission’s 2022 report on intimate image abuse.
The digital landscape has facilitated new forms of abuse, often with devastating consequences. Refuge has reported that one in 14 adults in England and Wales has experienced threats to share intimate images—that is 4.4 million people. The Revenge Porn Helpline has detailed the rise in those figures—it received nearly 19,000 reports in 2023, marking a 106% increase from 2022, and a tenfold rise over five years.
I also welcome the Minister framing this crime in the Government’s violence against women and girls strategy. There is a clear gender disparity when it comes to this crime. In 71% of cases, the victim is female and in over 81% of cases, the perpetrator is male. Those statistics underscore the urgent need for legal reforms to address and deter such abuses effectively, and to protect women and girls overwhelmingly. However, as we have heard frequently in Committee, it will also be critical that the measures are matched with improved enforcement. The sharing of intimate images has been illegal since 2015, and threatening to share intimate images has been a crime since 2021 but, shamefully, perpetrators are rarely held to account.
Data published by Refuge in 2023 showed that conviction rates for intimate abuse remain woefully low, with only 4% of cases that are reported to the police resulting in perpetrators being charged. I share Refuge’s view that that must improve. I was also shocked to learn that there remains a gap in the law where non-consensual images remain on perpetrators’ devices even after a conviction. That must be incredibly distressing for those affected by this crime. I ask the Minister to outline what provisions are in place to protect the dignity of victims, so that perpetrators are compelled to delete any non-consensual images.
Alex Davies-Jones
I thank the hon. Members who have contributed to the discussion, which has been deeply moving at times, particularly when it has touched on the impact on victims in all our constituencies and how widespread and horrific the problem is. That stresses the importance of us tackling it in the Bill.
The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton West, mentioned sextortion, as did other hon. Members. It is a growing problem. Just this week, its impact—on young men as well as young women—was highlighted on “Good Morning Britain”. Sextortion is already covered by existing offences; we feel that it is already tackled. We are aware that it happens primarily online on social media platforms. Thankfully, the codes of practice that Ofcom is introducing under the powers in the Online Safety Act 2023 will compel platforms to do more to tackle this horrific abuse. However, it is already a crime, and I stress that any victim or survivor who is struggling with it should report it to the relevant authorities—to the police and to the social media platforms directly—because action should be taken to tackle it and the powers and offences to do so are available. These crimes have caused tragic suicides, and I would encourage anyone struggling to reach out and tell someone to contact the Revenge Porn Helpline, which is there to offer assistance and support. It is a brilliant resource, as has been highlighted.
The hon. Member for Windsor asked about deprivation orders, I believe, and how we can ensure that these images are removed from devices so that victims are not retraumatised but protected. We are updating sentencing guidelines, to ensure that that measure is available to the courts—that devices can be taken off perpetrators and the images removed so that victims retain their dignity and are not being revictimised consistently.
This has been a very important discussion, highlighting just how important these measures are. I commend this clause and schedule to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 56 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 8 agreed to.
Clause 57
Exposure
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Alex Davies-Jones
The clause provides for a modest but important reform to strengthen the offence of exposure in section 66 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. Currently, the offence, which carries a two-year maximum prison sentence, is committed when a person intentionally exposes their genitals and intends that someone will see them and be caused alarm or distress. Importantly, the offence—subject to certain conditions—attracts sexual offender notification requirements. That means that qualifying offenders released into the community will be required to notify the police of their personal details. Offenders have to provide their local police station with a record of, among other things, their name, address, date of birth and national insurance number.
In “Modernising Communications Offences: A final report”, published in 2021, the Law Commission noted evidence in response to its public consultation that suggested that the intention to cause alarm or distress was “too narrow” a mental element for this offence. The commission highlighted the fact that sexual gratification and a desire to humiliate the victim were among the major drivers of exposure. Under the existing criminal law, if a person exposes their genitals to another with the intention to humiliate, or for the purpose of obtaining sexual gratification, and does not also have an intention to cause alarm or distress, the behaviour is not captured by the exposure offence in section 66 of the 2003 Act. If a person is exposing themselves only with the intent of obtaining sexual gratification and with no intent to cause alarm or distress, that is currently insufficient to commit the section 66 offence.
Crown Prosecution Service guidance makes that point clear and suggests that, in such cases, charging with the offence of outraging public decency should be considered. However, depending on the circumstances, outraging public decency might not be an appropriate or valid charge. That offence is committed only when someone does something lewd, obscene or disgusting in the presence of at least two members of the public. The offence requires at least two people to have witnessed the act or been capable of witnessing it, so if, for example, someone exposes themselves to a lone woman for sexual gratification, that very disturbing behaviour would not currently be captured by the outraging public decency offence—and it would not be captured by the existing sexual offence of exposure. If someone were to expose themselves, for sexual gratification, to a person in a private dwelling rather than in public, the behaviour would not fall within the terms of that offence, either. Furthermore, and very importantly, the offence of outraging public decency does not attract sexual offender registration requirements. On release, therefore, the additional protection to society that effective sex offender management provides would not apply to such an offender, even if they carried out the behaviour specifically to obtain sexual gratification.
It is important that we recognise the seriousness of the offence of exposure in the 2003 Act. For victims, it is clearly a disturbing and frightening experience, which can have lasting effects. It is a serious sexual offence that can be identified as a signal of potential for escalation towards even more serious and violent offences. Sadly, we have seen that time and again. Although what I am about to discuss is by no means the only example of escalation of sexual offences, it is perhaps one of the most prominent in recent history. It is one that I know has stayed with all of us across the House, and no one more so than the Minister for Policing, Fire and Crime Prevention, my very good and right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham. I pay tribute to the way she and her community have coped with the devastation of this tragic event five years ago.
Matt Vickers
The clause updates the offence of exposure set out in section 66 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The current legislation criminalises a person who intentionally exposes their genitals intending that someone will see them and experience alarm or distress. With technologies ever expanding, the last Conservative Government’s efforts to modernise the legal framework in response to the Law Commission’s 2021 report “Modernising Communications Offences” included the addition of a cyber-flashing offence aimed at better addressing the realities of digital abuse and ensuring that the law keeps pace with the increasing use of technology to commit sexual offences.
The clause rightly expands that to cover not just situations where the individual exposes their genitals to cause alarm or distress, but those where they do so for the purpose of sexual gratification and are reckless as to whether the exposure may cause alarm, distress or humiliation to someone who sees it. That follows the Law Commission’s reporting that it had received evidence indicating that limiting the offence to cases where there was intent to cause alarm or distress was too restrictive. It found that motivations such as seeking sexual gratification or aiming to humiliate the victim were also significant factors behind exposure-related behaviour. The Minister made a clear case for this change to the law, but also set out the impact that such behaviour can have or lead to.
Exposing yourself in public, often referred to as flashing, is a serious and unacceptable criminal offence. It is not just inappropriate; it can cause genuine fear, distress and long-term psychological harm to those who witness it, especially when the victim is a child or vulnerable person. Flashing is not a harmless prank or joke; it is a violation of personal boundaries and can be deeply traumatic. It demonstrates a lack of respect for others and a disregard for the basic right to feel safe in public spaces. This kind of behaviour erodes trust in the community and contributes to a culture of intimidation and discomfort. It is right that we take every measure to stop indecent exposure.
Proposed new section 66(1A) of the 2003 Act aims to introduce a safeguard by excluding certain scenarios, where the exposure is intended only for a specific person or group, from the offence. In such cases, the offence will not be committed under the sexual gratification limb unless the individual is also reckless as to whether one or more of those people will be caused alarm, distress or humiliation. This provision seeks to ensure that consensual acts of nudity—for example, between partners in a secluded area—are not criminalised simply because they are accidentally witnessed by a third party.
The clause will help to ensure that perpetrators of sexually motivated public exposure, such as flashing, can be held to account even if they deny intending to cause harm. The revised wording offers greater clarity for law enforcement and the courts, ensuring that such harmful behaviours are prosecuted more effectively while also providing reasonable protections for consensual and private conduct.
It has been reported that flashing offences have doubled in a decade, with more than 1,000 instances of indecent exposure being reported to the police every month, but barely one in 10 leads to a charge. In the light of that, can the Minister confirm whether she is confident that new subsection (1A) will not inadvertently create a loophole for perpetrators to evade accountability by claiming that their exposure was intended for only a particular person?
Jack Rankin
The clause aims to strengthen the protections for individuals from indecent exposure, and to ensure that our communities remain safe and respectful spaces for all. It seeks to provide clearer definitions and stricter penalties for offences involving indecent exposure so that perpetrators of such offences are held accountable and victims receive the justice that they deserve for this sexual crime.
While sometimes dismissed as minor, exposure of this kind can have a significant psychological and emotional impact on victims. It is not a trivial matter and can often be a precursor to more severe offences, as we saw with the tragic murder of Sarah Everard, and it contributes to a climate of fear and discomfort in public spaces. Multiple incidents of indecent exposure were linked to the convicted murderer of Sarah Everard before the tragic events of her death in March 2021. In 2015 and 2020, allegations of indecent exposure were made against him in Kent, where he was said to have exposed himself in public. Those reports were not fully investigated at the time. In February 2021, just days before he abducted and murdered Sarah Everard, he was reported to police for exposing himself to staff at a McDonald’s drive-through in Kent. Despite that report being made on 28 February, no meaningful action was taken prior to the murder, which occurred on 3 March. Those incidents have since been heavily scrutinised during inquests and reviews, revealing systematic failures in policing responses to sexual offences, especially so-called lower-level offences such as exposure.
While I welcome the expansion of the scope of this offence through clause 57, I urge police to use the new powers and treat these crimes as the serious crimes that they are. They can be a warning of even worse crimes to come. I welcome the Minister’s statement that the College of Policing guidance is being changed appropriately. Being subjected to indecent exposure by a stranger while walking home can leave a woman with lasting trauma. Such behaviour is unacceptable and should be met with appropriate consequences.
Alex Davies-Jones
I thank the hon. Member for Windsor for his important contribution. It is right that we expand the scope of the offence to ensure that all victims are properly protected and that perpetrators are brought to adequate justice. As he rightly pointed out, justice is a system; it needs every part to work. We need to ensure that the police are equipped with the guidance, training and tools to go after these foul perpetrators—they need to know what to do, what to look for and who to find. They should be taking this seriously, so I am glad that the College of Policing guidance is now in place. We need the CPS to have the offences available to charge the perpetrators—that is what this Bill will provide—and then we need the court system to be available to hear the cases so that justice can be brought.
The shadow Minister sought reassurance that perpetrators would be brought to justice. As I have just outlined, we are assured that we have all the tools available; we just need to stop these acts taking place. This modest but vital step is part of our wider strategy to halve violence against women and girls. These crimes may be low level and classed as non-contact, but sadly we all know what happens when they escalate. It is important that we take them seriously and have robust laws in place to deal with them.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 57 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 58
Sexual activity with a corpse
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Alex Davies-Jones
I feel that I should provide hon. Members with a content warning before I discuss what this new offence does, and it is probably quite important that we are doing this before lunch. Clause 58 is on a gruesome but none the less important issue. The clause introduces an amendment by expanding the law on sexual activity with a corpse—a distinct and abhorrent type of offending, as shown in the recent case of David Fuller. The sheer horror and repulsiveness of the crime cannot be overstated. My heartfelt condolences go out to the families of those subject to the offence, who have been profoundly affected by these unimaginable, heinous acts. The clause will address a wider range of such despicable behaviour and mark the beginning of a very important step towards ensuring justice for all. We are committed to stopping all such behaviour by making a significant change today. I would like to take a moment to set out the history of the offence.
The Labour Government introduced the Sexual Offences Act 2003 after a full and extensive consultation called “Setting the Boundaries”. It significantly modernised and strengthened the laws on sexual offences in England and Wales. One of the key recommendations from “Setting the Boundaries” was the inclusion of the offence of sexual penetration of a corpse, in chapter 8, “Other Offences”. At the time, the consultation said:
“It came as a surprise to most members of the review that there was no such protection in law for human remains and that necrophilia was not illegal.”
That is why the recommendation was simply put that sexual penetration of a corpse needed to be a criminal offence. Then and now, a Labour Government have demonstrated the importance of getting such legislation right to prevent such heinous behaviour. The commitment was evident then and remains even more crucial now.
I would like to extend my heartfelt thanks to the independent inquiry for its thorough investigation into the horrific acts committed by David Fuller in the mortuaries of the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells hospitals. The interim report, published on 15 October 2024, provides essential preliminary findings and recommendations for the funeral sector, highlighting areas that require attention. We eagerly await the final report and will carefully consider its findings to ensure that such atrocities are never repeated. At the core of our efforts, we remain deeply mindful of the families of those subjected to the offence. Their pain and suffering are unimaginable, and our thoughts are with them. We are grateful to the families of the deceased who have bravely come forward to speak publicly about their experiences in the hopes of making lasting change. We understand that revisiting these traumatic events is incredibly painful, and we are truly sorry for any additional distress caused by bringing these matters up in Parliament, but their voices are vital in ensuring justice.
Police officers have played a vital role in explaining the immense challenges faced while gathering evidence for the courts. Their painstaking work in sifting through the horrific images and explaining the evidence was crucial. Without their efforts, we might not have fully understood the importance of broadening the offence to include sexual touching. Their dedication and professionalism have been instrumental in bringing David Fuller to justice. David Fuller is serving a whole life sentence for his abhorrent crimes. As Mrs Justice Cheema-Grubb stated during the sentencing, his
“actions go against everything that is right and humane. They are incomprehensible”
and
“had no regard for the dignity of the dead.”
These words resonate deeply with all of us, reinforcing the importance of upholding the dignity of, and respect for, those who have passed.
We are committed to ensuring that justice is secured for the families of the deceased in all cases of sexual activity with a corpse, not just in cases of penetration. That is why the clause repeals the existing offence of sexual penetration of a corpse in section 70 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and replaces it with a broader offence of sexual activity with a corpse. The broader offence still criminalises sexual penetration of a corpse, but it also criminalises non-penetrative sexual touching, adding it into the criminal law for the first time. It increases the maximum penalty for sexual penetration of a corpse from two to seven years’ imprisonment. Where penetration is not involved, the maximum penalty will be five years’ imprisonment. The new offence will be committed whenever a person intentionally touches the body of a dead person if they know they are dead or are reckless as to whether the person they are touching is dead, and the touching is sexual. Touching is already defined in section 79(8) of the 2003 Act.
We want to ensure that criminal law is robust and comprehensive, effectively addressing the harm caused by this reprehensible behaviour. It is imperative that our criminal law evolves to encompass additional forms of abuse, particularly those that violate the dignity and sanctity of individuals both alive and deceased. By broadening the offence to include non-penetrative actions, such as the sexual touching of a corpse, the law will be more robust, ensuring that perpetrators cannot escape justice.
Our commitment extends beyond merely updating the law and involves a holistic approach to justice that prioritises respect for those affected. We strive to create an environment in which such heinous acts are met with the strongest possible legal repercussions, ensuring that justice is served and, importantly, that the families of the deceased receive the support and closure they so rightly deserve. I commend clause 58 to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
The clause updates and strengthens the current offence of sexual activity involving a corpse, as set out in section 70 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The revised provisions broaden the scope of the offence by replacing the term “sexual penetration” with the more encompassing term “sexual activity”. The clause replicates a provision of the Conservative Government’s Criminal Justice Bill, which fell due to the 2024 general election. The change ensures that any form of intentional sexual touching of a dead body—not just acts of penetration—will be captured by the law.
Many members of the public are shocked to hear that these vile and horrific offences take place, and will be further shocked that some of this activity is not covered by the law. Currently, section 70 of the 2003 Act defines the offence of sexual penetration of a corpse. That offence applies when a person intentionally sexually penetrates the body of a deceased individual, and knows or is reckless as to whether the body is that of a deceased person. The offence carries a maximum sentence of two years’ imprisonment.
As the Minister mentioned, the provision was notably used in the high-profile case of David Fuller, a former hospital electrician who was convicted under section 70 for multiple instances of sexual penetration involving the bodies of at least 100 women and girls in hospital mortuaries. However, the current scope of section 70 does not extend to non-penetrative sexual acts, so it could not have been used to prosecute further allegations against Fuller relating to other forms of sexual activity with the bodies of his victims. Under this legislation, a person commits an offence if they intentionally touch a part of a dead person’s body, with that touching being sexual in nature, and if they either know or are reckless as to the fact that the body is that of a deceased person.
The clause also provides a new, tiered sentencing structure. Where the sexual activity involves penetration, the offence carries a maximum penalty of seven years’ imprisonment. In all other cases, the maximum penalty is five years. These sentencing thresholds aim to reflect the seriousness of the conduct, while allowing courts flexibility to reflect the nature of the offence. The new offence introduces different maximum sentences depending on whether penetration is involved. Can the Minister explain how these sentencing thresholds were determined, and have the Government considered how the updated offence aligns with comparable offences in other jurisdictions? Does this bring us into line with international best practice?
Jack Rankin
There have been some truly harrowing cases that have exposed the inadequacies of our current legal framework in this regard. As both the Minister and the shadow Minister highlighted, the case of David Fuller is the obvious and most extreme example—a hospital electrician who, over 12 years, sexually abused the bodies of more than 100 women and girls in women and mortuaries. His crimes went undetected for decades, revealing significant systematic failure. I fully support the clause that the Minister has outlined, particularly because, as Baroness Noakes has highlighted during parliamentary debates, had Fuller not been convicted of murder, he might have faced only a minimal sentence for his other offences.
I have several critical questions on clause 58. I appreciate that the clause would significantly increase the penalty, but are those proposed penalties sufficient? Given the gravity of these offences, should the maximum sentence not be even higher, so that it serves as a stronger deterrent? Take the example of David Fuller. If we had caught him before the murder, under the provisions of the Bill, would he have been given seven years, and is that enough? What safeguards are in place? How can institutions, especially hospitals and funeral homes, implement stricter protocols to prevent such abuses? Perhaps the Minister can comment on that. How do we support the victims’ families? Beyond legal measures, what support systems are available to help families to cope with the trauma inflicted by disgusting crimes such as this? Clause 58 is clearly a necessary and long overdue reform that acknowledges the sanctity of the deceased and the rights of the families, and provides greater justice for those who can no longer speak for themselves. I welcome it.
Alex Davies-Jones
I welcome the comments from the shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Windsor. Both touched on sentencing, and I am happy to address their questions. We have considered a range of options. Increasing the statutory maximum for section 70 to seven years is in keeping with the other serious contact offences in the Sexual Offences Act, while it remains lower than most of the serious contact sexual offences against living victims. Sexual assault and rape, for example, have a maximum penalty of 10 years and life imprisonment respectively. The statutory maximum set out in the clause is for a single offence. If a person receives multiple convictions for this offence, or if that offence is committed alongside other offences, then the court may adjust the overall sentence to reflect the totality of the offending in the ordinary way.
We also heard strong evidence of the harm caused by this offending to victims’ families and believe that two years does not reflect the harm caused. We have, therefore, considered, in particular, the serious emotional and psychological distress and the feelings of shame and embarrassment that the families undergo, knowing that the bodies of their loved ones have been sexually abused. It is therefore right that the new law takes
“Concealment, destruction, defilement or dismemberment of the body”
as a factor that indicates high culpability on the part of the offender, and that a more serious punishment may, therefore, be appropriate.
I remind hon. Members that we currently have a sentencing review in place, which is reviewing all the offences available and looking at this. That independent review is ongoing and we anticipate that it will report this year. We are also aware that the Law Commission is considering a review of the criminal law around the desecration of bodies as part of its next programme of law reform. We are currently discussing the possibility of looking into this with it. Let me reassure Members that we are not stopping and that we will not hesitate to go further if required.
On the support available for victims, I would like to reassure the hon. Member for Windsor that victim support is always available for anyone who has been a victim of crime, whether or not that crime has been reported to the police. I encourage any victim, survivor or family to reach out to victim support. The Ministry of Justice funds a number of victim support organisations and provides grants to local police and crime commissioners to provide tailored support in their areas for whatever they feel is necessary. We also have the victims’ code, which outlines exactly what victims are entitled to if they have been a victim of crime, and support is one of the many elements available to them there. I encourage anyone to reach out and seek the support that is available.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 58 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 59
Notification of name change
Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 36, in clause 59, page 59, line 11, at end insert—
“(11) If a relevant offender does not comply with the requirements of this section, they shall be liable to a fine not exceeding Level 4 on the standard scale.”
This amendment imposes a fine of up to £2,500 if a registered sex offender does not notify the police when they change their name.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 50, in clause 59, page 59, line 11, at end insert—
“(11) Police must notify victims of relevant offender’s new name—
(a) No less than three days before an offender intends to use it, or
(b) If that is not reasonably practicable, no less than three days after the date the offender began using it.”
This amendment would place a duty on police forces to notify victims if their abuser legally changed their name.
Clause stand part.
Amendment 37, in clause 60, page 60, line 25, at end insert—
“(10) If a relevant offender does not comply with the requirements of this section, they shall be liable to a fine not exceeding Level 4 on the standard scale.”
This amendment imposes a fine of up to £2,500 if a registered sex offender does not notify the police when they are absent from their sole or main residence.
Clause 60 stand part.
Amendment 38, in clause 61, page 63, line 4, at end insert—
“(9) If a relevant offender does not comply with the requirements of this section, they shall be liable to a fine at Level 5 of the standard scale.”
This amendment imposes an unlimited fine if a relevant registered sex offender does not notify police if they are entering a premises where children are presented.
Clause 61 stand part.
Clause 66 stand part.
New clause 55—Annual statement on employment status of sexual offenders—
“(1) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report on the employment status of convicted sexual offenders at the time of their offence.
(2) For the purpose of subsection (1), ‘Sexual offenders’ means any person found guilty of an offence stipulated in the Sexual Offences Act 2003.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to release an annual report on the employment status of convicted sexual offenders.
Matt Vickers
Opposition amendment 36 introduces a financial penalty for a registered sex offender who fails to notify the police of a name change. The penalty, set at a fine not exceeding £2,500, aims to ensure that offenders remain fully accountable for complying with the notification requirements under the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The failure to notify the police of a change in name could undermine the effectiveness of the existing system designed to monitor and track sex offenders, making it crucial to incentivise full adherence to the notification process.
Sexual offences are among the most serious and traumatic crimes, leaving deep and lasting harm on victims, emotionally, psychologically and socially. These offences often involve a profound breach of trust and personal safety, with long-term consequences for victims’ wellbeing and mental health. The most severe cases can shatter lives and destroy families. Because of the gravity and impact of these crimes, it is vital that society sets a clear and uncompromising message that such behaviour will not be tolerated, including in the conditions and requirements that follow conviction.
Crime and Policing Bill (Eleventh sitting)
Tuesday 29th April 2025
(1 year ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 29 April 2025 - (29 Apr 2025)
The Chair
We continue line-by-line scrutiny of the Crime and Policing Bill. I have a few preliminary reminders for the Committee. As it is warm today, Members may take their jacket off if they wish—I will probably take mine off. Please switch all your electronic devices to silent. No food or drink is permitted during sittings of the Committee, except for the water provided. Hansard colleagues will be grateful if Members could email their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk or, alternatively, pass them to one of the Hansard colleagues in the room. If Members wish to speak, I remind them to bob to catch my eye.
Clause 78
Electronic devices for use in vehicle offences
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)
Good morning, Ms Lewell. It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair on this glorious day.
Clause 78 introduces two new criminal offences in relation to electronic devices used in vehicle-related theft. The first will criminalise the possession of such devices, and the second will criminalise the importing, making, adapting, supplying or offering to supply such devices. Both offences require a reasonable suspicion that the device will be used in connection with the theft of a vehicle, theft of anything in a vehicle, or taking a vehicle without authority.
A significant proportion of vehicle theft is driven by serious and organised crime groups, and it costs millions of pounds in social and economic harm each year. Given the high demand for stolen vehicles and vehicle parts, this is an attractive and lucrative area for criminals to profit from. Criminals find ways to overcome security measures, even in the latest vehicle models, by using electronic devices to exploit vulnerabilities in vehicles and new technologies. The Metropolitan Police Service estimates that electronic devices are used in approximately 60% of vehicle thefts in London.
The clause does not define specific electronic devices, but uses a broad definition to cover any electronic device that could be used in vehicle theft. That ensures that the legislation is future-proof for any new devices that may be developed and used by criminals. The offence will be triable either way and, on conviction on indictment, will carry a maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment, an unlimited fine or both.
We have also provided a defence for a person charged with this offence to show that they did not intend or suspect that the relevant article would be used in connection with the theft of a vehicle or anything in a vehicle. The clause also outlines that the court may assume that the defendant possessed the relevant article where it is on any premises at the same time as the defendant, or on premises at which the defendant was the occupier or an habitual user otherwise than as a member of the public. The defendant will have a defence where they can show that they did not know of an article’s presence on the premises or had no control over the article. During proceedings, a court can also assume that the articles in question are intended to be used in vehicle theft. That reflects the fact that the specified articles have few legitimate uses.
Clause 79 supports clause 78 by clarifying the evidential burdens for the new offence, while also inserting it into the list of lifestyle offences in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. That means that, if convicted of this offence, a person’s assets will be considered to have potentially derived from crime and may be subject to confiscation. To have a defence, a defendant will be required to establish the facts that are within their knowledge—such as demonstrating that they run a company that supplies legitimate electronic devices.
Signal repeaters, which have been approved for use by Ofcom, are legal to own and use to boost an otherwise weak mobile phone signal, for example. If a defendant can demonstrate that they did not intend, nor reasonably suspect, that the articles were to be used in vehicle theft, the evidential burden falls back on the prosecution. The prosecution will need to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant had reasonable grounds to suspect that the article they were importing, making, modifying, supplying, offering to supply or possessing would be used in vehicle theft.
That reverse evidential burden is appropriate given the few legitimate uses associated with the specified articles. It will ensure that law enforcement agencies are able to target those individuals who keep just enough distance from the serious offences being carried out to avoid consequences under existing legislation.
Serious and organised crime has a devastating effect— I am sure we can all agree on that. Clauses 78 and 79 send a clear message about our commitment to tackling vehicle crime and associated serious and organised criminality, and to making it easier for the police to take action. That means more prosecutions and more criminals off our streets, which will help to restore public confidence.
Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Lewell.
Clause 78 rightly introduces new offences aimed at preventing the misuse of electronic devices such as signal jammers, signal amplifiers and devices used to access vehicle wiring systems for committing vehicle-related crimes. The offences include the possession, importation, manufacturing, adaptation, supply or offer to supply such devices when there is reasonable suspicion that they will be used in connection with crimes such as vehicle theft, stealing items from a vehicle or taking a vehicle without authority.
The subsections provide a defence for individuals who can prove that they did not intend or suspect that the device would be used for a relevant offence, and they allow a court to presume possession of a device if it is found on premises occupied or habitually used by the accused, unless the accused can demonstrate that they were unaware of its presence or had no control over it.
Clause 79 clarifies the evidential burden in cases under clause 78, which deals with electronic devices used in vehicles. It explains that where a defendant seeks to rely on such a defence—for example, that they did not intend the device to be used in a crime—they must provide enough evidence to raise the issue, and the prosecution must then disprove it beyond reasonable doubt.
Clauses 78 and 79 are needed to strengthen the legal response to the growing threat of tech-enabled vehicle theft, which has become increasingly sophisticated with the use of electronic devices such as signal jammers and relay attack tools. Clause 78 creates targeted offences around the possession, manufacture and supply of such devices, recognising the role they play in modern vehicle crime. By focusing on intent and suspicion, the clause allows for earlier intervention and prevention even before a theft occurs.
We support the measures, but what consultation was done with law enforcement, manufacturers and cyber-security experts to develop the provisions? Does the Minister expect this designation to lead to more asset confiscation from organised crime groups involved in vehicle theft?
Luke Taylor (Sutton and Cheam) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Lewell, as always.
The Liberal Democrats very much welcome the measures in clauses 78 and 79 to give the police and courts more powers to reduce vehicle theft. It is disheartening to see so much car theft in our cities, particularly London. In south-west London, a regular complaint of residents is that the police are not able to do anything about it. The police themselves are struggling. The technology has become an arms race, and these clauses are needed to keep up with thefts that are becoming so much more technologically advanced.
It is depressing that a litany of old-fashioned manual theft prevention measures are now necessary again—people are having to use steering locks and wheel clamps—because the police cannot keep up with the technology that thieves employ. We are very supportive of these measures to give the police the tools they need to crack down on this incredibly distressing form of theft.
David Burton-Sampson (Southend West and Leigh) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell.
Signal jammers and other electronic devices are a real problem, and one that many of my residents did not realise exist until they were hit. I will never forget knocking on a door one Saturday morning, when the resident opened and said, “Where’s my car gone?” She said, “I’d locked it. It should be here,” but it turned out, again, that her car had been stolen using such a technique. The immediate inconvenience of a theft is significant, but it is not the only consequence. The victim may have to rearrange plans as they no longer have their car, and there are longer-term issues such as increased insurance premiums because of the theft.
Keyless cars, which once seemed super-convenient, are now seen by many as a significant security flaw. I will never forget watching on CCTV after my neighbour’s car was stolen a few years ago using this exact method. The individual walked up to the car, gained entry and drove off, all in 45 seconds. Essex police has said that its stolen vehicles intelligence unit recovered £13.5 million-worth of stolen vehicles and parts in 2024—this is a real issue. I welcome clauses 78 and 79 and the tough new penalties for those who consider it appropriate to commit this crime, which is so disruptive to people’s lives.
David Taylor (Hemel Hempstead) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to speak under your chairship, Ms Lewell. I rise to speak in favour of clause 78, which tackles the growing scourge of criminals using high-tech devices to steal from hard-working people, because I know how important this is in my community. For 14 years, between 2010 and 2024, crime in my patch doubled. These thieves no longer need a crowbar; they use laptops, signal boosters and hacking tools to rob families of their vehicles, their livelihoods and their sense of safety. Enough is enough. Clause 78 strikes directly at those parasites by making it an offence not just to steal but to possess, import, manufacture or supply the very devices that make these thefts possible—it cuts off the tools of their horrific trade.
I recently heard from a Hemel resident who, back in December 2023, had his truck broken into and all his work tools stolen. Then, in November 2024, his family’s disability car was also stolen. Later, two of their neighbours’ cars were stolen along with hundreds of pounds-worth of equipment, having been parked side by side in a lay-by by their homes.
This clause sends a message: “If you are gearing up to commit a crime, this country will come down on you like a ton of bricks.” Let us be clear that this is not about targeting legitimate businesses or technology users; it is about targeting criminals, gangs and the shadow economy that thrives on stealing from working people and laughing as they do it. Subsection (3) rightly offers a defence for those acting innocently, but it removes the cloak of plausible deniability that too many criminals have hidden behind for too long.
The people of Hemel Hempstead are fed up. They are tired of waking up to find their cars stolen, they are tired of seeing criminals treated as an inevitable part of life, and they are tired of seeing their vans broken into and their tools stolen. They expect and demand that we act, and act we must. We have to stand up for the delivery driver who loses their van, for the care worker who needs her car to get to her patients, and for every family who fear that they will become a victim of crime. It is not enough simply to chase stolen vehicles after they are gone. We must prevent these thefts from happening in the first place, and we must choke off the supply of tools that fuel this criminality. We must make it clear that there are no easy pickings for those who prey on working people.
I am proud that the Bill does not stop with vehicle crime. It invests in neighbourhood policing, strengthens the fight against organised crime and clamps down on new forms of digital exploitation. It rebuilds the idea that security—real, everyday security—is a right, not a privilege. The Bill is a line in the sand; it says to criminals, “Your time is up,” and it says to our communities, “We hear you and we are on your side.” For Hemel Hempstead, for our towns and cities and for the millions of honest people who deserve better, I urge hon. Members to back clause 78 and the Crime and Policing Bill without hesitation.
Dame Diana Johnson
I welcome the support for the two clauses. We all know the devastation that the theft of a motor vehicle and its contents can cause to our constituents. I want specifically to address the questions posed by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton West. As he may recall, vehicle crime was raised in the previous Government’s serious organised crime consultation. After that, conversations with law enforcement, vehicle manufacturers and Ofcom have confirmed that this is a key issue. I know from speaking to car manufacturers that they welcome the legislation.
We are also working closely with the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for vehicle crime to reduce vehicle crime through the national vehicle crime working group and the recently established, industry-funded national vehicle crime reduction partnership. The vehicle crime action plan was formed through the national vehicle crime working group and in conjunction with the Home Office, and it includes commitments to work with motor industry representatives to consider crime prevention measures that can be taken to prevent thefts.
The hon. Member for Stockton West also asked about the effect of the clauses on offending. As I indicated, designating the new offence as a lifestyle offence under POCA will support the increased confiscation of the proceeds of vehicle crime, which chimes well with sending a clear message to criminals that enough is enough and that we will come after them.
With that, I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 78 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 79 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 80
Possession of a SIM farm
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to consider the following:
Clauses 81 and 82 stand part.
Schedule 10.
Clauses 83 to 85 stand part.
Dame Diana Johnson
This group relates to SIM farms. We know that criminals abuse telecommunications networks, including texts and calls, to target people and defraud victims at a significant scale. We most likely all know of a friend, family member or constituent who has received such a text, or we have even received one ourselves—I certainly have. Such scams prey on the public, particularly those who are vulnerable. They can have a devastating emotional impact and can inflict serious financial harm on victims.
Scam texts are frequently traced back to SIM farms—electronic devices that can hold sometimes hundreds of physical SIM cards, which can be used to send out thousands of scam texts and calls in seconds. They are currently legal for anyone to buy, and it is easy to find suppliers online, making it easy to commit telecoms fraud on a very large scale. Clauses 80 and 81 therefore provide for new offences that criminalise the possession of SIM farms without good reason, and their supply without undertaking adequate due diligence.
Clauses 83 to 85 will also allow the potential extension of the ban to further technologies that may be exploited by criminals to scam the UK public, with any such extension subject to a high level of scrutiny and checks. The new offences will make it difficult for criminals to access and use these devices for the purpose of fraud. They will give the police the necessary tools to disrupt fraudsters, even before they start using SIM farms to commit fraud.
Clause 80 bans the possession of a SIM farm without good reason. A person can possess a SIM farm if they can prove that they have a good reason or lawful authority to do so. The Government have identified several legitimate uses of SIM farms, such as multi-SIM devices used in broadcast and programme-making to facilitate the production and delivery of live and pre-recorded broadcasts.
SIM farms are also used by transport providers to offer wi-fi—I am sure most hon. Members who have to travel frequently will welcome the availability of wi-fi—not only on trains, but on trams, buses, coaches and ferries, as the devices switch between mobile network operators, depending on which has the best reception where the device is located at any particular moment. We have worked closely with stakeholders to develop a defence that will allow such legitimate use to continue uninterrupted, while stopping criminals using SIM farms for criminal activities.
Clause 80 provides examples of what may be a good reason to possess a SIM farm, including the provision of broadcast services, the operation or maintenance of a public transport service and the operation or maintenance of an electronic communications network. The list of good reasons in subsection (3) is not exhaustive and it would be open to a person under investigation for, or charged with, the offence to argue that they have another good reason for possessing a SIM farm.
Matt Vickers
A SIM farm is a system used to manage and operate a large number of SIM cards simultaneously, often using multiple mobile devices or modems controlled by central software. Farms can contain hundreds or even thousands of SIM cards, and they are typically used to send or receive a high volume of messages, calls or mobile data across networks.
While there can be legitimate uses for SIM farms, such as in telecoms testing or large-scale communication platforms, they are commonly associated with illicit and fraudulent activities. One of their most concerning uses is in the spread of spam and phishing texts, where mass messages with links to scams or malware are sent to unsuspecting individuals. They are also frequently used to bypass verification systems by creating large numbers of fake accounts on social media, messaging apps or online services. In other cases, SIM farms are employed in SIM box fraud, a scheme in which international calls are rerouted and disguised as local calls, depriving telecom providers and Governments of revenue and making the original caller harder to trace.
According to research carried out by Ofcom in August 2022, the scale of nuisance and potentially fraudulent communications across UK mobile networks remains alarmingly high. An overwhelming 75% of mobile users reported receiving suspicious texts or calls in just a three-month period, highlighting the widespread nature of the issue. These figures demonstrate the persistent and pervasive threat posed by scam communications, underlining the urgent need for more robust protections and enforcement mechanisms to safeguard the public.
SIM farms pose serious risks to national security and digital infrastructure. Their use can lead to network congestion, overwhelming mobile networks and disrupting legitimate communications. More critically, they are often exploited by organised crime networks to co-ordinate illegal activity as they are cheap, disposable and difficult to trace. That makes it significantly harder for law enforcement to monitor communications or link messages to specific individuals. The previous Conservative Government committed to banning SIM farms as part of their fraud strategy announced in May 2023. They subsequently launched a consultation on how best to implement the ban, although, interestingly, there were only 50 responses, many from businesses or individuals identifying as legitimate SIM farm users who opposed a ban.
In response to the 2023 Home Office consultation on SIM farms, Mobile UK, the trade body representing the UK’s four major mobile network operators, raised concerns that the proposed ban risked being ineffective due to evolving fraud tactics and technological advancements, including the fact that single-SIM devices, rather than SIM farms, are now the most common tools used to send spam SMS messages, according to data from one mobile operator. Mobile UK further warned that the proposed measures would not eliminate large-scale spam or scam messaging, and urged the Government to broaden the definition of SIM farm to include software-based or e-SIM-enabled methods used to achieve the same fraudulent outcomes.
In the Criminal Justice Bill in the 2023-24 Session, the previous Government included provisions to criminalise the possession or supply of devices capable of holding five or more SIM cards, targeting the infrastructure used in large-scale scams. I welcome the Government’s carrying forward the provisions in the Criminal Justice Bill to amend the definition of SIM farm and prohibit other electronic devices used to commit fraud via secondary legislation.
Clause 80 introduces the new criminal offence of possessing a SIM farm, reflecting growing concerns about their misuse in fraudulent and criminal activity. The clause makes it an offence for an individual to possess such a system unless they can demonstrate that they have a lawful authority or good reason for doing so. That shifts the burden to the defendant to prove the legitimacy of their possession, aiming to deter misuse while protecting legitimate operations.
The clause also provides examples of what may constitute a good reason, including the use of SIM farms for broadcasting services, public transport operations, communications network maintenance or freight tracking. Those carve-outs are designed to safeguard industries with genuine operational needs for such technology, while still targeting the widespread abuse seen in mass-messaging scams, SIM box fraud and illegitimate telecommunications activity. The clause is a key part of the broader effort to close regulatory gaps and strengthen the legal tools available to tackle modern digital fraud.
Clause 81 makes it a criminal offence to supply a SIM farm to another person. Clause 82 offers a meaningful definition of what constitutes a SIM farm for the purposes of clauses 80 and 81, and provides the Secretary of State with the power to amend the definition by regulation. Schedule 10 provides for powers of entry and other investigatory powers relating to offences involving SIM farms. Clauses 83 to 85 create the offence of possessing a “specified article”; criminalise the supply of such articles, with appropriate exemptions; set out the sanctions; and allow for the Secretary of State to amend the definition of a specific article via amendment to keep the legislation in line with technology and changing criminal behaviours.
Will there be a formal review mechanism to assess the effectiveness and proportionality of these offences, particularly regarding the number of prosecutions under clauses 80 to 85? Given Mobile UK’s concerns that fraudsters are increasingly using single-SIM devices, e-SIMs and apps such as WhatsApp to bypass traditional SMS channels, is the Minister confident that the measures in the Bill and the Government’s current definition of SIM farm are sufficiently future-proof to tackle emerging forms of fraud?
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell. I support the clauses, which outlaw the use of SIM farms and the supply of SIM farms to others.
It is a defence for a person to show that they have “good reason” to use a SIM farm. Examples are given in the Bill, including providing broadcasting services, operating or maintaining a public transport service and tracking freight. I do not suggest that amendments are necessary, but I wonder whether the Minister can help us understand the provisions. What are examples of legitimate use in broadcasting services or tracking freight? These are areas of legitimate commercial activity that lay people are not particularly familiar with. I would be interested to know why a company would want to use multiple SIMs and phone numbers to track freight, for example. It is not meant to be a complex question.
Dame Diana Johnson
I am glad that there is cross-party support for these measures. The clauses were, on the whole, included in the Criminal Justice Bill introduced by the previous Government.
Fighting fraud is a top priority for this Government and tackling it is really important not only for our safer streets mission but for our growth agenda. We want to address the full range of fraud threats that occur. We want to close the systemic enablers that criminals are able to exploit to operate at scale and without detection, such as SIM farms.
The hon. Member for Stockton West is right that such a provision was included in the Criminal Justice Bill, but we have updated the definition of SIM farm to reflect newly emerging use cases. In response to feedback from stakeholders, we are creating an additional offence for the possession and supply of additional technologies, to be specified in the future, with appropriate exceptions to avoid unnecessary restrictions on legitimate businesses and professionals. I hope that goes some way to reassuring the hon. Member about why we are trying to future-proof these clauses. On the issue of review, the provisions will be reviewed two years after commencement.
On the point about legitimate activity, as I said, the list in the Bill is not exhaustive; it gives some indication of legitimate reasons why a business or organisation might have a SIM farm in its possession. Whether a reason is reasonable and stands up to scrutiny will obviously be a matter for the court to decide. The list is not exhaustive, in order to provide flexibility; as I said, this area is changing rapidly. In the coming weeks, months and years there may be new legitimate reasons for businesses to possess a SIM farm to assist them in providing a service or selling something. The clauses are constructed as they are in order to allow that flexibility.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 80 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 81 and 82 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 10 agreed to.
Clauses 83 to 85 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 86
Offence of concealing identity at protests
Jack Rankin (Windsor) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 51, in clause 86, page 98, line 2, at end insert—
“(3) The defence described in subsection (2) is only applicable if a person has given written notice to a police station nearest to the public place that is in a locality designated under section 87(1).
(4) Where it is not reasonably practicable to deliver written notice under subsection (3), a person must inform a constable within the locality designated under section 87(1).”
This amendment requires a person using an item that conceals their identity in a public place within a designated protest area for reasons related to health, religious observance or work to notify the police in writing or orally.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
Clauses 87, 88 and 91 stand part.
New clause 34—Meaning of serious disruption to the life of the community—
“(1) Section 12 of the Public Order Act 1986 (imposing conditions on public processions) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (2A), for the words from ‘, the cases’ to the end substitute—
‘(a) the cases in which a public procession in England and Wales may result in serious disruption to the life of the community include, in particular, where it may, by way of physical obstruction, result in—
(i) the prevention of, or a hindrance that is more than minor to, the carrying out of day-to-day activities (including in particular the making of a journey),
(ii) the prevention of, or a delay that is more than minor to, the delivery of a time-sensitive product to consumers of that product, or
(iii) the prevention of, or a disruption that is more than minor to, access to any essential goods or any essential service,
(b) in considering whether a public procession in England and Wales may result in serious disruption to the life of the community, the senior police officer—
(i) must take into account all relevant disruption, and
(ii) may take into account any relevant cumulative disruption, and
(c) “community”, in relation to a public procession in England and Wales, means any group of persons that may be affected by the procession, whether or not all or any of those persons live or work in the vicinity of the procession.’.
(3) In subsection (2B), for ‘subsection (2A)(a)’ substitute ‘subsection (2A) and this subsection—
“access to any essential goods or any essential service” includes, in particular, access to—
(a) the supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel,
(b) a system of communication,
(c) a place of worship,
(d) a transport facility,
(e) an educational institution, or
(f) a service relating to health;
“area”, in relation to a public procession or public assembly, means such area as the senior police officer considers appropriate, having regard to the nature and extent of the disruption that may result from the procession or assembly;
“relevant cumulative disruption”, in relation to a public procession in England and Wales, means the cumulative disruption to the life of the community resulting from—
(a) the procession,
(b) any other public procession in England and Wales that was held, is being held or is intended to be held in the same area as the area in which the procession mentioned in paragraph (a) is being held or is intended to be held (whether or not directions have been given under subsection (1) in relation to that other procession), and
(c) any public assembly in England and Wales that was held, is being held or is intended to be held in the same area in which the procession mentioned in paragraph (a) is being held or is intended to be held (whether or not directions have been given under section 14(1A) in relation to that assembly), and it does not matter whether or not the procession mentioned in paragraph (a) and any procession or assembly within paragraph (b) or (c) are organised by the same person, are attended by any of the same persons or are held or are intended to be held at the same time;
“relevant disruption”, in relation to a public procession in England and Wales, means all disruption to the life of the community—
(a) that may result from the procession, or
(b) that may occur regardless of whether the procession is held (including in particular normal traffic congestion);’.
(4) Section 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 (imposing conditions on public assemblies) is amended as follows.
(5) In subsection (2A), for the words from ‘, the cases’ to the end substitute ‘—
(a) the cases in which a public assembly in England and Wales may result in serious disruption to the life of the community include, in particular, where it may, by way of physical obstruction, result in—
(i) the prevention of, or a hindrance that is more than minor to, the carrying out of day-to-day activities (including in particular the making of a journey),
(ii) the prevention of, or a delay that is more than minor to, the delivery of a time-sensitive product to consumers of that product, or
(iii) the prevention of, or a disruption that is more than minor to, access to any essential goods or any essential service,
(b) in considering whether a public assembly in England and Wales may result in serious disruption to the life of the community, the senior police officer—
(i) must take into account all relevant disruption, and
(ii) may take into account any relevant cumulative disruption, and
(c) “community”, in relation to a public assembly in England and Wales, means any group of persons that may be affected by the assembly, whether or not all or any of those persons live or work in the vicinity of the assembly.’.
(6) In subsection (2B), for ‘subsection (2A)(a)’ substitute ‘subsection (2A) and this subsection—
“access to any essential goods or any essential service” includes, in particular, access to—
(a) the supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel,
(b) a system of communication,
(c) a place of worship,
(d) a transport facility,
(e) an educational institution, or
(f) a service relating to health;
“area”, in relation to a public assembly or public procession, means such area as the senior police officer considers appropriate, having regard to the nature and extent of the disruption that may result from the assembly or procession;
“relevant cumulative disruption”, in relation to a public assembly in England and Wales, means the cumulative disruption to the life of the community resulting from—
(a) the assembly,
(b) any other public assembly in England and Wales that was held, is being held or is intended to be held in the same area in which the assembly mentioned in paragraph (a) is being held or is intended to be held (whether or not directions have been given under subsection (1A) in relation to that other assembly), and
(c) any public procession in England and Wales that was held, is being held or is intended to be held in the same area as the area in which the assembly mentioned in paragraph (a) is being held or is intended to be held (whether or not directions have been given under section 12(1) in relation to that procession),
and it does not matter whether or not the assembly mentioned in paragraph (a) and any assembly or procession within paragraph (b) or (c) are organised by the same person, are attended by any of the same persons or are held or are intended to be held at the same time;
“relevant disruption”, in relation to a public assembly in England and Wales, means all disruption to the life of the community—
(a) that may result from the assembly, or
(b) that may occur regardless of whether the assembly is held (including in particular normal traffic congestion).’”
This new clause defines “serious disruption to the life of the community” so as to amend the effects of the Zeigler judgement.
New clause 53—Right to protest—
“(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended as follows.
(2) In Part II (Processions and Assemblies) before section 11, insert—
‘10A The right to protest
(1) Everyone has the right to engage in peaceful protest, both alone and with others.
(2) Public authorities have a duty to—
(a) respect the right to protest;
(b) protect the right to protest; and
(c) facilitate the right to protest.
(3) A public authority may only interfere with the right to protest, including by placing restrictions upon its exercise, when it is necessary and proportionate to do so to protect national security or public safety, prevent disorder or crime, protect public health or the rights and freedoms of others.
(4) For the purposes of this section “public authority” has the same meaning as in section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.’”
This new clause would introduce an express statutory right to protest, imposing both negative and positive obligations on public authorities whilst recognising that the right to protest may need to be limited to protect other legitimate public interests.
Jack Rankin
Clause 86 will criminalise the act of wearing or otherwise using an item as a face covering that conceals someone’s own identity or that of another person when in an area that the police have designated. A designation can be made only in relation to an area where the police reasonably believe that a protest may take place or is taking place, that the protest is likely to involve or has involved the commission of offences, and that a designation would prevent or control the commission of offences. The offence will carry a maximum penalty of one month’s imprisonment, a £1,000 fine, or both.
Current legislation gives police the power to direct people to remove their face coverings in designated areas, as well as to seize face coverings where they reasonably believe people are wearing them wholly or mainly for the purpose of concealing their identity. However, individuals can follow the direction of an officer to remove their face covering but then move to a new area and put the face covering back on. With growing frequency we have seen protesters using a face covering to conceal their identity, clearly with the aim of avoiding a conviction for criminal activity in a designated area.
Whether I or any individual hon. Member agrees with each protest is beside the point. The right to protest has long been at the heart of British democracy, but there are legitimate ways to protest and illegitimate ways to protest. In particular, since the onset of large-scale pro-Palestinian demonstrations, the Metropolitan police have made hundreds of arrests in connection with the protests. Those arrests encompass a range of offences, including breaches of Public Order Act conditions, public nuisance, assault of emergency workers and support for proscribed organisations. Notably, during the protest on 18 January 2025, over 70 individuals were arrested after attempting to breach the agreed protest conditions. The Metropolitan police described it as
“the highest number of arrests we have seen, in response to the most significant escalation in criminality.”
The cost of policing the protests is reaching enormous levels. The Standard reported in May last year that the cost in London had reached over £40 million, an average of £6 million a month between October 2023 and March 2024—eyewatering sums of money that I am sure most people and most Members of this House would prefer the police were using to crack down on shoplifting, mobile phone theft and violent crime.
The police put themselves in harm’s way to protect our precious right to protest and keep protesters safe as far as possible. The recent farmers’ protests against proposed inheritance tax reforms were an excellent example of public protest; as of April 2025 there have been no publicly reported arrests by the Metropolitan police in connection with them. The demonstrations, which commenced in November 2024, have been largely peaceful and co-ordinated with the authorities. For instance, on 1 March 2025, the Metropolitan police imposed conditions under the Public Order Act to prevent tractors from entering central London during the protest, a measure that was communicated in advance and adhered to by the organisers.
However, it is a sad reality that disruptive climate activist protests, antisemitic hate marches and far-right riots are increasingly accompanied by crime. Increasingly, cowards at those protests use face coverings and balaclavas to get away with crimes. Balaclavas intimidate the public, make law enforcement more difficult and embolden the wearer to commit crimes. In my view, face coverings have no place at protests in the overwhelming majority of cases. I strongly believe that those wishing to express a sincere, genuine view in a democracy—one they clearly feel strongly about—should be prepared to put their face to their opinions.
With crowds of the kind we are now used to seeing, particularly in London, the police increasingly have to rely on delivering justice after the fact using CCTV, iPhone or bodycam footage. Face coverings frustrate that process. A balaclava, a covid mask or any other type of face covering should not give people a free pass to commit crime. That is why I tabled amendment 51, which would require those wishing to wear a face covering within a designated protest area to register it with police before the event.
My concern with clause 86 is that those who wish to cause a problem will cover their face and make spurious claims. It is clear to most people with some common sense that, as it is currently drafted, with the defence of health, religious or work grounds able to be used, the clause will not have sufficient teeth. Amendment 51 in my name aims to shift the emphasis and prevent malicious actors from circumnavigating the well-intended clause.
A 2024 YouGov poll showed that 61% of the public would like to see a ban on Facebook groups where there is a clear intent to intimidate or to prevent police from identifying someone committing a crime. The public know that face coverings at protests are simply the tool of criminals. Let us give the police the real powers they need to tackle the issue. If people have genuine health, religious or work grounds for wearing a face covering, then working with the police and giving written notice will not be an issue for the law-abiding majority.
Luke Taylor
Can the hon. Gentleman give examples of how this will be enacted? Would the person who has permission to wear a face covering be given notice by the police? Would they be given a permission slip that they will wave above their head when they are taking part in a march, or does he imagine this as a tabard that they wear that allows them to cover their face? Can he give some examples of how he imagines this would be implemented in practical terms?
Jack Rankin
I thank the hon. Member for his constructive question. The problem with this defence is that it will obviously be abused. People who are malicious will claim these things after the fact; my amendment is an attempt to change the emphasis slightly. I appreciate that there will be difficulties with enforcement, but the point is that people should have to do this in advance. People who are malicious will not do so, and will not be given permission, so the police can then take action, as opposed to a crime happening, only for the police to go to the CCTV footage of the moment and find that there is nothing to be done.
Mr Alex Barros-Curtis (Cardiff West) (Lab)
I am listening carefully to the hon. Member. I agree with what he started with, but I am curious to know how he thinks this will work in practice. What practicalities do the police have in place, resource-wise and operationally, in order to deal with this? Similarly, how feasible will it be for the police to deliver notice orally, under proposed subsection (4), in the midst of a protest, when they are busy managing the protest and ensuring that it is safe and secure?
Jack Rankin
I appreciate the operational challenges; I would suggest that this would simply be automated online. My aim is to stop whole groups of protesters wearing masks. My view is that police should reject those applications if they are not legitimate, at which point they can treat it collectively as an offence.
I have a broader question for the Minister. I was thinking about when I would consider it legitimate to wear a mask at a protest. The only instance that I could think of—I am not saying that there are not more—is when, outside the Chinese embassy for example, those protesting what is happening in Hong Kong wish to protect themselves from being targeted by the Chinese state. With my amendment, those individuals should be able to declare that to the relevant police forces ahead of the event. I do wonder how we give proper protection to Hong Kong activists such as Tony Chung and Carmen Lau, who have both had threatening letters sent to their neighbours offering 1 million Hong Kong dollars— 100 grand in our currency—for information about them, or for delivering them to the Chinese embassy. Legitimate protest is in the great spirit of democracy and we need to ensure that we defend people exercising that right properly, particularly in this instance, which would be a legitimate use of face coverings.
Luke Taylor
I wish to raise concerns, as I did in my intervention, about the practicalities of the amendment. Although the hon. Member for Windsor did come on to discuss the case of Hong Kong protestors, we have seen an increase in surveillance by the Chinese state and the Hong Kong authorities of overseas protestors, and transnational repression of democracy activists is an increased worry for many of our residents. I worry that the amendment hinders the freedom to protest without worry of identification and family and friends being targeted elsewhere. This is not only about Hong Kong practising transnational repression in our country, but that is a useful example on which to base my objection. Under amendment 51, those seeking to come to a protest and exercise their democratic right would be required to register in advance and have some sort of certificate or permit that would then have to be checked, one by one. I think that puts an additional barrier in the way of exercising our democratic rights. On that basis, I invite the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.
Matt Vickers
We are all too familiar with those who use protests and the anonymity of face coverings to commit criminal acts and intimidate others. When individuals conceal their identity, whether through masks, scarves or other objects, it becomes much harder for police to identify suspects involved in criminal activity such as violence, vandalism or intimidation. That anonymity can embolden a small number of individuals to commit offences, in the belief that they will not be held accountable. In 2024, masked individuals were reported to have attacked police officers in Rotherham during protests, leading to discussions about banning face coverings at such events. Members might recall that in Birmingham, a group of men wearing balaclavas and waving Palestinian flags stormed a pub, assaulted a patron and caused property damage. That incident was part of wider unrest across the UK, prompting investigations by law enforcement.
My hon. Friend the Member for Windsor has ably set out the purposes and benefits of amendment 51, which seeks to provide a framework requiring those concealing their identity to provide advance notice. We heard during our evidence sessions about the legitimate reasons why people may wish to conceal their identity, and we are also aware of the need to protect the public from those who exploit such concealment to do harm to others. The amendment could provide a great opportunity for law enforcement to assess and monitor situations properly, offering a more flexible and accountable approach to managing exemptions. Does the Minister feel there could be enforcement benefits to having a more flexible power to assess the use of face coverings?
Clause 86 rightly introduces a new offence aimed at individuals concealing their identity while attending public protests in designated areas. It recognises and provides for certain legitimate reasons that a person might have for covering their face, including those related to health, religious observance or occupation. It also rightly sets out obligations on the authorities to ensure public awareness of the rule when it is in effect, as well as the sanctions for those who fail to comply. The clause sends a clear message that protest should be lawful, peaceful and safe. When used appropriately and with the public properly informed, the measure could greatly enhance the safety of both demonstrators and the wider public by discouraging those who intend to use anonymity as a cover for criminal acts.
Clause 87 sets out the powers available to senior police officers to designate a specific locality in England or Wales where the offence of concealing identity at protest will apply. It allows for the designation to be made for up to 24 hours if it is reasonably believed that a protest is happening or is likely to happen in the area, that it may involve criminal activity, and that it is necessary to limit or prevent such offences. The clause further sets out how the designation can be expanded and provides for the British Transport police and Ministry of Defence police to apply similar designations within their jurisdictions. Clause 88 sets out the requirements and procedures around creating such designations.
I would be grateful if the Minister set out what safeguards are in place to ensure that the designation power is not applied disproportionately or used to deter legitimate protests. How will the police ensure that adequate and timely public notice is given to protestors or members of the public who may enter a designated area unknowingly? Will the Minister clarify how long written records of designations and directions would be retained, and whether they would be publicly accessible for scrutiny and accountability? Will there be a requirement for post-event review of designations and use of these powers to assess their proportionality and impact?
Dame Diana Johnson
Clause 86 introduces a new criminal offence for a person
“wearing or otherwise using an item that conceals their identity or another person’s identity”
in a public place that has been designated by the police. It is a defence for a person to prove that they wore or used the item for a purpose related to either the health of the person or others, religious observance or the person’s work. Clause 87 provides that
“A constable whose rank is at least that of inspector may designate a locality in England or Wales that is in their police area for a specified period not exceeding 24 hours if they reasonably believe that—
(a) a public assembly, or public procession, which constitutes a protest may take place or is taking place in the locality,
(b) the protest is likely to involve or has involved the commission of offences, and
(c) it is expedient, in order to prevent or limit the commission of offences, to designate the locality”.
Earlier we heard evidence—the hon. Members for Windsor and for Sutton and Cheam raised this example—about people, perhaps from the Hong Kong community, protesting against the Chinese authorities, and how this provision could affect those who legitimately want to cover their faces because of the reprisals and repercussions that might be threatened against their families back in Hong Kong. I want to be clear: this measure does not create an offence of concealing identity at every protest. The offence applies only to a protest in a locality designated by the police, and they can designate a locality only where they reasonably believe that
“the protest is likely to involve or has involved the commission of offences,”
and that
“it is expedient, in order to prevent or limit the commission of offences, to designate the locality”.
The majority of protests are peaceful and would not be captured by these clauses. The use of these powers and the management of protests is also an operational decision for the police, and we would expect them to consider the nature of the protest, including those who are likely to be present, before deciding to designate an area using this power. I hope that deals with the point raised about protestors from the Hong Kong community, and of course others.
As I have set out, the constable at the rank of inspector who designates a locality must ensure that all reasonable steps are taken to notify the public that the designation has been made, the offences created under clause 86, the locality and the period for which the designation will be enforced. Clause 88 sets out the procedure for designation, including what must be specified. Clause 91 is the interpretation section for part 9 of the Bill.
In recent years, as a number of Members have said, the police have faced significant challenges in policing large-scale protests. While the majority of those attending these protests are exercising their rights peacefully and within the confines of the law, unfortunately we have seen a minority of individuals behave in a criminal manner while hiding their identity. It is vital that the police are able to identify those who commit criminal offences during the course of these protests, because those who commit criminal offences should face justice for their crimes and because preventing criminality at protests ensures that peaceful protestors and the wider community are protected from harm.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Jess Phillips)
The shadow Minister spoke about an incident that happened in my constituency. I want to assure everybody that the people who committed those criminal offences, which were not part of any protest, were held accountable and sent to prison.
Dame Diana Johnson
It is always good to hear when people are held accountable for their criminal actions and punished accordingly, so I am very pleased to hear that.
I want to explain fully how clause 86 will work. At the moment, the police have existing powers to require individuals to remove disguises in designated localities where criminality is likely, but those powers have not always worked in the way that we all want them to, with individuals complying with directions to remove disguises, but then later putting them back on. In a large protest, it is difficult to prevent that from occurring, which is why the new offence makes it a criminal offence to conceal an identity as soon as the locality has been designated.
I want to make it clear that the police have to take all reasonable steps to notify the public that a designation has been made, including the nature of the offence, the locality to which the designation applies and the period during which the designation will be enforced. A designation must be in writing, except for where that is not reasonably practicable, such as in a live and rapidly moving public order situation, in which case the police can make an oral designation instead and record that in writing as soon as reasonably practicable. The maximum penalty for this offence is one month’s imprisonment or a level 3 fine not exceeding £1,000.
Let me turn to the amendments in this group. Amendment 51 seeks to limit the defences in clause 86 to those who have given written notice to the police or, if not reasonably practicable, oral notice. While I understand the motivation behind the amendment, we believe that clause 86 already provides a sufficient and specific statutory defence for individuals who wear or use identity-concealing items for purposes related to health, religious observance or work. Crucially, this defence is subject to a reverse burden of proof, which means that the individual must prove on the balance of probabilities that their use of such an item was for one of these legitimate purposes. This mechanism already ensures that only those with genuine reasons can rely on the defence without placing an undue burden on the prosecution.
Introducing a requirement to notify the police in writing or orally would add an unnecessary and impractical layer of and risk excluding individuals with legitimate defences simply because they did not, or could not, provide prior notice, and could result in the criminalisation of innocent people on procedural grounds. The current legal framework strikes an appropriate balance between public safety and individual rights. Amendment 51 would undermine that balance without offering meaningful enforcement benefits.
New clause 34 seeks to import directly into the Public Order Act 1986 the provisions of the Public Order Act 1986 (Serious Disruption to the Life of the Community) Regulations 2023. The shadow Minister has indicated that the rationale for the new clause is to seek to mitigate the effects of the Supreme Court’s Ziegler judgment in June 2021.
The 2023 regulations amended and clarified the meaning of
“serious disruption to the life of the community”
for the purposes of the police’s powers to imposes conditions on protests under the 1986 Act. They did so by amending the examples of cases that may constitute serious disruption, specifying that the cumulative impact of protests in the same area, and all relevant disruption, may be considered by police, even when it is not protest-related, when they assess the impact of a particular protest for the purpose of imposing conditions. The serious disruption regulations also defined the term “community”. The example of cases that may constitute serious disruption aligned the use of the term with the definition provided in section 34 of the Public Order Act 2023.
The Supreme Court’s judgment in the Ziegler case established that the protection afforded to protesters by articles 10 and 11 of the European convention on human rights extends to circumstances in which the disruption caused by protesters is the intentional obstruction of others. However, the extent of the disruption, and whether it was intentional, are relevant factors in the assessment of proportionality.
Let me take the subjects in turn. First, the shadow Minister will be aware that Liberty successfully challenged the serious disruption regulations in May 2024. This Government disagreed with the High Court’s ruling in that case, particularly in relation to the Court’s finding on consultation. Accordingly, we have appealed the Court’s decision, and await the Court of Appeal’s judgment, which is expected shortly.
Secondly, the provisions in the serious disruption regulations are not discernibly impacted by the Supreme Court’s judgment in the Ziegler case. That judgment relates to the reasonable excuse defence, and more recent case law, such as R v. Hallam and Others, has since made clear the limitations of such a defence.
I recognise the positive intention of new clause 34 to ensure that the changes made by the serious disruption regulations remain available to police forces in their policing of protests, but we consider that we cannot seek to address the issue—should there be one—until the Court of Appeal’s judgment is received. In short, it would be inappropriate to pre-empt the Court of Appeal’s judgment. In the meantime, the regulations remain in force until the judgment is handed down. It remains open to the Court of Appeal to overturn the High Court’s quashing order, should the judges find in favour of the Government. We will consider our response to the Court of Appeal’s judgment once it is available.
New clause 53 seeks to insert a statutory right to peaceful protest into the Public Order Act 1986, by requiring public authorities to respect, protect and facilitate the right to protest. The rights that it outlines are already firmly established in UK law through the Human Rights Act 1998, and public authorities must act in a way that is compatible with a convention right. Introducing a parallel provision risks legal duplication, confusion and inconsistent interpretation, potentially complicating the enforcement of public order. Rather than adding legal clarity, the new clause might create uncertainty without offering any new protections.
I hope that I have been able to persuade Opposition Members that their amendments are not necessary or are premature. I ask that the hon. Member for Windsor withdraws amendment 51.
Jack Rankin
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 86 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 87 and 88 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 89
Possession of pyrotechnic articles at protests
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dame Diana Johnson
During recent protests, the police have observed that protesters are increasingly using flares and fireworks. Although there is existing legislation that prohibits the use of fireworks in public places and the possession of explosives other than for a lawful purpose, it does not consistently cover the mere possession of flares and fireworks during protests. The clause therefore creates a new criminal offence of possession of a pyrotechnic article for those taking part in a protest.
The misuse of pyrotechnic articles has implications regarding public safety. This new measure will enable the police to take the necessary preventive action against such behaviour during protests. It is a defence for a person to show they had a reasonable excuse for having the pyrotechnic article, such as a flare or firework, in their possession at the material time, or, in particular, to show they had it in their possession for use in connection with work.
The offence applies only to those taking part in a protest. It does not capture a person who is taking part in, for example, a cultural or religious event where pyrotechnic articles are customarily used. The maximum penalty for the offence will be a level 3 fine of £1,000. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Dame Diana Johnson
I am grateful for the hon. Member’s support and hope the Committee will agree to the clause standing part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 89 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 90
War memorials
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dame Diana Johnson
We all understand and accept that war memorials play a vital role in commemorating those who have made the ultimate sacrifice, including those who have no known grave. They offer a place of reflection and should be protected.
In some recent protests, protesters have climbed on war memorials, causing anger and outrage among the public. The new offence will provide greater clarity for policing. In particular, the measure makes it clear that the act of climbing on specified war memorials is unacceptable. It gives police the powers they need to ensure that justice is delivered to those who engage in such disrespectful conduct.
A war memorial is an object that preserves the memory of a war or conflict and those involved in it. It can take any form and be created by anyone at any time. It can be permanent or temporary; it can be a living thing such as a tree; it can a building or a more traditional plaque, monument or sculpture. The offence is intended to ensure that our most significant war memorials are used for their intended purpose of providing remembrance for those who have died and have no grave to be visited, and are not to be disrespected.
Schedule 11 specifies 25 war memorials, including the Royal Artillery memorial and the Cenotaph in London, the Portsmouth naval war memorial, and the Liverpool Cenotaph. The clause includes a power to amend the list of specified war memorials in schedule 11 by regulations.
The penalty for the offence will be a level 3 fine of up to £1,000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months. It is a defence for a person charged with the offence to provide that they had good reason for climbing on the specified war memorial, or had the owner or occupier’s consent to climb on it. That will ensure that activities such as maintenance approved by the owner will not be criminalised. If a war memorial has a base or steps that are designed for individuals to climb, individuals will not be criminalised. On that basis, I commend the clause and schedule 11 to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
The clause introduces a new offence targeted at individuals who climb on designated war memorials without lawful justification. It is designed to protect sites of national remembrance and ensure that they are treated with appropriate respect and dignity. The act of climbing on such memorials, often during protests or large gatherings, can be seen as disrespectful, provocative or even intentionally inflammatory, particularly when shared on social media.
For example, at a pro-Palestinian demonstration in London in 2023, a group of protesters climbed on to the Royal Artillery memorial at Hyde Park Corner, which honours the tens of thousands of Royal Artillery soldiers who died in the first world war. The Metropolitan police described the actions as inflammatory, but noted that at the time no specific law prohibited climbing on war memorials, so no arrests were made.
The introduction of the offence reflects growing public unease about the perceived disrespect towards war memorials during certain protests in recent years. It is right that this measure should be put in place to protect the memory and legacy of those who made the ultimate sacrifice.
Dame Diana Johnson
I am pleased with the cross-party support for the measure.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 90 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 11 agreed to.
Clause 91 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 92
Suspension of internet protocol addresses and internet domain names
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dame Diana Johnson
The clause introduces schedule 12, which provides for a new power for law enforcement and certain investigative agencies, such as the National Crime Agency and His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, to apply to the court for an order to suspend internet protocol addresses and domain names when they are used to facilitate serious crime.
All too often, criminals use IP addresses and domain names to facilitate crimes such as fraud, the distribution of child sexual abuse material, malware and phishing. Currently, law enforcement agencies do not have the legal power to mandate the suspension of IP addresses and domain names, so in some scenarios the UK public continue to be at risk of falling victim to crime.
Law enforcement agencies currently utilise voluntary arrangements with industry to request the suspension of IP addresses and domains. In the majority of domestic cases, voluntary arrangements are successful, and the Government are clear that they should continue to be the first port of call in the United Kingdom. However, most of the organisations responsible for providing the IP address or domain name are situated in foreign jurisdictions and often require a formal request, such as a court order, before they will take action. The measure will provide for such a court order to be obtained. Domestically, the provision will empower law enforcement agencies to compel the small number of organisations that do not co-operate with voluntary arrangements.
The measure will protect the public by giving law enforcement and certain investigative agencies the tools they need to tackle crimes facilitated by IP addresses and domain names, and to prevent individuals from becoming potential victims. It will ensure that the UK cyber-landscape continues to be one of the safest in the world. On that basis, I commend the clause to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
The clause rightly provides a legal framework for suspending IP addresses and domain names linked to serious crime. This is a valuable measure in the fight against cyber-enabled criminal activity, including fraud, child exploitation and unlicensed online gambling.
By allowing appropriate officers to apply to a judge for a suspension order, the clause ensures that access to digital infrastructure used for criminal purposes can be swiftly and lawfully disrupted. It will be particularly effective in cases where traditional enforcement is difficult because of the borderless nature of online platforms. Crucially, safeguards are built in to ensure that the powers are used only when necessary, and proportionately. The involvement of a judge, strict criteria for suspension, and provisions for variation or appeal ensure a fair balance between enforcement and civil liberties.
Dame Diana Johnson
I am grateful for the Opposition’s support.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 92 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 12 agreed to.
Clause 93
Electronically tracked stolen goods: search without warrant
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dame Diana Johnson
Clause 93 amends the Theft Act 1968 to create a new power for the police to enter premises to search for and seize stolen items that have been electronically tracked to the premises, without requiring a warrant from a court if it is not reasonably practicable to obtain one. Clause 94 makes the same change in respect of the service police.
Under the safer streets mission, the Government are determined to crack down on acquisitive and street crimes, antisocial behaviour, and other crimes that make people feel unsafe on our streets. Crimes such as phone theft and snatch theft are deeply invasive and can have a profound impact on those whose possessions are stolen.
Tackling mobile phone theft is a priority for the Government. According to the crime survey for England and Wales, in the year ending March 2024 an estimated 235,000 people had their mobile phone stolen. Around half of stolen phones are taken through snatch thefts or pickpocketing, known as theft from the person offences.
The latest crime survey estimates show that street crime, which includes theft from the person offences and personal robbery, increased by 43%, driven by a significant rise in snatch theft. Data published by the Metropolitan police shows that theft from the person offences involving a mobile phone increased by 30% in London during the year to January 2025. Those figures are extremely concerning.
In recent years, the ability to track valuable items such as phones, bicycles and vehicles has become vastly more sophisticated. If items fitted with GPS or other trackers are stolen, it is now far easier for victims to know where their stolen property is located. However, victims have raised concerns that when they share that information with the police, they are not always able to act. This is extremely frustrating for victims of crime and for the police.
Those who commit the offences are not just petty criminals and opportunists. There is clear evidence of organised criminality and profitability, with stolen devices often being trafficked internationally, particularly to China and Algeria. That is why, at our mobile phone summit on 6 February, my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary brought together law enforcement agencies and the mobile phone industry, and secured their commitments to working jointly to tackle mobile phone theft and to breaking the business model of the organised criminal networks that drive it.
Collaborative efforts include significantly boosting data and intelligence sharing to better understand this complex problem, increased police-intensification activities, and ensuring that all parties work together to drive joint solutions. To complement these actions, the legislative reforms in the Bill will enable the police to investigate more swiftly those who conduct mobile phone and other forms of theft. Currently, the police have no general power to enter and search premises solely for the purpose of searching for and seizing stolen property without a warrant. We know that when items can be tracked to specific locations, they are quickly moved on or sold, limiting the window in which the police can act.
Matt Vickers
Clause 93 is hugely important and rightly allows the police to search premises for electronically tracked stolen goods without a warrant, offering a fast and efficient way for the police to recover stolen items before they are further distributed or sold, with the clause defining the authorisation procedures and limitations on the powers.
The clause empowers senior officers at the rank of inspector or above to authorise searches based on reasonable grounds and electronic tracking data. This is particularly useful in cases where obtaining a warrant in time could risk losing crucial evidence or missing the opportunity to seize the stolen goods. It is designed to enable law enforcement to act quickly when there is clear electronic tracking evidence that stolen goods are present on the specified premises. It seems like a common-sense measure that will allow law enforcement to act swiftly in recovering electronically tracked stolen goods, making it a highly effective tool in the fight against crime.
When stolen items are equipped with tracking devices, the ability to bypass the often time-consuming process of obtaining a warrant can be crucial in preventing further harm, such as the sale or distribution of the goods. The clause will ensure that officers can quickly respond to real-time data, reducing the window of opportunity for criminals to move or hide stolen goods.
The clause adopts a narrower approach to these powers than that proposed by the Criminal Justice Bill. I have always been of the view that, wherever possible, we should look to further enable our police officers and law enforcement agencies to tackle crime. Will the Minister comment on the rationale for narrowing the scope of the powers being given to our police by this measure?
Luke Taylor
I broadly back the powers in the clause. However, I have been involved in two cases in which an item was tracked but the tracking was not sufficiently accurate to ascertain the address. I was witness to a neighbour banging on the door of another neighbour’s home, demanding that he be let in to retrieve his phone, which he claimed had been tracked to that address. The police had been called, but they were not able to enter. When the resident came home, it was demonstrated that the phone was not at that address; it was actually five doors down. The individual had dropped the phone while walking home, and another resident had picked it up, brought it home and was looking after it until they could take it to a police station.
That individual had been incredibly agitated. Under these measures, if the police were called and the tracking information showed that the phone was at a particular address, the inaccurate data would have allowed the police to enter the property incorrectly. Are there appropriate safeguards in relation to the accuracy of the location information that is used? What measures are in place to compensate people when errors are made?
The second example is that, when my bike was stolen, I followed its tracker and went to the house where it seemed to be located. I called the police, who attended. The bike was not in the house; the tracker was actually in a van that was parked on the street outside. Again, if entry to the property had been obtained under these measures, there would have been damage and an incorrect entry to a resident’s home.
These powers seem like a good idea. The hon. Member for Stockton West called them common sense, but what seems to be common sense usually omits serious thought. Without an additional step of scrutiny, I do not think tracking information is sufficiently accurate to ensure these powers are used appropriately. I therefore invite the Minister to provide a bit more reassurance that thought will be given to accuracy and that mitigations will be in place to compensate residents when the measures are used incorrectly. We must not put residents and citizens at risk of property damage for reasons beyond their control.
David Burton-Sampson
As I look around the room, we all have our mobiles glued to our hands. They do everything for us now: payments, emails, leisure and, occasionally, phone calls. These devices are massively important to us. We all know the feeling of leaving home without a mobile device—many of us would have to turn round because we cannot live without it.
There has been a significant rise in snatch-and-grab crimes throughout the country, and I know many constituents, friends and colleagues in this place who have been impacted. Given that these devices can be tracked, it is madness that the police are not currently able to go in and recover them. I take the point raised by the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam about the accuracy of tracking. I do not think it is as big an issue as he makes out, but perhaps it is something for the Minister to consider.
The biggest thing is that knowing the police can enter to recover these items will act as a deterrent. We need to drive down this crime. The prevalence of snatch-and-grabs in this country is simply unacceptable, so I welcome clause 93.
Dame Diana Johnson
I will deal with the questions that have been raised in this short debate. First, the new measure differs from the previous Government’s proposed reform as it provides the police with specific targeted powers to retrieve electronically tagged stolen items that have been tracked to premises using the geolocation data and intelligence, and it will equip the police with tailored powers to act quickly to retrieve items, bringing offenders to justice and providing a swifter resolution for victims. We are also introducing robust safeguards, including the requirement for an officer of at least inspector rank to authorise the use of the powers, so that they are used proportionately and lawfully.
I take very seriously the issue raised by the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam about the accuracy of data. With these new powers, as I tried to set out in my opening remarks, the police will need to be satisfied that at least one item of property in question has been electronically tracked to the premises, and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that it is stolen and on the premises before entry is authorised. We would expect the police to undertake due diligence and, as far as possible, to use additional information or intelligence to ensure that the location is accurate. As I said, any use of the power has to be authorised by at least an inspector.
Luke Taylor
I thank the Minister for giving way, because I think this is a helpful query: will there be any differentiation between last known locations and live tracking? Obviously, tracking devices can be removed and batteries can run out. Will a last known location be considered sufficient evidence of an item’s current location, or will a live location be needed to prove that the item is currently in that position?
Dame Diana Johnson
The hon. Gentleman raises legitimate questions about how this will work operationally. As I said in my opening remarks, there will be guidance on how this will function.
The hon. Gentleman also asked about the possible redress for householders when things perhaps go wrong. There are existing provisions under which individuals may be able to claim compensation where the police have caused damage to property by, for example, forcing entry. Any compensation will obviously depend on the circumstances of each case and will be for the police force to determine, and it is unlikely to be paid if the damage was caused by the police acting lawfully on the evidence and information available to them.
On that basis, I commend these clauses to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 93 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 94 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 95
Access to driver licensing information
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dame Diana Johnson
Clause 95 deals with access to driver licensing information. It will facilitate automatic access by the police and other law enforcement officers to Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency driver information, at the point of need, for all policing and law enforcement purposes.
The police and other law enforcement officers are frequently required to deal with unpredictable circumstances, often operating under significant time pressure, as they strive to protect the public, maintain order and investigate complex criminality. The police have provided compelling operational examples of where they could better deal with the threats and harms faced by individuals if direct access to DVLA driving licence data were provided.
Protecting our communities from the threat of sexual violence, stopping drug gangs preying on the vulnerable, safeguarding people from harassment and stalking, and informing relatives of the death or serious injury of a loved one are duties that our police officers frequently undertake. Unfortunately, those are some of the activities for which police officers cannot make effective use of DVLA driving licence information within the current data access regime.
Matt Vickers
Clause 95 updates and expands police and law enforcement access to driver licence data held by the DVLA. It replaces the existing section 71 of the 2000 Act with a revised framework, adding proposed new sections 71A and 71B. The modernised provision allows authorised individuals including the police, service police and other specified law enforcement bodies to access driver licensing information not just for road traffic offences but for a wider range of policing and law enforcement purposes. The Secretary of State is given power to regulate access, impose conditions and consult relevant bodies before issuing new rules or codes of practice. The clause also introduces oversight measures, such as a statutory code of practice and an annual report to Parliament, ensuring transparency and responsible data use. I welcome the Minister’s comments on the role of facial recognition technology and on the safeguards put in place to ensure the power is not used disproportionately or inappropriately.
Dame Diana Johnson
I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 95 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 96
Testing of persons in police detention for presence of controlled drugs
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to consider the following:
Schedule 13.
Clauses 97 to 100 stand part.
Dame Diana Johnson
These clauses relate to drug testing. There are a number of provisions we wish to introduce. Clauses 96 to 100 and schedule 13 amend existing legislation to expand the powers of the police to drug test people aged 18 or over on arrest, or aged 14 or over on charge, where the offence they have been arrested for or charged with is a “trigger offence” or where a police officer of at least the rank of inspector reasonably suspects that their drug use caused or contributed to their offending.
These clauses expand the police’s powers to drug test in three clear ways: first, by expanding the range of drugs that can be tested for, from specified class A drugs only to any specified controlled drug; secondly, by expanding the list of trigger offences which may automatically trigger a drug test; and thirdly, by expanding the power to take an additional sample for drug testing when the first is unsuitable or insufficient, and up to a maximum of two samples. The clauses also expand the regime for subsequent assessments for misuse of controlled drugs following a positive test result.
As we all appreciate, drugs can have wide-ranging and devastating impacts on individuals and society. Addressing the drug use that is linked to crime is key to the Government’s safer streets mission. The purpose of drug testing on arrest is to reduce reoffending by referring those whose offending is believed to be at least in part caused by drug use into assessment for treatment and support services. The intention is not to further criminalise drug users, although refusing to provide a sample or to attend or stay for an assessment is an offence. Nor does it mean that they will receive treatment instead of a sentence. Drug testing on arrest is a discretionary power, subject to the safeguards included in the existing legislation, the PACE codes of practice and other relevant guidance. How it is implemented and funded is a local decision made by the police and crime commissioner and service providers.
Clause 96 amends the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to expand the existing police power to drug test in police detention to include any “specified controlled drug” as opposed to just specified class A drugs. The list of controlled drugs will be specified in secondary legislation, subject to the negative procedure. To be specified, drugs must be controlled drugs within the meaning of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.
Clause 96 also inserts new schedule 2B into PACE, which provides an updated list of trigger offences for drug testing on arrest. A number of the additions to the list of trigger offences are key to the Government’s safer streets mission, including offences linked to violence against women and girls, knife crime and antisocial behaviour. Some existing trigger offences are removed, such as fraud and vagrancy offences where there is no longer a clear link to drug misuse or those offences are being repealed. The clause also moves the Secretary of State’s power to amend the list of trigger offences in secondary legislation, subject to the draft affirmative procedure, into PACE. Clause 97 amends the Drugs Act 2005 and the Bail Act 1976 to reflect the expansion from class A drugs to “specified controlled drugs” to align with the changes in clause 96.
Clause 98 amends PACE to expand the police’s power to take an additional sample from a person in police detention for the purpose of testing, where the first sample is unsuitable or insufficient, up to a maximum of two samples. It allows the police to take an additional sample where required—for example, where one sample alone is not suitable or sufficient for testing across more than one machine or kit to test for additional, different drugs. Only one additional sample may be taken, and only when the first sample is unsuitable or insufficient. The legislative safeguards that apply to the first sample will continue to apply, such as being reminded that refusal to provide a sample is a criminal offence, having a maximum of two samples taken during the period of detention, and not being tested before having seen a custody officer.
Clause 99 repeals subsections (8A) and (8B) in section 37 of PACE and amends section 38, which currently enable the police to continue to detain an individual for the purpose of taking a sample for drug testing, before or after charge. We have determined that, due to changes in operational procedure and drug testing technology, the power is no longer necessary and so we are removing it.
Finally, clause 100 removes the notification conditions in section 63B of PACE and in the Drugs Act 2005. In 2011, Home Office guidance advised all forces in England and Wales that they did not need to seek additional, individual authorisation from the Secretary of State to conduct drug testing on arrest. These amendments reflect that guidance by removing the notification condition from both PACE and the Drugs Act 2005. They remove an administrative burden on the police, improving efficiency. I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
Clause 96 and schedule 13 significantly expand the existing powers of the police to conduct drug testing on individuals in detention. Currently, the police can test only for class A drugs under certain conditions. The clause amends sections 63B and 63C of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to enable testing for any specified controlled drug, broadening the scope beyond class A to include class B and C substances. The change allows for testing following arrest for those aged 18 and over, or charge for those aged 14 and over, where the arrest relates to a trigger offence or where a police inspector reasonably suspects that drug misuse contributed to the offence.
The clause also inserts new schedule 2B into PACE to define the list of trigger offences, replacing the outdated schedule 6 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000. The updated schedule retains many existing offences, particularly theft and drug offences, but removes fraud and vagrancy offences. It adds a range of new offences such as common assault, certain violent crime and public order offences. The Secretary of State is given the power to amend the list of drugs and offences through regulations subject to either the draft affirmative or negative resolution procedures, depending on the nature of the change.
Clause 97 makes related changes to the Drugs Act 2005 to align the drug assessment framework with the new expanded testing regime. Sections 9 and 10 of the 2005 Act, which govern the process for initial and follow-up assessments following a positive drugs test, are amended to refer to specific controlled drugs rather than just class A substances.
David Taylor
I rise to support clause 96, a necessary update to the law that reflects the reality facing many of our communities. Drug misuse comes in many forms and continues to drive crime, harm and deep personal suffering. Hemel Hempstead has a long-standing drug issue going back several decades. Indeed, drugs were a significant cause of the deaths of two members of my own family, my aunt and my cousin, so I am particularly motivated to see the clause enacted to help tackle the causes of drug crime. Currently, police can test detainees only for class A drugs. Clause 96 rightly extends that power to all controlled drugs, including class B and C substances such as cannabis or illegally traded prescription drugs. Those are not harmless. They contribute to the cycles of reoffending, antisocial behaviour and exploitation, and too often go unnoticed in the system.
The clause is not about punishment; it is about awareness and intervention. Testing can be the first step forward towards treatment. It allows the police to respond more effectively and open the door to support for those struggling with addiction issues. With proper safeguards and parliamentary oversight, these changes give our officers the tools they need while protecting people’s rights. Communities, from major cities to towns like mine, will benefit from a smarter and fairer approach. This is about being honest about the harms that drugs cause, about how we help users and how we prevent the crime that drugs cause. I urge Members to support the clause.
Dame Diana Johnson
I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead for his speech. He talked about his experience within his family, and how devastating drugs can be to families, individuals and communities. That is why extending the testing regime with these clauses is so important to try to assist those people who have got themselves into problems with drugs and are involved in criminality. They are not excusing that at all, but finding a way of testing and offering that support and help if people are ready to access treatment. I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 96 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 13 agreed to.
Clauses 97 to 100 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 101
Cautions given to persons having limited leave to enter or remain in UK
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dame Diana Johnson
Clause 101 expands the current criteria for foreign national conditional cautions to encompass foreign nationals with limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom. A foreign national conditional caution requires a foreign national to be removed from the UK as an alternative to prosecution. It will also specify that they may not return within a specified period of time.
Presently, foreign nationals may be given a foreign national conditional caution to secure their removal from the UK if they do not have existing leave to enter or remain here. The clause extends that to apply to foreign nationals with limited leave to be here. The clause will extend the pool of persons to whom a foreign national conditional caution may be given with a view to securing the removal from the United Kingdom of more foreign nationals who commit crime. On that basis, I commend the clause to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
The clause expands the definition of a “relevant foreign offender” in both the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, to include individuals who have limited leave to enter or remain in the UK as defined by the Immigration Act 1971. By doing so, it ensures that people with limited immigration status are treated as relevant foreign offenders for the purposes of issuing conditional or diversionary cautions, enabling those cautions to carry immigration-related consequences, such as potential removal from the UK.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 101 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 102
Confiscation
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to consider the following:
Schedules 14 and 15.
Clause 103 stand part.
Dame Diana Johnson
Clause 102 introduces schedules 14 and 15 to the Bill, which make the most significant reforms to the confiscation regime in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, as contained in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 since that Act was passed over 20 years ago. The confiscation regime allows courts to place confiscation orders on defendants to repay the benefit gained from criminality and to make it clear to offenders that crime does not pay.
The Government have been aware that confiscation has been in need of reform for some time. In 2018, the Home Office commissioned the Law Commission of England and Wales to review the confiscation regime and make recommendations for reform. The Law Commission’s final report was published in November 2022 and contains 119 recommendations, which have shaped the measures we are introducing in the Bill. Reform is necessary to improve enforcement of confiscation orders and streamline processes by law enforcement and court services, so that the regime operates as efficiently and effectively as possible.
Reform will be achieved by rationalising court processes, creating streamlined confiscation orders, expediting the enforcement of unpaid orders and returning more funds to victims. In particular, the Bill contains a new measure to return funds to victims following an uplift of the amount that is to be paid towards a confiscation order. If a confiscation order is uplifted, money can be redirected towards existing victims to compensate for their outstanding losses. The Home Office has consulted extensively.
Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting)
Tuesday 29th April 2025
(1 year ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 29 April 2025 - (29 Apr 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 7 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Schedules 14 and 15.
Clause 103 stand part.
The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)
When the Committee adjourned this morning, I had just started to set out that the Home Office had consulted extensively on the reform of confiscation orders in clause 102. Not only did we consult extensively on those new measures, which were recommended by the Law Commission, but we had the benefit of over 20 years of operational insight. The reforms will support the delivery of key objectives endorsed by the Government in the economic crime plan 2 to reduce money laundering and increase asset recovery returns, to ensure that criminals are deprived of their benefits from crime.
The wide-ranging reforms are introduced across 12 parts in schedule 14 in relation to England and Wales. The provisions in schedule 15 largely replicate the reforms for Northern Ireland, with appropriate modifications. I do not propose to go through the whole of schedule 14 part by part because much of it contains necessarily very technical provisions, but I am happy to explain particular provisions if any hon. Member would find that helpful.
Clause 103 introduces cost protections for enforcement authorities in the High Court, and the Court of Session in Scotland, in civil recovery proceedings under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The Government are concerned that the current rules that govern how costs are awarded in civil recovery cases expose enforcement authorities to the risk of excessive strains on their budgets, particularly in cases against wealthy individuals who use very expensive legal teams. Even if a law enforcement agency applies for a civil recovery order in good faith and in the public interest, losing a case exposes enforcement agencies to paying substantial legal and court fees. Enforcement authorities work to make decisions in the public interest, and it is detrimental to the protection of the public if authorities are deterred from pursuing an investigation for fear that, if any resulting legal action is unsuccessful, they would face adverse costs and expensive litigation.
Clause 103 therefore amends the so-called “loser pays” principle to ensure that the court does not make an order for costs against an enforcement authority unless the authority has acted “unreasonably”, “dishonestly” or “improperly” during the course of proceedings or it would be
“just and reasonable to make such an order”
against them considering all the facts of the case. Cost protections will provide a positive step forward for the UK’s broader goal of recovering criminal assets and disrupting criminal activity, and I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)
Clause 102 reforms the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, aiming to clarify and strengthen the confiscation regime for proceeds of crime in England and Wales. Schedule 14 outlines several significant amendments with the primary goal of improving the effectiveness and fairness of confiscation proceedings.
One key change introduced by schedule 14 is the insertion of section 5A into the 2002 Act. The new section provides an overarching principal objective, which has been lacking, for the confiscation powers under part 2. The principal aim as defined in section 5A(2) is
“to deprive the defendant of the defendant’s benefit from criminal conduct, so far as within the defendant’s means.”
That will help to ensure that confiscation powers are used proportionately and in line with the objectives of the law, addressing gaps in case law and providing a clear framework for the court.
Paragraph 2 of schedule 14 now allows the prosecutor to decide whether to pursue a criminal lifestyle assessment rather than automatically applying it. That change allows for more flexibility in the application of these provisions, enabling prosecutors to allocate resources more efficiently and only pursue the criminal lifestyle route where appropriate.
Paragraph 4 introduces a change to the test for determining whether an offence constitutes part of a defendant’s criminal lifestyle. Previously, the law required at least three offences to qualify, but this change reduces that threshold to two offences. That will also apply if the defendant has benefited or intended to benefit from the criminal conduct involved in the offence, making the test easier to meet and broadening the scope of the confiscation regime.
A significant reform is found in paragraph 6, which amends section 7 of POCA to clarify how the value of the recoverable amount should be calculated. Currently, certain categories of property are ignored when calculating the value of a defendant’s benefit from crime, including property that has been forfeited or is subject to a recovery order. The proposed amendment extends that to further categories of property, such as property seized under any rule of law and property returned to victims. That ensures that the confiscation amount reflects only the actual benefit derived from crime and prevents double counting of assets that have already been returned or forfeited.
In the light of the changes introduced in clause 102 and schedule 14 on criminal lifestyle provisions, can the Minister clarify how the new flexibility in prosecutorial discretion will ensure that limited resources are effectively allocated, while safeguarding the fairness of confiscation proceedings for defendants who may not meet the criteria for a criminal lifestyle?
Clause 103(1) inserts new section 288A into part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. This provision aims to protect the enforcement authorities from being ordered to pay costs in civil recovery proceedings conducted in the High Court. The court is prohibited from making such orders unless the enforcement authority acted unreasonably, dishonestly or improperly during the proceedings.
Proposed new section 288A(1)(c) of the 2002 Act introduces a discretionary power for the court to determine if, in unforeseen circumstances, it would be just and reasonable for an enforcement authority to pay costs. This provision acknowledges that civil recovery orders, which result in the permanent deprivation of a person’s property, engage the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions. It ensures that the enforcement process complies with the right to access to a court, as guaranteed by article 6 of the European convention on human rights. I would be grateful if the Minister would tell us what mechanisms would ensure that enforcement authorities could be held accountable if acting unreasonably, dishonestly or improperly during civil recovery proceedings.
Dame Diana Johnson
I thank the shadow Minister; he went into some detail about how schedule 14 operates. I want to refer to the issue of criminal lifestyle offences in schedule 2 to POCA, which is about what the court utilises to determine whether a defendant has a criminal lifestyle. This is about the changes that we are adding. I refer in particular to the two environmental offences:
“depositing…certain waste, otherwise than in accordance with an environmental permit”
and
“operating a regulated facility, or causing or knowingly permitting a water discharge activity or groundwater activity, otherwise than in accordance with an environmental permit.”
The third offence that we are adding is the keeping of a brothel for prostitution. I want to make clear that those offences are being added.
The shadow Minister asked how this would be kept under review and whether unreasonable measures will be introduced. The legislation will set that out, but it is my understanding that the court will still have a role to play in any measures that are deemed to be unreasonable and forming a view about that. This part of the schedule is very technical, so I am happy to put in writing to the shadow Minister any further information that I have not been able to provide, but I think the general view is that it is implementing the recommendations from the Law Commission. As I understand it, it is very similar to what the previous Government were going to support. On that basis, I commend the provisions to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 102 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedules 14 and 15 agreed to.
Clause 103 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 104
Extension of polygraph condition to certain offenders
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair this afternoon, Ms Lewell. Clause 104 seeks to build on existing polygraph testing powers by making an express provision to enable the Secretary of State to impose mandatory polygraph testing as a licence condition for the most serious offenders who commit historic offences connected to terrorism, or who pose a risk of sexual offending.
Polygraph tests are used to monitor compliance with licence conditions. The information obtained from a test is used by probation practitioners to refine and strengthen risk management plans, thereby providing probation practitioners with additional risk-related information that they otherwise would not have known. Without this clause, these serious offenders would remain excluded from polygraph testing while on licence. Polygraph tests have been successfully used by the Probation Service in the management of sexual offenders since January 2014. Initially, it was as a successful pilot and later, a national programme. More recently, it was extended to terrorist offenders by the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021.
Subsection (3) of the clause extends eligibility for polygraph testing to offenders who have been convicted of murder and are assessed as posing a risk of sexual offending on release. It also extends to those who are serving multiple sentences alongside a sentence for a sex offence, to make sure that they can be polygraph tested for the duration of their licence.A gap in existing powers means that currently, for example, someone can be polygraph tested on licence when they have been convicted of rape, but if they have raped and murdered the victim, they are unlikely to be able to be polygraph tested because the sentence for rape is likely to have ended prior to their release on licence.
Subsections (4) to (8) of the clause extend polygraph testing to a cohort of individuals who committed a non-terrorism offence, such as conspiracy to murder, that would have been considered terrorist connected, but their offence was committed before the relevant legislation came into force enabling the court to make a formal determination of a terrorist connection.We refer to this cohort as historic terrorism-connected offenders. Following the changes introduced, where it is determined by the Secretary of State that an offence was an act of terrorism, took place in the course of an act of terrorism or was committed for the purposes of terrorism, individuals will become eligible to have the polygraph condition applied to their licence, subject to meeting the relevant policy criteria.
The polygraph testing licence condition is a vital tool for probation practitioners who are managing individuals who have been convicted of terrorism offences, yet it cannot currently be applied to historic terrorism-connected offenders. That means that polygraph is not available as a tool to manage the risk posed by this cohort, whereas it is available for an individual who commits the same offence today. The clause will therefore fill the gap in legislation and contribute to the consistent and effective risk management of historic terrorism-connected offenders in the community, seeking to close those small but significant operational gaps. Taken as a whole, clause 104 will ensure that polygraph testing can be used to strengthen the management of those who committed historic terrorism-related offences, and those who pose a risk of sexual offending.
Matt Vickers
Clause 104 broadens the use of polygraph testing for offenders by amending the Offender Management Act 2007. It allows polygraph testing for individuals convicted of murder upon release if they pose a risk of committing a sexual offence, and are 18 or over. It also applies to offenders who have served time for a relevant sexual offence, provided they are 18 or older at release. Additionally, the definition of “relevant offence” is expanded to include terrorism-related offences, including those committed for terrorist purposes. The provision functions as a preventive safeguard.
Polygraph testing can act as a deterrent, encouraging compliance with licence conditions or reminding offenders that their conduct and disclosures will be monitored. That is especially significant where there are concerns about future harmful behaviour, even if the original offence did not relate to sexual offending. The clause provides tools to manage individuals involved in terrorism-related offences, helping authorities gather intelligence and make informed decisions on their supervision. It also promotes consistency and supervision, as polygraph conditions are already used for sexual and terrorist offenders, ensuring a balanced approach to risk management across high-risk groups.
What safeguards ensure that the Secretary of State’s discretion in determining risk is transparent and fair? Given that polygraph evidence is not admissible in trials, why is it being increasingly used as a post-sentence supervision condition? Will there be an independent review of its effectiveness in reducing reoffending among the newly included categories?
Alex Davies-Jones
I thank the shadow Minister for his questions. He asked me about the basis of the Secretary of State’s decision; if a Secretary of State decides that, for the purpose of extending polygraph testing, an offence was an act of terrorism or was committed for the purpose of terrorism, but a court does not reach the same decision, the Secretary of State will review their decision in the light of the court’s findings. That is an important backstop. Guidance will be produced on the process of the Secretary of State designating terrorist connections and for the court for the different management changes in the Bill.
Polygraph testing is one of many tools available to the Probation Service when managing offenders in the community and when they are out on licence. It is not the only tool available in its arsenal to ensure the public are kept safe.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 104 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 105
Duty of offender to notify details
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Alex Davies-Jones
This clause will create a new duty on offenders serving a sentence in the community and supervised by probation or a youth offending team, requiring them to inform the responsible officer if they change their name, use a different name or change their contact information. I thank my very good friend, my hon. Friend the Member for Newport West and Islwyn (Ruth Jones), for her work in the previous Parliament on this issue, and I am delighted to be bringing forward this proposal.
The clause will improve the ability of probation and youth offending teams to monitor offenders in the community and will ensure that the public are protected. A significant number of offenders serve sentences in the community, and responsible officers must have the information that they need to keep tabs on those individuals, including if they change their name and contact information. The provisions in this clause are robust. Contact details can change for any reason, but the offender must report any difference from what is kept on file. The clause captures not just formal legal changes of name by deed poll but, for example, the use of an online alias.
We have a separate youth justice system, but it is equally important that services are able to maintain contact with children and have the right information about them to do their jobs. This policy therefore applies equally to offenders of all ages and will create consistency across offenders on licence and those serving sentences in the community, overseen by probation services or youth offending teams.
Probation and youth offending teams will have discretion about whether an offender is returned to court if they fail to comply with this requirement. It is right that the enforcement provisions for this clause are robust and reflect the seriousness of non-compliance. It is right that probation officers and youth offending teams have the same powers to deal with non-compliance with this duty as they have for any other case of non-compliance with a sentence requirement. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
Clause 105 requires certain offenders, including those under referral orders, youth rehabilitation orders, community orders and suspended sentence orders, to provide up-to-date contact information to relevant authorities. Offenders must notify their responsible officer or panel member of any changes in names, phone numbers or email addresses as soon as reasonably practicable after the relevant order is made or after they begin using new contact details. For youth offenders under referral orders, the clause adds a new section to the sentencing code, mandating them to inform a youth offending team member of any aliases and their current contact details as soon as reasonably practicable.
Similar requirements apply to offenders under future and existing orders. The overarching aim of the clause is to close a monitoring gap by ensuring that responsible authorities are kept fully informed of how to reach the offender. That is particularly important for managing compliance with rehabilitative requirements and preventing individuals from circumventing supervision through undisclosed identities or means of communication. Will the Minister clarify what threshold is intended by the term “reasonably practicable” in this context? Given that it is open to interpretation, will statutory guidance be issued to ensure consistent application by youth offender panels and responsible officers?
Alex Davies-Jones
I thank the shadow Minister for his questions. We will of course ensure that guidance is available for this new measure. We will provide the responsible officers with all the tools they need to protect public safety, and ensure that they have all the relevant information available to manage offenders on licence in the community.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 105 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 106
Accelerated investigation procedure in respect of criminal conduct
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clauses 107 to 109 stand part.
New clause 23—Previous conduct as factor in deciding whether to investigate a complaint—
“(1) The Police Reform Act 2002 is amended as follows.
(2) In Schedule 3, paragraph 1(6B)(d), at end insert ‘or
(e) the complaint is made about a person serving with the police who has previous convictions or has had previous complaints made against them.’”
This new clause would make previous complaints or convictions a factor in determining how to handle a new complaint against a police officer.
New clause 31—Automatic dismissal of officers who fail vetting—
“(1) The Police Act 1996 is amended in accordance with subsection (2).
(2) In section 39A (Codes of practice for chief officers), after subsection (1) insert—
‘(1A) Without prejudice to subsection (1) and subject to subsection (1B), a code of practice may provide for an officer to be dismissed without notice where—
(a) the officer fails vetting, and
(b) it is not reasonable to expect that the officer will be capable of being deployed to full duties within a reasonable timeframe.
(1B) Subsection (1A) does not apply where a chief officer concludes that—
(a) the officer, notwithstanding his vetting failure, is capable of being deployed to a substantial majority of duties appropriate for an officer of his rank; and
(b) it would be disproportionate to the operational effectiveness of the force for the officer to be dismissed without notice.’”
This new clause would ensure police officers who failed their vetting can be dismissed.
Dame Diana Johnson
Part 13 of the Bill pertains to matters relating to the police. Before I talk in detail about clauses 106 to 108, it may assist the Committee if I first provide some context for these provisions. Following the shooting of Chris Kaba, and the subsequent trial and acquittal of Sergeant Martyn Blake in October 2024, the Home Secretary made a series of commitments in response to the issues raised under the previous Government’s accountability review. The measures announced by the Home Secretary will rebuild confidence in police accountability systems for both the public and the police.
As the Home Secretary said when making her announcement, the case happened against a backdrop of wider and long-standing concerns about accountability, standards and confidence in policing. The British model of policing relies on mutual bonds of trust between the public and the police. For our model of policing to work, it is essential that the police have the confidence of the communities they serve, and that officers have the confidence they need to do the vital and often extremely difficult job of keeping us all safe. Too often in recent times, both elements of that confidence have become frayed.
Clauses 106 to 108 give effect to certain findings of the accountability review. Clause 106 will improve timeliness in the system by allowing the Independent Office for Police Conduct to make referrals to the Crown Prosecution Service prior to completing its final report. Clause 107 will amend the threshold for the IOPC to make referrals to the CPS, and clause 108 places the IOPC’s victims’ right to review scheme on a statutory footing, further improving the robustness of the IOPC’s investigative process.
Clause 106 will improve timeliness in the misconduct system. At present, a number of factors cause delay in the misconduct system, one of which relates to the fact that in order for the IOPC to make a referral to the CPS, it is legally required to complete its final report, concluding its investigation, which causes delays in making referrals. The final report has to include misconduct findings and lessons learned for the IOPC. Such elements are not required for referrals to be made to the CPS, so the change that we are making will enable the IOPC to make a referral prior to completing its final report, allowing for an improvement in pace in the accountability system.
Currently, the law states that the IOPC may refer a police officer to the CPS where there is an indication that a criminal offence may have been committed. This is a relatively low bar for making referrals to the CPS. Clause 107 changes this to bring the system in line with the threshold that the police apply when making referrals of members of the public to the CPS, which requires there to be a realistic prospect of conviction. It is right and fair that, as a result of this change, officers and members of the public will be referred to the CPS at the same threshold. The CPS will continue to make charging decisions at the same threshold, which is the full code test. This change will improve overall fairness in the system.
Finally, the IOPC’s victims’ right to review currently allows for victims and their families to challenge the IOPC when it decides not to refer matters to the CPS. This right is currently available to victims and their families through guidance. Clause 108 places this right on the statute book to protect victims and demonstrate our clear commitment to victims’ rights. Taken together, these clauses are a balanced package of measures that will help to speed up IOPC investigations while strengthening the rights of those who may be aggrieved by the outcome of an investigation.
Clause 109 amends the powers of the Secretary of State to make provisions on appeals to the police appeals tribunals. It will enable chief constables to appeal the findings or outcome of police misconduct proceedings, with a similar right for police and crime commissioners to appeal where the officer subject to proceedings is a chief constable. It will also enable a right of appeal to be conferred on the director general of the IOPC where the IOPC has presented the case at the misconduct proceedings.
This Government are committed to restoring public trust and confidence in policing, which is something fundamental to our model of policing by consent. While the majority of our police officers act with bravery and integrity, where things go wrong the public rightly expect that there is a system to robustly hold the police to account.
In the context of recent high-profile cases that have damaged that vital trust and confidence, chief constables must be empowered to drive up standards. While chief constables are themselves rightly held to account for standards in their forces, they are not afforded the same ability to challenge disciplinary decisions as the officers in their force. The only route for chief constables to challenge decisions that they consider to be unreasonable is through judicial review. That is a lengthier and more complex process than the existing specialist police appeals tribunals.
Clause 109 will allow the Secretary of State to make amendments to existing rules. First, it will provide for a right of appeal for chief constables to challenge the findings or outcomes of misconduct proceedings in relation to officers within their force, and an equivalent right of appeal for police and crime commissioners where the officer concerned is a chief constable. This is designed to ensure parity within the system, supporting the wider responsibilities of police and crime commissioners in respect of chief constables.
Furthermore, the clause will provide an equivalent right of appeal for the director general of the IOPC, limited to circumstances in which the IOPC has presented at the misconduct proceedings. This again supports public trust and confidence by ensuring vital independence in the system in the most serious and sensitive cases. Amendments to secondary legislation will be developed in consultation with the sector, including the Police Advisory Board for England and Wales.
I will speak to new clauses 23 and 31, which are also in this group, once we have heard from the shadow Minister.
Matt Vickers
On 5 September 2022, an armed police officer shot and killed Chris Kaba during a vehicle stop in south London. The police referred the case to the IOPC, as required when someone dies or is seriously injured in police custody or contact. The IOPC investigated and referred the case to the Crown Prosecution Service, which authorised a murder charge in September 2023. Concerns over accountability systems led the Home Office to launch a review in September 2023. In March 2024, the officer was identified and the Home Secretary announced three immediate changes to improve accountability: raising the threshold for CPS referrals; relaxing restrictions on criminal proceedings; and formalising victims’ rights under the IOPC’s victims’ right to review policy.
Clauses 106 to 108 implement these proposals, which had previously been tabled as amendments to the Criminal Justice Bill. Clause 106 introduces significant procedural reform to allow certain criminal investigations into police misconduct to be expedited. It is clear that the clause will help to significantly speed up accountability, especially in cases involving clear and serious misconduct by police officers. By allowing criminal proceedings to be brought sooner, it reduces the delay in holding individuals accountable for their actions, ensuring that justice is not unduly postponed.
In situations where there is clear evidence of misconduct, that allows for quicker action. A quicker response can help to reassure the public that, where there are serious allegations, the authority is acting swiftly and decisively. It demonstrates that law enforcement and oversight bodies are committed to transparency and integrity. What safeguards are in place to prevent inappropriate or premature referrals to the Director of Public Prosecutions under this accelerated procedure? How will the IOPC or other appropriate authority be held accountable for determinations made?
Currently, chief officers have no right of appeal against panel decisions and may only challenge outcomes via judicial review. In October 2022, the Government launched a review of the dismissal process, with findings published in September 2023. Recommendations included a presumption of dismissal for gross misconduct; automatic gross misconduct designation for certain convictions; streamlined performance and vetting-based dismissal processes; and a new appeal right for chief officers. Met commissioner Sir Mark Rowley welcomed the reforms, citing the need for greater control to uphold standards. However, the Police Federation criticised the changes, warning they could undermine fair hearings and lead to excessive influence by chief officers, risking biased outcomes.
Dame Diana Johnson
I welcome what the shadow Minister has said. There have been no changes to the clauses that were introduced in the Criminal Justice Bill and that are now in the Crime and Policing Bill, so I think we are on the same page in terms of these being the appropriate measures to take forward. I am grateful that he set out in detail the case for introducing the new clauses, which seek to ensure that the provisions work in policing and are fit for purpose, and that everyone who is in policing is fit to be a police officer. I reassure the Committee that the Government take police integrity very seriously. It is essential, as I said in my earlier remarks, that we have public confidence in policing and that the highest standards are upheld and maintained. I think we all agree that individuals who fall below the standards the public expect should not be police officers.
New clause 23 seeks to ensure that previous complaints or convictions are considered a factor in determining when a complaint against an officer should be handled formally under schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2002. I recognise the shadow Minister’s desire to strengthen the legislation to that effect but, in reality, these elements are already established practice. Under existing statutory guidance issued by the IOPC, previous complaints against an officer should be taken into account when considering whether to handle a complaint under schedule 3. All those working in policing must have regard to that statutory guidance. Compelling forces to record complaints under schedule 3, where a historical complaint exists on an officer’s record, would limit their ability to handle those complaints in the most proportionate manner and in the interests of the complainant.
Similarly, information on historical convictions is available to forces on the police national computer and is relevant in determining the most appropriate way to handle a complaint. The Government have committed to ensuring that vetting rules are strengthened with regard to historical convictions. We intend to put mandatory vetting standards into law this year, so that those who have committed certain offences cannot hold vetting clearance and serve as police officers.
New clause 31 would amend the Police Act 1996 to ensure that a code of practice may provide that a police officer who fails their vetting will be dismissed without notice. It may help the Committee to understand that the Government have acted rapidly to develop new regulations in this area, which will enable forces to dismiss officers who cannot maintain vetting clearance. The regulations have taken into account the relevant legal proceedings, such as the Di Maria judicial review, which considered the adequacy of the Metropolitan Police Service’s processes to remove those officers without vetting clearance. The Police (Vetting) Regulations 2025, which were laid just last week on 23 April, introduced a duty on police officers to hold and maintain vetting clearance, and provide a bespoke regulatory mechanism by which they can be dismissed should they fail to do so.
The Government also strongly believe that there should be no circumstances in which an officer who is unable to hold vetting clearance should remain in policing, so I cannot support the qualification in new clause 31, which suggests that an officer may be capable of deployment to other duties despite failing to maintain their vetting clearance. I hope that, having had the opportunity to consider the existing framework for complaints, the new regulations that I just referred to and the ongoing work to strengthen the vetting rules, the shadow Minister will be content not to move his new clauses later in our proceedings.
I want to mention how the IOPC will keep an eye on the changes that are being introduced. It is clear that there will be scrutiny of what happens following the changes. If there are emerging patterns of cases where, for instance, the CPS declines to charge an officer, despite the IOPC referral, I would expect the IOPC to consider whether there are lessons to be learned and a further review to be undertaken.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 106 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 107 to 109 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 110
Power to make youth diversion orders
Dame Diana Johnson
I beg to move amendment 53, in clause 110, page 128, line 31, leave out “an” and insert “a relevant”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 54.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 54 and 55.
Clause stand part.
Clause 111 stand part.
Government new clause 61—Notification requirements.
Dame Diana Johnson
Part 14 of the Bill is about counter-terrorism and national security. Protecting the public is the first duty of any Government, which is why national security is a key pillar of the Government’s plan for change. The UK has one of the strongest counter-terrorism frameworks in the world, but we cannot stand by while threats evolve.
As the Home Secretary has set out in her statements to the House, the Security Service, Counter Terrorism Policing and the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation have all consistently raised concerns related to the increasing number of young people being investigated for terrorism offences. While there must always be the potential to pursue prosecutions in the most serious cases, it is important to ensure that there are alternative risk management measures that do not automatically result in a young person receiving a terrorism conviction, which can have a hugely destructive impact on their life prospects. We have listened to operational partners about the need for alternative and earlier interventions, and we are taking the opportunity to build on a recommendation made by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall KC. Chapter 1 of part 14 therefore introduces new youth diversion orders or YDOs.
YDOs will be a new civil order designed to better manage terrorist risk from young people, while reducing the need for their further involvement in the criminal justice system. They demonstrate this Government’s commitment to ensuring that operational partners have the tools they need to reduce terrorism risk and support rehabilitation.
Clause 110 introduces a new power for the police to apply to a youth or magistrates court for a YDO. To impose a YDO, the court will need to be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the respondent has either committed a terrorism offence, committed a non-terrorism offence with a terrorism connection, or engaged in conduct likely to facilitate the commission of a terrorism offence. The court will also need to consider that it is necessary and proportionate to make the order to protect the public from a risk of terrorism or serious harm, as defined in clause 111. This ensures that the new orders will be imposed only where there is a serious risk to the public.
The technical Government amendments 53 to 55 adjust the definition of “offence with a terrorist connection” to avoid the need to refer to legislation relating to sentencing. Sentencing will not take place in YDO applications, but the judge considering a YDO application will be able to consider whether the individual has committed an offence with a terrorist connection, in the same way as a judge would consider this on sentencing.
Finally, new clause 61 requires individuals to provide their personal details to the police where a YDO includes notification requirements. The relevant details are the respondent’s name, including any aliases, and their home address. This requirement will not be automatic or mandatory for every YDO, but will need to be agreed by the court on a case-by-case basis.
The notification requirement will also include a requirement to provide information about the individual’s school or other educational establishment if relevant. This information would be helpful, for example, in a scenario where someone moved school and there was no other trigger for the local authority to inform the police of the move.
The new clause is supported by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, and operational partners have confirmed that it is necessary to support the effective day-to-day management of YDOs. I commend the Government’s amendments to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
The new youth diversion orders are designed as a counterterrorism risk management tool for individuals under the age of 21. The purpose of the YDOs is to divert young people from engaging in terrorist activities, and to allow police to intervene at an earlier stage.
Clause 110 grants the police the authority to apply to the courts for a YDO. Clause 110 clarifies that a YDO can be applied for by a chief officer of police when the respondent meets certain criteria based on their age and involvement in terrorist-related offences. In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the respondent must be between the ages of 10 and 21, and in Scotland, between 12 and 21.
The aim of the order is diversion, rather than punishment. The YDO is intended to help prevent further involvement in terrorism or related activities. The order may give rehabilitation, counselling or other interventions designed to steer the individual away from terrorism-related conduct. Clause 111 defines serious harm in the context of YDOs.
New clause 61 introduces notification requirements for a youth diversion order, where the respondent must notify the police within three days of being served with the order. The notification includes personal details such as the respondent’s name, any additional names, home address, and the name and address of any educational establishment the respondent normally attends. It is intended to help ensure the youth’s compliance with the order, as well as assist in tracking their progress or risk of non-compliance.
This approach strengthens the monitoring aspect of YDOs by tying in an educational component. It ensures that authorities have up-to-date information regarding the young person’s school involvement, which can be a crucial element in their rehabilitation. How will the Government ensure that the notification requirements, particularly educational details, do not inadvertently stigmatise the young person, or disrupt their education experience, especially in cases where the individual might already be vulnerable or at risk of exclusion from school?
Dame Diana Johnson
I am grateful for the shadow Minister’s comments. On his point about information on schools and stigmatising children, am I right in thinking he believes that information will be made available to the public? I was not clear.
Matt Vickers
In educational settings, if people are given the details and the contact, might that be reflected?
Dame Diana Johnson
I do not wish to try your patience, Mrs Lewell, but my understanding is that this would not be public information that was shared. It would remain within the youth court or the magistrates court. I am looking to my officials, and they are nodding at me, so this is not information that would be in the public domain. I hope that that deals with the point around any stigmatisation of a young person who was subject to a YDO.
Amendment 53 agreed to.
Amendments made: 54, in clause 110, page 129, leave out lines 8 and 9 and insert—
“‘relevant offence’ means an offence which—
(a) was committed on or after 29 June 2021,
(b) is punishable on indictment with imprisonment for more than 2 years, and
(c) is not specified in—
(i) Schedule 1A to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, or
(ii) Schedule A1 to the Sentencing Code;”.
This amendment, Amendment 53 and Amendment 55 replace the concept of an “offence with a terrorist connection” with the concept of a “relevant offence with a terrorist connection” so as to enable the court dealing with an application for a youth diversion order to makes its own determination as to whether an offence has a terrorist connection.
Amendment 55, in clause 110, page 129, line 14, at end insert—
“(3A) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a)(ii), a relevant offence has a terrorist connection if the offence—
(a) is, or takes place in the course of, an act of terrorism, or
(b) is committed for the purposes of terrorism.” —(Dame Diana Johnson.)
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 54.
Clause 110, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 111 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 112
Content of youth diversion orders
Dame Diana Johnson
I beg to move amendment 56, in clause 112, page 130, line 11, leave out “subsection (2) or (3)” and insert “subsections (2) to (3A)”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 59.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 57 to 59.
Amendment 40, in clause 112, page 130, line 33, leave out subsection (6) and insert—
“(6) A youth diversion order must specify the period for which it has effect, up to a maximum of 12 months.
(7) An assessment must be taken of the respondent before the conclusion of a youth diversion order to determine if they continue to hold extremist views or pose a terror threat.
(8) An assessment must be made by a qualified expert in extremism and counterterrorism.
(9) Assessments taken by the respondent’s youth offending team must be reviewed by an external expert with no pre-existing relationship to the respondent.
(10) If the respondent is assessed as holding extremist views or as a terror threat the youth offending team or a chief officer of police must apply to an appropriate court for the youth offending order to be extended up to a maximum of 12 months.
(11) All provisions, prohibitions and requirements of a youth diversion order remain in effect until the respondent has been assessed as holding no extremist views or posing a terror threat.”
This amendment would give the police the ability to apply for youth diversion orders in cases of youth extremism and terror risks. The diversion orders would conclude automatically after a maximum of twelve months without an assessment as to whether the individual remained a terror risk or extremist.
Government amendment 60.
Clause stand part.
Government new clause 62—Electronic monitoring of compliance with order: England and Wales.
Government new clause 63—Conditions for imposing electronic monitoring requirement: England and Wales.
Government amendment 79.
Dame Diana Johnson
Clause 112 sets out a non-exhaustive list of prohibitions or requirements that may be included in a YDO and the safeguards that the police and courts must consider. The police must have the ability to mitigate risk to the public from young people being drawn into terrorism—a growing problem, as we all appreciate. The YDO will enable the police to impose necessary restrictions on an individual, subject to a court order. These may include limits on accessing certain websites or apps, or restrictions on engaging with specific individuals or groups. For example, this could include engagement with other children who have been assessed to be vulnerable to radicalisation. A YDO may also include positive requirements that the respondent must comply with. These may be rehabilitative in nature, including, for example, mandatory attendance at intervention sessions that seek to support the respondent in moving away from extremist ideologies.
Although it is critical that the police are able to impose necessary risk management and rehabilitative measures, the legislation ensures that there are safeguards to limit the extent of such measures. First, each measure must be necessary and proportionate for the purpose of mitigating a risk of terrorism or serious harm. Secondly, any measure included as part of a YDO must not unnecessarily interfere with a respondent’s educational or work commitments, or their religious beliefs. Thirdly, any measure may not exceed a total duration of two years. The aim is to ensure that YDOs have enough time to make a positive impact on a young person’s life while remaining proportionate to the scale of risk they pose to the public by being drawn into terrorism.
The Government amendments to clause 112 provide further examples of the measures that may be imposed through a YDO. This increases transparency and provides a clear statutory basis for the most intrusive measures that will be available. The expanded list of prohibitions and requirements represents the measures that we expect the police will most commonly apply to the court to include in a YDO.
Amendment 57 allows for potential restrictions on entering a specific area, including travel restrictions inside or outside the UK. Amendment 58 outlines potential requirements for the respondent to answer questions, provide information, or produce documents. Amendment 59 provides that, if included in a YDO, the individual may be required to comply with notification requirements, as detailed in new clause 61, and may be subject to restrictions on the possession of weapons and explosives. Amendments 56 and 60 are consequential on these other amendments.
New clauses 62 and 63 and Government amendment 79 enable a YDO to include an electronic monitoring requirement. This will enable the effective monitoring of and compliance with measures such as curfew requirements and exclusion measures. Operational partners have been explicit that having this capability will maximise the utility and effectiveness of YDOs.
Finally, amendment 40, tabled by the shadow Minister, seeks to give the police the ability to apply for a YDO in cases where a young person exhibits extremist views; it would also prevent an order from expiring unless there is an independent expert assessment that concludes the individual no longer poses a terrorist risk or holds extremist views. YDOs are designed for terrorism-related cases only. A YDO is a tool to be used only when young people pose a public safety risk. There are no plans to use YDOs for cases that do not meet terrorism thresholds, as this would interfere with the rights of young people.
This Government take extremism very seriously, and we are committed to ensuring that we have the tools and powers needed to address this issue. Efforts to counter extremism span a broad range of Government and law enforcement activity, and we must persist in our efforts to challenge extremist narratives, to disrupt the activity of radicalising groups, and to directly tackle the causes of radicalisation. The Home Office leads work on countering extremism, and the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government will lead work with local councils on strengthening community cohesion. It is vital that the two programmes on cohesion and extremism work in parallel.
Clause 116(4), which we will debate in a later group, permits the police to apply for the extension of a YDO. There may be two extension applications, and each will be for a maximum of six months, so the maximum duration of an order is two years in total. I assure the hon. Member for Stockton West that counter-terrorism police will regularly assess the risk posed by the individual while the order is in force. Although decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis, the police may decide to apply to the court to extend an order. Where the police assess that the risk posed by the respondent remains despite the order having been in place, they may consider, in consultation with the relevant prosecutorial authority, whether the relevant test for prosecution for terrorist offending is met. Should the risk posed by the individual persist for longer than 24 months, other tools may be considered.
I hope the shadow Minister will agree not to press amendment 40 given the clear operational need for the Government’s amendments, which I commend to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
Amendment 40 primarily focuses on the duration, assessment and possible extension of YDOs, and it would ensure that the orders are subject to review and that further intervention is applied when necessary. Under the amendment, YDOs must specify a period of up to 12 months in which the young person is monitored and guided through the diversion programme. This would ensure there is a clear time limit with a defined end point for the intervention.
Additionally, before the order concludes, an assessment must be carried out to evaluate whether the individual continues to hold extremist views or poses a terrorism threat. This would add an important safeguard to the process, ensuring that young people who may still be a risk are identified before the order ends. A critical element of the amendment is the requirement that qualified experts carry out the assessment. The evaluation of whether the individual continues to hold extremist views or to present a terrorism risk must be conducted by an expert in extremism and counter-terrorism. This would ensure the assessment is informed by a high level of expertise and understanding of the complexities of radicalisation.
Assessments made by the youth offending team must be reviewed by an external expert who has no pre-existing relationship with the respondent. This independent review would guarantee objectivity and minimise any potential bias in the evaluation process. If the individual was assessed to be still holding extremist views or continuing to pose a terrorism risk, the youth offending team or a chief officer of the police would have the power to apply to the court for an extension of the youth diversion order. This extension could be granted for an additional 12 months, allowing continued intervention and monitoring of the individual. Importantly, the extension would ensure that the order remained in place for as long as the individual was considered to pose a risk to public safety.
Finally, the amendment specifies that all provisions, prohibitions and requirements set by the YDO will remain in effect until the individual has been assessed as holding no extremist views or posing no terrorism threat. This would ensure that the protective measures stipulated in the order were maintained throughout the duration of the individual’s involvement in the diversion programme, offering ongoing protection to the public while allowing continued monitoring of the individual’s risk level. The amendment would ensure that the diversion process is both effective and responsive to the changing nature of extremist behaviour, and that any decision to conclude or extend the order is based on robust and independent expert evaluations, thus improving the overall effectiveness of the youth intervention measures in countering extremism and terrorism.
Clause 112 outlines the content and conditions of a youth diversion order, providing the framework for how the order can be structured and what it can include. How will the Government ensure that YDOs do not interfere with religious or cultural practices of respondents, as the clause provides, especially when it comes to limitations on association or communication?
The Chair
My sincere apologies to the Committee: before I called the shadow Minister, I should have proposed Government amendment 56. I call the Minister.
Dame Diana Johnson
To answer the question that the shadow Minister just posed, I said in my earlier remarks that there would not be restrictions that interfered with educational and work commitments, or with religious observances. I think that deals with his question. On that basis, commend the Government amendment to the Committee.
Amendment 56 agreed to.
Amendments made: 57, in clause 112, page 130, line 18, at end insert—
“(d) the respondent’s presence in, or access to, a specified area or place or an area or place of a specified description;
(e) the respondent's travel (whether within the United Kingdom, between the United Kingdom and other places or otherwise).”
This amendment provides that the prohibitions or requirements a youth diversion order may contain include ones relating to the respondent’s presence in or access to particular areas or places, or to the respondent’s travel.
Amendment 58, in clause 112, page 130, line 22, leave out “provide information” and insert
“answer questions, provide information or produce documents”.
This amendment provides that a youth diversion order may require the respondent to answer questions, provide information or produce documents.
Amendment 59, in clause 112, page 130, line 23, at end insert—
“(d) require the respondent to comply with section (Notification requirements) (notification requirements).
(3A) An order may contain any prohibition that is of a kind that could be imposed by the Secretary of State in relation to an individual by virtue of paragraph 6A of Schedule 1 to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (weapons and explosives measures).”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This amendment provides that a youth diversion order may require the respondent to comply with notification requirements under NC61 and may contain prohibitions relating to weapons and explosives.
Amendment proposed: 40, in clause 112, page 130, line 33, leave out subsection (6) and insert—
“(6) A youth diversion order must specify the period for which it has effect, up to a maximum of 12 months.
(7) An assessment must be taken of the respondent before the conclusion of a youth diversion order to determine if they continue to hold extremist views or pose a terror threat.
(8) An assessment must be made by a qualified expert in extremism and counterterrorism.
(9) Assessments taken by the respondent’s youth offending team must be reviewed by an external expert with no pre-existing relationship to the respondent.
(10) If the respondent is assessed as holding extremist views or as a terror threat the youth offending team or a chief officer of police must apply to an appropriate court for the youth offending order to be extended up to a maximum of 12 months.
(11) All provisions, prohibitions and requirements of a youth diversion order remain in effect until the respondent has been assessed as holding no extremist views or posing a terror threat.”—(Matt Vickers.)
This amendment would give the police the ability to apply for youth diversion orders in cases of youth extremism and terror risks. The diversion orders would conclude automatically after a maximum of twelve months without an assessment as to whether the individual remained a terror risk or extremist.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Dame Diana Johnson
I beg to move amendment 61, in clause 113, page 131, line 4, leave out from “order” to “consult” in line 5 and insert
“, a chief officer of police must, if the respondent will be under the age of 18 when the application is made,”.
This is a drafting change that ensures consistency between the drafting of subsection (1) of clause 113 and subsection (2) of that clause as amended by Amendment 62.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 62, 64 and 63.
Clause stand part.
Government amendments 65 and 66.
Clause 114 stand part.
Government amendment 67.
Clause 115 stand part.
Dame Diana Johnson
Clauses 113 to 115 set out duties on the police to consult with relevant authorities, provide for applications to be made without notice in urgent circumstances, and provide for interim YDOs to be made.
The Committee will recognise the importance of ensuring that the police take wider factors into consideration—for example, a person’s age, mental health, safeguarding and educational needs—before applying for a YDO. Clause 113 therefore introduces a duty to consult before applying for an order or applying for variation or discharge of an order. In England and Wales, and in Northern Ireland, the police will be required to consult with youth offending teams and the Youth Justice Agency respectively for applications involving individuals under the age of 18. In Scotland, the police will be required to consult with the Lord Advocate for all applications. This is necessary to give effect to the different position in Scotland, where consultation with the Lord Advocate is appropriate for all YDOs, including for 18 to 21-year-olds, and for without-notice YDO applications. That reflects the Lord Advocate’s specific functions in relation to their role as the head of the system for the investigation and prosecution of crime, which includes a specific working relationship with Police Scotland.
Government amendments 62 and 65 make the additional requirement in respect of Scotland that the police consult with the local authority before making an application for a YDO, irrespective of the age of the respondent, and remove the requirement for consultation with the Scottish Children’s Reporter Administration for YDOs for under-18s. Again, the amendments are necessary to give effect to the different position in Scotland, where there is no equivalent to youth offending teams. Government amendments 63, 64 and 66 are consequential on those amendments, while Government amendment 61 ensures consistency of drafting between the subsections of clauses 113, as amended.
Consultation will be an important part of the YDO application process, ensuring that the police have thoroughly considered the necessity and proportionality of a YDO and taken into account the expertise of those who work closely with young people in the community. This statutory duty does not prevent the police from engaging with other authorities, such as the CPS or the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland, wider social services, or the respondent’s school or college, where appropriate.
While it is likely to be rare in practice, there may be circumstances in which an urgent YDO application is required and providing notice to the respondent may increase risk. Therefore, clause 114 provides a route for police to apply for a YDO without notice to the respondent. The requirement to consult does not apply in such cases, although the police will still be required to consult relevant authorities before the full court hearing for a YDO.
Where an application is made without notice, the court will be able to consider whether to impose an interim order, in line with the approach taken with other preventive orders, such as knife crime prevention orders. Due to the temporary nature of an interim order, clause 115 ensures that the only positive requirements that can be included in such an order are to provide information and to comply with notification requirements. For example, the Bill does not allow the police to impose a requirement to attend intervention sessions similar to Prevent in an interim order, but they will be able to impose risk-management measures where necessary and proportionate, subject to the court’s permission. Amendment 67 clarifies the measures that can and cannot be imposed in an interim YDO.
I commend the amendments and the clauses to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
Clause 113 outlines the duty to consult before making an application for a youth diversion order or the variation or discharge of such an order, particularly when the individual involved is under 18. It ensures that key stakeholders are involved in the decision-making process, so that the young person’s best interests are taken into account, and it ensures that the relevant agencies are informed and consulted before any formal application is made. How do the Government plan to ensure that the agencies that are consulted—in particular the youth offending teams—have the necessary expertise and resources to adequately assess the case before the application for a YDO is made?
Clause 114 outlines the process for making an application for a youth diversion order without notice to the respondent. This provision is significant because it allows for situations in which immediate intervention is necessary and the respondent is not notified before the application is made. How will the Government ensure that respondents’ rights are protected in cases where an application is made without notice? What measures are in place to prevent misuse of this provision?
Clause 115 makes provision for an interim youth diversion order to be made during the adjournment of a hearing for a full YDO. It ensures that even while a decision on the full application is pending, the court can take immediate temporary action to manage the respondent’s risk, particularly in cases involving potential extremism or terrorism. The clause allows the courts to impose interim measures to temporarily manage a respondent’s behaviour, safeguarding public safety, while the full process is ongoing.
Dame Diana Johnson
The shadow Minister raised the issue of consultation with youth offending teams and their equivalent in the devolved nations. My understanding is that we are not talking about a large number of individuals being subject to these provisions. The reason we say that youth offending teams have to be consulted is that they have the expertise and the knowledge of working with young people, and it is likely that the individuals they will be consulted on will already be known to them. It is a good, positive measure to undertake that consultation with youth offending teams and recognise the skills and safeguards that they will bring. Their knowledge of the individual will perhaps include, as I spoke about earlier, issues in their background or safeguarding issues that need to be considered. That is really important.
An interim YDO may be required if there is an immediate risk that has to be managed. That is why provision needs to be made for interim YDOs, but of course they are interim, and a full hearing will take place. Interim YDOs will be used only in urgent circumstances, and of course the court will have to agree; while an application can be made, if the court does not recognise the urgency, it will not be granted. The independent reviewer of terrorism legislation has agreed that the power to make interim measures is necessary in order for YDOs to be effective.
I hope that, on the basis of those answers, the shadow Minister is satisfied that the clause should stand part of the Bill.
Amendment 61 agreed to.
Amendments made: 62, in clause 113, page 131, line 10, leave out from “Scotland” to end of line 15 and insert
“must consult—
(a) the Lord Advocate,
(b) the relevant local authority, and
(c) if the respondent will be under the age of 18 when the application is made, the Principal Reporter.”
This amendment changes who the chief constable of the Police Service of Scotland must consult before making an application for a youth diversion order or for the variation or discharge of such an order.
Amendment 64, in clause 113, page 131, line 21, at end insert—
“‘relevant local authority’ means—
(a) the Scottish local authority in whose area it appears to the chief constable that the respondent lives, or
(b) if it appears to the chief constable that the respondent lives in more than one such area, whichever one or more of the relevant Scottish local authorities that the chief constable considers it appropriate to consult;”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 62.
Amendment 63, in clause 113, page 131, line 21, after “section” insert “—
‘Scottish local authority’ means a council constituted under section 2 of the Local Government etc (Scotland) Act 1994;”.—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 62.
Clause 113, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 114
Applications without notice
Amendments made: 65, in clause 114, page 131, line 27, leave out “Section 113(1) does” and insert
“Subsections (1) and (2)(b) and (c) of section 113 do”.
This amendment disapplies the requirement to consult the relevant local authority and (where the respondent is under 18) the Principal Reporter where an application for a youth diversion order is made without notice in Scotland.
Amendment 66, in clause 114, page 131, line 35, leave out “section 113(1)” and insert
“subsection (1) or (2)(b) and (c) of section 113 (as the case may be)”.—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 65.
Clause 114, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 115
Interim youth diversion orders
Amendment made: 67, in clause 115, page 132, line 8, leave out subsection (3) and substitute—
“(3) The only requirements that may be imposed by an interim youth diversion order on the respondent are—
(a) a requirement of the kind mentioned in section 112(3)(b) (requirements to provide information etc);
(b) a requirement to comply with section (Notification requirements) (notification requirements).”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This amendment enables an interim youth diversion order to require the respondent answer questions, provide information or produce documents, or to comply with notification requirements under NC61.
Clause 115, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 116
Variation and discharge of youth diversion orders
Dame Diana Johnson
I beg to move amendment 68, in clause 116, page 132, line 33, at end insert—
“(4A) The court may make provision of a kind mentioned in subsection (4) only if it considers that the provision is necessary for the purpose of protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism or other serious harm.
(4B) Subsections (5) and (7) of section 112 apply to additional prohibitions or requirements included on a variation of an order.”
This amendment provides that a court may only vary a youth diversion order to include an additional prohibition or requirement or to extend its duration if it considers it necessary; and that certain provision in clause 112 about the content of orders applies equally to such additional prohibitions or requirements.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
Government amendments 69 to 71.
Clause 117 stand part.
Dame Diana Johnson
Clause 116 ensures that the police or the subject of a YDO can apply to the relevant court to vary the order once it is in place to, for example, add or remove measures or to change the duration of existing measures. The clause also allows the police or the subject of a YDO to apply to end the order before it is due to expire, allowing the police to withdraw the order if it is no longer considered necessary.
Clause 117 sets out the route for the police or a respondent to appeal against a court decision to impose a YDO, an interim YDO or any change made under clause 116. Appeals will be made to the Crown court in England, Wales and Northern Ireland and the Sheriff Appeal Court in Scotland. The court may then make changes on the basis of that appeal, as required. Government amendments 68 and 71 make changes to clarify and streamline the appeals process for YDOs, as do Government amendments 69 and 70, which provide that a second appeal in relation to a YDO may be made to the Court of Appeal in England and Wales.
The Committee will recognise the importance of the clauses in ensuring that there is a process for varying or revoking the order as well as for both the police and YDO subjects to have a prescribed and proportionate route for appeals.
Amendment 68 agreed to.
Clause 116, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 117
Appeal against youth diversion order etc
Dame Diana Johnson
I beg to move amendment 72, in clause 118, page 133, line 22, at end insert—
“(1A) Where a youth diversion order requires a person to provide information or produce a document, it is an offence for the person, in purported compliance with that requirement, to provide any information or produce any document which the person knows to be false.
(1B) Where a youth diversion order requires a person to comply with section (Notification requirements), it is an offence for the person, in purported compliance with that section, to notify to the police any information which the person knows to be false.”
This amendment makes it an offence for a person to knowingly provide false information, produce a false document or notify false information in purported compliance with notification requirements imposed under a youth diversion order.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 73 to 75.
Clause stand part.
Government amendment 76.
Clauses 119 and 120 stand part.
Government amendments 77 and 78.
Clause 121 stand part.
Government new clause 64—Data from electronic monitoring in England and Wales: code of practice.
Government new clause 65—Reviews of operation of this Chapter.
New clause 42—Report on the organisations responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, publish a report on the organisations responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders.
(2) That report must include—
(a) the organisations which will be responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders;
(b) what level of counterterrorism and de-radicalisation training and expertise they have; and
(c) what additional resources they will require to effectively administer the provisions, prohibitions and requirements of youth diversion orders.
(3) Within one month of the publication of this report, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a plan assessing the—
(a) training,
(b) financing, and
(c) guidance,
available to the organisations identified in the report under subsection (1) to bring their training, expertise and funding to the requisite level identified in that report.
(4) The Secretary of State must commission a report from the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to assess whether the levels of funding, training and expertise proposed in the plan under subsection (3) are sufficient. This report will be laid before Parliament with the plan under subsection (3).”
This new clause would require the Government to publish a report on the organisations responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders and a plan and independent report on the funding, training and expertise they need.
Dame Diana Johnson
I wonder whether it might be helpful for the Committee if I respond after the shadow Minister has spoken to his new clause 42.
Matt Vickers
Clauses 118 and 119 outline the offence of breaching a youth diversion order and subsequent processes for issuing and revising guidance on the exercise of functions related to youth diversion orders.
Clause 118(4) provides that if a person is convicted of breaching a youth diversion order, the court cannot issue a conditional discharge requiring a substantive penalty instead. This provision prevents a lenient approach that might fail to deter non-compliance. The clause also establishes varying penalties based on age, with difference consequences for individuals under and over 18. How do these penalties balance deterrence with the goal of rehabilitating young offenders, particularly those under 18?
Clause 119 grants the Secretary of State the authority to issue guidance for local police forces. How does the Minister plan to ensure that that guidance brings consistency in the application of YDOs across different regions? Further clauses outline wider procedures, including for applications for YDOs.
New clause 42 would require the Secretary of State to publish a report within three months of the passage of the Act detailing the organisations responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders. The report must cover the organisations involved, the counter-terrorism and deradicalisation training they possess and any additional resources required to effectively manage the YDO provisions. Within one month of the report’s publication, the Secretary of State must present a plan to address training, financing and guidance to meet the required standards. Additionally, the Secretary of State must commission an independent assessment by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation to evaluate whether the proposed levels of funding, training and expertise are adequate, with that assessment being laid before Parliament alongside the plan.
The new clause would ensure the effective implementation of youth diversion orders with the necessary expertise. The requirement for a report and plan would ensure that organisations are prepared to handle counter-terrorism and deradicalisation issues. It would set clear expectations for training and funding, holding the Government accountable for providing sufficient resources. The independent assessment by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation would add scrutiny, ensuring that the Government’s plans meet the required standards. Overall, the new clause would introduce a proactive and transparent approach, fostering confidence in the system’s ability to address terrorism and extremism.
What steps are the Government taking to ensure that the organisations involved in implementing YDOs have the necessary counter-terrorism and deradicalisation training and expertise? Are the Government confident that those organisations are sufficiently prepared without the need for an independent assessment? Given the complexity of implementing YDOs, does the Minister agree that additional resources might be required to ensure that the orders are effectively enforced? If not, what plans are in place to guarantee that the organisations responsible are adequately resourced?
Dame Diana Johnson
Clauses 118 to 121 will support the implementation of YDOs. Although the aim of a YDO is to divert a young person away from terrorist offending, it is critical that there is an effective deterrent against breaching the order, and that where a young person breaches the order, the police can take action.
Clause 118 ensures that a separate criminal offence is available for breaching a YDO without a reasonable excuse. In practice, we propose that statutory guidance will set out that the police will be expected to consult youth offending teams where there is a suspected breach, and for less serious breaches the police may consider alternatives to prosecution, such as varying the measures in the order or issuing a formal warning to the individual. Prosecution for this offence will therefore be a last resort.
Government amendment 72 makes it an offence for a person to knowingly provide false information, produce a false document or notify false information in purported compliance with notification requirements imposed under a YDO. Government amendments 73 and 74 make the offences under clause 18 triable either way irrespective of the defendant’s age, with a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment. The amendments ensure that there is a consistent maximum penalty for any breach of a YDO, regardless of the young person’s age, and that the legislation more accurately reflects the potential severity of breaching a YDO. For example, a serious breach may involve a breach of a weapons measure, such as by making plans to purchase knives or encouraging or assisting others to do so. We would expect a prosecution for that offence to be the last resort. Detail on other options to be considered beforehand will be included in the statutory guidance. The change is supported by operational partners and the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. Government amendment 75 enables a copy of a YDO to be admissible as evidence in criminal proceedings for breach of the order.
Clause 119 introduces a new power for the Secretary of State to issue guidance to the police in relation to YDOs. In issuing such guidance, we recognise the importance of proper consultation with relevant authorities, including the police, the prosecution service in England and Wales and in Northern Ireland, and the Lord Advocate in Scotland. That is why clause 119 requires mandatory consultation with certain parties and permits the Secretary of State to consult with other stakeholders, where appropriate. Government amendment 76 expands the list of consultees to include youth justice agencies.
Clause 120 ensures that rules of court can provide for anonymity for individuals going through civil proceedings for a YDO. That is important to ensure that reporting restrictions apply, and it is in line with the general policy aim of ensuring that young people do not feel stigmatised through engagement with the justice system—something that the shadow Minister has spoken about.
Finally, clause 121 makes procedural provision in respect of applications for a YDO. Government amendment 77 disapplies the time limit that would otherwise prevent an application for a YDO from being made in relation to matters arising more than six months prior to the making of the application. Amendment 78 enables proceedings in Scotland for, or in relation to, a YDO to be heard by a summary sheriff.
I turn to the Government new clauses in this group. To safeguard effectively the data that is gathered under electronic monitoring requirements, new clause 64 will require the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice for the processing of such data. The processing of such data will be subject to the requirements in the UK general data protection regulation and the Data Protection Act 2018. New clause 65 will enable the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation to review and report on the use and operationalisation of the youth diversion order. The independent reviewer already has a number of statutory functions, and this new clause aligns his statutory functions, enabling him to report on the YDO. The independent reviewer has been consulted on the clause, and his view is that the power to review the operation of the youth diversion order is important.
New clause 42, tabled by the shadow Minister, would require the Government to publish a report on the organisations that are responsible for implementing and enforcing YDOs, and a plan for delivering the relevant funding, training and guidance available for these organisations. It would also require the Government to commission a report from the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation.
As Matt Jukes, the head of counter-terrorism policing, set out in his written evidence to this Committee, counter-terrorism policing is a collaboration of UK police forces with a network of exceptional investigators. It is the lead law enforcement agency for managing terrorist risk, so it is appropriate that it will lead the implementation and enforcement of YDOs. It will be supported in this role by youth justice partners who have substantial experience of working with young people who are subject to court-imposed orders.
As I have already set out, Government new clause 65 already ensures that YDOs are added to the statutory remit of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. As part of this role, the independent reviewer is required to review the operation of YDOs in practice and report to Parliament. I hope that the shadow Minister agrees that new clause 42 is therefore unnecessary.
On the other issue that the shadow Minister referred to, regarding the consistent use of YDOs across the UK, one of the key objectives of the statutory guidance under clause 119, which chief officers must have regard to, is to ensure that there is consistency. To go back to the point about the youth offending teams, given the small size of the cohort of children who are likely to be given a YDO, we do not anticipate that the changes will add significant pressures to those youth offending teams. On that basis, I commend the Government’s amendments to the Committee.
Amendment 72 agreed to.
Amendments made: 73, in clause 118, page 133, line 23, leave out subsection (2).
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 74.
Amendment 74, in clause 118, page 133, line 33, leave out “aged 18 or over”.
This amendment makes offences under clause 118 (breach of youth diversion order) triable either way whatever the age of the respondent.
Amendment 75, in clause 118, page 134, line 8, at end insert—
“(5) In proceedings for an offence under this section, a copy of the original youth diversion order, certified by the proper officer of the court that made it, is admissible as evidence of its having been made and of its contents to the same extent that oral evidence of those matters is admissible in those proceedings.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This amendment enables a copy of a youth diversion order to be admissible as evidence in criminal proceedings for breach of the order.
Clause 118, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 119
Guidance
Amendment made: 76, in clause 119, page 134, line 16, at end insert—
“(za) the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales;
(zb) the Scottish Ministers;
(zc) the Youth Justice Agency in Northern Ireland;”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This amendment adds to the list of persons the Secretary of State must consult before issuing or revising guidance to chief officers of police about youth diversion orders.
Clause 119, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 120 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 121
Applications
Amendments made: 77, in clause 121, page 135, line 17, at end insert—
“(2) Section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (time limit for complaints etc) does not apply to a complaint under this Chapter.”
This amendment disapplies the time limit that would otherwise prevent an application for a youth diversion order being made in relation to matters arising more than six months prior to the making of the application.
Amendment 78, in clause 121, page 135, line 17, at end insert—
“(3) In Schedule 1 to the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 (asp 17) (civil proceedings etc in which summary sheriff has competence), after paragraph 12 insert—
‘Youth diversion orders
13 Proceedings for or in relation to a youth diversion order under section 110 of the Crime and Policing Act 2025.’” —(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This amendment enables proceedings in Scotland for or in relation to a youth diversion order to be heard by a summary sheriff.
Clause 121, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 122
Prevention of terrorism and state threats: weapons etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dame Diana Johnson
Clause 122 amends the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 and the National Security Act 2023 to broaden the definition of weapons that are prohibited for individuals who are subject to terrorism prevention and investigation measures or state threat prevention and investigation measures. The clause gives the Secretary of State the power to prohibit individuals who are subject to terrorism prevention and investigation measures, or to state threat prevention and investigation measures, from possessing any items that she reasonably considers could be used to cause injury. The change builds on a recommendation by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, in his annual report “The Terrorism Acts in 2022”.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 43—Travel abroad to support a proscribed organisation—
“(1) A person commits an offence if they travel outside of the United Kingdom to support a proscribed organisation.
(2) For the purposes of this section, ‘support’ includes—
(a) becoming a member of a proscribed organisation, or an affiliated group of a proscribed organisation;
(b) working for any entity, either voluntarily or for financial gain, run by a proscribed organisation;
(c) attending political, religious or social gatherings in support of a proscribed organisation;
(d) meeting with members of a proscribed organisation;
(e) creating content, both online and offline, to raise support for a proscribed organisation; or
(f) travelling to territory controlled by a proscribed organisation without an exemption.
(3) This section does not apply to—
(a) accredited non-governmental organisations and humanitarian organisations;
(b) accredited media outlets and journalists;
(c) diplomats and other governmental officials travelling in an official capacity; or
(d) independent journalists and content creators reporting on a proscribed organisation, or in a territory with a proscribed organisation present.
(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years, to a fine (or both), or
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment of a term not exceeding 6 months, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both).”
This new clause would make travelling abroad to support a proscribed organisation an offence.
Dame Diana Johnson
Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000 makes it an offence for a person to wear or display an article in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that they are a member or supporter of a proscribed terrorist organisation. The offence is committed only if the person carries out such conduct in a public place.
Clause 123 makes two key changes to section 13 of the Terrorism Act. The first is to create a new offence where a person carries out the conduct in one of the relevant premises set out in the Bill, including prisons, young offender institutions and immigration removal centres. In 2022, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation undertook a review of terrorism in prisons. That was in the context of the UK suffering four terrorist attacks in 2019 and 2020 committed by serving prisoners or terrorist offenders who had been released on licence. One of the reviewer’s recommendations was for the Government to consider amending section 13 to extend the offence to prison settings. This clause implements and builds on that recommendation. The new offence will act as a deterrent to such harmful conduct in the prison estate, and it will help to prevent exposure to articles that are linked to terrorist organisations. That, in turn, may reduce the risk of individuals being radicalised or otherwise encouraged to support such groups.
The second change concerns the powers of seizure under section 13. In his report “The Terrorism Acts in 2022”, the independent reviewer highlighted that the existing seizure powers would not be available where the police could not connect an article, such as a flag or banner, to specific individuals for the purpose of further criminal investigation. He recommended that that gap should be rectified. The clause will therefore amend section 13 to ensure that the police can seize such articles even when there is no real prospect of prosecuting an individual for a section 13 offence. An article may therefore be seized to prevent its continuing display and to preserve it as evidence.
Both changes to section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000 implement the independent reviewer’s recommendations and are supported by the police. They will ensure that the offence and associated seizure powers can be used to full effect. I am happy to respond to new clause 43 once we have heard from the shadow Minister.
Matt Vickers
Clause 123 amends section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which concerns the offence of wearing or displaying articles in support of a proscribed organisation. The key amendment is the introduction of a new offence:
“A person commits an offence if, on relevant premises, the person…wears…or displays an article, in such a way…as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation.”
What is the rationale for introducing the concept of reasonable suspicion in the offence of wearing or displaying articles, as opposed to requiring more direct evidence of support for a proscribed organisation? I would also be grateful for clarity on how the list of relevant premises is determined. Could that include other locations or contexts beyond those listed?
New clause 43 introduces a criminal offence for individuals who travel outside the United Kingdom to support a proscribed organisation. The offence covers various forms of support, including joining or working for a proscribed organisation or its affiliated groups, attending events in support of such an organisation, meeting with its members, creating content to promote the organisation, or travelling to areas controlled by the organisation without a legal exemption. The new clause provides specific exemptions for accredited non-governmental organisations and humanitarian organisations, media outlets and journalists, and diplomats or Government officials travelling in an official capacity. A person who is found guilty under the provision could face a severe penalty of imprisonment for up to 14 years on conviction on indictment, or up to six months and a fine on summary conviction.
The measure is a proactive step to curb the influence and spread of terrorism. By criminalising travel abroad to support a proscribed organisation, it would help to prevent individuals from engaging in activities that might contribute to terrorism and destabilisation abroad. The inclusion of various forms of support, ranging from membership and financial involvement to attending gatherings or creating content, provides clarity on what constitutes illegal activity. That would ensure that law enforcement could pursue a wide range of actions that support proscribed organisations.
New clause 43 is designed to prevent individuals from becoming embedded with or supporting proscribed organisations. Why would the Government not support a preventive measure that helps to protect the UK from individuals travelling abroad to engage in terrorism-related activities?
Dame Diana Johnson
As the shadow Minister has explained, new clause 43 seeks to introduce a new offence for travelling abroad to support a proscribed organisation. The UK has one of the strongest counter-terrorism frameworks in the world. That includes, under the Terrorism Act 2000, the ability to proscribe an organisation that the Home Secretary reasonably believes is concerned in terrorism. That means that it commits and participates in terrorism, prepares for terrorism, promotes or encourages terrorism, or is otherwise concerned in terrorism. Some 80 terrorist organisations are currently proscribed.
As part of the counter-terrorism framework, there are a wide range of powers and offences that can be used by the Government and operational partners to disrupt travel overseas for terrorist purposes and to prosecute individuals on their return. That includes, for example, an executive power to cancel a British citizen’s passport and the power to temporarily seize a passport when there is a reasonable suspicion that the person is traveling to engage in terrorism-related activity.
There are also a wide range of terrorism offences that could be engaged in relation to an individual who travels to support a proscribed organisation. For example, it is an offence to be a member of a proscribed organisation, to invite support—the invited support can be intangible, and it is not limited to money, property or support that incites violence or encourages terrorism—for a proscribed organisation, to attend a place used for terrorist training or to provide or receive terrorist training, and to undertake preparatory acts with the intention of committing an act of terrorism or assisting another to commit an act of terrorism.
The counter-terrorism framework also includes the designated area offence, which permits the Secretary of State to designate an area if she is satisfied that it is necessary for the purpose of protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism to restrict British nationals and residents from entering or remaining in the area. It is an offence for UK nationals or UK residents to enter or remain in a designated area. I recognise that the power has not been used to date, but the Government’s view is that it remains a useful tool to disrupt terrorist travel in the right circumstances.
As the shadow Minister may be aware, the Government are considering a recommendation made by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, on the topic raised by his new clause. The Government will not hesitate to address gaps in our toolkit and to ensure that it keeps pace with the modern terrorist threat. We have brought forward measures in the Bill to implement and build on recommendations the reviewer put forward under the last Government. In November 2024, the Home Secretary accepted his recommendation to consider introducing a new terrorist travel offence. Officials are currently considering it with operational partners, as well as the extent to which there is a gap. It is vital that any new offence extends the ability of operational partners and the CPS to disrupt and prosecute those involved in terrorism. In due course, the Government will respond fully to that recommendation on disrupting terrorist travel.
Before I conclude, on the issue of reasonable suspicion and the requirement, this measure simply extends beyond private settings to designated settings. We are not changing the reasonable suspicion test; I hope that that is helpful to the shadow Minister. For the reasons set out, I hope he will be content not to press his new clause 43 when we reach it later in our proceedings.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 123 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 124
Management of terrorist offenders
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Schedule 16.
Government new clause 21—Terrorism offences excepted from defence for slavery or trafficking victims.
Government amendment 23.
Dame Diana Johnson
Clause 124 introduces schedule 16, which amends the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. It gives powers to effectively manage a certain cohort of historical terrorism offenders. That cohort includes individuals who committed non-terrorism offences, such as conspiracy to murder, that would have been considered to have a terrorism connection had they not been committed before the relevant legislation came into effect. This is the same cohort of historical terrorism-connected offenders as captured by clause 104, relating to the polygraph testing of those offenders, which my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Justice spoke to earlier.
The 2008 Act introduced a requirement for courts to consider whether there is a connection to terrorism when sentencing certain specified offences. In circumstances where a court determines that an offence has a terrorism connection, it must aggravate the sentence. Where a terrorist connection is determined, the sentence imposed will reflect the risk profile of the offender. In addition, the offender can be more appropriately managed on their release because certain counter-terrorism risk management tools become available to the police in respect of that offender.
Since the passage of the 2008 Act, several further risk management tools have been introduced via various Acts of Parliament to manage terrorism and terrorist-connected offenders. The Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021 also expanded the scope of the terrorist connection provisions to require a court to aggravate certain non-terrorism offences with a maximum penalty of more than two years.
The clause and the associated schedule will extend the application of existing risk management measures. Those measures include powers of urgent arrest and personal search for those on licence, where it is suspected that they have breached a licence condition, as well as imposing terrorist notification requirements under the 2008 Act for this cohort of historical terrorism-connected offenders.
The independent reviewer of terrorism legislation noted that the schedule will allow the police to apply important counter-terrorism measures to serious offenders involved in terrorist plots backed by proscribed organisations, but who were convicted of non-terrorism offences. The amendments made in schedule 16 will also permit the police or the Secretary of State to apply to the courts for an order imposing the terrorist notification requirements on offenders whose historical offences have a terrorist connection. If such an order is made, the urgent arrest power and the power of personal search will also apply in respect of the offender. That measure is supported by the police and the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, who described it as a “sensible measure”.
Government new clause 21 will add certain existing terrorism-related offences to schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015. Government amendment 23 is consequential on new clause 21. As we have debated, schedule 4 to the 2015 Act contains a list of serious offences to which the section 45 defence of that Act does not apply. The list currently includes some terrorism offences, as well as serious violence and sexual offences. Section 45 provides a statutory defence against prosecution for victims of modern slavery, and is designed to give victims the confidence to come forward without fear of prosecution.
Schedule 4 to the 2015 Act ensures that those who commit the most serious offences specified in the schedule do not have the option to rely on that defence. New clause 21 adds existing terrorism offences to schedule 4, building on a recommendation made by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. Currently, only a limited number of terrorism offences are listed in schedule 4, including those in sections 5 and 6 of the Terrorism Act 2006—preparation of terrorist acts and training for terrorism, respectively. Others, such as the offence in section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000—collection of information useful to terrorists—are in scope of the section 45 defence.
Alex Davies-Jones
The clause will bring the offence of breaching a foreign travel restriction order, under paragraph 15 of schedule 5 to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, within scope of the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020, known as TORER.
TORER was emergency legislation passed in 2020 following the horrific terrorist attacks at Fishmongers’ Hall and in Streatham, committed by terrorist offenders on licence. TORER restricts the eligibility of terrorist prisoners for release on licence. It ended the automatic early release—in other words, release without Parole Board approval—of individuals who have committed a terrorist offence carrying a maximum penalty of more than two years’ imprisonment, and increased their release eligibility date from the halfway point of their sentence to the two-thirds point.
The offence of breaching a foreign travel restriction order is not currently covered by TORER, despite having a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment and being a terrorism-specific offence, and despite offences for breaching other terrorism-related orders being within scope of TORER. The clause will add breaching a foreign travel restriction order to TORER, ensuring greater consistency.
Since the introduction of TORER in 2020, a number of other changes have been made to the counter-terrorism legislative framework to strengthen the risk management of individuals who commit a terrorism offence carrying a maximum penalty of more than two years. We are seeking to apply those changes to this offence too, in order to ensure that consistency remains.
Specifically, we are ensuring that the offence of breaching a foreign travel restriction order is capable of attracting a sentence for offenders of particular concern, and the equivalent sentence in Northern Ireland and Scotland. We are also making the offender eligible for certain specialist management on licence, including eligibility for personal search conditions, which will be UK-wide, and a polygraph condition, which will be for England and Wales only. We will also ensure that the offence is incapable of being found by the court at the point of sentencing to have been committed with a terrorist connection, on the basis that it is in fact a terrorist offence. Given that the offence of breaching a foreign travel restriction order applies UK-wide, the clause also makes the equivalent changes for Scotland and Northern Ireland.
This change will ensure that sentencing and release arrangements are commensurate with the risk that the individual is considered to pose, and that eligibility for terrorism management conditions is consistent with other terrorist offences. I commend clause 125 and schedule 17 to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 125 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 126
Length of terrorism sentence with fixed licence period: Northern Ireland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Alex Davies-Jones
Clause 126 makes a minor amendment to ensure that sentencing for terrorist offenders in Northern Ireland remains consistent with that in England and Wales. The sentencing and release regime for terrorists who commit offences attracting a maximum penalty of more than two years’ imprisonment is designed to be consistent throughout the United Kingdom.
However, as currently drafted, the relevant legislation in Northern Ireland—the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008, and specifically article 15A—makes it possible for judges to hand down incommensurate sentences. The purpose of the amendment is to ensure consistency, so that where a sentencing court in Northern Ireland hands down such a sentence, known as the terrorism sentence with a fixed licence period, the length of the sentence is commensurate with the seriousness of the offending. That will then be comparable to the equivalent sentence in England and Wales, namely the sentence for offenders of particular concern.
Action is necessary to ensure consistency and fairness across UK jurisdictions. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 126 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedules 16 and 17 agreed to.
Clause 127
Implementation of international law enforcement information-sharing agreements
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dame Diana Johnson
Clause 127 relates to the implementation of international law enforcement information-sharing agreements, clause 128 sets out the meaning of “appropriate national authority” and clause 129 relates to the consultation with devolved authorities about regulations under clause 127.
International law enforcement information-sharing agreements are a vital tool that provides law enforcement officers with access to new intelligence to fight crime, increase public protection and reduce the threat of societal harm posed by international criminality. Clause 127 will provide the appropriate national authority with the power to make regulations to implement any new legally binding international law enforcement information-sharing agreements. Such regulations may, for example, make provision for the technical and, where appropriate, operational detail needed to facilitate the information sharing provided for in a particular agreement. Clause 127 also stipulates that regulations can be made in connection with implementing an international agreement only in so far as it relates to the sharing of information for law enforcement purposes, and that any data sharing must comply with data protection legislation.
Clause 128 defines the appropriate national authority as the Secretary of State or, where a provision falls within devolved competence, Scottish Ministers, Welsh Ministers or the Northern Ireland Department of Justice. Clause 129 requires the Secretary of State, before making regulations, to consult devolved Governments about any provisions in the regulations that would be within the legislative competence of the relevant devolved legislature.
These measures will enable the swift implementation of new international agreements that are designed to help keep the public safe from the threat posed by international criminality and cross-border crime, and help to protect vulnerable people. I commend them to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
Clause 127 gives the Government the power to make regulations to implement international agreements relating to the sharing of law enforcement information. The agreements may evolve over time, and the clause ensures that UK law can adapt accordingly.
The clause allows regulations to override existing restrictions on information sharing, but with two key safeguards. A data protection safeguard means that regulations cannot require or allow the processing of personal data in a way that would breach UK data protection laws, unless the regulations themselves impose a legal duty or power. Regulations also cannot override the restrictions set out in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which covers the surveillance and interception of communications.
The clause aims to ensure that the UK can meet its obligations under international law enforcement agreements, while still upholding important privacy and legal protections. Clause 128 defines who the appropriate national authority is for the purposes of making regulations under clause 127.
Clause 129 places a duty on the Secretary of State to consult the devolved Administrations before making any regulations under clause 127 that include provisions falling within the legislative competence of a devolved legislature, as set out in clause 128. That ensures proper engagement with, and respect for, the roles of the Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive when regulations touch on devolved matters. We welcome these measures, but could the Minister briefly comment on what format such consultation would take?
Dame Diana Johnson
I am happy to comment. With matters such as this, the normal procedures are in place around consultation. There has been extensive consultation on getting these provisions into the Bill. That is just the normal way that we consult. I hope that that satisfies the shadow Minister.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 127 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 128 and 129 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 130
Criminal liability of bodies corporate and partnerships where senior manager commits offence
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dame Diana Johnson
As we know, crimes can be committed by corporate bodies, just as they can be committed by individuals. It is important that corporate bodies are held liable for committing criminality and face justice accordingly. That is achieved through what is called the identification doctrine.
In the 1970s, the Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass case determined that a corporation can be held liable for a crime if it is committed by its “directing mind and will”, but there is a lack of clarity on what that constitutes. As companies have grown in size and complexity, there are often multiple controlling minds within different business functions who can exert control and cause harm through different functions of the business.
Through clause 130 the Government are placing the case law test for attributing crimes to corporate bodies on a statutory footing, and clarifying and extending the circumstances under which a body corporate or partnership is liable for any criminal offence, if that offence has been committed by its senior management.
The previous Government undertook the first stage of this reform in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023, placing the identification doctrine in legislation for economic crime offences. However, the identification doctrine was never intended as an economic crime-only regime. It has historically applied to any criminal offence in case law, and it is important that statute reflects that.
Clause 130 therefore repeals the relevant sections of the 2023 Act and replaces them with an identification doctrine that applies to all relevant crime, not just economic crime. As a result of the clause, a body corporate or partnership in the UK can be held liable for any criminal offence and fined accordingly where a senior manager who has control over the whole or a substantial part of the business commits an offence while acting in the scope of their actual or apparent authority.
The broadening of the principle to senior managers with control over any substantial part of the body corporate reflects the wide decision-making responsibilities of organisations and mitigates prior concerns that individuals committing crime could escape liability by changing or removing their title. That will ensure that businesses cannot continue to avoid liability where senior management have clearly used the business to facilitate or conduct crime.
Matt Vickers
Clause 130 holds organisations criminally liable when a senior manager commits an offence within their authority, expanding liability beyond economic crimes to all criminal offences. This reform addresses gaps in the previous identification doctrine and applies to both UK and non-UK entities. However, liability will not apply if the offences occur entirely outside the UK, unless it would be criminal at the corporate level in the UK. How will the Government ensure that the broader application of corporate liability strikes the right balance between holding organisations accountable and avoiding unfair penalisation for offences that occur in part outside the UK?
Dame Diana Johnson
I am grateful for the question. It is clear that offences committed outside the UK would not be covered by the clause—I think that that answers the shadow Minster’s question. It is clearly something that we need to keep under review, because other legislation does have extraterritorial application. I am certainly willing to go away and look at that point, and to come back to the shadow Minister.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 130 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered,
That the Order of the Committee of Thursday 27 March be varied by leaving out paragraph 1(g).—(Keir Mather.)
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Keir Mather.)
Crime and Policing Bill (Thirteenth sitting)
Thursday 8th May 2025
(1 year ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 8 May 2025 - (8 May 2025)
The Chair
Before we continue line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill, I have a few preliminary reminders for the Committee—I am sure Members are aware of these. Please switch electronic devices to vibrate or silent. No food or drink is permitted during Committee sittings, except for water, unless you have a particular health need—obviously, speak to me, and I am sure that will be fine. Hansard colleagues would be grateful if Members email their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk, or alternatively pass their written speaking notes to the Hansard colleague in the room. Very importantly, Members are reminded to bob and catch my eye if they wish to speak in any debate. We will have a two-minute silence at 12 noon.
New Clause 21
Terrorism offences excepted from defence for slavery or trafficking victims
“(1) Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (offences to which defence in section 45 does not apply) is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph 29 (offences under the Terrorism Act 2000)—
(a) before the entry for section 54 insert—
‘section 11 (membership of a proscribed organisation)
section 12 (support of a proscribed organisation)
section 15 (fund-raising for terrorism)
section 16 (use and possession of property for terrorism)
section 17 (funding arrangements)
section 17A (insurance against payments made in response to terrorist demands)
section 18 (money laundering)
section 19 (disclosure of information: duty)
section 21A (failure to disclose: regulated sector)
section 38B (information about acts of terrorism)
section 39 (disclosure of information prejudicial to investigation)’;
(b) after the entry for section 57 insert—
‘section 58 (collection of information)
section 58A (eliciting, publishing or communicating information about members of armed forces etc)
section 58B (entering or remaining in a designated area)’.
(3) In paragraph 31 (offences under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001), after the entry for section 50 insert—
‘section 67 (security of pathogens and toxins)
section 79 (disclosures relating to nuclear security)’.
(4) In paragraph 35 (offences under the Terrorism Act 2006)—
(a) before the entry for section 5 insert—
‘section 1 (encouragement of terrorism)
section 2 (dissemination of terrorist publications)’;
(b) after the entry for section 6 insert—
‘section 8 (attendance at a place used for terrorist training)’.
(5) After paragraph 35 insert—
‘Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (c.28)
35ZA An offence under section 54 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (offences relating to notification).
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (c. 23)
35ZB An offence under section 23 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (contravention of terrorism prevention and investigation measures notice).
Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (c. 6)
35ZC An offence under section 10 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (breach of temporary exclusion order or notice).’
(6) The amendments made by this section do not apply in relation to an offence committed before this section comes into force.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause excepts the listed terrorism offences from the defence in section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 61
Notification requirements
“(1) This section applies where a youth diversion order requires the respondent to comply with this section.
(2) Before the end of the period of three days beginning with the day on which a youth diversion order requiring the respondent to comply with this section is first served, the respondent must notify to the police—
(a) the respondent’s name and, where the respondent uses one or more other names, each of those names,
(b) the respondent’s home address, and
(c) the name and address of any educational establishment the respondent normally attends.
(3) If, while the respondent is required to comply with this section, the respondent—
(a) uses a name which has not been notified under the order,
(b) changes home address, or
(c) begins to attend an educational establishment the name and address of which have not been notified under the order,
the respondent must notify, to the police, the new name, the new home address or the name and address of the new educational establishment.
(4) A notification under subsection (3) must be given before the end of the period of three days beginning with the day on which the respondent uses the name, changes home address or first attends the educational establishment.
(5) A notification under this section is given by—
(a) attending at a police station in the police area in which the home address, or the court which made the order, is situated, and
(b) giving an oral notification to a constable, or to a person authorised for the purpose by the officer in charge of the station.
(6) A notification under this section must be acknowledged in writing.
(7) In this section ‘home address’ means—
(a) the address of the respondent’s sole or main residence in the United Kingdom, or
(b) where the respondent has no such residence, the address or location of a place in the United Kingdom where the respondent can regularly be found and, if there is more than one such place, such one of those places as the respondent may select.
(8) In determining the period of three days mentioned in subsection (2) or (4), no account is to be taken of any time when the respondent is—
(a) in police detention within the meaning of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (see section 118(2) of that Act);
(b) remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court or kept in service custody,
(c) serving a sentence of imprisonment or a term of service detention,
(d) detained in a hospital, or
(e) outside the United Kingdom.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause enables a youth diversion order to require the respondent to notify to the police their name and address and the name and address of any educational establishment they normally attend.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 62
Electronic monitoring of compliance with order: England and Wales
“(1) A youth diversion order made by a court in England and Wales may impose on the respondent a requirement (an ‘electronic monitoring requirement’) to submit to electronic monitoring of the respondent’s compliance with prohibitions or requirements imposed by the order. This is subject to section (Conditions for imposing electronic monitoring requirement: England and Wales).
(2) A youth diversion order that includes an electronic monitoring requirement must specify the person who is to be responsible for the monitoring.
(3) The person specified under subsection (2) (‘the responsible person’) must be of a description specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State by statutory instrument.
(4) Where a youth diversion order imposes an electronic monitoring requirement, the respondent must (among other things)—
(a) submit, as required from time to time by the responsible person, to—
(i) being fitted with, or the installation of, any necessary apparatus, and
(ii) the inspection or repair of any apparatus fitted or installed for the purposes of the monitoring;
(b) not interfere with, or with the working of, any apparatus fitted or installed for the purposes of the monitoring;
(c) take any steps required by the responsible person for the purpose of keeping in working order any apparatus fitted or installed for the purposes of the monitoring.
These obligations have effect as requirements of the order.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause enables a youth diversion order to require the respondent to submit to electronic monitoring of their compliance with the prohibitions or requirements of the order (if the conditions set out in NC63) are met.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 63
Conditions for imposing electronic monitoring requirement: England and Wales
“(1) This section applies for the purpose of determining whether a court in England and Wales may impose an electronic monitoring requirement under section (Electronic monitoring of compliance with order: England and Wales).
(2) An electronic monitoring requirement may not be imposed in the respondent’s absence.
(3) If there is a person (other than the respondent) without whose co-operation it would be impracticable to secure the monitoring in question, the requirement may not be imposed without that person’s consent.
(4) A court may impose the requirement in relation to a relevant police area only if—
(a) the Secretary of State has given notification that electronic monitoring arrangements are available in the area, and
(b) it is satisfied that the necessary provision can be made under the arrangements currently available.
(5) For this purpose ‘relevant police area’ means—
(a) in any case, the police area in England and Wales in which it appears to the court that the respondent resides or will reside, or
(b) in a case where it is proposed to include in the order—
(i) a requirement that the respondent remains, for specified periods, at a specified place in England and Wales, or
(ii) provision prohibiting the respondent from entering a specified place or area in England and Wales,
the police area in which the place or area proposed to be specified is situated.
(6) In subsection (5) ‘specified’ means specified in the youth diversion order.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause sets out the conditions for imposing an electronic monitoring requirement under NC62.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 64
Data from electronic monitoring in England and Wales: code of practice
“The Secretary of State must issue a code of practice relating to the processing of data gathered in the course of electronic monitoring of persons under electronic monitoring requirements (within the meaning of section (Electronic monitoring of compliance with order: England and Wales)) imposed by youth diversion orders in England and Wales.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice relating to the processing of data gathered under electronic monitoring requirements imposed under NC62.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 65
Reviews of operation of this Chapter
“In the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, in section 44(2) (provisions the operation of which the person appointed under section 36(1) of the Terrorism Act 2006 is also responsible for reviewing), after paragraph (e) insert—
‘(f) Chapter 1 of Part 14 of the Crime and Policing Act 2025.’” —(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This amendment provides for the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to report on the operation of Chapter 1 of Part 14 of the Bill (youth diversion orders).
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 66
Remote sales of knives etc
“(1) Section 141B of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (remote sales of knives) is amended as follows.
(2) For subsection (4) substitute—
‘(4) Condition A is that, before the sale—
(a) the seller obtained from the buyer—
(i) a copy of an identity document issued to the buyer, and
(ii) a photograph of the buyer, and
(b) on the basis of the things obtained under paragraph (a), a reasonable person would have been satisfied that the buyer was aged 18 or over.
(4A) For the purposes of subsection (4) an “identity document” means—
(a) a United Kingdom passport (within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971);
(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom or by or on behalf of an international organisation;
(c) a licence to drive a motor vehicle granted under Part 3 of the Road Traffic 1988 or under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1));
(d) any other document specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.’
(3) In subsection (5)(b), for ‘a person aged 18 or over’ substitute ‘the buyer’.
(4) In subsection (6), for ‘a person aged 18 or over’ substitute ‘the buyer’.
(5) In subsection (8), omit ‘or a person acting on behalf of the buyer’ in both places it occurs.
(6) After subsection (9) insert—
‘(10) Regulations made by the Secretary of State under this section are to be made by statutory instrument.
(11) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause makes changes to the defences available to a person who sells knives etc to under 18s, in contravention of section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, where the sale is made remotely (e.g. online).
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 67—Delivery of knives etc.
Government new clause 68—Duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk: England and Wales.
Government new clause 69—Remote sale and letting of crossbows.
Government new clause 70—Delivery of crossbows.
Government new clause 71—Sale and delivery of crossbows: supplementary provision.
Government new clause 72—“Relevant user-to-user services”, “relevant search services” and “service providers”.
Government new clause 73—Coordinating officer.
Government new clause 74—Notice requiring appointment of content manager.
Government new clause 75—Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances.
Government new clause 76—Replacement of content manager.
Government new clause 77—Duty to notify changes in required information.
Government new clause 78—Failure to comply with content manager requirements: civil penalty.
Government new clause 79—Unlawful weapons content.
Government new clause 80—Content removal notices.
Government new clause 81—Content removal notices: review.
Government new clause 82—Decision notices requiring removal of unlawful weapons content.
Government new clause 83—Failure to comply with content removal notice or decision notice: civil penalties.
Government new clause 84—Guidance.
Government new clause 85—Notices.
Government new clause 86—Interpretation of Chapter.
Government new schedule 1—Civil penalties for service providers and content managers.
Government amendments 80 and 81.
Dame Diana Johnson
It is nice to see you back in the Chair, Mr Pritchard. This group of new clauses makes extensive and timely changes to the law around the sale and marketing of offensive weapons, particularly knives and crossbows. These measures form part of the steps that we are taking to tackle knife crime. They will implement recommendations from the police’s independent end-to-end review of online knife sales, undertaken by Commander Stephen Clayman at the request of the Home Secretary, and will deliver on our manifesto commitment to hold to account senior managers who flout the rules on online sales.
New clauses 66 and 67 introduce new, stricter age verification at the point of sale and on delivery for knives bought online. New clauses 69 and 70 make the same changes in respect of crossbows. Commander Clayman’s review highlighted that existing age-verification methods for online sales are insufficient. Buyers can provide false birth dates and parcels can be left with neighbours so that there is no age check of the buyer. Existing legislation, as contained in the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the Offensive Weapons Act 2019, already requires age checks for the sale and delivery of knives. We are introducing two key changes to the existing requirements.
First, the checks at the point of sale will have to include photographic identity documents, plus a current photograph to demonstrate that the identity documents belong to the buyer. Secondly, on delivery, couriers will be required to check photographic identification provided by the person receiving the package. There will also be a new offence of handing the knife to someone other than the buyer. That will mean that knives cannot be left on doorsteps or with neighbours with no checks of the intended recipient.
David Burton-Sampson (Southend West and Leigh) (Lab)
The Minister will remember me mentioning Julie Taylor, who has campaigned locally on this issue after the death of her grandson Liam. She welcomes these new clauses. She said to me that she welcomes anything that helps get rid of this awful crime, and that she thanks the Government for introducing them. Does the Minister agree that these measures give an even greater level of protection and prevention so that we can start to drive down the awful offence of knife crime?
Dame Diana Johnson
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that contribution. It is heartening to know that Julie supports these new clauses and recognises the important role that they can play in tackling knife crime. Again, I extend my condolences to Julie and her family on the death of Liam.
These clauses also have the support of the coalition to tackle knife crime, which involves many families, campaigners and victims of knife crime helping the Government to develop policy. They will make sure that we are held to account for our promise to halve knife crime over the next decade, including through the strengthened requirements in the new clauses, which aim to ensure that under-18s cannot easily evade checks when buying knives online, as they have sadly in the past.
Like knives, crossbows are an age-restricted item and cannot be sold or hired to anyone under the age of 18. Legislation for crossbows was brought in through the Crossbows Act 1987, but in contrast to knives, there has been little change to that legislation since. These new clauses seek to introduce the same age-verification requirements for the online sale, hire and delivery of crossbows as are being brought in, or are already in place, for knives.
New clause 69 amends the 1987 Act to introduce equivalent age-verification methods for crossbows to those in section 141B of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which provides limitations on the defence to the offence of selling a knife. For crossbows, where the seller or seller’s agent is not in the presence of the buyer, the seller will not be regarded as having taken
“all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence”
unless all the conditions are met.
Condition 1 is that the seller obtained a copy of an identity document and a photograph of the buyer. Condition 2 is that the package containing the article was clearly marked by the seller to say that it contained a crossbow or crossbow part and that it should be delivered only into the hands of a person aged 18 or over. Condition 3 is that the seller took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to ensure that it would be delivered into the hands of the buyer. Condition 4 is that the seller did not deliver the package, or arrange for its delivery, to a locker.
As with bladed articles, before the dispatch of the crossbow or part of a crossbow, the seller must receive from the buyer a copy of an identity document issued to the buyer and a photograph of the buyer, and confirm that they are aged 18 or over. New clause 70 amends the Crossbows Act 1987 to create a new offence on the part of the seller if they deliver or arrange for delivery to residential premises in respect of the sale or letting of a crossbow or part of a crossbow, similar to equivalent defences to those in section 39A of the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 for knives.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
I thank the Minister for setting out in detail the provisions for where crossbows are sold and the seller is not in the presence of the buyer. On providing identity documents and photographic evidence, is she concerned that the wording that she used is vague and that there is scope for providing false documents? Perhaps she could reassure me that, in some cases, copies would certified by a solicitor or someone of sufficient standing in the community—whatever the wording might be. I am concerned that false documents could be provided, but perhaps there is provision to stop that.
Dame Diana Johnson
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that point, and it is of concern to me as the Minister. We are introducing this new procedure because we think that the current legislation around buying and delivering is not strong enough. I take his point and I will reflect on it. It may be—I do need to think about it—that it would be onerous to have certified copies. We want to get this right, however, and ensure that accurate legal documents are used, so I will come back to that point.
I will return to the new clauses, so that the Committee is clear about what they will do. New clause 70 also provides for a new offence on the part of the courier or the person delivering on their behalf, equivalent to the new offence that I have described for the delivery of a knife. The courier or person delivering on behalf of the courier must provide the crossbow or parts of crossbows only into the hands of the actual buyer, and only at the address that the buyer provided at the outset. If the courier or person delivering on behalf of the courier fails to do that, they will commit a summary offence attracting a maximum penalty of an unlimited fine.
It will be a defence, however, for the courier or person delivering on behalf of the courier to show that they have checked an official identity document, and that the ID has the name of the person indicated by the seller, that it shows that the holder is over 18, and that as far as they can tell, the picture in the identity document is of the person at the doorstep. Where businesses hire out or let crossbows for corporate events or entertainment—something that I did not know happened, but apparently does—and do so online, the age-verification measures will apply to the hire and delivery of the crossbows where the hirer is an individual. New clause 71 also provides a power for the Secretary of State to issue statutory guidance on the new offence under the Crossbows Act 1987.
Turning to the reportable sale of knives, new clause 68 introduces a requirement to report all sales of knives where they are made remotely, including online sales. That will help the police to tackle what is called the grey market—the resale of knives on social media. The police tell us that grey market sellers act irresponsibly. For example, they promote knives as weapons, which is unlawful, and they do not conduct age-verification checks. The new clause will give the police information that will enable them to act. Sellers who do not comply will be liable to a fine.
Sales are reportable where six knives or more, or two or more qualifying sets of knives such as a block of knives, or one or more qualifying set together with five or more knives, are sold remotely in one sale and are to be delivered to the same residential address in England or Wales. The reporting requirement is also triggered when multiple sales meeting those limits are made to the same person or the same residential address in England or Wales within a 30-day period.
Matt Bishop (Forest of Dean) (Lab)
I welcome the new clauses—thinking back to my policing days, they are extremely welcome. Is there a risk that if we do not add these clauses to restrict such sales, knife crime and crossbow crime could become more prevalent over the coming years?
Dame Diana Johnson
These new clauses on bulk and suspicious sales come directly from the police—from Commander Clayman’s report and his concern about the grey market. The police clearly believe that these new measures are necessary for them to use this intelligence to tackle our problems with knife crime. Obviously, that fits with the Government’s manifesto commitment to halve knife crime over the next 10 years.
That information and intelligence will be sent to a central unit in the first instance. We will provide guidance to the police on the use of that information. We expect that the information that is not connected to other relevant intelligence linking it to criminality will be deleted and not subject to further investigation.
I turn now to the sanctions on online executives. Government new clauses 72 to 86 and new schedule 1 introduce civil penalties for online companies and their senior managers should they fail to take down illegal knife and offensive weapons content when notified of it by the police. Knives and weapons that are illegally marketed to encourage violence or to promote their suitability for use in violent attacks are commonly sold online and then used in senseless attacks. We know that the boys who murdered Ronan Kanda did so using weapons that had been illegally sold online. Many of those types of knives are marketed on social media and other platforms, meaning that those companies indirectly profit from their sale.
Commander Clayman’s review set out the extent of the problem related to the online sale of knives and offensive weapons, particularly where it relates to knives illegally being made available to young people. That report recommended that social media platforms be required to remove such prohibited material within 48 hours of police notification. These new clauses deliver on that recommendation.
The Home Office consulted widely on these measures. We engaged directly with tech companies and also held a public consultation. Tech companies and associations, charities, councils and members of the public responded to the consultation, and our response to that was published recently.
Collectively, the new clauses will grant the police the power to issue content removal notices to online marketplaces, social media platforms and search engines. The notices will require them to take down specified illegal content relating to knives or offensive weapons. If the specified content is not taken down within 48 hours, the company and an executive designated as their content manager would be liable to civil penalty notices of up to £60,000 and £10,000 respectively. Additionally, should a company fail to designate an appropriate UK-based executive when required to do so by the police, it would be liable for a civil penalty notice of up to £60,000.
These measures provide important safeguards. Both online companies and their designated executives will have the opportunity to request that the content removal notice be reviewed. The police must comply with such requests. Should online companies not have an executive who meets the criteria to be designated as their content manager, they will have the opportunity to inform the police as such. Prior to the issuing of a civil penalty notice, the company and the content manager will have the opportunity to make representations to the police. Finally, penalty notices may of course be challenged in the courts.
I fully expect online companies to act responsibly and take down harmful illegal content when made aware of it. The measures will be used in the rare cases where reckless companies choose to continue hosting such content. Taken together, this is a comprehensive package of measures that will further help to restrict the supply of weapons, particularly to children, and to keep our communities safe. I commend the new clauses to the Committee.
Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard. The Opposition welcome the measures that aim to restrict the sale of knives in a wider bid to tackle knife crime. The unregulated purchase of dangerous items such as knives or crossbows presents a serious and growing threat to public safety. Without proper controls the weapons can be easily acquired by individuals with harmful intent, including gang members, violent offenders and young people at risk of exploitation. The availability of such items online without age verification, purchase limits or traceability undermines efforts to reduce knife crime and protect communities. It also places law enforcement in a reactive position, forced to respond to violence that could have been prevented through stronger regulation and control. Ensuring proper safeguards around the sale and distribution of knives is not about restricting legitimate use: it is about closing loopholes that are currently exploited to devastating effect.
Government new clause 66 strengthens the legal framework around the remote sale of knives by tightening the requirement for verifying the age of the buyer. Under the proposed changes to section 141B of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, sellers must obtain both a copy of a valid identity document and a photograph of the buyer before the sale is made. A reasonable person would need to be satisfied that the buyer is 18 or over, based on the evidence. By increasing the burden of proof on the seller and clarifying acceptable forms of ID, the measure aims to reduce the availability of knives to young people and close key loopholes in online transactions, contributing to broader efforts to curb knife crime.
Government new clause 68 introduces a legal duty for sellers in England and Wales to report bulk remote sales of knives and other bladed articles, marking a significant step forward in tackling the online flow of potentially dangerous weapons. The measure is aimed at identifying suspicious buying patterns that might indicate stockpiling for criminal use or illicit resale, helping enforcement bodies to monitor and disrupt supply chains. Notably, the duty applies to individuals and businesses unless the buyer can prove they are a VAT-registered business or incorporated company. Failure to report such sales will rightly be a criminal offence, although sellers will have a due-diligence defence if they can demonstrate they took reasonable steps to comply. The clause bolsters the UK’s strategy to reduce knife crime by increasing accountability in the remote sales sector and closing gaps that criminals may exploit.
Government new clauses 69 to 71 amend the Crossbows Act 1987 to tighten the rules on remote sale and delivery of crossbows, preventing sales to under-18s. Government new clause 69 requires sellers to verify the buyer’s age with identity documents and photographs, ensuring marked packages are delivered only to the buyer, and not to lockers. Government new clause 70 creates offences for delivering crossbows to residential premises or lockers. Government new clause 71 defines terms, allows regulations for additional offences and extends guidance to cover crossbow offences. This aligns with the Bill’s aims to enhance public safety. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell the Committee how the Government will support businesses in complying with the new verification requirements. What resources will ensure effective enforcement of delivery restrictions?
Government new clauses 72 to 83 establish a framework for regulating online service providers by requiring the appointment of content managers to oversee compliance with a new chapter of the Bill. Government new clause 73 mandates the Secretary of State to designate a co-ordinating officer from a police force or the National Crime Agency to manage functions, with authority to delegate tasks. Government new clause 74 empowers the co-ordinating officer to issue an appointment notice requiring service providers to appoint a UK resident content manager within seven days or confirm that no suitable candidate exists, and provide contact details.
Government new clause 75 requires providers to appoint a content manager within seven days if a suitable candidate emerges within two years after they reported them non-existing. Government new clause 76 allows providers to replace content managers and mandates notification within seven days if a manager no longer meets eligibility criteria, requiring a new appointment or confirmation that there is no candidate. Government new clause 77 obliges providers to notify the co-ordinating officer of any changes in required information within seven days, and Government new clause 78 authorises penalties of up to £60,000 for non-compliance, including failure to appoint a manager, provide accurate information or correct any false statements. Government new clause 80 empowers authorised officers to issue content removal notices to providers and content managers, requiring removal of unlawful weapons content within 48 hours.
Government new clause 81 allows recipients to request a review of removal notices within 48 hours, with a senior officer reviewing and confirming, modifying or withdrawing the notice. Government new clause 82 requires decision notices post-review to enforce content removal within 24 hours or the remaining 48-hour period. Will the Government do anything to support service providers—especially smaller platforms—in meeting content manager appointment requirements and ensuring that there is appropriate guidance or training available? How will the co-ordinating officer ensure consistent enforcement of these obligations across diverse online services?
Dame Diana Johnson
I thank the shadow Minister for the general tone of his response on this group of Government new clauses, which come directly from the review that Commander Clayman set out, as well the manifesto commitment we made, particularly around tech executives and holding them to account.
There has been a great deal of consultation, particularly around the tech executives, how it would work and engagement with tech companies. I take the shadow Minister’s point about smaller platforms, but there has been that engagement. On the issue around training and enforcement in terms of the new clauses relating to sale and delivery, it is clear that all courier and delivery companies will have to ensure that their staff are trained on these new legal requirements. To be clear, if the person who is delivering the package has taken all steps to make sure that they have checked the information that is being provided and the identification document, and they are acting reasonably, that is a defence, but there will be a need for training and for people to know what their legal obligations are, particularly when they are delivering, because we know that has been a particular issue. The engagement, particularly with tech executives, that I talked about has also happened with courier firms and delivery businesses, and will continue.
I want to go back to the point that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East raised about identity checks, just so everybody is clear.
The Chair
Order. We will now stand for the national two-minute silence to commemorate VE Day.
The Committee observed a two-minute silence.
Dame Diana Johnson
Thank you, Mr Pritchard. I wanted to make it clear that the documents that are being talked about in relation to proving identity are passports and driving licences. I take the point that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East raised with me in his intervention, but those are the two documents that will be looked at and provided. We will want to make sure that this works, and in the future, other documents may well need to be added to that list. However, just to be clear, it is those two documents.
As I have also said, we would expect that a person who is delivering would look at those documents. I do not really want to get into how those documents can be forged, because that is obviously an issue that is on the hon. Gentleman’s mind, but at the moment those are the two documents, and we would expect them to be examined by a delivery driver or courier when the items are delivered.
Joe Robertson
I thank the Minister; that is helpful. Those documents are obviously very hard to forge, so I was not suggesting that they might be forged. My question was about was the possibility—I may simply be wrong here—of someone else presenting those documents. They are not forgeries; they are simply not the passport or driving licence of the buyer. Clearly, if the buyer has to be present when they present those documents to the person making the delivery, there is plainly not an issue, so I welcome that.
Dame Diana Johnson
I am glad that the hon. Gentleman is clear. As we have said, photographic identity has to be provided at the beginning of the process—at the point of sale—as well as the identity document, to ensure it matches up. ‘RTA section 27A Causing death by dangerous cycling. On indictment. Imprisonment for life. RTA section 27B Causing serious injury by dangerous cycling. (a) Summarily. (b) On indictment. (a) On conviction in England and Wales: the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine or both. On conviction in Scotland: 12 months or the statutory maximum or both. (b) 5 years or a fine or both.’ ‘RTA section 28B Causing death by careless or inconsiderate cycling. (a) Summarily. (b) On indictment. (a) On conviction in England and Wales: the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine or both. On conviction in Scotland: 12 months or the statutory maximum or both. (b) 5 years or a fine or both. RTA section 28C Causing serious injury by careless or inconsiderate cycling (a) Summarily. (b) On indictment. (a) On conviction in England and Wales: the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine or both. On conviction in Scotland: 12 months or the statutory maximum or both. (b) 2 years or a fine or both.’” —(Alex Davies-Jones.)
With that, I commend these measures to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 66 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 67
Delivery of knives etc
“(1) The Offensive Weapons Act 2019 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 39 insert—
‘39A Defences to offence under section 38: England and Wales
(1) It is a defence for a person charged in England and Wales with an offence under section 38(2) of delivering a bladed product to residential premises to show that the delivery conditions were met.
(2) It is a defence for a person (“the seller”) charged in England and Wales with an offence under section 38(2) of arranging for the delivery of a bladed product to residential premises to show that—
(a) the arrangement required the person with whom it was made not to finally deliver the bladed product unless the delivery conditions were met, and
(b) the seller took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to ensure that the product would not be finally delivered unless the delivery conditions were met.
(3) It is a defence for a person charged in England and Wales with an offence under section 38(3) to show that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid commission of the offence.
(4) The delivery conditions are that—
(a) the person (“P”) into whose hands the bladed product was finally delivered showed the person delivering it an identity document issued to P, and
(b) on the basis of that document a reasonable person would have been satisfied—
(i) that P was over 18, and
(ii) if the buyer was an individual, that P was the buyer.
(5) In subsection (4) “identity document” means—
(a) a United Kingdom passport (within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971);
(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom or by or on behalf of an international organisation;
(c) a licence to drive a motor vehicle granted under Part 3 of the Road Traffic 1988 or under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1));
(d) any other document specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(6) A person is to be taken to have shown a matter for the purposes of this section if—
(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and
(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(7) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for other defences for a person charged in England and Wales with an offence under section 38.’
(3) After section 40 insert—
‘40A Delivery of bladed products sold by UK seller to residential premises: England and Wales
(1) This section applies if—
(a) a person (“the seller”) sells a bladed product to another person (“the buyer”),
(b) the seller and the buyer are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale and the seller is within the United Kingdom at that time,
(c) before the sale the seller entered into an arrangement with a person (“the courier”) by which the courier agreed to deliver bladed products for the seller,
(d) the courier was aware when they entered into the arrangement that it covered the delivery of bladed products, and
(e) pursuant to the arrangement, the courier finally delivers the bladed product to residential premises in England or Wales.
(2) The courier commits an offence if, when they finally deliver the bladed product to residential premises in England and Wales, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—
(a) is aged 18 or over, and
(b) if the buyer is an individual, is the buyer.
(3) A person finally delivering the bladed product to residential premises in England and Wales on behalf of the courier commits an offence if, when they deliver it, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—
(a) is aged 18 or over, and
(b) if the buyer is an individual, is the buyer.
(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (2) to show that the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 39A(4)) were met.
(5) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) to show that—
(a) the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 39A(4)) were met, or
(b) the person did not know, and a reasonable person would not have known, that the person was delivering a bladed product.
(6) A person is to be taken to have shown a matter for the purposes of this section if—
(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and
(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(7) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine.
(8) Section 39(2) to (5) applies for the purposes of subsection (1)(b) and (e) as it applies for the purposes of section 39(1)(b) and (e).
(9) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for other defences for a person charged with an offence under this section.’
(4) After section 42 insert—
‘42A Delivery of bladed articles sold by non-UK seller to premises: England and Wales
(1) This section applies if—
(a) a person (“the seller”) sells a bladed article to another person (“the buyer”),
(b) the seller and the buyer are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale and the seller is outside the United Kingdom at that time,
(c) before the sale the seller entered into an arrangement with a person (“the courier”) by which the courier agreed to deliver bladed articles for the seller,
(d) the courier was aware when they entered into the arrangement that it covered the delivery of bladed articles, and
(e) pursuant to the arrangement, the courier finally delivers the bladed article to premises in England or Wales.
(2) The courier commits an offence if, when they finally deliver the bladed article, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—
(a) is aged 18 or over, and
(b) if the buyer is an individual, is the buyer.
(3) A person finally delivering the bladed article on behalf of the courier commits an offence if, when they deliver the bladed article, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—
(a) is aged 18 or over, and
(b) if the buyer is an individual, is the buyer.
(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (2) to show that the delivery conditions were met.
(5) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) to show that—
(a) the delivery conditions were met, or
(b) the person did not know, and a reasonable person would not have known, that the person was delivering a bladed article.
(6) A person is to be taken to have shown a matter for the purposes of this section if—
(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and
(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(7) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine.
(8) Section 42(2) and (3) applies for the purposes of subsection (1)(b) as it applies for the purposes of section 42(1)(b).
(9) In this section—
“bladed article” means an article to which section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 applies (as that section has effect in relation to England and Wales);
“delivery conditions” has the meaning given by section 39A(4), but reading the reference in that section to a bladed product as a reference to a bladed article.’
(5) In section 38(10) (offences) for “section” substitute “sections 39A and”.
(6) In section 39 (delivery of bladed products to persons under 18)—
(a) in the heading, at the end insert “: Scotland and Northern Ireland”;
(b) in subsection (1)(e) after “premises” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;
(c) in subsection (7) omit paragraph (a).
(7) In section 40 (defences to delivery offences under sections 38 and 39)—
(a) in the heading, after “39” insert “: Scotland and Northern Ireland”;
(b) in subsection (1) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;
(c) in subsection (2) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;
(d) in subsection (3) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;
(e) in subsection (4) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;
(f) in subsection (5) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;
(g) in subsection (6) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;
(h) in subsection (7), omit “England and Wales or”;
(i) in subsection (14), in the definition of “appropriate national authority” omit paragraph (a).
(8) In section 41 (meaning of “bladed product” in sections 38 to 40)—
(a) in the heading, for “40” substitute “40A”;
(b) in subsection (1) for “40” substitute “40A”;
(c) in subsection (2) for “40” substitute “40A”.
(9) In section 42 (delivery of knives etc pursuant to arrangement with seller outside UK)—
(a) in the heading, at the end insert “: Scotland and Northern Ireland”;
(b) in subsection (1)(e), after “article” insert “to premises in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;
(c) in subsection (5) omit “England and Wales or”;
(d) omit subsection (10)(a);
(e) omit subsection (11)(a).
(10) In section 66(1)(j) (guidance on offences relating to offensive weapons etc) for “42” substitute “42A”.
(11) In section 68 (regulations and orders)—
(a) in subsection (2) after “State” insert, “, except for regulations under section 39A(5)(d),”;
(b) after subsection (2) insert—
“(2A) A statutory instrument containing regulations under section 39A(5)(d) is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.”’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause makes changes to the offences and defences relating to delivery of knives to premises in England and Wales following a remote sale.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 68
Duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk: England and Wales
“(1) In the Criminal Justice Act 1988, after section 141C insert—
‘141D Duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk: England and Wales
(1) A person (“the seller”) must, in accordance with requirements specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State by statutory instrument, report to the person specified in the regulations any reportable sales the seller makes of bladed articles.
(2) A reportable sale of bladed articles occurs where the seller, in any of the ways set out in subsection (4), sells—
(a) six or more bladed articles, none of which form a qualifying set of bladed articles;
(b) two or more qualifying sets of bladed articles;
(c) one or more qualifying sets of bladed articles and five or more bladed articles that do not form a qualifying set.
(3) “Qualifying set of bladed articles” means three or more bladed articles packaged together for sale as a single item, where each bladed article is a different size or shape from the others.
(4) The ways are—
(a) in a single remote sale where the bladed articles are to be delivered to an address in England and Wales, or
(b) in two or more remote sales in any period of 30 days—
(i) to one person, where the bladed articles are to be delivered to one or more addresses in England and Wales, or
(ii) to two or more persons, where the bladed articles are to be delivered to the same residential premises in England and Wales.
(5) A sale of bladed articles is “remote” if the seller and the person to whom the bladed article is sold are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale.
(6) For the purposes of subsection (5) a person (“A”) is not in the presence of another person (“B”) at any time if—
(a) where A is an individual, A or a person acting on behalf of A is not in the presence of B at that time;
(b) where A is not an individual, a person acting on behalf of A is not in the presence of B at that time.
(7) A sale is not reportable if the person to whom the articles are sold (“the buyer”)—
(a) informs the seller that the buyer is carrying on a business, and
(b) is—
(i) registered for value added tax under the Value Added Tax Act 1994, or
(ii) registered as a company under the Companies Act 2006.
(8) A person who fails to comply with subsection (1) commits an offence.
(9) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (8) to show that the person took all reasonable precautions, and exercised all due diligence, to avoid commission of the offence.
(10) A person is to be taken to have shown a matter for the purposes of this section if—
(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and
(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(11) A person who commits an offence under subsection (8) is liable on summary conviction to a fine.
(12) In this section—
“bladed article” means an article to which section 141A applies (as that section has effect in relation to England and Wales), other than a knife which does not have a sharp point and is designed for eating food;
“residential premises” means premises used for residential purposes (whether or not also used for other purposes).
(13) Regulations made by the Secretary of State under subsection (1) may in particular include requirements about—
(a) how reports are to be made,
(b) when reports to be made, and
(c) the information reports must include.
(14) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (1) is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
(15) The Secretary of State may by regulations made by statutory instrument amend—
(a) the number of bladed articles specified in subsection (2)(a);
(b) the number of qualifying sets specified in subsection (2)(b);
(c) the number of qualifying sets specified in subsection (2)(c);
(d) the number of bladed articles specified in subsection (2)(c);
(e) the period specified in subsection (4)(b).
(16) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (15) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.’
(2) In the Offensive Weapons Act 2019, in section 66(1) (guidance on offences relating to offensive weapons etc) after paragraph (g) insert—
‘(ga) section 141D of that Act (duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk: England and Wales),’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause imposes a requirement on sellers of bladed articles to report bulk sales to a person specified in regulations.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 69
Remote sale and letting of crossbows
“(1) The Crossbows Act 1987 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 1 omit ‘unless he believes him to be eighteen years or older and has reasonable grounds for the belief’.
(3) After section 1A insert—
‘1B Defences to offence under section 1: England and Wales
(1) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 1 to show that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence.
(2) Subsection (3) applies if—
(a) a person (“A”) is charged with an offence under section 1, and
(b) A was not in the presence of the person (“B”) to whom the crossbow or part of a crossbow was sold or let on hire at the time of the sale or letting on hire.
(3) A is not to be regarded as having shown that A took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence unless, as a minimum, A shows that the following conditions are met.
(4) Condition 1 is that, before the sale or letting on hire—
(a) A obtained from B—
(i) a copy of an identity document issued to B, and
(ii) a photograph of B, and
(b) on the basis of the things obtained under paragraph (a), a reasonable person would have been satisfied that B was aged 18 or over.
(5) For the purposes of subsection (4) an “identity document” means—
(a) a United Kingdom passport (within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971);
(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom or by or on behalf of an international organisation;
(c) a licence to drive a motor vehicle granted under Part 3 of the Road Traffic 1988 or under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1));
(d) any other document specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(6) Condition 2 is that when the package containing the crossbow or part of the crossbow was dispatched by A, it was clearly marked to indicate—
(a) that it contained a crossbow or part of a crossbow, and
(b) that, when finally delivered, it should only be delivered into the hands of B.
(7) Condition 3 is that A took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to ensure that, when finally delivered, the package would be delivered into the hands of B.
(8) Condition 4 is that A did not deliver the package, or arrange for its delivery, to a locker.
(9) Where the crossbow or part of a crossbow was dispatched by A to a place from which it was to be collected by B, references in subsections (6) and (7) to its final delivery are to be read as its supply to B from that place.
(10) In subsection (8) “locker” means a lockable container to which the package is delivered with a view to its collection by B, or a person acting on behalf of B, in accordance with arrangements made between A and B.’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause makes changes to the defences available to a person who sells crossbows etc to under 18s, in contravention of section 1 of the Crossbows Act 1987, where the sale is made remotely (e.g. online).
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 70
Delivery of crossbows
“In the Crossbows Act 1987, after section 1B (inserted by section (Remote sale and letting of crossbows)) insert—
‘1C Offence of seller delivering crossbows or parts of crossbows to residential premises in England or Wales
(1) This section applies if—
(a) a person (“A”) sells or lets on hire a crossbow or part of a crossbow to another person (“B”), and
(b) A and B are not in each other's presence at the time of the sale.
(2) A commits an offence if, for the purposes of supplying the crossbow or part of a crossbow to B, A—
(a) delivers the crossbow or part of a crossbow to residential premises in England or Wales, or
(b) arranges for its delivery to residential premises in England or Wales.
(3) A commits an offence if, for the purposes of supplying the crossbow or part of a crossbow to B, A—
(a) delivers the crossbow or part of a crossbow to a locker in England or Wales, or
(b) arranges for its delivery to a locker in England or Wales.
(4) In subsection (3) “locker” means a lockable container to which the crossbow or part of a crossbow is delivered with a view to its collection by B, or a person acting on behalf of B, in accordance with arrangements made between A and B.
(5) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or a fine (or both).
(6) The “maximum term for summary offences”, in relation to an offence, means—
(a) if the offence is committed before the time when section 281(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 comes into force, six months;
(b) if the offence is committed after that time, 51 weeks.
1D Defences to offences under section 1C
(1) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 1C(2)(a) to show that the delivery conditions were met.
(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 1C(2)(b) to show that—
(a) the arrangement required the person with whom it was made not to finally deliver the crossbow or part of a crossbow unless the delivery conditions were met, and
(b) the person charged with the offence took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to ensure that the crossbow or part of a crossbow would not be finally delivered unless the delivery conditions were met.
(3) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 1C(3) to show that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence.
(4) For the purposes of this section the delivery conditions are that—
(a) the person (“P”) into whose hands the crossbow or part of a crossbow was finally delivered showed the person delivering it an identity document issued to P, and
(b) on the basis of that document a reasonable person would have been satisfied—
(i) that P was over 18, and
(ii) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire was an individual, that P was that individual.
(5) “Identity document” has the same meaning as in section 1B(5).
(6) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for other defences for a person charged with an offence under section 1C.
1E Offence of delivery business delivering crossbows or parts of crossbows to residential premises in England and Wales on behalf of UK seller
(1) This section applies if—
(a) a person (“A”) sells or lets for hire a crossbow or part of a crossbow to another person (“B”),
(b) A and B are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale or letting on hire and A is within the United Kingdom at that time,
(c) before the sale or letting on hire A entered into an arrangement with a person (“C”) by which C agreed to deliver crossbows or parts of crossbows for A,
(d) C was aware when they entered into the arrangement that it covered the delivery of crossbows or parts of crossbows, and
(e) pursuant to the arrangement, C finally delivers the crossbow or part of a crossbow to residential premises in England or Wales.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) a person other than an individual is within the United Kingdom at any time if the person carries on a business of selling articles of any kind from premises in any part of the United Kingdom at that time.
(3) C commits an offence if, when they finally deliver the crossbow or part of a crossbow to residential premises in England or Wales, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—
(a) is aged 18 or over, and
(b) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual.
(4) A person finally delivering the crossbow or part of a crossbow to residential premises in England or Wales on behalf of C commits an offence if, when they deliver it, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—
(a) is aged 18 or over, and
(b) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual.
(5) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) to show that the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 1D(4)) were met.
(6) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (4) to show that—
(a) the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 1D(4)) were met, or
(b) the person did not know, and a reasonable person would not have known, that the person was delivering a crossbow or part of a crossbow.
(7) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for other defences for a person charged with an offence under this section.
(8) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine.
1F Offence of delivery business delivering crossbows or parts of crossbows to premises in England and Wales on behalf of non-UK seller
(1) This section applies if—
(a) a person (“A”) sells or lets for hire a crossbow or part of a crossbow to another person (“B”),
(b) A and B are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale or letting on hire and A is outside the United Kingdom at that time,
(c) before the sale or letting on hire A entered into an arrangement with a person (“C”) by which C agreed to deliver crossbows or parts of crossbows for A,
(d) C was aware when they entered into the arrangement that it covered the delivery of crossbows or parts of crossbows, and
(e) pursuant to the arrangement, C finally delivers the crossbow or part of a crossbow to premises in England and Wales.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) a person other than an individual is outside the United Kingdom at any time if the person does not carry on a business of selling articles of any kind from premises in any part of the United Kingdom at that time.
(3) C commits an offence if, when they finally deliver the crossbow or part of a crossbow to premises in England or Wales, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—
(a) is aged 18 or over, and
(b) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual.
(4) Any person finally delivering the crossbow or part of a crossbow to premises in England or Wales on behalf of C commits an offence if, when they deliver it, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—
(a) is aged 18 or over, and
(b) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual.
(5) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine.
(6) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) to show that the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 1D(4)) were met.
(7) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (4) to show that—
(a) the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 1D(4)) were met, or
(b) the person did not know, and a reasonable person would not have known, that the person was delivering a crossbow or part of a crossbow.’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause creates offences relating to delivery of crossbows to premises following a remote sale equivalent to the offences relating to knives in sections 38 to 42 of the Offensive Weapons Act 2019.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 71
Sale and delivery of crossbows: supplementary provision
“(1) After section 1F of the Crossbows Act 1987 (inserted by section (Delivery of crossbows)) insert—
‘1G Interpretation of sections 1B to 1F
(1) This section applies for the interpretation of sections 1B to 1F.
(2) A person (“A”) is not in the presence of another person (“B”) at any time if—
(a) where A is an individual, A or a person acting on behalf of A is not in the presence of B at that time;
(b) where A is not an individual, a person acting on behalf of A is not in the presence of B at that time.
(3) “Residential premises” means premises used solely for residential purposes.
(4) The circumstances where premises are not residential premises include, in particular, where a person carries on a business from the premises.
(5) A person charged with an offence is taken to have shown a matter if—
(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and
(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.’
(2) After section 6 of the Crossbows Act 1987 insert—
‘6A Regulations
(1) Regulations made by the Secretary of State under this Act are to be made by statutory instrument.
(2) The Secretary of State may not make a statutory instrument containing (alone or with other provision) regulations under section 1D(6) or 1E(7) unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.
(3) Any other statutory instrument containing regulations made by the Secretary of State under this Act is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
(3) In section 66(1) of the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 (guidance on offences relating to offensive weapons etc), after paragraph (ga) (inserted by section (Duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk: England and Wales) insert—
“(gb) any of sections 1 to 3 of the Crossbows Act 1987 (sale etc of crossbows) as they have effect in relation to England and Wales,”.’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause makes provision about the interpretation of the new sections added to the Crossbows Act 1987 by NC69 and NC70 and extends the guidance-making power in the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 to cover offences under the Crossbows Act 1987.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 72
“Relevant user-to-user services”, “relevant search services” and “service providers”
“(1) For the purposes of this Chapter—
(a) a ‘relevant search service’ is a search service other than an exempt service;
(b) a ‘relevant user-to-user service’ is a user-to-user service other than an exempt service.
(2) In subsection (1), ‘search service’ and ‘user-to-user service’ have the same meanings as in the Online Safety Act 2023 (the ‘2023 Act’) (see, in particular, section 3 of that Act).
(3) The following are exempt services for the purposes of subsection (1)—
(a) a service of a kind that is described in any of the following paragraphs of Schedule 1 to the 2023 Act (certain services exempt from regulation under that Act)—
(i) paragraph 1 or 2 (email, SMS and MMS services);
(ii) paragraph 3 (services offering one-to-one live aural communications);
(iii) paragraph 4 (limited functionality services);
(iv) paragraph 5 (services which enable combinations of user-generated content);
(v) paragraph 7 or 8 (internal business services);
(vi) paragraph 9 (services provided by public bodies);
(vii) paragraph 10 (services provided by persons providing education or childcare), or
(b) a service of a kind that is described in Schedule 2 to the 2023 Act (services that include regulated provider pornographic content).
(4) This Chapter does not apply in relation to a part of a relevant search service, or a part of a relevant user-to-user service, if the 2023 Act does not apply to that part of the service by virtue of section 5(1) or (2) of that Act.
(5) In this Chapter, ‘service provider’ means a provider of a relevant user-to-user service or a provider of a relevant search service.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause, which together with NC73, NC74, NC75, NC76, NC77, NC78, NC79, NC80, NC81, NC82, NC83, NC84, NC85, NC86 and NS1 are expected to form a new Chapter of Part 2 of the Bill, defines key terms used in the new Chapter.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 73
Coordinating officer
“(1) The Secretary of State must designate a member of a relevant police force or a National Crime Agency officer as the coordinating officer for the purposes of this Chapter.
(2) The coordinating officer may delegate any of the officer’s functions under this Chapter (to such extent as the officer may determine) to another member of a relevant police force or National Crime Agency officer.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to designate a “coordinating officer” to perform the functions conferred on that officer under the new Chapter referred to in the explanatory note for NC72.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 74
Notice requiring appointment of content manager
“(1) The coordinating officer may give a service provider a notice (an ‘appointment notice’) requiring the provider—
(a) either to—
(i) appoint an individual who meets the conditions in subsection (2) as the provider’s content manager for the purposes of this Chapter, or
(ii) if there is no such individual, confirm that is the case to the coordinating officer, and
(b) to provide the coordinating officer with the required information.
(2) The conditions are that the individual—
(a) plays a significant role in—
(i) the making of decisions about how a whole or substantial part of the service provider’s activities are to be managed or organised, or
(ii) the actual managing or organising of the whole or a substantial part of those activities, and
(b) is habitually resident in the United Kingdom.
(3) ‘Required information’ means—
(a) the contact details of any content manager appointed;
(b) an email address, or details of another means of contacting the service provider rapidly which is readily available, that may be used for the purpose of giving the provider a notice under this Chapter;
(c) information identifying the relevant user-to-user services, or (as the case may be) the relevant search services, provided by the provider.
(4) An appointment notice must—
(a) specify the period before the end of which the service provider must comply with the notice, and
(b) explain the potential consequences of the service provider failing to do so (see section (Failure to comply with content manager requirements: civil penalty)).
(5) The period specified under subsection (4)(a) must be at least seven days beginning with the day on which the notice is given.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause confers a power on the coordinating officer to require a service provider to appoint a senior executive as their “content manager” for the purposes of the new Chapter referred to in the explanatory note for NC72 or to confirm that there is no-one who meets the appointment conditions.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 75
Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances
“(1) This section applies where—
(a) the coordinating officer has given a service provider an appointment notice,
(b) the provider has confirmed to the officer (in accordance with the appointment notice or under section (Replacement of content manager)(5)(b)), that there is no individual who meets the conditions in section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(2), and
(c) at any time within the period of two years beginning with the day on which that confirmation was given, there is an individual who meets those conditions.
(2) The service provider must, before the end of the period of seven days beginning with the first day on which there is an individual who meets those conditions—
(a) appoint such an individual as the provider’s content manager for the purposes of this Chapter, and
(b) provide the coordinating officer with the content manager’s contact details.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause requires a service provider that at any time could not appoint a senior executive as its content manager when required to do so (because there was no-one who met the appointment conditions) to make an appointment if, following a change in circumstances within 2 years, there is someone who meets the conditions.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 76
Replacement of content manager
“(1) This section applies where a service provider has appointed an individual as the provider’s content manager (whether in accordance with an appointment notice or under section (Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances) or this section).
(2) The service provider may replace the provider’s content manager by appointing another individual who meets the conditions in section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(2) as the provider’s new content manager for the purposes of this Chapter.
(3) The service provider must, before the end of the period of seven days beginning with the day on which an appointment is made under subsection (2), provide the coordinating officer with the new content manager’s contact details.
(4) If the individual appointed as a service provider’s content manager ceases to meet any of the conditions in section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(2), the appointment ceases to have effect.
(5) The service provider must, before the end of the period of seven days beginning with the day on which an appointment ceases to have effect under subsection (4)—
(a) either—
(i) appoint another individual who meets the conditions in section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(2) as the provider’s content manager for the purposes of this Chapter, and
(ii) provide the coordinating officer with the new content manager’s contact details, or
(b) if there is no longer such an individual, confirm that is the case to the coordinating officer.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause makes provision for the appointment by a service provider of a replacement content manager, including in a case where the original content manager ceases to meet the appointment conditions (and so that appointment ceases to have effect).
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 77
Duty to notify changes in required information
“(1) This section applies where a service provider has, in accordance with an appointment notice or under section (Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances)(2)(b) or (Replacement of content manager)(5)(a)(ii)provided the coordinating officer with required information.
(2) The service provider must give notice to the coordinating officer of any change in the required information.
(3) The notice must specify the date on which the change occurred.
(4) The notice must be given before the end of the period of seven days beginning with the day on which the change occurred.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause requires a service provider that has given the coordinating officer required information (as defined in NC74) to inform the officer of any changes in that information.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 78
Failure to comply with content manager requirements: civil penalty
“(1) This section applies if the coordinating officer has given a service provider an appointment notice and—
(a) the period specified in the notice as mentioned in (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(4)(a) has expired without the provider having complied with the notice,
(b) the provider has failed to comply with a requirement under section (Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances), (Replacement of content manager) or (Duty to notify changes in required information),
(c) the provider, in purported compliance with a requirement to provide, or give notice of a change in, required information (whether in accordance with an appointment notice or under section (Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances)(2)(b), (Replacement of content manager) or (Duty to notify changes in required information)(2)) makes a statement that is false in a material particular, or
(d) the provider makes a statement that is false in giving the confirmation mentioned in section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(1)(a)(ii) or (Replacement of content manager)(5)(b).
(2) The coordinating officer may give the service provider a notice (a ‘penalty notice’) requiring the provider to pay a penalty of an amount not exceeding £60,000.
(3) In order to take account of changes in the value of money the Secretary of State may by regulations substitute another sum for the sum for the time being specified in subsection (2).
(4) Schedule (Civil penalties for service providers and content managers) makes further provision in connection with penalty notices given under this Chapter.” —(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause confers a power on the coordinating officer to impose a monetary penalty of up to £60,000 on a service provider that fails to comply with various requirements imposed by an appointment notice or under NC75, NC76 and NC77.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 79
Unlawful weapons content
“(1) For the purposes of this Chapter, content is ‘unlawful weapons content’ in England and Wales if it is content that constitutes—
(a) an offence under section 1(1) of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 (offering to sell, hire, loan or give away etc a dangerous weapon),
(b) an offence under section 1 or 2 of the Knives Act 1997 (marketing of knives as suitable for combat etc and related publications), or
(c) an offence under section 141(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 under the law of England and Wales (offering to sell, hire, loan or give away etc an offensive weapon).
(2) For the purposes of this Chapter, content is ‘unlawful weapons content’ in Scotland if it is content that constitutes—
(a) an offence within subsection (1)(a) or (b), or
(b) an offence under section 141(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 under the law of Scotland.
(3) For the purposes of this Chapter, content is ‘unlawful weapons content’ in Northern Ireland if it is content that constitutes—
(a) an offence under Article 53 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (S.I. 1996/3160) (N.I. 24) (offering to sell, hire, loan or give away etc certain knives),
(b) an offence within subsection (1)(b), or
(c) an offence under section 141(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 under the law of Northern Ireland.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause defines “unlawful weapons content” for the purposes of the new Chapter referred to in the explanatory note for NC72.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 80
Content removal notices
“(1) This section applies where an authorised officer is satisfied that content—
(a) present on a relevant user-to-user service, or
(b) which may be encountered in or via search results of a relevant search service;
is unlawful weapons content in a relevant part of the United Kingdom.
(2) The authorised officer may give a content removal notice to—
(a) the provider of the relevant user-to-user service, or
(b) the provider of the relevant search service.
(3) If the authorised officer gives a content removal notice to a service provider in a case where the coordinating officer has the contact details of the provider’s content manager, the authorised officer may also give the notice to that manager.
(4) A content removal notice is a notice requiring the service provider and (if applicable) the provider’s content manager (each a ‘recipient’) to secure that—
(a) the content to which it relates is removed (see section (Interpretation of Chapter)(2)), and
(b) confirmation of that fact is given to the authorised officer.
(5) A content removal notice must—
(a) identify the content to which it relates;
(b) explain the authorised officer’s reasons for considering that the content is unlawful weapons content in the relevant part (or parts) of the United Kingdom;
(c) explain that the notice must be complied with before the end of the period of 48 hours beginning with the time the notice is given;
(d) explain that each recipient has the right to request a review of the decision to give the notice and how a request is to be made (see section (Content removal notices: review));
(e) set out the potential consequences of failure to comply with the notice;
(f) contain the authorised officer’s contact details;
(g) be in such form, and contain such further information, as the Secretary of State may by regulations prescribe.
(6) The authorised officer may withdraw a content removal notice from a recipient by notifying the recipient to that effect (but withdrawal of a notice does not prevent a further content removal notice from being given under this section, whether or not in relation to the same content as the withdrawn notice).
(7) In this section—
‘authorised officer’ means—
(a) a member of a relevant police force who is authorised for the purposes of this section by the chief officer of the force, or
(b) a National Crime Agency officer who is authorised for the purposes of this section by the Director General of the National Crime Agency;
‘relevant part of the United Kingdom’ means—
(a) where the authorised officer is a member of a relevant police force in England and Wales, England and Wales;
(b) where the authorised officer is a member of the Police Service of Scotland, Scotland;
(c) where the authorised officer is a member of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland;
(d) where the authorised officer is a member of the Ministry of Defence Police or a National Crime Agency officer, any part of the United Kingdom.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause confers power on the police or an officer of the National Crime Agency to give a service provider and (if there is one) the provider’s content manager a notice requiring them to remove unlawful weapons content from the services they provide.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 81
Content removal notices: review
“(1) A person who is given a content removal notice (a ‘recipient’) may, before the end of the initial 48-hour period, request a review of the decision to give the notice.
(2) A request under subsection (1) is to be made by the recipient giving—
(a) a notice (a ‘review notice’) to the authorised officer, and
(b) a copy of the review notice to the other recipient (if applicable).
(3) The grounds on which a recipient may request a review include, in particular, that—
(a) content to which the notice relates is not unlawful weapons content;
(b) content to which the notice relates is insufficiently identified for the recipient to be able to take the action required by the notice;
(c) the provider that received the notice is not, in fact, the provider of the relevant user-to-user service or relevant search service to which the notice relates;
(d) the individual who received the notice as the service provider’s content manager is not, in fact, that provider’s content manager;
(e) the notice was otherwise not given in accordance with this Chapter.
(4) On receipt of a review notice, a review of the decision to give the content removal notice must be carried out—
(a) if the authorised officer is a member of a relevant police force, by another member of that force who is of a higher rank;
(b) if the authorised officer is a National Crime Agency officer, by another officer who holds a more senior position in the Agency.
The individual carrying out the review is referred to in this section as ‘the reviewing officer’.
(6) On completing the review or (in a case where two review notices are given) both reviews the reviewing officer must, in respect of each recipient, either—
(a) confirm in full the decision to give the content removal notice,
(b) confirm the decision to give the notice, but in relation to only some of the content to which it relates, or
(c) withdraw the notice.
(7) The reviewing officer must give each recipient a notice (a ‘decision notice’)—
(a) setting out the outcome of the review or reviews, and
(b) giving reasons.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause makes provision for the police or the NCA to review the decision to give a service provider or their content manager a content removal notice under NC80 where the recipient of the notice requests a review.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 82
Decision notices requiring removal of unlawful weapons content
“(1) This section applies where the reviewing officer—
(a) has carried out a review or reviews under section (Content removal notices: review), and
(b) confirms the decision to give the content removal notice to the service provider, the provider’s content manager or both of them (in each case whether as mentioned in subsection (6)(a) or (b) of that section).
(2) If the reviewing officer confirms in full the decision to give the content removal notice, the decision notice must require its recipient to secure that—
(a) the content to which the content removal notice relates is removed, and
(b) confirmation of that fact is given to the authorised officer.
(3) If the officer confirms the decision to give the content removal notice but in relation to only some of the content to which it relates, the decision notice must—
(a) identify the content to which the confirmation relates (the ‘confirmed content’), and
(b) require its recipient to secure that—
(i) the confirmed content is removed, and
(ii) confirmation of that fact is given to the authorised officer.
(4) A decision notice within subsection (2) or (3) must specify the period before the end of which the notice must be complied with, and that period must be whichever of the following is the longest—
(a) the period of 24 hours beginning with the time the decision notice is given;
(b) the period—
(i) beginning with the time the review notice or, if there was more than one, the first review notice, was given under section (Content removal notices: review), and
(ii) ending with the end of the initial 48-hour period.
(5) In this section, ‘reviewing officer’ has the same meaning as in section (Content removal notices: review).”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause provides for the police or NCA, following a review under NC81 which confirms (in full or in part) the decision to give a content removal notice, to give the service provider or content manager a decision notice requiring the removal of the unlawful weapons content concerned.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 83
Failure to comply with content removal notice or decision notice: civil penalties
“(1) Subsection (2) applies where—
(a) a content removal notice has been given to a service provider, or to both a service provider and the provider’s content manager, in accordance with section (Content removal notices), and
(b) the initial 48-hour period has expired without the notice having been complied with or a review notice having been given.
(2) A senior authorised officer of the issuing force may give a penalty notice—
(a) to the service provider, or
(b) if the provider’s content manager also received the content removal notice, to the content manager or to both of them.
(3) Subsection (4) applies where, following a review or reviews under section (Content removal notices: review)—
(a) a decision notice has been given to the service provider or to both the provider and the provider’s content manager in accordance with section (Decision notices requiring removal of unlawful weapons content)(2) or (3) confirming the decision to give the content removal notice, and
(b) the period specified in the decision notice under subsection (4) of that section has expired without that notice having been complied with.
(4) A senior authorised officer of the issuing force may give a penalty notice—
(a) to the service provider, or
(b) if the provider’s content manager also received the decision notice, to the content manager or to both of them.
(5) In this section a ‘penalty notice’ means a notice requiring its recipient to pay a penalty—
(a) where the recipient is a service provider, of an amount not exceeding £60,000;
(b) where the recipient is a service provider’s content manager, of an amount not exceeding £10,000.
(6) In order to take account of changes in the value of money the Secretary of State may by regulations substitute another sum for a sum for the time being specified in subsection (5).
(7) See Schedule (Civil penalties for service providers and content managers) for further provision in connection with penalty notices given under this section.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause confers a power on the police or NCA to impose a monetary penalty of up to £60,000 on a service provider or up to £10,000 on a content manager if they have failed to comply with a content removal notice or a decision notice.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 84
Guidance
“(1) The Secretary of State may issue guidance to the persons mentioned in subsection (2) about the exercise of their functions under this Chapter.
(2) The persons are—
(a) the chief officer, and any other member, of a relevant police force;
(b) the Director General of the National Crime Agency and any other officer of the Agency.
(3) The Secretary of State may revise any guidance issued under this section.
(4) The Secretary of State must publish any guidance or revisions issued under this section.
(5) A person mentioned in subsection (2) must have regard to any guidance issued under this section when exercising a function under this Chapter.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause confers power on the Secretary of State to issue guidance to the police and the National Crime Agency about the exercise of their functions under the new Chapter mentioned in the explanatory statement to NC72.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 85
Notices
“(1) This section applies in relation to any notice that must or may be given to a person under this Chapter.
(2) A notice may be given to a person by—
(a) delivering it by hand to the person,
(b) leaving it at the person’s proper address,
(c) sending it by post to the person at that address, or
(d) sending it by email to the person’s email address.
(3) A notice to a body corporate may be given to any officer of that body.
(4) A notice to a partnership may be given to any partner or to a person who has the control or management of the partnership business.
(5) A notice sent by first class post to an address in the United Kingdom, is treated as given at noon on the second working day after the day of posting, unless the contrary is proved.
(6) A notice sent by email is treated as given at the time it is sent unless the contrary is proved.
(7) In this section—
‘director’ includes any person occupying the position of a director, by whatever name called;
‘email address’, in relation to a person, means—
(a) an email address provided by that person for the purposes of this Chapter, or
(b) any email address published for the time being by that person as an address for contacting that person;
‘officer’, in relation to an entity, includes a director, a manager, a partner, the secretary or, where the affairs of the entity are managed by its members, a member;
‘proper address’ means—
(a) in the case of an entity, the address of the entity’s registered office or principal office;
(b) in any other case, the person’s last known address;
‘working day’ means any day other than—
(a) a Saturday or Sunday, or
(b) a day that is a bank holiday in any part of the United Kingdom under the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971.
(8) In the case of an entity registered or carrying on business outside the United Kingdom, or with offices outside the United Kingdom, the reference in subsection (7), in the definition of ‘proper address’, to the entity’s principal office includes—
(a) its principal office in the United Kingdom, or
(b) if the entity has no office in the United Kingdom, any place in the United Kingdom at which the person giving the notice believes, on reasonable grounds, that the notice will come to the attention of any director or other officer of that entity.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause makes provision about the ways in which a notice can be given, and the time at which a notice is to be treated as given, under the new Chapter mentioned in the explanatory statement to NC72.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 86
Interpretation of Chapter
“(1) In this Chapter—
‘appointment notice’ has the meaning given by section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(1);
‘authorised officer’ in relation to a content removal notice, means the member of a relevant police force, or officer of the National Crime Agency, who gave the notice;
‘chief officer’—
(a) in relation to a police force in England and Wales, means the chief officer of police of the force;
(b) in relation to any other relevant police force, means the chief constable of that force;
‘contact details’, in relation to an individual, means the individual’s—
(a) full name;
(b) telephone number;
(c) email address;
(d) residential address, or other service address, in the United Kingdom;
‘content’ has the same meaning as in the Online Safety Act 2023 (see section 236(1) of that Act);
‘content manager’, in relation to a service provider, means the individual for the time being appointed as the content manager of the provider (whether in accordance with an appointment notice or under section (Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances) or (Replacement of content manager));
‘content removal notice’ has the meaning given by section (Content removal notices)(4);
‘coordinating officer’ means the individual designated as such under section (Coordinating officer)(1);
‘decision notice’ means a notice given under section (Content removal notices: review)(7);
‘encounter’, in relation to content, has the same meaning as in the Online Safety Act 2023 (see section 236(1) of that Act);
‘entity’ has the same meaning as in that Act (see section 236(1) of that Act);
‘initial 48-hour period’, in relation to a content removal notice, means the 48-hour period specified in the notice as mentioned in section (Content removal notices)(5)(c);
‘issuing force’—
(a) in relation to a content removal notice given by a member of a relevant police force, means that force;
(b) in relation to a content removal notice given by a National Crime Agency officer, means the National Crime Agency;
‘relevant police force’—
(a) in relation to England and Wales, means—
(i) a police force in England and Wales, or
(ii) the Ministry of Defence Police;
(b) in relation to Scotland, means—
(i) the Police Service of Scotland, or
(ii) the Ministry of Defence Police;
(c) in relation to Northern Ireland, means—
(i) the Police Service of Northern Ireland, or
(ii) the Ministry of Defence Police;
‘relevant search service’ and
‘relevant user-to-user service’ have the meanings given by section (‘Relevant user-to-user services’, ‘relevant search services’ and ‘service providers’);
‘required information’ has the meaning given by section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(3);
‘review notice’ has the meaning given by section (Content removal notices: review)(2)(a);
‘search content’ and ‘search results’ have the meanings given by section 57 of the Online Safety Act 2023;
‘senior authorised officer’, in relation to a relevant police force, means—
(a) the chief officer of the relevant police force, or
(b) a member of the relevant police force of at least the rank of inspector authorised for the purposes of this Chapter by the chief officer;
‘senior authorised officer’, in relation to the National Crime Agency, means—
(a) the Director General of the National Crime Agency, or
(b) an officer of the Agency who—
(i) holds a position in the Agency the seniority of which is at least equivalent to that of the rank of inspector in a relevant police force, and
(ii) is authorised for the purposes of this Chapter by the Director General;
‘service address’ has the same meaning as in the Companies Acts (see section 1141 of the Companies Act 2006);
‘service provider’ has the meaning given by section (‘Relevant user-to-user services’, ‘relevant search services’ and ‘service providers’).
(2) For the purposes of this Chapter, a reference to ‘removing’ content—
(a) in relation to content present on a relevant user-to-user service, is a reference to any action that results in the content being removed from the service, or being permanently hidden, so users of the service in any part of the United Kingdom in which the content is unlawful weapons content cannot encounter it;
(b) in relation to content which may be encountered in or via search results of a relevant search service, is a reference to taking measures designed to secure, so far as possible, that the content is no longer included in the search content of the service that is available in any part of the United Kingdom in which the content is unlawful weapons content;
and related expressions are to be read accordingly.
(3) The following provisions of the Online Safety Act 2023 apply for the purposes of this Chapter as they apply for the purposes of that Act—
(a) section 226 (determining who is the provider of a particular user-to-user service or search service);
(b) section 236(5) and (6) (references to content being present).”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause contains definitions of terms used in the new Chapter mentioned in the explanatory statement to NC72.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 87
Dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling
“(1) The Road Traffic Act 1988 is amended as set out in subsections (2) to (6).
(2) Before section 28 (dangerous cycling) insert—
‘27A Causing death by dangerous cycling
A person who causes the death of another person by riding a cycle dangerously on a road or other public place is guilty of an offence.
27B Causing serious injury by dangerous cycling
(1) A person who causes serious injury to another person by riding a cycle dangerously on a road or other public place is guilty of an offence.
(2) In this section “serious injury” means—
(a) in England and Wales, physical harm which amounts to grievous bodily harm for the purposes of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, and
(b) in Scotland, severe physical injury.’
(3) In section 28—
(a) in subsection (1) for ‘on a road dangerously’ substitute ‘dangerously on a road or other public place’;
(b) omit subsections (2) and (3).
(4) After section 28 insert—
‘28A Meaning of “dangerous cycling”
(1) This section applies for the purposes of sections 27A, 27B and 28.
(2) A person is to be regarded as riding dangerously if (and only if) the condition in subsection (3) or (4) is met.
(3) The condition in this subsection is met if—
(a) the way that the person rides falls far below what would be expected of a competent and careful cyclist, and
(b) it would be obvious to a competent and careful cyclist that riding in that way would be dangerous.
(4) The condition in this subsection is met if it would be obvious to a competent and careful cyclist that riding the cycle in its current state would be dangerous.
(5) In determining the state of a cycle for the purposes of subsection (4), regard may be had (among other things) to—
(a) whether the cycle is equipped and maintained in accordance with regulations under section 81 (regulation of brakes, bells etc, on pedal cycles);
(b) anything attached to or carried on the cycle and the manner in which it is attached or carried.
(6) In determining what would be expected of, or obvious to, a competent and careful cyclist in a particular case, regard is to be had both to—
(a) the circumstances of which the person could be expected to be aware (taking account of, if relevant to the case, the age of the accused), and
(b) the circumstances shown to have been within the knowledge of the accused.
(7) References in this section to something being “dangerous” are references to it resulting in danger of—
(a) injury to any person, or
(b) serious damage to property.
28B Causing death by careless, or inconsiderate, cycling
A person who causes the death of another person by riding a cycle on a road or other public place without due care and attention, or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road or place, is guilty of an offence.
28C Causing serious injury by careless, or inconsiderate, cycling
(1) A person who causes serious injury to another person by riding a cycle on a road or other public place without due care and attention, or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road or place, is guilty of an offence.
(2) In this section ‘serious injury’ means—
(a) in England and Wales, physical harm which amounts to grievous bodily harm for the purposes of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, and
(b) in Scotland, severe physical injury.’
(5) In section 29 (careless, and inconsiderate, cycling)—
(a) after ‘a road’ insert ‘or other public place’;
(b) after ‘the road’ insert ‘or place’.
(6) After section 29 insert—
‘29A Meaning of careless, or inconsiderate, cycling
(1) This section applies for the purposes of sections 28B, 28C and 29.
(2) A person is to be regarded as cycling without due care and attention if (and only if) the way the person cycles falls below what would be expected of a competent and careful cyclist.
(3) In determining what would be expected of a competent and careful cyclist in a particular case, regard is to be had both to—
(a) the circumstances of which the person could be expected to be aware (taking account of, if relevant to the case, the age of the accused), and
(b) the circumstances shown to have been within the knowledge of the accused.
(4) A person (A) is to be regarded as cycling without reasonable consideration for other persons only if those persons are inconvenienced by A’s cycling.’
(7) The table in Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 (prosecution and punishment of offences) is amended as follows.
(8) After the entry relating to ‘RTA section 27’ insert in columns 1 to 4—
(9) After the entry relating to ‘RTA section 28’ insert in columns 1 to 4—
This new clause creates new offences of causing death or serious injury by dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling with penalties corresponding to the penalties applicable to the existing offences for causing death or serious injury by dangerous, careless or inconsiderate driving. It also extends the existing offences of dangerous, and careless or inconsiderate, cycling so as to apply to cycling that takes place on public places that are not roads.
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Alex Davies-Jones
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Pritchard. No pedestrian or other road user should ever feel unsafe. Their safety is a priority for this Government and I know that such sentiments will be shared across the House. Like all other road users, cyclists are required to comply with road traffic law in the interests of the safety of other road users, and that is reflected in the highway code. There are already existing offences within the Road Traffic Act 1988 to prohibit dangerous and careless cycling, which carry a maximum penalty of £2,500 and a £1,000 fine respectively.
In rare, tragic cases that have occurred in recent years, where there has been a death or serious injury caused by a cyclist, the drawbacks of relying on the current offences—notably, the Offences against the Person Act 1861—have been clear. Unlike the penalties available for motoring offences that have the same tragic outcome, that offence carries a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment. The Government do not believe that those current penalties are appropriate in cases where a cyclist’s behaviour is dangerous or careless and results in the death or serious injury of another person.
Therefore, new clause 87 introduces new offences of causing death or serious injury by dangerous or careless cycling, making our streets safer for pedestrians and other road users. Those causing death by dangerous cycling or careless cycling will face a maximum penalty of life imprisonment or five years’ imprisonment respectively. Those who cause serious injury will face a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment or two years’ imprisonment respectively. Government amendment 82 extends these new offences to England, Wales and Scotland.
These penalties ensure that there is parity across the existing framework of motoring-related offences. All road users, whether they are drivers or cyclists, whose behaviour results in the death or serious injury of another road user will face the same penalties. To be clear, it is not our intention to discourage cycling; it is one of this Government’s broader objectives to promote cycling for its health, economic and environmental benefits. However, while the majority of cyclists are responsible and cycle safely, there are rare instances where victims have been seriously or fatally injured by irresponsible and dangerous cyclist behaviour. As a result, these offences will ensure that people who cause serious or fatal harm because of their reckless cycling behaviour are subject to appropriate punishment.
Before commending these measures to the Committee, I pay personal tribute to the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), and to Matthew Briggs, who have campaigned tirelessly for these changes. I had the privilege of meeting Matthew Briggs. We discussed the need for this new offence, and how the devastating impact of the death of his wife Kim in 2016, due to a reckless cyclist, shows the need to create these new offences. For that reason, I commend these measures to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
The devastating consequences of road traffic collisions caused by reckless or dangerous behaviour are not limited to motor vehicles. In recent years, a small but significant number of cases have emerged where pedestrians and other vulnerable road users have been seriously injured or even killed as a result of dangerous or careless cycling. This new clause rightly recognises that, while the majority of cyclists are law-abiding and responsible, the law must be equipped to deal appropriately with the minority who behave recklessly and put others at grave risk.
Currently, there is a glaring gap in the legal framework: while motorists who cause death or serious injury through dangerous or careless driving face severe legal consequences, no equivalent provision exists for cyclists. This clause introduces parity in accountability, ensuring that victims and their families are not left feeling that justice is denied simply because the vehicle involved was a bicycle rather than a car.
New clause 87, alongside Government amendment 82, ensures that the legal definitions of dangerous and careless cycling reflect the realities of modern shared road and path usage, including in public places beyond traditional roadways. With the increase in cycling on footpaths, shared spaces and pedestrianised zones, it is vital that the law keeps pace and applies wherever the public might be put at risk.
Importantly, the introduction of these offences does not criminalise cycling itself; it targets only those rare but serious cases where a cyclist’s conduct falls far below that which would be expected of competent and considerate road users. It draws on the well-established legal test from dangerous and careless driving legislation, helping to ensure that the proposed offences are proportionate, fair and clearly understood.
As Members will be aware, my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green has long campaigned for a change to the law regarding responsible cycling, and I pay tribute to his work to deliver this improvement to public safety. The last Government confirmed that they would adopt an amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill that would have resulted in a change comparable to the one we see today.
Much of this would not have been possible without the sustained efforts of people such as Matthew Briggs, who, in 2016, tragically lost his wife Kim Briggs, aged just 44, after she was hit by a cyclist riding a fixed-gear bike with no front brakes. She sustained catastrophic head injuries and sadly died a week later. Unfortunately, Kim is just one of many victims, and Matthew’s is just one of many families harmed by these situations, but he has campaigned for this change in the law after tragically losing a loved one. I pay tribute to Matt and his campaign for justice, and hope that this change effectively bridges the gap in the law that so many have highlighted.
Finally, this measure sends a strong message that all road users, regardless of their mode of transport, are responsible for the safety of others. It underlines the seriousness with which Parliament treats the loss of life or serious injuries, promotes responsible cycling, and contributes to safer public spaces for everyone.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 87 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 88
Places of worship: restriction on protests
“(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 12(1) (imposing conditions on public processions)—
(a) at the end of paragraph (ab) omit ‘or’;
(b) at the end of paragraph (b) insert ‘or
(c) in the case of a procession in England and Wales, the procession is in the vicinity of a place of worship and may intimidate persons of reasonable firmness with the result that those persons are deterred from—
(i) accessing that place of worship for the purpose of carrying out religious activities, or
(ii) carrying out religious activities at that place of worship,’.
(3) In section 14(1) (imposing conditions on public assemblies)—
(a) at the end of paragraph (ab) omit ‘or’;
(b) at the end of paragraph (b) insert ‘or
(c) in the case of an assembly in England and Wales, the assembly is in the vicinity of a place of worship and may intimidate persons of reasonable firmness with the result that those persons are deterred from—
(i) accessing that place of worship for the purpose of carrying out religious activities, or
(ii) carrying out religious activities at that place of worship.’
(4) In section 14ZA(1) (imposing conditions on one-person protests)—
(a) at the end of paragraph (a) omit ‘or’;
(b) at the end of paragraph (b) insert ‘or
(c) the protest is in the vicinity of a place of worship and may intimidate persons of reasonable firmness with the result that those persons are deterred from—
(i) accessing that place of worship for the purpose of carrying out religious activities, or
(ii) carrying out religious activities at that place of worship.’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause gives the police power to impose conditions on public processions, public assemblies and one-person protests that may intimidate people and deter those people from accessing a place of worship for carrying out religious activities or from carrying out religious activities there. It does not provide power to impose conditions where those who may be intimidated are using a place of worship for other purposes.
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 89—Powers of senior officers to impose conditions on protests.
Government new clause 90—Amendments relating to British Transport Police and Ministry of Defence Police.
Dame Diana Johnson
New clauses 88 to 90 further update our public order legislation to reflect operational experience. It is important that the legislation keeps pace with the operational realities faced by police on the ground.
In the wake of the events in Israel and Gaza on 7 October 2023, we have seen a wave of large-scale protests across the United Kingdom. Although the right to protest is of course a cornerstone of our democracy and the majority of demonstrations have been peaceful, we cannot ignore the very real impact that some of the gatherings have had on religious communities. We have heard troubling reports of people of all faiths feeling too intimidated to attend places of worship, and of services being cancelled due to the proximity and nature of the protests.
New clause 88 therefore seeks to provide religious communities with better protection from intimidation caused by protests within the vicinity of their place of worship. The police have powers under the Public Order Act 1986 to manage protests where there is serious disruption to the life of the community or intentional intimidation. However, the powers often do not capture the types of harm currently being experienced by religious communities, especially where the intimidation is not deliberate, but is none the less very real for those affected.
The intention of the new clause is to strengthen the police’s powers to manage intimidatory public processions, public assemblies or one-person protests near places of worship, specifically by allowing police to impose conditions where they reasonably believe that the procession, assembly or protest may result in the intimidation of and deter those seeking to access places of worship.
New clause 88 achieves that by creating a new threshold in sections 12, 14 and 14ZA of the 1986 Act, under which the police can impose conditions on public processions, public assemblies and one-person protests. To be clear, it does not ban protests outright, but it enables the police to use this threshold to consider the appropriate time, location or routing that a protest should have in order to avoid intimidating those wishing to practise their faith at their place of worship.
The new clause will allow the police to assess whether a protest may create an intimidating atmosphere that could deter people from accessing places of worship to carry out religious activities or from conducting religious activities there, regardless of whether the organisers of the protest themselves intended for the protest to have that effect.
I turn to new clause 89. In managing recent protests, the police have relied on their powers under sections 12 and 14 of the 1986 Act to impose those conditions, for example where there is a risk of serious public disorder or serious disruption to the life of the community. However, under the current law, only the most senior officers physically at the scene can impose these conditions on live protests or where people are assembling with a view to take part. That can cause delays, particularly when strategic or tactical commanders, known as the gold and silver commanders, who are often based in off-site control rooms, have better access to intelligence but are unable to impose conditions directly. That can also lead to inconsistencies in how similar protests are managed across different locations, especially when multiple events occur at once.
Policing stakeholders have made it clear that allowing gold and silver commanders to impose conditions remotely, where the statutory thresholds are met, would improve the timeliness, consistency and effectiveness of public order policing. Those commanders typically have the best oversight of unfolding events and are well placed to make informed decisions. New clause 89 therefore amends the 1986 Act to enable gold and silver commanders to exercise powers to impose conditions under sections 12(1) and 14(1) in relation to public processions and assemblies.
Finally, new clause 90 addresses two operational issues raised by the Department for Transport and the Ministry of Defence to ensure that public order powers can be used effectively by the British Transport police and the Ministry of Defence police. First, it amends the definitions in the Public Order Act 1986 to allow the BTP to impose conditions on public assemblies taking place at railway stations. Currently, the law restricts the use of these powers to open-air locations, which limits the BTP’s ability to manage protests in enclosed but high-risk public spaces such as major stations. This change will ensure that the BTP can act appropriately within its jurisdiction across England, Wales and Scotland.
Secondly, the new clause corrects a legislative error made in 2004 that unintentionally prevented the BTP from using section 60AA of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, the existing power to require individuals to remove face coverings. This amendment restores that power. It also empowers the MDP to issue authorisations under section 60AA and section 60 of the 1994 Act to enable MDP officers to exercise powers under these provisions within its jurisdiction, in the same way as territorial police forces.
These are technical but important amendments. They do not expand thresholds or the scope of the powers themselves, but simply ensure that the BTP and MDP can apply them, where appropriate, to keep people safe, particularly in transport hubs and around defence infrastructure. The proposals reflect direct feedback from operational policing and will bring clarity and consistency to the use of public order legislation. I commend the new clauses to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
New clause 88 rightly seeks to strengthen protections for the freedom of religion and belief by ensuring that individuals are not deterred or intimidated from attending or participating in religious worship due to protests taking place in the vicinity of places of worship. It balances the right to peaceful protest with the fundamental right of individuals to practise their faith without fear or obstruction. Places of worship are not just buildings; they are sanctuaries for reflection, community and faith. When people are intimidated from entering these spaces or carrying out religious observance because of aggressive or targeted protests, it undermines not only their personal freedoms, but the broader principle of religious tolerance.
This new clause helps to ensure that those attending religious services can do so without being subject to harassment or psychological pressure. The provision is not a ban on protests: it enables the police to impose conditions, not prohibitions, on processions, assemblies and even one-person protests that occur in the vicinity of a place of worship, where such demonstrations risk intimidating individuals of reasonable firmness and deterring from participating in religious activities. The threshold is carefully defined to target behaviour that causes harm, while still protecting legitimate expression of opinion.
While some may easily dismiss this new clause, it is important to recognise that there are real-world examples where people believe that protests are being used to undermine the ability to worship. For example, recently in Westcliff-on-Sea, a protest organised by Action for Palestine, which the Palestinian Solidarity Campaign described as “not constructive”, took place on Shabbat during the final week of Pesach, in a Jewish neighbourhood where many residents would be travelling to and from the synagogue. The local rabbi said:
“There were quite a few people in the community who were so intimidated that they decided to go to their parents’ in London for the weekend, to get away completely.”
Others decided to attend one of the other orthodox synagogues in the area, such as the Westcliff Charedi synagogue, and ending up having to walk a mile to make Saturday’s two services. While I would not expect the Minister to comment on the specifics of whether that protest would constitute a breach of the new clause in question, it highlights how people practising their religion have felt targeted by particular protests.
Given the rise in targeted demonstrations, whether based on religion, race or identity, this new clause ensures that the law is responsive to the realities of contemporary protest dynamics. It draws on the existing powers under the Public Order Act 1986, applying them specifically in a context where dignity, privacy and religious freedom deserve particular safeguarding. Ultimately, this new clause is a proportionate and necessary step to preserve the peaceful co-existence of rights: the right to worship freely and the right to protest responsibly. It affirms that places of worship must remain accessible and free from intimidation for all communities.
I would be grateful if the Minister could answer the following questions. How will she ensure that new clause 88 strikes the right balance between protecting freedom of religion and upholding the right to protest under articles 9, 10 and 11 of the European convention on human rights? What guidance will be provided to the police to assess whether a protest
“may intimidate persons of reasonable firmness”?
How will subjectivity be mitigated to avoid arbitrary enforcement? Has the Home Office identified particular recent incidents that demonstrate a pressing need for the power? How frequently does the Minister expect it to be used?
David Burton-Sampson
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Pritchard. Like my right hon. Friend the Minister, I will always defend the right to protest, but it must be appropriate. Having one’s voice heard must not come at the expense of intimidating those who are peacefully worshipping.
As the hon. Member for Stockton West mentioned, only recently in Southend my constituents were affected by a march that was purposely routed past a place of worship at the time when people were due to be leaving that place of worship. We have heard similar evidence of that happening across the country. Let us be clear: it is not acceptable that people should be intimidated while they go to or from, or are in, their place of worship, whatever their religion. I welcome the new clauses.
Dame Diana Johnson
I am grateful for the short speech that my hon. Friend the Member for Southend West and Leigh just made. He has spoken to me about the events in Westcliff-on-Sea and their impact on that community. I was also grateful to the shadow Minister for referencing that incident, because it sets out clearly why the provision in new clause 88 is necessary. I welcome that.
The shadow Minister asked whether we will stop legitimate protests, and somehow put the right to religious worship above the right to protest. I want to make it clear that the new clause does not place the freedom of religion above the right to protest. I think we all agree that the right to protest is an important part of our democracy. The new clause seeks to balance those rights by ensuring that protesters do not unduly intimidate or prevent individuals from accessing places of worship.
Although the right to protest remains key and fundamental, the provisions in the new clause clarify police powers to manage those protests near places of worship, ensuring that the freedom of religion is protected without imposing a blanket restriction on demonstrations. The intent is not to curtail protest rights, but to prevent situations where protests create a hostile environment that discourages religious observance. It is important to note that it applies equally to all faiths and all places of worship, not just, as we started off talking about, a specific religious group.
The shadow Minister raised the resource implications for BTP and MDP. The request to bring forward the provisions was because of the operational needs of those police forces. I am expect that they will be able to deal with any costs arising from new clause 90 from their existing budget. The shadow Minister also mentioned training and making sure that police officers understood the introduction of these provisions. I am sure he agrees that there is extensive training of police officers. With public order in particular, we know that there is a very well-worn path of how officers are trained at the right level, depending on the situation.
I recently had the pleasure of meeting Metropolitan police officers, who do a lot of public order work, down at Gravesend to see that training first hand, and I saw the amount of resource that goes in to ensuring that those officers are equipped and know their rights and how most effectively to use them. The new provisions will be part of the continuation of that training for police officers, alongside the work of the College of Policing. On that basis, I commend them to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 88 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 89
Powers of senior officers to impose conditions on protests
“(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 12 (imposing conditions on public processions)—
(a) in subsection (1), for ‘the’, in the first place it occurs, substitute ‘a’;
(b) in subsection (2)—
(i) in the words before paragraph (a) omit ‘the’;
(ii) in paragraph (a) for the words from ‘, the most’ to the end substitute ‘—
(i) the most senior in rank of the police officers present at the scene, or
(ii) in the case of a procession in England and Wales, a police officer authorised by a chief officer of police for the purposes of this subsection, and’.
(3) In section 14 (imposing conditions on public assemblies)—
(a) in subsection (1), for ‘the’, in the first place it occurs, substitute ‘a’;
(b) in subsection (2)—
(i) in the words before paragraph (a) omit ‘the’;
(ii) in paragraph (a) for the words from ‘, the most” to the end substitute ‘—
(i) the most senior in rank of the police officers present at the scene, or
(ii) in the case of an assembly in England and Wales, a police officer authorised by a chief officer of police for the purposes of this subsection, and’;
(c) in subsection (2ZB), for ‘reference in subsection (2)(b) to a chief officer of police includes’, substitute ‘references in subsection (2) to a chief officer of police include’.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause allows the powers in sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 to impose conditions on public processions and public assemblies to be exercised by a police officer authorised to do so by a chief officer of police.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 90
Amendments relating to British Transport Police and Ministry of Defence Police
“(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) and (3).
(2) In section 14A(9) (prohibiting trespassory assemblies), in the definition of ‘land’, after ‘“land”’ insert ‘, except in subsections (4A) to (4C) of this section,’.
(3) In section 16 (interpretation), in the definition of ‘public assembly’, for the words from ‘wholly’ to the end substitute ‘—
(a) wholly or partly open to the air, or
(b) within any of paragraphs (a) to (f) of section 31(1) of the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003;’.
(4) The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 is amended in accordance with subsections (5) and (6).
(5) In section 60 (powers to stop and search in anticipation of or after violence), after subsection (9A) insert—
‘(9B) So far as they relate to an authorisation by a member of the Ministry of Defence Police—
(a) subsections (1) and (9) have effect as if the references to a locality in a police area were references to a place in England and Wales among those specified in section 2(2) of the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987, and
(b) subsection (1)(aa)(i) has effect as if the reference to a police area were a reference to the places in England and Wales specified in section 2(2) of the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987.’
(6) In section 60AA (powers to require removal of disguises)—
(a) for subsection (8) substitute—
‘(8) So far as subsections (1), (3) and (6) relate to an authorisation by a member of the British Transport Police Force, those subsections have effect as if the references to a locality or a locality in a a police area were references to a place in England and Wales among those specified in section 31(1)(a) to (f) of the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003.
(8A) So far as subsections (1), (3) and (6) relate to an authorisation by a member of the Ministry of Defence Police, those subsections have effect as if the references to a locality or a locality in a police area were references to a place in England and Wales among those specified in section 2(2) of the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987.’;
(b) in subsection (9) omit ‘and “policed premises” each’.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause extends certain powers under Part 2 of the Public Order Act 1986 to land which is not open to the air; allows Ministry of Defence Police to issue authorisations under section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994; and allows British Transport Police and Ministry of Defence Police to issue authorisations under section 60AA of that Act.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 91
Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences
“(1) This section applies where in criminal proceedings in a court in England and Wales, or in proceedings (anywhere) before a service court, a person (‘D’) is charged with a qualifying offence.
(2) An offence is a ‘qualifying offence’ if—
(a) it is alleged to have been committed by D acting in the exercise of functions as an authorised firearms officer,
(b) the conduct alleged to constitute the offence involved the use by D of a lethal barrelled weapon to discharge a conventional round, and
(c) D was, at the time of the alleged offence, authorised by the relevant authority to use that weapon with that round.
(3) The court must—
(a) cause the following information to be withheld from the public in proceedings before the court, in each case unless satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so—
(i) D’s name;
(ii) D’s address;
(iii) D’s date of birth;
(b) give a reporting direction (see section (Authorised firearms officers: reporting directions)) in respect of D (if one does not already have effect), unless satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so.
(4) The court may, if satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so, make an anonymity order (see section (Authorised firearms officers: anonymity orders)) in respect of D.
(5) If D is convicted of the offence—
(a) subsections (3) and (4) cease to apply in respect of D, and
(b) any restriction put in place under subsection (3)(a) and any reporting direction given, or anonymity order made, under this section in respect of D cease to have effect at the time D is sentenced for the offence.
(6) In subsection (1), ‘authorised firearms officer’ means—
(a) a member of a relevant police force who is authorised by the relevant chief officer to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round in the exercise of functions as a constable,
(b) a National Crime Agency officer who is authorised by the Director General of the National Crime Agency to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round in the exercise of functions as a National Crime Agency officer,
(c) a member of the Police Service of Scotland or the Police Service of Northern Ireland who—
(i) is provided under section 98 of the Police Act 1996 for the assistance of a police force in England and Wales, and
(ii) is authorised by the relevant authority to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round in the exercise of functions as a constable, or
(d) a member of the armed forces who—
(i) is deployed in support of a relevant police force or the National Crime Agency, and
(ii) is authorised by the Secretary of State to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round for the purposes of that deployment.
(7) In this section—
‘conventional round’ means any shot, bullet or other missile other than one designed to be used without its use giving rise to a substantial risk of causing death or serious injury;
‘lethal barrelled weapon’ has the meaning given by section 57(1B) of the Firearms Act 1968;
‘member of the armed forces’ means a person who is subject to service law (see section 367 of the Armed Forces Act 2006);
‘relevant authority’ means—
(a) in relation to a member of a relevant police force, the relevant chief officer;
(b) in relation to a National Crime Agency officer, the Director General of the National Crime Agency;
(c) in relation to a member of the Police Service of Scotland, the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland;
(d) in relation to a member of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland;
(e) in relation to a member of the armed forces, the Secretary of State;
‘relevant chief officer’ means—
(a) in relation to a police force in England and Wales, the chief officer of police of that police force;
(b) in relation to the British Transport Police Force, the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force;
(c) in relation to the Ministry of Defence Police, the Chief Constable of the Ministry of Defence Police;
(d) in relation to the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, the Chief Constable of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary;
‘relevant police force’ means—
(a) a police force in England and Wales,
(b) the British Transport Police Force,
(c) the Ministry of Defence Police, or
(d) the Civil Nuclear Constabulary;
‘service court’ means—
(a) the Court Martial, or
(b) the Court Martial Appeal Court.
(8) This section does not apply in relation to proceedings begun before the coming into force of this section.”.—(Alex Davies-Jones.)
This new clause provides for a presumption of anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with (but not convicted of) an offence relating to the discharge of their firearm in the course of their duties
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 92—Anonymity for authorised firearms officers appealing convictions for qualifying offences.
Government new clause 93—Authorised firearms officers: reporting directions.
Government new clause 94—Authorised firearms officers: anonymity orders.
Government amendment 83.
Alex Davies-Jones
Currently, in criminal courts, adult defendants do not have a general right to anonymity, which reflects the principle of open justice. However, judges may impose reporting restrictions where the disclosure of identifying information could hinder the administration of justice, or impact fair trial rights. Armed police officers perform a unique and dangerous role. They are trained to use lethal force on behalf of the state to protect the lives of our citizens. Their work requires them to confront situations that demand split-second decisions that can have profound legal and personal ramifications. They respond to major crimes involving high-risk individuals, often linked to organised crime groups. That inherently dangerous role naturally increases the risk of retribution for both officers and their families, which was a risk highlighted by the police accountability review.
The Government’s plan to introduce the measures set out in new clauses 91 to 94 was originally announced to the House by my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary on 23 October. The proposed new clauses address specific concerns raised during the police accountability review, and following the trial of Sergeant Martyn Blake. They will help deliver our commitment to rebuild the confidence of police officers in their vital work to keep the public safe.
Proposed new clause 91 creates a presumption of anonymity for firearms officers who are charged with offences related to the discharge of their weapon during their official duties. That presumption does not extend to other police officers who use force in their duties or to firearms officers if force is used in the line of duty that does not involve discharging a firearm. The starting point for the court will be that anonymity should be granted in these cases, and that such anonymity will remain in place until the defendant is sentenced.
New clause 91 requires that the court must withhold identifying details from the public during proceedings and give a “reporting direction”. The terms of the reporting direction are set out in new clause 93 and prevent the publication of any material that may lead to the identification of the defendant. New clause 91 also gives the courts statutory powers to ensure that the defendant’s identity is protected in the courtroom, if it is
“in the interests of justice to do so”.
New clause 94 sets out the types of measures that can be used, such as screens or voice modulation. It will be for the court to decide whether these are required.
Judicial discretion is preserved under the new provisions, which enable courts to disclose identifying details or lift reporting restrictions, where considered necessary, taking into account the specific circumstances of the case and the overall interests of justice.
New clause 92 provides courts with the statutory authority to extend in-court anonymity measures and reporting restrictions beyond sentencing, should the defendant wish to appeal their conviction. However, it does not establish a presumption, nor does it apply if a firearms officer convicted of an offence seeks only to appeal their sentence. When a firearms officer is convicted, their right to anonymity ceases at the point of sentencing. However, the court may order that anonymity continues pending the outcome of an appeal. If the conviction is upheld on appeal, the right to anonymity will cease upon the finalisation of that appeal.
Conversely, when an officer is exonerated, their right to anonymity will continue, allowing them to resume their professional and personal lives without fear of stigma or threats to their safety. Ensuring national safety and security is a top priority for this Government and the role of firearms officers is essential to achieving that. They serve in their difficult and demanding role voluntarily and we cannot expect them to perform their duties effectively without providing adequate safeguards to protect them and their families. Amendment 83 provides for the new clauses to come into force two months after the Bill is passed. I commend the new clauses, and the amendment, to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
Government new clauses 91 to 94 provide anonymity protections for authorised firearms officers in legal proceedings involving qualifying offences. New clause 91 ensures that officers charged with offences related to their authorised use of lethal weapons discharging a conventional round will have their personal details withheld and reporting directions issued, unless contrary to justice. Such measures would protect them from public scrutiny and potential threats during sensitive investigations. They would foster officers’ confidence in performing high-risk duties because they would be shielded from premature exposure before conviction.
Government new clause 92 extends the protections to convicted officers, pending appeals. That would allow courts to maintain anonymity if necessary for justice, and would support fair appeal processes by preventing irreversible reputational damage if convictions are overturned.
Government new clauses 93 and 94 provide clear mechanisms for reporting directions and anonymity orders to enforce the protections, while ensuring that judges and juries retain access to the officer’s identity. That balances transparency with safety. As the Minister has said, Members will be all too aware of the case of Sergeant Martyn Blake, who was acquitted in October 2024 of murdering Chris Kaba after a 2022 shooting in London. Blake faced death threats, including a £10,000 bounty, forcing him into hiding and highlighting the need for anonymity to protect officers and their families from retribution during trials.
These measures will help to ensure that officers who act in good faith under dangerous circumstances are protected from such vindictive attacks while the judicial process is under way—as well as ensuring recruitment and retention in firearms roles, and public safety—while also allowing the courts to lift protections when justice demands. Will the Minister comment further on how the Government will ensure that courts balance anonymity protections with the public interest in transparent justice? In particular, what guidance will be provided to courts to assess when anonymity is contrary to the interests of justice?
Alex Davies-Jones
I welcome the tone in which the Opposition spokesperson has presented his comments and the fact that he shares our concern about the need for these new measures. Judges will of course have all relevant information in balancing the need for open justice with the need to protect firearms officers in these specific instances. The measures recognise the exceptional circumstances of defendants in such cases and create a presumption of anonymity. The starting point for the courts will be that anonymity should be granted in such cases, unless it is contrary to justice to do so.
Let me add that open justice and the freedom of the press to report on these cases continue to be important principles of our justice system, and this legislation will respect those key principles. A court may already order anonymity measures or reporting restrictions in a case where it judges that disclosure of a defendant’s identity would give rise to a real and immediate risk to life. The measure is being introduced in recognition of the unique responsibilities that firearms officers have, as I have said, and the potential risks associated with their identification during court proceedings. It is really important that judges and the courts get the balance right here, but this measure is absolutely necessary.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 91 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 92
Anonymity for authorised firearms officers appealing convictions for qualifying offences
“(1) This section applies where a person (‘D’) is convicted of a qualifying offence in proceedings in a court in England and Wales, or proceedings (anywhere) before a service court.
(2) The court by or before which D is convicted may, if satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so—
(a) cause any or all of the information mentioned in section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences)(3)(a)(i) to (iii) to be withheld from the public in proceedings before the court;
(b) give a reporting direction in respect of D (see section (Authorised firearms officers: reporting directions));
(c) make an anonymity order in respect of D (see (Authorised firearms officers: anonymity orders)).
(3) Any reporting direction given, or anonymity order made, under subsection (2) ceases to have effect at the end of the appeal period unless, before the end of that period, D brings an appeal against the conviction.
(4) Where, before the end of the appeal period, D brings an appeal against the conviction, the court dealing with the appeal may, if satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so—
(a) cause any or all of the information mentioned in section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences)(3)(a)(i) to (iii) to be withheld from the public in proceedings before the court;
(b) give a reporting direction in respect of D;
(c) make an anonymity order in respect of D.
(5) The court dealing with the appeal must at the earliest opportunity determine the issue of whether to exercise any or all of the powers under subsection (4).
(6) Any reporting direction given, or anonymity order made, under subsection (2) ceases to have effect upon the making of the determination mentioned in subsection (5) (whether or not the court dealing with the appeal gives a direction or makes an order).
(7) Any reporting direction given, or anonymity order made, under subsection (4) ceases to have effect if the appeal against conviction is abandoned or dismissed.
(8) In this section—
‘appeal period’ in relation to a person convicted of a qualifying offence, means the period allowed for bringing an appeal against that conviction, disregarding the possibility of an appeal out of time with permission;
‘qualifying offence’ has the meaning given by section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences)(2).
(9) This section does not apply where the proceedings in which D was convicted were begun before the coming into force of section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences).”—(Alex Davies-Jones.)
This new clause, which is related to NC91, provides courts with a power to preserve the anonymity of authorised firearms officers convicted of an offence relating to the discharge of their firearm in the course of their duties, pending any appeal against that conviction.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 93
Authorised firearms officers: reporting directions
“(1) A reporting direction, in relation to a person (‘D’) charged with (or convicted of) a qualifying offence, is a direction that no matter relating to D may be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify D as a person who is, or was, alleged to have committed (or who has been convicted of) the offence.
(2) The matters relating to D in relation to which the restrictions imposed by a reporting direction apply (if their inclusion in any publication is likely to have the result mentioned in subsection (1)) include in particular—
(a) D’s name,
(b) D’s address,
(c) the identity of any place at which D works, and
(d) any still or moving image of D.
(3) A relevant court may by direction (‘an excepting direction’) dispense, to any extent specified in the excepting direction, with the restrictions imposed by a reporting direction if satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so.
(4) An excepting direction—
(a) may be given at the time the reporting direction is given or subsequently;
(b) may be varied or revoked by a relevant court.
(5) A reporting direction has effect—
(a) for a fixed period specified in the direction, or
(b) indefinitely,
but this is subject to subsection (5)(b) of section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences) and subsections (3), (6) and (7) of section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers appealing convictions for qualifying offences).
(6) A reporting direction may be revoked if a relevant court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so.
(7) In this section—
‘publication’ has the same meaning as in Part 2 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (see section 63 of that Act);
‘qualifying offence’ has the meaning given by section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences)(2);
‘relevant court’, in relation to a reporting direction, means—
(a) the court that gave the direction,
(b) the court (if different) that is currently dealing, or that last dealt, with the proceedings in which the direction was given, or
(c) any court dealing with an appeal (including an appeal by way of case stated) arising out of the proceedings in which the direction was given or with any further appeal.”—(Alex Davies-Jones.)
This new clause, which supplements NC91 and NC92, makes provision about reporting directions that may be given under either of those new clauses.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 94
Authorised firearms officers: anonymity orders
“(1) An anonymity order, in relation to a person (‘D’) charged with (or convicted of) a qualifying offence, is an order made by a court that requires specified measures to be taken in relation to D to ensure that the identity of D is withheld from the public in proceedings before the court.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the kinds of measures that may be required to be taken in relation to D include measures for securing one or more of the following—
(a) that identifying details relating to D be withheld from the public in proceedings before the court;
(b) that D is screened to any specified extent;
(c) that D’s voice is subjected to modulation to any specified extent.
(3) An anonymity order may not require—
(a) D to be screened to such an extent that D cannot be seen by—
(i) the judge or other members of the court (if any), or
(ii) the jury (if there is one);
(b) D’s voice to be modulated to such an extent that D’s natural voice cannot be heard by any persons within paragraph (a)(i) or (ii).
(4) The court that made an anonymity order may vary or discharge the order if satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so.
(5) In this section—
‘qualifying offence’ has the meaning given by section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences)(2);
‘specified’ means specified in the anonymity order concerned.” —(Alex Davies-Jones.)
This new clause, which supplements NC91 and NC92, makes provision about anonymity orders that may be made under either of those new clauses.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 5
Pornographic content: online harmful content
“(1) A person commits an offence if they publish or allow or facilitate the publishing of pornographic content online which meets the criteria for harmful material under section 368E(3)(a) and section 368E(3)(b) of the Communications Act 2003.
(2) An individual guilty of an offence is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine or both.
(3) A person who is a UK national commits an offence under this section regardless of where the offence takes place.
(4) A person who is not a UK national commits an offence under this section if any part of the offence takes place in the UK.
(5) The platform on which material that violates the provisions in this section is published can be fined up to £18 million or 10 percent of their qualifying worldwide revenue, whichever is greater.
(6) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the Act receiving Royal Assent, make regulations appointing one or more public bodies (the appointed body) to monitor and enforce compliance by online platforms with this section.
(7) Regulations made under subsection 6 may provide the appointed body appointed by the Secretary of State with the powers, contained in sections 144 and 146 of the Online Safety Act 2023, to apply to the court for a Service Restriction Order or Access Restriction Order (or both).
(8) The appointed body must, within six months of being appointed by the Secretary of State, lay before Parliament a strategy for monitoring, and enforcing, compliance with the provisions in this section.
(9) The appointed body must lay before Parliament an annual report, outlining the enforcement activity undertaken in relation to this section.”—(Matt Vickers.)
This new clause extends safeguarding requirements for pornography distributed offline to pornography distributed online, making it an offence to publish online harmful material under section 368E(3)(a) and section 368E(3)(b) of the Communications Act 2003.
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 6—Pornographic content: duty to verify age—
“(1) A person (A) commits an offence if they publish or allow or facilitate the publishing of pornographic content online where it has not been verified that—
(a) every individual featuring in pornographic content on the platform has given their consent for the content in which they feature to be published or made available by the service; and/or
(b) every individual featuring in pornographic content on the platform has been verified as an adult, and that age verification completed before the content was created and before it was published on the service; and/or
(c) every individual featured in pornographic content on the platform, that had already published on the service when this Act is passed, is an adult.
(2) It is irrelevant under (1a) whether the individual featured in pornographic material has previously given their consent to the relevant content being published, if they have subsequently withdrawn that consent in writing either directly or via an appointed legal representative to—
(a) the platform, or
(b) the relevant regulator where a contact address was not provided by the platform to receive external communications.
(3) If withdrawal of consent under (2) has been communicated in writing to an address issued by the platform or to the relevant public body, the relevant material must be removed by the platform within 24 hours of the communication being sent.
(4) An individual guilty of an offence is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine (or both).
(5) A person who is a UK national commits an offence under this section regardless of where the offence takes place.
(6) A person who is not a UK national commits an offence under this section if any part of the offence takes place in the UK.
(7) The platform on which material that violates the provisions in this section is published can be fined up to £18 million or 10 percent of their qualifying worldwide revenue, whichever is greater.
(8) The Secretary of State will appoint one or more public bodies to monitor and enforce compliance by online platforms with this section, with the relevant public body—
(a) granted powers to impose business disruption measures on non-compliant online platforms, including but not limited to service restriction (imposing requirements on one or more persons who provide an ancillary service, whether from within or outside the United Kingdom, in relation to a regulated service); and access restriction (imposing requirements on one or more persons who provide an access facility, whether from within or outside the United Kingdom, in relation to a regulated service).
(b) required to act in accordance with regulations relating to monitoring and enforcement of this section issued by the Secretary of State, including but not limited to providing the Secretary of State with a plan for monitoring and enforcement of the provisions in this section within six months of the bill entering into force, and publishing annual updates on enforcement activity relating to this section.
(9) Internet services hosting pornographic content must make and keep a written record outlining their compliance with the provisions of this section. Such a record must be made summarised in a publicly available statement alongside the publishing requirements in section 81(4) and (5) of the Online Safety Act.”
This new clause makes it a requirement for pornography websites to verify the age and permission of everyone featured on their site, and enable withdrawal of consent at any time.
New clause 7—Pornographic Content: Duty to safeguard against illegal content—
“(1) The Online Safety Act is amended as follows.
(2) In section 80(1), after ‘service’ insert ‘and the illegal content duties outlined in Part 3 of this Act.’”
This new clause extends the illegal content duties in Part 3 of the Act to all internet services which are subject to the regulated provider pornographic content duties in Part 5 of the Act.
New clause 51—Amendment of Possession of extreme pornographic images—
“(1) Section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (possession of extreme pornographic images) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (7) after paragraph (a) insert—
‘(aa) an act which affects a person’s ability to breath and constitutes battery of that person.’”
This new clause would extend the legal definition of the extreme pornography to include the depiction of non-fatal strangulation.
Matt Vickers
New clause 6 would introduce a safeguard to ensure that all individuals featured in pornographic content online were verified as adults. By requiring verification before content was created and before it was published, the new clause would strengthen protections against the inclusion of minors, whether through coercion, deception or manipulation, and ensure that no content involving under-age individuals was ever legally uploaded in the first place. This is a clear and necessary step to combat child sexual exploitation online, and one that aligns with wider public expectations about safety and decency on digital platforms.
My hon. Friend the Member for Reigate (Rebecca Paul) has raised this issue in the House on multiple occasions, reflecting deep concern over the ease with which harmful and unlawful content can slip through the cracks of unregulated online platforms. The new clause takes that concern seriously and would place a firm legal duty on content hosts to verify the age and consent of all individuals involved. It would shift the burden on to platforms—where it rightly belongs—to adopt robust age verification measures and uphold basic standards of safety and legality. The new clause would not only protect children from exploitation, but help to rebuild public trust in the digital environment by demonstrating that the law was keeping pace with technology.
The new clause’s suggestion that pornographic content can be uploaded without the age of the individuals involved being verified is very disturbing. I would be grateful if the Minister could comment on that and why she feels that the new clause might not be necessary. What is in place to prevent content featuring minors from being uploaded?
The pornography review led by Baroness Bertin has recommended that individuals who feature in pornography should have the right at any time to withdraw their consent to the continued publication of that content. The review states:
“Even if a performer or creator has provided consent for the initial recording and sharing of pornographic content, they should have every right to withdraw consent at a later point…and have that content removed.”
I am keen to hear the Minister’s view and, in particular, why she thinks that that recommendation is wrong.
New clause 51 seeks to update section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 by expanding the definition of extreme pornographic material to include depictions of non-fatal strangulation where it constitutes an act of battery and affects a person’s ability to breathe. The purpose of the new clause is to reflect growing concern from victims’ groups, criminal justice professionals and law enforcement about the increasing normalisation and distribution of such harmful content. Depictions of strangulation, even when simulated, have been linked to increased risk of real-world violence, especially against women. It has been suggested that strangulation is a strong predictor of future domestic homicide and normalising its portrayal in pornography risks reinforcing abusive behaviour.
Currently, the law prohibits extreme pornography that portrays serious injury or life-threatening acts. However, non-fatal strangulation, although deeply dangerous and traumatic, is not consistently covered by the existing legal framework. The new clause would close that gap by providing clarity to police and prosecutors and sending a clear message that depictions of life-threatening violence for sexual gratification are unacceptable. By targeting depictions in which the act affects a person’s ability to breathe and amounts to battery, the new clause is narrowly focused to avoid capturing consensual and legal adult activity while still addressing that which represents serious harm. It would bring the law into line with recent legislative steps such as the introduction of the offence of non-fatal strangulation in the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, acknowledging the real risk and impact of that conduct. Ultimately, this change would strengthen protections for the public and uphold standards of decency, particularly in safeguarding against material that eroticises violence and coercion.
I do not wish to divide the Committee on new clause 6, but would like us to divide on new clause 51, which I understand will be decided on later.
Alex Davies-Jones
I want to make it very clear to hon. Members that I have immense sympathy for the sentiments behind all the new clauses in this group. All of us in the House wish to make society a safer place for women and girls. Indeed, this Government were elected with a commitment to halving violence against women and girls. I am sure we all agree that the fight against the proliferation of extreme pornography and access to harmful material is one step to achieving that goal, so before I respond to new clauses 5 to 7 and 51, I want to share a few thanks.
First, I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft (Jess Asato) for tabling new clauses 5 to 7 and for tirelessly campaigning to raise awareness of online harm. I also thank the hon. Member for Stockton West for tabling new clause 51. Importantly, I thank Baroness Bertin, whose independent report on pornography provides us with invaluable insight into pornography and online harm, which the Government continue to consider carefully. All the new clauses shed light on serious issues, and I welcome their being brought to the fore today.
New clause 5 aims to equalise the treatment of pornography regulation online and offline, by making legal but harmful content prohibited online. It seeks to give effect to a recommendation made by Baroness Bertin in her review, which makes the case for parity in the regulation of pornography online and offline. She recommends achieving that through either a new pornography code under the Online Safety Act 2023, or a publication offence, which would render illegal a variety of currently legal pornography content. That approach is similar to what new clause 5 aims to do.
Before I respond to the new clause, I will set out the current legislative framework. Both online and offline pornography is subject to criminal and regulatory legislation and enforcement. The Video Recordings Act 1984 makes it an offence to distribute pornography in a physical media format that has not been classified by the British Board of Film Classification. The BBFC will not classify any content in breach of criminal law or certain other types of pornography. Section 368E of the Communications Act 2003 builds on that framework by prohibiting on-demand programme services, such as ITVX or Prime Video, from showing “prohibited material”, which includes any video that has been refused classification certification by the BBFC and any material that would be refused a classification certificate if it were considered by the BBFC. That is enforced by Ofcom as a regulatory matter.
In addition, the Online Safety Act treats certain pornography or related material offences as priority offences, which means that user-to-user services must take proactive measures to remove extreme pornography, intimate image abuse and child sex abuse material from their platforms. The Act also places a duty on user-to-user service providers to take steps to prevent such material from appearing online in the first place. Those provisions apply to services even if the companies providing them are outside the UK, if they have links to the UK.
The criminal law also prohibits the possession of extreme pornography and the publication of obscene material, either online or offline. The Obscene Publications Act 1959 extends to the publication of obscene material other than pornography. The Video Recordings Act 1984, the Licensing Act 2003 and section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 criminalise the simple possession of extreme pornographic images.
New clause 5 would make the publication, or facilitation of publication, of such content online a criminal offence, with regulatory enforcement of the new criminal regime where the person publishing the content is an online platform. The criminal offence created by the new clause would rely on the definition in section 368E of the Communications Act 2003, which requires a judgment to be made about whether the BBFC would classify content that has not been subject to the classification process. Creating this style of criminal offence would require a clearer and more certain definition of such content, as any individual would need to be able to clearly understand what conduct may result in their conviction. Extensive further work would be needed to consider and define what currently legal online pornography cannot be published with sufficient certainty to ensure that any offence was enforceable and workable as intended.
New clause 6 also attempts to give effect to the recommendations made by Baroness Bertin in her review of pornography. It seeks to create additional requirements for websites hosting pornographic material to verify that all individuals featured were over 18 before the content was created, consented to the publication of the material, and are able to withdraw that consent at any time. It would further regulate the online pornography sector and create a new criminal offence for individuals who publish or facilitate the publishing of content online, where the age and valid consent of the individuals featured have not been verified. The underlying conduct depicted if a person is under 18 or non-consenting would include child sexual abuse, sexual assault, non-consensual intimate image abuse and potentially modern slavery offences.
The existing criminal law prohibits the creation, distribution and possession of child sexual abuse material, and the possession of extreme pornographic material, which includes non-consensual penetrative sexual acts. The law on the distribution of indecent images of children is very clear. Under the Protection of Children Act 1978, the UK has a strict prohibition on the taking, making, circulation and possession with a view to distribution of any indecent photograph or pseudo-photograph of a child under 18, and these offences carry a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment. Section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 also makes the simple possession of indecent photographs or pseudo-photographs of children an offence, which carries a maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment. In addition, all published material is subject to the Obscene Publications Act 1959.
Crime and Policing Bill (Fourteenth sitting)
Thursday 8th May 2025
(1 year ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 8 May 2025 - (8 May 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
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The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
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The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
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The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
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The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
New clause 6—Pornographic content: duty to verify age—
“(1) A person (A) commits an offence if they publish or allow or facilitate the publishing of pornographic content online where it has not been verified that—
(a) every individual featuring in pornographic content on the platform has given their consent for the content in which they feature to be published or made available by the service; and/or
(b) every individual featuring in pornographic content on the platform has been verified as an adult, and that age verification completed before the content was created and before it was published on the service; and/or
(c) every individual featured in pornographic content on the platform, that had already published on the service when this Act is passed, is an adult.
(2) It is irrelevant under (1a) whether the individual featured in pornographic material has previously given their consent to the relevant content being published, if they have subsequently withdrawn that consent in writing either directly or via an appointed legal representative to—
(a) the platform, or
(b) the relevant regulator where a contact address was not provided by the platform to receive external communications.
(3) If withdrawal of consent under (2) has been communicated in writing to an address issued by the platform or to the relevant public body, the relevant material must be removed by the platform within 24 hours of the communication being sent.
(4) An individual guilty of an offence is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine (or both).
(5) A person who is a UK national commits an offence under this section regardless of where the offence takes place.
(6) A person who is not a UK national commits an offence under this section if any part of the offence takes place in the UK.
(7) The platform on which material that violates the provisions in this section is published can be fined up to £18 million or 10 percent of their qualifying worldwide revenue, whichever is greater.
(8) The Secretary of State will appoint one or more public bodies to monitor and enforce compliance by online platforms with this section, with the relevant public body—
(a) granted powers to impose business disruption measures on non-compliant online platforms, including but not limited to service restriction (imposing requirements on one or more persons who provide an ancillary service, whether from within or outside the United Kingdom, in relation to a regulated service); and access restriction (imposing requirements on one or more persons who provide an access facility, whether from within or outside the United Kingdom, in relation to a regulated service).
(b) required to act in accordance with regulations relating to monitoring and enforcement of this section issued by the Secretary of State, including but not limited to providing the Secretary of State with a plan for monitoring and enforcement of the provisions in this section within six months of the bill entering into force, and publishing annual updates on enforcement activity relating to this section.
(9) Internet services hosting pornographic content must make and keep a written record outlining their compliance with the provisions of this section. Such a record must be made summarised in a publicly available statement alongside the publishing requirements in section 81(4) and (5) of the Online Safety Act.”
This new clause makes it a requirement for pornography websites to verify the age and permission of everyone featured on their site, and enable withdrawal of consent at any time.
New clause 7—Pornographic Content: Duty to safeguard against illegal content—
“(1) The Online Safety Act is amended as follows.
(2) In section 80(1), after ‘service’ insert ‘and the illegal content duties outlined in Part 3 of this Act.’”
This new clause extends the illegal content duties in Part 3 of the Act to all internet services which are subject to the regulated provider pornographic content duties in Part 5 of the Act.
New clause 51—Amendment of Possession of extreme pornographic images—
“(1) Section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (possession of extreme pornographic images) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (7) after paragraph (a) insert—
‘(aa) an act which affects a person’s ability to breath and constitutes battery of that person.’”
This new clause would extend the legal definition of the extreme pornography to include the depiction of non-fatal strangulation.
Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 9
CCTV on railway network
“(1) It is a legal requirement for CCTV cameras across the railway network in England and Wales to be capable of enabling immediate access by the British Transport Police and relevant Police Forces.
(2) All footage retained by CCTV cameras on the railway network must remain accessible to the British Transport Police and relevant Police Forces for the entirety of the retention period.
(3) The retention period specified in subsection (2) is 30 calendar days.
(4) Further to subsection (1), the Secretary of State must publish a report, within three months of the passing of this Act, specifying a compatibility standard that will facilitate CCTV access for the British Transport Police and any Police Force in England and Wales.”—(Luke Taylor.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Luke Taylor (Sutton and Cheam) (LD)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I rise to speak in support of new clause 9, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for St Albans (Daisy Cooper). We seek a simple but critical improvement to public safety: the interoperability of CCTV systems across our railway network. Currently, rail operators maintain CCTV systems that are not integrated with British Transport police or the local territorial forces in the areas they serve. This technological gap is not just a logistical inconvenience, but an active barrier to justice and public protection.
This issue came to light in a very practical context. My hon. Friend became aware of a spike in bike thefts at St Albans City station. Despite the presence of cameras at the station, the police faced severe limitations on their access to the footage they needed, which delayed investigations and reduced the chance of recovering the stolen property. At the other end of the Thameslink line, at Sutton station, I have had an expensive e-bike stolen and two other bikes dismantled—the theft of a saddle made my ride home from work one night particularly uncomfortable.
This is not just about my cycling challenges, but about broader criminal activity on our railways, including antisocial behaviour, assaults and, most gravely, threats to the safety of women and vulnerable people using our public transport. When someone is attacked or harassed on a platform or in a train carriage, time is of the essence, and having the ability to quickly retrieve and share CCTV footage can make the difference between justice and impunity. New clause 9 would fix this problem by requiring rail operators to ensure that their CCTV systems are compatible with law enforcement systems, enabling faster, more co-ordinated responses when incidents occur. In an age when we expect smart, connected infrastructure, this is a common-sense step that aligns with public expectations and operational necessity. In the age of Great British Railways, it would be an opportunity to streamline and standardise the systems used by our currently fragmented rail system into a single, interoperable system that improves the experience and safety of riders.
I urge the Committee to support the new clause not because it would improve security on paper, but because it would make a tangible difference to the safety and confidence of passengers across the rail network.
Matt Vickers
Requiring CCTV on the rail network to meet police access and retention standards could bring important benefits for public safety and criminal justice. Ensuring footage is readily accessible to the police would help to deter crime, enable faster investigations and support prosecutions with reliable evidence.
Victims and witnesses benefit when their accounts can quickly be corroborated, and cases are more likely to be resolved effectively. Standardising CCTV systems across train operators would also reduce inefficiencies, removing delays that can occur due to incompatible formats or outdated technology. In high-risk areas or busy urban transport hubs, this kind of clarity and consistency could make a real difference to public confidence and police capability.
No doubt some will argue that increased surveillance on public transport raises questions about privacy and civil liberties, particularly if passengers feel that they are being constantly monitored. Also, rail operators may face high financial and logistical burdens if they are required to overhaul existing CCTV infrastructure to meet new standards. For smaller operators in particular, the cost of compliance could be significant, potentially impacting service provision or ticket prices.
I would be grateful if the Liberal Democrats told us whether this requirement would apply to all train operating companies, including heritage railways and smaller, regional operators. What specific technical or operational standards would CCTV systems be expected to meet, and how would those be determined or updated over time? Have they reviewed how many operators already meet or fall short of the proposed standards, and what level of upgrade would typically be required? Have they assessed the financial implications for train operators, and would they expect any Government funding or support to assist implementation?
The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)
New clause 9 would introduce a requirement that all CCTV camera images on the railway be made immediately accessible to the British Transport police and the relevant local Home Office police force. I am sympathetic to the cases that the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam, who speaks for the Liberal Democrats, shared with the Committee. I particularly sympathise with his plight and predicament when his saddle was stolen; having to cycle home without a saddle must have been incredibly painful, so I fully welcome the aims of this new clause. We know that lack of immediate access to railway CCTV camera images has been a significant issue for the British Transport police, as it may reduce their ability to investigate crime as quickly as possible. However, I do not believe that legislation is necessary to address the issue. Let me explain why.
My colleagues at the Department for Transport are looking to implement a system that will provide remote, immediate access for the BTP, Home Office forces and the railway industry where relevant. As I said, that does not need legislation. What is needed is a technological solution and the resources to provide for that. I am sure that the hon. Member will continue to press the case with the Department for Transport, and for updates on the progress of the work, but for now, I invite him to withdraw his new clause.
Luke Taylor
In response to the specific comments from the Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for Stockton West, this measure relates entirely to existing footage and would allow access to existing footage. I thank the Minister for addressing the points made. At this point, are happy to withdraw the new clause. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 12
Domestic abuse aggravated offences
“(1) Any criminal offence committed within England and Wales is domestic abuse aggravated, if—
(a) the offender and the victim are personally connected to each other, and
(b) the offence involves behaviour which constitutes domestic abuse.
(2) In this section—
(a) ‘domestic abuse’ has the meaning given by section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, and
(b) ‘personally connected’ has the meaning given by section 2 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021.”—(Luke Taylor.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Luke Taylor
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
As things stand, there is no specific criminal offence of domestic abuse in England and Wales. Instead, such cases are prosecuted under a patchwork of broader offences: common assault, actual bodily harm and coercive control. While those charges may reflect elements of abuse, they too often fail to capture the sustained pattern nature of domestic violence.
The legal ambiguity has far-reaching consequences. Under the Government’s own SDS40—standard determinate sentences 40%—scheme, high-risk offenders, especially those who pose a continued threat to public safety, should be exempt from early release, but owing to the lack of specific domestic abuse offences, perpetrators charged under more general categories, such as common assault, remain eligible for early release. In effect, abusers walk free while their victims live in fear. That is not a technical oversight; it is a systemic failure, and it has rightly been challenged by Women’s Aid, Refuge, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner and other voices we cannot afford to ignore.
That is why I welcome both the proposed amendment to the SDS40 scheme and the Domestic Abuse (Aggravated Offences) Bill, brought forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Eastbourne (Josh Babarinde). That Bill would create a defined set of domestic abuse aggravated offences, recognising the context of abuse and making such offences clearly identifiable in the criminal justice system. If adopted, the reform would not only enhance the visibility of domestic abuse, but close the dangerous loopholes in relation to early release. It would bring the law into alignment with the lived experiences of victims and send a clear message: domestic abuse is not a private matter; it is a public crime and will be treated as such.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)
I personally thank the hon. Member for Eastbourne for his tireless commitment to, and campaigning on, tackling domestic abuse. He is right to highlight the need to identify and track domestic offenders better in our justice system. It is a crucial issue. I welcome this important discussion and the many conversations that I have had with him in my ministerial office about how best to collaborate to achieve this.
New clause 12 seeks to introduce a new label, “domestic abuse aggravated”, which will apply to any offence where the offender and victim are personally connected and both aged 16 or over. Offences ranging from assault to fraud would be designated as domestic abuse aggravated where they met the statutory definition of domestic abuse. We recognise the intent behind the new clause and are deeply sympathetic to it; we agree that better categorisation and management of domestic abuse offenders is crucial. However, there are a number of important considerations that need to be carefully worked through to ensure that any new approach is effective and workable, and that it will actually help victims.
There are significant questions that need to be answered if we are to ensure that any reform strengthens, rather than complicates, our response to domestic abuse. While the new clause introduces a new label, it does not set out a clear mechanism for how the designation would be applied in practice. As proposed, it creates a category of domestic abuse offender by virtue of their offence, but does not set out legal or operational implications for charging or sentencing. Without clarity about its function, there is a risk that the provision will introduce unnecessary complexity in the legal framework, in particular through how it operates alongside the Sentencing Council’s existing guidelines, in which domestic abuse is already recognised as an aggravating factor. Courts therefore already consider imposing tougher sentences when an offence occurs in a domestic setting.
Despite those concerns, the hon. Gentleman raises an important issue, and one that I have discussed at length with the hon. Member for Eastbourne. I assure both hon. Members that work is under way across Government on how we can better identify domestic abuse offenders. This is a complex issue, and it is right that we take the time to ensure that any changes are robust and deliver meaningful improvements, but we are on the case.
The hon. Member for Eastbourne can rest assured that the Government are actively considering the issue. I would be glad to work with him—I extend that invitation to any Member of the House—on identifying the most effective way forward. While we do not believe the new clause is the right solution at this time, we welcome ongoing discussions on how best to improve the categorisation and tracking of domestic abuse offenders within the justice system. For those reasons, I ask that new clause 12 be withdrawn.
Luke Taylor
We would like to press the new clause to a vote, please.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Anna Sabine (Frome and East Somerset) (LD)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 27—Fines for sale of stolen equipment—
“(1) The Equipment Theft Act 2023 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 3 (Enforcement), subsection (2) at end insert ‘equal to—
(a) the replacement cost of the equipment,
(b) the cost of repairing any damage caused during the theft, and
(c) the trading losses incurred by the offended party.’”
This new clause would ensure the fine charged to a person convicted of equipment theft would reflect the cost to a tradesman of replacing their equipment, repairing any damage to their equipment or property, and any business they’ve lost as a result.
New clause 32—Theft from farms—
“(1) The Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.
(2) In Chapter 3, Aggravating Factors, after section 72 insert—
‘(72A) Theft from farms
(1) This section applies where the court is considering the seriousness of an offence specified in section 7 of The Theft Act 1968.
(2) If the theft was of high value farming equipment, the court—
(a) must treat that fact as an aggravating factor, and
(b) must state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.
(3) For the purposes of this section—
“high value farming equipment” is machinery and tools used in agricultural operations to enhance productivity and efficiency, with a value of at least £10,000.’”
This new clause makes theft of high value farming equipment an aggravating factor on sentencing.
New clause 96—Theft of tools from tradesmen—
“(1) The Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.
(2) In Chapter 3, Aggravating Factors, after section 72 insert—
‘72A Theft of tools from tradesmen
(1) This section applies where the court is considering the seriousness of an offence specified in section 7 of the Theft Act 1968.
(2) If the theft was of tools from a tradesman, the court—
(a) must treat that fact as an aggravating factor, and
(b) must state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.’”
This new clause would make the theft of tools from a tradesman an aggravating factor.
New clause 98—Enforcement plan for sale of stolen equipment at car boot sales—
“(1) The Equipment Theft Act 2023 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 3 (Enforcement), after subsection (3) insert—
‘(3A) An enforcement authority must put in place an enforcement plan to enforce regulations made under section 1 at temporary markets in their area.’”
This new clause would require local councils or local trading standards organisations to put in place an enforcement plan for the sale of stolen equipment at temporary markets, which includes car boot sales.
Anna Sabine
I rise to speak to new clause 13, but the Liberal Democrats also support Opposition new clauses 27, 32, 96 and 98, which are grouped with it.
We want to amend the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023 specifically to include the theft of global positioning system or GPS equipment. That may sound like a technical issue, but for farmers across the country, such as those in my Frome and East Somerset constituency, it is an urgent and deeply practical one. GPS units are no longer optional extras—they are essential tools for modern farming, guiding tractors and combine harvesters with precision, improving productivity and ensuring that key agricultural work happens on time. Yet these high-tech units, typically costing over £10,000 each, have become a prime target for increasingly organised criminal gangs. In 2023 alone, NFU Mutual reported that claims for GPS theft soared by 137%, reaching an estimated £4.2 million. These are not isolated incidents: intelligence shows that gangs often target multiple farms in one night, stealing with precision and frequently returning weeks later to take the newly installed replacements.
Matt Vickers
New clauses 27, 96 and 98 seek to tackle the real and growing problem of tool theft from tradesmen. At this point, I declare an interest as the son of a builder. This country is built on the back of tradesmen. They are the small businesses that make a huge contribution to our economy and build the world around us. I have seen at first hand the nightmare that occurs when guys or girls in the trade get up at daft o’clock to go to work and earn a living, only to find that their van or lock-up has been broken into and their equipment stolen. They lose the equipment, their vehicle gets damaged and they lose a day’s work. In fact, they can lose days or weeks of work, and the nature of their employment often means that that is a real financial loss.
Not only do these hard-working people suffer that loss, but they know that little is done to stop this ever-increasing problem. I have spoken to tradesmen and key campaigners on this issue, such as Shoaib Awan and the team at Fix Radio, who have been standing up for tradesmen across the country, organising a rally in Westminster and ensuring that their voice is heard. Many people will have seen my good friend the shadow Justice Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick), raising this issue on GB News and talking about the failure of agencies to tackle it.
Shoaib has highlighted the fact that not only do people wake up to the consequences and costs of such thefts, but all too often, they go to a car boot sale at the weekend to see the thieves selling the stolen goods in broad daylight with little, if any, action from the police and trading standards. I ask anyone who does not think that these amendments are necessary to listen to Shoaib or watch the coverage on GB News, should they so wish. As more thieves get away with and profit from this crime, so its prevalence continues to increase. Since Sadiq Khan became mayor, tool theft in London has gone up by 60%. I hope Members will consider these amendments.
New clause 27 strengthens the deterrent effect of the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023 by aligning financial penalties with the real-world losses experienced by tradespeople and small businesses when their tools or equipment are stolen. The current enforcement provisions may result in fines that are disconnected from the actual harm caused, particularly to self-employed individuals or small and medium-sized enterprises, where the loss of equipment can be financially devastating. The new clause introduces a fairer and more effective approach by unequivocally requiring courts to impose fines that reflect the full replacement cost of the stolen equipment, the cost of repairing any damage done during the theft and the trading loss incurred while the equipment was unavailable, whether it be cancelled jobs, lost contracts or reputational harm.
Tool theft has reached crisis levels in the UK, with one in 10 tradespeople expected to experience tool theft this year alone. Many of the victims have already endured multiple incidents and, alarmingly, self-employed tradespeople are 38% more likely than their employed counterparts to fall victim to this type of crime. Yet, despite the prevalence of this crime, only 1% of stolen tools are ever recovered.
The consequences of tool theft go far beyond the immediate loss of equipment. Victims face an average cost of £2,730 to replace stolen tools, £1,320 in vehicle or property repairs and £1,900 in lost work and business disruption—a combined blow of nearly £6,000. More than four in five victims report a negative impact on mental health, with over one third describing it as “major”. That is no small issue, especially in an industry already suffering one of the UK’s highest suicide rates. More than 40% of victims say the theft has damaged their business reputation, and one in 10 say the reputational impact was significant. Frustration with the police and the legal response is widespread. Nearly one quarter of tradespeople—22.7%—do not even bother reporting tool theft to authorities, citing poor outcomes and a lack of follow-up.
According to figures from CrimeRate, Bristol has the highest rates of general crime, with 106 crimes per 1,000 residents, followed by West Yorkshire, Tyne and Wear and West Midlands. Those rates correlate with high levels of tool theft. The persistent threat of crime means that, for 68% of tradespeople, worrying about such theft is a daily reality. The new clause would not only ensure that victims are properly compensated, but send a strong message to offenders that equipment theft is not a low-risk crime. For many tradespeople, a single incident can lead to thousands of pounds in losses and days or weeks of missed work. The clause reflects a growing recognition that crimes affecting livelihoods must be met with penalties that match the seriousness and consequences of the offence. It supports victims, reinforces respect for the law and helps to protect the economic wellbeing of skilled workers across the country.
New clause 96 seeks to amend the Sentencing Act 2020 to make the theft of tools from a tradesman an explicit aggravating factor when courts are considering the seriousness of a theft offence under section 7 of the Theft Act 1968. The intention is to recognise the disproportionate harm caused when essential work tools are stolen from skilled tradespeople, many of whom rely entirely on their tools to earn a living. By requiring courts to treat such thefts more seriously and state that fact in open court, the clause ensures that sentencing properly reflects the real-world impact of those crimes. It improves public confidence in the justice system and sends a clear message that targeting workers in such a way will not be tolerated.
The UK’s skilled trade sector is essential to infrastructure, housing and national economic recovery, yet, when they are targeted by thieves, many tradespeople feel unprotected and underserved by the criminal justice system. By introducing this aggravating factor, Parliament would send a clear message that these crimes are taken seriously and that the justice system stands on the side of workers who keep our country running. The provision would also help to restore public confidence in sentencing, ensuring that punishment better reflects the real impact on victims.
New clause 96 would also bring greater consistency and transparency in sentencing by obliging courts to state in open court when a theft is aggravated by the fact that tools were stolen from a tradesman. The system reinforces public accountability and the principle that sentencing should consider not only the value of items stolen, but the importance to the victim’s life and work.
New clause 98 addresses a growing concern about the sale of stolen tradespeople’s tools at car boot sales and other temporary markets. Requiring local councils or trading standards authorities to implement an enforcement plan would ensure a more proactive and consistent approach to tackling the issue. Car boot sales and temporary markets, although important parts of local economies and communities, have become a common outlet for the sale of stolen tradesmen’s tools. These informal settings often have minimal regulatory oversight, making them attractive to criminals seeking to quickly offload high value items. Requiring councils to create enforcement plans would close this enforcement gap, helping to dismantle a key part of the stolen goods supply chain.
Tradespeople, many of whom are self-employed, are among those most affected by tool theft. Their tools are not just possessions; they are the means by which individuals earn a living. Stolen tools being resold at car boot sales with little oversight reinforces the cycle of crime and undermines legitimate business. A local enforcement plan will support hard-working tradespeople by increasing the risk for those attempting to profit from their misfortune.
Any Member who has taken the time to speak to affected tradespeople will have heard their overwhelming frustration at the lack of the lack of action at car boot sales, watching tools stolen from them being sold in front of their face in broad daylight with no action from the agencies. This new clause seeks to put that right. By requiring councils to plan enforcement at temporary markets, it would encourage more responsible behaviour among market organisers and set a baseline for due diligence, including vendor checks, co-operation with law enforcement and public awareness initiatives. Such expectations could help to preserve the integrity and trustworthiness of community markets without disrupting legitimate trade.
This is a common-sense, low-cost policy that leverages existing local authority structures. Many councils already have trading standards and enforcement teams in place able to take this on. This measure simply ensures that they will turn their attention to this persistent and growing problem. Enforcement plans could include scheduled inspections, information sharing with police and targeted education for both vendors and shoppers. This preventive approach could reduce the frequency of thefts by making it more difficult for criminals to profit.
The Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023 set an important precedent in efforts to crack down on the theft of high-value tools and equipment. However, legislation is only effective when matched by local enforcement. This clause bridges the gap between law and local action, giving councils a clear duty and direction to enforce the law where the illicit trade is happening on the ground.
Local residents and small business owners often feel powerless in the face of persistent tool theft. Seeing their local councils take meaningful and visible action, such as regular enforcement of markets, could help to build trust in the system, sending a message that this type of crime is taken seriously and that steps are being taken at every level to protect those most vulnerable to its effect.
The new clause would help deter the resale of stolen goods, protect legitimate tradespeople from further victimisation and send a clear message that theft and resale will be actively policed at all levels. This targeted local action complements broader sentencing reforms and supports efforts to reduce tool theft across the UK.
New clause 32 seeks to amend the Sentencing Act 2020 and specifically targets the growing issue of rural crime by making the theft of high-value farming equipment a statutory aggravating factor in sentencing decisions. Under the proposed provision, when a court is considering the seriousness of a theft offence under section 7 of the Theft Act 1968, and the theft involves farming machinery or tools valued at £10,000 or more, it must treat the value and nature of the stolen property as an aggravating factor.
The theft of high-value farm equipment has a profound and often devastating impact on rural communities and agricultural businesses. These machines, such as tractors, GPS systems, harvesters and other specialised tools, are not only expensive to replace, but also critical to daily operations. When they are stolen, the immediate financial loss can exceed £10,000, but the broader consequences go much further. Farmers face significant disruption to their work, delayed harvesting or planting and reduced productivity, which can affect the entire food supply chain.
Many rural businesses operate on tight margins and such thefts can push them into financial instability or force them to cease operations temporarily. Beyond economics, these crimes erode confidence in rural policing and leave victims feeling vulnerable and targeted, especially in remote areas where support and security may already be limited.
The new clause would also require courts to explicitly state in open court that the offence has been aggravated by this factor. The intent is to reflect the serious disruption and financial harm caused by the theft of vital agricultural machinery such as tractors, GPS units or harvesters, which are essential for productivity and food security in rural communities. By making that an aggravating factor, the new clause aims to ensure that sentencing reflects the full impact on victims and serves as a more effective deterrent. I hope that the Government will consider backing our farmers and backing this new clause.
My hon. Friend the Member for Mid Buckinghamshire (Greg Smith) has undertaken a significant amount of work to help tackle tool and equipment theft, including the introduction of the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023 as a private Member’s Bill, to address the escalating issue of equipment and tool theft affecting tradespeople, farmers and rural businesses across England and Wales.
The 2023 Act empowers the Secretary of State to mandate that all new all-terrain vehicles such as quad bikes come equipped with immobilisers and forensic marking before sale. The measures aim to make stolen equipment less attractive to thieves and easier to trace. The Act could make a real and meaningful difference to the issues we are debating here. It received Royal Assent and is designed to deter theft and facilitate the recovery of stolen equipment. I would be grateful if the Minister could comment on the progress of enacting the measures set out in that Act.
Alex Davies-Jones
I would be happy to do so, but first I must say how grateful I am to the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset and to the hon. Member for Stockton West for setting out the rationale behind these new clauses.
New clause 13 seeks to extend the scope of the 2023 Act to include the theft of GPS equipment. Such equipment is often used in agricultural and commercial settings. We know the significant impact of thefts of agricultural machinery, in particular all-terrain vehicles, on individuals and businesses in rural areas, and the disruption to essential farming when these thefts occur. That is why we are committed to implementing the 2023 Act to help prevent the theft and resale of high-value equipment. We intend to introduce the necessary secondary legislation later this year, and we will be publishing the Government’s response to the call for evidence soon to confirm the scope of that legislation.
Luke Taylor
The premise of the Minister’s point is effectively that sufficient legislation is already in place to combat these crimes. The response to an freedom of information request that I submitted to the Met police showed that in London, in the last five years, nine in 10 tool thefts went unsolved. The fact that that failure has been allowed to continue under the existing legislation suggests that legislation is not sufficient. I support the proposed new clauses because something needs to change to stop these incredibly damaging crimes, which are affecting not just the livelihoods, but the mental health of our valuable, essential tradespeople and their families.
Alex Davies-Jones
I welcome that comment from the Liberal Democrat spokesperson. I and this Government recognise that theft is a crime, and that victims are immensely impacted by it—we heard earlier about the hon. Member’s own circumstances—but the legislation is adequate. As I have already said, we have robust legislation to tackle these crimes. What has been apparent over the last 14 years is a decimation of our public services, including our policing, which has meant that police do not have the resources that they need to investigate these crimes effectively. I am glad to say that this Government are changing that by recruiting and funding more police officers, including for the Met police, to ensure that we have the police to go after these criminals.
Luke Taylor
The Minister has set me up nicely with that point, and I will come back to it later. The Met police are going to reduce their staff—including officers and police community support officers—by 1,700 next year. The Government are attempting to present a case that the legislation is sufficient at present, and that they are providing more officers and resources to police forces to combat the increase in these crimes. Whoever’s fault it was—and we all make points about the cause, the cuts, when the cuts started, and what conditions were prior to them—if the Met police will suffer the loss of 1,700 officers next year due to the funding situation, and the legislation is currently letting down tradespeople, I would gently push back that either the measures in the legislation or the resources are insufficient to solve an issue that we all generally agree exists today.
Alex Davies-Jones
The Policing Minister assures me that that figure for the number of cuts being made by the Met police is not correct. We are happy to debate that. I and this Government are still sufficiently certain that the legislation is robust in this area. We can debate the means that we have to tackle that but, as I have stated, this Government are funding more police resources to ensure that those who commit these crimes are being sought. In an earlier sitting of the Committee, we debated why it is so important to clarify and get right provisions for shop theft, so that the police have adequate equipment and resources to go after the perpetrators. These thefts are illegal but, for whatever reason, the crimes are not being pursued. We are determined to ensure, through our safer streets mission, that that problem is tackled, but the legislation that we have in place is robust.
Regarding the courts and the justice system, the Government do consider that the courts are already considering the impacts of such crimes when sentencing. The addition of the measures in the proposed new clauses would add unnecessary complications to the sentencing framework. Moreover, sentencing in individual cases should as far as possible be at the discretion of our independent judiciary, to ensure that sentences are fair, impartial and proportionate.
Finally, as I have already set out, any changes to the sentencing framework should take into account the sentencing review’s recommendations, which are due to be published shortly.
On new clause 98, I understand the frustration that many individuals feel when they see stolen equipment being sold at car boot sales and other informal markets. I reassure the shadow Minister that the Government take this issue seriously. However, we cannot support the clause in the absence of further policy work and engagement with relevant authorities to explore the best way to ensure that stolen equipment is not sold in informal market settings or at car boot sales.
Overall, I am sympathetic to the spirit of the new clauses, but I do not believe them to be necessary at this time. I reassure the Committee that this Government are fully committed to implementing the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023 to tackle the theft and resale of equipment.
Matt Vickers
Can I take it that there is a commitment to doing something to clamp down on the situation with temporary markets and car boot sales? Also, will the Minister meet with Shoaib Awan, the gas fitter who has been campaigning on the issue, to discuss what that might look like and to hear the sector’s frustrations?
Alex Davies-Jones
Yes, we are happy to meet with Shoaib Awan to discuss this, and yes, we have a commitment to looking at the situation more widely and at the issue directly. As someone who loves a car boot sale, I am keen to explore the question further.
I ask the shadow Minister to be patient for a little while longer as we finalise our plans for the implementation of the 2023 Act, and as we look into the issues in more detail to get the policy work right. On that basis, I ask hon. Members not to press their new clauses.
Anna Sabine
I seek a quick clarification from the Minister. Was she saying that under the plans to implement the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act, there may be scope within some secondary legislation to look at GPS thefts specifically? Did I understand that correctly?
Luke Taylor
I rise to speak in support of new clause 13, as well as Conservative new clauses 27, 96 and 98. We had a long discussion on this issue, but it is worth repeating as often as possible that tool theft is a devastating crime that cost tradespeople more than £94 million last year.
Research from NFU Mutual shows that one in three tradespeople now live in constant fear of violent thieves. Some have been attacked with crowbars and other weapons just for trying to protect their tools from being ripped out of their vans. At the February rally in Parliament Square organised by Trades United, I heard from campaigners about tradespeople not letting their vehicles out of their sight, and about thieves cutting off the roofs of their vans to steal tools. It was heartbreaking. We hear about the impact on those tradespeople and their families, including suicides and mental health problems.
Despite the back and forth, I think we should make it absolutely clear that this issue needs to be addressed, and that powers must be given to the police and courts to treat it with the seriousness that it deserves. Tool theft is more than just standard assault or theft; it is an assault on tradespeople’s hard work and their livelihoods. It is time to acknowledge that danger to their entire livelihoods and lifestyles.
Anna Sabine
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 14
Rural Crime Prevention Strategy
“(1) A day after this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must establish a rural crime prevention task force to develop proposals for tackling rural crime.
(2) The task force should be tasked with a remit that includes, but is not confined to, examining—
(a) The particular types of crime that occur in rural areas;
(b) Crime rates in rural communities across England and Wales;
(c) The current levels of police resources and funding in rural communities;
(d) Whether specific training in how to respond to rural crime call-outs should be undertaken by police control room operators;
(e) The operational case, and the funding implications, of appointing rural crime specialists in Police Forces across England and Wales which serve areas that include a significant rural population; and
(f) Whether a National Rural Crime Coordinator should be established.
(3) The task force established under subsection (1) must submit a rural crime prevention strategy to the Secretary of State within six months of its appointment.
(4) The Secretary of State must, within a month of receiving the report made by the task force, lay before both Houses of Parliament a written response to the task force’s recommendations.
(5) The Secretary of State must, within a month of laying their response to the task force’s report, ensure that an amendable motion on the subject of the rural crime task force’s recommendations is laid, and moved, before both Houses of Parliament.”—(Anna Sabine.)
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to establish a task force to produce a strategy for tackling rural crime, makes provision for specific aspects of the task force’s remit, and requires the Secretary of State to bring forward a substantive motion before both Houses of Parliament on the task force’s recommendations.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Anna Sabine
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause would require the Secretary of State to establish a rural crime taskforce, which is a long overdue step in recognising and addressing the growing threat of rural crime across England and Wales. In 2023 alone, the total cost of rural crime surged to a staggering £52.8 million—a 22% increase since 2020. Behind that figure lie the lives and livelihoods of farmers, landowners and rural communities who are increasingly under siege from organised criminal gangs. These are not petty thefts, but targeted cross-border operations involving the theft of high-value machinery, vehicles and GPS units, often facilitated by networks that are deliberately structured to evade detection by working across multiple police force boundaries. I have spoken to my many farmers in my constituency of Frome and East Somerset, and many of these rural crimes end in terrifying physical altercations between farmers and criminals, and even threats being made against farmers’ families.
Yet, while the threat has grown, the policing response has not. Fewer than 1% of officers in England and Wales are dedicated to rural crime. Many forces lack even the basic tools, such as drone kits and mobile automatic number plate recognition cameras, to respond effectively. It is no wonder that 49% of rural residents feel that police do not take rural crime seriously, and two thirds believe reporting it is a waste of time. This new clause would change that. It mandates the creation of a taskforce with a clear and comprehensive remit to assess crime levels, review police resources, consider rural-specific training, explore the case for rural crime specialists and evaluate whether a national rural crime co-ordinator should be established.
Importantly, the new clause is not just about a report gathering dust. It requires the Secretary of State to respond to the taskforce’s strategy in writing, and to bring an amendable motion before both Houses. That would ensure that Parliament is not just informed, but actively involved in shaping the solution to rural crime. Rural crime is not a niche issue; it is a national issue. Rural communities deserve to know that they are seen, heard and protected by the laws of this land. The taskforce is not a symbolic gesture; it is a practical, focused and long overdue step towards restoring confidence, strengthening policing and securing justice for rural Britain.
Matt Vickers
Rural communities deserve the same protection, visibility and voice as those in urban areas, yet too often rural crime goes under-reported, under-resourced and underestimated. From equipment theft and fly-tipping to wildlife crime and antisocial behaviour, the challenges facing rural areas are distinct and growing. Having rural crime recognised in police structures and developing a specific taskforce could send a strong signal that rural communities matter, that their concerns are heard and that they will not be left behind when it comes to public safety.
However, although the new clause is clearly well-intentioned I would like to put some operational questions to those who tabled it, to ensure greater clarity. What assessment has been made of the additional resources that police forces might need to implement such a strategy effectively, particularly in already stretched rural areas? The new clause refers to the creation of new roles. The National Police Chiefs’ Council already has a rural crime lead and many police forces across the country already appoint rural crime co-ordinators. How would the suggested additional roles be different?
How does the new clause balance the need for a national strategy with the operational independence and local decision making of police and crime commissioners? Is there a clear definition of what constitutes a rural area for the purposes of this strategy? How will this be applied consistently across the country? I am interested to hear the answers, but would be minded to support the new clause if it was pressed to a Division.
Dame Diana Johnson
As the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset set out, new clause 14 would require the Government to establish a rural crime prevention taskforce. Let me first say that the Government take the issue of rural crime extremely seriously, and that rural communities matter. I want to outline some of the work going on in this area.
I take the opportunity to acknowledge the vital role that the national rural crime unit and the national wildlife crime unit play in tackling crimes affecting our rural areas, as well as helping police across the UK to tackle organised theft and disrupt serious and organised crime. Those units have delivered a range of incredible successes. The national rural crime unit co-ordinated the operational response of several forces to the theft of GPS units across the UK, which resulted in multiple arrests and the disruption of two organised crime groups. The unit has recovered over £10 million in stolen property, including agricultural machinery and vehicles, in the past 18 months alone.
The national wildlife crime unit helped disrupt nine organised crime groups, with a further nine archived as no longer active, as well as assisting in the recovery of £4.2 million in financial penalties. It also oversees the police national response to hare coursing, which has resulted in a 40% reduction in offences.
I am delighted to say that the national rural crime unit and the national wildlife crime unit will, combined, receive over £800,000 in Home Office funding this financial year to continue their work tackling rural and wildlife crime, which can pose a unique challenge for policing given the scale and isolation of rural areas. The funding for the national rural crime unit will enable it to continue to increase collaboration across police forces and harness the latest technology and data to target the serious organised crime groups involved in crimes such as equipment theft from farms. The national wildlife crime unit will strengthen its ability to disrupt criminal networks exploiting endangered species both in the UK and internationally with enhanced data analysis and financial investigation, helping the unit to track illegal wildlife profits and to ensure that offenders face justice.
The funding comes as we work together with the National Police Chiefs’ Council to deliver the new NPCC-led rural and wildlife crime strategy to ensure that the entire weight of Government is put behind tackling rural crime. That new strategy is expected to be launched by the summer. We want to ensure that the Government’s safer streets mission benefits everyone, no matter where they live, including those in rural communities. This joined-up approach between the Home Office, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and policing, as well as the confirmed funding for the national rural crime unit and the national wildlife crime unit, will help to ensure that the weight of Government is put behind tackling rural crimes such as the theft of high-value farm equipment, fly-tipping and livestock theft.
Given the work already ongoing in this area, I believe that the Liberal Democrat new clause is unnecessary, and I urge the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset to withdraw it.
Anna Sabine
I want to come back on some of the questions asked by the Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for Stockton West. He asked about the resources that would be required to implement the strategy. Having spoken to the rural police force in my area, my understanding is that the issue is not necessarily one of rural officers being under-resourced, although more resource clearly would be helpful; it is actually to do with how those officers are allocated. For example, in Frome we have a rural crime team, but because of a lack of neighbourhood policing, if there is an incident in Frome on an evening—a fight outside a pub, for example—rural officers are deployed to go and deal with that rather than fighting rural crime. One of the challenges for those officers is that they are not actually allowed to do the job they are trained for, because they are covering for other areas.
The hon. Gentleman asked why the strategy was necessary when we already have various regional rural crime leads. The reason is that we need to ensure that rural crime is seen to be significant nationally—we need to have a national push and develop some strategies to tackle it. I welcome what the Minister said about that.
The shadow Minister’s third question was about defining rural areas. We are quite good at defining them now, so I am not sure why we could not continue to define rural crime areas in the way that constabularies do currently, but we could look at that.
I welcome the Minister’s comments on what is clearly a growing Government drive to take rural crime seriously. I do not doubt any of her figures about the reduction of crimes such as hare coursing. All I would say is that farmers in my constituency are really not reporting crimes, and I worry that crime figures are dropping simply because crime is not being reported, not because it is not occurring. The longer rural crime is not taken seriously, the more those numbers will drop.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 16—Neighbourhood Policing—
“(1) The Secretary of State must ensure that every local authority area in England and Wales has a neighbourhood policing team must be assigned exclusively to community-based duties, including:
(a) High-visibility foot patrols;
(b) Community engagement and intelligence gathering;
(c) Crime prevention initiatives; and
(d) Solving crime.
(2) The Home Office must publish proposals detailing the additional funding that will be required to ensure that police forces can meet these requirements without reducing officer numbers in other frontline policing roles.
(3) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report detailing:
(a) The number of officers and PCSOs deployed in neighbourhood policing roles;
(b) The total cost of maintaining the required levels; and
(c) The impact on crime reduction and public confidence in policing.
(4) If a police force fails to meet the minimum staffing levels required under subsection (1), the Home Office must intervene and provide emergency funding to ensure compliance within six months.”
Anna Sabine
New clauses 15 and 16 are vital in ensuring robust neighbourhood policing across England and Wales. New clause 15 mandates the Government to publish proposals within six months to maintain neighbourhood policing teams at levels necessary for effective community engagement and crime prevention. That includes designating a proportion of funds recovered under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 for neighbourhood policing initiatives and ringfencing 20% of total funds in future police grant reports specifically for neighbourhood policing.
New clause 16 would require the Government to ensure that every local authority area has a dedicated neighbourhood policing team assigned exclusively to community-based duties such as high-visibility foot patrols, community engagement, crime prevention initiatives and solving crime. The Home Office must also publish proposals detailing the additional funding needed to meet these requirements without reducing officer numbers in other frontline roles.
The rationale for the new clauses is clear. Home Office figures reveal that the number of neighbourhood police officers in England and Wales as of March 2024 was 20% lower than previously thought. Across the country, there were 6,210 fewer neighbourhood police officers than earlier official figures suggested. In my constituency of Frome and East Somerset the situation is particularly concerning. The latest data shows that crime rates have been rising, with 269 crimes reported in Frome in March 2024 alone. That highlights the urgent need for more neighbourhood police officers to ensure community safety and effective crime prevention. Furthermore, the number of PCSOs has been drastically reduced, with 235 taken off the streets of England and Wales in just one year. My local force, Avon and Somerset, saw PCSO numbers fall from 315 to 255 since September ’23—a loss of nearly 20% and the biggest in any force in England.
The new clauses are essential for reversing those trends and restoring public confidence in our policing. By ensuring minimum levels of neighbourhood policing and dedicated community-based duties, we can enhance public safety, improve community relations and effectively tackle crime. I urge my fellow members of the Committee to support new clauses 15 and 16. Let us take decisive action to strengthen neighbourhood policing and ensure that every community in England and Wales is adequately protected.
Matt Vickers
Neighbourhood policing is the foundation of public trust in our police forces. When officers are visible, engaged and embedded in the communities they serve, crime is deterred, information flows more freely and residents feel safer and more connected. New clause 15 recognises the role of neighbourhood policing in preventing crime and promoting community confidence. Having officers who know the patch and who are known by local residents is invaluable in early intervention, tackling antisocial behaviour and protecting the vulnerable.
I should be grateful for further comments and clarity on how new clauses 15 and 16 will ensure that forces and directly elected police commissioners will have the flexibility to deploy resources based on local need, rather than being constrained by rigid top-down targets. What criteria or metrics will be used to define whether neighbourhood policing levels are sufficient to ensure effective community engagement and crime prevention, and who decides what is effective? Further to that, what role will local communities have under this proposal in shaping what neighbourhood policing will look like in their area?
Luke Taylor
This year, the Met police will cut more than 1,700 officers, PCSOs and staff. I invite the Minister to intervene and correct me on that if necessary, as it would seem to suggest that there was an error in the figure given earlier. A correction cometh not.
That figure will include the loss of the parks police team and of officers placed in schools, who have been so critical in maintaining early intervention in those settings and diverting young people away from a life of crime. They have also improved relationships between young people and the police, ensuring that young people can trust the police when they have information that might lead to crimes being prevented or solved. Those officers are dearly needed today.
The £260 million shortfall below the required budget in London will also create a 10% cut to the forensics teams, which includes the investigation of offences such as tool theft, sexual offences and many other crimes. There will be an 11% cut to historic crime teams and a 25% cut to mounted police, who police festivals, sporting events and the protests we see happening so much more regularly in central London. There will also be a 7% cut to the dog teams that provide support to officers going into dangerous and challenging situations, leaving them unsupported and potentially at risk. There will also be reduced front counter operating hours, and there are even hints about taking firearms off the flying squad.
One might ask, “Why are these cuts relevant to this new clause?” The cuts throughout the Met police will inevitably lead to more abstractions from outer London police forces. In particular, the cuts to mounted police and dog teams will pull officers from outer London, including from Sutton and Cheam, which will leave our high streets less safe, our residents more fearful of being victims of crime and more crimes going unsolved.
That demonstrates the absolute necessity of community policing, as well as the need for guarantees to be put in place so that those cuts do not happen, which will affect my residents and residents across London. New clause 16 would also require an annual report that would give clear and transparent information on officer numbers, PCSO numbers, costs and the real-world impact on crime and public confidence. I urge Members to support this new clause.
Dame Diana Johnson
I will respond directly to the points that have just been made about the Metropolitan police. It is worth reminding ourselves that the Metropolitan police are the best-funded part of policing in England and Wales. They constitute around 25% of policing, and this year they are receiving up to £3.8 billion to provide policing in London—it is worth reflecting on that. They have also received, as has every other police force, additional money to fund neighbourhood policing. I have had reassurance from the Met that the money will actually go into neighbourhood policing, which I think is worth saying.
While I fully appreciate what the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam is concerned about for his constituents, it has to be made clear that we have just come out of 14 years, many of which were years of austerity. I do not wish to labour the point, but the hon. Gentleman’s party was involved in the first five years of austerity, when cuts to the public services were most acute and severe. We are now at the end of that period and this Labour Government are trying to put money back into policing. I have been very clear that more money is going into the Metropolitan police and into every other police force, to build up neighbourhood policing in particular. A little bit of humility on the part of the Liberal Democrats might be helpful.
Luke Taylor
Again, I invite the Minister to respond to the specific point about the 1,700 fewer officers in London. Whatever the circumstances, people today are concerned about crime, including tool theft and sexual offences. We can argue back and forth about the note from the right hon. Member for Birmingham Hodge Hill and Solihull North (Liam Byrne), which said that there was no money left, about austerity or about how long memories go back. If there are to be cuts to the number officers next year in my constituency of Sutton and Cheam, and across London, let us address the issues at hand about how we mitigate the impact on our residents tomorrow.
Dame Diana Johnson
I hear the hon. Gentleman’s point loud and clear. All members of this Committee are concerned about crime and want to ensure that crime goes down, that victims are supported and that the police are properly funded. We can probably all agree on that in this Committee. On the particular point about the Metropolitan police, I dispute the numbers that he has given. He is right that there will be a loss of PCSOs and police officers in ’24-25, but my understanding is that it is around 1,000, not 1,700. Subject to what happens in the spending review, we will have to look at what happens in future years.
The Metropolitan police have not had the necessary funding for years, which is why they are having to make some really tough decisions. Nobody wants to see a reduction in police officer numbers—I certainly do not, as the Policing Minister. The Home Secretary and I are working to do everything that we can to support police forces and not see reductions in PCSOs and police officers.
New clauses 15 and 16 seek to legislate for minimum levels of neighbourhood policing. I certainly agree with what the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset said about the need to address the lamentable decline in neighbourhood policing since 2010, which we can all see, but legislating in the way that she proposes is unnecessarily prescriptive and risks imposing a straitjacket on the Home Office, police and crime commissioners and chief officers.
The Government are already delivering on our commitment to restore neighbourhood policing. We have already announced that police forces will be supported to deliver a 13,000 increase in neighbourhood policing by the end of this Parliament. By April ’26, there will be 3,000 more officers and PCSOs working in neighbourhood policing than there are today. This is backed up by an additional £200 million in the current financial year, as part of the total funding for police forces of £17.6 billion, which is an increase of £1.2 billion compared with the ’24-25 police funding settlement.
Additionally, the neighbourhood policing guarantee announced by the Prime Minister on 10 April sets out our wider commitment to the public. As part of that guarantee, every neighbourhood in England and Wales will have dedicated teams spending their time on the beat, with guaranteed police patrols in town centres and other hotspot areas at peak times, such as a Friday and Saturday night. Communities will also have a named, contactable officer to tackle the issues facing their communities. There will be a dedicated antisocial behaviour lead in every force, working with residents and businesses to develop tailored action plans to tackle antisocial behaviour, which we all know has blighted communities.
Those measures will be in place from July this year, in addition to the new neighbourhood officers, whom I have already mentioned, who will all be in their roles by next April. Finally, through the Government’s new police standards and performance improvement unit, we will ensure that police performance is consistently and accurately measured. The work of the unit will reinforce our commitment to transparency through the regular reporting of workforce data and the annual police grant report.
I wholeheartedly support the sentiment behind the new clauses. We absolutely need to bolster neighbourhood policing, reverse the cuts and set clear minimum standards of policing in local communities. Working closely with the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the policing inspectorate, the College of Policing and others, we have the levers to do that. Although the new clauses are well intentioned, I do not believe that they are necessary, so I invite the hon. Member to withdraw the motion.
Anna Sabine
The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton West, made a couple of points. The first related to who would set the levels of neighbourhood policing under the new clause. Our proposal is that it would be the Home Office, in discussion with local police forces and local councils—the people who know their area best. I can easily see that there would be a way of doing community engagement through councils as part of that discussion, which is another point that he made.
Of course it is important for local police and crime commissioners to have flexibility, but there is a problem with the lack of structure around the numbers for neighbourhood policing. In my constituency, if a big issue, event or activity happens in Bristol, a lot of the local police get taken off there, and we lose our neighbourhood policing. It is similar point to the one that was made earlier.
I welcome the Minister’s response, which was thoughtful as always, and I appreciate the commitment that the Government are making to neighbourhood policing. I hear all of that, but we will still press both new clauses in the group to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 18—Senior manager liability for failure to meet pollution performance commitment levels—
“(1) A person (‘P’) commits an offence where—
(a) P is a senior manager of a water or water and sewerage company (‘C’),
(b) C commits an offence under section [Offence of failing to meet pollution performance commitment levels], and
(c) P has failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent that offence being committed by C.
(2) For the purposes of this section—
‘senior manager’ means an individual who plays a significant role in—
(a) the making of decisions about how C’s relevant activities are to be managed or organised, or
(b) the actual managing or organising of C’s relevant activities;
‘water or water and sewerage company’ has the meaning given in section [Offence of failing to meet pollution performance commitment levels].
(3) Where P is charged with an offence under this section, it is a defence for P to show that P was a senior manager of C for such a short time during the relevant period that P could not reasonably have been expected to take steps to prevent that offence being committed by C.
(4) Where P is guilty of an offence under this section, P is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to a fine;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine.”
This new clause creates senior manager liability for failure to meet pollution performance commitment levels.
Anna Sabine
New clause 17 addresses the critical issue of pollution performance by water and sewerage companies, and is essential to ensuring accountability and protecting our environment. The new clause would make it an offence for a water or sewerage company to fail to meet its pollution performance commitment levels for three consecutive years. It would also be an offence if the company experiences an increase in total pollution incidents per 10,000 sq km or serious pollution incidents for three consecutive years.
In my constituency, there are two amazing local groups, Friends of the River Frome and Frome Families for the Future, that monitor pollution levels and encourage the community to get engaged in their river. However, like many other groups across the country, they are working in a context of insufficient regulation. The new clause is designed to hold companies accountable for their environmental impact. By imposing fines on those who fail to meet these standards, we would send a clear message that pollution and environmental negligence will not be tolerated. Supporting the new clause means safeguarding our natural resources and ensuring that companies take their environmental responsibilities seriously.
New clause 18 addresses the critical issue of senior manager liability for failure to meet pollution performance commitment levels. It would make it an offence for the senior managers of water and sewerage companies to fail to take all reasonable steps to prevent their companies from committing pollution offences. By holding senior managers accountable, we ensure that those in positions of power are responsible for the environmental impact of their decisions. The data is clear: last year, sewage was pumped into waterways for more than 3.6 million hours. That is unacceptable, and highlights the urgent need for stronger enforcement and accountability.
Supporting these clauses means taking a firm stand against environmental negligence and ensuring that our water companies are managed responsibly. I commend them to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
No one disputes the need for stronger accountability on water pollution, but these new clauses take a headline-grabbing, punitive approach that risks being legally unsound, practically unworkable and counterproductive.
The last Conservative Government took decisive action to tackle water pollution, including announcing the “Plan for Water”, which outlined a comprehensive strategy to enhance water quality and ensure sustainable water resources across England. This initiative addressed pollution, infrastructure and regulatory challenges through co-ordinated efforts involving Government bodies, regulators, water companies, farmers and the public. The strategy committed to water companies speeding up their infrastructure upgrades, bringing forward £1.6 billion for work to start between ’23 and ’25. The plan also ensured that fines from water companies would be reinvested into a new water restoration fund—making polluters pay for any damage they cause to the environment.
On new clause 17, why is the threshold three consecutive years? That seems arbitrary. Water companies are already subject to significant civil penalties, enforcement orders and licence reviews by Ofwat and the Environment Agency. Is the clause necessary, or does it simply duplicate existing mechanisms with a more punitive spin? More widely, what evidence is there that these measures will improve water quality outcomes, rather than just increase legal costs and drive defensive behaviour within companies?
Dame Diana Johnson
I thank the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset for explaining the intention behind new clauses 17 and 18. The Government have been clear that water companies must accelerate action to reduce pollution to the environment. Ofwat, as the independent economic regulator of the water industry, sets water companies’ performance commitments, including those on pollution incidents, in the five-yearly price review process.
Where those performance commitments are not met, companies can incur financial penalties, which are returned to customers through lower bills in the next financial year. As a result of underperformance in the 2023-24 financial year, Ofwat is requiring companies to return £165.2 million to customers. Ofwat has just expanded those performance commitments further for the 2025-2030 period to include storm overflow spills and serious pollution incidents. That means that the regulator is already punishing water companies for failing to meet their pollution commitments.
Furthermore, the Water (Special Measures) Act 2025, which received Royal Assent earlier this year, significantly strengthens the power of the regulators and delivers on the Government’s commitment to put failing water companies in special measures. The Act introduced automatic penalties on polluters, and will ban bonuses for water company executives if they fail to meet adequate standards. Before introducing secondary legislation to implement automatic penalties, the Government will consult on the specific offences that will be in scope, and on the value of the penalties.
On the subject of senior management liability, the Water (Special Measures) Act creates a statutory requirement for all water companies to publish annual pollution incident reduction plans. The plans will require companies to set out clear actions and timelines to meaningfully reduce the frequency and seriousness of pollution incidents. Both the company and the chief executive will be personally liable for ensuring a compliant plan and report is published each year. In addition, measures from the Act, which came into force on 25 April, introduce stricter penalties, including imprisonment, where senior executives in water companies obstruct investigations by the Environment Agency and the Drinking Water Inspectorate.
The new clauses would cut across the recently strengthened regulatory regime, with enhanced penalties for the water companies that fail to live up to their obligations and increased powers for the regulator. Given that, the new clauses are unnecessary; indeed, they would add complexity and uncertainty in the regulatory process. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw the motion.
Anna Sabine
I enjoyed the new clauses being called headline grabbing. They are certainly headline grabbing; the whole issue of sewage in our waters has been massively headline grabbing, because the public feel incredibly strongly that our waterways, and the rivers that we use and want to swim in, should not be full of sewage pumped out by private water companies. I think many members of the public would welcome a slightly more punitive approach than we saw under the last Government.
In terms of being unworkable, I think the new clauses are very practical and measurable—I am not sure in what way they are unworkable. Turning to the Minister’s comments, the Lib Dems have said that we welcome many of the directions taken in the Water (Special Measures) Act 2025, but we do not feel it goes far enough. Banning bosses’ bonuses is not the same as making them criminally responsible for some of the actions they are taking in terms of environmental negligence. Again, we will press both new clauses in the group to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Luke Taylor
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
There can be no denying that we are entering a new world with the advent of new technologies that fundamentally reshape the relationship between citizens and the state. There is probably no more vivid an example of that than live facial recognition technology, which is rightly causing great concern among people across London and throughout the UK.
I am, for instance, concerned about the installation of permanent cameras in Croydon, just next door to my community in Sutton and Cheam. In Sutton itself, the use of roaming facial recognition cameras has already caused anxiety among local people, not least the thousands of Hongkongers who call Sutton home, many of whom escaped exactly this kind of potentially abusable surveillance from the Chinese Government, only to find it trying to take root in Britain. That anxiety has often been met with the unfair and often disproven riposte that if someone has done something wrong, they have nothing to worry about.
It is undeniable that without proper safeguards, this technology can be a negative force, through either human malpractice or, perhaps just as worryingly, technological shortcomings. Research from the US has shown that the technology can be racially biased, struggling to distinguish between non-white people, because it was trained on white faces. Research from the Alan Turing Institute has shown that a version of the technology developed by Microsoft has a 0% error rate in identifying white men, but a 21% error rate in identifying dark-skinned women. Those would be worrying facts in their own right, but we are talking about liberty and justice—the two cornerstones of our democracy. We must be very careful about adopting technology that undermines that, and any sensible legislator would want safeguards in place.
Anything that further erodes minority communities’ trust in the police must be resisted and avoided. Our neighbours in the EU have done just that, limiting the use of this technology unless it is absolutely necessary for security or rescue, and requiring judicial oversight or an independent administrative authority to facilitate its safe use even in that case. New clause 19 would see us follow our European neighbours in making sure that the technology is deployed only in limited circumstances and with the maximum oversight.
Our proposed measures—including a new oversight body and new powers for the Information Commissioner’s Office to monitor the use of this tech—present a path forward that we urge the Government to take. If we do not, we will continue to languish without a proper legal framework while permanent cameras are installed. For the technology to be embedded before safeguards have been properly considered would be a democratic and civil liberties tragedy and would put us on a path to a creeping digital authoritarianism. To put it another way, it would be unfair even on those who have to use the technology.
Currently, police services across the country seem to set their own rules on usage, without the proper guidance. To protect them from bad intelligence leading to awful miscarriages of justice, they deserve clarity, just as much as the public do, on the right way to make use of this tech. Nobody seriously doubts that this sort of technology and other major advancements in fighting crime will continue to arrive on our shores. The question is how we wield the new powers that they afford us in a judicious manner. That has always been the task for legislators and enforcers. Forgive the trite idiom, but it remains true that with great power comes great responsibility. How we protect privacy and liberty while keeping ourselves safe in the hyper-digital age is a central question of our times.
Matt Vickers
When deployed responsibly and with appropriate safeguards, facial recognition technology is an incredibly valuable tool in modern policing and public protection. It is already being used to identify serious offenders wanted for violent crime, terrorism and child exploitation; to locate vulnerable individuals, including missing children at risk; and to enhance safety in high-risk environments such as transport hubs, major events and public demonstrations. It enables rapid real-time identification without the need for physical contact—something that traditional methods, such as fingerprinting and ID checks, cannot provide in fast-moving situations. It can accelerate investigations, reduce resource demand and ultimately make public spaces safer.
The technology is improving in accuracy, especially when governed by transparent oversight, independent auditing and clear operational boundaries. I would be grateful for further comments on whether the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam and the Government feel that this proposed regulation of this crucial technology could limit the ability of law enforcement to respond swiftly to emerging threats or intelligence-led operations.
Dame Diana Johnson
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam for setting out the case for introducing new safeguards for the use of live facial recognition. I agree there need to be appropriate safeguards, but the issue requires careful consideration and I do not think that it can be shoehorned into this Bill.
I say strongly to the hon. Member that live facial recognition is a valuable policing tool that helps keep communities safe. If I may say so, I think that some of his information is a little out of date. Despite what he implied, the use of facial recognition technology is already subject to safeguards, including, among others, the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Data Protection Act 2008.
I fully accept, however, that there is a need to consider whether a bespoke legislative framework governing the use of live facial recognition technology for law enforcement purposes is needed. We need to get this right and balance the need to protect communities from crime and disorder while safeguarding individual rights. To that end, I have been listening to stakeholders and have already held a series of meetings about facial recognition, including with policing, regulators, research institutions, civil society groups and industry, to fully understand the concerns and what more can be done to improve the use of the technology.
I will outline our plans for facial recognition in the coming months. In the meantime, I hope that the hon. Member, having had this opportunity to air this important issue, will be content to withdraw his new clause.
Luke Taylor
Based on the comments and reassurances, I will be happy to withdraw the new clause. I would be interested in being involved in any discussions and updates as they come forward. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 22
Duty to follow strategic priorities of police and crime plan
“(1) The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 8(1) (Duty to have regard to police and crime plan), for ‘have regard to’ substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.
(3) In section 8(2) for ‘have regard to’ substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.
(4) In section 8(3) for ‘have regard to’ substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.
(5) In section 8(4) for ‘have regard to’ substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.”—(Matt Vickers.)
This new clause would require Police and Crime Commissioners to follow the strategic priorities of the police and crime plan rather than have regard to it.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Matt Vickers
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 requires police and crime commissioners and others to “have regard to” the police and crime plan. The new clause would replace that language with a firmer obligation to “follow the strategic priorities of” the plan. The change would apply consistently across subsections (1) to (4) of section 8.
The primary rationale for the amendment is to strengthen democratic accountability. PCCs are directly elected by the public to represent local views and set the strategic direction for policing. Their police and crime plans are developed following consultation and are expected to reflect community priorities. However, under the current “have regard to” standard, there is only a weak legal duty to consider the plan, and no binding requirement to act in accordance with it. The new clause would address that gap by ensuring that PCCs and, by extension, police forces must follow the strategic priorities that they have set and communicated to the public.
Dame Diana Johnson
I thank the shadow Minister for tabling the new clause. As hon. Members will be aware, those vested with responsibility for providing democratic oversight of police forces—whether PCCs or mayors with PCC functions—have an important role in policing across England and Wales. They are responsible for holding their chief constable to account for the performance of their force and for setting, through their police and crime plan, their strategic objectives for the area. In setting police and crime plans, PCCs must consult their chief constable, the public and victims of crime in their area, as well as their local police and crime panel. As the directly elected representatives for policing in their area, PCCs have a choice as to how they implement their plan and the weight they give to each priority.
The new clause would have the effect of placing an inflexible duty on PCCs to follow their own priorities, with no ability to adapt to and reflect changing circumstances. The new clause would also encroach on the operational independence of chief constables. It risks constraining chief constables and the officers under their command, limiting their ability to balance local priorities as set out in the police and crime plan with their own assessment of threat, risk and harm.
In setting their police and crime plan, PCCs and chief constables must also have regard to the strategic policing requirement. If the amendments to the 2011 Act set out in the new clause were made, they would also have the effect of creating an inconsistency, making local police and crime plans the most important instrument for PCCs and others to follow, potentially at the expense of national priorities. The Home Secretary and I have been clear that the Government will work with PCCs and chief constables to set clear expectations for policing on performance and standards, and to ensure that our communities have an effective and efficient police force within their force area.
Through our forthcoming police reform White Paper, we are working closely with policing to explore and develop specific proposals to deliver effective and efficient police forces and to address the challenges faced by policing. That includes ensuring that policing is responsive to national and regional priorities, as well as to local needs. The Home Secretary will set out a road map for police reform in a White Paper to be published later this year, which will consider proposals to strengthen the relationship between PCCs and chief constables in a revised policing protocol. For those reasons, I invite the shadow Minister to withdraw his new clause.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 35—Stop and search—
“(1) The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 60(1)(a) and (aa) leave out ‘serious.’.”
This new clause lowers the threshold for stop and search to “violence” rather than “serious violence.”
Matt Vickers
New clause 29 would introduce a statutory requirement for the Secretary of State to publish an annual report on specific police activities in areas experiencing high levels of serious crime. It would mandate the inclusion of data from police forces in England and Wales, identifying the areas with the highest rates of serious offences and reporting on three key areas: police presence, the use of stop-and-search powers, and the deployment of live facial recognition technology. The first report would be required within six months of the Act’s passage, with subsequent reports published annually.
The primary objective of the new clause is to improve transparency and accountability in policing where serious crime is most acute. In communities disproportionately affected by violence, organised crime or persistent public disorder, trust in policing is often strained. By requiring detailed public reporting, the new clause would ensure that policing tactics and resourcing in those areas are subject to regular scrutiny by Parliament and the public. It would allow for an informed debate about whether interventions are effective, proportionate and fair.
In particular, the inclusion of data on police officer deployment would ensure a clearer understanding of how police resources are distributed. That is especially important in communities where concerns about under-policing or over-policing are frequently raised. Having a publicly available record of officer presence would allow stakeholders to assess whether high-crime areas are receiving adequate attention and whether local policing strategies are matched to the severity of criminal activity.
The new clause also includes reporting on the use of stop and search powers under section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Stop and search remains a contentious, yet extremely powerful tool in combating serious crime. Home Office statistics show that in the year ending 31 March 2023, there were 529,474 stop and searches in England and Wales. A recent study published in the Journal of Quantitative Criminology analysed London-wide stop-and-search patterns and concluded that if searches had been maintained at the 2008 to 2011 level, approximately 30 fewer knife murders might have occurred each year. By requiring annual data on its use in high-crime data, this new clause promotes responsible policing and ensures the use of the powers is evidence-led, not arbitrary, and open to challenge where necessary. It enables patterns of disproportionality or inefficiency to be identified and addressed through public oversight.
Dame Diana Johnson
I thank the hon. Member for his suggestions about the police response to violence and other serious offending. However, I believe that the changes contained in the proposed new clauses are unnecessary.
Regarding proposed new clause 29, I agree that transparency is important. That is why the Home Office already annually publishes extensive data on police recorded crime and the use of police powers. That data includes the number of stop and searches conducted, broken down by individual community safety partnership and police force areas. In addition, members of the public have access to detailed crime and stop and search maps on police.uk, which use monthly data directly provided by police forces. Police forces also publish detailed information on deployments of live facial recognition.
Turning to proposed new clause 35, I note that stop and search is a vital tool for tackling crime, particularly knife crime, but it must be used in a fair and effective way. That is particularly true of section 60 powers, which are the focus of the proposed new clause. Such powers may be authorised under certain conditions in response to, or anticipation of, serious violence, and allow officers to search individuals without the normal requirement for reasonable suspicion. The powers are rightly subject to strict constraints.
In practical terms, changing the threshold from “serious violence” to “violence” would not represent a meaningful change. Section 60 provides powers to search for offensive weapons or dangerous implements, and any use of such items is, by definition, serious violence. In the year to March 2024, the latest for which data is available, 5,145 stop and searches were undertaken in England and Wales under section 60 powers. They resulted in 71 people being found carrying offensive weapons and 212 arrests made on suspicion of a range of offences. I therefore urge the hon. Member to withdraw his proposed new clause.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Matt Vickers
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 33 seeks to amend section 5(3) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, which currently states:
“For the purposes of this section it is immaterial whether a belief is justified or not if it is honestly held.”
New clause 33 would replace that with:
“For the purposes of this section, a belief must be both honestly held and reasonable.”
The change would modify the legal standard for the lawful excuse defence under section 5(2)(a) of the Criminal Damage Act, which allows a defendant to claim they believe the property owner consented to the damage. Under the current law, the belief needs only to be honest, regardless of its reasonableness. The new clause would require that the belief also be reasonable, introducing an objective standard alongside the subjective one.
In various areas of criminal law, defences based on belief require that it be honest and reasonable. For instance, in self-defence cases, the defendant’s belief in the necessity of force must be reasonable. Aligning the standard in criminal damage cases with those principles promotes consistency and fairness across the legal system. Public confidence in the legal system can be undermined when defendants are acquitted based on defences that appear unreasonable or disconnected from common sense. By introducing an objective standard, the proposed new clause would reinforce the integrity of the justice system, and ensure that legal defences are applied in a manner that aligns with societal expectations.
The proposed amendment to section 5(3) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 would introduce a necessary, objective standard to the lawful excuse defence by requiring that beliefs about owner consent be both honest and reasonable. The change would promote consistency with other areas of law, prevent potential abuses of the defence, balance the right to protest with property rights and seek to enhance public confidence in the justice system.
Alex Davies-Jones
I thank the hon. Member for Stockton West for tabling new clause 33.
It might be helpful for hon. Members if I briefly explain how the Criminal Damage Act 1971 works. The Act criminalises a range of activities, but the offence we are focused on today is the act of destroying or damaging property belonging to another without lawful excuse. “Lawful excuse” is not defined. However, section 5(2)(a) makes it clear that if the defendant honestly believes that the person who was entitled to consent to the destruction or damage has given consent, or would have consented if they knew of the circumstances, the defendant has a lawful excuse. For example, it could be said that someone has a lawful excuse if the owner of a car would have consented to their damaging it to help a person who was trapped in it to get out.
Additionally, under section 5(2)(b) of the 1971 Act, if the defendant damages property to protect their own or someone else’s property, and they honestly believe both that the property needs immediate protection and that their actions are reasonable, they have a lawful excuse. Section 5(3), to which the new clause relates, specifies that it does not matter whether a person’s belief is reasonable or justified. It just needs to be honest, even if it is an honest belief induced by intoxication, stupidity or forgetfulness.
The new clause seeks to change the law so that where a defendant seeks to rely on belief in consent, or belief in the necessity of protecting property as a lawful excuse for criminal damage, their belief must be “reasonable” as well as honest. This would narrow the application of the defence, and we consider doing so unnecessary. The law is already designed to strike the right balance and ensure that a wide variety of factors are taken into account, without widening the law too far.
For example, if a defendant tries to argue that a person would have consented to the damage of their property if they had known the circumstances, they need to demonstrate how that relates specifically to the damage caused. Some assessment of the wider context will be necessary to determine whether someone has a lawful excuse.
Recent cases involving damage to property following protests have also interpreted the operation of this defence narrowly. For example, acting in furtherance of a protest cannot be used as a lawful excuse where the damage caused is more than minimal for public property. We cannot see any evidence or rationale that suggests that the defence is being used in spurious contexts or abused in any way. Of course, if the hon. Member has specific evidence or examples, we would, of course, consider them. Until then, there is no justification or need to restrict the operation of the defence further. For that reason, I urge him to withdraw the new clause.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Matt Vickers
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause would mandate that the Secretary of State, through regulations, grant police access to His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs’ tobacco track and trace system. Such access would enable law enforcement to determine the provenance of tobacco products sold by retailers, specifically to identify whether those products were stolen. According to HMRC, the illicit market in tobacco duty and related VAT was £2.8 billion in 2021-22, preying on the most disadvantaged of communities. In 2023, about 6.7 billion counterfeit and contraband cigarettes were consumed, representing one in four cigarettes, thus undermining progress towards a smoke-free England by 2030.
With the negative impact that the illicit tobacco market has on communities and with UK revenue in mind, it is paramount that our police forces be provided with the resources required to counter the organised crime groups that dominate the illicit tobacco market. The sale of illicit tobacco on the black market also poses significant risks to public health, with illegal tobacco often containing five times the standard level of cadmium, six times as much lead, 1.6 times more tar and 1.3 times more carbon monoxide than regulated cigarettes and rolling tobacco.
The illicit tobacco market poses significant challenges, including revenue loss for the Government and health risks for consumers. Professor Emmeline Taylor’s report, “Lighting Up”, emphasises the potential of TT&T in identifying and prosecuting offenders involved in the illegal tobacco trade. Granting police access to TT&T would strengthen efforts to dismantle organised crime networks profiting from counterfeit tobacco sales.
Giving the police access to TT&T technology has the potential to disrupt the illicit tobacco trade and has been highlighted by the National Business Crime Centre, which argues that police utilisation of TT&T would allow them to routinely check tobacco sold by local retailers to ensure legitimacy, thus shrinking the pool of buyers for criminal gangs and lowering demand for stolen tobacco, helping police to tackle organised crime and safeguard legitimate business.
As a signatory to the World Health Organisation’s framework convention on tobacco control, the UK is obligated to implement measures that curb illicit tobacco trade. Providing police with TT&T access aligns with those commitments by enhancing the traceability and accountability of tobacco products throughout the supply chain. Illicit tobacco sales undermine legitimate retailers who comply with regulations and pay due taxes. Empowering police to identify and act against illegal tobacco products helps to level the playing field, ensuring that law-abiding businesses are not disadvantaged by competitors engaging in unlawful practices.
With that in mind, the Opposition believe that new clause 38, which would grant police access to the UK TT&T system to help determine whether a retailer has obtained stolen or counterfeit tobacco illegally, is necessary to facilitate the police in carrying out their duty in delivering the current plans for smoke-free England 2030. It will help to claim back revenue currently lost to the black market trade of tobacco and protect public health by disrupting the trade in these bogus products.
Dame Diana Johnson
New clause 38 seeks to grant the police access to the tobacco track and trace system, as we have just heard. The scourge of the illicit tobacco trade threatens the health of UK citizens, robs the public purse of billions of pounds and funds the wider activities of organised crime. All businesses in the tobacco supply chain are required to register within the track and trace system, and individual tobacco products are tracked from the point of manufacture up to the point of retail. The track and trace system includes a reporting platform that enables nominated authorities to access registry data, traceability data for individual products and UK-wide tobacco market data.
I understand the intention behind the shadow Minister’s new clause, and I know that we both share the same goal of working with our law enforcement agencies to tackle illicit tobacco. The principle of maximising the use of traceability data in these efforts to tackle illicit tobacco is sound. Existing legislation strictly limits who can access traceability and the purposes for which it may be used. At the moment, only HMRC and trading standards may access this data.
I reassure the Opposition that engagement is already under way between the police and HMRC to investigate opportunities for extending access for the police to traceability data. When that engagement is complete, the Government will consider whether it is appropriate to bring forward any necessary legislative changes. However, I do not wish, at this stage, to pre-empt the outcome of that engagement through legislation. In the light of those reassurances, I ask the shadow Minister to withdraw the motion.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Matt Vickers
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause would introduce a new statutory offence of soliciting prostitution in exchange for rent by inserting proposed new section 52A into the Sexual Offences Act 2003. It would criminalise the act of causing, inciting or attempting to cause or incite someone to engage in prostitution in return for free accommodation or discounted rent. The clause makes this a hybrid offence: on summary conviction, the penalty is up to six months’ imprisonment or a fine; on indictment, it is up to seven years’ imprisonment. It would also allow for a banning order under the Housing and Planning Act 2016, preventing convicted offenders from acting as landlords.
The “sex for rent” arrangement—where landlords exchange accommodation for free or at a discount in return for sexual relations with tenants—is a problem that has become increasingly common for house hunters in England, particularly in London. In response to this emerging issue, the last Government launched a call for evidence, which closed in the summer of 2023. It sought views on relevant characteristics, circumstances and any additional protective or preventive measures that respondents considered necessary. Given the seriousness of the issue, it would be helpful to know whether the Government intend to publish the findings from this call for evidence, as some of the data could inform debates such as this one.
According to research by polling company YouGov carried out on behalf of the housing charity Shelter, nearly one in 50 women in England have been propositioned for sex for rent in the last five years, with 30,000 women offered such housing arrangements between March 2020 and January 2021. Many victims of sex-for-rent schemes feel trapped, ashamed or powerless to report the abuse due to their dependency on accommodation. By clearly defining this as a criminal offence and providing real consequences for offenders, including banning orders, this clause sends a strong message: exploitation through coercive housing arrangements will not be tolerated.
The charity National Ugly Mugs, an organisation that works towards ending all violence towards sex workers, gave the case study of a tenant who, during the pandemic facing financial hardship, was approached by her landlord with a proposal to reduce her rent and utility costs in exchange for sexual acts and explicit images. Unable to afford alternative accommodation at the time, she felt she had little choice but to agree. Since then, the landlord has regularly turned up at the property uninvited and intoxicated, demanding sex and refusing to leave. She has lived under the constant threat of eviction and homelessness if she does not comply with his demands. The new clause represents a crucial advance in safeguarding vulnerable individuals from exploitation within the housing sector. By explicitly criminalising the act of soliciting sexual services in exchange for accommodation, it addresses a significant gap in the current legal framework.
The new clause would not only reinforce the seriousness of such offences through stringent penalties, but would empower authorities to impose banning orders, thereby preventing convicted individuals from further exploiting their position as landlords. This measure would send a clear and unequivocal message that leveraging housing and security for sexual gain is a reprehensible abuse of power that will not be tolerated. It would underscore a commitment to protecting the dignity and rights of tenants, ensuring that all individuals have access to safe and respectful living conditions.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Jess Phillips)
New clause 41, tabled by the hon. Member for Stockton West, would make it an offence to provide free or discounted rent in exchange for sex. I reassure the hon. Member that the Government firmly believe that the exploitation and abuse that can occur through so-called sex-for-rent arrangements has no place in our society. However, we have existing offences that can and have been used to prosecute this practice, including causing or controlling prostitution for gain.
I know the hon. Member will appreciate that this is a complex issue. I reassure the Committee that the Government will continue working closely with the voluntary and community sector, the police and others to ensure that the safeguarding of women remains at the heart of our approach. We are carefully considering these issues as part of our wider work on violence against women and girls. We are working to publish the new cross-government violence against women and girls strategy later this year. We will be considering all forms of adult sexual exploitation and the findings from the previous Government’s consultation on sex for rent as part of that.
Given that commitment, I hope the hon. Member will be content to withdraw the new clause, although I very much doubt that he will. On that note, I have tabled many Opposition amendments, but I very rarely pushed them to a vote. On this new clause, as on any others, the hon. Member or any other Members of his party are very welcome to approach us for a meeting, or to come and talk to any of us about how to progress this or any issue. I do not wish to school them on opposition, but that is a much more likely way of achieving the ultimate aim. In this instance, his aim is the same as mine—protecting people who are sexually exploited. To date, no approaches have been made, but they are always welcome.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
Before we adjourn, I want to let the Committee know that I will not be chairing the next sitting—it will be a more esteemed Chair than myself. I thank all right hon. and hon. Members for today’s contributions and their attention to the Bill, all our fantastic Clerks, the Doorkeepers, Hansard, the hidden but wonderful broadcasting team, and of course the hard-working officials from the Home Office. Thank you all very much indeed.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Keir Mather.)
Crime and Policing Bill
Tuesday 17th June 2025
(10 months, 3 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 17 June 2025 - (17 Jun 2025)
16:01 - The House divided: - Ayes: 194 / Noes: 335 - Question accordingly negatived.
16:15 - The House divided: - Ayes: 184 / Noes: 336 - Question accordingly negatived.
16:29 - The House divided: - Ayes: 189 / Noes: 328 - Question accordingly negatived.
16:42 - The House divided: - Ayes: 89 / Noes: 428 - Question accordingly negatived.
19:00 - The House divided: - Ayes: 379 / Noes: 137 - Question accordingly agreed to.
19:16 - The House divided: - Ayes: 117 / Noes: 379 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Mr Speaker
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 53—Arranging or facilitating begging for gain.
Government new clause 54—Proving an offence under section 38.
Government new clause 55—Special measures for witnesses.
Government new clause 56—Causing internal concealment of item for criminal purpose.
Government new clause 57—Secretary of State guidance.
Government new clause 58—Department of Justice guidance.
Government new clause 59—Removal of limitation period in child sexual abuse cases.
Government new clause 60—Threatening, abusive or insulting behaviour towards emergency workers.
Government new clause 61—Threatening or abusive behaviour likely to harass, alarm or distress emergency workers.
Government new clause 62—Interpretation of sections (Threatening, abusive or insulting behaviour towards emergency workers) and (Threatening or abusive behaviour likely to harass, alarm or distress emergency workers).
Government new clause 63—Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices.
Government new clause 64—Section (Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices): supplementary.
Government new clause 65—Section (Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices): interpretation.
Government new clause 66—Section (Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices): confidential information.
Government new clause 67—Section (Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices): code of practice.
Government new clause 68—Extraction of online information: ports and border security.
Government new clause 69—Extraction of online information following agreement etc.
Government new clause 70—Lawful interception of communications.
Government new clause 71—Law enforcement employers may not employ etc barred persons.
Government new clause 72—Meaning of “law enforcement employer”.
Government new clause 73—Application of section (Law enforcement employers may not employ etc barred person) to Secretary of State.
Government new clause 74—Application of section (Law enforcement employers may not employ etc barred person) to specified law enforcement employer.
Government new clause 75—Duty of law enforcement employers to check advisory lists.
Government new clause 76—Application of section (Duty of law enforcement employers to check advisory lists) to specified law enforcement employer.
Government new clause 77—Interpretation of sections (Law enforcement employers may not employ etc barred persons) to (Application of section (Duty of law enforcement employers to check advisory lists) to specified law enforcement employer).
Government new clause 78—Special police forces: barred persons lists and advisory lists.
Government new clause 79—Consequential amendments.
Government new clause 80—Power to give directions to critical police undertakings.
Government new clause 81—Ports and border security: retention and copying of articles.
Government new clause 82—Extradition: cases where a person has been convicted.
Government new schedule 1—Amendments to Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022.
Government new schedule 2—Confiscation orders: Scotland.
Government new schedule 3—Special police forces: barred persons lists and advisory lists.
Amendment 157, in clause 1, page 1, line 6, leave out “The Anti-social” and insert—
“Subject to a review of existing anti-social behaviour powers under the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2014 being conducted and completed by the Secretary of State within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Anti-social”.
Amendment 167, page 1, line 13, leave out “18” and insert “16”.
This amendment would lower the age to 16 at which a court can impose a respect order on a person to prevent them from engaging in anti-social behaviour.
Amendment 168, page 2, line 29, at end insert—
“(9A) If a court makes a respect order against a person (P) more than once, then P is liable to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale.”
This amendment means that if a person gets more than one Respect Order, they are liable for a fine.
Amendment 169, page 2, line 30, leave out from “behaviour” to end of line 31 and insert
“has the same meaning as under section 2 of this Act.”
This amendment would give “anti-social behaviour” in clause 1 the same definition as in section 2 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014.
Amendment 170, page 4, line 18, at end insert—
“D1 Power to move person down list for social housing
(1) A respect order may have the effect of moving any application the respondent may have for social housing to the end of the waiting list.”
This amendment would mean that a person who receives a respect order would move to the bottom of the waiting list for social housing, if applicable.
Amendment 171, page 8, line 2, at end insert—
“(4A) A person who commits further offences under this section is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates' court or a fine (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 5 years or a fine (or both).””
This amendment sets out the penalties for repeated breaches of a respect order with a prison sentence of up to 5 years.
Amendment 158, in clause 2, page 9, line 35, at end insert—
“(4) Prior to issuing any guidance under this section, the Secretary of State must conduct a full consultation exercise.”
Amendment 2, in clause 8, page 17, line 23, insert—
“(3) To facilitate the ability of the Police, under the provisions of section 59 of the Police Reform Act 2002, as amended by subsection (1), to seize e-scooters or e-bikes that have been used in a manner which has caused alarm, distress or annoyance, the Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, issue a consultation on a registration scheme for the sale of electric bikes and electric scooters.
(4) The consultation must consider the merits of—
(a) requiring sellers to record the details of buyers, and
(b) verifying that buyers have purchased insurance.”
Amendment 172, in clause 9, page 17, line 34, at end insert—
“(c) section 33B (Section 33 offences: clean-up costs).”
Amendment 173, page 17, line 34, at end insert—
“(1A) Guidance issued about the enforcement of section 33 offences must ensure that, where a person is convicted of a relevant offence, they are liable for the costs incurred through loss or damage resulting from the offence.”
This amendment would ensure the Secretary of State’s guidance on fly-tipping makes the person responsible for fly-tipping, rather than the landowner, liable for the costs of cleaning up.
Amendment 174, page 18, line 3, at end insert—
“(4A) The consultation undertaken by the Secretary of State must include an examination of establishing a penalty point fine to those found convicted of an offence under sections 33 or 87 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to consult on establishing a system for those who fly tip or leave litter to receive penalty points on their driving licence.
Amendment 175, in clause 25, page 30, line 24, leave out “4” and insert “14”.
This amendment would increase the maximum sentence for possession of a weapon with intent to commit unlawful violence from four to 14 years. The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation recommended an increase in his review following the Southport attack.
Government amendments 24 to 33.
Amendment 176, in clause 35, page 50, line 38, at end insert—
“(4) If the offender has previous convictions for an offence under section 14 of the Crime and Policing Act 2025 (assault of a retail worker) or for shoplifting under section 1 of the Theft Act 1968, the court must make a community order against the offender. The community order must include a tag, a ban, or a curfew.”
This amendment clause would require the courts to make a community order against repeat offenders of retail crime in order to restrict the offender’s liberty.
Government amendment 34.
Amendment 4, in clause 38, page 51, line 29, leave out “criminal conduct” and insert “conduct for criminal purposes”.
This amendment would expand the remit of the offence created under clause 38 to include exploiting a child into conduct for criminal purposes.
Amendment 7, page 51, line 31, leave out paragraph (b).
This amendment would remove the requirement that for an offence of child criminal exploitation to be committed, the perpetrator did not reasonably believe that the child was aged 18 or over.
Government amendment 35.
Amendment 5, in clause 38, page 51, line 37, leave out “criminal conduct” and insert “conduct for criminal purposes”.
This amendment would expand the remit of the offence created under clause 38 to include exploiting a child into conduct for criminal purposes. It is consequential on Amendment 4.
Amendment 6, page 52, line 2, leave out “or” and insert—
“(b) activity that is undertaken in order to facilitate or enable an offence under the law of England and Wales, or.”
This amendment would expand the remit of the offence created under clause 38 to include exploiting a child into conduct for criminal purposes.
Government amendments 36 to 49.
Amendment 8, in clause 53, page 61, line 5, after “(A)” insert ““aged 18 or over”.
This amendment would ensure children cannot commit an offence of cuckooing.
Government amendments 50 to 66.
Government motion to transfer subsection (4) of clause 59.
Government amendments 68 and 69.
Amendment 177, in clause 64, page 73, line 24, at end insert—
“4A) For the purpose of this section—
“Child” means a person under the age of 18.
“Grooming” means meeting or communicating (in person or online) with a child and or their network (on one or more occasion) with a view to intentionally arrange or facilitate child sexual abuse (in person or online) for an act including themselves or others.”
This amendment would introduce a legal definition of grooming.
Amendment 178, page 74, line 31, at end insert—
“70B Group-based sexual grooming of a child
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a court is considering the seriousness of a specified child sex offences,
(b) the offence is aggravated by group-based grooming, and
(c) the offender was aged 18 or over when the offence was committed.
(2) The court—
(a) must treat the fact that the offence is aggravated by group-based grooming as an aggravated factor, and
(b) must state in court that the offence is so aggravated.
(3) An offence is “aggravated by group-based grooming” if—
(a) the offence was facilitated by, or involved, the offender, who was involved in group-based grooming, or
(b) the offence was facilitated by, or involved, a person other than the offender grooming a person under the age of 18 and the offender knew, or could have reasonably been expected to know that said person was participating, or facilitating group-based grooming, or
(c) the offender intentionally arranges or facilitates something that the offender intends to do, intends another person to do, or believes that another person will do, in order to participate in group-based grooming.
(4) In this section “specified child sex offence” means—
(a) an offence within any of subsections (5) to (7), or
(b) an inchoate offence in relation to any such offence.
(5) An offence is within this subsection if it is—
(a) an offence under section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978 (taking etc indecent photograph of child),
(b) an offence under section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (possession of indecent photograph of child),
(c) an offence under any of sections 5 to 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape and other offences against children under 13),
(d) an offence under any sections 9 to 12 of that Act (other child 25 sex offences),
(e) an offence under section 14 of that Act (arranging or facilitating commission of child sex offence),
(f) an offence under any of sections 16 to 19 of that Act (abuse of position of trust),
(g) an offence under section 25 or 26 of that Act (familial child sex offences), or
(h) an offence under any of sections 47 to 50 of that Act (sexual exploitation of children).
(6) An offence is within this subsection if it is—
(a) an offence under any of sections 1 to 4 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape, assault and causing sexual activity without consent),
(b) an offence under any of sections 30 to 41 of that Act (sexual offences relating to persons with mental disorder),
(c) an offence under any of sections 61 to 63 of that Act (preparatory offences), or
(d) an offence under any of sections 66 to 67A of that Act (exposure and voyeurism), and the victim or intended victim was under the age of 18.
(7) An offence is within this subsection if it is an offence under section 71 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sexual activity in a public lavatory) and a person involved in the activity in question was under the age of 18.
(8) For the purposes of this section—
(a) “group-based grooming” is defined as a group of at least three adults whose purpose or intention is to commit a sexual offence against the same victim or group of victims who are under 18, or could reasonably be expected to be under 18.”
This amendment would introduce a specific aggravating factor in sentencing for those who participate in, or facilitate, group-based sexual offending.
Amendment 159, in clause 65, page 74, line 39, leave out subsection (2) and insert—
“(2) An officer may seek independent judicial authorisation to engage in conduct which is for the purpose of obtaining data from the person.
(2A) Authorised conduct may consist of an officer—
(a) scanning the information stored on the device using technology approved by the Secretary of State for the purpose of ascertaining whether information stored on an electronic device includes child sexual abuse images,
(b) requiring the person to permit the scan, and
(c) requiring the person to take such steps as appear necessary to allow the scan to be performed.”
This amendment subjects any searches of electronic devices to prior authorisation by a judge.
Amendment 179, in clause 66, page 75, line 16, leave out subsection (7).
This amendment would keep an individual under the duty to report child abuse despite the belief that someone else may have reported the abuse to the relevant authority.
Amendment 3, page 75, line 31, at end insert—
“(2) the duty under subsection (1) applies to—
(a) any person undertaking work for the Church of England, the Roman Catholic Church, or any other Christian denomination on either a paid or voluntary basis,
(b) any clergy of the Church of England, the Roman Catholic Church, or any other Christian denomination, notwithstanding any canonical law regarding the seal of confession, and
(c) any person undertaking work on either a paid or voluntary basis, or holding a leadership position, within the Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim or Sikh faiths, or any other religion, faith or belief system.”
This amendment would ensure that the duty to report suspected child sex abuse covered everyone working for the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church whether paid or on a voluntary basis, including clergy, as well as all other faith groups. Reports received by clergy through confession would not be exempt from the duty to report.
Amendment 10, page 76, line 28, at end insert—
“(10) A person who fails to fulfil the duty under subsection (1) commits an offence.
(11) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.”
This amendment would implement part of recommendation 13 of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse that a failure to report a suspected child sex offence should be a criminal offence.
Amendment 22, page 77, line 13, at end insert
“or
(c) an activity involving a “position of trust” as defined in sections 21, 22 and 22A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.”
This amendment would implement part of recommendation 13 of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sex Abuse that any person working in a position of trust as defined by the Sexual Offences Act 2003, should be designated a mandatory reporter.
Amendment 11, in clause 68, page 78, line 19, at end insert—
“(7) The sixth case is where P witnesses a child displaying sexualised, sexually harmful or other behaviour, physical signs of abuse or consequences of sexual abuse, such as pregnancy or a sexually transmitted disease, to an extent that would cause a reasonable person who engages in the same relevant activity as P to suspect that a child sex offence may have been committed.
(8) The seventh case is where P witnesses a person (A) behaving in the presence of a child in a way that would cause a reasonable person who engages in the same relevant activity as P to suspect that A may have committed a child sex offence.
(9) A failure to comply with the duty under subsection (1) is not an offence where the reason to suspect that a child sex offence may have been committed arises from subsection (7) or subsection (8).”
This amendment would implement part of recommendation 13 of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sex Abuse that there should be a duty to report where a person recognises the indicators of child sexual abuse. Failure to report in these instances would not attract a criminal sanction.
Government amendment 70.
Amendment 9, in clause 80, page 84, line 22, at end insert—
“(b) if the name change is by deed poll, 7 days prior to submitting an application for change of name (whichever is earlier), or”.
This amendment would require relevant sex offenders to notify the police of an intention to change a name 7 days before making an application to do so by deed poll.
Amendment 180, page 85, line 26, at end insert—
“(11) If a relevant offender does not comply with the requirements of this section, they shall be liable to a fine not exceeding Level 4 on the standard scale.”
This amendment imposes a fine of up to £2,500 if a registered sex offender does not notify the police when they change their name.
Amendment 181, in clause 81, page 86, line 41, at end insert—
“(10) If a relevant offender does not comply with the requirements of this section, they shall be liable to a fine not exceeding Level 4 on the standard scale.”
This amendment imposes a fine of up to £2,500 if a registered sex offender does not notify the police when they are absent from their sole or main residence.
Amendment 182, in clause 82, page 88, line 25, at end insert—
“(9) If a relevant offender does not comply with the requirements of this section, they shall be liable to a fine at Level 5 of the standard scale.”
This amendment imposes an unlimited fine if a relevant registered sex offender does not notify police if they are entering a premises where children are presented.
Government amendments 71 to 73.
Amendment 19, in clause 94, page 115, line 25, at end insert
“, or
(c) the person does so being reckless as to whether another person will be injured, aggrieved or annoyed.”
This amendment would expand the offence for administering harmful substances, including by spiking, to include those who do so being reckless.
Amendment 20, in clause 95, page 116, line 37, at end insert—
“(6A) In determining a sentence for an offence committed under this section, the Court is to treat encouragement or assistance of self-harm, when preceded by a history of abuse perpetrated against the victim/other person by D, as an aggravating factor.
(6B) The criminal liability for D, when the other person mentioned in subsection 1(a) or 1(b) commits suicide, and where D has subjected that person to physical, psychiatric or psychological harm, is the offence of murder.”
This amendment treats encouragement or assistance of serious self-harm when preceded by a history of abuse as an aggravating factor in sentencing with explicit recognition of murder as the criminal liability for perpetrators who cause serious physical, psychiatric, or psychological harm that directly results in, or significantly contributes to, suicide.
Government amendments 74 to 76.
Amendment 14, in clause 102, page 124, line 16, leave out from subsection (1) to “where” in line 29 and insert—
“(1) A person who possesses a SIM farm without good reason or lawful authority commits an offence. For the meaning of ‘SIM farm’, see section 104.
(2) In subsection (1) the reference to a good reason for possessing a SIM farm includes in particular possessing it for a purpose connected with—
(a) providing broadcasting services,
(b) operating or maintaining a public transport service,
(c) operating or maintaining an electronic communications network (as defined by section 32 of the Communications Act 2003),
(d) tracking freight or monitoring it in any other way, or
(e) providing or supporting an internet access service or the conveyance of signals (as defined by section 32 of the Communications Act 2003).
This subsection does not limit subsection (1).
(3) For the purposes of subsection (1),”.
This amendment would mean that a person would only commit an offence if they possessed a SIM farm without a good reason, such as for broadcasting purposes, or lawful authority.
Amendment 15, in clause 103, page 124, line 37, leave out from subsection (1) to “prove” on page 125, line 2, and insert—
“(1) A person who supplies a SIM farm to another person commits an offence unless subsection (2) applies.
(2) It is not an offence for a person to supply a SIM farm under this section provided the person (‘the supplier’) can”.
This amendment would mean that a person would only commit an offence if they supplied a SIM farm without taking reasonable steps to confirm that the person receiving the SIM farm would have a good reason, including for broadcasting purposes, or lawful authority to possess the SIM farm.
Amendment 16, in clause 104, page 125, line 34, after “interchangeably,” insert “and designed primarily” and line 39, at end insert—
“(1A) For the purposes of subsection (1), a device is not a SIM farm if it uses five or more SIM cards simultaneously or interchangeably for the purposes of provided data only services or internet access services or conveyance services.”
This amendment would amend the meaning of “SIM farm” to cover only devices that are primarily used for calls and text messages and would exclude devices primarily used for data connectivity such as Bonded Cellular Devices used by broadcasters.
Amendment 164, page 128, line 5, leave out clause 108.
Amendment 184, in clause 108, page 128, line 10, leave out lines 10 and 11 and insert—
“(2) No offence is committed under this section where a person wears or otherwise uses the item for—”
This amendment would ensure that Clause 108 does not apply to people wearing the hijab, niqab or wearing a mask for health reasons.
Amendment 185, page 128, line 25, at end insert—
“(6) Within a year of this section coming into force, the Secretary of State must review the equality impact of the provisions of this section, and lay a report of the review before both Houses of Parliament within a month of its publication.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to review the equality impact of the provisions of Clause 108.
Amendment 165, page 128, line 26, leave out clause 109.
Amendment 166, page 129, line 28, leave out clause 110.
Government amendments 77 to 86.
Amendment 161, page 131, line 29, leave out clause 114.
This amendment would delete Clause 114 which would place restrictions on the right to protest near places of worship.
Amendment 160, in clause 115, page 133, line 12, at end insert—
“(4) Prior to imposing conditions under either Section 12 or 14, the senior officer of the Police Force in question must confirm that live facial recognition will not be in use, unless a new code of practice for the use of live facial recognition surveillance in public spaces in England and Wales had previously been presented to, and approved by, both Houses of Parliament.”
Amendment 21, in clause 120, page 140, line 37, at end insert—
“(8) The authorised persons listed in Clause 71A may not use the information referenced in subsection (1) for the purposes of biometric searches using facial recognition technology”
Government amendment 87.
Amendment 162, page 148, line 1, leave out clause 126.
Amendment 163, in clause 126, page 148, line 13, at end insert—
“(3) Within a year of this section coming into force, the Secretary of State must review the human rights and equality impact of the provisions of this section, and lay the report of the review before both Houses of Parliament within a month of its publication.”
Government amendments 88 to 91.
Amendment 183, in clause 141, page 168, line 5, leave out subsection (7) and insert—
“(7A) A youth diversion order must specify the period for which it has effect, up to a maximum of 12 months.
(7B) An assessment must be taken of the respondent before the conclusion of a youth diversion order to determine if they continue to hold extremist views or pose a terror threat.
(7C) An assessment must be made by a qualified expert in extremism and counterterrorism.
(7D) Assessments taken by the respondent’s youth offending team must be reviewed by an external expert with no pre-existing relationship to the respondent.
(7E) If the respondent is assessed as holding extremist views or as a terror threat the youth offending team or a chief officer of police must apply to an appropriate court for the youth offending order to be extended up to a maximum of 12 months.
(7F) All provisions, prohibitions and requirements of a youth diversion order remain in effect until the respondent has been assessed as holding no extremist views or posing a terror threat.”
This amendment would give the police the ability to apply for youth diversion orders in cases of youth extremism and terror risks. The diversion orders would conclude automatically after a maximum of twelve months without an assessment as to whether the individual remained a terror risk or extremist.
Government amendments 92 to 101, and 134 to 151.
Amendment 23, in schedule 9, page 229, line 15, at end insert—
“(11) Section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (time limit for summary offences) does not apply to an offence under subsection (1).”
This amendment allows the offence of taking or recording intimate photograph or film to be tried by a Magistrates’ Court at any time by disapplying the six-month time limit in s.127 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980.
Government amendments 152 to 156 and 102 to 133.
Dame Diana Johnson
Before I speak to the key Government amendments tabled on Report, I quickly remind the House why the Government have brought forward this Bill. It is a vital part of our safer streets mission, and contains a host of measures to tackle antisocial behaviour, retail and knife crime, and the epidemic of violence against women and girls, and to restore confidence and trust in policing.
It is worth reminding the House that on the previous Government’s watch, shoplifting soared to record-high levels; there was a 70% increase in their last two years in office alone. Street theft was rapidly rising; it was up by almost 60% in just the last two years. Antisocial behaviour was rampant in our towns and cities, with 1 million incidents last year. In the year to June 2024, the crime survey of England and Wales estimated that 25% of people perceived antisocial behaviour to be a fairly or very big problem in their area. That is the highest level since at least March 2013, over a decade ago. Violence and abuse against shop workers was at epidemic levels. The British Retail Consortium said that incidents of violence and abuse against shop workers stood at more than 2,000 a day in ’23-24—up by almost 50% on the previous year, and nearly treble the pre-pandemic figures from 2019 to 2020.
Mr Toby Perkins (Chesterfield) (Lab)
I have been down to the local Co-op in Chesterfield and met one of the shop workers, who faced a terrible attack. Luckily, the people were jailed, but in so many cases there is a sense that shoplifters are able to walk out the door without anything being done. The traumatic effect that this has on shop workers has to be seen to be believed. Would the Minister say that the message the Bill sends to anyone who wants to walk out of a store after doing these things is that the police will come after them, and they will end up going to jail?
Dame Diana Johnson
My hon. Friend puts that very well. Attacks on retail workers are totally unacceptable. The Co-op and the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers have done important work to highlight this issue and ensure that measures on it will be enacted through the Bill.
The previous Conservative Government wrote off a number of the crime types I have just talked about as low-level crime, and allowed them to spiral out of control. At the same time, they decimated local neighbourhood policing teams, causing untold damage to our communities, as we all know.
Wendy Morton (Aldridge-Brownhills) (Con)
On neighbourhood policing, I welcome the fact that we have some extra capacity coming into the west midlands, but I have not yet had clarification on whether the money that is coming to the west midlands will cover all the extra national insurance costs. The Labour police and crime commissioner is already saying that his budgets are underfunded under the Labour Government.
Dame Diana Johnson
The right hon. Lady and I have had this discussion before, and I have made it very clear that the national insurance increases have been funded through the money that is available to police forces this year. That is in stark contrast to the situation under the previous Government, who did not make a proper allocation for the police pay award for last year. This Government had to supplement it when we came into power in July.
Chris Vince (Harlow) (Lab/Co-op)
Will the Minister join me in celebrating the five new neighbourhood police officers we have in Harlow? I cannot take all the credit for them, because I only taught one of them maths.
Dame Diana Johnson
Absolutely. I think we will have 3,000 additional neighbourhood police officers by the end of March next year, as part of our commitment to putting in place 13,000 neighbourhood police officers by the end of this Parliament.
It has been clear throughout the Bill’s passage that it commands broad support across the House. I hope that over the next two days, right hon. and hon. Members from all parts of the House can come together and recognise the shared goals that the Bill fulfils. The Government are tireless in our drive to make our streets safer.
Simon Hoare (North Dorset) (Con)
The right hon. Lady is setting out very clearly what the Bill is intended to be, and has rightly pointed to the cross-party support for the main thrust of it. Does she agree that that unanimity of purpose is put in grave jeopardy by the Christmas tree-ing of significant amendments relating to abortion? I know that she had a personal interest in this issue in opposition. These very dramatic changes to abortion law require a much fuller debate in this place than can be had on an amendment to a Bill that has the purpose that the right hon. Lady has set out. The Government never intended the Bill to be a Christmas tree Bill, but it has become one. The House runs the risk of fracturing its unanimity of purpose if those amendments are pressed to a vote and become part of the legislation.
Dame Diana Johnson
I do not want to try Mr Speaker’s patience, but time has been allocated for that debate this afternoon. The hon. Gentleman is a very experienced Member of this House, and he will know that crime Bills often become Christmas tree Bills due to their very nature, as Members wish to table amendments on all sorts of areas of the criminal law. We have the Bill that is before us, and the amendments that have been tabled.
The Government and, I hope, other parties in this House are committed to making our streets safer. Where there are gaps in the law, we will not hesitate to address them, and the Government amendments that have been tabled are very much directed to our achieving that end. I will start by going through them. New clause 54 will aid legal certainty and the consistent application of the new offence of child criminal exploitation. The new clause makes clearer to the courts that the offence is focused on the criminal intentions of the adult only, rather than those of the child. It puts beyond doubt that the offence captures circumstances in which the child is used as an entirely innocent agent and cannot satisfy all the elements of the intended criminal conduct themselves. The new clause also puts beyond doubt that the offence is capable of capturing earlier-stage grooming; as such, it addresses the concerns raised in amendments 4 to 6, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion (Siân Berry). It will also cover perpetrators who arrange for another person to exploit a child on their behalf. At the request of the Scottish Government and the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland, we are also extending the offence of child criminal exploitation to Scotland and Northern Ireland.
New clause 56 criminalises the highly exploitative and harmful practice of coerced internal concealment. It is commonly associated with county lines drug dealing, and involves a child or adult being intentionally caused to conceal drugs or other objects—such as weapons or SIM cards—inside their body to facilitate criminality. The new clause creates two new offences. The first targets perpetrators who intentionally cause a child to conceal a specified item inside their body. The second applies in cases where an adult victim is caused to internally conceal a specified item through compulsion, coercion or deception, or through controlling or manipulative behaviour, and where the perpetrator intends, knows or reasonably suspects that the item has been or may be used in connection with criminal conduct. These new offences will carry a maximum penalty of up to 10 years’ imprisonment.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
The Bill applies to England and Wales, but it is important for knowledge and information to be shared with the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Scottish Parliament, for example, so that they are aware of what is happening here—and people may move from England or Wales to Northern Ireland or Scotland. We should ensure that information can be exchanged between police forces and other authorities here and those in the devolved Administrations: if we want security and safety for all our people, that really needs to happen.
Dame Diana Johnson
I entirely agree with the hon. Gentleman about the importance of sharing information, good practice and policy development, and I hope that that will go from strength to strength under this Government.
Let me now say something about abusive behaviour towards emergency workers. As we all know, they put themselves in harm’s way to protect us every day, and they deserve robust protection in return. That includes protection from racial and religious abuse, which is not only deeply harmful but undermines the values of decency, respect and public service. Unlike most people, emergency workers cannot walk away from abuse. When they enter private homes they do so not by choice, but because it is their duty to do so. Whether they are responding to a 999 call, providing urgent medical care or attending an incident involving risk to life or property, they are legally and professionally required to remain and act. They cannot remove themselves from the situation simply because they are being abused. The law must recognise that and ensure that they are properly protected in every setting, including private dwellings.
At present, there is a clear and pressing gap in the law. Although existing legislation provides important protections against racially and religiously aggravated offences in public places, they do not extend to abuse that occurs inside private homes. Policing stakeholders have highlighted that gap, and have emphasised the need for stronger safeguards for emergency workers. New clauses 60 to 62 therefore introduce specific offences relating to the use of racially or religiously threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour towards emergency workers acting in the course of their duties. Crucially, that includes incidents that take place within a private dwelling.
This is a focused and proportionate measure. It does not interfere with freedom of expression; rather, it reinforces the principle that emergency workers should be able to carry out their critical roles without being subjected to hate or hostility because of their race or religion. I hope that the hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Monica Harding) will agree that these Government new clauses achieve the underlying purpose of her new clause 120.
Clause 112 strengthens the protection afforded to nationally significant war memorials by providing for a new offence of climbing on specified war memorials without lawful excuse. We believe that the same protection should now be extended to other nationally significant memorials, starting with the statue of Sir Winston Churchill in Parliament Square. The Churchill statue, which is a prominent national symbol of Britain’s wartime leadership, has repeatedly been targeted and climbed on during protests in recent years. Including it within the new offence ensures the consistent protection of one of the foremost culturally significant monuments linked to national remembrance. Amendments 77 to 84 therefore expand the scope of the new offence to include other memorials of national significance, as well as adding the statue of Sir Winston Churchill to the list of specified memorials set out in schedule 12.
New clauses 63 to 70 and 81 and new schedule 1 deal with remotely stored electronic data, clarifying powers for law enforcement agencies to access information stored online and extract evidence or intelligence for criminal investigations, to protect the public from the risk of terrorism and safeguard our national security. The powers will apply when law enforcement agencies have lawfully seized an electronic device, as part of national security examination at UK borders or when a person provides his or her agreement. New clause 70 also amends the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 to permit the interception of access-related communications, such as two-factor authentication codes. Those reforms are necessary to ensure that our law enforcement agencies have clear powers to access vital evidence and intelligence when investigating serious offences, including child sexual abuse, fraud, terrorism and threats to national security, at a time when more and more information is stored remotely in the cloud rather than on people’s electronic devices.
Let me now turn to new clauses 72 to 79 and new schedule 3. A crucial aspect of our safer streets mission is to rebuild public confidence in policing. Among other things, that means ensuring that only those who are fit to serve can hold the office of constable or otherwise work in our law enforcement agencies. As well as strengthening the vetting regime for police officers, the new clauses and the new schedule require the National Crime Agency, the British Transport police, the Civil Nuclear Constabulary and the Ministry of Defence police to establish barred persons lists and advisory lists, similar to those created in 2017 for territorial police forces in England and Wales The chief officers of these forces, and others, will be under a legal duty to consult the lists before employing or appointing an individual to prevent those dismissed from policing from rejoining another force in the future.
My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has announced a new police efficiency and collaboration programme to cut waste and bureaucracy. It is important that undertakings providing services to the police are delivering the most benefit, and unlocking the efficiency savings needed by forces to achieve better outcomes for the public. Announcing the Government’s intention to consult on establishing a new national centre of policing, the Home Secretary said that she envisaged the body’s being responsible for existing shared services, national IT capabilities, and force-hosted national capabilities. It is right that the Home Secretary has the powers to ensure that those capabilities are fully aligned with the priorities of the police efficiency and collaboration programme, and that they are adequately prepared for transition into the new body with no disruption to service delivery. New clause 80 ensures that the Home Secretary has the power to direct undertakings providing critical services and capabilities to policing to take appropriate action to strengthen their service delivery to better deliver our efficiencies programme, and, ahead of any future legislation to establish the national centre for policing, to remove any barriers to the transition of services into the new centre.
We tabled new clauses 52 and 53 against the backdrop of the Government’s commitment to bring into force the repeal of the outdated Vagrancy Act 1824, which criminalises begging and many forms of rough sleeping. It is generally the case that when begging reaches the threshold of antisocial behaviour there are already sufficient powers available to the police and others to address that, but we have identified two gaps in the law that will arise from the repeal of the 1824 Act, which the new clauses would address. New clause 52 makes it a criminal offence for any person to arrange or facilitate another person’s begging for gain. Organised begging, which is often facilitated by criminal gangs, exploits vulnerable individuals and can undermine the public’s sense of safety. This provision makes it unlawful for anyone to organise others to beg—for example, by driving people to places for them to beg. That will allow the police to crack down on the organised crime gangs that use this exploitative technique to obtain cash for illicit activity.
Chris Vince
The Minister is being very generous in taking interventions. Having worked for a homelessness charity, I have seen this issue at first hand. Does she agree that when there is an organisation behind the begging, the person forced to beg is actually being exploited, so these laws will help to tackle a form of exploitation?
Dame Diana Johnson
My hon. Friend makes that point very well. These individuals are exploited by serious and organised criminal gangs, and we are going to clamp down on those gangs’ activity.
New clause 53 re-enacts the offence of being on enclosed premises for an unlawful purpose. It will make it an offence for a person to trespass on any premises—that covers any building, part of a building or enclosed area—with the intention of committing an offence. Without this replacement offence, the police would be able to rely only on the trespassing provisions in the Theft Act 1968, which covers trespassing only in relation to burglary. It is important that the police have the powers to tackle all cases of trespassing with intent to commit an offence, and new clause 53 will ensure that.
Jim Dickson (Dartford) (Lab)
I congratulate the Minister both on the Bill as it stands and on today’s amendments. Near my constituency, there has been a troubling spate of recent incidents in which younger people, in some cases encouraged by older men, are filming themselves catapulting and injuring wildlife, and placing that footage on TikTok. The footage is deeply unpleasant, and I do not recommend anybody looks at it. Would the Minister agree that that behaviour goes well beyond antisocial behaviour, and may at some point require a ban perhaps on the sale of catapults, but certainly on their use for that purpose?
Dame Diana Johnson
Sadly, that is not the first time I have heard about such appalling behaviour of attacking and injuring animals using catapults. I will certainly be raising that with my counterparts in the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs to see what more we can do. I am aware that this issue needs to be looked at, and I thank my hon. Friend for raising it.
Amendments 24 to 33 will require operators of collection points for items such as knives and crossbows to carry out the same enhanced age verification checks before handing over knives to the buyer, or in the case of crossbows and crossbow parts, to the buyer or even the hirer of the item. Clause 30 imposes similar requirements on couriers.
Clause 128 introduces costs and expenses protections for law enforcement agencies in civil recovery proceedings, under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, in the High Court or the Court of Session in Scotland. As currently drafted, it is not clear how the cost protection measure applies to pre-existing cases, particularly where cases have started before the provision comes into force but costs are incurred after the provision comes into force. As a result, it may be difficult and costly to determine which costs are covered. Amendment 89 provides that cost protections apply to any case where proceedings start after the measure comes into force.
Schedule 15 to the Bill introduces reforms to the confiscation regime in England and Wales in respect of the proceeds of crime. Among other things, the reforms make provision for the provisional discharge of confiscation orders made under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, allowing outstanding confiscation orders to be placed in abeyance when there is no realistic prospect of recovery in the immediate term and all enforcement steps have been exhausted. Amendments to schedule 15 extend the provisional discharge measures to confiscation orders made under legislation predating the 2002 Act.
Chapter 1 of part 14 provides for youth diversion orders, which are a new counter-terrorism risk management tool for young people who, on the balance of probabilities, the court assesses to have committed a terrorism offence or an offence with a terrorism connection, or to have engaged in conduct likely to facilitate a terrorism offence, and where the court considers it necessary to make the order for the purposes of protecting the public from terrorism or serious harm.
The amendments to clause 139 make a change to the scope of YDOs to ensure that applications can be made for individuals up to and including 21-year-olds. Currently, a court may make a YDO in respect of a person aged 10 to 21, but exclusive of 21-year-olds. Following further engagement with operational partners on the types of cases that could benefit from a YDO, we have concluded that this change would increase the operational utility of the YDO and ensure that it can be considered as an intervention in a wider variety of cases involving young people.
Clause 141(2) enables a YDO to include prohibitions or requirements relating to the respondent’s possession or use of electronic devices. The amendments to this clause set out a non-exhaustive list of some of the most common or intrusive requirements that may be imposed to support the police’s ability to monitor compliance with restrictions on electronic devices, providing a clearer statutory footing for imposing such requirements. For example, it would allow the court to impose a requirement on someone subject to a YDO to enable the police to access their device for the purposes of checking compliance with restrictions such as accessing specific websites or applications. It would allow the police to identify harmful online activity at an earlier stage and intervene before it escalates. As with other YDO measures, the court would need to assess that any monitoring requirements are necessary and proportionate for the purposes of protecting the public from a risk of terrorism or serious harm.
Technical amendments are also required to clauses 142 and 150 relating respectively to the definition of “police detention” for Scotland and Northern Ireland and to the appeals process in Northern Ireland. The amendments will adapt the relevant provisions for the purposes of the law in Scotland and Northern Ireland. The amendments to clause 151 provide that, where a person ceases to have a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with notification requirements but continues to fail to comply, they commit an offence.
The other Government amendments in this group, which make necessary refinements to existing provisions in the Bill, were detailed in the letter that I sent last week to the hon. Member for Stockton West (Matt Vickers), a copy of which has been placed in the Library. With your permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will therefore seek to respond to the non-Government amendments in this group when winding up. For now, I commend the Government amendments to the House.
Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)
I would like to express my appreciation to all those who have worked on the legislation to develop and shape the policies, whether they be the majority developed under the previous Conservative Government or members of the Bill team, who I am sure have provided helpful assistance to Ministers. As I am sure we will hear today, some of the measures in the Bill are the result of amazing people who have suffered the worst experiences, but who have worked to ensure that others do not have to suffer them in future.
In addition, considering the context of the legislation, it is right to pay tribute to the excellent work of police officers across the country. Week in, week out, those serving in our police forces put themselves in harm’s way to keep our streets safe. Those who serve and place themselves in danger cannot be thanked enough. Many people ask themselves whether they would have the bravery to stand up and intervene. Officers across the country do so on a daily basis. Thanks to the efforts of the previous Conservative Government, the police force numbered over 149,000 officers in 2024, with 149,769 recorded in March 2024. This was the highest number of officers, on both full-time equivalent and headcount basis, since comparable records began in March 2003.
Wendy Morton
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for setting out those policing numbers. Does he share my concern about the additional police officers we are getting? When I look at our figures for the west midlands, the boost is coming from deployments. I worry about where they are actually coming from and just how much of an increase we are really going to see.
Matt Vickers
I wholeheartedly agree. There are a lot of concerns about the neighbourhood policing guarantee and where the resource comes from: whether it is through specials or volunteers—of course, we want to see more of them—or redeployments. When people ring 999, they want to know that they are going to get the response they expected. They do not want to see that depleted to move officers from one bucket to the next. That has real consequences. The biggest hit to our police force numbers at the moment will be the national insurance rise—the tax that is taxing police off our streets.
Chris Vince
The shadow Minister and I probably disagree on many things, but he is giving a very well-presented speech. Does he not recognise, however, that there may well be an increase in police numbers, but we have seen a decrease in police staff? In Essex, we lost over 400 police staff during the Conservatives’ period in office and a number of police officers have been redeployed to roles that could have been done by police staff.
Matt Vickers
I am glad to see all those police officers getting proper training through the hon. Gentleman’s maths teaching. I am glad he has new recruits in his part of the world, but people are concerned about the frontline numbers. The number of police on our streets is a huge concern to the public. The chair of the National Police Chiefs’ Council has said that the funding will not match the Government’s ambitions and falls short of maintaining the existing workforce. And just listen to the Police Federation, which states quite simply:
“This Chancellor hasn’t listened to police officers.”
Can the Minister confirm that by the end of this Parliament there will be more police officers than were serving in March 2024?
Matt Bishop (Forest of Dean) (Lab)
The shadow Minister will know from our time in Committee that I am an ex-police officer, and I thank him for his words about police officers serving the country. Does he agree that the Bill will give the police more confidence that they will have the right powers, so that they are able to make a difference?
Matt Vickers
I welcome lots of the measures in the Bill and I hope they will really help our police officers to keep our streets safe, but the police need the resource, funding and support to be out there enforcing the legislation we are putting forward today. I thank the hon. Member for his service—on the Committee as well as in the police force.
The House will debate a number of amendments and new clauses today and tomorrow. The Opposition amendments are sensible and aim to improve the Bill, which our constituents would want us to get behind. Amendment 175 relates to the Government’s objective, which we all want to achieve, of reducing knife crime by 50%. We know the untold damage knife crime causes to victims, families and communities across the country. This legislation introduces a new offence: possession of an article with a blade or point, or an offensive weapon, with the intent to use unlawful violence.
Let me put that in context. Imagine you are at home in your garden enjoying a nice peaceful afternoon with the kids. Suddenly, our hard-working police officers swoop in on a man walking down the street—a man carrying a knife or offensive weapon who is then proven beyond all reasonable doubt to have planned to use it for violence. He could have been coming for your neighbours, your friends or your family. This is a man who clearly needs to be locked up. Would you want to see him put away for four years or 14 years? In fact, with the sentencing review, whatever he is sentenced to, he is likely to serve significantly less. Who knows how much of that four years he would serve before he could walk back down your street?
Wendy Morton
According to Keep Britain Tidy, littering and fly-tipping cost the country £1 million a year. Does my hon. Friend agree that that is money that could go to frontline services, so it is about time we took more stringent measures to change behaviour, along with some good enforcement?
Matt Vickers
I could not agree more. A small minority wreak havoc on our countryside and our streets, and create absolute chaos. That is what this amendment is about: tougher sanctions to divert people from doing such mindless things.
The money wasted every year on cleaning up would be better spent on frontline services, such as filling potholes or providing community services. Instead, it is used to clean up after those who have no respect for others or for our natural environment. The most common location for fly-tipping is on pavements and roads, which accounted for 37% of all incidents in 2023-24. The majority—59%—involved small van-sized dumps, or an amount of waste that could easily fit in a car boot. It is therefore logical to conclude that a significant majority of fly-tipping incidents stem from vehicles. Using a vehicle to dump a van full or a boot full of waste should come with real consequences, and the people who do it should feel that in their ability to use their vehicle, as well as through financial penalties. The previous Government increased fines for fly-tipping from £400 to £1,000, but we can go further to deter people from dumping on the doorsteps of others. The amendment would require the Home Secretary to consult on the establishment of a scheme of driving licence penalty points for fly-tippers and those who toss rubbish from vehicles.
In Committee, the Minister pledged to engage with DEFRA on this issue. By passing this amendment, we could go further by committing to undertake a consultation to develop a workable and effective scheme. For the benefit of all those who want to be able to enjoy their green spaces, and for our environment and the wildlife that suffers at the hands of fly-tippers and those who toss waste, I urge Members to support the amendment. Let us send a message to the mindless minority who wreak havoc on our green spaces.
Before concluding my remarks, I would like to draw the attention of the House to amendments 167, 168, 170 and 171, which, among other Conservative proposals, aim to strengthen respect orders. We have heard the Minister speak both in Committee and in the Chamber of the role these orders can play in tackling antisocial behaviour. The success of the policy will be contingent on its effective enforcement by the police, and on perpetrators being aware that they will face tough sanctions if they breach the orders. I hope the Government will continue to consider these amendments.
I draw Members’ attention to these amendments as they are indicative of the constructive approach Conservative Members have taken towards improving the Bill in ways that we believe would benefit the legislation as a whole. I hope that Members across the House will give serious consideration to our amendments and new clauses over the coming two days.
The Minister and I have spent more time together than she probably ever envisaged, and I believe we can agree that the Bill contains some sensible and proportionate measures: greater protections for our retail workers, efforts to tackle antisocial behaviour, and more measures to tackle vile and horrendous child exploitation. However, we can work together to go further, and that is what our Opposition amendments seek to do.
Sam Carling (North West Cambridgeshire) (Lab)
I begin by once again welcoming the Bill. It will deliver so much for my constituents by protecting people from crime and enabling tough action on antisocial behaviour, including in areas that have too long been labelled “low level” and ignored, such as the illegal off-road bikes that constituents so often raise with me.
The Bill will introduce mandatory reporting for child sexual abuse—one of the key recommendations of the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse, or IICSA. This is a long-overdue measure, which has long been called for by our Labour Home Secretary and Prime Minister personally. However, I remain concerned that the Government are not going far enough on the issue of mandatory reporting. I have therefore tabled three amendments to the Bill on that subject—amendments 10, 11 and 22—on which I will focus my speech today.
Amendments 10, 11 and 22 are not intended to change Government policy—quite the opposite. They are intended to deliver the Government’s stated policy to implement the IICSA recommendations relevant to the Home Office in full. The Home Secretary stated in January that that was the Government’s intention, and reaffirmed that just yesterday, responding with a firm “yes” to my question after her statement on whether it remained Government policy to implement the recommendations in full.
However, there are three significant gaps in our plans to implement recommendation 13 on mandatory reporting, where the Bill does not deliver what IICSA recommended. With these gaps, I am concerned that the duty to report will be ineffective in some of the settings where it is most needed. My concern applies to religious groups in particular. I will use the example of the Jehovah’s Witnesses—the religious group I grew up in—to illustrate how and why.
Jehovah’s Witnesses have a deep cultural distrust of secular authorities, which, as happens in a lot of religious groups, leads to a culture of dealing with everything internally, including child sexual abuse, and reporting nothing to the police. Their internal processes for doing so are atrocious. Jehovah’s Witnesses have something called the “two witness rule”, which means that no action is taken on any report of wrongdoing unless there are two witnesses to it. There are never two witnesses to child sexual abuse. I give that context to highlight why the mandatory duty to report must be absolutely watertight, as IICSA recommended, to prevent people in the leadership of organisations like the Jehovah’s Witnesses from avoiding it.
I will cover the three gaps in turn. First, there are no criminal sanctions if someone does not comply with the duty. I understand that the Government are proposing professional sanctions, such as a referral to the Disclosure and Barring Service and to relevant professional regulators, but that is not set out in the Bill and would apply to only a fraction of people under the duty. It would not, for example, do much in religious settings, where so many of the failings are happening, and where the duty would, if constructed properly, help immensely to protect children.
IICSA was clear that failure to comply should be a criminal offence, and amendment 10 would make that the case. It proposes a fine as the appropriate sanction, which is in line with best practice overseas. Many other countries—France, Australia, parts of Canada and so on—have introduced mandatory reporting, and many have done so with criminal sanctions of this kind. While the Government will likely say that criminal sanctions could have a chilling effect that would stop people going into professions that work with children, the international evidence clearly shows that this does not happen—in the Australian state of Victoria, for instance. Professor Ben Mathews has done extensive research on mandatory reporting laws and their efficacy, which I thoroughly encourage the Minister to ask officials to examine.
The second gap relates to those who come under the duty to report. IICSA recommended that the duty should apply first to anyone working in regulated activities with children under the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, and the Bill uses that criterion—tick. However, IICSA also recommended that it should apply to anyone in a position of trust over a child, as defined by the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which the Bill does not include. Amendment 22 would make it so.
The Bill sets out a list of relevant activities in part 2 of schedule 8, which replicates about 90% of what is in the Sexual Offences Act. However, that missing 10% is critical; for a start, it includes sports coaches and teachers, which schedule 8 does not. Going back to my earlier example, section 22A of the Sexual Offences Act includes a very effective definition of religious leaders. Schedule 8 does include a definition of religious leaders, but requires such people to have “regular unsupervised contact” with children to be subject to the duty. That qualification will allow virtually any religious leader—be they paid clergy or a volunteer elder, like in the Jehovah’s Witnesses—to escape the duty, as very few have regular unsupervised contact with children, despite being in a significant position of power and influence.
I personally know at least one person who was sexually abused as a child in that organisation. When they went to speak to religious leaders about it, in the presence of their parents—not unsupervised—they were advised that going to the police would mean bringing reproach on God’s name. So no report was made, by either the victim or their family, or by those religious elders. That is commonplace.
Under the Bill as drafted, there is no sanction for that. Those elders are not mandated reporters; even if they were, the proposed offence in clause 73 of stopping someone else from making a report—an offence I very much welcome, for the record—applies only to other mandated reporters. If, therefore, someone pressures a victim or their parents not to make a report, that will not be illegal. That offence needs to be broadened, too.
The National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children is calling for the Government to consider a broader offence of concealing child sexual abuse, to which I urge the Government to give serious consideration. I will give more detail on that later, if there is time.
Cameron Thomas (Tewkesbury) (LD)
The hon. Gentleman is making very important points, in particular on the Jehovah’s Witnesses cult. One of the methods Jehovah’s Witnesses use to ensure that issues like this do not escape from the organisation is threatening individuals with the act of disfellowshipping—being cut off from all communication with their own family. I wonder whether he will go a little further in recognising that, too.
Sam Carling
I thank the hon. Member for that intervention. I am very pleased that other hon. Members in the House are aware of that issue, which is something I am trying to do some work on separately. It is certainly relevant to what I am discussing. To give the House a little more context on that, through the act of disfellowshipping, when the organisation decides that someone has committed a serious sin, it can essentially tell all their family and friends to cut them off permanently; the same applies if an individual chooses simply to leave the religion. Disfellowshipping is very rarely applied to perpetrators of crimes, and is more often applied to the victims who report them. It is an enormous problem that has to be dealt with, and I look forward to engaging with the hon. Member further on that.
As I highlighted on Second Reading, the Australian royal commission that investigated the organisation’s handling of abuse cases found that while allegations had been documented by religious elders against 1,006 individuals in Australia alone, not a single one was reported to the police. We must tighten up this definition and ensure that it includes religious leaders. The Government could do so by amending the definition in paragraph 17 of part 2 of schedule 8, and by adding a further item to the list in relation to sports professionals to deal with that point as well. However, the much neater and stronger legislative solution would be to just do what IICSA said, and refer to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and the definition therein, which amendment 22 seeks to do.
The third problem relates to what triggers the duty to report. IICSA recommended that the duty should apply in three cases: first, when a mandated reporter is told by a child or perpetrator that abuse has taken place; secondly, when they see it happening; and thirdly, when they observe recognised indicators of child sexual abuse, which can range from things like a child being pregnant or having a sexually transmitted infection to other, more subjective indicators. Our Bill scores two out of three, as it does not include the third point on recognised indicators, which are also referred to as reasonable suspicion.
Overwhelmingly, children do not report abuse that is being done to them at the time that the abuse is happening. Those who do report tend to do so years after it happens, when it is far too late to protect them and far too late, in many cases, to catch the perpetrator and stop them harming other children.
The Australian royal commission in 2015 found that the average time for someone to disclose child sexual abuse was 22 years after it happened, so including reasonable suspicion is critical, and that is what my amendment 11 would do. Given the potentially subjective judgments needed in that case, amendment 11 would exempt the case of recognised indicators from criminal sanctions for non-compliance, which is also what IICSA recommended.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.
Lisa Smart (Hazel Grove) (LD)
I rise to speak to amendment 160, which stands in my name, and briefly in favour of amendments 157 and 158, also in my name.
I wish to start by thanking all those who have campaigned over many years for some of the sensible changes to the Bill that we are discussing today. I also want to put on record my thanks to our fantastic police forces, including Greater Manchester Police, and also to my hon. Friends the Members for Frome and East Somerset (Anna Sabine) and for Sutton and Cheam (Luke Taylor) for their assiduous work on the Bill Committee.
Liberal Democrat amendment 160 would ensure that the police cannot use live facial recognition technology when imposing conditions on public assemblies or processions under sections 12 or 14 of the Public Order Act 1986, unless a new and specific code of practice governing its use in public spaces has first been approved by both Houses.
Regulations around the use of live facial recognition have been discussed many times in this House, and support for strengthening the current situation, bringing clarity and certainty to police forces, has gained support from all parts of the House, both in this Chamber and in Westminster Hall. I hope this amendment does the same today.
The Liberal Democrats oppose the police’s use of facial recognition surveillance. It breaches the right to privacy and is far too often biased, particularly given its propensity to wrongly identify people of colour and women. In our manifesto last year, we committed immediately to halting the use of live facial recognition surveillance by the police and private companies.
When data or technology, such as artificial intelligence, are used by the police, they must be regulated to ensure that they are unbiased. They must be used in a way that is transparent and accurate and that respects the privacy of innocent people. Policing should not intrude on this right for people who are not suspected of any crime.
On the question of bias, much of the recent debate has centred around the National Physical Laboratory’s 2023 study into the equitability of facial recognition technology in law enforcement. This report is frequently cited by proponents of facial recognition, including the shadow Home Secretary, both at the Dispatch Box, when the Bill came before the House on Second Reading, and during a well-attended Westminster Hall debate last November as evidence that bias in the technology is on the decline.
However, we should not overlook one of that study’s most critical findings. In live facial recognition—where a real-time camera feed is compared against a predetermined watchlist—the likelihood of false positives is not fixed. Instead, it depends heavily on the specific parameters of how that technology is deployed, particularly on the face-match threshold. That threshold, in turn, is influenced by both the size and composition of the watchlist, as well as the volume and nature of the people moving through the surveillance zone.
The study recommends that, where operationally feasible, the police use a face-match threshold of 0.6 in order to reduce the risk of bias. However—and this is crucial—without clear regulation, police forces are under no obligation to adopt this or any specific standard. In other words, the presence of the technology alone does not ensure fairness. Without oversight, significant room remains for bias to persist in how facial recognition is applied. This leads to increased instances of the wrong people being stopped and searched—an area of policing that already disproportionately impacts black communities.
New technologies in policing may well present good opportunities to improve public safety, and police should take advantage of them to prevent and solve crime. However, given that new technologies can raise significant concerns related to civil liberties and discrimination, we must ensure that any new powers involving them are scrutinised by both Houses.
Liberal Democrat amendment 160 would ensure that the police cannot use live facial recognition technology when imposing conditions on public assemblies or processions under sections 12 or 14 of the Public Order Act 1986, unless a new and specific code of practice governing its use in public spaces has first been approved by both Houses. This will ensure democratic oversight of any changes to further legislation that may impact public privacy and civil liberties. I hope that the amendment will have support from across the House.
I have just a few words to say on amendments 157 and 158, which would enable a review of antisocial behaviour powers. Antisocial behaviour, as Members have already mentioned this afternoon, blights communities, erodes trust, frays the social fabric and disproportionately affects the most vulnerable. Many colleagues have raised issues within their own communities, some of which I see in my constituency. We have off-road bikes in Heaviley, Marple, Offerton and High Lane. They are a persistent blight on my community. They intimidate people, endanger public safety and are just really annoying. But we must respond with laws that are not just tough, but fair and proportionate. That is why I urge all colleagues to support amendments 157 and 158, which would ensure that antisocial behaviour laws are reviewed before being changed, and that any new guidance is created with public input.
I also welcome amendment 3, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Wells and Mendip Hills (Tessa Munt), which aims to ensure that the duty to report suspected child abuse covers faith groups. I encourage the hon. Member for North West Cambridgeshire (Sam Carling) to seek her out as he will find a doughty ally in his attempts to improve the Bill as it impacts on faith groups.
As I said on Second Reading, there are measures in the Bill that the Liberal Democrats support. Were our amendments to be accepted, the Bill would go even further towards keeping our communities safe in a way that is proportionate and that balances the civil liberties implications of giving the police more powers. I hope that the House will support our amendments.
Kirith Entwistle (Bolton North East) (Lab)
I rise to support the Bill and to speak to amendment 20, which stands in my name and is supported by more than 50 Members from across the House. The measures in the Bill represent the most significant package of crime prevention and policing reforms in a generation. From strengthening action against shoplifting, knife crime and antisocial behaviour to introducing new powers to confront child sexual abuse, this legislation gives our police the tools they need to take back our high streets and town centres. I am proud to support the Bill, and I am proud that this Labour Government are showing leadership by putting victims first, supporting our police and turning the tide on crime after 14 years of Conservative neglect.
It is in that same spirit of placing victims at the heart of our justice system that I have tabled amendment 20. It addresses an urgent and under-recognised issue: the devastating link between domestic abuse and suicide and the failure of our legal system to properly reflect it. My amendment is supported by Southall Black Sisters—a pioneering black feminist organisation founded in 1979, dedicated to empowering black, minoritised and migrant women and girls, particularly those fleeing violence. For over four decades, Southall Black Sisters has been a trailblazer in advocating for the rights and safety of some of society’s most marginalised women and girls and in addressing barriers rooted in racism, sexism and socioeconomic inequalities. Their mission is to dismantle the structural injustices harming black, minoritised and migrant women and girls, while fostering global solidarity for a future rooted in equity, justice and empowerment. I sincerely thank the dedicated staff at Southall Black Sisters for their help with my amendment.
Too often those who drive their victims to suicide through sustained coercion, violence or psychological abuse walk away without consequence. While the Bill introduces welcome offences on serious self-harm, it still falls short of recognising the full impact faced by victims of domestic abuse, particularly when the abuse ends in suicide.
The statistics should stop us in our tracks. According to the Vulnerability Knowledge and Practice Programme, suspected suicides linked to domestic abuse now outnumber domestic homicides. It is estimated that three women die by suicide every week as a result of abuse, yet since 2017 there has been just one conviction where a victim’s suicide was legally recognised as the outcome of domestic abuse—just one. That is not justice; it is a failure to see these women, recognise what they have endured and hold their abusers to account.
Coercive control and psychological torment may leave no bruises, but the impact is every bit as lethal. When domestic abuse ends in suicide, it must be recognised for what it is: a crime. The injustice of this issue falls heaviest on those already most marginalised. Black, minoritised and migrant women face the highest barriers to safety—barriers rooted in racism, immigration insecurity, stigma and a lack of culturally competent services. Too often they are misjudged, criminalised or simply ignored. The justice system, and indeed society, must stop asking, “Why didn’t she leave?”, and start asking, “Why wasn’t he stopped?” That is the change that amendment 20 calls for. It shines a light on these deaths and makes it clear that when abuse leads to suicide, the law must see it, hear it and respond.
I am pleased that, through this Bill, the Government are taking forward meaningful changes to deliver on Labour’s mission to halve violence against women and girls. I do not intend to press my amendment to a vote, but I hope that the Government will bring forward changes that recognise the link between abuse and suicide and ensure that our laws reflect that reality. In France, for example, the law was changed in 2020 to recognise suicide or attempted suicide as an outcome of domestic abuse. A perpetrator may now face up to 10 years in prison and a substantial fine if abuse is found to have significantly contributed to the victim’s death. That is the level of seriousness that the issue should demand.
I am grateful to the Victims Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypridd (Alex Davies-Jones), for meeting me to discuss the issues that my amendment raises, and I welcome her invitation to submit evidence to the forthcoming Law Commission review. I also welcome the Minister’s recognition that current homicide laws do not adequately reflect these cases. I fully support the Bill’s mission to protect victims and restore trust in our justice system, but that justice must be complete. The women driven to take their own lives because of abuse must no longer be invisible to the law.
In short, amendment 20 would criminalise abusers who drive victims to self-harm or suicide by introducing a new offence of encouraging serious self-harm or suicide following a sustained pattern of abuse. The Bill introduces new offences for encouraging or assisting self-harm but falls short of covering cases where victims die by suicide following sustained patterns of coercive control and abuse. Recognising this form of abuse in law is critical. The amended Bill would reflect the severe psychological impact of coercive control, enhance deterrence and increase survivor and public confidence in the criminal justice system. It would also compel judges, juries, coroners and the police to properly investigate and respond to such cases, treating them with the seriousness that they deserve. Ultimately, it would ensure that victims are not failed by a legal framework that continues to overlook the long-term and often fatal results of domestic abuse.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
I rise to support my amendment 19, which seeks to amend clause 94, which brings in a new law to make spiking or administering a harmful substance an offence. I am grateful for the cross-party support I have received for this amendment from Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat, Green and Independent MPs. The intended law around spiking is a sound one, and it generally has cross-party support—indeed, it was a measure in the previous version of this Bill, brought in under the previous Government. My concern is that it has a defect and that there is a loophole. My amendment seeks to close that by ensuring that spiking by a reckless act is also an offence.
Spiking is a hideous, heinous activity that destroys lives. It destroys people’s physical and mental health, and at worst, it kills people. The majority of victims of spiking—74%—are women, and the average age of those being spiked is just 26, but there is no typical spiking incident. The majority involve putting something in a drink, but needle spiking is also on the rise. The most likely place for spiking to happen is in a bar, pub or a club, but it can happen anywhere, including in a supermarket or on the street.
Spiking is most commonly thought among members of the public to be motivated by sexual intent or to facilitate a theft, but in Committee we heard from Colin Mackie from Spike Aware UK about a very different type of spiking, which is what I think the new law fails to address. It is the rise in spiking that seems to have no particular intent behind it. It is sometimes referred to as prank spiking—spiking for, to quote the Government’s own guidance, seemingly “a bit of fun”. We heard from Colin Mackie about how his son Greg died through suspected spiking of that kind.
The Bill criminalises spiking or administering a harmful substance with intent to injure, aggrieve or annoy. I do not accept that every case of spiking fits into that definition. I will give an example of a scenario where recklessness would cover a case of spiking—by the way, I should say that recklessness is a well-trodden principle in criminal law, dating back over 200 years. It is an alternative to intent, so that if the prosecution fails to establish that someone meant to do something, it can alternatively establish that their actions were so reckless that they should be convicted.
An example is assault causing actual bodily harm. The prosecution must establish the harm, but it can establish either that someone intended that harm or that they did an act so reckless that harm was bound to follow. It does not matter which it establishes to a jury; it will secure a conviction. It is the same with manslaughter: the prosecution can run a case that although somebody did not intend for someone else to die, their actions were so reckless that they should have known that someone might die, and it can secure a conviction.
By the way, in the absence of law on spiking, those two offences are often used, but they are often defective, which is why the Government are bringing in their own spiking law. However, they have failed to replicate the principle of recklessness within it.
I will give a hypothetical example. A group of friends go into a bar. Two of them have been taking illegal drugs—they have done it before—and they are enjoying themselves. They say to each other, “That friend in our circle—he needs to loosen up some more. He needs to stop his ridiculous opposition to having a bit of fun by taking these pills. I tell you what: we’ll do him a favour. Let’s not tell him, but let’s slip one of these pills we’ve been taking in his drink so he can loosen up and enjoy the evening like we are.” They go ahead and do that, and of course their friend, very likely, is harmed. He may not have done that drug before, or he may have been taking prescription drugs and the mixture is a cocktail.
I am sure the House would intend that those two people had committed a crime, but when they are taken to trial I can see a scenario where their defence will say, “Members of the jury, my clients were foolish. They were silly. They shouldn’t have done it. But they didn’t intend to annoy their friend. They didn’t intend to injure their friend. What they intended to do was have a bit of fun and help him have a bit of fun. It was stupid, but they did not intend it.” How is a jury supposed to convict beyond reasonable doubt on that?
Instead, if the prosecution could point to recklessness, it would be able to say, “Members of the jury, we do not care whether what these two people intended would be fun for that friend. It was so obviously reckless to any reasonable person that it must be a crime, and you must convict.” Clause 94 needs that much more wide-ranging, all-encompassing, tried and tested legal principle in it. My amendment would do just that.
I thank Colin Mackie from Spike Aware UK for bringing that evidence to the Bill Committee, and Stamp Out Spiking, which has also done a huge amount, as well as Members no longer in this place who have been doing a lot of work behind the scenes.
Simon Hoare
I am not a lawyer, but my hon. Friend has deployed a clear and compelling argument. At the beginning of his remarks, he referenced how amendment 19, to which I am a signatory, commands cross-party support. In advance of anything the Minister may say, is my hon. Friend able to indicate, from conversations he has had with the Home Office and individual Ministers, the Government’s response? He seems to be making such a compelling case; it would be helpful if the Government accepted it.
Joe Robertson
I thank my hon. Friend. I was on the Bill Committee, where a similar amendment was tabled, so I can reference the Minister’s response at that time. I have also had a brief word with the Minister outside this place. The Government’s position seems to be that the type of activity I am describing is covered in the intent to annoy, but I hope that I have made it perfectly clear that all reckless acts are plainly not covered by an intention to annoy.
I do not for one minute suggest that the Government wilfully do not want the law to work and to cover all scenarios, but I am left with the impression that they have not sufficiently addressed their mind to the gaping loophole that is staring them in the face. If they do not like my amendment, I urge them to draft an amendment of their own to deal with the issue. If just one person walks free following this law because they were able to convince a jury that their actions were not annoying—but they would have been deemed reckless—that will be a terrible failure of what the Government are trying to do in the Bill. I urge the Minister to think again, and I urge all across the House to vote for the amendment to force the Government’s hand.
John McDonnell (Hayes and Harlington) (Ind)
I tabled amendment 161 on public order issues and the policing of demonstrations. Before I get to that, I welcome the proposals in the Bill on fly-tipping, and I look forward to the guidance that will be issued to the various authorities to deal with it. I am attracted by the Opposition’s amendments on what is included in that guidance, largely because, like other Members, my constituency is plagued with fly-tipping. I seem to be followed by a mattress throughout my constituency in virtually every area I visit.
I come to public order and my amendment, which I tabled to try to get on the record the reality of what is happening with the public order issue and demonstrations. In the explanatory notes, the Government have set out this argument:
“The regular protests following the events in Israel and Gaza on 7 October 2023 highlighted gaps in public order legislation, principally the Public Order Acts 1986 and 2023.”
They have therefore brought forward proposals in response to the policing challenges of such protests.
Since 7 October, I have been on virtually every national demonstration in central London organised by the Palestine Solidarity Campaign and other groups. I understand the pressure on the police service; in fact, I have police constituents who have had their leave cancelled and all the rest because of the frequency of the protests, but that has largely been a response to the depth of concern about what is happening in Gaza. People have wanted to express their view, and one of the ways of doing that through our democratic system is to demonstrate and march and protest. All the demonstrations I have been on have been peaceful, good natured and—up until a few recent incidents—extremely well policed.
In the explanatory notes, the Government set out that legislation is being brought forward in relation to three things, which I think we can all agree on. There is:
“A new criminal offence of climbing on war memorials.”
Secondly, there is
“possession of a pyrotechnic article at a protest”,
which is dangerous, anyway. The other is about concealing identity, although issues with that are referred to in other amendments, because that might well have an impact on the exercise of religious freedoms, particularly with regard to the veil and being able to dress.
The Government do not cite in the explanatory notes the issue in clause 114 of restriction on protests at places of worship. In all the national demonstrations in London that have taken place, there has never been an incident outside a place of worship. Concerns have been expressed by some groups, but largely, I think, they have been by groups who have motivations other than concerns about public order.
In the negotiations with the Metropolitan police on each demonstration that has taken place, there has been a long discussion in which the route is identified, and usually there is overall agreement to avoid any areas that could be seen as contentious and could provoke a reaction. Even when a place of worship, such as a synagogue, has been some distance from the demonstration, the organisers have tried to ensure not just proper stewarding, so that the demonstration does not go anywhere near it—usually, it has to be 10 or 15 minutes’ walking distance away—but that the times of services are avoided as well.
Interestingly, until recently there had never been a problem, but the police seem to have hardened their attitude, I think as a result of coming under pressure from organisations that might simply not want the protest to go ahead in any form because they take a different attitude to what is happening in Gaza and Pakistan. [Interruption.] If the water the hon. Member for Selby (Keir Mather) is carrying is for me, I thank him.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
I rise to speak to amendments 4 to 8 on child criminal exploitation. I thank the right hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) and the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East (Joe Robertson) for their speeches and proposals.
I voice my support for amendment 21, tabled by the hon. Member for Brent East (Dawn Butler), which would prevent driver’s licence information obtained by the police being used for the purposes of intrusive facial recognition and gathering biometrics, and amendment 164 tabled by the hon. Member for Liverpool Riverside (Kim Johnson), which would remove clause 108 and the ban on face coverings in protest situations. The hon. Member for Clapham and Brixton Hill (Bell Ribeiro-Addy) has also tabled mitigating amendments on that subject; amendment 184 would create exceptions, and not just defences, relating to health, work, and religious faith coverings. I also support amendment 185, which proposes an equality review. I hope the Government will look at them all.
I welcome the efforts in the Crime and Policing Bill to protect vulnerable children, and I particularly welcome the introduction of a new offence of child criminal exploitation, which will signal to perpetrators that coercing, manipulating and exploiting children into criminal activity is child abuse and will be treated as such. Criminals are exploiting thousands of vulnerable children; Children In Need data shows that more than 15,000 children were at risk of exploitation in 2023-24, and that is likely to be just the tip of the iceberg.
The perpetrators of exploitation include serious organised crime gangs, which are well versed in taking advantage of legislative gaps. Even though the Bill takes a huge step forward, areas of it must be strengthened if we are to protect children and bring the perpetrators of that abuse to justice. That is why I have tabled amendments 4 to 8.
First, amendments 4 and 5 would amend the wording in clause 38 to ensure that the offence includes activities that put children at significant risk and are linked to criminal conduct but are not in themselves criminal offences. Examples of this include carrying large amounts of cash on public transport, being used as a look-out or decoy, and guarding unsafe accommodation alone. Amendment 6 expands the definition of “exploitative activity” to ensure that preparatory acts, such as grooming and coercion, are captured by the offence.
I welcome the Minister’s comments earlier, and am grateful for the engagement with these amendments, but it is not yet obvious to me how referencing only the facilitation of future offences covers the gaps that would be closed by amendments 4 and 5, and amendment 6 seems to have been only partly addressed. I would therefore welcome further clarification, or a discussion of the issue with the Minister, ahead of consideration in the other place.
Secondly, amendment 7 would remove clause 38(1)(b), which currently amounts to a defence if the perpetrator reasonably believes that the child is over 18, unless the child is under the age of 13. While such provisions are common in other areas of law, in the case of criminal exploitation, this clause risks undermining the prosecution of perpetrators due to the well-publicised issues of adultification and racism within the criminal justice system. The recent Independent Office for Police Conduct report into race discrimination and the Alexis Jay report on criminally exploited children on behalf of Action for Children both highlight the roles of adultification and racism in the criminalisation of children, and how it leads to failures in safeguarding responses specifically, but not only, for young black boys. The Modern Slavery Act 2015 is clear: children cannot consent to their own exploitation, and this principle must be upheld by our removing this part of the offence.
Finally, amendment 8 to clause 53 would insert the words “aged 18 or over”. This would ensure that children could not be criminalised under the new offence of cuckooing. It would recognise that they are more often than not the victims, not the perpetrators, in these situations. The children targeted are often very young and extremely vulnerable, and they need protection, not prosecution. These amendments are not merely technical; they are essential. They reflect the lived experiences of children, and the findings of numerous reports and reviews that provide compelling evidence of the need for a more robust and child-centred legal framework. I urge all Members of the House to support these proposals. Together, we can take a decisive step towards better protecting vulnerable children from exploitation.
Alistair Strathern (Hitchin) (Lab)
Before I move on to the amendment I want to speak about, I thank the Minister for the speed with which the Government have brought forward this Bill. It addresses important issues around protecting retail workers and tackling shoplifting and antisocial behaviour—issues that communities such as the towns and villages that I represent feel have been overlooked all too often. I really welcome the Government’s urgency of action in recognition of the great campaigns fought by many unions, including USDAW, and also of the real sentiment of my constituents that these crimes need to be taken far more seriously.
Today, though, I want to focus my time on amendment 19 to clause 94, in the name of the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East (Joe Robertson), which brings forward important legislative action on spiking. I do so on behalf of a constituent. I will call her Sarah today because, understandably, she has asked to be kept anonymous for the purpose of the story she wishes me to share with all Members, but that in no way diminishes the great bravery that she has shown in her work on this. It is a real privilege for Members of the House to meet constituents who, having experienced deeply traumatic, incredibly difficult moments in their personal life, show a resilience and depth of character that lots of us could not even dream of, and who turn their pain and personal trauma into a powerful force for change. That is deeply true of Sarah, and of so many women right across the country who have been victims of spiking.
Sarah’s story is her own, but it has themes that will resonate with far too many people here and across the UK. It starts on her birthday. Like most of us, she was looking forward to celebrating her birthday with her friends. They had organised drinks in a nearby town, and the night started off filled with fun and joy. It ended, though, with Sarah alone, traumatised, confused and unable to speak, in a car park outside the venue after she was spiked. Sadly, this horrific act is one that far too many women across the country are falling victim to. After she was spiked, Sarah tried to do what she could. She had lost control of her words. She tried to call out for help, but she felt unable to. An ambulance was called, but did not know what to do. It waited there with her, but did not take her to hospital or make sure that she got the aftercare and testing that she needed. She was left to fend for herself.
What is really tragic is the fact that on top of all that trauma, and despite how difficult that moment in the car park must have been for her, it was not the only time in this experience that she felt alone. At every step—when she engaged with the police and the authorities, and when she pushed for action—she was ignored. There was insufficient action and insufficient focus. There was minimal follow-up and no prosecution, and the police took no further action on her case.
Lola McEvoy (Darlington) (Lab)
I thank my hon. Friend for his brilliant articulation of Sarah’s story, which for too many of us, including myself as the MP for Darlington, is not uncommon. Before I was elected as the MP, I raised this issue in Darlington because a number of people there had been affected by spiking. Does he agree that bringing this provision into law today is important because for so many people—often women and vulnerable people—not being believed when they report being spiked is one of the big barriers to seeking justice?
Alistair Strathern
A lot of us have been inspired by my hon. Friend’s campaigning before she arrived in this place, and her intervention is a powerful example of why. It is exactly that moment—that lack of belief—that far too many victims of spiking are encountering when they go to the authorities at the moment, and it is that lack of belief that we are looking to completely undercut in legislating to make this a specific offence today.
Sarah reached out to me because, excited as she is about the Bill, she rightly wants to ensure that we are delivering it as fully as possible. I know that it is the same motivation that made the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East table his amendment. I thank the Minister for taking the time to speak to me about this amendment on Friday. I know from the conversations she has had with officials that they are confident that, as drafted, the Bill would capture the fullness of possible offences related to spiking.
Joe Robertson
I am grateful to the hon. Member, particularly for setting out the case of his constituent, who was here in Westminster yesterday; indeed, I also met her. Does he accept that it is those of us elected in this Chamber who make decisions, and that assurances from officials that cannot be articulated in this House—I am looking for that articulation—are not a good reason not to back my amendment?
Alistair Strathern
I thank the hon. Member for all the work he has done on this important issue through tabling the amendment, not just now but in Committee. I do not want to put words into the Minister’s mouth, but I am pretty sure she will be able to articulate some of those officials’ views back to him when summing up. However, I want to ask the Minister, as I am sure the hon. Member and other colleagues would want to, that, as we go through this process—and given that she cares so passionately about this issue—she continues to test that understanding with officials. We owe it to Sarah and the many other victims of spiking to ensure that we get this right. I know the Minister is as determined as I am to ensure that happens, and I really hope that as a result we can fully test officials’ understanding and that view before we finally get the Bill into law, to ensure that we are taking the fullness of action needed to tackle spiking.
That fullness of action is important, because the issues that Sarah encountered and the challenges that far too many people face from spiking right across the country are not ones that we can solve with legislation alone. That is an important part of why we are acting by bringing forward a new clause today, and why we are discussing amendment 19.
If the Bill is finally passed and finally brings forward that specific offence that so many of us have been looking for, I hope that it will not be the end of the story. I hope the Minister will be able to bring forward further action, working closely with police chiefs and commissioners, to ensure that this is drilled into their strategic visions as part of our national strategy to reduce violence against women and girls.
We need to make sure that forces appropriately prioritise spiking cases, that officers are appropriately trained to encounter them and take them seriously, ensuring that deadlines around collecting CCTV are not missed before crucial evidence is deleted. We need to ensure that right across the country, there is not a single force that is not taking this issue with the seriousness that it deserves. I will certainly be reaching out to both my police and crime commissioners to urge them to do exactly that, and I would welcome the Minister’s thoughts about how this Government can make sure that we use all the powers and tools at our disposal to ensure that police forces are doing so too.
If we are to deter possible perpetrators of this crime, it is important that the severity of this new legislation and the new penalties are well understood, too. I would therefore welcome the Minister’s thoughts on how we can ensure that we are disseminating the action we are underlining today, and hopefully bringing into law in due course, to ensure that right across the country no one is under any illusions that spiking is not a deeply serious offence. It will be treated as such by this Government and by the police, who will go after them with the full force of the law.
For far too long, victims like Sarah and far too many people—typically women—right across the country have been left exposed to spiking. They have been left feeling like they are victims and left to go through their experiences alone. Fantastic organisations like Spike Aware UK have done all they can to champion their cause, to bring them together, to mobilise and to reinforce the need for change, but it is only through action nationally and delivering through our police forces right across the country that we can finally do justice to the severity of this issue and to the passionate campaigning of constituents like Sarah, who for far too long have felt that they have been suffering alone. I am glad to see this legislation coming forward and to see this specific spiking offence included. I look forward to working with the Minister to ensure that we can deliver it in as ambitious a way as possible.
Wendy Morton
As we have heard, the Bill is broad in scope. Before I turn to the couple of amendments that I support, I want to recognise that the Bill’s scope is evidenced by the breadth and number of amendments and new clauses. It is worth gently reminding ourselves that a number of the measures were carried over from the Criminal Justice Bill, which sadly fell due to the general election almost a year ago, though there are obviously new clauses and amendments. I hope the Minister is in listening mode, in change mode and is willing to work across the House, and I hope that she accepts some of these amendments, because they would go a long way to further improving this legislation.
I have read through the Bill, and much of it goes right to the heart of the communities we seek to serve and represent. There are topics in the Bill that regularly pop up in my inbox and I am sure into colleagues’ inboxes as well. I want to cover two specific areas. The first is fly-tipping and littering—an issue that I have spoken about on many occasions in this Chamber since I was first elected. I support the amendments and new clauses tabled by the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West (Matt Vickers).
In an intervention earlier, I touched on the cost of littering to the country. I think I said that it was £1 million, but I meant £1 billion; I hope that can be firmly corrected, because it is a big difference. The principle is the same—it is money that could go back into our communities—but £1 billion spent on managing littering and fly-tipping is a huge amount of money that could otherwise buy a huge amount of services for constituencies up and down the country.
Lola McEvoy
Does the right hon. Lady’s calculation of £1 billion account for how people feel, for the degradation of pride in areas where people fly-tip, and for the failure of local services to be able to afford to collect and clean up rubbish tips on the side of our roads? I wonder if there is a multiplier effect in how people feel about their areas because of all this fly-tipping.
Wendy Morton
The hon. Lady makes an important point. There is a social and community cost that is difficult to evaluate. I am fortunate to have some fantastic volunteers and groups, including the Wombles group, that go out and litter pick. I do not mind going out and helping when I can. There is a great sense of a community coming together, but nothing is more frustrating than litter picking a street, walking back and finding that one of the tossers has just tossed some more litter out of their car.
Tom Hayes (Bournemouth East) (Lab)
I do not think the right hon. Member was pointing at her shadow Minister when she was accusing somebody of being a litter tosser—I think it was just a dramatic gesture, because nothing could be further from the truth.
Building on the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Darlington (Lola McEvoy), does the right hon. Member agree that when people see potholes unfilled, litter uncollected, overgrown verges and general disrepair—when they are walking through decline—they feel hopeless, not just about their communities, in which they take such pride, but about the ability of their council and elected officials to act on their most immediate priorities? Does she agree that when we restore pride in place by fixing these problems, we help to create a confidence that politics can deliver a better community?
Wendy Morton
That is an important point about pride in where we live and about hope. As I travel around the country, I often take a mental note of the number of potholes I drive across; there is a noticeable difference from one authority to another. I have to say that Walsall is quite good at the moment when it comes to filling potholes.
The hon. Gentleman makes an important point about litter and communities. My local authority of late has been successfully prosecuting some litterbugs. I have seen a couple of examples on social media just this week of individuals who have been treating the high street in Pelsall as their own personal litter bin, and the local authority has gone after them and fined them. That sends a strong message, but there is more we can do. Although much of this is about clearing up after these people, we also need deterrence to stop this happening. A lot of it is down to a lack of respect for the community and antisocial behaviour, for want of a better word, and it is a burden that we should not expect the taxpayer to keep shouldering. We have reached something of a tipping point, and we need to do something more than letting people walk away with a slap on the wrist.
Whether it is bin strikes, as we have seen in Birmingham, rural fly-tipping or littering, a lot of our communities feel absolutely fed up and overwhelmed, and they want action. I support the amendments tabled by the shadow Minister because, taken together, they form a serious and joined-up response that would help to protect and support not only our communities and those who want to keep them clean, but the local environment and wildlife too.
Similarly, it is often local farmers who face the burden of fly-tipping. When fly-tipping happens on their land, the cost of removing it falls to them. It hardly seems fair that they are left to foot the bill for waste that they did not create. Amendment 172, on clean-up costs, seeks to address that. I have heard time and again from frustrated landowners and farmers that the system often punishes the victims of fly-tipping, not the perpetrators.
Lola McEvoy
Does the right hon. Lady have any thoughts on the idea that people who hire somebody privately to take away their rubbish are often being held accountable for that third-party company dumping the rubbish illegally? People are at a loss to know what they are supposed to do.
Wendy Morton
The hon. Lady makes another important point about tackling waste crime—I think that is the technical phrase for it. Again, that is something that I see locally. Enforcement matters, but there also has to be strong reminder—I hate to use the word “education”, so perhaps “reminder” is best—to our constituents: if somebody comes to you and says they will clear your rubbish away, your need to think carefully about where they are putting that rubbish. In my constituency, fridges and mattresses have been dumped. I was driving down Bridle Lane last year and saw a whole lorry or van-load of rubbish that had been fly-tipped in the middle of the road. That meant that the road had to be blocked. That is outrageous and it needs to stop.
Jo White (Bassetlaw) (Lab)
Lawlessness, antisocial behaviour, street crime and shoplifting have dragged our communities down. When people believe that they can act with impunity, without fear of apprehension or respect for others, we need Parliament to come down hard to restore law and order and give the police the resources that they need to make our streets safe again. I therefore take this opportunity to welcome the Crime and Policing Bill, which put right the years of damage and disregard caused by the previous Government.
My focus today is on street racing, a problem that stretches across the country but has become a curse in Bassetlaw, where cars speed along a stretch of the A57, the by-pass that runs through Worksop and then into the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Rother Valley (Jake Richards). Those unofficial road-racing events are organised via social media. People meet up in an edge-of-town car park and then stage races up and down the A57, attracting huge crowds who come to witness the speeds and the flashy souped-up cars with booming exhausts.
Residents living close to the A57 hear the noise, including the screeching of tyres, but they are terrified that they or a family member will get caught up with the racers as they drive home or go about their daily business. The fear of a nasty accident is all pervasive. Across the country, people who have turned up to watch the racing have died, such as 19-year-old Ben Corfield and 16-year-old Liberty Charris from Dudley, and 19-year-old Sophie Smith from Radcliffe—young lives needlessly lost.
Cameron Thomas
Let me say, in the spirit of openness, that as a young man I perhaps did not always drive as responsibly as I do now. Although the hon. Lady is making an important point, there is an educational component to this. Will she join me in commending the work of the Under 17 Car Club and its Pathfinder initiative, which teaches young drivers about the dangers of driving in that fashion?
Jo White
My concern is that such unorganised racing events are held to show off how fast and noisy cars can be—there needs to be much stronger action to control that. I worry that there will be further deaths and accidents if the police are not given the powers to deal with it.
In Bassetlaw, I visited residents who told me that their lives are a living hell, with their nerves on edge every weekend. Not only do they hear the noise, but the fronts of their houses have become viewing platforms for the crowds.
Freddie van Mierlo (Henley and Thame) (LD)
I thank the hon. Lady for making that point, because I have experienced exactly what she describes on my own street in Henley. We had a problem with street racing—boy racing, if we can call it that—and I phoned the police on several occasions. They said, “We know it’s happening, but we don’t have the resources to come and deal with it.” Eventually they got so many calls that they acted. They put in place some sort of prevention order for antisocial behaviour, but that could be done only once—they could not do it over an extended timeframe. Does she feel that the powers should be strengthened for the police to stop that intimidating and antisocial behaviour?
Jo White
I very much agree; that is why I am raising it today. The hon. Gentleman talks about public space protection orders, which I will come to shortly, but I think the law needs to be strengthened to give the police much stronger powers to deal with the problem. It is not a local phenomenon, because it is happening right across the country and people are using encrypted social media to organise the groups.
Since those visits, I have been working with Bassetlaw district council and the police on this issue. That council has joined forces with Rotherham council, and they are bringing forward a public space protection order, which I just mentioned, to cover the whole of the A57—from outside Worksop all the way to Rotherham—with the ambition of prohibiting car cruising and giving the police the ability to serve fixed penalty notices, prosecute or issue fines for breaches.
In the meantime, I have worked with the police to install a CCTV camera at a key point on the A57, and there are plans to put up a second. The camera is being used to collect data on the vehicles that turn up for cruising events. The police then send pre-enforcement letters to the car owners. The owners were not necessarily driving at the time, however, because quite often young people have borrowed their parents’ car, meaning that the notices are being sent to parents—but I think that is just as good, to be honest. The police say that that is helping to reduce involvement.
The police tell me that they have put dedicated staffing into patrolling the A57 for the next four weekends. Their zero-tolerance approach will include fines, seizure and reporting to the courts. They are also sharing live intelligence on vehicles moving around the county, in order to be proactive and prevent cruising and meets before they happen. They have been successful, they believe, in preventing racing before it starts. Like me, the police are fearful that someone could die or be seriously injured, so they regard this matter as a high priority. I am disappointed that the local police of the hon. Member for Henley and Thame (Freddie van Mierlo) do not consider it in the same way.
This is a serious issue. Most weekends on Friday, Saturday or Sunday night, such cars are present. People perhaps just meet in an empty supermarket car park to compare their vehicles, but on other occasions they take the opportunity to race. I have been out to look at the cars myself to see who those individuals are. At first, I thought that they were using their vehicles to engage in crime, but the whole focus is on showing off their souped-up vehicles. We have already had deaths—quite often of the people who go out to witness the speeding—so I am calling for much stronger action to prevent further death.
Mrs Sureena Brackenridge (Wolverhampton North East) (Lab)
The increased orders in the Crime and Policing Bill, such as respect orders, will help to tackle antisocial behaviour. Does my hon. Friend think that they could be a vehicle—sorry, poor choice of word—to address the gatherings that she has described?
Jo White
I agree with my hon. Friend—those orders could be used.
The Bill strengthens the ability to seize motor vehicles when they are used in a manner causing alarm, distress or annoyance, but this is a nationwide problem, and I ask the Minister for a private discussion to consider whether the Bill can be strengthened to make it criminal to organise, promote or attend an unofficial road-racing event.
I welcome the Bill because it respects and recognises the daily risks our shop workers face. My constituent went to buy a pint of milk in his local Sainsbury’s at Easter time. He was queuing up for the milk when somebody rushed in and swept the whole shelf of Easter eggs into a bag. They call it “supermarket sweep”, and it is the new form of shoplifting. It is not someone sneakily putting something in their pocket or bag—it is people stealing food to order very publicly, and it is food that is worth a lot of money.
Lola McEvoy
In my constituency of Darlington, I have witnessed people doing what my hon. Friend described so often that it is now a common source of conversation between me and the assistants working in those shops. Does she agree that USDAW’s campaign to protect shop workers, which has been going on for years, is brilliant and that it is excellent that this Labour Government are going to finally introduce the right punishments for people who commit aggravated assaults against shop workers?
Jo White
USDAW was the first union I ever joined, and I very much support its campaign. I share the fear that shop workers have, because there is nothing they can do. They have to sit or stand and watch the crime happen, for fear of being assaulted or abused—that is the advice that USDAW and their management have given them. The law has to be strengthened to protect them. They have to go to work every day and face that fear, which creates inordinate stress. That is unacceptable.
Tom Hayes
My hon. Friend is giving a powerful speech. In my constituency of Bournemouth East, I regularly talk to shop workers who are experiencing the scourge of shoplifting—no, wholesale looting—and they are being made to feel incredibly unsafe. I am thinking of the staff of Tesco in Tuckton, the Co-op on Seabourne Road and Tesco on the Grove in Southbourne. I am also thinking of the owner of a wine shop who has a hockey stick beside them, so that they can chase away shoplifters who try to take carts of wine bottles. Does my hon. Friend agree that it is very good news that our Labour Government are introducing a new offence of assaulting retail workers and ending the effective decriminalisation of shoplifting? Will she also commend the Co-op party, which, like USDAW, has campaigned so hard for this new law?
Jo White
I wholeheartedly agree. It is not just USDAW; the Co-op party has campaigned vociferously on this matter, too. It is so important, and I very much welcome the action this Government are taking. This has gone on for too long. People need to feel safe in the workplace, and this is the best step we can take towards that.
Shop workers in Worksop town centre also have to deal with an inordinate amount of antisocial behaviour. For example, I have been told about how young people come into Greggs, take food from the cabinets and throw it about. The shop workers there feel so fearful that they have not taken the covid screens down, because they do not want to be attacked. The intimidation they feel is not acceptable. I have visited an opticians where the management escort their staff out of the workplace to their cars on a regular basis. It was particularly bad last winter, when I spoke to staff and management there because I was so concerned. I have had meetings with the council and the police to tackle this issue.
I welcome the Government’s commitment to increasing neighbourhood policing, with more police in our town centres. Everybody tells me they want to see more police walking the streets so that they feel safe as they go into town and can make the choice about where they shop. I do not want people to think about their safety when they go into town centres in my constituency. It is a priority that they know where the police are, know them by their names and feel safe as they go into town. This Bill goes to the heart of many of the issues that have broken our country, and we are doing what we can to repair it.
Graham Leadbitter (Moray West, Nairn and Strathspey) (SNP)
There is not a huge number of areas of the Bill that impact Scotland directly, given the role of the justice system in Scotland, but road traffic law is one of those areas. Antisocial behaviour involving vehicles has been raised by several Members today, and some powers, including those over vehicle licensing, remain reserved.
Matt Rodda (Reading Central) (Lab)
The hon. Gentleman is making an excellent speech. This is, indeed, a serious problem across the country. In my constituency, many residents are concerned about speeding e-bikes of various types. I am pleased that our local force, Thames Valley Police, is taking more action, and I would urge it to go further. I am glad to hear that Police Scotland is also taking action on this terrible menace.
Graham Leadbitter
I am pleased to hear that work is ongoing throughout the country.
I should have said at the start that I am speaking to amendment 2, which stands in my name. The SNP recognises that there have been calls for further legislation on licensing, which is what my amendment relates to. The SNP tabled a similar amendment in Committee relating to off-road bikes.
Everyone who uses our roads and paths is responsible for respecting other road and path users and for following the rules and guidance in the highway code. Unfortunately, a significant minority of road users are not respecting the rights of other road users and are riding motorised vehicles illegally on our roads and paths. In the worst cases, they have caused serious injury and death to either themselves or other people, causing huge heartache for the families affected.
Lola McEvoy
I commend the hon. Member for making that important point—these young people who are using off-road bikes are not only tearing up communities and green spaces, but putting themselves at severe risk. I commend him for bringing that point to the House, because it is such an important one.
Graham Leadbitter
It goes to the point made by the hon. Member for Tewkesbury (Cameron Thomas), who talked about his experience as a young driver and being a more responsible driver now. I would echo that myself, and I am sure most people recognise that in themselves. Some of it is inexperience, sometimes it is just plain stupidity, but that education is important to help tackle the issue, and ensure that people understand the potential consequences of such actions both for themselves and for other people.
A particularly good education piece was done in north-east Scotland, when children from all over the area went to a large venue and were given a hard-hitting and pretty blunt message, including videos of serious road accidents where people had been either seriously injured or killed. When they went into the venue they saw a fine-looking car; when they came out, that car had been crushed as if it had been in an accident. That was a hard-hitting experience, and lots of young people came out of it with a new respect for driving and using motor vehicles.
I turn now to off-road and quad bikes, and particularly e-bikes, which the amendment is focused on. The SNP supports Police Scotland and its partners in dealing with illegally modified vehicles and the misuse of off-road vehicles. The Scottish Government are considering ways forward, in partnership with Police Scotland and local authorities, to tackle vehicle nuisance and related safety issues. That includes continuing to liaise with the UK Government—a lot of work has gone on behind the scenes between the devolved Administrations and the UK Government, and I welcome that work by the Minister and her civil servants, which has been helpful. The ongoing collaboration ensures that Scottish interests are considered in any UK-wide decisions affecting road safety.
We are also considering further options, including liaising with the UK Government on a cross-party basis, and community engagement regarding the potential use of mobile safety camera vans to deter registered vehicles from speeding on public roads. The amendment calls on the Government to conduct a consultation on licensing and tracking the ownership of e-bikes and e-scooters, which in many cases are required to be insured, although the public are generally not aware of that.
I will make a final plea to the insurance sector, which I think could be doing a lot more to make it clear to people what insurance does and does not cover. The modification of vehicles—that was raised earlier by the hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Jo White)—is one such issue, and I do not recall seeing a great deal about that in insurance documents I have received over the years. The insurance industry could do a lot more to increase public awareness and try to tackle such issues and support the Scottish and UK Governments in their objectives.
Jack Abbott (Ipswich) (Lab/Co-op)
I will be speaking to a number of new clauses, but I will start by setting out a tiny bit of context and saying why the Bill is so important for my town. At the heart of Ipswich is a community—neighbours who support each other, and small businesses that serve us in the town centre and that are seeing real shoots of recovery. However, there is no doubt that when I was proudly elected as its MP, we were arguably at our lowest ebb for generations. Regenerating our town is not just about economics; it is about rebuilding our community, and that is exactly what the Bill helps to deliver. I welcome the Government’s new clauses and amendments, which strengthen the Bill further.
This has been a good conversation and cross-party debate, but I say gently to the shadow Minister, who tried to claim credit for a number of the changes, that I do not think the argument “If only we’d had 15 years, rather than 14” will wash with many of the people watching. The challenges that we have spoken about did not happen overnight; they were years in the making. Although I appreciate the conversations that we have had today, we must acknowledge the years of suffering that many of our residents, businesses and emergency services—I will come to them in a moment—have faced. With those years behind us, I welcome the amendments that introduce important provisions to help turn that tide.
The Bill gives the police the power they need to tackle mobile phone thefts and recover stolen goods. As has been said, we are scrapping the £200 shoplifting threshold, which has disproportionately hit small and independent businesses in my town and across the country. It also introduces tough new respect orders to tackle the worst antisocial behaviour offenders, so that our town centre is no longer blighted by the same offenders again and again. Any retail worker in any corner of our town will be able to list a shocking litany of abuse, harassment and sometimes even violence. As has been said, USDAW and the Co-operative party have done incredible work in that area, but such abuse is not part of the job, which is why the Bill creates the specific offence of assaulting a shop worker.
New clause 52 will introduce a new offence of trespassing with intent to commit a criminal offence. It will give the police the necessary powers to act when individuals enter a premises with the intention of committing serious criminal acts, be that burglary, theft, assault or criminal damage. For businesses in towns such as Ipswich, that matters hugely. I speak regularly with local shop owners, small business owners, and retail workers who are proud to serve their communities but who have seen at first hand the impact of rising theft, vandalism, break-ins and antisocial behaviour on our high streets. The new clause gives our police a tool to intervene early before harm is done and when there is clear intent to commit a crime.
The amendments also extend protection to those who protect us. That is why I strongly support new clauses 60 to 62, which strengthen the law to ensure that emergency workers are properly protected from the threats, intimidation and abuse that they all too often face while simply doing their jobs to serve the public. Too many of our frontline police officers, paramedics, NHS staff and firefighters have faced unacceptable abuse. Let me be frank: it is utterly disgusting that those serving our communities and country, who keep us safe, sometimes with great sacrifice and selflessness, all too often suffer such unacceptable behaviour. I am sure that everyone in the Chamber has heard awful stories of emergency workers who have endured abuse on account of their race or religion, and the new clauses make clear the consequences for an individual if they engage in such bigotry.
As I said earlier, we should never accept such things as simply being part of the job. The new measures ensure that when people threaten or insult those emergency workers, there are clear criminal consequences. To our frontline workers, I say this directly: “This House stands with you. You deserve not just our gratitude, but our full support. You protect us, so we will protect you.”
Another sad indictment of the last few years is the absolute impunity for violence against women and girls. I speak to so many women in Ipswich who feel uncomfortable, particularly at night. Women have been told to keep an eye on their drinks for fear of spiking, and victims of other heinous crimes have felt that they are fighting not just the perpetrator, but a system stacked against them. I therefore strongly support stronger stalking protection orders and the new spiking offence.
However, the Bill is about more than new laws; it is also about faster justice, stronger protections, and proper accountability for police and councils when victims are let down. That is why I support new clause 59, which rightly removes time limits for civil claims in child sexual abuse cases. The law should never compound the trauma of victims by closing the doors to justice simply because too much time has passed.
New clauses 54 and 56 also apply much stronger protections for children and young people. The abuse and coercion of children is a grotesque crime, and the cowards using children to carry out their criminal operations should face the full force of the law. We know this abuse can be pernicious, and the tactics that are used are constantly evolving, but these new clauses and other parts of the Bill seek to tackle the issue head-on.
Like the Bill, the new clauses also put victims where they should always have been—at the heart of the legal system. The Bill sends a clear message: we will no longer tolerate survivors being shut out by the technicalities of the system. Their voices matter, their experiences matter and their right to seek justice matters. Public confidence does not just rest on tough talk or new offences; it rests also on a system that people trust—trust that the police will respond, victims will be supported, those who commit crimes will be held to account, and powers granted will be used fairly, proportionately and with accountability.
The safety of our communities cannot rest on central Government alone. I welcome this Bill’s focus on partnership—not passing problems between agencies, but solving them together. The national initiative matches our local initiative in Ipswich. I have been working with Labour-led Ipswich borough council to put in place a groundbreaking partnership with Ipswich Central to tackle street drinking in our town centre. The Bill is proof that if we work together, we can deliver at every level.
While we bring forward fully formed and fully costed plans to make a difference to the lives of people in my town, and in others, I am only too aware that some people still want to divide communities such as ours in Ipswich. They rarely offer real solutions, policies or change. Instead, they simply want to feed resentment, and pit neighbour against neighbour. I know that we are stronger when we stand together—not divided by fear or set against each other, but united in our determination to make our town and our country safer, fairer and more secure for everyone. That is exactly what the Bill will give us.
Several hon. Members rose—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
Order. Before I call the next speaker, I inform the House that I plan to call the Minister at 3.50 pm, which would give the remaining Members bobbing about five minutes each.
David Mundell (Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale and Tweeddale) (Con)
I rise to support amendment 19, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East (Joe Robertson). I hope that the Minister listened to the compelling case that my hon. Friend made, and to the compelling case made by the hon. Member for Hitchin (Alistair Strathern) on the issue of spiking more generally.
I want to put on record my support for my constituents, Colin and Mandy Mackie, and their organisation, Spike Aware UK. I do not think any of us can fully comprehend their experience: the police knocked on their door to tell them that their 18-year-old son had died at college from a drug overdose, but they subsequently found out that his non-alcoholic drink had been spiked by five ecstasy tablets. As other Members have said, there was no support or help for the family in that situation. The police assumed that he had died of a drug overdose although they did not know that, and they subsequently apologised to the Mackies for their treatment of them.
What I particularly admire about Colin and Mandy is how they have focused their efforts on ensuring that their experience is not shared by anyone else. That is why I very much welcome the inclusion of spiking in the Bill, which is a continuation from the Criminal Justice Bill introduced in the previous Parliament. The point to be made is about certainty, and the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East brings certainty to the situation. I have been in this House with previous Ministers who have been told by officials that spiking was already covered by legislation, and therefore there was no need for specific mention of spiking.
David Mundell
Given the strictures on time, I had better not.
Previous Ministers said that there was no need for specific legislation on spiking, because it was already covered. Campaigning, including by your colleague, Madam Deputy Speaker, the First Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means, the hon. Member for Bradford South (Judith Cummins), and by my former colleague, Richard Graham, demonstrated that there was a need for a specific measure, and that if we are going to have a specific measure, it needs to bring certainty.
Part of that certainty is for the benefit of the police and others. The police should know that that reckless behaviour is also a crime, and there should not be any dubiety when they arrive at a venue to find someone in a partially conscious state or unable to articulate what has happened to them. It will also allow campaigning to be clear that whatever the circumstances, a drink is spiked or a person is injected, and that is a crime. Amendment 19—or perhaps another amendment that the Government might bring forward in the other place—would bring clarity, which is important. That is what we need to bring about. As the hon. Member for Hitchin said, that can lead to the greater training of the police and NHS workers to be able to support people in a spiking situation. I hope the Minister will reflect on everything that has been said today.
The final point I will make relates particularly to Scotland. We need to have a common approach across the UK; it should not matter whether somebody is spiked in Glasgow, Manchester or Cardiff. That is not to disrespect the devolution settlement and the different approaches of the criminal justice system. The effect and the impact should be the same wherever people are, and the criminality should most certainly be the same, whether the behaviour is intentional or reckless.
Emily Darlington (Milton Keynes Central) (Lab)
In the interests of time, I will skip through the many amendments I want to support, but there are a few that will really make a difference to people in Milton Keynes Central.
First, I reiterate what my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw (Jo White) said on street racing. Unfortunately, we had a Formula 1 driver who said that his success was based on practising on the grid roads of Milton Keynes, which really encouraged loads of people to decide to race there.
In terms of stalking and spiking, the most egregious bit of spiking for me is the premeditation—sourcing the materials, bringing them to the venue then using them on a person. That is not a crime done on the spur of the moment: significant premeditation comes into it.
One of the major issues we have had in Milton Keynes is organised begging outside our shopping centre. It is organised by gangs. People often look like they are homeless, or they are assumed to be homeless by caring residents in Milton Keynes, but in reality they are housed by the council, and they are exploited. They have a rota for which corner or which shop they can each sit in front of during which period of time, and the majority of the proceeds that people donate go to an organised crime network. Those individuals are being exploited in other ways as well. New clause 53 is so important in addressing this issue as the real, true crime that it is—not the crime of the people begging but of those organising the begging.
I also rise in support of new clause 55, which is on special measures for witnesses, particularly around youth justice. That is very important. As we heard from my hon. Friend the Member for North West Cambridgeshire (Sam Carling), many people who experience sexual abuse do not come forward for years and years, so new clause 59, which would remove limitations, is really important.
Let me address a couple of other things in the Bill. My hon. Friend the Member for Bolton North East (Kirith Entwistle) made such an important speech considering domestic abuse, and she explained it very well. New clause 71 is about barred persons not having employment in law enforcement. We must recognise that, following the case of Sarah Everard, confidence in law enforcement is at an all-time low. When people call law enforcement because they have experienced domestic abuse, sexual harassment, rape or stalking, they are at their most vulnerable and they need to know that the people responding to those incidents—no matter which law enforcement service—will treat them according to the law, and not with some of their own natural biases, as we have seen.
That brings me to my final point. In terms of confidence in policing, we need to ensure that all law enforcement is done with clarity of law, not because of particular campaigning, as we have seen with the enforcement of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, which we will debate later.
Luke Taylor (Sutton and Cheam) (LD)
I was incredibly fortunate to sit on the Bill Committee considering this legislation. It is clear that, although opinions differ on details, we all share a common goal of tackling crime in a meaningful way, so that we can make people feel safe in our communities again.
As a community-focused liberal, I have stated many times that keeping people safe and instilling safety in our neighbourhoods are some of the most powerful ways that we can foster strong communities and improve the quality of life and freedom of opportunity that everyone in our country should enjoy. I am grateful to the Government for their willingness to engage with the points that we all made in Committee, particularly to the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips), and the Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention, the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham (Dame Diana Johnson). Despite several productive conversations, it is frustrating that several important additions to the Bill were rejected by the Government in Committee.
For that reason, I rise to speak in favour of several new clauses before us. Although several of the measures closest to my heart—those regarding community policing, knife crime and stalking—are not before the House today, there are several pressing new clauses that I feel I must speak to. They pertain to what should be fundamental rights in our country: the right to freedom from oppression, and the right of access to proper healthcare for women. I congratulate the hon. Member for North West Cambridgeshire (Sam Carling) on the courage he demonstrated in his speech earlier, and encourage the Government to consider the measures he spoke to if they come back from the Lords, if not to consider them beforehand.
I start by expressing my support for amendment 19, which deals with spiking and was tabled by the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East (Joe Robertson). Spiking is a horrendous offence—a deeply violating act of harm and potential exploitation that must be treated with the utmost seriousness. In Committee, we heard evidence from Colin Mackie, who is the chair and co-founder of Spike Aware UK. Colin gave important evidence for the Committee to consider, indicating that spiking offences can often be intended as pranks, rather than intended to cause harm. His son Greg died in a suspected drink-spiking incident in a club, and Colin has since campaigned alongside Greg’s mother Mandy for a change in the law to stop similar incidents from occurring.
I also thank the hon. Member for Hitchin (Alistair Strathern) for raising broader concerns about spiking. I agree that further measures need to be introduced, including A&E awareness, so that testing takes place, further evidence can be gathered and a conviction can be secured. Amendment 19 is a sensible and necessary clarification of the law. It makes clear what seems painfully obvious: that what matters in spiking cases is not the nature of the intent, but the recklessness and callousness of the act itself. I encourage Members across the House to support the amendment when we vote.
I am also pleased to support amendment 160, as well as related new clauses 92 and 93, which we will discuss tomorrow. Taken together, these amendments create vital safeguards around the right to protest; they would subject facial recognition technologies to the proper scrutiny of a regulatory framework for the first time, and would enshrine the right to protest. From many people in my constituency of Sutton and Cheam and from campaigning groups such as Liberty, I know that these measures are long overdue, and will provide much-needed clarity to police forces as they use new technologies to fight crime. Police forces themselves are asking for these measures, and I am looking forward to a briefing later this month from the Minister on that subject. In particular, I remind the House that Hongkongers in my community are deeply worried about the impact of unregulated use of facial recognition technology on our streets. They fear that, if compromised, such technology could provide a powerful tool to the Chinese Communist party in its transnational oppression of Hongkongers here on our streets in Britain.
We know that facial recognition technology can be a powerful tool for police forces as they try to keep us safe, but as with any new technology with great capacity to infringe on our liberties in daily life, it must be properly regulated. Liberal Democrats have a proud tradition of standing up for those civil liberties, arguing that we must never throw them away or sleepwalk into surrendering them. Amendment 160, which the Liberal Democrats have tabled, is rightly in that tradition. It would make sure that facial recognition technology cannot be used in real time for biometric identification unless certain conditions are satisfied, such as preventing or investigating serious crimes under the Serious Crime Act 2007 or public safety threats such as terrorist attacks, or searching for missing, vulnerable people. It would also make the use of such technology subject to judicial authorisation, with a judge needing to approve its use and appropriately define its scope, duration and purpose. These regulations would allow for safe use of this important tool, protecting our civil liberties while keeping us safe from crime.
Freddie van Mierlo
In the time remaining, I will speak to amendment 9, which has been tabled by the hon. Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion) and is supported by many Members across the House, including myself. I welcome the Government’s provisions to limit sex offenders’ ability to change their name, and I know that many other Members also welcome them. I pay tribute to tireless campaigners such as Della Wright, who have campaigned for such provisions for many years and who I had the privilege of meeting at an event organised by Emma Jane Taylor, another tireless campaigner and a constituent of mine.
Emma Jane is a survivor, and has spoken very bravely about the lifelong impact of child sexual abuse. Like many survivors, she has channelled her pain into campaigns such as this one and has set up a charity, Project 90-10. That charity is based on research showing that 90% of child sexual abuse is carried out by persons known to the victim.
We are right in the House to focus—as we have in the past—on online abuse and abuse by strangers, but we should not forget that 90% of child sexual abuse is carried out by someone the victim knows. Work by Project 90-10 raises awareness of good safeguarding practices. Emma Jane brought to my attention the loophole that allows sex offenders to change their name and, potentially, continue to offend untraced. Amendment 9 would strengthen the name change provision in the Bill by requiring sex offenders to notify the police of their intention to change their name seven days before submitting an application to do so. Even if the Government do not adopt amendment 9, either here—I know that it will not be voted on—or in the other place, it is important for them to monitor the success of the changes that are in the Bill, and, in particular, the number of sex offenders who do, and do not, come forward to comply with the rules. I hope that the Government will monitor developments closely, and will introduce new legislation if the loophole is not closed, as they intend it to be.
Child sexual abuse is a wicked and despicable crime, and the Government are right to introduce these measures, as well as the others about which Members have spoken so eloquently. I ask the Government to follow up on the Bill’s implementation, and to monitor that extremely closely, as this matter is important to many Members of this House.
Dame Diana Johnson
I am grateful to Members for setting out the case for their amendments, and I will seek to respond to as many Members as possible in the remaining time available.
The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton West (Matt Vickers), tabled amendments 167 to 183, which echo many of the amendments considered in Committee. I do not propose to repeat the considered responses that my ministerial colleagues and I provided at that stage, but I will deal with a couple of the amendments to which the shadow Minister referred today.
Amendment 175 deals with the possession of weapons with intent to use unlawful violence. It seeks to increase the maximum sentence for possession of a bladed article or offensive weapon with the intention to use unlawful violence from four years to 14. Increasing the maximum penalty for that offence in isolation, without looking at other possession offences, would result in inconsistency in the law in this area. We have set the maximum penalty for the “possession with intent” offence at four years’ imprisonment to be consistent with the maximum penalties for all other knife-related possession offences. We will conduct a review of the maximum penalties for knife-related offences, and establish whether they are still appropriate.
The shadow Minister said that the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation had recommended that the sentence for the new offence of possession of a weapon with intent to cause violence should be increased substantially. In his recent report, the independent reviewer recommended the creation of a new offence for cases where an individual prepares to kill more than two people. He said:
“If this offence is created, then there is no need to reconsider the maximum sentence for the proposed offence of possessing an article with violent intent under the Crime and Policing Bill.”
As I have said, the Government are considering creating such an offence, so increasing the maximum sentence for the new offence of possessing an article with violent intent is unnecessary. We will debate the matter further tomorrow, when we consider the shadow Minister’s new clause 143.
The shadow Minister also tabled, and referred to, amendments 172 and 173, which would make those responsible for fly-tipping
“liable for the costs of cleaning up.”
When local authorities prosecute fly-tippers, on conviction, a cost order can already be made by the court, so that a landowner’s costs can be recovered from the perpetrator. While sentencing is a matter for the courts, guidance on presenting court cases produced by the National Fly-Tipping Prevention Group, which the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs chairs, explains that prosecutors should consider applying for compensation for the removal of waste, and we will consider building on that advice in the statutory guidance issued under clause 9. Amendment 174 concerns points on driving licences as a penalty for fly-tipping. Again, sentencing is a matter for the courts, but I will ask my counterparts at DEFRA, who are responsible for policy on fly-tipping, to consider the benefits of enabling the endorsement of penalty points for fly-tippers.
The hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Lisa Smart) spoke to amendment 160 on the use of live facial recognition in the policing of protests. Live facial recognition is a valuable policing tool that helps to keep people safe. Its use is already governed by the Human Rights Act 1998 and data protection laws. I do, however, recognise the need to assess whether a bespoke legislation framework is needed, and we will set out our plans on this later in the year.
Dawn Butler (Brent East) (Lab)
On facial recognition, does the Minister agree that my amendment 21 would stop the police accessing everybody’s driving licences to use them for complete surveillance, which is not the intention of the Bill?
Dame Diana Johnson
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for raising that point. I probably will not have time to go into detail, but the amendment is not required because what my hon. Friend describes is not what the Bill is intended to do. I am very happy to speak to her outside the Chamber about that, but I reassure her that that is not its intention.
On amendment 157, the Home Office regularly engages with frontline delivery partners and practitioners to understand how the antisocial behaviour powers are being used, and their effectiveness in preventing and tackling ASB. That is why the Bill includes measures to strengthen the powers available to police and local authorities. New requirements in the Bill for local agencies to provide information about ASB to the Government will further enhance our understanding of how the ASB powers are used to tackle antisocial behaviour.
On amendment 158, I want to make it clear that housing injunctions and youth injunctions are not novel. They are already provided for in legislation in the form of the civil injunction, which is being split into three separate orders: the respect order, the youth injunction and the housing injunction. The youth and housing injunctions retain elements of the existing civil injunction that are not covered by the new respect orders—namely, elements relating to offenders under 18 and housing-related nuisance ASB. I also assure the House that any revisions to the ASB statutory guidance are extensively consulted on with relevant stakeholders, including frontline practitioners.
The Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Hazel Grove, also spoke to amendment 3, tabled by the hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills (Tessa Munt), which would apply the duty to report child sexual abuse to anyone working or volunteering in any capacity for religious, belief or faith groups. I know that she has had an opportunity to discuss that amendment in recent days with the Minister who has responsibility for safeguarding.
Turning to the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for North West Cambridgeshire (Sam Carling), I thought it was very helpful and useful for the House to hear his experience and knowledge of the issues involving Jehovah’s Witness groups, and he brought to life what it means when such reports are made.
On amendment 10, the Government do not consider that it would be proportionate to provide for a criminal sanction that may inadvertently create a chilling effect on those who wish to volunteer with children or enter certain professions. We are creating a specific offence of preventing or deterring a person from complying with the duty to report, and anyone who seeks deliberately to prevent someone from fulfilling their mandatory duty to report child sexual abuse will face the full force of the law.
Dame Diana Johnson
I will continue, because I need to cover other amendments that have been tabled.
On amendment 11, assessing the signs and indications of abuse can be complex and subjective, particularly for the very large number of non-experts that this duty will apply to, many of whom are engaging with children infrequently or irregularly. We have therefore chosen to focus the duty on scenarios in which a reporter has been given an unambiguous reason to believe that they are in receipt of an allegation of child sexual abuse.
Amendment 22 seeks to add a reference to the legislative definition of “positions of trust” in schedule 7. However, a person occupies a position of trust only in relation to specific sexual offences committed against a specific child, and the term’s value as a definition for a reporter of abuse is therefore limited. The amendment also has the potential to create confusing duplication, given the significant overlap between regulated activity with children and positions of trust. The list of activities in schedule 7 has been drawn up to set out activities involving positions of trust that may not be adequately covered by the definition of regulated activity. The Government will of course keep this list under review, and amend it if necessary.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bolton North East (Kirith Entwistle) spoke to amendment 20, which relates to the new broader offence of encouraging or assisting self-harm in clause 95. She made a very passionate speech on this issue, and I know that she, too, has met the Minister to discuss it in recent days. On sentencing, the courts must already consider the circumstances of each case, including aggravating and mitigating factors, and follow relevant guidelines set by the independent Sentencing Council. Where a defendant has previous convictions, this is already recognised as a statutory aggravating factor in sentencing.
On whether a charge of murder should be brought in the circumstances set out in the amendment, I have to say to my hon. Friend that the amendment is wholly inconsistent with the criminal offence of murder, which has different elements that must be met before a person can be convicted. That said, it is important to recognise that where the encouragement or assistance results in suicide, the separate offence of encouraging or assisting suicide applies; manslaughter may be charged if there is a direct link between the abuse and the suicide.
The right hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) spoke to amendment 161, which aims to delete clause 114. The clause will allow the police to impose conditions on a protest near a place of worship if the police have a reasonable belief that the protest may deter individuals from accessing the place of worship for religious activities, even if that effect is not intended. That gives the police total clarity on how and when they can protect places of worship, while respecting the right to peaceful protest.
A number of hon. and right hon. Members spoke about spiking, including my hon. Friends the Members for Hitchin (Alistair Strathern) and for Darlington (Lola McEvoy), the right hon. Member for Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale and Tweeddale (David Mundell), and my hon. Friend the Member for Milton Keynes Central (Emily Darlington), as well as the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East (Joe Robertson), who tabled amendment 19. Before I say anything else, I pay tribute to all those who have campaigned on this issue for many years, including families and campaign groups. Richard Graham, a former Member of this House, was a pioneer of the case for bringing forward a spiking amendment.
As discussed in Committee, the offence as drafted already captures a wide range of criminal behaviours, which cover both spiking and non-spiking incidents; for example, it covers the victim being pepper sprayed. As for the reference to a specific intent to “injure, aggrieve or annoy”, that wording is of long standing and has been widely interpreted by the courts. Every case will be judged on the facts. For instance, if someone administers a harmful substance as a prank, they would likely be found to have intended to “annoy” or “aggrieve”. The broadness of the new offence, and the increase in the maximum penalty as compared to the penalty for the existing offence under section 24 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, is, in the Government’s view, sufficient. Introducing recklessness as an alternative to intent risks over-complicating the law and is unnecessary for securing appropriate convictions.
The hon. Member for Isle of Wight East spent a lot of time looking at this issue, so I want to address it. The spiking clause in the Bill is modelled on the offence under the 1861 Act, which does not have a recklessness test. In the 2004 case of Gantz, an intention to “loosen up” the victim—he referred to that intention in the example he gave today—was covered; it may be helpful for him to reflect on that. We also understand that as recently as last month, a person was convicted of spiking another person “as a joke”. We therefore deem that the inclusion of “recklessness” is unnecessary to ensure the appropriate convictions that we are looking for with this new offence. However, we are very happy to continue to have conversations about this to ensure that we get the law absolutely right.
Many other speeches were made today that I would like to comment on, but I am running swiftly out of time. In my earlier comments, I referred to amendments 4 to 8 from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion (Siân Berry). I fully understand why amendment 2 was tabled by the hon. Member for Moray West, Nairn and Strathspey (Graham Leadbitter), but those who cycle have a duty to do so safely and in accordance with the highway code, and they are wholly responsible and liable for their actions.
In conclusion, I hope that in the light of the responses I have given to the amendments today, Members will not press them. I commend new clause 52 to the House.
Enforcement officer | Senior officer |
|---|---|
a constable of a police force in England and Wales | a constable of at least the rank of inspector |
a constable within the meaning of Part 1 of the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 (asp 8) (see section 99 of that Act) | a constable of at least the rank of inspector |
a police officer within the meaning of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000 (see section 77(1) of that Act) | a police officer of at least the rank of inspector |
an officer appointed by the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland under section 56(1) or (1A) of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998 | an officer of at least the rank of inspector |
a member of a civilian police staff | a constable of at least the rank of inspector |
a constable of the British Transport Police Force | a constable of at least the rank of inspector |
a constable of the Ministry of Defence police | a constable of at least the rank of inspector |
a member of the Royal Navy Police or any other person who is under the direction and control of the Provost Marshal of the Royal Naval Police | a member of the Royal Navy of at least the rank of lieutenant |
a member of the Royal Military Police or any other person who is under the direction and control of the Provost Marshal of the Royal Military Police | a member of the Royal Military of at least the rank of captain |
a member of the Royal Air Force Police or any other person who is under the direction and control of the Provost Marshal of the Royal Air Force Police | a member of the Royal Air Force of at least the rank of flight lieutenant |
a member of the tri-service serious crime unit described in section 375(1A) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 or any other person who is under the direction and control of the Provost Marshal for serious crime | a member of the Royal Navy, Royal Military or Royal Air Force of at least the rank of lieutenant, captain or flight lieutenant |
a National Crime Agency officer | a National Crime Agency officer of grade 3 or above |
an officer of Revenue and Customs | an officer of Revenue and Customs of at least the grade of higher officer |
a member of the Serious Fraud Office | a member of the Serious Fraud Office of grade 7 or above |
a person appointed as an immigration officer under paragraph 1 of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 | an immigration officer of at least the rank of chief immigration officer |
an officer of the department of the Secretary of State for Business and Trade, so far as relating to the Insolvency Service | an officer of the department of the Secretary of State for Business and Trade, so far as relating to the Insolvency Service, of grade 7 or above |
an officer of the department of the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care authorised to conduct investigations on behalf of the Secretary of State | an officer of the department of the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care authorised to conduct investigations on behalf of the Secretary of State of grade 7 or above |
an officer of the NHS Counter Fraud Authority | an officer of the NHS Counter Fraud Authority of at least pay band 8b |
‘Section 27A (causing death by dangerous cycling) | Section 28 (dangerous cycling) Section 28B (causing death by careless, or inconsiderate, cycling) Section 29 (careless, and inconsiderate, cycling) |
Section 27B (causing serious injury by dangerous cycling) | Section 28 (dangerous cycling) Section 28C (causing serious injury by careless, or inconsiderate, cycling) Section 29 (careless, and inconsiderate, cycling)’ |
‘Section 28B (causing death by careless, or inconsiderate, cycling) | Section 29 (careless, and inconsiderate, cycling) |
Section 28C (causing serious injury by careless, or inconsiderate, cycling) | Section 29 (careless, and inconsiderate, cycling)’” |
“an employee of the Law Officers’ Department | His Majesty’s Attorney General for Jersey” |
Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)
We now move on to the second part of today’s proceedings, on new clauses and amendments relating to abortion. Before I call Tonia Antoniazzi to move new clause 1, I inform the House that new clause 20 in the name of Stella Creasy, which will be debated as part of this group, will fall if the House agrees to new clause 1.
New Clause 1
Removal of women from the criminal law related to abortion
“For the purposes of the law related to abortion, including sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, no offence is committed by a woman acting in relation to her own pregnancy.”—(Tonia Antoniazzi.)
This new clause would disapply existing criminal law related to abortion from women acting in relation to her own pregnancy at any gestation, removing the threat of investigation, arrest, prosecution, or imprisonment. It would not change any law regarding the provision of abortion services within a healthcare setting, including but not limited to the time limit, telemedicine, the grounds for abortion, or the requirement for two doctors’ approval.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Tonia Antoniazzi (Gower) (Lab)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 20—Application of criminal law of England and Wales to abortion (No. 2)—
“(1) The Secretary of State must ensure that the recommendations in paragraphs 85 and 86 of the CEDAW report are implemented in respect of England and Wales.
(2) Sections 58, 59 and 60 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 are repealed under the law of England and Wales.
(3) The Infant Life Preservation Act 1929 is repealed.
(4) No investigation may be carried out, and no criminal proceedings may be brought or continued, in respect of an offence under those sections of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 or under the Infant Life Preservation Act 1929 under the law of England and Wales (whenever committed).
(5) The Abortion Act 1967 is amended as follows.
(6) In section 6 remove, ‘sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against The Person Act 1861, and’.
(7) Notwithstanding the repeal of the criminal law relating to abortion, the provisions of sections 1 to 4 of the Abortion Act 1967 remain in place except that that section 1 is amended so as to remove the words ‘a person shall not be guilty of an offence under the law relating to abortion when’ and replaced with ‘a pregnancy can only be terminated when’.
(8) The Secretary of State must (subject to subsection (9)) by regulations make whatever other changes to the criminal law of England and Wales appear to the Secretary of State to be necessary or appropriate for the purpose of complying with subsection (1).
(9) But the duty under subsection (8) must not be carried out so as to—
(a) amend this section,
(b) reduce access to abortion services for women in England and Wales in comparison with access when this section came into force, or
(c) amend section 1 of the Abortion Act 1967 (medical termination of pregnancy).
(10) The Secretary of State must carry out the duties imposed by this section expeditiously, recognising the importance of doing so for protecting the human rights of women in England and Wales.
(11) In carrying out the duties imposed by this section the Secretary of State must have regard in particular to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in considering what constitute the rights of women to sexual and reproductive health and to gender equality.
(12) The Secretary of State may (subject to subsection (9)) by regulations make any provision that appears to the Secretary of State to be appropriate in view of subsection (2) or (3).
(13) For the purpose of this section—
(a) ‘the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women’ or ‘the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women’ means the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted by United Nations General Assembly resolution 34/180, 18 December 1979;
(b) ‘the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ means the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, adopted by United Nations General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI), 16 December 1966; and
(c) ‘the CEDAW report’ means the Report of the Inquiry concerning the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland under article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW/C/OP.8/GBR/1) published on 6 March 2018.”
New clause 106—Abortion: requirement for in-person consultation—
“In section 1(3D) of the Abortion Act 1967, omit ‘, by telephone or by electronic means’.”
This new clause would mean that a pregnant woman would need to have an in-person consultation before lawfully being prescribed medicine for the termination of a pregnancy.
Amendment 17, in clause 167, page 186, line 36, leave out “or 112” and insert—
“112 or [Application of criminal law of England and Wales to abortion Amendment 2]”.
Amendment 1, in clause 170, page 189, line 22, after subsection (2)(c) insert—
“(ca) section [Removal of women from the criminal law related to abortion].”
This amendment is conditional on the introduction of NC1. It would bring the new law into force on the day the Act is passed.
Amendment 18, page 189, line 22, at end insert—
“(ca) [Application of criminal law of England and Wales to abortion No. 2];”.
Tonia Antoniazzi
Nearly five years ago, having suffered a rare complication in her abortion treatment, Nicola Packer lay down in shock, having just delivered a foetus at home. Later arriving at hospital, bleeding and utterly traumatised, she had no idea that her ordeal was about to get profoundly worse and that her life would be torn apart. Recovering from surgery, Nicola was taken from her hospital bed by uniformed police officers in a police van and arrested for illegal abortion offences. In custody, her computers and phone were seized, and she was denied timely access to vital anti-clotting medication.
What followed was a four-and-a-half year pursuit by the police and the Crown Prosecution Service that completely overshadowed Nicola’s life, culminating in her being forced to endure the indignity and turmoil of a trial. She spent every penny she had funding her defence. The most private details of her life were publicly aired, and she had to relive the trauma in front of a jury—all that ultimately to be cleared and found not guilty.
Nicola’s story is deplorable, but there are many others. Laura, a young mother and university student, was criminalised for an abortion forced on her by an abusive partner. He coerced her into taking abortion pills bought illegally online, rather than going to a doctor. Laura describes his violent reaction to her pregnancy:
“he grabbed hold of me, pushed me against the wall, was just screaming in my face…pulling my hair and banging my head off the wall”.
Laura nearly died from blood loss as a result of the illicit medication he had coerced her into taking. When she was arrested, her partner threatened to kill her if she told anyone of his involvement. Laura was jailed for two years; the partner was never investigated by the police.
Another woman called an ambulance moments after giving birth prematurely, but instead of help, seven police officers arrived and searched her bins. Meanwhile, she tried to resuscitate her baby unassisted, who was still attached to her by the umbilical cord. While the baby was in intensive care, she was denied contact; she had to express breast milk and pass it through a door. She tested negative for abortion medication—she had never taken it. Rather, she had gone into spontaneous labour, as she had previously with her other children. She remained under investigation for a year.
One of my constituents discovered that she was pregnant at seven months—she had no symptoms. She was told that she was too late for an abortion. She had seen reports of women being investigated after miscarriages or stillbirths based on their having previously been to an abortion clinic. She spent the rest of her pregnancy terrified that she would lose the baby and be accused of breaking the law. When labour began, she even delayed seeking medical help out of fear.
Jim Allister (North Antrim) (TUV)
Can the hon. Lady advise us whether there is any other area of law governing the taking of life in which the guardrails of the criminal law have been removed? That is what new clause 1 proposes when it comes to the voiceless child. Is there no thought of protection for them?
Tonia Antoniazzi
The hon. and learned Member will know that the Abortion Act is not going to be amended. New clause 1 will only take women out of the criminal justice system because they are vulnerable and they need our help. I have said it before, and I will say it again: just what public interest is being served in the cases I have described? This is not justice; it is cruelty, and it has to end. Backed by 180 cross-party MPs and 50 organisations, and building on years of work by Dame Diana Johnson, my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
Order. I remind the hon. Member that she should not have referred to the Minister by name.
Tonia Antoniazzi
I do apologise, Madam Deputy Speaker. Every day is a school day.
My amendment, new clause 1, would disapply the criminal law related to abortion for women acting in relation to their own pregnancies. NC1 is a narrow, targeted measure that does not change how abortion services are provided, nor the rules set by the 1967 Abortion Act. The 24-week limit remains; abortions will still require the approval and signatures of two doctors; and women will still have to meet the grounds laid out in the Act.
Tonia Antoniazzi
Not at the moment, but I will later. Healthcare professionals acting outside the law and abusive partners using violence or poisoning to end a pregnancy would still be criminalised, as they are now.
There has been a cacophony of misinformation regarding new clause 1, so let us be clear: if it passes, it would still be illegal for medical professionals to provide abortions after 24 weeks, but women would no longer face prosecution. Nearly 99% of abortions happen prior to 20 weeks, and those needing later care often face extreme circumstances such as abuse, trafficking or serious foetal anomalies. The reality is that no woman wakes up 24 or more weeks pregnant and suddenly decides to end her own pregnancy outside a hospital or clinic, with no medical support, but some women in desperate circumstances make choices that many of us would struggle to understand. New clause 1 is about recognising that such women need care and support, not criminalisation.
As Members will know, much of the work that I do is driven by the plight of highly vulnerable women and by sex-based rights, which is why I tabled new clause 1. I have profound concerns about new clause 106, tabled by the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Dr Johnson), which would remove the ability of women to have a consultation either on the phone or via electronic means, rowing back on the progress made in 2022 and again requiring women to attend a face-to-face appointment before accessing care. Introduced in 2020, telemedical abortion care represented a revolution for women and access to abortion care in this country. We led the world: evidence gathered in the UK helped women in some of the most restrictive jurisdictions, including the United States, to access abortion remotely. Here, the largest study on abortion care in the world found that telemedicine was safe and effective, and reduced waiting times.
The fact is that half the women accessing abortion in England and Wales now use telemedical care. Given the increases in demand for care since the pandemic, there simply is not the capacity in the NHS or clinics to force these women to attend face-to-face consultations. New clause 106 would have a devastating effect on abortion access in this country, delaying or denying care for women with no clinical evidence to support it.
What concerns me most about the new clause, however, is the claim that making abortion harder to access will help women in abusive relationships. Let me quote from a briefing provided by anti-violence against women and girls groups including End Violence Against Women, Rape Crisis, Women’s Aid, Solace Women’s Aid and Karma Nirvana, which contacted Members before the vote in 2022. They said:
“the argument that telemedicine facilitates reproductive coercion originates with anti-abortion groups, not anti-VAWG groups. The priority for such groups is restricting abortion access, not addressing coercion and abuse. Forcing women to carry an unwanted pregnancy to term does not solve domestic abuse.”
I could not agree more.
My hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy), who tabled new clause 20, had a terrible experience today: she was unable to walk into Parliament because of the abuse that she was receiving outside and the pictures that were being shown. That was unforgivable, and I want to extend the hand of friendship to her and make it clear that we are not in this place to take such abuse.
While my hon. Friend and I share an interest in removing women from the criminal law relating to abortion, new clause 20 is much broader in terms of the scope of its proposed change to the well-established legal framework that underpins the provision of abortion services. While I entirely agree with her that abortion law needs wider reform, the sector has emphasised its concern about new clause 20 and the ramifications that it poses for the ongoing provision of abortion services in England and Wales. The current settlement, while complex, ensures that abortion is accessible to the vast majority of women and girls, and I think that those in the sector should be listened to, as experts who function within it to provide more than 250,000 abortions every year. More comprehensive reform of abortion law is needed, but the right way to do that is through a future Bill, with considerable collaboration between providers, medical bodies and parliamentarians working together to secure the changes that are needed. That is what a change of this magnitude would require.
Simon Hoare
My friend the hon. Lady—I hope she does not mind if I refer to her as a friend—is making a clear point. She has drawn attention to a great deal of confusion and misrepresentation in respect of what she is trying to achieve in her new clause, and she has shared some heartrending examples. However, she has just said something with which I think the whole House would agree. In recent years, we have seen our legislative approach to abortion effectively as placing ornaments on a legislative Christmas tree, tacking measures on to Bills in a very ad hoc way. I think she is actually right: this is a serious issue—I say this as a husband and as a father of three daughters—that requires serious consideration in a Public Bill Committee, with evidence from all sides and so on. Does she agree with me that, notwithstanding her laudable aims and heartfelt sincerity, it would be much better if these complex issues were dealt with in a free-standing Bill, rather than by amendment to a Crime and Policing Bill?
Tonia Antoniazzi
I thank my friend the hon. Member for his intervention, and I heard him make that point in an earlier intervention on the Minister. The fact is that new clause 1 would take women out of the criminal justice system, and that is what has to happen and has to change now. There is no way that these women should be facing what they are facing. Whether or not we agree on this issue, and this is why I have not supported new clause 20, a longer debate on this issue is needed. However, all that this new clause seeks to do is take women out of the criminal justice system now, and give them the support and help they need.
Jim Shannon
The hon. Lady and I have been friends for all the time we have been here. We had time last night to chat about these things, and we both know each other’s point of view. May I ask her to cast her mind back to telemedicine, if she does not mind? It is said that telemedicine is needed to protect vulnerable women who are unable to attend a clinical setting, but the risks are surely greater. Women may be coerced into abortions against their will with an abuser lurking in the background of a phone call, and pills can fall into the wrong hands, as we all know. Does she accept that, with all the protections she is putting forward to safeguard women, the one thing that does not seem to be part of this process is the unborn baby, and that concerns me greatly?
Tonia Antoniazzi
I thank the hon. Member for that contribution, and for the recognition that, while our voices and opinions differ across the House, we have respect for each other. I do not see this as a discussion about the Abortion Act or raising any issue relating to it, because this is the Crime and Policing Bill, and the new clause is only about ensuring that vulnerable women in those situations have the right help and support. That is the whole purpose of it; it is not about the issues that he would like to discuss now.
Mr Perkins
I absolutely recognise that my hon. Friend is coming from the right place on her amendment. I totally agree with her that a reform is needed, and she has raised some very powerful cases. She describes this as a very narrow change, but in actual fact she is asking us to ensure not just that in such cases the police should act differently, but that in every case ever no woman can ever be prosecuted. It is a hell of a leap for us to take, when this remains against the law, for her to say that these women, whatever the circumstances, must never be prosecuted. That is why I do not think I will be supporting the amendment, despite recognising that she is right that such a reform is needed. Can she say anything to explain why there must never be any prosecution ever?
Tonia Antoniazzi
Yes. I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention, because the truth is that we have to flip this around. No woman, or anybody, is deterred. This is not a deterrent. The criminal law does not work as a deterrent. These women are desperate and they need help. They may be coerced, or it could be just a stillbirth—it could be—but prosecution is not going to help the woman at any point.
Sam Rushworth (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)
I agree with my hon. Friend that these women need help, but I cannot imagine a more lonely and difficult experience than being a woman who has an abortion under the circumstances she is outlining, and I think that is a problem with new clause 1. Would it not actually make abortion much more dangerous and much more lonely by simply decriminalising the woman, but not those who may be there to give support? I cannot think of any other time when someone might be more in need of support.
Tonia Antoniazzi
I do not know of any woman who has had an abortion, at any stage, and taken it lightly. Any abortion at any stage of your pregnancy is a life-changing experience. That is why I do not take this lightly. That is why, whether it is six weeks, 10 weeks, 15 weeks or whatever, and whether it is in term or out of term, that experience of child loss, whether it is planned or not, stays with a woman for the rest of her life. I do not take this easily, standing up here with the abuse we have had outside this Chamber. This is a serious issue and these are the women who need the help. They need that help and they need it now. We cannot continue in this way. This very simple amendment to the Crime and Policing Bill would take the women out of that situation, and that is what I am seeking to achieve.
Mr Angus MacDonald (Inverness, Skye and West Ross-shire) (LD)
If a woman goes all the way through to full term and then decides it is an inconvenience, does the hon. Lady still think that she should be covered by this legal protection?
Tonia Antoniazzi
Wow. I would like to know if the hon. Member actually knows of any woman who would put themselves in that situation if there was not coercion or control of some kind. Obviously, a lot of research and conversations have been going on for years on this issue. I understand that people across the House have deeply held religious views—indeed, I was brought up a Catholic. My issue, from what I have been told, is this: how would that woman go about it? If it was by taking abortion pills, she would have a baby. Painting a picture of killing an unborn child in that way does not help to serve what we are doing in this place. We need to protect the women. [Interruption.] I need to make progress.
In the meantime, doctors, nurses, midwives, medical bodies, abortion providers and parliamentarians have come together to try to end the criminal prosecution of women on suspicion of illegal abortion offences. This is a specific and urgent problem, and one that is simple to fix. New clause 1 is the only amendment that would protect women currently at risk of prosecution and protect abortion services. That is why it has the explicit backing of every abortion provider and every organisation that represents abortion providers in England and Wales. The Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, the Royal College of Midwives, the Royal College of General Practitioners, the Royal College of Psychiatrists and the Royal College of Nursing also endorse it. Numerous violence against women and girls groups, including the End Violence Against Women and Girls Coalition, Refuge, Southall Black Sisters, Rape Crisis England and Wales, Imkaan, and the Centre for Women’s Justice, are also behind new clause 1.
The public overwhelmingly support this change too. I implore colleagues not to lose sight of the moral imperative here: namely, vulnerable women being dragged from hospital bed to police cell on suspicion of ending their own pregnancies. This is urgent. We know that multiple women are still in the system awaiting a decision, accused of breaking this law. They cannot afford to wait.
We have a once-in-a-generation opportunity to put an end to this in a simple and secure manner. This is the right change at the right time, so I implore colleagues who want to protect women and abortion services to vote for new clause 1. Let us ensure that not a single desperate woman is ever again subject to traumatic criminal investigation at the worst moments of their lives. There must be no more Lauras. There must be no more Nicola Packers.
Dr Caroline Johnson (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)
I rise to speak in support of new clause 106, which stands in my name, but first I will speak briefly to new clause 1, which we have been discussing so far. The hon. Member for Gower (Tonia Antoniazzi) spoke about some pretty harrowing cases, and said how the first lady was utterly traumatised by having had her abortion at home, which she received via telemedicine. My new clause seeks to make women safer by ensuring that they are seen and given the opportunity for proper medical consultation before they get to the stage where they are given inappropriate medication because of a misunderstanding, and then end up traumatised, delivering a relatively mature foetus unexpectedly at home.
The hon. Lady did not say during her speech whether she believes that a baby should be terminated right up to term, but I want to put on the record that I do not. I work as an NHS consultant paediatrician, and I have cared for and personally held babies in my hands from 21 weeks and six days’ gestation right through to term. I am very aware that babies from, say, 30 weeks upwards have a more than 98% chance of survival, so although I am supportive of women’s right to choose early in pregnancy, I am not supportive of similar rights in relation to healthy babies right up to term.
Until the pandemic, women had to attend abortion clinics, where they would see a professional and talk through their desire for an abortion and the reasons for it. At the clinic, it would be checked that the woman was pregnant and how far pregnant she was. The hon. Lady raised cases of women who believed they were so far pregnant, but who turned out to be much further pregnant, which are well known; sometimes it goes the other way. One of the key reasons for this confusion is that women often bleed in early pregnancy, and they may believe that those bleeding episodes represent a period; when a woman thinks that she is 10 weeks pregnant, therefore, she may actually be 14 weeks pregnant.
That consideration is important in the context of accessing an abortion because at-home abortions via telemedicine are allowed only up until 10 weeks. The reason for that is not to be difficult or awkward, or to make it more difficult for women to access abortions; instead, it is a safety issue, because we know that complications are greater later in pregnancy. What happens in the early stages is that the procedure essentially causes the foetus to be born. If that happens to a baby much later in pregnancy, the procedure will cause it to be born when it has a chance of survival, which can lead to a traumatic experience for the mother as they deliver a much larger foetus than expected. It can lead to bleeding and, in one case I am aware of, has led to the death of a mother who was given pills to take at home when she was much further along in her pregnant than she had expected.
Rachael Maskell (York Central) (Lab/Co-op)
If this is about safety, then we also have to think about the safety of the baby. In my constituency, a baby had a live birth at 30 weeks’ gestation. Tragically, that baby went on to live for just four days, struggling over that period, and then died. Must we not consider the baby’s safety as much as the woman’s safety?
Dr Caroline Johnson
I thank the hon. Lady for that intervention. I think we need to consider both.
I remember a case involving a lady, Carla Foster, in June 2023. From my reading of the case, she admitted to lying about where she was in her gestation, saying that she was further back in pregnancy, at seven weeks, when she was actually much further along; she turned out to be around 33 weeks pregnant when her baby—her little girl, whom she called Lily—was born. In the papers I have read about the case, she described being traumatised by the face of that baby, which could have been prevented if she had been to a proper clinic and seen a health professional, as that health professional would have clearly seen that she was not seven weeks pregnant, and that taking abortion pills intended for early pregnancy was not a suitable or safe medical intervention.
If one has a termination later in pregnancy, it is done by foeticide. Essentially, an injection of potassium chloride is administered to kill the baby, and then the baby is born in the usual way, but deceased. That is why it is important to know what the gestation is—because the termination offered under the law is done by a different route, to make sure that it is done safely. We know that the later in pregnancy a termination happens, the more a woman is at risk of medical complications.
Suella Braverman (Fareham and Waterlooville) (Con)
My hon. Friend is making an expert and well-informed speech, and I shall be supporting her amendment. On the point about the risks involved with abortion to birth, what does she think about jurisdictions such as New Zealand and the State of Victoria in Australia that have decriminalised abortion and seen a significant increase in failed late-term abortions—where a baby is born and there has been a lot of physical harm and risk as a result?
Dr Johnson
Every jurisdiction has a democratic right to do as it chooses and I respect that, but it is a tragedy when we hear of cases where late-term abortions have not been supported by medical care or the law, and women and infants have suffered significant harm as a result.
I want to raise the case of Stuart Worby. Some people say that this issue is about protecting vulnerable women, but in this case, which was prosecuted in December 2024, a man who did not want his partner to be pregnant, when she did want to be pregnant, decided to take matters into his own hands. He asked a woman who was not pregnant to get the pills for him. He put them in a drink and gave them to his partner, inducing a miscarriage. He has rightly been put in jail for that, but the case demonstrates that there are men out there who will obtain tablets with the help of a woman. That could not have happened if women had to have an in-person appointment, because the woman arriving at the clinic to get the abortion pills on the man’s behalf would be clearly seen not to be pregnant, so would not be able to obtain the medication. My amendment seeks to protect women—women who are wrong about their gestation or who are mistaken in thinking they have had a bleed or whatever—to make sure that they have a safe termination using the right mechanisms.
Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)
I am delighted to tell my hon. Friend that I, too, will be supporting her amendment. There has been a lot of talk in this place in recent weeks about coercion—in a different Bill and in a different context. The kind of coercion that she describes is a reality. It is all fine and well to have a fanciful middle-class view of the world, but as I said in respect of a different Bill, there are many wicked people doing many wicked things. The kind of coercion that she describes is the truth; it is the reality.
Dr Johnson
I agree with my right hon. Friend, and I shall come to coercion a little later. First, let me go back to new clause 1, which decriminalises the woman having an abortion in relation to her own pregnancy. It seems to me that what many wish to do is decriminalise abortion up until term. That is a legitimate position that some people take.
Catherine Fookes (Monmouthshire) (Lab)
I urge the hon. Lady to rethink what she is saying. There is nothing in new clause 1 that refers to abortion up until term. There would be no change to the abortion law—absolutely no change at all. We are not saying aborted to term, and it is extremely harmful for her to say that.
Dr Johnson
I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention. Currently, it is illegal for a woman to procure her own abortion between 24 weeks and term if the baby is healthy. If there is a problem, she has to have it done by doctors in hospital. Under the proposed new rules, we will have is a situation where a woman can legally have an abortion up until term if she wants to do so— [Interruption.] Yes, at any gestation. That is a completely legitimate argument. It is not one that I support or agree with, but it is a legitimate argument that people can make. If that is the case, they should have the courage of their convictions and make it.
Carla Lockhart (Upper Bann) (DUP)
If criminal law does not work as a deterrent, why did late-term abortions increase in the State of Victoria and in New Zealand after decriminalisation? If we look at New Zealand in 2020, there was a 43% increase in late-term abortions between 20 weeks’ gestation and birth compared with 2019. Therefore, criminal law does act as a deterrent, and when it is removed we see an increase. We need to learn from different jurisdictions in that regard.
Dr Johnson
The hon. Lady is right to say that we have seen an increase in incidences of people taking abortion pills late. Previously it was very difficult, if not impossible, to obtain the pills—it was certainly impossible to obtain them through NHS clinics—but now it is possible, because people can use a telemedicine clinic. They say that they are seven weeks pregnant and ask for pills, and we have seen examples where people have asked for the pills much further on in their pregnancy—into the 30 weeks—obtained the medicine and made themselves very unwell in doing so.
Turning to coercion, when a doctor sees a patient, they take at face value everything the patient tells them. When a lady uses telemedicine to have an abortion, it is not possible for a doctor or clinician to know whether somebody else is in the room with them, or sat the other side of the camera forcing them to say what they are saying. It is not possible for the doctor to know whether the lady is pregnant or not or whether the person asking for the medicine will be the person who takes it. That is very unsafe.
Anna Sabine (Frome and East Somerset) (LD)
I take the hon. Lady’s point, although the same would apply if someone were face to face with a doctor; for example, I could get abortion pills and then give them to someone else after my appointment. I represent a semi-rural constituency, where we struggle with lack of bus routes and medical facilities. I understand her concerns about coercion, but there will be lots of women in my constituency who are victims of domestic violence and coercion for whom it will be significantly harder to access telemedicine were her amendment to be passed. A point was made about middle-class people, but it would be poorer people who struggle to access the service as a result of her amendment.
Dr Johnson
The hon. Lady is correct that if a woman got the tablets at a clinic, she could give them to somebody else, but in order to get them in the first place she would need to be 10 weeks pregnant, and the clinician would check that she was pregnant. When the medication appears not to have worked, questions would perhaps be asked about where the tablets had gone, so I think there is an inherent safety feature there.
The hon. Lady brings up the issue of bus routes. That is important, but the question is whether we should improve the bus routes or make medical services less safe. Most clinical services are accessed by individuals attending hospitals or clinics, and in some respects this instance is no different, because it is important that proper medical checks are done. I am not trying to limit people’s access to what is clinically legally available. I am trying to make sure that people are safe when they do so.
I want to turn to women who have been trafficked or are being forced into sex work. We talked yesterday in the House about young girls who had been groomed and raped in the grooming gangs scandal. Would we put it past those evil, nasty men to have got drugs and given them to these young girls to hide the evidence of their crimes? I would not.
What about those who want to preserve the honour of their family by preventing their daughter from being pregnant? What about those who think that the baby being carried by their partner is of the wrong gender—they would like a boy but are having a girl? What about those who are trying to cover up sexual abuse, particularly of teenagers and young girls, by causing a termination to hide the evidence of their crimes? What if a partner does not want a baby? Stuart Worby got caught, was prosecuted and is rightly in jail, but how many others have done that and not got caught? We simply will never know.
No one knows who is taking these medications. If we have proper clinics, gestation can be checked, a clinician can ascertain more effectively if a woman is being coerced, and they can make the abortion medically as safe as possible. My amendment is not pro-life or pro-choice. It is pro-safety.
Ms Stella Creasy (Walthamstow) (Lab/Co-op)
I think we all agree that there are concerns about vulnerable people and abortion law in this country, but we disagree about how to address them. I propose new clause 20 as a way to address those concerns and recognise that the issue of abortion access is increasingly under attack, not just in our country but around the world. If we think that we face these challenges because we have outdated laws in this country, why would we retain them in any shape or form rather than learning from best practice around the world for all our constituents?
To start, let me put on the record that I take seriously all the concerns raised across the House about abortion. I recognise that this is a complex issue, I hear strongly the stories about investigations and prosecutions, and I want to see change, but I also recognise that change does not come without consequences. New clause 20, therefore, is based on what is good abortion law—what many of us have worked on. It is based on what the sector itself used to say mattered, which was that abortion law in England and Wales should recognise developments in modern abortion law in Northern Ireland, delivering on the promise we made in this place in 2019 that abortion was a human right, that safe care was a human right for women, and that we should see a progression of minimum human rights standards on abortion, including through the proposals of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women.
I want to start with how the new clause would do that. I want to be clear that only this new clause would provide for decriminalisation. Decriminalisation, as defined by Marie Stopes, means removing abortion from the criminal law so that it is no longer governed by both the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and the Infant Life Preservation Act 1929, because that would protect both clinicians and those who are at threat of criminal prosecution. Decriminalisation would not impact the regulations on safe medical use, medical conduct, safeguarding—I recognise that is a serious concern—or the distribution of medicines, and neither would it stop tackling those people who seek to use abortion as a form of abuse or coercion. I want to explain how,
In decriminalising and removing the laws that have caused those problems, the new clause would keep the 1967 Act not as a list of reasons why someone would be exempted from prosecution but as a guide to how abortion should be provided. Many of us in the House would recognise the shock for our constituents that abortion is illegal in theory and that the guidelines in the 1967 Act are the settled will of this place. To resolve any regulatory challenges, the new clause would require the Secretary of State to comply only with sections 85 and 86 of CEDAW—the convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. Those sections are about minimum, not maximum, standards of care, and that is only if the Secretary of State believes there appears to be an incongruence that needs to be addressed.
Sir John Hayes
I am trying to reconcile the two things that the hon. Lady has said. She talked about the significance of the 1967 Act. When Lord Steel—David Steel as he was then—spoke on its Second Reading, he said that it was not his aim
“to leave a wide open door for abortion on request”,—[Official Report, 22 July 1966; Vol. 732, c. 1075.]
yet she has said that it is a human right and so people should have the right to an abortion. How does she reconcile her advocacy of what she described as the “settled will” of the 1967 Act—not having abortion on request—with the right to have an abortion on request?
Ms Creasy
I hope that the right hon. Member has read the human rights requirements, because they are about the treatment and dignity of the woman in question and the safety of the service provided. I do not believe that Lord Steel would want women to be put at risk; indeed, I think that is why he fought for that original legislation. We have supported these human rights treaties in this place for other reasons. The new clause, as in the provisions in Northern Ireland, would use the human rights requirements as a guide—a template or a test—as to whether the safety and wellbeing of women is at the heart of what many of us believe is a healthcare rather than a criminal matter.
The new clause sets out additional tests for how we would interpret those human rights provisions. It brings in the international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights to constitute the rights of women to sexual and reproductive health and gender equality. Fundamentally, those human rights are about equal treatment of each other’s bodies. At the moment, the lack of a human right creates an inequality for women in my constituency and his—an inequality that women in Northern Ireland do not face. We should shape services around their wellbeing; it is an established principle.
Some have argued that we should not make this change through amendments to legislation. This issue has always rightly been non-governmental, and there are people who disagree with the right to abortion, and people who support it, in every single party. That means that proposals for reform of abortion will always come from Back Benchers, or from somebody who has won the golden buzzer of a private Member’s Bill, which happens very rarely.
For those who have called for consultation, the good news is that it is exactly what we got by voting for abortion to be a human right in Northern Ireland. If hon. Members’ concern about this amendment is the lack of consultation, they should know that voting for it will trigger a consultation on how to apply the human rights test to abortion provision in England and Wales, so that we can test whether our services meet the objectives that we set for women in Northern Ireland.
Sir Desmond Swayne (New Forest West) (Con)
There is a difference of principle on the question of human rights, because there are two lives involved in these decisions. That is the fundamental problem.
Ms Creasy
I respect the right hon. Gentleman’s belief, and I will always defend his right to it. I tell him this, however: the human rights of the woman carrying the baby are intricately related to the ability of the baby to survive. If we do not look after women and protect their wellbeing, there will be no babies.
The human rights test allows us to ask whether it matters to us that we treat women equally when it comes to the regulation of this healthcare procedure. Practically, it also means that there is somebody to champion those regulations. In Northern Ireland, the human rights commissioner has taken the Government to court when access to the procedure has been denied. She has established buffer zones and safe access to abortion clinics as a human right. Indeed, she is now looking at telemedicine as a human right, and at how to provide it for women in a safe way.
Jim Allister
The hon. Lady refers to Northern Ireland. It was courtesy of her intervention back in 2019 that we had foisted upon Northern Ireland the most extreme abortion laws of any place in this United Kingdom—laws that totally disregard the rights of the unborn and treat them as a commodity to be disposed of at will and at whim. In consequence, we have seen a huge, unregulated increase in the destruction of human life through the destruction of the unborn in Northern Ireland. I do not think that that is an example that anyone should want to follow in any part of this United Kingdom.
Ms Creasy
I respect the fact that the hon. and learned Gentleman does not agree with abortion, but as I have said throughout my life when campaigning on this issue, stopping access to abortion does not stop abortion; it stops safe abortion. We are talking about how to provide abortion safely. He disagrees with abortion, and I will always defend his right to do so, but I will also point out the thousand women who have now had abortions in Northern Ireland safely, which means that their lives are protected. Surely if somebody is pro-life, they are pro-women’s lives as well. New clause 20 is on that fundamental question.
Ms Creasy
I am sorry, but I cannot. I will tell him afterwards why I cannot, but I promise that it is not out of a lack of respect for his position.
Some say that Northern Ireland is different, but why would we think that women in Northern Ireland are different from women in England and Wales when it comes to human rights? We are seeking not to remove our regulations, but to apply the same test to them. We simply want the Secretary of State to ask whether they are human-rights compliant. Those who celebrated bringing abortion to Northern Ireland, and who continue to promote it, did not just celebrate the provision of a service; they celebrated the liberation of women from this inequality, which we risk perpetuating for our constituents.
Ms Creasy
I am sorry, but I cannot take any interventions.
New clause 20 is primarily about whether we think that abortion is a human right, and how we apply that principle to our laws here. It is also about the very present and real threat to access in our communities. Members will have seen outside this place the modern anti-abortion movement that we now have in the UK, and will have received the scaremongering emails. Of course those in that movement are reacting more strongly than ever to the idea of women having this human right protected in law, because their opposition is not about children. If it was, they would not shout at mine when they see them in the street. It is about controlling women. They do not openly advocate for an end to abortion access, but they make lurid claims, including the claim that there would be abortion at birth, so let me put that one to bed. Because new clause 20 retains the 1967 framework, it retains not just the time limit—crucially, it is different from new clause 1 in that regard—but all the provisions in the 1967 Act relating to everyone involved in an abortion.
Ms Creasy
I am sorry; I cannot take interventions because of time.
Those who worry that new clause 20 removes outdated laws should look at the limited number of prosecutions that have taken place under existing laws, and compare it to the number of investigations that have taken place. Let us deal with the claims that are being put about. First, there is a claim that repeal would mean that there would no longer be the crime that MSI has called reproductive coercion. That is what it called the offence of coercion in the Serious Crime Act 2015, which it hailed. That offence would remain, and it explicitly covers forcing someone to have an abortion, giving the same penalty as section 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. Those who claim that coercing someone to have an abortion would be legal under new clause 20 have not paid attention to that legislation, or to the calls from the abortion providers to ensure that more healthcare providers—and, it seems, more Government lawyers—are aware of that 2015 law, and of reproductive coercion.
Those who claim that the loss of the “concealment of the body” law in section 60 of the Offences Against the Person Act would facilitate live abortions should look at the existing laws on grievous bodily harm and actual bodily harm, which are used in such cases because of the difficulty of proving an offence under section 60, and indeed because of the requirements of the Infant Life Preservation Act 1929. Having given birth to a baby at 37 weeks, I want to be very clear why time limits and medical decisions matter when it comes to abortion, not just to the application of substance misuse laws. Let us be very clear that there would be criminal offences to cover the cases that the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Dr Johnson) described, but we are also talking about removing laws that have criminalised people who have had stillbirths. These are people who need our compassion, and who need us to be able to differentiate between an outdated law that criminalises abortion and the malicious intent in the substance misuse legislation.
People should recognise how seldom these offences can be proved because they make no sense. Also, in retaining the 1967 Act, we retain the good faith principle for all parties to an abortion. That would deal with the trope of sex selection; nobody can prove that abortion for sex selection reasons has happened, but that is covered in the good faith arrangements that are retained with the 1967 legislation.
I return to the subject of Northern Ireland, because it was not the absence of regulation that made a difference; it was Parliament voting to make abortion a human right, and then the Government working with us to make it happen. Voting for new clause 20 would kick-start a similar process. We know that Government lawyers never really like to deal with change—who does?—but this is the proper and appropriate way to proceed, and in our Parliament, this is the only way for Back-Benchers to make changes on matters of conscience.
Those of us who recognise that reproductive rights are the foundation of social justice know that now is the time to act. If we are not free to control what happens to our bodies, we cannot be free in the rest of our lives. Those who are playing politics with abortion play politics with equality. The Vice-President of the US has attacked our buffer zones. We should not tolerate his interference in any matter of human rights. Only new clause 20 would give buffer zones that human rights footing. We would not ask a woman to carry to term a baby that would die at birth, but again, there are people in this place who call our abortion laws ludicrous, and who advocate for a reduction in the time limit, putting a woman’s health second. That would not happen with a human rights framework.
Those of us who care about these rights need to act tonight. Less than half of all men under 40 in this country believe that abortion should be legal in most cases, so those who feel that abortion is a settled matter that cannot be weaponised in our politics need to listen to the drumbeat already banging loudly in this country. We face a choice today. We know that these laws are outdated. Do we retain but limit them, or do we remove them and get ahead of what is to come? I urge colleagues who care about these matters to listen to our American counterparts, who bitterly regret not having acted under Biden and Obama to protect abortion access, and who now find medics being prosecuted and dragged across state lines. Do we learn from how Parliament has acted before?
Procedurally, Members know that if new clause 1 is passed, new clause 20 cannot go to a vote, so they will not have the chance to say whether they believe that a safe and legal abortion is a fundamental human right. I want to be clear that I will support new clause 1, but with great hesitation. That is not because I dismiss those proposing it. I hope we can all agree that there are genuine and decent terms for disagreement. It is because new clause 20 brings in a lock on ministerial powers. It explicitly restricts what Ministers and the Government—not Parliament—can do on this subject in a delegated legislation Committee.
It has been surprising to learn, in these debates, how few people have had the joyous experience of sitting in a delegated legislation Committee, stacked by the Whips with Government MPs, that makes major changes to the law, but in 15 years, that has happened to me a number of times. We have seen it on tuition fee rates and welfare cuts, and the previous Government tried to do it with the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023. Only new clause 20 would stop Ministers using regulatory powers to overturn abortion rights. They could use them only to bring in human rights-compliant regulations. Conversely, if new clause 1 is passed, there are no constraints on how Ministers could use the powers. The Minister might say that the new clause brings in no requirement to make regulations. That is true. New clause 1 does not require regulation, but it can and will facilitate it. As the Hansard Society points out, Ministers sometimes seek powers in a Bill to enable them to take actions that they consider appropriate. That leaves Ministers with huge powers.
New clause 1 would bring abortion within the province of this legislation and give the Secretary of State enabling powers to make laws relating to abortion, as long as they would not reverse the disapplication of abortion law to a person acting in relation to their own pregnancy. The powers could be used to target medics, or the family of a person seeking an abortion. I therefore ask the Minister to explicitly give a commitment that if new clause 1 is passed, there will be no further regulation on abortion under the Bill, and no application to make new clause 1 workable or to clarify the impact of a prosecution on the anti-abortion laws that remain. If the Minister cannot do that, by definition she proves that that power will exist. By contrast, new clause 20 would restrict that. It would give power back to this place. Nobody can bind a future Parliament, but we can demand that it is not small Committees of hand-picked, select MPs making decisions on the Government’s behalf, and that each of us should be able to act on behalf of our constituents.
Criminalisation does not reduce or deter abortion; it just makes it harder to carry out safely. We should be clear that criminalisation will remain if only new clause 1 is passed. If we want the decriminalisation that the sector has always advocated for—for good reason—it is only through new clause 20 that we can achieve that. I hope that colleagues in the Lords will have heard this debate, and will not let these matters rest.
Regret has no place in politics. It certainly has no place in the politics that I came here to represent. When there are those who would seek to attack women in this way, I pledge to continue fighting for women’s rights. I pledge to continue fighting to make abortion a human right in this country, and I ask colleagues to consider the case for doing so in this way. But I ask people who care about this to think about this moment and whether we will ever have another one when this Parliament could act in such a positive, constructive and established way. We can get one thing over the line. Why not make it the thing that would make the biggest difference to our constituents?
Several hon. Members rose—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
Order. I am imposing an immediate four-minute time limit. Members will see that many colleagues wish to get in this evening.
Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)
I rise to speak for new clause 106 and against new clauses 1 and 20.
I am grateful for this opportunity to place on the record my grave concerns about this hurried attempt to significantly alter our nation’s abortion laws. It is my view that by doing so we risk creating a series of unintended consequences that could endanger women, rather than protect and empower them. We need more time.
This is not a pro-choice versus pro-life debate. We already have the most inclusive abortion laws in Europe: medical abortion is available up to 24 weeks, which is double the European average, and we have the option of full-term abortion on medical grounds. Instead, today’s debate is about ensuring that legislation as significant as this—seeking to introduce a wholesale change to abortion laws affecting England, Scotland and Wales—is not rushed through without the chance for significant scrutiny. Indeed, 90 minutes of Back-Bench debate does not cut it, in my opinion.
We should, of course, treat women seeking an abortion with compassion and dignity—that goes without saying. As a councillor on Plymouth city council, I chaired the commission on violence against women and girls. Defending the voiceless is my guiding principle in politics, and it is with those women and unborn babies in mind that I make this speech.
As over 1000 medical professionals said in an open letter cited in The Telegraph today,
“If offences that make it illegal for a woman to administer her own abortion at any gestation were repealed, such abortions would, de facto, become possible up to birth for any reason including abortions for sex-selective purposes, as women could, mistakenly, knowingly or under coercion, mislead abortion providers about their gestational age. If either of these amendments were to become law, it would also likely lead to serious risks to women’s health because of the dangers involved with self-administered late abortions.”
They continue,
“Quite aside from the increased number of viable babies’ lives being ended beyond the 24-week time limit, there would likely be a significant increase in such complications if”
new clause 1 or 20
“were to pass, as they would remove any legal deterrent against women administering their own abortions late in pregnancy. The current law permits flexibility and compassion where necessary but, for these reasons, we believe a legal deterrent remains important.”
Many supporters of new clauses 1 and 20 claim that the 24-week time limit for abortions would not change, but that is misleading. Any time limit is meaningless if abortions are legalised all the way up to birth, for any reason, without a legal deterrent. My concern is that, once decriminalisation has taken place, further steps will be taken to expand abortion time limits. Indeed, many of the campaigners mentioned this afternoon are on record saying as much. It is important that we are realistic about that.
Tonia Antoniazzi
We are not here to amend the Abortion Act. This is not a Backbench Business debate. We are here to debate an amendment to the Crime and Policing Bill. I hope that the hon. Lady stands corrected.
Rebecca Smith
I do not think it is a case of being corrected. I have significant concerns that, should the new clauses be passed, those are the next steps—it is a bit of a slippery slope. We may just have to disagree on that.
Public opinion and professional advice are clear. Polling undertaken by ComRes reveals that only 1% of the public support the introduction of abortion up to birth, 70% of women would like to see a reduction in the time limit from 24 weeks to 20 weeks or less—still well above that of many of our European neighbours—and 89% of the population oppose the sex-selective abortions that new clauses 1 and 20 would allow.
Rebecca Smith
No, I will make some progress.
Those who champion new clause 1 claim that it is needed to stop arrests, long investigations and the prosecution of women, but it is important to highlight that prosecutions under sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act almost always relate to males inducing or coercing women into abortions. By decriminalising women, we would, by implication, also stop the opportunity to prosecute abusive or coercive males. To be prosecuted for aiding and abetting abortion, there needs to have been a case to answer in the first place.
Instead, I stand here to suggest a better route forward: new clause 106, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Dr Johnson). She has rehearsed the arguments for that new clause excellently, but I will add that freedom of information requests have revealed that one in 17 women who took pills by post required hospital treatment—equivalent to more than 10,000 women between April 2020 and September 2021. Further investigation found that the number of ambulance service call-outs relating to abortion increased in London. They also increased in the south-west, where my constituency is, from 33 in 2019 to 74 in 2020—a 124% increase. That correlates directly with the removal of the need for a doctor’s appointment. At-home abortions were made permanent by just 27 votes in March 2022. Polling in June 2025 found that two thirds of women support a return to in-person appointments. I call on the House to support new clause 106.
Catherine Fookes
I rise to speak in support of new clause 1, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Gower (Tonia Antoniazzi), which would remove women from the criminal law on abortion. Before my election last year, I served as the director of the Women’s Equality Network Wales, and this issue has long been close to my heart.
Until very recently, violent men ending their partners’ pregnancies made up the bulk of prosecutions under this 1861 law, but recently we have seen a big rise in women being targeted, many erroneously. This is not a law that exists in Northern Ireland, Scotland, France, Canada, Australia, New Zealand or even, Members may be surprised to know, the most anti-abortion states of America, but it is increasingly used against women in this country.
I want to take some time today to speak about one of these women. I will call her Becca, which I stress is not her real name. I know about what happened to Becca because her mum and dad were horrified at what happened, and they want us to hear about the injustice this law causes and to think of Becca when we cast our votes later.
Catherine Fookes
Due to time, I will not; I apologise.
When Becca gave birth, her baby was small and premature. She says the first hospital she stayed in was amazing, providing support for her, her partner and their baby. The second, however, made the decision—against professional guidance and rules on patient confidentiality —to report her and her partner to the police on suspicion of attempted abortion. One month after her child was born, Becca returned home to register the birth. The police swooped. Both she and her partner were arrested, her from her parents’ house and him from their baby’s cot side. They were held in police cells and interviewed under caution, without understanding what was happening or why.
When they were bailed, social services visited their house and told them they were not allowed to care for their baby without supervision, meaning that Becca could not breastfeed or hold her baby until her parents were approved as supervisors. During that visit, the social worker made a difficult situation even worse, telling the family their baby was deaf and blind as a result of the alleged abortion attempt. The baby was not. This casual cruelty by a social worker caused immense distress. Fortunately, Becca, her partner and her baby are now doing well. Social services agree that they are good parents and are no longer monitoring them.
I imagine that many Members across the Chamber today had never thought this kind of cruelty existed under abortion law in this country. I know that I had never considered it. The truth is that the current legal framework harms women and girls when they are at their most desperate, and the only people who can stop it are us here in Parliament today. While changing the law by voting through new clause 1 today cannot erase what happened to Becca and her family, it can stop it happening to any more women. I urge Members to keep women like Becca in the forefront of their minds when they vote. Think of Becca and vote for new clause 1.
Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)
My concerns about these amendments were such that I and others commissioned a leading King’s Counsel to draft a legal opinion regarding their effects. Let me inform Members of his conclusions. I begin with new clause 1. The KC confirms that, under new clause 1, in practice,
“it would no longer be illegal for a woman to carry out her own abortion at home, for any reason, at any gestation, up to birth.”
I note that the hon. Member for Gower (Tonia Antoniazzi) acknowledges in her explanatory statement to new clause 1 that her amendment applies “at any gestation”—that is, up to full term.
Let us be clear what this means. Under new clause 1, women would be able to perform their own abortions—for example, with abortion pills, which can now be obtained without an in-person gestational age check—up to birth, with no legal deterrent.
Sarah Pochin (Runcorn and Helsby) (Reform)
Due to medical advancements, we can save the life of a foetus at 21 weeks, yet we can legally terminate a foetus at 24 weeks. I shall be voting against all the amendments relating to the decriminalisation of abortion. Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that we should actually be reducing the window in which it is possible to have an abortion, so that the law reflects the realities of modern medicine?
Sir Edward Leigh
I agree. Let me move to new clause 20. I am dealing with very narrow legal points, and it might be of interest to the House that the KC concludes that the new clause
“would render the 24-week time limit obsolete in respect of the prosecution of women who undertake termination of pregnancy in typical circumstances.”
He explains that
“the NC20 amendment would repeal the abortion law offences”,
including those relating to a “late abortion”. In other words, new clause 20 would fully repeal all existing laws that prohibit abortion in any circumstances, at any gestation, both in relation to a woman undergoing an abortion, and abortion providers or clinicians performing abortions.
In the second iteration of her new clause, the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy) has added a measure that seeks to amend the Abortion Act 1967, to create the impression that a time limit would remain. However, the Abortion Act only provides exemptions against prosecution under the laws that new clause 20 would repeal, so those offences would no longer remain under new clause 20. Since the Abortion Act itself contains no penalties or offences, and neither would the proposed new clause introduce any, adding a mere mention of an ongoing time limit in the Act would be toothless and utterly meaningless under the law. New clause 20 would de facto have the effect of fully decriminalising abortion up to full term for both women and abortion providers.
Hon. Members do not need to take my word for it. It is not often that they will hear me agree with the British Pregnancy Advisory Service, the UK’s leading abortion provider, but its assessment of new clause 20 concludes that it would
“largely render the Abortion Act 1967 obsolete”
and
“create a regulatory lacuna around abortion provision and access.”
There is one additional angle that Members need to be aware of. On new clause 20, the legal opinion finds that
“the effect of the amendment is that a woman who terminated her pregnancy solely on the basis that she believed the child to be female would face no criminal sanction in connection with that reason, or at all.”
Similarly, on new clause 1 the opinion confirms that
“it would not be illegal for a woman to carry out her own abortion at home, solely on the basis that the foetus is female.”
These amendments are not pro-woman; they would introduce sex-selective abortion.
Sex-selective abortion is already happening in this country. Back in 2012, a Telegraph investigation found that doctors at UK clinics were agreeing to terminate foetuses because they were either male or female. A BBC investigation in 2018 found that non-invasive prenatal tests were being widely used to determine a baby’s sex early in pregnancy, leading to pressure imposed on some women to have sex-selective abortions. That evidence led the Labour party to urge a ban on such tests being used to determine the sex of babies in the womb. A report by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics similarly found that several websites were privately offering tests to determine the sex of a baby, and the council warned that the increasing prevalence of private testing may be encouraging sex-selective abortions. Passing new clause 1 or new clause 20 would likely make the situation worse. In conclusion, what we are faced with is an extreme set of amendments going way beyond what public dominion demands, and way beyond what is happening in any other country in the world.
Maya Ellis (Ribble Valley) (Lab)
I rise in support of new clause 1 and new clause 20. I am someone who chooses the spend the majority of my time in this place focusing on women, who make up 51% of the population —on mothers, parents, women’s health and maternity—and I would like specifically to address comments that have been made in the Chamber today which pit the life of a foetus against that of a mother. Despite the fact that 40% of MPs are now women, and that every single one of us represents a constituency that will be 50% women, I rarely hear women’s issues being discussed here. On every issue in this House there is an angle that affects women differently, and that especially affects those caring for children differently, yet we do not speak about it.
When people speak against abortion in any form, I am stupefied by the bubble from within which they speak. Will they also speak out about the risk of giving birth when two-thirds of maternity wards are deemed unsafe by the Care Quality Commission? I doubt it. Will they speak out about the fact that more than 1.6 million women are kept out of the labour market because of their caring responsibilities, which are seven times those of men? I doubt it. Will they speak out about children in temporary accommodation, the extortionate cost of childcare, medical negligence and the decimation of Sure Start? I doubt it.
Until hon. Members have done their time making this world one thousand times better for mothers and parents, as it needs to be, I suggest that they reflect on the audacity of making a judgment in isolation today that cries, “Life.” Every decision we make in this place comes relative to its context. A woman who ends up in the truly agonising position of having an abortion is protecting a life—she is protecting her own life. Hers is the life that hon. Members choose to vote against if they vote against these amendments; hers is the life hon. Members would be choosing to discard.
As others have said, in reality, the amendments before us today will affect very few people, but will critically mean that while a woman is the carrier of a child, she will not be criminalised for anything to do with or within her body. Given how little the world tends to care about women and their bodies, I personally trust those individual women far more than I trust any state or judicial system that has yet to prove it can properly support the rights of women. That is why I will be voting for this and any amendments that further the rights of women over their own bodies.
Carla Lockhart
I believe that both lives matter in every pregnancy—both the mum’s life and the child’s life. Abortion is often framed as a choice between the rights of the mother and of the child. I reject that framing, but today we are considering two amendments, new clause 1 and new clause 20, that would be bad for both women and unborn children; and one amendment, new clause 106, that would protect both women and unborn babies who are old enough to survive outside the womb.
In the last Parliament, I, along with a number of colleagues, warned that the pills-by-post scheme for at-home abortions would cause an increase in medical complications, dangerous late abortions and coerced abortions. Sadly, those warnings have become reality. A study based on a freedom of information request to NHS trusts found that more than 10,000 women who took at least one abortion pill at home, provided by the NHS, in 2020, needed hospital treatment for complications; that is the equivalent of more than one in 17 women or 20 per day.
Last December, Stuart Worby was jailed after using abortion pills, obtained by a third party through the pills-by-post scheme, to induce an abortion in a pregnant woman against her knowledge or will. Such cases could have been prevented if abortion providers had not pushed, in the face of warnings about precisely such incidents, for the removal of in-person appointments where a woman’s identity and gestational age could be accurately verified, and any health risks assessed.
The issue of inaccurate gestational age has led indirectly to the amendments before us today. Abortion providers have themselves conceded, and I quote Jonathan Lord, former medical director for Marie Stopes, that, until recently,
“only three women have ever been on trial over the past 160 years”
for illegal abortions. Since then, there has been an increase in investigations and prosecutions, albeit a small number compared to the quarter of a million abortions we now have every year in the United Kingdom. This small rise in prosecutions has been caused by the pills-by-post scheme, which has enabled women, either because they miscalculate their own gestational age or through dishonesty, to obtain abortion pills beyond the 10-week limit, when at-home abortions are legal and considered safe for women, and even beyond our 24-week time limit for abortions. Tragically, this has led to viable babies’ lives being ended.
What is the answer? I suggest it cannot be to make things worse by decriminalising abortion. That would be bad for women and unborn lives, removing the legal deterrent against dangerous late-term, unsupervised abortions that would put women at risk as well as babies, even long after they are viable in the womb. This would render our already very late time limit redundant in a context where pills can be obtained without any reliable in-person gestational age check.
The alternative solution is to end the pills-by-post scheme and reinstate in-person consultation. That is why I support new clause 106, and the public support it too. New polling has found that just 4% of women support the current pills-by-post arrangement and two thirds want a return to in-person appointments. Decriminalisation may allow the problems with the pills-by-post scheme to be covered up, but it will not stop the problems happening. In fact, it will incentivise more dangerous late-term abortions of viable babies.
Let me close by turning to Northern Ireland. When the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy) hijacked the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation etc.) Act to impose abortion on Northern Ireland, she argued that women in Northern Ireland faced discrimination because they did not have access to the same abortion provision as women in Great Britain. Let me very clear: Northern Ireland is very different. Northern Ireland does not have the pills-by-post scheme, so a direct correlation with GB cannot be made. I ask hon. Members to support new clause 106.
Lizzi Collinge (Morecambe and Lunesdale) (Lab)
It is worth being absolutely clear about what new clause 1 would and would not do. It would simply remove the threat of prosecution for women who end their own pregnancy: it would not change the abortion time limit, which remains. The rules around telemedicine remain. The requirement for two doctors to sign off remains.
In recent years there has been what I consider to be a worrying rise in the number of people being investigated, prosecuted and even imprisoned under the law. These prosecutions are deeply distressing and, in most cases, entirely disproportionate. It is far more common for a woman to miscarry or to miscalculate the stage of her pregnancy than to wilfully break the law.
To fully address the question from my hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Mr Perkins), I do not think it is right, in the context of what is actually happening in investigations and prosecutions, that any woman should be prosecuted. The harm caused by the number of investigations and prosecutions where it is absolutely not justified outweighs that.
Deirdre Costigan (Ealing Southall) (Lab)
A constituent came to see me yesterday and explained that when she was 16 she was coerced into a forced marriage by her family. She had not been allowed to have any sex education, so when she became pregnant she did not even realise. It was only when her mum noticed that she managed to access a legal abortion, but she told me that she could have been in a situation in which she would have had to get out of that marriage in order to have a late abortion. Does my hon. Friend think it would be in the public interest to go after women such as my constituent who were in forced marriages? Is that helpful?
Lizzi Collinge
I absolutely think it is not helpful to go against those women. New clause 1 would retain the criminal prosecution of men who force women to have an abortion, or indeed anyone who coerces a woman into having an abortion. One in eight known pregnancies end in miscarriage, yet we have seen women subjected to invasive investigations, delayed medical care and lengthy legal processes because they have had an abortion or a stillbirth.
Many colleagues have already spoken about the intense distress that legal proceedings inflict, whatever the circumstances. In the case of Nicola Packer, it took four years to clear her name. During that time, the scrutiny she faced was entirely dehumanising, with completely irrelevant matters treated as evidence of wrongdoing. For every woman who ends up in court, many more endure police investigations, often including phone seizures, home searches and even, in some cases, having children removed from their care. All that not only is distressing and disproportionate for those women, but makes abortion less safe. If women are scared of being criminalised, they will not be honest with their midwives, GPs or partner. Abortion is healthcare, and healthcare relies on honest conversations between care providers and patients.
I will rebut a bit of the misinformation that says that new clause 1 would allow abusive partners or others to avoid prosecution. That is simply not true. NC1 applies only to the woman who ends her own pregnancy. Healthcare professionals who act outside the law, and partners and other family members who use violence or coercion would still be criminalised, just as they are now, and quite rightly so.
The amount of misinformation about abortion is distressing—I have seen it within and without this Chamber. What are the facts? Some 88% of abortions happen before nine weeks. As a woman who has lost two very-much wanted pregnancies at about that stage, I am very aware of what that actually means physically, and of what stage the foetus is at then. Abortions after 20 weeks make up just 0.1% of all cases, and those are due to serious medical reasons. Women are not ending their pregnancies because of convenience.
NC1 would not change what is happening with abortion care, but it would protect women from being dragged through these brutal investigations, which are completely inappropriate in the majority of cases anyway. Women are extremely unlikely to try to provoke their own abortion outside the time limits. A criminal sanction for that, or a distressing and intrusive investigation, is entirely disproportionate. It is not in the public interest to subject these women to these investigations.
I will finish with this: women who have abortions, women who have miscarriages and women who have children are not distinct sets of women. Many of us will experience at least two of those things, if not all three. Let us stop making false distinctions and trying to pit groups of women against each other, and let us stop brutally criminalising women—many of them very vulnerable women—in the way that the current law does, because it serves no purpose. Today, we can end that.
Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)
I rise to speak against new clauses 1 and 20, and in support of new clause 106, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Dr Johnson). First, it is important for me to say that I fully support women’s reproductive rights. I think that we generally get the balance right here in the UK, and protecting that is a hill I would die on. However, I am disturbed by new clauses 1 and 20, which would decriminalise abortion up to birth. If they become law, fully developed babies up to term could be aborted by a woman with no consequences.
The reason we criminalise late-term abortion is not about punishment; it is about protection. By providing a deterrent to such actions, we protect women. We protect them from trying to perform an abortion at home that is unsafe for them, and from coercive partners and family members who may push them to end late-term pregnancies. I have great respect for the hon. Member for Gower (Tonia Antoniazzi), who has tabled new clause 1. We share many of the same objectives on other topics, but in this case I think she is trying to solve a very real issue—the increased number of prosecutions—with the wrong solution.
These amendments are driven by the case of Carla Foster, among others. Carla Foster is a mum who was prosecuted under UK law for carrying out an illegal abortion in May 2020, during the covid pandemic. She carried out the abortion at 32 to 34 weeks of pregnancy after receiving the relevant drugs through the pills-by-post scheme introduced during lockdown. This is a terrible case that harshly demonstrates the flaws with the current process, but the issue here is not the criminalisation of abortion after 24 weeks; it is the fact that Carla Foster was given the pills without checking how far along she was in the first place. She was failed by people here in Parliament who voted to allow those pills to be sent out by mail during lockdown without an in-person consultation. That was an irresponsible decision; and one that might have been forgiven in the light of a global pandemic if it had remained temporary. However, in March 2022 the scheme was made permanent.
If we want to protect women from knowingly or unknowingly acquiring abortion pills after 24 weeks of pregnancy and inducing an abortion at home, we must put an end to the situation in which those pills can be acquired without a face-to-face consultation at which gestational age verification by medical professionals can take place. These drugs are dangerous if not used in the right way, as we saw when Stuart Worby spiked a pregnant woman’s drink with them, resulting in the miscarriage of her 15-week-old baby. Make no mistake: the pills-by-post scheme enabled that evil man and his female accomplice to commit that crime.
It is also important to note that prior to the pills-by-post scheme, only three women had been convicted for an illegal abortion over the past 160 years, demonstrating the effectiveness of the safeguard. However, since that scheme was introduced—according to Jonathan Lord, who was medical director of Marie Stopes at the time—four women have appeared in court on similar charges within an eight-month period. Criminalisation of abortion after 24 weeks is not the problem; the pills-by-post scheme is.
If new clause 1 passes while the pills-by-post scheme remains in place, here is what will happen. More women will attempt late-term abortions at home using abortion pills acquired over the phone, and some of those women will be harmed. Many of them will not have realised that they are actually going to deliver something that looks like a baby, not just some blood clots—that is going to cause huge trauma for them. Many of those women genuinely will not have realised how far along they are, due to implantation bleeding being mistaken for their last period, and on top of all of this, some of the babies will be alive on delivery.
We in this place need to get away from this terrible habit of only considering issues through a middle-class lens. What about women who are being sexually exploited and trafficked? What about teenage girls who do not want their parents to find out that they are pregnant?
David Smith (North Northumberland) (Lab)
I rise to oppose new clauses 1 and 20 and to support new clause 106. All the new clauses concern the issue of abortion.
Through the process of decriminalisation, new clauses 1 and 20 will introduce the possibility of de facto abortion up to birth for any reason in this country, for the first time in history. Let me be clear: this means that it will no longer be illegal for a woman to abort a full-term, healthy baby. That would be a profound change in the settled position on abortion in this country for the past 58 years—an extreme move that polling has shown that the vast majority of the country does not want. Indeed, recent polling shows that only 3% of the public support the idea of abortion up to birth. New clause 106 would diminish the risk of women being criminalised for abortions beyond the current legal limit through the reinstitution of in-person appointments. That is popular; recent polling shows that two thirds of women back a return to in-person appointments for abortions.
I do not want to be standing here talking about abortion. It is not something that I came into Parliament to do. I am also very conscious that, as a man, I should be very careful about commenting on the experience of women. However, I feel that new clauses 1 and 20 give me no choice but to speak against them, despite my huge respect for the mover of new clause 1 in particular.
What are we trying to achieve here? If the aim is to decriminalise women in difficult situations, I have huge sympathy for that. For eight years I was the chief executive of a homelessness charity that housed and supported women in desperate situations, many of whom were traumatised, dependent on substances, with fluctuating mental ill health conditions and extensive experience of the criminal justice system. A common theme among them was that they had been abused and harmed from a very early age, consistently into their adulthood. The women we served and supported still had agency. They still had free will. If their circumstances were desperate at times, they nevertheless often confounded those circumstances to rise above them. However, they also made decisions that they regretted. They made decisions, at times, that those around them—and even they themselves, later—were appalled by.
Sam Rushworth
I recall, a few years ago, supporting a woman in a hostel who was traumatised by her own decision to abort a child. Does my hon. Friend agree, in the context of this language about protecting people, that we also need to protect people from these decisions when they are not made with the proper safeguards and protections in place?
David Smith
I do agree. If something is absolute—in terms of the new clauses, as I understand them—it must cover all eventualities, and what we are trying to say is that we simply do not believe that it can.
I have heard it said that no woman would induce an abortion after 24 weeks, but we cannot introduce such a profound change in abortion law on the basis of a simple hope that no woman would take such a drastic step. If we remove the possibility of criminal prosecution for abortion post 24 weeks’ gestation, it is a certainty that some women will take that drastic step if there are no sanctions and no wider consequences.
Tracy Gilbert (Edinburgh North and Leith) (Lab)
Will my hon. Friend give way?
David Smith
I am afraid I am going to make some progress.
In 2024, according to Government statistics, there were a quarter of a million abortions. If only 1% of them took place as late-term abortions, that would mean 2,500 late-term abortions a year. We also risk the rise, once more, of backstreet abortions. Imagine a scenario in which a woman knows that she cannot now be prosecuted under the law for a late-term abortion, but for some reason wishes to go ahead with one, or is pressured into it. Surely at this stage she is more likely to get hold of pills by post—which are not considered safe to take outside a clinical context after 10 weeks—by pretending to be under the legal limit, to undertake a dangerous procedure on herself, or to seek to procure an off-the-books abortion.
David Smith
I will make progress.
The new clauses seek to address a perceived problem of police actions that were over-zealous in a handful of cases by making a fundamental change to abortion law that would put more women at risk while also risking the lives of infant children.
Lola McEvoy
My hon. Friend is giving a speech that I think many Members will find difficult to hear from such a wonderful friend and colleague. Does he agree that many women are already facing incredibly difficult situations, and many could already have a late-term abortion for which they could order pills online? We do not want to criminalise those who are not doing that. It is entirely wrong to criminalise people for taking action. Does my hon. Friend agree that the majority of women are doing the right thing?
David Smith
I absolutely do agree that the vast majority of women are doing the right thing, but I do not believe that we can cover all eventualities through such a fundamental black-and-white change in the law.
The real problem is that the temporary pills-by-post abortion scheme brought in during covid, which does not require in-person appointments, has been made permanent. That is why I added my name to new clause 106. In-person appointments would remove any doubt about the gestational age of a foetus within a narrow range, and massively reduce the likelihood of successful coercion, which is something I have seen throughout my work, as I have mentioned. This would consequentially remove the possibility of egregious police overreach, which I know my hon. Friends are so concerned about.
David Smith
I am just coming to my conclusion.
The choice for Members is very clear—indeed, stark. It is to approve the biggest change to abortion law in 58 years while, I believe, making things worse for women and their unborn children, or to solve the problem of criminal justice overreach by reinstating in-person appointments for abortion. This is clearly a very difficult subject, and I just feel that amending this Bill is not the right way to go about such a divisive and emotive change, but I will leave it there.
Several hon. Members rose—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
Order. The speaking limit is further reduced to three minutes.
Julia Lopez (Hornchurch and Upminster) (Con)
I rise to speak against new clauses 1 and 20, which represent rushed changes to our abortion laws of profound consequence not only for the unborn child, but for women themselves. My fear is that, if passed, these new clauses would undermine the ability to prosecute abusive partners who force women into ending a pregnancy, inadvertently lead to more dangerous and highly distressing at-home abortions, and risk reducing the status of an unborn child to a legal non-entity.
I also wish to put on record my deep unease about the continued attempts to lasso unrelated legislation with amendments on abortion. Whether or not one supports liberalisation, we should all be able to agree that these amendments represent substantial change to the existing law.
Tonia Antoniazzi
I am afraid the hon. Member is not stating what my new clause would actually do. It takes women out of the criminal justice system, and this is the Crime and Policing Bill.
Julia Lopez
I was also expressing my concerns about other amendments that have been tabled, but I believe the hon. Member is none the less proposing a substantial change that deserves more than a two-hour debate among Back Benchers.
As MPs, we are not here simply to express our opinions of an ideal world or even to focus only on highly distressing cases; we are legislators, and no greater legislative duty exists than to make sure that what we do in this House does not lead to unintended consequences in the real world for the most vulnerable. In two hours of debate on a Tuesday afternoon, we are being asked to rewrite a profound boundary in British law that protects the unborn child. That is not responsible lawmaking; it is a procedural ambush. It is telling that not even the promoters of decriminalisation in this House can agree on the form it should take. That ought to make each one of us pause, because it speaks to the challenge of moving beyond principle to real-world application.
It is worth our recalling previous efforts to amend Bills in this way and their consequences. The temporary pills-by-post scheme brought in during the crisis of the pandemic was made permanent by an amendment hooked, with little notice, on to an unrelated Bill, and what have we seen since? We have seen women accessing pills under false names and gestational dates, and taking them far beyond the recommended 10-week limit, and viable babies have been lost after late-term abortions. That is not women’s healthcare; it is legal and medical failure.
Julia Lopez
I am afraid there is simply not enough time.
That failure is now being used to justify the loosening of abortion laws still further due to a recent uptick in cases of women being investigated. I have looked carefully at the arguments being pushed for decriminalisation, and with those from the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy), I see that the bogeyman of the US right is back. Apparently, unless we agree to these amendments, evangelical religious groups paid for by US cash are going to start rolling back women’s reproductive rights in this country. This is utter nonsense. We are in the UK, and we have a very different and a more balanced national conversation. This is not pro or anti life. It is not extremist to want protections for viable babies, and it is not anti-women to say that coercion or dangerous self-medication should not be outside the reach of the law.
We also see the argument made that this is solely a woman’s health issue and nobody but she should have a say over what happens to her body, but that is to ignore a very inconvenient truth that has always stalked the abortion debate: this is not about one body; there are two bodies involved. Like it or not, this House has a duty to consider the rights of a woman against the safety and morality of aborting the unborn viable child without consequence. It is not extreme or anti-women to say that a baby matters too. I accept that new clause 1 does not decriminalise a doctor or third party carrying out an abortion outside existing time limits, but let us step back and ask why we have criminal law at all. It is not simply to punish, but to deter.
The former Justice Minister Laura Farris has expressed concerns that the challenge of prosecution for infanticide will become greater. She has also raised similar concerns about prosecuting coercive partners if the termination is no longer a criminal offence.
Tom Hayes
I want to start by aligning myself with, and commending the speeches of, my hon. Friends the Members for Morecambe and Lunesdale (Lizzi Collinge), for Ribble Valley (Maya Ellis), for Monmouthshire (Catherine Fookes), for Gower (Tonia Antoniazzi) and for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy). I am proud to stand alongside my colleagues and was proud to listen to what they had to say today. And because of what they had to say today, I have less to say, which will allow more people to speak.
I have been sent here by my constituents to defend and further their right to safe and illegal abortion. My inbox has been inundated with messages from constituents who are concerned, and who want to be able to have safe and legal abortions. They want to be removed from the criminal justice system, as my hon. Friend the Member for Gower said, because we have situations where clinically vulnerable women, who have gone through some of the worst experiences that anybody can go through, will in some cases be arrested straight from the hospital ward, hurried to cells and made to feel unmitigated levels of shame and guilt, on top of the physical and mental traumas they have already experienced.
Lola McEvoy
My hon. Friend is articulating exactly the point, which is that very few women, if any at all, take the decision to have an abortion lightly. It is an incredibly difficult, painful and hard decision, which is physically and mentally very tough to deal with. Does he agree that that is the crux of what we are doing here: alleviating some of the pain that those women are having to go through?
Emily Darlington
Is my hon. Friend aware of the fact that it is impossible medically to determine whether somebody has had a miscarriage or has used abortion pills, so the cases these women do not have a scientific or medical basis, only suspicion? If we really wanted to protect the woman, we would make sure that she had the right advice and the right medical support throughout her pregnancy.
Tom Hayes
I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. I do agree, and it takes me to the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Ribble Valley. She talked about how, over many years, women have been denied access to the healthcare, advice, guidance, childcare and other infrastructure that is so critical to a woman’s quality of life. We need to end that, full stop.
That takes me to another point, which relates to new clause 106. I listened to the mover of new clause 106, the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Dr Johnson), and to those on the Opposition Benches making cases in support of it. I am afraid I do not agree. There is nothing in the clinical evidence available to support the new clause. As somebody who ran a domestic abuse and mental health charity for five years before I was elected, I am very painfully aware of the trauma and difficulties that women who have been domestically abused will go through, and I do not want them to feel, on top of that, shame and trauma about trying to access abortion services. It is important that we think about those people.
I forget who it was on the Liberal Democrat Benches, but they made a really important point about poorer people who are unable to access transport links to access clinics. There was a really important point about our infrastructures being broken down, such as bus connectivity. That is the legacy of the past 14 years, but it is a legacy we must none the less contend with or women will be impeded in their access to abortion services as a consequence.
Luke Taylor
Does the hon. Gentleman agree with the advice from the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, the Royal College of General Practitioners, the Royal College of Midwives, the Royal Pharmaceutical Society, the Faculty of Sexual and Reproductive Healthcare and the British Medical Association, who all know much more than we do about the issue, to vote firmly against new clause 106, because it makes women more vulnerable?
Tom Hayes
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. I agree with those bodies and I agree with him.
Finally, the hon. Member for Hornchurch and Upminster (Julia Lopez) made an argument about a bogeyman of American politics somehow being conjured up by my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow. I represent Bournemouth East. In my constituency, we have BPAS Bournemouth, which was targeted by US Vice-President J.D. Vance when he made his point about buffer zones and abortion access. I have spoken with the people who work at that clinic since that speech was given, and they are scared. They want to support women’s reproductive rights and women’s health and safety, but staff members’ vehicles are being tampered with, and women seeking the clinic’s support are finding their access impeded. They want us to be sensitive in what we say and how we say it, because there are people across our constituencies who are deeply concerned for the welfare of women, and who look to us to send the right signal through how we conduct our politics.
I was a signatory to new clause 1 and new clause 20. I recognise that there will be a vote on new clause 1 first. I will vote in favour of it, and I call on all Members across this House to do the same.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
We have run out of time, so I will call the Front-Bench speakers. I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.
Lisa Smart
As is usual on matters of conscience, these votes will not be whipped by my party today, as I believe is the case across the House. That said, my party passed relevant policy at our party conference, and I will lay out that policy before talking a little about my predecessor’s work on the 1967 Act. Then I will explain, in a personal capacity, why I will support some, but not all, of the amendments before us.
The Liberal Democrats believe that women have the right to make independent decisions about their reproductive health without interference from the state, and that access to reproductive healthcare is a human right. The current law impacts the most vulnerable women. Under that legislation, some can be dragged from hospital beds to prison cells and endure needlessly long periods of investigation and prosecution. The provisions that allow for this were introduced before women were even allowed to vote, so it is not surprising that many see the need for them to be updated.
In the past five years, there have been both debates about whether the police have the resources that they need to keep our community safe, and a surge of police investigations into women suspected of obtaining medication or instruments to end their pregnancy outside the law. That surely cannot be the best use of police time. Lib Dem policy is to ensure proper funding for impartial advice services, so that people can receive comprehensive, unbiased information without being pressured. Access to abortion should never be made more stressful, so we would maintain safe zones around clinics to protect those seeking care.
My predecessor as Liberal MP for Hazel Grove, the late Dr Michael Winstanley, later Lord Winstanley, was key in shaping the Abortion Act 1967. He was on a cross-party group of around a dozen MPs who sought to refine the language and the strategy of that vital legislation. Dr Winstanley continues to be mentioned on the doorstep in my constituency, and he is known, among other things, for bringing calm, professional insight to the debate. He drew on his background as a general practitioner and on his medical knowledge and experience to ground the discussion in medical evidence, and was especially vocal in highlighting the dangerous and often desperate conditions faced by women when abortion was severely restricted. He made the case that legal, regulated abortion was not only safer but more humane.
At the end of this debate, I will join the World Health Organisation, the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, midwives, nurses, psychiatrists, general practitioners and the End Violence Against Women Coalition in supporting new clause 1. To be clear, this new clause would not change how abortion is provided or the legal time limit on it, and it would apply only to women acting in relation to their own pregnancy. Healthcare professionals acting outside the law, and abusive partners using violence or poisoning to end a pregnancy, would still be criminalised, as they are now.
Lisa Smart
I am under strict encouragement from Madam Deputy Speaker to be speedy, so I will not give way.
I very much support the spirit of new clause 20, but I cannot support new clause 106. I acknowledge that those who tabled it want women to be able to access the best healthcare available, but it would be a step backwards to make it harder for women to access the treatment that they need, whether that is women in a coercive relationship, or those who live in a rural area with limited transport options, and who find it hard to access in-person medical appointments. Telemedicine enables timely, accessible abortion care. We rightly speak repeatedly in this House of the strain on our NHS’s space, staff and capacity, so it feels entirely retrograde to roll this service back and insert clinically unnecessary barriers, and I cannot support doing so.
The amendments and new clauses before us are subject to free votes, so Members can rightly choose for themselves. I very much hope that we choose to move forwards, not back.
Harriet Cross (Gordon and Buchan) (Con)
In recent weeks and months in this House, we have become familiar with votes of conscience. The amendments that I shall speak to—new clauses 1, 20 and 106—are also matters of conscience. Although I am responding for his Majesty’s official Opposition, Conservative Members will have free votes, so the views that I express will be my own, and I fully recognise that there may be Conservative colleagues who disagree with me.
I recognise that the hon. Members for Gower (Tonia Antoniazzi) and for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy) tabled new clauses 1 and 20 with the very best of intent. I have no doubt that all Members who signed them did so with the objective of supporting and safeguarding the rights of women, and I can unequivocally say that I share those aims, as do my hon. Friends the Members for Hornchurch and Upminster (Julia Lopez), for Reigate (Rebecca Paul), for South West Devon (Rebecca Smith), and for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Dr Johnson), and my right hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh), who have also spoken. However, I do not believe that new clauses 1 or 20 achieve the safeguarding of women that Members seek.
Views on abortion do not have to be absolutist. Being pro-choice is not incompatible with being pro-life when the foetus is at a stage at which it is inherently viable. Believing that women should have autonomy over their bodies does not negate the need for a system that safeguards women from physical and emotional harm. As we have heard, new clause 1 would ensure that pregnant women were not criminalised for accessing an abortion during their pregnancy. It would, however, retain the law relating to the provision of abortion in healthcare settings as it stands. Effectively, a woman in England and Wales would legally be able to abort an unborn child by her own means up to the moment prior to a natural birth, but a healthcare professional would be breaking the law if they tried to help her do so outside the 24-week limit.
Sir John Hayes
There is a calumny at the heart of this, which is that these new clauses are compatible with the ’67 Act. When breaching an Act of this Parliament ceases to be unlawful, it loses its force and therefore its purpose, and that calumny cannot be allowed to stand on the record.
Harriet Cross
I thank my right hon. Friend for his intervention.
On the one hand, abortion would be decriminalised for women; on the other, restrictions on her ability to access that same procedure in a safe, controlled and supportive setting would remain. We must be careful not to create a law that has unintended and potentially harmful consequences, especially for those it is designed to help, and especially when those who are likely to rely on it are likely to be in a state of stress or distress.
New clause 1 raises many questions. Is it tenable to legalise all but full-term abortions in England and Wales, but not in other parts of the UK? What would be the legal implications if a woman in Gretna travelled 10 miles across the border to Carlisle to have an abortion after the 24-week limit that is in place in Scotland? Under new clause 1, how do we monitor such abortions that occur outside a healthcare setting? How do we ensure that mothers’ physical and mental health is protected and supported? And what happens to the once-delivered foetus, if the abortion is outside a healthcare setting?
As we have heard, new clause 20 goes further than new clause 1 in many respects, so many of the same concerns apply. New clause 106 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham would mandate an in-person consultation before a pregnant woman was prescribed medication to terminate a pregnancy. This new clause is not about making abortions harder to access. An abortion should, of course, be readily available to those who need and want it, and of course abortion medication should be easily accessible during the appropriate stages of pregnancy, but this new clause is about the safety of the mother and the unborn child.
Face-to-face appointments are commonplace for patients with a wide range of medications and conditions, particularly when new medications are being prescribed. A private, in-person consultation allows a doctor to be as sure as they can be that the woman is acting of her own informed free will, and ensures that her mental state is assessed and understood. It also reduces as much as possible the likelihood of medication being misused or abused.
Telemedicine, while it has its place, can never be a replacement for the patient-doctor relationship developed during face-to-face appointments. It has serious shortcomings. There have been many cases where abortion medicine has been misused following telemedicine, and there have been many more hospitalisations of women following the use of telemedicine. However, I stress that not all of these cases will be down to misuse; we should all be aware of that. New clause 106 does not attempt to restrict access to abortions, and I would not support it if it did. Instead, it would act as an important safeguard to protect women from emotional trauma and physical harm.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)
Let me begin by emphasising that all women in England and Wales can access safe, regulated abortions on the NHS under our current laws. I also recognise and respect that there are strongly held views across the House on this highly sensitive issue, and I welcome the considered and informed debate we have had today.
The Government maintain a neutral stance on changing the criminal law on abortion in England and Wales. We maintain that it is for Parliament to decide the circumstances under which abortion should take place, and will allow Members to vote according to their moral, ethical or religious beliefs. If it is the will of the House that the criminal law on abortion should change, whether by our exempting pregnant women from the offences or otherwise, the Government would not stand in the way of such change. However, we must ensure coherence between the statute book and any legislation proposed.
It will be helpful if I first set out the relevant law. As hon. Members will know, in England and Wales, the criminal offences relating to abortion must be read in conjunction with the provisions of the Abortion Act 1967, which provide exemptions to the criminal offences. The Act defines the circumstances in which abortions or terminations can legally take place. Section 58 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 is the offence of administering drugs or using instruments to procure an abortion. It is an offence for a pregnant woman to unlawfully take a drug or use instruments with the intent of procuring her own miscarriage. It is also an offence for another person who has the intent of procuring the miscarriage of a woman, whether or not she is pregnant, to unlawfully administer drugs or use instruments with that intent. It is also an offence under section 59 of the 1861 Act for a person to supply or procure drugs, poison or an instrument that was intended to be used to procure a miscarriage.
The Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 deals with acts in the later stages of pregnancies, including late-term abortions in England and Wales. Under section 1 of the 1929 Act, it is an offence for any person to intentionally destroy the life of a child before it is born, if it is capable of being born alive, unless it can be proved that the act was done in good faith and only to preserve the life of the woman.
Turning to the amendments, the purpose of new clause 1, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Gower (Tonia Antoniazzi), is to disapply criminal offences relating to abortion from a woman acting in relation to her own pregnancy at any gestation. This means that it would never be a criminal offence for a pregnant woman to terminate her pregnancy, regardless of the number of weeks of gestation, including beyond the 24 weeks.
Alex Davies-Jones
I apologise, but I will not. We are really short on time.
It would also not be a criminal offence for a woman to intentionally deceive a registered medical practitioner about the gestation of her pregnancy in order to procure abortion pills by post beyond the 10-week time limit. It would remain an offence for another person, such as a doctor, to do the relevant acts, and for a pregnant woman to do the relevant acts for another woman, unless the provisions of the Abortion Act are applied.
New clause 1 seeks to ensure that a woman cannot commit an offence in relation to her own pregnancy under the law related to abortion, including under sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929. The phrase “related to abortion” is not defined in the clause but in practice will be limited to these provisions, as there are no other offences that relate to abortion in England and Wales.
It was suggested during the recent Westminster Hall debate on decriminalising abortion, and again today, that the risk with new clause 1 is that it creates a general power for the Secretary of State to amend the Abortion Act 1967 or the relevant criminal legislation relating to abortion. I would like to clarify that new clause 1 does not create such a power, nor do any other provisions of the Crime and Policing Bill. New clause 1 does not grant the Secretary of State additional secondary legislation powers, while clause 166 of the Bill does grant the Secretary of State a regulation-making power in relation to the provisions of the Bill. That can only be exercised to make provisions that are appropriate in consequence of the Bill’s provisions. It would not, for example, give the Secretary of State general powers to make substantive amendments to the Abortion Act 1967 in order to change the rules about abortion, or to amend the Offences Against the Person Act to reintroduce criminal offences, as that would not be consequential to new clause 1.
I turn to new clause 20, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy), which would repeal existing criminal offences relating to abortion and concealment of a birth, place a duty on the Secretary of State to implement certain recommendations relating to abortion services, and create regulation-making powers regarding criminal offences relating to abortion.
Alex Davies-Jones
I will not give way.
This is a complex new clause, and I will not address all of its provisions or the policy intentions behind them. However, I will highlight areas where the House may want to consider whether the duties or delegated powers may be unclear or give rise to unintended consequences.
I acknowledge that my hon. Friend’s approach seeks to mirror the model used to decriminalise abortion in Northern Ireland. However, it is important to recognise that the circumstances in Northern Ireland at the time were markedly different from those in England and Wales. There was no functioning Executive, no provision of abortion services except in the most exceptional circumstances and no equivalent to the Abortion Act 1967, so provision had to be made to create a regime for abortion services. As such, the approach to decriminalising abortion in England and Wales, where the provision and regulation of lawful abortions already exists, needs to reflect the distinct legal context.
New clause 20 would impose a duty on the Secretary of State to implement paragraphs 85 and 86 of the convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women in England and Wales by using the regulation-making powers in subsection (8). The CEDAW report contains recommendations relating to the criminal law on abortion, which would, in so far as they relate to England and Wales, already be addressed by the repealing of the offences through subsections (2) and (4) of the new clause.
The report includes recommendations that go beyond the provision of abortion services, such as on the provision of sexual and reproductive health and education. As I have mentioned, the CEDAW report and its recommendations were developed in the specific context of Northern Ireland and therefore reflected the position there at the time. The position in England and Wales is different, with existing guidance, services and legislation that already address many of the report’s recommendations.
I turn to the criminal law aspect of the new clause. Subsections (2) and (3) would repeal sections 58 to 60 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, as well as the Infant Life Preservation Act 1929. Repealing those offences would remove criminal liability for a woman acting in relation to her own pregnancy and would also decriminalise any other person doing the relevant acts to a pregnant woman, or in relation to the body of a child. For example, there would no longer be a specific offence to cover cases of forced abortion. That would mean that situations in which an individual subjected a pregnant woman to violence with the intention of causing a miscarriage would be dealt with under different offences relating to assaults and bodily harm rather than section 58 of the Infant Life Preservation Act. The moratorium on investigations and prosecutions contained in subsection (4) would discontinue such cases. Therefore, those suspected of forcing a woman to have an abortion before the offences were repealed could not be investigated for those offences.
Subsection (2) seeks to repeal section 60 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, which criminalises concealing a birth by disposing of a child’s body after its birth. Unlike sections 58 and 59 of the 1861 Act, that offence is not limited to abortion-related acts. Repealing it entirely could therefore create a gap in the law regarding non-abortion-related concealment of birth following a child’s death. While I understand the concern of my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow about investigations under section 60 relating to alleged illegal abortions, a full repeal may have unintended consequences.
I will briefly address a point that my hon. Friend made about existing offences that cover this matter. The offence of perverting the course of justice requires a positive act coupled with an ulterior intent that the course of justice will be perverted. Therefore, it is not necessarily the same and we do not want to provide unintended consequences. It is important to note that subsection (12) grants the Secretary of State regulation-making powers in the light of the repeal of these offences, subject to certain restrictions. The power could be used, for example, to create offences specifically targeted at forced abortions or concealing a birth by disposing of a child’s body. While I do not comment on the policy intent, the House typically exercises its full powers of scrutiny over the introduction of new and serious offences, rather than conferring a power on the Secretary of State to do so through secondary legislation.
New clause 106, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Dr Johnson), deals directly with the Abortion Act 1967. The intended purpose of the new clause is to require women to attend an in-person consultation. Section 1(3D) of the Abortion Act 1967 does not apply to consultations that take place before the medicine is prescribed. Women would therefore continue to have remote consultations for prescription of the medicine, but would then be required to travel to a hospital or clinic for an in-person consultation before being able to self-administer the medicine at home. Alternatively, women could have an in-person consultation to be prescribed the medicine and then the medication could be posted to the women at home. The overall effect of this new clause would mean that no woman could legally have an at-home early medical abortion without an in-person consultation.
In conclusion, if it is the will of Parliament that the law should change, the Government, in fulfilling our duty to ensure that the legislation is legally robust and workable, will work closely with my hon. Friends the Members for Gower and for Walthamstow to ensure that their new clauses accurately reflect their intentions and the will of Parliament, and are coherent with the statute book. As I have already stated, the Government take no position. I hope these observations are helpful to the House when considering the new clauses.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Jerome Mayhew (Broadland and Fakenham) (Con)
On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. Irrespective of our position on the votes that we have just taken, we have to acknowledge that we have made a major change to abortion law, yet that was on the basis of no evidence sessions, no Committee stage scrutiny, and just 46 minutes of a Back-Bench debate and a winding-up speech by a Minister who refused to take any interventions, when the Chamber was full of one-line debates. If we want to continue like this, can you advise me, Madam Deputy Speaker, on how we can improve our rules, so that we do not have this situation in the future?
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
Mr Mayhew, to be clear, nothing has happened that is out of order. Your point is more one of frustration than process and procedure, and it is not a point of order for the Chair.
Crime and Policing Bill
Wednesday 18th June 2025
(10 months, 3 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 18 June 2025 - (18 Jun 2025)
17:59 - The House divided: - Ayes: 102 / Noes: 390 - Question accordingly negatived.
18:14 - The House divided: - Ayes: 147 / Noes: 305 - Question accordingly negatived.
18:26 - The House divided: - Ayes: 178 / Noes: 313 - Question accordingly negatived.
18:37 - The House divided: - Ayes: 114 / Noes: 310 - Question accordingly negatived.
18:48 - The House divided: - Ayes: 178 / Noes: 313 - Question accordingly negatived.
19:01 - The House divided: - Ayes: 312 / Noes: 95 - Question accordingly agreed to.
Tonia Antoniazzi (Gower) (Lab)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 3—Commercial sexual exploitation—
“(1) A person (A) who gives, offers, or promises payment to a person (B) to engage in sexual activity with person (A) shall be guilty of an offence.
(2) A person (A) who gives, offers, or promises payment to a person (B) to engage in sexual activity with any other person (C) shall be guilty of an offence.
(3) For the purpose of subsections (1) and (2)—
(a) a ‘payment’ includes money, a benefit, or any other consideration;
(b) an activity is sexual if a reasonable person would consider that—
(i) whatever its circumstances or any person’s purpose in relation to it, it is because of its nature sexual, or
(ii) because of its nature it may be sexual and because of its circumstances or the purpose of any person in relation to it (or both) it is sexual;
(c) no offence is committed by a person (A) unless the sexual activity with the other person (B) involves—
(i) the person (A or C) being in the other person (B)’s presence, and
(ii) physical contact between the person (A or C) and the other person (B), or
(iii) the person (B) touching themselves for the sexual gratification of the other person (A or C);
(d) it is immaterial whether the payment is given, offered, or promised by a person (A) engaging in the sexual activity, or a third party.
(4) A person guilty of an offence under subsections (1) or (2) is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both), and a requirement to complete an offender behaviour programme at the offender’s expense;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both).
(5) A person who is not a UK national commits an offence under subsections (1) or (2) if any part of the offence takes place in the UK.”
This new clause makes it an offence to pay for, or attempt to, pay for sex either for themselves or on behalf of others.
New clause 4—Victims of Commercial sexual exploitation—
“(1) The Street Offences Act 1959 is amended as follows.
(2) Omit Sections 1 and 2.”
This new clause decriminalises victims of commercial sexual exploitation by repealing the offence of “Loitering or soliciting for purposes of prostitution” and relevant related parts of the Street Offences Act 1959.
New clause 5—Interpretation (Dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling)—
“(1) The Road Traffic Act 1988 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 32 insert—
‘32A Interpretation of sections 27A to 32
(1) For the purposes of sections 27A to 32, “a cycle” includes but is not limited to—
(a) a pedal cycle,
(b) an electronically assisted pedal cycle,
(c) a mechanically propelled personal transporter, including—
(i) an electric scooter,
(ii) a self-balancing personal transporter (including a self-balancing scooter, self-balancing board or electric unicycle), and
(iii) any other mechanically propelled personal transporter provided for by the Secretary of State in regulations made under this section.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(c), mechanically propelled personal transporters are to be defined in regulations made by the Secretary of State under this section.’”
This new clause would define “a cycle” as including a pedal cycle, an e-bike, or a mechanically propelled personal transporter, for the purposes of cycling offences under the Road Traffic Act 1988, including the proposed new clauses tabled by the Government on dangerous, careless of inconsiderate cycling.
New clause 7—Abolition of non-crime hate incidents—
“(1) Non-crime hate incidents as a special category of incident to be recognised by police authorities are abolished. Reporting, recording and investigation of such incidents should occur only in the limited circumstances provided for in this section.
(2) For the purposes of Article 6(1) of the UK GDPR, section 35 of the Data Protection Act 2018 (‘the Act’) and Article 8 of the Law Enforcement Directive, the processing of relevant data by a police authority is unlawful.
(3) In this section, ‘relevant data’ means personal data relating to the conduct or alleged of a data subject which is unlikely to constitute criminal conduct and which has been perceived by another person to be motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility or prejudice towards one or more persons who have or who are or have been perceived to have one or more relevant characteristics and with that hostility or prejudice arising due to that or the perception of those protected characteristics.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (3), the following are relevant characteristics—
(a) race,
(b) religion,
(c) sexual orientation,
(d) disability,
(e) transgender identity.
(5) Subsection (2) does not apply in respect of the processing of relevant data—
(a) pursuant to an ongoing criminal investigation or prosecution,
(b) for the purposes of the internal administrative functions of the police authority.
(6) Subsection (2) does not apply in respect of the retention of a record (a ‘non-crime perception record’) of relevant data where a police officer (the ‘certifying officer’) of the rank of inspector or above certifies that in their opinion the retention of the non-crime perception record is likely materially to assist in the detection or prevention of criminal conduct which may occur in the future.
(7) Where a certifying officer certifies the retention of a non-crime perception record pursuant to subsection (6)—
(a) the certifying officer must include in the record a description of the future criminal conduct they have in mind and the reasons they believe that the retention of the record may assist in its detection or prevention,
(b) the relevant data which may be retained as part of the record may be no more than the certifying officer believes is likely materially to assist in the detection or prevention of criminal conduct,
(c) a copy of the record must be expeditiously provided to the data subject unless an officer of the of the rank of superintendent or above certifies that—
(i) the provision of the record to the data subject may interfere in the detection or prevention of criminal conduct, or
(ii) the officer is satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable to provide a copy of the record to the data subject.
(8) If the data subject objects to the retention of the non-crime perception record, subsection (6) does not apply unless a police officer of the rank of superintendent or above certifies that in their opinion the retention of the non-crime perception record is likely materially to assist in the detection or prevention of criminal conduct which may occur in the future.
(9) No police authority or police officer can be held under any circumstances to be under any duty to undertake the retention of any relevant data.
(10) After subsection 113B(3) of the Police Act 1997 insert—
‘(3A) An enhanced criminal record certificate must not give the details of a relevant matter to the extent that doing so would result in the disclosure of relevant data as defined in section (The retention by the police of non-crime perception records) of the Crime and Policing Act 2025.’
(11) For subsection 39A(3) of the Police Act 1996 substitute—
‘(3) No part of any Code of Practice issued by the College of Policing may be in a form which could be issued by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 60 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022.’
(12) Section 60 the 2022 Act is to be amended as follows—
(a) the cross heading to be changed to ‘Non-crime perception records’,
(b) the section heading to be changed to ‘Code of practice relating to non-crime perception records’,
(c) in subsection (1) leave out from ‘by’ to the end of the subsection and insert ‘of relevant data’,
(d) omit subsection (2),
(e) in subsection (3)(a), leave out ‘personal data relating to a hate incident’ and insert ‘relevant data’,
(f) in subsections (3)(b), (c), (d) and (e), for ‘such personal data’ substitute ‘relevant data’,
(g) in subsection (4)(a), for ‘personal data’ substitute ‘relevant data’,
(h) in subsection (4)(b), leave out ‘personal data relating to the alleged perpetrator of a hate incident’ and insert ‘relevant data relating to the alleged perpetrator’,
(i) in subsection (7), at end, insert ‘relevant data’ has the meaning given by section (The retention by the police of non-crime perception records) of the Crime and Policing Act 2025.
(13) Any code of practice previously issued under section 60 of the 2022 Act is deemed to be withdrawn.
(14) Within three months of the commencement of each calendar year, each police authority which is retaining non-crime perception records must—
(a) undertake a review of the relevant data by an independent person to ensure that any retention of such records is in compliance with the provisions of this section.
(b) publish a report in respect of the review prepared by the independent person including setting—
(i) the total number of non-crime perception records retained by the police authority;
(ii) the total number of data subject to which those records relate; and
(iii) the equivalent numbers of those records added in the previous year.
(15) In this section—
(a) ‘a police authority’ means—
(i) a person specified or described in paragraphs 5 to 17 of Schedule 7 of the Act,
(ii) a person acting under the authority of such a person,
(b) the terms ‘data subject’, ‘processing’ and ‘the UK GDPR’ have the same meanings as under section 3 of the Act,
(c) ‘the Law Enforcement Directive’ means the Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament,
(d) ‘the 2022 Act’ means the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022.”
This new clause would amend legislation and guidance to remove the recording and retention of non-crime hate incidents, replacing that in some instances with non-crime perception records.
New clause 8—CCTV on railway network—
“(1) It is a legal requirement for CCTV cameras across the railway network in England and Wales to be capable of enabling immediate access by the British Transport Police and relevant Police Forces.
(2) All footage retained by CCTV cameras on the railway network must remain accessible to the British Transport Police and relevant Police Forces for the entirety of the retention period.
(3) The retention period specified in subsection (2) is 30 calendar days.
(4) Further to subsection (1), the Secretary of State must publish a report, within three months of the passing of this Act, specifying a compatibility standard that will facilitate CCTV access for the British Transport Police and any Police Force in England and Wales.”
New clause 9—Training for those subject to a mandatory reporting duty—
“(1) Any person who is subject to the duty under section 66(1), must be trained to an appropriate standard to carry out their responsibilities under the duty.
(2) Such training shall be deemed appropriate only if it includes, but is not limited to, the following components—
(a) the recognised signs and indicators of child sexual abuse,
(b) what it means to suspect a child sexual offence may have been committed under the duty, as outlined in section 68—
(i) including understanding the different ways children may disclose abuse, and
(ii) the barriers to children disclosing abuse,
(c) how to respond to and support a child who they have been given reason to suspect is the victim of a child sexual offence, as set out in section 68,
(d) how to make notifications in accordance with section 66(2),
(e) how to judge whether making a notification would pose a risk to the life or safety of a relevant child, as set out in section 66(5), and
(f) how to understand, identify and apply the exemptions for consensual peer on peer activity, as set out in sections 69, 70 and 71.”
This new clause would ensure that those subject to the mandatory reporting duty for child sexual abuse are provided with appropriate training to equip them to fulfil these obligations.
New clause 10—Meaning of exploitation: modern slavery—
“(1) Section (3) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (meaning of exploitation) is amended as follows.
(2) After subsection (6)(b) insert—
‘Criminal Exploitation
(7) Something is done to or in respect of the person which involves the commission of an offence under section 38 of the Crime and Policing Act 2025 (child criminal exploitation).’”
This new clause seeks to ensure criminally exploited children are not prosecuted for offences committed as result of their exploitation.
New clause 11—Offences of verbal and physical abuse of public transport workers—
“(1) This section applies to a qualifying offence that is committed against a public transport worker acting in the exercise of functions as such a worker.
(2) In this section, a ‘qualifying offence’ is—
(a) an offence of common assault, or battery, under section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, or
(b) an offence of harassment under section 2 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 which involves the verbal abuse of the public transport worker.
(3) A person guilty of an offence to which this section applies is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or to a fine (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or to a fine (or both).
(4) In subsections (1) and (2), ‘public transport worker’ means any person working on public transport, whether on public transport vehicles, or in public transport stations, or in any relevant setting where they are working in their capacity as a public transport worker.
(5) It is immaterial for the purposes of this section whether the employment or engagement is paid or unpaid.”
New clause 12—Definition of modern slavery exploitation: orphanage trafficking—
“(1) Section (3) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 is amended as follows.
(2) After subsection (6)(b) insert—
‘Orphanage trafficking
(7) The person is a child who has been recruited into a residential care institution overseas for the purpose of financial gain and exploitation.’”
This new clause would expand the definition of exploitation under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to include children who have been recruited into residential care institutions that engage in orphanage trafficking.
New clause 13—Joint Enterprise—
“(1) The Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 8 (abettors in misdemeanours), after ‘shall’ insert ‘, by making a significant contribution to its commission,’.”
New clause 14—Duty to review treatment of childhood convictions and cautions—
“(1) Within a year of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must lay before both Houses of Parliament a report on the management of childhood convictions and cautions.
(2) The report must look at—
(a) the prevention of automatic disclosure of childhood conditional cautions;
(b) the prevention of adult treatment of offences committed by individuals who were minors at the time of the offences, in question, taking place;
(c) the range of childhood convictions which are removed from standard and enhanced checks after five and a half years.
(3) In considering the areas outlined in subsection (2), the report must look at the policy merits for reform of the existing management of childhood convictions and cautions, and the legislative steps which would be required in each case for reform to take place.”
New clause 15—Unlicensed drivers: penalties—
“(1) The Road Traffic Act 1988 is amended as follows.
(2) In Section 87, after subsection (2) insert—
‘(2A) The maximum penalty available to the Courts when sentencing an individual who has been convicted of driving without a license, and who has never held a license, shall be an unlimited fine, or a custodial sentence of six months (or both).’”
New clause 16—Failure to stop—
“(1) The Road Traffic Act 1988 is amended as follows.
(2) In Section 170, after subsection (4) insert—
‘(4A) The maximum penalties available to the Courts when sentencing an individual who has been convicted of an offence under this section are as follows—
(a) an unlimited fine;
(b) a custodial sentence of one year; and
(c) disqualification from driving for a period of up to two years.
When considering its sentence, the Court may issue more than one of the maximum penalties listed above.’”
New clause 18—Definition of the criminal exploitation of children—
“For the purpose of defining the offence created in section 38 of the Crime and Policing Act 2025 (Child criminal exploitation), the criminal exploitation of children is a form of child abuse in which a child under the age of 18 is used for purposes that constitute, enable or facilitate an offence under the law in England and Wales, regardless of whether the activity appears to be consensual, or whether the activity occurs online, through the use of technology, or in person.”
This new clause would create a statutory definition of the criminal exploitation of children.
New clause 19—Power of Secretary of State to disregard convictions or cautions—
“(1) The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 92(1) after ‘same sex’ insert ‘, or for an offence committed under Section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959’.
(3) In section 92(2) after ‘A and B are met’ insert, ‘, or, for a conviction or caution for an offence committed under Section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959, B alone is met’.”
This new clause would mean that convictions or cautions for loitering or soliciting for the purposes of prostitution become disregarded.
New clause 21—Prohibition of the use of live facial recognition technology by police forces—
“(1) The use of live facial recognition technology for real-time biometric identification in publicly accessible spaces by police forces is prohibited.
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1), facial recognition systems used for biometric verification, where the sole purpose is to confirm a person’s identity for the purpose of unlocking a device or having security access to premises, are not prohibited.”
New clause 22—Automated decision-making in the law enforcement context—
“(1) Where a significant decision taken by, or on behalf of, a controller in relation to a data subject in the law enforcement context is—
(a) based entirely or partly on personal data, and
(b) based solely on automated processing,
the controller must ensure that safeguards, which comply with subsection (2), for the data subject’s rights, freedoms and legitimate interests are in place.
(2) The safeguards must consist of, or include, measures which—
(a) provide the data subject with personalised information about any decisions described in subsection (1) that have been taken in relation to the data subject;
(b) enable the data subject to make representations about such decisions;
(c) enable the data subject to obtain human intervention from the controller in relation to such decisions;
(d) enable the data subject to contest such decisions;
(e) ensure human reviewers of algorithmic decisions have the necessary competence, training, time to consider, authority to challenge the decision, and analytical understanding of the data to rectify automated decisions; and
(f) require the publication of any algorithmic tools that have been used to process personal data on the Algorithmic Transparency Recording Standard.
(3) For the purpose of subsection (1), a decision based entirely or partly on personal data may not be made unless—
(a) the data subject has given explicit consent; or
(b) the decision is required or authorised by law.”
New clause 23—Restrictions on the delivery of pointed knives after agreements made by distance communication—
“(1) This section applies to any delivery of a pointed knife if the cutting edge of its blade exceeds 3 inches and,
(a) the delivery of the pointed knife is the result of an agreement made by distance communication; and
(b) either the delivery or the agreement for the delivery is made in the course of a business.
(2) For the purposes of this section an agreement is made by ‘distance communication’ if, at the time that the agreement is made, none of the parties to the agreement is within visual sight of the other.
(3) A party is not within visual sight of another if the only way that they can be seen is by use of an electronic, digital or other artificial means.
(4) A company or partnership is to be treated as being within visual sight of any other party if one or more of its employees or partners is within visual sight of the other parties.
(5) A means of distance communication may include, but not be limited to—
(a) electronic mail,
(b) unaddressed printed matter,
(c) telephone with human intervention,
(d) telephone without human intervention (including automatic calling machine, audiotext),
(e) videophone (telephone with screen),
(f) any form of social media,
(g) addressed printed matter,
(h) letter,
(i) press advertising with order form,
(j) catalogue,
(k) radio,
(l) videotext (microcomputer and television screen) with keyboard or touch screen,
(m) facsimile machine (fax), or
(n) television (teleshopping).
(6) A person in England or Wales is guilty of an offence if they knowingly or recklessly cause a pointed knife to be delivered or deliver any pointed knife to either—
(a) domestic premises; or
(b) a remote locker or collection point which is not supervised by a human being at the time when the pointed knife is collected
(7) For the purposes of this section domestic premises are defined as any premises which have not been assessed as liable for business rates and do not appear as such on the list maintained by the Valuation Agency Office.
(8) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding twelve months, or a fine not exceeding Level 5 on the standard scale or both.
(9) Nothing in this section prevents the delivery of rounded knives without a point.”
This new clause would create an offence of delivering a lethal pointed knife to domestic premises or remote locker/collection point.
New clause 24—Prohibition of displays of pointed knives—
“(1) A person who in the course of a business displays any pointed knife, or causes any pointed knife to be displayed, in a place in England and Wales or Northern Ireland is guilty of an offence.
(2) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for the meaning of ‘place’ in this section.
(3) No offence is committed under this section if the display is a requested display to an individual aged 18 or over.
(4) Subsections (5) and (6) apply where a person (‘D’) is charged with an offence under this section in a case where the display is a requested display to an individual aged under 18.
(5) Where D is charged by reason of D having displayed the pointed knife it is a defence that—
(a) D believed that the individual was aged 18 or over, and
(b) either—
(i) D had taken all reasonable steps to establish the individual's age, or
(ii) from the individual's appearance nobody could reasonably have suspected that the individual was aged under 18.
(6) For the purposes of subsection (5), a person is treated as having taken all reasonable steps to establish an individual's age if—
(a) the person asked the individual for evidence of the individual’s age, and
(b) the evidence would have convinced a reasonable person.
(7) Where D is charged by reason of D having caused the display of a pointed knife it is a defence that D exercised all due diligence to avoid committing the offence.
(8) In this section ‘a requested display’ means a display to an individual following a particular request by the individual to purchase a pointed knife, or for information about a pointed knife.
(9) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding twelve months, or a fine not exceeding Level 5 on the standard scale or both.
(10) Nothing in this section prevents the display of rounded knives without a point.”
This new clause would create an offence of displaying pointed knives in the course of a business.
New clause 25—Unauthorised Encampments—
“The amendments to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 inserted by Part 4 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 are repealed.”
This new clause would repeal amendments to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 in respect of unauthorised encampments, including those on which the High Court has made a Declaration of Incompatibility under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
New clause 26—Provision of information by the Secretary of State—
“(1) The Secretary of State must publish, on a quarterly basis, data on the use of anti-social behaviour orders.
(2) The data published under subsection (1) must include—
(a) The number of civil orders issued;
(b) The purposes for which such orders were issued;
(c) Information about the number of occasions when stop and search powers were utilised by the police prior to issuing anti-social behaviour orders; and
(d) The protected characteristics of persons subjected to anti-social behaviour orders.”
This new clause requires the Home Office to publish quarterly data on the issuing of anti-social behaviour orders, including the number of occasions when stop and search has been used by the police prior to issuing anti-social behaviour orders and the protected characteristics of those who have been issued with orders.
New clause 27—Suspension of Police Force’s ability to use stop and search powers: ‘Engage’ monitoring stage—
“(1) The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 7 insert—
‘7A Suspension of Police Force’s ability to use stop and search powers: ‘Engage’ monitoring stage
(1) The Secretary of State may, by regulations, vary the ability of Police Forces in England and Wales to use stop and search powers.
(2) The Secretary of State must, within a fortnight of being notified by His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) that a police force in England and Wales has been moved to the ‘Engage’ stage of HMICFRS’s monitoring process, bring forward regulations under subsection (1) to suspend the respective Force’s ability to use stop and search powers.
(3) The Secretary of State may not bring forward regulations to re-instate a suspended Police Force’s stop and search powers until such a time as HMICFRS confirms that the Force is no longer subject to the ‘Engage’ monitoring process.’”
This new clause allows regulations to vary the ability of police forces to use stop and search, and requires the Government to suspend a police force’s stop and search powers if that force is subject to the ‘engage’ monitoring process by His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services.
New clause 28—Disapplication of time limit for offence of sharing intimate photograph or film—
“In section 66B of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, (sharing or threatening to share intimate photograph or film), after subsection (9) insert—
‘(9A) Section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (time limit for summary offences) does not apply to an offence under subsection (1).’”
This new clause allows the offence of sharing intimate photograph or film to be tried by a Magistrates’ Court at any time by disapplying the six-month time limit in s.127 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980.
New clause 30—Prohibition of Police use of technologies to predict offences based on automated decisions, profiling, etc—
“(1) Police Forces in England and Wales shall be prohibited from using any automated decision-making system, profiling or artificial intelligence system for the purpose of—
(a) Making risk assessments of natural persons or groups thereof in order to assess the risk of a natural person for offending or reoffending; or
(b) Predicting the occurrence or reoccurrence of an actual or potential criminal offence based on profiling of a natural person or on assessing personality traits and characteristics, including the person’s location, or past criminal behaviour of natural persons or groups of natural persons.
(2) ‘Profiling’ is profiling as defined by Article 4(4) of the Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘the UK GDPR’).
(3) Automated Decision Making means a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.
(4) Artificial Intelligence systems are computer systems designed to produce results, opinions or assessments, produced through modelling from datasets and other automated training methods.”
This new clause would prohibit Police Forces from using of certain forms of 'predictive' policing technologies, particularly those that rely on automated decision-making, profiling, and AI to assess the likelihood that individuals or groups will commit criminal offences.
New clause 41—Inspection of police force firearms licensing departments—
“(1) The Police Act 1996 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 54 (appointment and functions of inspectors of constabulary), after subsection (2) insert—
‘(2A) Any inspection conducted under subsection (2) shall include a review of the performance of the police force’s firearms licensing department.’”
This new clause would require HM Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMICFRS) to inspect the efficiency and effectiveness of police force’s firearms licensing departments as part of every police, efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy (PEEL) inspection.
New clause 42—Offences with a terrorism connection—
“(1) The Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.
(2) In Section 69, omit subsection (4).”
This new clause would raise the threshold of offences which can be considered as terrorism related offences back to the level provided for by the Sentencing Act 2020 as originally enacted.
New clause 43—Commencement of the Protection from Sex-based Harassment in Public Act—
“(1) Section 4 of the Protection from Sex-based Harassment in Public Act 2023 is amended as follows.
(2) Leave out subsections (3) and (4) and insert—
‘(3) Sections 1, 2 and 3 come into force on the day that the Crime and Policing Act 2025 receives Royal Assent’.”
This new clause automatically commences Protection from Sex-based Harassment in Public Act 2023 when the Crime and Policing Bill receives Royal Assent, removing the need for regulations to bring the Act into force. The Act criminalises the public harassment of individuals where that harassment is based on an individual's sex.
New clause 44—Sentencing: “honour”-based offences:—
“(1) The Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.
(2) In Schedule 21, after paragraph 9(g) insert—‘(h) the fact that the offender inflicted “honour”- based abuse on the victim.’
(3) In Schedule 21, after paragraph 10(g) insert—‘(h) the fact that the offender was a victim of “honour”-based abuse perpetrated by the deceased.’”
This new clause would modify the Sentencing Act 2020 to recognise ‘”honour” as an aggravating factor under paragraph 9 and as a mitigating factor under paragraph 10.
New clause 45—Disclosure of convictions for child sexual offences—
“(1) This section applies where a police force is aware or notified of an individual within its jurisdiction who has been cautioned or convicted of a child sex offence.
(2) A police force must notify any organisation that has responsibilities for a child’s welfare where an individual identified under subsection (1) is employed by or volunteering for that organisation, or is seeking to do so.
(3) The Secretary of State must issue guidance to police forces on their duty under subsection (2) within six months of the passing of this Act.”
This new clause would require police forces to proactively notify an organisation of an individual working or volunteering for it, or seeking to do so, where that individual has been cautioned or convicted of a child sex offence.
New clause 46—Requirements on sellers of vehicle to provide specified information—
“(1) The Road Vehicle (Registration and Licensing) Regulations 2002 are amended as follows.
(2) After regulation 18, insert—
‘Requirements on sellers of vehicle to provide specified information
(1) Where a keeper sells a vehicle, the keeper must record relevant information in the registration document of the vehicle at, or before, the date on which the vehicle is sold to a new keeper.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the relevant information is—
(a) where the keeper is an individual, the home address of the keeper,
(b) where the keeper is a company, information which the Secretary of State may specify, and
(c) where the keeper is the keeper of a fleet, information equivalent to that required in paragraphs (a) and (b) as relevant to the circumstances of the keeper.’
(3) The information the Secretary of State may specify under paragraph (2)(b) may include the company’s registered address and company number.
(4) A keeper who fails to record relevant information in accordance with this regulation commits an offence.
(5) A person who is guilty of an offence under this regulation is liable for a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale.
(6) For the purposes of this regulation ‘company’ has such meaning as the Secretary of State may specify.”
This new clause would create a requirement for a person selling a vehicle to provide their address in the registration document of the vehicle.
New clause 47—Failure to disable stolen mobile devices: civil penalty—
“(1) An appropriate officer must provide the relevant service provider with a notification of a stolen mobile device.
(2) A notification under subsection (1) must—
(a) identify the stolen device or service provided to the device;
(b) require the service provider to disable the stolen device or take actions to prevent it from being re-registered;
(c) explain that the notification must be complied with before the end of a period of 48 hours beginning with the time the notification is given; and
(d) set out the potential consequences of failure to comply with the notification.
(3) A service provider who is given a notification under subsection (1) may, before the end of the initial 48-hour period, request a review of the decision to give the notification.
(4) The grounds on which a recipient may request a review include, in particular, that—
(a) the device to which the notification relates is insufficiently identified for the service provider to be able to take the action required by the notification; or
(b) the service provider that received the notice is not, in fact, the provider of the relevant service to which the notification relates.
(5) If the initial 48-hour period has expired without the notification having been complied with or without a review request having been received, an appropriate officer may give a penalty notice requiring the service provider to pay a penalty of an amount not exceeding £10,000.
(6) Schedule 4 makes further provision in connection with penalty notices given under this section.
(7) In this section—
‘appropriate officer’ has the same meaning as in Schedule 13, paragraph 14
‘service provider’ means a provider of a relevant mobile phone service.
(8) In Schedule 4, after all instances of ‘section 16’, insert ‘section (Failure to disable stolen mobile devices: civil penalty)’.”
This new clause would require the police to issue notifications to service providers requiring them to disable stolen mobile devices within 48 hours or be issued with a penalty.
New clause 48—Assault on a delivery worker—
“(1) A person who assaults a delivery person in connection with a delivery commits an offence under this section.
(2) ‘Delivery person’ means a person who—
(a) is logged into a delivery app,
(b) is travelling to a location to collect goods for delivery,
(c) is at a location waiting for, or taking possession of, goods for delivery,
(d) is travelling to deliver those goods to another location,
(e) is delivering those goods to another location,
(f) is within an hour of having delivered those goods to another location, or
(g) has commenced travel to another location.
(3) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or a fine (or both).
(4) In subsection (3) ‘the maximum term for summary offences’ means — (a) if the offence is committed before the time when section 281(5) of the Criminal Justice Act (alteration of penalties for certain summary offences: England and Wales) comes into force, 6 months; (b) if the offence is committed after that time, 51 weeks.
(5) In section 40(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (power to join in indictment count for common assault etc), after paragraph (ad) insert—
‘(ae) an offence under section (Assault on a delivery worker) of the Crime and Policing Act 2025;’”.
This new clause would create an offence of assault on a delivery worker.
New clause 49—Definition of serious disruption: amendment—
“(1) The Public Order Act 2023 is amended as follows.
(2) Omit Section 34.”
This new clause would restore the previous threshold for serious protest disruption by removing the wording in the Public Order Act which defines it to mean any obstruction that caused ‘more than minor hindrance’ to day to day activities.
New clause 50—Right to protest—
“(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended as follows.
(2) In Part II (Processions and Assemblies) before section 11, insert—
‘10A The right to protest
(1) Everyone has the right to engage in peaceful protest, both alone and with others.
(2) Public authorities have a duty to—
(a) respect the right to protest;
(b) protect the right to protest; and
(c) facilitate the right to protest.
(3) A public authority may only interfere with the right to protest, including by placing restrictions upon its exercise, when it is necessary and proportionate to do so to protect national security or public safety, prevent disorder or crime, protect public health or the rights and freedoms of others.
(4) For the purposes of this section “public authority” has the same meaning as in section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.’”
New clause 51—Causing death while driving unlicensed or uninsured—
“(1) The Road Traffic Act 1988 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 2A (meaning of dangerous driving), at the end of subsection (1)(b) insert ‘,or
(c) at the time when they were driving, the circumstances were such that they were committing an offence under section 87(1) of this Act (driving otherwise than in accordance with a licence), or section 143 of this Act (using motor vehicle while uninsured).’
(3) Omit section 3ZB.”
This new clause would mean that an individual who is driving without a licence and/or insurance and causes a death would be considered as causing death by dangerous driving.
New clause 83—Prevention of resale of stolen GPS products—
“(1) The Equipment Theft Act 2023 is amended as follows.
(2) In Section 1(2)(b), after ‘commercial activities’ insert, ‘including GPS equipment’.”
This new clause extends the Equipment Theft Act 2023 to specifically include the theft of GPS equipment.
New clause 84—Rural Crime Prevention Strategy—
“(1) A day after this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must establish a rural crime prevention task force to develop proposals for tackling rural crime.
(2) The task force should be tasked with a remit that includes, but is not confined to, examining—
(a) The particular types of crime that occur in rural areas;
(b) Crime rates in rural communities across England and Wales;
(c) The current levels of police resources and funding in rural communities;
(d) Whether specific training in how to respond to rural crime call-outs should be undertaken by police control room operators;
(e) The operational case, and the funding implications, of appointing rural crime specialists in Police Forces across England and Wales which serve areas that include a significant rural population; and
(f) Whether a National Rural Crime Coordinator should be established
(3) The task force established under subsection (1) must submit a rural crime prevention strategy to the Secretary of State within six months of its appointment.
(4) The Secretary of State must, within a month of receiving the report made by the task force, lay before both Houses of Parliament a written response to the task force’s recommendations.
(5) The Secretary of State must, within a month of laying their response to the task force’s report, ensure that an amendable motion on the subject of the rural crime task force’s recommendations is laid, and moved, before both Houses of Parliament.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to establish a task force to produce a strategy for tackling rural crime, makes provision for specific aspects of the task force’s remit, and requires the Secretary of State to bring forward a substantive motion before both Houses of Parliament on the task force’s recommendations.
New clause 85—Neighbourhood Policing: minimum levels—
“(1) Within six months of the passage of this Act, the Secretary of State must lay before both Houses of Parliament proposals on maintaining minimum levels of neighbourhood policing.
(2) The proposals must include—
(a) A requirement for every Police Force in England and Wales to maintain neighbourhood policing teams at a level necessary to ensure effective community engagement and crime prevention;
(b) A plan to designate a proportion of funds, recovered under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, for neighbourhood policing initiatives; and
(c) A plan for future Police Grant Reports to include a ring-fenced allocation of 20% of total funds to be allocated specifically for neighbourhood policing.”
New clause 86—Neighbourhood Policing—
“(1) The Secretary of State must ensure that every local authority area in England and Wales has a neighbourhood policing team must be assigned exclusively to community-based duties, including:
(a) High-visibility foot patrols;
(b) Community engagement and intelligence gathering;
(c) Crime prevention initiatives; and
(d) Solving crime.
(2) The Home Office must publish proposals detailing the additional funding that will be required to ensure that police forces can meet these requirements without reducing officer numbers in other frontline policing roles.
(3) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report detailing:
(a) The number of officers and PCSOs deployed in neighbourhood policing roles;
(b) The total cost of maintaining the required levels; and
(c) The impact on crime reduction and public confidence in policing.
(4) If a police force fails to meet the minimum staffing levels required under subsection (1), the Home Office must intervene and provide emergency funding to ensure compliance within six months.”
New clause 87—Offence of failing to meet pollution performance commitment levels—
“(1) A water or water and sewerage company (‘C’) commits an offence where C has—
(a) failed to meet its pollution performance commitment level for three consecutive years; or
(b) experienced an increase in serious pollution levels
for three consecutive years.
(2) For the purposes of this section—
(a) ‘water or water and sewerage company’ means companies which are responsible for the provision of water, or water and sewerage, services and which are regulated by Ofwat and the Environment Agency;
(b) ‘pollution performance commitment level’ means the level of performance on pollution that the company has committed to deliver, and which is reported against by Ofwat in its annual water company performance report; and
(c) ‘total pollution incidents per 10,000km2’ and ‘serious pollution incidents’ mean the relevant figures under those headings reported by the Environment Agency in its annual environmental performance report.
(3) If guilty of an offence under this section, C is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to a fine;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine.”
This new clause creates an offence of failing to meet pollution performance commitment levels.
New clause 88—Senior manager liability for failure to meet pollution performance commitment levels—
“(1) A person (‘P’) commits an offence where—
(a) P is a senior manager of a water or water and sewerage company (‘C’),
(b) C commits an offence under section [Offence of failing to meet pollution performance commitment levels], and
(c) P has failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent that offence being committed by C.
(2) For the purposes of this section—
‘senior manager’ means an individual who plays a significant role in—
(a) the making of decisions about how C’s relevant activities are to be managed or organised, or
(b) the actual managing or organising of C’s relevant activities;
(3) Where P is charged with an offence under this section, it is a defence for P to show that P was a senior manager of C for such a short time during the relevant period that P could not reasonably have been expected to take steps to prevent that offence being committed by C.
(4) Where P is guilty of an offence under this section, P is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to a fine;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine.”
This new clause creates senior manager liability for failure to meet pollution performance commitment levels.
New clause 89—Duty of candour—
“(1) Every police officer shall have a duty to act with candour and transparency in relation to—
(a) the investigation of criminal offences;
(b) the investigation of misconduct or complaints involving the police;
(c) participation in any public inquiry, inquest, disciplinary proceedings, or legal process arising from their duties;
(d) any engagement with bodies exercising oversight of policing or the criminal justice system.
(2) This duty shall apply regardless of whether the officer is directly the subject of the matter in question or is providing evidence as a witness.
(3) The duty includes an obligation to—
(a) disclose any information which the officer knows or reasonably believes to be relevant;
(b) disclose such information proactively and not solely in response to formal requests;
(c) refrain from withholding or distorting relevant facts, whether by act or omission.
(4) Failure to comply with the duty of candour shall—
(a) constitute misconduct for the purposes of police disciplinary procedures;
(b) amount to gross misconduct where the breach is intentional or demonstrates reckless disregard for the truth;
(c) be subject to mandatory referral to the Independent Office for Police Conduct.
(5) The Secretary of State shall, within six months of this Act coming into force, issue statutory guidance on the implementation of the duty of candour.
(6) The College of Policing shall include the duty of candour within the Code of Ethics and ensure its incorporation into training programmes.
(7) The Independent Office for Police Conduct shall report annually to Parliament on the application, enforcement, and impact of this duty.
(8) For the purposes of this section, ‘police officer’ means—
(a) any constable or member of a police force in England and Wales;
(b) any special constable;
(c) any former officer where the conduct in question occurred during their service.”
New clause 90—Mandatory mental health training for police officers—
“(1) Every police force in England and Wales must ensure that all frontline police officers receive regular training in dealing with incidents involving individuals experiencing mental health crises.
(2) The training provided under subsection (1) must—
(a) be developed and delivered in consultation with NHS mental health trusts, clinical commissioning groups, and other relevant health and social care bodies;
(b) reflect the principles of the Right Care, Right Person (RCRP) approach;
(c) include instruction in de-escalation techniques, legal obligations under the Mental Health Act 1983, communication with vulnerable persons, and referral pathways to appropriate healthcare services; and
(d) be trauma-informed and culturally competent.
(3) Initial training must be completed within six months of an officer’s commencement of frontline duties.
(4) Refresher training must be undertaken at least once every two years.
(5) Each police force must publish an annual statement on compliance with this section, including the number of officers trained and steps taken to evaluate the effectiveness of the training.
(6) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for—
(a) minimum standards for training content and delivery;
(b) procedures for monitoring and enforcement; and
(c) sanctions for non-compliance.
(7) Regulations under this section must be made by statutory instrument and are subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.”
New clause 91—Right to protest: report on restrictions—
“(1) Within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must lay before both Houses of Parliament a report on the restrictions which have been made to the right to protest over the last ten years.
(2) The Secretary of State must ensure that within a month of the report produced under subsection (1) being published, time is made available for a debate on a substantive motion in both Houses of Parliament.”
New clause 92—Safeguards for the use of facial recognition technology in public spaces—
“(1) The use of live facial recognition technology for real-time biometric identification, by any public or private authorities, shall be prohibited unless one or more of the following conditions are met—
(a) It is used for the purpose of preventing, detecting, or investigating serious crimes as defined under the Serious Crime Act 2007;
(b) The deployment has received prior judicial authorization specifying the scope, duration, and purpose of its use;
(c) It is necessary and proportionate for preventing an imminent and substantial threat to public safety, such as a terrorist attack; and
(d) It is deployed for the purpose of locating missing persons or vulnerable individuals at risk.
(2) Any public authority deploying live facial recognition technology must:
(a) Conduct and publish a Data Protection Impact Assessment before deployment;
(b) Ensure that use is compliant with the principles of necessity and proportionality as outlined in the Human Rights Act 1998;
(c) Maintain clear and publicly available records of deployments, including justification for use and any safeguards implemented;
(d) Inform the public of deployments, unless exceptional circumstances apply; and
(e) Create, implement and follow nationwide statutory guidance for using the technology.
(3) The use of live facial recognition technology for mass surveillance, profiling, or automated decision-making without human oversight, is an offence.
(4) The Information Commissioner’s Office and an independent oversight body shall be responsible for monitoring compliance with the provisions of this clause, conducting audits, and investigating complaints.
(5) Within six months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must sure that a motion is tabled, and moved, before both Houses of Parliament to approve the appointment of the independent oversight body specified in subsection (5).
(6) A public authority or private entity guilty of an offence under this section will be liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to a fine;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine
(7) A private individual found guilty of an offence under this section will be liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to a fine;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine or imprisonment (or both).
(8) The Secretary of State must lay before both Houses of Parliament an annual report detailing the use of live facial recognition technology, including instances of authorisation and compliance measures undertaken, and ensure that a motion is tabled, and moved, before both Houses to approve the report.
(9) The motion specified in subsection (9) must include proposals to strengthen the role of the Office of the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner (OBSCC) in overseeing the impact of emerging technology such as facial recognition and its impact on civil liberties.”
New clause 93—Right to peaceful protest—
“(1) It is the duty of public authorities, including police forces, to respect and facilitate the exercise of the right to peaceful protest in accordance with Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
(2) A person’s presence at, or participation in, a peaceful protest—
(a) must not, of itself, be treated as grounds for arrest or the use of force; and
(b) must not be subject to unnecessary or disproportionate restrictions.
(3) In exercising powers under this Act or any other enactment, a constable must have regard to the importance of—
(a) enabling peaceful protest to take place; and
(b) minimising interference with the rights of those engaged in peaceful protest.
(4) This section does not prevent a constable from imposing conditions on a protest or taking enforcement action where necessary and proportionate to prevent—
(a) serious disruption to the life of the community;
(b) serious public disorder;
(c) serious damage to property; or
(d) the commission of serious crime.
(5) The Secretary of State must issue guidance on the application of this section within six months of the passing of this Act.”
New clause 95—Offence of stalking: review—
“(1) Within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must establish a review into the effectiveness of Sections 2A and 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.
(2) The review established under subsection (1) must complete its work within nine months of its establishment.
(3) Within a month of the review submitting its final report, the Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before both Houses of Parliament and make time available in both Houses for a debate on a substantive motion relating to the report.”
This new clause would require the Government to establish a review into the effectiveness of the stalking provisions of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, specifies the review's timeframe, and requires the Government to make time available in both Houses of Parliament for a substantive debate on the review’s report.
New clause 96—Stalking awareness guidelines: review—
“(1) Within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must establish a review into the effectiveness and adequacy of stalking awareness guidance provided by public bodies in England and Wales.
(2) The terms of reference for this review should include examining whether stalking awareness guidance should form part of the national curriculum in England.
(3) Within a month of the review submitting its final report, the Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before both Houses of Parliament and make time available in both Houses for a debate on a substantive motion relating to the report.”
This new clause would require the Government to establish a review into the effectiveness of the stalking awareness guidance provided by public bodies, specifies that the review should examine making stalking awareness guidance mandatory under the national curriculum, and provides for a substantive debate in Parliament on the review's report.
New clause 97—Electronic searches under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000—
“(1) The Terrorism Act 2000 is amended as follows.
(2) In Schedule 7, after paragraph 8 insert—
8A ‘(1) An examining officer may not search any electronic device under paragraph 8(1) without the prior authorisation of a judge, unless the examining officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the device contains information necessary to prevent—
(a) an emergency threatening the life of a person or persons, or
(b) an immediate threat to national security.
(2) An examining officer may seek the prior authorisation of a judge to engage in conduct which is for the purpose of obtaining data necessary for the purpose of determining whether the person falls within section 40(1).
(3) Authorised conduct may consist of an officer—
(a) scanning the information stored on the device using technology approved by the Secretary of State for the purpose of ascertaining whether someone falls within section 40(1),
(b) requiring the person to permit the scan, and
(c) requiring the person to take such steps as appear necessary to allow the scan to be performed.’”
This new clause places safeguards on the searches of electronic devices to ensure these are conducted only when necessary to determine whether the person is a relevant person for the purposes of the Terrorism Act 2000.
New clause 98—Use of Prevent data—
“In the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, after section 33 insert—
‘33A Duty to obtain authorisation for use of Prevent data
(1) This section applies where a specified authority uses information collected under the Prevent duty for criminal investigations, national security or any other purpose unrelated to compliance with the general duty under section 26.
(2) Where this section applies, a specified authority must seek the prior authorisation of a judge for the use of the information, except where doing so would prevent the authority from addressing—
(a) an emergency threatening the life of a person or persons, or
(b) an immediate threat to national security.
(3) A specified authority which uses information under paragraphs 2(a) or (b) must seek a review of its use from a judge at its earliest convenience and no later than a week after the use.
(4) A specified authority is a person or body listed in Schedule 6.’”
This new clause would require specified users to seek the approval of a judge prior to using data collected under the Prevent duty, except where there was an emergency or immediate threat. If data is used in urgent situations, a judge must review it within a week.
New clause 99—Universal jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and ancillary conduct (England and Wales)—
“(1) The International Criminal Court Act 2001 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 51(1)—
(a) After ‘person’, insert ‘, whatever his or her nationality,’
(b) After ‘war crime’, insert ‘in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.’
(3) Omit section 51(2).
(4) In section 52(1)—
(a) After ‘person’, insert ‘, whatever his or her nationality,’
(b) After ‘conduct’, insert ‘in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.’
(5) Omit section 52(4).”
This new clause would amend the ICC Act 2001 to provide for the exercise of universal jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and ancillary conduct, allowing authorities in England and Wales to prosecute persons suspected of these crimes without any requirement for a connection to the UK.
New clause 100—Universal jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and ancillary conduct (Northern Ireland)—
“(1) The International Criminal Court Act 2001 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 58(1)—
(a) After ‘person’, insert ‘, whatever his or her nationality,’
(b) After ‘war crime’, insert ‘in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.’
(3) Omit section 58(2).
(4) In section 59(1)—
(a) After ‘person’, insert ‘, whatever his or her nationality,’
(b) After ‘conduct’, insert ‘in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.’
(5) Omit section 59(4).”
This new clause would amend the ICC Act 2001 to provide for the exercise of universal jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and ancillary conduct, allowing authorities in Northern Ireland to prosecute persons suspected of these crimes without any requirement for a connection to the UK.
New clause 101—Threshold for offences to be considered as terrorism-related: review—
“(1) Within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must establish a review into the effect of the raising of the threshold of offences which can be considered as terrorism related offences by the Counter Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021.
(2) The review specified in subsection (1) must report within nine months of its establishment and its final report must be laid before both Houses of Parliament, and time made available for a debate on a substantive motion in both Houses of Parliament on the report’s conclusions, within a month of the report’s publication.”
New clause 102—Amendment of Possession of extreme pornographic images—
“(1) The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 is amended as follow.
(2) In section 63 subsection (7) (possession of extreme pornographic images) after paragraph (a) insert—
(aa) an act of choking, suffocating or strangling another person.”
This amendment would extend the definition of extreme pornographic images to cover realistic and explicit pornographic depictions of acts of strangulation/choking.
New clause 103—Pornographic content: online harmful content—
“(1) A person commits an offence if they publish or allow or facilitate the publishing of pornographic content online which meets the criteria for harmful material under section 368E(3)(a) and section 368E(3)(b) of the Communications Act 2003.
(2) An individual guilty of an offence is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine or both.
(3) A person who is a UK national commits an offence under this section regardless of where the offence takes place.
(4) A person who is not a UK national commits an offence under this section if any part of the offence takes place in the UK.
(5) The platform on which material that violates the provisions in this section is published can be fined up to £18 million or 10 percent of their qualifying worldwide revenue, whichever is greater.
(6) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the Act receiving Royal Assent, make regulations appointing one or more public bodies (the appointed body) to monitor and enforce compliance by online platforms with this section.
(7) Regulations made under subsection 6 may provide the appointed body appointed by the Secretary of State with the powers, contained in sections 144 and 146 of the Online Safety Act 2023, to apply to the court for a Service Restriction Order or Access Restriction Order (or both).
(8) The appointed body must, within six months of being appointed by the Secretary of State, lay before Parliament a strategy for monitoring, and enforcing, compliance with the provisions in this section.
(9) The appointed body must lay before Parliament an annual report, outlining the enforcement activity undertaken in relation to this section.”
This new clause extends safeguarding requirements for pornography distributed offline to pornography distributed online, making it an offence to publish online harmful material under section 368E(3)(a) and section 368E(3)(b) of the Communications Act 2003.
New clause 104—Pornographic Content: Duty to safeguard against illegal content—
“(1) The Online Safety Act is amended as follows.
(2) In section 80(1), after ‘service’ insert ‘and the illegal content duties outlined in Part 3 of this Act.’”
This new clause extends the illegal content duties in Part 3 of the Act to all internet services which are subject to the regulated provider pornographic content duties in Part 5 of the Act.
New clause 105—Pornographic Content: Duty to verify age—
“(1) A person (A) commits an offence if they publish or allow or facilitate the publishing of pornographic content online where it has not been verified that—
(a) every individual featuring in pornographic content on the platform has given their consent for the content in which they feature to be published or made available by the service; and/or
(b) every individual featuring in pornographic content on the platform has been verified as an adult, and that age verification completed before the content was created and before it was published on the service; and/or
(c) every individual featured in pornographic content on the platform, that had already published on the service when this Act is passed, is an adult.
(2) It is irrelevant under (1a) whether the individual featured in pornographic material has previously given their consent to the relevant content being published, if they have subsequently withdrawn that consent in writing either directly or via an appointed legal representative to—
(a) the platform, or
(b) the relevant regulator where a contact address was not provided by the platform to receive external communications.
(3) If withdrawal of consent under (2) has been communicated in writing to an address issued by the platform or to the relevant public body, the relevant material must be removed by the platform within 24 hours of the communication being sent.
(4) An individual guilty of an offence is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine (or both).
(5) A person who is a UK national commits an offence under this section regardless of where the offence takes place.
(6) A person who is not a UK national commits an offence under this section if any part of the offence takes place in the UK.
(7) The platform on which material that violates the provisions in this section is published can be fined up to £18 million or 10 percent of their qualifying worldwide revenue, whichever is greater.
(8) The Secretary of State will appoint one or more public bodies to monitor and enforce compliance by online platforms with this section, with the relevant public body—
(a) granted powers to impose business disruption measures on non-compliant online platforms, including but not limited to service restriction (imposing requirements on one or more persons who provide an ancillary service, whether from within or outside the United Kingdom, in relation to a regulated service); and access restriction (imposing requirements on one or more persons who provide an access facility, whether from within or outside the United Kingdom, in relation to a regulated service).
(b) required to act in accordance with regulations relating to monitoring and enforcement of this section issued by the Secretary of State, including but not limited to providing the Secretary of State with a plan for monitoring and enforcement of the provisions in this section within six months of the bill entering into force, and publishing annual updates on enforcement activity relating to this section.
(9) Internet services hosting pornographic content must make and keep a written record outlining their compliance with the provisions of this section. Such a record must be made summarised in a publicly available statement alongside the publishing requirements in section 81(4) and (5) of the Online Safety Act.”
This new clause makes it a requirement for pornography websites to verify the age and permission of everyone featured on their site, and enable withdrawal of consent at any time.
New clause 107—Equality Impact Analyses of provisions of this Act—
“(1) The Secretary of State must review the equality impact of the provisions of this Act.
(2) A report of the review under this section must be laid before Parliament within 12 months of the date of Royal Assent to this Act.
(3) A review under this section must consider the impact of the provisions of this Act on—
(a) households at different levels of income,
(b) people with protected characteristics (within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010),
(c) the Government’s compliance with the public sector equality duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010, and
(d) equality in the different nations of the United Kingdom and different regions of England.
(4) A review under this section must include a separate analysis of each section of the Act, and must also consider the cumulative impact of the Act as a whole.”
New clause 108—Extension of freedom of expression—
“For section 29J of the Public Order Act 1986 (protection of freedom of expression), substitute—
‘Nothing in—
(a) this Act;
(b) section 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988 (offence of sending letters etc. with the intent to cause distress or anxiety); and
(c) section 127 of the Communications Act 2003 (improper use of public communications network)
shall be read or given effect in a way which prohibits or restricts discussion, criticism or expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular religions or the beliefs or practices of their adherents, or of any other belief system or the beliefs or practices of its adherents, or proselytising or urging adherents of a different religion or belief system to cease practising their religion or belief system.’”
This new clause would extend the protection of freedom of expression afforded to Part 3A of the Public Order Act 1986 to other areas of statute that create offences relating to speech or communication.
New clause 109—Review of compliance and enforcement mechanisms in relation to Police Forces—
“(1) Within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must publish a proposal for approval by the House of Commons on the establishment of an independent commission to investigate the enforcement powers of His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS).
(2) The proposal for an independent commission must include a terms of reference, which must include, but may not be limited to—
(a) a review of the powers available to other independent regulatory and investigative bodies, such as Ofqual, the Care Quality Commission, the Financial Conduct Authority, and Ofsted;
(b) the lessons learned from other regulatory bodies with stronger enforcement powers; and
(c) an examination of whether a statutory framework of coordination between HMICFRS, the Independent Office for Police Conduct, and Police and Crime Commissioners, could enhance the enforcement powers available to all three sets of bodies and the accountability of policing in England and Wales.
(3) The proposal for an independent commission must set out a timetable for its work including that—
(a) the commission should conclude its deliberations within nine months of its establishment, and
(b) the Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before both Houses of Parliament and ensure that time is made available, within a fortnight of the report being laid, in both Houses for a substantive debate on the report’s conclusions.”
This new clause would require the Government to publish a proposal for an independent commission for approval by the House of Commons to review the enforcement powers of His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS), including consideration of a statutory framework to enhance the collective enforcement powers of bodies supervising Police Forces in England and Wales.
New clause 110—Requirement to bring forward proposals for an inquiry on the exploitation of children by organised networks—
“(1) The Secretary of State must within 3 months of the passing of this Act publish proposals for approval by the House of Commons for the establishment of an inquiry, including the appointment of members of any such inquiry in accordance with section [Proposals for an inquiry: appointment of inquiry panel members].
(2) The terms of reference contained in the proposals referred to in subsection (1) must include, but may not be limited to—
(a) investigation of the nature and extent of sexual exploitation of children by organised networks, including—
(i) the experiences of victims and survivors of child sexual exploitation by organised networks,
(ii) the extent to which local authorities, law enforcement agencies, the judiciary and other public authorities were aware of child sexual exploitation by organised networks in their areas,
(iii) the appropriateness and effectiveness of any responses of those public authorities to cases of child sexual exploitation, including the effectiveness of sentencing or sentences served for offences involving child sexual exploitation by organised networks,
(iv) the extent to which public authorities have cooperated with previous inquiries and investigations into cases of child sexual exploitation in their areas,
(v) any organisational or individual responsibilities for not responding effectively to cases of child sexual exploitation,
(vi) identification of common patterns of behaviour and offending between organised networks,
(vii) identification of the type, extent and volume of crimes committed by organised networks including the number of victims of those crimes,
(viii) identification of the ethnicity of members of organised networks, and
(b) recommendations about legislative, policy and institutional changes to prevent child sexual exploitation in the future.
(3) The Secretary of State’s proposals must stipulate that any inquiry should conclude within 18 months of the passing of this Act, and report to the Secretary of State within 3 months of concluding.
(4) The Secretary of State’s proposals may make provision for the issuing of such interim reports as the chair of any inquiry considers to be appropriate.
(5) The Secretary of State’s proposals may make provision for supplementing the terms of reference of any inquiry after consultation with the chair, but may not omit, modify, or otherwise adversely affect any of the terms of reference set out in subsection (2).”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to bring forward proposals for setting up an inquiry on the exploitation of children by organised networks for approval by the House of Commons.
New clause 111—Proposals for an inquiry: appointment of inquiry panel members—
“(1) The inquiry proposals brought forward by the Secretary of State under section [Requirement to bring forward proposals for an inquiry on the exploitation of children by organised networks] must make provision for any inquiry to be overseen by a chair and inquiry panel appointed by the Secretary of State.
(2) The inquiry proposals must require the prospective chair to have senior experience of and expertise in the successful investigation of serious offences and that the person does not have a conflict of interest in the subject matter of the inquiry.
(3) The inquiry proposals must make provision for the chair to appoint one or more persons to act as assessors to assist the inquiry panel and may at any time terminate the appointment of an assessor.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State’s proposals for an inquiry relating to the sexual exploitation of children by organised networks under NC10 to make provision for the appointment of a chair and inquiry panel members.
New clause 112—Proposals for an inquiry: inquiry evidence and procedure—
“(1) The inquiry proposals brought forward by the Secretary of State under section [Requirement to bring forward proposals for an inquiry on the exploitation of children by organised networks] must make provision for the procedure and conduct of any inquiry to be such as the chair may direct.
(2) The inquiry proposals must require the chair, in making any decision as to the procedure or conduct of any inquiry to act in a manner which is consistent with the terms of reference and—
(a) fairness,
(b) regard to the need for a detailed investigation of the issues before the inquiry,
(c) regard to the need to conclude the inquiry within the period set in the terms of reference, and
(d) regard to the need to avoid unnecessary cost (whether to public funds or to witnesses or others).”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State’s proposals for an inquiry relating to the sexual exploitation of children by organised networks to require the chair to make provision for the procedure of that inquiry.
New clause 113—Proposals for an inquiry: requirement for public access to inquiry proceedings and information—
“(1) The inquiry proposals brought forward by the Secretary of State under section [Requirement to bring forward proposals for an inquiry on the exploitation of children by organised networks] must make provision for the chair of any inquiry to take steps to secure that members of the public (including reporters) are able to—
(a) attend a hearing of the inquiry,
(b) see and hear a simultaneous transmission of proceedings at the inquiry, and
(c) obtain or to view a record of evidence and documents given, produced or provided to the inquiry or inquiry panel,
subject to any restrictions imposed by an order under section [Proposals for an inquiry: restrictions on public access etc].
(2) The inquiry proposals brought forward by the Secretary of State under section [Requirement to bring forward proposals for an inquiry on the exploitation of children by organised networks] must make provision for records (including transcripts of the proceedings) of any inquiry to be held for a period of 10 years, and to be made available on a website maintained by the Secretary of State, subject to any restriction imposed under section [Proposals for an inquiry: Inquiry restrictions on public access etc],”
This new clause would enable the chair of any inquiry proposed by the Secretary of State relating to the sexual exploitation of children by organised networks to make provision for public access to that inquiry.
New clause 114—Proposals for an inquiry: inquiry restrictions on public access etc—
“(1) The inquiry proposals brought forward by the Secretary of State under section [Requirement to bring forward proposals for an inquiry on the exploitation of children by organised networks] must make provision on restrictions that may, in accordance with this section, be imposed on—
(a) attendance at any inquiry established following approval by the House of Commons, or at any particular part of the inquiry,
(b) the disclosure or publication of any, or part of, evidence or documents given, produced or provided to the inquiry (including the simultaneous transmission of proceedings at the inquiry), and
(c) disclosure or publication of the identity of any person.
(2) Restrictions made under subsection (1) may be imposed by being specified in an order (a ‘restriction order’) made by the chair during the course of the inquiry
(3) A restriction order must, having regard to the matters in subsection (4), specify only such restrictions required by any express statutory provision, assimilated enforcement obligation, or for national security purposes, or which otherwise protect—
(a) a victim or a whistle-blower,
(b) the identity of an individual authorised for the conduct or the use of a covert human intelligence source except where that person is accused of an offence and the chair considers it to be conducive to the inquiry in fulfilling its terms of reference, or
(c) a matter which the chair considers to be in the public interest provided that this does not affect the inquiry fulfilling its terms of reference.
(4) The matters referred to in subsection (3) are—
(a) the importance of public attendance at the inquiry and disclosure or publication of information to the allaying of public concern,
(b) any risk of harm to—
(i) a victim or survivor of child sexual exploitation,
(ii) a whistle-blower, or
(iii) the future operational practices or methods of law enforcement,
that could be avoided or materially reduced by any such restriction,
(c) any conditions as to confidentiality subject to which a person acquired information which that person is to give, or has given, to the inquiry, and
(d) the extent to which not imposing any particular restriction would be likely to cause delay or to impair the efficiency or effectiveness of the inquiry or the fulfilment of the terms of reference.
(5) The Secretary of State may direct the chair to revoke any restriction order made under this section or require the chair to impose a restriction order if they consider it conducive to the fulfilment of the terms of reference of the inquiry and in the public interest having regard to the matters in subsection (4).
(6) The Secretary of State must, by a notice published within a month of the end of the inquiry—
(a) revoke a restriction order containing disclosure restrictions that are still in force, or
(b) vary such a restriction order so as to remove or relax any of the restrictions,
unless the Secretary of State considers it necessary, having regard to the matters in subsection (4), to retain any of the disclosure restrictions after the end of the inquiry.”
This new clause would enable the Secretary of State and the chair of any inquiry proposed by the Secretary of State on the sexual exploitation of children by organised networks, to make provision for restrictions on information provided to that inquiry.
New clause 115—Proposals for an inquiry: powers to require production of evidence etc.—
“(1) The inquiry proposals brought forward by the Secretary of State under section [Requirement to bring forward proposals for an inquiry on the exploitation of children by organised networks] must make provision for powers to produce evidence in accordance with this section.
(2) The chair of any inquiry may require a person at a time and place stated by notice—
(a) to give evidence,
(b) to produce any documents in the custody or under the control of that person which relate to a matter in question at the inquiry, or
(c) to produce any other thing in the custody or under the control of that person for inspection, examination or testing by or on behalf of the inquiry panel.
(3) The Secretary of State must require a public authority that has control of audio or visual records of specified proceedings to provide those audio or visual records to the Secretary of State.
(4) Subject to subsection (5), the Secretary of State must, following the provision of audio or visual records under subsection (2), publish a transcription of those records on a website maintained by the Secretary of State for a period of 10 years.
(5) The Secretary of State may redact or omit any or all of the transcription where it is required by any express statutory provision, assimilated enforcement obligation, or for national security purposes, or which otherwise—
(a) protect a victim or a whistle-blower,
(b) protect the identity of an individual authorised for the conduct or the use of a covert human intelligence source except where that person is accused of an offence and the Secretary of State considers it to be conducive to do so, or
(c) avoid or remove any risk of harm to—
(i) a victim or survivor of child sexual exploitation, or
(ii) a whistle-blower, or
(iii) the future operational practices or methods of law enforcement, or
(d) adversely affect any conditions as to confidentiality subject to which a person acquired information which that person has provided in the course of any specified proceedings.
(6) A person subject to subsection (2) cannot be required to give, produce or provide any evidence or document if that person could not be required to do so on the grounds of legal professional privilege if the proceedings of the inquiry were civil proceedings in a court in England and Wales.
(7) In this section, ‘specified proceedings’ means any previous inquiry or commission or criminal proceedings which is notified in writing to the Secretary of State by the chair of the inquiry.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State’s proposals for an inquiry into the sexual exploitation of children by organised networks to enable the chair to require that attendance or evidence is provided to that inquiry and, would provide for a process requiring the publication of specified proceedings.
New clause 116—Inquiry offences—
“(1) This section applies if the House of Commons has approved the establishment of an inquiry relating to the sexual exploitation of children by organised networks under section [Requirement to bring forward proposals for an inquiry on the exploitation of children by organised networks].
(2) A person (‘P’) is guilty of an offence if during the course of the inquiry—
(a) P intentionally suppresses or conceals a document that is, and that P knows or believes to be, a relevant document, or
(b) P intentionally alters or destroys a relevant document.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2) a document is a ‘relevant document’ if it is likely that the inquiry panel would (if aware of its existence) wish to be provided with it.
(4) A person who is guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks.”
This new clause would make it a criminal offence not to provide evidence to an inquiry relating to the sexual exploitation of children by organised networks if an inquiry was established under NC110.
New clause 117—Inquiry enforcement by High Court and contempt—
“(1) This section applies if the House of Commons has approved the establishment of an inquiry relating to the sexual exploitation of children by organised networks under section [Requirement to bring forward proposals for an inquiry on the exploitation of children by organised networks].
(2) Where a person—
(a) fails to comply with, or acts in breach of, a notice to provide evidence or an order made by the chair, or
(b) threatens to do so,
the chair may bring a case referring the matter to the High Court.
(3) The High Court, after hearing any evidence or representations on a matter brought to it under subsection (2), may make any order by way of enforcement or otherwise which it could have made if the matter had arisen in proceedings before it.”
This new clause would enable enforcement to be taken in relation to a person who breached a requirement to provide evidence or attend proceedings in connection with any inquiry into the sexual exploitation of children by organised networks established under NC110.
New clause 118—Inquiry immunity from suit and legal challenges—
“(1) This section applies if the House of Commons has approved the establishment of an inquiry relating to the sexual exploitation of children by organised networks under section [Requirement to bring forward proposals for an inquiry on the exploitation of children by organised networks].
(2) No legal action may be brought against—
(a) a member of the inquiry panel,
(b) an assessor, counsel or solicitor to the inquiry,
(c) a person engaged to provide assistance to the inquiry, or
(d) the Secretary of State,
in respect of any act done or omission made in the execution of that person’s duty or power, or any act done or omission made in good faith in the purported execution of that person’s duty in the undertaking of the inquiry.
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of any other enactment, a court or tribunal must not consider any claim or complaint (whether by way of judicial review or otherwise) which relates to the decision or conduct of—
(a) a member of the inquiry panel,
(b) an assessor, counsel or solicitor to the inquiry,
(c) a person engaged to provide assistance to the inquiry, or
(d) the Secretary of State,
in respect of any act done or omission made in the execution of that person’s duty or power as part of the inquiry, or any act done or omission made in good faith in the purported execution of this Act.
(4) An application which is not excluded under subsection (2) for judicial review of a decision made—
(a) by the Secretary of State in relation to the inquiry, or
(b) by a member of the inquiry panel,
must be brought promptly and, no later than 14 days after the day on which the applicant became aware of the decision, unless that time limit is extended by the court.”
This new clause would make provision relating to legal challenges in connection with any inquiry into the sexual exploitation of children by organised networks established under NC110.
New clause 119—Duty of cooperation with inquiry—
“(1) This section applies if the House of Commons has approved the establishment of an inquiry relating to the sexual exploitation of children by organised networks under section [Requirement to bring forward proposals for an inquiry on the exploitation of children by organised networks].
(2) A public authority must not act in a manner which conflicts with or impedes the inquiry acting in accordance with its terms of reference and must otherwise cooperate with the members of the inquiry in the exercise of its functions.
(3) In this section, ‘public authority’ includes any person or body certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature.”
This new clause would ensure there is a duty of cooperation in connection with any inquiry into the sexual exploitation of children by organised networks established under NC110.
New clause 120—Racial and religious hatred and hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation against an emergency worker—
“(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 18, after subsection (2) insert—
‘(3) The exemption in respect of a dwelling place in subsection (2) does not apply where the offence is committed against an emergency worker.
(3A) For the purposes of subsection (3) the term “emergency worker” has the meaning given by section 3 of the Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act 2018.’
(3) In section 29B, after subsection (2) insert—
‘(3) The exemption in respect of a dwelling place in subsection (2) does not apply where the offence is committed against an emergency worker.
(3A) For the purposes of subsection (3)(a) the term “emergency worker” has the meaning given by section 3 of the Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act 2018.’”
This new clause would create an offence where racial or religious hatred or hatred on the basis of sexual orientation is directed against an emergency worker, and the offence takes place in a private dwelling.
New clause 121—Amendment of Possession of extreme pornographic images—
“(1) Section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (possession of extreme pornographic images) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (7) after paragraph (a) insert—
‘(aa) an act which affects a person’s ability to breathe and constitutes battery of that person.’”
This amendment would extend the legal definition of the extreme pornography to include the depiction of nonfatal strangulation.
New clause 122—Aggravated offences against people because of their sexual orientation, transgender identity or disability—
“(1) An offence is to be considered aggravated on the basis of sexual orientation, transgender identity or disability if—
(a) at the time of committing the offence, or immediately before or after doing so, the offender demonstrates towards the victim of the offence hostility based on the victim’s—
(i) sexual orientation, transgender identity or disability (or presumed sexual orientation, transgender identity or disability), or;
(ii) association with an individual or group defined by reference to sexual orientation, transgender identity or disability (or presumed sexual orientation, transgender identity or disability); or
(b) the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards people because of their sexual orientation, transgender identity or disability or presumed sexual orientation, transgender identity or disability).
(2) In this section—
‘presumed’ means presumed by the offender.
‘disability’ has the same meaning as in the Sentencing Act 2020.
‘transgender identity’ has the same meaning as in the Sentencing Act 2020.
‘sexual orientation’ has the same meaning as in the Public Order Act 1986.
(3) A person is guilty of an offence under this section if they commit—
(a) an offence under section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (malicious wounding or grievous bodily harm);
(b) an offence under section 47 of that Act (actual bodily harm);
(c) an offence under section 75A of the Serious Crime Act 2015 (strangulation or suffocation); or
(d) common assault,
which is aggravated for the purposes of this section.
(4) A person guilty of an offence falling within subsection (3)(a), (b) or (c) above shall be liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years or to a fine, or to both.
(5) A person guilty of an offence falling within subsection (3)(d) above shall be liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to a fine, or to both.
(6) A person is guilty of an offence under this section if they commit an offence under section 1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 (destroying or damaging property belonging to another) which is aggravated for the purposes of this section.
(7) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years or to a fine, or to both.
(8) For the purposes of this section, subsection (1) above shall have effect as if the person to whom the property belongs or is treated as belonging for the purposes of that Act were the victim of the offence.
(9) A person is guilty of an offence under this section if they commit—
(a) an offence under section 4 of the Public Order Act 1986 (fear or provocation of violence);
(b) an offence under section 4A of that Act (intentional harassment, alarm or distress); or
(c) an offence under section 5 of that Act (harassment, alarm or distress),
which is aggravated for the purposes of this section.
(10) A person guilty of an offence falling within subsection (9)(a) or (b) above shall be liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to a fine, or to both.
(11) A person guilty of an offence falling within subsection (9)(c) above shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale.
(12) If, on the trial on indictment of a person charged with an offence falling within subsection (9)(a) or (b) above, the jury find them not guilty of the offence charged, they may find them guilty of the basic offence mentioned in that provision.
(13) For the purposes of subsection (9)(c), subsection (1)(a) above shall have effect as if the person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress were the victim of the offence.
(14) A person is guilty of an offence under this section if they commit—
(a) an offence under section 2 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (offences of harassment and stalking); or
(b) an offence under section 4 or 4A of that Act (putting people in fear of violence and stalking involving fear of violence or serious alarm or distress),
which is aggravated for the purposes of this section.
(15) A person guilty of an offence falling within subsection (13)(a) above shall be liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to a fine, or to both.
(16) A person guilty of an offence falling within subsection (13)(b) above shall be liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or to a fine, or to both.
(17) If, on the trial on indictment of a person charged with an offence falling within subsection (13)(a) above, the jury find them not guilty of the offence charged, they may find them guilty of either basic offence mentioned in that provision.
(18) If, on the trial on indictment of a person charged with an offence falling within subsection (13)(b) above, the jury find them not guilty of the offence charged, they may find them guilty of an offence falling within subsection (13)(a) above.”
This new clause would create statutory aggravated offences motivated by hostility towards an individual’s disability status, sexual orientation or transgender identity (or perception thereof). The new clause would also protect people who are victims of hate crime because of their association with individuals based on their disability status, sexual orientation or transgender identity (or perception thereof).
New clause 123—Removal of parental responsibility for individuals convicted of sexual offences against children—
“(1) After section 2 (parental responsibility for children) of the Children Act 1989, insert —
‘2A Prisoners: suspension of parental responsibility
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a person (“P”) has been found guilty of a serious sexual offence involving or relating to a child or children; and
(b) P had parental responsibility for a child or children at the time at which the offence was committed.
(2) P ceases to have parental responsibility for a child or all children—
(a) until the child, or children, turns 18, or
(b) until an application by P to the family court to reinstate parental responsibility has been approved.’”
This new clause would terminate the parental rights of any individual convicted of child sex offences to any children the individual had at the time the crime was committed.
New clause 124—Duty to follow strategic priorities of police and crime plan—
“(1) The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 8(1) (Duty to have regard to police and crime plan), for “have regard to” substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.
(3) In section 8(2) for ‘have regard to’ substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.
(4) In section 8(3) for ‘have regard to’ substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.
(5) In section 8(4) for ‘have regard to’ substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.”
This new clause would require Police and Crime Commissioners to follow the strategic priorities of the police and crime plan rather than have regard to it.
New clause 125—Amendment of the Police Act 1996—
“(1) Section 39A of the Police Act 1996 is amended as follows.
(2) After subsection (7) insert—
‘(8) The Secretary of State may require that the College of Policing revises the whole or any part of a code of practice issued under this section or any other guidance or standards for policing the College of Policing may issue.
(9) The Secretary of State may require that the National Police Chiefs’ Council revises the whole or any part of policy, strategic plan, action plan, or any other document intended direct policing practices.’”
This new clause gives the Secretary of State the power to amend, or require the withdrawal of, any Code of Practice issued by the College of Policing, or any document issued by the National Police Chiefs’ Council intended to direct policing practices.
New clause 126—Previous conduct as factor in deciding whether to investigate a complaint—
“(1) The Police Reform Act 2002 is amended as follows.
(2) In Schedule 3, paragraph 1(6B)(d), at end insert ‘or
(e) the complaint is made about a person serving with the police who has previous convictions or has had previous complaints made against them.’”
This new clause would make previous complaints or convictions a factor in determining how to handle a new complaint against a police officer.
New clause 127—Points on driving licence for fly tipping—
“(1) The Environmental Protection Act is amended as follows.
(2) In section 33, subsection 8(a) at end insert ‘and endorse their driving record with 3 penalty points;’”
This new clause would add penalty points to the driving licence of a person convicted of a fly-tipping offence.
New clause 128—Requirements in certain sentences imposed for third or subsequent shoplifting offence—
“(1) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows.
(2) In section 208 (community order: exercise of power to impose particular requirements), in subsections (3) and (6) after ‘subsection (10)’ insert ‘and sections 208A’.
(3) After that section insert—
“208A Community order: requirements for third or subsequent shoplifting offence
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a person is convicted of adult shoplifting (“the index offence”),
(b) when the index offence was committed, the offender had on at least two previous occasions been sentenced in respect of adult shoplifting or an equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence, and
(c) the court makes a community order in respect of the index offence.
(2) The community order must, subject to subsection (3), include at least one of the following requirements—
(a) a curfew requirement;
(b) an exclusion requirement;
(c) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if—
(a) the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which—
(i) relate to any of the offences or the offender, an
(ii) justify the court not including any requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2), or
(b) neither of the following requirements could be included in the order—
(i) an electronic compliance monitoring requirement for securing compliance with a proposed curfew requirement or proposed exclusion requirement;
(ii) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.
(4) In subsection (1)(b), the reference to an occasion on which an offender was sentenced in respect of adult shoplifting does not include an occasion if—
(a) each conviction for adult shoplifting for which the offender was dealt with on that occasion has been quashed, or
(b) the offender was re-sentenced for adult shoplifting (and was not otherwise dealt with for adult shoplifting) on that occasion.
(5) In this section—
“adult shoplifting” means an offence under section 1 of the Theft Act 1968 committed by a person aged 18 or over in circumstances where—
(a) the stolen goods were being offered for sale in a shop or any other premises, stall, vehicle or place from which a trade or business was carried on, and
(b) at the time of the offence, the offender was, or was purporting to be, a customer or potential customer of the person offering the goods for sale;
“equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence” means—
(a) in Scotland, theft committed by a person aged 18 or over in the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of “adult shoplifting”, or
(b) in Northern Ireland, an offence under section 1 of the Theft Act (Northern Ireland) 1969 committed by a person aged 18 or over in those circumstances.
(6) Nothing in subsection (2) enables a requirement to be included in a community order if it could not otherwise be so included.
(7) Where—
(a) in a case to which this section applies, a court makes a community order which includes a requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2),
(b) a previous conviction of the offender is subsequently set aside on appeal, and
(c) without the previous conviction this section would not have applied, notice of appeal against the sentence may be given at any time within 28 days from the day on which the previous conviction was set aside (despite anything in section 18 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968).”
(4) After section 292 insert—
“292A Suspended sentence order: community requirements for third or subsequent shoplifting offence
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a person is convicted of adult shoplifting (“the index offence”),
(b) when the index offence was committed, the offender had on at least two previous occasions been sentenced in respect of adult shoplifting or an equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence, and
(c) the court makes a suspended sentence order in respect of the index offence.
(2) The suspended sentence order must, subject to subsection (3), impose at least one of the following requirements—
(a) a curfew requirement;
(b) an exclusion requirement;
(c) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if—
(a) the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which—
(i) relate to any of the offences or the offender, and
(ii) justify the court not imposing on the offender any requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2), or
(b) neither of the following requirements could be imposed on the offender—
(i) an electronic compliance monitoring requirement for securing compliance with a proposed curfew requirement or proposed exclusion requirement;
(ii) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.
(4) Section 208A(4) (occasions to be disregarded) applies for the purposes of subsection (1)(b).
(5) In this section “adult shoplifting” and “equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence” have the meaning given by section 208A.
(6) Nothing in subsection (2) enables a requirement to be imposed by a suspended sentence order if it could not otherwise be so imposed.
(7) Where—
(a) in a case to which this section applies, a court makes a suspended sentence order which imposes a requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2),
(b) a previous conviction of the offender is subsequently set aside on appeal, and
(c) without the previous conviction this section would not have applied, notice of appeal against the sentence may be given at any time within 28 days from the day on which the previous conviction was set aside (despite anything in section 18 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968).’”
This new clause imposes a duty (subject to certain exceptions) to impose a curfew requirement, an exclusion requirement or an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement on certain persons convicted of shoplifting, where the offender is given a community sentence or suspended sentence order.
New clause 129—Requirements in certain sentences imposed for third assault of retail worker offence—
“(1) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows.
(2) In section 208 (community order: exercise of power to impose particular requirements), in subsections (3) and (6) after ‘and sections 208B’ (inserted by section [Requirements in certain sentences imposed for third shoplifting offence] of this Act) insert ‘and 208B’.
(3) After sections 208B insert—
‘208B Community order: requirements for third or subsequent assault of retail worker offence
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a person is convicted of an offence under section 14 of the Crime and Policing Act 2025 (assault of retail worker) (“the index offence”),
(b) when the index offence was committed, the offender had on at least two previous occasions been sentenced in respect of an offence under section (Assault of retail worker) of the Crime and Policing Act 2025 committed when the offender was aged 18 or over, and
(c) the court makes a community order in respect of the index offence.
(2) The community order must, subject to subsection (3), include at least one of the following requirements—
(a) a curfew requirement;
(b) an exclusion requirement;
(c) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if—
(a) the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which—
(i) relate to any of the offences or the offender, and
(ii) justify the court not including any requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2), or
(b) neither of the following requirements could be included in the order—
(i) an electronic compliance monitoring requirement for securing compliance with a proposed curfew requirement or proposed exclusion requirement;
(ii) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.’
(4) Nothing in subsection (2) enables a requirement to be included in a community order if it could not otherwise be so included.
(5) After section 292A (inserted by section [Requirements in certain sentences imposed for third shoplifting offence] of this Act) insert—
‘292B Suspended sentence order: community requirements for third or subsequent assault of retail worker offence
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a person is convicted of an offence under section (Assault of retail worker) of the Crime and Policing Act 2025 (assault of retail worker) (“the index offence”),
(b) when the index offence was committed, the offender had on at least two previous occasions been sentenced in respect of an offence under section (Assault of retail worker) of the Crime and Policing Act 2025 committed when the offender was aged 18 or over, and
(c) the court makes a suspended sentence order in respect of the index offence.
(2) The suspended sentence order must, subject to subsection (3), impose at least one of the following requirements—
(a) a curfew requirement;
(b) an exclusion requirement;
(c) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if—
(a) the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which—
(i) relate to any of the offences or the offender, and
(ii) justify the court not imposing on the offender any requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2), or
(b) neither of the following requirements could be imposed on the offender—
(i) an electronic compliance monitoring requirement for securing compliance with a proposed curfew requirement or proposed exclusion requirement;
(ii) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.
(4) Nothing in subsection (2) enables a requirement to be imposed by a suspended sentence order if it could not otherwise be so imposed.’”
This new clause imposes a duty (subject to certain exceptions) to impose a curfew requirement, an exclusion requirement or an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement on certain persons convicted of an offence under section 15, where the offender is given a community sentence or suspended sentence order.
New clause 130—Theft of tools: prevention of re-sale and prosecution of offences—
“(1) The Equipment Theft Act 2023 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 3 (Enforcement), subsection (2) at end insert ‘equal to—
(a) the replacement cost of the equipment,
(b) the cost of repairing any damage caused during the theft, and
(c) the trading losses incurred by the offended party.’
(3) In section 3 (Enforcement), after subsection (3) insert—
‘(3A) An enforcement authority must put in place an enforcement plan to enforce regulations made under section 1 at temporary markets in their area.’
(4) The Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.
(5) In Chapter 3, Aggravating Factors, after section 72 insert—
‘72A Theft of tools from tradesmen
(1) This section applies where the court is considering the seriousness of an offence specified in section 7 of the Theft Act 1968.
(2) If the theft was of tools from a tradesman, the court—
(a) must treat that fact as an aggravating factor, and
(b) must state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.’”
New clause 131—Power to deport foreign nationals for possession of child sexual abuse images—
“(1) The Protection of Children Act 1978 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 1 (Indecent photographs of children) after subsection (4) insert—
‘(4A) Where a person is a foreign national and is charged with—
(a) an offence under subsection (1), or
(b) is found to be carrying an electronic device storing child sexual abuse images under section 164B of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979,
the Secretary of State must make a deportation order in accordance with section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007.’”
This new clause would make foreign nationals found in possession of child sexual abuse images subject to automatic deportation.
New clause 132—Annual report on police actions in areas with high levels of serious offences—
“(1) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report on police actions in areas with high levels of serious offences.
(2) Each such report must include data from police forces in England and Wales to identify areas with the highest rates of serious offences.
(3) For each area specified under subsection (2), each report must include data on—
(a) levels of police officers on duty;
(b) use of powers under section 1 (power of constable to stop and search persons, vehicles etc.) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984; and
(c) use of live facial recognition technology.
(4) The first such report must be laid before Parliament within a period ending 6 months after the passing of this Act.
(5) Each subsequent report must be laid before Parliament within 12 months of the publication of the last report under this section.
(6) For the purposes of this section, ‘serious offences’ has the same meaning as in Schedule 1 of the Serious Crime Act 2007.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish annual reports on police presence, use of stop and search, and live facial recognition technology in areas with the highest levels of serious crime.
New clause 133—Stop and search—
“(1) The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 60(1)(a) and (aa) leave out ‘serious.’”
This new clause lowers the threshold for stop and search to “violence” rather than “serious violence.”
New clause 134—Seizure of motor vehicles: driving licence penalties—
“(1) The Police Reform Act 2002 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 59 (Vehicles used in a manner causing alarm, distress or annoyance), after subsection (6) insert—
‘(6A) A person who is convicted of repeat offences under subsection (6) will have their driving licence endorsed with penalty points up to and including the revocation of their driving licence.’”
This new clause would make a person guilty of repeat offences of using vehicles in a manner causing alarm, distress or annoyance liable to penalty points on their driving licence or the revocation of their licence.
New clause 135—Automatic dismissal of officers who fail vetting—
“(1) The Police Act 1996 is amended in accordance with subsection (2).
(2) In section 39A (Codes of practice for chief officers), after subsection (1) insert—
‘(1A) Without prejudice to subsection (1) and subject to subsection (1B), a code of practice may provide for an officer to be dismissed without notice where—
(a) the officer fails vetting, and
(b) it is not reasonable to expect that the officer will be capable of being deployed to full duties within a reasonable time frame.
(1B) Subsection (1A) does not apply where a chief officer concludes that—
(a) the officer, notwithstanding his vetting failure, is capable of being deployed to a substantial majority of duties appropriate for an officer of his rank; and
(b) it would be disproportionate to the operational effectiveness of the force for the officer to be dismissed without notice.’”
This new clause would ensure police officers who failed their vetting can be dismissed.
New clause 136—Theft from farms—
“(1) The Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.
(2) In Chapter 3, Aggravating Factors, after section 72 insert—
‘(72A) Theft from farms
(1) This section applies where the court is considering the seriousness of an offence specified in section 7 of The Theft Act 1968.
(2) If the theft was of high value farming equipment, the court—
(a) must treat that fact as an aggravating factor, and
(b) must state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.
(3) For the purposes of this section—
“high value farming equipment” is machinery and tools used in agricultural operations to enhance productivity and efficiency, with a value of at least £10,000.’”
This new clause makes theft of high value farming equipment an aggravating factor on sentencing.
New clause 137—Defence to criminal damage—
“(1) The Criminal Damage Act 1971 is amended as follows.
(2) Leave out subsection (5)(3) and insert—
‘(3) For the purposes of this section, a belief must be both honestly held and reasonable.’”
This new clause would change the defence to criminal damage in the Criminal Damage Act 1971 to specify that the belief that the owner of the property would have consented must be reasonable.
New clause 138—Meaning of serious disruption to the life of the community—
“(1) Section 12 of the Public Order Act 1986 (imposing conditions on public processions) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (2A), for the words from ‘, the cases’ to the end substitute—
‘(a) the cases in which a public procession in England and Wales may result in serious disruption to the life of the community include, in particular, where it may, by way of physical obstruction, result in—
(i) the prevention of, or a hindrance that is more than minor to, the carrying out of day-to-day activities (including in particular the making of a journey),
(ii) the prevention of, or a delay that is more than minor to, the delivery of a time-sensitive product to consumers of that product, or
(iii) the prevention of, or a disruption that is more than minor to, access to any essential goods or any essential service,
(b) in considering whether a public procession in England and Wales may result in serious disruption to the life of the community, the senior police officer—
(i) must take into account all relevant disruption, and
(ii) may take into account any relevant cumulative disruption, and
(c) “community” in relation to a public procession in England and Wales, means any group of persons that may be affected by the procession, whether or not all or any of those persons live or work in the vicinity of the procession.’
(3) In subsection (2B), for ‘subsection (2A)(a)’ substitute ‘subsection (2A) and this subsection—
“access to any essential goods or any essential service” in particular, access to—
(a) the supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel,
(b) a system of communication,
(c) a place of worship,
(d) a transport facility,
(e) an educational institution, or
(f) a service relating to health;
‘area’, in relation to a public procession or public assembly, means such area as the senior police officer considers appropriate, having regard to the nature and extent of the disruption that may result from the procession or assembly;
‘relevant cumulative disruption’, in relation to a public procession in England and Wales, means the cumulative disruption to the life of the community resulting from—
(a) the procession,
(b) any other public procession in England and Wales that was held, is being held or is intended to be held in the same area as the area in which the procession mentioned in paragraph (a) is being held or is intended to be held (whether or not directions have been given under subsection (1) in relation to that other procession), and
(c) any public assembly in England and Wales that was held, is being held or is intended to be held in the same area in which the procession mentioned in paragraph (a) is being held or is intended to be held (whether or not directions have been given under section 14(1A) in relation to that assembly), and it does not matter whether or not the procession mentioned in paragraph (a) and any procession or assembly within paragraph (b) or (c) are organised by the same person, are attended by any of the same persons or are held or are intended to be held at the same time;
‘relevant disruption’, in relation to a public procession in England and Wales, means all disruption to the life of the community—
(a) that may result from the procession, or
(b) that may occur regardless of whether the procession is held (including in particular normal traffic congestion);”.’
(4) Section 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 (imposing conditions on public assemblies) is amended as follows.
(5) In subsection (2A), for the words from ‘, the cases’ to the end substitute—
“(a) the cases in which a public assembly in England and Wales may result in serious disruption to the life of the community include, in particular, where it may, by way of physical obstruction, result in—
(i) the prevention of, or a hindrance that is more than minor to, the carrying out of day-to-day activities (including in particular the making of a journey),
(ii) the prevention of, or a delay that is more than minor to, the delivery of a time-sensitive product to consumers of that product, or
(iii) the prevention of, or a disruption that is more than minor to, access to any essential goods or any essential service,
(b) in considering whether a public assembly in England and Wales may result in serious disruption to the life of the community, the senior police officer—
(i) must take into account all relevant disruption, and
(ii) may take into account any relevant cumulative disruption, and
(c) ‘community’ in relation to a public assembly in England and Wales, means any group of persons that may be affected by the assembly, whether or not all or any of those persons live or work in the vicinity of the assembly.’
(6) In subsection (2B), for ‘subsection (2A)(a)’ substitute ‘subsection (2A) and this subsection—
“access to any essential goods or any essential service”, includes, in particular, access to—
(a) the supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel,
(b) a system of communication,
(c) a place of worship,
(d) a transport facility,
(e) an educational institution, or
(f) a service relating to health;
‘area’, in relation to a public assembly or public procession, means such area as the senior police officer considers appropriate, having regard to the nature and extent of the disruption that may result from the assembly or procession;
‘relevant cumulative disruption’, in relation to a public assembly in England and Wales, means the cumulative disruption to the life of the community resulting from—
(a) the assembly,
(b) any other public assembly in England and Wales that was held, is being held or is intended to be held in the same area in which the assembly mentioned in paragraph (a) is being held or is intended to be held (whether or not directions have been given under subsection (1A) in relation to that other assembly), and
(c) any public procession in England and Wales that was held, is being held or is intended to be held in the same area as the area in which the assembly mentioned in paragraph (a) is being held or is intended to be held (whether or not directions have been given under section 12(1) in relation to that procession), and it does not matter whether or not the assembly mentioned in paragraph (a) and any assembly or procession within paragraph (b) or (c) are organised by the same person, are attended by any of the same persons or are held or are intended to be held at the same time;
‘relevant disruption’, in relation to a public assembly in England and Wales, means all disruption to the life of the community—
(a) that may result from the assembly, or
(b) that may occur regardless of whether the assembly is held (including in particular normal traffic congestion).”
This new clause defines “serious disruption to the life of the community” so as to amend the effects of the Zeigler judgement.
New clause 139—Removal of prohibition on entering a private dwelling to confiscate an off-road bike and ensure their destruction—
“(1) The Road Traffic Act 1988 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 165A, after subsection (5)(c) insert—
‘(5A) In exercising their powers under subsection (5), a constable may enter a private dwelling house for the purposes of seizing an off-road bike’.
(3) The Police Reform Act 2002 is amended as follows.
(4) In section 59(7), at end insert ‘, except where the intention is to seize an off-road bike.’
(5) The Road Traffic Act 1988 is amended as follows.
(6) In section 165B(2), at end insert—
‘; (g) where the seized motor vehicle is an off-road bike, to ensure its destruction by the police’.
(7) The Police Reform Act 2002 is amended as follows.
(8) In section 60(2), at end insert—
‘; (g) where the seized motor vehicle is an off-road bike, to ensure its destruction by the police.’”
This new clause would remove the prohibition on the police entering a private dwelling to confiscate an off-road bike that is driven without a licence, uninsured, or being used illegally and would create a duty to destroy off-road bikes.
New clause 140—Police access to the UK tobacco track and trace system—
“The Secretary of State must, through regulations, make provision for the police to access the HMRC tobacco track and trace system for the purposes of determining the provenance of tobacco products sold by retailers.”
This new clause would allow the police to access the UK Tobacco Track and Trace system for the purposes of determining whether a retailer has obtained stolen or counterfeit tobacco illegally.
New clause 141—Soliciting Prostitution for Rent Offence—
“(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 52 (causing or inciting prostitution for gain) insert—
‘52A Soliciting prostitution for rent
(1) A person commits an offence if—
(a) they intentionally cause or incite a person to become a prostitute in exchange for accommodation;
(b) they intentionally cause or incite a person to become a prostitute in exchange for a reduction in money paid as rent for a property;
(c) they attempt to cause or incite a person to become a prostitute in exchange for accommodation; or
(d) they attempt to cause or incite a person to become a prostitute in exchange for a reduction in money paid as rent for a property.
These offences refer to both properties owned or resided in by the offender.
(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 7 years; or
(c) to a “banning order” as defined in part 2, chapter 2 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016.’”
This new clause would create a new offence of soliciting prostitution in exchange for rent and allow offenders to be banned from renting properties after the offence.
New clause 142—Travel abroad to support a proscribed organisation—
“(1) A person commits an offence if they travel outside of the United Kingdom to support a proscribed organisation.
(2) For the purposes of this section, ‘support’ includes—
(a) becoming a member of a proscribed organisation, or an affiliated group of a proscribed organisation;
(b) working for any entity, either voluntarily or for financial gain, run by a proscribed organisation;
(c) attending political, religious or social gatherings in support of a proscribed organisation;
(d) meeting with members of a proscribed organisation;
(e) creating content, both online and offline, to raise support for a proscribed organisation; or
(f) travelling to territory controlled by a proscribed organisation without an exemption.
(3) This section does not apply to—
(a) accredited non-governmental organisations and humanitarian organisations;
(b) accredited media outlets and journalists;
(c) diplomats and other governmental officials travelling in an official capacity; or
(d) independent journalists and content creators reporting on a proscribed organisation, or in a territory with a proscribed organisation present.
(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years, to a fine (or both), or
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment of a term not exceeding 6 months, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both).”
This new clause would make travelling abroad to support a proscribed organisation an offence.
New clause 143—Individual preparation for mass casualty attack—
“(1) A person commits an offence, if, with the intention of—
(a) killing two or more people, or
(b) attempting to kill two or more people, they engage in any conduct in preparation for giving effect to their intention.
(2) A person found guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for life.”
This new clause would allow the police to intervene early to prevent attacks, like in terrorism cases, without causing unintended consequences for wider counter-terrorism efforts. It gives effect to a recommendation by the independent reviewer of terrorist legislation following the Southport attack.
New clause 144—Requirement to bring forward proposals for a national statutory inquiry into grooming gangs—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 3 months of the passing of this Act, publish proposals for approval by the House of Commons for the setting up of a statutory inquiry into grooming gangs.
(2) The Secretary of State’s proposals for an inquiry must include, but may not be limited to identification of—
(a) common patterns of behaviour and offending between grooming gangs;
(b) the type, extent and volume of crimes committed by grooming gangs;
(c) the number of victims of crimes committed by grooming gangs;
(d) the ethnicity of members of grooming gangs;
(e) any failings, by action, omission or deliberate suppression, by—
(i) police,
(ii) local authorities,
(iii) prosecutors,
(iv) charities,
(v) political parties,
(vi) local and national government,
(vii) healthcare providers and health services, or
(viii) other agencies or bodies, in the committal of crimes by grooming;
(f) such national safeguarding actions as may be required to minimise the risk of further such offending occurring in future; and
(g) good practice in protecting children.
(3) The Secretary of State’s proposals for an inquiry must stipulate that the inquiry may do anything it considers is calculated to facilitate, or is incidental or conducive to the carrying out of its functions and the achievement of the requirements of subsection (2).
(4) The Secretary of State’s proposals must make provision for the timetable of any inquiry, including that a report must be published within two years of its launch.
(5) For the purposes of this section—
‘gang’ means a group of at least three adults whose purpose or intention is to commit a sexual offence against the same victim or group of victims;
‘grooming’ means—
(a) activity carried out with the primary intention of committing sexual offences against the victim;
(b) activity that is carried out, or predominantly carried out, in person;
(c) activity that includes the provision of illicit substances and/or alcohol either as part of the grooming or concurrent with the commission of the sexual offence.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to bring forward proposals on the setting up of a national statutory inquiry into grooming gangs for approval by the House of Commons.
New clause 145—Annual statement on ethnicity of members of grooming gangs—
“The Secretary of State must make an annual statement to the House of Commons on the ethnicity of convicted members of grooming gangs.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to make an annual statement to the House on ethnicity data of convicted members of grooming gangs.
New clause 146—Publication of sex offender’s ethnicity data—
“(1) The Secretary of State for the Home Office must publish—
(a) quarterly; and
(b) yearly; datasets containing all national data pertaining to the ethnicity of sex offenders.
(2) For the purposes of this section, a ‘sex offender’ is anyone convicted of—
(a) an offence under section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978 (taking etc indecent photograph of child),
(b) an offence under section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (possession of indecent photograph of child),
(c) an offence under any of sections 5 to 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape and other offences against children under 13),
(d) an offence under any sections 9 to 12 of that Act (other child 25 sex offences),
(e) an offence under section 14 of that Act (arranging or facilitating commission of child sex offence),
(f) an offence under any of sections 16 to 19 of that Act (abuse of position of trust),
(g) an offence under section 25 or 26 of that Act (familial child sex offences), or
(h) an offence under any of sections 47 to 50 of that Act (sexual exploitation of children),
(i) an offence under any of sections 1 to 4 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape, assault and causing sexual activity without consent),
(j) an offence under any of sections 30 to 41 of that Act (sexual offences relating to persons with mental disorder),
(k) an offence under any of sections 61 to 63 of that Act (preparatory offences), or
(l) an offence under any of sections 66 to 67A of that Act (exposure and voyeurism),
(m) an offence under section 71 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sexual activity in a public lavatory) and a person involved in the activity in question was under the age of 18.”
This new clause would introduce a requirement that ethnicity data of sex offenders be published on a quarterly and a yearly basis.
New clause 147—Financial gain from child sexual exploitation and abuse—
“(1) The Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 70 insert—
‘70A Financial gain from child sexual exploitation
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a court is considering the seriousness of a specified child sex offence; or
(b) the offence is aggravated by financial gain; and
(c) the offender was aged 18 or over when the offence was committed.
(2) The court—
(a) must treat the fact that the offence is aggravated by financial gain from a specified child sex offence or child sexual abuse material as an aggravating factor; and
(b) must state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.
(3) An offence is “aggravated by financial gain from a specified child sex offence or child sexual abuse material as an aggravating factor” if—
(a) the offence was facilitated by, or involved, the offender financially profiting from a child sexual offence; or
(b) the offence was facilitated by, or involved, a person other than the offender financially profiting from a child sex offence, and the offender knew, or could have reasonably been expected to know that the said person was financially profiting from said child sex offence.
(4) In this section “specified child sex offence” means—
(a) an offence within any of subsections (5) to (7); or
(b) an inchoate offence in relation to any such offence.
(5) An offence is within this subsection if it is—
(a) an offence under section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978 (taking etc indecent photograph of child);
(b) an offence under section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (possession of indecent photograph of child);
(c) an offence under any of sections 5 to 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape and other offences against children under 13);
(d) an offence under any of sections 9 to 12 of that Act (other child sex offences);
(e) an offence under section 14 of that Act (arranging or facilitating commission of child sex offence);
(f) an offence under any of sections 16 to 19 of that Act (abuse of position of trust);
(g) an offence under section 25 or 26 of that Act (familial child sex offences); or
(h) an offence under any of sections 47 to 50 of that Act (sexual exploitation of children).
(6) An offence is within this subsection if it is—
(a) an offence under any of sections 1 to 4 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape, assault and causing sexual activity without consent);
(b) an offence under any of sections 30 to 41 of that Act (sexual offences relating to persons with mental disorder);
(c) an offence under any of sections 61 to 63 of that Act (preparatory offences); or
(d) an offence under any of sections 66 to 67A of that Act (exposure and voyeurism), and the victim or intended victim was under the age of 18.
(7) An offence is within this subsection if it is an offence under section 71 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sexual activity in a public lavatory) and a person involved in the activity in question was under the age of 18.
(8) For the purposes of this section “financially profiting” means receiving money, goods, or any other form of payment.’”
This new clause would create an aggravating factor when sentencing for any individual who has financially benefited from the creation, distribution, possession or publication of any specified child sexual abuse offence.
New clause 148—Annual statement on employment status of sexual offenders—
“(1) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report on the employment status of convicted sexual offenders at the time of their offence.
(2) For the purpose of subsection (1), ‘Sexual offenders’ means any person found guilty of an offence stipulated in the Sexual Offences Act 2003.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to release an annual report on the employment status of convicted sexual offenders.
New clause 149—Child Murder Sentencing Guidelines—
“(1) The Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.
(2) In Schedule 21, paragraph 2(2) omit (b) and (ba) and insert—
‘(zb) the murder of a child’.”
This new clause would make the starting punishment for child murder a whole life order. Currently a child murderer must have abducted, sexually abused or put substantial planning into the murder to receive a whole life order. Any child murderer should receive a whole life order.
New clause 150—Prohibition on sexual relationships between first cousins—
“(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 27 (family relationships), subsection (2)(a) after ‘uncle,’ insert ‘first cousin,’.
(3) In section 64 (sex with an adult relative: penetration), subsection (2) after ‘niece’ insert ‘or first cousin.’
(4) In subsection 64(3) at end insert—
‘(c) “first cousin” means the child of a parent’s sibling.’
(5) This section does not affect the continued sexual relationships between first cousins that had begun before the Crime and Policing Act 2025 received Royal Assent.”
This new clause would ban sexual relationships between first cousins after the passing of this Act.
New clause 151—Threshold for intentional harassment, alarm or distress—
“(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended as follows.
(2) In sections 4A(1)(a) and (b) leave out ‘or insulting.’.”
New clause 152—Points on driving licence for littering out of a vehicle window—
“(1) The Environmental Protection Act 1990 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 87, subsection (5), at end insert—
‘(5A) Where a person is found guilty of an offence of littering committed under section 87(1) that occurs as a result of litter being thrown, dropped or otherwise deposited from a vehicle, they shall also be liable to an endorsement of 3 penalty points on their driving record.’”
This new clause would add penalty points to the driving licence of a person convicted of littering from a vehicle.
New clause 153—Access to public funds for organisations supporting criminal conduct—
“An organisation or group will not be eligible for public funding if there is evidence that it—
(a) actively promotes or supports criminal conduct, or
(b) seeks to subvert the constitutional integrity or democratic institutions of the United Kingdom through violent or illegal means.”
This new clause would prevent organisations or groups which support criminal conduct or use violence to seek to subvert the constitutional integrity or democratic functions of the UK from accessing public funds.
New clause 155—Report on an economic crime fighting fund—
“(1) The Secretary of State must undertake an assessment of the viability, and potential merits, of establishing an economic crime fighting fund based on the principle of reinvesting a proportion of receipts resulting from economic crime enforcement into a pooled fund for the purposes of providing multi-year resourcing for tackling economic crime.
(2) The assessment specified in subsection (1) must also examine whether such a fund could address how annularity rules can prevent some law enforcement agencies from benefiting from recovered assets under the asset recovery incentivisation scheme.
(3) In carrying out the assessment, the Secretary of State must consult such persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(4) The Secretary of State must publish and lay before Parliament a report on the outcome of the assessment by the end of the period of 12 months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.”
New clause 156—Filming and distributing violent acts: offence—
“(1) It is an offence for person (X) to film and distribute violent acts involving person (Y) where there was clear premeditation, and deliberately participate with intent, by X to humiliate and/or distress Y.
(2) It is also an offence under this section for any person, whether X or another individual, to have made the recording with the premeditated intention that it will be distributed, streamed or broadcast, with the intent to humiliate and/or distress Y.
(3) When sentencing an individual convicted of an offence under subsection (1) or (2) (or both), the courts are to treat the age and vulnerability of person Y as aggravating factors.
(4) An offence is not committed where the footage is used for public interest journalism or evidentiary purposes.”
New clause 157—Processing of data in relation to a case-file prepared by the police service for submission to the Crown Prosecution Service for a charging decision—
“(1) The Data Protection Act 2018 is amended as follows.
(2) After Section 40, insert—
‘40A Processing of data in relation to a case-file prepared by the police service for submission to the Crown Prosecution Service for a charging decision
(1) This section applies to a set of processing operations consisting of the preparation of a case-file by the police service for submission to the Crown Prosecution Service for a charging decision, the making of a charging decision by the Crown Prosecution Service, and the return of the case-file by the Crown Prosecution Service to the police service after a charging decision has been made.
(2) The police service is not obliged to comply with the first data protection principle except insofar as that principle requires processing to be fair, or the third data protection principle, in preparing a case-file for submission to the Crown Prosecution Service for a charging decision.
(3) The Crown Prosecution Service is not obliged to comply with the first data protection principle except insofar as that principle requires processing to be fair, or the third data protection principle, in making a charging decision on a case-file submitted for that purpose by the police service.
(4) If the Crown Prosecution Service decides that a charge will not be pursued when it makes a charging decision on a case-file submitted for that purpose by the police service it must take all steps reasonably required to destroy and delete all copies of the case-file in its possession.
(5) If the Crown Prosecution Service decides that a charge will be pursued when it makes a charging decision on a case-file submitted for that purpose by the police service it must return the case-file to the police service and take all steps reasonably required to destroy and delete all copies of the case-file in its possession.
(6) Where the Crown Prosecution Service decides that a charge will be pursued when it makes a charging decision on a case-file submitted for that purpose by the police service and returns the case-file to the police service under subsection (5), the police service must comply with the first data protection principle and the third data protection principle in relation to any subsequent processing of the data contained in the case-file.
(7) For the purposes of this section—
(a) the police service means—
(i) constabulary maintained by virtue of an enactment, or
(ii) subject to section 126 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (prison staff not to be regarded as in police service), any other service whose members have the powers or privileges of a constable,
(b) the preparation of, or preparing, a case-file by the police service for submission to the Crown Prosecution Service for a charging decision includes the submission of the file,
(c) a case-file includes all information obtained by the police service for the purpose of preparing a case-file for submission to the Crown Prosecution Service for a charging decision.’”
This new clause adjusts Section 40 of the Data Protection Act 2018 to exempt the police service and the Crown Prosecution Service from the first and third data protection principles contained within the 2018 Act so that they can share unredacted data with one another when making a charging decision.
New clause 158—Anti-social behaviour: definition and enforcement—
“(1) For the purposes of—
(a) section 2(1) of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, and
(b) Part 1 of this Act,
conduct shall not be considered ‘anti-social behaviour’ solely on the basis that it involves—
(i) rough sleeping,
(ii) non-aggressive begging,
(iii) the use of public space for shelter, rest, or subsistence-related activity,
(iv) any conduct arising directly from homelessness, socio-economic need or vulnerability, or lack of access to housing or essential services.
(2) For conduct to meet the threshold of being ‘likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to any person’, it must—
(a) involve behaviour that is targeted, threatening, or persistently disruptive to others, and
(b) give rise to a genuine and ongoing risk of harm or serious nuisance beyond mere visibility or discomfort caused by socio-economic need or vulnerability.
(3) In assessing whether behaviour constitutes anti-social behaviour under either Act, the relevant authority or court must have regard to—
(a) whether the conduct reflects socio-economic need or vulnerability rather than intent to harm or harass,
(b) the individual’s housing status, mental and physical health, and access to support, and
(c) whether alternative, non-punitive interventions have been offered or exhausted.
(4) An order, injunction, or direction under either Act must not be imposed where the conduct arises from destitution or homelessness unless—
(a) the conduct poses a demonstrable and ongoing risk to the public, and
(b) enforcement is necessary and proportionate, and
(c) appropriate support, including housing or welfare assistance, has been actively sought and reasonably refused.
(5) Nothing in this section shall prevent proportionate enforcement action where conduct constitutes a demonstrable and ongoing threat to public safety or the rights and freedoms of others, and where such action is necessary and proportionate in the circumstances.”
This new clause would make clear that rough sleeping, passive begging, or visibly using public space for shelter or subsistence does not, on its own, amount to anti-social behaviour. It would place a legal duty on authorities to consider context, vulnerability, and proportionality when assessing whether behaviour constitutes anti-social behaviour.
New clause 159—Duty for church, faith groups and other bodies to report suspected child sex offences—
“(1) An individual must make a notification under this section if they are given reason to suspect that a child sex offence may have been committed (at any time).
(2) A notification—
(a) must be made to a relevant police force or a relevant local authority (but may be made to both);
(b) must identify each person believed to have been involved in the suspected offence (so far as known) and explain why the notification is made;
(c) must be made as soon as practicable; and
(d) may be made orally or in writing.
(3) The duty under subsection (1) applies to—
(a) any person undertaking work on either a paid or voluntary basis, or holding a leadership position, within the Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim or Sikh faiths, or any other religion or faith, and
(b) any other belief system or cult.”
New clause 160—Removal of 12-Month Limitation Period for Historic Sexual Offences—
“(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 8, insert—
‘(8A) Removal of 12-Month Limitation Period for Historic Sexual Offences
(1) Proceedings may be instituted at any time for the offence of unlawful sexual intercourse with a person aged 13 to 15 under section 6 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, regardless of the time elapsed since the alleged offence.
(2) Subsection (1) applies to offences alleged to have been committed before 1 May 2004.’”
This new clause removes the 12-month limitation period for offences under section 6 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 where the offence occurred before 1 May 2004.
Tonia Antoniazzi
I am proud to have stood on a manifesto pledge to halve violence against women and girls in a decade, and I know that colleagues on the Front Bench take that extremely seriously. There are significant measures in this Bill on intimate image abuse, stalking, spiking and the sexual exploitation of children. I know they mark only the beginning of the Government’s mission to tackle those shameful crimes. As a national inquiry into child sexual exploitation perpetrated by grooming gangs rightly gets under way, we must now also confront the adult sexual exploitation being perpetrated on an industrial scale by pimping websites and men who pay for sex, both of which currently enjoy near-total legal impunity.
Laws against the commercial sexual exploitation of adults in this country are outdated, unjust and totally ineffective. In fact, our current legal framework creates a conducive context for commercial sexual exploitation—a failing that overwhelmingly affects women. Pimping websites, which function as massive online brothels, operate openly and freely, supercharging the sex trafficking trade by making it easier and quicker for exploiters to advertise their victims. Those online mega-brothels make millions of pounds every year by advertising thousands of vulnerable women from across the world for prostitution in the UK. Sadly, our legislation allows that.
Men who pay for sex, so often left out of conversations on prostitution and sex trafficking but who are the beating heart of such a brutal trade, abuse with impunity. Their demand and their money drives the sex trafficking trade, yet we do very little to deter them. Let us therefore start that process today by making it crystal clear as a Parliament that it is not possible to buy sexual consent. Giving someone money, accommodation, goods or services in exchange for sex acts is sexual exploitation and abuse; it is never acceptable.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
I commend the hon. Lady and her party for bringing this legislation forward. She is probably well aware that we in Northern Ireland, through Lord Morrow and the Assembly sometime back, brought in specific legislation on this, for the first time in the United Kingdom. Has she had an opportunity to look at that legislative change we had at Stormont? What she brings forward is even better than what we had originally tried to get at the Assembly. Does she feel, in all honesty, that women will be protected from sexual exploitation, as she has clearly said that they should?
Tonia Antoniazzi
The hon. Member is right to say that there is excellent practice in Northern Ireland, and the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, which I chair, is looking at that. He may be interested in that.
Nadia Whittome (Nottingham East) (Lab)
Why should we implement this model for sex work when the evidence from the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland shows that it has increased violence towards sex workers?
Tonia Antoniazzi
My hon. Friend and I obviously do not look at this through the same lens. For me, it is prostitution and not sex work, and we need to see some more examples of that being used. We currently have a situation where sex buyers enjoy near-total impunity while the vulnerable women they exploit can face criminal sanctions if they solicit on the street. The state hands out fines to women in a self-defeating effort to stop them soliciting on the street, ignoring the question of where those women are most likely to earn the money to pay their fine. Sanctioning victims of sexual exploitation is counterproductive and a barrier to seeking help and exiting this ruthless trade.
That is why I have tabled amendments new clauses 2, 3 and 4. New clause 2 would make it a criminal offence to enable or profit from the prostitution of another person online and offline, thereby outlawing dangerous pimping websites that are fuelling demand and facilitating sex trafficking. New clauses 3 and 4 would together shift the burden of criminality off victims of sexual exploitation and on to perpetrators. New clause 3 would make it a criminal offence to pay for sex, sending a clear message to boys that that is not an acceptable way to treat women and an equally clear message to men who are considering paying for sex that they face prosecution. We know from research with UK sex buyers that this would be an effective deterrent. Over half of 1,200 sex buyers questioned in one study said that they would definitely, probably or possibly change their behaviour if a law were introduced that made it a crime to pay for sex.
New clause 4 would repeal sanctions against victims of sexual exploitation who solicit on the street to remove that barrier to women exiting prostitution and rebuilding their lives. It is also widely agreed that the expunging of criminal records of section 1 offences is necessary to end the unjust stigmatisation that these women continue to experience. That is why I have also tabled new clause 19 to introduce such a mechanism.
The Home Affairs Committee has recommended that
“the Home Office change existing legislation so that soliciting is no longer an offence”,
and
“legislate for the deletion of previous convictions and cautions for prostitution from the record of sex workers by amending the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act.”
For most of these women, their record of convictions is a record of their exploitation and abuse, and they live in fear of having to disclose that history when applying for jobs or volunteering. Decriminalising section 1 offences and allowing for the expunging of those historical convictions would allow those women to finally be free of the record of their abuse and the stigma they have endured for decades.
My amendments would usher in a legal framework that recognises that prostitution is violence against women, and the only way to end this violence is to deter the perpetrators and profiteers. I am delighted, then, that more than 50 hon. Members have signed new clauses 2 to 4. I particularly thank members of the all-party parliamentary group on commercial sexual exploitation, which I chair, for their support. The amendments are informed and supported by survivors and best practice frontline support services such as NIA, Kairos Women Working Together, and Women@TheWell.
I note that, unsurprisingly, some of my proposals are hated by pimping websites, one of which, Vivastreet, emailed its allies, urging them to mobilise against my amendments. A recent Sky News investigation found that over half of the 14,000 prostitution adverts on Vivastreet displayed a phone number linked to another advert on the site, which is a key red flag for organised sexual exploitation. I therefore find it reassuring that those prostitution pedlars are unnerved by my proposals.
I want to address a myth promoted by defenders of pimping websites that shutting down these sites will make no difference to the scale of sexual exploitation taking place and will, instead, simply drive it all into the dark web and make it harder to identify. That is patently nonsense, lacking in logic and evidence. The dark web carries major disadvantages for both traffickers and sex buyers. It would require significant technical expertise to post, as well as locate and access, prostitution adverts on the dark web, thereby substantially restricting the pool of exploiters able to engage in this crime. There is also no evidence that such a shift has taken place in jurisdictions that have outlawed pimping websites. The reality is that police simply cannot keep up with the scale of sexual exploitation taking place via pimping websites on the open web.
Another myth I want to address was all too visible in the written submissions opposing my amendments submitted to the Public Bill Committee. Every single one of the organisations who argued that pimping websites should be allowed to operate described prostitution as work—as “sex work”. The idea that paying someone to perform sex acts is an ordinary consumer activity—that ordering a woman online to perform a blow job is the equivalent of ordering a cappuccino—is a pernicious and harmful myth. Prostitution is violence against women.
Let us legislate to put pimps and traffickers out of business. We must protect individuals from exploitation today, but also address the historical criminalisation of victims and abuse. I thank Members on the Front Bench for their engagement on this issue and I look forward to working with them very closely.
Dame Karen Bradley (Staffordshire Moorlands) (Con)
I rise to speak to new clauses 12 and 123 in my name, new clause 43 in the name of the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells (Mike Martin) and new clause 121 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Gosport (Dame Caroline Dinenage).
New clause 43 seeks to commence the Sex-based Harassment in Public Act 2023, which was taken through the House as a private Member’s Bill by Greg Clark, the predecessor of the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells. Greg did great work on this Bill. I was one of its supporters and a member of the Bill Committee. I spoke on Second Reading, Third Reading and in Committee. It is a simple Act, which had cross-party support—it was not in any way a controversial piece of legislation. It corrected an oversight in the law that had been missed out in a previous piece of legislation.
As so often happens, a private Member’s Bill requires a statutory instrument to commence it, and that statutory instrument has not yet been laid in this House. I am sure the Minister is well aware of that and is seeking to do so. This new clause would allow the Act to commence now, rather than requiring that statutory instrument, thereby saving her a little bit of time. I hope, therefore, that she might look favourably on it. As I say, this was an Act that was supported across the House. There was no Division on it; it was very much something that we all wanted to see, so I hope that the Government accept the new clause and that the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells can follow on in the footsteps of his predecessor in making sure that this Act of Parliament becomes live and real for the people who need it.
Let me turn now to new clause 121 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Gosport. I was almost disappointed not to be able to table this new clause myself, because it fits with the work that I have done previously on these issues. I was Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport when the Digital Economy Act 2017 introduced age verification for pornography. Again, new clause 121 is a simple piece of legislation, which would make non-fatal strangulation a criminal act if in pornography. This does not impact on what people may wish to do in their private lives, but it does mean that those images would not then be available to be seen in pornographic films. It also means that there is protection for children who may be looking at this pornography—we do not want them to look at it, but we are realists and recognise that this happens—and that it does not normalise what is a really dangerous act, which should not be promoted in any way.
I know from experience that social media companies will remove content if it is illegal. They will not remove it if it is not. Therefore this simple change would mean that the depiction of non-fatal strangulation would become illegal content and social media companies would therefore be forced to act. I hope that this is something that can be supported across the House. Although I understand that we will be pushed to Division this evening, I do hope that the Minister can say something about the Government introducing something similar—perhaps in the other place—so that we can make sure that this inappropriate content is illegal and therefore not available to be seen by children.
Let me turn now to the new clauses in my name. I wish to start with new clause 123, because my hon. Friend the Member for Meriden and Solihull East (Saqib Bhatti), who has been such a champion of this legislation, has to go to a Delegated Legislation Committee at 2.30 pm. I also wish him a very happy birthday. He is choosing to spend his birthday in this Chamber and attending a DL Committee—what a hero! Again, I think that this new clause will have cross-party support. It concerns the removal of parental responsibility for individuals convicted of sexual offences against children. When I have talked about this to colleagues and asked them to consider supporting the new clause, they have been utterly amazed that anybody convicted of a sexual offence against a child may be allowed to have parental responsibility for their own child. That responsibility is stopped only if the offence is committed against their own child. That cannot be right.
How can it be that a convicted sex offender—somebody who has been convicted of a sexual offence against a child—is allowed to make parental decisions about their own children? My hon. Friend’s constituent has talked about this—I believe that they are known as “Bethan” in this situation—and has been a real champion on this issue. In this particular case, a man who was convicted of raping a relative who was a child still has parental responsibility for his own child. That cannot be acceptable. Again, this feels like a piece of legislation where, at some point, we just failed to address this one issue. I hope, therefore, that this can be seen as a defect in the legislation that we all agree should be corrected.
New clause 12 is a relatively simple amendment to the Modern Slavery Act 2015, but it reflects a phenomenon that we simply did not know about when we introduced the Act 10 years ago. As the Minister on the Bill, I remember going through many definitions of what constituted trafficking and exploitation, but, at the time, the phenomenon of orphanage trafficking was simply not known. That may be a shock to some in this Chamber, because there is such awareness of the issue in Australia and New Zealand but we simply do not know about it here.
Sarah Champion (Rotherham) (Lab)
I appreciate being called to speak, Madam Deputy Speaker. I also really appreciate being able to follow in the wake of my two friends—my hon. Friend the Member for Gower (Tonia Antoniazzi) and the right hon. Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Dame Karen Bradley)—who have been incredible campaigners on these issues. I know from first-hand experience of meeting the victims and survivors they spoke about that there are gaping holes in our legislation. I hope that the House will support their amendments, because that would do something to close them.
I rise to speak first about my new clauses 9, 10 and 18, which seek to better protect child victims of sexual and criminal exploitation and empower our frontline responders to keep them safe. I welcome the Government’s introduction of the mandatory duty to report, which was recommendation 13 of the independent inquiry into child sexual exploitation, as it has the potential to strengthen our child protection system. However, following detailed conversations and meetings with Rotherham and Sheffield NHS safeguarding staff, I share their concerns about the finer details of its implementation.
To put it bluntly, the duty will not protect children as intended unless mandated reporters are adequately trained. Recognising, reporting and—crucially—responding to child sexual abuse is far from straightforward, so to prevent overwhelming an already strained system, all those under the duty must be trained to know what to look for and how to report it.
Let me give an example. A nursery nurse might see bruising around the genital areas of a toddler, and with the fear—I put it that way—of her duty on mandatory reporting, she will report it to the hotline or directly to the NHS safeguarding teams, which is absolutely the right thing to do. However, toddlers fall over and they fall in awkward places, so that nursery worker needs to have the skills and experience to be able to know when it is appropriate to report and when it is not appropriate, along with what evidence to gather and what not to. At the moment, I am scared that everything will be reported and that the system, which is there to protect and safeguard those children, will be unable to cope. I hope that a standard training package will be given to all people who fall under the duty.
I will now turn to new clauses 10 and 18, on child criminal exploitation, which I know the safeguarding Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips), is very familiar with, I having campaigned on this with her for many years in previous Parliaments. As Baroness Casey’s report states, right now criminally exploited children are at risk of prosecution rather than protection. These new clauses seek to change that. They have the backing of Action for Children. ECPAT UK, Barnardo’s and many other children’s charities.
In 2024 alone, more than 2,891 children were referred to the national referral mechanism as potential child victims of criminal exploitation, but many more ended up in courtrooms, not safeguarding systems. As my police chief said to me, it is deeply sad that the first time we see these criminally exploited children is when we are looking to criminalise them. We cannot get above this and ahead of it.
Clause 38 rightly creates a new offence of CCE, recognising the severity of that abuse. However, without corresponding changes to the Modern Slavery Act 2015, legal protections remain inconsistent and inadequate. New clause 10 seeks to fix that.
In a similar vein, new clause 18 would insert a definition of “child criminal exploitation” alongside the offence in clause 38. Evidence from the Jay review into criminal exploitation of children demonstrates that the current lack of a definition contributes to significant inconsistencies in practice across the country and persistent failures to identify children as victims. I saw that time and again in Rotherham, with young, exploited girls all too often referred to as “child prostitutes” and not given the support they needed. The shift started only after we got the statutory definition for child sexual exploitation. Clear, consistent legislation empowers professionals to intervene earlier, prevents inappropriate prosecutions and ensures that exploited children receive the safeguarding support that they need.
I turn to my amendment 9, on registered sex offenders, which is supported by 39 MPs from across the parties. It will not be new to many in the House as I have brought it up in the last three Parliaments. Between 2019 and 2022, 11,500 sex offenders were prosecuted for failure to notify changes of information. The same ongoing pattern allows offenders to slip through the cracks, with over 700 going completely missing in those years. I welcome the new measures in the Bill that require some offenders to seek police authorisation before applying to change their name on UK passports and driving licences, which will genuinely make a difference.
However, I remain deeply concerned that many of the new measures lack strength and could lead to confusion. Clause 80 states that sex offenders must give seven days’ notice of using a new name but does not define what “using” means. The amendment seeks to provide much-needed clarity. It would require offenders to notify the police of an intention to change their name seven days before doing so by deed poll. That would allow vital time for the authorities to conduct appropriate risk assessments. More than that, I want to draw attention to the fact that the Bill still relies too heavily on a sex offender doing the right thing, which is something they rarely do.
Finally, I will speak to my new clauses 99 and 100, in my capacity as Chair of the International Development Committee. Last week my Committee published its report on international humanitarian law. It is vital that those responsible for attacks on aid workers and unlawful blockages of humanitarian assistance are brought to justice. Throughout the inquiry, it became apparent that the UK needed powers to exercise universal jurisdiction over crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. There must be no safe haven for those who commit such heinous crimes.
My new clauses would allow the relevant authorities to prosecute people suspected of those crimes without any requirement for a connection to the UK. At a time when the legitimacy and impartiality of some international courts is being questioned, the UK must stand firm in support of these important mechanisms for accountability, to prevent impunity for serious violations of international humanitarian law while ensuring that we have the domestic powers needed to hold perpetrators to account, no matter where their crimes are committed.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)
I rise to speak to new clause 5, which stands in my name and is supported by hon. Friends in different political positions across the House. But, before I do so, I want to congratulate the Government—that is unusual from the Opposition, but I will do so anyway. I think that the Minister will know what I am about to say. The cuckooing amendment, which was moved in the last Parliament—the previous Government and she, in particular, were in discussions on that—has been passported through, as it were, so that cuckooing will be a criminal offence. That will hugely help those who have their houses taken over—the vulnerable and the elderly—and, where crimes are committed from those houses, the police will have a reason to go in without explicit knowledge of the crime being committed other than the cuckooing. To that extent, I thank the Government for making that a law. Hopefully it will go through without too much problem in the other place. I and many others appreciate that enormously.
New clause 5 is consequential to an amendment to an earlier Bill on reckless and dangerous cycling, because there were no offences that were relevant to that and people were being killed and injured as a result of cyclists’ bad behaviour on the roads. One person in particular who campaigned for that amendment was Matt Briggs, and he was the reason that I brought that amendment forward. The Government accepted that amendment and it is now bound into legislation. However, there was an issue at the time about the danger of e-bikes. We know from talking to the police that e-bikes are now becoming responsible for some of the worst crimes on the streets, involving antisocial and threatening behaviour. They are silent and they can creep up on people rather quickly, and a lot of things that were being snatched by people on motorised scooters are now being snatched using e-bikes.
Dame Caroline Dinenage (Gosport) (Con)
I have a similar concern about mobility scooters. Obviously, they are a fabulous tool, enabling so many in our constituencies to get out and about, but the number of serious injuries caused by mobility scooters has gone up by nearly 60% in the last 10 years, and the number of fatalities has doubled. These heavy class 3 mobility scooters, which can go up to 8 mph and travel on the roads, are not subject to insurance rules and cannot be penalised under dangerous driving regulations. Does my right hon. Friend agree that this is something the Government also need to consider very carefully? I would really love the Minister to look at whether there is any legislation that would be implementable in cases such as these.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
My hon. Friend is right, and I hope the Government will respond to that. However, she will forgive me if I focus on the essence of new clause 5, which is e-bikes.
The definition of a legal e-bike is one that uses pedals and also uses electricity to assist the cyclist. All the other ones are illegal. This brings me to the problem that, if this measure is going to go through into law, as it will, will the Government press the police to start arresting and prosecuting not only the people who deliberately use e-bikes for nefarious purposes but more importantly, those who just cycle dangerously on footpaths? E-bikes are now more dangerous than bicycles in the sense that they are e-bicycles and therefore get up to higher speeds. Even though the speeds are supposed to be governed, they are still higher than most cyclists will get up to in the normal act of pedalling their way to work.
Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)
My right hon. Friend and I had a discussion about this earlier. On the subject of illegal e-bikes, does he agree that we need to clamp down on the illegal conversion kits that are readily accessible online which allow an ordinary bicycle to be converted to do anything up to 30 or 40 mph? I tabled a written question about that, and the Government said that it was for the Office for Product Safety and Standards and local authority trading standards to enforce that, but could the Government do more to crack down on it?
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
It is funny that my hon. Friend raises that point, because I was just about to get on to it. I am glad he has pinched my speech, but we are on the same side, so let me thank him for getting ahead of me.
I reinforce that point: the Government now need to decide whether to do something about that issue in the other place. All non-bicycle electricity-supported cycles are legal, but all the others are either illegal or have to be used on the road and therefore have to qualify for road use, which means in many cases taking instruction and passing a test, or treating the e-bike like a car or a motorcycle. The problem is that most people do not know that. They are either ignorant of it or they deliberately do not care, and they can buy these illegal bikes in lots of legal shops in the UK. It seems bizarre that we are allowing people to buy these bikes—many are not bikes; they could be boards or all sorts of contraptions—and they then think they are able to use them. Most people do not check up on the highway code or the law; they just get on and use them. They are deeply dangerous to themselves, but also to other road users. I would press the Government to look at this again in the other place—it is too late to do it here—to see whether there is some way in which selling these things to people without proper licences could be made illegal.
Chris Vince (Harlow) (Lab/Co-op)
I have listened to the right hon. Gentleman’s speech with genuine interest. This is not a party political point at all. Is there perhaps work that could be done on a public information campaign to make people aware of these bikes? As he has just said, many people do not realise that they are illegal. If they can buy them in legal shops, they do not realise that they are doing anything wrong in the first place. Does he agree that a public campaign like that would be welcome?
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
I am all in favour of public campaigns and I agree with the hon. Gentleman that it would be a very good idea for people to know that what they were buying was illegal. I suspect many of them already do so. That notwithstanding, if such a campaign could be backed up by a penalty for selling illegal bikes in shops, that would be a far better way of dealing with it. Right now, lots of kids do not know that the bikes are illegal, and they go and take these things and they can pay for them, and that is where the danger comes from. We are shutting the door too late. These kids have gone on to the roads, they have created an accident and they have killed themselves. That is too late for us. What we need to do is get ahead of this and try to figure it out completely.
The final bit of this issue is the fact that people can change the monitors inside the boxes, even on the legal bikes, and lots of them do so. We see them going down the road at 30 mph, which is incredibly dangerous. I am a motorcyclist, I have to say, but Members should not go looking for the leather jacket; I left it at home.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
Don’t get excited—it’s not that great!
Motorcyclists have to be tested even more than car drivers. There are balancing tests and they have to know everything like that. This is absolutely critical, because it is a slightly more dangerous mode of transport—more exciting, yes, but more dangerous. Someone cannot buy a motorcycle in a shop and take it away unless they are able to show their licence and that they are qualified to ride that bike, and that really requires instruction, but people can buy e-bikes—these electric vehicles—without any sort of licence. It seems bizarre that that should be allowed. Even though we want people not to use petrol, diesel and all the rest of it because of the environment, this goes beyond that.
Dawn Butler (Brent East) (Lab)
Is the right hon. Member aware of Simon Cowell’s campaign? He purchased an electric bike, flipped over backwards and almost broke his back. That is definitely a clear indication of how dangerous these bikes can be.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
These bikes often accelerate fast, and only someone who is used to riding something that can move quickly on two wheels can do that. If not, they will go off the back. In a car, they would be restrained by the seat, but that is not the case on a bike or motorcycle. Knowing that does take some instruction—being ready, leaning into it and all the rest of it. My main point is that that is a good illustration of how we are being a bit too casual about these modes of transport, and too many young kids do not understand that they should have some training. For their sake, we should do more on this issue.
Suella Braverman (Fareham and Waterlooville) (Con)
My right hon. Friend has been generous with taking interventions. I support his amendment and note that his amendment helpfully includes e-scooters, because there is a real problem. As e-scooters do not meet the criteria in the Highways Act 1980, they are effectively banned. When I speak to the hard-working police in Waterlooville, they say that e-scooters are banned in public areas. We have a real problem with illegal usage in public areas and in the shopping centre. However, people do not know that, and we need the law to be more proactive, deliberate and expressive, and that is why an amendment like this is right. Is there anything he would like to add on the issue of e-scooters?
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
I bow before my right hon. Friend’s greater knowledge in these matters, having headed up the Department. I simply say that for this particular purpose, I agree with her. I am urging the Government to take this matter away and look at it in the other place. Although I will not press my amendment, because legal bikes are incorporated in the earlier cycling amendment that I put forward and the Government accepted, we need more work on illegal bikes and e-scooters.
My worry, as I have said again and again, is that people can buy these things without any qualification whatsoever, whereas if I as a motorcyclist buy a bike, I have to be able to demonstrate that I am qualified to ride it away from the shop. People are not required to do so with e-bikes and e-scooters, so there is a peculiarity. Everywhere else in our legislation, we follow through. This one has dropped through the grid, and I therefore urge the Minister and the Department to look closely at the matter and see whether we can define that better in the other place and ensure that shops are unable to sell those bikes. I will not press this new clause because I think we are at the right place so far with the Government.
Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith and Chiswick) (Lab)
I will speak to new clauses 23, 24 and 25 in my name. New clauses 23 and 24 propose restrictions on the delivery and display of pointed knives to avoid death and serious injury from knife attacks. New clause 25 repeals certain unnecessary and unlawful punitive measures directed against Roma, Gypsy and Traveller communities.
I am grateful for the interest the Minister has shown in these matters and for meeting me to discuss them. I do not intend to press them to a vote, but I look forward to her response as to how they may be progressed. I support many other amendments and new clauses to the Bill. I have signed new clause 13 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Riverside (Kim Johnson) and new clause 155 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West (Phil Brickell) on setting up an economic crime fighting fund. I of course congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Gower (Tonia Antoniazzi) on her new clause 1 which was debated and passed yesterday.
On Second Reading, I expressed a general concern that the necessary and complex legislation affecting the criminal justice system set out in the Bill and in other Bills and reports in this Session would place an even greater strain on an already creaking system. I will not repeat what I said then, but I hope and trust that Ministers from the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice are working together to ensure that resources are in place to deal with the unintended consequences when supply in one part of the criminal justice system causes demand in another. More police numbers mean more arrests, prosecutions, convictions and incarcerations, but early release or community alternatives to custody can create more work for probation and for the police.
New clauses 23 and 24 would change the selling practices of manufacturers and retailers in the following ways. First, they would prevent the delivery of lethal pointed knives to domestic premises, remote lockers and collection points. Nothing in them would prevent the delivery of pointed knives to chefs, butchers, fishmongers or any other commercial enterprise that uses pointed knives in the course of business. Secondly, they would prevent the display of pointed knives in shops, but would allow safer, rounded knives to be openly displayed in shops, and delivered by courier or mail with minimal restrictions.
Dawn Butler
I support my hon. Friend’s new clauses. In fact, when I was Minister for Young Citizens and Youth Engagement, we posed this question of whether there should be rounded knives. I am glad to see that the debate has moved on, because at that point, people found the idea that this would help solve the knife crime problem almost comical, so I thank him for pursuing this issue.
Andy Slaughter
When it was people like me proposing it, it was regarded as comical, but now Idris Elba is in favour of it, as well as experts across the field. I pay tribute to not just those celebrities, but victims and experts, particularly those on the Safer Knives group, of which I am member. It looks at the legal, medical and psychological effects of knife crime, and suggests practical ways of not eliminating but reducing the number of deaths and serious injuries.
New clause 25 seeks to repeal draconian police powers relating to unauthorised encampments. Those powers were introduced to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 by the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, which became law under the previous Government. These punitive and hostile powers led to the victimisation of Romani, Gypsy and Irish Travellers, who are among the most marginalised groups in UK society.
Wendy Morton (Aldridge-Brownhills) (Con)
I am clear that Traveller and minority groups absolutely do have rights, but they also have responsibilities. When this law was put in place, there was good reason for it: to redress some of the imbalance. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that repealing this law would leave our communities unprotected against unauthorised Traveller encampments? In areas like mine, the police became involved in a game of cat and mouse. Excrement, litter and worse was left in our communities. Would not a repeal leave the police with no powers to tackle the issue?
Andy Slaughter
I am afraid that is the sort of nonsense that I hear a lot of the time. Let me read to the right hon. Lady some of the measures that were in force before the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act was passed: temporary stop notices, injunctions to protect land from unauthorised encampments, licensing of caravan sites, possession orders, interim possession orders, local byelaws, the local authority power to direct unauthorised campers to leave land, addressing obstructions to the public highway, planning contravention notices, enforcement notices and retrospective planning, stop notices, breach of condition notices, powers of entry on to land, power of the police to direct unauthorised campers to leave land, and police powers to direct trespassers to an alternative site. That was the position before that Act came into effect. There were ample powers to deal with these matters.
Andy Slaughter
No, I will not give way again. Frankly, I found the right hon. Lady’s last intervention a bit beyond the pale, so I am not giving her another opportunity. I am afraid that the sort of information she peddles leads to the situation that we are in. The constant threat of criminalisation of nomadic lifestyles has a devastating impact on families. That is why human rights campaigners and international bodies, including the Council of Europe and the United Nations, have raised concerns about the legality of the provisions that I am addressing.
Charlie Dewhirst (Bridlington and The Wolds) (Con)
The hon. Member has just painted a complex legislative picture. Does he not agree that there was a need for the 2022 legislation, because all the measures that he has just read out simply were not working?
Andy Slaughter
The powers are there, but we must look at their implementation. I am always sympathetic to the hon. Gentleman, because he was such a good opponent for me at two elections, and I take to heart the measured way in which he puts his point, but to counter what he says, in May 2024, following a judicial review of part 4 of the 2022 Act brought by Wendy Smith against the Home Office, the High Court issued a declaration of incompatibility with the Human Rights Act 1998. The Court found that certain provisions on the extension of a ban on returning to a particular area from three months to 12 months constituted unjustified discrimination against Gypsies and Travellers. Despite that, the powers remain in force, and although the declaration of incompatibility with our laws relates only to the provisions I just mentioned, I put it to the Minister that all of part 4 could be scrapped without any detriment to the enforcement of previous laws.
Police and local authorities already have a whole spectrum of other powers, as I have set out, which they can and do use against encampments. If they are failing to use those, it is for them to say why. I also know that the police did not seek those powers; they were simply imposed on them. The Crime and Policing Bill presents the perfect opportunity for the Government to put this right by repealing part 4 of the 2022 Act, which, let us remember, allows police to ban Gypsies and Travellers from an area, to arrest and fine them, and even to seize their home.
I hope to receive positive news today, but if my right hon. Friend the Minister wishes to discuss these matters further, I would be happy to engage in that discussion—I have great support from Friends, Families and Travellers, and other excellent groups representing the Roma Gypsy and Traveller communities—to see how the law can be made fair to nomadic and non-nomadic communities. That is what is being asked for here. Frankly, at the moment the law does not create a balance; it creates a bias one way.
Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (North Cotswolds) (Con)
I rise to speak in support of new clause 41, which is in my name, and in the names of others. It is a very simple amendment that would require His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services to include firearms licencing in their PEEL—police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy—obligations. I declare an interest as chairman of the all-party parliamentary group on shooting and conservation, and as a firearms owner.
I first thank the Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention for attending our most recent meeting of the APPG to answer a range of questions from our members; we were very grateful for her time. I share her commitment to protecting public safety through sensible firearms law and an effective and efficient firearms licensing system. It is not in the interests of the public or the shooting community for the wrong people to have guns in their possession. That is why I am proposing the new clause.
Members will be aware that the firearms licensing system in the UK is a postcode lottery. With 43 separate licencing authorities, inconsistency in the application of the law, guidance and services is endemic across the system. A quarter of police forces are taking a year or more to process applications for certificates, with delays across the system. Gloucestershire constabulary—the force that I know best—recently put out a statement saying that it was not accepting any new firearm licence applications for two years, due to a lack of trained firearms officers. I intervened, and the police acted quickly to reverse the decision, setting up a gold command, and I now receive regular updates from the team. However, that wait is not good enough, especially when the Government are imposing a 133% hike in fees.
An inefficient and ineffective licensing department endangers the public. The inquest on the tragic murders in Keyham, Plymouth, revealed that the Devon and Cornwall police firearms licensing department, which had issued a certificate to the murderer, removed his firearm after an assault but, unbelievably, gave it back to him once he had done an anger management course. The department was described as a “chaotic shambles” that could not operate its own risk matrix. It identified the murderer as low-risk, when in reality he was high-risk and should never have received a certificate.
I appreciate that the Minister has given assurances that data on licensing department waiting times, for both renewals and new applications, are now being made available to the public. However, that does not go far enough to ensure that police forces take their inefficiencies seriously and put an action plan in place to improve departments across both England and Wales.
PEEL inspections take place every year or so for every police force in England and Wales. They include themes such as treating the public fairly, responding to the public, and resources and value for money. Firearms licensing comes under all three categories, yet there is no mention of it in any previously published PEEL inspection. In addition, although the Minister has reassured us that all funds received from the full cost recovery of firearms licensing will be ringfenced for improving firearms licensing departments, that is not guaranteed. The British Association for Shooting and Conservation, which acts as my secretariat on the APPG, wrote to all forces when the increase in firearms licensing fees was imposed, seeking assurances that all funds would go to firearms licensing. To date, only a third of constabularies have given that assurance.
Including firearms licensing in PEEL inspections is a powerful way to ensure that police forces are publicly accountable, funded properly and run efficiently for the benefit of public safety. New clause 41 is a sensible and proportionate probing amendment that I hope the Minister might feel able to accept, if it were to be tabled in the other place.
Bell Ribeiro-Addy (Clapham and Brixton Hill) (Lab)
I rise to speak in support of new clause 107, which stands in my name, and to lend my support to other vital amendments, particularly those relating to protest rights, joint enterprise, facial recognition and predictive policing technologies.
New clause 107 would require the Home Secretary to publish a comprehensive equality impact assessment within 12 months of the Bill becoming law. I acknowledge the initial equality impact assessments, but I must stress that they are no substitute for a thorough and ongoing review of how the powers will be used and who they will affect. This Bill touches every part of our criminal justice system, from police powers and sentencing to surveillance. If we know anything from decades of experience, it is that such legislation rarely lands equally. We already know, for example, that black men are disproportionately stopped and searched; that Muslim communities are targeted by counter-terrorism laws; and that ethnic minority communities are more likely to face over-policing, under-protection and systemic mistrust.
We must also talk frankly about how the system fails women, particularly in the context of violence against women and girls.
While the state has found countless new ways to expand police powers and increase maximum sentences, we are yet to find the will to use those powers to properly protect women: not when women who report domestic abuse and sexual violence are ignored; not when black, minoritised and working-class women who report violence are dismissed; and not when rape is effectively decriminalised, with cases rarely making it to court. Let us not forget those cases that have shocked the nation, the reports that have exposed misogyny, racism and abuse within police ranks, and the institutional discrimination and failures that some forces still fail to admit exists.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)
I apply an immediate five-minute time limit.
Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)
I rise to speak in favour of new clause 130 to strengthen the law on tool theft.
In early May this year, I joined police officers from Sidcup and Havering in a raid to uncover stolen tools at a boot sale in east London. Unlicensed boot sales are notorious for selling stolen goods. However, I was still astounded by what officers found. As they arrived in police vans and unmarked cars, there was a flurry of action among some traders: stolen goods were hidden, a van tried to flee and the keys to vehicles crowded with tools were suddenly lost. But the police had struck quickly and in numbers. Stolen tools were uncovered across traders’ stalls, six arrests were made and, eventually, officers struck the mother lode—a van overflowing with stolen tools.
The raid took officers to a second site, where even more stolen tools were uncovered. Over 1,650 stolen tools were found, worth around half a million pounds, on just one day. Officers were even able to return some marked tools to their owners. The raid shows why tradespeople must mark their tools properly. If they are marked with the likes of DNA tagging, the police can easily prove they are stolen and lock up the thieves responsible. They can also return the stolen tools to the hard-working tradespeople across the country.
But marking tools alone will not stop tool theft. Vans are being broken into in broad daylight and tools sold openly across the country. It is a disgrace. The law must change to punish the thieves responsible and crack down on the boot sales driving the crime wave. That is why I encourage all Members to support new clause 130, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West (Matt Vickers). First, it would increase fines to better match the severity of the crime, reflecting the cost of replacing tools and repairing damage to vans and of lost work.
Wendy Morton
Does my hon. Friend agree that accepting the amendment is one way in which the Government could reach out to businesses and traders and show that they are on the side of local businesses and the people who get up every morning and go out to work—in effect, “white van man”—for whom tools are key to being able to do the job, as are the farm implements that are also subject to theft?
Mr French
I thank my right hon. Friend for her vital contribution. We must back the makers, not the law breakers, whether they are “white van men” or rural farmers who are having their tools stolen. The impact on their ability to go to work is significant, but it also has an impact on their families because of their ability to buy food and other goods. We must back the makers and not the law breakers.
Secondly, the Bill would impose tougher sentences on thieves by recognising the seriousness of the crime. Finally, it would require councils to create an enforcement plan to stop the sale of stolen tools at boot sales. These are all necessary changes to help stop tool theft across the country.
Tradespeople and industry cannot afford parliamentary dither and delay. As campaigners, tradespeople, policing experts and industry have told us, action is needed now. Every 12 minutes, a van is broken into and tools are stolen, costing tradespeople thousands of pounds, hurting their mental health and stopping them from earning a living.
Lincoln Jopp (Spelthorne) (Con)
Does my hon. Friend agree that it is not just about thefts from vans? This is about people’s whole livelihood and ability to work. Businesses can be struck down. Does he agree that this is therefore worthy of its own offence?
Mr French
I agree with my hon. Friend’s vital contribution. I will come on to a couple of the larger impacts.
We often think about small businesses, but we have found from our roundtable that very large companies also suffer a lot of damage. For example, on average Openreach vans are hit three times a day, which delays the fibre rollout in rural communities. Over £2 million of surveying equipment was stolen from Balfour Beatty’s vans in just three months, impacting HS2, which we have discussed today. If any MPs are unsure about the need to act now, they need to speak to Shoaib Awan, Frankie Williams, Sergeant Dave Catlow, PC Dan Austin and the teams at SelectaDNA, Checkatrade and On The Tools, among many others who have worked tirelessly on this issue. I thank them all, especially the Sidcup police team who are leading a lot of that hard work.
Saqib Bhatti (Meriden and Solihull East) (Con)
I thank my hon. Friend for giving way; he is making a very eloquent speech. Will he acknowledge Alex Insley, from my constituency, who runs a podcast for tradespeople and who brought this issue to my attention?
Mr French
I applaud all the efforts by podcasters and tradespeople who are going online and sharing their experiences. Any hon. Member can look up the likes of Stolen Tools UK or the Gas Expert on Instagram and they will see cases, every single day, of people having their tools stolen and the damage that is doing to their financial and mental health. The impact of this on the wider economy is now so severe that we must act: Parliament must act across party to change the law—today, I hope.
I also thank the police and crime commissioners across the country who are getting stuck into the problem. I have highlighted examples from the Met of Sidcup and Havering police forces in particular, but I know that the PCCs in Kent and Sussex are also doing great work tackling this issue.
As I have highlighted, this is not a party-political issue and I appreciate the work of the hon. Member for Portsmouth North (Amanda Martin) in shining a spotlight on it. Today we can work cross-party and get the law changed now, and I hope, in all sincerity, that all MPs get behind this amendment and that the Government can help us change the law today, get on the side of the makers and tackle the lawbreakers.
Kim Johnson (Liverpool Riverside) (Lab)
I rise to speak in support of new clause 13 in my name and new clause 50 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel).
New clause 13 proposes to change the law on joint enterprise. For those who do not know, this is a centuries-old doctrine that allows multiple people to be convicted of a crime, usually murder or manslaughter, even if only one person committed the fatal act. Evidence demonstrates it leads to unjust convictions, disproportionately impacting young black and working-class people, with young black men 16 times more likely to be convicted under joint enterprise than their white counterparts. I thank all who supported my private Member’s Bill that had its Second Reading in February 2024 and for their continued support for the campaign, particularly Joint Enterprise Not Guilty by Association.
As a result of a judicial review brought by Liberty and JENGbA, the Crown Prosecution Service conducted a pilot survey of joint enterprise cases, resulting in access to accurate data and highlighting the racial disparities that exist. Case law on joint enterprise was reversed by a Supreme Court ruling in 2016. The Jogee case identified how the law had taken “a wrong turn” for 30 years. The Law Commission is now undertaking a review of homicide and the sentencing framework for murder. It will examine the law on joint enterprise in light of the Supreme Court ruling on Jogee, with campaigners anticipating clear solutions on the disparities and inequality.
While I understand the Government have some reservations about my amendment, it is clear that there is recognition across the House that joint enterprise needs to be fixed. The prosecution of joint enterprise cases is flawed and racialised. The 2016 Supreme Court ruling did not resolve the key problems with the law. Speculative prosecution theories are accepted in place of strong evidence. This allows and encourages racist stereotyping, using gang narratives to imply collective intent, and using a person’s taste in music as evidence of being in a gang, with police being called as expert witnesses on drill music, which is a conflict of interest.
Art not Evidence is making significant inroads in this space, proposing a criminal evidence (creative and artistic expression) Bill to limit the admissibility of evidence of a person’s creative and artistic expression in criminal proceedings and for connected purposes. The Westminster Commission on Joint Enterprise is gathering evidence and will produce a report for the Government in 2026.
Reform of joint enterprise is long overdue. It has gone as far as it can in the courts, and it is now for Parliament to act; that is what the former Director of Public Prosecutions who is now the Prime Minister has said.
New clause 50 would enshrine the right to protest in law. The purpose of this amendment is to keep public authority powers proportionate and to uphold the right of our society to protest peacefully as a fundamental pillar of free and equal democracy. The right to protest and the freedom to express dissent goes back centuries and is championed across the political spectrum. From the peasants revolt to the suffragettes, we celebrate the great British tradition of direct action. So many of our freedoms have been won this way, including workers’ rights. Most recently, we have seen the farmers protesting outside Parliament, the mass trespass organised by the Ramblers’ Association in defence of our right to roam, striking workers, anti-war protesters and beyond. Millions of people have marched peacefully against the genocide in Gaza. Thousands of disabled people have protested against proposed welfare and disabled benefit changes. We have seen protesters outside Parliament against the assisted dying Bill and yesterday pro-life protesters gathered outside this place.
The ability to protest and freedom of expression and assembly are protected by articles 10 and 11 of the European convention on human rights and are enshrined in UK law. The planned demonstration outside the BBC headquarters in January demanding impartial coverage of Israel’s war in Gaza was banned by the Met police on the basis that the headquarters are in close proximity to a synagogue. This was after weeks of meetings and agreement of the route with the Met police. This is a serious infringement of our right to protest. If we cannot protest outside the headquarters of our public broadcaster, what does that say about our democracy? This should be of concern for all who believe in democracy and free society. The Government have a chance now to change course and roll back on these clampdowns for our rights and freedoms, for our democracy.
Mike Martin (Tunbridge Wells) (LD)
I rise to speak in support of new clause 43 in my name and in the name of the Chair of the Select Committee on Home Affairs the right hon. Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Dame Karen Bradley) and of the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy), both of whom I thank for their support. It is also co-signed by 100 Members from across the House representing our entire political spectrum from almost every party, including many Members of the Labour party.
New clause 43 seeks to do something very simple: to commence the Protection from Sex-based Harassment in Public Act 2023, which has already received Royal Assent. This Act simply criminalises the harassment of people in public based on their sex, but this is a crime that overwhelmingly affects women so this really is about the criminalisation of harassment of women in public.
The Act started life as a private Member’s Bill laid by my constituency predecessor, Greg Clark. He was approached by a sixth-former in our constituency who said that she had been harassed while coming home from school. One third of schoolgirls in the United Kingdom say they have been harassed in their school uniforms. We should be ashamed of that statistic, and Greg was ashamed and he took action.
The 2023 Act, as passed, creates a specific offence of harassment on account of someone’s sex. Like the new clause I rise to speak in support of, it received cross-party support, including, it must be said, from the hon. Member for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips), who is now the Minister for safeguarding and violence against women and girls.
The Act criminalises harassing, following and shouting degrading comments and making obscene gestures at women and girls in public with the deliberate intention of causing them harm or distress, and it carries a maximum sentence of two years. So I am quite disappointed and confused by the interactions that I have had with the Government on this issue. Every time I have pressed them for an update on commencement, I have not really received a substantive answer. For example, eight months ago I asked a question in this House and received a letter from the Government telling me that the Home Office is making all the necessary arrangements and that I would be contacted when a commencement date is confirmed. As a new MP, I thought this was quite promising. Five months ago, I tabled a written question and the Government responded saying that they would publish next steps at the earliest opportunity. Then two weeks ago I received a reply from the Government to a further communication stating that an update on commencement would be provided in due course. Each communication I receive from the Government is a little vaguer, a little bit less definitive about commencement.
Yesterday, at her instigation, I met with the Minister for VAWG and I thought, “Fantastic, finally we will get some answers.” But there was nothing, I am afraid—there was nada, zip. I gently ask the Minister present now—not the Minister for VAWG—what is the point in arranging a meeting if the Government are not going to say anything new to what they have previously said?
Lincoln Jopp
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, a fellow member of the Select Committee on Defence, for giving way, and I am proud to put my name to new clause 43 in his name. I also pay tribute to him for taking forward Greg Clark’s previous work in a very cross-party way for the benefit of the community. Does he share my frustration and slight bewilderment at the way in which the Government appear to be blocking commencement?
Mike Martin
In the Government’s defence, I do not think that this is a difference in policy; it is a difference in timing, but the timing seems to be very elastic. We seek a definitive time when the Act will be commenced—perhaps the Minister can respond at the Dispatch Box.
Ms Stella Creasy (Walthamstow) (Lab/Co-op)
As somebody who was incredibly proud to work with the hon. Gentleman’s predecessor on this legislation, having worked for many, many years to recognise misogyny in our hate crime framework, let me say that it will be two years in September since this House agreed to this legislation on a cross-party basis. It will be two years in September of the work being done, in theory, to be able to commence the legislation. Many of us on the Government Benches are proud of our commitment to recognising misogyny in hate crime, so will the hon. Gentleman join me in saying that we really want to understand what the barriers might be to getting on with the job that we know across this House will keep women and girls safer on our streets?
Mike Martin
I can actually give the hon. Lady a very specific time: it is 21 months to the day since this Act received Royal Assent. If the Minister would be so gracious, we might have from her either a time for commencement or, as the hon. Member for Walthamstow says, a specific problem that is stopping the Act being commenced, rather than some of the more general responses we have had to date.
I am doubly disappointed that although this Act was passed in a previous Parliament—expressing the unanimous will of Parliament, as it passed without a Division—it is entirely commensurate with the Labour Government’s policy to halve violence against women and girls. Harassment and violence are on a continuum and a spectrum. One of the things we are trying to do is to change the culture of men in how they act towards women; this Act is a part of that and really does contribute to the Labour Government’s priorities and manifesto. Indeed, the Minister for VAWG sat on the Public Bill Committee for the Act in 2023 and said that the Labour party would work with the then Conservative Government to ensure that the Bill passed without a Division, and so it did.
The Government have signalled that they will vote against new clause 43, which has been selected for a vote tonight. When the new clause has cross-party support and the original Act had unanimous cross-party support, why will the Government vote against the new clause? It seems to me that they are voting against their own manifesto and their own commitments while in opposition. That is difficult to understand, because I think we all want the same thing.
I will conclude. Implementing the Protection from Sex-based Harassment in Public Act is an important step in helping the Labour Government to achieve their own manifesto commitments. Let this not be another speech without action. I urge hon. and right hon. Members to vote for new clause 43.
Dawn Butler
I rise to speak to new clause 47 in my name. This is a very simple new clause, in a way, about how we stop mobile phones that have been stolen from being reconnected to the cloud and sold on. If we can break that link, we can stop the proliferation of mobile phone theft, which has increased by 150%.
Some 200 mobile phones are snatched every single day, and there has been a marked increase in Westminster. I know that a number of MPs have had their mobile phones stolen—some of them are sat not too far away from me. The amount of money in this crime is incredible. I do not believe phone manufacturers are that keen to stop this crime, because I feel it is part of their business model: when somebody has their mobile phone stolen, they go and buy another mobile phone.
New clause 47 says that once somebody’s phone has been stolen and they report it to the police, the police must report it to Apple, Google, Samsung or whoever, which then stops that phone from being reconnected to the cloud. In effect, that phone would become inactive. If the manufacturer failed to do that within 48 hours, it would be fined £10,000. We need to ensure that the manufacturers take this issue seriously, because they are not. Here is the simple thing: if we want to stop mobile phones being stolen to order, we need to ensure that the manufacturers take the issue seriously. We need to ensure that IMEI numbers are easily accessible, and we need to ensure that thieves cannot reconnect the mobile phones.
Dame Caroline Dinenage
I rise to speak to new clause 121, which is tabled in my name and supported by my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns) and, I am very pleased to say, by Members from both sides of this Chamber. It would extend the definition of extreme pornography to include depictions of non-fatal strangulation, known as NFS.
NFS was made a criminal offence in 2021 under the last Government, not because we think the Government should necessarily stick their nose into what people want to get up to in the bedroom, but because abusers use non-fatal strangulation without consent, as it leaves little visible injury and makes it hard to prosecute under domestic abuse cases. When a woman dies from strangulation, it is becoming increasingly common to use the defence that it was a sex game gone wrong.
Non-fatal strangulation has a life out there in the world of online porn. As we know, the UK is a large porn consumer. In any given month, more than 10 million adults in the UK will access online porn, and the vast majority of them will be chaps. That is up to them—we do not judge—but we know from research that online porn is so widespread that one in 10 children have seen it by the age of nine. Unfortunately, it is the guide that many young people use to learn about sex.
That is why I am extremely worried that non-fatal strangulation has been found to be rife on porn sites. Evidence has shown that it is directly influencing the sexual behaviour of young men, who are non-consensually strangling young women during consensual sex. Recent polling has suggested that 17% of 16 to 34-year-olds have been strangled without giving consent during consensual sex.
We are not being prudes in calling for this misogynistic act to be banned in online porn. Health experts warn that there is no way to strangle someone without risk, given that blood and airflow may both be restricted. A person can become unconscious within 10 seconds of being choked, and within 17 seconds they can have a seizure due to lack of oxygen. Death can occur within 150 seconds of being rendered unconscious.
Almost 20% of the women killed in the UK since 2014 were strangled by an intimate partner. Perpetrators who choke their partners are seven times more likely to kill them. I am sure the Minister will agree that it is alarming to hear reports of young men and boys seeking advice on how they can safely strangle their partner in bed and that girls are expected to accept that kind of behaviour. There was even a report last year, which the Minister may have heard about, of draft personal, social, health and economic education guidance from a Welsh local authority including safe choking during sex for a child sex education class. We need to send a signal that strangling your partner in bed is not safe—it can be a precursor to coercive, abusive behaviour. I know that the Government also want to send that signal, because in February they said, in their response to an independent review commissioned by the previous Government:
“The government will take urgent action to ensure pornography platforms, law enforcement and prosecutors are taking all necessary steps to tackle this increasingly prevalent harm.”
I therefore urge the Minister to support my new clause 121, which sets out one of the necessary steps referred to in the Government’s response. We need to back this amendment, ban this harmful practice, and send out a very strong message that depictions of non-fatal strangulation in porn normalise something that is not normal and is not safe.
Joe Powell (Kensington and Bayswater) (Lab)
I rise to speak to new clause 155, which stands in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West (Phil Brickell) and is supported by the all-party parliamentary group on anti-corruption and responsible tax. I welcome the Bill for its clear and ambitious strategy to tackle antisocial behaviour and crime, but if we want truly safer streets, we must also step up our efforts to tackle financial and economic crime. That is the aim of our amendment, which is supported by at least 30 Members from across the House.
Ben Maguire (North Cornwall) (LD)
I rise to speak in support of Liberal Democrat new clauses 83, 84, 85 and 86, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Hazel Grove (Lisa Smart). I also commend my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells (Mike Martin) on his new clause 43.
Representing one of the most rural constituencies in the UK, I know just how deeply rural crime affects my constituents’ lives and livelihoods. I am not talking about the occasional petty theft from a property; the problem we face is calculated organised crime, and it is devastating North Cornwall’s farmers, small businesses and entire communities in our rural areas. Take the farmer in St Kew who lost more than £3,000-worth of tools and equipment in a single night, or the farming couple in Blisland who had two of their quad bikes stolen, worth £15,000. In that case, the police did not even arrive until three days later. To this day, the couple have heard nothing more. That is not to blame our hard-working local constables, who are stretched to breaking point.
It is no wonder that 86% of countryside residents say that rural crime is harming their mental wellbeing, and these are not isolated incidents. They are all part of a growing pattern that successive Governments have allowed to thrive under their watch. New clause 83 would finally extend the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023 to cover GPS units, which are some of the most commonly stolen pieces of farm tech. Separately, new clause 84 would establish a dedicated rural crime taskforce, on which the Liberal Democrats have long campaigned. It is working in Scotland and a handful of regional police forces, so it is time that the Government developed and rolled out a properly funded and equipped taskforce nationwide.
I am pleased that, after years of pressure from me and my Liberal Democrat colleagues, the Government have finally announced that they will be committing to a full rural crime strategy. I hope that the Minister can today update the House on its timing. Strategy alone, however, will not stop thefts; it must come with proper enforcement. That is why new clause 85 and new clause 86 matter. They would guarantee minimal levels of neighbourhood policing and ensure that every local authority area has officers exclusively dedicated to community-based work.
In Cornwall, the police are doing all they can, but when the force gets less money per head than almost anywhere else in England, it is not enough. Officers are overstretched and underfunded. We need boots on the ground, with officers who understand the rural landscapes they are serving. That is why I urge the House to back these amendments, for the tradesmen who have lost their tools, for the farmers who have lost their machinery and vehicles, and for every rural community that has lost faith that justice will ever be done.
Separately, new clauses 87 and 88 would make it a criminal offence for water companies to breach pollution performance commitments and would finally hold senior executives personally liable for their failures. In North Cornwall, my constituents are living with the consequences of systematic pollution for profit. In 2024, South West Water issued more than 3,000 sewage alerts in its region, including 540 during the official bathing season and a staggering 2,600 outside of it. This is a routine and preventable environmental harm. South West Water pledged to significantly reduce its sewage discharges, but freedom of information requests show that it increased its discharges by a shocking five times last year versus the previous year, and the human cost is real.
In Widemouth Bay, my three-year-old constituent Finley became severely ill with diarrhoea and vomiting after playing on the beach. A friend’s child who was there that same day suffered similar symptoms, and I was contacted at one of my surgeries a few weeks ago by a teenage girl who required hospital admission after surfing in Harlyn bay. In St Eval, I dealt with residents reporting brown water coming from their taps. As a result of cracks at Bears Down reservoir due to South West Water’s lack of maintenance, many had no water for days, and the compensation from South West Water was £50 a household.
The leadership behind these constant and shocking failures continues to be rewarded. Susan Davy, the chief executive of Pennon Group, which owns South West Water, was paid a total of £860,000 in 2024. That was a small increase of £300,000 from the year before. Our beaches, rivers and families are being failed and let down, especially by the last Conservative Government and now by this Government. That is why these new clauses offer a clear message—
Rachel Taylor (North Warwickshire and Bedworth) (Lab)
On 30 April 1999, three nail bombs went off in London, killing four and injuring 140. One of them exploded at Brick Lane, the hub of London’s Bengali community; one exploded in Soho, at the Admiral Duncan pub, the heart of London’s gay district; and one exploded in Brixton, in an attack on south London’s black community. The sick terrorist who committed those evil acts was motivated by hatred. He hated Bengalis and black people because of their race. He hated LGBT people because of who they love and how they live their lives. He hated those groups because they were different from him. He hated them because of who they are.
I raise that appalling incident to remind the House that hatred comes in many forms, but whoever in our society it is against, we must all stand equally strongly against it. We must have hate crime laws that show that whether the hatred is for someone’s race, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity or disability, Britain is a country that will not tolerate it; that all hatred is equal; and that all those who commit vile acts of hatred will face the same grave consequences.
I regret to say that that is not currently the case. Today the law recognises five categories of hate crime—race, religion, sexual orientation, transgender identity and disability—but only two, race and religion, are treated as aggravated offences subject to stronger sentencing powers; the other three are not. That discrepancy cannot be right. We cannot say, as a society, that some forms of hatred are more evil than others.
I was at university when section 28 was introduced—I remember it vividly. It was more than a law; it was an attack on the right of people like me to live openly. It stigmatised lesbians, gays and bisexual people; and it pushed us out of public life. I went into politics to fight that cruel law and everything it represented.
Hate corrodes our entire society. It does not just harm the individuals who are targeted; it creates fear—fear to go outside, fear to speak up, fear to be seen. It silences people. It makes us all afraid. Research by Stonewall found that less than half of LGBT+ people felt safe holding their partner’s hand in public. That is the impact that the fear of hatred has on people. It makes them afraid even to show the world that they exist.
Unfortunately, far too many recorded crimes never result in charges. Of 11,000 disability hate crimes recorded by police, 320 led to prosecutions. Of 22,000 homophobic hate crimes, 3,118 led to prosecutions. Of 4,000 hate crimes against transgender people, only 137 led to prosecutions. Behind those statistics are real people, whose scars may heal on the outside but who may never recover from the fear and trauma that they have suffered.
In 2024, a teenage far-right extremist was jailed for targeting and attacking a transgender woman. Along with another young man, he kicked her to the ground in a park in Swansea and hurled transphobic abuse at her. In 2022, Cassie, a PhD student and wheelchair user, was waiting outside a shop when two drunk men grabbed her wheelchair, pushed her down the road and made sexual comments. She had to escape by rolling into traffic.
We must fight back against this hatred. We must show that we are not content to stick with the status quo. The victims of these attacks deserve to live in a society that says that we take this hatred seriously and will not stand for it. Victims must be at the heart of our criminal justice system, and we must ensure that laws protect them. That is why my new clause 122 is so important.
LGBT and disabled people tell me that they do not feel as safe as they used to. We are seeing rising transphobia everywhere. Pride flags are being taken down at county halls, and some politicians are openly questioning whether disabilities are even real. I am proud that Labour, in our manifesto, committed to equalising our hate crime laws by making hate crimes against LGBT people and disabled people aggravated offences. I am proud to be bringing forward that change through new clause 122. I hope that I can persuade all my parliamentary colleagues to support the new clause today, and to take this important step forward for equal rights.
I thank my hon. Friends the Members for Burton and Uttoxeter (Jacob Collier) and for Penistone and Stocksbridge (Dr Tidball) for standing shoulder to shoulder with me throughout this process, and I urge the House to support the new clause.
Mr Peter Bedford (Mid Leicestershire) (Con)
As MPs, we receive a wide range of correspondence from constituents during some of the most difficult times in their lives, but the email that I received from Emma Johnson was perhaps one of the most harrowing that I have ever received. It is because of Emma’s story that I have tabled new clause 51, and I will speak to it today.
Mary Kelly Foy (City of Durham) (Lab)
I rise to speak in support of new clause 25, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith and Chiswick (Andy Slaughter). It seeks to repeal the unnecessary and arbitrary police powers introduced via the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, which introduced new powers to seize the homes of Gypsy and Traveller families, and to fine, arrest and imprison them. The powers contained in part 4 of the Act have had a devastating impact on Romani Gypsy and Irish Traveller communities, and on a culture that is not only centuries old but protected by law. The Government have a legal and moral duty to facilitate this way of life, not to legislate it out of existence.
As we heard earlier from my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith and Chiswick, in May 2024 the High Court found certain provisions in part 4 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act to be incompatible with the Human Rights Act. The Government have so far failed meaningfully to respond to that, let alone correct it. In issuing the declaration of incompatibility, the High Court recognised the lack of transit provision for Gypsy and Traveller communities across England, and the impact that the Act’s powers have on Gypsy and Traveller families. If there is any doubt in people’s minds about the state of transit provision in England, I refer them to the research published this year by Friends, Families and Travellers, which found that 92% of the 362 local authorities have no transit provision at all.
Notably, the introduction of the powers has an effect on the community’s fears of being targeted and sanctioned. I will share the words of someone from the Romany community who has been directly impacted by these powers, which highlight the human consequences of these laws:
“This law adds to the knock-on effects we face daily with access to healthcare and education; being moved on constantly has been detrimental to my health, as sometimes I have to drive over 100 miles to see a GP. I could be made a criminal and lose my home, all because I have never known any different.”
It is painfully obvious that what we need are not criminal sanctions for families who have nowhere to stop; the answer is, of course, to create laws which ensure there are enough places for people to stop—I might add that the Planning and Infrastructure Bill provides the perfect opportunity for that.
As I stand here today during Gypsy, Roma and Traveller History Month, I urge the Government not to delay further. Let us repeal part 4 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act through this Bill, and take a meaningful step towards justice, inclusion and respect for all communities.
Liz Jarvis (Eastleigh) (LD)
I would like to start by paying tribute to Berney Hall, who is in the Gallery today and who has been campaigning for a change in the law to remove the 12-month limitation period for historic cases of rape of 13 to 15-year-old girls, when they occurred before 2004. It can take years for victims of abuse to come forward. Baroness Kennedy of Cradley tabled amendments to the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill in the other place which sought to close this loophole, but they were not taken forward by the previous Government. That is why I have tabled new clause 160. I hope the Government will give all survivors of this terrible crime the closure and justice they deserve.
I am supporting several amendments today, including new clause 9 tabled by the hon. Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion). I recently met a mum from my constituency whose ex-partner was convicted of sexual communication with a child and put on the sex offenders register, but was then allowed to change his name. Understandably, my constituent was horrified to learn that he could take on a new identity, and that other women might not be aware. New clause 9 would stop offenders avoiding monitoring measures that are important for public safety, as well as reassuring victims that perpetrators cannot dodge the repercussions of their actions.
I am also supporting new clauses 85 to 88, new clauses 121 and 122, and new clause 102. In addition, I support new clause 120, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Monica Harding), which would strengthen protections for emergency workers by addressing hate-motivated offences committed against them in private dwellings. No one doing their job to protect others should face abuse. Whether on the street or in someone’s home, hate-fuelled attacks on those who serve the public must be prosecuted with the seriousness they warrant.
Finally, I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells (Mike Martin) for tabling new clause 43, which would ensure the Government implement the Protection from Sex-based Harassment in Public Act 2023. No one should have to put up with sexual harassment and this change in the law is long overdue.
Jess Asato (Lowestoft) (Lab)
I rise to speak to new clauses 102 to 105 in my name. First, I thank the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypridd (Alex Davies-Jones) for her engagement on the issues I am about to discuss, and I pay tribute to UK Feminista, which runs the all-party parliamentary group on commercial sexual exploitation, to CEASE—the Centre to End All Sexual Exploitation—and to Barnardo’s for its steadfast campaign on tackling violence against women and girls, and the protection of children.
My new clauses reflect the recommendations of the very thorough recent review conducted for the Government by Baroness Gabby Bertin into online pornography. I am so proud that this Labour Government have made a commitment to halve violence against women and girls. I truly believe that regulating violent online pornography, which is viewed by nearly 40% of men once a week in the UK, will make a clear impact on that commitment.
As the hon. Member for Gosport (Dame Caroline Dinenage) has already powerfully argued, sexual strangulation is one of the most frequently found acts across all categories on mainstream pornography sites. Despite its dangers, it is portrayed as perfectly safe and a normal part of sex. In a Google search, CEASE found 30 million videos immediately for “choke her” porn. I want to share the story of Hannah, who met her killer, James Morton, on the day she died. Morton
“was reported as being obsessed with strangulation, frequently watching porn featuring strangulation of women. Although the judge said Morton had strangled Hannah ‘without warning or permission’, Morton claimed he began to lightly strangle Hannah…before more forcefully strangling her.”
Women and girls are paying the price of both an industry that seeks to profit from the most violent kinds of content and laws that are not fit for purpose. Despite the clear evidence of a direct connection between viewing strangulation content in mainstream pornography and undertaking such acts, the law requires the removal of this type of pornographic content only if the threshold of “life-threatening” is clearly met. New clause 102 would ban pornographic content depicting all strangulation and, with the requirement in the Online Safety Act 2023 to remove illegal content, would place a duty on platforms to remove strangulation videos or face sanction.
It is clear that we need stronger regulation. Offline, we have been regulating pornographic content since the Video Recordings Act 1984, which specifically prohibits offline content that the British Board of Film Classification would find unsuitable, yet our online regulation has not kept pace.
Of particular concern is content that depicts sexual activity with children. Known as “teen porn” or “incest porn”, this content features young-looking performers made to look under age through use of props such as stuffed toys, lollipops and school uniforms. Such content normalises children as objects of sexual desire and drives the demand for child sexual abuse material. Pornography producers have got around the ban on incest material by promoting porn videos in which there is step-incest. In a society where many of us have blended families, it is simply not right that step-daddy/daughter pornography is legal, no matter whether the actor is over 18 or not. New clause 103 would ensure that what is illegal offline is illegal online.
We must also ensure that all illegal pornographic content is regulated equally online, regardless of where that content is hosted. Duties under the Online Safety Act to combat illegal content apply only to pornography websites that host user-to-user interactions or user-generated content, and pornography websites that host only commercially produced pornography are exempt from illegal duties. We must not allow that to continue. New clause 104 would ensure that all pornography sites must adhere to illegal content duties.
Finally, it is important to remember that the acts of sexual violence I have spoken about today are perpetrated against real women and girls. This is not acting or performing. Women are often forced or coerced into this industry, and, once in it, even the most famous pornography performers are exploited. For example, Kate was trafficked from the UK to the pornography industry in America, where she suffered horrendous abuse and was forced to take part in dangerous and degrading sex acts on film. The consequences of what she endured have stayed with her despite her escaping the industry.
The truth is, there is no way of knowing whether the women who appear in pornography have given their consent, or whether they are even adults. New clause 105 would ensure that pornography websites accessed from the UK must verify the age and consent of every individual featured on their site and, crucially, enable individuals featured in pornography to withdraw their consent to its publication at any time.
I look forward to working with the Government and colleagues across the House to tackle the harmful impacts of this multibillion-pound industry.
Saqib Bhatti
I rise to speak to new clause 123 in the name of my right hon. Friend the Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Dame Karen Bradley).
I have to say, I am a little surprised that I am having to speak to this new clause today, and I implore the Minister to give it due consideration, not least because it was presented on a cross-party basis in the previous Parliament by Baroness Harman. In fact, on the day it was debated, Baroness Harman, who had done all the work on it, was away due to a personal matter, and it was spoken to by the hon. Member for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips), who is, of course, now the Minister for Safeguarding and Violence Against Women and Girls. The Minister will be aware that this issue directly concerns a constituent of mine, whose experience I will speak to later. I really encourage the Minister to give the new clause due consideration and, if it is not taken up, perhaps she can clarify in her remarks why there is a delay. Every engagement I have had with the Department has suggested that such a provision is well on its way, so I would be curious to know about that.
For the benefit of the House, the new clause seeks to remove the parental rights of convicted sex offenders. It is unconscionable to my constituents that children could be subject to living with a sex offender because the sex offender is their parent. It is reprehensible that the law allows that to happen. It allows convicted criminals who have committed the most heinous crimes to exploit the law, and it puts vulnerable children at risk.
Will Stone (Swindon North) (Lab)
I rise to support new clauses 15 and 16 in my name. The amendments address two specific but crucial failings in our current road traffic laws: the absence of adequate penalties for driving without ever having held a licence and insufficient consequences for people who fail to stop after an incident.
The amendments are in honour of Harry Parker, a much-loved 14-year-old whose life was tragically cut short on 25 November 2022 on his way to school. I engage with the family regularly, and this has truly rocked Adam and Kelly. It is utterly devastating for them to have lost their child at such an early point in his life. I extend my deepest sympathy to Harry’s parents, and I admire their courage in seeking change through their grief. The driver who killed Harry was driving without a licence, had no insurance and did not stop. Shockingly, all charges were dropped. The police and the Crown Prosecution Service followed the letter of the law, but that is why I am here. The law as it stands does not recognise the gravity of these offences when they are committed by someone who should never have been behind the wheel in the first place. That is why I have brought forward the two amendments.
New clause 15 on unlicensed drivers would amend section 87 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 to introduce tougher penalties for individuals who have never held a licence. New clause 16 on the offence of failure to stop would amend section 170 of the 1988 Act to allow courts to impose unlimited fines, a custodial sentence and a disqualification from driving for up to two years. More importantly, it would allow the courts to impose any combination of those penalties.
No law can bring Harry back. No sentence will ease the pain of the family and friends. These amendments are about restoring the balance and sending a clear message: if someone chooses to drive without a licence and if someone runs from the scene of a crash, there will be real-world consequences. I appreciate that the amendments may not progress, but I ask the Government to take them seriously with a road safety strategy, which I hope we can push forward in future.
Edward Morello (West Dorset) (LD)
I rise to speak to new clause 156 in my name, which I bring forward because of Isabella, a 14-year-old girl who lives in my constituency. In May of this year, Isabella was hanging out with friends in Lyme Regis when she was lured to the cemetery. A group of young people were waiting. One of them had their phone out and was already filming her arrival. Moments later, another girl who Isabella knew launched a brutal assault. Her head was smashed against a concrete step, she was stamped on and kicked in the face again and again. While Isabella was being attacked, no one stopped to help; instead, they stood by and they filmed. They laughed and they demanded they be sent the video.
The attack was premeditated, but so too was the filming. The recording began before Isabella even arrived. It was not taken to provide evidence or to expose wrongdoing but taken deliberately to broadcast her humiliation and glorify the violence. I have seen the video; it is horrific. Isabella’s mother has seen the video, her friends have seen the video and hundreds, and possibly thousands, of people have seen the video because it was intentionally and maliciously circulated on social media and in private WhatsApp groups in schools across West Dorset. Children who were not there and who do not even know Isabella saw her brutal attack play out on their phones. The violence did not stop when the attack ended. It was shared, it was forwarded, it was replayed and it was whispered about.
Isabella’s attacker was charged with actual bodily harm. She received anger management classes and a six-month restraining order. That was bad enough, but the people who filmed it walked away entirely unpunished. The filming had started before the attack occurred, they knew the attack was coming, they planned to film it and then they proceeded to share the video while laughing. They did not walk away unpunished because there was no proof of what they did—the video was the proof—but because our law does not yet recognise such specific, premeditated and deeply harmful behaviour as the offence that it should be.
That is why I believe that new clause 156 is so important. It seeks to create a specific offence for premeditated filming and distribution of violent acts with the intent to humiliate, distress and psychologically harm the victims. It recognises what too many families already know: that this is not about a punch thrown or a kick delivered, but about the deliberate choice to film violence, broadcast it and humiliate the victim repeatedly for an audience that grows with every share, every click and every forwarded message.
We are not talking about evidence or journalism, or about someone catching wrongdoing to expose it. Indeed, new clause 156 makes it very clear and contains an explicit safeguard to protect public interest journalism and for footage being used as evidence. Yet where there is premeditation and where someone knowingly films or broadcasts an attack with the intent to amplify the victim’s humiliation, that behaviour must face consequences. Isabella’s case is not an isolated one.
Dr Scott Arthur (Edinburgh South West) (Lab)
The hon. Gentleman speaks with great passion about his constituent. Yesterday evening, I held a roundtable with parents in my constituency to talk about mobile phone use in schools. One of the parents was a GP and she spoke about how children who have been subject to such attacks have come to her surgery saying that they are contemplating suicide because of what they have faced. Does he agree that this goes well beyond mere humiliation and to some of the worst mental health problems our young people could face?
Edward Morello
I agree with the hon. Gentleman; we do not fully understand the lasting psychological damage, especially as this is a growing problem.
I have received further letters from other people, who have told me about similar incidents in other schools, other towns and other playgrounds. Nationally, the problem is rising. According to the Youth Endowment Fund’s 2024 survey, 70% of young people reported seeing real-world violence online in the past year and that most of that footage was of fights involving young people. It is happening in our communities right now and the law is failing to keep pace.
Our children already face enormous pressures from social media—from online bullying to apps designed to capture their attention and expose them to content far beyond their years. As parents, we do our best to protect them, but we cannot be everywhere. We have a duty to put proper deterrents in place where social media companies have continually failed us.
We have a duty to send a clear message that this behaviour is unacceptable, that it is dangerous and that it will not go unpunished. I will finish with the words of Isabella’s mother, Sarah. She said:
“I have to live with the flashbacks of watching my daughter being beaten. I also have to live knowing that this video will be forever available on social media.”
On behalf of Sarah and of Isabella, I hope that the Government will support a change to the law so that something positive can come from Isabella’s experience.
Anneliese Midgley (Knowsley) (Lab)
I pay tribute to the hon. Member for West Dorset (Edward Morello) for his speech and for advocating for new clause 156. He is a powerful advocate for his constituent who suffered such horrific things, and I thank him for that.
I rise to speak in support of new clause 48, which stands in my name. It would create a new, stand-alone offence of assaulting a delivery worker. Before I begin, though, let me refer Members to my entry in the Register of Member’s Financial Interests and my membership of the GMB Union.
Delivery workers are vital to our local economies. They link shops with homes, cafés with customers and communities with each other. They help keep our high streets alive and our homes supplied. But too often, they are abused, assaulted, and attacked just for doing their job.
Rolston, who rides for Deliveroo, has been verbally abused and threatened with violence on people’s doorsteps for asking for ID when delivering alcohol, as the law requires him to do. Emiliana has been riding in Kent since 2018. She has had two motorbikes stolen and has been pelted. Sometimes it is far worse. Claudiu Carol Kondor was an Amazon delivery driver. He was killed in Leeds last year. A thief jumped into his van while he was delivering parcels. Claudiu tried to stop him, clinging to his vehicle for half a mile, pleading with the thief to stop. He was deliberately knocked off and killed. He had bought that van just three weeks earlier and was trying to protect his livelihood. Instead, he lost his life. No one should leave home to go to work and not come back.
Those are just a few stories, but they are not isolated incidents. The Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers has found that 77% of delivery workers for major retailers such as Tesco, Sainsbury’s, Asda, Ocado, Morrisons and Iceland have been a victim of abuse in the past year. A quarter have turned down deliveries because they feared for their safety, and 13% have been physically assaulted. And this is happening during an epidemic of retail crime. Shoplifting has nearly doubled since the pandemic, and rose by 23% last year alone. In-store retail staff also face absolutely shocking abuse.
I welcome the Labour Government’s commitment to protecting retail workers with a stand-alone offence, which USDAW, through its freedom from fear campaign, has campaigned on for years. It is the right move, because no one should feel unsafe, or face abuse—verbal or physical—just for doing their job.
Delivery workers are on the frontline, too. They work alone, often at night. They are public-facing and can be vulnerable. When something goes wrong—a delay, a missing item, or the wrong order—they are the ones who face the backlash. Too often frustration turns into abuse, violence, or worse. Delivery workers deserve the same protection that this Government are rightly offering to staff in stores. When Parliament places extra responsibilities on delivery riders to police much-needed laws on age verification, it should legislate to provide additional protections for them. New clause 48 is backed by the GMB Union, USDAW, Deliveroo, the British Retail Consortium and UKHospitality. Trade bodies and trade unions are campaigning together, because they know the reality. They see what delivery workers face every day. Since the covid pandemic, delivery riders have become a part of how we shop and we rely on them.
Ben Obese-Jecty
I wish to speak about new clauses 84 to 86 and return once again to policing and police funding. In new clause 86 on neighbourhood policing, the Liberal Democrats seek to address the Government’s recently announced neighbourhood policing plan. The plan pledges to recruit an additional 13,000 police officers—a figure that still simply does not stack up. I spoke last week in Westminster Hall about the discrepancies in the Government’s pledge, the lack of clarity around the baseline figure against which progress will be measured, the fuzziness around how the 3,000 officers transferred from other roles will be determined or implemented, and the fact that the 2,611 officers overcounted as being in neighbourhood roles by 29 of the 43 police forces in England and Wales means that the 3,000 officers the Government have announced this year is all but net neutral in terms of additional warranted police officers—it is an in-year increase of just 389 officers once the adjustment is taken into account.
Kirith Entwistle (Bolton North East) (Lab)
I rise to speak to new clause 44, otherwise known as Banaz’s law, tabled in my name and in memory of Banaz Mahmod. I am grateful for the cross-party support that I have received for the new clause from 54 Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat Members and for the opportunity to continue the work of my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips), and the last Women and Equalities Committee; I am proud to be a member of the Committee.
Banaz was a young woman from south London. In 2006, she was murdered by her father, her uncle and five male cousins in a so-called honour killing. Her crime, in their eyes, was to leave an abusive husband, whom she had bravely reported for rape and violence, and to seek love with a man of her own choosing. Believing she had brought shame and dishonour upon the family, they convened what they chillingly called a council of war and plotted her death. Banaz’s body was found months later buried in a suitcase in a back garden in Birmingham.
This horrific injustice did not begin with her murder, however. Banaz went to the police five times. She reported rape, she named her abusers, she predicted her own death and still her cries for help were dismissed. An investigation by the Independent Police Complaints Commission into the police handling of Banaz’s case later found multiple serious failings. This was not only a family crime; it was a community crime. Police estimated that as many as 50 men were involved in plotting the murder, covering it up or encouraging this honour narrative. Banaz’s uncle called her death “justice”. Others called him a hero.
Banaz’s case is not unique. Shafilea Ahmed, Somaiya Begum, Raneem Oudeh, Khaola Saleem and Fawziyah Javed were all women subjected to honour-based abuse. The Domestic Abuse Commissioner estimates that at least 12 honour killings take place in the UK every year. More than 7,000 incidents of honour-based abuse are recorded annually, but the true scale is almost certainly greater.
While I fully support the important steps this Bill takes to tackle violence against women and girls, I am concerned by its insufficient focus on honour-based abuse and I am grateful to the Minister for Victims, my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypridd (Alex Davies-Jones), for taking the time to meet me. However, I must stress that subsuming honour-based abuse within extant law does not adequately contend with these issues and is not sufficiently capable of yielding the change promised by Banaz’s law.
My new clause calls for honour-based abuse to be recognised in law as an aggravating factor in sentencing. It also calls for victim-survivors who act in self-defence or under coercion after years of abuse to have that context recognised as a mitigating factor. With this new clause, statutory guidance across the criminal justice system could be given so that police, prosecutors and courts could be trained to recognise and respond to this high-risk, often collective, form of abuse.
I want to pay tribute to the Bekhal Mahmod, Banaz’s sister. Her courage and the tireless work of Southall Black Sisters have brought us to this point. I will not be pressing my new clause to a vote today, but I hope that Ministers will take this opportunity to reflect on the need to take further action against all forms of honour-based abuse, because the need for reform is undeniable.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
Order. I think the hon. Member for Bolton North East (Kirith Entwistle) just ran out of time. I remember that I too raised Banaz’s case as a Back Bencher.
Mr Richard Holden (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)
I rise to speak in support of six of the new clauses that go to the heart of our responsibilities as legislators—safeguarding children, restoring public confidence in the law and defending free expression—although due to the lack of time, I will not be able to go into them all in detail.
New clause 45, standing in my name, seeks to ensure that where an individual under the age of 18 has been cautioned or convicted of a child sex offence, the police must notify any organisation that that child is involved in, where they are with other children, or an organisation that that person is seeking to join. This new clause stems from a real case in my own constituency and would close a dangerous and demonstrably harmful safeguarding loophole, which I have already discussed privately with the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips). I hope that the Government will look at this as they take this legislation through the other place.
New clause 46, also standing my name, addresses another gap in legislation: a person’s ability to buy a car without providing any form of verifiable ID, or indeed proving that they can actually drive. This is in memory of Andrew Rowlands, with the support of his family, and it would make it harder for criminals and reckless drivers to use untraceable vehicles with impunity and kill people, as happened in Andrew’s case.
New clause 108, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for West Suffolk (Nick Timothy), seeks to reaffirm the right to speak freely about religion or belief, including criticism, satire and dissent, by restoring clarity to our public order laws. I know he will be speaking to it later, and I wholly support it. It is closely aligned to new clause 7, which is being put forward by the Opposition Front Bench today. We need to start addressing some of these non-crime hate incidents, which I think are becoming a pernicious attack upon freedom in our society.
More broadly, it was great to hear the hon. Member for Lowestoft (Jess Asato) speak about pornography and some of the amendments she has put forward. I support new clause 103. In fact, I have been doing some work recently with the British Board of Film Classification because there are clearly major issues between what is allowed to be broadcast and age rated within traditional broadcast settings and what is available online. There is a growing body of evidence linking violent and abusive pornography with increased rates of sexual aggression, especially towards women and girls. I fully support the new clause and hope that the Government pay attention to what the hon. Member proposed.
I support new clause 150 relating to cousin marriage. I am glad that the Opposition Front Bench has put it forward, and I spoke at length about the matter earlier in Westminster Hall. This is not a knee-jerk reaction; it represents the next logical step in a serious and ongoing effort to protect the vulnerable and promote social cohesion. I have already introduced a private Member’s Bill in this Session on the marriage element, following the successful challenge banning virginity testing and hymenoplasty in the last Session, because when it comes to protecting women and men from outdated, coercive and harmful practices, this House must not look the other way.
This is not about race or religion; it is about freedom, societal cohesion and health. It is about freedom because consent is meaningless when extended families can pressure young men and women into cousin marriages that they do not want. We must stand up for those without a voice and give them the legal backing to say no. It is about cohesion because multigenerational cousin marriage often fosters huge issues around social segregation, locking individuals into closed systems of authority. When countries like Norway and Denmark have acted decisively, there is no excuse for this country to lag behind others with progressive credentials. It is about health because there is a real risk. The Born in Bradford study, which has been going on for many years, has found the real societal implications, and we still do not know the full side effects of multigenerational first cousin marriages.
We rightly prohibit relationships where power distorts consent—between teachers and pupils, doctors and patients, and within close family settings. The same logic clearly applies here as well. This new clause is rooted in compassion, not condemnation. It speaks to freedom, especially for women, and the courage to legislate where silence simply causes harm.
Each of these amendments addresses a different risk—child safety, public accountability and freedom of expression—but they are united in the common principle that the law should protect the vulnerable, demand responsibility, and preserve the freedoms on which a healthy and confident society depends.
Dr Marie Tidball (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Lab)
I rise to support new clause 122, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for North Warwickshire and Bedworth (Rachel Taylor).
In 2007, Fiona Pilkington drove herself and her 18-year-old daughter, Francecca Hardwick, to a lay-by near her home. She also took the family’s pet rabbit to soothe her daughter, who had severe learning disabilities. She then set the car on fire, killing them both. An inquest two years later heard how the family had been kept virtual prisoners in their home by youths who threw stones, flour and other objects and kept up a relentless stream of abuse. At the time, the Independent Police Complaints Commission concluded that one of the police’s main failings was in not identifying the abuse as hate crime.
The case prompted wider concern that many police forces were failing to properly identify hate crimes motivated by disability, and thus treating them as low-priority antisocial behaviour—something disability campaigners say too often remains the case. I am proud that last year our Labour manifesto
“committed to championing the rights of disabled people and to the principle of working with them, so that their views and voices will be at the heart of all we do.”
I support my hon. Friend’s new clause 122, which would implement our manifesto commitment to protect LGBT+ and disabled people by making all existing strands of hate crime an aggravated offence. The new clause would finally place the Law Commission’s recommendations on a statutory footing. As the commission has said:
“It is undesirable for the current law to give the impression of a ‘hierarchy’ of victims.”
The Bill will be powerful in delivering the Government’s safer streets mission and plan for change. It will help to tackle the crimes that matter most to communities but that have been ignored for too long, after 14 years of the Tory dereliction of duty on law and order.
Luke Taylor (Sutton and Cheam) (LD)
Let me start by highlighting my support for new clauses 85 and 86, which deal with neighbourhood policing. They would ensure that police forces are required to practise community policing
“at a level necessary to ensure effective community engagement and crime prevention”.
It is a shame that the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty) is not in his place to intervene for a definition on that. It is about engaging with local communities and ward panels to define the appropriate levels in their areas—which I am sure he would support— rather than taking a top-down view. The new clauses would compel the Secretary of State to produce an annual report on the state of community policing.
We have outlined a way of funding that too: 20% of future police grants would be ringfenced for community policing activities, literally making crime pay—in the reverse of the manner in which that phrase is normally used—by allocating funds recovered from the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to community policing. That is important, because commitments to policing numbers mean little without serious action to reverse the scale of forthcoming cuts, such as the cuts of 1,419 officers and staff that we in London are about to experience this year. Indeed, as the Metropolitan Police Commissioner recently told the BBC,
“ambition and money go alongside each other”.
I urge Members across the House to support those new clauses.
I will now turn to my new clauses 95 and 96. It is good to see the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips), in her place to continue a conversation that we have had many times on stalking. Stalking is a heinous crime: it throws lives into chaos, leaves victims in life-changing and near-constant terror, and too often goes unpunished. The current legislation forces too many victims to meet an improbably high bar of evidence, forcing them to jump through hoops to be a perfect victim, just to prove the scale of the threat against them.
I have heard from victims in my Sutton and Cheam constituency who have had their lives completely upended by their stalkers, and who are completely at their wit’s end after facing so many obstacles to getting justice. It is clear that the two relevant sections of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 are the root of those obstacles. The distinction between a lesser section 2A offence and a more severe section 4A offence is failing victims and fails to recognise the total scope of stalking.
Successful prosecutions of section 4A offences are far too hard to achieve. The burden of proof is placed so heavily on the victim.
Iqbal Mohamed (Dewsbury and Batley) (Ind)
Even celebrities such as Emma Raducanu, and others in the public eye who have been affected by stalkers, feel unsafe and unprotected by existing legislation. Does the hon. Member agree that is clear additional evidence that the law needs strengthening?
Luke Taylor
The hon. Member provides a clear and visible example of how the legislation is not working, if somebody with such a high profile and with additional security protection cannot be protected from stalkers. I thank him for his apt intervention.
The burden of proof means that many victims withdraw from the process completely and give up on gaining justice. My new clauses would compel the Secretary of State to publish a review into the two clauses within six months of the Act receiving Royal Assent, and to make time for that review to be properly considered in the House upon its completion. They would also compel the Secretary of State to launch a review into the effectiveness and adequacy of the stalking awareness guidance provided by public bodies in England and Wales, and to make similar provision for proper consideration and debate in this House. I know that aim is supported by the Minister, so I would like to hear how it is being brought forward.
New clause 43, tabled by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells (Mike Martin), is incredibly important and deserves the support of the House. The new clause automatically commences the Protection from Sex-based Harassment in Public Act 2023 when the Crime and Policing Bill receives Royal Assent. That he has managed to corral together such luminaries in this House as the right hon. Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Dame Karen Bradley), my hon. Friend the Member for Hazel Grove (Lisa Smart), and the hon. Members for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy), for Brighton Pavilion (Siân Berry) and for Clacton (Nigel Farage), to support the measure is a triumph in itself.
We spoke about new clause 130 in Committee, and I very much support its measures on tool theft. It would add the theft of tools from tradesmen to the list of aggravating factors in the Sentencing Act 2020, and present a way forward towards more sensible regulations of temporary markets, where too many stolen tools are often sold out of car boots. I recently visited the Kimpton industrial estate in Stonecot in my constituency, where I heard more about the awful impact of that kind of theft from tradespeople, who too often are left with their livelihoods wrecked and very little proper recourse to getting their lives back on track, other than to fork out huge amounts to buy new tools, which in many cases are later stolen again. It is a horrible cycle, which I also heard about at the Stop Tool Theft rally on the streets outside this Chamber earlier this year.
The measures set out in the new clause provide a good path forward but will not solve the issue alone. Without the kind of commitment to restoring community policing that I mentioned in reference to new clauses 85 and 86, police forces will remain too overstretched to mobilise the resources to investigate these crimes in the first place.
Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)
My hon. Friend talks about community policing and getting police officers back into the community, so does he support my new clause 157, which seeks to streamline the way police case files are prepared and submitted to the Crown Prosecution Service? It is a common-sense approach that would reduce red tape and, most importantly, get police back out supporting victims and building the community trust that they need?
Luke Taylor
My hon. Friend’s words have convinced me and hon. Members across the House about her new clause.
The Met police recently responded to a freedom of information request about tool theft, which revealed that nine in 10 tool thefts in the last five years in London went unsolved, which shows the scale of the problem and the importance of supporting new clause 130 today.
I would like quickly to draw attention to some other amendments. New clauses 87 and 88, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Hazel Grove, would hold water company executives to account properly for the first time, and that would mark a huge step forward in tackling the sewage crisis we face in this country. Those individuals should be held liable for their carelessness and fixation with raising bills, while running companies into the ground and ruining our rivers. I wish I had more time to outline my reasons for supporting the clauses, but I refer the House to my many prior contributions on the subject.
New clause 44, tabled by the hon. Member for Bolton North East (Kirith Entwistle), would mark a step forward in providing support to victims of honour-based violence and murder.
New clause 122, tabled by the hon. Member for North Warwickshire and Bedworth (Rachel Taylor), would strengthen the law on hate crimes directed at disabled, LGBT+ people, and rightly seeks to protect people who are victims of hate crime because of their association with individuals in those groups, and I wholeheartedly support it.
In contract, new clause 7, tabled by the official Opposition, would weaken hate crime legislation in this country, and I fear it is motivated by a complete lack of respect for the decades of progress we have made in recognising the types of discrimination faced by people the length and breadth of this country. For this Bill to push us forward, and not drag us backwards, that new clause must be rejected.
Rachael Maskell (York Central) (Lab/Co-op)
I refer to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests, as a proud member of the trade union movement.
No one should go to work with the uncertainty each day that their safety might be put at risk. We as a Government clearly support that for emergency workers, and of course we are legislating for retail workers too. New clause 48, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Knowsley (Anneliese Midgley), addresses delivery workers, and today I stand to speak for my new clause 11, which would do the same for transport workers.
Every day, transport workers face verbal abuse, sexual harassment or physical assault, whether on bus, tram or ferry. Transport workers, alongside their trade union, the RMT, are calling for new measures to protect them at work: first, the introduction of a specific offence of assaulting or abusing a transport worker; and secondly, an extension in the maximum sentence, from six to 12 months—not least if sentences are now to be served in the community.
Monica Harding (Esher and Walton) (LD)
I had meant to speak to my amendment 120 today, but that intention was superseded by the Government’s movement on this, which I really welcome. It will close a loophole so that it will now be an offence to abuse an emergency worker on the grounds of race, religion or sexual orientation in somebody’s private dwelling. I congratulate the Government on that.
Rachael Maskell
I welcome the hon. Member’s intervention. This just goes to show the extent to which our public servants put themselves in harm’s way, often running towards danger on our behalf. When people are serving us—our constituents—day in, day out, they deserve the protections that we are aiming to introduce in this legislation.
Let us look at the scale of the abuse our transport workers are facing. Transport for London says that 10% of workers are physically assaulted, with 90% verbally abused and 60% experiencing violence at work, and that is just in the last 18 months. In fact, 10,493 TfL workers had incidents of violence or aggression perpetrated against them. More widely, the British Transport Police highlighted in 2024 that 7,027 offences were committed, and just in the last year there were 7,405 crimes, with 3,650 violent crimes. And there has been a 47% increase since 2021.
Out transport workers will not be safe unless more measures are included in this legislation. We are also hearing from other groups of workers, so we need to look holistically at the threats they are facing and how we can put those protections in place to ensure that specific measures are available to help keep them safe. That would also be better for the public.
We should also look at the work the RMT has done. It has surveyed its women workers, and 40% of transport workers who are women have been sexually harassed in the last year, and that, too, is on the rise. Two thirds of RMT members have experienced abuse, violence or antisocial behaviour, but 40% have not reported it as they are not confident that they will get the recourse they need. This is having an impact on their health and wellbeing. The level of post-traumatic stress disorder experienced by transport workers is double that of the general population. That is why they are calling for legal protection for all public transport workers—because of the scale and the prevalence. Moving forward with this will also deter perpetrators and support workers. It will improve action and response times and the support that is available.
We in this House need only think back to the covid pandemic. Belly Mujinga was spat at while working at Victoria station and, sadly, lost her life. She was there serving faithfully as a sales clerk during that period. Her union, the Transport Salaried Staffs Association, has said:
“While we remember Belly today, our union continues to fight for safe and healthy workplaces for all of our members.”
That is why I am here today: to fight for them alongside the trade unions, the British Transport Police, the rail industry bodies, the Rail Delivery Group, Network Rail and all of the transport unions—standing together, saying they need more measures to keep workers safe on our transport systems.
We often hear about other safety risks that transport workers place themselves in, but today it is about their own personal safety, and I am sure this House will hear it. So I am asking for clear support for new clause 11, but of course I am willing to meet the Minister to discuss how we can advance the cause of transport workers and hope that, if we cannot make these amendments today, we will be able to do so in the other place.
Nick Timothy (West Suffolk) (Con)
Before I turn to my new clause, I welcome in particular new clause 7, on non-crime hate incidents, and new clause 150, proposed by my right hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Holden), which would ban sexual relationships between first cousins.
This Bill presents an opportunity for the Government to support my new clause 108 to protect freedom of expression. That is urgently needed, because existing legislation has been manipulated to create a blasphemy law for the protection of Islam from criticism and protest. As I said in my speech last week, I am not a Muslim, and I reject any attempt to tell me that I cannot say what I think about any religion. No ideas or beliefs should be above criticism or scrutiny.
Cat Eccles (Stourbridge) (Lab)
The hon. Gentleman is making a really impassioned speech. In some ways, I agree with elements of what he is saying; I was involved in extensive discussion with the humanists recently about exactly this issue. A gentleman was prosecuted for burning a Koran, and he just wanted to express his displeasure to the Turkish Government. Does the hon. Gentleman not think it would be preferable to ensure that the law is being adhered to correctly by those who administer it in the courts, rather than trying to bring in an additional law that could damage religious relations in some way?
Nick Timothy
I thank the hon. Lady for her contribution, but the point is that the courts are interpreting the law as they see it. If we in this place believe that interpretation to be wrong, it is our job to correct it through legislation, and I think the appropriate way to do so would be to extend section 29J of the Act in the way I have described.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Jess Phillips)
Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Nick Timothy
I do not know whether the Minister is allowed to intervene, but she would be welcome to do so. [Interruption.] She has been here longer than I have.
Jess Phillips
We did discuss whether or not I was allowed to intervene. I have been involved with cases of harassment and malicious communications involving antisemitism and anti-Jewish hatred. Is the hon. Gentleman suggesting that criticising Jewish people should be allowed?
Nick Timothy
No, I think the Minister has misunderstood my point. Actually, I was about to move on to a related issue, which is that hating people and discriminating against them on the basis that they are Muslims, or indeed members of different religious groups, is already a crime. If someone were harassing Jewish people in the way that the Minister has just described, that would be a criminal offence, even if my amendment passed. However, as I was saying, Islamophobia is a made-up and nonsensical concept that elides the protection of individuals from hatred with the protection of ideas and beliefs, and—in my view—is therefore completely unacceptable in principle.
Shockat Adam (Leicester South) (Ind)
Can I ask the hon. Gentleman what he would like me to tell the family of Mohammed Saleem, the 80-year-old grandfather who was stabbed simply for being a Muslim?
Nick Timothy
That was obviously an appalling crime —I remember it very well—but I do not think it has anything to do with what I am saying in this debate.
In a free and pluralistic society, we have to be free to criticise ideas. There are laws to protect people, but we cannot have laws that protect ideas from scrutiny or criticism. However, the Government are pressing on with their work on Islamophobia. Only this week, on the very day that Baroness Casey said that the rape gangs were often not prosecuted because of the ethnicity of the perpetrators, Ministers launched a consultation on the new Islamophobia definition. That consultation is open only to carefully selected, invited organisations; it will last for only four weeks; and it allows contributors to remain anonymous. In other words, as lots of people have put it to me, it is rigged, and that is completely unacceptable. Parliament repealed blasphemy laws years ago, and trials for blasphemy had stopped many decades back in any case, but they are with us once more. Parliament must act to restore our freedom of expression.
John McDonnell (Hayes and Harlington) (Ind)
Briefly, I would like to express my support for new clause 11. I declare my interest, as I am chair of the RMT parliamentary group and this issue is part of our campaigning, particularly given the rising number of assaults on bus drivers at the moment. I also express my support for new clause 13, and congratulate the hon. Member for Liverpool Riverside (Kim Johnson) on her determined campaign on the joint enterprise initiative. Of course, I also support new clause 50, which deals with the right to protest, and who could not support new clause 122 after the speeches we have heard from Labour Members today?
I want to raise an anomaly that has arisen in debates about terrorism legislation since 2020. I do not want to go into too much technical detail, but basically, section 69(3) of the Sentencing Act 2020 gave the Crown Prosecution Service the power to allege a terrorist connection
“if the offence…(a) is, or takes place in the course of, an act of terrorism, or (b) is committed for the purposes of terrorism.”
The implementation of that legislation meant that if an offence was determined to have a terrorist connection, the sentences became aggravated and harsher restrictions were imposed, both within prison and on release. I believe that had cross-party support—there was no problem with it.
However, in 2021, the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act came along. The powers in the Sentencing Act related to schedule 1 offences such as murder, kidnapping and hijacking—things that we would naturally consider to be terrorism. The Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act extended the use of that definition to an offence that is
“punishable on indictment with imprisonment for more than 2 years”.
By moving away from a schedule of offences, almost any offence before the Crown court meeting that definition was brought into consideration. For example, protest cases involving damages of more than £5,000 became interpreted as terrorist-connected cases.
When we have had discussions about terrorism, we have always had problems with definition. Lord Carlile did a report for us way back in 2007, and he said that jury trial is one of the guards that can assist in protecting us from the misinterpretation of the range of definition. He said that
“jury trial provides an important protection against prosecutions the public find unreasonable or arbitrary.”
The problem is that the use of this section of the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021 does not involve juries. Such things are not brought before a jury; it is applied only by the judge at sentencing.
As a result, we have found that since late 2024, the provisions in the 2021 Act have been deployed for the first time against protesters. Someone who has possibly committed criminal damage, aggravated burglary or, yes, violent disorder in a protest activity now finds themselves with a terrorist connection allegation. That will never be brought before a jury, because it will be applied only at sentencing. Amnesty International has expressed its concern about direct action protests being subject to the UK’s overly broad definition of terrorism laws, which are
“open to misuse and abuse”.
Four UN rapporteurs have expressed their concerns to the Government about the misuse of the terrorism legislation in this instance. They have said that the legislation is being used against political prisoners, which is raising concerns about the potential infringement of their fundamental rights.
I raise that issue here because an increasing number of cases are being trapped by a misinterpretation of the legislation that we brought forward in 2020 and 2021. That is resulting, I think, in injustices and miscarriages of justice, an anomaly which we will have to address at some point if we do not address in this Bill, to correct a crucial misinterpretation of what this House intended back in 2021.
Several hon. Members rose—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
The speaking limit is now reduced to four minutes.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
I will not be able to speak to all the amendments that Members have worked so hard on and that I have supported so many times by putting my name to them, but the Members know that I support them. New clauses 21, 25, 13, 18, 10, 43 and, in particular, new clause 122 are all important proposals that the Government should listen to. I do not support new clause 7 from the official Opposition, and I cannot support new clauses 2 and 3, as I do not believe there is any evidence that those measures would help make sex workers safer. We have to respect evidence and listen to sex workers and their voices on these issues.
Principally, I rise today to speak to my new clauses 26, 27, 109, 30 and 49, and new clause 50 from the hon. Member for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel). First, new clause 26 would require the Home Office to publish quarterly data on antisocial behaviour orders, including the number of times that stop-and-search powers were used prior to such orders being issued and the protected characteristics of individuals who receive those orders. That is important scrutiny to make sure the powers are being exercised fairly.
New clause 27 would enable regulations to vary the ability of police forces to use stop-and-search powers. Specifically, it would require the Government to suspend the use of those powers by any police force subject to Engage status under His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services. If a force has reached the point of requiring formal monitoring due to systemic issues, it is right that the most intrusive and abused police powers are subject to heightened scrutiny or even suspension.
New clause 30 would prohibit the deployment and use of certain forms of “predictive” policing technologies, particularly those that rely on automated decision-making, profiling and artificial intelligence, to assess the likelihood that individuals or groups will commit criminal offences. My hon. Friends will recognise that danger. Such technologies, however cleverly sold, will always need to be built on existing, flawed police data, or data from other flawed and biased public and private sources. That means that communities that have historically been over-policed will be more likely to be identified as being “at risk” of future criminal behaviour. As I have always said in the context of facial recognition, questions of accuracy and bias are not the only reason to be against these technologies. At their heart they infringe human rights, including the right to privacy and the right to be presumed innocent.
Michael Wheeler (Worsley and Eccles) (Lab)
I refer the House to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests, and my membership of the trade union USDAW.
I rise to support new clause 48, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Knowsley (Anneliese Midgley). Before becoming a Member of Parliament, I was proud to campaign for many years alongside retail workers as part of USDAW’s Freedom From Fear campaign, which successfully highlighted the epidemic of abuse and violence faced by retail workers and brought together workers, employers and sectoral bodies. For years there has been consensus outside this place that something needs to be done, but here there has been no consensus. Warm words did not lead to the necessary action from the last Government. The sacrifices made by retail workers during the pandemic were quickly forgotten, and given that the latest figures from USDAW show that one in 10 retail workers and one in eight delivery drivers have been assaulted at work in the past 12 months, it is well past time for us all to remember that these are frontline workers providing a vital service. That is why the introduction of a new stand-alone offence of assaulting a retail worker is so vital and so welcome.
Too many workers have suffered life-changing injuries while simply trying to enforce the law or provide a service. Upholding age-restricted sales is a key part of their role, bringing with it unique challenges. It is not a small responsibility, but a legal duty that often acts as a flashpoint for abuse. Failure to comply carries serious consequences for the worker, including disciplinary action or prosecution. We in this Chamber put that duty on them, we hold them accountable, and we need to give them the protection that they deserve. The new stand-alone offence will provide a clear deterrent, give prosecutors better tools, and send a powerful message to offenders that abuse will not be tolerated.
Rachel Taylor
I thank my hon. Friend for supporting the new clause and for signing it, along with other Members. Does he agree that our hard-working delivery drivers in the freight and logistics sector also need such backing, given that they often face attacks at knifepoint while delivering what our country needs?
Michael Wheeler
I welcome my hon. Friend’s intervention, but I do not need to interrupt my speech, because I am about to deal with exactly that point. New clause 48 would create a specific offence along similar lines to cover delivery workers, which is incredibly welcome. These workers deserve protection just as much as in-store staff. They, too, are required to enforce the law and conduct age checks, and this Bill places additional requirements on them regarding the delivery of knives. But unlike in-store staff, they carry out their work without the safety net of colleagues, security or familiar surroundings. As is the case in Scotland following the passage of the Protection of Workers (Retail and Age-restricted Goods and Services) (Scotland) Act 2021, home delivery drivers must be included. It is only right that delivery workers in England and Wales receive equal protection, which must not stop at the shop door.
We should never underestimate the important contributions of retail workers. They serve our communities, bring essentials to our doors and keep the nation fed. Without them, the country would grind to a halt. New clause 48 provides the opportunity to give retail workers the protection they so obviously deserve, and I urge hon. Members to take that opportunity and to send a clear message from this place that abuse is not part of the job.
Esther McVey
I rise to support new clause 144, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West (Matt Vickers). On Monday, the Government hastily came to the House to deliver yet another U-turn and to announce a national inquiry into rape gangs. It is apparent that this U-turn was forced on them, because whenever any member of the public or Member of Parliament said that they wanted a national inquiry, the response from the Government was that they were “far right”, “jumping on a bandwagon” or even blowing a “dog whistle”—those were the words used by Ministers on the Front Bench.
This was a hasty U-turn. In fact, those on the Government Front Bench were somewhat taken aback, as it appears that the Prime Minister had appointed Baroness Casey of Blackstock in the hope that the whole thing would go away and that the inquiry would not happen. She said that she changed her mind because of the weight of evidence that confronted her. Her words were, “I think I have surprised people in Downing Street and beyond.” She did, and the clincher was that the local inquiries were inadequate, because local authorities could decide whether they were going to commission an inquiry and the Government would not intervene. She also said that of the five local inquiries, only one came forward—that was in Oldham. There was reluctance from local areas to face up to the facts and to accept their failings. Denial ran through absolutely everything.
Denial is like a poisonous thread: it weaves its way through all public bodies, strangles the truth and stops justice coming forward. It is essential that an investigation is held into all the failings of the police, local authorities, prosecutors, charities and political parties. The Prime Minister himself was in denial until Saturday, when the U-turn was forced upon him. He often brandishes his credentials as the former director of public prosecutions, and in 2014 he penned an article for the Guardian in which he acknowledged that there were at least 1,400 victims, but he did nothing until the U-turn was forced upon him.
We need to ask questions about the statutory inquiry, because the public need to know the answers. Who will chair the inquiry? What type of inquiry will it be? It already seems to have been watered down. Will it be independent, a national inquiry or, as it now seems, a national commission? What are the terms of reference? It is not good enough to say that we will hear “in due course”. What are the inquiry’s powers? That is unclear. Will there be judicial powers to subpoena people to give evidence?
Iqbal Mohamed
I welcome the inquiry and the investigation into who was responsible for helping this scourge to continue unabated, but does the right hon. Lady agree that the 20 recommendations of the Jay review urgently need to be implemented and that the inquiry should not delay the implementation of those recommendations?
Esther McVey
The inquiry should not delay that, but the inquiry needs to be done with speed and haste, not be watered down and not brushed under the carpet, because it is essential that the victims’ voices are heard and that they have justice.
The House also needs assurance there will be no exemptions from prosecution in exchange for evidence. It needs to know if witnesses can be compelled to produce documents protected by public interest immunity. When will that happen? It is not good enough that the Home Secretary was saying that it would be three years away, close to a general election. It needs to be done as soon as possible. I also wonder why it will be a statutory inquiry, not a criminal inquiry. Is it because a criminal inquiry can lead to arrest, charges and criminal prosecutions, whereas a statutory inquiry tends to make a series of recommendations to then be acted on? At the end of this inquiry, will we see prosecutions? Will we see deportations?
Time and again, we heard that community cohesion was put above working-class girls. That cannot ever happen again. That issues were not investigated for fear of people being labelled racist cannot ever happen again. If somebody does wrong, the colour of their skin or their religion do not matter: they have done wrong. If they have committed a criminal act it is right that they are brought to justice. This Government will not get away with a watered-down national inquiry. They have been dragged kicking and screaming to deliver a national inquiry. That national inquiry needs to be delivered.
Jacob Collier (Burton and Uttoxeter) (Lab)
I rise to speak in strong support of new clause 122, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for North Warwickshire and Bedworth (Rachel Taylor). I am proud to be the first signatory to it, as I believe it represents a vital step forward in the protection of some of the most marginalised people in our society.
New clause 122 would amend the Crime and Policing Bill to create aggravated offences where the underlying crime is motivated by hostility because of a person’s sexual orientation, transgender identity, disability or perceived identity. It would align the legal treatment of those forms of hate with the framework that already exists for racially and religiously aggravated offences. It delivers on a promise, a promise that we in the Labour party made in our manifesto to the British people: that we would act to close the gap in our hate crime laws and provide equal protection to LGBT+ people and disabled people in the criminal justice system. It is about living up to our values. Labour is the party of equality, fairness before the law and standing with those whose voices have too often been ignored. That is why I joined the Labour party and this amendment is rooted in that tradition.
It is also fitting that we are tabling this new clause in Pride Month and in the wake of the Supreme Court ruling which has caused so much anguish among the trans community. We know the scale of the problem. Hate crimes based on sexual orientation have risen by 112% over the last five years. Against trans people, that figure is 186%. The charity Galop, which supports LGBT+ victims of abuse, saw a 60% increase in referrals in the last year alone. In the year ending March 2024, 11,719 disability hate crime incidents were reported. Shamefully, just 1% of that hate crime involving violence resulted in a charge.
And yet, still, the majority of incidents go unreported. Too many victims still believe the system is not on their side. New clause 122 gives us the opportunity to change that. It would give police and prosecutors a clearer route to charge and convict offenders in a way that truly reflects the nature of these crimes. I know what it means to think twice about how you walk down a street, to pause before holding someone’s hand, and to wonder whether that shout from across the road is something that you can ignore or that you cannot afford to ignore. And I know I am not alone in that. I have spoken to my constituents and to people from far beyond, who tell me they do not feel safe reporting hate when it happens. They do not believe they will be taken seriously. There is a profound failure of trust, one that we in this House have a duty to repair.
This is also about dignity. It is about recognising that, whether you are a trans teenager being punched in a park, a gay couple being spat at on the tube, or a disabled man being harassed on his way to work, all people deserve the full protection of the law. They deserve to know that this country is on their side, and that if they are targeted for who they are, justice will not look the other way. New clause 122 would provide vital protection for disabled people, who remain far too invisible in the public conversation around hate crime despite facing damaging harassment, violence and abuse every single day.
This change is recommended by the Law Commission and supported by Stonewall, Galop and Disability Rights UK. I am proud that it is backed by 104 right hon. and hon. Members across the House. People are simply asking to live their lives in peace and have the right support when things go wrong. I hope we can take a step forward in advancing LGBT+ rights and disability rights today.
Vikki Slade (Mid Dorset and North Poole) (LD)
I am proud to follow the hon. Member for Burton and Uttoxeter (Jacob Collier), who made an incredibly powerful speech.
If people do not feel safe in their neighbourhoods, those neighbourhoods will not thrive; children are denied their independence because parents fear letting them walk to school or play in the park, while businesses suffer from not only the financial impact of shoplifting and worries about the safety of their workers, but the reluctance of customers—especially the elderly—who do not feel safe going out to those shops. When trust between different parts of our community breaks down, the very fabric of our society is weakened. To lead good lives, we all need to feel safe. I therefore welcome the Government’s mission for safer streets and the commitment in their manifesto, which rightly stated:
“Visible neighbourhood policing was the cornerstone of the British consent-based model. In too many areas it has been eroded, leaving the police a reactive service focused on crisis response, rather than preventing crime.”
However, actions speak louder than words.
While the promise of thousands of extra police officers is welcome, the National Police Chiefs’ Council has made clear that the amount
“falls far short of what is required to fund the Government’s ambitions”
and maintain the existing workforce. It fully supports the Government’s drive to cut crime and grow officer numbers, but says that for those goals to succeed,
“investment in policing must live up to the ambition.”
Let me bring this closer to home. Dorset is one of the lowest-funded police forces in the country, and I, too, am sad that the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty) is not present to hear me say that I agree with his concerns about the funding formula. I am pleased that Dorset’s crime levels are lower than in many other areas, and accept that areas that face daily serious crime need the investment. However, our small, semi-rural towns and villages often feel completely forgotten.
In communities across Mid Dorset and North Poole, organised shoplifting is now on the rise. Offenders know the chances of being caught are slim. I welcome the Bill’s inclusion of the offence of assaulting a retail worker on behalf of Michelle, Nicola and Lewis, who have all written to me. One was told by a shoplifter who had been apprehended in her shop,
“I know where you live.”
However, this new offence is meaningless without enough police officers embedded in our neighbourhood. Another retailer told me:
“We have extensive CCTV, headsets, alarm systems, panic buttons and ANPR cameras”
but the individuals involved have no
“respect or fear of police action.”
They realise that the police are not equipped to tackle it, and do not believe the Government think it is “politically important”.
Dorset is home to award-winning beaches, a world heritage coastline and many historic towns and villages. We are less than two hours from London, the home counties and the midlands. Our population swells in the summer, putting huge pressure on police services, yet there is no recognition in police budgets of the need to boost police numbers to reflect the seasonal demand. That is why I support new clauses 85 and 86 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Hazel Grove (Lisa Smart), which would require minimum levels of neighbourhood policing. Towns like Wimborne and Wareham should not have their resources stripped to support larger coastal towns.
I am also proud to support new clause 122, which would make offences aggravated when motivated by hostility towards sexual orientation, transgender identity or disability. We live in an increasingly divided society, and division and hate in the virtual world are fuelling real-world crime. LGBT+ people are four times more likely to experience violence than their straight counterparts; disabled adults are three times more likely to experience domestic abuse; and half of all transgender people have been sexually assaulted at least once in their lifetime.
That is why I cannot support new clause 7, which would remove the recording and retention of non-crime hate incidents. If we stopped recording those incidents, what would I say to my constituent Samreena, who told me:
“I fled domestic violence. I am a practising Muslim and wear a hijab. Since the day I arrived, I have faced…problems because of my religious identity”?
She says that going to parks, taking the bus and going shopping all feels like a “war zone”. We want safe streets and safe homes, but they will be safe only if they are safe for everyone.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)
Order. I intend to start Front-Bench speeches at around 5.25 pm.
Paul Davies (Colne Valley) (Lab)
It is completely unacceptable for anyone to face abuse, harassment or discrimination due to their race, disability, religion or belief, sexual orientation or gender identity. Hate crimes have a profound and lasting impact on their victims, as they target the very essence of who a person is.
In the year ending March 2024, over 26,000 hate crimes based on sexual orientation and nearly 5,000 targeting transgender individuals were recorded in England and Wales. These are not just statistics. These are real people, and they represent real trauma and a systemic failure to protect some of the most marginalised members of our society. We have seen this in my constituency with an appalling homophobic attack on a young man outside a local pub only this April. That is why I strongly support new clause 122, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for North Warwickshire and Bedworth (Rachel Taylor).
The new clause would create statutory aggravated offences for crimes motivated by hostility towards a person’s sexual orientation, transgender identity or disability—or even the perception of these characteristics. It would also extend protection to those targeted because of their association with individuals from these communities. This amendment is a vital step in recognising the specific harm caused by hate-motivated offences. It ensures that perpetrators of such crimes, whether they involve physical violence, harassment or criminal damage, are held fully accountable under law. It sends a clear message that hate has no place in our society, and that the law will reflect that.
While the amendment strengthens the legal framework, we must acknowledge that legislation alone cannot dismantle prejudice. We must go further. First, we must improve reporting mechanisms. Many LGBTQ and disabled individuals do not report hate crimes due to the fear of being dismissed or retraumatised. Police forces must build trust through community engagement and training that reflects the lived experience of those most affected.
Secondly, we must invest in education. Hatred is not innate; it is learned. Schools must be empowered to deliver inclusive curricula that promote empathy, respect and understanding from an early age. Education is our most powerful tool in preventing hate before it takes root.
Thirdly, we must ensure that support services for victims are fully funded and accessible. That includes mental health support, legal aid and safe spaces for those recovering from trauma. Victims must know that they are not alone and that help is available.
My message is clear: everyone has the right to feel safe, and we must collectively adopt a zero-tolerance stance against hate crime. This amendment is not just a legal reform but a moral imperative, and for us it is a manifesto promise. It reflects the values of the Labour party and wider society, which consist of dignity, equality and justice for all. Let us pass this amendment and continue the work of building a country where everyone can live free from fear and hatred.
Madam Deputy Speaker
I call Shockat Adam to make the final Back-Bench speech.
Shockat Adam
I would like to speak briefly to the issue of live facial recognition and new clauses 21 and 22 in my name. New clause 21 calls for a ban on live facial recognition because it is not safe, lacks legal legitimacy and is an attack on the fundamental democratic rights of the British people. It is the choice of authoritarian states and dictators and should have no place in British policing, which I remind the Minister is still by consent.
The technology is not safe. It was described by the Court of Appeal as “novel and controversial”. Academics have shown that the technology makes mistakes in the recognition of darker-skinned women in 21% to 35% of cases, yet 99% of light-skinned men were identified correctly. Caucasian females are also not safe—just ask Danielle Horan, who was escorted out of not one but two Home Bargains stores due to an apparent facial recognition mix-up. It is no wonder that the Court of Appeal, in striking down the south Wales experiment, ruled it a breach of public sector equalities duties in failing to recognise possible bias in the algorithms.
Facial recognition lacks legal legitimacy by operating under vague common law powers, unlike DNA or fingerprints. It is also an attack on hard-won democratic rights, undermining the principle that people should not be forced to identify themselves to police without suspicion. It has been used to monitor protesters, thus deterring lawful participation and threatening free assembly, which are some of our most important and enshrined civil liberties. Just ask the protesters picked up in Russia’s underground train stations or protesters and Uyghurs in China. The Government must think again.
New clause 22 calls for broader safeguards on automated decision making to ensure that law enforcement does not solely rely on AI algorithms and that there is always human review of its use. The new clause also calls for transparency, for the rights of people both to know what information is held about them and to contest decisions made by any AI, and to stop abuse by putting in the necessary checks. Those checks must meet high global standards, recommended by human rights organisations, and the best practice standards of our neighbours in the EU. Without human safeguards, the Government are ushering in a “Minority Report” world—a potential dystopia where the computer simply says no and there is nothing we as individuals can do about it.
Unamended, the Bill is dangerous and intrusive and breaks the fundamental contract between the British people and the police, along with the fundamental right to be considered innocent until proven otherwise. For those who think that that will never happen here, please take a look across the Atlantic. It certainly can happen here. It is time for the Government to admit that they have got this wrong. It is a sign of a strong, not a weak, Government if they listen to the evidence and change course as a result. Live facial recognition is not the answer and will cause more problems than it claims to solve. It needs to go.
Lisa Smart (Hazel Grove) (LD)
Our communities have been plagued by crime and antisocial behaviour for too long. Change is clearly needed after the former Conservative Government failed to get even the basics right on stopping and solving crime. More than 4,500 police community support officers have been taken off the streets since 2015, and more than 2 million crimes went unsolved across England and Wales in 2024. Even though there are many measures that we welcome in this wide-ranging Bill—we have heard some impassioned speeches today and I look forward to voting in favour of some changes—it remains the case that opportunities for the Government to take real action in a number of areas, from cracking down on sewage dumping and rural crime to supporting a real return to proper neighbourhood policing, have not been taken.
I will focus my remarks on the amendments in my name. The previous Conservative Government let water companies get away with pumping sewage into our rivers and on to our beaches for years, creating an environmental crisis and a public health emergency while the companies’ executives handed themselves huge bonuses. This Government have taken some steps in the right direction, but in our opinion, they have not gone nearly far enough. Everyone deserves the right to enjoy clean, safe rivers in their local communities, yet our waterways have been polluted, often with impunity, by water companies that operate under weak regulation and with the complicity of a negligent Conservative Government, who voted time and again throughout the last Parliament against tougher action on sewage dumping.
The scale of the crisis is undeniable. According to the Government’s own data, there were more than 500,000 sewage spills in 2024 alone, releasing 3.6 million hours’ worth of sewage into our rivers and coastal waters. Today, just 14% of rivers and lakes in the UK are in good ecological health, and despite that environmental failure, water company executives pocketed £20 million in pay and bonuses in the 2023-24 financial year. That is a damning reflection of a system that rewards pollution and punishes the public with higher bills and dirtier rivers. In my Hazel Grove constituency, sewage discharges into water bodies last year cumulatively lasted for almost 200 days. At the Otterspool Road outflow alone, sewage flowed into the beautiful River Goyt for more than 1,000 hours.
The Liberal Democrats have pushed, and will continue to push, to hold the companies and their leadership to account. I particularly commend my hon. Friend the Member for Witney (Charlie Maynard) for his efforts in holding Thames Water to account for its failures. Last year, a Liberal Democrat amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill suggested creating an offence of failing to meet pollution performance commitment levels, but it was defeated by the Conservative Government. As we have scrutinised this Bill, it is clear that we are again witnessing a Government that do not go far enough to reform a broken water industry or hold polluters to account. Lib Dems have a plan to do exactly that.
With new clause 87, we would create a new offence of failing to meet pollution commitment levels, while new clause 88 would create senior manager liability for failure to meet those commitment levels. If this Government are serious about ending the national scandal of sewage dumping, they really should stop shielding those responsible and start delivering real accountability.
Luke Taylor
Was my hon. Friend as surprised as I was to hear the contribution from the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty), who seemed to ridicule the concept of having a minimum level of policing for communities, which would surely protect them and help to prevent thefts of farm equipment, which was the example he gave in his speech.
Lisa Smart
I do not know why anybody would be against a minimum level of neighbourhood policing. It was in this Government’s manifesto that they wanted to see a proper restoration of neighbourhood policing. It is the model that has the most trust and the most support from my community—and, I am pretty sure, everybody’s community—and it seems daft, frankly, to oppose such a measure.
Ben Obese-Jecty
At no point did I say that I was against minimum levels of neighbourhood policing. I merely pointed out that the Liberal Democrats’ new clause is simply not good enough in articulating that point. This is where I would encourage the Liberal Democrats to put pressure on the Policing Minister to change the police allocation formula.
Lisa Smart
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for timing his arrival to the Chamber so beautifully—that is a skill. I agree with him about the importance of neighbourhood policing. I also agree that the funding formula should put enough weight behind neighbourhood policing so that all our communities that need that strong neighbourhood policing get it. [Interruption.] I cannot hear the hon. Member for West Suffolk (Nick Timothy), who is speaking from a sedentary position, but I would be delighted to take an intervention.
Nick Timothy
I was inviting the hon. Lady to withdraw what she and her colleague said about my hon. Friend, because it was incorrect.
Lisa Smart
I do not recall mentioning the hon. Member’s hon. Friend; I said that somebody saying that it was incorrect to have minimum levels of neighbourhood policing was daft, and I hold to that belief.
New clauses 83 and 84 relate to rural crime. In rural areas, organised gangs target farm machinery, vehicles and GPS equipment, the cost of which soared to more than £52 million in 2023, according to the National Farmers’ Union. And I heard for myself, when I met local farmers recently, about the impact that organised fly-tipping and equipment theft have. I must applaud the work of my hon. Friend the Member for North Cornwall (Ben Maguire), who has been remarkably effective in pushing the Government on this area. In particular, he secured from the Home Secretary a commitment to establish a new rural and wildlife crime strategy, which of course is welcome. Liberal Democrat new clauses 83 and 84 would extend the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023 to explicitly include the theft of GPS equipment and establish a rural crime taskforce to ensure that the new rural and wildlife crime strategy can be as effective as possible.
Something that is discussed often in this House is a duty of candour, and its introduction is a commitment that I welcome from this Government. Justice must be accessible to all, and survivors should never have their trauma compounded by Governments and courts that fail to uncover the truth and hold those responsible to account—as happened after the Hillsborough disaster. It continues to be deeply disappointing to see how slow this Government have been in implementing a legal duty of candour.
New clause 89 would ensure that police officers must be open and honest in all investigations and oversight processes, sharing relevant information proactively and truthfully. Failure to do so would lead to misconduct charges, including serious consequences for intentional or reckless breaches.
Too many police officers are struggling to access the mental health support they need, with a growing number on mental health leave as a result, so new clause 90 seeks to deal with that issue. We would require every police force to ensure that all police get proper training on how to deal with that.
I will conclude by commending my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells (Mike Martin) on his work on new clause 43. He is dressed in the colours of all parties, representing the cross-party work he has carried out to get support for it. I urge the Government and colleagues across the House to back that new clause and the changes that I have outlined so that our communities get the action they so urgently need.
Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)
I may have said it yesterday, but it cannot be said enough: once again, I pay tribute to the hard work of police officers, PCSOs and police staff across the country. They put themselves in harm’s way every day to keep our streets safe, under immense pressure. I hope that every Member across the House will join me in thanking them for their service.
Yesterday I mentioned the Opposition’s support for many of the measures in the Bill, although given that the vast majority are carried over from the previous Government’s Criminal Justice Bill, it is probably no great surprise. Enforcing the Bill will require resources. I have already outlined concerns about funding for our police forces and the devastating impact that will have on frontline police numbers. I asked that question of the Minister yesterday, and I am not quite sure I heard an answer. Will the Minister confirm whether there will be more police officers at the end of this Parliament than the record high levels achieved by the last Government in March 2024? [Interruption.] Yes, the highest number on record.
I turn to new clause 130, which relates to tool theft, and I declare an interest as the son of a builder.
Matt Vickers
He is not a toolmaker, no.
Tool theft is completely out of control, and I know the impact it has on people’s lives. Research from Direct Line shows that 45,000 tool thefts were reported to the police in a single year, amounting to one every 12 minutes. This country is built on the back of our tradesmen—they are the small businesses that make a huge contribution to our economy and literally build the world around us. Just imagine getting up at daft o’clock to go to work and earn a living, leaving the house only to find your van has been completely raided and all the tools stolen. The ability to work is stolen as well. The impact is huge: it is not only the cost of replacing the stolen tools, but days of lost work and disappointed customers, many of whom may have taken a day off work themselves. The issue is made worse still when tradesmen go to car boot sales only to see stolen equipment being sold in broad daylight, with no action taken by the authorities.
In recent months I have been campaigning alongside tradesmen for real action on this issue. Just last week the Leader of the Opposition and my hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr French) met tradesmen, businesses and the police to hear at first hand about the impact. We heard from campaigners, including the gas expert Shoaib Awan and Frankie from On The Tools, alongside affected businesses such as Checkatrade, Balfour Beatty and BT Openreach.
Tom Hayes (Bournemouth East) (Lab)
If the Conservatives had won a 15th year in government, would they have started to tackle this epidemic?
Matt Vickers
One of the things we were doing was putting record funding into policing and putting a record number of police on the streets. The one thing we were not doing was taxing our police forces off the streets. We were making huge progress.
I would also like to mention Sergeant Dave Catlow of the Metropolitan police, who joined us last week. He is doing great work on this issue.
New clause 130 proposes three key changes. First, fines for perpetrators would equate to the cost of replacing equipment, repairing the damage caused and the loss of work. Secondly, theft of tools would be treated as an aggravated offence, meaning tougher sentences for the crooks who steal tradesmen’s vital equipment. Finally, councils would be required to put in place an enforcement plan to crack down on the sale of stolen tools at car boot sales.
I will also take this opportunity to pay tribute to the hon. Member for Portsmouth North (Amanda Martin) for her campaigning on this issue. I know how much she, too, wants to see action on tool theft. As the Minister knows, my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Buckinghamshire (Greg Smith) brought the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023 through the House. It could make a real difference on this issue. Will the Minister confirm when the Government will table a statutory instrument to put it into action?
I turn to non-crime hate incidents. New clause 7 would change legislation and guidance to remove the recording and retention of non-crime hate incidents. The use of non-crime hate incidents has spiralled out of all control and well beyond its originally intended purpose. The deal should be simple: if the law is broken, justice must be served. But non-crime hate incidents are a different beast—you did not break the law; you just said something daft and ended up logged on police records like a criminal. We need our police on the streets, not policing hurty words on Twitter. We have all seen the utterly barmy story of a nine-year-old who insulted another pupil in the playground. Is that unkind? Yes, of course it is. But instead of a quiet word with a teacher or a call to the parents, the police were brought in. I appeal to Members across the House—would they want that happening to their child, or would they rather give them a proper telling-off at home?
This also has a bigger effect. Our police officers are being tied up documenting playground spats and Twitter comments, treating childish jibes like national security threats, while real crimes such as burglary, robbery and even violent offences are being pushed to the back of the queue. In fact, research from Policy Exchange has found that, nationally, over 60,000 police hours are being spent on non-crime hate incidents. Our police need to get back to keeping our streets safe, not policing silly words or childish playground issues.
Before concluding my remarks, I would like to draw the House’s attention to some of the Opposition’s other amendment that could protect our communities and keep our streets safe. We would have been voting today on new clause 144 to secure that national statutory inquiry into grooming gangs—a scandal that is our country’s shame. Child sexual exploitation ruins lives; preying on the most vulnerable in our communities, exploiting them for horrific sexual acts and often coercing them into a life of crime. A national inquiry is what the victims wanted, so I am glad that the Prime Minister has finally U-turned, given into the pressure and joined what he described as the far-right bandwagon of people who wanted a national inquiry.
As the Leader of the Opposition said yesterday, we must not have another whitewash. The national inquiry must ask the hard questions and leave no stone unturned. Criminal investigations must run in parallel to the inquiry. It must look at the whole system—Whitehall, the Crown Prosecution Service, the police and local authorities—and wherever there is wrongdoing, there should be prosecutions. Foreign perpetrators must be immediately deported, and the inquiry must be fully independent, with statutory powers covering all relevant towns. Local councils simply cannot be left to investigate themselves.
New clause 125 aims to reinstate people’s confidence in policing. We have recently seen the perverse anti-racism commitment issued by the National Police Chiefs’ Council. It calls for arrest rates to be artificially engineered to be the same across racial groups. Advice to treat black and white suspects differently is morally indefensible. It is, by definition, two-tier policing. It undermines trust and confidence in our police. This new clause would give the Home Secretary the power to amend or require the withdrawal of any code of practice intended to direct policing practices.
New clause 139 makes provisions in relation to off-road bikes. I know many Members across the House know the havoc being caused by them in local communities. The issue has been raised by Members on both sides of the House numerous times in Westminster Hall and in this place, and the tweak in approach that features in this Bill will simply not be enough. Using alternative legislation, the police are already able to seize off-road bikes without notice. The new clause would remove the prohibition on the police entering a private dwelling to confiscate an off-road bike and ensure that police destroyed seized bikes rather than selling them back into the market. I urge the Minister—in fact, I beg her—to look again comprehensively at how we tackle the scourge of off-road bikes.
I would also like to draw the House’s attention to new clause 131, which would introduce mandatory deportation for foreign nationals found in possession of child sexual abuse images. These sick paedophiles have no place in our country and they, along with all foreign offenders, should be deported.
To conclude, the British people want our police to be able to focus on putting real criminals behind bars—the thieves who nick our hard-working tradesmen’s tools—not spending time policing playground squabbles and treating them like crimes. Our Opposition new clauses are common-sense changes that I hope the whole House will get behind, protecting victims and restoring policing to what it is meant to be: tackling crime on our streets.
The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)
I thank all hon. and right hon. Members, including the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, the right hon. Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Dame Karen Bradley), and the Chair of the Justice Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith and Chiswick (Andy Slaughter) who have taken part in the debate, and in particular those who have brought forward new clauses. There are well over 100 new clauses in this group, so I am sure the House will appreciate that, sadly, I will not be able to cover them all. I will do my best in the time remaining to respond to as many as I can.
Amanda Martin
I thank the Minister for acknowledging how tool theft affects people’s lives. Does she agree that this is not just about police on our streets and arrests, but about sentencing, and will she work with me, across Departments, to ensure that the aggravated circumstances powers that the courts already have reflect the real cost of such crime?
Dame Diana Johnson
Yes, I am very happy to do that. I congratulate my hon. Friend on taking this campaign forward and on being such a worthy advocate for it. We take the issue very seriously and we are fully committed to implementing the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023. We are finalising our plans for commencement and we will update the House in due course.
Dame Diana Johnson
I am going to keep going, because I am conscious that I do not have much time.
To reiterate to the shadow Minister what I said in Committee, my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has been clear that a consistent and common-sense approach must be taken with non-crime hate incidents. Accordingly, it has been agreed with the National Police Chiefs’ Council and the College of Policing that they will conduct a review of this area. I say to the shadow Minister that it was the shadow Home Secretary, when he was the Policing Minister, who introduced the current code of practice and police guidance on non-crime hate incidents. He said:
“The Government fully recognises the importance of ensuring that vulnerable individuals, groups and communities continue to be protected by the police; indeed, this is the purpose of non-crime hate incident recording. We are confident that the code does precisely this.”
It seems odd that he said that the approach was right at that stage, but now he wants to scrap it.
On new clause 144, I was disappointed that the right hon. Member for Tatton (Esther McVey) seemed to have missed the announcement made by the Home Secretary on Monday, which answered a number of her questions. The shadow Minister did not seem to be aware of the announcement either. Using existing legislation in the Inquiries Act 2005, the independent commission will be set up under a national inquiry with full powers to compel individuals to testify, with the aim of holding institutions to account for current and historic failures in their response to group-based child sexual exploitation. The Home Secretary was clear that she is accepting all the recommendations from Baroness Casey.
Dame Diana Johnson
No, I am going to carry on.
The hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Lisa Smart) mentioned new clauses 87 and 88. This Government have been clear that water companies must accelerate action to reduce pollution to the environment. The Water (Special Measures) Act, which received Royal Assent earlier this year, significantly strengthens the power of the regulators and delivers on the Government’s commitment to put failing water companies under special measures. Among other measures, the Act introduced automatic penalties on polluters and banned bonuses for water company executives if they fail to meet adequate standards.
Dame Diana Johnson
No.
On new clauses 85 and 86 about neighbourhood policing, it is clear that this Government are starting to implement our neighbourhood policing guarantee.
On new clause 13, introduced by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Riverside (Kim Johnson), the Government recognise the serious consequences that can result from joint enterprise convictions. However, joint enterprise ensures that those who act together in committing a crime are all held responsible. We saw that in the cases of Ben Kinsella and Garry Newlove, as well as many others. We are aware of the concerns raised by my hon. Friend and we will continue to look at that.
I apologise to right hon. and hon. Members for not being able to get through all 100 amendments that were tabled. I also need to leave time for the person whose new clause leads the group to respond.
Tonia Antoniazzi
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the new clause.
New clause 2, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 7
Abolition of non-crime hate incidents
“(1) Non-crime hate incidents as a special category of incident to be recognised by police authorities are abolished. Reporting, recording and investigation of such incidents should occur only in the limited circumstances provided for in this section.
(2) For the purposes of Article 6(1) of the UK GDPR, section 35 of the Data Protection Act 2018 (“the Act”) and Article 8 of the Law Enforcement Directive, the processing of relevant data by a police authority is unlawful.
(3) In this section, “relevant data” means personal data relating to the conduct or alleged of a data subject which is unlikely to constitute criminal conduct and which has been perceived by another person to be motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility or prejudice towards one or more persons who have or who are or have been perceived to have one or more relevant characteristics and with that hostility or prejudice arising due to that or the perception of those protected characteristics.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (3), the following are relevant characteristics—
(a) race,
(b) religion,
(c) sexual orientation,
(d) disability,
(e) transgender identity.
(5) Subsection (2) does not apply in respect of the processing of relevant data—
(a) pursuant to an ongoing criminal investigation or prosecution,
(b) for the purposes of the internal administrative functions of the police authority.
(6) Subsection (2) does not apply in respect of the retention of a record (a “non-crime perception record”) of relevant data where a police officer (the “certifying officer”) of the rank of inspector or above certifies that in their opinion the retention of the non-crime perception record is likely materially to assist in the detection or prevention of criminal conduct which may occur in the future.
(7) Where a certifying officer certifies the retention of a non-crime perception record pursuant to subsection (6)—
(a) the certifying officer must include in the record a description of the future criminal conduct they have in mind and the reasons they believe that the retention of the record may assist in its detection or prevention,
(b) the relevant data which may be retained as part of the record may be no more than the certifying officer believes is likely materially to assist in the detection or prevention of criminal conduct,
(c) a copy of the record must be expeditiously provided to the data subject unless an officer of the of the rank of superintendent or above certifies that—
(i) the provision of the record to the data subject may interfere in the detection or prevention of criminal conduct, or
(ii) the officer is satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable to provide a copy of the record to the data subject.
(8) If the data subject objects to the retention of the non-crime perception record, subsection (6) does not apply unless a police officer of the rank of superintendent or above certifies that in their opinion the retention of the non-crime perception record is likely materially to assist in the detection or prevention of criminal conduct which may occur in the future.
(9) No police authority or police officer can be held under any circumstances to be under any duty to undertake the retention of any relevant data.
(10) After subsection 113B(3) of the Police Act 1997 insert—
“(3A) An enhanced criminal record certificate must not give the details of a relevant matter to the extent that doing so would result in the disclosure of relevant data as defined in section (The retention by the police of non-crime perception records) of the Crime and Policing Act 2025.”
(11) For subsection 39A(3) of the Police Act 1996 substitute—
“(3) No part of any Code of Practice issued by the College of Policing may be in a form which could be issued by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 60 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022.”
(12) Section 60 the 2022 Act is to be amended as follows—
(a) the cross heading to be changed to “Non-crime perception records”,
(b) the section heading to be changed to “Code of practice relating to non-crime perception records”,
(c) in subsection (1) leave out from “by” to the end of the subsection and insert “of relevant data”,
(d) omit subsection (2),
(e) in subsection (3)(a), leave out “personal data relating to a hate incident” and insert “relevant data”,
(f) in subsections (3)(b), (c), (d) and (e), for “such personal data” substitute “relevant data”,
(g) in subsection (4)(a), for “personal data” substitute “relevant data”,
(h) in subsection (4)(b), leave out “personal data relating to the alleged perpetrator of a hate incident” and insert “relevant data relating to the alleged perpetrator”,
(i) in subsection (7), at end, insert “relevant data” has the meaning given by section (The retention by the police of non-crime perception records) of the Crime and Policing Act 2025”.
(13) Any code of practice previously issued under section 60 of the 2022 Act is deemed to be withdrawn.
(14) Within three months of the commencement of each calendar year, each police authority which is retaining non-crime perception records must—
(a) undertake a review of the relevant data by an independent person to ensure that any retention of such records is in compliance with the provisions of this section.
(b) publish a report in respect of the review prepared by the independent person including setting—
(i) the total number of non-crime perception records retained by the police authority;
(ii) the total number of data subject to which those records relate; and
(iii) the equivalent numbers of those records added in the previous year.
(15) In this section—
(a) “a police authority” means—
(i) a person specified or described in paragraphs 5 to 17 of Schedule 7 of the Act,
(ii) a person acting under the authority of such a person,
(b) the terms “data subject”, “processing” and “the UK GDPR” have the same meanings as under section 3 of the Act,
(c) “the Law Enforcement Directive” means the Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament,
(d) “the 2022 Act” means the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022.”—(Matt Vickers.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Crime and Policing Bill
Thursday 19th June 2025
(10 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 18 June 2025 - (18 Jun 2025)
Crime and Policing Bill
Thursday 16th October 2025
(6 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 18 June 2025 - (18 Jun 2025)
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, I do not want to disappoint anybody, but I am not my noble friend Lord Hanson of Flint; it would not be a very convincing impersonation, not least because he is sitting next to me. Noble Lords will all have the pleasure of hearing from him later on.
This Bill reflects not only our manifesto commitments but demonstrates the careful stocktake we have made of the important parts of our criminal justice system and our determination to improve the law where needed. It aims to keep citizens safer and more confident in the daily lives of all of us and I am proud of our proposals. They are fair, proportionate and add to the law where needed.
As part of the Bill’s driving force, which is to make people and communities safer, it will build on what we have done already in the past year to rebuild neighbourhood policing. We are restoring public trust in the criminal justice system through the delivery of our safer streets mission and aim to halve—yes, halve—knife crime and violence against women and girls in a decade.
For too long, neighbourhood policing has been neglected and downgraded. That has ended. We are already delivering on our commitments, with 13,000 additional neighbourhood policing personnel by the end of the Parliament, backed by £200 million in new funding this year. Alongside this investment, the Bill brings in new respect orders to tackle persistent offenders who engage in the anti-social behaviour that blights our town centres. There are also enhanced powers to tackle the anti-social use of cars and off-road bikes. The police will now be able to seize these without first having to give a warning.
Everyone should feel safe when they are at work. This Bill delivers stronger action to protect shop workers. Assaulting a shop worker will be a bespoke criminal offence with a presumption that the courts will, on conviction, impose a criminal behaviour order on offenders. We are also repealing the provision that treats low-value shop theft as a minor offence. Shoplifting is not minor, and we are sending a clear message that all shop theft should be taken seriously. I know both these measures will be particularly welcomed by the Justice and Home Affairs Committee.
Part 2 of the Bill brings in Ronan’s law. We are clamping down on dangerous knives and weapons on our streets by introducing a duty on retailers to report bulk sales of knives and offensive weapons, increasing the maximum penalty for offences relating to the sale of knives to children and strengthening the age-verification requirements for the online sale and delivery of bladed products and crossbows. We are also delivering on our manifesto commitment to hold senior managers of online platforms personally liable for failure to take action to remove illegal content relating to knives and offensive weapons.
I turn now to violence against women and children. The prevalence of violence and abuse against women and children defiles our society. We need more effective enforcement action against perpetrators and better protection for victims. To this end, the Bill strengthens stalking protection orders and the management of registered sex offenders, including preventing them changing their names on official identity documents where they pose a risk of sexual harm.
The Bill also creates a new offence of administering a harmful substance, including by spiking, to make it absolutely clear that such behaviour is illegal and encourage victims to report such incidents.
Recognising how dangerous online material is in perpetuating the growing epidemic of violence against women and girls, we will bring forward amendments in your Lordships’ House to criminalise pornography that depicts acts of strangulation and suffocation. I take this opportunity to pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, for her tireless work culminating in the pornography review which recommended that action be taken in this area.
Child sexual abuse and exploitation are among the most despicable crimes imaginable. It is estimated that half a million children every year experience some form of child sexual abuse. Alongside the new national inquiry recommended by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, we are pleased to be pressing ahead with the implementation of some of the key recommendations of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse.
As a result, the Bill creates a new duty to report child sexual abuse, backed up by strong criminal sanctions for those who seek to cover up such abuse by preventing or deterring a person from carrying out the duty. It makes grooming a statutory aggravating factor when sentencing and removes the three-year time limit for civil personal injury claims brought by victims and survivors of child sexual abuse.
Part 5 of the Bill also helps to tackle the rising levels of online child sexual abuse. In particular, the Bill provides for new criminal offences to stop—and we mean stop—AI-facilitated child sexual abuse and hold accountable those who commit or enable these vile crimes. I commend the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for her earlier advocacy of the new child sexual abuse image-generator offence.
The Bill also provides enhanced protections for children and vulnerable adults against their exploitation for criminal purposes. First, it provides for a new offence of child criminal exploitation, where an adult intentionally uses a child to commit criminal activity. To complement this new offence, the Bill also provides for child criminal exploitation prevention orders to help prevent the criminal exploitation of children occurring. Secondly, the Bill introduces a new offence to tackle the practice of cuckooing, where criminals take over the home of a vulnerable person for the purpose of illegal activity, such as drug dealing. Thirdly, the Bill creates a new offence to combat coerced internal concealment, or plugging, where children or vulnerable adults are coerced into concealing drugs or other items in their body for criminal purposes, typically as part of a county lines operation.
We also recognise how dangerous online material is in perpetuating the growing epidemic of violence against women and girls. We committed in the other place to criminalising pornography that depicts acts of strangulation and suffocation in this Bill, and we will shortly bring forward an amendment to that effect.
I turn now to children who are victims of child sexual abuse. As noble Lords will be aware, 10 years ago the Street Offences Act 1959 was amended so that the offences of persistent loitering or soliciting in a public place for the purposes of prostitution no longer applied to children. Parliament was right to do that because it recognised that children, because they are children, involved in such conduct are not criminals but the victims of sexual exploitation. I am pleased to say that we will bring forward amendments in this House to introduce a new disregards and pardons scheme for anyone convicted or cautioned as a child for these offences.
I now turn to policing. We will address the need to rebuild trust in policing. In some serious and worrying cases, public confidence has been undermined by atrocious criminality and misconduct by a very small minority of officers. Deterrence and punishment of such misconduct is a priority for this Government, as it is for the police. A key strand of the Government’s safer streets mission is to increase public confidence in policing and the wider criminal justice system.
Since 2017, the College of Policing has operated a police barred list—an advisory list which ensure that those officers who are dismissed by a police force in England and Wales are prevented from just joining another force. Such individuals have no place in policing. The Bill extends this approach, ensuring that officers dismissed at disciplinary proceedings from the National Crime Agency and other specialist police forces cannot be re-employed by another force.
It is vital that the system of police accountability commands the confidence of both the public and the police. As a society we rely on the professionalism and bravery of firearms officers who put their own lives at risk to keep us all safe. Thankfully, the occasions where the police have to use lethal force in this country are few and far between. When they do so, it is entirely right that officers are accountable for their actions. But those accountability arrangements must be proportionate, timely and fair to all concerned. Regrettably, this is not currently the case. Measures proposed in the Bill will improve the timeliness and appropriateness of investigations by the Independent Office for Police Conduct and the rights of victims. That said, if firearms officers are charged with offences relating to and committed during their duties, the Bill will protect them from violent reprisals by establishing a presumption of anonymity in criminal proceedings up to the point of sentence.
The public rightly want to see crimes solved and offenders brought to justice. To do this, the police must have the necessary tools to do their job. If someone has their mobile phone stolen and the victim can trace its whereabouts, the Bill ensures that the police have the powers to enter premises quickly and, if necessary, without a warrant, to recover electronically tracked stolen goods.
It is also vital that police powers keep in step with the march of technology in other respects. Evidence of criminality is no longer routinely stored on a computer hard drive; it is instead held remotely in the cloud. The Bill clarifies the circumstances in which law enforcement agencies can access such information, subject to strong safeguards, as they investigate offences ranging from child sexual abuse to fraud and terrorism, thereby protecting the public and our borders.
The Bill also ensures that law enforcement agencies have the necessary powers to combat other forms of technology-enabled crime. We are banning the possession and supply of SIM farms, save where there are legitimate uses such as in broadcasting. We are giving the police and others the power to suspend IP addresses and domain names used to commit fraud or other serious crimes, such as the so-called pimping websites involved in commercial sexual exploitation.
I turn to protests. The right to peaceful protest is fundamental to our vibrant democracy, but in facilitating peaceful protest, the police also have a duty to uphold the rights of others not to be harassed or intimidated and to go about their daily lives without serious disruption. The Bill ensures that the police have the powers they need to protect places of worship from intimidatory protests and protects specified war and other memorials, including the Cenotaph and the statue of Winston Churchill in Parliament Square, that have been the target of protest action. A new targeted offence of concealing identity at designated protests will strengthen police powers to require the removal of face coverings at protests where violence or other criminality either has occurred or is likely to occur.
The precious right to engage in peaceful protest and the equally precious entitlement to freedom of speech do not extend to threatening or abusing others, all the more so where those threatened or abused are emergency workers. The law already recognises that racially or religiously motivated threats and abuse should attract tougher penalties, but these currently do not apply where the behaviour takes place in a person’s private home. When the police, firefighters and ambulance staff attend someone’s home— for example, in response to a 999 call—they have no choice but to remain and to act. The Bill closes the loophole in the law so that anyone who threatens or abuses an emergency worker because of their race or religion within a private dwelling will be liable for the higher maximum penalties such hate crimes would attract where the conduct took place in a public place.
I now turn to counterterrorism. We must also make sure that counterterrorism powers reflect evolving threats, ensuring that operational partners have the tools they need to keep the public safe. Part 14 of the Bill delivers on several recommendations made by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall KC. He has identified the need for a new diversion order in response to the increasing number of young people who are the subject of counterterrorism investigations. The youth diversion order provided for in Part 14 will be a new civil order that will enable the police to intervene earlier to prevent young people engaging in terrorism and divert them from the criminal justice system.
Finally, in addition to the three new measures that the Government will seek to add to the Bill to which I have already referred, we will table amendments to apply various further provisions in the Bill to Scotland and/or Northern Ireland. These amendments are being brought forward at the request of the Scottish Government and the relevant Northern Ireland departments.
This Government were elected to deliver change: change that will reverse the decline in neighbourhood policing; change that will tackle the epidemic of violence against women and girls and the epidemic of knife crime. The Bill will help deliver that change by cracking down on anti-social behaviour, making our town centres safer, building trust in the police, clearing our streets of knives, protecting our children from sexual abuse, criminal exploitation and online harms, and safeguarding women and girls from stalkers and sexual predators. These are the purposes behind this Bill. I beg to move.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to open this debate on behalf of His Majesty’s Official Opposition. It will come as no surprise to noble Lords on the Government Front Bench that we on these Benches broadly support the Bill, because large parts of it are a copy-and-paste job from the previous Conservative Government’s Criminal Justice Bill. From the provisions on anti-social behaviour to the new offence of cuckooing, the duty to report child sexual abuse and the new protest and public order offences, this Government are continuing the work we were doing to strengthen the criminal justice system. This is, of course, very welcome, but it does not mean that all is plain sailing.
The feeling among the British public is that crime has been increasing, even though overall rates of crime have fallen since 2010. The Crime Survey for England and Wales for the year ending March 2025 shows that there were 9.4 million incidents of headline crime. Although this represents a 7% rise from the previous year, the ONS states that this is due entirely to a 31% increase in fraud.
Undoubtedly, a significant factor in this overall feeling of pessimism is the increase in more visible crimes that impact people’s daily lives. Shoplifting, phone theft, graffiti, vandalism, fare evasion and drug use are highly visible crimes that leave people feeling unsafe in their daily lives. Shoplifting, for example, has risen by 20% in the year from 2024 to 2025.
The National Police Chiefs’ Council has pointed to an estimated £1.2 billion shortfall in police funding. The chair of the NPCC has said that the funding settlement in the spending review will “cover little more” than police pay rises. Chief Constable Paul Sanford has warned that the Government will find it “incredibly difficult” to meet their neighbourhood policing pledge with the funding settlement. The Metropolitan Police has already announced that it will have to cut 1,700 staff, scrap its dedicated anti-social behaviour officers and close down half of the front desks in stations across London.
This strikes at the heart of a wider principle. Is this Crime and Policing Bill, which runs to over 200 clauses and over 20 schedules, actually going to reduce crime on the streets of this country? In some ways, it might, but in many others, unless coupled with serious improvements in enforcement and police action, it may very well not.
To turn to the Bill, the Government have committed three crimes of commission and two crimes of omission. I will start with the crimes of omission. The Government’s 2024 election manifesto promised to introduce new respect orders with the aim to
“stamp out issues such as public drinking and drug use”.
The Government come armed with a noble cause, but all it takes is to scratch just below the surface to see that these respect orders are little more than smoke and mirrors.
The Bill inserts a new part before Part 1 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, creating respect orders. It then converts what are currently anti-social behaviour injunctions into youth injunctions. Rather than giving the police, local authorities and the courts tough new powers to tackle anti-social behaviour, as the Government claim, they are instead simply renaming the currently existing injunctions and creating new orders that are the same in all but the name.
The anti-social behaviour injunctions were introduced as part of my noble friend Lady May of Maidenhead’s efforts to streamline the powers available to authorities to deal with criminal and challenging behaviour. As she noted at that Bill’s Second Reading, under the previous Labour Government, over nine anti-social behaviour laws were passed, creating 19 separate powers. The Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 consolidated those into six powers. That had a purpose. I cannot see what this Government’s new respect orders will add to this arsenal.
Secondly, on the repeal of Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, this provision states that shoplifting of goods with a value of less than £200 is to be tried only summarily in a magistrates’ court. There has been much misinformation about this provision, which was brought forward by the last Conservative Government. The Labour manifesto called this an “effective immunity” for some shoplifting—a line that has been parroted by Labour Ministers ever since. However, the Government’s policy paper on the Bill, published on GOV.UK, calls it “perceived immunity”, and I think that sums up the bizarre nature of the criticism.
I want to be absolutely clear: anyone claiming that trying low-value shoplifting in a magistrates’ court is granting criminals immunity is wrong and misleading the public. There is absolutely no reason why theft under £200 cannot be tried summarily. I need not remind the House, full of eminent lawyers as it is, that a person can still be sentenced to up to six months’ imprisonment and issued with a fine if found guilty in a summary trial. Six months’ imprisonment is clearly not immunity.
What this does is clear the already clogged-up Crown Court and let the police prosecute more serious cases. That does not mean that thefts under £200 from shops do not impact on shopkeepers, or that they should not be investigated, but there is nothing wrong with having a bit more summary justice in this country. It permits cases to be tried and discharged more quickly and efficiently, rather risking long and drawn-out Crown Court cases that last for months if not years. If the police are not investigating such offences, that is an issue with the operation of policing, not the law.
Clauses 107 and 108 were inserted into the Bill on Report in the other place and, as such, have not had as much scrutiny, perhaps, as they ought to. The 11th report of the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House has drawn attention to these clauses for the uncertain scope of the new offences and the use of highly subjective terminology.
Clause 107 creates the new offence of using threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour towards an emergency worker that are racially or religiously hostile. Clause 108 creates the offence of using threatening or abusive words or behaviour that are likely to cause an emergency worker harassment, alarm or distress. These offences are very similar to the existing offences under Section 4A and 5 of the Public Order Act 1986. The key difference is that these new offences can be committed in a private dwelling, whereas those in the Public Order Act cannot. It is understandable why the Government might wish to press ahead with these new offences—we all wish to see our emergency workers protected—but it is far from certain that creating two new speech-related offences will offer emergency workers any greater protection in reality.
Clause 107 involves the criminalisation of insults and Clause 108 uses the term “distress”. Both are highly subjective, thereby leaving people open to prosecution on undefined terms. We already know that this an acute problem in this country. There exists a litany of cases where people have been arrested and prosecuted for speech offences. The continual misuse of non-crime hate incidents, and the probably irresponsible policing of tweets and online comments, have had a chilling effect on free speech. If anything, we should be reviewing and removing barriers to freedom of expression and speech, not expanding those limitations. I therefore echo the comments of the Constitution Committee in relation to Clauses 107 and 108 and call on the Government to heed its advice that these clauses should be drawn far more narrowly.
I am sure much of the debate on the Bill will comprise what noble Lords deem to be omissions and missed opportunities. I have time to mention only a few of those, but I give notice to the Minister that in Committee I will be raising many more. Given that this Bill, in many ways, mirrors the previous Government’s Criminal Justice Bill, it was surprising to see there has been no inclusion—bar two clauses—of the measures to end and replace the Vagancy Act. The previous Government planned to repeal the Act and replace it with a new framework around nuisance begging and rough sleeping. If the Government are to commence the repeal of the Vagrancy Act, but not institute further powers to replace it, there may be a gap in the law. I would appreciate it if the Minister could perhaps comment on why the Government have not included these measures in the Bill.
Furthermore, the Bill does not include the previous Government’s plans to impose tougher penalties on those convicted of shoplifting offences on more than three occasions. Those provisions would require the court to impose a community order, including a curfew, exclusion or electronic whereabouts monitoring condition, or a combination of such conditions. Given the Government’s tough talk on bearing down on retail crime, it is more than a little confusing why they have not included such measures in the Bill.
I will end where I began: criminal justice is not simply about laws this Parliament passes. We can continually create new criminal offences and we can pass as many new laws as we like, but until we get to grips with the enforcement of those laws, we will never tackle the scourge of criminality. The Government have been talking tough on crime, but this must now be met with corresponding action.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her introduction and I am grateful to the many organisations that have provided briefings. In too many areas of crime and policing, we are failing the people who most need protection: children and vulnerable adults exposed to predators, shopkeepers bearing the cost of unchecked theft, farmers shouldering the consequences of criminals stealing expensive farm equipment to order, and traumatised women who hesitate to report assaults, fearing that the justice system will only compound their suffering.
Much of this comes down to resources. Although the Minister often states that Labour is investing an extra £1.2 billion in policing this year, the reality is that little of this will reach front-line services. The National Police Chiefs’ Council notes that a quarter of this sum will be returned to the Treasury through increased employer national insurance, with the rest already committed to fund pay awards and service debt. A decade of underfunding has forced police to borrow just to maintain their dilapidated buildings and antiquated IT. Already, gaps in children’s services, mental health and social care force police into roles they are ill-equipped to fill.
In scrutinising this Bill, we have to ensure that we do not set the police up to fail. Take drug testing: the Bill expands the range of triggers for police to be able to test someone for drugs but makes no provision at all for more drug testing centres or forensic resource. That must change because drugs are deeply intertwined with serious violence and linked to more than half of all homicides. Drug-related deaths have doubled since 2012, and about 70% of thefts and cases of domestic violence are driven by addiction. Yet more than 27,000 suspected drug suppliers remain on bail or under investigation, largely because we lack enough trained forensic specialists. If these delays, and the patchy availability of treatment programmes, are not addressed, the measures in the Bill will become irrelevant.
In a similar vein, there are a number of provisions in the Bill that are welcome in principle but need careful scrutiny in practice. Among those are new offences—such as assaulting retail workers and the proposed respect orders—which, while well-intentioned, risk duplicating existing laws and further straining a justice system already operating way beyond capacity.
Liberal Democrats have long argued that neighbourhood policing is the most effective way to address these problems before they take root. The role of local beat officers is crucial: they know where the domestic abusers live, where kids are left home alone, and where the drug dens operate. Effective neighbourhood policing depends on familiarity, consistency and trust—qualities that can only be built over time. We cannot keep parachuting in new officers and expect these relationships to flourish. That is why we have proposed legal minimum resourcing to ensure that neighbourhood policing teams are maintained at the level necessary to sustain long relationships and a sense of safety among communities.
That sense of safety is especially important for young people. At the moment, one in three young people reports that they do not feel safe in their communities. The dangerous and often tragic result is that they carry weapons. We therefore back proposals to tighten the rules around the online sale and delivery of weapons and we will bring forward amendments to give legislative life to even more of the Clayman review’s recommendations.
Turning to police and criminal justice reform, very few people realise that 90%—yes, 90%—of crime is now digitally enabled. That means that chief constables must be given the flexibility to decide the right mix of traditional police officers and specialist staff needed in their forces, because digital skill is very often now more highly valued than physical prowess, and recruitment should reflect that.
Meanwhile, training has to move with the times. One-third of all police officers now have under five years’ experience, but inspection after inspection exposes serious flaws in the training provided. Poor professional development, combined with infrequent updates on new laws and procedures, means that many front-line officers have outdated skills, leading to uneven standards and a workforce that lacks confidence to use its powers. With 94% of reported offences unresolved, new laws mean little if officers are not equipped to enforce them, so we will push for the first national review of police training since 2018.
However, reforming policing alone is like fixing a lock on a door that is completely rotten. It simply beggars belief that at the end of March 2025 there were 310,000 cases outstanding in magistrates’ courts; that serious offences such as rape are taking more than two years to come to trial, with offenders back out on the streets on bail, tormenting their victims; and that perpetrators who are convicted of crimes often pass through prisons without any kind of rehabilitation.
I shall highlight some serious concerns on civil liberties. In Clause 138, the move to give police automatic access to driving licence data for any law enforcement purpose, not just driving offences, marks a major expansion from current practice. The Home Secretary need only consult police, with no full parliamentary oversight, when drafting these regulations. While the Bill does not mention facial recognition, and Ministers say that there are no plans to use DVLA data this way, the National Police Chiefs’ Council, in a written submission to the Home Affairs Committee, stated that police chiefs are seeking access to the DVLA database for facial recognition searches, and proposals by the previous Government would have enabled this. To do this would put more than 50 million innocent people in a perpetual digital line-up, which poses profound risk, particularly for people of colour and minority groups. Big Brother Watch found that in the UK in 2023 89% of police facial recognition alerts wrongly identified members of the public as people of interest. We shall vigorously press the Government to ensure that DVLA access is necessary, proportionate and set out clearly in primary legislation, restricted to tackling serious crime or public safety threats.
It is about not just facial recognition but a whole range of biometrics, some of which are only now in development. I am particularly concerned about the need to future-proof the Bill against tomorrow’s technologies. New digital tools such as remote data extraction, advanced surveillance systems, predictive analytics and wearable sensor technology will soon reach the UK market. The Bill must be capable of evolving this technology, ensuring that protections for citizens remain robust as new digital tools appear.
In conclusion, public confidence in policing is at an all-time low. This may not be fair—I do not think it is—but it is the reality. New duties imposed by Parliament must therefore be matched by new investment. We must deliver policing that keeps people safe without edging towards a surveillance state. The Bill gives us a great opportunity to strike that balance, but more power without resources or safeguards risks serious consequences. Let us ensure that the Bill empowers the police, protects freedom and prepares the service for a fast-moving technological world, because only then will it truly deliver safer communities.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I broadly support the Bill, as there is an awful lot in it to be commended. I would not agree with everything that the Liberal Democrats have said about access to more data, certainly not facial recognition, but I think that there are some steps in the right direction. Of course, the nature of a Second Reading is to highlight the things that you would have preferred to be in the Bill rather than things that are in it.
My first point is about what I feel is a missed opportunity to set out a strategic direction, partly for the criminal justice system and certainly for the police. We have not embedded anything about prevention as a strategic direction in the way that fire brigades have. We have not said much about police professionalism and how that might be developed. Finally, there is the use of technology, and how we set a strategic framework in which that will develop. That is a genuine missed opportunity.
Of the four areas that I want to highlight and which I shall push in Committee for recognition, the first concerns firearms officers. First, I acknowledge that the development around the anonymity of officers is welcome, although I confess that on occasion I have thought that actually they should be named, because accountability is very important. But this development is a good one, and I support it. This group of brave men and women, 3,500 of them, who protect 69 million of us, who are the only ones who can go forward on our behalf and deal with the people they have to deal with, are, I am afraid, not receiving a good deal at the moment.
This week, the officer who shot and killed Jermaine Baker in 2015 was told that he had no case to answer in a misconduct process—after 10 years. He was never at risk of a criminal charge, but 10 years later—that cannot be right. So there is something about timeliness there, but the law also ought to offer more generosity and sympathy to the officer in the first place. We do that for householders who protect themselves and kill someone in their home; they are in a unique group—so why does this unique group not have any similar protection? It is about having a higher bar before prosecution is considered, not immunity. No one is arguing for that—accountability is essential. But something must happen in that area, and as yet it has not.
My second area is cycling. I have tried to get some amendments into this Bill, because it is time that cyclists have more accountability too. Insurance would not be a bad idea, along with the opportunity to have points on their licence, if they have a driving licence, should they commit offences, and registration marks to identify them—and even licences for the people who ride bikes. The Public Bill Office tells me that it is out of scope, but I cannot understand that, because obviously there are measures on dangerous cycling that the Government have brought forward, which I support. But it will be no use having them if you cannot identify the person who did it—so I suggest that there is a possibility to consider future developments in this Bill.
My third point is around the suicide of police officers. The Police Federation is concerned that the number of police officers and staff committing suicide over the years is increasing, but it is having real difficulty getting hold of the data, either about those who have committed suicide or those who have attempted it. It recently had a survey in which only 41 forces replied; two of the biggest forces in the country, including the biggest, did not reply, so the federation is struggling to get hold of the data. It would like to see a legal duty to ensure that the data is collected, first, and then if there is a problem how big it is and where the themes are that might enable more prevention to take place.
My final point is about the indirect consequences in terms of historical offensive weapons. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, has done some work on this, but there is more to do to make sure that those who have historical weapons are not captured under the offensive weapon debate. The couriers who carry these things are now withdrawing from the market, meaning that very few people are carrying weapons or things such as scissors—and that means that we will have a real problem soon if we do not consider that indirect impact.
The Lord Bishop of Derby
My Lords, I commend this Government’s mission to achieve safer streets and applaud particularly the aim of halving both knife crime and violence against women and girls in a decade. The Bill touches on a wide range of complex and important issues, and I will raise just a few.
Reporting of child sexual abuse and the decriminalisation of abortion are of particular interest to my colleagues on these Benches. Indeed, noble Lords may have seen the Church’s statement in response to the debate in the other place on the decriminalisation of women seeking abortion.
Fundamental reform to this country’s abortion laws ought to merit its own parliamentary process, we would say, and we on these Benches are keen to continue engaging with government to ensure that care-filled, careful consideration is given to support all those facing such a painful decision.
I declare my interest as chair of the board of trustees at the Children’s Society, and I am proud of its unwavering commitment to protect children from harm—including child sexual abuse—and to enable them to flourish. I am pleased that the Bill includes a stand-alone offence of child criminal exploitation, or CCE. I welcome the Government’s commitment to define CCE for police, but also support calls to bring forward a statutory definition of CCE on the face of the Bill that is directed at all organisations supporting children, to be supported by a robust, comprehensive implementation package with adequate funding and training.
I note that the Bill before us risks criminalising children forced or coerced into criminal activity. I think we need to take care that children are exempted in the work of the Bill from any offence of “cuckooing” or coerced internal concealment, recognising here, as elsewhere, children as victims, not perpetrators. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester is also following this Bill and is unable to be here today. With her, I will make the case for recognising so-called honour-based abuse as an aggregating factor in sentencing; introducing a new offence where victims die of suicide following sustained patterns of coercive control and abuse; introducing statutory defences for victims and survivors of domestic abuse who are accused of offending; and removing the parental rights of individuals convicted of child sexual offences.
We have been reminded today that recent terrible events mean that many are fearful when approaching a place of worship—indeed, going about their everyday lives. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, who cannot be in his place today, wishes to engage with elements of this Bill offering practical guidance for police to enable expressions of public protest while also preventing intimidation and harassment. He also looks forward to working with noble Lords to ensure that this Bill offers stronger safeguards against the discriminatory treatment of Romani, Gypsy, Roma and Irish Travellers.
Noble Lords will be aware that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Sheffield has recently been nominated to chair the Orgreave inquiry into the events of 18 June 1984. My colleagues on these Benches and I will continue to engage with the Government on public order policing measures.
Finally, I welcome the principle of youth diversion orders for those under 22. This Bill will need to strike a delicate balance. Overzealous restrictions on movement and social contacts under such orders may lead to yet more disenfranchisement and distrust.
This is a challenging time and the obstacles are real. I therefore commit myself and those on these Benches to work with noble Lords to think creatively, compassionately and constructively in our collective scrutiny of this Bill.
Lord Garnier (Con)
My Lords, yet again we are being asked to digest a lengthy criminal justice Bill which covers far too many diverse areas of conduct. Churchill might have said that this Bill has no theme. Before the Bill began its progress through the other place, the Government proclaimed that it contained 35 headline measures. Andy Slaughter, the chairman of the Justice Select Committee, said the Bill introduced 27 new criminal offences. I think he was congratulating the Government.
Had I been discussing the Criminal Justice Bill—that is to say, the Bill that my noble friend Lord Davies referred to, which fell at the last election—I would have said of that what I now say of this Bill. It covers too many subjects. It makes criminal activities that are already criminal. It has 430 pages, 203 clauses and 21 schedules. Just look at it: it is like a telephone book. It is a catalogue, in my view, of Early Day Motions rather than a practical answer to the problems it seeks to identify. It reminds me of the Criminal Justice Act 2009, which included provisions for, among other things, the appointment of senior police officers, prostitution and lap dancing, the supply of alcohol to children, gang-related violence, aviation security, border controls and extradition, and more besides.
I am sure that many of the measures in this Bill are, on their face, worthy, and, assuming they are not already criminal offences, no doubt good measures are taken from the Criminal Justice Bill. But passing laws is not of itself a solution to an actual or perceived problem. Movement is not productivity. Too often, Governments of all political persuasions think that sounding vigorous is a substitute for action.
Between 1815 and 1914, remarkably few laws—about 15 or 20 statutes—were passed that affected the criminal law. Several of them are still in force, in whole or in part. When Tony Blair was Prime Minister, between 1997 and 2007, more than 50 criminal law statutes were enacted. The Criminal Justice Act 2003—another doorstop of a Bill—even repealed earlier sections of earlier Acts of Parliament passed after 1997 that had not even been implemented. I tabled Written Questions in the other place, asking how many criminal law provisions had been implemented, how many had been repealed before implementation, and how many had been brought into force. The answer I used to get was roughly one-third had been implemented, one-third had not been implemented and one-third had been repealed before implementation or soon afterwards. I am not making a politically antagonistic point: I am simply pointing out that the early 21st century legislative equivalent of Dreadnought building is ineffective unless the Government—any Government—do more than pass laws and pat themselves on the back.
The court system is under strain. The police are under strain. Our prisons are under strain. Yet we blithely pile more and often repetitive legislation on them for political effect, without calculating whether the new provisions already exist or can be managed within the present creaking criminal justice system. The Lord Chancellor recently promised 1,250 new Crown Court sitting days. With the Crown Court trial backlog leading to serious criminal trials now being scheduled for 2028 or 2029, and with literally hundreds of courtrooms unused, 1,250 additional days is insignificant. A senior Crown Court judge recently told me that he could use those days in just his own court centre.
The Home Secretary’s Second Reading speech in the other place in March amounted to empty jargon interrupted by loyal Back-Benchers reading out interventions drafted by her spads or by Government Whips, and by the Opposition complaining that she was ignoring the previous Government’s achievements or claiming that they were her own. This is not a satisfactory way to amend the law, still less to create new law.
Of course, this Bill will—either in this version or some other version of it—pass into law, and the Government will proclaim its enactment as one of their great achievements at the next election. In the meanwhile, the IPP scandal continues, despite the heroic efforts of the noble Lord, Lord Timpson, and other noble Lords from across the House to release the ghastly grip of its talons around the lives and hopes of those hundreds of prisoners still in prison well beyond their tariff. Governments and Ministers say a lot. The voters watch carefully and remember what they actually do.
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)
My Lords, as the Minister has so clearly set out, there is much to welcome in this Bill to improve the law where needed and to make us safer. I look forward to following it closely. To the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, I say that I also look forward to following the implementation when it is an Act. It will have a profound impact on the lives of many, including the most vulnerable. I particularly support the clauses relating to countering violence against children, women and girls.
Following the report of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, the IICSA, I welcome the abolition of time limitations in historical cases of child sexual abuse with Clause 82. The importance of this clause was brought home to me by a very courageous survivor, who, following years of sexual abuse by his priest, has lived a life with incapacitating mental illness, of which the origin was that trauma. The last Government refused to act on this specific issue, so I am proud that this Government have conceded the fundamental legal principle. However, as drafted, it has limited benefit to those who have fought for the change and whose sufferings make it necessary to fight. I ask the Minister to discuss this with me further, together with survivors.
The IICSA recommendations should be adopted without change or qualification. However, the clause adds a new “substantial prejudice”, especially for historical cases, which creates uncertainty, delays and an extra hurdle for survivors. As I understand it, the IICSA’s final report did not include any changes regarding the introduction of “substantial prejudice”. Its inclusion in the Bill could be interpreted as reintroducing the status quo. The impact of narrowing the court’s focus to a fair trial, with the burden on defendants, should make out-of-time CSA claims easier overall, but ambiguity remains around what count as “claims arising”.
New Section 11ZB(3)(b) and (c), introduced by Clause 82, introduce the novel legal idea of “substantial prejudice”, adopted from Scottish legislation, but they are unjustified, as there is no provision for relitigation in these cases in England and Wales. I suggest that if cases fail in civil courts then the legislation has failed in its aims, and these new paragraphs should be removed.
The testimony of witnesses to the IICSA shows institutional discouragement and the extended, often ineradicable psychological harm of abuse, underscoring the need for these reforms to remove barriers. One witness said to me, “Attending the IICSA was the second most dramatic thing in my life and the trauma of it has lasted seven years so far. If subsection (3)(b) and subsection (3)(c) remain, then preparing for a court case which could be dismissed on these grounds would be as traumatic as that, and with little personal benefit”. While survivors are relieved that, through this legislation, time limitations in historical cases of child sexual abuse will be abolished, the “substantial prejudice” clauses need to be deleted for better access to justice.
The clauses on the management of sex offenders are hugely important for the victims of violence against women and girls, and I am delighted, with my long-term interest in countering stalking, that the Government are seeking both to implement their manifesto commitments and to respond to the invaluable super-complaint made by the Suzy Lamplugh Trust. Following discussions with those most concerned, I will wish to probe Part 6. I also know from campaigning on doorsteps that the new offence of cuckooing will be of great benefit, especially to those living in social housing.
Finally, I wholeheartedly support Clause 191 on the removal of women from the criminal law related to abortion. I pay tribute to my colleague, Tonia Antoniazzi.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)
My Lords, I will focus on disorder in public places and spaces, which is having such a detrimental effect on our lives. In doing so, I will concentrate on Clauses 37 and 38, which create a new stand-alone offence of assault against a retail worker and build on the aggravated offence contained in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. I support the two new measures in the Bill: I want to see violence against someone doing their job dealt with seriously. No one should be subject to random attacks while at work, and I should declare that, as a vice-chair of the All-Party Group on Customer Service, I do not want people who care deeply about giving great customer service to leave their jobs, or to deter anyone from taking up this kind of employment, which is essential and valuable to us in so many ways. I will say more about how in a moment.
First, however, the Institute of Customer Service tracking survey shows that violent abuse against all front-line service workers continues to rise. That means public transport workers, those who work in the hospitality trade, people who work in post offices and banks, delivery drivers and even utility engineers working on the streets. That is why the aggravated offence in the 2022 Act covers anyone, not just retail staff, providing a public-facing service or doing a public-facing job. I ask the Minister to say, when he comes to wind up, why the Bill’s stronger measures cover retail workers only.
All the people who do these public-facing jobs matter, not just because we need the services they provide but because, more often than not, they are the responsible person in charge of public spaces and places, so they need not just protection but our support to uphold our common standards, which are so important to maintaining good order and a civil society. That means that we must show respect for the authority of their roles in public settings, whether their authority in such situations is formal or informal. We need to give the people who do these jobs the recognition they deserve so they discharge their responsibilities well.
If we are to prevent violent criminal behaviour in public spaces becoming normalised, we must work together to tackle the low-level disorder and disrespect that we see on our streets, on public transport, in shops and elsewhere, which cause us to feel so despondent: litter dropping; feet on seats; watching videos or listening to music on our phones without headphones; queue-jumping; fare dodging; graffiti. Police presence on our streets is important. Rapid response from the police to actual crimes is vital, but we cannot keep creating new criminal offences and expect the police to deal with everything that has gone wrong in society. We as leaders, whether political, religious, business, public service or union, must use our authority to set, promote and honour the standards we know are vital for a healthy society, yet too often now treat as unimportant.
I would support expanding Clauses 37 and 38 to more than just retail workers for the reasons I have given, but I ask all the businesses, unions and trade bodies, which understandably want more legal protection for their workers, to think about what I have said. Likewise, we as legislators must do more than the easy bit of making new laws, as my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier said. Tackling crime and disorder through better policing and stronger sentencing is important, but on its own it is not enough. We need to share and promote what the good citizens of this country want and expect from each other in our shared spaces. That is how we will create the right conditions for people to support each other and together make it harder for people to behave badly and do wrong.
Baroness Benjamin (LD)
My Lords, this Bill has the potential to transform how we protect children from the devastating crime of child sexual abuse. I welcome mandatory reporting. It will be a historic step, made possible thanks to the survivors who bravely shared their testimony with the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse. Too many children have been failed because adults in positions of trust and institutions that employed them protected themselves over children who needed them. But I fear that mandatory reporting will not be enough to create the culture of safeguarding this country so desperately needs.
All those who work with children—teachers, healthcare professionals and social workers—have a responsibility to keep children safe from harm, but they must feel confident and have the skills to do so. In 2020, the national review into child sexual abuse within the family environment highlighted that many practitioners lacked the knowledge, skill and confidence to talk about sexual abuse with children. That is why Barnardo’s, in which I declare an interest as vice-president, and many other children’s charities are calling for the introduction of clear guidance and training to accompany this essential new duty. Mandated reporters must be confident in their responsibilities and clear on what they should do if they suspect abuse, so training will support professionals to identify and act on the signs and symptoms of abuse, as well as to respond effectively in cases where children do disclose. Otherwise, we risk more children falling through the cracks and abuse going unrecognised.
There must also be accountability for both professional and civil mandated reporters who fail to report, as well as criminal convictions for any individual or institution that deliberately conceals abuse. The Centre of Expertise on Child Sexual Abuse, which was hosted by Barnardo’s, has highlighted how such cover-ups have served only to increase a survivor’s sense of betrayal. Never again should institutions be allowed to put their reputation ahead of the safety of the child. They must be held accountable for failures to protect children, whether due to concealment, poor safeguarding or a lack of proper recruitment and training. This duty must be backed by a strong inspection regime so that children are never again left unprotected by systemic failure.
Protecting children is now more vital than ever, both offline and online. This means ensuring that the messages and images that shape young people’s understanding of relationships and content are not harmful. The BBFC found that one in three users of pornography had seen violent and abusive content online on numerous occasions. A poll by the Children’s Commissioner found that 44% of young people had viewed material online which portrayed sexual violence as normal. Content involving strangulation, incest and, worryingly, adults dressed as children, as well as content involving trafficking and torture, is rightly illegal offline, yet these images and videos are widely accessible online. This inconsistency is harmful, especially to children, and many find themselves victims.
In 2023, during the passage of the Online Safety Bill, I raised the extremely concerning issue that the laws on pornography are regulated differently offline from what is permitted online. The independent review by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, Creating a Safer World - the Challenge of Regulating Online Pornography, which I strongly support, is now also calling for online pornography to be regulated in line with offline pornography. If we do not act, we risk legitimising a culture where children continue to be sexualised and young people grow up with a distorted understanding of healthy relationships. No child should grow up in a world where abuse is normalised or their safety is undermined for profit, so let us ensure that every child’s lifetime is free from abuse, fear and silence, because childhood lasts a lifetime.
Baroness O'Loan (CB)
My Lords, it is almost absurdly challenging to try to speak on a Bill of 427 pages, 203 clauses and 21 schedules in four minutes. The Bill is extremely wide. It ranges across multiple offences, creating multiple new criminal offences, and we will need to determine inter alia whether they have sufficient clarity, whether they disproportionately limit our fundamental freedoms and whether they may lead to unintended consequences. Clause 185(3) is a case in point. And we will need to consider the very real resource implications of what we propose.
I want to concentrate on Clause 191, though there are many others I would want to talk to. This clause was passed after only 46 minutes of Back-Bench debate in the other place. It was not a manifesto commitment. It constitutes a very significant change to our law on abortion. It carries with it enormous risks to women who might consequently think that aborting a baby up to birth will be safe in these circumstances, doing so without medical help.
Dr Caroline Johnson MP explained in the other place that she works as an NHS consultant paediatrician and has cared for and held babies in her hands from 21 weeks and six days gestation right through to term. She said:
“I am very aware that babies from, say, 30 weeks upwards have a more than 98% chance of survival”.
She went on to explain how an abortion is achieved in the later stages of pregnancy, saying that taking abortion pills intended for early pregnancy is not a suitable or safe medical intervention in later pregnancy. She said:
“If one has a termination later in pregnancy, it is done by foeticide. Essentially, an injection of potassium chloride is administered to kill the baby, and then the baby is born in the usual way, but deceased. That is why it is important to know what the gestation is—because the termination offered under the law is done by a different route, to make sure that it is done safely. We know that the later in pregnancy a termination happens, the more a woman is at risk of medical complications”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/6/25; col. 309.]
That is the essence of the challenge we face here. We must scrutinise a clause that, under current law, would enable a woman who has secured medication to end a pregnancy under the pills by post scheme—which is supposed to be used only up to 10 weeks—to take this medication right up to birth in a non-clinical setting where she would have no professional medical support, despite the fact that, as Johnson said, she is at greater risk of complications. The clause does not give her any protection other than that against prosecution—but prosecution is the least important issue. What is profoundly important is the woman’s safety.
Even at earlier stages of gestation, there may be need for surgical intervention to remove a dead baby. How might a woman achieve an abortion in the later stages of pregnancy? Essentially, as I understand it, it will be by taking abortifacient medication which is neither suitable nor safe, or by acquiring potassium chloride by some means. But how could the potassium chloride be administered? It has to be injected into the baby’s heart, using ultrasound guidance, to cause cardiac arrest and death to the baby. That is not the end of the process; the baby must be delivered. During childbirth, specific drugs are administered and offered for pain management and the prevention of things such as haemorrhage and other complications. None of these would be available to this mother.
Most women who have experienced miscarriage or childbirth will probably agree that, if proper medical help is not available, it is terrifying. Things can go so terribly wrong: for example, babies can get stuck in the birth canal, which will eventually lead to the need for an intervention, whether by caesarean section, forceps or vacuum extraction. There is a serious risk that a mother whose baby gets stuck may die if the baby is not removed. At the very least, she may suffer terrible pain or multiple serious consequences to her own health and her future childbearing capacity.
We are left, then, with a situation in which your Lordships are being asked to legislate for abortion to birth without medical help, because any medical practitioner who helped would be subject to prosecution. If this provision is passed, women will think that aborting their own babies will be a safe thing to do, simply because it is lawful. This clause is redolent with danger to women. Can the Minister tell us exactly how the Government think women might seek to end a full-term pregnancy, and how they might be protected against the potentially catastrophic consequences of aborting and delivering a baby without medical help? This clause is too dangerous to women to remain in the Bill.
Baroness Lawrence of Clarendon (Lab)
My Lords, the policing Bill stands as an important framework for how we, as a society, respond to acts that cause harm and undermine our shared values. Among its many provisions, one issue demands our urgent attention: the failure to treat racist comments and abuse as crimes when they go unreported or unchallenged.
When racist comments are dismissed as “harmless” or “just words”, their impact is underestimated. In truth, silence allows prejudice to grow. Communities subjected to racism feel unsafe, unheard and excluded. This erodes trust between not only neighbours but the public and the institutions meant to protect them.
If racist acts are not reported and addressed, they normalise intolerance, creating an environment where discrimination can escalate into more serious violence, such as the racist murder of my son, Stephen. I do not want to see this repeated in years to come, with families forced to go through what my family has in the past 30-plus years. There has been an increase in knife crime since Stephen’s death. This needs to be addressed urgently to stop parents like me suffering the trauma of losing a child.
When racist behaviour is recognised, reported and challenged, it sends a powerful message: everyone—regardless of their background—belongs and deserves protection under the law. Within a school environment, racist name-calling must never be ignored, as it can escalate into more serious forms of harm and violence. If such behaviour is not addressed early and documented properly, it risks developing into more dangerous attitudes and actions as individuals grow older.
The Bill must therefore ensure robust measures that empower individuals to report racism, support victims and hold perpetrators accountable. Only then can we strengthen community cohesion and safeguard the dignity and equality that are the foundations of our society. For these reasons, I firmly believe that the abolition of the recording of non-crime hate incidents should not proceed, as doing so would risk silencing victims, undermining trust in law enforcement and weakening our collective ability to confront and prevent hate in all its forms. I thank the Government for their commitment to addressing crime on our streets.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, this is a very large Bill—as my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier said, it is too large—but for present purposes, I am going to focus exclusively on Clause 191, the clause that allows a mother to abort an unborn child right up to the moment of birth. This clause is wrong in principle and should be removed from the Bill. Your Lordships will note that this provision was incorporated into the Bill late during the parliamentary process, on Report. The debate lasted for some two hours. So far as I am aware, there was no pre-statutory consultation.
I have always taken a very libertarian view on abortion. I am a strong supporter of the 1967 Act. I agree that abortion raises serious issues of morals and faith, but I have always taken the view that that is a matter for the mother and, on the whole, not for Parliament. However, Clause 191 goes far too far. I find it very difficult to distinguish in principle between a child who has just been born and a child who is about to be born. If the child were killed immediately after birth, its killing would be an act of homicide; so, I suggest, is the killing of an unborn child immediately before its birth. There is very little distinction in principle.
Of course the law and common sense have always recognised that some acts of homicide are lawful. For example, reasonable defence is lawful; so, for example, is abortion when the health of the mother is at risk, long after the 24 or 26 weeks. But such is not the case here. The arguments advanced have relied very largely on the distress of vulnerable mothers—mothers who, incidentally, could have had an earlier abortion under the provisions of the 1967 Act.
I accept, of course, that there may be very distressing cases, and I hope that the prosecution authorities would consider carefully in any individual case whether the public interest required prosecution—very often not. I also hope that if a prosecution occurs and leads to a conviction, the sentencing judge will give serious consideration to the mitigating factors and impose as lenient a sentence as possible. But these considerations are not the same as decriminalising an act of homicide. Society as a whole, and Parliament as an institution, have a duty of care to an unborn child capable of being born alive. It is an obligation which reflects the value that we place on human life. This clause, if passed, would flout that obligation, and I do not think we should allow that to happen.
Baroness Thornton (Lab)
My Lords, I am very pleased to take part in this Second Reading debate. I am particularly pleased to welcome my noble friend the Minister to her place and her first Bill—the first of many, I hope. My two noble friends on the Front Bench know that they have my support for the Bill.
Following the remarks from my noble friend Lady Lawrence, I was struck by the Government’s commitment in the Commons to introduce an amendment to make hate crimes on the basis of sexual orientation, transgender identity and disability aggravated offences. I look forward to its introduction in due course and offer my support to my noble friends the Ministers on it. As a Labour and Co-operative Peer and a former USDAW member, I also welcome that the Bill addresses retail crime.
In this debate, I intend to address Clause 191. I profoundly disagree with the two speakers who have spoken before me on this. On 5 June, MPs voted to insert the clause into the Crime and Policing Bill by 379 to 137 on a free vote. The clause would disapply the existing criminal law on abortion from women acting in relation to their own pregnancies, bringing the law for women in England and Wales into line with the changes that Westminster already made to abortion law in Northern Ireland in 2019, which works well and was debated at some length and agreed in this House.
The proposal to repeal the provision was led by my honourable friend Tonia Antoniazzi MP. In recent times, contrary to the words of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, we have seen a substantial increase in the number of investigations into and prosecutions of women in England and Wales under abortion law dating back to 1861. That has included women who were victims of domestic abuse, suspected victims of human trafficking and exploitation, and girls under the age of 18. Clause 191 is a simple, principled stance that reflects the strong position of cross-party MPs, and I strongly support it as it is.
Notwithstanding the words of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, and the noble Viscount—as well as the hysteria from those outside our gates this morning—the Abortion Act 1967 will not be changed by this clause. However, a number of technical issues remain, which I and others believe it is our job in this House to consider as the legislation proceeds. They concern the lifelong impacts of investigation into, and convictions for, relevant offences. The change in the law under Clause 191 applies only to offences committed after the Bill receives Royal Assent. There are a number of women whose pre-existing cases remain under investigation where decisions have not been made, so the House needs to consider an amendment to halt ongoing criminal investigations and prosecutions for repealed offences, to pardon women with criminal records and to expunge the records of those investigations.
If a woman is convicted of these offences, it precludes her from certain employment opportunities for life due to the DBS check. It also includes women who have not had a commitment, because that also stays on their record as part of a DBS check. In line with the Turing pardon for the criminalisation of same-sex activity and similarly outdated laws, an amendment that pardoned women with a criminal record for a repealed offence and expunged those records would be relevant.
Finally, notwithstanding the introduction of Clause 191, I note that a number of offences have been brought against women under the Offences against the Person Act 1861 and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929. It is therefore important that we ensure that the law is in step on this matter if we want to decriminalise abortion in these circumstances.
Lord Mackenzie of Framwellgate (Non-Afl)
My Lords, the Government have pledged to halve serious violent crime, rebuild public confidence in policing and strengthen our criminal justice system. In my judgment, the Crime and Policing Bill represents a significant step toward these vital goals.
Reflecting on the Bill, I am reminded of my early years as a young beat constable in Jarrow during the 1960s. At the age of 20, fresh from training, I patrolled a town area. There were no radios or mobile phones, only public telephone boxes to contact the police station. I still remember, all those years ago, a warm summer’s night, when at 2 am, at the back of the Jarrow shopping centre, I saw a chink of light. It was two men carrying a till from the back of a shop. The shops were surrounded by a large wall with an opening for delivery vehicles. Fortunately, on seeing me, the men separated—otherwise, I believe I would have been sunk.
I tackled the one with the till, who dropped it. We both fell to the ground, and I lost my helmet and torch after a struggle. He broke away and, fortunately, he ran into a builders’ compound, which was a cul-de-sac. He was trapped, because it had barbed wire at the top. He turned and threw a four-foot-long piece of cast-iron guttering at my head. Had I not ducked, I would not be here today. I even remember thinking, “They didn’t tell me about this at the training school”.
I tackled him again and, with the liberal use of my truncheon, he was arrested. I remember being splattered by his blood. That moment illustrates how risky, demanding and dangerous lone night patrol could be, yet it helps develop resourcefulness and resilience—qualities that are essential in policing. As the service has evolved, today’s officers face even greater complexity and risk. They do so with dedication and courage, and they deserve our respect and support.
The Bill commits to recruiting 13,000 additional neighbourhood police and support officers, focusing especially on town centres. Their visibility is key to reducing anti-social behaviour and the alarming rise in violent shop thefts.
Another issue the Bill tackles is the lack of police visibility. People frequently say that they never see a uniformed police officer any more. This is not just about appearances: visibility fosters trust, provides community reassurance and helps to gather local intelligence, preventing and detecting crime.
The devastating decision to cut 20,000 officers during austerity must never be repeated. That mistake drained the service of experience, especially sergeants and inspectors, with those officers being so vital for mentoring and guiding young officers. These are the supervisors who might have spotted the red flags, such as Sarah Everard’s killer, PC Wayne Couzens, and serial rapist PC David Carrick. The Bill rightly empowers forces to raise standards, sack miscreants very early and restore trust. I include in this the disgusting recent behaviour of the Charing Cross 11.
In the UK, we police by consent. That principle is foundational to our system and must never be taken for granted. To uphold it, we must recruit the most honest, capable and resilient individuals and support them through strong leadership and accountability.
I firmly believe in the broken windows theory: early action on minor anti-social behaviour prevents escalation. This demands visible and engaged officers and intelligence-led, proportionate stop and search, used judiciously, with public support. If these are used wisely, we can enhance policing, public safety and community confidence. I include in this modern facial recognition cameras. To those who object, I ask a simple question: what is the difference between a member of the public telling me that Man A looks like a rape suspect published on “Crimewatch” and an image produced from a technical camera telling me the same thing? The reality is that, in both cases, it simply points the police in the right direction and cannot be used simply to convict.
Finally, I wholeheartedly support the Bill. Let us stand firmly behind the men and women who risk their lives daily to protect us all and give them all the training, leadership and support that they need, and let us all work together to restore public confidence in the idea that the maintenance of law and order is the bedrock of a just, civilised and democratic society.
Baroness Coffey (Con)
My Lords, there is a lot in the Bill that I welcome, although I have some sympathy with my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier about how we keep creating law upon law. One answer to that is that, when Governments lose rulings in the courts, often the only way to try to tackle what Governments perhaps thought was in place is to introduce new primary legislation, to make sure that the will of Parliament can be put in place in how we govern our country. To that end, there are a number of issues where I am concerned that, on some elements, that this Bill is now going too far, or indeed, on others, may not be going far enough.
It was Richard Graham, former MP for Gloucester, who first raised the issue of spiking in the Commons several years ago, and it has been taken up by Joe Robertson, the Member of Parliament for Isle of Wight East. Where he is in difficulty or dispute with the Government is in his concern that the threshold for prosecution is concerningly low. We have discussed already this week when you prosecute on spying: when you prosecute on spiking is what my honourable friend wishes to address. In particular, he wants to talk about—and I will continue to do this with others in this House—reckless behaviour that could, instead of just being intended to annoy, actually be prank spiking, which can have serious consequences.
We report fraud through either recorded crimes or surveys. The crime that people fear the most and experience the most in this country is fraud, yet Part 8 is quite light, although perhaps this is a case of how we need to try to make sure we get more resources in the police focused on the crime that is considered to affect most people in this country, rather than more statutory duties. Nevertheless, this is something that needs tackling right across the country, and not just by online reporting to somewhere in the City of London Police, perhaps never to be seen again. At the moment, of course, the banks will pick up the bill by refunding victims of fraud, but that cost goes across all of us who have bank accounts, and that is something to be considered.
Quite rightly, there is a lot of debate about reporting. We talk about children under the age of 16 having sex, getting treatments or getting the morning-after pill. It is a long time since parents were basically blocked from learning about this activity, even though it is their child who is involved in underage sex. I would be interested to explore during debate on the Bill the fine line about what is right for the child but also where the parent has the primary responsibility for looking after their child.
I think of Luke 17:2. I appreciate that the Bishops are not present in the debate at this moment, but I am concerned about Clauses 72 and 79 when it comes to the confessional, and I would be interested to discuss this further with the Minister, perhaps outside the Chamber.
In terms of reporting, the BBC has asked me to raise a particular issue regarding Schedule 8(2)(d). It is very keen to ensure that undercover journalism is seen as a reasonable excuse, rather than having their journalists inadvertently criminalised.
In terms of the other aspects of this Bill, it has been well trailed already that Clause 191 is probably the most controversial, brought in at the other end. A lot of the prosecutions that have been referenced already are due to “pills by post”, which ultimately was passed in the House of Commons by 27 votes a few years ago. It is very difficult—in fact, it is impossible at the moment—to get any statistics. We do not record how many pills by post are issued. We have not yet been able to get the abortion statistics, primarily because the ONS is not able to capture them at the moment—the whole use of HSA forms and similar. However, I think we need to consider this further and in much more detail, including what further changes the Government intend to make to the law to cover those who provide abortion services illegally.
I am sorry to go on about the 1861 Act, but I am afraid that it is the basis of lots of charges brought in this country—murder, use of chloroform, lots of different things. To try to say that it is an out-of-date Act is irrelevant to the reality of how we use our laws today. For this, I am looking forward not just to further comments from the Minister today but to debate during Committee.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
I very much appreciated the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, although I see more value in this this Bill than the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, was prepared to admit. I agree with what they each said about hard topics that this Bill might usefully have tackled but did not.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights has produced another of its helpful and focused reports. I agree with the committee that the difficult issue of concealing identity at protests may need to be better calibrated. I agree with it also on the issue of universal jurisdiction, which was debated in the Moses Room on 9 September. To bring our law into line with our neighbours and allow perpetrators of the gravest international crimes to be prosecuted here would involve nothing more complicated than removing the requirement of citizenship or residency in the International Criminal Court Act 2001. I look forward to supporting proposed amendments along those lines.
The Constitution Committee raised two issues in addition to that referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower: the widening by Clause 4 of the categories of people who can issue on-the-spot fixed penalty notices—now of up to £500—and the need for parliamentary scrutiny of statutory guidance to the police on the child sex offender disclosure scheme, Sarah’s law. Like many constitutional issues, they may seem mundane, but I hope they will not escape our attention.
Turning to national security, I support the youth diversion orders, which will be used to disrupt, at an early stage, young people who are believed to be involved in low-level terrorist offending, such as the possession and dissemination of material, often online. The idea is to divert them from the criminal justice system for their benefit and for ours. As noted in my recent report, Lessons for Prevent, their availability might also help to increase the rate of consent to Channel interventions, which is currently running at about 75%.
Polygraph testing is to be extended: I should like to know more about how rigorously the use of this technology has been assessed, and with what result, since it was rolled out for sex offenders in 2014 and terrorist offenders in 2021.
Finally, Clauses 130 to 137 of the Bill extend police powers following the seizure of electronic devices to access information accessible from such devices but stored on the cloud. The logic of that extension is not hard to understand, but its sheer scale requires us to think about safeguards. That is so particularly in relation to Clause 135, which concerns the no-suspicion powers to search and to question that are exercised by counterterrorism police in ports and airports under the Terrorism Act 2000 and the National Security Act 2023. The utility of those powers has not been doubted by any of those who have been tasked with the close examination of their use, but the latest of them, Jonathan Hall KC, was moved to ask this week what will prevent excessive data from being extracted and copied, how journalistic and legally privileged material on an online account will be protected, and—given the quantity of personal data that members of the public hold on the cloud—whether merely travelling through a port or border should be considered a sufficient reason to surrender so much private data. Senior courts have expressed a degree of disquiet about the existing power, and a further case is under way. Nobody wants a regime of pointless box-ticking, but we need to rise to the independent reviewers’ challenge and satisfy ourselves that, if this strong and intrusive power is to be further extended, it is accompanied by the right safeguards.
Lord Frost (Con)
My Lords, crime and disorder have reached such levels in this country that we certainly need more effective and meaningful policing, but it has to be done in a way that retains confidence, does not damage fundamental freedoms and keeps the criminal law clear and easily understood—or, rather, stops the law becoming ever more complex and harder to understand. I will not dwell on that point, as my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier has made it eloquently, but I am sorry that the Bill continues down the road that the previous Government took of creating specific offences for things that are already crimes—for example, the offence of assault on a shop worker. Speaking as somebody who has been very critical of the way the pandemic and the lockdowns were handled, I cannot help seeing some irony in the fact that, four years ago, it was an offence to attend a demonstration without a face mask, and soon it will be an offence to attend one with one. Nevertheless, I am generally supportive, and in the time available I want to register two concerns briefly.
First, I note the Government’s intention, which we have heard about and which the Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention expressed in the Commons, to expand the scope of so-called hate crime offences by making all existing strands of hate crime aggravated offences. Given the way so-called hate crimes have recently, in practice, been used to chill freedom of expression and freedom of speech, I have quite a lot of concern about this; it seems to be going in quite the wrong direction. Rather, as a society, we ought to be going in a different direction, which is to begin to remove the concept of hate crimes from the statute book, and particularly to abolish the entirely illegitimate category, in my view, of non-crime hate incidents. An amendment to that effect was put forward in the Commons and did not succeed, but I hope and expect that it will be tabled again; indeed, I may propose my own amendment on that subject.
Secondly, as others have done, I register the deepest concerns about Clause 191. If this becomes law, it would be the biggest change to abortion legislation since the Act was introduced in 1967. As has been said, the permanent extension of the pills by post scheme, with no requirement for an in-person consultation, has made it possible to try to end a pregnancy at any point beyond 24 weeks. At the moment, that is still a criminal offence, and this clause would mean that it no longer was, provided that only the mother was involved. It is foreseeable that, in practice, this will make abortions up to birth more common, endanger more women because of the medical risks of termination after 24 weeks, and create pressure for a similar decriminalisation for medical practitioners themselves. People will argue, “How can it be illegal for a doctor to help with something that is not in itself illegal?” or they will say that doctors need to be able to perform late-term abortions to avoid the risks of terminations at home. It is the beginning of a slippery slope.
There is no demand for this. Polling shows that more than half the public favour keeping abortion after 24 weeks a criminal offence and only 1% of women support introducing abortion up to birth—and, in passing, 70% of women support a reduction in the time limit from 24 to 20 weeks.
The clause would remove one of the few remaining legal protections for the unborn. In our country, if children are born prematurely after 24 weeks, the medical system will do everything it can to save them, and it is often successful. Yet this clause will make it possible to try to end the life of a baby after 24 weeks without criminal consequences. It is simply inconsistent, not just with current abortion law but with current law around maternal and child health more broadly. This clause had a wholly inadequate couple of hours’ debate in the Commons. Its proponents really should be embarrassed to legislate on life and death in this fashion. I hope it will get a lot more debate here, and I hope noble Lords will reject it.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I welcome the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, in introducing a Bill described as challengingly broad. It is not easy, however, to identify an overarching theme, so I shall speak rather generally about children who are the subject—or, if you like, object—of much of the Bill.
I declare an interest as a trustee of Safer London. We—not me; I pay tribute to the professionals in the organisation—work with young Londoners and families caught in cycles of violence, exploitation and trauma. We help them escape harm, heal, rebuild and believe in brighter futures. That may sound naive and flowery, but it is hard-headed and hard work.
An effective response is often rooted in safeguarding, not the imposition of punishment. Young people caught up in child criminal exploitation, for instance, are frequently significantly affected by trauma—seriously adverse childhood experiences—before this happens. Alongside this, Safer London is finding that about a third of its clients are neurodiverse or have special educational needs. Allowing for those undiagnosed, this may actually mean about 50%.
So many are so vulnerable. Grooming often involves quite small gifts—so called—followed by, “Now you owe me, and if you do not do as I say, you will see what is coming to your sister”; a sort of debt bondage. It takes skill to work alongside, advocate for and help a young person effect change, to see beyond behaviour to what leads them to where they end up or are in danger of ending up. Noble Lords will not be surprised to hear me mention resources. When support services have lost funding, anti-social behaviour has increased. The first inquiry of the House’s Justice and Home Affairs Committee three years ago looked at alternatives to short custodial sentences and heard a lot about the need for more investment in treatment as the response to crime. This applies to children as well as adults. It is hard for a child with a criminal record to find employment when they need an economic future outside criminality. On top of this, I am told there is a racial element as black children do not get diversionary sentencing to the same degree as others.
Of course, this skates the surface and I share the frustration of other noble Lords this afternoon. I may express through amendments concerns about polygraphs and whether there are gaps in the mandatory reporting provisions. Those are just for instances. On a different, broad point, how much new law are we loading on the police, who have to prioritise and get their heads around the detail of new offences, when, as other noble Lords have said, an activity has been covered by an old law? But I recognise that sometimes we do need to update, as with cuckooing, which I welcome specifically, and with the late addition of halting the criminalisation of women in England and Wales under abortion law dating back to 1861 to bring us into line with changes that noble Lords across the House—and I have been reminded I was among them—voted into Northern Ireland law in 2019.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
My Lords, Clause 191 proposes an extremely radical change to abortion law. It was added on Report in the other place without due consideration and with only 46 minutes of Back-Bench debate. It is unnecessary, badly drafted and will harm women. We already have one of the most permissive abortion laws in the world. Even David Steel said he never intended the Abortion Act 1967 to enable termination to be treated like a form of contraception. The presumption in the Act is that deliberately ending the life of a child in the womb is a criminal offence unless it is signed off by two doctors who decide in good faith that one or more of the specified grounds are met.
The change in the law is not because there are women who cannot get abortions or because it is too difficult to get a doctor to sign off, but because of an ideological commitment to presenting abortion as a form of healthcare, like the removal of a tumour. The humanity of the baby in the womb is ignored. A wanted child is a baby and should be protected; an unwanted child is a foetus—an othering word, if ever there was one—and can be removed and disposed of. I simply do not believe the degree to which a mother wants or does not want her baby changes the moral status of the child and think we need to have a national conversation about this.
I may be in a minority in this House when I speak on this issue, but I suspect that the removal of abortion from the ambit of the criminal law for the mother is something that makes many people uncomfortable because abortion is important. I think we all instinctively know we are dealing with the termination of a human life. We cannot just allow a free for all; there must be limits. Even though prosecution of mothers for unlawful abortions is incredibly rare, the existence of a criminal law framework for abortion sends a vital message that ending the life of an unborn person is a serious matter. This is reflected in the way the law is framed, and that is what the majority of the public appear to want.
A poll of over 2,000 adults found that more than six in 10 respondents agreed that abortion should continue to remain illegal after 24 weeks; just 17% disagreed. Clause 191 disapplies the law from a woman acting in relation to her own pregnancy. No matter how she ends the life of her unborn baby, no matter how late in the pregnancy, no matter how painful for the child, no matter how distressing for whoever finds the remains, she would be beyond the reach of the law; whereas any doctor or nurse who is complicit would be committing a criminal offence. The Member for Gower gave an interview to Times Radio. She was asked whether she was comfortable with any woman ending a pregnancy at any time; she said she was. That is what Clause 191 will enable.
Janice Turner of the Times, a supporter of abortion, wrote that she was “aghast” at this “glib, careless and amoral” clause. In her words,
“it cannot be that killing a full-term baby in the birth canal is legal, but smothering it outside the womb is infanticide”.
The Times editorial also raised the issue of pills by post, which was passed in the dead of night in 2022 without proper debate, or an impact assessment, and indeed the amendment was a disorderly one which had to be amended by the department.
There can be severe complications with abortion pills, especially when they are taken late in pregnancy. These include haemorrhaging and excruciating pain. The traumatic situations in which these women have ended up is as a result of pills by post. It enables women to have dangerous, late-term abortions at home alone without any medical supervision. Yet activists are now using the failings of pills by post to push for even more extreme laws.
In conclusion, Clause 191 will only make the situation worse, increasing the number of late-term abortions, and putting more women in danger. If we really care for women, we need to reinstate in-person appointments: proper, sensitive, skilled medical assessments where experts can assess how far along a woman is, whether there are any complicating factors that put her in danger, or whether she is being coerced. We already have unfettered access to abortion: Clause 191 is an embarrassment to supporters of abortion and a stain on our reputation as a country that claims to care for pregnant women and their unborn children.
Lord Birt (CB)
My Lords, Tony Blair had a pronounced interest in reducing crime. Two decades ago, as his strategy advisor, I spent two and a half years working with gifted teams of officials, looking at patterns of crime and offending, and how the many organisations within the criminal justice system were responding. Two decades on, however, the crime picture has changed fundamentally. On the plus side, a combination of forensic science, the extraordinary ubiquity of street cameras, including in doorbells, and the data obtainable from suspects’ mobile phones has seen highly professional police clinically solve the worst crimes, particularly murder.
We are, however, failing miserably to organise effectively in countering other types of offences, which each of us now experiences either directly or through friends and family, all the time and to an unprecedented extent, and which mostly go unrecorded. Staff at my local supermarket tell me they witness shoplifting with impunity at least once every hour. Watch thieves stalk the streets of Soho. A visitor to a fifth-floor flat in my apartment block had his £5,000 bike stolen, all captured clearly on CCTV and shared with the police. Two days later he saw his bike for sale on eBay, but they refused to help him reclaim it.
The BBC’s “Scam Interceptors” programme scams the scammers: listening in, catching them in the act, chiefly frightening older people unversed in technology into parting with some or all of their life savings. The scammers operate with impunity on an industrial scale out of identified buildings in India. The BBC recently tracked down a scammer facility in Nigeria which tricks naive British teenagers into selling sex pics, then blackmails them. In one instance, tragically, this triggered a suicide.
We should be ashamed—sitting here in the nation’s Parliament, in the Borough of Westminster—that we are cited as the street crime capital of the UK, with mobile and other theft rampant. Yes, the police have finally mounted an ambitious operation, but each of us will know someone who has had their mobile snatched, who has immediately located it at a specific house in Hackney or elsewhere using the “find my phone” facility, only to be told by police that no action will be taken.
In our city centres, warrior e-bikers bomb along, some at souped-up speeds, sometimes at night without lights, ignoring red lights and zebra crossings and going the wrong way up one-way streets—all with impunity, confident that they will never be stopped. I thought the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, tellingly identified other forms of wholly unwelcome and ever-increasing anti-social behaviour on our streets.
Knife crime has doubled in a decade with over 50,000 annual offences and 200-plus deaths; it is now the most common method of murder. The current inquiry into the horrific Southport massacre by a 17 year-old has produced chilling evidence of just how easy it was for him to purchase outrageous weaponry online—in his case, a black panther kukri machete with a 16.5 inch blade.
I do not dispute the value of most measures in this Bill, but I suggest that nothing in it addresses the need for the police and other agencies massively to raise their game and to attack every kind of crime that has a material impact on our everyday lives, whether on the internet or on the streets. I conclude by asking the Minister if the Government will step back and frame a bold and transformative strategy to tackle head on the plague of everyday crime that we are living with today.
Lord Herbert of South Downs (Con)
My Lords, I draw attention to my interest declared in the register as chair of the College of Policing.
For our police service, founded on the principle of consent, to be effective, the trust and confidence of the communities they serve is essential. But the proportion of the public who believe the police are doing a good job has fallen precipitously in the last few years. There are multiple causes, but I believe this Bill and the Government’s focus on rebuilding neighbourhood policing will be a very important step towards improving confidence.
We place immense demands on the police service. In recent years, there has been a shift of priorities and resources towards dealing with crimes of harm and important issues such as violence against women and girls—issues which simply were not on the agenda before. Combined with funding and other pressures, we have seen in some forces a failure to attend to the basic standards of service which the public expect, such as action following shoplifting, burglaries or mobile phone theft. It is, I believe, the failure to attend to these basics which exacerbates criticism of the police for overreach, for getting involved in things we do not want them to be doing and in particular in relation to police action which it is felt intrudes upon free speech.
Non-crime hate incidents have become a kind of lightning rod for criticism of the service, and a number of high-profile cases of ill-judged police intervention have undoubtedly damaged confidence. NCHIs were born out of the landmark Stephen Lawrence inquiry as a means to support police to monitor incidents linked to hate or hostility, with the purpose of preventing future crimes, supporting investigations and protecting the most vulnerable in our communities. Recent events, such as the horrific attacks on the Manchester synagogue and the Peacehaven mosque, should remind us that dealing with hate crime remains as vital in 2025 as it did over a quarter a century ago.
It is essential that policing continues to have the ability to monitor hate and hostility within our communities. What could not have been envisaged at the time of the Lawrence inquiry was the growth of the internet, the advent of smartphones and social media, and how these have transformed how people interact with each other. The rapid expansion of the online space, coupled with increasingly polarised public discourse, has resulted in forces grappling with the challenge of balancing free speech with monitoring community tension in both physical and online spaces to prevent crime and protect people from harm.
Not all perceived hate reported to police requires a police response or police incident record. The requirement to record should be shaped by necessity, proportionality and legality. There have been high-profile instances where policing has struggled with all three. That is why I called in this Chamber for a rebalancing of the system. At my instigation, the college, together with the National Police Chiefs’ Council and with the support of the Inspectorate of Constabulary and the Government, set up a review of the entire system of non-crime hate incidents. The review has found that the current approach and use of non-crime hate incidents is not fit for purpose, and there is a need for broad reform to ensure that policing can focus on genuine harm and risk within communities. The recording of hurt feelings and differing views should not continue. A report has just been sent to Ministers, and I am sure that they will respond in due course.
But while I believe change is vital to restore public confidence and ensure that free speech is protected, I would counsel against laying all the problems of policing at the door of non-crime hate incidents. The police are not spending all their time policing tweets. The Metropolitan Police Commissioner has pointed out that non-crime hate incidents account for 0.05% of the calls they respond to. A number of the high-profile and controversial cases about the policing of social media comment relate to hate crimes—offences that Parliament created for good reason. If we want to revisit those criminal offences, then that is a debate that we should have here, but in the meantime the police have a duty to uphold the law.
We can and should expect that the police will act proportionately, without fear or favour, and use common sense and professional judgment in the investigation of crimes. That judgment was obviously lacking in some recent cases. Therefore, a second key initiative that I and the college’s chief executive, Sir Andy Marsh, have instigated will be new guidance on the exercise of that discretion, so that we can ensure that common-sense decisions are taken and that confidence in the police service is not undermined.
Baroness Hazarika (Lab)
My Lords, I very much welcome the Bill, especially measures to tackle anti-social behaviour and shoplifting. I thank my noble friend Lord Hanson for visiting Brixton just before the summer, where he met with local shop workers and local businesses. We were very grateful for his time.
I strongly support Clause 191, which seeks to decriminalise women who have to have an abortion. It was introduced by our colleague, Tonia Antoniazzi, who is with us in the Chamber today. It is not in the public interest for any woman to be prosecuted and given a criminal record in relation to her own body and her own abortion. In this day and age, we should not be vilifying and hounding pregnant women who often find themselves in deeply traumatic circumstances. I do not believe that any woman takes an abortion lightly, particularly at a very late stage. They need support, medical care and compassion, not the threat of prison. I will tell you what I find embarrassing: it is this conversation and the tone of this conversation; it feels like we are back in Victorian times. It is absurd and wrong that in 2025 we are arguing whether a woman should have the right or the agency to choose what she knows is best for her body and her health.
I also welcome the Government’s commitment to ending time limits on child abuse. At the moment, it is very difficult to bring a case if you are over the age of 21. This makes no sense and is a denial of justice, as it often takes many years before people who were abused as a child can speak about their abuse. However, the Government are proposing that this apply only to sexual abuse. I would ask Ministers to consider widening this to include physical and emotional abuse and neglect, which often accompany sexual abuse. This is the approach taken in Scotland, and I think it is right.
I hope that Ministers will also consult with victims of child sex abuse about how to make it easier to seek justice. We know from the grooming rape gang scandal how hard it is for young people to speak out and be believed, and of the devastating consequences of abuse. I very much agree with lots of the points raised by my noble friend Lady Royall. I also welcome what we heard from the Minister, who announced a pardon and disregard scheme for those girls caught up in the grooming-gang scandal. I know that is something that they have been pressing for, and they will very much hope that it will happen.
Finally, we know that much of the troubling increase in sexual violence and misogyny against women and girls is rooted in people, particularly young people, having unfettered access to extreme pornography. Some 90% of online porn involves acts of torture and barbarism against women. Some 44% of our children have watched rape scenes online. This is poisoning minds and leading to violence in real life.
So I very much support the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, to better protect children from online pornography. I also appreciate the Government’s efforts to ban the depiction of strangulation. It is not right or normal to teach our children that sex means inflicting pain on a woman. That is what is happening, and we are allowing it to happen online, on screens that our kids have in their hands every single day. I hope Ministers can make some progress on these three issues through the passage of this Bill.
Baroness Browning (Con)
My Lords, there is much in this Bill that can be supported. Many of its measures were, as we have heard, part of the Conservative Criminal Justice Bill that fell at the time of the last election, so on many levels there should be consensus. But this is a very large Bill, with many specific headings, many of which would merit a stand-alone Bill in their own right. Our scrutiny will require time, as we have seen—when considered by the other place it required 15 Committee days—and we have been promised further amendments from the Government. I hope the Minister will encourage his Front Bench to allow sufficient time for the level of scrutiny of which we in this House are proud. These are all important subjects.
The Government have said that the Bill will deliver their safer streets mission. The early parts of the Bill address, inter alia, offensive weapons, stalking, retail crime and anti-social behaviour. Anti-social behaviour is complex and we often use it as an umbrella term—that is not good enough. As far as this Bill is concerned, the public and in particular the police need clarity in this area, where if anti-social behaviour is not dealt with at a low level then it can turn into much more serious criminal activity, and that becomes the norm. We have only to look at the more recent change in retail theft. It is not a new crime but one that has developed in a way that now requires us to afford stronger protection for retail workers with this Bill, in Clause 37 to 39. I hope we are able to deliver that.
Serious crime, knife crime and the sexual abuse of children need stronger enforcement. As we progress with this legislation, I hope we will hear more about how enforcement is to be delivered. It is a fact that, as criminality evolves, we legislators often find ourselves playing catch-up and somewhat behind the curve to keep up with the criminals. I have been here well over 30 years—not in this House, but in the whole building—and enormous Home Office Bills seem to be required in almost every Session. It is understandable why: we cannot afford to stay still. The criminals do not stay still and technology very often aids and abets them.
Like many others, I too am concerned about Clause 191. The noble Baroness, Lady Hazarika, just mentioned that a woman in this position would need many things, including medical assistance. From what I have heard today, I am not clear in my mind that, if this were enacted, medical assistance would be lawful. I hope we will give sufficient time to this clause, and that the Minister will make sure that we have the information we need when debating this to ensure that existing legislation already on the statute book is weighed against what is being proposed in this clause.
I support this Bill. I am sure there will be one or two bits and pieces on which I have issues, but this former Home Office Minister none the less wishes it good speed.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I will talk about one specific issue in the Bill, which has been referred to by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hazarika and Lady Royall, which is the limitation period for child sexual abuse claims. Child sexual abuse is abhorrent, and unfortunately it has been shown, over the past 20 or 30 years, to be much more widespread than was once believed to be the case.
It has always been possible for the victim of child abuse to sue the perpetrator or, more commonly, the institution where the perpetrator worked or to which they were closely connected, the limitation period being three years. However, there are exceptions, the most important and relevant of which is that time does not start to run until the claimant reaches the age of 18. Even after three years, there are various ways in which to extend the limitation period. The first is when a claimant did not have the necessary knowledge or awareness of the abuse, which is quite often relied on. But the most important extension was provided by Section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980, which gave the court complete discretion to disapply the limitation period. The section sets out in detail all sorts of sensible factors that guide the exercise of the discretion, but the discretion is in fact unfettered, so that other factors not listed can be taken into account. Although it is for the claimant to persuade the court, the courts generally disapply the limitation period as it happens, unless there are particular circumstances where it would be unfair for the case to go on.
Noble Lords might think that it would never be unfair for the victim of child sexual abuse to be able to bring a claim, and I have some sympathy for that, but the reality is that the claims are not against the perpetrators—they are against institutions, educational or religious, and those run by local authorities or government, where the abuse has taken place. The law on vicarious liability was changed by the courts so that an institution could not argue that the abuse was outside the scope of employment, with the result that compensation often had to be paid, sometimes even by the taxpayer or insurers, without any fault on their part.
I should make it entirely clear that I have a relevant interest to declare. Over the years, as a barrister, I have acted for institutions that have been sued for what is known as historic child abuse. I have also acted for victims and been involved in a number of cases that have reached the higher courts on the questions of limitation.
My query to the Government is essentially this: what was wrong with the existing law in practice, and how do the relevant provisions change it? My current view is that, if these provisions become law, there is a risk of satellite litigation just at a time when the law seemed relatively settled. There are some cases where it is simply impossible for there to be any meaningful trial. For example, the claimant’s own recollection may be very hazy; the perpetrators, or alleged perpetrators, of the abuse may be dead; there may be no records of any sort; and the relevant institution may have closed and any insurance may be untraceable. The intention presumably—and the way it is framed in the Bill is something of a compromise—is to make it very difficult for the defendant to defeat a claim on grounds of limitation, but what sort of cases would now be in time that would not be under the current law?
Some other features need to be raised in Committee, some already referred to: what is the proper definition of sexual abuse, and what about other forms of abuse that may properly be described as sexual? What if there are mixed abuse claims? There will also be uncertainty as to what constitutes “settled by agreement”. Does that include prelitigation settlements? What about claims that have been discontinued or settled informally?
My current view is that the law is fair to both parties. These changes will breed uncertainty and litigation—good for lawyers, but not a beneficial advance in the law. The proposed changes are not the result of a Law Commission report, nor of a large piece of legislation such as the Limitation Act. Rather, they seem to be the result of a general recommendation from the IICSA inquiry and a rather modest consultation. That is not a good way in which to make law; it will result in uncertainty and much litigation. In a wholly natural desire to help the victims of abuse, we should be careful not to make bad law.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for the introduction of her Bill, which has much to commend it. Earlier this year, I indicated that I would retire in the spring. However, I am a politician, and I did not say which spring. I really do want to retire, but I have one last parliamentary task to deal with.
When I arrived at your Lordships’ House in 1992, one of my areas of expertise was in road haulage operation, including abnormal load movements. In the late 1990s, the late and much missed Lord Mason of Barnsley worked tirelessly on seeking to replace the police with the private escorting—or rather, self-escorting—of abnormal loads. This was because it was not a good use of police time, and in some cases the police were not very good at it—although forces such as the Met were, and still are, excellent.
A large part of the problem was police priorities causing abnormal loads to have to wait a long time for a police escort, which was expensive for industry. At this point I should declare an interest, as I operate a tank transporter for the REME Museum. I have given the Minister full details of this interest. We succeeded in about 2002, when the then Minister of State for policing, John Denham, changed UK policy, and thenceforth the police would not routinely escort abnormal loads unless they were particularly large, or traffic rules would have to be contravened. By and large, this policy change worked well and I am proud of it.
About three years ago, however, some police forces decided to take a very close interest in heavy haulage operations. It is not clear why, because my understanding, based on discussion at retired senior traffic commissioner level, is that operators who conduct heavy haulage work are generally regarded as responsible, compliant hauliers who want to do it right, despite the many challenges they face. There will, of course, be a small proportion of heavy hauliers identified who do not comply, just as there are always hauliers in all sectors who will not comply, but these are the exception and not the rule. With regard to the few forces involved, the most appropriate term would be “persecution and harassment”, even of the largest and most professional operators in the land. I have emailed a report to many of your Lordships about my investigations and I urge your Lordships just to read page 3.
Noble Lords often ask me what is driving this behaviour. The short answer is money. Often, the police officers who decide whether the load needs a police escort are the same ones who will pick up the overtime payments. Furthermore, over the last five years, the income for West Midlands Police, for instance, has increased somewhat: year one, £15,000; year two, £39,000; year three, £36,000. Are your Lordships sitting down comfortably? Year four, £855,000; and year five, projected using the 2023-24 figures, £1.1 million. So we have gone from £15,000 to £1.1 million. The income profile of many other police forces has remained steady, so, for other comparative police forces, you are looking at about £30,000 a year. Some police forces, such as Thames Valley, do not make any charges at all.
We have regulations about how much the police can charge for issuing a firearms certificate—and basically, we screw down the amount the police can charge, so they cannot do a proper job—but none about charges for escorting an abnormal load. There is NPCC guidance, but it is predicated on policing events such as football matches. The police forces involved are charging for a minimum six-hour shift but using the same team to escort several loads within that shift. This cannot be right. It should be noted that a lot of the money eventually comes from government-funded projects such as HS2. I will be tabling amendments about this, and quite a few others about abnormal loads, because relevant STGO legislation is no longer fit for purpose.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her kind words about the new offence with respect to child sexual abuse image generators and I take the opportunity to recognise the work of the specialist police unit that has worked alongside me on these and other issues. Working at the front line of child sexual abuse detection and enforcement is to come up against some of the most sordid and horrendous scenarios that can make you lose faith in humanity, so I want to put on record our huge debt to those in the unit for their courage and commitment.
I was also pleased to hear the Minister’s commitment to criminalise pornography that depicts acts of strangulation and suffocation. This is one of a number of concerns that the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, will speak to shortly, and I shall be supporting her on all her amendments. During the Recess, I chaired a meeting of extremely senior health professionals and the prevalence of young people presenting in clinical settings suffering from violence and abuse during sex was simply horrific, with outcomes ranging from fear and trauma to death itself. There is an epidemic of sexual violence, normalised and driven by pornography, and I very much hope that the noble Baroness will have the support of the whole House on this matter.
I have four further areas of concern and I am going to touch on each very briefly. First, this House successfully introduced amendments to the Data (Use and Access) Act to empower coroners to require technology companies to preserve data when a child has died. At the time, we proposed that preservation notices should be automatic and that statutory guidance should be developed, but this was refused. We now have the law, but bereaved families are still unable to benefit from its provisions, because preservation notices are not being used quickly enough, and nor are the powers fully understood. It is simply heartbreaking to see a parent who has just lost a child become a victim of a system that does not understand or use its own powers. I will be tabling amendments to make the new law work as was promised and as Parliament intended.
Secondly, we have all seen media reports of chatbots suggesting illegal content or activity to children. I remain unclear about the Government’s appetite to strengthen Ofcom’s codes or to resolve the differences of opinion between Parliament and the regulator about the scope of the Online Safety Act. Nevertheless, I will be seeking to ensure that AI chatbots that suggest or facilitate illegal activity are addressed in the Crime and Policing Bill.
Thirdly, as I have indicated, I welcome the CSAM generator offence in the Bill, but a gap remains and I will be tabling amendments to place clear, legally binding duties on developers of generative AI systems to conduct risk assessments, identifying whether and how their systems could be misused for this narrow but devastating purpose.
Finally, I am curious about youth diversion orders. I am by no means against them, but I would like to understand whether they are to be backed up by other support, such as autism screening and therapeutic support. Many at the front line of this issue say that there is a serious lack of resource, and I would be interested to hear from Ministers how young people are to be supported once diverted, and whether the Government have plans to look further at the responsibility of tech companies that deliberately design for constant engagement, even if extreme content is being used simply as bait. It is no longer possible to consider the online world as separate from any other environment and, if we do not impose the legal order we require elsewhere, we will continue to create a place of lawlessness and abuse.
Baroness Bertin (Con)
My Lords, hers is never an easy act to follow but I want to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, so much for her work. I say to her: “Back at you”, as I will be supporting her work in this Bill as well. I also welcome the Minister to this House—what an asset she will be to it and the Government. I graciously thank her and this Government for the announcement around the criminalisation of depictions of strangulation. However, the law has to be well drafted, because the industry will find every loophole it possibly can. It is like water dripping through the cracks. It will already be thinking about it, because it is a very popular and profitable genre, so I would appreciate some back and forth on that to make sure we absolutely get it right. This is a big Bill, so we do not want to spend time arguing over things that we basically agree on.
Pornography has long existed, and it is not going anywhere anytime soon, but its scale, nature and impact have changed dramatically. As many noble Lords have already said, today, free and easily accessible content is increasingly violent, degrading and misogynistic. This is not a niche issue. Over a quarter of the UK population regularly accesses online pornography, a third of men say they watch it weekly, and the average age of first exposure is just 13. Technology such as nudification apps designed to sexually humiliate are still legal and very prolific.
This is not confined to pornography sites. Violent sexual content is now present on social media, X being the worst offender, and mainstream platforms. Homepages of major porn sites display material with titles including words like “attack”, “kidnap”, “force” and “violate”. Mainstream search engines very quickly get you to thousands of videos with harmful titles such as: “He overdid it and now she is dead” and “Lawyer strangled, bound and gagged in a van”—these are just the ones I can read out. I am pleased the little ones have gone from the Chamber. Content involving themes of incest and child abuse are also disturbingly prevalent. The free-to-view porn business model has driven this extremity. This is rewiring how young people think about sex, gender and relationships. We know that toxic masculinity is rising, and experts warn of links between viewing extreme pornography and committing sexual violence. Indeed, online porn has been described by one expert as
“the largest unregulated social experiment in human history”.
We discovered this during the review. The impact is far-reaching. Choking has now become a sexual norm. That is why the law needs to be changed, but it will take a while to reverse this. Some 38% of women under 40 say they have been strangled during sex. Nurses reported to us that they deal with sexually inflicted injuries on a very regular basis. Teachers reported pupils’ confusion over what constitutes sexual assault. Increasingly, there are reports of sexual dysfunction among men who find real-life intimacy less stimulating than online extremes, leading to many relationship breakdowns. When I met with Gisèle Pelicot’s daughter last month, she was adamant that online pornography played a role in her father’s crimes, and Dame Angiolini, in her inquiry, highlighted that Sarah Everard’s murderer had a history of viewing violent pornography.
Yet, despite the harm and the pace at which extreme online content has proliferated, legislation has lagged far behind. There is no external moderation nor proactive monitoring. There is no one government department with overall accountability or responsibility. Laws are patchy and rarely enforced. I am delighted that one recommendation out of 32 has been taken forward, but there is a lot more to do. In stark contrast, the world of offline pornography, such as DVDs, is regulated by the British Board of Film Classification, which my noble friend Lady Benjamin spoke about.
These amendments will absolutely do just that and will seek to reduce this imbalance in the law. It cannot be right that offline law refuses to classify material that promotes or depicts child sexual abuse, incest, trafficking, torture and harmful sexual acts. This has to change. These recommendations and amendments would ensure that not only the act of incest but also its depiction is banned along with material that encourages an interest in child sexual abuse. They would bring parity between material prohibited online and offline. They would also compel sites and platforms to verify the age and consent of anyone appearing on them.
This is not about ending pornography; it is about putting proportionate and necessary guard-rails back in place. I do not stand here naively and think that these amendments will solve everything overnight, but I believe these changes could bring good, workable and enforceable law that, at long last, is in step with technological developments and growing national sentiment.
To our daughters, it would say there is no industry or subculture that condones or excuses violence against them. To the porn industry and the ecosystem it supports, it would say that they can no longer avoid accountability or scrutiny. To our sons—who are also damaged in all this—regulating online pornography says to them that what they see on their screens is not normal, it is not acceptable and it is not inevitable. When we come to later stages, I urge noble Lords and the Government to support these amendments. I apologise for overrunning.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, should be congratulated for her extraordinary achievement in summarising more than 400 densely packed pages of legislation in 15 minutes. By my mathematics, that works out at summarising around 25 pages per minute, so she has set the bar pretty high and I know that her friends on the Government Front Bench will be looking very closely to see if they can follow that.
I follow my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier and the noble Lord, Lord Birt, down the perhaps unpopular opinion in this House of legislation that the answer does not always lie in the statute book. Much of the anti-social behaviour-type issues that we have been talking about in the early part of this very substantial Bill are already illegal activities—they are crimes. The focus of my remarks will be much more on execution, delivery, performance and co-ordination than on the generation of new criminal offences—which are quite often activities that are already illegal.
I hope the Minister will accept that nothing I say today should be taken as a party-political point or a criticism of a Government of one flavour or another. My remarks are intended to address the performance of government as a whole, under various Administrations, and all the agencies involved, including the police. I certainly pay tribute to the police officers who protect us all. We are extremely lucky to have such a high-quality police force and, when there are failings—such as those we have heard about, including from the noble Baroness—they are even more extraordinary because the overall standard is so high.
Despite that, public confidence in local policing has continued to decline. One of the principal factors is that the public see overt offending not being properly prioritised or dealt with. The cumulative effect of the de facto tolerance of street crime means that the public feel powerless and disenfranchised, while lawbreakers are allowed to carry on without fear or sanction. We have heard about, for example, the extraordinary prevalence of bicycle crime. I understand that the clear-up rate is 1%; so, for 99% of the time, criminals are getting away with it. That is normalisation and tolerance of crime, and we cannot allow that to be the case.
We all listen carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, on so many issues and I find myself very much aligned with his view: if we see people riding obviously illegally powerful e-bikes, how does that affect those who take the proper route of purchasing registered vehicles with number plates, insuring and taxing them, getting MOTs, and being prepared to take the sanctions should they break the law? I walk a couple of miles a day around the streets of central London and I have never once seen a policeman stop one of these vehicles.
There has been a lack of co-ordination, and accountability has fallen through the cracks between central and local government. As a final note, there are about 45 police forces; is that really a sensible number in our small group of islands in a modern digital age?
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I add my welcome and thanks to the Minister for her introduction to the Bill. I also thank my noble friend Lady Doocey for setting out the Liberal Democrat stall so cogently both on policing more generally and on this Bill. On these Benches, we recognise the imperative to make our streets safer and to equip the police with the tools necessary to address modern crime. We support the elements of the Bill that tackle knife crime, combat online child exploitation and pursue criminal proceeds.
However, the foundation of our approach to public safety is our demand that new laws should be not just tough but fair and proportionate. We reject measures that risk the erosion of civil liberties or the criminalisation of the vulnerable. A core priority for me and my party is ensuring that our legal framework is modernised and future-proofed against evolving digital and online threats, as my noble friend emphasised. We support the new measures concerning the online supply chain of offensive weapons. We welcome the introduction of civil penalties aimed at strengthening accountability for businesses and online platforms involved in the advertising or selling of unlawful weapons. To enhance police intervention capability, we will, however, propose an amendment mandating a proactive real-time system for reporting under the new duty to report to the police bulk or suspicious sales of bladed articles.
The current cybersecurity landscape is badly hampered by outdated legislation. The Computer Misuse Act 1990 is now 34 years old, stemming from a time before widespread internet access. It inadvertently criminalises legitimate cybersecurity activities such as vulnerability research, which are essential for national security. We call for the introduction of a statutory public interest defence within that Act to decriminalise the vital work of cybersecurity professionals and provide clearer legal protections.
Furthermore, to combat organised crime and address widespread online fraud, we want to see the creation of a specific criminal offence for digital identity theft. This new offence must target the unauthorised obtaining of personal or sensitive information, such as passwords or biometric data, with the clear intent to impersonate an individual for unauthorised activities.
We support new online child protection offences targeting AI-generated child sexual abuse material and enhanced Border Force powers to compel device unlocking for CSAM searches. On extreme pornography, we will strongly support amendments to be tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, following her review, extending the online definition to explicitly cover incest, pornography, and material depicting adults acting as or depicting children.
We want robust safeguards against the inappropriate use of intrusive technology. We oppose police use of live facial recognition—surveillance in public spaces without a statutory framework—given concerns regarding privacy and algorithmic bias. Deployment of LFR should be explicitly authorised by a judicial warrant and governed by a statutory code of practice, complete with an independent oversight body.
For antisocial behaviour measures, accountability and fairness are crucial. New respect orders must be subject to rigorous democratic scrutiny. Applications need to undergo full public consultation and should be approved by the relevant full council or its executive or cabinet before implementation.
We oppose the punitive increase in fixed penalty notices for breaches of public spaces protection orders and community protection notices from £100 to £500. This sharp increase risks intensifying abuses and arbitrary enforcement against the most vulnerable individuals. We will continue to protect the fundamental right to peaceful protest.
On these Benches, we will seek to amend the Bill to ensure that it is rooted, online and offline, in accountability, proportionality and the protection of civil liberties. We must ensure that this legislation is fair, effective and fit for the future.
Lord Farmer (Con)
My Lords, I also support much of this Bill. The Home Secretary introduced the Bill to drive her Government’s safer streets mission and to halve violence against women and girls in a decade, so I welcome the tightening of the law in Clauses 84 and 85 around voyeurism and criminalising exposure intended for sexual gratification or humiliation. Despite the Supreme Court disallowing biological males from using women’s changing rooms and spaces, this still happens in many contexts. Not all are motivated by voyeurism—which is already a crime—or because someone wishes to expose themselves for sexual gratification or humiliation, but we should not turn a blind eye to these possible motivations; consideration should be given to them. Can the Minister confirm that the new law will protect women and girls while everyone catches up with the Supreme Court ruling?
Clause 147, which seeks to extend polygraph testing to more offenders, including those posing a risk of committing certain sexual offences, should shore up protection against predation on women and girls. If technology helps us manage sex offenders more smartly, let us use it.
However, as we have heard much today, Clause 191 cuts across the Bill’s protections against predation. Despite risks to women, this clause, intended to transform our societal approach to abortion, was appended in a rushed, emotive way in the other House. There is a pattern here. Safe access zones around all abortion clinics were also hurriedly appended to the Public Order Act in the Commons. That was despite testimonies from women now with grown-up children whom they were very glad they decided not to terminate after talking to caring and compassionate people outside clinics. Once such measures appear in legislation, they acquire unassailability on the grounds of care and compassion for women seeking abortions.
Clause 191 repeats the same pseudo-virtuous stitch up: a short discussion in the other House on Report of a Bill that has absolutely nothing to do with abortion, with the assumption that all fair-minded people should agree to it. Those who do not can just be dismissed as reactionaries, because abortion is treated as an unlimited good in our topsy-turvy moral universe. Whatever we individually think about abortion, the laws of this land and a wide range of other considerations are being ignored or twisted out of shape to meet the insatiability of extreme bodily autonomy. Safe access zones sacrificed freedom of speech on that altar.
Clause 191 shreds a woman’s criminal responsibility and, with it, a vital protection for her against a partner or family member coercing or predating on her to have a late-term abortion. Bringing about her own late-stage termination of a baby that has been kicking, hiccupping and otherwise moving in utero will leave a long tail of effects on her life. Decriminalisation is only caring and compassionate in a very narrow and short-term way. This House will discuss ramifications of allowing terminations up to birth, but the only fit place for Clause 191 is the cutting room floor.
I apologise on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie, for not being here today. She will table amendments against trafficking for sexual exploitation, to outlaw lucrative UK-based pimping websites which enable traffickers to advertise their victims easily and ply this vile trade.
Lord Walney (CB)
My Lords, having nodded along to those who complained about the length and diverse nature of the Bill, I am going to propose five modest additions to it, which in their entirety would take up less than an extra page to add to the 400 that the Bill already contains. These measures are related to the review I carried out in my capacity as the Government’s former independent adviser on political violence and disruption. The review had such a profound impact on the last Government that the Prime Minister called a general election 24 hours after my having published it, so this is the first legislative opportunity to enact some of these measures.
This is a timely moment. The Prime Minister rightly stood up after the Heaton Park synagogue murders and said that he would do whatever it takes to keep the Jewish community safe. There are a number of measures in the Bill that will help protect vulnerable communities and individuals, such as Jewish people, in this increasingly dangerous and intimidating environment and better balance the right to protest, which is indeed fundamental, with the wider rights of communities and individuals to live their lives free from disruption.
But it must go further in a number of key ways: first, on cumulative impact, where the focus of the Prime Minister and Home Secretary is welcome, looking at the harm that has been done to Jewish communities in particular from the repeated, weekly marches that have taken place, which have made many areas seem unsafe for Jewish people. The commitment made so far, which is to add cumulative impact into Sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act, already exists—unless the Minister can explain to me how it will be extended. The important thing is to add cumulative impact into Section 13 of the Act, which enables the police to recommend to the Home Secretary that a procession should not go ahead on particular days. Simply amending the precise route or the timing is not going to be sufficient. I do not want to go over my time, so let me race through the other measures.
Secondly, on protecting police resources, the Government should consider adding into Sections 12, 13 and 14 the difficulty of police being able to resource repeat marches and the effect that this is having on other key areas.
Thirdly, on protecting our democracy, places that are central to the functioning of our democracy, such as council offices and MPs’ offices, should have their protection strengthened, alongside the very welcome strengthening of the protection of places of worship.
Fourthly, there should be enhanced powers to tackle extreme protest activity. However anyone comes down on the recent issue of Palestine Action, it was a nonsense that it took five years of it being able to carry out crimes and advertise them for it to reach the terrorism threshold. I hope the Government will consider my proposal of an extreme protest activity order.
Finally, there should be clearer statutory measures to prohibit public funding going to bodies such as Kneecap, which received a public grant that could not be taken back by the Government, despite its promotion of criminal activity and its undermining of democratic governance.
Baroness Sugg (Con)
My Lords, I will use my time to focus on the protection of women and girls. The first issue I wish to raise is honour-based abuse—a crime motivated by the perpetrator’s perception that an individual has somehow shamed or may shame a family or community. These crimes, which include devastating honour-motivated killings, female genital mutilation and forced marriage, have happened in the shadows for too long. It has been pointed out that there is a lot in the Bill, but honour-based abuse is not currently mentioned. I am not suggesting a new offence, but I want to ask the Minister whether he will incorporate a statutory definition of honour-based abuse in the Bill, with language strongly supported and agreed by survivors and the groups and charities that work with them, alongside issuing formal guidance to ensure understanding and consistency across agencies.
Offences related to honour-based abuse continue to have the lowest conviction of all flagged crimes, and it remains hidden, misunderstood and underprosecuted. Far too often, cases are misidentified or inaccurately recorded, which obscures the true scale of the problem and limits the protection available to victims. Collective and family involvement is not consistently recognised in investigations, and courts are left without a clear framework to identify and address honour as a motive. A survivor-led and sector-backed definition has already been developed, which recognises the role of collective perpetration, honour-based motivations and the powerful silencing effect of shame. This definition would provide a consistent basis for identification, recording and intervention, and effective protection for those at risk.
I also intend to raise whether the Government will consider adding honour as an aggravating factor in sentencing, which would ensure that honour-based motives are formally recognised by the courts and better reflect the gravity and broader societal impacts of these crimes. The announcement in August that the Government intend to introduce a definition and accompanying guidance was hugely welcome, and this change has been campaigned for for many years by many people, including Yasmin Javed, whose daughter Fawziyah was so tragically murdered in the name of honour. The Bill provides the earliest legislative opportunity to act on that commitment, so I hope that the Minister will be positive in his response.
On other issues relating to women and girls, I fully support my noble friend Lady Bertin’s work on regulating online pornographic content and hope that the Government will take the opportunity to deliver many of her recommendations in her powerful report, Creating a Safer World. I also support my noble friend Lady Owen in her ongoing work on image-based sexual abuse.
Finally, I turn to Clause 191 on the decriminalisation of women in relation to abortion. Noble Lords will have received much correspondence on the subject, and I want to use this time to clarify what Clause 191 does and does not do. Clause 191 removes women from the criminal justice system, meaning that they will no longer be investigated or prosecuted for having an abortion. What the clause does not do is make abortion legal up to birth. There is no change to the 24-week limit. There is no change to the 10-week limit on telemedicine. Abortions would still require two doctors’ signatures to be legally provided, women would still have to meet one of the grounds laid out in the Abortion Act 1967 and, importantly, non-consensual abortion would remain a crime at any gestation. Abortion outside these limits remains illegal, and anybody, including a medical professional, who assisted a woman in obtaining an abortion outside this law would be liable for prosecution.
The reason this clause has been introduced is because more than 100 women, many of them vulnerable and abused, have been investigated by police in recent years, and these investigations have taken many years. Those investigations themselves can prevent women getting the healthcare, mental health support and referral to appropriate support services that they need. I appreciate that noble Lords will want to discuss this clause in more detail in Committee, and I very much welcome that. It is supported by leading medical organisations, and I encourage interested noble Lords to read what they have to say.
I also highlight that decriminalising women in relation to abortion is not unusual. It would bring England and Wales in line with Northern Ireland and 50 countries worldwide, including Canada, Australia, New Zealand and over 31 European jurisdictions—and, indeed, the United States, where women can never be prosecuted for having an abortion. Those countries have laws that criminalise those who provide an abortion, and that will remain the case here.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
It is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg. First, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Hanson of Flint on securing the considerable legal services of my noble friend Lady Levitt. The Government are very lucky to have them both steering this supertanker. There is much to commend: its focus on several vulnerable groups, including exploited children, victims of stalking, cuckooing and so on. I hope to speak to these parts in Committee. There is further scope to innovate in other areas genuinely to improve criminal justice.
I still have some concerns about an arms race begun over 30 years ago and escalated by some parts of this measure. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994—some noble Lords are too young to remember—began raising public expectations that Governments could legislate their way to a harmonious society. Politicians purported to do this even in times of austerity, amid real-time cuts to living standards, in the justice system, and to youth, mental health and addiction services. Continued rhetorical attacks on the judiciary and fiscal attacks on legal aid have left swathes of ordinary people thinking that the law is not for them. It will arrest and prosecute them for a growing array of crimes and misdemeanours but rarely protect them from abusive employers, landlords or unaccountable corporations. That is why I welcome the imminent Hillsborough law.
The disillusionment can be disastrous. Knee-jerk politics fights the alligators but never drains the swamp. I fear that we have been breeding alligators in a swamp in which only populist far-right politics thrives. We see this long shadow in compromises to due process rights, the unregulated deployment of technology at the cost of personal privacy, and always more police powers; every year, yet more powers—broad, vague and never mirrored by measures improving police vetting, training and discipline.
In 1994, it was the end of the right to silence, suspicionless stop and search, and restrictions on gatherings featuring music with a repetitive beat. Now, and for years, the target has been non-violent protest. I share the Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner’s concerns about our existing public order statute book; and now we have the measures proposed in this Bill, and those trailed as likely new government amendments to come in Committee, to restrict cumulative protest. Protests against asylum hotels make me very anxious. But I would no more ban them than those against job losses, benefit cuts, environmental degradation, war crimes, or racism and antisemitism. What would blanket bans on face coverings at protests mean for dissidents outside the embassy of an authoritarian foreign power? With all its churches, restrictions on protesting “in the vicinity of” places of worship could render our capital an extremely un-British protest-free zone.
Recently Ministers have warned, rightly, of the existential dangers of a far-right Administration. We must never write, let alone legislate for, a blank cheque for potential future anti-democratic abuse. While today is one for broad brushes and four-minute speeches, I hope noble Lords will come prepared for line-by-line forensic scrutiny of Bill and amendment text in the vital weeks to come. The other place may invoke the will of the people, but here we read the small print.
Lord Vaizey of Didcot (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the clerks, the Whips and the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, for allowing me to change my place in the running order. I declare my interest as the UK chair of Common Sense Media, a US not-for-profit that campaigns for children’s safety on the internet. I had to step out of the debate briefly because I wanted to take part in a debate on music education in the Moses Room, which allows me to continue a tradition that I have set up for myself to always shoehorn the arts into any debate that we have here.
I echo to a certain extent the excellent sentiment behind the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. There is an interesting theme developing in this debate—an undercurrent coming from many noble Lords: do we need endless pieces of criminal legislation? Do we narrowly focus on the specifics that happen to exercise the public mind—or the political mind, perhaps—today and miss the big picture? I have long campaigned on the importance of the arts in the criminal justice system and, of course, the importance of the arts in our society in helping people to find interests and ways of expressing themselves that contribute to a harmonious society. I completely agree with the noble Baroness that this is impossible to legislate for. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Timpson, does so much incredible work as Prisons Minister and, in a previous life, in promoting the use of the arts in this way.
I was very struck by the speech of my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier, which set this tone about constant recourse to legislation. I was reminded that, when I first became the Arts Minister, I inherited the Digital Economy Act and the new legislation to prosecute people who downloaded illegal music. I thought then that going after teenagers in their bedrooms was a fool’s errand; there would be a technology solution. The music industry found a solution by using existing legislation; it used the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 to prosecute the big websites that were ripping off music makers, and in that way we started to get things more on an even keel.
It has long been a slightly bizarre obsession of mine as to why we do not have a criminal code in this country—one piece of paper, as it were, that lists the criminal offences—which would allow the Government of the day to do exactly what my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier was speaking about: cross-reference whether the offences that they are now bringing into law already exist or whether there are existing offences that could cover the current passion. For example, I bow to no one in wanting to defend retail workers from attacks by increasingly aggressive shoplifters, but I want to prevent everyone being attacked in this way. Do we need a specific offence for retail workers, or does this merely clog up the system? Indeed, to a certain extent, legislation such as this misses the big picture. The noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, referred to the merger of police forces, which is long overdue, and we have referred in this debate to clogged cases.
Having said all that, of course, let me now do a complete reverse ferret—channel my inner noble Lord, Lord Walney, if you like—and say that I also wanted to speak in this debate to offer my unequivocal support to the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. She and many other noble Baronesses and noble Lords have done incredible work in bringing the criminal statute book up to date in terms of the way that technology has fundamentally changed how pornography is used and has fundamentally impacted the lives of young people. I will support anything that can make that more coherent and allow us to have greater powers to crack down on this great technological scourge.
Lord Elliott of Mickle Fell (Con)
My Lords, there are a great many aspects of the Bill with which I agree, and my understanding of it has been greatly enhanced by today’s debate. However, I am uncomfortable with Clause 191. Decriminalising abortion up to birth for women clearly marks a significant shift in the law on abortion in the UK. Over the coming months, we will hear many arguments about Clause 191, drawing on the diverse expertise of this House, but I wish to focus on three points: parliamentary procedure, unanswered questions, and the Salisbury convention.
On the first point, it should be noted that Clause 191 has received precious little parliamentary scrutiny. By way of comparison, consider the level of scrutiny that both Houses have given the assisted dying Bill. That Bill had more than 100 hours of debate in the other place; in contrast, Clause 191 had just a few hours. That Bill has an impact assessment of over 150 pages; in contrast, Clause 191 is not covered in the Crime and Policing Bill’s impact assessment, and up-to-date information is not published on how many abortions take place through the pills by post scheme. If the assisted dying Bill has not been sufficiently scrutinised, as many have suggested, clearly the scrutiny of Clause 191 is insufficient.
Secondly, decriminalising abortion raises a plethora of unanswered questions, and when questions have been asked of the Government, they have often received weak replies. For example, the noble Baroness, Lady Foster of Aghadrumsee—who is not in her place, sadly—tabled the following, pertinent Written Question on 6 October, which is worth quoting in full:
“To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the potential risks to vulnerable women, including those who may be subject to coercion or abuse, if abortion were to be decriminalised; and what safeguarding measures they plan to put in place to protect them”.
That is a very sensible question. Sadly, the Government’s response on 10 October did not inspire much confidence. It began simply:
“No assessment has been made”.
I question how we are meant to vote on or, indeed, debate Clause 191 when no assessment has been made of the consequences. It clearly needs much more scrutiny than it has received thus far.
Finally, it is worth noting that the Salisbury convention does not apply to Clause 191, because this proposal was not included in the Government’s manifesto last year. This omission is perhaps unsurprising, because it does not command the support of the public. Polling from Ipsos earlier this year indicated that 63% of people support the status quo of 24 weeks, and polling from Whitestone Insight in May showed that 62% of voters agree that having an illegal abortion should continue to be a criminal offence.
In this House, we rightly pride ourselves on our commitment to scrutinising legislation clearly and effectively and providing the necessary time to challenge how it will be implemented. I know that noble Lords will be tabling amendments to Clause 191 in Committee; I will be looking closely at them to ensure that the clause receives the level of scrutiny it merits for the profound impact it would have on society.
Lord Cromwell (CB)
My Lords, economic crime, in particular fraud, is now the leading form of UK crime and, together with money laundering and bribery, costs the UK billions of pounds each year. It also undermines public trust, public confidence and economic growth. The good news is that enforcement against these economic crimes and associated confiscation of assets, while complex, generates substantial receipts—some £566 million per year currently. Yet, while we entrust the police and other law agencies with more and more tasks, mostly both difficult and vital, the very agencies responsible for securing these funds from criminals face acute resource challenges, particularly in recruiting and retaining specialist staff, updating skills and modernising ageing IT systems and capabilities, as a number of other speakers across the House have referred to so powerfully today.
I suggest to the House—and not for the first time—that those enforcing the laws we so carefully create and pass here must be properly resourced. An obvious means of doing this would be to use the confiscated criminal assets via a ring-fenced fund to resource the agencies concerned. There are two existing schemes in this area. The economic crime levy is an annual charge on UK businesses regulated under the money-laundering regulations. This private sector contribution could logically be matched by greater reinvestment of enforcement receipts. The current asset recovery incentivisation scheme, ARIS, is subject to the curiously named “annularity rules”. This means that money not used by the year end, which is sometimes just weeks away from when the money is obtained, is lost. A ring-fenced fund would enable stronger agencies, which would then deliver greater asset recovery and confiscation which, reinvested into the fight against economic crime, would establish a virtuous circle of self-financing investment and effectiveness.
Beyond the obvious capacity and effectiveness benefits from such targeted resources, a ring-fenced fund would demonstrate to working people that the Government are exploring all avenues to crack down on economic crime. There is a certain fiscal poetry here—not a phrase one hears very often, I believe—in that this would all be achieved without adding to anyone’s tax burden, but by making the criminals pay: a form of “polluter pays”, if you will.
In the House of Commons, an amendment to the Bill was put down to require the Government simply to investigate the viability of such a ring-fenced economic crime fighting fund using a proportion of the assets I have referred to. This cross-party proposal secured broad parliamentary support. It was signed by 28 MPs from Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat and Green parties on Report. Unfortunately, there was insufficient time to debate the amendment, but there were productive conversations with the relevant Ministers.
To underline again, the amendment did not suggest, and I do not suggest, that the Bill is used to establish such a fund, simply that its viability is investigated. I have already shared these ideas and, indeed, a draft of the amendment with the Minister. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s thoughts on this subject when he winds up this debate and would also welcome a meeting to discuss it with him.
Baroness Shawcross-Wolfson (Con)
My Lords, we live in an age where pretty much all of us carry in our pocket the means to access pornographic content so extreme that it would be illegal for any shop to sell it to any adult, anywhere in the country and, until very recently, children have had ready access to this extreme content. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hazarika, said—it bears repeating—44% of children see depictions of rape in pornography before they turn 18. I think everyone in this House would accept that, since the early 2000s, there has been a huge change in who sees pornography and what pornography they are seeing. However, by and large, the regulatory framework has not changed. It is not designed for the digital age or the smartphone age, and it is certainly not designed for the age of AI, where anyone can generate a pornographic image in seconds.
Our legislation must catch up. The provisions in the Online Safety Act and the Data Act are an important first step, but more is needed. While running the No. 10 Policy Unit for Rishi Sunak, I pushed for an independent review to look at the problems associated with online pornography and to advise the Government on what could be done. That review was established in 2023 and my noble friend Lady Bertin was appointed lead reviewer.
I am extremely glad that the current Government shared our concerns and continued to support the work of the independent review, which, as we have heard, published a comprehensive and shocking report earlier this year. It is thanks to my noble friend Lady Bertin and her team that we now have a much clearer understanding of what is happening online and the impact it is having in the real world. As she set out in her speech, our failure to regulate online pornography has facilitated an industry that is
“increasingly violent, degrading and misogynistic”.
It is an industry that directs users towards ever more extreme content, and in doing so it is changing attitudes and fuelling violence towards women and girls. Indeed, almost every month seems to bring fresh evidence of the damage being done to children, to women and to those viewing this harmful content—content that goes unchecked because we have failed to apply our existing, settled laws and regulations to the online world.
In the pre-internet age, we had a broadly effective mechanism for regulating pornography through classification. We balanced the rights of consenting adults with the need to protect society. For over 40 years, legislation has ensured that pornographic videos are regulated by the British Board of Film Classification. Depictions of illegal activity such as rape, and harmful activity such as violent sexual activity, are banned. However, this regulation has never been extended to cover online pornography. There is nothing rational about a system that says content is illegal and harmful when watched on a DVD, but legal and permissible when watched on the internet. If we still believe that it is wrong and harmful for adults to watch depictions of incest on video, Blu-ray or DVD, how can we believe that that content should be readily available online?
In this Bill, the Government have a chance to act decisively, and I am extremely grateful for the commitment to bring forward an amendment to ban depictions of strangulation and suffocation in pornography. That is an important start but, during the passage of the Bill, I hope the House will agree to go further. My starting point is that we should apply the same standards to films that are distributed online as we already do to those that are distributed offline. It raises legitimate questions of enforcement and regulatory capacity. Those are valid concerns and I hope that we will debate them in Committee. However, I do not believe it should raise concerns about freedom of expression: after all, I am simply proposing that we apply and enforce our existing standards consistently—unless, of course, some would like to argue that our current laws for offline pornography have been stifling our freedom for decades and should now be relaxed, in which case I look forward to debating that, too.
I know that regulation in the digital age is not straightforward. Having spent many years in government, I have every sympathy for the current Government, who may well think that this is simply too hard to do. It is hard to do. But I would say to them that it is too important not to do, which is why I will be supporting the amendments in this space, including those from my noble friends Lady Owen and Lady Bertin.
Baroness Featherstone (LD)
My Lords, I wish to address three issues. The first is the long-awaited duty of mandatory reporting of child sexual abuse. This is a key recommendation of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, but with a strengthened and more encompassing base, and a key issue supported by the NSPCC.
This mandatory provision is born of tragedy: it reflects too many cases where children found the courage to speak but nothing was done. But, while the principle is right, the drafting is too narrow, too timid and risks being ineffective in practice. The duty to report is triggered only when a disclosure is made or abuse is witnessed. Yet most abuse is not disclosed, and rarely is it seen first-hand. Professionals in health, education and faith settings often encounter warning signs, not confessions. The duty must extend to situations where there are reasonable grounds to suspect abuse.
Secondly, the Bill currently imposes no real sanction for failure to report, and a law without consequence is not a law that can change culture. There should be a clear offence of deliberate failure to act when a child’s disclosure is known.
Thirdly, there is a risk that the present wording could sweep in minor consensual activity between young people or undermine trust in health services. That must be corrected because the duty should target exploitation and coercion, not teenage relationships or confidential medical advice.
Fourthly, implementation matters, and we will need proper training and triage mechanisms to prevent overreporting and resources for local authorities and police to respond swiftly and sensitively.
The second issue is that we need to introduce a penalty for the intention to conceal. All too often, the orthodoxy is for individuals to feel a pressure to protect the organisation they serve—too big to fail. Individuals are too scared to report. Individuals who are protecting their institution must risk penalty.
My third issue is that when I served in the Home Office I had the privilege of introducing and funding the “ugly mugs” scheme. The principle behind it was not controversial. When a sex worker experiences violence or a threat, it enables them to report it anonymously so that others are warned. That information is their only line of defence, and since it was introduced it has saved lives, prevented repeated attacks and encouraged people who would never otherwise go near the police to start trusting them again.
New Clause 1, as tabled in the Commons, directly implicates online platforms and intermediaries that currently help sex workers publish adverts or manage listings. That is one of the main ways that the ugly mugs scheme engages—through alerts, listing of known bad actors and facilitating reporting. It has been truly successful in helping protect sex workers from dangerous clients. Whatever one’s view of prostitution, no one should be assaulted, raped or murdered for the work they do.
Ugly mugs was never about endorsing prostitution; it was about reducing harm and preventing homicide. The evidence is clear: where harm-reduction schemes exist, sex workers are better able to report violence, share intelligence and access justice. Where they are removed, people go underground. It is a dangerous illusion to think that, by abolishing the tools that keep people safe, we abolish the reality of prostitution. We do not; we simply make it more dangerous.
The duty of any Government, whatever their moral stance, is to protect life and prevent violence. Ugly mugs does precisely that, quietly and effectively, at very modest cost. Closing it would not advance women’s safety; it would imperil it.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, there are necessary provisions in the Bill but there is also window dressing. While we all deplore assaults on shop workers, we do not need this new measure. There are good laws of theft, robbery and assault. What we lack are the resources to arrest and prosecute. Last night, the Metropolitan Police announced that London will be left with just two police stations with front counters operating 24 hours a day—10 more are set to close under cost-cutting measures. That is not good enough.
Today’s Times reports that family drug and alcohol courts face closure, yet each such court case saves local authorities £58,000 in care costs and £15,000 in legal costs. Instead of chasing headlines, the Government should be funding the police, the CPS, those on legal aid and the courts properly. The Ministry of Justice has been starved of money by the previous Government—I accept that—and it is not being helped by the current one.
Clause 39 is well intentioned. It will show shoplifters who regularly steal low-value goods that this may be treated as a serious offence, triable in the Crown Court. But it is really important that only the prosecutor and not the defendant can go on to elect a Crown Court trial. If not, our Crown Courts will be overwhelmed. Backlogs are already years long.
I welcome the measures in Part 8, which are directed at electronic devices to steal cars. These are necessary and overdue. The measures to address so-called SIM farms are also to be welcomed.
I agree entirely with what the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said about the changes proposed under Clause 82 to the law of limitation. These are unnecessary and will be unhelpful.
Finally, I turn to Clause 191—the decriminalisation of abortion. I make it plain that I am not in principle opposed to abortion, but there was no prior scrutiny of, or public consultation on, this. The intention, which I accept is benign, of not criminalising a woman who aborts her own child risks new evils. Without the safeguards of the current law, women may be harassed into abortion, and a woman will be permitted, without medical advice, to abort a baby right up to due birth date. Just think about that; on any measure, it is a human being at that stage. What if the baby survives but is damaged? Will they sue the mother?
I agree with what my noble friend Lord Elliott of Mickle Fell has had to say about this provision. We must look at it very carefully. Such an important change to the law regarding human life should be based on proper inquiry and evidence, and then, if necessary and appropriate, made through measured change in measured circumstances to the Abortion Act 1967.
To wind up, 240 seconds to debate 400 pages is not very much. We must be allocated proper time in Committee. It is likely that more baubles will be added to the Christmas tree.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)
I welcome the Minister to her role. She introduced this large Bill with admirable clarity.
The need to address the mandatory reporting of abuse of children is urgent, but the Bill should go wider than sexual abuse, because the criminal exploitation of children is associated with all types of abuse. As physical abuse occurs, the abuser initially tends to use the loophole to claim it is “reasonable chastisement” and avoid action being taken, yet this is linked to increasing violence, sexual abuse and emotional exploitation.
Such abuse and the driving of children to crime can happen within the home. The perpetrator grooming and using and abusing a child is not always from outside the home. The child, deeply disturbed, is pushed into criminal activity that escalates with frightening speed from relatively minor offences to very serious crime. There is an urgent need to ensure that children are protected from ongoing exploitation.
These children are subject to significant threats, such as them or their family being killed. Some have acid or heat burns and some are scolded or stabbed—all as ways of intimidating. Some 90% of these children do not disclose who is abusing them. The child is terrified; they cannot protect themselves.
Many struggle with the idea that the child is both a victim and a perpetrator at the same time. When it comes to the use, earlier on, of this loophole of claiming “reasonable chastisement”, it is important to remember that bruises do not show on skin of colour. Children need equal protection from assault and battery, just as adults have. That loophole needs to be closed.
The prevention of the exploitation of children with the criminal exploitation of children protection orders is long overdue. These will provide protection of the child, allowing services to intervene earlier and disrupt the business model of criminal gangs that control these children, at times even operating from inside prison. The perpetrator’s defence of reasonably assuming that the young person is over 18 leaves the door open to victimising teenagers without protection. We must not think that we will be adequately protecting children by only requiring the mandatory reporting of child sexual abuse.
On a completely different subject, if we are to protect all on our streets, we must lower the drink drive limit to 20 milligrams per hundred millilitres of blood. To leave it as high as it is leaves lives endangered every day.
Baroness Monckton of Dallington Forest (Con)
My Lords, I am deeply concerned about the process—or lack of it—around Clause 191, which was tacked to the end of an unrelated Bill via a Back-Bench amendment in the Commons, with just 46 minutes of Back-Bench debate. Many MPs wanting to speak were unable to; this is not a responsible way to make law.
As many other noble Lords have said, I fear there would be an increase in the number of late-term abortions with no medical supervision whatever, particularly as women continue to be able to obtain pills through the post without an in-person consultation. That came in during the special circumstances of the pandemic, but it has not been rescinded as it should be, even though we are no longer in such a health emergency.
Recent figures show that 54,000 women were admitted to NHS hospitals in England for the treatment of complications arising from the use of such abortion pills—a 50% rise from the figures before the pandemic. Analysis of accredited official statistics published by NHS England and the Office for Health Improvement and Disparities shows that one in 17 women self-managing their abortion at home were subsequently admitted for hospital treatment. This clause will scarcely improve that.
I fear two things: first, that we are creating a modern-day equivalent of back-street abortion and, secondly, that it will assist the coercion of women into late terminations by coercive and abusive partners. They could just argue that this is legal now.
The clause would also remove the vital protection for unborn babies mature enough to survive outside the womb. There is no popular demand or pressure for this form of infanticide. If the public were made fully aware of this, I am sure the great majority would regard this clause not as progressive but as barbaric. I am profoundly worried about this clause and will seek to address it in Committee.
Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)
My Lords, this Bill presents a unique opportunity to close long-standing accountability gaps in the UK’s universal jurisdiction laws and will ensure, if the amendments are received, that perpetrators of the world’s most serious crimes can be brought to justice on British soil. The House has heard me on a number of occasions advocate for a review of the universal jurisdiction laws as they operate in this country.
Many noble Lords may ask what universal jurisdiction is all about. UK courts can prosecute certain international crimes under the principle of universal jurisdiction, a legal framework that allows states to pursue justice for the most serious offences committed abroad, even when the case has no direct connection to the UK. These crimes include genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and torture. Universal jurisdiction reflects the global consensus that such crimes are so grave that they demand accountability, wherever they occur.
However, there is a certain problem here in the United Kingdom, in that our organisations that are involved in human rights have seen, over and again, ways in which prosecution fails to take place because we require residency and nationality, so that a person who is present in the UK—sometimes coming to speak at a conference or to find a university for one of their children—cannot be prosecuted because they are not a British national and do not perhaps have residency in this country.
At a time when the number of such crimes—grievous crimes—is rising globally, reform is necessary. It would uphold the rule of law, enhance national security and help build safer communities both at home and abroad. We are renowned worldwide for our commitment to the rule of law—Britain probably leads the world—yet there is this serious gap. At present, the UK’s ability to prosecute grave international crimes under universal jurisdiction is severely limited, as I have just said.
The International Criminal Court Act declared that prosecutions could be brought for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity only where the suspect is a UK national or resident. It means that individuals accused of serious international crimes enter this country and do not face justice—and we can give you examples of that having happened. It is illogical, because we can prosecute internationally renowned torturers under the torture convention and the law that we used to introduce that as a domestic crime, but we cannot prosecute those others for the crimes that I have listed—war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and sexual crimes that have been weaponised as weapons of war.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights, on which I sit, led by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, published two reports this year, one relating to this Bill and another to Daesh/ISIL and people who have returned from criminal activities abroad. Both those reports recommended that there should be a review of the universal jurisdiction laws in this country. The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, a former Director of Public Prosecutions, pointed out that it was illogical that we can prosecute for torture but we cannot prosecute for all these other grievous crimes. The example that I wanted to give briefly was that of a Rwandan general, James Kaberebe, who has been known to have committed many crimes and come to this country yet not been in any way detained or prosecuted.
I strongly recommend that the House considers this issue in the fullness of time, along with the many valuable recommendations made in other speeches.
Baroness Grey-Thompson (CB)
My Lords, I declare an interest as a president of the Local Government Association and chair of the Duke of Edinburgh awards.
While I broadly welcome this Bill, I have a number of reservations—but I strongly support the work of the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, on tackling pornography. I am sorry that my noble friend Lord Hogan-Howe is not in his place at the moment, because I support the fervour with which he wishes to improve cycling safety.
I shall concentrate my comments on the mandatory reporting of child sex abuse—I have a Private Member’s Bill on this topic; I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, for responding to me on that at Second Reading. Tom Perry, who previously worked with Mandate Now, has said:
“Among the 82% of countries in the rest of the world that mandate prescribed personnel to report child sexual abuse, none employ such a dilute approach”.
The impact assessment for this Bill says that there will be an increase of only around eight extra reports per annum per police force—hardly ground-breaking.
In April 2025, the Home Office published a progress update on tackling child sex abuse and found that the scale of child sexual abuse was “truly staggering”. Children are 20% of the population but are the victims in 40% of all sexual offences. The Local Government Association estimates that only one in three children who are sexually abused by an adult tell someone. The Centre for Crime and Justice Studies estimates that 85% of child sexual abuse goes undetected and unreported.
While the Home Office update states that the Government are committed to tackling child sex abuse and will respond to the report from the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, a system that requires abuse to be disclosed by the child, witnessed by the reporter or confessed by the perpetrator before a report is mandated is far too weak. What His Majesty’s Government propose falls short of the recommendations made in IICSA; the recommendation from IICSA is for anyone in a position of trust, whereas the scope of the proposed Bill is much reduced. This Bill excludes leadership and supervisory roles from the duty to report. Furthermore, only disclosed and witnessed abuse is covered. No criminal penalties are proposed for a failure to report, meaning that suspected child sexual abuse may continue to go unreported with no repercussions.
Lastly, the confidentiality duties for religious and medical sectors remain open to interpretation or to possible future exemption. The IICSA report shows that international evidence supports the view that England and Wales ought to introduce mandatory reporting laws to enable the police and local authorities better to identify children in need of protection. We must learn from other areas where mandatory reporting has been implemented, such as female genital mutilation, and endeavour to ensure that we have a clear, comprehensive and effective law. Our children deserve better.
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
My Lords, I welcome the Minister to her new role, and I very much look forward to working with her. I further welcome the clarification that this Bill brings to the law on spiking and the new offence of taking non-consensual intimate images. I very much look forward to supporting my noble friend Lady Sugg on her amendments on honour-based abuse and my noble friend Lady Bertin on her amendments on online pornography. I want to take this opportunity to congratulate my noble friend Lady Bertin on her brilliant review and thank her for her tireless efforts pushing for comprehensive law on online pornography.
I turn now to the new taking offence. I greatly welcome the implementation of the Law Commission recommendation to update the pre-existing voyeurism and upskirting offences and implement a single taking offence. I am very pleased to see that it is vitally a consent-based offence, removing the unnecessary burden of having to prove the motivation of the perpetrator, which has featured in previous iterations of image-based abuse offences. However, it is vital that we further strengthen this offence, by increasing the time limits prosecutors have to bring forward charges, so that victims are not inadvertently timed out by the six-month time limit of a summary offence.
In February, the Government gave me an undertaking to extend the time limits for the non-consensual creation offence in the data Bill after it was highlighted by the campaign group #NotYourPorn. The extension of the time limit here means that, for the creation offence, victims have three years from when the offence is committed or alternatively from when the CPS has enough evidence to prosecute. Given that we have already achieved a legal precedent for extending the time limits on image-based sexual abuse, I would be grateful if the Minister, in his summing up, could commit to extending the time limits available in both the new taking offence and the pre-existing sharing offence, to ensure that all image-based abuse offences have parity within the law.
I was pleased to see the updating of the Sentencing Code to reflect the new taking offence and to clarify that photograph or film to which the offence relates, and anything containing it, is to be regarded as used for the purpose of committing the offence. However, I am keen that we look into further ways to ensure that this content is not kept by perpetrators and remains offline in perpetuity. Further, I will continue my work with survivors of this abuse and charities to explore ways in which this content can be removed from the internet as rapidly as possible.
Additionally, I was concerned that there does not seem to be a sufficient definition of what it is to “take” an image or video in the offence, and I would therefore also be grateful if the Minister could confirm that the definition of taking will include screenshotting. In the 2022 Law Commission report on intimate-image abuse, the example was given where a person may consent to being in an intimate state on a video call but not consent to the person screenshotting them. The Law Commission concluded that taking a screenshot of a video call should fall under the definition of taking, because this conduct creates a still image that does not otherwise exist.
I turn now to the issue of spiking, which my colleague in the other place, Joe Robertson MP, has highlighted, alongside the campaigners Colin and Mandy Mackie, whose son Greg tragically died after a spiking incident at university. While the clarification of spiking in this new offence is very welcome, I echo the point made by my noble friend Lady Coffey that there is concern that the intention element might be too narrow and that it might not allow for cases where a person has been spiked that do not fall into the categories of injure, aggrieve or annoy. This Bill is a positive step, and I look forward to working with the Government and noble Lords to strengthen it.
Lord Cashman (Non-Afl)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, and I congratulate her on the campaigning work that she has done on some of the issues that we are addressing in this Bill. I also congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, on opening the Second Reading of this juggernaut of a Bill—she is a welcome addition to the Front Bench.
As other noble Lords have said, there is much to welcome in the Bill, but we must also recognise that there are deep concerns too. Non-governmental organisations that I hold in high regard, and across a wide spectrum, have expressed deep reservations. Therefore, it is vital that the Government get the equation right and ensure that there is a balancing of rights and protections. The opportunity, as other noble Lords have said, to widely address concerns and omissions will be in detailed Committee work. I eagerly await amendments that will be introduced by the Government to make all existing strands of hate crime an aggravated offence. I will also address omissions in relation to the needs of the Traveller, Gypsy and Roma communities.
Hate crime continues to rise and therefore government action is to be welcomed. Those who encourage and promote hate crime, whether online, in print or on the streets, empower the thugs who ultimately take violent action. The litmus test of any civilised country is that we all enjoy the equal protection of the law and the universal freedoms and obligations that are basic human rights. Yet online hate crime increases and is, sadly, often defended by those who should know better, Elon Musk among them. People are routinely grossly misrepresented, defamed and victimised because of their religion, their belief, their disability, the fact that they are transgender, lesbian, gay, bisexual or gender non-conforming, because of their race or more. To attack and denigrate such people and portray them as a threat to others is, in my opinion, to debase the very society in which we live. Freedom of expression is not the freedom to incite violence. Whoever incites hate or violence, or carries it out, should be held accountable and the law must be applied equally; therefore, I have no hesitation in encouraging the Government in their attempts through the Bill to create a better and more equal society.
Like other noble Lords, I have concerns, not least in relation to the Bill’s public order provisions, and I share reservations expressed by the Joint Committee on Human Rights as well as the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House. The right to protest is an essential freedom. Protests often offend and often discomfort, and that is a price, I believe, worth paying in a democracy. And to counterprotest is not un-British; it is how protests are undertaken and conducted that matters. I am one of 16 Members of your Lordships’ House who voted against the proscription of Palestine Action because the case was not and has not been made. All restrictive actions by the state must be open and transparent and the evidence for such decisions clear for all to see.
In conclusion, if the Bill helps to make our country safer and stronger, then it is to be welcomed, but it must strike the right balance in protecting the essential freedoms that underpin democracy, otherwise it will do more harm and create further division. I associate myself completely with the intervention by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. We need to return to being a country where we are more comfortable with one another, where we respect difference and celebrate somebody else’s right to disagree with us. No one has anything to fear from equality, the equal protection of the law and the equal obligation to abide by the same laws. That is the litmus test of any decent, civilised society. It is not defined by draping oneself in a flag, the proclamation of patriotism, the defining of Britishness by the claim of some right or another, or how and when we make our voices heard. The essence of a civilised society is defined in its treatment of the most defamed, the most disfavoured, those shunned and misrepresented. Britishness is when we return to being a better, fairer, more generous country. If the Bill can help us move in that direction, it is to be welcomed.
Lord Hannett of Everton (Lab)
My Lords, I add my congratulations to the Minister, particularly on her skill in introducing such a wide-ranging Bill. My interest is parochial in the sense that, while there are many subjects here that require appropriate attention and scrutiny, as a previous general secretary of a retail union and somebody who has been involved in the issue of retail crime for many years, I want, in the short time available, to bring the impact on retail workers into this Chamber.
Some months ago, I introduced a debate in this Chamber on retail crime and there were many speakers—in fact, there was universal support; why would there not be?—on the subject of the abuse of workers. There are nearly 3 million workers in retail. In 2003, I had the responsibility and the pleasure to introduce the Freedom From Fear campaign in retail in my union. It sounds dramatic but it was born out of necessity, when there was such systematic verbal and physical abuse. One of the criticisms of many retail workers was that politicians were not listening. Of course, politicians cannot resolve the ills of society with one clause, but the message Ministers have sent out by this stand-alone clause is significant. The attention it has received in my union says that politicians not only make speeches but conclude actions. For me, it is a conclusion of hard work.
I could give many examples to bring to life the effect of verbal and physical abuse, but time does not allow, so I shall quote just a couple. Before I do, I want to say that verbal abuse might seem a victimless crime and just something that people do when they can or when they do not get their way in a store, but it is demeaning. We have heard of it in many other contexts in this Chamber. The right to go to work and be safe is fundamental in the workplace. This has never been an adversarial campaign. Retailers have supported it. The British Retail Consortium and many of the big retail companies were with us on this. In fact, when it started, all the recording was about the theft in the stores, not the reality of the impact on the employees. That day is gone. This decision by this Government sends the right message that abuse will never be tolerated.
Of course, one stand-alone clause does not in itself solve everything and we will monitor its impact in due course. There will be calls for an extension of it to other front-line workers, but we must not let that negate its importance. One of the best recruitment opportunities I had as a leader of a trade union was when we introduced this campaign and people who had never have wanted to join a union in the past liked the idea that they had somebody speaking up for them who was prepared to discuss with the companies, the stakeholders and politicians. So, whatever reservations there may be about specific clauses, the Government should be congratulated on this one. This is extremely important.
I will give two examples. A store manager, who had been assaulted three times, gave his job up. He could not face returning to the workplace. A young woman who had two children and was the only earner could not face coming back to the workplace. I know that is trying to draw a degree of emotion into this, but these are real people. Some 70% are receiving verbal abuse, and behind that statistic are individuals. So I applaud the Government for the Bill and I look forward to watching it work its way through and to contributing.
Lord McColl of Dulwich (Con)
My Lords, I welcome the inclusion of the cuckooing offence in this Bill. Unfortunately, across the country as a whole, vulnerable people are being exploited, threatened and manipulated in their own homes by criminals who take control of their property for their own purposes. Communities are also suffering terribly from this anti-social behaviour as a consequence. We call it cuckooing, which sounds a bit odd, but it is because of the similarity to the behaviour of the cuckoo bird, which imposes itself into another bird’s nest, expelling the rightful offspring and manipulating the adult birds into caring for it. It was 2021 when I first proposed the criminalisation of cuckooing. This was prompted by expert research by Justice and Care and the Centre for Social Justice. I was concerned that the existing laws were inadequate to address the exploitative nature of this predatory behaviour.
I congratulate the Minister and his colleagues on bringing forward this offence. I also thank him for his response to my correspondence regarding the victims who are too afraid to verbalise their lack of consent and young people who may be compelled to engage in cuckooing by others who are exploiting them. I hope these issues will be addressed on the record during later stages of the Bill. The cuckooing offence treats this activity with the seriousness it deserves and will give the police the tools they need. I look forward to seeing it brought into force.
Lord Strasburger (LD) [V]
My Lords, I declare my interest as chair of Big Brother Watch. I welcome the earlier comment by the noble Lord, Lord Herbert, that the non-crime hate incident regime is not fit for purpose. This Bill has much to recommend it, but four minutes is nowhere near enough to do it justice, so I will focus on just two concerning aspects.
Until recently, our country was an exemplar of how government and other institutions could be held to account by citizens through peaceful protest. However, in 2022, the previous Government gave us the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act, which handed senior police officers and Ministers powers to impose extensive constraints on protests. Then, in 2023, the Public Order Act further enhanced police powers to restrict and criminalise protest activity. As a result, in just two years, 712 protests in England and Wales were subject to police conditions, 95% of them in London.
Now it seems the Government want even more powers to restrict protests. Clause 124 will enable police to ban protests in the vicinity of a place of worship. Whatever “in the vicinity of” means, it will certainly include Parliament Square and most urban centres. Clause 118 will have a chilling effect on some people’s willingness to engage in protest. Furthermore, the Government are promising additional clauses to enable the police to ban repeating protests—which is, of course, most protests.
Protecting the right to protest is vital to maintaining a healthy, vibrant democracy where power is questioned and balanced by the collective will of citizens. The cumulative effect of more and more restrictions on protest is one of the reasons why our country is sliding down the world’s free speech league, and this trend needs to be reversed.
I turn to an astonishing omission from the Bill. The collection of DNA, how it is retained, examined and used as evidence, and its eventual destruction, are quite rightly controlled by several Acts of Parliament and detailed regulations, all overseen by a statutory regulator. However, when it comes to the relatively new facial recognition technology, none of these protections and none of this oversight exists—nothing at all. Facial recognition is far more intrusive than DNA; it is as if citizens are walking around the streets with a barcode on their foreheads that police can read from a distance to identify them. It drives a coach and horses through our time-honoured right—with limited exceptions—to withhold our identity from the police. When this technology is incorporated into this country’s vast network of CCTV cameras, as it surely will be, it will be possible to track us wherever we are, going about our lawful business. Since the technology was first used in south Wales in 2017, police forces have reluctantly had to cobble together their own rules and mark their own homework, falling foul of the courts in the process.
So we would assume that the new Government would seize the opportunity of a major Bill on policing to introduce the long-overdue statutory regulation of facial recognition technology. But if you thought that, you would be wrong. The Bill does nothing to urgently fill the black hole where the essential regulation should be—the black hole that is crushing our privacy. Instead, the Government are presenting a Bill that says nothing about facial recognition, other than in Clause 138, which seeks to make the technology even more intrusive by linking it to the DVLA database. This extraordinary regulatory vacuum must be filled by amendments during the passage of the Bill.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, I know that many on the Labour Benches do not want to hear this, but this Government are actually more authoritarian than the previous one. Not only have the Labour Government accepted all the draconian laws of the Conservative Government, but they continue to add to them. I have been here for only 12 years, but how many times in the past 14 years have the Labour Benches spoken against laws clamping down on protest? But now they are supporting them, defending them and even adding to them. The values of liberty and democracy and a passionate defence of the right to protest—it all sounded great in opposition, so why did Labour drop them when it came to power?
The desire to quash effective protest is the aim of this legislation. Of course Governments do not mind if protest changes nothing. The bulk of laws in recent years have been aimed at the kind of non-violent direct action protests that stop big corporations from, for example, setting up damaging fracking wells in our countryside, or support people trying to stop an ancient woodland being cut down to build a destructive new road.
A lot of those protests were successful and led to policy changes, either locally or nationally—like the direct action protests a few years ago that led to the passing of the climate emergency Act. The oil and gas industry does not like countries switching to renewables, insulation or net zero. So it paid a think tank to come up with laws clamping down on effective protest, which the last Government passed and this Government have kept. That is why we need to enshrine a legal right to protest, and I intend to bring an amendment to that effect.
I have spent 12 years in this House warning about this country being on the path towards a Big Brother state. A combination of laws against effective protest while using digital ID will enable a future Government to carry out repression with a biometric link. The police are already using facial recognition without any proper regulation or legal restraints. With the proposed rules against face covering and the rollout of digital ID, just being seen on a protest against a future Government could see you losing promotion, or your job, or state benefits. It has already happened to dissenters in Hong Kong and other repressive countries.
The Government can blacklist people, just as the UK building industry did to trade unionists, in conjunction with the police. We have to allow people to disrupt, make a noise and get noticed. That is democracy. The police should, of course, be able to arrest for serious infringements, and people should still face legal consequences—but not the very severe punishments of recent years that labelled protesters as terrorists. The proscription of Palestine Action was another nail in the coffin of democracy and dissent. The new powers for the police to ban repeated protests are the state trying to shut down the people who are putting a spotlight on the Government’s complicity in the genocide in Gaza. After all, when you are supplying military intelligence to Israel and exporting arms to a country that wants to ethnically cleanse people from a land that it wants to settle, those are actions which could land you in an international court.
My noble friend Lady Bennett, who cannot be here today, will engage on the issue of Travellers’ rights and abortion law at a later stage. So I just have a few questions for the Minister to answer. I will cram in as many as I can. Does he suspect that the proscription of Palestine Action has discredited the use of anti-terror laws? Will the Government look instead at the case for proscribing members of the Israel Defense Forces living in or visiting this country? These are people who have taken part in potential war crimes, and who have murdered and terrorised thousands of women and children in Gaza. Finally, does the Minister really feel it is a priority for the police and security services to waste their time enforcing this unpopular and largely pointless proscription when they have real terrorists to track down?
Lord Hampton (CB)
My Lords, as ever, I declare my interest as a teacher in a state secondary school in Hackney—a place that my noble friend Lord Birt was rather unfair about earlier.
This is an extensive and wide-ranging Bill—you know you are in trouble when they have to treasury tag it rather than bind it—but there are many good things about it, including Clause 191. As Professor Ranee Thakar, president of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, said:
“Abortion is an essential form of healthcare and should be subject to regulatory and professional standards like other medical procedures, not criminal sanctions”.
Clause 78 is also good, as it seeks to preserve the right of child confidentiality in some circumstances. Barnardo’s and the NSPCC, among others, stress its importance for services such as Childline. Many noble Lords have talked about making illegal the AI image generators used to produce child abuse material.
But there are issues. The Children’s Society feels that the offence of child criminal exploitation does not go far enough. Any child can be at risk of exploitation. Indeed, perpetrators are now looking for so-called “clean skins”: children who are not known to the police or involved with the local authorities, so the exploitation can go undetected. Many of these young people are from affluent backgrounds. The Children’s Commissioner has concerns about parts of Clause 40. She states clearly:
“When an adult exploits any child”
to engage in criminal activity,
“that should always be a mandatory criminal offence, regardless of the child’s perceived age”.
I welcome the Government’s mission to halve knife crime and get knives off our streets, which the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence of Clarendon, so movingly spoke about. The Ben Kinsella Trust reports an 81% increase in police-recorded offences involving a knife or sharp instrument in the 10 years to March 2025. Our school lost a child, who was killed in a knife attack last year. Do we need zombie hunting knives and other overly aggressive styles of knives? Surely some are just too dangerous.
According to the Youth Endowment Fund, in 2024, 50% of murders that were carried out with a blade used a pointed kitchen knife. The organisation calls for a ban on pointed knives altogether. The catering fraternity might object, although studies have shown that there is no culinary effect of a knife having a point. Would the Minister support such a ban?
We also get to equal protection. Does it go in this Bill or should we try to get it in the children’s well-being Bill? With over 65 countries, including Wales and Scotland, already having legislated to protect children from physical punishment, how much longer can England justify standing still? The NSPCC does not describe this as a “smacking ban” but talks about “equal protection”. This is not a call for the creation of a new offence, just for the removal of a legal defence in order to make equal the law of assault for both children and adults. This is about giving children the best possible start in life, not criminalising parents. Deliberately causing pain to a child, for whatever reason, has to belong to the last century. There are much better and safer ways to respond to a child’s behaviour than the use of physical force, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s thoughts on that.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
My Lords, I welcome the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, to the Front Bench to supplement the efforts of the indefatigable Home Office team on the Front Bench in the Lords.
I wish to speak about Clause 191, which decriminalises abortions for women ending their pregnancy at any stage to birth. The clause does not change the existing time limit of 24 weeks, after which an abortion will be a criminal offence, except under special circumstances, for medical professionals and for those who provide an abortion or assist a woman to procure one for herself. What will change is that the woman herself, who takes the steps to end her pregnancy at any stage up to birth, will not face criminal charges.
I am against such a change on three grounds—one procedural and two substantive. First, a private Member’s conscience amendment has been used to amend a government Bill, bringing the weight of the Executive to a matter of conscience. Moreover, by this procedure, a matter of great significance may be allowed to slip through, tagged on to the Crime and Policing Bill, avoiding the full national and parliamentary scrutiny that such major changes in a law require.
Secondly, it is selective in the application of the law in a way that goes against the very principle of law. It is bad in principle and practice to count some action as a crime for some people but not for others. In Clause 191, it is accepted that aborting a baby over 24 weeks old is normally a crime and that those involved should be punished, except for one—the pregnant woman who is the instigator of the action. Part of the very principle of what it is to be a law is that it is applied universally. There can be special factors, such as coercion, which relieve someone of criminal responsibility in particular circumstances, but not a blanket exception.
Moreover, there could be no greater denigration of pregnant women, and indeed all women, than to deny them the most basic right of all: to be judged morally and, when they have committed a crime, judged criminally. Abortion over 28 weeks is accepted as a crime by all. To say that pregnant women can commit it so long as they do so against their own children or own child—but nevertheless they are not criminals—is to treat them as less than fully human adults.
Baroness Mattinson (Lab)
My Lords, I want to start, as lots of people have done today, by echoing the comments about this excellent Bill. I know very well the impact that its many measures will have in many communities around the country. I also want to echo the congratulations to my friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, on her hugely impressive debut in introducing a very complex Bill.
I will talk in favour of Clause 191 because I believe very strongly that women, often very vulnerable women, should not be criminalised for ending their own pregnancy outside the law, which often results in years of investigation and a custodial sentence. Earlier, the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, talked very eloquently about what is and is not contained in Clause 191, so I am not going to go through that again, but there are a couple of points I want to make.
The other place voted to repeal this antiquated law, bringing us in line with many other democracies around the world. It also brings us in line with public opinion. Some 52% overall oppose criminalising women in these circumstances, while only 21% support it. That is men and women—fair-minded people, if you like. Unsurprisingly, women feel this most strongly: just 16% of women support criminalising women in this way. When we look at women under the age of 40—namely, the women who are most likely to be directly affected by the law—that drops down to just 13%. So the data is very clear.
For me, the most powerful and persuasive argument comes directly from some of the women who have been treated barbarically by this law. Take Sammy, who went into premature labour at home and, as she attempted to resuscitate her own baby, seven police officers were searching her bins for evidence, even before the paramedics had arrived. She was then interviewed under caution for suspected illegal abortion and had her phone and her computer seized. She was not allowed home for a week, as it was sealed off as a crime scene, and she was left just in the clothes that she had attended hospital in. She was also not allowed to contact her partner. Despite providing forensic samples that did not show the presence of abortion drugs, she remained under police investigation for a year and was allowed only limited supervised contact with her baby, who had survived the traumatic birth—probably because of her intervention. Sammy is now a very active campaigner against this law, a law that was passed before women even had the vote. We have a chance now to end the suffering it causes, and we must do so.
Lord Lucas (Con)
My Lords, there is a great deal of interest in this Bill, so I shall confine myself to talking about something that is not in it but should be. The research we have done over the last five years shows that, of the 42 million vehicles on UK roads, 10 million of them are non-compliant: uninsured, unregistered, untaxed or without MOT. That is an astonishing figure, but it should not surprise us. If you do not enforce a law, you get an upsurge in people breaking the law. As this Bill deals with shoplifting—I am delighted that it does—so it should deal with vehicle non-compliance.
With non-compliant vehicles, there is something that we can do without cost to the Treasury, because we are dealing with people who are easier to locate, who owe money anyway and who are in possession of a substantial asset. That produces a set of circumstances where we can devise a system of enforcement that does not cost the Treasury anything. If any other noble Lords are interested in this problem, please correspond with me. In the Commons, it has been most actively pursued by Sarah Coombes MP, who has now been brought within the Government and therefore cannot campaign for it actively. This is very much a cross-party issue—a national issue, not a party one.
I intend to propose amendments to this Bill to allow a pilot to help us reach a self-funding solution to the problem. My amendments will enable local authorities and other enforcement bodies to identify high-risk vehicles and intervene, starting with things such as warning notices and text messages, targeting the worst persistent evaders, those using cloned number plates, foreign registered vehicles and those without DVLA keeper details. There are a lot of them. The pilot can be delivered at zero cost to police or government. It will end up supporting overstretched police forces, denying criminals the use of our roads and reducing vehicle-related antisocial behaviour. The pilot proposals have been developed in consultation with those representing the interests of roads, policing, local government and trade associations. This is very well thought through—I take no credit for it; I am just a spokesman—but none of this can happen without government support and legislative change. This Bill seems to me to be the place for that.
Rather than embarking on something wholesale, which would raise all sorts of questions about people needing to be consulted, a pilot is much more limited. If it falls over, we will all have learned something without the Government having to pay for the lesson. If it succeeds—and I am most optimistic—it will drive lasting reform and make UK roads safer for us all. I very much hope that the Minister will be agreeable to a meeting with him and relevant officials to present this initiative in more detail, alongside industry experts who have helped to shape its development.
Baroness Hunt of Bethnal Green (CB)
My Lords, I begin by congratulating the Minister on an exceptionally comprehensive introduction to what is, by any measure, a wide-ranging and ambitious Bill. In the time available, I will confine my remarks to three aspects of the Bill: the Government’s manifesto commitment to extend aggravated offences to all strands of hate crime; the continuing discussions around the recording of non-crime hate incidents; and, in common with the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, as a London cyclist, I am very interested in the new provisions around cycling.
First, I welcome the Minister’s commitment, made on Report in the other place, to introduce a government amendment at Committee in this House to make all existing strands of hate crime aggravated offences. The framework for race and religion has made a real difference: it has given prosecutors the tools to reflect the gravity of hate-motivated crime, ensured higher sentences where hostility is proven and given victims confidence that the law recognises when they have experienced such an offence. These offences send a clear message about who we are as a society and what we are prepared to confront. For disabled people, the same clarity has never existed; hostility is too often treated as an afterthought, with incidents instead recorded as ordinary assault or public order without recognition of the prejudice behind them. Extending aggravated offences to disability would bring long overdue parity and show that hate in any form will be met with equal seriousness. For LGBT people, too, the gap in protection remains; while cases can be charged as hate-motivated, they still fall outside the aggravated framework. I hope that the Government’s amendment will close that gap once and for all. I look forward to working with Ministers on this.
I note the comments by the noble Lord, Lord Herbert, on the recommendations to stop non-crime hate incidents. I believe that seeing a spike in incidents can help police forces and, crucially, communities take action. For example, an increase in antisemitic incidents in an area can signal growing tensions. I accept the recommendations of the National College of Policing, but I am interested in how police forces and communities can still consider signals and measures of community cohesion and take proportionate and measurable action to prevent escalation.
Finally—perhaps the most controversial thing I will ever talk about in this Chamber—I welcome the provisions on cycling now included in the Bill. I cycle in London and I do something that sometimes feels rare: I stop at red lights, I indicate when turning and I wear a helmet. Anything that deters dangerous or careless cycling is to be welcomed, and it is time our laws reflected how we travel in our cities today. I must confess, however, that I enjoy an e-bike. Although I have no financial interest in Lime, it certainly has a financial interest in me. Reducing the maximum speed of hired e-bikes would be a simple way to make them safer. They simply go too fast, and they evoke an adolescent abandonment of safety and conscience in a way that I am totally ashamed of. Riders must behave responsibly, but providers also have a part—an easy part—to play in protecting everyone.
This Bill covers a great deal of ground, and the issues I have touched on all point to the same principle: the law must be fair, proportionate and responsive to the world as it really is, not how we wish it was. I look forward to working with the Minister and noble Lords across the House as the Bill progresses.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, a lot of today’s speeches have been on abortion, which is weird in a Bill boasting that its aim is to make our streets safer. I support Clause 191’s aim of disapplying the criminal law for women acting in relation to their own pregnancies, but I do not think this Bill was the right vehicle for such an important law change. I have some sympathy with the public backlash about a lack of debate on the issue. You can see how it happened: the Bill is so disparate and unfocused that even the Government keep adding to it. Ministers introduced 90 amendments, 66 new clauses and four new schedules at Committee and on Report in the other place, and apparently there is more to come here. But where does all this chopping and changing leave us? Recent tensions over our scrutinising role have led to accusations of filibuster and time-wasting, but how can we keep on top of what the Government intend when it is so scattergun and expansive? As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, explained so well, the Bill exemplifies the trend of excessive lawmaking as a substitute for enforcing laws that we already have.
We have heard a lot today about the Bill creating a specific offence of assaulting retail workers. Well, call me old-fashioned, but I have always been opposed to assaulting retail workers—as far as I knew, it was against the law. Now we are creating a new law which avoids crucial questions: why has there been a shocking increase in attacks on shop workers, often accompanied by mass shoplifting, and why has this not been dealt with by the police? Inevitably, other workers say, “What about us?” For example, in an unlikely outbreak of consensus, the RMT, National Rail and the Rail Delivery Group are united in demanding that there should be a specific offence of assaulting or abusing transport workers. To counter lots more special pleading, perhaps the Government should use their energy in ensuring that assault laws lead to prosecutions.
Another worry is that the public’s civil liberties and free speech are being carelessly jeopardised by this trend of criminalising ever more aspects of everyday life. For example, in relation to Clause 118, the Joint Committee on Human Rights warns that criminalising all forms of identity concealment could unjustifiably interfere in the right to protest. Yet again, the police already have powers to require individuals to remove such face coverings. Maybe the Government should investigate why the police do not use that power when, for example, dealing with pro-Palestinian marchers chanting Jew hatred behind their keffiyehs and balaclavas. No, it is far easier to ban all face coverings instead. As Big Brother Watch notes, there are many law-abiding individuals who might want to conceal their identities on demos. Topically, why do we think Hong Kong dissidents cover their faces on protests? Here is a hint: their own authoritarian government agents are watching. These proposals are made against a backdrop of other attacks on privacy, from facial recognition technology to digital ID.
Then there is Clause 4, which many civil libertarians are concerned about. First are those much-vaunted respect orders. It seems the epitome of technocratic governance to imagine you can tackle the breakdown of social respect, so well described by the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, by creating a new civil order called a respect order. These are almost a duplicate of the overused, discredited and ineffective anti-social behaviour injunctions, which will continue, but respect orders will have criminal sanctions of up to two years in prison but only use the lower civil standard of proof, and recipients will not even be told when they are put on an order. Meanwhile, the proposed increases in penalties for breaching the misnamed public spaces protection orders and CPNs from £100 to £500 is pettily punitive but, outrageously, they are predominantly issued by private enforcement agencies which are paid by the state per fine.
I am afraid too much of the Bill will continue this trend of eroding our everyday liberties. I will be working with groups such as Manifesto Club and Justice to ensure that we focus on keeping our streets safe, but what are not safe with this Bill are our civil liberties and our free speech.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, and I welcome the noble Baroness the Minister to her first Second Reading. I welcome elements of this new portmanteau Bill and the Minister’s assurances at the beginning of this debate of the focus being on fighting basic crime.
The Bill addresses legislation seen as obsolete, incomplete or needing amendments or improvement; I see a further golden opportunity in the Bill to remove hate crime law, which was first put on the books in 1965, addressing race hatred. Since then, hate crime law has proliferated—indeed, metastasised. It has proliferated in which protected characteristics it covers—now up to five in the UK, seven in Scotland; in the triviality that can now incur the police’s attention; in political agendas being pursued, with some hateful beliefs allowed to flourish but less politically modish views cracked down on; by uncoupling hate crime from actual crime, with police intimidating and harassing individuals for the absurd and near-oxymoronic concept of non-crime hate incidents; and in the many new organisations claiming to unearth hate crime and hate speech, funding false narratives of hate crime, dividing the nation further but with no reduction in hate crime. Hate crime has crystallised as the useful tool of left identitarians, dividing and conquering by inciting grievance within the identity groups whose votes they seek to capture.
Set against this is free speech. In this country, we traditionally do not believe in thought crime. Our first Queen Elizabeth famously said she had no desire to look into men’s souls, but now we have policemen saying, “I need to check your thinking”. Free speech advocates see the need to tolerate it when people say disgusting things we do not like. Only ordinary criminal law, not hate crime law, should be deployed in such circumstances, and only then if there is intent to incite imminent violence.
Criminalising hate speech did not prevent the hateful marches that occurred immediately after 7 October, before Israel could even react. Nor did it stop the continuation of those marches after the ceasefire had been achieved. In my view, those marches quickly, over the months, rose to the standard of criminal incitement after 7 October, yet nothing was done about that month after month. Is there any evidence that the invention of hate crime has reduced the number of attacks on minorities? Try asking Jews in Manchester that question, or Muslims in Bethnal Green.
Meanwhile, hate crime law has led to the police being confused, overstretched, badly led and distracted from fighting actual crime. Not one burglary was solved in 48% of English and Welsh neighbourhoods in the past three years. The police’s soft target now is to pursue the unthreatening middle-class tweeter rather than shoplifters, phone muggers, burglars or drug dealers. To redirect the police, we need to get hate crime off the statute book while ensuring that we have adequate provision within the criminal code for the punishment of any crime driven by the intent to intimidate, persecute or marginalise any group of citizens of whatever identity. Police could then focus on the numerous actual crimes that are committed daily so that our police forces can return, as they say, to policing our streets and not our tweets.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, while I broadly welcome this Bill, I do not welcome how large it is. Its scale and complexity were referred to by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, and even the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, with whom I find myself agreeing. It is in, a sense, a testament to how many of our public bodies live in silos and have inconsistent, changing leadership, and how much they have a selective interpretation and enactment of regulation or guidance. In some senses, this Bill is well intended, but it is also a manifestation of a systemic malaise and testament to our continuous failure, under Governments of whatever colour, to enact and/or enforce existing law or regulation and guidance.
I was at a dinner last Monday for the All-Party Parliamentary Group for the Armed Forces and a very impressive gentleman, who is in charge of all of our cybersecurity, talked about the appointment of Mr Rupert Pearce as the National Armaments Director to try to sort out once and for all our rather lamentable track record in major defence procurement. If I ruled the world—which unfortunately is not a hereditary role—I would be tempted to appoint the noble Lord, Lord Timpson, as the national joined-up government director, as his wonderful father, Sir John Timpson, created the concept of upside-down management. So many areas of our governance would benefit from focusing on the people at the bottom, who are the subject of all sorts of things happening to them, and working upwards to find out how to remove the blockages which continuously fail to remedy what repeated laws and new regulations fail to do.
At the beginning of the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill, I said to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Malvern, that I would be all over the first part of the Bill like a rash. I make the same promise to the noble Lord and the noble Baroness for this Bill, because there are many areas of interest. I will work closely with the office of the Victims’ Commissioner—the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, regrets that she is unable to be here today—on a variety of amendments to try to make more sense of the attempts to deal with anti-social behaviour. I shall continue work with the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, and others on stalking. I will work with the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong of Hill Top, and others on trying to deal with the difficult issue of exploitation of children, because there is a difficulty that we have in differentiating between the individual as a victim and the individual as a perpetrator. If you are a child, you can be one and the same thing, and it is very complicated to try to deal with that.
I shall deal with mandatory reporting of child sexual abuse, again to try to make that more forensic and efficient, and with AI-generated child sexual material. I shall, of course, support the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, on all her amendments around pornography. It is a tribute to the women in this Chamber—how often it is women—who speak up about these issues. I am afraid that not enough men do. I thought it was very interesting that a large number of men have commented on the rights of women and what they do with their own bodies during the course of this debate, and rather fewer women. With that, I will sit down.
Baroness Spielman (Con)
My Lords, much that is valuable and important has been said by many in this Chamber this afternoon, particularly about the risks of criminal law creeping too far into the conduct of everyday life—the law should not be a code of conduct—and the problems of unenforceability when law becomes overcomplex. The noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, made an important suggestion, which I hope is debated in Committee.
I will speak to Clause 191, which has profound implications for the lives of some children. Those in favour in the Commons spoke of a recent increase in investigations and prosecution. They spoke of women abused and pressured into abortions, and of unreasonable behaviour by the police and the CPS. They used harrowing cases to make their arguments. A number argued that abortion should be considered only as a healthcare matter. But it is not hard to unpick these arguments, and to see on what shaky foundations this decision was taken.
It is blindingly clear that abortion is a profoundly difficult issue, because the rights attaching to two different lives conflict: this is why it figures in criminal law. I do not stand with those who argue for absolute priorities in either direction, but I have worked for years in areas where adults and children’s rights unavoidably conflict. I know how easy it is for campaigners to be blinded by such conflict of rights by their perceptions of their own rightness. This is how some can see giving women an unqualified right to kill their own children—even the day before birth—as merely a progressive modernisation of the law.
For abortion, there is an uncomfortable asymmetry: unlike their mothers, unborn children are helpless and voiceless. We should therefore reject the argument that abortion should be considered purely as a healthcare matter. Of course women’s healthcare matters, but to make healthcare the only consideration is to deny a vast and important ethical debate. Both lives in question matter very much. Clinicians and support services naturally want to be kind to the woman in front of them, to whom they owe responsibilities, and of course it is easier for professionals if the law removes any possibility of repercussions for them from a self-induced late abortion.
Furthermore, decriminalisation, even in the interests of kindness, is not always a social good. To give one example, Oregon has had to reverse its disastrous policy of decriminalising low-level drug possession and usage.
Next, if there are cases of police or CPS overreach or malpractice, primary legislation is not the right way to correct that. It is shocking when someone proves to have been wrongly convicted, but do a few cases of wrongful conviction justify decriminalising rape, for example, lest any man ever be unfairly accused and investigated?
Finally, Parliament should not succumb to emotional blackmail. The old saying is that hard cases make bad law. Domestic violence charities see dreadful cases, and abused women deserve kindness and consideration, but not all women are angels without agency. There are women who are not abused, but who neglect and maltreat their own children—ask any social worker. There is clear moral hazard here. For example, a woman who forms a new relationship mid-pregnancy may be tempted to eliminate the baby that she thinks could be an impediment to that relationship. As far as I know, despite the red flag of increased investigations in recent years, no systematic review has looked at whether telemedicine for abortion is having an undesirable consequence of enabling greater numbers of women to conceal their stage of pregnancy so as to attempt late abortions.
For all these reasons, I believe that noble Lords should be concerned about this clause, the fact that it was inserted without any national consultation showing a clear balance of public opinion in support, and that it was not informed by a full review of the impact of permitting abortions by telemedicine. I will therefore be proposing amendments to delay its implementation until such a review and consultation have taken place.
Baroness Whitaker (Lab)
My Lords, this comprehensive Bill, so well introduced by my noble friend, brings our treatment of crime up to date to fit new kinds of offences and some hitherto unrecognised. In the time available, as my experience in dealing with crime is limited to my time as a magistrate in the past and my current membership of the Sussex Police diversity advisory board, I will focus on two areas I am particularly concerned with: the new provisions on county lines, and the surprising omission of dealing with the High Court decision that Part 4 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 breached human rights.
I declare interests as president of the Advisory Council for the Education of Romany and other Travellers and of Friends, Families and Travellers, to which I am grateful, as ever, for expert briefing, together with that of the Traveller Movement. The new offence of coerced internal concealment and associated provisions will enable those forgotten children or vulnerable adults who have been excluded from education or who have slipped through the net in other ways to be found, rescued and protected.
The abhorrent practice by organised criminal gangs of recruiting these young people by force or deception into carrying drugs, illicit money and SIM cards away from the centres where they were stolen or dealt with has mushroomed in recent years. It exploits many who have been virtually abandoned by society and its institutions, instilling fear which estranges them from their family and community networks. The reinforcement of the civil prevention order is helpful and further support from the £42 million county lines programme is a sensible broadening of the approach to include positive elements of safeguarding and rehabilitation. I warmly welcome this set of measures.
My other concern is that our Government have missed an obvious opportunity to end discrimination against Gypsies and Travellers created by the Conservative Government’s Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act. That small minority of Gypsies and Travellers who live in their traditional way in caravans on sites and have to make do with unauthorised ones can be imprisoned and their vehicles, which are their homes, impounded even if there are no authorised sites for them to go to—under circumstances found by the judge to be discrimination. The case followed formal recommendations by our Joint Committee on Human Rights, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights and UN treaty bodies to repeal these measures.
They were not welcomed by our police either. The majority of police forces and police and crime commissioners responding to the initial Home Office consultation on criminalising staying on unauthorised encampments, rather than the previous definition of trespass, opposed it. Some 93% of police bodies called for better site provision as the solution to unauthorised encampments. Of course, it is the paucity of these that is the real problem, as the judge commented, not the desperate search to find somewhere to put the caravan home.
Meanwhile, the Government are under a solemn obligation to remedy the incompatibility with our human rights law. That is, they must restore to these fellow citizens who do not live in bricks and mortar that small measure of security they had to be able to live and send their children to school without fear of being driven out unreasonably, having their mobile home impounded or being sent to prison. I trust that my noble friend the Minister will not default on this obligation. Surely this Bill is a suitable vehicle.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
My Lords, I declare my interest as director of the Free Speech Union.
I intend to table an amendment to the Bill scrapping non-crime hate incidents. A non-crime hate incident—NCHI—is an incident or alleged incident that involves or is alleged to involve an act that is perceived by the intended victim to be motivated wholly or partly by hostility or prejudice towards one or more of their protected characteristics. This definition is hopelessly subjective, relying as it does on the perception of the complainant.
NCHIs have been recorded against a woman who said she thought her cat was a Methodist, a man who whistled the theme tune to “Bob the Builder” and former MP Amber Rudd, who had an NCHI logged against her against after a speech at the 2016 Conservative Party conference in which she called for British jobs for British workers. She was Home Secretary at the time.
The reason the police are logging these incidents is because in 2014 the College of Policing instructed them to record all hate crime reports that, on investigation, turned out not to be crimes, as NCHIs. That explains why, according to the most conservative estimate, 130,000 NCHIs have been recorded in the last 11 years.
The police should not be put in the invidious position of having to record what are often vexatious, politically motivated complaints. As the High Court judge said in 2020 when he found for Harry Miller, an ex-policeman who challenged an NCHI that had been recorded against him:
“In this country we have never had a Cheka, a Gestapo or a Stasi”.
Noble Lords may ask why it matters if an NCHI is recorded against someone’s name. It matters because they can show up in an enhanced DBS check and stop someone getting a job as a teacher or a carer. Why should the fact that someone has committed a non-crime prevent them from getting a job?
NCHIs are a breach of a sacrosanct principle of English common law: unless something is explicitly prohibited, it is permitted. The behaviour recorded in NCHIs is, by definition, not prohibited by law; it is non-criminal, so why are people being punished for it?
Recording NCHIs is also a colossal waste of police time. In a report published last year, Policy Exchange estimated that recording NCHIs takes up 60,000 hours of police time every year.
It is not just free speech lobbyists such as me who think that NCHIs have to go. His Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary, Sir Andy Cooke, has called for their abolition. Earlier this year he said:
“We need, at times, to allow people to speak openly without the fear that their opinion will put them on the wrong side of the law … I’m a firm believer … that … non-crime hate incidents are no longer required”.
Sir Andy is not alone among senior and ex-senior police officers in his opinion of NCHIs. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, a former Metropolitan Police Commissioner, will be co-sponsoring my amendment.
The Minister said she hoped that the Bill will restore public confidence in the criminal justice system. Scrapping NCHIs, which risk turning the police into objects of ridicule, is a vital first step.
Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer (LD)
Your Lordships’ House has, over the years, taken a very serious role in defending our free speech, freedom of assembly and right to peaceful protest. Just this afternoon, we have heard powerful speeches from the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Jones, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox—probably the first time I have ever agreed with her—and from the noble Lords, Lord Cashman and Lord Clement-Jones.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, pointed out something I have noted too. Out of power, political parties defend those rights very vociferously, but once they are in power as the Government, they are very tempted—as we see in this Bill—to introduce legislation to restrict protest more and more. In the 25 years I have been following this, I have noticed that successive Governments have increased not only legislation about protest but also the severity of the penalties for those protesting or organising protests. What especially concerns me is the cumulative effect of all those Acts.
I can accept that sometimes legislation is a proportionate response to emerging social issues, and I am sure that is something we will explore in Committee, but too often it has been the easy way for successive Governments to limit dissent against their policies. As we look at this Bill, with more curbs on protest, it is shocking to think—and this is something I especially want noble Lords to bear in mind as we go through the Bill—that international bodies have found that the UK has moved from being a champion of free speech and assembly to a nation where protest is a risk.
For example, the UN rapporteur for human rights and the environment, David Boyd, warned of the chilling impact of recent legislation on democratic rights. Volker Türk, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, said the Public Order Act 2023 was “deeply troubling” and incompatible with international law. Michael Forst, the UN rapporteur for environmental defenders, condemned the harsh sentencing of climate protesters as
“not acceptable in a democracy”.
We have to take those as very serious criticisms.
On that last point, some of the sentences handed down to protesters are truly shocking. Even a short sentence can disrupt your life a lot. It can affect the jobs you can apply for. It can disbar you, for example, from going to the United States. In my case, that would be a very severe penalty as so many of my family live there. That is a massive disincentive to stand in protest, so there is a real chilling effect. I am fortunately quite old, so I think I have had my fill of protests—that is not to say that I would not feel like protesting some more, but I at least have a voice here now.
The reason I am speaking today is that I have heard the anger and frustration of the young. They need to make their voices heard on the issues that will critically affect their future. In this case, I am particularly thinking of environmental issues and climate change. Our job in this House is to enable those voices, not to crush them, not to frighten them into submission and not to chill them until they are frozen out.
Baroness Cash (Con)
My Lords, I believe—well, I hope—that there is one thing that all Members of this noble House agree upon: that none of us wish to see the rise of the far right or of any political movement that feeds upon public fear and the failures of our institutions. Yet that is precisely what is happening in the UK today.
I have come here today to address what is not in this Bill, which I believe is a missed opportunity to address some of those most significant and pressing issues of our time. The public have lost faith in the even-handedness of policing and the moral courage of those in authority. When people see double standards—or two-tier standards—resentment grows, and trust dies. This Bill is a chance to restore that trust, to ensure that the criminal justice system in Britain is not captive to ideology and not paralysed by fear any more.
I commend much in the Bill, but so far it fails to address the underlying causes of what is known by the public and by our media as two-tier policing. We are failing to confront too many uncomfortable truths, and we have seen where that fear leads. In Rotherham and Telford, thousands of children—and we are still counting, by the way—were abused while officials looked away. The Jay and Casey reviews both record that professionals were nervous about
“identifying the ethnic origins of perpetrators for fear of being thought racist”.
One police officer put it more bluntly—that it was “safer to do nothing”. Let me repeat that: it was safer to do nothing. That single sentence should haunt us, and I hope that that sentence will hang over this House while we scrutinise and look to close the gaps in this Bill.
What a time to have a debate about introducing a definition of “Islamophobia”. I remind noble Lords that the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, for her efforts, was voted “Islamophobe of the year”. It is not right that those who have the courage to address these issues are attacked and accused of being racist for that. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, will take these issues seriously, and I hope that we can work together to address them.
The same paralysis has cost lives in honour-based abuse. The murders of Banaz Mahmod and Shafilea Ahmed are just two examples. Both young women sought help and both were dismissed as family disputes—and both were killed. The Government have promised to define honour-based law, and that is welcome, but definition without duty is not protection. We will need clearly spelled-out statutory obligations to act, report, share intelligence and intervene—likewise with grooming.
I am running out of time. Even as the police have shrunk from appalling crimes, they have continued to prosecute non-crime hate incidents—I support everything that has been said on that. It is part of the same issue, and we need to show the courage that this country needs so that we do not end up driving voters into the arms of something less savoury. Why, in the current climate, would anyone do what the Casey or Jay reports urge? The very definition of two-tier policing is that fear has dictated who is protected and who is silenced.
The Earl of Lytton (CB)
My Lords, I very much welcome the opportunity to discuss the matters in this Bill and welcome the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, to the Front Bench. She is obviously used to dealing with gargantuan matters, such as those to do with my profession and the RICS, in her previous capacity, and I wish her well in her endeavours in chewing through this 400-page Bill.
My first point relates to anti-social behaviour. In my experience of inter-neighbour matters, the distinction between perpetrator and victim is seldom absolute—a point made by my noble friend Lord Russell of Liverpool. When I encounter instances of an ASB order made in such terms that normal life is actually impeded—and then the so-called victim proceeds to indulge in exactly the same sort of behaviour that has been prevented for his neighbour—I know that something is not right. There needs to be a better balance and there need to be order-making powers, and enforcement ought to be subject to better rules, competence and oversight.
My second point relates to Clauses 72, 79 and 80, principally regarding the duty to report suspected sex abuse of children. I fully support that duty, particularly in so far as it is applied to the persons listed as being under the duty to report. It should have consequences for those who culpably fail to report or who obstruct that duty.
This follows the prima facie principle that victims should be heard and believed and that a report of a matter involving a commission of a crime, as defined by law, should be so recorded unless there is credible evidence to the contrary, particularly in the context of young people. Once on a record in the system, the matter then demands attention and conscious process, including, one hopes, some support to the victim. That is until such time as additional verifiable information dictates otherwise. Outside that recording system, there is nothing—no practical form of subsidiary watch-list or anything like that—so spotting a trend, pattern or commonality in the data, outside a formal record, seems to me to depend on chance recognition by an official.
So far so good, but then Clause 80 proceeds to start unravelling things by effectively deferring to the balance-of-probabilities, evidence-based approach inherent in police procedures and Home Office counting rules. I believe this is incompatible with the intent and aim of Clauses 72 and 79. Suspicions, which is what we are talking about reporting, almost inevitably lack hard evidence. If, say, the recording officer of police does not happen to be satisfied as to the evidence, and therefore does not believe it can be reliably stated to be a crime that has been committed on his or her balance of probabilities test—as suggested in guidance or as directed by the senior officer—it may not get recorded. Not only does this court perversity, because recorded crime is related to police performance, but it risks repetition of precisely the outcomes of the Bradford child sexual exploitation case, when vulnerable young people were not believed and criminal enterprise went unchecked. In my view, Clause 80 requires a rethink or simply deleting. I note that this may have wider implications for the way in which crime is recorded and acted upon.
My final point relates to Part 9. Other noble Lords have made impassioned comments, so I am not alone in sensing that there is a degree of tendency to administrative overreach—even a politically thin-skinned reaction at times—in the cumulative measures eroding the right to demonstrate. I very much relate to the comments of the noble Baronesses, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer and Lady Cash, and I hope that, between us, we can get a better balance of what we actually mean by allowing people the necessary freedom and opportunity to vent their emotions and campaign and demonstrate safely.
Baroness Donaghy (Lab)
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, on her excellent presentation. When you are speaker number 65, it is probably best to adapt your speech a little, so I will save a bit of time by saying that I agreed with every word that the noble Baronesses, Lady Bertin, Lady Owen and Lady Sugg, said—end of. I have been a supporter of Liberty and its predecessor, the NCCL, for 50 years. I also had the privilege of leading Sir Chris Bryant’s Private Member’s Bill in this House on increased protection for emergency service workers. It became the Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act 2018. You could therefore argue that I have had a foot in both camps.
I want to make a brief point about police employment issues—not strictly speaking part of the Bill—but then move on to the issue of aggravated offences. I appreciate that the employment issue is not a direct part of the Bill. However, as a former chair of ACAS and a fellow of the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, I want to make a point about the importance of retaining skills and experience in the police force. When you cut back a police force by 20,000, it has a devastating effect: you lose literally hundreds of years of experience. It might mean you lose some bad habits, but you also lose the institutional memory and there is a reduction in on-the-job training capacity.
If you reduce a service to the bone, as the last Government did, you have a demoralised workforce and a stampede for the door when the opportunity for a retirement package arrives. Those with a grievance are the ones forced to stay. Practicality says that the police will then prioritise their work and leave other things undone. Dealing with attacks on lesbian, gay and trans people is a long way down the list, and it might explain why retail theft and attacks on retail workers are so serious as we speak. It is this kind of short-termism that makes the issues of powers and responsibilities of the police rather secondary. My plea to the Minister is for adequate resources and for active management planning, which allows the police to do their job.
Nevertheless, I support fully the attempt by Rachel Taylor MP to extend aggravated offences to include attacks on gay, lesbian, trans and disabled people, and I congratulate the Government on their commitment to include this in the Bill. Can the Minister say a little more about the likely content of that amendment? The Law Commission report on hate crime laws in 2021 recommended
“that aggravated offences be extended to cover all existing characteristics in hate crime laws: race, religion, sexual orientation, disability and transgender identity”.
As has already been said, it was also in the Labour Party manifesto of 2024. One can only wonder why this has not been on the statute book for years in this day and age, but I look forward to our consideration in Committee.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, while I agree with so much that has been said so eloquently today, I want to focus on three areas close to my heart: the inadequacies of enforcement of the criminal law; how to deal with the Wild West of e-scooters and cycling; and the best way to reduce shoplifting. Although this is not declarable as an interest, my son is a detective in the Met, and I think he would agree with what the noble Baroness, Lady Donaghy, has just said about the need to retain skills and experience in the police.
In a long career in and outside government, at the top and on the front line, I have discovered that enforcement of the law is as important as the rules and regulations themselves. As Calvin Coolidge, President of the United States, said, the laws of the country must be enforced. There is no substitute for law enforcement, and that is why, in March 2024, we the Conservatives ensured that police numbers were at their highest ever. For this Bill to be effective, they need to rise further, and the resource needs to be focused on the right things: away from the obsession with online harm, prosecutions for tweets and non-hate crime, and into neighbourhood policing.
The truth is that we have moved away from the founding Peelite principle that police need to be part of the community they serve. They are increasingly a wholly separate organism, usually absent from our streets and town centres, and sometimes appearing to want to control our thoughts. Part of the problem has been the huge increase in bureaucracy, with energetic police men and women weighed down by paperwork requirements and the inefficiency of the police, CPS and court interaction and its supporting and less than compatible IT systems. My noble friend Lady Coffey has drawn attention to the burden of yet more reporting requirements in the Bill. To my mind there is an enforcement crisis, and I ask the Minister what he is planning to do about it.
I am very pleased to see Clause 106, introduced in the other place, which creates new offences of causing death or serious injury by dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling. I also like Clause 8, which makes it easier to seize an e-scooter being driven anti-socially—I note that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, actually wants to go further. As noble Lords know, I have been horrified by this Wild West of scooters and cyclists, especially speedy electronic versions, dashing through lights, driving routinely on pavements and spreading terrors among mothers with pushchairs, the disabled, the infirm and sometimes me. I have been knocked over myself. The truth is that this lawlessness in London has got worse; the results can be seen in A&E admissions.
However, there is no need to wait for the new Act, as cycling on pavements is illegal. Current laws must be enforced. I ask the Minister to consider a hotspot policy, perhaps by the Transport Police, to crack down on bad behaviour by cyclists and e-scooterists. We know that this sort of enforcement works. When I worked at Downing Street in the 1990s, the Met got burglary down with Operation Bumblebee and, more recently, we have seen the successful crackdown on mobile phone thieves at Oxford Circus.
My final plea for better enforcement relates to shoplifting, which has also exploded recently. I know from my time at Tesco how this ruins honest endeavour and allows free-riders free rein. It is so difficult for the staff and there is a wider impact. I remember women putting large jars of Nescafé and beef fillet down their trousers to sell and fund their drug habit and I remember the drudgery and cost of adding security tags to every valuable item. The Bill rightly responds to USDAW’s long-standing campaign and creates a new offence of assaulting a retail worker. Clause 39 seeks to tackle the ridiculous situation whereby so-called “low-value theft”—under £200—tends to go unprosecuted. However, I note that the Opposition have concerns about how this is achieved. We would also like to see tougher sentences on shoplifting where there have been more than three occasions of theft.
In conclusion, I return to Sir Robert Peel. He not only founded the Met but gave officers clear guidelines on expected behaviour, so establishing a highly visible and positive relationship with the British people. In this respect, it is time for us to revisit our roots.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
My Lords, in seeking to intervene in the gap, my intention is to bring about the minimum of delay as we reach the most important stage of Second Reading, namely the winding-up speeches. I unhesitatingly begin by entirely endorsing the words of my new noble friend Lady Levitt—to whom much welcome—when opening this debate. Yes, neighbourhood policing has been neglected. Yes, we need to pay much more attention, for example, to the awful offence of child sexual abuse. But, in the steps of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, although in rather stronger language, I have to say that this Bill is a monster.
Indeed, I am holding it in my hand and I have to put it down because it is going to crash any moment and it is causing all my notes to go in a mess. In its 422 pages it seeks, if my arithmetic is correct, to amend no less than 44 previous statutes going back to the Offences against the Person Act 1861 and the Limitation Act 1980. In some cases, the amendments are extensive. For example, for the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, if you look at Schedule 16 to the Bill and pages 316 to 323, you will see no less than seven pages of amendments. We cannot change this in this Bill, but we should be aware of what we are doing. Not only are we imposing on ourselves in Committee, doing our job properly, the task of putting in front of ourselves all 44 of these statutes while seeking to amend them, but what about this Bill becoming law? How are the police and everybody else involved in enforcement going to cope? When in Committee, we must do our duty, however long it takes. Fortunately, we have in my noble friend Lord Hanson the nicest of Ministers who has ever-enduring patience—but he is going to be tried out.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, although this Bill is extremely wide-ranging, as has been pointed out, and plainly lacks focus, we have had an interesting and diffuse debate and we can discern something now of the Government’s central aims: first, to help halve violence against women and girls; secondly, to protect children from criminal exploitation and abuse, on which my noble friends Lady Benjamin, Lady Hamwee and Lady Featherstone, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay and Lady Cash, and others spoke so compellingly; and then to cut street violence, particularly knife crime, to reduce anti-social behaviour and to increase neighbourhood policing and public confidence in the police. On these Benches, we support all these aims. However, as it stands, the Bill risks many unforeseen and undesirable consequences.
Broadly, we will seek to ensure that the Bill does not unjustifiably reduce citizens’ rights and liberties; that it should not unnecessarily create new or duplicatory offences; that it will keep the law up to date with new technology, as my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones explained; that it will enhance police effectiveness and community confidence, and will not increase pressure on the police or local authorities; and, generally, that it will not make managing the criminal justice system more difficult, either by increasing court backlogs or making it harder for courts to handle their workload effectively and justly, or by increasing the prison population when our aim is to reduce reoffending, reverse sentence inflation and rehabilitate more offenders in the community.
I can make only a few points. The detail we will leave to 11 days in Committee, and we may need even more for proper consideration of the many expected amendments, as the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, predicted.
I turn first to the protection of citizens’ rights, particularly the right to peaceful protest. Whatever our differing views on the horrors in the Middle East, many have been frankly shocked that the Terrorism Act was deployed in the proscription of Palestine Action, whether or not that was sanctioned by the legislation. Many hundreds of protesters face prosecution for offences labelled as “terrorist” for taking part in protests in an entirely non-violent way. Such prosecutions may prevent them finding employment or travelling to the States, as my noble friend Lady Miller pointed out, or indeed the EU when the European travel authorisation scheme is launched next year. These are not groundless scare stories; they are points made by the Government and senior officers to deter attendance at these protests. We will be seeking stronger statutory protection for the right to peaceful protest and a review of the threshold for so-called “terrorist offences”.
I am concerned that the generally very clear and helpful opening by the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt—for which I thank her—revealed on these issues a lack of balance in government. The speeches by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, and my noble friends Lord Strasburger and Lady Miller, and numbers of others, provided a welcome counterweight.
We also worry about the indiscriminate use of live facial recognition, as my noble friend Lord Strasburger explained. While it may have uses—for example, in connection with retail theft, car break-ins, bag snatches and other street crime—I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Mackenzie, and others that its use needs careful review and control. Unsafeguarded access to DVLA information, or electronic information on which the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, spoke, presents similar risks. So, while agreeing with much of what the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said, we do not always go along with his approach to police access to personal information. However, I suggest that the concept of stewarded public interest data trusts—introduced, for example, in Canada, Australia and Belgium—offers balance on these privacy issues and deserves serious consideration. We must not slide inadvertently, carelessly or by stealth towards being a surveillance state.
The respect order proposals are not risk-free. Although making these orders will be for the courts, applications for them will be largely for our underresourced police and local authorities. How confident can the Government be of their usefulness? Will not the financial and administrative burden of securing these orders, organising their supervision and then policing and punishing their breach, outweigh their effectiveness in reducing crime and anti-social behaviour? Are the procedures robust in respecting citizens’ liberties? Before respect orders are made, there must be wide consultation on the guidance and an independent review of existing powers.
The Bill will create many new offences. I started in preparation to count them but ran out of steam. A number of them duplicate existing offences and will make the criminal law more complicated. As the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, pointed out, and as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, so graphically described, supported by the noble Lords, Lord Vaizey, Lord Russell of Liverpool and others, other provisions increase existing penalties.
This mixture is generally not helpful. More prosecutions for complex new offences will tend to clog up the courts and exacerbate the appalling backlogs we so desperately need to clear. More and longer prison sentences will do nothing to reduce reoffending or its massive cost to society. We already imprison more people and for longer than other countries in western Europe. Our prisons are still overcrowded, understaffed and in many cases dilapidated, often serving more as academies of crime than as centres of reform. We should be reversing sentence inflation, relying on more and better community sentencing and focusing on rehabilitation and training. The Sentencing Bill will cover these issues, but this Bill betrays a lack of co-ordination across criminal justice issues
While opposing unnecessary new offences, I will relay the amendment I proposed to the Domestic Abuse Bill, to criminalise psychotherapists who exercise controlling or coercive behaviour over their patients, often vulnerable young adults. When I moved this amendment in 2021 with all-party support, the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, who is now in a stronger position to influence these matters, argued that we had made a powerful case for change and said that he hoped the Government would, as he put it,
“set out a pathway to remedy this undeniably serious problem”.—[Official Report, 10/3/21; col. 1776.]
I hope to hold this Government to his word.
Finally, on police effectiveness and public confidence, and on pressure on the police and local authorities, my noble friend Lady Doocey rightly said that pressure on the police largely comes down to resources—for example, on drug testing and law enforcement. This Government, like the last, persistently understate both the shortage of resources for policing and the pressures on the police, which diminish both police effectiveness and public confidence. Public confidence means community confidence, which requires a genuine commitment to neighbourhood policing, which was addressed by my noble friend, and to ending racism and hate crime, on which the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, and others spoke. We will seek progress on these issues.
I add one final point on policing and police resources. The prevalent minimum, or zero, response to so-called minor crime undermines public confidence. It is said that minimal response is acceptable for crimes that are low-level and low-value. But, just as the noble Lord, Lord Birt, and the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, described, crimes such as bike theft, car break-ins, shop theft and mobile phone, watch and bag snatches are committed on an industrial scale. Such offences may often be low-value in isolation, but these are not isolated incidents; they are largely the work of multiple repeat offenders and professional gangs. Concerted efforts to ensure they are policed more effectively would do much to restore public confidence in our policing.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I first extend my thanks to all noble Lords for their contributions to this Second Reading debate but in particular to the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, for the clarity of her opening, for which I am sure we are all grateful.
My noble and learned friend Lord Garnier opined, correctly, that passing laws is not a solution. That reflected an observation made by the noble Lord, Lord Birt, about the plague of everyday crime that already exists. The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, also made the point about the need for neighbourhood policing. It might be observed that, in the period from 2010 to 2023, neighbourhood crime in England and Wales fell very substantially. That progress was hard won through local policing, prevention and firm sentencing, rather than the creation of new laws.
Of course, many of the measures in the Bill will not be effective if police funding, police numbers and police priorities cannot keep pace. The National Police Chiefs’ Council recently observed that the Lord Chancellor’s plan for police funding will result in a shortfall in England and Wales of £1.2 billion. Police forces have had to rely on borrowing to achieve the necessary delivery of services. Rather worryingly, it has been estimated that the cost of debt servicing in respect of these liabilities is projected to rise by 50% in the next three years, so we are creating a snowball of underfunding. No additional funding is available to manage the potential increase in the number of offenders coming on to our streets as the result of early release or the reduction in spending on in-prison education, all of which is liable to impact and increase recidivism.
All that said, we welcome and support many of the provisions in the Bill. This Bill follows the Criminal Justice Bill, which was introduced by the previous Government and fell after the last election. Indeed, about one-third of the clauses in the current Bill are essentially the same as those in the previous Bill. Unfortunately, this Government have left out much and introduced a watering down of much of the previous Bill’s intent, and that is what I will address.
I will begin with those provisions that should have been added back to the Bill and were the subject of proposed amendments in the other place. The Government claim to be tough on crime but have consistently resisted amendments in the other place that sought to bolster the Bill’s provisions. They are reluctant to put into statute more robust sentence guidance and have rather ducked responsibility by referring repeatedly to their proposals for a review. In particular, the Government are unwilling to introduce tougher sentencing in respect of persistent retail crime offenders; a number of noble Lords addressed that in the context of it being a social blight in many areas today. In the other place, amendments were proposed to introduce mandatory sentencing for courts dealing with repeat retail crime offenders and to introduce the requirement for the electronic tagging of repeat offenders. The response from the Government in the other place was that
“sentencing in individual cases is a matter for our independent judiciary”.—[Official Report, Commons, Crime and Policing Bill Committee, 3/4/25; col. 211.]
With the greatest of respect, I believe that that response is as empty as it is true.
Further, the Government will not commit to introducing appropriate penalties to protect farmers and tradespeople, a point that was touched on by some noble Lords. In the other place, we moved an amendment to the equipment theft Act, to ensure that fines made under the Act reflected the cost of replacing equipment stolen from farmers and tradespeople. We also proposed an amendment to the Sentencing Act 2020 to make the theft of tools from tradespeople an aggravating factor. Why should it be aggravating? That is because of the double loss. The tradesman not only loses his tools; he loses the means to carry on his trade. Can the Minister explain why such provisions will not be the subject of this Bill? It indicates an unwillingness by the Government to address these issues head on, while they instead talk of a review.
Furthermore, the Government in the other place would not commit on the maximum penalty for possession of an offensive weapon with intent to commit unlawful violence, despite their manifesto promise to reduce knife crime substantially. The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, particularly in the wake of the Southport attack, argued that the proposed sentence of four years was far too low, and yet, in the other place, the Government have resisted a proposal to raise the maximum penalty for such heinous crimes from four years to 14 years. The Minister said in the other place that they will “conduct a review”.
Further, the Government have resisted an amendment to make child murder a stand-alone aggravating factor in sentencing guidelines. They have once again ceded responsibility to a separate body, rather than taking any action. In this instance, they suggest that there should be a review by the Law Commission. Perhaps the Government will then review the reviews. Normally, we expect to find that a review is a message that something is going to be placed in the long grass. It appears that, so far, the long grass is becoming unduly crowded.
I move on to some of the more pragmatic options that were recommended in the other place in order to address the issue of crime. It had been proposed that there should be an expansion of police powers of stop and search, but again that was resisted by the Government in the other place. I find this difficult to reconcile with their manifesto promise to crack down on the knife crime epidemic. The proposed amendment to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 was to lower the threshold required for stop and search, albeit it would still require a perception with regard to violence. I ask the Minister to explain the logic of not embracing that simple step in order to attempt to address the knife crime epidemic.
Furthermore, in the other place, the Government were presented with two pragmatic amendments to crack down on the issue of tipping offences. That would have involved, first, making a third party responsible, where there is vicarious liability, imposing statutory guidance that the cost of removing the fly-tipping should be reflected in the penalty and that, in some instances, it should be possible to impose driving points on those who engaged in the fly-tipping. The Government’s response was to say that they would consult with Defra—I thought Defra was a part of the Government. It does not seem to me that in this instance the Government are really willing to face up to the hard need for appropriate penalties in respect to these crimes. I invite the Minister to explain why the matter should be deferred in that way.
I turn to the need for police action. In the other place, an amendment would have required that there should be regular reporting on police presence, on stop and search, and on live facial recognition in areas with the highest levels of serious crime. I regret that the Government should have resisted that, because if the public are meant to have faith in these proposals, they are surely going to be interested in knowing whether they are actually working. I invite consideration of that matter by the Government as we go on to Committee.
Some of the issues around sexual crimes and sexual abuse were touched upon by the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey. It was proposed that, with regard to the offence of spiking, which is so obviously related to sexual offences, there should be a test of recklessness rather than intent. When you consider the nature of the crime, it seems perfectly sensible that recklessness should be the appropriate test. The Government have argued that adding recklessness to the relevant statutory test would create confusion. I would welcome the Minister’s explanation as to what confusion he anticipates that simple amendment to the test would create. Those are the matters that we must immediately consider for amendment going forward, if we are to introduce proper teeth to these proposals.
Finally, I will address a further matter that should be removed by virtue of this Bill. It has been touched on already by the noble Lord, Lord Young: non-crime hate incidents. They have a chilling effect on free speech. They divert precious police time away from tackling very real crimes. Indeed, it is reported that over 13,000 of these non-crime hate incidents are now being logged each year, consuming an estimated 60,000 hours of police time. It is time, in my respectful submission, for that to be properly addressed, not by a review but by a proper consideration of the policy that lies behind this. We find ourselves in line with the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Young, that this should be addressed in the Bill.
This Bill is intended to be a step forward in addressing crime and policing. Unfortunately, it also risks being two steps back. The Government should not persistently avoid hard and necessary decisions by deferring to wide, non-specific powers of sentencing or the wish for review after review. We can act now to significantly improve our means to tackle crime and to determine specific policies on punishment, as the original Conservative Bill intended. I hope that we can raise the present Bill to that necessary standard. The Bill has much to commend it, but it has much more to improve.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I am grateful to the almost 70 speakers in today’s debate. I start by declaring an interest on my own behalf. I am a member of the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers, and have been for 46 years. That will obviously have an impact on my view of the measures on shop theft and assaults on shop workers.
I am pleased tonight to have the broad support of HM Opposition and, indeed, the broad support of the Liberal Democrat Benches—with some caveats from both. I look forward to the noble and learned Lord’s amendments in Committee. I cannot give him a response tonight on those details, but we will have plenty of time to discuss that. In saying that, I note that the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, the noble Baronesses, Lady Browning and Lady Fox of Buckley, and others mentioned the length of time for debate and the size of the Bill. Indeed, so did my noble friend Lord Hacking. We will have time for that, and it will be discussed through the usual channels. I look forward to a full and frank debate on this matter in due course.
The Bill deals with a number of key issues, and Members have talked about a theme in it. There are several themes in this Bill: making our communities safe, strengthening child sexual abuse prevention, tackling anti-social behaviour and knife crime and, dare I say it, supporting free speech—while at the same time ensuring that we have some measures on protests. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, the noble Lords, Lord Frost and Lord Vaizey, and indeed my noble friend Lord Hacking said that there is a mixture in this Bill, that it does not have a theme and that it is very large. It is a government programme, much of it based on a manifesto commitment. As my noble friend Lady Levitt mentioned in her excellent maiden speech from this Front Bench on a Second Reading debate, it is a manifesto commitment from the Government to do most of the things in this Bill, and therefore we are going to do most of the things in it, with the support of this House and the House of Commons.
A lot of issues in the debate have been about legislative proposals, certainly, but we have touched on neighbourhood policing, courts, speeding, police presence, speeding up justice, police numbers, et cetera. My noble friend Lord Mackenzie of Framwellgate mentioned that. The noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, talked about delivery, which is extremely important. Those things are not in the Bill, but they are extremely important matters that are before us today.
I shall concentrate, if I may, on what is actually in the Bill and the points that have been debated by noble Lords today. Let me start with respect orders and youth diversion orders, which were raised by the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. Respect orders are a substantial new power that gives police and authorities effective levers to deal with anti-social behaviour. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, made some criticism of them and I know that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, challenges them as well. We believe them to be an effective tool, and we will have a chance to debate that in due course in Committee.
Youth diversion orders are an important measure. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, that we will come back to them, but they are designed to help prevent terrorism and prevent people drifting into terrorism.
The noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey, Lady Stowell, Lady Hazarika and Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Lords, Lord Herbert, Lord Sandhurst and Lord Davies of Gower, all raised the issue of shop theft. Shop theft is extremely important, and something we should not tolerate. That is why we are removing the £200 threshold, are putting a focus on it with policing and have encouraged police forces to tackle it. The measures that we are removing will send a signal. It is still for judicial discretion, but it will send a very strong signal—as will, on the issue of mobile phone theft, giving tracking powers for officers to be able to visit a premise straightaway. I look forward to debating them, but it is important to take action.
The issue closest to my heart in this Bill is that of retail workers and attacks on retail workers. The noble Baronesses, Lady Stowell, Lady Doocey, Lady Thornton, Lady Browning and Lady Fox, and my noble friend Lord Hannett of Everton contributed to this debate. This is a long-standing campaign, which is why I declare my membership of USDAW. When in the House of Commons I moved amendments on this issue over many years, and I appreciate very much the support of my noble friend Lord Hannett of Everton and the members of USDAW, along with the businesses—the Co-op, Tesco, Sainsbury’s and others—that have raised this issue. The new offence will put in place an obligation to ensure that those who uphold the law—which is what colleagues do in shops on solvent abuse, cigarette sales and alcohol—are also protected by the law. I hope that will have good support.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)
Before the Minister moves on, will he respond to my question? Why have the Government decided to legislate only for that group of workers?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The argument I will put to the noble Baroness now is that shop workers are upholding the law on solvent abuse, alcohol, cigarette sales and other things. There will be representations on other areas, and we will examine those representations, but I really want to get this over the line after a long campaign. I hope that the noble Baroness will support those measures, whatever amendments she may bring forward.
There has been considerable debate around civil liberties from the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, Lady Chakrabarti, Lady Doocey and Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Derby, the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, my noble friend Lord Cashman and others. We are making some changes, and we will bring some further changes forward, but the principle of this is that we are trying to ensure that we have freedom of speech and the right to protest, but that we also have the right to ensure that protest is managed in an effective way. There are responsibilities in protest as well as the right to protest.
We have looked at the question of the Vagrancy Act; the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, mentioned that in particular. The Government have been clear that no one should be criminalised, which is why we are repealing the outdated 1824 Act. We are committed to a repeal of the Vagrancy Act once a replacement can be determined. I hope that clarifies that for him.
The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, among many other issues that I will come back to in a moment, raised the issue of policing and suicide. We are working closely with the National Police Wellbeing Service to examine that.
There has been a major debate from noble Lords and noble Baronesses on the question of child exploitation, child sexual abuse and the IICSA implementation. The noble Baronesses, Lady Grey-Thompson, Lady Hamwee, Lady Royall, Lady Benjamin, Lady Kidron, Lady Cash and Lady Finlay of Llandaff, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Derby, the noble Lords, Lord Hampton and Lord Faulks, the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, and others all raised and discussed that issue. We are going to have a big debate on this. We are trying to meet the IICSA recommendations. The Private Member’s Bill from the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, stretches us a bit further. We will have a discussion around that. I hope that this Bill, at the end of its process in this House, will have achieved an improvement in child protection services as a whole.
We have also had a discussion around the big issue of abortion, raised by many Members: the noble Baronesses, Lady Spielman, Lady O’Loan, Lady Coffey, Lady Mattinson, Lady Hazarika, Lady Thornton, Lady Lawlor and Lady Monckton, the noble Lords, Lord Elliott of Mickle Fell, Lord Jackson, Lord Frost, Lord Farmer and Lord Hampton, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. There are different pressures on that: some want that provision taken out and some want it maintained. The Government will remain neutral on this matter and facilitate whatever Parliament agrees and settles on in the end. We will look at those issues, and the Government will have a free vote on that matter as a whole.
The issue of police misconduct and police vetting was raised very strongly by my noble friend Lady Lawrence, the noble Lord, Lord Mackenzie, and others, particularly in the light of the “Panorama” investigation we touched on in Question Time today. There are a number of measures in the Bill to support strengthening police vetting, and I very much welcome those and hope they will be looked at positively in the future.
Knife crime was mentioned by the noble Lords, Lord Hampton, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Birt, and my noble friend Lady Lawrence. Again, the measures in the Bill are designed to regulate the supply of knives by people who wish to use those knives in a way that is not conducive to good behaviour and that causes death, misery and injury. We have to take those actions, and I think it is important that we do so.
There has been a lot of discussion around the issue of hate crime. First of all, I want to touch on the issue raised by my noble friends Lady Donaghy and Lord Cashman and the noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton and Lady Hunt of Bethnal Green: the aggravated offence. It was a Labour manifesto commitment at the general election. We are carefully considering now how best to amend the law to ensure the protected characteristics have that fairness. We will set out our conclusions later, during the passage of the Bill, but that commitment has been given and we will examine that in due course.
That leads me on to the question, a live issue for noble Lords, of non-crime hate incidents. The noble Lord, Lord Herbert, indicated very strongly what has happened in relation to the National Police Chiefs’ Council, and I am grateful to him for his support in giving the review on this matter. We have recently had discussions from the noble Lord, Lord Frost, and others in the House, including the noble Lord, Lord Young, about this matter, and we are going to have a debate about it, but I am hoping that the review that the noble Lord, Lord Herbert, has instigated will help colour whatever amendments are brought forward. The noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, mentioned it as well. It is important that we have that debate and discussion, but I want it to be influenced by the review from the National Police Chiefs’ Council, if noble Lords think that is appropriate.
A number of noble Lords mentioned the pornography review, and I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, in particular for the work she has done on that. The noble Baronesses, Lady Owen of Alderley Edge, Lady Shawcross-Wolfson, Lady Kidron and Lady Sugg, the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, and my noble friend Lady Donaghy all made contributions today on the pornography review. We are committed to taking any necessary action following consideration of the noble Baroness’s recommendations. We have committed to criminalising pornography that depicts acts of strangulation and suffocation in this Bill, and we will bring forward an amendment to that effect. Where we can, in relation to the recommendations of the noble Baroness’s report, we will take early action to undertake that as a whole.
The noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, mentioned honour-based abuse, and I am grateful to her—I was looking for her, and she was there when we started but has now moved over there. She called for a statutory definition of so-called honour-based abuse, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Cash. We will work closely with the honour-based abuse sector to develop that statutory definition. We have given that commitment. I agree that it is vital that all professionals with safeguarding responsibilities have the right framework to identify victims and perpetrators, and I will be looking at that during the passage of this Bill.
The noble Baroness, Lady Owen of Alderley Edge, mentioned spiking. It is an important measure and, again, I will reflect on the points she made in this discussion.
I was pleased by the welcome from the noble Lord, Lord McColl of Dulwich, for the measures on cuckolding—
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
Cuckooing, not cuckolding. Sorry, it has been a long day in the Chamber today—apart from a very quick 20-second call of nature, I have been in for the whole day. I am grateful for the noble Lord’s support for that measure as a whole.
We have also had a range of new ideas for the Bill, and I look forward—honestly—to developing and arguing and having a discussion around the amendments during the passage of the Bill.
I am happy to meet any Members, if I can, who are going to raise those issues. I have firearms and cycling from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. Historical weapons were raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and I know that the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, takes an interest in that. I have had measures on child abuse from the noble Baroness, Lady Hazarika, and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. I have transport issues from the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, deceased children from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the chatbot issues. I have new proposals on cyber-digital from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, The noble Lord, Lord Walney, raised a number of issues to do with the terrorism review.
I have universal jurisdiction from my noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws. I have the cumulative impact issues from the noble Lord, Lord Walney. I have facial recognition from the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger. I have vehicle non-compliance from the noble Lord, Lord Lucas. I have fraud from the noble Lords, Lord Cromwell and Lord Birt, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Coffey. On all those things, I am happy to meet and discuss. Let us look at what is tabled, let us look at what is put down, and the Government will reflect on it. We may disagree at the end, but let us have that discussion as a whole.
On the fraud issue, from the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, in particular, I am the Government’s first Fraud Minister—Anti-Fraud Minister, really, but is called Fraud Minister for the purposes of the discussion here today. I have a challenge from the Government to produce a new fraud strategy. We are in the process of working on that. By January or February of next year, there will be a three-year fraud strategy, which will cover some of the points that the noble Lords, Lord Cromwell and Lord Birt, and others mentioned.
I know that facial recognition issues are important to the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, and I want to ensure that we examine those.
The noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, the noble Baroness, Lady Royall of Blaisdon, and others made representations about the stalking measures in the Bill. I hope they will welcome those, but we will have a debate around that in due course.
My noble friend Lady Whitaker argued for the repeal of the provisions on encampments in Part 4 of the Police Act. We are aware of the High Court ruling and of the points made there. We will consider how best to respond in due course and will do so.
The noble Lord, Lord Farmer, again mentioned the recording of offences of intimate images. I am not sure we are going to agree on some of these issues, but at least I look forward to the amendments in due course if they are brought forward.
I also note the points from the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, which I will reflect on and look at in due course.
This is indeed a very large Bill. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, mentioned the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act and the implementation of that for farmers. We are looking now at when we can implement that and trying to bring the necessary regulations later this year—so I can give him the answer and support on that.
Although it is very rushed, I think I have covered every point raised by every Member who has spoken in the debate today. I may not have satisfied every Member, but I hope I have recognised that—
Lord Cromwell (CB)
Can I make the briefest of interruptions? That is a terrific to-do list and I congratulate the Minister on a spectacular summation. The one thing that has not really been touched on, which I think almost all of us spoke about, is resources. How are we going to pay for it?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
Again, the Bill covers a range of legislative options on a range of matters. In parallel to that, there are two other aspects of work. We will produce a policing White Paper very shortly, which will look at some of the issues in policing and how we can improve efficiencies. With the National Police Chiefs’ Council and colleagues and police and crime commissioners, we will look at how we can get better value and better focus on the key policing issues that Members have talked about today.
The very point that the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, and others have mentioned—about delivery, about use of resources, about focus and about asking what the police do on particular issues—is extremely important. It is absolutely vital that we focus the police on government priorities. Aside from the police White Paper, we have issues with police funding and budgets. We have given £1.2 billion extra this year to policing. There is a challenging settlement, but our job is to get better value out of that. But I think there is commonality between all of us in the Chamber today that the issues that matter to people are anti-social behaviour, shop theft, violence against women and girls and child sexual abuse. Although there are many policing priorities, those are things that this legislation is dealing with. Therefore, we are hoping that the resources and focus will follow the legislation. The work we have done already—putting an extra 3,000 neighbourhood police on the ground and focusing on neighbourhood policing—means that over the next two to three years we try to increase the number of forward-facing neighbourhood police officers on the ground.
Nobody expects that there will be no challenge in all this, but the purpose of this Bill is to give legislative framework to government manifesto commitments. I think it meets a number of important objectives. There will be debate between Members; there will be differences; there will be votes; there may not be a meeting of minds on certain issues. But I am hopeful that, when this process is over, this Bill will pass, that it will be put into effect and that Members of this House and the House of Commons will hold the Home Office to account for making sure that we reduce crime, increase confidence in policing and make sure that there are fewer victims in the future. I commend the Bill to the House.
Lord Hanson of Flint
That the bill be committed to a Committee of the Whole House, and that it be an instruction to the Committee of the Whole House that they consider the bill in the following order:
Clauses 1 and 2, Schedule 1, Clauses 3 to 5, Schedule 2, Clause 6, Schedule 3, Clauses 7 to 18, Schedule 4, Clauses 19 to 55, Schedule 5, Clause 56, Schedule 6, Clauses 57 to 65, Schedule 7, Clauses 66 to 72, Schedule 8, Clauses 73 to 84, Schedule 9, Clauses 85 to 96, Schedule 10, Clauses 97 to 117, Schedule 11, Clauses 118 to 122, Schedule 12, Clauses 123 to 127, Schedule 13, Clauses 128 to 136, Schedule 14, Clauses 137 to 139, Schedule 15, Clauses 140 to 145, Schedules 16 to 18, Clauses 146 to 164, Schedule 19, Clauses 165 to 186, Schedule 20, Clause 187, Schedule 21, Clauses 188 to 203, Title.
Crime and Policing Bill
Monday 10th November 2025
(6 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-I(b) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (10 Nov 2025)
Lord Clement-Jones
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Government to review current anti-social behaviour powers within six months of the Bill becoming law, before the new measures proposed in the Bill take effect.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 1, I will speak to other amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Doocey.
I welcome the start of Committee and the opportunity to engage in detail with Part 1 of the Bill concerning anti-social behaviour. We on these Benches recognise the imperative to make our streets safer, and we support measures designed to tackle genuinely persistent and disruptive anti-social behaviour. However, the Liberal Democrat approach to public safety demands that new laws be not just tough but fair and proportionate. We reject measures which risk the erosion of civil liberties or the criminalisation of the vulnerable. This debate on respect orders goes directly to that principle.
Clause 1 introduces the respect order for adults, which partly replaces the old anti-social behaviour injunction. The fundamental difference is severe. While breach of an ASBI was treated as a civil contempt, breach of a respect order is explicitly categorised as a criminal offence that can lead to an unlimited fine or up to two years’ imprisonment. If the state intends to use a civil tool granted merely on the balance of probabilities to impose prohibitions whose breach results in criminal sanctions, that tool must be subject to the most rigorous safeguards. Unfortunately, respect orders currently risk replicating and arguably worsening the problems and abuses associated with past anti-social behaviour regimes.
The Manifesto Club—I declare an interest as a member of its advisory board—highlights several fundamental flaws in the previous regime under the 2014 Act, which civil liberties advocates argue must be addressed before new anti-social behaviour powers such as respect orders are introduced.
The core legal powers underpinning PSPOs and CPNs are inherently flawed due to their low legal threshold and vague scope. PSPOs can be implemented if activities are deemed to be having a detrimental effect on the quality of life in a defined public area. The Manifesto Club notes that this is an unprecedentedly low legal test for criminal intervention and argues that there is often no requirement to show substantial evidence of this effect. PSPOs are vague and subjective restrictions and are often drafted broadly, which leads to them functioning more as a tool applied at the discretion of officers than as a precise law, and this has resulted in what the Manifesto Club calls
“absurd, stigmatising and authoritarian orders”
that ban diverse and sometimes anodyne non-criminal activities.
A major criticism centres on the weak governance and poor assessment of these powers. Manifesto Club research found that nearly half of all PSPOs issued by local authorities in one year were signed off by a single council officer, without passing through scrutiny procedures within the council, such as approval by cabinet or full council. Despite legal requirements for consultation, the Manifesto Club points out that the legislation requires consultation only with the police chief, the landowner and whatever community representatives the local authority thinks it appropriate to consult, meaning that there is no requirement for any public consultation or minimum standards for one.
There is a significant lack of official data collection and central government scrutiny on the use and effectiveness of anti-social behaviour powers such as CPNs and PSPOs. The broad and unchecked nature of the powers creates inconsistency of enforcement across the country, leading to postcode lotteries for victims, where enforcement depends on location rather than circumstances.
PSPOs and dispersal powers are often unfairly imposed on or enforced against homeless people, including bans on rough sleeping and begging. Homeless individuals report being moved on by police multiple times a day and feeling that the system is set against them. Examples of arbitrary and overzealous enforcement include fines issued to an 82 year-old man for cycling his bike in a town centre, for the feeding of stray cats, for the flying of model aircraft, for keeping a wheelbarrow behind a garden shed and for using foul language. Community protection notices have been issued with restrictions on how people conduct themselves in their own home, sometimes based on weak evidence reliant on hearsay.
There is increasing commercialisation of enforcement of anti-social behaviour powers. Many councils outsource the issuance of fixed penalty notices for PSPOs and CPNs to private companies. The most common contractual arrangement involves companies receiving a percentage of FPN—fixed penalty notice—income, which directly incentivises officers to issue as many penalties as possible.
This practice is explicitly stated to contradict statutory guidance, which notes that enforcement should in no circumstances be used as a means to raise revenue. Private officers employed under this system have been accused of setting daily targets, hiding badges, intimidating people and ticketing minor offences or non-offences. This intensification of busybody offences and penalties risks increasing injustice, particularly for vulnerable people.
Amendment 1, tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Doocey, and signed by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, would require the implementation of respect orders to be delayed until a comprehensive review of existing anti-social behaviour powers under the anti-social behaviour Act 2014 is conducted and completed by an independent person within six months of Royal Assent.
Before we introduce a new measure, we should assess whether the myriad existing tools—ASBIs, community protection notices and public space protection orders—are truly fit for purpose. The process of anti-social behaviour governance is already widely criticised as confusing, inconsistent and prone to arbitrary enforcement.
Without undertaking this vital review, we risk merely layering a new, complex civil order onto a system that is already confusing, ineffective and unjust, leading to overlapping powers and making enforcement decisions more difficult. Additional support for this delay, and an independent review, comes from key stakeholders, including Justice and the Victims’ Commissioner. We must pause, review what we have and then legislate effectively.
The core legal test for imposing a respect order is dangerously permissive. It rests on two conditions: the civil standard of proof—the balance of probabilities that the individual has engaged in anti-social behaviour—and the judicial belief that it is merely just and convenient to make the order. This is an alarmingly low threshold for an order that can severely restrict an individual’s liberty and lead to imprisonment. We must insist on a higher standard.
Amendment 5, in the name of my noble friend Lady Doocey and signed by me, proposes to replace the vague phrase “just and convenient” with the essential standard of “necessary and proportionate”. This change is essential to ensure that the restrictions imposed align strictly with the principles of the Human Rights Act 1998, ensuring that the conditions are tailored and appropriate to the specific case.
Amendment 4, also in my noble friend’s name, probes the wording that allows an order to be made if a person “threatens to engage in” anti-social behaviour. This vague phrasing gives excessive scope for judicial speculation, allowing the state to impose serious orders based on future suspicion rather than concrete, proven past behaviour.
Amendment 7, also in my noble friend’s name, seeks to specify a maximum length of time for an order, challenging the Bill’s proposals that a respect order can be imposed for an indefinite period. An indefinite order, based on a civil standard of proof, is inconsistent with the framework of other behaviour control orders. We propose a maximum duration, such as two years, to align respect orders with other established orders and requiring judicial review for any extension.
We must ensure that these powers cannot be weaponised against those struggling with homelessness or mental health issues, as seen with past anti-social behaviour powers targeting people for begging, sleeping rough or feeding the birds. Amendment 12—I thank the noble Lord, Lord Meston, for signing it—seeks to remove the power to exclude a person from their home. This power, introduced in new Section C1, is disproportionate; exclusion from one’s home is an extremely severe sanction. While the Bill limits this to cases involving violence or a significant risk of harm, such threats should be handled exclusively through the criminal justice system or specific protection orders to ensure that the necessary safeguards and standards of proof are met. We on these Benches are particularly concerned about the risk of this power being used inappropriately against victims of domestic abuse, potentially leading to their eviction instead of the perpetrator’s detention.
Amendment 18 would remove the provision creating interim respect orders. Interim orders lack proper procedural safeguards and carry the inherent risk of disproportionate interference with liberty, particularly when they are made without notice to the respondent. If a situation is so urgent that it requires immediate prohibition, a more specific or criminal intervention is warranted. Anti-social and behaviour measures must possess strong democratic and public accountability to counter the risk of arbitrary local restriction.
Amendment 9 in my name requires respect orders to pass through full council and be subject to a full public consultation before the relevant authority makes an application to the court. This would ensure that elected representatives approve decisions that directly impact civil liberties, which would mitigate the democratic deficit seen in the implementation of other local orders such as PSPOs.
Amendment 21, in my name and signed by my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, mandates that the Secretary of State must conduct a full public consultation exercise prior to issuing any statutory guidance on respect orders. This guidance must be informed by groups including the police, victims’ interests groups, housing providers and, crucially, homeless persons and legal practitioners. This would prevent guidance aimed at curbing behaviour being developed in a vacuum and ensure that it is practical and trauma-informed, especially when dealing with those struggling with addiction or homelessness.
In conclusion, these amendments collectively seek to address the historical weaknesses of the ASBI regime —weak judicial thresholds, arbitrary enforcement, indefinite application and a lack of accountability—before they are codified in a new measure that carries the full weight of the criminal law. If respect orders are to succeed where previous civil orders failed, they must be founded on evidence, necessity and transparency. I urge the Minister to recognise the fundamental importance of these safeguards. I beg to move.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I have added my name to Amendments 1 and 21 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, which have just been moved so well. I agree with all the amendments in this group, although I am not quite sure and have reservations about Amendment 2 on lowering the age to 16.
The proposition seems to me straightforward. The powers to tackle anti-social behaviour are currently contained in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. So, before the state affords itself even more powers—which, by the way, often duplicate what we already have—should we not assess whether what we have actually works in improving outcomes for victims and fundamentally reducing anti-social behaviour, which is what we want? We should note that 82% of anti-social behaviour practitioners surveyed by Justice have called for such a review of existing powers and criticised the lack of proper consultation, or even engagement, by the Government. It is shocking that there has never been a formal review of the 2014 Act, and that data on the use of existing orders is not collated centrally, nor their use monitored, by government. Surely the Minister agrees that the Government should be working to identify and address problems that are inherent in existing anti-social behaviour powers and orders before creating more, and that that would be an evidence-based approach to this question.
We are largely focusing on respect orders in this group. They are almost duplicates of anti-social behaviour injunctions but will provide, the Government has argued, more effective enforcement. Experts and practitioners in fact suggest that they could confuse enforcement agencies. What is more, as respect orders are so close to ASBIs, the fear is that they will just reproduce and increase the problems with those injunctions, which research shows are overused, inconsistently applied and sweep up relatively minor behaviour problems alongside more serious incidents. At the very least, can the Minister explain why the discredited ASBIs are staying on the statute book? Why not just dump them?
If, as the Government tell us, the key difference with respect orders is to deal with persistent and serious anti-social behaviour, that should be made explicit in the legislation. Otherwise, the danger is that they just become another overused part of a toolkit, handed out promiscuously. That is a particular concern because of the use of the phrase by the Government and in the Bill that these orders are “just and convenient”.
“Convenient” is chilling, because—here is the rub—respect orders are formally civil orders but, in essence, are criminal in character. I am worried about the conflation of civil and criminal in relation to respect orders, which the noble Lord explained so well. The Government are removing that rather inconvenient problem of a criminal standard of proof because it has all that tiresome “beyond reasonable doubt” palaver that you have to go through. However, if you are found guilty, as it were, there is a criminal punishment doled out via a respect order and you can, as we have heard, receive up to two years in prison, which rather contradicts some of the emphasis in the Sentencing Bill on trying to stop people going to prison and keeping them in the community—so this is not entirely joined-up government either.
At Second Reading I quoted Dame Diana Johnson, who made clear the “convenience” point by explaining that the problem with a civil injunction such as an ASB is that,
“if a civil injunction is breached, the police officer has to take the individual to court to prove the breach”,
and she complained that there was no automatic power of arrest. That bothersome inconvenience has been overcome by creating a new respect order, which Dame Diana enthusiastically states
“combines the flexibility of the civil injunction with the ‘teeth’ of the criminal behaviour order”.—[Official Report, Commons, 27/11/24; cols. 795-96.]
However, that convenient mash-up of a legal solution is something that we should be wary of. It has a dangerous precedent, showing that a cavalier attitude to legal norms and justice can lead to great injustice.
When I read all this, I thought of the single justice procedure, which we were told would allow public authorities to bring cheap and speedy prosecutions for law breaches, such as not paying the BBC licence fee or dodging transport fares. However, with quick prosecutions conducted in such a way—and, in that instance, behind closed doors, as exposed brilliantly by Tristan Kirk, a journalist at the Evening Standard—we have seen thousands of people on an industrial scale being found guilty, often of small unintended mistakes. We have to remember that, if you try to bring about justice quickly and using these new methods, you can cause huge amounts of problems. There are harrowing stories of people who are very ill, people who have dementia and even people who have died, who have been victims of these single justice procedure issues.
I hope the movers of the amendments in this group will recognise that fast-track systems of convenience can lead to some terrible unintended consequences. I am reminded, in similar vein, of the growth of those monstrous non-crime hate incidents—again, a legalistic mash-up that have caused so many problems for free speech, using paralegalistic language and confusing us over what constitutes guilt. I was therefore glad to see the amendments by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, in this group, and I look forward to his comments later.
This group of amendments is one to which I would like to hear the Minister respond positively. They are well intentioned—no one has been dismissive of anti-social behaviour—but we do not think respect orders are fit for purpose and, on the other hand, anti-social behaviour orders in general are in a mess. At least let us review what works and what does not before we move forward.
Baroness Whitaker (Lab)
My Lords, I add my support for Amendment 1. There should be a review of all these orders before layering another one on. In fact, some of that work has been done: freedom of information data demonstrates that people from minority ethnic communities are far more likely to be subject to this range of orders—Gypsy and Irish Traveller people are also more likely to receive disproportionate criminal punishments on breaching the orders—so the lack of monitoring of the use of behavioural orders is disturbing. I am sure that my noble friend the Minister does not want to continue this cycle of criminalising vulnerable and disadvantaged communities, so please can we have a formal review of the impact of the orders currently in place?
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, I find myself in agreement with many of the genuine human rights concerns already expressed around the Committee. I find myself in a bit of a time warp because these concerns were evidenced by the use, abuse, disrepute and ultimately disuse that anti-social behaviour orders fell into all those years ago. The criminalisation of vulnerable people, people with addiction problems, people with mental health problems, homeless people and so on is not hypothesis; it was evidenced by the practice of the original anti-social behaviour orders.
I therefore hope that, in his reply, my noble friend, who I know to be a very thoughtful Minister, will go some way to expressing how he thinks these new respect orders will improve on the very unhappy history of ASBOs. Other members of the Committee have already set out what happened in the interim. It would be useful if my noble friend the Minister could explain what will be different this time, why and how.
In a nutshell, my concerns are, first, that the threshold of behaviour likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress is low and vague. To be blunt, some people are easily alarmed and distressed. Harassment is the more objective, higher part of that threshold. That is the entry point at which vulnerable people can first fall into this quasi-civil criminal order that can sweep them into the criminal justice system rather than diverting them from it.
The second concern is that, once one is under the jurisdiction of such an order, it becomes a personal, bespoke criminal code for the individual. I remember the suicidal woman banned from bridges and the pig farmer who was given an ASBO because the pigs wandered on to the neighbours’ land. Is it really appropriate to have bespoke criminal codes for different people in different parts of the country? The postcode lottery point was made well, but there is also the issue of vulnerable people and minorities, who find themselves disproportionately affected.
Once you breach your personalised criminal code—which could be to keep away from a part of town where your close relatives live—you are then swept into the system. That is my third concern about these quasi-civil criminal orders: the ease with which vulnerable people with chaotic lives who have been let down by social services and society in general are now swept into the criminal justice system rather than diverted from it.
Finally, I share the concerns about making such orders available to even younger people, who really should not be anywhere near the criminal justice system. In a much later group—sometime next year, I think, when we will still be in this Committee and will be older, if not wiser—I have tabled an amendment, with the support of the noble and learned Baronesses, Lady Hale of Richmond and Lady Butler-Sloss, to tackle the shockingly low age of criminal responsibility, 10 years-old, that we still have in England and Wales.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 3 and 10. Superficially, Amendment 3 may look radical, in seeking to reduce the age from 18 to 14. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, certainly might not like it, but, if we want to tackle the lack of respect or anti-social behaviour of those aged 18-plus, that will not be possible unless we tackle all the anti-social behaviour that has built up from age 10 or even younger.
We cannot get into pre-14 behaviour today, but I discovered some frightening statistics from the Met Police, which it was forced to publish under an FOI request last year. They show that, for the year ending December 2023, 879 crimes were committed by children aged 10 to 17. Of these, 173 were violence against the person, 64 were robbery, 81 were theft, 28 were arson, 385 were drug offences and 81 involved possession of weapons. That is fairly frightening. But if that was not bad enough, the Met also published a breakdown of crimes committed by children aged one to nine, of which there were 653 offences. Some 128 were theft and 95 were arson and criminal damage, but the really frightening statistics were the 85 sexual offences and—the largest group—191 crimes of violence against the person. As I say, we cannot deal with that age group today, but I simply ask what kind of sick society we are becoming when in the Met area alone we have 85 children aged between one and nine accused of sexual offences and 191 accused of violence against the person.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
In the spirit of Committee, I wonder whether I might challenge the noble Lord a little on this epidemic of child criminality to which he so graphically referred. I think we should park these arguably very rare cases of child homicide outside a debate on anti-social behaviour, but would he agree with me that, when it comes to fisticuffs—what would be common assault—or even theft, we know that quite small children in every home in the country are capable of fisticuffs with each other, between siblings, and taking things that are not their own? But is not a crucial difference in our response to those children? Anti-social behaviour on the playing fields of Eton rarely ends up anywhere near the criminal justice system, but looked-after children in particular are more likely to be reported to the police and end up criminalised at a very early age. So does the noble Lord agree that children in, for example, England and Wales are no more malign than children in Scotland, where the age of responsibility is 14? We should look to ourselves as adult society and our responses to these vulnerable children.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
The noble Baroness says that child homicides are very rare, but they have doubled in the past 12 years. All the statistics that I quoted were from the Youth Justice Board and the Office for National Statistics, showing a huge increase in knife crime. Then there are the police forces themselves; there is an article relating to the Met, or a discussion on a blog from yesterday, asking whether knife crime by children was out of control—and those are their words, not mine.
There has been a huge increase in viciousness, knife use and violent crime by children, and I suggest in my amendments that lowering the age to include 14 to 18 year-olds in respect orders might make a difference, if we could hive them off early. Of course, I accept that children in Scotland, as in England, Northern Ireland and Wales, will also have violent tendencies. My concern is that we are failing to intervene early enough to do anything about them; that is the whole cause of the problem in the past 30 years—a lack of early intervention to deal properly with children. For some, that will mean a caution or restorative justice; for others, it could mean better work from social services. But some prolific young offenders may need to be taken out of circulation, for their own benefit and to save the lives of other children.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, accurately pointed out that a respect order may be made merely on the balance of probabilities—the civil standard of proof. Will the Minister confirm my understanding that, if a criminal charge is to be brought for breaching a respect order, it will be brought under new Section I1, and the offence of breach of respect order? It is then for the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt, on the criminal standard, that the person concerned has not merely breached the respect order but has done so without reasonable excuse. That may provide an answer to some of the more graphic and extreme examples that have been given in this debate of when a respect order may apply. I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm whether my understanding is correct.
In this debate we need to take account of the fact that anti-social behaviour occurs in our society with alarming regularity and causes misery to law-abiding citizens. There needs to be some effective means of addressing it. Having said all that, I share some of the concerns that have been expressed as to the width of the powers that we are being invited to endorse. There are two particular concerns that I have.
The first is that in new Section A1(1)(b), it is sufficient for the court to consider it “just and convenient” to impose a respect order. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, referred to that—and I have great sympathy with the argument that that really ought to be a test of “necessary and proportionate”. All the sorts of cases that one would want to see prohibited by law could be brought within a necessary and proportionate test.
The other concern that I have—and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, was the one who mentioned this—is that in new Section A1(9), the test of anti-social behaviour is
“conduct that has caused, or is likely to cause, harassment, alarm or distress to any person”.
That means any person, however vulnerable they may be, or weak-minded, which is a purely subjective test. I suggest in this context that there really needs to be some objectivity written into the definition, whether or not by referring to a reasonable person; other types of drafting mechanism could be adopted. I share some of the concerns, but I also see the need for an effective and functioning system in this context.
Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)
My Lords, I shall speak to my Amendment 22 and to Amendment 1. I believe that we need to look at the current rules as they stand and have a review of those rules, their effectiveness and who they fall upon. As someone who has been a youth worker for over three decades now, I have seen large parts of poorer communities, black and white, end up in very serious legal entanglements just because of what somebody else has subjectively decided was a piece of anti-social behaviour which has then led to some kind of legal sanction. These respect orders seem like a very fast track too. Many people’s behaviour is not what I would call traditional, is not recognised, and therefore these orders would become a real danger to them; there is a real danger that they have done something that was anti-social and all of a sudden, they are facing a criminal sanction.
Notwithstanding what the last speaker said—that the court would then go back and test and would have to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, above the civil court’s level of proof—it would be too late for many young people, because it would have blighted them. Many young people act out once they realise they are in trouble, because they are afraid. If we are going to put someone through that mechanism, we had better make sure that they actually have a question to answer before we posit a question that leads them to end up in some kind of legal entanglement.
Another thing to consider is that, if we change the age of criminal consent, we have to be careful that we do not expose young people to gang grooming. If a gang is able to say that, under a certain age, you will not be legally held to account for your crimes, they will use that as a rallying cry, as a recruitment cry. Currently, most children of 10 years of age understand the risk they would be taking. If we remove that, we could be exposing those children inadvertently to high levels of gang membership, because they will be told, “You cannot be prosecuted, because you cannot be held responsible”. I really think that bears looking at.
All that said, my Amendment 22 is a very small amendment, but I believe it is very important. We all know that anti-social behaviour can be an absolute blight on a whole community’s life. It is often the beginning, the prelude, to a very large and long criminal career, so if we can nip it in the bud early, that is very important. When it comes to where people live, the ripple effect from small amounts of anti-social behaviour can affect hundreds, so I welcome the Bill’s aim to tackle anti-social behaviour in the UK, especially around housing developments. I think that is a very good thing to do. However, I am concerned that the Bill in its current form fails to extend the new powers to all housing providers. Currently, the Bill provides for social housing inconsistently. This does not appear to be a purposeful exclusion; rather, the Bill uses the definition of “housing provider” from the crime and policing Act 2014, a definition that talks about not-for-profit housing providers.
As the Bill is currently worded, institutional housing providers are not covered by these rules. I think it is very important that they are, because it is a huge sector, projected to grow to very large proportions in future, and it looks after the same vulnerable communities as any other housing provider. That is the important thing here. Whether they are institutionally funded or not is actually irrelevant; it is about who is their client group. Their client group is some of the most vulnerable communities in this country, which many of our RSLs are very good at catering for, but because they are dealing with the same client group, because the young people and older people in their purview are exposed to exactly the same situations, they should have exactly the same powers to help people.
We are talking about the ability to defend people’s life chances, because we can make where they are living safe. It can be dealt with properly. I have worked on many housing estates; I was born and raised on one myself. Anti-social behaviour that cannot be addressed by the landlord is an absolute blight on people’s lives, so we are just asking for that small wording to be changed. It would be a very small but very powerful change. I believe that it is not a purposeful exclusion; it is just because we are using the definition from 2014.
Lord Meston (CB)
My Lords, I too agree with much of what the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, said, and I have added my name to his Amendment 12 to ask the Government to amplify the basis upon which exclusion orders might be made and the quality of the evidence required. An order excluding someone from his or her home has always to be seen as a last resort —in this context, when other less drastic restraints have not worked or are clearly not likely to work. I therefore hope that the Government can clarify the likely scenarios and the criteria that will apply when exclusion orders are sought and granted.
As I understand it, under the Bill, the application will be based on the risk assessment to be carried out under new Section J1, supplemented by guidance yet to come. The Bill does not expressly say, as far as I can see, that the risk assessment should be included with the application to be made to the court, or that it should be served on the respondent where possible. Both requirements should surely be explicit, not implicit. I suggest also that at least the risk assessment should be expected to summarise the behaviour and attitude of the respondent giving rise to the risk of harm, and specifically to the need to evict him or her from their home. In addition, and by analogy with the family jurisdiction, with which I am more familiar, it should actually state the effects of making or not making the order on other known occupants of the home, including relevant children.
Finally, the assessment, I suggest, should set out clearly the reasons to believe that making an exclusion order will actually reduce the perceived risks. Experience shows—certainly, my experience shows—that in some cases, making such an order may do no more than move the problem on somewhere else.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
My Lords, I echo a lot of the concerns that have been expressed so far in this debate. The scrutiny of the Bill by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is something that I hope we will all take very careful note of.
I particularly support my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti in her first intervention. She is very experienced in social matters from her days in Liberty, and she rightly warns us that there will be a lot of problems if respect orders are brought in as they are legislated. Incidentally, respect orders cover 11 pages of the Bill, a Bill that I, for legislative complaints, described at Second Reading as “a monster”. I shall not describe these 11 pages on respect orders as being a monster, because I think the Government have been trying very hard to get it right, but they have not so far done so, and therefore the sensible thing—and this is not to criticise the Government—is for there to be a pause, and for these new respect orders not to be brought in as such in the Bill but only after we have been able to review the entirety of these orders, anti-social orders and orders to protect citizens from being badly disturbed living in their homes or walking the streets.
I urge my noble friend the Minister to move with caution and to accept that the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, is not a destructive amendment but a sensible amendment to achieve the one thing that we should be achieving in the Bill, which is to get it right, as right as we possibly can.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, I associate myself with the remarks we have heard from around the Chamber, including from my noble friend Lord Bailey of Paddington and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about the seriousness of anti-social behaviour and the rationale of the Government in bringing forward the measures that they have in this part of the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, summed it up as the requirement for an effective and functioning system—hear, hear to that.
My concern is aligned with the sentiment, if not the letter, of Amendment 1, which would require the Government to explain why they feel that this set of measures, including respect orders, will work, when previous similar measures—ASBIs and so forth—have not worked to the extent, perhaps, that the Ministers who championed them when they were originally brought in expected. I do not believe that this is the moment for an independent review, but I think the Minister could give the Committee a detailed explanation of the specific circumstances in which he feels that these new respect orders will be deployed, why they are more likely to work than the existing arrangements and, in particular, the degree to which they will really make a difference. The Minister has brought forward these measures for the approval of Parliament, and he must be able to justify the result he expects them to have once they are implemented.
We know that that Governments of all flavours—this is not a specific reflection on the current Government—tend to reach for the statute book to address knotty problems, when in fact the answer may equally lie in better execution of existing powers. That probably is the overall challenge that has been put to the Minister this afternoon. I very much look forward to his answer.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the speakers in this debate so far. This Committee stage will be a long haul, but I hope that we can continue this level of discussion and scrutiny throughout. Sorry.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
No problem.
My Lords, I rise to speak very briefly to Amendments 4, 5 and 7 in my name. My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones has made a very clear case for each one, so I will speak briefly. I put on record my thanks to Justice, which has gathered insights from so many people working in this field and it has been really interesting reading case studies that are backed up by very clear evidence.
These amendments would provide essential safeguards, ensuring the powers contained within respect orders are proportionate. Amendment 4 would require orders to be made only where there is evidence of actual conduct, not speculation about what a person might do in future. Amendment 7 would ensure that an order is imposed with a clear end date, capped at two years. In my opinion, it is wrong that an individual could be subject to potentially serious restrictions in perpetuity as a result of behaviour that falls below the criminal threshold. In Amendment 5, we want to change the “just and convenient” threshold generally applied in civil proceedings to “necessary and proportionate”. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, put a very good case for this—much better than I could ever do, so I will not try.
Amendment 1, moved by my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones, calling for an independent review of existing anti-social behaviour powers before respect orders are rolled out, would improve the Bill considerably, because precisely what laws are already used, and what works in practice, is critical to their success.
On the subject of likely success, I welcome the fact that respect orders can include positive requirements that people have to, for example, attend rehabilitation—perhaps to deal with addictions to drugs or drink or both. However, such requirements can work only if every region has capacity in drug and alcohol treatment programmes. I am sure the Minister is aware that only 12 of the 43 police forces returned data last year on how many cases were referred for such treatment. Without that information, we cannot know how such rehabilitation can work. I would be grateful to hear from the Minister, when he responds, about what efforts are being made to ensure there are places available. Legislation alone is no good without resources.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
I apologise to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. I did want to hear what she had to say, but my enthusiasm to move on overtook me, unfortunately. I must learn to ignore nods from the Government Bench opposite as well.
As I said, the Committee stage will be a long haul, but I hope that we can continue this level of discussion and scrutiny throughout. On these Benches, we are not entirely sure of the need for new anti-social behaviour laws, and the validity of the proposed measure will be touched on more thoroughly in group 3. We feel the focus should be on enforcement first and foremost.
But as this proposal will become law, there are several individual parts of it that would benefit from being amended. I begin with Amendment 2 in my name, which is intended to probe the age at which a person can be given a respect order. The Bill states that this will be 18 and that younger offenders will be subject to a youth injunction. I cannot see why there should be two different powers to deal with the same behaviours. One of the benefits of anti-social behaviour injunctions is that they can apply to any person over the age of 10, rather than having different powers for different age groups.
To set the age minimum at 16 seems like common sense, and I would be surprised if the Minister disagrees with me. It is, after all, his party that believes in treating children of that age as adults. Why should 16 year-olds be allowed to choose the people who create anti-social behaviour laws, but simultaneously be exempt from those laws? Perhaps the Minister can explain the rationale, should he oppose the amendment.
Amendment 6 aims to ensure that an issued respect order does not place excessive restrictions on the recipient. It is similar to Amendment 5, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, in seeking to ensure that orders are “necessary and proportionate”. As it stands, respect orders may require the recipient to do anything specified by the court—a power that does not contain any internal safeguards. This could lead to massive judicial overreach. The amendment in my name seeks to ensure that this is not the case. It is fair and proportionate that a recipient may be prohibited from doing anything that may cause a repeat of that which required an order in the first place. Prohibiting those actions is just, but that is where the powers of prohibition should end. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to this potential issue with the proposed policy.
Amendment 11 would remove perhaps the most egregious part of this clause: giving the Secretary of State complete discretion not only over which authorities fall under the scope of respect orders, but the definitions that define respect orders themselves. It means that the already strong and limiting orders can be altered and twisted by whichever Home Secretary happens to be in office. I am sure each noble Lord could think of a different set of hands that they would not want this power to reside in. The amendment in my name would prevent that occurring and leave this already forceful power as it is.
Amendments 13 and 14 seek to improve the clarity in the chain of command in issuing orders. In a policy with so many moving parts, efficiency is key. A respect order would currently appoint a supervisor, who would then have the discretion to inform an
“appropriate chief officer of police”
if the offender lives in more than one area. This adds an extra layer of responsibility to a supervisor already charged with monitoring the respect order’s recipient. I can foresee potential mix-ups and miscommunications whereby either no or multiple chief officers believe themselves to be responsible for a recipient. The easy solution would be to specify the relevant chief officer alongside the supervisor, disaggregating the chain of appointments and improving clarity. I hope the Minister considers this point.
Amendment 20 seeks to require that risk assessments are the basis of respect order applications. It seems wrong that, despite being required to carry out a risk assessment, an applicant can apply for a respect order without having to reference it to the court. Respect orders are potentially very freedom-limiting; the court that issues them should be able to reference the risks posed by the recipient as a justification for these sanctions. As always, I look forward to the Minister’s response.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lords who have spoken in this debate on the first day in Committee on the Crime and Policing Bill. I feel like I am at base camp at the start of a climb to Mount Everest—but, as ever, Mount Everest has been conquered, as I am sure the Bill will eventually be as well. It feels like we are at the very start of a long, fruitful and productive process.
I will start by outlining a little about respect orders, because it is important to put them into the general context of why the Government are doing what they are doing. There were over 1 million recorded incidents of anti-social behaviour in the last year for which records exist. That is an awful lot of anti-social behaviour and does not include even the underreporting that may well exist.
There is a government manifesto commitment to take action on respect orders. The new orders will enable courts to both ban offenders from engaging in harmful anti-social behaviour, and/or—as the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, noted—impose positive requirements to tackle the root cause of anti-social behaviour. That could be anger management or alcohol or drug awareness courses, which will hopefully tackle the root cause of that anti-social behaviour and stop it occurring.
Unlike existing ASB civil injunctions, breach will be a criminal offence enforceable by arrest and tried in the criminal courts. That goes to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. This goes to court only if an individual breaches the order put on them—the purpose of the order is to stop the behaviour taking place. Penalties for breach will include community sentences, unlimited fines and potentially prison time for the most serious breaches, but only on a breach. That is a really important point to recognise in our discussions today.
Because there are so many amendments in this group, although it is a slow process I will take the amendments in turn. Amendment 1, supported by the noble Lords, Lord Bailey of Paddington and Lord Clement-Jones, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, my noble friends Lady Whitaker and Lord Hacking, and the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, would require a Home Secretary within six months of the Bill becoming law to undertake a review of existing powers under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, prior to introducing respect orders.
First, the introduction of respect orders was a manifesto commitment, so the Government have put some thought into it. I also assure noble Lords that the Government are committed to ensuring that the powers to address anti-social behaviour remain effective. As such, they are subject to continuous review. I do not want to disappoint the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, but there will not be a pilot on this, because the Home Office has regularly engaged with front-line practitioners and with the ASB sector to better understand how the powers of the 2014 Act are used and where improvements can be made.
In addition, under the last Government the department launched a public consultation in 2023 to understand how powers could be used more consistently and effectively. That consultation has helped inform the measures in Part 1 of the Bill. I draw noble Lords’ attention to Clause 7 of the Bill, which, to aid this ongoing evaluation process, provides for new requirements for local agencies to report information about anti-social behaviour to the Government to help us continually improve and review.
Therefore, the provisions in Clause 1 deliver on the manifesto commitment. We need to press ahead with respect orders as soon as possible to ensure that the police, local authorities and others have the effective powers to tackle the 1 million cases per year. Amendment 1 would require us to have a costly and unnecessary review, and it would slow and cause delay in the rollout. Therefore, with respect, I cannot accept it either today or on Report.
Amendments 2 and 3 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Blencathra, seek to lower the age at which respondents can receive a respect order from 18 to 16, or indeed to 14. Again, I hope the noble Lords understand that the Government do not wish to criminalise young people unless it is absolutely necessary, which is why our manifesto was clear that respect orders were aimed at tackling anti-social behaviour perpetrated by adults. The noble Lord, Lord Bailey, made some very valid points on that in relation to the potential criminalisation of younger people.
That does not mean there is no provision for the relevant agencies to deal with youth-related anti-social behaviour. The respect order, while replacing the civil injunction for adults, will remain in place for those under the age of 18, renamed as the youth injunction. Importantly, this will enable youth courts to impose behaviour requirements on younger offenders without resulting in criminalisation if they breach the injunction. There is still the potential for those orders to be placed, but it does not involve criminalisation.
Amendments 4 and 5 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and others would amend the legal test for issuing a respect order. Amendment 4 would mean that a respect order could be issued only in relation to ASB that a respondent had already engaged in, and not where the respondent had threatened to engage in this behaviour, as is the case with existing civil injunctions.
I stress to the House that respect orders are fundamentally preventive in nature. They are designed to stop bad behaviour by putting in place a restraining order that says, in effect, “Don’t do these particular actions”. If the offender abides by the terms of the order, there will be no further sanctions. That is an important point for the House to understand and grasp from the Government’s perspective. Anti-social behaviour can be insidious and difficult to prove and it can take many forms. We know that the threat of aggressive or anti-social behaviour can often escalate quickly into more serious, violent and criminal behaviour —a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. That is why it is crucial that we retain the ability to issue an order against those threatening to engage in ASB, in order to prevent that harm before it happens.
Amendment 5, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, would change the legal test for issuing a respect order, so that that the court would need to find it “necessary and proportionate” to issue the order to prevent the respondent engaging in anti-social behaviour, rather than using the legal test as currently drafted, in which the court must find it “just and convenient” to do so. The current “just and convenient” language mirrors that of the civil injunction and is therefore familiar to the courts.
Let me be clear—this again goes to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—that the current threshold still requires a judge, with all the relevant legal duties and safeguards that that entails, to be satisfied that the issuing of an order is just, reasonable and fair. Courts will already take the necessity and proportionality of an order into account as a result of their duties under the Human Rights Act. Given these considerations, the benefits of amending the legal test in this way are limited.
Moving on to Amendment 6—
Lord Pannick (CB)
Since the Minister rightly accepts that there is a test of proportionality under the Human Rights Act, would it not be better to put it in the Bill, so that everybody understands—whether they are magistrates, judges, solicitors or counsel—that that is the test? That would provide a great deal of comfort and protection for those who may be subject to the orders.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I have great respect for the noble Lord’s contributions. I have heard what he said, but I believe that this is the right way forward. We can always examine his comments again and I appreciate the way in which he has contributed to the debate.
Amendment 6, from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, seeks to ensure that any positive requirements placed on the recipient of a respect order are restricted to those which would prevent a future breach of the order. Positive requirements to address the underlying causes of the behaviour are an important aspect of the respect order. That is a key point that I want to impress on noble Lords today. While the legislation sets out a number of restrictions on how positive requirements can be used, it is the Government’s view that the amendment is unnecessarily restrictive and that courts and agencies should have the discretion to tailor positive requirements to the particular needs of each case.
Amendment 7, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and also spoken to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, would limit the amount of time that a respect order may be in effect to two years. As it stands, there is no limit on the time a respect order might be in effect for, and I think that is the right thing to do. Again, there will be secondary action under the respect order only in the event of a breach taking place. If, for example, someone has previously been a persistent offender and the order puts in place an unlimited time, that would be reasonable until such time as the behaviour is noted. Implementing a two-year time limit might be of some difficulty and would not necessarily tailor against the individual’s behaviour. I come back to the central point that, ultimately, no action is taken against the individual if they do not breach the order.
The duration of a respect order is dependent on the specific circumstances of each case. That will be determined by the courts. I do not expect that every respect order will be imposed for an indefinite period, but that option should be available if there are relentless adult ASB perpetrators. The legislation makes provision for respect orders to be varied or discharged depending on the circumstances of the case.
Amendment 9, again tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would make it a requirement that an applicant must gain full council approval for all local authority-led applications for a respect order. It is proper quite that, while some councils may seek full council approval for PSPOs, there is no legislative requirement for them to do so. It should be noted that respect orders, unlike PSPOs, are granted by the courts, which provides additional safeguards to ensure that respect orders are used proportionately—this goes back to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. Whereas PSPOs impose prohibitions on the general public, respect orders will be for individuals who have a history of disruptive, anti-social behaviour.
I return to the fact that, if individuals do not breach an order, the matter will go no further. It is the Government’s view that, given this distinction, it would not be appropriate to require full council approval for all respect orders—which quite honestly is self-evident. I have been a councillor and spent time in council committees, so I know that there is potential for delay. It might take a long time to make an order, which would risk us not taking action quickly and supportively for the benefit of victims and communities at large. The amendment might also require a full public consultation when applying for a respect order, but I do not believe that that is the way to run respect orders or to impact on individuals.
Amendment 10, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, seeks to add non-crime hate incidents to the definition of anti-social behaviour. I respectfully say to him that we are going to use the phrase “non-crime hate incidents” during the course of the Bill in relation to a number of amendments, including those tabled by his noble friend, the noble Lord, Lord Young. As I have previously said publicly in the House, the College of Policing—under the chairmanship of his noble friend, the noble Lord, Lord Herbert of South Downs—will very shortly produce a review of non-crime hate incidents. There has also been discussion by the Metropolitan Police on what it is doing. I hope that the review will help inform later stages of the Bill. At this stage, I believe that, while we should not kick Amendment 10 down the line—we will come back to the subject of the amendment—we should not deal with it in relation to Clause 1.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I may have misheard the Minister, but if I heard him correctly, I want to correct what he said. I do not want to add it to the Bill; I want to add to the Bill a provision that it is not included under prevention orders.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I appreciate that. If I have misunderstood his intention, I apologise. None the less, the principle is still the same for me. There are specific amendments about this downstream. By the time we reach them, I hope that we will have further enlightenment from the College of Policing and that we can determine government policy on non-crime hate incidents in the light of that review. That is what I have said on a number of occasions in response to similar questions. Therefore, I respectfully suggest that Amendment 10 is slightly premature at this stage, and we will discuss that matter in full detail downstream.
Amendment 11, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, seeks to remove the provision for the Secretary of State to amend, by regulations, the list of relevant authorities that can apply for a respect order. The Secretary of State needs that power to look at the range of contexts, and a multiagency approach is often needed to tackle anti-social behaviour. To ensure that we have that, I believe that the Secretary of State needs to retain that power—that may be a source of disagreement between us, but that is where I think we stand. The Secretary of State should be able to add an agency to the list. It would not be done unilaterally; new regulations would have to be laid. Those made under new Section B1 of the 2014 Act would be subject to the draft affirmative procedure and, as such, subject to debate and approval in both Houses. It is not an unfettered power for the Secretary of State.
A number of important issues have been raised in relation to Amendment 12, which seeks to remove the power to exclude a person from their home as part of a respect order in cases of violence or risk of harm. As noble Lords have said, including the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Meston, excluding a person from their home is of course not something that should be taken lightly. However, we know that anti-social behaviour is not always trivial and can escalate into violence. We also know that, sadly, in some cases, anti-social behaviour is accompanied by domestic abuse. The ability to exclude perpetrators from their homes in such scenarios is a valuable safeguard in protecting vulnerable victims and ensuring that they do not face eviction for the wrongs of their perpetrator.
The key point on Amendment 12—this goes to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Meston—is that an exclusion can happen only when there is a significant risk of violence or harm. This will be key for protecting vulnerable victims who live with perpetrators or are in the same building. The applicant for the respect order will be able to make a proper risk assessment; that is the purpose and focus of that. The power to exclude remains a decision for the court and will be used only when it considers it necessary, in order to protect victims from the risk of violence or harm. I do not know whether that satisfies the noble Lord, but that is the Government’s rationale for the discussions we are bringing forward today.
This is a long group of amendments, so I apologise to the Committee for continuing to deal with them. Amendment 13 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies, seeks to ensure that
“the appropriate chief officer of police”
is specified where a respect order has been issued. The Bill also provides that a supervisor must provide details of the respondent’s compliance with positive requirements to the chief officer of police. While the police are among the agencies that can apply for these orders, the operational responsibility for enforcing requirement lies with the designated supervisor and not with the chief officer of police. It is intended that positive requirements would be managed by those closest to the respondent’s circumstances.
Amendment 14 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, seeks to ensure that the supervisor does not make the final decision on who the relevant chief officer of the police would be, where it appears that the respondent lives in more than one police area. Supervisors are directly involved in managing the positive requirements of respect orders. They have first-hand knowledge of the respondent’s living arrangements and which police areas are most impacted by the respondent’s behaviour. Specifying the chief officer of police prior to issuing a respect order could be an unnecessary burden on police forces that have minimal involvement, and therefore it is appropriate that the supervisor makes the final decision on these matters.
Amendment 18 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, seeks to remove the provision enabling courts to make interim respect orders. Again, I highlight that interim court orders are not a novel concept; they are generally available to courts in exceptional cases. There is currently the possibility for a civil injunction, and it remains the case for the respect order where it is necessary for the courts to grant an interim respect order to prevent serious harm to victims.
Victims are central to the proposals we are bringing forward. If an interim order has been granted, it is because there has been a case made to a court that victims need some assistance to prevent serious harm to them. An interim respect order can be granted by the court only when all the relevant legal duties and safeguards that that entails are met, and it requires the court to be satisfied that it is just to make an order. That goes back to the point the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made. If that order is placed, it is because the court has determined on the evidence before it that there is a real risk of threat to an individual and therefore that order has to be made.
Amendment 20 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, seeks to ensure that a respect order is based on a risk assessment. The introduction of the risk assessment offers a further safeguard in ensuring that respect order applications consider contextual vulnerabilities and agencies take a joint multilateral approach. I hope I can make it clear to the noble Lord that this is a statutory requirement, and all agencies must complete a risk assessment prior to applying for a respect order, so we have met the provisions that he wants in Amendment 20 to date.
Amendment 21 from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, would place a duty on the Home Secretary to conduct a public consultation before introducing new statutory guidance for practitioners on respect orders. I make it clear to the Committee that any updates or additions to the ASB statutory guidance are already subject to extensive consultation with relevant stakeholders. That will include the front-line practitioners for whom the guidance is intended. This will be the case for statutory guidance on respect orders, and I hope that satisfies the noble Lord. As respect orders partially replace an existing power, the civil injunction, a large portion of the guidance will therefore already be familiar to practitioners.
Finally, Amendment 22, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, seeks to add for-profit registered social housing providers to the list of relevant agencies that can apply for a respect order. For-profit social housing providers have grown in prominence since the 2014 Act came into force, and I recognise the importance of the relevant agencies having the powers needed to tackle anti-social behaviour. That is why, for example, we are giving both for-profit and non-profit social housing providers the power to apply for and issue closure notices. However, these are powerful tools, and it is also important that further challenges to the agencies that can use the powers, including respect orders, are considered carefully. But the noble Lord has raised some very important issues, and we will consider them carefully. I really appreciate his bringing them to the Committee today.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I think it is the Matterhorn at this stage, rather than Everest, but we will see. I thank the Minister for his very full reply, and I thank all noble Lords for their support for this set of amendments that I and my noble friend Lady Doocey put forward. The Minister has set out his stall; he is clearly very wedded to the current wording, and that will merit careful consideration. I recognise the point he made about this being a manifesto commitment, but Amendment 1 is not designed to negate respect orders; it is designed to review the existing suite of anti-social behaviour legislation in order to make sure that it is effective.
I recognise the point the Minister made about the 1 million incidents, but we do not know at this stage, other than from the Minister’s assertions, that the respect orders are going to be effective in dealing with those, or, indeed, whether existing powers would have themselves been effective.
The Minister did not really explain why the current legislation is inadequate. He also did not for one second admit that the current regime of PSPOs and CPNs had its faults.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The real difference between this legislation and the existing legislation is that action can be taken immediately. I think I did touch on that point, but if it was not to the noble Lord’s satisfaction, I apologise. We can take action immediately on a breach.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
I think we are going to need some more convincing that that is the case, compared to anti-social behaviour injunctions. So, we remain somewhat unconvinced.
We have the common aim across the House of achieving an effective system that is fair and proportionate. The one chink in the Minister’s armour was that he was prepared, in response to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to consider the wording “necessary and proportionate”. I very much hope that he will consider that as a possible amendment to his proposal.
I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, that Governments reach for the statute book; we need to consider whether existing legislation is sufficient. The noble Lord, Lord Hacking, called for a pause. Whether it is a pause or a review, we will definitely want to return to this on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 1.
Lord Davies of Gower
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, we must ensure that courts can operate within their means. If we issue them with new responsibilities, we have to be sure that they have the capacity to fulfil them. Unfortunately, in restricting respect orders to the High Court and county courts, the Government risk not providing the bandwidth to deal with new orders.
At the end of Labour’s first year in office, the Crown Court backlog suffered an annual increase of 11%. There are over 74,000 cases waiting to be judged. Of course, that burden is not entirely at the door of the Crown Courts, but a considerable number of the outstanding cases will require their use. County courts are in a better—but still not ideal—state. The average time for justice to be delivered is just over 49 weeks. Reflecting on this, it makes sense for the Government to divide the responsibilities for the new respect orders as widely as possible. The logical conclusion is to permit an application for a respect order to be made to a magistrates’ court.
If respect orders were confined to the serious criminality that we expect to be dealt with by the High Court and county courts, I would accept placing additional pressures on to them and excluding magistrates’ courts. It is right that those facing serious harassment or other forms of anti-social behaviour have the ability to make application to these courts, but the scope for respect orders is far wider than that. The definition of anti-social behaviour is to include actions causing alarm and distress. These are two very subjective metrics: they are fundamentally different from harassment and more serious forms of anti-social behaviour. So I see no reason why magistrates’ courts should not be available to deal with these less serious and potentially menial forms of anti-social behaviour. This is the reasoning behind Amendments 8 and 16, tabled in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie.
There is also precedent for this. When the last Labour Government introduced anti-social behaviour orders in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, they could be made only by a magistrates’ court. This recognised that anti-social behaviour should be the purview of summary justice. The Minister might argue that the Government are simply replicating the application process for anti-social behaviour injunctions and that they were the action of the previous Government. That may be a fair criticism, but that would not mean that the Government are right. Simply following the case of previous legislation does not automatically mean that the legislation before us today is following the right path; nor does it acknowledge the very different state of the backlog in the High Court and county courts today, as opposed to 2014. It makes far more sense to permit the use of magistrates’ courts for this purpose today, given the historic case burden.
Finally, I can see no downside to this. It will permit burden-sharing between three types of courts. It would not alter the nature of the orders, nor the process by which they are made. But it would make some progress toward reducing the waiting time for the making of a respect order. Surely the Government do not want to see a 49-week wait for a respect order to be made. Would that not hamper the effectiveness of these supposedly tough new respect orders? I hope the Minister will consider these amendments carefully and sensibly.
The other amendments in this group seek to minimise the pressure placed on our courts by the new measures and ensure that our shared principles of justice are upheld. Interim respect orders interact with the principle of innocent until proven guilty. They can be made following a court adjournment up until the final court hearing. They have the same function as a regular respect order and can impose the same restrictions. I am conscious that this may sometimes be necessary. I reiterate the debilitated state of our courts and the fact that adjournment is sometimes out of their hands, even if the defendant is likely to engage in further anti-social behaviour. In these occasional instances, I can understand the need for an interim respect order.
Amendment 15 aims to find a balance, creating a presumption against issuing an interim order, while still leaving the option open. Amendment 19 exists to forward the argument that these orders can be issued to prevent only further harassment, and not the vague concepts of alarm and distress. These amendments aim to ease the administrative burden on the courts. Amendment 17 seeks to ensure that, if an appeal is made against a decision to refuse to issue an interim respect order, the defendant is notified. It is right that a person should know when they might be subjected to a respect order, especially when they have not yet been proven guilty. I beg to move Amendment 8.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I have just a few comments. I am quite concerned that the latest figures show that the magistrates’ courts’ backlog of cases to be heard reached 361,000 as of September 2025, a record high and a significant increase on previous years. In the other place, the Minister said the legal test for respect orders was being kept “broad and flexible” to enable them to be used for a wide range of anti-social behaviours. Again, this suggests significant extra pressure on courts. Jamming up the system further is not going to help victims. Can the Minister say what the Government’s assessment is of the impact on the wider criminal justice system?
Giving evidence in the other place, the Police Federation also pointed to the pressure these orders would put on custody places, saying that infrastructure was needed to make new legislation “effective and believable”. Perhaps the Minister could also address that.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for their comments. I am sorry: I am just getting my pages in order; it came slightly more quickly than I expected. I thought we would have a few more contributions.
The amendments all relate to the role of the courts in the Government’s new respect orders, and it is fair and proper that they do so. These new orders will enable courts to ban offenders from engaging in formal, harmful anti-social behaviour and—again, as we have discussed—tackle the root cause. Amendments 8 and 16 seek to allow magistrates’ courts to issue respect orders. I have been clear that the respect orders are civil behaviour orders intended to prevent further anti-social behaviour occurring. They also aim to encourage rehabilitation through the positive requirements that I discussed in the previous group of amendments. Because they are civil in nature, applications should be heard in the civil courts, which have the appropriate procedures and expertise for handling these types of orders.
Magistrates’ courts deal primarily with criminal matters and summary offences. Hearing civil applications in a magistrates’ court would risk treating preventive orders as punitive measures, when, actually, as I mentioned, they are designed either to try to stop people undertaking negative behaviour or to encourage people to undertake what I will term positive behaviour, such as anger management or alcohol awareness courses.
Amendment 15 seeks to ensure that the interim respect orders are not issued by the courts unless specifically said otherwise, and where an application has been made without notice. Again, anti-social behaviour can escalate quickly and cause great harm, and an interim respect order enables rapid protection in urgent cases involving immediate risk. Judges can make decisions based on the individual facts of the case and ensure that victims receive immediate relief in cases which they deem to be appropriate. On occasion, these will have to be issued without giving notice to the respondent, and it is important that judges retain the ability to do so on or without request from the relevant agency. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that the court would be required to apply itself to the question of whether it was appropriate to make an interim order. There is no question of one being made without an express determination to that effect, but speed is still required.
Amendment 17 seeks to ensure that, if an appeal is made against the decision by the courts to refuse an interim respect order, the respondent is duly notified. I reiterate that interim respect orders are designed to provide urgent temporary relief to protect victims and the public from serious harm before a full hearing. If the respondents were notified of an appeal, it could undermine the immediacy and effectiveness of the interim order, and doing so would likely complicate proceedings, prolonging risk to victims and communities. I come back to the fact that all the measures in the Bill are designed to tackle anti-social behaviour at source and provide either interventions to prevent or interventions to encourage positive behaviour. The law allows appeals without notice to maintain speed and efficiency in safeguarding measures.
Amendment 19 seeks to ensure that the interim respect orders are made only when the court considers the respondent likely to engage in harassment. Again, I just say to the noble Lord that the definition of anti-social behaviour is broad: it is intended to capture behaviours that may not meet the criminal threshold but which can cause severe harm to victims and communities. As I pointed out, interim respect orders are a necessary thing to provide immediate relief, preventing harmful behaviour from escalating and causing further damage to victims and communities. I would have thought that the noble Lord would have supported that general direction of travel. They are a preventative order, not a punitive order; they are punitive only in the event of a breach. Again, the purpose of the order is not to have that breach in the first place but to send a signal that says, “This behaviour is unacceptable”, or “This support mechanism is required”, and if you do not attend the support mechanism or if you breach the preventive mechanism, you are facing a potential criminal sanction.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
Just briefly, because this is a very important aspect of the enforcement of respect orders, I ask whether the Minister is saying that all that is needed is that it is shown beyond reasonable doubt that the respect order has been breached, or does one go back to the original decision on the civil balance of probabilities—the reasons for the respect order? Is it purely that you have to show beyond reasonable doubt that the respect order has been breached, in which case it is still a civil balance of probabilities requirement for the original respect order to be enforced?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
There is a determination, and I believe the legislation before us today is clear on that matter. We will debate this still further, undoubtedly, but there is essentially a respect order where the court will consider the potential breach and will make a judgment on it, and having examined that, it will determine the issue in relation to that breach. The noble Lord raises that issue now, but as regards Amendment 19 before us today, which is the point I am making now, limiting the scope of where an interim respect order can be issued risks further harm for communities as a whole.
I will just focus on the points that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, mentioned. She covered in the last series of amendments the same issue, in a sense, about capacity, which is important. It will be a matter for discretion of the applicant and the court to determine what requirements will be most suitable in line with the resources and options that are available in a given area. So, again, that discretion is there at a local level to determine; for example, if an alcohol awareness course is required, then self-evidently an alcohol awareness course has to be available for the individual to take up that course. Those judgments will be made at a local level by the local individuals who are determining these matters.
Again, I refer noble Lords to the economic impact assessment that we have published. The ASB package is expected to lead to
“an overall reduction in prison places”.
The respect order replaces the civil injunction, and we are not expecting additional cases per se. Once in a steady state, annual prison places for respect orders will stay more or less the same, and we expect respect orders to have a neutral impact on prison places, given that they are replacing civil injunction powers. So I hope that that again reassures the noble Baroness in relation to the resource question of the additional impact of these matters. With those comments, I respectfully request the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
Before the Minister sits down —I love that expression—can I just check? I think he said that respect orders were not going to be piloted. Is that correct? Diana Johnson, the Policing Minister in the other place, in the third session in Committee, said:
“We will pilot respect orders to ensure that they are as effective as possible before rolling them out across England and Wales”.—[Official Report, Commons, Crime and Policing Bill Committee, 1/4/25; col. 104.]
So, what has changed between then and now that the Government have changed their mind?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The Government have considered the reflections in another place, and we have now determined that we want to get on with this. Remember that the Bill has 12 days in Committee, and then Report, and we have a long way to go before Royal Assent. The Government want to have a manifesto commitment that they made in July 2024 implemented in good time. Even now, that manifesto commitment will take us potentially nearly two years to put in place. That is a reasonable process, we have consulted widely on the respect orders and that is the Government’s position now.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
Can the Minister say whether anything else has changed that we would not be aware of because it has not been written down anywhere?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
That is a very wide question, my Lords. Let me say that the purpose of Committee is to provide a significant number of days for Members from all sides of the House—as we have had today, from the government side as well as from the Opposition and the Liberal Democrats—to test Ministers and raise points. If the noble Baroness has points she wishes to raise during the passage of the Bill, as ever, I will try to answer them, either on the Floor of this House or in writing afterwards.
The noble Baroness asks whether things have changed. Even today, there are a number of amendments that the Government have brought forward in the groups of amendments that we are deliberating on today. Things move; the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, was saying with regard to the immigration Bill that a number of things have changed over the course of time, and things move. It is now 16 months since the King’s Speech which introduced this legislation. We continue to monitor and move; where necessary we bring forward amendments, and I am open to testing on all matters at all times. But I would welcome the noble Lord withdrawing his amendment today.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister and to those who have contributed. I know we all have the interests of a functioning justice system at heart, and the discussion has reflected that. We must approach this debate with pragmatism as our guiding principle. That means that, when legislating for new crimes, the best outcome is the one that sees offences prosecuted. In a perfect world, perhaps the Crown Courts and the county courts alone would have the capacity to handle these new respect orders. But, as I have outlined, the courts system is incredibly backlogged, and it is therefore necessary to use as many courts as possible to deliver the policy.
Considering the scope of respect orders on top of that, my amendments and the amendments of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie are perfectly reasonable. To consider causing alarm as on the same level as causing harassment, as prosecuting them in the same courts effectively does, defies sense. Making use of magistrates’ courts is both the rational and practical solution to this problem.
Similarly, approaching interim respect orders from a more conservative standpoint would be prudent. They are very illiberal measures and should be used only in the most necessary circumstances. Amendments, such as those tabled in my name, to create presumptions against them and to narrow the preview of their power seek to ensure that this is the case.
I hope that the Minister will agree with the important principles behind these amendments and will perhaps take them away and consider them, but for the time being I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I have tabled and de-grouped this clause stand-part notice because it would be helpful to the Committee to probe the real purpose of respect orders. We have no plans to insist that this part of the Bill be removed on Report.
This Government appear to be making the same errors as those of the previous Labour Administration. The Blair Government seemed to believe that, the more they legislated on crime and anti-social behaviour, the less of that behaviour there would be. We saw Act after Act, many repealing or amending Acts that they had passed merely a few years before. This flurry of lawmaking meant that, by the end of its term in office, Labour had created 14 different powers for police to tackle anti-social behaviour and criminality. My noble friend Lady May of Maidenhead undertook to simplify this system by condensing all these measures into just six powers. However, with this Bill we see that old pattern of the new-Labour years re-emerging. This Bill creates four new powers: respect orders, youth injunctions, housing injunctions and youth diversion orders. I cannot see what real-world impact this will make.
As I said at Second Reading, the concept of respect orders appears to be little more than a gimmick. It is legislative action to make the Government appear to be tough on anti-social behaviour when in fact they are not. Respect orders are no different from the existing anti-social behaviour injunctions. Applications for both are made by the same list of people to the same cause. The requirements that can be placed on the respondent are the same for ASB injunctions and respect orders. Both permit the making of an interim order or injunction. Both permit the exclusion of a person from their home in the case of serious violence or risk of harm. Both permit the variation or discharge of the order or injunction. They are, in almost every aspect, exactly the same.
The only difference is that one is a civil order and the other a criminal order. The Bill creates a criminal offence of breaching a condition of a respect order. A person found guilty of that offence on conviction or indictment is liable to a jail sentence of up to two years. Anti-social behaviour injunctions, however, do not have a specific criminal offence attached to them. A person who breaches a condition of an ASB injunction does not commit an offence of breaching the injunction. The Government have argued that this difference makes their respect orders tougher and therefore justified. However, this overlooks two important facts.
First, the court granting the ASB injunction can attach a power of arrest to the injunction under Section 4 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. Section 9 of that Act states that
“a constable may arrest the respondent without warrant”
where they believe that the person has breached a condition of their injunction. The person arrested for a breach of their injunction can then be charged with contempt of court, which carries a punishment of up to two years’ imprisonment. It is entirely understandable that the Government wish to introduce a specific criminal offence of breaching conditions. It is easier to prosecute someone who breaches their respect order than to prosecute someone for contempt of court for breaching their injunction. That is not least because a police officer would have to know that a person had an injunction against them, that they had breached the condition and that their injunction contained a power of arrest. It is also because, even though ASB injunctions are civil orders, the criminal standard of proof is applied when determining whether a person has breached a condition.
I understand this entirely, but it does not explain why the Government are seeking to replace injunctions in their entirety. Surely, given that every other aspect is the same, it would be far easier and more expeditious to retain the injunctions and simply amend them to create an offence of breach of conditions. That would mean that the ASB injunctions remain in place but they have the same power of enforcement. Why did the Government not follow this route? Why did they not simply amend the anti-social behaviour injunctions, as opposed to creating a whole new class of order?
The answer cannot be that one is a civil order and one a criminal order because, as I have demonstrated, the civil order could easily have been upgraded to criminal status by way of legislative amendment. I would hazard a guess and say that the reason is perhaps bluster. Is it not the case that the Government wanted to seem to be tough on crime, so they came up with a rehash of ASBOs with a slightly catchier name? These new respect orders will likely have little effect on reducing anti-social behaviour. What would have a positive impact would be to increase the number of police officers. Unfortunately, the Government have failed on that front. Since they entered office, the total police officer headcount has fallen by 1,316. That record to date stands in stark contrast to the previous Government’s successful recruitment of 20,000 additional police officers during the last Parliament.
If the Government are serious about getting tough on crime, they should stop the gimmicks and start with enforcement. I beg to move.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I have listened to the quite detailed discussion that we have had so far in our attempt at line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill in relation to respect orders. Weighing up the pros and rather more cons, I am very aware that what I am going to say might seem glib about anti-social behaviour. People listening in might think, “This crowd who are raising problems of civil liberties are not aware of the real scourge of anti-social behaviour and the impact and the misery that it can cause on ordinary people’s lives”. The noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Blencathra, gave us a taste of what that anti-social activity can feel like in local areas. I recognised the descriptions from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, of young people potentially running amok in local areas. Where I live, that has been known to happen, so I recognise that.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I am prompted to rise following the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, with which I largely agree. I am not sure whether I should be offended or pleased by some of the other remarks she made about me, but I think her crucial point is that anti-social behaviour orders have been around for years.
We heard from the Lib Dems that they are worried that orders may be imposed inappropriately on people who should not have them. The Government are worried that they do not have enough powers; therefore, they want respect orders instead. People generally know what anti-social behaviour orders are. My question to the Minister is: why not amend the anti-social behaviour orders to tighten them up as the Lib Dems want and impose the penalties the Government want?
I know the Government will say they used the word “respect” in their manifesto and have to stick to it, but it would seem to me to be introducing, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, has said, a whole new concept which people maybe do not understand—they may think it is more magical than it actually is. Why not use the existing system and amend it to make it work the way the Government want it, the way the Lib Dems want it and the way my noble friends in the Official Opposition want it to? That is all I ask.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, the Minister mentioned in his remarks on the first group that there are over a million instances of anti-social behaviour in the United Kingdom, and he is seeking broad new powers in the early part of the Bill. Can he give the House any guidance as to what sort of effect, if the House were to give the Government these powers, will be seen in terms of a projected reduction in anti-social behaviour as a result?
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I will seize the opportunity to agree with the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, while the going is good and before I have to disagree with him on future groupings. I entirely agreed with what he had to say, as indeed I did with the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower.
This stand part debate goes to what might be called the heart of legislative utility. Why do we need a new tool if the old tools are sufficient? We must ask: does Clause 1 solve a problem or does it merely create complexity and risk? The Bill, as we have heard, introduces respect orders, but it also retains anti-social behaviour injunctions. Many of us already feel that the new respect orders, as we debated in the first group, are unnecessary and largely either replicate powers already available under the 2014 Act, or, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, made very clear, add undesirable elements to those powers.
We have seen with ASBIs that there have been some proposals to include positive requirements tailored to underlying causes of behaviour. If the goal of the Government is to better address the underlying causes of persistent anti-social behaviour, we could be strengthening the existing injunction framework, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said, focusing resources on effective enforcement and mandating psychological or therapeutic interventions, rather than introducing a confusing, duplicated power.
Our preference on these Benches is very clear. We should focus on accountability, review and proportionality to ensure that the existing framework works effectively, rather than adding a potentially flawed new tool that invites mission creep and targets the vulnerable.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to noble Lords for the discussions that we have had today. I will start by saying something that I hope is helpful and which is meant to be helpful. Respect orders are not something in their own right. They are part of a suite of tools that the Government are looking at to help tackle anti-social behaviour.
I take some issue with what the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has said about police numbers. I was Police Minister in 2009-10, and immediately after we lost office, the coalition Government reduced police numbers by around 20,000. The figure of 20,000 officers that the noble Lord says are being put on the streets really represents a replacement of ones who were taken off the streets by the very same Government that he supported.
The noble Lord asked whether we have additional police officers on the ground. This year we have put around another 3,000 police officers on the ground, and we are looking at providing around 13,000 extra pairs of boots on the ground—specials, PCSOs and, indeed, direct warranted officers—during this Parliament. That is again a commitment in the manifesto that we are doing. Many of the measures in the Bill that we will come to later around phone theft, the use of anti-social vehicles and all sorts of other measures are still part of the suite of measures to try to tackle anti-social behaviour as a whole.
If I take the challenge from the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, head on, I cannot give him a figure as to what the impact is going to be directly on those matters as of now. I will reflect on what he said and see whether I can bring further light to that. The key point is that this legislation before the Committee today—this clause stand part notice that the noble Lord is testing the Committee on—is a measure whereby in the event of a breach of those orders, speedier criminal action can be taken, which is different from where we are currently with other forms of anti-social behaviour legislation.
Again, I reaffirm what I said in earlier contributions: we are not seeking to be punitive; we are seeking to be preventive. I hope that nobody will be sanctioned by the legislation for breaching an order. The whole purpose is to put some behaviour modification in place to stop a poor behaviour or to encourage help and support to overcome the reasons why that poor behaviour has taken place in the first place.
This goes to the heart of what the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, said because, from my perspective, this is part of a suite of measures. That is the point I want to put to the Committee today. We know that the powers in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 did not always go far enough to tackle anti-social behaviour and I believe that the whole Committee wants to tackle that anti-social behaviour. It is why the Government committed in our manifesto to introducing the respect order and cracking down on those making our neighbourhoods, town centres and communities unsafe and unwelcome places.
The 1 million police-recorded incidents and over a third of people experiencing or witnessing some form of anti-social behaviour are key issues that any Government should address. The respect order partially replaces civil injunction powers for persons aged 18 or over but, like the civil injunction, will enable courts to set prohibitive conditions by banning disruptive ASB perpetrators from town centres or engaging in a particular behaviour or by providing a rehabilitative, positive requirement, such as attending an anger management course or, potentially, a wider drug or alcohol awareness course to help tackle the root causes of their offending.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for responding to my question about projections of the effect of these measures. The purpose of me asking him these questions, just as I did on another Bill, is not just to ask awkward questions and give his officials more work but a genuine focus on performance. We have a very serious issue in the country and we all agree on anti-social behaviour. The price for the Committee, in essence, agreeing to broader powers is some degree of confidence that they are likely to have a significant effect. Of course, it is incredibly difficult to quantify what that effect may be, but some guidance on it would help the Minister’s cause, which is always a cause close to my heart.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I accept that, but it would be fair to say that I would be making promises or guessing about issues that I could not guarantee. But I can guarantee for the noble Viscount that we will monitor the use of this and that the measures that I have already outlined—those in the Bill, those on police numbers and the focus that we are putting on certain police initiatives through central government discussion with the National Police Chiefs’ Council—will make a difference. They will be judged on that.
Self-evidently, a manifesto commitment to reduce and tackle anti-social behaviour requires this Minister, this Government and this Home Secretary to go back to the electorate, at some point, to say, “That is the difference that we have made”. While I cannot give the noble Viscount an aperitif today, I hope I can give him a full-course meal after the discussions have taken place further down stream.
It is important, as we have just heard, that if perpetrators breach an injunction multiple times, the police cannot take action unless they take them to court. Under this measure, there will be a criminal action so police can take action immediately.
I wish to tell the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that, for a respect order to be issued, two tests must be satisfied. First, the court must be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the respondent has engaged in or threatened to engage in anti-social behaviour as defined. Secondly, the court must be satisfied that issuing the respect order is just and convenient. A further safeguard introduced is that the relevant authorities carry out risk assessments prior to the respect order being put in place.
These clauses, about which the noble Lord has quite rightly asked questions, are important and I wish to see them retained in the Bill. I am grateful for his overall indication that, when it comes to determining that, he will not oppose these clauses, but I will take away his comments and I hope to continue our discussions in the positive way that we have to date.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
I am grateful for the contributions made and to the Minister for his response. Of course, I have no intention of opposing the passage of respect orders. They were part of the Government’s election manifesto and, as such, shall become the law of the land. This does not prevent my criticising them. Indeed, simply because they were part of the Government’s manifesto does not mean that they are a good idea that would have a positive impact on the streets of Britain.
I have provided substantive justification for why I believe that respect orders are, simply put, an effort to paint a picture of a Government bearing down on crime and anti-social behaviour when, in reality, they are not. The proof will be in the pudding; we will see whether the Prime Minister’s so-called tough new respect orders have any actual impact, in due course. For now, I will leave it there.
Lord Clement-Jones
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes the subsections increasing the level of fines attached to FPNs, aiming to address concerns that existing notices and orders are being imposed in inappropriate circumstances.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 23 would remove subsections that increase the maximum level of fines attached to fixed penalty notices for breach of public space protection orders and community protection notices. The core proposal of Clause 4 is to increase the maximum FPN for these breaches from £100 to a punitive £500. This represents a 400% increase in the penalty for infractions often issued without judicial oversight.
The Manifesto Club—a body which I mentioned previously and with which I have engaged extensively on these powers—rightly labels this increase as a
“grossly out-of-proportion penalty”.
We must look at the nature of the offences that these fines target. The Home Office claims that this increase shows a “zero-tolerance approach” to anti-social behaviour, but that ignores the actual activities being punished. Manifesto Club research, relying on freedom of information data, shows that the vast majority of penalties are issued for innocuous actions that fall far outside anyone’s definition of serious anti-social behaviour. This is leading to what the Manifesto Club calls
“the hyper-regulation of public spaces”.
For instance, in 2023, Hillingdon Council issued PSPO penalties largely for idling—leaving a car engine running for more than two minutes. This affected 2,335 people, including a man waiting to collect his wife from a doctor’s surgery. Other commonly banned activities that face this grossly increased penalty include loitering, swearing, begging, wild swimming, busking and feeding birds.
The Manifesto Club has documented community protection notices that target non-harmful behaviours, which are also subject to the increased fine. Orders have been issued banning two people from closing their front door too loudly, prohibiting a man from storing his wheelbarrow behind his shed and banning an 82 year-old from wearing a bikini in her own garden. The increase in fines to £500 for these so-called busybody offences appears to be simply a form of message sending, rather than a proportionate penalty designed to resolve community harm.
The second, and perhaps most corrosive, effect of Clause 4 is that it will spark a boom in the enforcement industry and intensify the practice of fining for profit. The Manifesto Club found that 75% of PSPO penalties in 2023 were issued by private enforcement companies. These companies are typically paid per fine issued, which creates an overt financial incentive to pursue volume regardless of genuine harm or proportionality. They target easy infractions rather than the most serious offenders.
Increasing the financial reward fivefold heightens this perverse incentive to issue as many FPNs as possible for anodyne activities. Crucially, while Defra has published guidance stating that environmental enforcement should never be a means to raise revenue, the Home Office has not prohibited fining for profit for anti-social behaviour offences such as PSPO and CPN breaches, nor even formally acknowledged the issue. I have raised this many times in the House.
Rather than authorising this increase in fines, we should be prohibiting incentivised enforcement for all ASB penalties in primary legislation or statutory guidance. The system of FPNs is already heavily criticised for undermining due process. They are issued solely based on the decision of an official and do not involve the production of evidence in court. This lack of judicial scrutiny means that, when innocent people are fined for innocuous actions, they often feel completely helpless, lacking the means to appeal a decision made by incentive-driven officers.
If we are serious about addressing serious anti-social behaviour, the enforcement should focus on serious criminality and nuisance, not extracting revenue from arbitrary restrictions. We must resist measures that intensify arbitrary law enforcement and injustice. This increase in penalties must be abandoned. I therefore urge the Government to support Amendment 23 and reject subsections (3) and (4) of Clause 4. I beg to move.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I rise to speak to my Amendments 24 and 25. In some aspects, I take a slightly different view from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, because I approve of the increased £500 penalty, provided it is for real anti-social behaviour. I accept the noble Lord’s point that there seem to have been quite a few ASBOs granted for “busybody offences”, and that is not right.
However, my concern here is making sure that the fines are properly paid. If we give the rise to £500, what will be the punishment if criminals do not pay it? Imprisonment is not important. In the words of the great capitalist Del Boy, it is “cushty”, and most criminals, from the smallest to the greatest, regard a term of imprisonment as factored into the crime. What about fines? No problem, they will simply not pay them, and with sufficient sob stories to the court, they will probably get away with a ridiculously low payment plan. Then, when they go outside and drive away in their BMW while texting on their new iPhone, that is great.
Only one thing works as proper punishment—they hate it—and gives the state and victims proper recompense: that is the confiscation of their ill-gotten gains or of any part of their property, which will cover the amount of any unpaid penalty. Of course, there are compensation orders, which can be made for most crimes, but, again, the convict will probably not pay up and nothing more will be done about it.
We must expand confiscation orders to all crimes where a penalty has not been paid, and my amendments are, I would suggest, a tiny but good example. We seem to go out of our way to make compensation orders as difficult as possible to obtain and deliver. Confiscation orders in the UK can be issued for any crime that involves financial gain, not just specific offences. They are used to take away profits from criminal activity, with the court determining the amount of the order based on the defendant’s benefit from their criminal conduct. The common crimes involve fraud, drug trafficking, theft and organised crime, but any offence where a financial element is present can trigger an order.
How do confiscation orders work? First of all, a conviction is required. Even I would agree with that. A confiscation order can be made only after the defendant is convicted of a crime. The Crown Court decides whether to issue an order after gathering information from both the prosecution and defence. The court’s goal is to recover the benefit—they stress “benefit”—the defendant gained from the criminal conduct. The court considers whether the defendant has a criminal lifestyle, which can be established by their conduct over time. The ultimate aim is to disrupt criminal activity by making the crime unprofitable and preventing future offences.
Why on earth stop with that tight confiscation concept about ill-gotten gains? If someone has committed a crime and gets a financial penalty or a fine and he does not pay up, he has benefited from that crime. He has made a financial gain in that he has saved the money he should have spent on a fine. In those circumstances, it is only just and right that the court’s bailiff can confiscate all and any property of the convict to recover the fine he has refused to pay or says that he cannot pay.
In this case, we are looking at confiscation of his goods and property up to a value of £500 plus a small administration fee. My amendment advocates automaticity, and that is essential. We do not need all the evidence of ill-gotten gains that prosecutors have to go through to prove that the superyacht, Bentleys and five homes all over the world came from drug running or ripping off a pension fund, since we would be collecting only on a known fine imposed by a court.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, of course I support the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, opposing the increases in these fines, but I think we need to go further and for a variety of reasons abolish these on-the-spot penalties per se, which is why I have tabled this clause stand part notice.
You cannot overestimate how much public space protection orders and community protection notices trivialise what we understand to be dealing with anti-social behaviour. We have just had a long discussion about what anti-social behaviour is. These orders are part of the toolkit to deal with anti-social behaviour and they end up targeting individuals for the most anodyne and mundane activities, and banning everyday freedoms.
The use of fines has, in a way, led us to not take seriously what real anti-social behaviour is, because these fines are given out for such arbitrary, eccentric reasons. PSPOs and CPNs can be issued on a very low threshold, are entirely subject to misuse—there is lots of evidence showing that—and often criminalise, as I said, everyday activities. For example, PSPOs are often used to ban young people gathering in groups—which seems to me to be a dangerous attack on our right to assembly—despite the fact that the statutory guidance states that PSPOs should target only activities that cause a nuisance and should not criminalise
“everyday sociability, such as standing in groups”.
That is what it says, yet they are constantly used in that way and seem to be unaccountably doled out.
There are now over 2,000 PSPOs in England and Wales, and each of them contains up to 35 separate restrictions. That means that tens of thousands of new controls are being issued on public spaces all the time. As we heard earlier, they are imposed in different geographic areas, making prohibitions on different types of activities for different citizens from one place to another. You can be in one town where an activity is legal and then go to the next town and the same activity is illegal. We discussed some of that earlier.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, pointed out and as Justice has drawn our attention to, the inconsistent use of PSPOs creates a “postcode lottery” for victims but also for perpetrators. Justice says that this
“undermines the rule of law by making enforcement dependent on the victim’s location rather than the circumstances”.
I hope we can send the Minister the research done by Justice and by the Manifesto Club that has already been referred to so that he can see from the freedom of information requests to local authorities just what kind of activities are being issued with PSPOs and CPNs, and therefore what these fines are being used to tackle. I assure the Committee that it is innocuous activities, not anti-social behaviour. There are councils that are banning kite-flying, wild swimming, as we have heard, and using camping stoves.
I thought it was interesting that, recently, the Free Speech Union forced Thanet District Council to scrap its imposition of a sweeping public spaces protection order that would have banned the use of foul or abusive language in a public space in the Thanet area, so you would have been able to swear in one area but not in another. I understand that it might have raised a lot of money, but that is not necessarily the same as dealing with anti-social behaviour.
Actually, the councils themselves do not do the dirty work of enforcement. Instead, they outsource that to private companies, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has explained so well the dangers of using these private firms. We have a geographic breakdown of the national way of dealing with anti-social behaviour, and now we have an almost feudal way of collecting fines from it. These kinds of fines mean that orders might well be issued for all the wrong reasons—for income-generating, commercial purposes to meet targets that are about raising money rather than tackling anti-social behaviour—and increasing the fines will surely only incentivise that practice further.
I urge the Minister to consider that the noble cause that the Government are associated with here is dealing with anti-social behaviour, but using private companies to fine people in such a cavalier way discredits the whole cause. It is damaging the reputation of that noble cause. There is no transparency or oversight mechanism for these companies. There is one ban that I would like to bring in, and that is fining for profit. I hope the Minister will consider at least reviewing this and looking at it closely.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I do not intend to rehearse the arguments already put so effectively by my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones. Suffice to say that we on these Benches fully support Amendment 23, as £500 is an extortionate amount of money for the type of behaviour that fines are designed to address and will simply result in private companies making even greater profits than they do at the moment while pushing those already struggling further into debt. For these reasons, we have serious reservations about the implications of the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra.
The orders create a postcode lottery for victims. Charities warn that, in some parts of the country, orders are handed out like confetti. This undermines public trust by making enforcement dependent on the victim’s location.
Overall, the use of these powers needs to be subject to much stricter safeguards. The Government must ensure that there is proper oversight of their use and that the law is applied equally, openly and proportionately.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this thoughtful debate on Clause 4 and associated amendments. The discussion has reflected the balance that must be struck between proportionate enforcement and ensuring that penalties remain effective and fair. As anti-social behaviour seems to be increasingly present on our streets, it is right that the clause is given careful consideration.
The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, raised concerns in Amendment 23 about the overuse or inappropriate issuance of fixed penalty notices. Those are indeed legitimate points for consideration, and I am sure that all noble Lords agree that such powers should be exercised carefully and with a proper sense of proportion. Fixed penalty notices are designed and intended to deal swiftly with low-level offending without recourse to the courts, but they must always be used responsibly and in accordance with proper guidance. However, it seems that Clause 4(3) and (4) will help to act as a proper deterrent to anti-social behaviour, as they will play an important part in ensuring that the penalty levels remain meaningful. I look forward to hearing the Government’s thoughts on this matter.
I turn to the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Blencathra. We are grateful to my noble friend for his focus on practical enforcement. His Amendments 24 and 25 seek to strengthen the collection of fines by introducing automatic confiscation provisions and modest administrative charges for non-payment. It is right that those who incur penalties should expect to pay them, and that local authorities are not left to have to chase persistent defaulters at the public’s expense. We therefore view my noble friend’s proposals as a constructive contribution to the debate in order to ensure that enforcement is both efficient and fair.
The noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, has given notice of her intention to oppose the Question that Clause 4 stand part of the Bill. We respect this view, but we cannot agree to the removal of the clause. Clause 4 contains a number of sensible and proportionate measures that are designed to improve compliance and to strengthen the effectiveness of penalties. Many of these reforms build on the Criminal Justice Bill brought forward by the previous Conservative Government.
This debate has underlined the importance of maintaining confidence in the fixed penalty system, ensuring that it is used appropriately and enforced consistently. The system exists to fulfil the wider aim of upholding law and order in our communities. In these endeavours, we on our Benches will always be supportive.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, with the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for discussing and tabling Amendment 23, and to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for his Amendments 24 and 25. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, for his broad support for the Government’s approach to the main thrust of the issues, although he, like us, slightly diverges from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, which I will come back to in a moment.
I cannot agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Fox—I am afraid that is the nature of political life. These offences are used for things such as dog fouling, littering, vandalism and drunken, aggressive behaviour. They are not trivial or low level; they are things that impact on people’s lives, and the abandonment of the clause would mean the abandonment of the people who are victims of those particular instances. The debate for me is around whether £100 or the £500 that we have put in the Bill is a reasonable figure. I argue to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that it is practitioners who have said to us that the current £100 limit does not always carry enough weight to stop offenders committing further anti-social behaviour.
I also say to him that, under existing legislation, relevant agencies may already issue fixed penalty notices of up to £500 for environmental offences such as littering, graffiti or fly-posting. We expect that the prospect of a higher fine will act as a stronger deterrent, as the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, has said. These measures were consulted on by the Home Office in 2023, before this Government came to office, and received majority support as an effective deterrent to anti-social behaviour. I do not know offhand whether the Manifesto Club contributed to that consultation, but the point is that a majority in the consultation accepted that the increase was necessary. Increasing the upper limit does not mean that every person breaching an order will receive a fine of £500. The figure could be lower, proportionate to the individual circumstances and the severity of the case.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lord, I thank the Minister for his reply, disappointing though it is, but that is probably a pattern that will continue as the Bill carries on.
I did not even get an acknowledgement from the Minister that there are flaws in the existing PSPO/CPN system; often, it is just busybody offences that receive fixed penalty notices. He just recited a number, at perhaps the outer edge of anti-social behaviour, which of course should attract fixed penalty notices. He also prayed in aid the fact that environmental offences can have fixed penalty notices at a higher level, but we have heard quite a lot of anecdotal evidence about those being misused. The chances are that these new higher penalties will be misused as well.
I also did not seem to get any acknowledgement that the fining-for-profit aspect of this by local government is a problem. I do not know whether the new statutory guidance the Minister mentioned will include something along those lines. I very much hope so, and that he can reassure us that there will be a reaffirmation of the need for proper democratic oversight of PSPOs and CPNs. The current guidance recommends that councils, either in full council or in cabinet, approve these orders but that appears not to be the case currently, with all the consequences that the Baroness, Lady Fox, has outlined.
I hope that, if we are going to learn from the experience of the current anti-social behaviour powers, the Government take on board some of this debate and the points made in previous groups. We will probably return to this on Report, but for now, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 23.
Crime and Policing Bill
Monday 10th November 2025
(6 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-I(b) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (10 Nov 2025)
Lord Blencathra
“(1B) An RSH provider may issue a closure notice in respect of an individual flat within a housing block for which they are responsible.”
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 26 relates to Clause 5. Clause 5 is very short and is titled “Closure of premises by registered social housing provider”. It says that Schedule 2 amends various parts of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014
“so as to enable registered social housing providers to close premises that they own or manage which are associated with nuisance and disorder”.
My amendment says:
“An RSH provider may issue a closure notice in respect of an individual flat within a housing block for which they are responsible”.
I apologise to the Committee and to the Minister if my amendment is already included in the definition of “premises”. However, the only definition I can find is in Clause 92 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act, and that says
“‘premises’ includes … any land or other place (whether enclosed or not) … any outbuildings that are, or are used as, part of premises”.
Thus, it would seem to me, as a non-lawyer, that a person could argue that an individual flat in an RSH housing block was technically not “premises” within the definition of the 2014 Act or Schedule 2 to this Bill.
I tabled this amendment because I am aware of a serious problem in a block of flats next to mine and only about 400 yards away from here. Over a period of about two years, residents complained of blatant drug dealing in a flat owned by the L&Q social landlords. Addicts were threatening other householders to let them in to buy drugs from the flat. Children in other flats were scared to come home from school in case they met violent druggies in the corridor. The police were involved but could not sit there 24/7, waiting to catch drug dealing in practice. The Westminster City Council anti-social behaviour unit and the local MP got involved, demanding action, but L&Q refused to do anything. It even lied that it had applied for an ASBO, and it took two years before that tenant was finally evicted. Of course, the Bill and my amendment cannot force a negligent RSH, such as L&Q, to issue a closure notice, but it might help those who do care about their tenants.
Just for the record, I have named that company because my noble friend Lord Gove, then the Housing Minister, called in the chief executive after writing to him, stating:
“You have failed your residents”.
He did that after a devastating ombudsman’s report uncovered a prolonged period of decline in L&Q’s repairs and complaint handling.
I do not need to say any more. If the Minister tells me that “premises” includes individual flats within the definition and we will be covered with this, I will not come back to this on Report. But if I have a valid point, I hope the Government will make a little tweak and amend the Bill accordingly. I beg to move.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I knew there was a reason why I was so nice about the earlier amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. I am afraid we do not agree with Amendment 26. The amendment focuses on the power to issue closure notices, a measure which deals directly with the security of the home, which we believe is a fundamental right in our society. A closure notice is an extreme measure, and any power enabling the exclusion of a person from their residence must be subject to the highest legal scrutiny and strict proportionality, and we do not support the amendment.
Social justice groups consistently caution that new powers risk disadvantaging tenants and vulnerable groups. We must remember that, where these orders relate to social housing, they have the potential to render entire families homeless. We believe that the amendment would exacerbate that.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his Amendment 26 to Schedule 2 to the Bill, which permits a registered social housing provider to issue a closure notice in respect of premises they own or manage, under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. As my noble friend and other noble Lords have stated, a closure notice under Section 76 of that Act is a notice which prohibits a person from accessing specific premises. Currently, such a notice can be issued only by the police or the local authority, but Schedule 2 permits an RSH to also issue such notices.
My noble friend’s amendment would ensure that the RSH provider is able to issue a closure notice for an individual flat in the premises it is responsible for. Given that paragraph (2)(b) of Schedule 2 does not specify that fact, I look forward to the Minister’s answer and hope he might clarify that point.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
I thank all noble Lords for this short but focused debate, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for introducing his amendment. As he has explained, it seeks to allow registered social housing providers to issue a closure notice in relation to an individual flat within a housing block that they own or manage.
The closure power is a fast, flexible power that can be used to protect victims and communities by quickly closing premises that are causing nuisance or disorder. Clause 5 and Schedule 2 extend the closure power to registered social housing providers. Currently, only local authorities and police can issue closure notices. This is despite registered social housing providers often being the initial point of contact for tenants suffering from anti-social behaviour. Now, registered social housing providers will be able to issue closure notices and apply for closure orders, to enable them to close premises that they own or manage which are associated with nuisance and disorder.
The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, mentioned a specific landlord. Without going into the facts of that case, it is clear that registered social housing providers have to meet regulatory standards set by the regulator of social housing. There is statutory guidance in place, and registered social housing providers are expected to meet the same legal tests as set out in the 2014 Act that the noble Lord mentioned. This will ensure that all relevant agencies have the right tools to tackle anti-social behaviour quickly and effectively. In turn, this will save police and local authorities time, as housing providers will be able to make applications directly, rather than having to rely on the police or local authority to do so on their behalf.
The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, raised his concerns about risks of abuse. For instance, he was concerned that extending the power to housing providers might risk it being misused to evict tenants, such as those in rent arrears. There are robust safeguards in place to mitigate the risk of misuse. Like other agencies, housing providers will be required to consult with relevant partners prior to the issuing of a closure notice. This requirement is in addition to the legal test having to be met and the fact that the process will go through the courts.
I want to assure the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and others that premises here means any land or other places, whether enclosed or not, and any outbuildings that are, or are used as, part of the premises. This could therefore already include an individual flat within a housing block. Indeed, that would be the expectation: that this targets individual households, rather than whole blocks of flats. We are confident that the current legislative framework and the Bill will cover that and make that clear. On the basis of that clarification—of course, I will reflect on Hansard and the points he specifically raised about the 2014 Act, and I will write to him in more detail if I need to—I hope the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful for that clarification. I am quite happy with all the standards and powers, and I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Clement Jones; I know there are robust standards. The only thing I was interested in was whether the word “premises” includes individual flats in a housing block. I have the Minister’s 98% assurance on that. I would be very grateful if he and his officials would reflect on that and, at some point, confirm absolutely to the House that the power exists to close an individual flat or a couple of flats, and not just the whole shooting match of the block. On that basis, I am happy to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Russell of Liverpool
“(1A) In section 104 (review of response to complaints about anti-social behaviour), after subsection (1) insert—“(1A) Where a person has made at least three qualifying complaints about the anti-social behaviour and irrespective of whether the person applies for an ASB case review, the police must undertake an impact assessment which determines whether—(a) the alleged behaviour exceeds the threshold of criminality, irrespective of whether the police intend to pursue criminal charges, and(b) the level of harm inflicted on the person is low, medium, or high.(1B) Following an impact assessment under subsection (1A), where the threshold for criminality has been met or exceeded and the level of harm is assessed as medium or high, the police must refer the person to local victim support services, pursuant to the Victim Code of Practice.””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment requires police officers to undertake an anti-social behaviour impact assessment when a victim meets the trigger point for an Anti-Social Behaviour Case Review, so that those who are assessed as having experienced medium to high levels of harm can receive appropriate support.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Hampton for putting his name to these five amendments, which seek to ensure that victims of persistent anti-social behaviour are swiftly identified, protected from further harm and, above all, given the opportunity to have their voices heard. These amendments have the full support of the Victims’ Commissioner for England and Wales.
Although the Bill forms part of the Government’s very welcome determination to crack down on anti-social behaviour, it fails to address some of the underlying issues victims currently face and risks maintaining the status quo, leaving many victims without meaningful recourse and allowing harm to persist. So the status quo, in effect, does not bring about the degree of change called for by the Victims’ Commissioner herself and by HMICFRS in its October 2024 report, just 12 months ago, called The Policing Response to Antisocial Behaviour.
Lord Hampton (CB)
My Lords, I have added my name to Amendments 27 to 31. I declare my interest as a secondary school teacher.
These amendments from the Victims’ Commissioner have been ably introduced by my noble friend Lord Russell of Liverpool, so the Committee does not need to hear much from me. We are told that data is the new gold. In teaching, with safeguarding we are told to report every slight suspicion because it can form part of a jigsaw that can show that abuse is happening. The Victims’ Commissioner calls it missed patterns and missed victims. These sensible amendments would give victims of anti-social behaviour a route to support and a strong voice in anti-social behaviour case reviews. As the Victims’ Commissioner’s office says, this would deliver real change for victims. Victims of persistent ASB must be swiftly identified, consistently supported and given access to resolution processes that deliver effective outcomes. These amendments would do just that.
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
My Lords, I support the amendments in this group, so ably introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Russell.
Amendment 27 asks for a statute of requirement for police officers to undertake an anti-social behaviour impact assessment when a victim reports three incidents of anti-social behaviour in a six-month period. This would enable agencies to understand the level of harm that is being caused, so that victims are given access to the appropriate support.
Victims have cited several barriers to utilising the anti-social behaviour case review. A key barrier was a lack of knowledge and awareness about the case review among staff at key agencies with a responsibility to resolve anti-social behaviour. For many victims, this lack of knowledge prevented them being signposted promptly, if at all, to the case review mechanism. This posed additional barriers to them being able to successfully activate the case review process and get the anti-social behaviour resolved. This ultimately prolonged victims’ suffering—and none of us wants that. I ask the Minister to seriously consider this.
Amendments 28 and 31 ask for a statutory threshold for triggering an anti-social behaviour case review that removes any discretion for authorities to insert additional caveats which serve as a barrier to victims getting their cases reviewed. To ensure consistent access to anti-social behaviour case reviews, we are recommending the Home Office consults on the need to legislate to standardise the threshold for anti-social behaviour case reviews by placing it in statute as opposed to just guidance. This would prevent local authorities unilaterally adding caveats which make it more difficult for the victim to make a successful application. This consultation, we recommend, should look at mandating access to case review applications via a range of options, including but not limited to paper, online and telephone applications.
Amendment 29, which has already been outlined, would give victims a voice and enable them to explain the impact that the behaviour is having on them and their families, which is critical. To strengthen victim participation and ensure their voices are central to the process, we recommend the Home Office consults on the need to introduce legislation which guarantees victims the right to choose their level of participation in a way that best suits their needs. It might include attending a case review meeting in person, participating virtually or submitting a written impact statement detailing the anti-social behaviour effects, or being represented at the case review by a chosen individual to ensure their perspective is effectively communicated. We want them to have the right to choose the method in which this happens. There should be a statutory requirement that anti-social behaviour case reviews are chaired by an independent person—this is not an unreasonable request. Very often, when there is somebody independent who can see things that other people have not seen and bring it to people’s attention, fairness and confidence in a system is absolutely strengthened.
Amendment 30 seeks that local bodies should be compelled to publish data on the reasons an anti-social behaviour case review was denied to enable better overall scrutiny and an understanding of how effective and consistent the process is across England and Wales. As the noble Lord, Lord Russell, stated, data is king, and we do not think this is an unreasonable request at all.
I hope the Minister will give serious consideration to these amendments and, if they cannot be accepted, he will explain in detail why.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, these are powerful amendments and it is hard to see how they can be argued against. We have all heard of cases where victims have had a very tough time demonstrating the persecution that they have experienced, and they often get challenged in court, unreasonably, I think. These amendments are excellent and we should encourage the noble Lord to push them to a vote later.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, this group, so well introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Stedman-Scott and Lady Jones, focuses on putting the victim first, a principle that we wholeheartedly support.
Clause 6 aims to strengthen the anti-social behaviour case review, and we support the package of amendments to the clause tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Russell and Lord Hampton. We support the objective of establishing a statutory threshold for convening a review that explicitly considers the victim’s vulnerability. This is crucial, as it would remove the discretion for authorities to apply additional caveats and ensure that the severity of the impact on the individual is prioritised over mere persistence of the behaviour.
We back the proposal in Amendment 29 to ensure that the review is chaired by an independent person who has not previously been involved in the case. Independence is essential to restore trust and ensure objectivity when agencies review their own failures. We also strongly agree with the demand in Amendment 30 that authorities must publish the reasons for determining that the threshold for a review has not been met. This is a simple but powerful measure to increase accountability and transparency in the decision-making process. Amendment 27, which would require police officers to undertake an ASB impact assessment when the threshold is met, is a common-sense measure to ensure that victims experiencing high levels of harm receive appropriate support.
These amendments demonstrate how we can collectively strengthen the system to deliver genuine justice for victims of persistent anti-social behaviour, ensuring that their trauma and vulnerability are fully recognised. I very much hope that the Government will take them on board.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Russell of Liverpool and Lord Hampton, for tabling these amendments and all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. Ensuring that anti-social behaviour complaints are adequately handled and delivering a just outcome for the complainants and communities affected without being overly burdensome on the relevant authorities are important principles. These amendments are largely in line with that goal.
This group is particularly important, as anti-social behaviour seems to be on the rise in our streets. As such, it is important that we have the right framework not only for dealing with complaints but for self-correcting any potential mistakes made. With an increased volume, local authorities simply do not have the time to be weighed down by bureaucratic procedures.
For that reason, Amendment 27 raises eyebrows. It is important that we provide the necessary support for those who are harmed by criminal behaviour, but it is also true that this clause would require policing bodies to review responses to complaints about anti-social behaviour, in certain instances. It would place an additional level of administration on to these authorities. As it stands, the amendment seems to cast the net too widely on when impact assessments might be necessary; it would therefore add yet more workload to already strained forces. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s opinion on this matter.
Amendments 28 and 31, however, appear to work to the opposite end. It is right that, when we mandate administrative work from our public servants, we should give them clear guidance on where it is necessary. A discretionary threshold has the potential to encourage local authorities to err on the side of caution and thus review cases that do not merit the time required. Adding a statutory threshold for an ASB case review would both streamline the process and create a more regular system across authorities. This is never a bad thing, and I hope the Minister will consider taking it on board.
I am cautious of Amendment 30 for reasons similar to those that I have already discussed. In principle, the amendment is sound, but adding more bureaucracy to the process by publishing the reasons for not reviewing a case has the potential to take time and attention away from cases that do meet the threshold. Additionally, a statutory threshold would be available for all to see and would set out the criteria needed to meet it. This would surely forgo the need to release the reasons why thresholds were not met.
This is a largely sensible set of amendments that have the interests of both complainants and the respective authorities at heart. I hope that the Minister agrees with what I have just said and look forward to what he says in response.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for his amendments. I also thank the Victims’ Commissioner, the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, both on the amendments and for her work on this issue over many years. I am also grateful for the support of the noble Baronesses, Lady Stedman-Scott and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for the comments on this area from the noble Lords, Lord Hampton and Lord Clement-Jones, and to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, from His Majesty’s Opposition.
Amendment 27 aims to ensure that all victims of repeat anti-social behaviour are subject to an impact assessment, even where the individual has not requested a case review to be undertaken. The Government believe that there is a more effective response to this issue, in that we can ensure that victims are aware of their rights to request a case review. That has been included in updated statutory guidance for front-line staff, which we published in September. The proposals in the amendment would significantly increase the resources required to review anti-social behaviour incidents. The wording of the amendment would mean that even in cases where the victim is satisfied with the response, the police would be required to conduct an impact assessment.
The noble Lord, Lord Russell, has approached this by saying he wishes to work with the Government to look at this. I am happy to have further dialogue with him and the responsible policy Minister in the Home Office post Committee. We can return to it then and examine the nuances. I hope that my initial comments give him a flavour of where the Government currently are.
Amendments 28, 29 and 31 look at the anti-social behaviour case review process and mandate the requirement for there to be an independent chair, for victims to be invited to attend their case review, and to reduce the ability for authorities to add additional caveats that reduce the victim’s abilities to request a case review. I am pleased to say—I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, will accept this and the way that I put it to him—that we have recently updated the statutory guidance to front-line professionals, which already reflects the proposals he has put to the Committee today. I believe that this will create the impact that his amendments intend to bring while still allowing for greater flexibility for circumstances to be treated on an individual basis. Again, if the noble Lord would like further information on the statutory guidance, I am happy to provide that to him and to the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, but we think that it meets the objectives of Amendments 28, 29 and 31.
Amendment 30 seeks to require relevant bodies involved in case reviews to publish details on why they have determined that the statutory threshold for a case review was not met. Under existing legislation, it is already a requirement for the relevant bodies to publish the number of times they decided that the review threshold was not met. I highlight to the noble Lord that, through Clause 7, the Government are introducing further requirements for local agencies to report information about anti-social behaviour to the Government. That is for the purpose of us understanding how local agencies are using the powers and tools provided by the 2014 Act, including the question of case review.
If the noble Lord looks at Clause 6 in particular—it is buried in the depths of the undergrowth of Clause 6 but I assure him that it is there—he will see that there will be a new duty for police and crime commissioners to set up a route for victims to request a further review where dissatisfied with the outcome of their case review. This includes where the relevant bodies determined that the threshold was not met for the initial case review. I will give further explanation of Clause 6 when we reach it, but I hope that it meets the objectives that the noble Lord has set out in Amendment 30.
The recently updated guidance on case reviews address many of the same points as these amendments and I hope that it will have the opportunity to bed in. I am happy to send the noble Lord a copy of the guidance, if I am able to, and I assure him that we will monitor the effectiveness of that guidance in improving good practice. He has my commitment that, if necessary, we will revisit the issues again in the near future. Until then, I submit that it would be premature to legislate further on case reviews beyond the measures in the Bill. I hope that with those assurances, the invitation to further discussion and the offer of further information, the noble Lord would be content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for the tenor and content of what he just said. The devil is quite often in the detail, so I, with others, would be happy to sit down with him and try to make sure that we all understand it in the same way and are talking the same language.
I have concerns about guidance that is, in theory, flags up to people in a slightly different and slightly more lurid way what their rights are. In evidence, I would state the experience of the victims’ code, which has been around for a very long time. On numerous occasions, when officers of various agencies who are, in theory, responsible for knowing the contents of the victims’ code are quizzed on it, they no absolutely nothing or very little or get very confused about it. Having guidance does not in itself solve any issue if people do not understand the guidance, are not trained in it and do not have sufficient experience of how to apply that knowledge in a sensible way.
However, I hear what the Minister is saying and I think we are moving in the right direction. I feel strongly that trying to look at, and perhaps reverse-engineer, some of the examples of best practice that are around would be informative and helpful, since we have a habit of reinventing the wheel in our 43 different police forces. Then of course there are all the local authorities and housing associations as well, so there is quite a muddle of people and agencies looking at this and the evidence suggests that we need to pull that together much more coherently and effectively than we are doing at the moment. But I take and accept the Minister’s kind invitation to discuss this issue further, and on that basis I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes provision that is no longer needed because of the general data protection override in section 183A of the Data Protection Act 2018, which was inserted by section 106(2) of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 and came into force on 20 August 2025.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, the amendments in this group are technical amendments that affect provisions in the Bill containing data-sharing provisions. Within the relevant clauses and schedule, there are general provisions that bar the disclosure of data if such disclosures would contravene data-protection legislation. These protections against data-protection overrides are now no longer needed within the Bill, as a general provision to the same effect is now made by Section 183A of the Data Protection Act 2018, which was inserted by Section 106(2) of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025. That Act came into effect on 20 August and, now that the general provision is in force, the amendments remove the redundant duplicative provisions from the Bill. I beg to move.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I welcome the Minister’s confirmation that the amendments are matters of purely technical housekeeping, because they remove provisions that are no longer needed, and that this is caused by the insertion of Section 183A into the Data Protection Act 2018 by Section 106(2) of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025. I must confess, having spent time in the salt mines of the then Data (Use and Access) Bill, that this did not come to my attention at the time, but I am sure it is a valuable piece of legislation.
This creates an overarching safeguard, ensuring that new enactments such as this Bill do not automatically override core data protection requirements. However, I must say that the fact that the Government’s intentions are technically sound in this respect does not remove the need for clarification and specific statutory safeguards in certain highly sensitive policy areas, which we will be debating in due course. I thought I would put the Minister on notice that we will be calling for the adoption of additional safeguards ensuring that new powers in the Bill are fair and proportionate: for instance, the DVLA access and facial recognition provisions in Clause 138, which grant powers for regulations concerning police access to DVLA driver licensing information. We remain deeply concerned that the power granted by Clause 138 could be used to create a vast police facial recognition database, and we will be looking for additional safeguards.
On Clauses 192 to 194, concerning international law enforcement information-sharing agreements, the cross-border transfer of data inherent in such agreements presents significant civil liberties concerns, so we will be calling for mandatory privacy impact assessments. That is just a taster.
In conclusion, while the Government’s amendments are technical in nature, we will in due course be using the opportunity to embed specific, robust statutory safeguards for a number of new powers in the Bill.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, it is all too often the case that, when the Government say they are bringing minor and technical amendments to a Bill, those amendments are neither minor nor technical in nature. However, with these amendments, that is genuinely the case. There is, therefore, little for me to say in response to this group of amendments. The Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 was passed by this House earlier this year and, as far as I am aware, the data protection override in Section 106 of that Act was not queried or opposed by noble Lords during its passage, and no amendment was proposed to that clause. I therefore have no issue with these amendments.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful and all I say in response is that the sooner we get to Clauses 132 and 192, the better.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to Schedule 3, page 248, leave out lines 27 to 30.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes provision that is no longer needed because of the general data protection override in section 183A of the Data Protection Act 2018, which was inserted by section 106(2) of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 and came into force on 20 August 2025.
Lord Blencathra
“(6A) Regulations may not require a relevant authority to provide information on social media posts which they may consider to be anti-social or have anti social behaviour messages.”
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 35 standing in my name says:
“Regulations may not require a relevant authority to provide information on social media posts which they may consider to be anti-social or have anti-social behaviour messages”.
I do not need to regurgitate much of what I said earlier on non-crime hate incidents, which could compose a large part of this, because I am looking forward to the Minister’s announcement in due course that he will have solved the problem of so-called non-crime hate incidents.
I was tempted to propose that Clause 7 should not stand part of the Bill, because I wanted to discuss the huge number of requirements in it, but I thought I would do it under the scope of this amendment. Basically, I want to ask the Minister: what will the Government do with all the information demanded by Clause 7? When I was a Home Office Minister—and I am certain the noble Lord has had this experience as well—we got lots of written requests from Members of Parliament, PQs, asking for information on all sorts of law and order issues concerning what the police were up to in England and Wales. We could not provide it, because the police forces were not under an obligation to send it to the Home Office.
Sometimes I would think, “Oh, I’d like to know that as well”, but whenever I asked the police forces if they could provide it, they would quite legitimately say, “What resources do you want us to divert from fighting crime to collating this information to send to the Home Office, and what practical use will you put it to?” Well, I think they had a fair point, but the demands for more and more statistics from the police have continued to increase. I will not suggest that it is in proportion to the rise in crime, but more information has not helped reduce it.
I come back to the point: will the Minister tell the House exactly what use the Home Office will make of all this information, since what is demanded is fairly extensive? If this information was free, it would be okay, but we all know what will happen. All councils will employ at least one, probably more than one, special information-gathering co-ordinator to collect the information required and transmit it to the Home Office. New computer systems will be needed to provide it in “the form and manner”, as per new subsection (4)(b).
This, I suggest, is not a low-grade clerking job, since the information demanded in subsection (2) is not just a collection of numbers or reports, but provision of the reports, plus the authorities’ responses, plus the details of ASB case reviews. Then subsection (3)(d) calls for the information collected to be analysed by the local authorities. As I say, analysis of the plethora of different anti-social behaviour orders and responses to them in sufficient quality to be sent to the Home Office will be regarded as a fairly high-level job, not one for a low-paid junior clerk in the council.
I think we are probably looking at a salary of about £50,000 for the lead person and £30,000 for the assistant, and with national insurance and pensions we are looking at about £100,000 per authority. Multiply that by 317 local authorities and we will have local government costs of £32 million. No doubt many local authorities will love it; there will be more office-bound jobs as they cut dustbin collections and social services work and leave potholes unfilled. Okay, that is a sinister, cynical comment, but that will happen in some local authorities.
I simply ask the Minister to tell the Committee, if that £32 million I calculate will be the cost of every authority supplying all the information requested in Clause 7, will that be money well spent? My little amendment would do my bit to limit some of the costs, since I do not want local authorities wasting time and resources by collecting and analysing so-called anti-social social media posts which have happened in their area, either to the poster or to the complainant. They will be chasing their own tails if they attempt to go down this route. It would be a self-defeating waste of time. That is the purpose of my amendment: to ask the Government to justify what they will do with all the information collected under Clause 7 and to ask whether my calculation of £32 million is roughly right. I beg to move.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 55A, which is supported by StopWatch, a campaign organisation that is concerned with the use of stop and search. I disagree wholeheartedly with the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra.
Amendment 55A would require the Home Office to publish quarterly data on the issuing of anti-social behaviour orders and related injunctions. Specifically, it would ensure that these reports include the number of occasions when stop and search has been used by the police prior to the issuing of such orders, and the protected characteristics of those who have been issued with them. These powers can have serious and lasting consequences for those subject to them, particularly young people and those from marginalised communities. Yet at present, the public and Parliament have very limited visibility of how these tools are being applied. This would ensure transparency and accountability about how anti-social behaviour powers are being used across England and Wales.
We know from existing evidence that stop and search disproportionately affects people from black and non-white ethnic backgrounds. The Government’s own figures last year reported that there were nearly 25 stop and searches for every 1,000 black people and yet only around six for every 1,000 white people. There is a real risk that these disparities could be echoed or even compounded in the issuing of anti-social behaviour orders or injunctions. Without clear data, broken down with protected characteristics, we cannot know whether these concerns are justified, nor can we properly evaluate the fairness and effectiveness of the system. By requiring the Home Office to publish quarterly data, this amendment would bring much-needed transparency. It would allow Parliament, bodies with oversight and the public to monitor trends, identify disparities and ensure that anti-social behaviour powers are being used proportionately and appropriately.
The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, is clearly very exercised about the use of resources. He actually said that more information does not reduce crime. I think that is probably completely wrong, because the more information you have, the better you can understand what is happening. So this is about good governance and evidence-based policy. If these powers are being used fairly, the data will confirm that. If not, then we will have the information necessary to take corrective action. Either way, the transparency will strengthen public trust in policing and the rule of law.
This amendment is about shining a light where it is most needed. It would do nothing to restrict police powers. It would simply ensure that their use can be properly scrutinised. I hope the Minister will agree that accountability and transparency are not optional extras in a just society; they are actually the foundations of it.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, we support Amendment 55A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. She has already highlighted the importance of improved data collection around the use of anti-social behaviour legislation. This is essential because it is impossible to gauge the fairness or effectiveness of anti-social behaviour powers without adequate data and transparency.
We also support Clause 7. It is important to have more transparency around how these powers are used by local authorities and housing providers. The evidence is that they already have this information but are failing to share it. As a result, little is known about how these powers are being used in practice.
The charity Crisis wants the Government to go further by making this information publicly available. This would provide full transparency around patterns of anti-social behaviour and the powers used to tackle it. Is this something the Government might consider? Perhaps the Minister could let us know.
The police, too, must improve their recording practices around anti-social behaviour. A report last year by HMICFRS found that some forces’ recording is very poor, while others do not always record the use of statutory powers. We believe that transparency is key to ensuring that future orders are applied reasonably and proportionately, and to prevent discrimination.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Blencathra, as ever, raises a serious and pertinent point with his Amendment 35. Clause 7 permits the Secretary of State, by regulations, to require authorities to provide them with information about anti-social behaviour. Unfortunately, Clause 7 contains rather vague requirements on what information the regulations might contain. It would perhaps be helpful for the Minister to provide the Committee with some concrete examples of what might be included. My noble friend is absolutely right that social media posts should not be included in any of the guidance.
With Amendment 55A, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, my fear is that the police and the Home Office, already overburdened with creating statistics, will yet again be further burdened. Perhaps this is not the way forward.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to both the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for these two amendments.
As the noble Lord explained, Amendment 35 relates to the new power in Clause 7 for the Home Secretary to make regulations requiring relevant authorities, including local councils and social housing providers, to report information on anti-social behaviour. The amendment would mean that those regulations would not be able to request information from the relevant authorities about things that are considered anti-social or indeed anti-social messages. We will come on to the non-crime hate incident issues that the noble Lord has a concern about, but currently Clause 7 would allow information to be requested on reports of anti-social behaviour made to an authority, responses of the authority and anti-social behaviour case reviews carried out by the relevant authority. Anti-social behaviour can come in various forms, and it is important that the regulation-making power can address this.
Information held by central government on anti-social behaviour is in some areas limited. This has led to a significant evidence gap in the national picture of anti-social behaviour. I mentioned the 1 million incidents per year, but there is still an evidence gap in that picture of anti-social behaviour. The new clause will change this to ensure stronger and more comprehensive understanding of ASB incidents and interventions, but we want to make sure that Clause 7 creates a regulation-making power only. Regulations will then be made following the passage of the Bill to specify the information that agencies must provide. Going back to what the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, indicated, this may be information they already have but do not necessarily share.
I assure the noble Lord that regulations are being developed in close consultation with the relevant practitioners, including local authorities and social housing providers, to understand what information is held on anti-social behaviour and the impact that this requirement may have upon them, for the very reasons that the noble Lord mentioned. We will of course make sure that any new requirements are reasonable and proportionate but meet the Government’s objective of having a wider understanding of some of the trends and information.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I am very grateful to the noble Lord for his usual detailed explanation and courtesy. With particular reference to my rather narrow amendment, does he think it right that we should report on so-called anti-social behaviour that occurs in media posts? Leaving aside the non-crime hate incidents, will local authorities be expected to report on instances of anti-social behaviour in their areas when those incidents have been only on social media, not face to face?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
What I can say to the noble Lord is that, again, the Secretary of State has within this clause a regulation-making power and is currently examining—and will do if this power is approved by Parliament—with local councils what information they hold that they can share with the Government. There is a range of issues to go down the road yet, before we get to a stage where we are issuing regulations that demand or require particular types of information, but that will be done in consultation. Of course, it also depends on sharing information that the local authorities or social housing providers hold, not what the Government are asking them to hold, necessarily. We will cross that bridge a little further down the line, if the legislation is passed and receives Royal Assent.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
In view of the Minister’s detailed reply and assurances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 7, page 16, leave out lines 26 to 29.
Lord Davies of Gower
“Increased penalties for littering offences(1) The Environmental Protection Act 1990 is amended as follows.(2) In section 88 (fixed penalty notices for leaving litter)—(a) in subsection (6A)(b)(i), for “£100” substitute “£125”;(b) in subsection (6A)(b)(ii), for “£75” substitute “£94”;(c) in subsection (8C) (England, Wales and Scotland versions), for “level 3” substitute “level 4”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to increase penalties for littering and related offences. It raises fixed penalties in England and Wales by 25 per cent and moves the maximum fine levels up one tier on the standard scale.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this group of amendments addresses three separate but related offences: increasing the penalties for littering and dog fouling offences and introducing a specific offence of littering on public transport.
Littering may appear to be a minor problem when juxtaposed with some of the issues discussed in the Bill, but it is one of the most prominent anti-social offences to plague towns and communities. Littering is one of the most visible forms of environmental degradation, affecting not only the appearance of our streets and greenery but degrading our sense of public pride and community. Littering is associated with signs of a neglected area, and it sends a powerful negative message about standards and civic responsibility.
The scale of this problem is undeniable. Keep Britain Tidy estimates that local authorities in England alone spend around £1 billion each year clearing litter and fly-tipped waste. Almost 80% of our streets in England are affected by littering to some degree, with the most common items including food and drink packaging, cigarette ends and sweet wrappers.
The Government’s own figures show that local councils issue fewer than 50,000 fixed penalty notices a year, despite the widespread scale of the problem. This is why my amendments seek to increase the penalties for littering offences. The current fixed penalty levels were last revised in 2018, when the maximum fine was raised to £150. Since then, both inflation and enforcement costs have risen considerably. As time has gone on, therefore, the deterrent effect of the penalty has been eroded. An uplift is thus justified and necessary. A higher penalty would reflect the real cost to communities and to local authorities, and would send a clear message that littering is not a low-level or victimless offence.
The same logic applies to my amendment concerning dog fouling offences. It is true that some progress has been made through awareness campaigns, but the problem persists in many communities. It is unpleasant, unsanitary and requires local authorities to bear the cost of cleaning it up. It is therefore only right that penalties are raised to reflect both the nuisance and costs incurred. I hope the Government agree that more must be done to combat littering and dog fouling offences.
The negative effects of littering are felt most in highly frequented public places. Public transport is one such area of public life where the harm of littering is exacerbated. It is a growing problem on our trains, buses, trams and underground systems. Anyone using public transport on a Saturday or Sunday morning will no doubt have experienced the scale of rubbish left behind from the thoughtless few of the night before. The accumulation of food packaging, coffee cups, bottles and newspapers left behind by passengers is a saddening sight and must be addressed. Littering on public transport causes expensive inconvenience for operators and diminishes the travelling experience for others. Often, passengers would rather stand than sit on dirty seats. A distinct offence of littering on public transport would underline the responsibility of passengers in shared public places and support transport authorities in maintaining standards of cleanliness and safety.
These amendments are not about punishing people for the sake of it; they are about upholding civic standards and ensuring that those who do the right thing are not let down by those who do not. They are about fairness: the costs of litter removal fall on local taxpayers, transport users and businesses, rather than on those responsible for creating the mess. It is time the Government took a firmer stance on the few who ruin the enjoyment of Britain’s streets for the many. Higher penalties and clearer offences would, in my view, provide both the incentive and the clarity needed to improve compliance.
I hope the Government will view these proposals in that spirit—not as punitive but as a practical contribution to cleaner, safer public spaces and to civic pride. I look forward to hearing from the Minister, and from across the Committee, on how the Government intend to continue building on their anti-littering strategy and supporting local authorities in enforcement. I am sure many noble Lords will have received letters and emails from constituents complaining about the state of local streets and the scale of litter they must contend with. They are right to be concerned. The cost to our environment, our economy and our collective morale is far greater than the individual cost of a packet or a coffee cup dropped out of selfish behaviour. I beg to move.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I support the amendments in the name of my noble friend. My only criticism is that the proposed increase for the penalties is not high enough, but at least it is a very good start. I declare an interest, as on the register: I am a director of the community interest company, Clean Streets, which works with Keep Britain Tidy to try to reduce cigarette litter on the streets, with considerable success.
In about 1995, I was privileged to make an official visit to Commissioner Bratton in New York, who pioneered the broken window theory—I am sure the Minister is aware of it. As he discovered, if there is a street with one broken window and no one does anything about it, very soon there will be more broken windows, then litter and rubbish lying in the street, and then low-life people, as they call them in America, move in. He said that you would start with a street with a broken window and, within a couple of years, end up with garbage and then a drug den. I actually visited one where they were trying to batter down a steel door to get the druggies out.
I am not suggesting that a little litter would cause that here, but there was an experiment cited by the excellent nudge unit, set up by Oliver Letwin, when he was in government. The experiment was carried out in the Netherlands, where, for one week, they looked at a bicycle parking lot. They pressure-washed the whole thing, scrubbed it and kept it clean, and over the course of that week not a single bit of litter was left there and no damage was caused. The following week, they put bits of litter in the parking lot—a bottle here and an empty cigarette box there—and, within days, the whole place got more and more litter, because people thought it was an okay thing to do. If people see one bit of rubbish, they think they can just add their rubbish to it as well.
Littering is not only unsightly but highly dangerous. Cigarette litter, in particular, is dangerous—not from the cigarettes themselves but from the filters, which have microplastics in them. It causes enormous costs to councils to clean up.
A couple of months ago, serving on the Council of Europe, I attended an official meeting in Venice. It was the first time I had been there. It is not very wheelchair friendly, but I did manage to get around. After four or five days in Venice—I paid to stay on for some extra days—I was impressed that there was not a single scrap of litter anywhere on the streets. One could not move for tourists, but there was not a single scrap of litter. There were signs everywhere, saying “Keep Venice Clean”. People, mainly ladies, were going round with their big two-wheeled barrels collecting garbage from people’s homes. It was impressive.
I was even more impressed that everyone seemed to have a dog—the widest variety of dog breeds I have ever seen—but there was only one occasion in five days where I saw dog mess on the pavement. The view was that, if you have a dog, you clean up after it. It is an extraordinary place. When I am on my wheelchair in London or anywhere else—trying to avoid the people on their mobile phones who walk into me—I am looking down all the time as I dare not drive through dog dirt on the pavement because I can never get it off the wheels. I manage to avoid it, but that is what I must to do in my own country. I cannot take the risk in a wheelchair of driving through the dog mess we find on the pavements. To be fair, in Victoria Tower Gardens, where I see people exercising their dogs, they all have the little poop-scoop bag and they pick up the mess and that is very good, but there is too much dog mess on the pavements.
We need tougher sanctions. We need the highest possible penalties, particularly for fouling and leaving mess on the pavement. I know the penalties are there already, but they have not been enforced rigorously enough. My friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, might condemn the private companies that move in and start imposing more fines for the ridiculous dropping of litter, but perhaps they could move in and start imposing them, and catch out the people who are leaving the dog mess on the pavement. I almost tried to do it myself on one occasion, when I came across similar dog mess in the same spot three days in a row. I was tempted to get up at 5 am, sit there with my camera to catch the person doing it and report him or her to Westminster City Council.
We need enforcement on this. Goodness knows how colleagues in this place who are blind and who have guide dogs manage to avoid it—I hope the dogs do—but others may not avoid it and will walk through it. It is filthy and disgusting, and a very serious health hazard. I support the amendments in the names of my noble friends, and I urge the Government to consider all aspects of making tougher penalties for litter and tougher enforcement penalties for dog mess on the pavement.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
I support my noble friends Lord Davies and Lord Blencathra. Litter is important, and while it may sound like a low-level issue, I endorse the sentiments expressed by my noble friends about the broken windows theory that a messy environment leading to more litter and more problems.
I support the increase in fines. In reality, I doubt whether taking £100 or £125 would make the slightest bit of difference. I believe this is all about enforcement. We have heard from my noble friend about the low level of fines being put forward for littering offences. The emphasis is on local authorities to provide adequate water paper bins. That is the other side of it—there must be carrot and stick involved.
I support what my noble friend Lord Blencathra said about dog fouling. I add one thing: human nature is very strange. In the countryside where I live, in Devon, on a number of occasions one comes across people picking up dog mess in little plastic bags and then chucking it into the hedge—they seem to think that is super helpful, but it is littering. We need some sort of public information campaign to say that that is dangerous to livestock as well as to the environment.
Lord Goddard of Stockport (LD)
My Lords, I have great sympathy with some of the sentiment of the amendments. However, as usual, they put the price—the fines—up but miss the elephant in the room. Who is going to do the work to collect the fines, to see the dog walker that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, is looking for, and to be on every train and street corner? That is the issue we have with these amendments.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
Sorry, I thought the noble Lord was gearing up to make further comments.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for tabling the amendments. I agree with him and everybody else who has spoken that fly-tipping, littering and dog fouling are not victimless crimes; they blight our communities. I find it very annoying to see not just dog mess in bushes but stuff thrown out of car windows and stuff left on trains that is not picked up. An important point made by the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, is that some of this is also about improving behavioural change and encouraging people not to tolerate this. Never mind fines or responsibilities, it is about not tolerating this as a society.
Having said that, the amendments themselves are unnecessary in this case, and I will try to explain why. Local authorities can already issue fixed-penalty notices for littering of up to £500, which is greater than the proposed penalties in the amendment. In addition, local authorities already have the power to issue public space protection orders to tackle persistent anti-social behaviour, including dog fouling. As we have debated, Clause 4 raises the maximum penalty for the breach of PSPOs from £100 to £500, so there is already an upward target in terms of the amount of potential fine. This is not meant as a snide point, but I say to the noble Lord that the Dog (Fouling of Land) Act 1996 has been repealed and replaced; I cannot amend it because it does not exist any more.
The argument I put to the House is that local authorities are best placed to set the level of these penalties in their area, taking into account the characteristics of the community, which might even include ability to pay. Outside of issuing a fixed-penalty notice, those prosecuted for littering can also face, on conviction, a fine of up to £2,500. I do not believe that increasing the fine available to someone who fails to give their name and address to an enforcement officer issuing them a fine is appropriate, with a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale—currently £1,000—being the appropriate level in these circumstances.
Amendment 38 makes a very important point about littering on public transport becoming a specific offence. I pay tribute to the people whom the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, mentioned: the people who go up and down trains, collecting rubbish on behalf of the company. They are also the people who helped protect us last week in the LNER attack. They fulfil a very important function as a whole.
However, the British Transport Police and the railway operators already have the power to enforce the railway by-laws and prevent unacceptable behaviour on both heavy and light railway. That includes fines of up to £1,000. On the noble Lord’s late-night train back, in theory, a £1,000 fine for littering could be issued. By-laws are controlled by each individual devolved area, which will have its own by-laws around littering and enforcement.
That takes me to the other point—I do not mean to be cocky in the way I say this—that the amendments, as proposed, seek to amend the law in Scotland and Wales as well as for England, and they deal with matters that are devolved to Scotland and to the Senedd in Wales. As such, it would not be appropriate to include such measures in the Bill without the consent of the legislatures, which at the moment we do not have and have not sought.
Finally, I think it is of benefit to noble Lords if I briefly outline the steps the Government are taking to reduce littering among our communities. There is a Pride in Place Strategy, which sets out how Government will support local action—the very point that the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, mentioned—by bringing forward statutory enforcement guidance on littering, modernising the code of practice that outlines the cleaning standards expected of local authorities and refreshing best practice guidance on powers available to local councils to force land and building owners to clean up their premises.
Having had the opportunity to debate all these issues, I think that the amendments make an extremely important point, and I am not trying to downgrade the points that have been made by noble Lords. Litter is an extremely important issue, but the approach taken in these amendments is not one that I can support—but not because I am not interested in the issue itself. I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment and not to move the other amendments, but we can still discuss it further at some point, no doubt on Report.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am most grateful to those who have contributed and spoken in support of this group of amendments and, indeed, for the Minister’s response, although I was a little disappointed by the scepticism of colleagues on the Liberal Democrat Benches.
These matters go to the heart of civic pride and the everyday quality of life that our constituents rightly expect. The present system of penalties is no longer an adequate deterrent, having not been amended for many years. As has been observed, local authorities spend hundreds of millions of pounds every year clearing up after those who show little regard for the public realm. When the maximum fine for littering has remained unchanged since 2018, its real-term value has fallen sharply. Fines are now too often treated as a minor inconvenience rather than a genuine consequence for selfish behaviour. My amendments seek to address that imbalance and ensure that penalties once again reflect the true cost to our communities. Our buses, trains and underground systems are shared spaces used by millions every day. They should be clean spaces, not repositories for discarded coffee cups and beer bottles.
As I mentioned in my opening speech, although awareness of dog fouling has improved, enforcement remains inconsistent and penalties insufficient. It is only fair that those who allow this behaviour to persist should face meaningful consequences, rather than leaving their neighbours and local councils to deal with the aftermath.
These amendments are modest practical steps towards restoring civic responsibility and pride in our shared environment. They are not intended to be punitive; they are about accountability and respect for the public spaces we all enjoy. I hope that the Government will take note of the strength of feeling by travellers and the public at large and will continue to work with local authorities and communities to tackle the persistent blight of dog fouling and littering, especially on public transport. But for the time being, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Crime and Policing Bill
Monday 17th November 2025
(5 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-II(a) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Second Marshalled List) - (14 Nov 2025)
Lord Blencathra
“Forfeiture of vehicles under the Environmental Protection Act 1990In section 33C of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 (section 33 offences: forfeiture of vehicles), omit subsection (7).”Member’s explanatory statement
This would remove some of the issues a court has to consider before granting a forfeiture order for someone convicted of fly tipping controlled waste, and ensures that the innocent landowner must not bear the cost of removal.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I apologise for the delay; the lift was delayed, so I just made it.
In moving my Amendment 40, I will also address Amendment 42. Amendment 40 suggests omitting subsection (7), on the forfeiture of vehicles, from the Environmental Protection Act 1990. The first question is: what does subsection (7) say? To start with, this part of the 1990 Act deals with the criminal act of illegally fly-tipping and the massive amounts of rubbish dumped in the countryside, including controlled waste. We saw an example of that at the weekend at Kidlington, where an enormous amount was illegally dumped there. Section 33 deals with a forfeiture of vehicles and rightly gives the appropriate authority, which may be a local authority or the Environment Agency, power to ask the court to take possession of the vehicle used in the commission of the crime and dispose of it—excellent law, in my opinion.
Regarding subsection (7), the point of my amendment is to remove a few hoops which the court has to consider before making the order—in my opinion they are not necessary—and make it more difficult to penalise the organised crime rackets behind most of the worst illegal dumping. Thus, subsection (7) says:
“In considering whether to make an order under this section a court must in particular have regard to … the value of the vehicle … the likely financial and other effects on the offender of the making of the order (taken together with any other order that the court contemplates making) … the offender’s need to use the vehicle for lawful purposes”
and
“whether, in a case where it appears to the court that the offender is engaged in a business which consists wholly or partly in activities which are unlawful by virtue of section 33 above … the making of the order is likely to inhibit the offender from engaging in further such activities”.
I say to these caveats that the value of the vehicle is irrelevant. If the criminal uses it to commit a crime, too bad. Whether it is a 20 year-old clapped-out van or a new Mercedes-Benz Sprinter, if it is used in a crime, he loses it, whatever the value. As for the likely financial effects, what should we care if it has financial effects on the criminal? I would hope it would—that is the point of confiscating the implement he uses to commit the crime.
Then the court has to consider the criminal’s
“need to use the vehicle for lawful purposes”.
I have no doubt that he will tell the court that he needs it to transport meals on wheels or medical supplies and give any number of bogus excuses. If a criminal uses a vehicle for criminal purposes and has made a lot of money by doing so, he should forfeit the vehicle, even if he can no longer use it for the school run.
Let us not be naive. We are not looking here at a householder who drives in his Volvo to the countryside to dump a bag of garbage but at serious and organised criminals, using their three-tonne tipper trucks—or, as we saw recently, their 30-tonne tipper trucks—to dump thousands of tonnes of controlled waste, including asbestos, chemicals and other building rubble. It is estimated, according to our House of Lords Select Committee report of two weeks ago, that the organised gangs make about £1 billion per annum from illegal dumping of controlled waste. As I said in a debate last week, the only thing that hurts these criminals is not a fine, which they might not pay, but depriving them of their property. We should not have any get-outs, as we have in subsection (7); instead, we should confiscate any and all vehicles used in their criminal waste-dumping activities.
I will not speak to Amendment 42, since my noble friends on the Front Bench put down their own amendment before mine and will make a better argument of it than I can. All I say is that I apologise that my explanatory statement is wrong here; I inadvertently attached the same one as for Amendment 40. However, going back to Amendment 40, I beg to move.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, I wholeheartedly support my noble friend. He has done the Committee a great service by bringing forward these amendments. The Bill is indeed very broad, and the question of fly-tipping falls very squarely within its auspices.
This is a very serious issue indeed, and it is undertaken by a range of criminals, from small one-man bands to large, organised gangs, and everything in between. The fact is that we still have a really serious problem, which is not taken sufficiently seriously by law enforcement. Therefore, we have to bring forward measures that the criminals will be frightened of and will not just consider as a cost of business of being in that field. They must be concerned about the potential loss of their vehicles and the potential removal of—or, at least, adding of points to—their driving licenses. I could not agree with my noble friend any more; he has absolutely hit the nail on the head.
There is another very important measure, on which we will hear from my noble friends on the Official Opposition Front Bench in a few moments, around equity. It is inequitable that the person who is the victim of this crime must be responsible for clearing it up—that is just completely wrong. I have never understood why that should be the case.
I declare an interest of some description in that I have a small farm in Devon. I really feel for landowners and those who have responsibility for land. They go into their fields to tend their stock and then see massive piles of waste that could contain everything from biowaste to asbestos, to building products, and so forth, and then somehow it becomes their problem to find the means to clear it up. This is wrong, so we ought to use the Bill, in a very positive way, to remove that burden on the victims of crime and put it on the perpetrators, with support from local authorities.
Earl Russell (LD)
My Lords, I will respond briefly to this group of amendments. Fly-tipping is out of control and a very serious problem. As we have heard, farmers and innocent landowners often end up paying the cost for other people’s criminality. The Government’s own statistics show that around 20% of all waste generated ends up being illegally managed. These figures highlight the absolute scale of the problem. With profits being up to £2,500 per lorry, if you start driving 30 lorries a day, the profits soon add up. So this is no longer a small matter of rural dumping but a major criminal enterprise—it certainly spreads into major criminal enterprises—which damages our ecosystems, undermines legitimate businesses and leaves legitimate legal landowners with responsibilities.
We on these Benches start from the position that prevention is better than cure and call on the Government to make rapid reforms and approaches to these issues through a lens of fairness, proportionality and effective enforcement. We stand firmly behind innocent landowners and want to see progress made on these matters. The law needs fundamental and major reform. We would like to see that happen.
Amendment 40 concerns the forfeiture of vehicles under the Environmental Protection Act. We can see the logic in removing Section 33C(7), strengthening the ability to confiscate vehicles used for fly-tipping offences. Its removal concerns the offenders’ need to use the vehicle for lawful purposes—well, they should have thought about that before they started using it for illegal ones. However, enforcement agencies must ensure that these powers are used proportionately if the Government agree to them.
Amendments 41 and 42 relate to landowners and the bills that they are facing from others’ criminality. We support the principle that the polluter should pay and that those who dump waste should be caught and prosecuted. However, we have some concerns about these amendments. This is a complicated matter and the truth is that most of these criminals are not caught. Convictions are often far too lenient. Often, when people are caught, the authorities lack the financial capability to track down sufficient funds to meet clean-up costs. This can all take considerable time, during which there is ongoing environmental damage.
Amendment 42 comes as a package deal with Amendment 41. It states categorically:
“Any guidance issued under this section must state that the costs of removal of illegally tipped refuse will not fall on the landowner on whose property the refuse was dumped”.
The trouble is that it does not say who does pick up the cost. It raises a lot of questions without providing enough answers. In some cases, we are seeing criminals even buying land specifically for the purposes of dumping waste—it is so profitable to do so. I am worried about the nuance of the law in this. I fully recognise that the law needs full reform. I have every sympathy with what the noble Lords are trying to do. I am just not certain that, as drafted, these amendments would do what the noble Lords intend.
Amendment 46 seeks to add a penalty point to driving licences of those convicted of fly-tipping. This is about creating a potentially powerful deterrent. This policy was a hangover from the last Conservative Government which was not legislated for. Fly-tippers depend on their vehicles to carry out their criminal activities. This is an amendment that we generally welcome and support. I would be interested in the Government’s response to it.
Amendment 47 goes further by seeking to amend the Police Reform Act to allow vehicles used in fly-tipping to be seized. Local authorities already have a lot of these powers to seize vehicles. This amendment would take it further. I am interested in the Minister’s response to this amendment. Separate to these amendments, I ask the Government to go further and consider giving local authorities greater powers to stop vehicles that are suspected of taking part in fly-tipping and to create greater co-operation and intelligence sharing between local authorities and the police.
Some of the answers to these questions revolve around our policy of a national fund to support innocent landowners who fall victim to this, rather than this approach and these amendments. We call for that fund to be enacted from levies on waste carriers and for that money to help innocent landowners who find themselves the victims of others’ crime.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, the amendments in this group address the very serious blight that is fly-tipping. The issue lies at the heart of community life. It is vital that we make every effort to ensure environmental protection and community confidence in law enforcement.
The scale of fly-tipping in the UK should not be understated. Between 2023 and 2024, local authorities in England dealt with around 1.15 million incidents, a 6% increase on the previous year. The majority of these cases involved household waste, sometimes dumped in bulk. Unfortunately, the absolute number of prosecutions is tiny in relation to the problem. There were only 1,598 prosecuted actions in that same year. Fly-tipping is organised crime, but it is local councils and private landowners who often bear the cost of clearing up the mess.
The amendments tabled in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Davies and my noble and learned friend Lord Keen seek to protect local communities from the destructive practice of fly-tipping by providing for harsher penalties and giving the police more powers to act. Amendment 41 amends Clause 9 so as to ensure that the Secretary of State’s guidance on fly-tipping makes the person responsible for the fly-tipping, rather than the landowner, liable for the costs of cleaning up. It is wrong that this is currently left to judicial discretion—that risks inconsistent outcomes. The amendment does identify the person responsible, who in this case is the convicted offender.
My Amendment 46 introduces a further enforcement tool. Where a person is found to have committed a fly-tipping offence, authorities would have the power to add three points to their driving licence. Rather than simply compelling fly-tipping offenders to pay a fine, which they may deem a worthy risk when compared with the profits of their actions, this measure places at risk the offenders’ ability to drive. By threatening points on driving licences, repeat offenders will be less likely to fly-tip as their licences will be in jeopardy.
I thank my noble friend Lord Blencathra for his Amendment 42, which seeks to ensure in statute that the cost of cleaning up fly-tipping should not fall on to the landowners. In many ways, this amendment seeks to achieve the same outcome as my Amendment 41. I therefore welcome it and hope that the Government will pay it due regard.
I also thank my noble friend Lord Blencathra for his Amendment 40, which seeks to remove the provision of third-party protection for seizure of vehicles in respect of fly-tipping, which he spoke to most compellingly just now. This would mean that offenders cannot escape punishment by using someone else’s vehicle and that local authorities are better equipped to tackle fly-tipping. Again, I look forward to hearing the Government’s position on this proposal. If we are to tackle fly-tipping seriously, it is important that police are well equipped to act.
My Amendment 47 seeks to amend Section 59 of the Police Reform Act 2002 so that the police can seize a vehicle which they reasonably believe has been used in association with fly-tipping offences. It empowers the police, not just local authorities, to take action.
In conclusion, these are practical, targeted interventions with a clear principle: those who dump waste illegally should be held to account and local communities should not be left footing the bill. I hope that all noble Lords recognise the importance of holding those who dump waste to account and protecting communities from the blight of illegal dumping. I earnestly hope that the Government will consider carefully the practical measures proposed by me and my noble friend Lord Blencathra and the broader structural steps proposed by the noble Earl, Lord Russell, in the amendments in the next group. Together they form a system for tackling fly-tipping. I look forward with interest to the Minister’s response.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, we are debating again the Crime and Policing Bill—the second day in Committee—which has as its core purpose making our communities safer, protecting victims from harm and ensuring that they secure the justice they deserve, so it is fitting that I echo the words of my noble friend Lord Hanson earlier today, when he spoke on the border security Bill, by paying my own tribute to that doughty campaigner for victims’ rights, Baroness Newlove. Her tireless campaigning on behalf of victims and the bereaved was truly inspirational. Like other Members of your Lordships’ House, I was deeply saddened to hear of her most untimely passing. She will be much missed, and I am sure all noble Lords will join me in passing on our condolences to her family and friends.
I thank the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra and Lord Davies of Gower, for setting out the Opposition’s position on Clause 9 and fly-tipping more generally. Fly-tipping is a serious issue, as both the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, and the noble Earl, Lord Russell, said. It is environmental vandalism, and you have only to consider the enormous pile of illegally dumped waste by the A34 and the River Cherwell in Kidlington, to which the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, referred, to see that this is a very real problem, which the Government are absolutely committed to tackling.
On that particular, egregious example of fly-tipping, noble Lords will, I hope, be pleased to hear that the Government are engaging with the Environment Agency on this specific case. I understand that an investigation is under way. An Environment Agency restriction order has been served to prevent access to the site and further tipping, and the local resilience forum has been notified to explore opportunities with multi-agency support.
In 2023-24, local authorities in England reported 1.15 million fly-tipping incidents and 60% of fly-tips involved household waste. Fly-tipping is not only an eyesore, blighting our streets and open spaces, it can pose a serious public health hazard when not effectively dealt with. It really impacts the quality of life in communities across our land, often the most deprived areas, urban and rural, and that is why we as a Government are committed to tackling it.
The current waste carriers, brokers and dealers regulatory regime is not fit for purpose and the Government have announced plans to reform this regime and move the regulation of waste management and transport from a light-touch registration scheme into environmental permitting. We committed in our manifesto to forcing fly-tippers to clean up the mess that they have created, as part of a crackdown on anti-social behaviour, and will provide further details on this commitment in due course. We are also carrying out a review of local authority powers to seize and crush vehicles of suspected fly-tippers, to identify how we can help councils make better use of this specific tool.
We want to see an effective enforcement strategy at the centre of local efforts to combat the problem, which makes full and proper use of the available powers. I stress that we think that this is appropriately done at the local level, because it is local people, local communities, and indeed local councillors, who are elected to represent those communities, who are best placed to understand the specific needs and issues in those areas. Clause 9 will help achieve that by placing a legal duty on councils across the country to have regard to forthcoming guidance on fly-tipping enforcement.
I recognise the significant burden that clearing fly-tipping waste places on landowners. However, I do not believe that Amendment 41 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and Amendment 42 from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, are the right way to tackle the issue.
Through Section 33B of the Environmental Protection Act 1990, where local authorities prosecute fly-tippers, a court can mandate that a costs order be made on the convicted person in order that a landowner’s costs can be recovered from the perpetrator. Such a cost order is a criminal penalty and, as such, is properly imposed by the independent judiciary under the relevant provisions of the 1990 Act. Where there is sufficient evidence, fly-tippers can be prosecuted and, on conviction, a costs order can be made by the court so that those landowners’ costs can be recovered.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, can the Minister help the Committee by telling us how often such an order has been imposed?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I am afraid I will have to write to the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, with that detail. But I stress that there is no statutory limit on the amount of compensation that may be imposed for an offence committed by an offender aged 18 or over. However, in determining whether to make a compensation order and the amount that should be paid under such an order, the court must take into account the offender’s means. If they are limited, priority must be given to the payment of compensation over a fine, although a court may still impose a fine. I suppose 20% of something is better than 100% of nothing, if I can put it that way.
Having said that, guidance on presenting court cases produced by the National Fly-tipping Prevention Group, which is a group chaired by Defra that includes a wide range of representatives from interested parties—central and local government, enforcement authorities, the waste industry, police and fire services, private landowners, and the devolved Administrations—sets out that prosecutors should consider applying for compensation for the removal of waste. Defra will consider building on this advice in the statutory guidance that will be issued under Clause 9 once the Bill becomes law.
Noble Lords will also be interested, I hope, to hear that local authorities can already issue fixed penalties of up to £1,000 to fly-tippers, the income from which must be spent on clean-up or enforcement. Local authorities issued 63,000 fixed penalty notices in total for fly-tipping during 2023-24, and these were the second most common enforcement action, according to Defra data.
I fully understand the sentiment behind these amendments and entirely accept the principle that the polluter should pay but the Government believe that the sentencing framework, as set out in primary legislation, is the proper place to deal with this issue. I recognise, however, that there may be benefits in providing the court with an alternative disposal relating to penalty points, as proposed in Amendment 46 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies. Defra remains committed to considering such a move and will provide an update in due course.
I also stress, and in response to Amendment 47, as the noble Earl, Lord Russell, noted, that there is an existing power for local councils and the police to seize a vehicle where there is a reasonable belief that it is being used or had been used for fly-tipping, which can lead to the vehicle being sold or crushed if it is not claimed. If the vehicle is claimed, the council can prosecute and a court can order that ownership rights are transferred to the council, under which it can keep, sell or dispose of the vehicle. There were nearly 400 vehicles seized in 2023-24 as an enforcement action.
When such an order is being considered, it is appropriate that the court must consider certain factors that Amendment 40, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, seeks to remove. The duty on the courts to consider these factors, such as the financial impacts of the forfeiture or the offender’s need to use the vehicle for lawful purposes, embeds principles of Article 1 of Protocol 1 of—our friend—the European Convention on Human Rights. This entitles a person to a peaceful enjoyment of their possessions but allows the state to enforce laws to control use of that property when it is in the general interest. Any such interference with this right must be lawful for legitimate aim and be proportionate. Amendment 40 would remove these safeguards, and we should always tread lightly when considering long-held rights regarding property, something I am sure I would not have to tell the Benches opposite.
In light of my explanations, I hope the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful for the Minister’s response and to all those who have spoken in this short but interesting debate. I start with the problem: fly-tipping does not sound as bad as the crime actually is. Many people say, “Oh, fly-tipping, that is just dumping a mattress or a fridge in the countryside”, but as we have seen recently, there are 30,000 tonnes of contaminated garbage in Hoads Wood, with probably around 900 or 1,000 tonnes left at the weekend. It is not fly-tipping: it is rubbish racketeering. I am not going to suggest an amendment to change the title of it, but we really need to take it seriously.
Now, the other point that my noble friend on the Front Bench and I—and, I think, nearly all of us—agree on is that, ideally, the landowner should not have to pay the cost of clearing it up. He or she is the victim by having it dumped on their land in the first place, and then they are the victim the second time around in having to pay for clearing it up. But it should not be the ratepayers who pay for it either.
Ideally, of course, it should be the people who do it, but in many cases, we cannot catch them; we do not know who they are. In those circumstances, it seems grossly unfair that the landowner then has to bear the cost of doing that. We may discuss this in the next group of amendments, but I would hope that on, say, the Kidlington thing, a couple of forensic experts can crawl over that and find something. There must be addresses; there must be some data—that rubbish has not come from 200 miles away. There must be intelligence to pin down who has been doing it and then we should hit them hard.
I do not accept that the European Court of Human Rights would say that we need all those safeguards before taking away the vehicle of someone who has been involved in heavy crime. I challenge the Minister on that. I like the idea of three points on the licence, although I would go slightly further and make it three points for every load the person has dumped, but there are various penalties we can add there as well.
So I think we are all on the same side here—the noble Earl, Lord Russell, my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel on the Front Bench, myself and the Minister—and we are all searching for slightly tougher penalties. I hear what the Minister said, but perhaps if all of us on this side of the House could agree some simple, concerted amendment for Report where we can toughen up on this a bit, maybe adding the penalty points thing, maybe finding some way to make sure that the landowner does not pay and some way to penalise the organised crime behind this, it may be worth while coming back on Report. But in the meantime, in view of what the Minister said and his assurances, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Earl Russell
“Serious and organised waste crime: national action plan(1) The Secretary of State must regard serious and organised waste crime as a strategic priority threat.(2) In furtherance of the strategic priority in subsection (1), the Joint Unit for Waste Crime (JUWC) must follow an approach based on reducing serious and organised waste crime.(3) The JUWC must establish a national action plan to further the priorities of—(a) reducing the impact of waste criminality where it takes place,(b) preventing people from engaging in serious and organised waste crime,(c) protecting the UK’s critical infrastructure, environment, and communities, and(d) prosecuting and disrupting people engaged in serious and organised waste criminality.(4) JUWC partners must use all their relevant specialist skills, experience and investigative and intelligence in furtherance of the priorities in subsection (3).(5) A relevant person must, so far as appropriate and reasonably practical, cooperate with the JUWC to further the priorities in subsection (3), including by— (a) sharing intelligence on waste crime, (b) reporting incidents of waste crime, and(c) sharing connections between waste crime and other forms of serious and organised crime.(6) The national action plan may include a single point for receiving and disseminating reports of waste crime.(7) In this section—(a) “JUWC partners” means—(i) Environment Agency;(ii) National Resources Wales;(iii) Scottish Environmental Protection Agency;(iv) Northern Ireland Environment Agency;(v) His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs;(vi) Police;(vii) National Fire Chiefs Council;(viii) British Transport Police;(ix) National Crime Agency;(x) Revenue Scotland;(xi) Welsh Revenue Authority;(xii) Environmental Services Association;(xiii) Chartered Institute for Waste management.(b) a “relevant person” means—(i) regional organised crime units,(ii) local police forces in England and Wales, and(iii) local authorities.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment takes forward recommendations of House of Lords Environment and Climate Change Committee. It requires the Secretary of State to designate serious and organised waste crime as a strategic priority threat. It also requires the Joint Unit on Waste Crime to establish a national action plan and places a duty on relevant persons to cooperate with the JUWC in furtherance of the plan’s priorities.
Earl Russell (LD)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 43, I shall speak also to Amendments 44 and 45, all on serious and organised waste crime. By chance, I found myself involved in this since those from the save Hoads Woods campaign came to me. That resulted in a ministerial direction and resulted in the clean-up of Hoads Wood at a cost of £15 million to the taxpayer, equivalent to the Environment Agency’s annual budget for fighting waste crime. It also led to the Environment and Climate Change Committee conducting a short inquiry into these matters, which has reported in the last couple of weeks. My amendments deal with some of the key findings from that report.
I do not wish to jump the gun, but some of these matters are clear cut; they are urgent, and I want to keep up the pressure. The Bill represents a vital opportunity to make progress, and it is progress that I do not want to be missed. I know that the Government have inherited broken systems and are committed to making reforms, particularly on the broker and dealer regulations, which I welcome and thank them for doing. The work done by the committee clearly shows that all parties recognise that this is a problem and is out of control. The findings paint a picture of fundamentally broken systems, where criminality is endemic in our waste sector. The key is to treat it as an organised crime problem and provide the right tools with which to fight it. We need to fight fire with fire.
While we sit with bits of paper that are easily forged, criminal networks buy land under false ID, using the dark web and secret apps to communicate with each other. I have no wish to blame individuals, but broken systems are creating broken results. This is a £1 billion a year problem. These criminal organised gangs are also involved in drugs, firearms, money laundering and modern slavery. There is the sheer scale: 38 million tonnes—enough to fill Wembley stadium 30 times over—is believed to be illegally managed every year.
We need look no further than the devastating environmental catastrophe that is unfolding in real time in Kidlington, Oxfordshire, as has already been mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, which came to light just this weekend. My heart sank when I saw this, because this dump—150 metres long and 6 metres high—threatens to become an environmental disaster, with toxic leachate running into the River Cherwell, which is only metres away. It feels like Hoads Wood has been allowed to happen all over again. I do not understand how, for months and months, lorries were allowed to dump this stuff and nothing has been done. I ask the Minister seriously to consider meeting the costs and to work with local residents and the council to ensure that that clear-up takes place. That is extremely important.
Without swift and decisive action, we will continue to draw ever more sophisticated criminal networks into the UK waste sector. The National Crime Agency warns that this is now a strategic threat. Beyond financial losses, this is not a victimless crime; there are damaging consequences for public health and the natural environment, and we, the taxpayer, are left to pick up the bill.
We welcome the Joint Unit for Waste Crime, but it has only 12 individuals and has no statutory footing or clear strategic direction. There needs to be better co-operation between partners. The committee heard witnesses say that this is the Bermuda triangle of intelligence—information is simply lost between partners and falls between the cracks. Amendment 43 would require the Secretary of State to take serious and organised waste crime as a strategic priority threat and to mandate the Joint Unit for Waste Crime to establish a comprehensive national action plan. That would focus on prevention, protection and prosecution, underpinned by effective intelligence sharing. It would place a duty of co-operation on all relative public bodies and enforcement agencies, ensuring that intelligence and expertise flow across the system. The national action plan would create a single point for receiving and disseminating waste crime reports.
Members of the public report this and get rightly frustrated when nothing happens. The need is clear: these issues are falling between organisations and jurisdictions, and all the while it is the criminals who are benefiting. Amendment 44 calls for greater transparency and accountability. Openness and accountability are key to understanding the causes and the scale of organised waste crime. A lack of transparency benefits only the criminal networks.
When the Environment Agency was asked by the Environment and Climate Change Committee how many sites of a similar size to Hoads Wood existed, the answer given was six. However, since then Sky News has reported a site in Wigan and, as we have heard, there is the site in Kidlington which was publicised in the press at the weekend. It is not clear whether those two sites are additional, but time will tell, and we need to know the true scale. We cannot effectively fight that which we do not know. More than numbers, it would require location, sizes, types of waste and what action is being taken to clear up these tremendous, huge waste piles. This amendment is also essential; these matters need to be legislated for as otherwise they will not be properly reported.
Amendment 45 is the linchpin of the committee’s recommendations. It would establish a root-and-branch review of serious and organised waste crime which would be independent of Defra, the Environment Agency and HMRC. The committee found multiple failures by the Environment Agency and criticised the regulators for being slow to respond. Despite receiving over 24,000 reports of waste crime in three years to March 2025, the EA opened only 320 criminal investigations. HMRC has achieved zero criminal convictions for landfill tax fraud, despite the tax gap being estimated at £150 million annually. The independent review scrutinised the egregious events at Hoads Wood, the fact that they were reported for years and that it took until January 2024 for the EA to obtain a restriction order. Clearing up the six sites that are already known about could cost close to £1 billion if the cost is similar to that of clearing Hoads Wood.
These are very important issues. Critically, we want to see a change in the financial rules set by the Treasury that prevent the Environment Agency diverting income derived from environmental permits on legitimate businesses towards dealing with criminal activity. Additional funding provided to the Environment Agency for 2025-26 should be maintained.
To conclude, I recognise that the Minister has not had long to consider the committee’s report, and that a formal response is not due until the start of December. My hope is that there is time for a formal response to the committee’s report prior to the Bill’s Report stage. I hope that the Government are minded at least to take an initial look at the amendments. If it is helpful, I am fully prepared to work and co-operate with the Government in any way I can. I beg to move.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
May God and my noble friends forgive me, but I think our Lib Dem Peers have a good point, particularly with regard to the new clause proposed in Amendment 43. I will not repeat what the noble Earl, Lord Russell, said, but the letter from our chair of the Environment and Climate Change Committee is absolutely spot on. The crime is massive—costing the country £1 billion per annum—and the environmental damage is enormous. I was not aware that our committee had carried out a short investigation, and I had not focused on Amendments 43, 44 and 45 until I saw the horrendous photos and videos last Friday and Saturday of the hundreds, possibly thousands, of tonnes dumped on that back lane in Kidlington, just six yards from the River Cherwell. The local MP and others have called it an environmental catastrophe, and that is no exaggeration.
This criminality is happening all across the country. I was on the board of Natural England when our SSSI at Hoads Wood was destroyed by 30,000 tonnes of illegal waste, dumped over a period of many months before the Environment Agency was aware of it. The agency then issued a notice barring further access to the site and is now spending £15 million to clean it up. The cost of cleaning up the Kidlington dump is estimated to be greater than the local authority budget.
Many have criticised the Environment Agency but I will not slag it off—at least, not too hard. Its main response is to issue a notice stopping further dumping, but inevitably that is weeks or months too late and the criminal gangs will have found new sites by then. This level of mega organised crime is way beyond its capability. It is a licensing organisation. It can do criminal investigations, but not of this complexity. It is easy for it to investigate a leak into a river from a factory, or prosecute a farmer who illegally dredged the River Lugg, but this level of organised crime is way beyond its capacity to investigate.
Conclusion 2 in the letter to the Defra Secretary of State from the noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan, is so right. She says:
“What we do know, however, is that criminality is endemic in the waste sector. It is widely acknowledged that there is little chance of criminals being brought to justice for committing waste offences—the record of successful prosecutions and other penalties is woeful. Organised crime groups, including those involved in drugs, firearms, money laundering and modern slavery, are well-established in the sector. They are attracted to the low-risk opportunity to make large sums of money and commit crimes from coordinated fly-tipping to illegal exports and landfill tax fraud”.
When I was on the board of the Food Standards Agency until 12 months ago, I had responsibility for the National Food Crime Unit. We found that the gangs involved in recirculating condemned food back into the food chain, usually to the catering sector, were also involved in moving stolen high-value cars, JCBs, drugs, mobile phones, et cetera. They were simply movers and distributors of all high-value stolen property or illegal items. If you have the network to move stolen vehicles then you have the network to dump thousands of tonnes of rubbish also.
How much money do these organised crime teams make from illegal dumping? The cost of legally disposing of mixed waste is up to £150 per tonne, and up to £200 per tonne for hazardous waste. A legal company would have to charge that fee, which includes the landfill tax of £94 per tonne. All these crooks have to do is put in a bid slightly below £150 and they would probably get the contract, including from possibly legitimate companies that did not know that they were dealing with crooks—it is possibly more likely that they would know, but they take the cheaper option and deny responsibility. The crooks who dumped at Hoads Wood probably made away with about £4 million: 30,000 tonnes at a profit of £130 per tonne. At Kidlington, let us say that they dumped 10 loads of 30 tonnes each day for 30 days. That is 900 tonnes, or £120,000 pure profit—dirty profit, to be more exact.
Although Amendments 44 and 45 are okay, they are not the important ones in this group. Of course there is no harm in more data, but we already know how serious the problem is, as our Lords inquiry has shown. Conducting a review to report by 2027 sounds a bit like that wonderful line from Sir Humphrey Appleby in the “Yes Minister” episode “Doing the Honours”, when he said,
“I recommend that we set up an interdepartmental committee with fairly broad terms of reference, so that at the end of the day, we’ll be in the position to think through the various implications and arrive at a decision based on long-term considerations rather than rush prematurely into precipitate and possibly ill-conceived action which might well have unforeseen repercussions”—
to which Hacker says: “You mean ‘no’?”
However, the new clause in Amendment 45 has one good gem in it—namely, proposed new subsection (2), which says that the review must consider
“the extent and effectiveness of integrated working between the Environment Agency, HMRC, the National Crime Agency, local police forces in England and Wales, and local authorities”.
That leads me on to the noble Earl’s Amendment 43, which has a very sensible key suggestion: beefing up the Joint Unit for Waste Crime. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock, whom we all respect, said in answer to an Oral Question in this Chamber on 15 October that Defra had increased the budget for the EA to use on the joint unit by 50% and that the number of staff had doubled. I have no real criticism of Defra, but that will still not work because the Environment Agency is the wrong organisation to lead it.
We are talking about massive, organised crime of £1 billion. There is only one organisation capable of leading a multiagency task force on that, and that is the National Crime Agency. I urge the Minister to take this back to the Home Office, discuss it with Defra, the EA and the NCA, and, without changing everything, give the National Crime Agency the lead in tackling this. As I and the noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan, have pointed out, these same criminals are involved in high-value stolen goods such as mobiles, construction equipment, drugs—all stuff way out of the league of the EA but bang in the bailiwick of the NCA. If the noble Earl, Lord Russell, can come back with a simpler amendment on Report on something like that, then I would be minded to support him.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
I thank the noble Earl, Lord Russell, for his amendments. As he said, they include requiring the Secretary of State to designate serious and organised waste crime as a strategic threat; to create a national action plan to collect and publish quarterly information on waste crime; and to provide for an independent review of serious and organised waste crime.
On the strategic priority designation and the national action plan, of course I support taking fly-tipping and organised waste much more seriously. Fly-tipping goes far beyond simple domestic waste and is a widespread practice of criminals; I point to the comments I made in the preceding group. I earnestly hope that the Government take this amendment seriously and I look forward to hearing their thoughts on a national action plan.
On the publishing of quarterly data, we on these Benches are always sympathetic to the principle of transparency, which in turn drives government accountability. More granular and consistent data assist the Government in formulating their efforts to tackle fly-tipping.
On the third and final amendment, although I recognise the noble Earl’s thought process behind an independent review and the importance of scrutiny, my one worry is that it may divert scarce government resources away from tackling the problem at hand. Too large a focus on reviewing may unduly delay action. In our view, this Government are already all too keen to launch a review to solve every problem that comes their way. We do not need to give them any more incentive to do so. It is our priority to give the police the power to act as soon as possible. None the less, I hope the Government take all the noble Earl’s amendments seriously.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, as the noble Earl, Lord Russell, explained, the purpose of these amendments is to take forward some of the recommendations of your Lordships’ House’s Environment and Climate Change Committee to tackle serious and organised crime in the waste sector. At this point, I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan, and the work of her committee, not just in their detailed examination of the issue but in the whole way their report has raised the profile of this important issue.
I am glad we have had an opportunity to discuss waste crime in the round. As we have noted, and I think we are all in accord across the Chamber, this is a serious issue. At the end of the debate on the previous group, the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, mooted that perhaps we need to rebrand fly-tipping to make people take it more seriously. From reflecting on this debate, nobody can be in any doubt, as the committee’s report demonstrated, that this is a serious business—and it is a business. It incurs huge costs in terms of the damage done. It is obviously a very profitable business to those who engage in it and I think we are all determined to tackle it. We argue that there are certainly provisions in the Bill, as well as other government actions, that will help to address this.
As the noble Earl, Lord Russell, said, waste crime costs the economy an estimated £1 billion annually. We are determined to tackle it, why is why we are preparing significant reforms to the waste carriers, brokers and dealers regime and to the waste permit exemptions regime. Bringing waste carriers, brokers and dealers into the environmental permitting regime will give the Environment Agency more powers and resources to ensure compliance and to hold operators to account. Changes will make it harder for rogue operators to find work in the sector and easier for regulators to take action against criminals. Our planned reforms will also introduce the possibility of up to five years’ imprisonment for those who breach these new laws.
We are also introducing digital waste tracking to make it harder than ever to misidentify waste or dispose of it inappropriately. By digitising waste records, we will make it easier for legitimate businesses to comply with their duty of care for waste and reduce the opportunities for criminals to operate. Furthermore, better data will help us manage resources more sustainably, reduce waste and protect the environment for future generations.
As the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, noted, the Government have also increased the Environment Agency’s funding, including the amount available to tackle illegal waste operators. This year, we have raised the budget for waste crime enforcement by over 50% to £15.6 million. The Joint Unit for Waste Crime, which is hosted within the Environment Agency, has nearly doubled in size thanks to that extra funding. Overall, the EA has been able to increase its front-line criminal enforcement resource in the Joint Unit for Waste Crime and area environmental crime teams by 43 full-time equivalent employees. They will be targeted at activities identified as waste crime priorities, using enforcement activity data and criminal intelligence. That includes tackling organised crime groups, increasing enforcement activity, closing down illegal waste sites more quickly, using intelligence more effectively and delivering successful major criminal investigations.
The noble Earl, Lord Russell, touched on the terrible incident at Kidlington, which we discussed in the previous group. All I can do is repeat what I said to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. The Government are engaging with the Environment Agency on the case with the utmost seriousness. An investigation is underway, and an Environment Agency restriction order has been served to prevent access to the site and further tipping. I understand the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra; it is bad now, but at least this way it cannot get any worse. The local resilience forum has been notified to explore opportunities for multi-agency support. Noble Lords may be aware that there was an Urgent Question in the other place this afternoon asked by the local MP Calum Miller; I believe that my honourable friend the Minister Mary Creagh offered to meet with Mr Miller to discuss this further. This is an issue that we are taking very seriously.
As the noble Earl, Lord Russell, will appreciate, the Environment and Climate Change Committee wrote to my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs as recently as 28 October, to set out the conclusions of its inquiry into waste crime. I am sure that noble Lords will appreciate that it will necessarily take a little time to consider fully the Government’s response. Having read the letter that the committee sent this morning, I know that it is a complex letter that raises many points, and rightly so. Notwithstanding what the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, offered from the annals of classic British comedy, we do not want to rush our response, and it certainly would ill behove me to shoot from the hip in my response when my right honourable friend the Secretary of State will respond to it. I assure the Committee that the Secretary of State is carefully considering the report and will respond in due course.
Noble Lords will be aware of two facts, and I will put it no more strongly than this. First, the committee asked in its letter for a response by 9 December. Secondly, we are due to continue in Committee on this Bill until the end of January at the earliest—
Lord Katz (Lab)
Hooray indeed. I will not commit any more strongly than that. I will let noble Lords come to their own conclusions about the ability to take on those considerations ahead of Report.
In the light of the action that we are taking already to tackle waste crime, and without pre-empting the response from my right honourable friend the Secretary of State Emma Reynolds to the Environment Committee’s report, I hope the noble Earl, Lord Russell, will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
Before the noble Earl responds to the debate, I ask the Minister: when he comes back to the Committee with an update on the Kidlington issue, will he explain how it unravels in open sight? As we have heard, there must have been hundreds of lorry loads and, no doubt, many complaints and missives to the police, the Environment Agency and the other bodies responsible. To the man and woman in the street, it seems that if we cannot deal with something as enormous and obvious as this, what hope is there for smaller fly-tipping incidents?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, for that point. I appreciate what he is saying. I am not aware of the events that led up to the time it took to issue this enforcement action, and it would be wrong for me to speculate. I am afraid I have not yet had the time to review the Hansard report of the Urgent Question, but I suspect we may have some of the answers to that question if we review the Commons Hansard report of the Urgent Question that Calum Miller asked of the Government today.
I understand the point the noble Viscount is making, and in the future should I be in the position to report back, I will offer more information. All I will say is that one would hope—I am not speaking out of turn, I simply do not know the facts—that there would be community action and community reporting of this in strength. The Environment Agency only has so much resource; it cannot be all-seeing and so it cannot take enforcement when it does not know the action there. I am not suggesting that that was the case in this situation in Kidlington, but it is important for us to take wider societal responsibility to address these issues.
I am fortunate that the London Borough of Camden, my home borough, has an app through which I can always report fly-tipping, which is nowhere near on the scale of Kidlington. I am an avid user, and therefore I take responsibility. My kids hate me stopping to take pictures of rubbish when I am walking along with them, but I use it because that means that the offence is noted and recorded, and then action is taken. In tribute to Camden, it is usually taken quickly.
Earl Russell (LD)
I thank all those who have spoken in this group and the Minister for his response to my amendments. I recognise that the Government have inherited this problem, and I recognise that they are putting more resources into it through the plans for brokers and dealers and through digital waste tracking, which I hope are brought forward as soon as possible. That will start to make some concrete changes to these issues.
That said, however, this problem is out of the Government’s control and more needs to be done. It is not acceptable that these serious organised criminal gangs are exploiting loopholes in the system, destroying our countryside and leaving a mess behind them. Therefore, I want to see action on that.
I fully recognise that the Select Committee report came out only two weeks ago and that the Government are not due to respond until 9 December, as the Minister said. I am sure that the Minister also recognises that, if I did not raise these points in Committee, I cannot bring them back at Report. I think there is a commonality here on the need to address these issues, and I hope that between now and Report we can have further conversations and co-operate on these issues.
Returning to Kidlington, I know there was an Urgent Question. I had an opportunity to have a word with my honourable friend on that prior to the Statement. It is important that this site is cleared up and that the Government help meet the costs for that. I encourage the Minister to consider using a ministerial direction, if needed, to make sure that that happens. That said, I hope that, when the response to the committee’s report comes, the Government recognise that it is a serious job of work and that it takes a unique and forward-thinking perspective on genuinely trying to find ways to address and resolve these problems. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Blencathra
Member’s explanatory statement
Anyone trespassing in the gardens or grounds of a private house must be assumed to be targeting the private residence and should be guilty of the same offence as if the tresspasser had entered the physical building and there should be a minimum penalty as well as the scope to have a larger maximum.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I will also speak to Amendment 47B.
Amendment 47A is to seek clarification that the definition of “premises” as
“any building, part of a building or enclosed area”
will include gardens and grounds associated with private dwellings. The phrase “enclosed area” is a key part of the statutory definition. Gardens and grounds of private dwellings are typically surrounded by fences, walls or hedges, marking them as distinct and separate from public areas. I hope that the intention behind the word “enclosed” here is to extend the definition beyond the physical structure of the buildings to include spaces that are set apart for private use. Therefore, I suggest that gardens and grounds, by virtue of their possible enclosure and association with the dwelling, fulfil the criteria set out in the definition.
Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville (LD)
My Lords, I have listened carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and read the Member’s explanatory statement on these two amendments. I will be brief.
I can remember, as a child, signs indicating the barriers and limits of public access to certain parcels of land. Across the field, there was a substantial area of public allotments with a wide footpath running through the middle to an empty field beyond, which had public access. Nevertheless, there was a large hand-painted black sign at the start of this footpath that read, “Trespassers will be prosecuted”—not that as a child I understood what that meant, except to say that I could not use the footpath to access the field beyond but would have to walk a long way round to access the field, which was public open space.
Trespass is a crime that has been with us for decades but not always understood. At a time when Governments are trying to open up the countryside to those who have previously had limited access, extending trespass to private gardens and grounds needs careful consideration. Of course, if someone enters your property uninvited, even if the front door is temporarily open, they are trespassing, but those who are not intent on committing a crime—stealing the owner’s valuables, or helping themselves to the contents of the fridge—might have strayed there by accident. That is extremely unlikely. Strangers will generally enter a private property uninvited only if they have some nefarious project in mind.
However, that is unlikely to be the case in respect of grounds and gardens. Public footpaths are not always clearly signposted. The map that the walker may be following might be inaccurate or out of date. Some footpaths may have been temporarily diverted due to the lambing season or some other stock grazing in the area. Stiles and bridges may have fallen into disrepair, causing walkers to look for an alternative route to complete their walk. Is the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, suggesting that these unwitting miscreants should be dealt with in the same way as those who have deliberately set out to commit a crime?
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My amendment refers specifically to gardens and grounds of houses, not to farmers’ fields with a footpath wandering through them. Even if a garden has a footpath going through it, people have the right to use that footpath and it would be difficult then to prove that someone had criminal intent, but if someone enters the grounds and gardens of a private residence, we must assume they have the same criminal intent as if they want to enter the person’s house. It has nothing to do with farmers’ fields or footpaths.
Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville (LD)
I am grateful for the noble Lord’s interjection and for that clarification. However, as somebody who lived for 35 years with a footpath running through their garden, I have to say that I do not really agree with him.
We should be very careful about implementing these two amendments. They smack to me of the landed gentry attempting to keep the ordinary man and woman from enjoying the countryside. I am not a lawyer, but it seems to me that it would not be an easy task to prove that deliberate trespass had occurred over land and grounds or gardens with the intent of causing harm or wanton damage to those grounds.
In respect of Amendment 47B, I do not support increasing the fee should an offence be proved. I am nevertheless keen to hear the Minister’s views on the amendment, but at the moment I am not inclined to support the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Blencathra for tabling these amendments. The case he set out seems clear and obvious. His amendment would ensure that the offence of trespassing with intent to commit an offence extended to people’s gardens and grounds, and it goes no further than that. Any intrusion into those grounds or gardens with mal-intent should be reflected in the level of criminal fines.
My noble friend’s amendments simply proceed on the assumption that gardens or grounds, in their simplest terms, should be treated the same in legislation as residences and buildings. Private property does not stop existing once you step out of a physical doorway; the grounds or gardens surrounding buildings are extensions to them, to be bought and sold just as freely. I think the word “curtilage” often appears—certainly in the law, but often more widely—to describe the land or garden around someone’s house. Indeed, there may be even as great a need to create an offence for this as there is for trespassing on a property with intent. I can imagine criminals using back gardens to navigate between houses to commit burglary. I can imagine confrontations taking place not inside a building yet still in the garden or grounds owned by a victim. They are just as serious as entering a property to commit a crime.
However, I acknowledge that there is generally a difference between entering someone’s house and entering their garden. The former is in most cases far more intrusive—a far greater infringement of someone’s right to a private property. It therefore follows that entering a house should regularly carry a harsher sentence than merely entering the grounds, but that can be the case while ensuring that both are offences. We do not have to disapply the latter simply because it might carry a lower fine than the former.
My noble friend Lord Blencathra’s Amendment 47B provides for this, as he set out. It seeks to give the court the discretion to alter the fines levied on an offender based on the seriousness of the offence, creating a higher maximum fine to be used for the most serious offences. Additionally, creating a minimum fine will ensure that any form of trespassing with the intent to commit another offence is dealt with to a minimal acceptable standard.
Whatever form it takes, trespassing in order to commit crime is incredibly invasive and often traumatic, and it is right that this is acknowledged in the range of the fine level. I hope the Minister has listened to these points, and I look forward to his response.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for tabling the amendments. I hope I can half help him today and, in doing so, assist the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville.
I confirm that the Government will repeal the outdated Vagrancy Act 1824. In Clauses 10 and 11, the Government are legislating to introduce targeted replacement provisions for certain elements of the 1824 Act, to ensure that the police have the powers they need to keep our communities safe. Those targeted replacement measures include a new offence of facilitating begging for gain, which we will come on to shortly, and an offence of trespassing with the intention of committing a crime. Both were previously provided for under the 1824 Act, and the police have told us that it would be useful to retain them.
I hope this helps the noble Baroness, because the new criminal offence of trespassing with intent to commit a criminal offence recreates an offence that is already set out in the 1824 Act. It does not add to it; it recreates it. As is currently the case, it will be an offence for a person to trespass on any premises—meaning any building, part of a building or enclosed area—with the intention to commit an offence, and that is currently in the legislation.
Amendment 47A from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, seeks to ensure that trespassing in gardens and grounds of a private dwelling is captured by the replacement offence. This is where I think I can half help him by indicating that gardens and grounds would already be included in the definition of “premises” in the 1824 Act, so, in essence, that is covered already.
His Amendment 47B would introduce a minimum level 2 fine and increase the maximum level fine from level 3 to level 4 for this offence. Again, the measure in the Bill replicates entirely—going back to the noble Baroness—the maximum penalties currently set out in the existing legislation that we are repealing, but replacing in part, through the clauses addressed by these amendments. I agree with the noble Baroness on the proportionality of the current level of the fines. I say to the noble Lord what he anticipated I would say to him: sentencing is a matter for the independent judiciary, and we need to afford it appropriate discretion. Parliament rarely specifies minimum sentences, and this is not an instance where we should depart from that general principle. I know he anticipated that I would say that—as the good old, former Home Office Minister that he is, I knew he would clock that that was the potential line of defence on his amendment.
It is important to say that the penalties set out in the current legislation, which we are replicating, are considered appropriate and proportionate to the nature of the offence. Therefore, with what I hope was helpful half clarification on grounds and gardens, and with my steady defence on the second amendment, which the noble Lord anticipated, I ask him not to press his amendments.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, half a loaf is better than no bread, of course. All I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, is that she has got totally the wrong end of the stick. I will not go into more detail to argue against her, except to say that I too had a footpath right across the middle of my garden in Cumbria, and I had no problem with it at all. However, that is quite separate from the guy who, in 2000, threatened to burn down my house because he did not like my view on hunting. That is quite a different matter. He committed an offence on my driveway, as opposed to the thousands of people who used the footpath, which I built special turnstiles at either end of for them to use.
I accept entirely what the Minister said and am delighted to see that grounds and gardens of public dwellings will be included in the definition—that is the half I am very happy with. I knew he would not accept my amendment on the penalties. He said that it is up to an independent judiciary—I wish we had one, without a Sentencing Council tying its hands, but that is a matter for another debate. With the Minister’s courteous remarks, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Whitaker
“Repeal of offence for unauthorised encampment in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994(1) The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 is amended as follows.(2) Omit section 60C (Offence relating to residing on land without consent in or with a vehicle).(3) Omit section 60D (Offence under section 60C: seizure of property etc).(4) Omit section 60E (Offence under section 60C: forfeiture).(5) In section 61 (power to remove trespassers on land)—(a) in subsection (1)—(i) in paragraph (a), omit sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii), and(ii) at the beginning of paragraph (b) omit “in either case,”,(b) in subsection (4)(b) omit “prohibited period”,(c) omit subsection (4ZA),(d) in subsection (9), in the definition of “land”, in paragraph (b)—(i) in the words before sub-paragraph (i), omit “in Scotland”, and(ii) insert—“(i) a highway unless it falls within the classifications in section 54 of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 (footpath, bridleway or byway open to all traffic or road used as a public path) or is a cycle track under the Highways Act 1980 or Cycle Tracks Act 1984; or”, and”,(e) omit subsection (10).(6) In section 62 (powers to seize property related to offence under section 61)—(a) in subsection (1)(b), omit “prohibited period”;(b) omit subsection (1A).(7) In section 62B(2) (failure to comply with direction under section 62A: offences), for “twelve” substitute “3”.(8) In section 62C(2) (failure to comply with direction under section 62A: seizure), for “twelve” substitute “3”.(9) In section 68(5) (offence of aggravated trespass), omit paragraphs (a) and (aa).(10) Omit section 62F (guidance).”Member’s explanatory statement
This would repeal amendments to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 made in 2022 in respect of unauthorised encampments, including those on which the High Court has made a Declaration of Incompatibility under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
Baroness Whitaker (Lab)
My Lords, Amendment 49 in my name and those of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Lincoln and the noble Baronesses, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville and Lady Bennett of Manor Castle—for whose wide-ranging support I am most grateful—would right an acknowledged wrong: the declaration of incompatibility with human rights of part of Part 4 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. The right reverend Prelate regrets he cannot at the last minute attend, but he hopes His Majesty’s Government will help. The amendment also tackles the whole of that discriminatory part of the 2022 Act. I will not rehearse again the full range of unfair disadvantage which has resulted from these provisions, which I set out at Second Reading. I will briefly describe what our amendment would achieve, to correct a manifest unfairness which harshly criminalises, and confiscates the caravan homes and domestic possessions of, a small number of families whose nomadic way of life is recognised in law.
I should first of all say that it is the shortage of authorised sites which is the underlying problem. That is why that minority of Gypsies and Travellers who live in that way have often no other choice than to park their family home on an unauthorised site. This is where the judge found race discrimination. He said that
“it means that Gypsies will no longer be able to avoid the risk of criminal penalty by resort to transit pitches. The position might be different if transit pitches were readily available … But the evidence shows this is not the position”.
The amendment simply returns the situation to what it was before the cruel and discriminatory provisions of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act were enacted. It in no way reduces the ample powers the police already had in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 to oblige unauthorised trespassers to leave if there had been threatening behaviour or damage—previous case law has included “squashed grass” in this category—to issue temporary stop notices and injunctions to protect land, to direct unauthorised campers to an alternative site, and to prevent them returning within three months. Our amendment’s main provisions are: the elimination of the power of a landowner to command eviction on a subjective reason of being caused distress, and a return to 12 months as the interval within which the travelling family cannot return to the land—from three months, which was the discrimination that the incompatibility declaration captured.
I need hardly remind the Committee that our Gypsy and Traveller population already suffer a degree of prejudice which has substantially contributed to the worst life chances in health, employment, education and well-being of any minority ethnic group in our country: the attitudes and conduct enabled by the provisions we seek to repeal can only further encourage that prejudice and disadvantage. Can your Lordships imagine how it feels to have hanging over your head, when you cannot find an authorised site, the fear that your family home might be impounded, with all that is in it, and your family turned out, homeless, to find shelter—all on the say-so of a member of the public who feels “distress” simply at the presence of a travelling family? Not the least of your fears will be that your children cannot get to their school, or that the medical regime of an elder in your family has to be abandoned.
I urge the Minister to heed the widespread condemnation of the provisions we seek to repeal by our Joint Committee on Human Rights, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Committees on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and fulfil this Government’s acceptance of the obligation to comply with the court through our amendment. I beg to move.
The Lord Bishop of Manchester
My Lords, Manchester’s famous Christmas markets are now in full swing. If you’re visiting my city any time in the next few weeks, until the last few days before Christmas, you are most welcome to patronise them. However, that was not the case for a number of young people from Gypsy, Roma and Traveller backgrounds this time last year. They were turned away by police at the railway station on the supposition that they must have come to commit crime. Children were seen being forced on to trains heading to unknown destinations, separated from family members, and subjected to physical aggression. That included shoving, hair-pulling, and handcuffing. Several individuals reported officers making disparaging remarks about their ethnicity.
It is a sad fact that in 2025, it remains acceptable in our society to treat Gypsy, Roma and Traveller people in ways that seek to drive them to the margins of society. The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, which amended the 1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act in respect of unauthorised encampments, included changes in respect of which, as we have just been reminded by the noble Lady, Baroness Whitaker, the High Court has made a declaration of incompatibility under Section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998. Police powers were expanded beyond the original provisions of the CJPO Act, allowing officers to arrest, seize vehicles, and forfeit property if individuals failed to leave when directed. The PCSC Act also extended those powers to cover land on highways, increased the no-return period from three months to 12 months, and broadened the types of harm that justify eviction, removing the previous need to demonstrate threatening behaviour or damage.
I opposed those changes in your Lordships’ House then, and I do so still. The overwhelming reason why illegal encampments take place is simple. As the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, has just reminded us, it is down to the continuing failure of local authorities across the nation to provide sufficient legal sites. There are few votes for local councillors in providing Traveller sites; alas, there are many more votes for those same councillors in closing or refusing permission for them. That is a direct consequence of the same prejudiced attitudes against the Gypsy, Roma and Traveller community which underlay the distressing treatment of the young people in Manchester last year. Amendment 49 can be a first step towards rectifying that institutionalised injustice.
I hope that in responding to this debate, the Minister, can give us some indication of how His Majesty’s Government intend to legislate, both in this Bill and elsewhere, to tackle the persistent levels of discrimination against the Gypsy, Roma and Traveller community.
Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville (LD)
My Lords, I wish to speak in support of the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, and thank her for tabling this important amendment. The noble Baroness has laid out the arguments extremely carefully and clearly. Romany and Traveller people experience stark inequalities. They are subject to a wide range of enforcement powers against encampments. Part 4 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act, introduced in 2022, created a new criminal offence relating to trespass and gave police tougher powers to ban Gypsies and Travellers from an area for up to 12 months, alongside powers to fine, arrest, imprison and seize the homes of Gypsies and Travellers.
This draconian amendment was tabled and supported by the previous Conservative Government. It took no account of whether elderly relatives or children were on site, or whether a woman might be in the late stages of pregnancy. It was a broad, sweeping power which the police had not asked for; nor did they want it.
On several occasions I called on the previous Government to require all local authorities to provide adequate permanent sites for Romany people and Traveller people, as well as temporary stopping sites to accommodate the cultural nomadic lifestyle—but to no avail. His Majesty’s official Opposition prefer the scenario where, due to the absence of authorised stopping places or sites, illegal camping is dealt with in a draconian manner. The Gypsies and Travellers are evicted and thrown in prison; their caravan homes and vehicles are seized; and their children are taken into care—all a burden on the taxpayer, with no thought to the humanitarian impact on the Romany people and Travellers themselves. Making a nomadic, cultural way of life a criminal activity was and is appalling and is out of all proportion, and it is in breach of Section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
In Somerset there was previously adequate provision of both temporary and permanent sites for the Traveller community. I am pleased to say that I worked very hard to get those sites up and running, against huge opposition. Some of those sites have since been closed. I now live in Hampshire, where I am to all intents and purposes surrounded by Traveller sites. They live round the corner; they live at the bottom of the road I live in; their children go to the local schools, both primary and secondary; their babies are baptised in the church. One baby girl was baptised yesterday, surrounded by over 100 well-wishers from her extended family. We bought our logs from the man who lived down the road. Sadly, he died earlier this year, and we now buy from his grandson, who has taken over his grandfather’s business. There is nothing but good will and respect between the Travellers and the rest of the community.
There will, of course, be those who live close to very large, unmanaged, sprawling Traveller sites. I have some sympathy with those people. However, if their local authority had made adequate provision in the first place, with sites having adequate toilet and water facilities, maybe they would not be in the current unfortunate circumstances we hear about.
I thank the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester for reminding us how Gypsies and Travellers are still treated. It is a disgrace. It really is time that proper provision be made for those who have a culture different from those of us living in bricks and mortar. Now is definitely the time to ditch the legislation of 2022. It was not needed then, and it is not needed now. I fully support this amendment and look forward to the Minister’s response.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
My Lords, I rise with pleasure to join the three other proposers of Amendment 49. I apologise for not taking part at Second Reading. As my noble friend Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb said then, there are two specific issues that we will be dealing with, and this is one of them. The case for the amendment has already been overwhelmingly made, so I will not repeat what has already been said. However, I will take your Lordships back to December 2021, when I called for a vote in the House on whether Part 4 should be part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act, as it became in 2022. I said then that this was a moral issue: to have legislation explicitly targeting Gypsy, Roma and Traveller people, given what it was doing to them, was such a moral issue that it could not be allowed to drift by. I note that first on the list of the people supporting me in that vote was the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester. There were four Cross-Bench Members who supported me, including the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Grey-Thompson and Lady O’Loan. There were nine Labour Members who supported me in that vote, and 54 Liberal Democrats. I thank all of them for supporting me then and for hearing the strong words from the noble Lady, Baroness Bakewell, now.
It is worth looking back to that debate. At Second Reading, the then Conservative Minister said, in effect, “We have to have this; we are delivering on a manifesto commitment.” I believe and hope that maintaining Part 4 of the Bill was not a Labour manifesto commitment. This is an opportunity for Labour to undo something the previous Tory Government did, and which absolutely should be undone. That could be achieved very simply, as shown by the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, who is such a champion of Gypsy, Roma and Traveller issues in your Lordships’ House over such a long period, and who leads all of us who follow that path so well. This is a chance simply and clearly to do something that needs to be done.
I will also go back to the discussion around that time. The noble Lord, Lord Dubs—who is not in his place, unfortunately—wrote a very powerful piece for the Independent opposing Part 4, which is what we are essentially undoing here. Like the right reverend Prelate, the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, who, of course, is a Kindertransport survivor, was thinking of the situation of Gypsy, Roma and Traveller children, who
“could see their worldly possessions wheeled away, their warmth and shelter seized, their parents potentially imprisoned”.
That is what this part of the Bill, which we seek to remove, actually does.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate and to the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, for her amendment. Contributions have been thoughtful, and they have certainly highlighted some of the issues that certain communities face. There is no doubt at all that we are united in the belief that all communities should be treated with dignity and fairness, and that these considerations should guide interactions between them and local authorities.
However, I respectfully state that we on these Benches cannot support Amendment 49. The effect of this amendment would be to repeal the provisions introduced by the previous Government in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. That Act created the offence relating to unauthorised encampments and the accompanying enforcement powers. Those powers were introduced by a Conservative Government, after much consultation and representations from local authorities and members of the public, who repeatedly expressed concern about the impact of unauthorised encampments on local communities.
The provisions that this amendment seeks to remove were designed to address situations where unauthorised encampments caused significant harm, such as damaging land, obstructing highways and shops or creating fear and distress in local neighbourhoods. We are not talking about minor inconveniences; we are talking about serious damage and disruption. In many cases, these provisions have provided clarity and reassurance, enabling the police to respond more proportionately and local authorities to act more swiftly while still supporting negotiated stopping and offering lawful sites wherever possible.
The noble Baroness deployed the argument that these provisions have been declared incompatible with the Human Rights Act, but I do not think that is an overwhelming argument for repealing legislation passed by this Parliament.
Baroness Whitaker (Lab)
I apologise for interrupting the noble Lord, but does he accept that there is no definition of “alarm and distress”, and that it is in fact a subjective view on the part of the landowner? Does he also accept that majority of the police did not want this provision when consulted?
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
I think the point is that the lack of a definition gives the police the ability to act within their discretion.
As for the issue of incompatibility, it is worth noting that, when a declaration of incompatibility is made by the courts, such a declaration is not a strike-down power; it is not a mandate for immediate legislative repeal. It will come as no surprise that we on these Benches believe that there have been too many instances of judicial overreach, as to justify a repeal of the Human Rights Act and withdrawal from the ECHR. If we cannot prevent unlawful encampments by people with no right to reside on the land, which is, in our view, an absolutely legitimate aim, that is an indication that the Human Rights Act and the ECHR are not fit for purpose.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
I thank the noble Lord for giving way. He speaks about so-called judicial overreach, but building on what the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, said, in a consultation in 2018, 75% of police said they did not want these extra powers and 85% said that they did not support the criminalisation of unauthorised encampments. This is across the justice system; it is not just what the judges are doing.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
That may be the case in the year the noble Baroness cited, but the fact remains that these provisions have been brought into force, have been effective and have responded to representations from local authorities and members of the public, who have repeatedly expressed concern about the impact of unauthorised encampments on their community. I earnestly believe that repealing these measures entirely would remove essential tools for managing the real and sometimes serious harms experienced by communities across the country. For those reasons, these Benches cannot support the amendment.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Whitaker for tabling the amendment. She has obviously secured widespread support—from the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle.
As my noble friend explained, the High Court ruling in May 2024 found that the specific changes made by the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 relating to Traveller sites were incompatible with convention rights. This is where I am going to depart from the view of the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, because the Government respect the decision of the court. The Government—I hope that this is helpful to my noble friend—are working now on a response to that court judgment. I want to make it absolutely clear that I recognise the High Court ruling, and the response is needed. I hope I can help my noble friend by saying that I can undertake to update the House ahead of Report on this matter. We are not able to finalise the exact response as yet, but I hope that is helpful to my noble friend.
I cannot support my noble friend’s amendment today, but it is important that we signal to her that this matter is one we have to resolve speedily. In considering the court’s judgment, the Government will carefully balance the rights of individuals to live their private lives without discrimination, while recognising the importance of protecting public spaces and communities affected by unauthorised encampments. That balance will be made, and I hope to be able to resolve that issue by Report, as I have said.
A number of noble Lords and Baronesses have mentioned the question of the shortage of unauthorised sites available to Gypsies and Travellers, and that is an important point. Local authorities, as Members will know, are required to assess the need for Traveller pitches in their area and must plan to meet that need. These decisions are made locally; they reflect specific circumstances in each area and operate within the national planning policy for Traveller sites, which is set by the Government. We aim to ensure fair and equal treatment for Travellers in a way that facilitates the traditional and nomadic way of life of Travellers, while respecting the interests of the settled community.
The Lord Bishop of Manchester
Does the Minister accept that, aggregated across the country, the effect of lots of local decisions by local authorities is that there is a calamitous shortage of legitimate sites for Gypsy, Roma and Traveller people? If so, what do the Government plan to do about that, rather than simply saying that it is up to each local authority?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The position of the Government is that it is up to each local authority. I understand the right reverend Prelate’s point, but there is overarching guidance in England, provided by the National Planning Policy Framework, which basically indicates that local authorities are required to assess the need for Traveller pitches in their area. That is a conflict; there is a shortage, there is always a debate on these matters, there is always opposition, there is always discussion, but, ultimately, local councils have to settle on sites in their areas and I cannot really help the right reverend Prelate more than that. There is guidance and a process to be followed.
Issues around the proportionality of enforcement action were also mentioned in passing today. Again, our laws are designed to address unlawful behaviour such as criminal damage or actions that cause harassment, alarm or distress, rather than to criminalise a way of life. This distinction is central to ensuring fair and proportionate policing. Harassment, alarm and distress are well established within our legal framework, so there is a careful balance to be achieved. The response to unauthorised encampments, locally led, involves multi-agency collaboration between local councils, police and relevant services. This approach supports community engagement and ensures that responses are tailored to local needs.
My noble friend’s amendment goes slightly further than the court’s judgment: she seeks to repeal the offence of residing on land without the consent of the occupier of the land, as well as the power for police to direct trespassers away from land where they are there for the purpose of residing there. I just say to my noble friend that those are matters the court did not rule on, and the Government still consider these to be necessary and proportionate police powers, but I give her the undertaking today that I did in my earlier comments, that we hope to be able to bring forward solutions by Report. In the light of that undertaking, I hope my noble friend will withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Whitaker (Lab)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken, in particular my cosignatories, the noble Baronesses, Lady Bakewell and Lady Bennett, but also the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, who spoke tellingly about recent experience. I thank warmly my noble friend the Minister for being the first Minister to offer a way through. The sites issue will, all the same, be pursued, but then there are other routes to pursue that with areas that are not within Home Office responsibility.
I simply make one point: the 1994 Act does give the police powers to remove people when there is damage caused. It is the criminalisation element of Part 4 of the 2022 Act which is so discriminatory, but we shall discuss these aspects before Report, I hope, including the way through that my noble friend the Minister outlined. I hope we shall have the opportunity to talk about that. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel
“Removal of power of entry under Part 8 of the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003In the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003, omit section 74 (power of entry in relation to complaints about high hedges).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would repeal provisions of the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 that permit the local authority to enter a person’s property without their consent to investigate complaints about high hedges.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, this amendment seeks to repeal provisions of the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003 that permit the local authority to enter a person’s property without their consent to investigate complaints about high hedges. I entirely accept that this is a somewhat niche and technical amendment, but it is nevertheless an important one. The 2003 Act established a regime whereby individuals can make a complaint about their neighbour’s high hedge. This provision made its way into the Act after amendments to the Bill in your Lordships’ House during its passage in 2003.
The intention was understandable, but it is one thing to give people the ability to complain about their neighbour’s high hedge and another matter entirely to grant the state the right to enter a person’s private property without their consent simply to measure that hedge. Such a power is and must always be exceptional. It should be tightly drawn and robustly justified. We submit that the matter of high hedges, however irritating or capable of provoking neighbourhood disputes, simply does not meet that threshold. Section 74 was conceived at a time when the framework for powers of entry was far less coherent than it is today, and since then, Parliament has rightly legislated to reduce, rationalise and strengthen oversight of such powers. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 in particular represents a significant step towards rebalancing the relationship between citizens and the state. Yet the power preserved in Section 74 stands out as an anomaly, disproportionate in nature and insufficiently justified in practice.
Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville (LD)
My Lords, I listened attentively to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and I am inclined to agree with him—in part. I start by declaring my interest as the part owner of a property that has high hedges on both sides of our home. One side is higher than the other: approximately four to five metres high. It may well keep the sun out of our neighbour’s front garden in winter when the sun is low in the sky, but since it is where they park their cars and it is their hedge, they are not that worried. We cut our side of the hedge and bought a special three-legged ladder to ensure that this was conducted safely and my husband did not break his neck. I stress that neither hedge is Leylandii.
The right to light is something that many of us take for granted. However, travelling to Waterloo on the train every day, I can see that many of those who live towards the bottom of high-rise flats have little or no right to light. I understand and sympathise with those who live close to a property which has a high hedge obscuring the sun from their house and garden.
While good hedges and fences make for good neighbours, excessively tall and untidy hedges may not. It is always better if neighbouring properties can come to some accommodation about what is acceptable as the height of a hedge. Where this is not possible and communication has broken down, there must be some recourse for those suffering from being on the wrong side of a very high hedge. In the first instance, this will be the local authority.
Currently, local authorities have the right to enter a property without the owner’s consent to investigate a high hedge complaint. Given the current budget restrictions on local authorities, I cannot imagine that many officers will pitch up unannounced at a property to investigate. They would much rather not have a wasted journey, and hope to solve the problem easily—that is, unless they have previously been threatened when visiting the hedge.
The problem with the hedge will depend on what is growing in it. Leylandii causes a significant problem, being dense and fast-growing, enabling a hedge to reach unsatisfactory heights in a relatively short time. If there is a considerable problem with such a hedge, then just how is it to be resolved if local authorities are not involved in finding a solution? Will one party continue to have the disadvantages of living with the high hedge and all that involves while the owner of the hedge remains intransigent and deaf to their protests?
This is unacceptable. I have sympathy with those who suffer from high hedges and am keen to find a solution. The legislation in the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003 was introduced not on a whim but in a serious attempt to tackle unpleasant situations arising between neighbours. While the best solution is for difficulties to be sorted out between the interested parties, that is not always possible. In those cases, the local authority should have the power to intervene. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, for tabling what he termed a niche amendment today—there is nothing wrong with a niche amendment; it has generated discussion. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, has just said, this puts the focus back not on the legislation or even on the enforcement but on whether, when discussions between parties break down, the local authority should be and is the arbiter of the dispute and, in order to be the arbiter of the dispute, whether the local authority can have access to the property.
It is important to say that, when assessing a complaint or appeal, issuing a remedial notice to an individual or assessing whether an individual has taken the necessary action, entering a property to assess the hedge in question surely is not a niche issue; it is part of the role of the local authority to be able to assess that issue. The Government believe that local authorities are best placed to consider unresolved disputes on high hedges; the procedures are set out in national guidance.
On the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, has mentioned, I note that the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003 enables local authorities to intervene, as a last resort. It should be for neighbours to try to sort these matters out, but there are opportunities for people who are unhappy with the council’s decision to have a right of appeal to the Secretary of State in cases in England. The power of local authority officers to enter someone’s property is an important part of ensuring such disputes are resolved and any remedial action is taken.
I assure the noble Lord that the power of entry is a power to enter a “neighbouring land” to carry out functions under Part 8 of the Act. The term “the neighbouring land” means the land on which the high hedge is situated—effectively someone’s garden. A local authority must give 24 hours’ notice of its intended entry and, if the land is unoccupied, leave it as effectively secured as it was found. I stress to the noble Lord that there is clear guidance on GOV.UK for local authorities in exercising their powers. The Government will keep this guidance under review.
In the absence of disputes being resolved by neighbours themselves—as the noble Baroness has said—amicably between the parties, it is possible that there are remedial powers to step in and require the offending property owner to take action. Where they fail to do so, it is also right that the local authority should be able to undertake the remedial work itself and charge the householder concerned. To do this, it is necessary to undertake the niche point of entering someone’s garden to examine the fence or hedge or to erect a platform on the highway to do the same.
If we accepted the proposal from the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, today, I do not know how local authorities would be able to assess in terms of the legislation under the Act. If he says he does not believe the legislation under the Act is appropriate, and we should not have high hedges legislation, that is a different point. If we do have that legislation, then we need a mechanism whereby the local council can enter a premises. There might well be occasions where the local council must do that because relations have broken down to such an extent that only the local council can resolve it, and therefore it must undertake entry into a person’s garden or erect a platform to assess the issue in the first place. That is not a gross invasion of a householder’s property; it is a sensible resolution by a third party—given the powers to do so under the 2003 Act—to resolve an issue that neighbours have not been able to resolve.
The local council may resolve the complaint in favour of the complainant or in favour of the person with the high hedge; that is a matter for them. But if the council does not have access to the property to do that, then the niche discussion will be about not being able to resolve the problem, so I hope the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank those in your Lordships’ House who have spoken in this debate. I am delighted to have a degree of support from the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, who, as she recounted, has had some personal experience of this issue. I reiterate to the Minister that it seems entirely disproportionate for local authorities to be able to enter a person’s private property without their consent to investigate this issue—that is what underpins this amendment. I do not want to beat around the bush any more, and, for now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel
“Gang-related graffiti(1) A person commits an offence if—(a) the person defaces a relevant surface with graffiti, and(b) the graffiti is gang-related.(2) Graffiti is gang-related if—(a) the graffiti contains any symbol, sign, mark or slogan that is associated with, or is an identifiable marker of, a gang or gang activity,(b) the graffiti contains any symbol, sign, mark or slogan that a reasonable person would associate with a gang or gang activity, or(c) the person who defaced the relevant surface with the graffiti is part of a gang.(3) In this section a “relevant surface” is any of the following surfaces, whether internal or external or open to the air or not—(a) the surface of any street or of any building, structure, apparatus, plant or other object in or on any street;(b) the surface of any land owned, occupied or controlled by a statutory undertaker or of any building, structure, apparatus, plant or other object in or on any such land;(c) the surface of any land owned, occupied or controlled by an educational institution (including its governing body) or of any building, structure, apparatus, plant or other object in or on any such land.(4) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—(a) on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.(5) In this section –(a) “gang” means the activities of a group that—(i) consists of at least three people, and(ii) has one or more characteristics that enable its members to be identified by others as a group;(b) “graffiti” includes painting, writing, soiling, marking or other defacing by whatever means.”
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, this group speaks to the two amendments in my name and in the names of my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower and my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie. They seek to address the long-standing problems of gang involvement in our cities and to probe the Government’s approach to this. I am grateful to the Minister for approaching me recently to discuss the issue, and I hope that we can continue that conversation.
Gangs are groups of people whose entire identities are founded on the control of a territory through the means of violence. They are established to exert power, maintained through the coercion and grooming of the youth, and exist to establish themselves over their counterparts by any means. They are exploitative organisations. The very idea that groups of young men should be able to gain de facto control of large parts of our cities through intimidation and aggression is one that should have been stamped out long ago. Unfortunately, we have let them fester. The result is that the Metropolitan Police believes there are 102 active gangs in London, each vying for their own share of the territory that is not, and cannot become, theirs. They commit a litany of crimes, with the most horrific reports suggesting that they keep scoreboards of the number of rival gang members they either stab or kill. This is not unique to the capital; it is the norm across many of our major cities.
Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to legislate against gang involvement before a crime has taken place. They are uncodified organisations, and attempting to break them up would require a large infringement on every citizen’s right to associate freely. But that does not lessen the need for legislative steps to be taken. Amendment 52 would implement, in our view, the next best thing by creating the aggravating factor of committing an offence in connection to the activities of a gang. This would disincentivise group-based crime and would mean that criminals identified as gang members would be able to be imprisoned for longer.
Similarly, it is well known that gangs often leave tags to mark their territories. This graffiti comes at enormous cost to either the taxpayer or private businesses. Small local businesses can see the fronts of their stores defaced, leaving them to choose between forking out repair costs or seeing customers potentially put off by the vandalism. Councils are faced with even more bills as they are forced to pay for the upkeep of their local areas. It is entirely unfair on the law-abiding communities that are burdened with this.
Gang-related violence does not end at the physical crime committed; it extends to the psychological. There is also the problem of the tone that gang-related graffiti sets. It is bad enough seeing your neighbourhood vandalised by gangs, but it is far worse when it is vandalised by a violent group marking their territory. It sends a signal to locals that their community is not, in fact, their shared property but that it belongs to a small group of individuals with scant regard for the law. It alarms them that these people live among them; it causes fear, distress and alarm. It is an act of intimidation which makes society feel less safe.
On the subject of graffiti, I do not know whether noble Lords on the Liberal Democrat Benches are aware, but my right honourable friend the shadow Lord Chancellor has received a letter from one of their colleagues, the honourable Member for Cheltenham, Max Wilkinson. In his letter, he said that our amendments would see anyone who paints a St George’s cross on a public surface jailed for up to two years. I was rather baffled when I saw that; the subject matter of Amendment 51 is, in explicit terms, gang-related graffiti. The amendment would criminalise graffiti that uses gang signs, symbols or slogans that is committed in the course of gang activity. It uses the same definition of “gang” as Section 51 of the Serious Crime Act 2015. In our view, a person who simply paints a cross on a public building is very clearly not in scope of this new offence.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I support my noble friend’s amendments. Every week, coming from the north of England to this House, I see literally miles and miles of repulsive gang graffiti. On the outskirts of every station, walls and buildings are plastered with it. At Crewe and near Euston, hundreds and hundreds of goods wagons are covered in it, and even the walls of residential buildings. We see it everywhere, so why worry about it? It is unsightly and destroys any beauty that may be left on the approaches to cities by rail, but it is much more insidious than that, as my noble friend on the Front Bench has pointed out.
Gang-related graffiti, which we see in all urban areas, is often seen as both a symptom and a catalyst of criminal activity. I suggest that there is sufficient evidence available to conclude that gang graffiti leads to increased crime in affected neighbourhoods and that it instils fear among local residents. Gang graffiti typically consists of symbols, tags or messages used by criminal gangs to mark their territory, send warnings or communicate with other gangs. It differs from other forms of graffiti, such as street art, due to its association with organised crime and territorial disputes.
Several studies and reports indicate a correlation between the presence of gang graffiti and higher rates of crime, particularly violent offences. Gang graffiti is often used to demarcate territory, which can lead to turf wars and retaliatory violence. Areas marked by gang symbols may experience an increase in robberies, assaults and drug-related crimes as gangs seek to assert dominance. A study published by the Journal of Criminal Justice found that neighbourhoods with visible gang graffiti reported higher levels of gang-related crime and violence, suggesting that graffiti serves as both a warning and an invitation for conflict. Police departments in cities such as London and Manchester have noted that the appearance of new gang graffiti often coincides with spikes in criminal activity, particularly when rival gangs respond by marking over existing tags.
Crime prevention experts argue that gang graffiti is not merely a symptom but a tool used to intimidate, recruit and claim control, thereby fostering an environment conducive to criminal behaviour. Although correlation does not necessarily imply causation, the consistent association between gang graffiti and increased crime rates supports the argument that graffiti can contribute to localised crime.
The visual presence of gang graffiti can have a significant psychological impact on residents and visitors, as my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel said. Research conducted by community safety organisations has shown that people perceive areas with gang graffiti as less safe, which can lead to heightened anxiety, avoidance behaviours and reduced community cohesion. Surveys by our local councils in the UK reveal that residents often cite gang graffiti as a major contributor to their fear of crime, even if they have not personally experienced gang violence.
Our own British Crime Survey found that the visibility of gang markers and threatening messages increases the perceived risk of victimisation, causing some individuals to alter their daily routines or to avoid certain neighbourhoods or streets altogether. Community leaders report that gang graffiti can erode trust in public institutions as residents feel that the authorities are unable to maintain law and order and prevent criminal groups operating openly. In summary, gang graffiti acts as a visual clue that can frighten people, negatively impact mental well-being and discourage positive social interaction within affected communities.
Last year, the Metropolitan Police estimated that there were 102 active gangs in London engaged in violence and robbery, and they were responsible for a significant amount of serious violence, including half of all knife crimes with injury, 60% of shootings and 29% of reported child sexual exploitation. I think those 102 gangs equate to about 4,500 individuals. It is not just London; the same is happening in all our major cities. Let us be clear: gang-related graffiti is not some kids with aerosol cans spray-painting walls for a bit of fun. Gangs are making powerful statements to their allies and enemies that this is their criminal territory. Therefore, the solution has to be the prompt removal of graffiti, expensive though it is, and that has to be part of gang prevention strategies. However, we also need increased penalties, as suggested by my noble friend in his Amendment 51.
I do not need to speak in support of Amendment 52; I think I have just made the point that gangs are highly dangerous organisations and there should be tougher sentences for any crimes that have gang connections.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, everyone is concerned about gang activity. The dark web means it has never been easier for people to source and buy drugs independently, contributing to the emergence of more loosely organised micro-gangs, as once an individual has a large supply of illicit drugs, they need to recruit others to help distribute them. I am sympathetic to the intentions behind the tabled amendments.
On Amendment 51 on graffiti, I entirely agree with some of the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, that this usually relates to gangs marking territory or expressing group affiliation. It can result in public spaces feeling unsafe, and the fear is that it could fuel turf wars between rival gangs. To many it is also an unsightly nuisance, with the clean-up cost high for home owners, businesses and local authorities. However, we remain unconvinced that this amendment is the way forward.
Graffiti without the property owner’s permission is already a criminal offence, classified as vandalism or criminal damage, with penalties ranging from fines to imprisonment. I am also concerned that measures such as this risk embedding racial bias in law enforcement and disproportionately affecting minority and marginalised communities. The courts have already found that using graffiti as a marker of gang identity can result in the unjust targeting of marginalised groups, especially people of colour.
In 2022 a legal ruling forced the Metropolitan Police to admit that the operation of its gangs matrix was unlawful, breached human rights and had a disproportionate impact on black people. The matrix used factors, including graffiti, to label people as gang members, leading to life-changing consequences for those who had been wrongly included. Over 1,000 individuals assessed as low risk subsequently had to be removed from the database. This demonstrates the danger of conflating graffiti, gangs and criminality. While I understand the intention behind this amendment, the risk of unintended consequences is clear.
The definition of a gang in Amendment 52 feels worryingly broad, so we cannot support it. As drafted, it raises significant concerns that outweigh its intended benefits. Prosecutors are already cautioned not to use the term “gang” without clear evidence because, used inappropriately, it can unfairly broaden liability for an individual’s offending while disproportionately affecting ethnic minorities.
This proposal also feels overly prescriptive. It is important that the courts retain discretion and the law allows for nuanced sentencing; for example, when someone was plainly being coerced, groomed or manipulated into gang activity.
On these Benches, we believe that sentencing must account for individual circumstances and be based on specific individual criminal behaviour. Simply being in with the wrong people is not the same thing.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
I thank the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, for tabling Amendments 51 and 52. These amendments are proposed and supported by three Members of your Lordships’ House who, between them, have considerable experience in what might loosely be called the law and order space. They are, in rugby terms, a formidable front row and, as such, I have considered what they proposed with care.
I reassure the noble Lords, Lord Cameron and Lord Blencathra, and indeed your Lordships’ House, that this Government are definitely against gangs and absolutely against graffiti. That said, we do not believe that these proposals are needed, primarily because the activities criminalised in these measures are already covered by existing legislation.
The intended effect of Amendment 51 is to criminalise the kind of graffiti which gangs use to mark what they feel is their territory and/or to threaten rival groups with violence. As the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, said, this criminal behaviour is already covered by the existing offence contained within Section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. Section 1 is broad enough to cover graffiti because case law establishes that the damage does not have to be permanent, and it catches behaviour such as using water-soluble paint on a pavement or smearing mud on the walls of a police cell. In addition, Section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act has a higher maximum penalty than the proposed new offence, being punishable in the Crown Court by a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment.
Not only is the proposed offence not needed, there are very real problems with the structure of what is proposed; I will mention three, but there are others. First, this amendment creates an offence of strict liability. That means that the prosecution is not required to prove intention, recklessness or even knowledge. The result is a criminal offence which could be committed by accident. The criminal law does not like strict liability offences, and they are very rare in our jurisprudence. The reason is simple: we do not usually criminalise people who are not even aware that they were doing anything wrong.
Secondly, whatever the intention behind the drafting of this proposed criminal offence, in the way it is drafted, the definition of “gang” is so broad that it would capture both the Brownies and the Church of England, as well as football teams, drama societies and many other groups not normally regarded as criminal. I do not think that the noble Lords intend that a Christian cross chalked on a fence could potentially be prosecuted as a criminal offence.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I apologise for standing up a bit late but I want to go back to an earlier comment that graffiti could happen by accident. How on earth can graffiti artists spray a wall with gang tags by accident?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
The difficulty is that if somebody were to put something on a fence, for example, and they were not aware that this was associated with a gang, they would potentially be criminalised by it.
Thirdly, the requirements of the proposed new offence mean that expert evidence would need to be adduced in order that the jury or magistrates could decide whether the prosecution had proved to the criminal standard—that is, beyond reasonable doubt—whether the graffiti is gang-related within the meaning of the section. Most judges, magistrates and juries are unlikely to understand the significance of particular names, symbols or tags—this is not just the Sharks and the Jets that we are talking about, but rather most abstruse versions. Then the requirement that a trial be fair would require that the defence would also have to be able to instruct an expert, usually at public expense. Your Lordships’ House is well aware of the difficulties the criminal courts already have with delay. The idea that these existing challenges should be added to by numerous “battle of the expert” trials about graffiti is as unpalatable as it is unnecessary, given that the conduct is already captured by the Criminal Damage Act.
Amendment 52 seeks to make gang involvement a statutory aggravating factor in the sentencing for any criminal offence; thus, it is very wide indeed. The definition of “gang” is once again so broad that it would capture a number of wholly innocuous groups, and this is not a mere drafting issue. It encapsulates the fundamental problem with this provision, which is the difficulty of defining the conduct which it seeks to condemn with sufficient precision to make it workable. Again, evidence might be needed at the sentencing stage.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate, and I thank the Minister for her kind comments at the start—they were slightly undeserving in my case, given her own experience. I listened carefully to what she said.
There were a couple of points I would like to come back on. Painting a St George’s cross, a saltire or whatever symbol might be chosen, would not and would never be caught by this, because it is not “gang related”. In addition, it is not too difficult for juries to understand the concept of something that is gang related.
On the issue of defining a gang, a point made both by the Minister and by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, the definition of a gang is the same as the one used in Section 51 of the Serious Crime Act 2015. It is the accepted definition. In that respect, I would not accept that it is too broad.
Underpinning these amendments is something that we all want to see: clean, happy cities that do not face the persistent threat of crime of any form. Unfortunately, a large part of the urban crime we currently face is the product of gang-related feuds and violence. The Centre for Social Justice has estimated that 60% of all shootings are gang related. Other reports suggest that they are responsible for as much as half of all knife crime. If we are serious about tackling crime, especially knife crime, we must do all we can to punish criminal gang members and disincentivise those who have not yet joined a gang. It is for that reason that we have put forward these amendments: to make gang-related offences specific and for them to require specific treatment in our law.
I could say much more about the amendments—and I am very grateful for the comments from all noble Lords, particularly for the support from my noble friend Lord Blencathra—but for the time being, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 51.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel
“Offence of engaging in nuisance begging(1) A person aged 18 or over who engages in nuisance begging commits an offence.(2) Where a constable has reasonable cause to believe that a person is engaging or has engaged in nuisance begging, the constable may require the person to leave a relevant location as soon as reasonably practicable.(3) Where a person has been required to leave a relevant location by a constable, the person commits an offence if the person does not comply with the requirement.(4) A person who commits an offence under subsections (1) or (3) is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month or a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale.(5) For the purposes of this section, a person engages in “nuisance begging” if subsections (6) or (7) applies.(6) This subsection applies if the person begs—(a) on public transport,(b) in a station or any form of public transport, or at an entrance to or an exit from any such station,(c) at a bus stop, tram stop or other place where members of the public get on to, or alight from, any form of public transport,(d) at a taxi rank,(e) on a carriageway or cycle track,(f) in any area outside business premises (whether or not the area forms part of a highway) where people are consuming food or drinks supplied by the business,(g) within 10 metres of an automated teller machine or night safe, (h) within 10 metres of a ticket machine, a vending machine or any other device through which members of the public obtain goods or services by making payments,(i) in, or within five metres of, the entrance to, or exit from, retail premises, or(j) in the common parts of any building containing two or more dwellings,(7) This subsection applies if the person begs in a way that has caused, or is likely to cause—(a) harassment, alarm or distress to another person,(b) a person reasonably to believe that—(i) they, or any other person, may be harmed, or(ii) any property (except property belonging to the person begging) may be damaged,(c) disorder, or(d) a risk to the health or safety of any person except the person begging.(8) In this section—“carriageway” and “cycle track” have the meaning given by section 329(1) of the Highway Act 1980;“distress” includes distress caused by—(a) the use of threatening, intimidating or abusive words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour, or(b) the display of any writing, sign, or other visible representation that is threatening, intimidating or abusive;“relevant location” means a location where the person is engaging or has engaged in nuisance begging;“retail premises” means premises used wholly or mainly for the purposes of the sale of anything by retail.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would introduce the offence of nuisance begging and permit a constable to move on a person engaging in nuisance begging.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, these amendments require a little bit of legislative background to be given. In 2022, the Government accepted an amendment to the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act to repeal the Vagrancy Act 1824. Section 81 of the 2022 Act containing the repeal has not yet been commenced.
The previous Government stated their intention to commence the repeal of the Vagrancy Act only once appropriate replacement legislation was put in place. The replacement legislative framework was included in the previous Government’s Criminal Justice Bill, after which the current Bill is modelled. While almost one-third of the clauses of the Criminal Justice Bill have made their way into this Bill, the provisions to replace the Vagrancy Act have not. This amendment is intended to ascertain why.
The Criminal Justice Bill proposed to create a new framework of nuisance begging and nuisance rough sleeping, as well as creating three new related criminal offences. I entirely accept that the Government have carried forward the offence of trespassing with intent to commit a criminal offence and the offence of arranging or facilitating begging for gain, but we do not see anything relating to nuisance begging in the Bill. My question to the Minister is simply: why? Do the Government believe that the police will have sufficient powers to deal with anti-social begging once the Vagrancy Act is repealed? It appears somewhat counterintuitive for the Government to seek to criminalise the facilitation of another person’s begging but not to criminalise nuisance begging. Do the Government believe there is such a thing as nuisance or anti-social begging?
Regardless of the Government’s response to that, it appears to us that there will be a legislative gap if the Vagrancy Act is repealed and nothing is put in place to substitute it. My Amendment 53 therefore mirrors the proposals from the previous Government’s Criminal Justice Bill. It would create a very narrowly defined offence of nuisance begging and would equip the police with a proportionate and practical tool—namely, the power to require an individual to move on from a relevant location where disruptive or unsafe behaviour is occurring.
This amendment does not criminalise poverty, homelessness or the simple act of asking for help. It does not target those who are vulnerable or down on their luck, nor does it seek to sweep such people out of sight. It draws a clear distinction between legitimate, peaceful begging on the one hand, and conduct which crosses into harassment and intimidation—with danger both to the public and often to the person begging themselves—on the other.
We believe that the public have a right to move through stations, transport hubs, shopfronts and busy pavements without being impeded, threatened or placed at risk. Likewise, those who beg have a right to be treated with dignity. But it is precisely because dignity matters that we must address those situations where begging is carried out in a manner or in locations that create real harm.
The amendment identifies particular locations: public transport; station entrances; ATM machines; business forecourts; taxi ranks. These are points where there is little practical ability for a member of the public to avoid unwanted confrontation. They are places where one cannot simply walk around a challenging encounter. A narrow station staircase is not somewhere to negotiate past an insistent or aggressive request for money. These are the very locations where nuisance behaviour has taken root and where the police currently lack a clear and effective mechanism to act.
The amendment would set a threshold based not on the mere presence of a person asking for money but on conduct that has caused, or is likely to cause, harassment, alarm or distress, fear of harm, risk to health or safety, or disorder. These are long-established, widely understood standards in public order law, and they ensure that the power is used only when behaviour becomes unacceptable.
The move-on power in subsection (2) is at the heart of the proposal. It is preventative rather than punitive. It would give a constable the ability to intervene early, to de-escalate situations and to protect all involved before matters deteriorate. For the individual concerned, it would avoid immediate criminalisation; it would give them an opportunity to comply and move on without penalty. Only wilful refusal to comply would constitute an offence.
For all those reasons, and with the balance that this amendment strikes so carefully, in our view, I commend it to the Committee, and I urge noble Lords to lend it their support. I beg to move.
Amendment 53A (to Amendment 53)
Lord Blencathra
“(k) outside any residential building.”
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, as well as moving Amendment 53A, I will also speak to my Amendment 53B in this group. I completely support the comments of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel on the Front Bench, and I support his amendments.
I encounter this every day coming to this House, where beggars lie on the pavement, half blocking it. Possibly they think they are less frightening sitting down than standing up, but the nuisance is the same, as is the chant asking for money. I have not seen them for some months now, but for a couple of years we had different beggars every day; then I realised it was the same dog they had. I presume that the dog got passed around between them, since the public are possibly more sympathetic to the dog than to the beggar— a kind of Dogs R Us.
There was another one who, when I first encountered him, was really scary. He was a beggar, but he was shouting and screaming—not at the public, I realised, but more to himself or to the ether than anything else. Clearly, he had a mental health problem. After I saw him a couple of times, I had no problem; I just did not make eye contact. However, people who had never met him before, such as women coming out of the shops, were terrified of him. It was nuisance begging, but clearly there was a health problem behind it.
My Amendment 53A would merely add a little tweak to my noble friend’s new clause by adding “outside any residential building” to the list in subsection (6). In this Westminster area, I have seen them sitting not on the doorstep but right beside the entrance to a residential block of flats. Frankly, I think that is intimidating, and residents should not have to face that fear, whether misplaced or not, that they may face beggars as they come and go from their own property.
My Amendment 53B would amend my noble friend’s amendment after subsection (7), by inserting:
“The judgement that the begging satisfies the conditions in (a), (b) and (d) is one to be made by the person who is the victim of the begging”.
So what does subsection (7) say? It says:
“This subsection applies if the person begs in a way that has caused, or is likely to cause … (a) harassment, alarm or distress to another person, … (b) a person reasonably to believe that … they, or any other person, may be harmed, or … any property … may be damaged, … (c) disorder, or … (d) a risk to the health or safety of any person except the person begging”.
In other words, the purpose of my amendment is that I do not want a police officer to come along and say, “Oh no, guv, that’s not harassment or causing alarm. What are you worried about? There’s no risk to your health and safety”. I suggest that the judgment be made by the person who is the victim of the nuisance begging. Some people will not be worried or alarmed, as I was not worried after I saw that chap with the mental health problem a few times, but others may be.
I came across this in an accusation about bullying in the Civil Service. If a civil servant believes that someone is bullied, that is taken for granted because one person felt it even though others might have felt differently. I dealt with that in my capacity of serving on an ALB.
In conclusion, I want to make it clear that, if a person feels that begging is causing him or her alarm, distress or harassment, or is a risk to health and safety, then it is the victim’s view that must be considered, not that of anyone else applying their own test for what that alarm might be.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, there is a genuine problem around aggressive begging and the involvement of organised criminal gangs. That is why we support Clause 11, which rightly focuses not on individuals who are begging but on those who are orchestrating and profiting from this practice.
Lots of things in life are a nuisance, but that does not mean we should criminalise them. Where begging is causing a genuine nuisance, police already have a range of powers to deal with it under anti-social behaviour legislation. We think this amendment is the wrong solution at a time when charities such as Crisis say that the number of vulnerable people on the streets who survive by begging, including women and first-time rough sleepers, is rising. In these circumstances, we should be looking at how we can better reach and support those in such straitened circumstances. By contrast, criminalising begging would push people away from support, and it will not solve the problems of poverty, homelessness, addiction or exploitation.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, for his Amendment 53, which, as he explained, would introduce a new offence of nuisance begging and permit a constable to move on a person engaging in this behaviour. Failure to comply with the notice would constitute a criminal offence. I note also Amendments 53A and 53B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, which seek to further extend what constitutes nuisance begging under the proposed new offence.
I start by saying to noble Lords that the Government do not wish to target or criminalise individuals who are begging to sustain themselves or rough sleeping because they have nowhere else to go. That is why we are committed, as the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, mentioned, to repealing the outdated Vagrancy Act 1824, and why we will not be introducing measures that target or recriminalise begging and rough sleeping. It is also—for the very reason the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, mentioned—why the Government have invested more than £1 billion in homelessness and rough sleeping services this year, which is up £316 million compared to last year. So there is an increase in support to tackle the very issues that the noble Baroness mentioned.
However, we are legislating in the Bill to introduce targeted replacement measures for certain elements of the 1824 Act to ensure—I hope the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, will welcome this—that police retain the powers they need to keep our communities safe. These targeted replacement measures, in Clauses 10 and 11, include a new offence of facilitating begging for gain and an offence of trespassing with the intention of committing a crime, both of which were previously provided for under the 1824 Act.
As noble Lords mentioned, begging is itself a complex issue, it can cause significant harm or distress to communities and local areas need appropriate tools to maintain community safety. But where I come back to in this debate is that there are powers in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, which many police forces use effectively to tackle anti-social behaviour in the context of begging and rough sleeping—for example, the very point the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, mentioned, where an individual may be harassing members of the public on a persistent basis, including potentially outside their own home, as in his amendment.
The Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 provides for current statutory guidance. I hope that it partly answers the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, to say that we will update that anti-social behaviour statutory guidance. This will ensure that it is clear to agencies how ASB powers can be used in the context of harassment and this type of begging, if an individual’s behaviour reaches a threshold that will be set in the ASB statutory guidance.
Existing criminal offences can also be applied where the behaviour crosses the current criminal threshold. I expect the updating of the guidance to take place very shortly after Royal Assent is given to the legislation passing through the House of Lords. In the light of the assurances that we take this issue seriously, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, will not press his amendment and that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, is somewhat mollified that there are powers in place to deal with the issues that he has raised.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I am grateful for what the Minister said. I admire his style at the Dispatch Box; he is courteous and thorough in giving his answers. In view of his assurances that this is really covered by the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, this has been a most interesting debate, and I thank all those who contributed. I listened very carefully to the Minister and his indication that the Government believe that they have all the necessary tools to prevent anti-social begging.
Underpinning these amendments is that those who work daily in town centres, transport networks and retail spaces consistently report situations where members of the public feel frightened or cornered. The law does not provide a consistent, targeted response to those problems. That is the basis of this amendment, which seeks to ensure clarity for the public and the police. The amendment is carefully drawn, limited, balanced and rooted in the principle that no one should be made to feel unsafe when going about their daily business.
We cannot ignore the reality that some forms of begging today bear little resemblance to what many of us have known in the past. We now see behaviour that is aggressive, persistent and sometimes strategically targeted at locations where people feel trapped. However, having listened very carefully, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Blencathra
“Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014: amendment(1) Schedule 2 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 is amended as follows.(2) After paragraph 1(3) insert—“(3A) A detention order must be made in relation to a person between the ages of 14 and 18 who has been in breach of three injunctions.(3B) A person subject to a detention order under sub-paragraph (3A) must be detained in youth detention accommodation as defined by paragraph 14(3).”.(3) After paragraph 2(7) insert—“(8) Any person subject to a supervision order under this paragraph is eligible for an electronic tag.”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment and another in the name of Lord Blencathra add a power of detention for 14 -18 year olds who have a record of breaching inunctions.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, in moving my Amendment 54, I will also speak to my Amendment 55. Amendment 54 seeks to amend Schedule 2 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. The relevant section says that:
“A youth court, if satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a person aged under 18 is in breach of a provision of an injunction under section 1 to which he or she is subject, may make in respect of the person—(a) a supervision order or (b) a detention order”.
Dealing with the detention provisions first, the court “may” make a detention order. My amendment seeks that it “must” make such an order, tying the court’s discretion, if a person between the ages of 14 and 18 breaches three or more injunctions.
As the Minister knows—indeed, as we all know—the problem with juvenile crime is habitual offenders. None of us want to lock up little kiddies who make a couple of mistakes or commit minor crime—of course not. However, before any juvenile gets an injunction, the anti-social behaviour has to be reasonably serious. This is what the College of Policing says on the grounds for an injunction:
“A civil injunction is issued on the balance of probabilities. It must be just and convenient to grant the injunction to prevent anti-social behaviour, and the respondent must have engaged in or threatened to engage in either: conduct that has or is likely to cause harassment, alarm, or distress … or conduct capable of causing nuisance or annoyance”.
The College of Policing states that a civil injunction is used for
“drug/alcohol-related ASB … harassment … noise (tenure-neutral)”—
whatever that means—“vandalism” and “aggressive begging”. Therefore, I submit that if a juvenile between the ages of 14 to 18 breaches three of those, we have passed the stage where the court may—I stress “may”—make a detention order. Anyone who has breached three injunctions is rapidly heading to becoming a habitual offender. If he does not get a detention order after all that behaviour, what signal will that send to him and his mates? It will signal that you can get away with it, and nothing will happen but another appearance before the court, a rap on the knuckles and being told to be a good boy. As parliamentarians, we owe it to innocent members of the public to protect them from habitual trouble-makers, and my amendment would do just that.
The court also has a discretion on whether to make a detention order when a juvenile breaches one or two injunctions. I am happy with that. I submit that we only remove that discretion when the offender breaches three or more.
I will move on to supervision orders. The court could order a supervision order instead of detention. Such an order could impose one or more of three requirements: a supervision requirement, an activity requirement or a curfew requirement. We do not need to go into what each of those requirements can do or the obligations they might impose. My amendment simply seeks to add an additional power, so that:
“Any person subject to a supervision order … is eligible for an electronic tag”.
Note my wording: it states that they would be “eligible” for an electronic tag; I am not tying the court’s hands here to make it compulsory.
One of my reasons for attaching electronic tags to juveniles under court-imposed supervision orders is the enhancement of accountability. Electronic monitoring provides a reliable, objective mechanism for tracking the whereabouts of young offenders. This not only helps to ensure compliance with curfews and exclusion zones stipulated by the court but gives our Prison and Probation Service immediate insight into any breaches. The knowledge that their movements are being monitored can act as a significant deterrent against further anti-social or criminal behaviour.
I suggest that electronic tagging offers reassurance to communities affected by persistent anti-social behaviour. Enabling authorities to monitor offenders more closely would reduce the risk of reoffending while under supervision. This is particularly pertinent in cases where the offence involves intimidation, vandalism or harassment in a particular locality. The visible commitment to monitoring can help rebuild public confidence in the justice system’s capacity to protect communities.
I have no doubt that some will argue that tagging for a juvenile is punitive, but I suggest it can also help with rehabilitation. Electronic monitoring allows for greater flexibility compared with secure detention, enabling juveniles to remain in their communities, continue education and maintain family relationships. The structure imposed by tagging can help young people develop routines and take responsibility for their actions, while still being held accountable. For many, this balance of liberty and oversight provides a constructive framework for positive behavioural change.
As we all know—the Minister knows this, and he knew it from his last experience in the Home Office—for many young offenders, early intervention is critical to prevent escalation into more serious criminal behaviour. Electronic tagging, as a clear and immediate consequence, can serve as a wake-up call, highlighting the seriousness of continued non-compliance. This timely intervention can disrupt cycles of offending and encourage reflection, potentially diverting young people from the future of criminality.
I will not speak to my Amendment 55, since I think I have a bit of inadvertent duplication here. I was drafting an amendment to the Act and then one to Schedule 2, and my Amendment 55 is my first draft, which I should not have sent to the Public Bill Office by mistake. Therefore, I beg to move Amendment 54.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, we recognise the legitimate concerns about persistent anti-social behaviour. Repeat offenders represent a significant challenge; within many communities there is a small core of individuals creating a disproportionate amount of misery and distress to victims. However, the Liberal Democrats remain sceptical about the approach taken by Amendment 54. On these Benches, we believe that youth incarceration should be a last resort, not an automatic consequence. Mandatory detention after three breaches not only removes judicial discretion, it risks criminalising young people for behaviour which is below the criminal standard.
The evidence shows that detention is largely ineffective and often counterproductive. In reality, it increases the likelihood of future offending. Indeed, a chief constable I spoke to told me that short-term sentences simply equip people to be better at crime. The aim of these measures may be to help victims, but the risk is that they could ultimately result in the creation of more of them.
We believe that the key to tackling persistent anti-social behaviour is properly funded community policing. There are about 10,000 fewer police and PCSOs and neighbourhood teams now than in 2015. More than 4,500 PCSOs have disappeared, and their loss is continuing. Some forces simply do not have enough personnel in neighbourhood teams to actively address anti-social behaviour. In his response, will the Minister say what is being done to reverse the exodus of community officers?
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, the contributions we have heard demonstrate the seriousness of the issue and highlight why communities and victims need reassurance that persistent anti-social behaviour will be confronted robustly and effectively. I thank my noble friend Lord Blencathra for bringing forward these amendments. They provide a welcome opportunity to examine whether the current response to repeat breaches of injunctions is sufficient.
It goes without saying that ongoing and persistent anti-social behaviour has a profound impact on the lives of ordinary residents, including the feeling of individual safety and a wider sense of cohesion in our neighbourhoods. Amendment 54 seeks to provide that if someone under 18 breaches three injunctions of supervision orders, they must be given a detention order. It seems likely, to me at least, that someone who has broken three such injunctions is plainly on the path to becoming an habitual offender. Repeated breaches should not simply be met with ineffective sanctions—communities have to know that the law has teeth and that those who repeatedly defy court orders will face meaningful consequences. The amendment seeks to reinforce that principle and to signal clearly that a cycle of breach, warning and further breach is unacceptable.
I hope that the Government give the amendment the thought and time that it deserves, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for Amendment 54 and for fessing up to Amendment 55, which we will accept as an honest mistake. I welcome his honesty in raising the issue.
There is a recognition that Amendment 54 still wants to provide for minimum sentences for persistent breaches of youth injunctions. I emphasise that the Government do not want to criminalise children unnecessarily, an aspiration we share with the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. That is why the new respect order in the Bill will not apply to those under 18. However, we know that in many cases the behaviour of offenders under 18 requires a more formal deterrent and intervention. That is why we have retained the civil injunction as is for those under 18. Practitioners have told us that it is a particularly helpful and useful tool to tackle youth anti-social behaviour and to ensure that their rights and the safety of the community are upheld.
Youth injunctions are civil orders and fundamentally preventive in nature, which again goes to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. It is more important to intervene to prevent than it is to punish afterwards, particularly when young people are the individuals who are causing those challenges in the first place.
The important point about youth injunctions, which, again, goes to the heart of the noble Lord’s amendment, is that if the respondent abides by the terms of the order, they will not be liable for any penalties but, self-evidently, where a respondent does breach an order there needs to be some action. The noble Lord has suggested one course of action. I say to him that the courts already have a range of responses, including supervision orders, electronic tagging, curfews and, in the most serious cases, detention orders for up to three months for 14 to 17 year-olds.
I hope there is a common theme across the Committee that detention of children should be used only when absolutely necessary, and that courts should consider the child’s welfare and other risks before imposing such a response. This should be on a case-by-case basis, and the prescribing of a mandatory minimum sentence, even for repeat offenders, would both undermine the ability of the independent judiciary to determine the appropriate sentence and potentially be disproportionate. There is a place in our sentencing framework for mandatory minimum sentences, but I submit that this is not it.
The noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, is quite right again that one of the best preventive measures we can have is to have large numbers of boots on the ground in neighbourhood policing. She will know that the Government have a manifesto commitment to put 13,000 extra boots on the ground during this Parliament. In this first year or so, the Government have put an extra 3,000 in place. We intend, where we can, to increase the number of specials, PCSOs and warranted officers to replace those who were lost between 2010 and 2017. When I was Police Minister in 2009-10, we had 20,000 more officers than we had up to around 2017. That is because they were hollowed out and taken out by the two Governments who ran the Home Office between 2010 and 2017.
The noble Baroness is absolutely right that visible neighbourhood policing is critical to tackling anti-social behaviour, but the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, seeks to provide minimum sentences, which I do not think will achieve his objective. It does not have my support either. I hope he will withdraw the amendment, having listened to the argument.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, once again, I am grateful to the Minister for his courteous and detailed answer. I did not realise that electronic tagging was already an option and it is very important that it is applied in appropriate cases. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that I am not creating a new criminal offence here. The power of detention already exists to be used by the court when it thinks fit.
On the general principle of minimum sentences, why do we fetter a judge’s discretion by having a maximum sentence? If we want proper judicial discretion, we should say that the judge can sentence anything he likes, but we do not—and I am glad we do not. We say that Parliament cannot set a minimum. Why is it appropriate, in a democracy, for Parliament to set a maximum sentence but not a minimum? I knew that the Minister, in his courteous way, would say that we would fetter judicial discretion, but I have suggested three breaches of injunctions. When can a court say, “You’ve done six now”, or, “You’ve done 10, Johnny”, and impose a sentence of detention for continued breaches of injunctions? As a democracy, it is perfectly legitimate for us as parliamentarians—and Members in the other House, whose constituents are suffering—to say that judges will have a discretion to impose orders of detention up to a certain level, but once the breaches of injunctions go past a certain threshold, Parliament demands that they impose a level of detention, whatever that level may be.
I have made my point. The Minister will probably hear me make a similar point about minimum sentences at various other points in the Bill but, in view of his remarks, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Blencathra
“(3) The coordinating officer need not be a constable but must be someone versed in the internet and online sales and purchases.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is to ensure that the police and NCA appoint a person as the co-ordinating officer who is the most qualified about the internet and online sales and need not be a person who has qualified as a constable.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
The House will be relieved to know I will be mercifully brief on this occasion. Until 1968 the Met and other police forces used CID officers to do SOCO work—that is, collecting forensic evidence at the scenes of crimes. For many it was not their speciality and they often damaged vital evidence. Police forces realised that teams of dedicated civilians who specialise in gathering evidence at crime scenes could do a better job. Naturally, the Police Federation opposed any civilians being brought in to do it. Now, civilians do command and dispatch—which used to be done by serving officers—investigation support, and crime analysis. Over the years the police service has had to recognise, reluctantly in my opinion, that a constable of whatever rank may not be the best-qualified person to undertake increasingly complex tasks. We see credit card fraud going through the roof because there is practically no one in any police force capable of investigating it. Goodness knows who could do it —forensic accountants, perhaps.
All I am seeking here is an assurance from the Minister that this important co-ordinating role will not go to an inspector or a superintendent unless he or she is an absolute expert on the internet and online sales. This requires a switched-on internet geek, and not necessarily a uniformed bobby. Can the Minister assure me that the police will recruit for this role the best-qualified person, from wherever that person comes from, provided that he or she passes all the integrity tests, and that the guidance envisaged in the clause will say so? I beg to move.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
I must say, I admire the range of interventions made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. I do not want him to fall back on his seat, but on this occasion, we have some sympathy with the two amendments he has put forward. This group addresses the establishment of the new civil penalty regime for online advertising, a measure which we on these Benches support for its goal of strengthening accountability for online platforms. The introduction of civil penalties in this part of the Bill is intended to tackle the online grey market that facilitates the sale of illegal weapons, enabling earlier intervention and prevention of offensive weapon crimes. We must ensure that the framework we establish is not only robust legally but operationally effective in the digital age.
Amendment 55B tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, concerning Clause 13, focuses specifically on the essential role of the co-ordinating officer. Clause 13 mandates that the Secretary of State designate a member of a relevant police force or a National Crime Agency officer as the co-ordinating officer for this chapter. The amendment proposes that:
“The coordinating officer need not be a constable but must be someone versed in the internet and online sales and purchases”.
We on these Benches recognise that 21st-century crime fighting is no longer solely about boots on the ground. It relies heavily on specialised digital expertise to effectively police online marketplaces and hold search services and user-to-user services accountable. The designated officer must possess deep knowledge of digital platform sales techniques and online advertising mechanisms, as the noble Lord indicated. By explicitly allowing this officer to be a non-constable professional and expert, we would ensure that law enforcement can deploy the most qualified individuals to secure content removal notices and apply civil penalties. In our view, this pragmatic approach would ensure efficiency and maximum efficacy against technologically sophisticated platforms.
Amendment 55F in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, relates to Clause 24, which governs the guidance issued by the Secretary of State regarding the operation of this new regime. All new intrusive powers, especially those concerning online services, require clear, precise guidance to avoid unintended consequences and ensure fairness. Proper statutory guidance is the mechanism by which the principles established in the Bill should be translated into proportionate and actionable requirements for online service providers.
In short, in our view these amendments seek to guarantee that the architecture of this new regime is built on technical expertise and clarity, both those pillars being essential in ensuring that our online crime-fighting tools are fit for purpose. As such, we support them.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I hope to be as brief as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and my noble friend Lord Blencathra when introducing these amendments.
There is an urgent need to ensure that the mechanisms we put in place under the Bill are both workable and effective. My noble friend’s amendments seek to ensure that the person appointed as the co-ordinating officer is simply the most qualified regarding the internet and online sales. There seems to be broad agreement that those responsible for enforcing penalties for illegal online sales must have the right skills. Whether or not such individuals wear a uniform is less important than whether they understand the digital channels through which harmful goods are marketed and moved, and criminals should not be able to exploit technological advantage to stay one step ahead of enforcement. I therefore hope that the Government take these amendments seriously as practical suggestions to help tackle a serious problem.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for his amendments to the clauses that implement this Government’s manifesto commitment to hold senior managers of online platforms, be they social media platforms, online marketplaces or search engines, personally liable for the failure to remove illegal online content relating to knives and offensive weapons. His Amendment 55B would require the co-ordinating officer—that is, the person appointed by the Home Secretary to administer these new powers—to have the necessary internet and online sales experience and skills, stating that they need not be a warranted officer. Amendment 55F would make these criteria explicit in the statutory guidance for these measures.
I agree with the sentiment behind the amendments. It is of course important that the co-ordinating officer responsible for the administration of these powers be suitably experienced. I reassure the noble Lord that the Government are providing £1.7 million for a new national police unit to tackle the illegal online sale of knives and weapons, including the issuing of content removal notices. The unit will be dedicated to co-ordinating investigations into all aspects of online unlawful knife and offensive weapon sales, and to bringing those responsible to justice. It will also improve data collection and analysis capability in order to expand police understanding of the knife crime problem and how enforcement activities can best be targeted. The intention is that a senior member of this specialist unit will be appointed as the co-ordinating officer, and they will have the necessary skills and resources to administer the powers.
Whoever is appointed as a content manager must be experienced in both aspects of the problem we are trying to tackle. They should have experience not only of online sales but of the investigation of illegal online sales of knives and weapons—that is, they must be able to understand the investigatory and evidential process as well as having experience of the internet. This will, to paraphrase the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, not be any old bobby with a warrant card but someone highly experienced in internet sales and the investigatory and evidential role. That is why, in short, we feel that the role must be held by a warranted officer. It is a police role. They will be issuing enforcement notices and, as part of the criminal process, they need to have that experience as well as the essential online experience that all noble Lords who spoke in the debate mentioned; we agree that that is necessary.
Given the assurance that we are not neglecting the online side of things, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, will be sufficiently reassured and is content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, first let me say that I am almost overcome with deep emotion, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the Lib Dems have supported a Blencathra amendment—I wonder where I have gone wrong.
I say to the Minister that I am not totally reassured. I was not suggesting any old bobby; I was afraid that the police would automatically look for someone of senior rank: inspector, superintendent or chief superintendent. But the absolutely crucial thing is that that person must be fully qualified on internet sales and online stuff. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, set it out with rather elegant detail; I called the person a computer geek. If that superintendent is a senior investigating officer and he or she is a computer geek, then I am satisfied. I do not suggest that I will take this back on Report, but the Minister’s answer did not totally satisfy me that the best person will necessarily be recruited for the job. Yes, of course the person must have an understanding of investigation techniques, but that does not necessarily mean that it has to be a high-ranking police officer. The police already have civilians investigating things that do not require an officer.
As I say, I am slightly equivocal about the Minister’s answer. It is slightly disappointing that the Government will not countenance the possibility that this person may not be a warranted officer. It is quite simple: if you recruited the right computer geek, you make him or her warranted officer—you can do it that way. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Blencathra
Member’s explanatory statement
A fine is based on a judgement of the seriousness of the crime and is subjective. My amendment ensures that the penalty is based on the actual value of the illegal knives and the profits from their sale.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 55C, I will speak also to my Amendments 55D and 55E. My three amendments here are all similar, as I argue that a value-based penalty is more effective than a maximum fixed fine. The issue of illegal knife sales on the internet is a matter of serious public concern. It is big business with big consequences when those knives—machetes and zombie knives—are used to kill and maim, as is increasingly the case.
The proposals in the Bill to fine individuals and businesses up to £60,000 for selling illegal knives online seem hefty at first glance. However, the effectiveness and fairness of such a fixed penalty are questionable. A more effective approach would be to impose a fine equal to 500% of the total value of all the illegal goods advertised. I want to convince the Minister that a proportional penalty is, in some cases, superior to a subjective fixed maximum fine.
First, there is the subjectivity of the fixed maximum fine. Setting a maximum fine of £60,000 for selling illegal knives leaves the final penalty to the discretion of the court. This introduces subjectivity into the process, as judges must determine what amount is appropriate in each case. The outcome may vary significantly depending on the judge’s interpretation of the offence’s severity, the defendant’s circumstances and other factors. Consequently, similar offenders could face vastly different penalties, undermining the consistency and predictability of the law. Then, of course, I come back to my favourite organisation, the Sentencing Council, advising that the £60,000 fine should never be imposed—but let us leave that aside for the moment.
Moreover, a fixed cap may not reflect the true scale of the illegal activity. For example, a small-scale individual seller and a large business operation could both face the same maximum penalty, despite the latter potentially profiting far more from illegal sales. This lack of proportionality can result in fines that are either too lenient or excessively harsh, depending on the specifics of the case.
In contrast, my suggestion of a fine set at 500% of the value of all illegal knives advertised is directly linked to the scale of the offence and the profits. This proportional penalty approach ensures that the penalty increases in line with the seriousness of the crime. Large-scale operations, which are likely to profit more and cause greater harm, would face correspondingly larger fines. This not only achieves greater fairness but strengthens the deterrent effect. As we have said on many occasions, criminals are primarily motivated by profit. If the financial penalty reliably exceeds any potential gains—by a factor of five in this case—the risk heavily outweighs the reward. I suggest that that creates a strong disincentive for individuals and businesses to engage in illegal knife sales.
The proportional system also ensures that penalties remain meaningful, even as the market or profitability of legal knives fluctuates over time. The proportional penalty system is more likely to deter criminal behaviour, because it removes ambiguity and subjectivity from sentencing. Offenders know in advance that any profits from illegal activity will be entirely wiped out and replaced by a substantial loss. That clarity and certainty are crucial in discouraging would-be offenders. Furthermore, tying the fine to the value of the legal goods ensures fairness across all cases. Small-time offenders are punished proportionately for their actions, while major players face penalties commensurate with the harm they cause and the profits they make. That upholds the principle that the punishment should fit the crime.
In summary, I submit that a fixed maximum fine of £60,000 for selling illegal knives online introduces subjectivity and inconsistency—whereas a penalty of 500% of the value of all illegal goods advertised is fair, more predictable and far more likely to deter criminal activity.
I do not need to speak to my Amendment 55E; it is the same concept but suggests a mere 100% proportional penalty for a lesser offence. I urge the Minister to consider adopting a proportional penalty system to effectively combat the sale of illegal knives over the internet. I beg to move.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, has so concisely described—he gets more concise as the evening goes on—this group deals with the sanctions applied under the online weapon advertising regime.
We very much welcome the Government’s commitment to ensuring accountability for businesses and sellers who facilitate the online sale of knives. However, if the penalties imposed are too small, they merely become a tolerable cost of doing business for large, wealthy online service providers. As the noble Lord explained, the Bill proposes maximum civil penalties for service providers of up to £60,000 for failing to comply with content manager requirements or for failing to comply with a content removal notice. His Amendments 55C and 55D directly challenge that maximum limit by proposing that the penalty for a service provider’s non-compliance should instead be a minimum of 500% of the value of the illegal goods advertised.
In our view, that proposal shifts the focus decisively towards financial deterrence—although I hate to agree with the noble Lord twice in one evening. The argument embedded within these amendments is sound: fines should reflect the scale and profitability of the illegal advertising business they enable. By linking the minimum fine directly to five times the value of the illegal goods advertised, we ensure that the penalty scales proportionally with the volume of the illicit trade facilitated by the platform, making it financially unsustainable to turn a blind eye to illegal weapon content.
The noble Lord’s Amendment 55E applies this same principle to the penalties imposed on the service provider’s content manager. Clause 23 currently sets the maximum penalty for the content manager at £10,000. Amendment 55E seeks to replace that cap with a minimum penalty of 100% of the value of the illegal goods advertised. That would ensure that the individual responsible for overseeing compliance within the organisation also faces a penalty that reflects the seriousness of the content they failed to manage or remove, particularly where that content is tied directly to the advertisement of unlawful weapons.
These amendments force us to consider how we can make our laws genuinely tough on organised online crime. In our view, legislation must be proportionate; and proportionality, in the face of corporate digital crime, means that penalties should meaningfully exceed the profits derived from facilitating criminal activity. The amendments rightly push us to consider the financial consequences that would truly deter platforms from risking public safety for private gain.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Blencathra for these amendments and offer support from the Front Bench for them.
The three amendments by my noble friend all have the same aim: to tie the level of financial penalty directly to the value of the illegal knives being advertised and the profits generated from their sale. The logic behind them is obvious—and they also raise an important point. Fines that merely represent a modest operational cost to criminals will do little to deter those who deliberately trade in dangerous and illegal weapons. If the economic reward remains greater than the economic risk, the deterrent effect is minimal. Therefore, it seems prudent to put into statute appropriate provisions to ensure that that never is the case. The purpose of penalties must be both to punish wrongdoing and to disrupt the business model that makes it worth pursuing.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for his explanation of the amendments in this group. As he said, Amendment 55C would set minimum fines for companies that fail to comply with an appointment notice that requires them to designate an executive to be held liable for failing to take down illegal knife and weapons content. Amendments 55D and 55E would set minimum fines for companies and liable executives that fail to take down illegal content when requested to do so. As he explains, his proposed minimum fines are proportionate for companies; they are set at 500% of the value of the knife or the weapon for companies, and 100% of the value for individuals.
I hate to disappoint the Committee or to ruin the spirit of accord that has broken out across the Benches opposite, but while the logic of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, is good, I am afraid it does not reflect the actual behaviour and experience of the marketplace. If I can, I will try to explain why it would not be as effective or as impactful as he no doubt intends.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
I hate to interrupt the Minister—well, I do not really—but can he explain what he means by that about the market? I did not grasp what he meant by that.
Lord Katz (Lab)
Well, that is a very good segue into the words that are just following—I was about to get there.
Many knives and weapons that are sold illegally are sold relatively cheaply, in the order of tens of pounds. Some sellers who sell knives and weapons over social media tend to hold and advertise small stock numbers. Therefore, we contend that the suggested minimum penalties are simply too low to incentivise the prompt removal of illegal content. The independent review of online safety of knives shows a case study as an example where an individual bought 30 knives to sell illegally over social media for under £50 each. Should the social media company not take the illegal content down, the proposed minimum fine under these amendments would be £1,500 for the executive and £7,500 for the companies. Those penalties, as I am sure noble Lords would agree, would be too low for large tech companies and executives to be worried about at all. Not having a minimum penalty will leave full discretion to the police, who specialise in investigating illegal knife sales online. This will allow them to use their judgment to issue fines that are commensurate in each case.
The penalties for failing to comply with these are, as already noted, issued in the form of civil penalty notices by the police. They can be up to £60,000 for companies and £10,000 for individuals. I remind noble Lords that these penalties are for single violations and will add up if companies and executives repeatedly fail to comply with removal notices. The measure is intended not just to punish companies but to facilitate behaviour change. I trust that the police administering these measures will issue fines of an appropriate level to incentivise the prompt removal of illegal content.
I note the experience, which I found instructive, of the independent review of the online sale of knives, that a lot of the activity is undertaken through very small stocks that are cheaply sold. If we used the regime of a proportionate measure, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, we simply would not generate enough. Noble Lords may not think that £60,000 is worth much, but we certainly would not generate anywhere near £60,000 in those examples.
It is worth bearing in mind that a lot of the grey market sellers do so over social media websites. The recipient of the fine is the tech company that does not take down the illegal material, rather than the person selling the knives or the weapons. We understand the intended recipient of the punishment—the fines—which is why we think that having the £60,000 or £10,000 level is appropriate, because that is for single offences. Any time a company fails to remove the content for which they have received a notice, the fines will add up and accumulate, which will make an impact—and we would all agree that that needs to be done.
In response to another point made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, we feel that the Sentencing Council is unlikely to comment on the level of a civil penalty. That may be a little speculative from my perspective, but I think that it is probably what the experience bears out.
Given this explanation and the clarification of our view of how the environment—I should not have used the word “market” earlier—in which these sales take place, I hope that the noble Lord is sufficiently assured that these penalties will have an impact in the way they are set out in the Bill and that he will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I almost had palpitations for the second time tonight when the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, supported my amendment.
I hear what the Minister has to say. I had not intended for the 500% penalty to apply to just two or three individuals selling a few knives; I intended that it would apply to the supply of the whole shooting match. The individuals who are selling a few knives have got them from somewhere: there is a supplier or a big source making these by the thousand. For someone at the centre who has a warehouse with £100,000 worth of knives, a penalty of £500,000 would clean them out completely, whereas a penalty of £60,000 would still leave them with £40,000 profit. However, I accept the point that, if the case involves small-scale individuals, the 500% penalty might not be as great as the penalty in the Act. I wonder whether it is worth looking at the possibility of offering “either/or” as an option—I think that is a possibility for the future.
I will make another general point. I woke up about a week ago at 2 am and thought of this proportional system. It may not be perfect for knives, but I think there is some merit in this concept of proportionate fines for certain offences, whereby rather than having a maximum penalty imposed by law, the penalty is a percentage—100%, 200%, 300% or 1,000%—of the value of the goods being advertised or sold.
Bearing in mind what the Minister said, we would like to look again at the possibility of offering a fine and some proportional penalty. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would increase the maximum sentence for the new offence of possessing a weapon with intent.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 56 in my name seeks to increase the maximum sentence for the new offence of possessing a weapon with intent, where conviction is conviction on indictment, from four to 14 years. The principle behind a new offence of possessing a weapon with intent to use violence is well intentioned. It is one that we support. We are living through an epidemic of knife crime, and the level of general offensive weapon offences has shown no signs of declining over the past decade.
I appreciate that the Government are taking some of the necessary steps to attempt to curb this situation and this new offence is one of them. Creating more offences to eliminate the problem at source is the right approach, in our view, while introducing additional measures that target the most dangerous in our society is also necessary. This Bill creates a separate category for those who have violent intent, which, in principle, should achieve the latter. But it is worth implementing this offence only if it is accompanied by sufficient corresponding punishment. The Bill as it stands does not achieve this.
There is, of course, the current law that prohibits the carrying of a bladed article in public. That offence carries a maximum sentence of four years. It is a blanket offence which does not consider additional factors; it treats offenders the same regardless of whether they hold some kind of ill intent. This new law, conversely, will consider intent. Violent intent will become an additional factor to be considered, and rightly so, because the extra element of meaning to commit damage or harm makes it a worse crime than simply carrying a weapon. It will differentiate between those who might and those who intend to cause a threat to society. In essence, the question behind this amendment is: why then is this not reflected in the punishment? Why does the new law carry the same maximum four-year sentence?
This law should work to do two things. It should allow the justice system to differentiate between those who pose intentional threats and those who may not. It should deter those who have intent from leaving the house with a weapon in the first place. If the penalty does not differ from the current law, it will do neither. If the maximum sentence remains identical, the courts will not have the means to sufficiently differentiate criminals who have been convicted. The criminals themselves will not be deterred in the first place, as there will be no greater threat of repercussion than that which already exists.
If we are to treat carrying an offensive weapon with violent intent as a separate, more serious crime, it must be reflected in the punishment. It is an incredibly serious offence that someone should not only break the law by carrying an offensive weapon but do so with the intent to inflict damage or harm. It self-evidently threatens the safety of our citizens and shows complete disregard for the functioning of society. Sentencing these criminals as if their violent intent is merely a secondary factor that does not deserve consideration will not do, in my respectful submission.
Amendment 56 seeks to solve this disparity. It increases the maximum sentence to 14 years. It is a maximum sentence, a ceiling, not the sentence to be imposed whenever. That, in our view, is the right thing to do. It will give the courts the means to reflect this in practice. There is no reason why the Government should not wish to achieve both these things, but the punishment must be reflective of the crime. I look forward to the Government’s response on this. For those reasons, I beg to move.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, very briefly, I align myself with my noble friend on his remarks and the question he put to the Minister. I do not understand the situation, so I would very much appreciate an explanation from the Minister. What is the logic of having the same maximum penalty for both the existing offence of carrying an offensive weapon and the new offence of carrying an offensive weapon with intent to commit harm or violence, and so forth?
My mild concern, which I am sure the Minister with his usual skill can allay, is that if we have the four years maximum penalty for the new aggravated offence of having intent to commit harm, is there not a danger that that could diminish the seriousness of the existing offence if it is not possible or likely to prove the intent to commit violence or the other provisions of the new section? I absolutely support what the Government are trying to do here; we are all on completely the same side. It would be very helpful for the Minister to explain how these two offences would differ in their application in practice and therefore the implications for the maximum sentences.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I rise for the final time tonight—the Committee will be pleased to know—to support the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel. I wish I had put down my own amendment to Clause 27 to draw attention to what I think is the complete disconnect between subsections (1) and (3) in the new section.
The Bill in its current form proposes in subsection (1) of the new section that it shall be an offence for any person to possess an article with a blade or point or an offensive weapon with the intent
“to use unlawful violence against another person, … to cause another person to believe that unlawful violence will be used against them”
and others, or
“to cause serious unlawful damage to property”.
That is fairly serious stuff.
However, the penalties in subsection (3) of the proposed new section, with a maximum of 12 months’ imprisonment in a magistrates’ court and up to four years on indictment, are insufficient given the gravity of the offence. I support the argument for a substantial increase in sentencing powers to reflect the seriousness of the conduct involved.
Possession of an offensive weapon with intent to use it for violence or to cause fear is a profoundly serious criminal act. Such intent demonstrates a premeditated willingness to inflict harm, intimidate or destroy property. It is not a spontaneous or lesser form of criminality but rather a calculated and dangerous escalation. The mere possession of a weapon with such intent poses a direct threat to public safety, undermines community trust and creates an atmosphere of fear and insecurity.
As the Minister will know, offences involving offensive weapons are often precursors to more serious crimes, involving grievous bodily harm right up to homicide. I maintain that actions that create an imminent risk of serious harm should be met with robust deterrence and sentencing. Allowing relatively lenient penalties for those caught with weapons and with criminal intent fails to deter potential offenders and signals a lack of seriousness in addressing violent crime. The psychological impact on victims—those who are threatened or believe they are at risk of violence—can be profound and long-lasting, as many reports say, even if no injury actually occurs.
When compared with other offences of similar seriousness, the proposed penalties appear disproportionately low. For instance, offences such as aggravated burglary or possession of firearms with intent to endanger life attract significantly higher sentences, often exceeding a decade in custody. This clause is about people going out with vicious knives or machetes, intending to use unlawful violence against another person—in other words, to attack them and possibly kill them. Why on earth should there even be a summary trial for that sort of offence? That is why I wish I had put down my own amendment to delete from the new section subsection (3)(a), which provides for trial in a magistrates’ court.
Of course, we must not look at this Bill in isolation; we have the Sentencing Bill coming along, which will aim to ban anyone—if I understand it correctly—going to prison for a sentence of 12 months or less. If one of these cases goes to a magistrates’ court, and the magistrates impose the maximum sentence of 12 months, it will be automatically suspended and the perpetrator will get away with it. What signal does that send? If these criminals were going out with a knife to scratch cars or vandalise property, summary might be appropriate, but they are going out with knives to attack people and possibly kill them. That is why, in my opinion, it has to indictable only and a 14-year maximum sentence—which, as we know, will end up as seven in any case, with automatic release at half-time. I believe the current proposal for a maximum of four years on indictment is markedly out of step with comparable offences and the seriousness of potential offences in subsection (1).
The criminal justice system must not only punish offenders but deter would-be offenders and reassure the public that their safety is paramount. Inadequate penalties such as this one risk undermining public confidence in the legal system. A more severe sentencing framework would send a clear message that society will not tolerate the possession of weapons in the street with intent to commit violent acts or grievous bodily harm to people. It would also be a stronger deterrent to those contemplating such conduct.
In conclusion, I believe the Government are absolute right to introduce this new power, but they have the penalties wrong since they are disconnected from the seriousness of the offence. Given the potential for severe physical and psychological harm, the premeditated nature of the crime and the need for effective deterrence, I also submit that the maximum penalties should be increased. Of course, this is not tying the judge’s discretion; I am suggesting no minimum sentence but a sentence of up to 14 years.
I should add that I have exactly the same view on the suggested penalties in the next massive group of amendments, but I have made my arguments here and I will not repeat them when we come to that group on Wednesday.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, nearly half the murders in the UK over the last three years are due to knife crime, so we recognise the vital importance of equipping police with the necessary tools to intervene when there is clear evidence of intent to commit serious violence. We give Clause 27 our full backing.
Before I turn to the amendment, I want to make a couple of points around the new offence. Will the Government ensure that robust guidance and oversight are in place to prevent unjustified or discriminatory use of this power? That needs to be accompanied by improved training for police and judiciary. The reality is that young black men are already significantly overrepresented in knife crime prosecutions, and we must be careful not to compound that position. Discrimination and justice are opposites.
I hope this may also help stem the rising number of incidents in which people suffer life-changing injuries after being attacked with acid or other corrosive substances. Reports of such offences increased by 75% in 2023, including 454 physical attacks. Half these victims were women, with attacks often occurring in a domestic abuse context, but only 8% of these cases resulted in a charge or summons, partly due to the victim’s fear of reprisal. The hope is that this new offence may allow prosecutions to be brought before harm is inflicted, since proving intent would not necessarily require the victim to testify. Can the Minister say how the Government intend to use the offence to this end?
On Amendment 56, the Liberal Democrats agree with Jonathan Hall that four years in prison in insufficient when there is clear evidence of the intention to cause mass fatalities. The court must have the full weight of the law behind it in the hopefully rare cases in which a lengthy sentence is thought necessary for public prosecution. I would expect the Sentencing Council to issue guidance around how to categorise levels of seriousness, and I hope this will guard against sentence inflation. Nevertheless, we are minded to support this amendment and I urge the Government to look again at the maximum penalty.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, for his amendment, which, as noble Lords will know, increases the maximum penalty to 14 years for possessing a weapon with intent. I happen to think that sentences should be proportionate to the offence, and that is why the maximum sentence for this offence has been set at four years. This is in line with other weapons offence penalties, such as that for possession of a bladed article. To set the sentence for this offence at 14 years would be disproportionate.
The noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, and others, including the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, asked legitimate questions about the difference between existing offences and this new proposed offence. It is already an offence to carry a bladed article in public without good reason. It is also an offence to then threaten a person with a bladed article or weapon. Under Section 52 of the Offensive Weapons Act 2019, it is an offence to intentionally threaten someone with an offensive weapon in public or in private.
The introduction of this new offence bridges a gap, which I believe is there, between being in possession of a knife or other offensive weapon in public or on education premises, and it being used to threaten or harm anyone. This offence will target those who equip themselves with bladed articles with the intention to endanger life, cause serious harm or fear or violence, but are intercepted by the police before they have had the chance to carry out any attack on the intended victim. It will therefore empower the police to bring charges against those individuals, which, in my view, is a differentiation which I hope has been clarified for the noble Viscount. He shakes his head.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
The issue is not the Minister’s explanations. I will have to think carefully about this. If the police can already stop someone and already have an easier test to make an arrest and prosecute that individual for the carrying of a knife, how does the carrying of the knife with the intent to commit harm make that easier to do? Surely, it makes it more difficult, because not only do you have to show that the person was carrying the knife, but you also have to prove their intent. I am not criticising the Minister’s intention here; I just do not understand.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I hope the noble Viscount can examine Hansard tomorrow. The maximum sentence is the same, but the intention will be reflected in the courts being able to give a penalty close to the top end of the range, whereas a simple possession offence is likely to attract a sentence close to the bottom end of the range. Therefore, again, this is for judicial interpretation, but it gives a flexibility within the proposed clause that allows for a potentially different level of maximum sentence within the four-year range that we have.
We believe that 14 years is disproportionate, which is where we have a difference with the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and I cannot support that amendment for this reason. However, we have introduced this new power, which will be of additional benefit for police forces to examine and work with at a local level.
The noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, mentioned the report by Jonathan Hall, KC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, which followed the Southport attack in July 2024. He has indicated that he wants us to examine creating a new offence, proposed by the independent reviewer. He said in his report:
“If this offence is created, then there is no need to reconsider the maximum sentence for the proposed offence of possessing an article with violent intent under the Crime and Policing Bill”.
We are currently considering his recommendations and examining them with operational partners. We want to look at how we can close that gap, but, as yet, we are not in a position to make a further announcement on this issue. However, as I have said, the maximum penalty of four years’ imprisonment is consistent with maximum penalties on other knife-related possession offences. To answer the noble Viscount’s point, it gives greater flexibility to police forces to take action under Clause 27, if the Bill becomes law in due course.
The noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, took a wide view, perfectly legitimately, on the issue of knife crime. We have a clear government objective to reduce knife crime—to halve it—and we are trying to do that. There is an awful lot of work going on with my colleagues in the policing side of the Home Office on how to ensure we tackle some of that disproportionality, focusing on young black men particularly. Ultimately, we want to focus on all individuals who are victims of knife crime. There is a range of public education work being done at the moment, and a range of new resilience measures are being talked about, as well as support for neighbourhood policing. This is part of the back-up we will have to support individuals through highly visible policing, looking at issues such as stop and search, which are still valuable in identifying and collecting weapons.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friends Lord Goschen and Lord Blencathra, and to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for their support for this amendment. I really hope that the Minister will reflect on the support for it from different quarters of the Committee.
I particularly want to comment on the speech of my noble friend Lord Blencathra, in which he pointed to the 12-month summary conviction, because under the Government’s Sentencing Bill, that sentence would be suspended. A convicted criminal, having just been proven in court to hold violent intent, will not go to prison, but will instead be released back into the public. I really hope that the Minister reflects on that specific point, as well as the more general one, which is that it is self-evident that legislation must give the courts the necessary flexibility to account for different levels of crime. If we cap the maximum sentence at four years, which is the same as for the lesser crime of carrying a bladed article, we risk not effectively penalising those planning to commit the worst possible crimes.
As the Minister said, it is a differentiation, this new offence. It is a more serious offence, and it must be sufficiently different from the existing law: that difference must continue through to a different level of sentence. It is consistent that the maximum punishment is increased to reflect this additional consideration, but the Bill does not yet do this. The maximum sentence remains at four years, even though it is for a more serious crime. Therefore, I really hope that the Minister reflects on everything that has been said tonight and that he looks again at Amendment 56 in my name.
It is an amendment that solves these issues: it gives the courts ample room to adapt their sentences, based on the severity of a crime; it gives the judiciary the discretion to issue longer sentences than it is currently able to do; and it is a maximum—I say again, it is a maximum—sentence. It is a ceiling. It would allow the justice system to effectively deal with criminals who pose a tangible risk to their fellow citizens, and act as a great deterrent. We all want a system where the worst criminals are proportionately punished and the courts are able to adapt to achieve this. Although I listened very carefully, I am not convinced that the legislation as it stands achieves this, and I really hope that the Government reconsider this. For the time being, however, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Crime and Policing Bill
Wednesday 19th November 2025
(5 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-III(b) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Third Marshalled List) - (19 Nov 2025)
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment increases the maximum term of imprisonment on summary conviction in Scotland for an offence under section 141(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
My Lords, this is the first in a number of groups of government amendments. I apologise for the large number of amendments before the Committee today. Their core aim is to apply various additional provisions in the Bill to Scotland and/or Northern Ireland. They reflect the outcome of further engagement with the Scottish Government and relevant Northern Ireland departments since the Bill’s introduction, which is why we have tabled so many amendments today. That has happened since February.
In each case, we are bringing forward these amendments at the request of the devolved Governments. The amendments unavoidably cover a significant number of pages of the Marshalled List, but I assure noble Lords that, importantly, in general they do not import new policy into the Bill. The amendments all relate to the offensive weapons provisions in Part 2, Chapter 2 of the Bill. These will contribute to our safer streets mission to halve knife crime in a decade. I am pleased to report that, even now, in the latest crime survey, figures for the year to the end of June show a 5% reduction in knife-enabled offences. This is to be welcomed, but of course there is much more to do.
Clause 28 amends Sections 141 and 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and Section 1 of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959. It increases the maximum penalty for offences relating to offensive weapons from six months to two years imprisonment. This includes the offence of manufacturing, selling, hiring, offering for hire, lending or possessing in private any prohibited offensive weapon as detailed in the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988. Also covered here is the offence of selling a knife or bladed article to anyone under the age of 18.
Amendments 57 to 70 to Clause 28 simply extend the increase of the maximum penalty for those offences to Scotland, at the request of the Scottish Government. Existing legislation in England and Wales provides that anyone over 18 years of age found guilty of any of these offences will face a maximum penalty of six months imprisonment, an unlimited fine or both. We believe that the maximum penalty does not reflect the seriousness of these offences and should be increased in line with the current offence of unlawful marketing of knives, which carries a maximum penalty of two years imprisonment. This will align the maximum penalties for the offences in relation to the sale of knives.
In Clauses 31 and 32 we are introducing a stricter two-step age-verification check for the sale and delivery of knives bought online. These provisions will require at the point of sale specific checks of a photographic identity document and a current photograph of the buyer, as well as photographic identity checks at the point of delivery, be it a residential address or a collection point. In addition, we are providing for a new offence of delivering a package containing a knife to someone other than the buyer if the buyer is an individual, as opposed to, for example, a company, so that knives cannot be left on doorsteps or with neighbours. These are both welcome measures.
Amendments 71, 72 and 74 confirm that, under Section 141B of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, where a passport or driving licence is used as proof of age for a remote sale of a knife, it is required to be a copy of a physical version. We are, however, adding provisions that would allow the Secretary of State to make regulations—subject to affirmative procedure, so that this House and the Commons have the opportunity to debate them further—so that alternative means of age verification such as digital ID, including digital passports and digital driving licences, can be used. These amendments are required to ensure that the appropriate digital proofs can be used as evidence of identity in place of a physical document, and that the necessary safeguards can be attached to their use.
It is clear that many consumers already expect to be able to use digital forms of ID, rather than just the physical version, to prove to a seller they are aged 18 or over in order to purchase knives or crossbows. The Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 lays the foundation for trusted digital verification services that are already widely used across the economy. Digital versions of government-issued documents such as driving licences and veteran cards will become available soon. For both consumers who buy and businesses that sell knives or crossbows, it is also important to provide consistency with the existing position across different sectors where digital age verification is used or soon will be—for example, in the purchase of other age-restricted products such as alcohol and tobacco, or for gambling.
The other amendments to Clauses 31 and 32 extend the provisions made by these clauses for England and Wales to Scotland, and the additional clause makes provision for Northern Ireland. This is at the request of both devolved Governments.
I apologise for the length of the discussion on the amendments in this group. The amendments to Clauses 33 and 34 relate to the Crossbows Act 1987, which requires that crossbows, or parts of a crossbow, can only be sold or let on hire to someone aged 18 or over. Clauses 33 and 34 introduce the same stricter two-step age-verification checks for the sale and letting on hire of crossbows, or parts of crossbows bought or let on hire online, that have been introduced for the sale and delivery of knives bought online.
Government Amendments 124 to 189 extend the provisions in Clauses 33 to 35 to Scotland—again, at the request of the Scottish Government—and Amendments 190 to 192 insert new clauses that amend the Crossbows (Northern Ireland) Order to ensure that stricter age-verification checks for the sale, letting on hire and delivery of crossbows also apply to Northern Ireland. It is important that there is a cross-UK approach on these significant issues.
Finally, Clause 36 provides for the mandatory reporting of the bulk sale of knives. Clause 36 defines reportable sales as the purchase of six knives in a single transaction in England and Wales, or when made over two or more occasions in a 30-day period. In the latter case, relevant sales include those made to a single person, or up to two or more persons where these are to be delivered to the same residential address. As noble Lords probably know, there are exemptions for business sales and for sales of cutlery knives without a sharp point, safety razor blades, and pocketknives with a cutting edge that does not exceed 3 inches.
There will also be exemptions for qualifying sets of knives, such as kitchen knife blocks. These will be sets of at least three knives that are each of a different size or shape, no matter how many knives the set contains—we are all very familiar with that type of kitchen equipment. The purchase of multiple sets of knives, or the purchase of a single set alongside individual knives where these combinations lead to a total purchase of at least six knives, will also be reportable.
That is what is currently in the Bill. Amendments 193 to 209 extend these provisions to Scotland, and similar provisions are also being introduced for Northern Ireland, so, again, there is consistency across the whole of the United Kingdom. There are various consequential and drafting amendments at the back of the Bill relating to the power to make consequential amendments. But, in essence, the policy positions in the Bill, through these Government amendments, are being replicated in Scotland and Northern Ireland. I beg to move.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
My Lords, I rise to ask on a point of information and declare an interest: I chair the National Proof of Age Standards Scheme board. In the list of identifications for proof of age purposes, I did not hear the noble Lord say that the PASS card was acceptable. It is a Home Office-approved document and is widely used. Maybe he said it and I missed it—we were going at quite a pace—but could he confirm that the physical proof of age card is still acceptable for these purposes?
We are expecting the mandatory conditions for digital proof of age to be published before Christmas, possibly. Is the noble Lord able to confirm that the Government are still on track to publish these changes so that sales of alcohol and other proof of age purposes can be done by a digital proof of age card as well as by a physical card?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I think I can say yes to both those points. If I cannot, I shall revert to her shortly.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, on these Benches, we support the intent behind this blizzard of government amendments. Of course, as the Minister says, the effect of these amendments and other consequential changes is to apply tougher maximum penalties and provisions relating to offensive weapons in Scotland and, in certain cases, Northern Ireland.
It would be extremely useful if the Minister could say whether the law in each of the home nations is the same. I assume that is the effect of all these different amendments—that the UK should be on exactly the same footing, however and wherever you commit that offence. Even though I understand that it was at the request, in the first instance, of the Scottish Government.
We very much support the way in which the amendments reflect the gravity of the kinds of violence that plague our communities from these offensive weapons and that the manufacture, supply and possession of these articles will be met with the full force of the law. We welcome not only the amendments but the original provisions of the Bill, but we need to think of not just penalties but prevention. I hope some of those provisions will make individuals accountable with the digital identity, which we also support.
Like the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, I would like an answer to the question of whether the analogue identity provision will continue. Otherwise, that could lead to forms of digital exclusion, which I do not think that we or the Minister would welcome.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful for the noble Lord’s comments, which I will respond to in a moment, but it is important that I clarify the point referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. I was half right. The answer “yes” is to the question of passports; it is correct that digital passports or driving licences can be approved documents. There is a power by regulation to add other documents; at the moment, the PASS card is not added to that as a form of identification, but obviously it potentially can be in due course, if Governments decide to add that. That will again be subject to regulation. I apologise, but the noble Baroness asked me a question and I gave her the answer in good faith, but it is best that we clarify that point now.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this group essentially encompasses several different groups of amendments; perhaps they should have been separated, but we are where we are. Two of those groups within this very large group are, I would argue, quite uncontroversial. I have absolutely no issue with the Government increasing the maximum penalties for the offence in Clause 28 in Scotland, and for extending the provision in Clauses 31, 32 and 35 to Northern Ireland and Scotland. I have no issue with the government amendments about the bulk sale of knives.
I do, however, take issue with government Amendments 71, 72, 73, 74, 85, 86, 110, 111, 129, 130, 141, 142, 170, 171, 185, 186, 187 and 188. These amend the Bill to permit the Secretary of State to make regulations specifying further forms of identification that can be used for age-verification purposes relating to the online sale and the delivery of knives and crossbows. That might seem innocuous at first, but all it takes is to look at the explanatory statements to realise what these amendments are really about. The explanatory statement for Amendment 71 says that the amendment
“allows the Secretary of State to make regulations prescribing an alternative process for age verification (such as digital ID)”.
That is the point.
What is happening here is that the Government are attempting perhaps to sneak in provisions permitting digital ID by the backdoor. I say that the Government are sneaking these in, because they have not only tabled amendments to change clauses already in the Bill but included the regulation-making power permitting digital ID in the drafting of the new clauses that extend provisions to Northern Ireland and Scotland. On top of that, they have lumped these amendments together with all the others in this enormous group. I can only assume that the Government hoped that perhaps no one would notice their attempts to take the very first step towards legislating for mandatory digital ID. That is why we cannot support these amendments.
The Government will perhaps attempt to play this off as a small and practical change to allow Ministers to retain flexibility by allowing new age-verification processes, but that is a red herring. Digital ID is an affront to our rights, and the Government have repeatedly stated that it will not be mandatory, that it is no big deal and that it will simply make things easier. Yet here we are with the Government seeking to insert provisions for digital ID into the Crime and Policing Bill. They have not even enacted the policy, yet they are already trying to expand its purpose. Does this not tell us all we need to know? They say that it will not be mandatory, but how can we ever be sure of that?
We notified the Government of our opposition to these amendments in advance to let them know that we would not accept any amendments to this Bill, or for that matter any Bill, that enables digital ID. It is in that spirit that I tabled my Amendments 72A, 72B, 87A and 131A to remove provisions in the Bill that permit the Secretary of State to make regulations that specify other identity documents. My Amendments 75A, 75B, 75C, 76A, 76B, 76C, 190A, 190B, 191A and 191B amend the government amendments for that same purpose. If the Government accept these proposed changes to their amendments—that is, if they accept that there can be no power to specify digital ID for the purposes of these clauses—I have no further concerns with them. However, if they do not want to accept my changes to their amendments to remove the ability to specify digital ID for age-verification purposes here, then we will not be able to support them.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and I am genuinely sorry. I understand where he is coming from, and I am grateful to him and the Opposition Whips’ Office for giving notification that they would have concerns over those matters, but I am sorry that he has done it. We are in the 21st century; digital ID is becoming a commonplace issue. I understand that we are going to have steps to have age verification, such as acceptable digital ID, as the norm in future.
As I set out earlier, it is to allow different forms of digital ID to be used to verify purchasers’ identity information. When changes to the acceptable proofs of identity, digital or otherwise, are proposed, they will be subject to the affirmative procedure, so there would have been an opportunity for the noble Lord, and in both Houses, to oppose or question at that time, but I understand where he is coming from. I am of the view that as technology progresses, there will be different types of digital ID which might be acceptable. It is not an attempt by the Government to speed up or usurp the process; it is just future-proofing, because there may be digital ID on a range of issues.
As an example, I have a digital and a hard copy of my railcard. I show both at different times, depending on which one is easiest to get to. Digital ID is progressing, and it will continue to do so. There are potentially new digital documents, such as the recently announced digital ID card, coming downstream. As with any new legislation, that is still a matter for Parliament to consider, but if a Bill comes before the House—after the outcome of a consultation, it might be in the next few weeks—that is something we are trying to future-proof accordingly.
I hope that, given those assurances, the noble Lord is prepared to support all the amendments, but I guess that he will not—that is a reasonable position for him to take and one we must look at. To help him today, in a genuine spirit of trying to help, if the noble Lord remains unpersuaded, which I think he is—he confirms that he is—I will move only Amendments 57 to 70 and Amendments 193 to 209 to Clauses 28 and 29, respectively. I will not move Amendment 210A, which makes equivalent provision for Northern Ireland to that contained in Clause 36 and, in due course, the related consequential and drafting amendments to the Bill, so that we can look at these matters on Report and not have that debate and discussion today. At this stage, I will not move the amendments to Clauses 31 to 35 and the associated back-of-the-Bill consequential amendments. The Committee should rest assured that I will bring them back on Report, and if the noble Lord has his disagreements then, we will test the House. If the House votes one way, we accept it; if it votes the other way, we potentially test the House again. That is a matter for discussion and debate downstream.
There is nothing to fear from the proposals for someone having a digital ID and showing it when receiving a knife or weapon through the post. That is not something to be afraid of. We are in the 21st century —I am in the 21st century at least, let us put it that way. We will go from there.
I also assure the noble Lord that paper documents such as passports and driving licences will be acceptable as forms of ID, as well as potentially any digital versions of those in due course. I hope that satisfies his question.
I welcome, in a spirit of co-operation and consensus, the agreement from both Front Benches to the provisions for Northern Ireland and Scotland, so that in those areas there is a United Kingdom response from the three Administrations who deal with these matters in a devolved or non-devolved way. I commend the amendments I said I would move.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
Before the Minister sits down, I thank him for what he said. I am slightly baffled. There is no Bench more strongly against compulsory digital ID than the Liberal Democrat Benches, so I find the Minister’s assurance that the analogue form of identity will continue—and digital ID in this instance, whatever is prescribed by the Secretary of State, is an alternative form of identification—wholly convincing, but if we must come back on Report and debate this at length, so be it.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
Will the noble Lord respond on the mandatory conditions on the digital proof-of-age pass, which he confirmed would be published before December?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I cannot give the noble Baroness a date at the moment, but I will reflect on that with colleagues and return to her, because there are a number of other departmental interests as well.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment increases the maximum fine on summary conviction in Scotland for an offence under section 141(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
“(da) on conviction on indictment in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or a fine (or both);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment allows trial on indictment in Scotland for an offence under section 141(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, and provides for the penalties available.
“(ia) in paragraph (b) for “6 months, to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale” substitute “12 months, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum”;”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment increases the maximum term of imprisonment and maximum fine on summary conviction in Scotland for an offence under section 141(1A) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
“(cb) on conviction on indictment in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or a fine (or both);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment allows trial on indictment in Scotland for an offence under section 141(1A) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, and provides for the penalties available.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to penalties for a conviction in Scotland for an offence under section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
“(aa) on summary conviction in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment increases the maximum term of imprisonment and maximum fine on summary conviction in Scotland for an offence under section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to penalties for a conviction in Scotland for an offence under section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
“(c) on conviction on indictment in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or a fine (or both).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment allows trial on indictment in Scotland for an offence under section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, and provides for the penalties available.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment increases the maximum term of imprisonment on summary conviction in Scotland for an offence under section 1(1) of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment increases the maximum fine on summary conviction in Scotland for an offence under section 1(1) of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959.
“(d) on conviction on indictment in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or a fine (or both).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment allows trial on indictment in Scotland for an offence under section 1(1) of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959, and provides for the penalties available.
“(ia) in paragraph (b) for “6 months, to a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale” substitute “12 months, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum”;”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment increases the maximum term of imprisonment and maximum fine on summary conviction in Scotland for an offence under section 1(1A) of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959.
“(d) on conviction on indictment in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or a fine (or both).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment allows trial on indictment in Scotland for an offence under section 1(1A) of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959, and provides for the penalties available.
The Senior Deputy Speaker (Lord Gardiner of Kimble)
I cannot call Amendments 75A, 75B or 75C, as they are amendments to Amendment 75, which has not been moved.
The Senior Deputy Speaker (Lord Gardiner of Kimble)
I cannot call Amendments 76A, 76B or 76C, as they are amendments to Amendment 76, which has not been moved.
Clause 32: Delivery of knives etc
Lord Clement-Jones
“Sale and delivery of knives: review(1) The Secretary of State must review the impact of sections 31 and 32 of this Act within two years of these sections coming into force.(2) A review under subsection (1) must consider—(a) the effect of sections 31 and 32 in preventing the online sale of knives to those under the age of 18,(b) whether safety design regulation would limit the availability of knives that may be used in violent offences, and(c) what mechanisms could be used to improve data collection by the police of bladed articles used in all knife-related crimes.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to review the effectiveness of sections 31 and 32 in preventing the online sale of knives to under 18s, and requires the review to look at other measures that might limit the availability of knives that could be used in violent offences.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, while we welcome the effort to strengthen accountability for businesses and sellers in tackling online knife sales, we must ensure that these new powers are effective, enforceable and subject to continuous review.
In moving Amendment 122, I also speak to Amendment 194. Both aim to enhance the long-term effectiveness and impact of this legislation. Amendment 122 would insert a new clause immediately after Clause 32. It would mandate that the Secretary of State conducts a review of the impact of Sections 31 and 32 of what will be the Act within two years of these provisions coming into force.
New powers addressing the remote sale of knives are crucial, yet legislative intervention alone is rarely sufficient to address a complex societal challenge such as knife crime. I recall some years ago running a project in the London Borough of Lambeth on precisely this issue, and it was extremely complex dealing with young people in this particular area. We must ensure that the mechanisms we are implementing, such as the requirement for physical ID on delivery and the provisions for age verification, and indeed those mentioned by the Minister, moving towards digital verification, are actually achieving the desired result and preventing the online sale of knives to under-18s. The review must go beyond merely confirming compliance. Crucially, it must also look at other measures that might limit the availability of knives that could be used in violent offences, such as the design of knives—for instance, by changing kitchen knives available online to rounded ends.
Home Office statistics indicate that two-thirds of the identified knives used to kill people in a single year are kitchen knives. We are very much on the same page as the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, with his Amendment 123. We must not stand still but use real- world evidence of what works in tackling and preventing violent crime. We need to continuously monitor and assess the effectiveness of the solutions we put in place. Amendment 194 relates to Clause 36:
“Duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk”.
Clause 36 introduces the requirement for sellers to report bulk sales, an essential provision for tackling the grey market and ensuring accountability. However, for this provision to be an effective law enforcement tool, the information reported must be timely.
My amendment would require regulations made under Clause 36(1) to include a clear provision that any reportable sale must be notified to the specified person in real time or as soon as is reasonably practicable. Furthermore, to eliminate any ambiguity, the amendment would set a hard stop specifying that notification must occur, in any event, no later than the delivery of the bladed articles or the end of the day on which the seller became aware that the sale constituted a reportable sale. If we expect law enforcement agencies to use this reporting data to intervene and prevent crimes, giving them advance warning is paramount. A delay in reporting a suspicious bulk purchase renders the power largely reactive rather than preventive, and this amendment would simply ensure that the regulations implement the duty to report as soon as possible, turning bureaucratic compliance into actionable intelligence. I hope the Government will support Amendment 122 to ensure accountability and scrutiny over time and Amendment 194 to ensure that the immediate operational impact of the new bulk reporting duties is maximised. I beg to move.
Lord Hampton (CB)
My Lords, my Amendment 123 says:
“Within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must launch a consultation”—
as a teacher, marking my own homework, I realise that the drafting is then wrong and it should say “on a ban on sharp-tipped knives”. In this, I associate myself with the words of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I am a teacher, and two years ago my school lost a student to knife crime. With respect to my noble friend Lord Russell of Liverpool, who is not in his place but who at Second Reading warned that there must not be too much law, I will use the analogy that amendments are like cars: everybody agrees that there are too many but nobody wants to give up their own. According to the ONS, last year 46% of homicides in the UK were with a sharp instrument, and 50% of those were with a kitchen knife. It was 52% the year before. Combat knives account for 6% and zombie knives 2%. Are we looking in the wrong direction here? Should we be looking within the home?
I am very grateful to Graham Farrell, professor of crime science at the University of Leeds, the Youth Endowment Fund and the Ben Kinsella Trust for their help. If anybody has not watched Idris Elba’s brilliantly thought-provoking film “Our Knife Crime Crisis”, I heartily recommend it. It is still available on BBC iPlayer.
Pointed-tipped knives are significantly more lethal than round-tipped knives, as shown by forensic studies on penetrative damage. A rounded knife will not penetrate clothing, let alone kill. Domestic settings are high-risk environments—especially for women—in which kitchen knives are readily available and often used in fatal attacks. Blade magazine disagrees. It says:
“The harsh truth is this: no amount of blunted blades, banned kitchen knives, or bureaucratic licensing schemes will stop individuals hell-bent on violence. You can’t legislate evil out of existence by targeting inanimate objects. England doesn’t have a knife problem—it has a people problem. A system problem. A failure-to-act-when-it-matters problem”.
But it is not the situation in which a perpetrator has planned their attack and carefully obtained or adapted a weapon to kill that this would prevent. It is the impulse homicide, particularly within a home environment, that we are trying to reduce here.
Situational crime prevention theory supports reducing crime opportunities by altering environments and tools, such as replacing lethal knives with safer ones. Rounded-tipped knives reduce temptation and harm, making impulsive violence less deadly without affecting culinary function. Small paring knives that do not penetrate far enough could be used in kitchens where a sharp point is really needed. Evidence also shows that crime rarely displaces to other weapons when access to one is restricted. Alternative weapons, such as scissors or screwdrivers, are less effective and less available and carry a lower status, thereby reducing their appeal. Dining knives are already rounded, showing a public tolerance for safer designs in everyday life. There are also policy parallels, with phase-outs such as incandescent light bulbs, diesel cars and the smoking ban.
The expected outcomes from this include a halving of knife-related homicides, reducing other knife crimes and preventing thousands of injuries. Can we please just have a consultation on this?
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, I rise briefly to make observations about Amendments 122 and 123. I am not against a review or a consultation, but I make the point that these are not cost-free. Reviews and consultations take up a lot of time within departments and are expensive, and we need to keep that in mind when this House authorises them.
My point is very narrow and applies to both the review and the consultation. It is perfectly true that the sharp-bladed knife is a matter of very great concern to the public, and rightly so. It is important to keep in mind, however, that sharp-bladed knives also have legitimate purposes. My point is that when we authorise the review or consultation, we need to be sure that the scope of the review or consultation is sufficiently wide to address the balance between banning, or further banning, sharp-bladed knives and the impact on those who use them for proper purposes. In other words, the scope of the review or consultation must consider the issue of proportionality when we come to any further proposed changes. That is the only point that I want to make, but it goes to both the review and the consultation.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, once again, I find myself in the rather scary position of seeing some considerable merit in the suggestion of a Lib Dem Peer, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I will also comment on the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, who also advocated for controls on knives.
There is merit in having a review, or otherwise, of the measures in the Bill. However, I would go further and say that we probably need a wide-ranging review of all the measures successive Governments have taken to try to crack down on knife crime as, despite all our efforts, we cannot manage to do it. I was the Home Office Minister who took through the Offensive Weapons Act 1996, followed up the next year by the Knives Act 1997. That was building on Section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1998.
Lord Hampton (CB)
My Lords, I will reply quickly to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and also the noble Viscount. I am not against sharp-edged knives. I have a very good knife that cuts through a Savoy cabbage and does a great job with everything I need in the kitchen. It is just rounded at the edge, so I cannot stab my wife with it.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, the key finding of the Clayman review was the need for better police data recording on knife crime. Officers often fail to note the specific type of knife used, with further gaps around sales and marketing. Amendment 122 recognises that, without understanding the threat, it is difficult to counter it, so the evidence base must be improved.
The amendments from the noble Lords, Lord Hampton and Lord Clement-Jones, promote a policing approach to reduce opportunities for crime through better design of our buildings, known as designing out crime. I have spoken to a number of chief police officers who have tried this, with great effect. They are very happy about how this can happen and would really like to see it rolled out. This preventive approach aligns with the Liberal Democrat position and I hope the Government will give it serious attention.
We welcome the Government’s proposals on this part of the Bill, but laws work only if they are enforceable. Again, the Clayman review said that police currently lack the training, know-how and resources to police online knife sales effectively.
Can I ask the Minister about the policing of overseas suppliers, since this is where many of these lethal weapons originate? What plans are in place to monitor imports? The Clayman review found that there is often very poor co-ordination between Border Force and police and noted the difficulty in getting data from tech and communication companies based overseas. Can the Minister mention that when he winds up, please?
Clayman also suggested an import licensing scheme to ensure that a licence is required to bring knives into the UK. He proposed revisiting the tax levy on imported knives to ensure that potential weapons brought into the country are easier to track and identify. Do the Government intend to implement either of those recommendations?
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, we on these Benches believe that this group contains sensible and prudent amendments. They require us to review the effectiveness of the Government’s measures and to consider carefully the potential implications of the new regulations around the sale of knives. They also seek to ensure that we have the necessary evidence base to improve legislation where needed. These, in our view, are good principles.
Amendment 122 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, contains both those elements. The first part of the amendment seeks a review within two years of the effectiveness of the measures in preventing the online sale of knives to persons under the age of 18. This would plainly be sensible. There is little point in legislating to prevent something if we find out that in fact that prohibition is not taking effect. We all want to stop the sale of knives to children, but we should want to do so in the most effective and proportionate manner. By reviewing the impact of the Bill, the Government would be able to make the necessary adjustments in response to the evidence. Having said that, we should listen carefully to the observations of my noble friend Lord Hailsham in this respect.
Another aspect of the question of efficacy is our obligation to the law-abiding public. It is right that we should attempt to ban children from purchasing knives. We are all aware of the severity of the knife crime epidemic and that part of the problem is the easy access to knives. But we should not pretend that the entire problem stems from their online availability. Of course, it is a factor, but children and young persons intent on committing knife crime will have plenty of other opportunities, if they are determined enough, to buy knives and to acquire them from other sources. They could use an older friend’s or family member’s identification, or indeed, they could ask them simply to make the purchase. They could steal a knife—given the current rates of shoplifting, I suspect this already happens—or they might simply go no further than their kitchen drawer and take one of the many easily accessible knives there.
By adding restrictions to online sale, the Government are merely stemming one route of access, but doing so adds an extra burden to the great majority of law-abiding citizens and retailers. As I have said, we understand why action is necessary, but, if we are to make it mandatory, we should ensure that it is genuinely effective in practice. Here, we should listen to the wise words of my noble friend Lord Blencathra. We must know, therefore, that we are not adding regulation for its own sake and that we are simultaneously taking other meaningful measures to address the wider issue. The Government should continue to explore this further.
Proposed subsections (2)(b) and (2)(c) in Amendment 122 address another aspect of the knife problem. While the first part reviews the effect of the Bill on the sale of knives, these subsections turn to the design and legality of the knives themselves.
If the knives which we make harder to purchase are not the ones being used in knife crime, our efforts will be in vain. Collecting data both on knives sold and, separately, on knives used in crimes, as Amendment 194 argues for, could offer a remedy for this. It would provide the Government with the necessary data to identify which types of weapons in particular lie at the root of the problem and to take action accordingly. This principle also underlies Amendment 123—I had already noted the typo, if I can put it that way, and have marked the noble Lord’s homework accordingly. But, taking it seriously, consulting on what knives are used in offending and on the measures to be required to curb their circulation must be sensible and proportionate, and it should complement the Government’s proposals.
This is a moderate group of amendments on a subject that clearly needs further review and refinement. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response on the Government’s position. At the same time, I think we need to hear carefully and take heed of what noble Lords have said in their words of caution on this topic.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Hampton, for setting out the case for these amendments, and particularly to the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, for bringing his front-line experience of the tragedy in the school in which he currently works. I am also grateful for the comments of other noble Lords and I will try to respond to those in due course. I note the broad support from the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, for the amendments before the Committee today.
I want to start with the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. I accept that there have been numerous attempts by numerous Governments to take numerous courses of action to reduce knife crime and that this is another one. But I just say to him that it is still worth trying, and it is still worth examining how we can best reduce the level of knife crime. The measures in the Bill before the Committee today are an honest attempt by the Government to put further obstacles in the way of individuals who might use those knives for nefarious purposes. I simply say it is worth trying, and we are seeking to do that.
As the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, explained, Amendment 122 would require the Home Secretary to review the effectiveness of Clauses 31 and 32 in preventing sales to under-18s within two years of those clauses coming into force. I agree in principle that we should have to keep under review the impact of those measures, for the very reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, mentioned: to look at what works and what has not worked.
The Government are providing £1.75 million of funding for a new national police co-ordination unit to tackle the online sale of knives, and the police will be responsible for enforcing this legislation. I hear the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, about enforcement but it is for the police to understand the legislation’s effectiveness and what more can be done to tackle knife crime. I will return to the other points that she mentioned in due course.
It is standard practice—I hope this helps the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones—that all measures in the Bill will be subject to post-legislative scrutiny three to five years after Royal Assent. This scrutiny will consider the effectiveness of the measures in the Bill; self-evidently, that includes Clauses 31 and 32. The noble Lord is asking for a two-year review; it will be undertaken within three to five years. I hope that reassures him that the measures will be reviewed in a timely and appropriate way—and, again, to learn the lessons that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, mentioned that we need to examine.
Amendment 123 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, would require the Government to consult on regulating the sale of sharp-tipped knives and provide a report to Parliament. The design of knives is also addressed in Amendment 122, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones.
I share the view of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham: bladed articles with pointed ends have legitimate uses. They are often needed for a wide range of purposes: they are used as tools in work, and for farming, fishing and cooking. The Government are keen to try to strike the right balance between allowing access to knives for legitimate reasons, which the noble Viscount ably outlined, and the need to protect the public from dangerous weapons.
If it helps the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, the Government are actively exploring options for how we can strengthen enforcement and prevention measures, including consulting on a licensing scheme for all knife sellers in the future. I hope that the noble Lord can accept that as I progress the discussion today.
Amendment 194 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would require regulations relating to the reporting of remote sales of knives to ensure that such reporting takes place as soon as possible following a bulk sale. I am sympathetic to the overall aim of the amendment. Clause 36 provides for a duty to report remote sales of knives in bulk. It makes it mandatory for online sellers to report bulk sales. It defines those bulk sales as purchases of six or more knives, two or more qualifying sets of knives or one qualifying set or five knives, in a single transaction or made over two or more occasions within a 30-day period. That is set out in Clause 36. In the latter case, relevant sales include those made to a single person or two or more persons where they are believed to be delivered to the same residential address.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, before I come to the Minister’s very constructive response, I want to thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. It has been a very valuable debate, and we have had a huge degree of consensus on the way forward. I very much welcome what the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, had to say about there being no easy answers. I would say that he is lethal not just at the checkout but elsewhere in this House.
On a serious note, we have a common cause here to prevent knife crime in any way we possibly can. I very much appreciated what the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, had to say with his experience as a headteacher. He quite rightly gave Idris Elba a namecheck, as he has done so much towards the cause of knife crime prevention. I accept what the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, had to say in caveating this kind of review. It could be as specific as the Minister has said, in looking in particular at design. He certainly indicated that in his response.
I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst—and I very much appreciate the support from the Opposition Front Bench. As he says, it is legitimate to seek adjustments in response to the evidence; that is a very important point that was made. When he says that this is a moderate measure, I will take that; I think moderate is good in this context.
I come to what the Minister had to say. He said that the current provisions were an honest attempt to tackle these issues. I entirely take that, but I also took a lot of comfort from what he said about what the Government are doing to explore further preventive measures, including perhaps licensing schemes, or whatever. I very much hope that, between Committee and Report, we can discover a bit more about the shape of that. I also took comfort in what he had to say about the content of the regulations: that appropriate timescales would be included in those regulations.
On the basis of those two assurances—I think the Minister has responded—we can take some comfort in the fact that we are not only seeking answers but continuing to question whether we have all the answers.
Lord Hampton (CB)
Before the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, sits down, can I correct a quick note of fact? It is very kind of him to promote me massively, but I am a simple design technology teacher. I have a very good headteacher way above me.
The Senior Deputy Speaker (Lord Gardiner of Kimble)
I cannot call Amendment 131A, as it is an amendment to Amendment 131.
The Senior Deputy Speaker (Lord Gardiner of Kimble)
I cannot call Amendments 190A and 190B, as they are amendments to Amendment 190.
The Senior Deputy Speaker (Lord Gardiner of Kimble)
I cannot call Amendments 191A and 191B, as they are amendments to Amendment 191.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 200, page 230, line 29, which provides for new section 141D of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to extend to Scotland as well as England and Wales.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment extends the requirement to report bulk sales to include deliveries to anywhere in the UK that meet the specified criteria, not just deliveries in England and Wales.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment extends the requirement to report bulk sales to include deliveries to anywhere in the UK that meet the specified criteria, not just deliveries in England and Wales.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment extends the requirement to report bulk sales to include deliveries to anywhere in the UK that meet the specified criteria, not just deliveries in England and Wales.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adjusts the wording of new section 141D of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to make it consistent with the wording of existing section 141B.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adjusts the wording of new section 141D of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to make it consistent with the wording of existing section 141B.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adjusts the wording of new section 141D of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to make it consistent with the wording of existing section 141B.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adjusts the wording of new section 141D of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to make it consistent with the wording of existing section 141B.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adjusts the wording of new section 141D of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to make it consistent with the wording of existing section 141B.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adjusts the wording of new section 141D of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to make it consistent with the wording of existing section 141B.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 36, page 55, line 34.
“(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to a fine; (b) on summary conviction in Scotland, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum;(c) on conviction on indictment in Scotland, to a fine.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is related to my amendment to clause 200, page 230, line 29, which provides for the new section 141D inserted by clause 36(1) to extend to Scotland as well as England and Wales. It sets out the penalties for offences under the section committed in Scotland.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes a reference to England and Wales that is no longer needed because new section 141D is to extend to Scotland as well as England and Wales (see my amendment to clause 200, page 230, line 29).
“(17) The Secretary of State must consult the Scottish Ministers before making regulations under this section.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is related to my amendment to clause 200, page 230, line 29, which provides for new section 141D to extend to Scotland as well as England and Wales.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 200, page 230, line 29, which provides for new section 141D to extend to Scotland as well as England and Wales.
“(b) in section 66(2) (guidance by Scottish Ministers) after paragraph (d) insert—“(da) section 141D of that Act as it has effect in relation to Scotland,”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is related to my amendment to clause 200, page 230, line 29, which provides for new section 141D to extend to Scotland as well as England and Wales.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“Duty to report remote sale of knives etc in bulk: Northern Ireland(1) The Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (S.I. 1996/3160 (N.I. 24)) is amended as follows.(2) After Article 54A insert—“54B Duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk(1) A person (“the seller”) must, in accordance with requirements specified in an order made by the Department of Justice, report to the person specified in the order any reportable sales the seller makes of bladed articles.(2) A reportable sale of bladed articles occurs where the seller, in any of the ways set out in paragraph (4), sells—(a) six or more bladed articles, none of which form a qualifying set of bladed articles;(b) two or more qualifying sets of bladed articles; (c) one or more qualifying sets of bladed articles and five or more bladed articles that do not form a qualifying set.(3) “Qualifying set of bladed articles” means three or more bladed articles packaged together for sale as a single item, where each bladed article is a different size or shape from the others.(4) The ways are—(a) in a single remote sale where the bladed articles are to be delivered to an address in the United Kingdom, or(b) in two or more remote sales in any period of 30 days—(i) to one person, where the bladed articles are to be delivered to one or more addresses in the United Kingdom, or(ii) to two or more persons, where the bladed articles are to be delivered to the same residential premises in the United Kingdom.(5) A sale of bladed articles is “remote” if the seller is not in the presence of the person (“the buyer”) to whom the bladed articles are sold at the time of the sale.(6) For the purposes of paragraph (5) the seller is not in the presence of the buyer at the time of the sale if—(a) where the seller is an individual, the seller or a person acting on the seller’s behalf is not in the presence of the buyer at that time;(b) where the seller is not an individual, a person acting on the seller’s behalf is not in the presence of the buyer at that time.(7) A sale is not reportable if the buyer—(a) informs the seller that the buyer is carrying on a business, and(b) is—(i) registered for value added tax under the Value Added Tax Act 1994, or(ii) registered as a company under the Companies Act 2006.(8) A person who fails to comply with paragraph (1) commits an offence.(9) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under paragraph (8) to show that the person took all reasonable precautions, and exercised all due diligence, to avoid commission of the offence.(10) A person is to be taken to have shown a matter for the purposes of this Article if—(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.(11) A person who commits an offence under paragraph (8) is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.(12) In this section—(a) “bladed article” means an article to which Article 54 applies, other than a knife which does not have a sharp point and is designed for eating food;(b) “residential premises” means premises used for residential purposes (whether or not also used for other purposes).(13) An order made by the Department of Justice under paragraph (1) may in particular include requirements about—(a) how reports are to be made,(b) when reports to be made, and(c) the information reports must include. (14) The Department of Justice may by order amend—(a) the number of bladed articles specified in paragraph (2)(a);(b) the number of qualifying sets specified in paragraph (2)(b);(c) the number of qualifying sets specified in paragraph (2)(c);(d) the number of bladed articles specified in paragraph (2)(c);(e) the period specified in paragraph (4)(b).”.(3) In Article 57 (rules and orders)—(a) the existing text becomes paragraph (1);(b) in that paragraph for “or 54(3)(c)” substitute “, 54(3)(c) or 54B(1)”;(c) after that paragraph insert—“(2) An order may not be made under Article 54B(14) unless a draft of the order has been laid before and approved by a resolution of the Northern Ireland Assembly.”(4) In the Offensive Weapons Act 2019, in section 66(3) (guidance by Department of Justice) after paragraph (f) insert—“(fa) Article 54B of that Order (duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk),”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause makes provision for Northern Ireland equivalent to that made for England and Wales by clause 36.
Lord Hogan-Howe
“Defence of historical importanceAfter section 141(7A) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (offensive weapons), insert—“(7B) It shall be a defence for any person charged in respect of any conduct of that person relating to a weapon to which this section applies—(a) with an offence under subsection (1), or(b) with an offence under section 50(2) or (3) of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (improper importation),to show that the weapon in question is one of historical importance.”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment applies a similar historical importance defence to that introduced by item (sa) (Zombie Style Knives and Machetes) and item (u) (Ninja Swords) of Section 141 CJA 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988. If the owner of a historic weapon can satisfy defence 7A (Ownership in private), then there is no good reason preventing them passing the item on to the next custodian in a similar manner to an item which is antique (100 years).
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 211, 212, 213 and 214 in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas. I am grateful to the noble Lord for his support in these amendments.
This area is about producing consistency and fairness. I would not like anyone to be confused about thinking that I wanted to be more liberal—not Liberal Democrat, but liberal—about knife crime. It is about producing consistency for people who possess knives with innocent intent. Generally speaking, I welcome the update of the penalties associated with offensive weapons under the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 and Section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, in line with more modern regulation. I suggest that, as well as reviewing the penalties, it is appropriate for us now to review the defences as set out in my Amendments 211 to 214.
The last two pieces of legislation on zombie knives and ninja swords have included a range of defences, such as historical importance, being a blunt weapon or skilled handmade items, in addition to existing global defences of religious ceremony, Crown and visiting forces, antique theatrical and media productions, museums —when the public have access—and ownership for educational purposes. In the new legislation, items such as zombie-style knives, machetes and ninja swords have the defence of historical importance, which applies to sale, gift, loan and importation. In my view, there is no good reason for that not to apply as a defence in a consistent global manner to the other 20 items in that schedule.
For example, if the family of a World War II veteran or a collector can prove that the item they own in private is historically important, it allows them to own it legally, so there is no good reason to prevent them passing it on to the next custodian. The defence relates to the nature of the item, not the person who owns it. We should feel confident that, in doing this, it will follow what happened in 2018, when many thousands of historical weapons from the trenches of World War I dropped out of the scope of the legislation because they became antiques. That was not accompanied by a surge in crime involving these knives. Historical knives do not play a significant role in crime; they are far too expensive for that, and, with the public interest in the end of World War I, the only surge seen was a rise not in crime but in the auction prices they realised because they became antiques and were, therefore, more valuable.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, I will just say a word about Amendment 213. I shall come back more fully to a discussion of the principles in the fifth group of amendments, but there is a danger that a range of agricultural and gardening tools will be caught. I have in mind, for example, machetes, bill-hooks and hand scythes—all of which will be found in various parts of my house. I think it is a very good thing that we should make the exemption clear.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, I agree with the points made and the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, supported by my noble friend Lord Hailsham. We are in the territory of unintended consequences. The Committee needs to take a pragmatic approach. Where there are lacunae and mishaps in complex swathes of legislation, with many successive Acts on knives and similar offensive weapons, we need to take the opportunity to correct those. I certainly support the derogation for agricultural, gardening or conservation purposes, and for weapons of historical importance, collectables and so forth. These seem to be very pragmatic measures, which I support.
I am not knowledgeable on the subject of truncheons. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, even with his experience did not use his. I remember the noble Lord, Lord Mackenzie of Framwellgate, at Second Reading saying that he made “liberal use” of it in an arrest with the result of blood “being spattered” onto his uniform. I guess experience varies, but I support the noble Lord’s efforts today.
Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington (CB)
My Lords, I also support the amendments put forward by my friend and colleague, my noble friend Lord Hogan-Howe. I will address the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for a short period. He was a Minister, as was one other person in this Committee, when I was a senior police officer. I do not remember the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, once instigating or taking through legislation that did not have an effect. That is a fact.
The other thing I am going to disclose—I was going to keep it secret, but I know I can trust all of you and that you are all positively vetted—is that when the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, left he was given a helmet, as was the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey. She was also an extremely effective Minister in my time. The noble Lord was offered a truncheon, but he decided that his shepherd’s stick was far more effective than a truncheon, so we did not give it to him. As a matter of record, I used my truncheon once. I was chasing someone down Tottenham Court Road. I hit him three times and it had absolutely no effect. From then on, I never used it. However, on the flying squad, when we were going to violent robberies where we had intelligence that weapons were being used, we used pickaxe handles. They are far more effective.
This is a move in the right direction. I think the noble Lord described it as a practical approach. We need a common-sense approach to things such as straight truncheons and all the other issues that have been raised this afternoon. It has been a great debate as far as I am concerned, but we will make a difference. Following the approach of my dear friend the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and his historical delivery in terms of what he delivered with the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, in the time they were Ministers, we will make a difference.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, far be it from me to disagree with two former commissioners; that would be extremely inadvisable. We have heard the word “liberal” used twice in this debate, which shows that interpretations can vary.
In this House, we learn something new every day. I had no idea that we can trace pre-1945 steel in the way that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, described. I thank him for his clear and expert introduction to his amendments, which seek to refine the definitions and provide necessary defences within the existing offensive weapons legislation.
His amendments that seek exemption for agricultural tools and historical and cultural items seem entirely sensible to us on these Benches. They would protect legitimate interests in the film, theatre and television industries, as well as non-public museums, and seek to prevent the law from becoming obsolete or unnecessarily broad. We are entirely comfortable with ensuring that while we crack down on those who equip themselves for violence, we do not punish collectors, farmers or those engaged in artistic production. To us, these are common sense amendments that safeguard the legitimate possession and use of articles that could otherwise be caught by broad definitions, and we support them.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, we on this side of the Committee are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for bringing forward this thoughtful group of amendments relating to the controls on offensive weapons. Each of these amendments raise practical questions about the application of current laws that relate to offensive weapons and seek to ensure that legislation designed to protect the public does not inadvertently criminalise legitimate, historically important or professionally supervised activities.
Amendment 211 proposes a defence where a weapon is of genuine historical importance. The reasoning behind this amendment is eminently sensible and aligns the treatment of such items with existing defences relating to antiques and curated collections. This is a meaningful distinction between dangerous modern weapons intended for misuse and historical artifacts preserved for cultural or heritage purposes. There is an important question here on proportionality and the scope of reasonable excuse. I hope the Government will reflect carefully on whether existing provisions fully address the concerns raised.
Amendments 212 and 213 relate to the traditional straight police truncheon and agricultural tools. I can tell the Committee that in my 32 years as a police officer, I did not use my truncheon on anybody, but it is very useful for silencing alarms in business premises in the middle of the night when you cannot get the keyholder out of bed. Here too, we recognise the practical issues that these amendments seek to resolve. It is not a controversial belief that items with legitimate ceremonial, historical or agricultural uses should not inadvertently fall within criminal restrictions where there is no evidence of misuse. The examples provided in support of these proposals make clear that the law must operate with fairness and precision, and I hope the Government consider them with due regard.
Amendment 214 addresses a wide range of potential exemptions for visiting forces, emergency services, theatrical and film productions, museums and antiques. These are complex areas with operational realities that deserve serious thought. The amendment raises legitimate questions about how the law accommodates professional and historical circumstances without undermining public safety. I look forward to hearing the Government’s thoughts on, and response to, this amendment.
These amendments rightly probe the intersection of criminal law with the heritage and cultural sectors. These are sectors that must be protected. We cannot allow well-meaning legislation unintentionally to criminalise legitimate historical and cultural activities. We look forward to the Minister’s response and assurances that these matters will receive the careful consideration that they merit.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
My Lords, I stand to ask for guidance from the Dispatch Box. When I was doing my national service in the Royal Navy in March 1957— I can date it precisely—I became a midshipman. With that ranking, I was awarded a midshipman’s dirk, which I still hold today. I cannot find that dirk falling under any of the exceptions proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. Do I therefore have to table a special amendment to make it lawful for me to continue to hold my midshipman’s dirk?
Lord Blencathra (Con)
Before the Minister replies, I will briefly respond to the very kind remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington. To continue the love-in, I say that he was not only an excellent commissioner but a superb chief constable. He was a hands-on bobby as chief constable.
One night, he decided to go out in a squad car in plain clothes. He was sitting in the back, and a call came in for the officers about an incident around the corner. The officers said, “You just sit there, sir, we’ll go and have a look at it”. No sooner had the officers disappeared than the back door of the car was wrenched open, and a Geordie stuck his head in and said, “It’s okay, mate, you can scarper now—the rozzers have gone”. The noble Lord did not scarper.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
Maybe this should be called the “afternoon of the long knives”.
I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in the debate and thank the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and, in his absence, the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, for bringing these amendments. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for explaining the intention behind them.
We can see the merit in Amendments 211, 212 and 214, but making changes like this would first require thorough consultation with the police and officers. Obviously, we are very privileged to have the testimony and experience of—I am not sure whether “brace” is the right collective noun for two former commissioners—the noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, remarked on how you learn something new every day: indeed, I had no idea that truncheons have so many uses or non-uses. I am grateful also to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, opposite for explaining the ingenious uses that he put his truncheon to from time to time.
While I am referring to comments from noble Lords, I say to my noble friend Lord Hacking that his issue depends on the question, “How long is your dirk?” I am not sure whether that is something I would want to say at any point in time, let alone at the Dispatch Box, but there we are.
More seriously, I assure the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and the rest of the Committee that the Government will consider further the issues raised in the discussion that we have had on this group of amendments. In doing so, we will ensure that any changes to the existing defences and exemptions are made after thorough consideration of the impacts. As the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said, they all deserve serious thought and thorough consultation. Although I am not suggesting for a minute that anything said by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, suggested otherwise, we must place the safety of the public in a paramount position. As such, I cannot undertake to bring forward any proposals in time for later stages of the Bill. However, I stress that, in any event, it would be possible to give effect to the sort of proposals that the amendments intend through existing regulation-making powers. Any such regulations would be subject to the draft affirmative procedure and, therefore, would need to be debated in and approved by both the House of Lords and the other place.
Amendment 213, on items used for agriculture, gardening or similar purposes, was tabled by noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and discussed by the noble Viscounts, Lord Hailsham and Lord Goschen. We believe the legislation is clear that it targets curved swords, and, if that is contested, it is ultimately for the courts to decide. We will work with the National Police Chiefs’ Council to ensure that police officers have access to appropriate guidance. I am sympathetic to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and other noble Lords, and the proposed amendments require further consideration and consultation.
Regarding Amendment 214—indeed, all the amendments—I stress that it is at the discretion of the police, the CPS and ultimately the courts to decide to take action against those holding weapons or items on the Schedule’s list for legitimate historical reasons, or indeed those using them for legitimate cultural sets of reasons. It is at the discretion of the police and the courts in taking a case forward. But I equally stress that we have existing powers to change the relevant law through secondary legislation. Given that, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
I thank the Minister for both the tone and the content of his response. I agree with him entirely that the main purpose is to keep people safe, and I would never want to do anything to compromise that in any way. One reason for the amendments is that sometimes, the discretion of the police and the prosecution services that he urged has not always been exercised in a way that businesses and collectors have felt is appropriate. This has probably left them to manage that risk themselves. They are not trying to break the law, but they sometimes feel they are at risk of doing so. With all that said, I am reassured by the fact that the Government may be able to consider secondary legislation appropriate. That may be the best way to deal with this. I of course beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Brady of Altrincham
“Definition of firearms(1) Section 57 of the Firearms Act 1968 (interpretation) is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (1), omit paragraph (d).(3) In subsection (4), in the definition of “shot gun”, omit “and any accessory to a shot gun designed or adapted to diminish the noise or flash caused by firing the gun”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment deregulates sound moderators, muzzle breaks and flash hiders, as recommended by the Government in ‘Firearms licensing: proposal to remove sound moderators from firearms licensing controls - government response’, published June 2025. This change will help to alleviate the administrative burden on police firearms licensing departments without any increase in risk or danger to the public.
Lord Brady of Altrincham (Con)
My Lords, I rise briefly to move my Amendment 214A. I declare an interest as honorary president of the British Shooting Sports Council. Amendment 214A would amend the Firearms Act 1968 to reduce the administrative burden on the police, and it would do so with no risk whatever to public safety. It would remove the current requirement to apply to the police for a specific variation on a firearms certificate in order to purchase a sound moderator, a muzzle brake or a flash hider.
I hope to be brief because I believe this amendment to be so utterly uncontroversial. Indeed, I stand here seeking to be of assistance to Ministers because, in June, this Government published Firearms Licensing: Proposal to Remove Sound Moderators from Firearms Licensing Controls—Government Response, in which they recommended exactly the course of action set out in Amendment 214A. They have since indicated their intention to implement the recommendation as soon as parliamentary time allows.
This amendment is in scope for this Bill, it would help to reduce the burden of bureaucracy on police forces, and the Government want to do it. So I hope that the Minister, when he comes to respond, will commit to incorporating this measure at a later point in our deliberations on this Bill. It is clearly a benefit in reducing the drain on police resources. It is a benefit to those who engage in shooting sports and to the industry. As the Government themselves have accepted, it poses no threat whatever to public safety, simply removing what, in the instance of a sound moderator, is essentially an inert tube from a requirement to be licensed as though it were a firearm. I beg to move.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, I will briefly support my noble friend Lord Brady’s amendment for exactly the three or four reasons he articulated. First, it is consistent with the Government’s response in June this year. Secondly, silencers themselves do not constitute a public risk. Thirdly, we are advised that this is a Bill that could permit the amendment. Fourthly, the licensing requirement imposes administrative burdens that we could do well without. These are all very good reasons for accepting the amendment. I declare an interest: I possess a silencer.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I too will be brief. I was pleased to add my name to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Brady. It is a common-sense amendment that is very much in line with the Bill in reducing police bureaucracy without doing anything to harm public safety. The Government have already consulted on this. They have made their views clear— I am pleased to be on their side on an issue—and I hope that the Bill gives the opportunity not to stall any longer or to wait for more parliamentary time, but to go ahead. If we can get this through in a short time, it shows that, overall, there is broad support for this measure. I hope that the Government will accept it and move on.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, the education of townies such as myself continues. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Brady of Altrincham, for his Amendments 214A and 438, which aim to deregulate sound moderators, muzzle brakes and flash hiders. It had not occurred to me that they would be caught by the legislation, so this measure, explicitly designed to alleviate the administrative burden on police firearms licensing departments without increasing risk or danger to the public, seems eminently sensible. Police resources are already stretched, and we are demanding an increased focus on neighbourhood visibility—we have talked about this during the passage of the Bill—so we support sensible deregulation that removes unnecessary bureaucracy without compromising public safety. We support these amendments.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this is a group of relatively straightforward and common-sense amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Brady of Altrincham. It tends to carry out the Government’s own consultation results in a careful and measured way.
Amendment 214A, moved by my noble friend Lord Brady, is a simple procedural measure that implements the Government’s own recommendations. As my noble friend set out, this amendment would not impact, let alone endanger, the public. Sound moderators are inert objects that contain no moving parts. They do not enhance the ability of a firearm, nor is there significant evidence of them being used in crime. The Government have themselves concluded that removing regulation of them will not pose any risk to public safety. I understand the original logic of including them in many firearms regulations, but, in practice, it means that police firearms officers must now obtain a certificate. It is an administrative burden that is not necessary.
Amendment 438 acts much in the same vein. It would require a review of the administrative burdens that noise and flash accessories place upon the police. The Government’s own previous consultation on the latter demonstrated that there is scope here for reform; to expand that to cover other accessories seems a very logical step.
We should aim to remove bureaucratic and administrative hurdles wherever they appear. This is particularly the case for the police, as our forces are under strain. This measure is evidently a small reform among many that should be made and is based on the right principle.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Brady of Altrincham, for setting out the case for his Amendments 214A and 438. I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, who attached their names to Amendment 214A. As the noble Lord, Lord Brady, has explained, the aim is to deregulate the devices known as sound moderators, muzzle brakes and flash hiders.
Like the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, I too must out myself as a townie. As with the previous group, it has been a bit of an education finding out about these items and their uses. They are currently subject to control as they are included in the statutory definition of a firearm set out in Section 57 of the Firearms Act 1968. This means that firearms licence holders with a legitimate need for these items are required to apply to the police to include them on their existing firearms licence, and this is obviously at a cost to both the police and the licence holder.
As many noble Lords have noted—indeed, every noble Lord who spoke—removing these items from the legal definition of a firearm would alleviate the administrative burden on police firearms licensing departments. Because these are entirely inert objects containing no moving parts, they do not of themselves create a risk to public safety, as the noble Lord, Lord Brady, and others have said. The Government have already set out our intention to remove these items from the legal definition of a firearm, and I am therefore sympathetic to the intent behind these amendments.
However, I hope that the noble Lord will understand that I cannot give a commitment at the Dispatch Box this afternoon to bring forward the necessary legislative changes to the Firearms Act in this Bill. If he would agree to withdraw his amendment, I will undertake to update the noble Lord ahead of Report. I will say no more.
Lord Brady of Altrincham (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his constructive response and grateful to all those who have spoken in support of the amendment. I feel almost ashamed to be moving an amendment that is so widely supported and has no opposition on either side of the House. I reassure the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that I am a bit of a townie as well, but there is hope for all of us—we can learn. I am grateful to the Minister and look forward to a further conversation. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Blencathra
“Knives on educational premisesIn section 139A(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (offence of having article with blade or point (or offensive weapon) on educational premises), omit paragraphs (b) to (d).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would ensure that the only justification for anyone to have a knife at school would be for “use at work” and that would apply to teachers only. It would remove any other defence for having a knife on educational premises.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I will speak also to my other amendments in this group. Amendment 214B is rather small; the others propose three large new clauses which I hope to sell to the Government.
On Amendment 214B, the Criminal Justice Act 1988 makes it an offence to have an offensive weapon on any school premises, with the exception that
“it shall be a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) or (2) above to prove that he had the article or weapon in question with him … for use at work … for educational purposes … for religious reasons, or … as part of any national costume”.
My amendment suggests deleting
“for educational purposes … for religious reasons, or … as part of any national costume”.
I see no justification whatever to permit schoolchildren to have knives. What is their educational purpose? Perhaps it is to learn that they have sharp edges.
The religious exemption, I understand, is for the Sikh men and women who are under a religious obligation to wear a knife called a kirpan when they are old enough to understand its meaning. There is no specific age for that, and I stress that it is a religious artefact and is not worn as a weapon. I also stress that Sikhs using the kirpan as a weapon are extremely rare and the only documented case that I can find was of a man drawing it in self-defence when he was attacked, and he was rightly exonerated for it.
Nevertheless, we are awash with knife crime in schools. I think it sends completely the wrong signal that some young men and girls can attend school carrying or wearing a knife. It gives all the ignorant others a chance to say, “If they can carry one, why can’t I?” I stress again that Sikhs do not have a track record of using their kirpans as offensive weapons. I also say that, in my view, no religious belief can trump public safety, no matter what the religion.
Similarly, the exception for national costume must also go, as far as schoolchildren are concerned. In full dress uniform, which I wore very exceptionally, I had a sword on my left side and a dirk on my right—one drew them with contrary arms, so you were fully armed on both sides. We of course also had a sgian-dubh down our hose—our sock, for English speakers. In a civilian kilt, I would also have that black knife—the translation of sgian-dubh—down my right hose. It is a black knife not because of the colour but because it was sneaky and underhanded and you could stab your opponent with a hidden weapon he did not know about—although every single person in Scotland knew you were carrying a secret, hidden weapon down your sock. I am not sure how my dirk differed from the dirk of the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, and I am not sure what purpose his was supposed to be put to as a midshipman: we had better not go there. But I say that there is no justification whatever for permitting any schoolchildren to wear a sgian-dubh or any other knife as part of a national costume. Those exemptions should be rescinded.
Turning now to my principal amendments in this group, and they are related, I think the new clauses I have suggested here are terribly important. Amendment 214 lists some of the categories of offensive weapons that are so dangerous and so evil that they should have separate mention from all other offensive weapons in legislation. Amendment 214D suggests measures to stop their manufacture or importation, with some tough penalties for breaches, and the new clause proposed in Amendment 215 would create tough penalties for possession, carrying and use. The first thing the Minister and other noble Lords will say, quite rightly, is that we do not need a special category for these weapons, since they are all caught already in various laws on offensive weapons. That is entirely correct, but I shall argue that we now have such an epidemic of the use of these appalling weapons, especially machetes, that we need exemplary action to crack down on them.
The first known machete attack in this country was the barbaric murder of PC Blakelock in Broadwater Farm in 1985, where reports say that he was on the ground, curled up in a ball, screaming in agony as a machete and knife-wielding mob hacked him to death with 43 vicious wounds. No one has ever been convicted of that crime. The next big machete attack was in Wolverhampton in 1996, but it is in the last 10 years that machete attacks have really taken off. On Monday, two days ago, an 18 year-old was sentenced to 24 years for the machete murder of a man in Leeds. Also last Monday, a man was sentenced in Croydon for the murder of a 16 year-old with a machete. In Woolwich in October, two teenagers were sentenced for the machete murder of another 15 year-old kid. In September, two youths were sentenced to life imprisonment for the machete murder of a 14 year-old on a London bus. In Lincolnshire, two men were sentenced for the manslaughter with a machete of another man. In October, we all saw videos of a group of men fighting in the street with machetes, and two weeks ago similar videos were shown of a gang outside a Starbucks in east London, fighting with machetes. This did not look like the United Kingdom but downtown Kinshasa, where I see they are almost re-enacting another Rwanda massacre.
I say this carefully. Who is doing nearly all the machete killings? Why, black youths. Who are nearly all the victims who are dying? Again, black youths. This is not the time or the place to go into it, but we seem to have imported an African attitude to the use of machetes, either through some of the people coming into this country or British-born youths adopting a machete culture. Leaving aside the individual historic cases I mentioned, the generality is that police figures recently released from police forces in England and Wales following an FoI show that machetes are used in almost 700 cases every month. That is a machete attack almost every hour on average, but the true total is even higher, as the nation’s largest force, the Metropolitan Police, failed to provide statistics, saying it would take too long for staff to compile them. I am certain that the two noble Lords the former commissioners who are with us here today would have found the time to compile those statistics, especially if I had asked for them. Six other police forces failed to respond. A survey of police forces found that machetes were involved in 1,335 crime incidents in two months at the end of last year.
I have focused on heavily on machetes, since they are the new preferred weapon of choice for gangs and individuals wanting to terrorise and kill those they see as their opponents. Why take a seven-inch knife or a nine-inch carving knife from the kitchen drawer when you can get a 21-inch machete and have a much more offensive weapon? I used to have a machete myself, a handle and a blade about 21 inches long, which I would sharpen to an absolute razor’s edge. I used it for clearing brambles and brush in an overgrown orchard I had. It was a superb implement which could slash through anything. The mind boggles to think of that used on any human being.
The other particularly dangerous weapons I list in this new clause are zombie knives, obviously, and cleavers. Why cleavers? Do we have butchers on the rampage? Well, no, but the scum who murdered drummer Lee Rigby outside Woolwich Barracks used a standard meat cleaver. That is why I say in proposed new subsection (3) that the Secretary of State must be able to add new particularly dangerous weapons if the fad suddenly changes. For example, in rural farming supply shops, noble Lords will find an implement called a bill-hook. It is rather like a shorter version of a machete, but with a curved, pointed end. It is used for hedge laying, but it is not beyond the wit of thugs to buy these if we clamp down so much on machetes or other things that they cannot get them. There is no recorded incidence of a cutlass being used, but they are very similar to machetes and the bad guys will switch to them if we clamp down on everything else.
Finally, in this proposed new clause, I suggest that the Secretary of State be given a rather unusual power—which I do not think we do anywhere else in regulations—to put pictures or photos in the regulations. Look how many words it takes to define a zombie knife. Let us make it simpler by publishing representations of them as well.
I do not need to spend long on Amendment 214D, which provides for the offence of selling, manufacturing and importing of these particularly dangerous weapons. I have already made the case why they are evil, and I suggest that anyone convicted of an offence under this new clause should get up to 10 years’ imprisonment and an unlimited fine. I am not tying the judges’ hands; I can assure the Minister of total discretion to sentence up to 10 years. It must also apply to the directors and officers of a company, who should not be allowed to hide behind limited company status.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, my noble friend was gracious enough to make a reference to me, in the sense that he suggested that I have some concerns about his drafting. Indeed, I do. I shall take the liberty of expressing them, and I shall also deal with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, about his dirk, which I will come to in a moment.
Machetes are my particular concern, but so, too, are cleavers, defined in this amendment. We need to understand that both have legitimate purposes. The fact is clearly recognised in the exemptions contained in proposed new subsection (6) in Amendment 214E, where the fact that they have legitimate purposes is fully recognised.
I have a number of machetes. I have used them all my life and I still do. They are essential for clearing brambles and thorns when you cannot get at them with a strimmer or another mechanical instrument. I have not actually got a cleaver, but I know that people interested in cooking—not me—use them. Butchers certainly use them, as do gamekeepers and gillies when preparing carcasses from animals shot on the estate. Let us face it: these things have legitimate use. It is in that context that we must come to the detail with which we have been provided.
Proposed new subsection (1) in Amendment 214D states that any person marketing or selling, et cetera, any of these instruments is committing an offence. That means that any hardware store in my former constituency which happened to be selling a machete would be committing an absolute offence. That is a very bizarre proposition. It means that any decent catering shop that sells cleavers is committing an absolute offence.
In proposed new subsection (2) these are absolute offences—no mens rea whatever. Then in proposed new subsection (3), anybody guilty of any of those offences faces imprisonment for up to 10 years. Proposed new subsection (4), the most bizarre of all, states that the police or the National Crime Agency can come into a private house to see whether there are any machetes or cleavers in it. That is all very bizarre stuff.
We then come to an even more interesting set of propositions in Amendment 214E.
“Any person over the age of 18”,
that is me,
“in possession of … a machete … in a public place is guilty of an offence”.
I have brambles and thorns in the adjoining fields to which I have to get access to cut—armed with my machete —by going along the footpath, which happens to be a public way, or by crossing the street, which happens to be a public way. In doing so I would be committing an absolute offence. That, I regret to say, is absurd.
I notice in proposed new subsection (3) that the police can come into my house to find these offensive weapons which I have had all my life. That is absurd. Proposed new subsection (4) states:
“It is assumed that the possession or carrying of”,
these things,
“is for the purposes of unlawful violence”.
When I am going along the footpath or crossing the street to cut down some brambles or thorns, it is to be presumed that I am intending some act of unlawful violence. Is that really sensible?
Proposed new subsection (5) on zombie knives is acceptable. However, proposed new subsection (6) deals with the “Hacking” point, if I may so call it. The noble Lord, Lord Hacking, possesses a dirk. I do not know how long the dirk is, but I can imagine that it is of a length to make it a sword. If this amendment is accepted by your Lordships, should the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, go for a stroll on Whitehall carrying his dirk, he will be committing an absolute offence, and it will be assumed that he is intending some violence to third parties. Let us assume it is a sword. What happens if he stores it at home? Is it displayed for historical purposes? I rather doubt that; I do not suppose it is hanging on the wall to be shown to the public. Is it worn by uniformed personnel, as part of their uniform? Well, I am looking forward to seeing the noble Lord in his uniform, but I fancy that the answer to that is also no.
The truth is in a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, in an earlier debate. If you go to any country house like mine, my friends’ or my neighbours’, they are stuffed full of these things, like swords from previous campaigns, that their great-great-grandfather carried at Waterloo, or that their great-grandfather carried at the Boer war, or whatever. These are not displayed for historical purposes; they are family possessions, and it is an absurdity to say that the police can come into my house and take these things. Oh no, no, no—this will not do at all.
The truth is that if somebody wishes to walk down Whitehall waving a machete, I am not surprised that the police get upset, but if they come to Lincolnshire—Kettlethorpe in particular—and find me crossing the street to cut down brambles and thorns with a machete I have owned for 50 years, I shall be passing annoyed. My noble friend’s purpose may be splendid, but his drafting is defective.
Lord Garnier (Con)
My Lords, there have been two things which were splendid. First of all were the intentions behind the proposals of my noble friend Lord Blencathra, and secondly, the content and tone of the speech of my noble friend Lord Hailsham. It seems to me that my noble friend Lord Blencathra is essentially saying that there needs to be greater attention paid by the public authorities—I include legislators as a public authority for this purpose—to the increase in the incidence of machete and cleaver crime, and that we need to make sure there is less of it. Secondly, as my noble friend Lord Hailsham has said, there is some deficiency here. I think he was making what we used to call a pleading point, but let us leave it there.
Lord Garnier (Con)
There we are. Perhaps in the spirit of compromise, I suggest that the answer to this is a sentencing question. My noble friend Lord Blencathra pointed out that, in some of the particularly nasty cases he referred to, very lengthy sentences were awarded for the people who committed these crimes with these particular weapons. As I said at Second Reading, I have a horror of legislating to create new offences which are already offences. It is already an offence to do something criminal with one of these weapons, no matter what it is called. Although I entirely understand my noble friend’s motives, the better way is to consider whether the sentencers have sufficient powers to deal very seriously with these very serious crimes. By the sound of it, they already do, but the Government may want to look to see whether the criminal courts should be given greater powers of sentencing when dealing with crimes committed with these particular weapons.
I come back to my points. I understand my noble friend Lord Blencathra’s motives; I equally understand my noble friend Lord Hailsham’s enthusiasm for the points he has made. But, essentially, we are here dealing with a matter of sensible sentencing for particularly vicious crimes. If we concentrated on that, we would not clutter up the already over-lengthy legislation with yet more provisions.
Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)
My Lords, since the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, mentioned my name, perhaps I should just say that his recollection of what happened in Glasgow is indeed correct. Lord Carmont was dealing with convicted criminals. These were people who had been convicted of crimes, from assaults to severe injury, and were using a perfectly familiar weapon: an open razor, which people commonly used. The example that the noble Lord gave makes exactly the point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, made: it was dealt with by sentencing, not by legislation.
In those days, there was no Sentencing Council, and a judge was free, more or less, to choose his own sentence. Lord Carmont chose very severe sentences, which were quite out of the usual range. The shock that caused had a real effect in reducing that particular crime. It was not the end of knife crime, I am afraid, although that was suppressed later by other measures, but it was a very effective use of a sentencing power in the days when judges were not constrained by a Sentencing Council, other rules and so on. They were able to select a really severe sentence when it suited the situation. The noble Lord’s recollection is perfectly correct, but I think it makes the point that it is better to deal with this by sentencing.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, briefly, I associate myself with all the sentiments that have been shared this afternoon on this matter. I think we all know what we want to try and stop with the Bill: zombie knives. There is no excuse or legitimate use at all for a zombie knife. But it is incredibly difficult to define, and legislation has attempted to do so. The points raised by my noble friend Lord Hailsham are absolutely right: we do not want to criminalise the use of everyday items or the ownership of swords. They may not be for historical purposes, but they may be of sentimental value, family heirlooms or collector’s items and may have any number of associated uses. My noble friend Lord Blencathra has put his finger on an absolute scourge which we, as parliamentarians and in co-operation with the police, really have to deal with using every tool that we have. But I also share the concern that there will be many unintended consequences if my noble friend’s amendments, as currently drafted, were included in the Bill.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I will speak about Amendment 214B on knives in schools. It will come as no surprise to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, that we on these Benches take a different view. We strongly believe that criminalising children is just not the way forward. Last year, an authoritative joint police and Ofsted report warned that serious youth violence has spread its tentacles further than many adults realise and that 11 year-olds now carry knives for protection, so there is no doubt that there is a major problem. However, the same report does not call for more punitive sanctions to deter young people from offending. Instead, it recommends a preventative, public health approach, focused on early intervention, safeguarding and partnership working. It warned that, without better co-ordination and sustained investment in prevention, efforts to tackle youth violence will fall short and the cycle of harm will continue. These warnings must be heeded.
Yet, budget pressures mean police forces are cutting safer school programmes. The Met, for example, is moving 371 officers out of schools due to funding shortfalls. Prevention has to be taken seriously and resourced properly. Public health funding per capita has fallen by 28% since 2015. That results in reactive rather than preventative policing, and nowhere is this more important than with children and knife crime.
I agree that there is no justification for a child to bring a knife into school, but we cannot support the approach of Amendment 214B. Instead, we should concentrate on the success of interventions such as Operation Divan, which involves a single, voluntary face-to-face meeting between a young person at risk and a police officer or a youth justice worker. This prioritises prevention, education and safeguarding. Early results show a 60% reduction in knife and weapon offences at a cost of only £30 to £65 per person.
I turn briefly to the noble Lord’s remaining amendments and the proposal for a special category of particularly dangerous weapons. As the noble Lord recognises, these weapons are already prohibited. In our view, creating another category risks unnecessary overlap without adding any real benefit.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
I thank my noble friend Lord Blencathra for his series of interesting amendments regarding knife crime. As we have already heard, my noble friend comes to this debate with the experience of some time in the Home Office—a real experience at the sharp end. Although the rates of knife crime have fallen a little over recent years, any victim of a crime, particularly one caused by knives, is a victim too many. Just recently, we heard of the terrible incident on fireworks night a year or so ago and the trial, which finished in the Old Bailey earlier this autumn; 16 year- olds were involved, and one of them died, and it all happened very quickly. So, knives are a real problem. The Government pledged in their manifesto to halve knife crime by 2030. If they wish to make good on that premise, it is imperative that they really do something to reduce it.
My noble friend’s amendments are a welcome practical measure in that direction but are subject to a number of reservations. I begin with schools. Amendment 214B introduces an important clarification to the law in respect of defences for carrying a knife in school premises. It makes plain that the only justification for someone having a knife at school can be in relation to educational services. It is also right that, in turn, this justification should apply only to teachers or those holding a position of authority. There is no plausible reason why a student should come on to the school premises carrying a knife. We welcome the amendment as an important step to ensure that both pupils and teachers are safe from knives at school, and we hope that the Government look at this and consider the amendment seriously.
We also thank my noble friend for his Amendments 214C to 214E. As we have heard, these seek to create a special category of particularly dangerous weapons: machetes, zombie knives, cleavers, swords and cutlasses. The merit is in identifying particular weapons by name. That will strike a chord with the public and with those who might otherwise carry them. They will know that, if they carry one of these weapons, just having it in their possession risks a very heavy prison sentence. Just having existing powers of sentencing does not, it seems, carry that resonance with those who most need to hear it, so we have got to do something.
Given the substantial increase in the use of machetes in recent years—we heard from my noble friend about the increase in their use in particular—something has to be done which identifies them, singles them out and curbs their circulation and use. In 2024, there were 18 machete homicides, an increase from 14 in 2023. Amendments 214D and 214E similarly ensure that manufacturing, selling, ownership and possession of these dangerous weapons will be regarded as a specific new offence.
My noble friend Lord Hailsham was right to point out that the drafting causes problems, and there are people, in the countryside in particular, who may have a legitimate use for machetes. But we are not in the jungle of Belize; we are in the United Kingdom. Sickles and scythes can be used, of course, but if there is going to be a use for something such as a machete, there should be specific clarity to make sure that we do not allow it to be put forward as a specious defence.
To call these amendments bizarre would, in my submission, go too far. If we take this matter seriously, as we all should, we will know full well that this really is an important mischief which has to be addressed, named and called out. My noble friend has raised an important issue, and the Government, if they are serious about cutting knife crime—and not just knife crime but the use of these appalling tools and weapons—must work to bridge the drafting gap so that the sorts of things which we have seen and heard about in the last few years are heavily reduced and people can walk and live in safety, particularly in our big cities.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I confess that despite preparing for the debate on these amendments, I did not expect to venture into Glasgow razor crime in the 1950s, the use of Waterloo swords or, indeed, the brambles of Lincolnshire, but this has been an enjoyable debate on a very serious subject and I welcome the contributions from across the Committee today.
Amendment 214B in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, asks whether existing defences to possession of a bladed article—that is, a knife—should be removed in educational establishments. I am of the view that the defences listed under Section 139A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 are appropriate and in line with similar defences that already exist for the offence of possession of a bladed article in a public place.
The defence for educational purposes, for example, which Amendment 214B seeks to remove, would cover instances where both the teacher and the student may need to use a knife in the classroom or for educational purposes on the premises, such as in craftmanship or cookery lessons, or others. The noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, made common cause with the view that there is a need for certain uses of knives in schools under strictly controlled circumstances.
The issue of prevention, which the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, also mentioned, is important, and I endorse the idea that we need to look at how we prevent the use of knives. However, I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, that in Amendment 214B his withdrawal of those definitions would cause some difficulties in educational matters.
The religious reasons defence takes into account the need sometimes to carry a knife for religious reasons. The noble Lord and others have mentioned the position of individuals of the Sikh faith. The Government are not aware of any cases where this or any other existing defence has been abused in educational establishments by members of that faith.
Again, it is appropriate to put on record that educational establishments can introduce their own rules and regulations, and, of course, if someone brings a knife into an educational establishment or uses a knife already in the establishment to cause harm, even if they have a defence such as for work purposes, they will have a committed a serious criminal offence under existing legislation.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
Indeed. On reflection, I think I can tell the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, that his dirk is a dagger and therefore does not fall within the remit of the legislation proposed—I think that information was considered by my noble friend Lord Katz but it was not able to be deployed at the time. However, we can return to that at some point.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am glad that the noble Lord is relieved about that.
The serious point here is that getting the defences and exemptions under which weapons may be legal to own, import or sell under certain limited circumstances right also requires consultation—I think the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, acknowledged that. In the absence of such consultation, I suggest that the Bill is not the right place to legislate on a specific category of knives and weapons, and we risk not taking account of some important matters if we have not consulted first.
In any event, it would be possible to give effect to these proposals for further restrictions through existing regulation-making powers provided for since the Criminal Justice Act 1988. Any such regulations would be subject to the draft affirmative procedure, so, again, they would be subject to debate in and approval by both Houses of Parliament.
We have debated the provisions in Chapter 1 of Part 2 which introduce new measures to provide the police with the power to require social media marketplaces and search services to take down online illegal content. I understand the honest, genuine motivation of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, in tabling these amendments, but just a casual listen to the debate today shows that there are a number of issues that we need to consider, and I believe that the existing powers that we have, the actions that we have taken and the measures under the Bill will be sufficient. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken, some mildly in support of my amendments and others liking the concept but pointing out the serious drafting flaws in them. I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Hailsham; he is right that the drafting is flawed. Any future amendments I make would need to include “legitimate and lawful use”. He pointed out that he would need to go on to the high street or to another public place to use his machete. I would have to do the same myself, with a buddleia overgrowing the road. If I had a machete, I would have to go on to the pavement to use it. Instead, I have an electric trimmer, which my wife can use. There are legitimate flaws in my drafting.
I suspect that many of my noble friends from a hereditary background have houses stuffed full of dangerous, sharp weapons—from pikes to swords—as well as armour and all the other accoutrements acquired over centuries in this great and noble land of ours, where tremendous battles have been fought to secure our freedoms since 1066. Of course they are not for public display; I accept that this too is an error in my drafting. They are there because they are owned by the family, who should not be penalised for having them.
My concept is right. There is a problem here, and I hope that if we come back to some elements of this amendment on Report, my noble friend Lord Hailsham will help me in the drafting. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, that a dirk is not included in my definition. My noble and learned friend Lord Garnier hit the nail on the head: tough sentences are required, though that may not require some of the amendments that I have suggested. I am so grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for pointing out that with the Prevention of Crime Act 1953, it was tough sentences that cracked down in Scotland. I do not want to put words into his mouth, but he said that there was then full judicial discretion. We did not have the Sentencing Council, which to me ties the hands of our judges—judges who should have full discretion to sentence as they see fit.
In some of those cases in the last few months which I quoted, people got a minimum term of 24 years or 30 years for an appalling murder, but hundreds of others who attacked people who did not die received much lesser sentences. Machete attacks have now become endemic. It is the weapon of choice for bad guys, for youths who want to commit crimes or terrorise their opponents in other gangs. We need unique and specialised exemplary action.
I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that I am not calling for children to be criminalised. I referred to three instances, and I was wrong in suggesting removing educational uses. But I can see no justification for maintaining a religious exception and a national dress exception allowing kids to bring such knives to school. The Government are wrong to stick to that.
Introducing this has been worth while. I do not mind that my noble friend Lord Hailsham called some of it “bizarre”. What is happening on the streets of London and elsewhere in England today is bizarre. If, 20 years ago, we had said that we would see these gangs fighting on the streets outside Starbucks with machetes, we would have said, “Don’t be fanciful; it’s barking mad; it’s never going to happen”. It is happening day in, day out on our streets. It is not only bizarre; it is obscene and dangerous. Therefore, we need to take special action, exemplary action, to deal with this problem. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment 214B.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe
“(c) is employed by the occupier or owner of the retail premises in delivering goods directly to a consumer from the premises.”
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 214F and 214G, in my name, as we move away from the regulation of weapons to retail crime and shoplifting. I will try to be brief.
In my 15 or so years as an executive at Tesco and as vice-chair of the British Retail Consortium, I spent many hours investigating and studying shoplifting and what could be done to reduce it. We used staff training, the latest waves of technology and generous business investment to combat it. I was always very worried by the wider social impact, as stolen goods were sold on to fuel drug habits and innocent shop workers were sometimes hurt in the process of trying to stop it. The truth is that these risks and their devastating effect on individuals have become much greater as society has changed and become more divided and less moral, and hence violent crime has become more of a day-to-day occurrence. As with so much else, the long Covid lockdown has made things worse, and the police have prioritised other things.
However, this Bill is full of amendments requiring the police to do more. That will put yet further pressure on the police contribution to tackling neighbourhood crimes such as shoplifting and assaults on retail workers, which frighten retail workers, especially in the smallest shops, and lead, sadly, to more shop closures on the high street. For some years I strongly supported USDAW’s campaign for a stand-alone offence of assaulting a retail worker. As the Minister knows, I am delighted that the Bill puts that into law. It is a good day for the Minister, given his USDAW links, and for the noble Lord, Lord Hannett of Everton, smiling over there, who represented USDAW so intelligently when I was at Tesco.
However, the Bill as drafted does not quite do the trick as it does not cover retail delivery drivers, who have also been the subject of growing aggression. This is a particular problem if the driver has to ask for ID because a juvenile under 18 is taking delivery—a flashpoint, according to a recent British Retail Consortium survey—or if there is a disagreement about what is being paid for and delivered. Last week, Tesco even announced that it was piloting giving body cameras to delivery drivers. Another point of significance is that such drivers are already covered by parallel legislation in Scotland. That is not always a recommendation, but given the national character of much of retail, I hope the Minister will agree that this alignment makes sense and accept my Amendments 214 F and 214 G. I beg to move.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I will be very brief this time. My Amendment 214FA seeks to add hospitality venues. This is an important clause which has my full support; I simply want clarification that cafes, restaurants, pubs and bars are included in the definition of retail premises.
In UK law, “retail premises” typically refers to premises where goods are sold directly to consumers for personal use. This includes shops, supermarkets and other establishments where tangible products are offered for sale. Hospitality venues such as cafes, restaurants, pubs and bars primarily provide services: the preparation and serving of food and drink for consumption on the premises. While these venues may sell some items to take away, their main business activity is the provision of hospitality services rather than retailing goods.
UK planning law differentiates between retail and hospitality venues through the use of “use classes”, which categorise buildings and their permitted activities. Class E—commercial, business and service—includes shops, restaurants, cafés, financial services and other commercial uses. While both retail shops and hospitality venues are covered under class E, they are distinct subcategories within this class. Class E(a) refers to shops selling goods, while class E(b) refers to the
“sale of food and drink principally to visiting members of the public where consumption is mostly undertaken on the premises”,
which covers cafés, pubs and restaurants. Therefore, while cafés and restaurants fall under the same broad planning class as retail shops, they are not regarded as retail outlets in the strict sense, but rather as hospitality or food service venues.
Legislation relating to employment, health and safety, licensing and business rates may further distinguish between retail and hospitality businesses. For example, food hygiene regulations specifically address food service establishments, while retail regulations focus on the sale of goods. Under UK law, cafés and restaurants are not generally regarded as retail outlets; they are classified as hospitality venues or food service establishments. The key distinction lies in the primary activity. Selling goods is retail whereas providing food and drink services is hospitality. From what I understand, the core hospitality operations—serving meals and drinks, and providing accommodation—are not generally covered under the definition of a retail outlet. If I am wrong and Clause 37 includes cafés, bars and restaurants, then I am content that there is no problem. However, if it does not, we have a gaping hole in the law and my amendment is essential to plug it. If I am right that those are not covered, I hope the Minister will bring forward a little amendment to ensure that those workers get the same protection as workers in retail shops.
Lord Hannett of Everton (Lab)
My Lords, I am pleased to contribute to this debate. In fact, some months ago, I introduced a debate on retail crime. I think it is fair to say that there was support across the House—why would there not be? The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, made the point that, to some extent, this was never an adversarial debate between employers and the trade union. It is a good example of where we come together for a common cause.
In historical terms, I should say that, in 2003, USDAW, which has been referred to, introduced its Freedom From Fear campaign. It sounds very dramatic, but it was born out of necessity. Too many retail workers were being verbally and physically abused. In some ways it had become normalised. It was an acknowledgement that, on too many occasions, people working in retail were abused. This campaign has run since 2003 and has resulted in this stand-alone offence being accepted.
I congratulate the Minister, not just because he had the enlightened view to become a member of USDAW, which I should acknowledge, but because of his commitment to retail workers and to understanding the implications of being verbally and physically abused. We often see the retail store as an environment that, quite rightly, encourages people to come in, and the vast majority of the public do so. In truth, however, over the years, the trend of coming into a store and believing that you can abuse somebody has become normalised. It is not condoned by employers, and certainly not by the trade unions, but the £200 threshold, to some extent, gave licence. Even some of the perpetrators would say, “Don’t worry, if it’s less than £200 there’ll be no action taken”.
Retail workers, of whom there are just under 3 million, do an exceptional job; reference was made to the pandemic. Abuse can never be a part of the job. It is a fundamental right to be able to go to work safe and come home safe. That is why I congratulate the Government and the Minister on their commitment to this matter. I could read out lots of statistics about the effects of retail crime; I will not do so. However, I draw noble Lords’ attention to the USDAW campaign, to retail crime and to its impact. Everyone has stores within their area. If you talk to shopworkers, you will see that this is very much an evidence-based campaign.
When I talk about statistics, I am not talking about thefts from a store; I am talking about the fact that behind every statistic, there is an individual. Some of those individuals who were physically abused never went back to the workplace. Having been abused two or three times, they did not have the confidence to return. That is a shame. Maybe it reflects the way society has gone, as we have referred to.
I welcome this stand-alone offence, and I do not want to detract from it. It is 22 years, at least, in the making. A lot of effort has gone in. I am proud of the fact that this Government have understood it and have done it, although I have to say to the Minister that the question of where the Act will stop has been referred to in respect of this offence. I am proud that this offence has been accepted, because it matters. I say to my noble friend the Minister that USDAW wants me to send a big thanks for the effort that has gone in to achieve this outcome.
However, I want to make a request of the Minister; I hope that he will consider it favourably. I would like to meet him to consider some of the implications of the further reach of retail offences. I would like that meeting to be with my general secretary, Joanne Thomas, and maybe people from the Home Office. I make that request on a without prejudice basis, but it would give me the opportunity to express some further considerations and concerns that have been raised in this House.
I will leave it at that but express my support for the work that has been done on this Bill. Hopefully, when this Bill takes effect with the stand-alone offence, USDAW members will feel now that it has been accepted.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I agree entirely with the noble Lord. This is slightly extraneous to the amendment but, wearing his USDAW hat, will he please campaign against automatic tills, which we helpless disabled people find absolutely appalling? Will he commend shops such as Booths in the north of England, which has absolutely refused to have automatic tills and insist on having tellers at every one? It is a wonderful way to shop.
Lord Hannett of Everton (Lab)
We can have a conversation about that at some stage. I thank the noble Lord.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)
My Lords, if I may, I will come back to the topic of this group. I too have an amendment in this group, Amendment 351. I am pleased to follow the noble Lord, Lord Hannett, and indeed my noble friends. I endorse a lot of what they have said and argued.
As I said at Second Reading, I have huge sympathy for those in public-facing jobs who have been subject to abuse and violent threats at work. Aside from such threats being unacceptable, I, like the noble Lord, Lord Hannett, understand the fear that they generate. Anyone at work on the receiving end of such a threat should at least be confident that the police will respond swiftly when they are in danger, or when an actual crime starts to be committed.
My instincts have always been to support Clauses 37 and 38, as I said at Second Reading. However, I find myself somewhat conflicted. Several noble Lords argued at Second Reading that existing provisions on assault are an adequate protection in law and that a special law for assault against retail workers was not needed. I thought these arguments were somewhat convincing. Having said that, to be absolutely clear, I have no desire to remove Clauses 37 or 38 from the Bill. I will continue before everybody thinks that I am going to do something radical, which will cause all sorts of upset.
The amendments tabled by my noble friends Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lord Blencathra to extend the protection to delivery drivers and some hospitality workers in some establishments highlight that, having started down the path of singling out just the retail sector, it is difficult to draw a clear boundary line. The noble Lord, Lord Hannett, has already said that he now wants to push it yet further.
As we know, the aggravated crime of assault against public-facing workers, which we added to the crime and courts Bill, included all industries and sectors. That was not focused only on the retail industry. I worry that the aggravated offence of assault, which covers everybody in public-facing work, together with this new offence of assault on retail workers, will create a somewhat confusing picture for people who are employed in public-facing roles but are not in the retail sector. I think here of people working in public transport, or in banks or post offices; there are all sorts of different categories.
This potentially confusing picture brings me back to my underlying concerns. First, we cannot afford to lose good people who are doing a good job, whether that is in shops, on public transport, or in banks or post offices, as I said. We think of the recent horrific incident on LNER the other Saturday and the railway worker who was heroic in intervening. We are very conscious now that a lot of people are in places of work where they are subject to real threats and abuse.
So I ask the Minister: what work have he and the department done to satisfy himself that any perception of two-tier protection for people in different public-facing roles will not have a detrimental effect on employees who may fear they are no longer as covered as some other people in other public-facing roles? If there has been any work on that, that would be helpful to know and understand.
Secondly, and in my view just as importantly, if not more so, noble Lords who were in the Chamber at Second Reading may have heard me argue then that one of the things that I feel are needed is for workers who are in charge of public spaces or places, whether they be commercial or public sector spaces, to be encouraged to be more active in upholding common standards of conduct that we should all have a right to expect of each other in public, the breakdown of which is adding to people’s despair. The sorts of things I am talking about here are litter dropping, feet on seats, watching videos or listening to music on phones without headphones, and queue jumping. That is the kind of activity that comes before we get to actual offences that sometimes are happening now, such as fare dodging, smoking or drinking alcohol on public transport where they are not meant to be, or even defecating in public. We need workers to have delegated authority, from their employer or their union, and from all of us in leadership positions, and have confidence that, along with them, we will do the same in upholding these important standards in public places. We need a collective effort to tackle what I see as a broken windows type of activity. If we keep allowing this kind of activity to be ignored, we are allowing the risk of escalated bad behaviour to continue, which could then lead to actual serious crimes.
While the various trade bodies are coming at this from their perspectives with a desire to protect their staff, and rightly so, we need to look at this through a much wider lens and see the bigger picture. As a consequence of that, it might be that the price we need to pay is expanding what some believe is an unnecessary new crime in the Bill, to include other workers and to match the terms of the aggravated offence in the Crime and Courts Bill.
As I say, this was a probing amendment—this is not me trying to introduce a new law—but I would like it if the Minister agreed to meet me, perhaps with my noble friend Lord Davies, to talk about this some more. I genuinely think there are potential unintended consequences to this that we need at least to be alive to. We should consider what more is needed to ensure that everyone who is in a public-facing role feels sufficiently protected, but also, if we are to tackle the behaviour that is leading some to feel that they can do things with impunity, and that then gives them the courage and confidence to go on to commit more serious offences, we need to be thinking about this in a very different and more innovative way.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I have a lot of sympathy with many of the points made. First, we welcome the new protections introduced by Clauses 37 and 38. As legislators, we cannot stand by while so many people turn up to work every day expecting to face potentially terrifying abuse, threats and physical violence. This was brought home to me recently when a friend of mine went into our local Boots the chemist earlier this week in order to buy some headache tablets, only to find that practically every shelf in the shop was completely empty. When she spoke to the staff, they said, “Oh, it happens on a daily basis”, and they are so terrified that they just stand by and do nothing, because they are petrified that if they do anything or say anything they could be knifed. That is not in an area that is known for, to use the noble Baroness’s expression, “baddies”. It is in an area of London that is very safe. So that is really worrying.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for bringing forward Amendments 214F and 214G, which address a gap in the protections afforded to retail workers under Clause 37. I am also grateful to noble Lords who have contributed to the debate.
The amendments seek to ensure that delivery drivers who are employed as part of the retail and distribution process are fully included in the scope of the proposed offences against retail workers, and that delivery vehicles themselves are recognised as an extension of the retail premises. We understand and support the underlying principle behind these proposals. Delivery drivers in many cases are the face and point of contact between businesses and consumers and they often work alone, sometimes at unsociable hours and in circumstances where they may be exposed to heightened vulnerability and increasing levels of aggression and abuse.
The safety of delivery drivers should not depend on whether they are standing behind a shop counter or stepping out of a branded van. The rise of home delivery as a core component of modern retail means that this work is an integral part of the sector, and it is only right that the law reflects that reality. It is regrettable to read that certain major supermarkets have rolled out bodycams for their delivery drivers in an effort to protect them. I therefore hope the Government will consider carefully how these protections might sensibly be extended to those whose job it is to ensure that goods reach the customer.
Turning to Amendment 351 in the name of my noble friend Lady Stowell of Beeston, I fully understand the principle and intent behind this amendment. It raises significant questions about whether the current scope of legal protection is sufficiently broad. The question of whether other public-facing workers, such as in transport, hospitality or civic buildings, face similar risks is one worth raising and discussing. Many of those workers play a crucial role in maintaining order, ensuring safety and supporting essential public functions in spaces accessible to the public.
I similarly thank my noble friend Lord Blencathra for his Amendment 214FA. This would include premises used by the hospitality industry for the supply of food or drink as part of the definition of retail premises for the purposes of this offence. This is also an important question to pose to the Government, and I hope they consider it with care.
The issues raised by this group of amendments deserve serious consideration. They invite the Government to reflect on whether extra provisions are needed to protect certain public-facing roles and, if so, which roles specifically need to be highlighted. The question that needs to be answered in response to all the amendments in this group is why only retail workers should be afforded a special criminal offence. Does the A&E receptionist not face the threat of violence and intimidation too? What about the bar staff at a nightclub? A wide range of people are at higher risk of assault during the course of their work. If we are to create a specific offence of assaulting a retail worker, it would make sense to expand this. I hope that the Government will give this careful thought and return the clarity in how they intend to address the concerns expressed.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am very grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lady Stowell, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for their amendments. I should note—if not declare an interest—that I have been a member of the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers for 46 years now. That is a long time. I think it is worth noting that I have an interest in this matter. Indeed, I spent many years trying to raise this very issue when a Member of Parliament and outside Parliament before coming to this House.
I should also say at the outset that I am meeting the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, to discuss this matter, and am very happy to meet the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, as well. I had a request from my noble friend Lord Hannett of Everton to meet him and the USDAW general secretary, Joanne Thomas. I am also happy to do that between now and Report; it may not be immediately.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)
I would be very happy to join a group meeting rather than the Minister having to have several meetings with each of us. If there were to be third parties involved in a meeting, such as USDAW, I wonder whether he would also consider including the Institute of Customer Service. It is in a unique position—and I declare an interest as a vice-chair of the All-Party Group on Customer Service—as it looks at this across the board, and the letter it organised included signatories from a range of different industries.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
We will reflect on that. It is a helpful suggestion, if colleagues are happy to have a joint meeting. I would also like to involve the Policing Minister, who has an interest in this matter as a whole.
I want to place on record my thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and my noble friend Lord Hannett of Everton. They have campaigned very strongly as representatives of the supermarkets, in this case Tesco, and the workforce. My noble friend has campaigned for many years on this issue. Freedom from Fear is a campaign that Paddy Lillis, the previous general secretary, Joanne Thomas, the current general secretary, and my noble friend Lord Hannett of Everton, the general secretary before Paddy Lillis, worked on for a long time. It has been brought to them by members of the union as an important issue. It is worth putting that on record, and we can examine how we organise the discussion and consultation in due course.
Assault on anyone, including delivery drivers and transport staff, is wholly unacceptable. Everyone should be protected from assault. Under the Criminal Justice Act 1988, common assault has a maximum sentence of six months in prison and the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 covers serious violence, grievous bodily harm and actual bodily harm.
I come back to the reason why I have campaigned on this issue for many years. Retail workers have been at the forefront of upholding much of the legislation. They uphold legislation on solvent abuse sales, tobacco sales, knife sales, drink sales and a range of other issues. They are also very much the first port of call on shop theft and the issues that the noble Baroness mentioned. USDAW figures show that 10% of staff have reported a physical attack on them in the last year alone; that seems to me to be a very strong reason why the Government have brought forward this amendment. There is a wealth of evidence to back the position that there is a significant problem specific to retail workers because of the nature of that work.
Clauses 37 and 38 provide for the bespoke offence of assaulting a retail worker. They also place a duty on the courts when sentencing an offender to make a criminal behaviour order; shop theft may often be linked to drug and alcohol abuse issues as a whole. Our definition of a retail worker is intentionally narrow, given the vital need to provide legal clarity and ensure there is no ambiguity for courts in identifying whether an individual is a retail worker when impacted by their job.
The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, mentioned the hospitality sector. This sector is specifically excluded, but if he looks at the definition of retail premises in Clause 37(3), he can see that it would be open to a judge to determine what might be included. For example, cafes might have stalls inside the shop, so that could be potentially defined as a retail premise as well. There is no specific offence, and I would not wish to extend it to the hospitality sector, but a judge could potentially interpret some aspects of hospitality being within the retail sector under Clause 37(3).
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I think the Minister’s remarks make quite a telling case. In particular, I was struck by the point that retail workers, because of the things they sell—cigarettes and tobacco—are more on the front line than people serving chicken nuggets, or whatever. I accept that there is a very good point that the retail sector needs to be guarded specifically, possibly differently from the hospitality sector. I shall look carefully at what he said.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
Delivery drivers cover a wide range of sectors and roles and therefore including them could potentially cause an issue with definition and therefore with the courts using the legislation. Again, my noble friend and the noble Baronesses, Lady Stowell of Beeston and Lady Neville-Rolfe, have put that case. I am happy to meet them, and we can examine and discuss and hear what they have to say outside the Committee.
With regard to public-facing workers, which the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, also mentioned, the previous Government—again to their credit—introduced a statutory aggravating factor for assault against any public-facing worker via Section 156 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. I am advised that that would include, for example, train staff, and the aggravating factor would apply in assault cases when an offence is committed against those providing a public service, performing a public duty, or providing a service to the public. There may be areas of definition, but I hope that the issue that the noble Baroness has raised ensures that the courts treat the public-facing nature of a victim’s role as an aggravating factor when considering the sentence for an offence and will send a clear message that violence and abuse towards any public-facing worker will not be tolerated.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and my noble friend Lord Davies for their support for my amendment. I thank the Minister for agreeing to further discussions, and to a meeting, although I have to say that I am slightly disappointed by his initial remarks. I would also like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Hannett, and my noble friends Lord Blencathra and Lady Stowell, for the probing and constructive questions that they have put forward on this important part of the Bill. I emphasise again the everyday risk to retail staff and retail drivers who were, of course, so heroic during Covid. Without them, we would all have starved.
I hope the Minister will understand that I drafted a very narrow amendment advisedly; I reduced what was originally proposed by the experts from the retail industry. It very much confines the opportunity to retail, and to drivers from retailers. I am very happy to look at the wording and I can see that we need to keep it narrow. I have resisted a number of representations from other sectors in putting forward this amendment, because it is so important that we look at the evidence base, which seems to be stronger in respect of violence, both towards retail workers and drivers. I look forward to our further discissions; I may bring this issue back at Report. In the meantime, however, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I have tabled this notice of my intention to oppose the question that Clause 39 stand part of the Bill, to correct what has become serious misinformation. By way of background, Clause 39 repeals Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980. That section was inserted into the 1980 Act by Section 176 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 provides that where a person is charged with a shoplifting offence where the value of the stolen goods is under £200, the offence is triable only summarily. Accordingly, low-value shoplifting cases will only be heard before magistrates’ courts and will not go before the Crown Court. This alteration has become the subject of significant misinformation, largely perpetuated by the party in government. In the 2024 election manifesto, it claimed that this had created
“effective immunity for some shoplifting”
and the Government’s policy paper in the Bill, published on GOV.UK, calls it “perceived immunity”. This, of course, is absolutely false. There is no immunity in any form for any shoplifting offences. Allowing an offence to be tried only in a magistrates’ court does not give anyone immunity.
The Sentencing Council’s guidelines for sentencing a person guilty of theft from a shop state that the starting point for low-value shoplifting, with little additional harm to the victim, is a “high-level community order”, with the maximum being a 12-week custodial sentence. For low-value shoplifting, with significant additional harm to the victim, the starting point is 12 weeks’ custody and the maximum is 26 weeks’ custody. It is clear, then, that magistrates’ courts can impose community orders and terms of imprisonment on offenders found guilty of low-value shoplifting. If the Government believe that is immunity, they clearly need to have a serious rethink. I therefore ask the Minister why the Government are making this change, since there is absolutely not immunity for low-value shoplifting. What can they possibly hope that this will achieve?
The reality is that Clause 39 is purely performative. Worse than that, it is performative politics with negative ramifications. Where an offence is triable either way, it is up to the magistrates’ court and the defendant to decide which court finally hears the case. If the magistrates’ court deems itself to have sufficient powers to try the case, a defendant is able to elect the court that their case will be heard by. Are we seriously saying that we will be permitting a person charged with stealing £50-worth of chocolate to be hauled in front of a Crown Court judge and jury? In such a scenario, the most likely sentence would be a community order for a few months’ imprisonment: that sentence would likely be the same whether the case was tried in a magistrates’ court or the Crown Court.
Why enable the possibility for a person charged with low-value shoplifting to elect to go to a Crown Court, simply for them to be handed the same sentence they could have been given in the magistrates’ court? There are around 73,000 criminal cases waiting to be heard by the Crown Courts. Many people are waiting years for their case to be heard. The last thing we need now is for more minor offences to be sent to the Crown Courts, adding to their already sizable backlog. This is not a solution to shoplifting. It is simply another way for a defendant to string out their proceedings. Permitting low-value shoplifting to be tried only summarily does not give shoplifters immunity but will serve only to clog up our already stretched Crown Courts.
What does create an effective immunity for shoplifting is the Government’s Sentencing Bill. Noble Lords will know that the Bill creates the presumption that a custodial sentence of less than 12 months be suspended. Even if a person is given a custodial sentence for low-value shoplifting, they will not serve any time in prison. If that does not give would-be shoplifters more incentive to steal, I do not know what does. Clause 39 is pointless and performative, and would be damaging to the swift passage of justice.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, I acknowledge the intention of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, to oppose Clause 39 standing part of the Bill. I have listened with care to what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, but we firmly believe that the inclusion of this clause is necessary. There is one thing that we can all agree on: shop theft has risen at any alarming rate in recent years. It is a blight on our society; it causes loss and distress to retailers and it undermines the safety of retail spaces.
This Government are committed to restoring confidence in the safety of retail spaces, and to protecting businesses from escalating losses. The latest figures from the Office for National Statistics are stark. Shoplifting almost doubled over the past five years, increasing to 530,643 cases in 2025. While multiple factors have contributed to rising retail crime, one persistent issue is the perception in many quarters that low-value theft has no real consequences, and some regard it as having been, in effect, decriminalised.
The noble Lord is right that Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Courts Act converted theft of goods worth £200 or less from shops to being tried summarily. I completely understand that the argument of the previous Government was that this would increase efficiency by enabling the police to prosecute instances of low-value theft and keeping the cases in the magistrates’ court, but it has not worked. Instead, it is not that there is immunity, but there is a perception that those committing theft of goods worth £200 or less will escape any punishment. My noble friend Lord Hannett referred to this in relation to the previous group of amendments.
Clause 39 will rectify this, and it really matters. Evidence from the Association of Convenience Stores shows that only 36% of retail crime is even reported. Many retailers choose not to do so; they think it is a waste of time, because they believe that the police will not do anything. The underreporting masks the true scale of the problem and leaves businesses vulnerable.
We must act decisively to support retailers facing this growing challenge, and Clause 39 does exactly that. It closes a critical gap by sending a clear and unequivocal message: theft of any value is a serious criminal act and will be treated seriously. By removing the financial threshold for so-called low-value shop theft, we are sending a clear message to perpetrators and would-be perpetrators that this crime is not going to be tolerated and will be met with appropriate punishment. We are also making it clear to the retailers that we take this crime seriously, and they should feel encouraged to report it.
I acknowledge the concern raised by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that by making shop theft triable either way there is scope for some cases to end up in the Crown Court. However, there are two reasons why the noble Lord does not need to worry about this. The first is that Sir Brian Leveson highlighted in his independent review that the risk is mitigated by the existing sentencing guidelines, which provide a clear and structured framework to ensure that the penalties remain proportionate. This means that, in practice, the vast majority of such cases fall well within magistrates’ courts’ sentencing powers, meaning that they are highly unlikely to be committed to the Crown Court, for either trial or sentence. We anticipate that the effect on the backlog will be negligible. Secondly, as far as defendants electing trial in the Crown Court is concerned, they already have the ability to do this in relation to the so-called summary only offence. In practice, elections occur only in marginal numbers. There is no evidence to suggest that Clause 39 will change this.
I urge the noble Lord to join us in sending this very clear message—we entirely accept it was always the intention of the previous Government not to decriminalise this—to make it clear to everybody what a serious offence this is. I hope that he is willing to withdraw his opposition to Clause 39 standing part.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. I am, however, very disappointed by her continued defence of Clause 39. It is absolutely clear that the changes made by the previous Government do not create effective immunity for low-value shoplifting. All shoplifting offences are able to be tried in a magistrates’ court, where the court can impose a custodial sentence if necessary. Drink-driving offences are tried summarily only. I do not see the Government proposing to make that offence triable either way.
The fundamental point is that this change will not help anyone. It will not deter shoplifters. I hardly think a potential shoplifter will suddenly decide to stop because he might be tried in a Crown Court as opposed to a magistrates’ court. It will simply increase the Crown Court backlog without any benefit. This is a matter that I am sure we will return to on Report.
Lord Davies of Gower
“Requirements in certain sentences imposed for third or subsequent shoplifting offence(1) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows.(2) In section 208 (community order: exercise of power to impose particular requirements), in subsections (3) and (6) after “subsection (10)” insert “and sections 208A”.(3) After that section insert—“208A Community order: requirements for third or subsequent shoplifting offence(1) This section applies where—(a) a person is convicted of adult shoplifting (“the index offence”), (b) when the index offence was committed, the offender had on at least two previous occasions been sentenced in respect of adult shoplifting or an equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence, and(c) the court makes a community order in respect of the index offence.(2) The community order must, subject to subsection (3), include at least one of the following requirements—(a) a curfew requirement;(b) an exclusion requirement;(c) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if—(a) the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which—(i) relate to any of the offences or the offender, and(ii) justify the court not including any requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2), or(b) neither of the following requirements could be included in the order—(i) an electronic compliance monitoring requirement for securing compliance with a proposed curfew requirement or proposed exclusion requirement;(ii) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.(4) In subsection (1)(b), the reference to an occasion on which an offender was sentenced in respect of adult shoplifting does not include an occasion if—(a) each conviction for adult shoplifting for which the offender was dealt with on that occasion has been quashed, or(b) the offender was re-sentenced for adult shoplifting (and was not otherwise dealt with for adult shoplifting) on that occasion.(5) In this section—“adult shoplifting” means an offence under section 1 of the Theft Act 1968 committed by a person aged 18 or over in circumstances where—(a) the stolen goods were being offered for sale in a shop or any other premises, stall, vehicle or place from which a trade or business was carried on, and(b) at the time of the offence, the offender was, or was purporting to be, a customer or potential customer of the person offering the goods for sale;“equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence” means—(a) in Scotland, theft committed by a person aged 18 or over in the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of “adult shoplifting”, or(b) in Northern Ireland, an offence under section 1 of the Theft Act (Northern Ireland) 1969 committed by a person aged 18 or over in those circumstances.(6) Nothing in subsection (2) enables a requirement to be included in a community order if it could not otherwise be so included.(7) Where—(a) in a case to which this section applies, a court makes a community order which includes a requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2),(b) a previous conviction of the offender is subsequently set aside on appeal, and(c) without the previous conviction this section would not have applied, notice of appeal against the sentence may be given at any time within 28 days from the day on which the previous conviction was set aside (despite anything in section 18 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968).”.(4) After section 292 insert— “292A Suspended sentence order: community requirements for third or subsequent shoplifting offence(1) This section applies where—(a) a person is convicted of adult shoplifting (“the index offence”),(b) when the index offence was committed, the offender had on at least two previous occasions been sentenced in respect of adult shoplifting or an equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence, and(c) the court makes a suspended sentence order in respect of the index offence.(2) The suspended sentence order must, subject to subsection (3), impose at least one of the following requirements—(a) a curfew requirement;(b) an exclusion requirement;(c) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if—(a) the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which—(i) relate to any of the offences or the offender, and(ii) justify the court not imposing on the offender any requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2), or(b) neither of the following requirements could be imposed on the offender—(i) an electronic compliance monitoring requirement for securing compliance with a proposed curfew requirement or proposed exclusion requirement;(ii) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.(4) Section 208A(4) (occasions to be disregarded) applies for the purposes of subsection (1)(b).(5) In this section “adult shoplifting” and “equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence” have the meaning given by section 208A.(6) Nothing in subsection (2) enables a requirement to be imposed by a suspended sentence order if it could not otherwise be so imposed.(7) Where—(a) in a case to which this section applies, a court makes a suspended sentence order which imposes a requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2),(b) a previous conviction of the offender is subsequently set aside on appeal, and(c) without the previous conviction this section would not have applied,notice of appeal against the sentence may be given at any time within 28 days from the day on which the previous conviction was set aside (despite anything in section 18 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968).”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause imposes a duty (subject to certain exceptions) to impose a curfew requirement, an exclusion requirement or an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement on certain persons convicted of shoplifting, where the offender is given a community sentence or suspended sentence order.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 215 in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie speaks to a growing and deeply felt concern shared by communities and retailers across the country—that the persistent and habitual shoplifter is too often left to reoffend, with little intervention, limited consequences and insufficient support to break the cycle of offending. There has been a 13% increase in shoplifting offences in the year ending June 2025.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 216 in my name. I look forward very much to hearing the Minister’s response to the proposal from my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower for tougher community treatment of repeat offenders. As it is focused on the community and on suspended sentence orders, it seems to fit in very well with the spirit of the Sentencing Bill, which we will no doubt be debating on a number of further days.
As the Minister the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, has already acknowledged, and as the recent Crime Survey shows, shoplifting has risen very significantly in recent years, especially since Covid. Indeed, we heard on the “Today” programme this morning that the average number of days it takes to deal with shoplifting cases has increased by 80% in the last decade.
My own experience has taught me something else: the biggest problem with shoplifting is not so much the law as the patchy and sometimes non-existent nature of police enforcement in relation to shoplifting and associated misdemeanours. The general acceptance that thefts worth less than £200—the noble Lord, Lord Hannett, was the first to mention that minimum—do not matter to the authorities is a particular bugbear of mine and of others who care about decency and limiting neighbourhood crime and its distressing effects.
That issue lies behind my Amendment 216, which would reverse that deplorable trend. My amendment would require the College of Policing to issue a code of practice to ensure that police forces also investigate shoplifting where the value of goods is less than £200. Letting people walk into shops, steal things and get away scot free eats at the heart of a civilised society, as the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, explained earlier. You only need to visit San Francisco in recent years to see the awful effects on its once golden streets. However, there is hope there: a Democratic mayor is at last seeing good sense. I hope the Government will follow that lead and consider my amendment this evening.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, on the noble Lord’s Amendment 215, I have great sympathy for its suggestions. Electronic monitoring can certainly play a useful role, although there is mixed evidence of its ability to reduce reoffending. However, there are multiple challenges in implementation, including inconsistent use by probation services, delays in procuring new GPS tags and gaps in responding promptly to breaches. However, my main problem is that, from a policing perspective, I worry there is no slack available in police time to monitor curfews, exclusion orders or electronic tagging. I fear it may be counterproductive to give the police yet more work when they are having great difficulty coping with what they already have.
I have a similar reservation about Amendment 216, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. In principle, I would support a code of practice to improve enforcement. However, in the absence of more police resources, the danger is that this would only exacerbate the current situation, where chief constables are faced with having to rob Peter to pay Paul in other areas of policing, and victims of other crimes would likely suffer as a consequence.
I would stress prevention over cure. I draw the Committee’s and the Minister’s attention to a West Midlands Police programme that diverts repeat low-level shoplifters into services like drug rehabilitation. Since its pilot in 2018, it has been credited with saving local businesses an estimated £2.3 million through reduced shoplifting. Surely this is something we ought at least to investigate.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, for tabling Amendments 215 and 216 respectively. I have great respect for both the noble Lord and the noble Baroness. The noble Baroness’s background means that she knows more than most about the corrosive experience of shoplifting and the effect it can have on those working in the retail industry. The noble Lord’s distinguished career as a police officer gives him great authority to speak about the challenges to police forces and their obligations to society that they should be fulfilling. I reassure both the noble Lord and the noble Baroness that we are all on the same side on this. This is one of these situations where I am very keen to work with Members from all sides of your Lordships’ Committee to ensure that we deal with this social and economic menace efficiently and effectively.
On Amendment 215, I will repeat what I said a few moments ago: this Government take repeat and prolific offending extremely seriously. However, sentencing in individual cases must be a matter for our independent judiciary, and it must take into account all the circumstances of the offence and the offender, as well as the statutory purposes of sentencing. Your Lordships will, of course, be aware that the courts have a broad range of sentencing powers to deal effectively and appropriately with offenders.
As some of your Lordships may be aware, until relatively recently I was a judge in the Crown Court, and I sentenced my fair share of shoplifters. There was a complete spectrum of those offenders, from the destitute, homeless young mother stealing nappies for her baby at one end to the shameless, organised shoplifting gangs who terrify and terrorise shop workers. As the sentencing judge, there was a toolbox of disposals of increasing seriousness available to me, so that I could match the appropriate sentence to the offender on a case-by-case basis. These included discharges, fines, community sentences, suspended sentences with requirements and custodial sentences where appropriate.
Previous convictions are already a statutory aggravating factor, with the sentencing guidelines making it clear that, when determining the sentence, sentencers must consider the nature and relevance of previous convictions and the time elapsed since the previous conviction. But that repeats what is, in fact, common sense and what every sentencer knows. From my own experience, I can tell the Committee that the more frequently a defendant appears before the court, having gone out and done exactly the same thing that he or she had just been sentenced for, the more exasperated the judge becomes, who then starts imposing tougher and tougher sentences.
Despite the popular caricatures, judges do live in the real world. While sentencing a shoplifter to prison as a standard proposition will seem harsh, it can and does happen if the court concludes that there is no other way of stopping them. Importantly, this Government will introduce a whole range of options that will ramp up the community and suspended sentence powers for judges. In other words, the toolbox is getting fancier and more extensive.
As the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has said, sentencers are already able to impose a robust range of electronic monitoring requirements on anyone serving their sentence in the community. Where the court imposes curfews, exclusion zones and/or an alcohol ban, offenders must be electronically monitored, subject to individual suitability. I note the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, about the effect on police resources. However, quite a lot of the monitoring is done by the Probation Service. As the noble Baroness is probably aware, the Government are putting a lot of additional resources back into the Probation Service to enable it to do this.
Soon judges will be able to add driving bans and bans on offenders attending pubs, bars, clubs and desirable social activities like sports and concerts, as well as some tough new geographical restriction zones, to the existing tools.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I love that the Minister said that judges will be able to do that. Will she use the new powers, which I think the Attorney-General is taking, to overrule the Sentencing Council if it tries to dilute those powers?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
This is probably not the moment for me to embark on that one. This, of course, is simply about agreeing with the Sentencing Council’s guidelines in individual cases, not overriding them. I am confident that agreement will be reached, but, with respect to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, perhaps that is one I will deal with another day.
We are also about to expand the intensive supervision courts to deal with the root causes of these crimes by making repeat offenders come back in front of the same judge on regular occasions to see how they are doing. That is what is going to be available to judges.
Let us look at the other side of the coin for a moment. Many shoplifters have complicated backgrounds and complex needs, and sometimes electronic monitoring may not be an appropriate requirement to add to an offender’s sentence, even if this is their third or more offence. Many prolific offenders are homeless and lead chaotic lives. Even getting them to turn up to court on time can be a significant challenge. Imposing an electronic monitoring requirement in some of these cases would be setting the defendant up to fail instead of helping to improve the outcome for the perpetrators and victims of crime and the public at large. It is all entirely case specific, and the judge is the right person to make that decision.
I am proud of our judiciary, which is working hard under very difficult circumstances at the moment, and I am asking noble Lords to trust our magnificent judges, because they do understand the problems that repeat shoplifting can cause and they understand the powers available to them to sentence individual offenders appropriately. This measure would put unnecessary constraints on them and make an already difficult job harder. I can also assure noble Lords that we are continuing to work with cross-government partners and police forces to consider new ways of targeting and tackling persistent and prolific offenders.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
I thank the noble Baroness for her courtesy and the depth of her reply, but I am not quite sure how we solve the £200 problem. The points she made about enforcement are very good ones, but the difficulty is this belief that if you steal something worth less than £200, nothing will happen to you; thus my parallel with San Francisco. What are we going to do about that?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
The first thing we want to do is Clause 39, which, of course, was opposed by the noble Lord, Lord Davies. But in addition, this is about making it clear to everybody that it really does matter, and driving it through to the police that there should be no immunities—that there are no levels below to which this should not apply.
For all these reasons, I do believe these amendments are not required, but I would be very happy to discuss the matters further with both the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, and I encourage them to speak with me if they feel there are matters that I have not fully taken into account. But, for now, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her kind offer.
The amendment of my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe focuses on enforcement. If the police do not investigate theft, if they do not take measures to deter and prevent shoplifting, no amount of legislation will change that. Creating a code of practice for low-value shoplifting could be a step in the right direction. Together with my Amendment 215—and I am grateful, I think, for the implied support of the Liberal Democrats—these measures target enforcement and punishment. This is in stark contrast to what the Government are proposing in Clause 39. The effective immunity for shoplifters comes from the inability of the police to catch those who shoplift. It is an issue of enforcement and investigation, which in turn all comes back to police funding and officer numbers—a point made by the noble Baroness Lady Doocey. Better enforcement is what will drive down shoplifting offence rates, not putting those cases before Crown Court judges. But, for now, I beg leave to withdraw.
Crime and Policing Bill
Thursday 27th November 2025
(5 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-IV(a) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Fourth Marshalled List) - (26 Nov 2025)
“Definition of the criminal exploitation of children(1) The criminal exploitation of children is a form of child abuse in which a child under the age of 18 is used for purposes that constitute, enable or facilitate an offence under the law in England and Wales.(2) The victim may have been criminally exploited even if the activity appears consensual.(3) The criminal exploitation of children can occur online and through the use of technology.”
Baroness Brown of Silvertown (Lab)
My Lords, this is the first amendment I have moved in your Lordships’ House and I hope I do it some justice because, in just one year, there were nine murders of young people associated with the pernicious drug trade colloquially known as county lines. As the MP for the constituency, I worked closely with the police service and colleagues across the other House to identify solutions to effectively close down the business model that used, abused and destroyed children and their families.
Much of what I hope to see to tackle this abomination has been delivered by this Government, and I am grateful. I very much welcome the new child criminal exploitation offence and the hefty jail sentences that this can carry. I am hopeful that, once these new charges are in effect and have been successfully levied against these child abusers, the very lucrative and cruelly efficient business model employed by the drug dealers will be less attractive and eventually made redundant due to the high penalties they face when caught.
County lines, as we know, is organised crime. It is adults grooming our children, mostly our young boys, and sending them off as cheap labour to deliver and sell drugs across the country. It is a cycle of grooming, abuse and exploitation that has become an industry. The children ensnared by these groomers live a terrifying existence. They witness depravity and violence almost day to day. They are disposable children, making big profits for the criminals who control and exploit them. I am absolutely delighted that the new offence will apply not only to groomers but to all individuals who arrange or facilitate a child committing a crime, ensuring that gang leaders who may plead ignorance of their subordinates’ practice do not evade the heavy sentences.
I am acutely aware that the children involved are, in the eyes of the criminal justice system, both victim and perpetrator. This was brought home to me by the experiences of a young man on the fringes of a gang, who was groomed by his neighbour, kidnapped by the gang and forced on a drugs run. He was terrified. He phoned his mum, crying and begging her to rescue him. When he was finally allowed home, they both went to the police to report his experiences. They waited for action against his abusers, but none came. However, on his 17th birthday, he was arrested for the crimes that he had, in effect, confessed to the police while reporting the actions of his abusers. It is obviously easy in this case to feel genuinely appalled by the actions of the criminal justice system and really angry about the ruined life chances of this young man, who had at that time been accepted into the Army.
I want to be clear that there are many other stories that are less easy for us to feel sympathy about—where the young person is both abused and the perpetrator, sometimes of heinous crimes. They are desensitised to the violence or fearful for their own safety, so that they cannot refuse an order from the elder. We need to create a system that can deal with the crimes while still recognising that the children were victims. This amendment is almost a mopping-up exercise, because we need a definition of child criminal exploitation in the Bill, to work in conjunction with the offence detailed in Clause 40.
I honestly do not understand why, over years, the Home Office has resisted this small but I believe necessary action. I gently point out that the Modern Slavery Act has a definition in it, so why is there such resistance to a definition here? I do not know whether it is okay for me to admit at this point that I am wedded not to the words but to the concept and spirit of my amendment, and I am hopeful that this exceptionally helpful Minister will take away my desire and wish and bring back something that will work, if he feels that my words are insufficient to the cause.
Although Clause 40 rightly introduces an offence to prosecute those who exploit children to commit criminal activity, it does not, as I have said, provide a statutory definition of what constitutes child criminal exploitation for safeguarding and identification purposes. A statutory definition would serve a fundamentally different purpose from the criminal offence. It would provide a clear and consistent framework for identifying and protecting children at risk and enabling front-line agencies to intervene early and prevent harm.
Evidence from the national child safeguarding review panel and Action for Children’s Jay review into the criminal exploitation of children shows that the lack of a definition contributes to significant inconsistencies in practice and persistent failures to identify children as victims. There is often a postcode lottery, shaped by variable interpretations and thresholds across agencies and jurisdictions. Although I am grateful that the Government have committed to putting a definition in the guidance, I do not think this will go far enough because, frankly, the guidance may not be adopted by all the agencies that work with victims of this form of child abuse.
A statutory definition in the Bill would establish a shared understanding across all services, ensuring that children receive support regardless of where they live. It would, I hope, enhance multi-agency working, helping to build a national picture of exploitation and improve data collection and reporting. Importantly, it would support early intervention and prevention by providing a clear legal basis for services to respond to signs of exploitation before criminal harm escalates.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, I declare several interests. I am a co-chair of the All-Party Group on Modern Slavery and vice-chairman of the Human Trafficking Foundation. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Brown. She has done a brilliant first amendment and I am delighted to support her. I played a very small part in the Modern Slavery Act: I was involved in the pre-legislative scrutiny and an earlier report that persuaded the then Home Secretary, now the noble Baroness, Lady May, to put the Bill in place.
Exploitation of children is in the Modern Slavery Act, but it is rather masked and has not been taken seriously, particularly by the police. Perhaps more importantly—this is one thing that the noble Baroness, Lady Brown, did not say—under the Act, a child who is exploited cannot consent to exploitation and cannot commit an offence. That is absolutely crucial, and it probably ought to be expressed again in primary legislation.
I enormously admire a great deal of what this Government are trying to do. I went on behalf of Action for Children to a very useful meeting with Diana Johnson and Jess Phillips, where I got the impression that they were going to move forward on this. But what is offered in this Bill does not really meet the need. To put into guidance what was put in primary legislation 10 years ago seems to make it less important. I ask the Minister to reflect on why you would want to put into guidance something that was expressed, not as well, in primary legislation 10 years ago.
The time has come to deal with county lines. A great deal of work has been done by the National Crime Agency. At long last, at least some magistrates’ courts realise that children who are ferrying drugs around the country—and cash, nowadays, as well as drink and various other things—are in fact victims and not perpetrators. But it is not fully known. The police do not seem to understand it. We need to explain, through primary legislation, to whoever is now in charge of modern slavery in the police that we are talking about child exploitation, of which modern slavery is a component. There is no doubt that these children are enslaved, but I suspect that, in this country, the word “exploitation” is rather easier to understand—and it is time it was there.
This amendment is brilliant. It could perhaps be improved in certain ways, but it asks the Government to do something really practical which, when I went to that very useful meeting, I got the impression they were going to do.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, I support my noble friend Lady Brown of Silvertown, but she may not need much support, having received the much-coveted gold star from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, who, I am very proud to say, supports a later amendment of mine on raising the age of criminal responsibility—which, I am ashamed to say, is barbarically only 10 in England and Wales. The UN recommends that it be 14. In Scotland it is 12 and the heavens do not seem to have fallen.
I have a couple of specific points to make in support of my noble friend’s amendment. If I may, I will be as bold as to predict what my noble friend the Minister and his advisers might be about to say in response. If they are about to say that my noble friend’s definition is unnecessary because the definition can be taken from the offence itself in Clause 40, I would like to get in first with two points to counter that. If I am pessimistic and wrong, so be it. Noble Lords know that I do not mind looking a fool.
The first point, which has already been made clearly by my noble friend Lady Brown, is that we need a definition that is about not just a specific criminal offence but interagency working and interventions across services, well in advance of any investigation or prosecution for a criminal offence.
I do not think the second point has been made yet. If the Committee compares the elements of my noble friend’s definition with the definition of the criminal offence in the Bill, it will see that the Government’s approach misses something very important that is to be found in my noble friend’s definition: enabling the child, not just causing the child, to engage in criminal conduct. That addition is important because “causing” is a harder thing to prove and a greater step in grooming. Currently, the Government’s definition is
“causing the child to commit an offence”,
or, indeed, “facilitating” somebody else to cause the child to commit the offence.
To prove causation in law is a serious matter. Enabling—making it easy, making the tools of the trade available, providing the opportunity—is a lower threshold, which is appropriate in the context of children. My noble friend made the point that currently in law they are treated as victims but also as perpetrators, and sometimes it is a matter of luck as to whether you will find the adult and the public service who will take the proper approach, in my view, of always treating the child as a child and as a victim, and not criminalising them. This is the point about “enabling”.
My noble friend the Minister is very experienced in these matters. Whatever he comes back with, I would like him and his advisers to consider the question of the lower threshold of enabling, not just causing. If there is to be a further compromise that includes some element of my noble friend Lady Brown’s amendment, I hope that that is taken on board.
The most formative time in my professional life was as a Home Office lawyer. I know what it is like to work on big Bills and to defend them as originally crafted and drafted. But it is wise, especially in this House, to take good advice and to bend a little when it might improve legislation for the benefit of victims.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, first, I absolutely congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Brown of Silvertown, on her excellently motivated amendment. It is very thought provoking. In particular, this sentence caught my attention:
“The victim may have been criminally exploited even if the activity appears consensual”.
That is one of the most difficult challenges. For some years I have been involved in the grooming gangs scandal, and one of the most horrible parts of that was when the police took the decision that the young 14 or 15 year-old, precocious though she—a general “she”—may have been, was somehow actively consenting to her own rape or sexual exploitation. It was about the notion of this being a child, because the young girl may have looked more adult—it was literally as superficial as that—and about the type, if we are honest, in class terms. Therefore, it was said that she could not be a victim and she was accused of being a prostitute, and so on. We are familiar with that. That is the reason why that sentence stood out to me.
However, I have some qualms, and I want to ask genuinely what we do about those qualms, because I do not know where to go. I am slightly worried, because county lines gangs, as the noble Baroness will know, are a young men’s game. Some of the gang leaders are younger than one would ever want to imagine in your worst nightmare. That is a problem with this, in a way, and with how you work it out. If you have a general rule that this is always a child, how do you deal with the culpability and responsibility of a 17 year-old thug, not to put too fine a point on it, who is exploiting younger people or even his—and it is generally “his”—peers? I am not sure how to square that with what I have just said. It also seems that there is a major clash with the age of criminal responsibility. I am very sympathetic with that not being 10, but how do you deal with the belief that someone aged under 18 is a child, yet we say that a child has criminal responsibility? Perhaps I am just misunderstanding something.
My final reservation is that if we say that everybody under 18 has to be a victim all the time, would that be a legal loophole that would get people off when there was some guilt for them to be held to account for? I generally support this amendment, but I want some clarification on how to muddle my way through those moral thickets, if possible.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I join in congratulating the noble Baroness on how she moved the amendment. It is very nice to see a Government Back-Bencher introducing an amendment and taking part; I wish we had slightly more of it.
To bring one back to Professor Jay’s review of child criminal exploitation, she made several important recommendations, of which the first and arguably most important is at the heart of what we are talking about at the moment. She called for a single, cohesive legal code for children exploited into criminal activity, and detailed what that needed to contain. The noble Baroness’s amendment goes to the heart of that matter. Having well-meaning explanations put into advice or regulation is not enough. There needs not only to be a common understanding across all government departments and agencies involved in dealing with these children and gangs; it needs to be completely clear for the police in particular, who are clearly looking into the criminal activity, exactly what it is and what it is not.
With the next amendment, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, and I shall speak, we will talk about ways in which a child who is both a victim and perpetrator can be defended—but we will discuss that in the next group. As for this group, I think that I probably speak for all noble Lords who are concerned about this issue in saying that absolute clarity about the definition, so there is no argument about it whatever, would be a giant step forward. The best-meaning attempts to deal with child criminal exploitation over the past decade have been hindered severely by the lack of consistency.
I ask the Government to listen very carefully to what the noble Baroness has asked for. She has said clearly that her wording may not be perfect—I think that in many Bills the wording is not necessarily perfect, even in the final Act—but we have a chance to get this right. I look forward to what the Minister says in response.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I fully endorse the important points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Brown. I had great pleasure in working with the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, on the Modern Slavery Bill. I am totally in awe of her experience and her willingness to share that experience, which, as a new Peer, was absolutely wonderful for me—although I could certainly do with it now as well.
The government amendments in this group provide more welcome detail on the definition and operation of child criminal exploitation prevention orders and include provisions necessary to cover the whole of the UK, not just England and Wales. As with other government amendments during the passage of the Bill, we welcome the expansion of detail in the Bill. Could the Minister confirm that each of the three devolved states has approved the relevant amendments in this group? It would be very good to hear that this has already been done. I do not disagree with anything that anyone has said so far—it has been an excellent and very clear unification of the views of everyone here.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brown of Silvertown, for introducing this large group of amendments. As noble Lords will appreciate, many of the amendments before us today concern matters of clarification or technical improvement to ensure consistency across the Bill and the amendments tabled so far.
We on these Benches are broadly supportive of these changes, particularly when they strengthen child safeguarding protections and improve clarity, which we hope will eventually result in more seamless practical implementation. In this regard, we welcome amendments extending the scope of child criminal exploitation prevention orders to Scotland and Northern Ireland, and those clarifying procedural matters, such as the form of notification requirements when oral notification may not be practicable. These are sensible adjustments that contribute to ensuring that the Bill operates coherently across the four nations and in real-world enforcement scenarios.
I briefly draw attention to Amendment 235ZA in my name, which would remove Clause 43(3)(a). That subsection currently requires that, when a court makes a criminal exploitation prevention order, the terms of the order must avoid
“conflict with any religious beliefs of the defendant”.
Although religious beliefs are, of course, an important individual right, the purpose of these orders is to protect children from very serious criminal harm. It is, therefore, my view that safeguarding and public protection must take precedence over all other concerns and that no such exemption should hinder appropriate and proportionate restrictions when a court considers them necessary. I hope the Government consider the matter carefully and take the recommendation on board.
Finally, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, for bringing forward Amendment 235A, which would give the courts an explicit ability to impose a prevention order to protect a child from being threatened, intimidated or coerced into criminal exploitation. The intention behind the amendment—to intervene earlier and more effectively to safeguard children at risk—is one that I hope all sides of the Committee can support. I look forward to hearing the Government’s response and clarification of how the Bill will ensure that those protections are fully delivered. These are complex issues, but our shared objective is simple: to ensure that vulnerable children are protected and that those who exploit them face firm consequences. I hope the Government will reflect carefully on the points that have been raised here today.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
My Lords, if the Committee will allow me, I will begin by detailing the government amendments in this group. We know that criminal gangs conducting activity such as county lines drug dealing do not stop at internal UK borders, and children are criminally exploited across the UK. To go to the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, mentioned, this is why—at the request of the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Department of Justice—we are making provision in the Bill for child criminal exploitation prevention orders in Scotland and Northern Ireland. That is at their request, and I hope that also answers the point from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. Since the Bill covers England and Wales, this means that the offence of child criminal exploitation will now apply UK-wide. These amendments have been tabled because, since the Bill was published, we have had those discussions and this is a way of making sure that we have a UK-wide approach.
These orders will give the police and courts across the whole of the United Kingdom powers to prevent child criminal exploitation happening in the first place, or happening again, by putting prohibitions and requirements on an adult who poses a risk of criminally exploiting a child. As I have mentioned, these provisions have been drafted in collaboration with the Scottish and Northern Ireland Governments and consequential amendments are therefore required for England and Wales to ensure that the orders function smoothly across the United Kingdom.
Finally, we have tabled some other amendments to put beyond doubt that assessment of whether an individual has engaged in child criminal exploitation, or associated conduct, in an application for, or imposition of, a child criminal exploitation prevention order is to be determined by the court on the basis of the civil standard of proof; that is, the balance of probabilities. This is appropriate given that there are civil rather than criminal proceedings in this case. The application of the civil standard of proof is well precedented in many similar preventive orders across the statute book and is important to ensure that an order can intervene earlier in the course of a child’s exploitation so that it can be prevented. I hope that I have wide support across the Committee for those measures—I think I do.
Amendment 232B is in the name of my noble friend Lady Brown of Silvertown. I welcome her moving her first amendment in such a positive way. She has secured the support of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, the noble Earl, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, which is a fairly impressive bunch on a first amendment, so I say well done to her on that. Her amendment seeks to create a further definition of child criminal exploitation.
I say to my noble friend—and I think that this was anticipated by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti—that “child criminal exploitation” is already defined in Clause 40 by the description of conduct amounting to an offence. It is where an adult
“engages in conduct towards or in respect of a child, with the intention of … causing the child to”
engage in criminality. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, raised a number of issues for which I am not accountable, but which my noble friend may wish to respond to. That is the Government’s view on the purpose of Clause 40. Clause 40 captures activity online, through the use of technology and whether or not it is seemingly consensual. This definition also operates for the purposes of the child criminal exploitation prevention orders.
My noble friend has made a very strong case, through personal experience as a constituency MP in east London for almost 20 years, on the impact of county lines gangs on young people. I fully accept, understand and appreciate where she is coming from on those issues. That is why the Government introduced Clause 40 in the first place. It is also why the Government are introducing a bespoke stand-alone offence of CCE, along with the CCE prevention orders, to signal unequivocally that using a child to commit crime is against the law and that those children are victims of a crime. I also agree that any apparent consent of the child to involvement is irrelevant to whether they have been criminally exploited, and that criminal exploitation can occur online and through the use of technology. I understand my noble friend’s amendment, but these points are captured by the definition of CCE in Clause 40, which does not include a child’s consent and captures adults’ conduct by means of any method or control.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
Obviously, I correctly anticipated the response that was coming, but I would be grateful if my noble friend would deal with this point about “enabling”, which is a substantive point of difference in the two definitions. Enabling is easier to prove than causing. “Causing” is closer to a child being used, which is reflected in my noble friend Lady Brown’s definition, but I do not think that “enabling” is in the Clause 40 definition as it stands.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I appreciate my noble friend’s comments. If she will bear with me, I will come on to that point in a moment. I am doing this in a structured order to try to address the points that are before the Committee today.
I say to my noble friend Lady Brown that, within the Bill, we are also taking the power to issue statutory guidance to chief officers. The noble Earl, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and my noble friend have looked at that, and I will return to it in a moment. The guidance will include a descriptive definition of CCE, setting out in lay person’s terms the conduct captured by the offence, and will provide practical guidance on how the CCE offence and orders should be applied.
An important point, to go particularly to what the noble Earl, Lord Russell of Liverpool, said, is that in Clause 60—which we will come to in later considerations—the Secretary of State has power to issue statutory guidance to chief officers of police about the exercise of their functions in connection with the prevention, detection and investigation of CCE offences and CCE prevention orders. I hope that the Committee will recognise that, importantly, the relevant police officers will be under a legal duty to have due regard to that statutory guidance when exercising functions in relation to the CCE offences and the CCE prevention orders. On the question of the statutory guidance, which my noble friend and others have touched on, the guidance has not been issued yet because the relevant legislation has not yet received the consent of this House or indeed Royal Assent. On the applicability of both of those conditions, statutory guidance under Clause 60 will be issued, which will place a legal duty on police officers to adhere to it.
My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti mentioned a very important point. There is a clear difference in what my noble friend Lady Brown of Silvertown has put forward, supported by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. I hope this helps: the forms of conduct that are likely to enable a child to commit criminality are expected in most cases to also meet the test of conduct by an adult intended to cause, or facilitate the causing of, a child to commit a future crime. The nature of the offence, which is broad and large, will ensure that it captures offenders who will use children for crime. I believe that that is the right format. Both my noble friends have said that “enable” is a critical word. I believe that a separate definition is unnecessary, as it would have no legal impact over and above what is already in the Bill. It could cause confusion among police and prosecutors about which definition they should be applying.
The statutory guidance, which I emphasise will gave a legal bass and will be issued under Clause 60, is the appropriate place to provide the extra detail to understand proposals that are covered by the amendment, but which are already in scope of the clear and simple legal terms of Clause 40. I know that that is the defence that my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti expected me to use, but it is the defence: Clause 40 is what it is, and the guidance will also be statutory.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
While statutory guidance is welcome, this particular case has similarities to other areas of the criminal law where the motivations and behaviours are complex, such as stalking and various areas of domestic abuse. In every case where regulation has been put in such a way that it becomes statutory, unless that goes hand in hand with appropriate and quite intensive training, you can have as many regulations as you like, as legally watertight as you like, but if the officials who are charged with implementing it do not understand the complexity that they are dealing with and cannot define and understand exactly how to apply the regulations, you are going to have confusion. We have a lot of history of that not happening. Good intentions are one thing; what actually happens when you put it out there and expect that everybody will understand and comply with it is another, and that is a concern that a lot of us have.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
That is a valid point. I have considered with officials how we ensure enforcement of the guidance. I simply put it to the noble Earl—and we can debate this outside the Bill—that the statutory guidance is issued to chief constables of police forces under Clause 60 and they have a legal duty to ensure that statutory guidance is implemented, and officers have a legal duty to support and interpret that at a local level when they are faced with incidents of child exploitation as defined by the Bill. That requires a whole shift of culture and of training—I understand that. I will take from this comment and from the Committee generally that my colleagues in the Home Office need to look not just at the guidance but at its implementation. Ultimately, it has a statutory footing, and that is the key point for the Committee.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
Will the Minister take on board the fact that countless inspections of police training, including by HMICFRS, have said that there has not been an independent assessment of police training since 2018, despite the fact that so many of the policing bodies themselves have asked for it? Taking the point, will he now say that there will be an independent assessment, so that police training can be much more appropriate and police will know exactly what they are supposed to be doing when we sit in this House and make legislation?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I will sound like I am repeating myself from Question Time, but, very shortly, we anticipate bringing forward a policing White Paper looking at a whole range of mechanisms to improve police performance. If the noble Baroness will allow me, I will wait for further detail on the policing White Paper, which I have already said to the House will be published before Christmas, to allow for further discussion on a range of efficiency and improvement matters for policing. The point she makes is worthy of consideration, but I will park it until a later date in the parliamentary calendar.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for his detailed response, but will he reflect on the potential distinction between “enabling” and “causing”? Will he go back to parliamentary counsel and be clear that enablers will always meet this threshold of causation? I am really concerned about that. I understand that my noble friend has rejected the idea of a separate free-standing definition and is worried about confusion between the offence definition and a general definition, but in blending the intentions of the Government and those of my noble friend Lady Brown, it would be helpful to know that that language of “causing”, without specific mention of enabling, is watertight.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to my noble friend for further pressing me on the issue. I have tried to explain to the Committee where the Government are on this. We always reflect on debates in Committee, because there are always opportunities for my noble friend and others to bring matters back on Report. I am giving the Committee today the Government’s view that the definition in Clause 40, plus the guidance issued under Clause 60, will be sufficient to cover the objective of ensuring that we have this offence on the statute book and monitored and enforced by authorities.
To the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, I have just remembered that we will have further discussions on police training in later groups in Committee today, but the White Paper will deal with a whole range of matters on improving police performance.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
If the Minister can bear one more intervention, would he be good enough to take back the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Brown? I cannot quite understand why that amendment is not listed nearer to Clause 40, because it would have been helpful to look at the two together, as has not been done to any great extent. I say politely to the Minister that I prefer the noble Baroness’s interpretation of exploitation.
The other point I want to make is that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, is absolutely right—it is a point I have not made, but I am well aware of it—that at the age of 18, people who may have been victims become perpetrators. Some of them become perpetrators because they have no choice, but others—the young thugs she spoke about—are genuine perpetrators. Therefore, to specify the age of 18 in Clause 40 may be misleading.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful for the further pressure on this issue from the Cross Benches. My job is to set out to the Committee the Government’s view on these amendments, which I am trying to do. The measures in Clause 40 and the guidance in Clause 60 are sufficient to meet the objectives of my noble friend and, at the same time, to ensure—let us not forget this—that this offence goes on to the statute book for the first time. It will have a big impact on county line gangs and on defining further criminal child exploitation. I have put the Government’s view; we will obviously reflect on what my noble friend has said and I am happy to meet her, with other colleagues, outside the Committee to discuss that explanation further. I recognise the great motivation my noble friend had in bringing this to the Committee. I hope she will reflect on what I have said and withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Brown of Silvertown (Lab)
I believe I get another chance to speak. I am grateful to all contributors to my amendment today. I can tell the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that I tried, but obviously not impactfully enough, to talk about the complexities involved and the differences between an abused child and a perpetrator, and how difficult it is for the criminal courts—and all of us—to understand the distinction.
I say gently to my noble friend the Minister that given that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Doocey, the noble Lord, Lord Russell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox—if I might pray her in aid—are all pressing on this issue, it would be a good idea for the Government to reflect properly on it.
I knew that the argument was going to be that my amendment is unnecessary. With 20 years’ experience in Parliament, I know that there have been many unnecessary clauses in Bills, and indeed that some Bills have become Acts that some people believe are unnecessary. I cheekily ask what harm it could do. It would be fabulous if my noble friend the Minister could humour us and bung it in. I genuinely believe that this is an important part of the protection of our children in the future. In hope, therefore, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment spells out, on the face of the Bill, that “satisfied” here means satisfied on the balance of probabilities
(ii) doing anything in Scotland or Northern Ireland that would constitute an offence under section 40 (as it has effect in England and Wales) if done in England and Wales;”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment expands the meaning of “engaging in child criminal exploitation” in the provisions about child criminal exploitation prevention orders in England and Wales, to encompass anything done anywhere in the UK that would be an offence under clause 40 if done in England and Wales.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment changes the meaning of “engaging in conduct associated with child criminal exploitation”, in the provisions about child criminal exploitation prevention orders in England and Wales, to encompass conduct anywhere in the UK.
Lord Hanson of Flint
(a) by attending at an appropriate police station and”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is related to my first amendment to clause 48, page 65, line 29.
(b) in a way specified in the CCE prevention order.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment allows for notifications to be made in a way specified in the CCE prevention order. This is likely to be used to provide for notifications other than in person when the defendant lives outside England and Wales in cases where in person notification is considered unreasonable.
“(5A) An “appropriate police station” is a police station in the police area in which—(a) the defendant’s home address is situated, or(b) the court which made the order is situated.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is related to my first amendment to clause 48, page 65, line 29.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with my other amendment to this clause, changes the meaning of “home address” so that the home address of the subject of a CCE prevention order made in England and Wales may be anywhere in the UK.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with my other amendment to this clause, changes the meaning of “home address” so that the home address of the subject of a CCE prevention order made in England and Wales may be anywhere in the UK.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with my amendment inserting a new subsection (1A) into clause 51, makes the offence in this clause cover breaches of CCE prevention orders made in Scotland or Northern Ireland as well as England and Wales.
“(1A) The orders are—(a) a CCE prevention order; (b) a CCE prevention order under Schedule (CCE prevention orders: Scotland) (CCE prevention orders in Scotland);(c) a CCE prevention order under Schedule (CCE prevention orders: Northern Ireland) (CCE prevention orders in Northern Ireland).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with my amendment to clause 51(1), makes the offence in this clause cover breaches of CCE prevention orders made in Scotland or Northern Ireland as well as England and Wales.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my other amendments to clause 51.
“(6) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend subsection (1A) so as to add to or remove from the list of orders any relevant UK order.(7) “Relevant UK order” means an order under the law of Scotland or Northern Ireland which appears to the Secretary of State to be equivalent or similar to a CCE prevention order.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment gives the Secretary of State power to amend the list of orders made by courts in Northern Ireland or Scotland, breach of which constitutes an offence.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendments to clause 51.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“CCE prevention orders: Scotland and Northern Ireland
Child criminal exploitation prevention orders: Scotland and Northern Ireland(1) Schedule (CCE prevention orders: Scotland) makes provision about child criminal exploitation prevention orders for Scotland. (2) Schedule (CCE prevention orders: Northern Ireland) makes provision about child criminal exploitation prevention orders for Northern Ireland.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adds a new clause which introduces Schedules with provision about child criminal exploitation prevention orders for Scotland and Northern Ireland.
“Criminal exploitation protection order (CEPO)(1) A criminal exploitation protection order (“CEPO”) is an order which protects a child who meets the condition in subsection (2) from further harm by—(a) prohibiting the child from doing anything described in the order, and(b) requiring the child to do anything described in the order.(2) The condition is that the child has been threatened, forced, intimidated or persuaded to commit criminal acts or actions that support or facilitate criminal activity.(3) A court may include a prohibition or requirement only if it considers it necessary for the purpose of protecting the child from criminal exploitation.(4) Prohibitions and requirements must, so far as practicable, be such as to avoid—(a) any conflict with any religious beliefs of the child;(b) any interference with the times, if any, at which the child normally attends any educational establishment;(c) any conflict with the prohibitions and requirements of any other court order or injunction to which the child is subject.(5) A prohibition or requirement applies throughout the United Kingdom unless expressly limited to a particular area.(6) A CEPO must—(a) specify the period for which it has effect, or(b) state that it has effect until a further order.(7) A CEPO may specify periods for which particular prohibitions or requirements have effect.(8) Where a court makes a CEPO in respect of a child who is already subject to such an CEPO, the earlier CEPO ceases to have effect.(9) The Secretary of State may by regulation made by statutory instrument make provision for the—(a) procedure for making,(b) notification requirements for,(c) variation, discharge and appeal of, and(d) imposition of measures in response to a child breachinga CEPO.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to create a new “criminal exploitation protection order” (CEPO) to protect children who have been subject to criminal exploitation from further harm. It seeks to protect children from committing criminal acts or being drawn into activity to support or facilitate criminal activity due to criminal exploitation. The order could be complementary to a prevention order (see Chapter 1 of the Bill) that would apply to their adult exploiters.
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top (Lab)
My Lords, we have already demonstrated today just how complex this issue is. We began talking about it on the last day in Committee and, as I said last week, it affects children and young people in ways we never imagined; nor did we imagine years ago that this would become almost normal for some communities and in some areas. I wish it was simple and easy to say, “They are the victims and they are the perpetrators”. It is not as easy as that. I congratulate my noble friend Lady Brown on her amendment. We know that when some children and young people have tried to say, “We’re in trouble—can we get help?”, the response from the agencies has largely been, “You’ve committed an offence and we have to make you accountable for that”. I understand that, but in this amendment I am seeking to make another approach possible.
I thank Action for Children and declare my interest as an ambassador for it. I have been involved with Action for Children for virtually my whole life; it used to be a Methodist organisation, the National Children’s Home. I was involved for about 12 years in governance terms, but have always been involved with it. It works around the country, although I know more of its work in the north-east, and this has been an issue for it in Scotland, Wales and the rest of the country, wherever it has been working.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for having given my Amendment 235A a positive acclamation. However, I did not move it because it struck me that the amendment we are now debating is actually better than the one I tabled. Therefore, there seemed no point in having a double debate. I listened very carefully to the excellent exposition of the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Brown of Silvertown, which is really important.
I came to this having looked after three children’s homes when I was a GP. I became suspicious that there was something funny going on in one of them but could never put a finger on it or get social services to recognise it. However, I am sure there was, because one Christmas the children in that home set fire to it and burnt it down—but I really do not know what was happening, and I never found out.
It is terrifying the layers with which children can be enticed, encouraged and supported into criminal activity and then become quite expert at it. They are terribly intimidated and frightened for their lives. The intimidation may not be overt but covert. They have threats made against them, their families, for their lives, or of mutilation. They get beaten up and all kinds of terrible things happen. That locks them further into a world of criminality.
It therefore seemed that this would be the third side of the triangle, if you like. We talk about prosecuting the exploiter, and we talk about prosecuting the child for whatever crimes they have committed. Let us be honest: these are sometimes very difficult children. They are severely emotionally damaged, very difficult to get close to, and will not disclose to people in authority what is really happening to them, because they are so terrified. Therefore, they may be unwilling to disclose information to the police. Then, we have this gap which still leaves them liable and open to exploitation.
It was with that thought that this amendment, this concept, came forward, to try to close that gap a little bit. I hope when the Minister sums up—and perhaps criticises this clause, because I anticipate we might be told it is not necessary—that he explains what harm such an order would do. I cannot see how it would make anything worse, but it may certainly make things better, and that was the sentiment behind the support of the Opposition Front Bench for this concept.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, when I first saw this new clause, I did not pay too much attention, but having looked at it in more detail, I support the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong of Hill Top, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, since I think they are on to something here. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, has confirmed that. I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, who has a long track record of fighting for the rights of children, from trying to save the children’s playground in Victoria Tower Gardens from the Holocaust Memorial Bill to his track record of tabling amendments to this Bill and others.
Researching the Casey review recently with regard to my amendments on grooming gangs prompted me to look at this again. Then, I realised that a CEPO would be valid in dealing with some of the problems caused by those grooming gangs. The criminal exploitation of children is a real, growing concern across the UK, with increasing numbers of young people being coerced, manipulated or forced into criminal activity by adults or older peers.
As the Committee knows, these vulnerable children suffer significant harm, both physically and psychologically, and often find themselves trapped in cycles of offending, unable to escape the influence of exploiters. In response to this issue, the concept of a criminal exploitation protection order is possibly a very sensible idea to offer targeted legal protection for children who have been victims of criminal exploitation.
Existing legal frameworks, while robust in certain areas, do not sufficiently address the unique vulnerabilities of children subject to criminal exploitation. Traditional criminal justice responses may inadvertently criminalise victims—as we have seen all too frequently with the grooming gangs cases—or fail to disrupt the exploitative relationships at the heart of their offending.
A CEPO could fill this gap by prioritising the welfare and protection of exploited children, recognising them as victims rather than solely perpetrators. The order would empower authorities to intervene proactively, preventing further harm and breaking the cycle of exploitation.
The details are not in the Bill, and the regulations will set out the details, but I would expect and hope that the regulations may do the following. On prohibitions, the CEPO could prohibit children from engaging in specified activities that are linked to their exploitation, such as associating with certain individuals, visiting particular locations or possessing items used in criminal activity.
On the positive requirements for the children, the order may require them to take positive steps such as attending counselling, engaging with support services or participating in educational programmes designed to build resilience and reduce vulnerability. Those are just a few examples, but I hope that the regulations would detail a whole range of things that children could be stopped from doing and encourage them to do good things.
Importantly, this is a holistic approach: by combining restrictions on the one hand and supportive measures on the other, the CEPO could address both the immediate risks and underlying factors that contribute to continued exploitation. CEPOs could prevent further harm, as the order would be seen as a protective barrier, reducing the likelihood of children being drawn back into criminal activity and shielding them from exploiters.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I was very happy to add my name, alongside that of the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, to this amendment. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, who indicated that he wanted to speak before me. He has done sterling service by saying a great deal of what I was going to say, so I will not bore your Lordships with that.
I have one or two confessions. On Methodism, I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, that I come from several generations of Methodist ministers—the Reverends MacDonald—one of whom was one of John Wesley’s original disciples. At some point, my family slightly lost the plot and became lapsed Anglicans, like I suspect a lot of your Lordships.
If the Minister is kind enough to mention me again in his response, in promoting me to an Earl, he is doing a disservice to the direct descendant of Lord John Russell, an ex-Prime Minister. I call in evidence a letter that my grandfather and the grandfather of the noble Earl, Lord Russell, wrote to the editor of the Times in 1961, saying: “Dear Sir, we would like to point out that neither of us is the other. Yours, Russell, Russell of Liverpool”. I had to say the same thing to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, when she also inadvertently promoted me.
I again point out that this proposed new clause has the absolute support of Professor Jay, who has looked into this issue in more detail than any of the rest of us. I am a great believer that, when trying to argue the case for something, we should not talk about it in abstract or general terms but try to personalise it by talking about a real-life case which perhaps indicates the virtue of having an order such as this. Therefore, I will give a real-life example from the work done by Action for Children.
There is a 16 year-old young man with ADHD who is experiencing significant criminal exploitation, including daily cannabis use, coercion through drug debt and regular threats of violence. His engagement with support services, unsurprisingly, is somewhat inconsistent and is often influenced by the level of control and threats of violence exerted by the exploiters. The police have already made him subject to a youth referral order for drug and weapon offences, but law enforcement has deprioritised his case due to a perceived lack of co-operation. In the circumstances the young man finds himself in, a lack of co-operation with law enforcement is perhaps somewhat understandable. Recent incidents that have occurred to this young man include a violent attack on his home by individuals linked to his exploitation. One of his perpetrators is housed in the same residential block of flats as him, which must be somewhat unpleasant. The young person remains fearful for his and his mother’s safety, but he is unwilling to disclose information, which currently limits statutory intervention options.
If we had this order, it would enable the authorities to protect that young man and his mother by stopping him from contacting certain people. Following what the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, said, it would mandate him turning up to appointments with support services. It would restrict and monitor his movements to create a distance from the exploiters. In the case of serious threat of harm, or in an instance where a perpetrator is living almost next door, it would also give the authorities the ability to provide alternative accommodation to protect that young person and his family.
For all those reasons, I wish and hope that the Minister and his department will look at this very carefully. A relatively small percentage of child victims and perpetrators may be involved, but to protect them in the way we have described would be effective, proportionate and worth while.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, I chair a commission on forced marriage. One of the most useful things that the Labour Government did in 2007 was create a forced marriage protection order. That was intended to deal with the perpetrators rather than the victims. However, having listened to the speeches so far, I realised that I had not thought of protection orders being for the victim rather than to prevent the victim being dealt with.
It is an admirable scheme. I was much touched by the story that the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, gave to us. One thing that would make it most useful is to deal with parents. My experience is not so much in this area, but when I was a family judge, one of the problems, particularly in care cases, was the inability of the parents to manage their children. Very often, the children were very well meaning, but they absolutely would not do what their parents said. Is anybody who is a parent surprised? As a grandparent, I am even less surprised by the fact that children, if they are told to do something by a parent, will not do it—just out of bloody-mindedness, apart from anything else.
This would offer a genuine ability to look after a child who is being exploited and is extremely vulnerable, but whose parents, trying as hard as they can, cannot manage him or her. This would give them the power, apart from the authorities, to do something useful—and useful not just for the child but for the state.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, we welcome this amendment, which would provide a valuable additional tool to protect children who are criminally exploited while at the same time committing criminal acts that victimise others. The amendment seeks to address these behaviours proportionately, managing the child’s risk to others without inflicting the potentially life-changing damage of having a criminal label attached, while ensuring the child is protected from further exploitation.
A criminal exploitation protection order would be an important step towards providing an end-to-end response for children in this situation. Unlike a youth rehabilitation order, it would directly target behaviours linked to child criminal exploitation, addressing the unique power imbalances and coercion involved in those often-complex situations. I urge the Government to look closely at the proposed order, which would be an extremely worthwhile addition to the Bill and which has the full support of these Benches.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong of Hill Top, for bringing forward this important amendment. It speaks to an issue that has been much discussed during the Bill’s passage: the urgent need to protect children who are coerced or manipulated into criminal activity by those who exploit them for profit and control.
Amendment 247 proposes a new clause to establish a criminal exploitation protection order. This would be aimed directly at safeguarding children who have already been subjected to criminal exploitation, preventing further harm. As the noble Baroness has eloquently explained, these children deserve support and a clear pathway out of exploitation. Undoubtedly, there is merit in exploring whether a new bespoke order focused on the safety and welfare of the exploited child could complement the existing prevention orders in the Bill which target the adult perpetrators. We recognise the intention behind ensuring that prohibitions and requirements are carefully balanced so as not to interfere unnecessarily with education, family life or existing legal orders. From these Benches, we are sympathetic to the objectives of the amendment.
We recognise that introducing new regimes raises practical considerations that must be considered. I therefore look forward to hearing the Government’s response and to further discussion as the Bill progresses. Protecting children from exploitation must be central to this legislation. I thank the noble Baroness for her continued leadership on this issue.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Armstrong for Amendment 247. I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay of Llandaff and Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for their support for the amendment, and for the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. I am sorry to have elevated the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool—obviously, I was transfixed by the “Liverpool” part of his title. I appreciate his gentle chiding of me for that rookie error, which I still occasionally make after 15 months in this place. I apologise for that.
I hope I can reassure the Committee that the Government are committed to tackling the criminal exploitation of children and to supporting children who are victims of criminal exploitation. There are a number of comprehensive provisions in the Bill. In early December, the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, is meeting the Policing Minister in the Home Office to discuss these issues. I am grateful for her expertise and for the discussions that my noble friend Lady Armstrong has had with Action for Children and colleagues outside of the House.
I fully understand and agree with the desire to safeguard children from the horrific consequences of criminal exploitation. That is why the Government are delivering on the manifesto commitment to bring forward this order, under the clauses that we have discussed, and go after the gangs that are luring young people into violence and crime. Additionally, as the Committee will know, through Clauses 42 to 55 and Schedule 5 to the Bill, the Government’s criminal exploitation prevention orders will place prohibitions and requirements on adults who pose a risk of exploiting children into criminality.
This brings me to the central point of the amendment before us. The Government have considered the position but feel that the most effective way to manage the behaviour of those who have criminally exploited children, or who are at risk of doing so, and to protect children from being criminally exploited are the measures in the Bill. We should be restricting the conduct of the adult perpetrator rather than of the child victim.
I simply say to my noble friend—this is an important point—that for legislation to be effective, there needs to be a consequence for non-compliance. If the measure that she has brought forward was put into legislation, we would be focusing on the child victim and their behaviour. In the event of non-compliance, unless there is a consequence to that—and I am not quite sure what that consequence would be—the proposal would have no legal effect. If a child breaches the prohibition or requirements in an order, the first response could be a further narrowing of the prohibitions or requirements, or varying them. Ultimately, a breach of the order would require a consequence, and I am not sure that we have considered that matter in full.
The Government believe that the measures we are introducing in the Bill will create greater awareness of child criminal exploitation and increase identification of victims, and will ensure that we assist victims in receiving appropriate support. When victims are identified, practitioners will be encouraged to recognise vulnerability, first and foremost, and, I hope, to clearly signal that the children who are used by adults to commit crime are victims of abuse.
I hear what noble Lords have said. Everybody who has spoken has broadly supported the direction of travel. We want to draw on that wealth of experience and insight, which is why my colleagues, the Policing Minister and the Safeguarding Minister in the Home Office, are hosting a round table with experts before Christmas to meet the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and look at how we can better support children who are victims of crime and potentially perpetrators of crime.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
It seems fairly obvious to me that if the order were breached by the child, the child would end up in the family proceedings court preferably, rather than the family criminal court. That could be done by an order, and it might not do any harm for the child. There could be some innovative thinking in the Home Office as to other ways of dealing with this. The real point being made today, if I might remind Minister, is about helping the parents. At the moment, I do not see what else can help the parents. I would be very grateful to know what the Minister thinks about that.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The noble and learned Baroness, with all her experience, brings forward one potential output of a breach of an order, and I accept that that is a potential output. The point I am making to my noble friend is that we want to discuss what happens to the child and the range of consequences. That is why my honourable friend the Policing Minister and my honourable friend Jess Phillips, the Safeguarding Minister, are meeting agencies in this field to look at what is going to happen. That is planned for before Christmas. There is a separate meeting with the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. Although the noble and learned Baroness has brought forward one consequence, I want to look at all the issues. I am not able to accept the amendment before us because that is one of the issues that is not resolved. Therefore, although I understand the desire behind this, I ask that my noble friend withdraws her amendment today and allows for reflection to occur.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)
I am most grateful to the Minister and look forward to the meeting. To pick up the point made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, I wonder whether the Minister, in tackling this, recognises that many times, the so-called parents will be someone who has legal responsibility but who actually may not be helping the child. One of the issues with an order such as this would potentially be making sure that those who have legal responsibility for a child also have a duty to try to enforce the protection of that child. That may mean a change in their own behaviours. It is a complicated issue. I am grateful to the Minister for having listened so carefully and to the Home Office for recognising that somehow, something has to be done. This might not be perfect, but we cannot leave a big gap there.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I accept and understand that young children will be impacted by the potential behaviour of the parent, or indeed the lack of behaviour by the parent. The suggestion of the order may be a contributing factor which might assist with that. I have tried to point out to the Committee that there are a number of issues. First, this would be an order against the child, which is a big issue. Secondly, there would have to be a consequence for a breach. Thirdly, the Government’s focus in the Bill is on action on adults. Those are three issues that I put on the table for the Committee and which lead me to ask my noble friend to withdraw the amendment.
However, the engagement and discussions, both with the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, and with the coalition of groups that have a concern about this, will continue before Christmas. That will obviously give the mover of the amendment an opportunity to reflect upon it. But in the meantime, I urge her to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top (Lab)
My Lords, I thank everyone for their contributions to this debate and to the previous one.
This is complex and we all want to have good outcomes. I appreciate that the Minister is saying that we need more discussion and to make sure that we address this issue in a way that safeguards children and young people but also deals with perpetrators and potential perpetrators and makes sure that the families of the children and young people are engaged in the way that we sort things out. The real problem is that it is much more than just Home Office business, which I appreciate. However, Members of this House have made great strides in at least beginning to identify the issues, reflecting our discussions and experiences from outside. That is important. I look forward to continuing to engage with the Government and the Minister in the next period of time so that we can come up with something that people will have confidence in. In that spirit, I therefore seek to withdraw the amendment.
Crime and Policing Bill
Thursday 27th November 2025
(5 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-IV(a) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Fourth Marshalled List) - (26 Nov 2025)
Lord Randall of Uxbridge
“Definition of modern slavery exploitation: orphanage trafficking(1) Section 3 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 is amended as follows.(2) After subsection (6) insert—“Orphanage trafficking(7) The person is a child who has been recruited into a residential care institution overseas for the purpose of financial gain and exploitation.”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would expand the definition of exploitation under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to include children who have been recruited into residential care institutions that engage in orphanage trafficking.
Lord Randall of Uxbridge (Con)
My Lords, the proposed new clause in my Amendment 247A would expand the definition of exploitation under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to include children who have been recruited into residential care institutions that engage in orphanage trafficking. One privilege, and benefit, of being a Member of this House—or indeed of the other—is the fascinating people whom one meets and finding out about issues that I do not think everybody would always understand.
It was only last week at the annual general meeting of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Human Trafficking and Modern Slavery that I discovered that, during the passage of this Bill in the other place, my right honourable friend Dame Karen Bradley and Sarah Champion had put down an amendment, which is being mirrored here, about orphanage trafficking. That had not come across my radar, even though I have been—I declare my interest—the chairman of the Human Trafficking Foundation. As I say, it was not something that I had been aware of, so I tabled this amendment. By some chance, earlier this week, I met Dame—no, not Dame, sorry, I have elevated her; I met Claire Wright MBE. She is a patron of a very good charity called Hope and Homes for Children. She was talking to me about orphanage trafficking and I said that I had put down an amendment. We got into a discussion with my noble friend Lady Sugg, who I see here in her place, so she also heard about this. It just goes to show what can happen.
Orphanage trafficking is a form of child trafficking defined as
“the recruitment or transfer of children into orphanages, or any residential care facility … for a purpose of exploitation … or profit. It involves both ‘acts’ and ‘purposes of exploitation’ that meet the definition of child trafficking under the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons”.
As I have said, it is a little-known crime here in the UK, but it is estimated that around 5 million children worldwide are living in residential institutions, which exist not to help, support and educate the children but to make profits from charitable donations and something that I had not come across before called “voluntourism”—a form of tourism in which travellers participate in voluntary work. Australia has been in the lead with this and was the first country to legislate to outlaw this crime.
Child trafficking into institutions is something that has been going on and is linked to the funding of orphanages through private donations, volunteer tourism, as I have just mentioned, mission trips and other forms of fundraising. It is estimated that US Christian organisations alone donate approximately $3.3 billion to residential care each year. The popular practice of orphanage volunteering—people from high-income countries travelling abroad hoping to help children living in orphanages, with every good will in the world—also serves to provide a continual income for the orphanage as well as reduced labour costs for the care of the children. There is, however, a grim downside to this. Although often well intentioned, these sources of financial and in-kind support undermine national efforts to support broader child protection and social welfare systems by creating a parallel system without official oversight and accountability. They also create a marketplace that can incentivise the expansion of existing orphanages and the establishment of new ones, with the supply of funding and resources into orphanages increasing the demand for children to be in them.
There is evidence of children being deliberately recruited from vulnerable families to fill spaces in orphanages, under the guise of better care and access to education. Once trafficked into those orphanages, children are then vulnerable to neglect, abuse and exploitation. Orphanages that are run for profit have been found to operate under extremely poor conditions to drive down care costs, with evidence pointing to children being kept deliberately malnourished to encourage further donations, forced to interact with and perform for visitors, or forced to beg for financial donations.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lord, I focused on this new clause when I saw my noble friend Lord Randall of Uxbridge’s name on it. When I was Opposition Chief Whip, among the many fixtures and fittings I inherited in the office was the MP for Uxbridge, John Randall. Although I was Chief Whip, I became his understudy, and to this day I follow his lead on many of the amendments he tables, particularly on biodiversity and so on. So when I saw his name, I thought, “There is something in this and I had better look at it”. My noble friend has tabled a very important amendment and put his finger on the appalling abuse of children in the world. It is a significant and widespread issue which serves as a pipeline to modern slavery and other forms of exploitation globally.
My noble friend’s proposal seeks to expand the definition of exploitation under Section 3 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to include orphanage trafficking—specifically, the recruitment of children into overseas residential care institutions purely for the purpose of financial gain and exploitation. As he said, orphanage trafficking is a form of child exploitation whereby children are deliberately separated from their families and recruited into residential care institutions, not for their welfare but to generate profit. This hidden practice is driven by greed and the profit motive, with children being used as commodities to attract charitable donations and international funding or to facilitate voluntourism. In many instances, children are not without parents but are falsely labelled as orphans to increase the institution’s appeal. The problem is as extensive as my noble friend has said.
There are an estimated 5.4 million children worldwide living in orphanages and other residential care institutions. Research consistently shows that over 80% of these children have at least one living parent. Orphanages, particularly in developing countries, are often set up and run as businesses, with the children as the “product”. Orphanage directors and “child-finders” often target poor, low-education families in rural areas, making false promises of education and a better life in exchange for the children.
The exact scale of orphanage trafficking is difficult to quantify due to a lack of data, poor government oversight of many unregistered facilities and the clandestine nature of the crime. Children in these institutions are often untracked, making them more susceptible to exploitation. The links between institutions and child trafficking have been formally recognised in recent years by the United Nations General Assembly and the US Government’s Trafficking in Persons Report, which highlights the growing international concern.
Children in these institutions face various forms of modern slavery and abuse, including financial exploitation, with the children being used to elicit donations from well-intentioned tourists and volunteers. This can involve forcing them to pose as orphans or perform for visitors, or keeping them in deliberately poor conditions to evoke sympathy. Then there is sexual exploitation—children are vulnerable to sexual abuse by staff, volunteers and organised criminal groups targeting these facilities. Then there is forced labour: children being forced to perform labour such as working on a director’s land, doing excessive domestic chores, or begging on the streets. Then there is illicit adoption: in some cases, children are recruited for the purpose of illicit, fraudulent adoption, with documentation falsified to facilitate the process and generate profit.
This is an evil trade, and it is well organised. These so-called child-finders lure families into giving up their children through deception, coercion or payment. Gatekeeping procedures are bypassed or manipulated, often by falsely declaring children as abandoned or creating fraudulent documents. The child’s identity is altered—the child’s name is changed to establish an orphan identity and make them untraceable by their biological family. The child is maintained in the institution long term for ongoing exploitation and profit generation through donations and sex tourism. My noble friend’s amendment deserves Government support.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, I strongly support this amendment. As the Minister might notice, it is not intended to be dealt with under the Crime and Policing Bill but under the Modern Slavery Act. That means, in a sense, it is probably simpler for the Government to accept it, because it is an improvement to an Act of 10 years ago. I am not quite sure why, oddly enough, the noble Lord, Lord Randall, and I did not think about it in those days, but it was not raised.
When I was a judge, I had the specific example of a child being put into an orphanage by their father, with the intention of a large amount of money being paid eventually for that child to be adopted. The child was in the process of being adopted in England by an American family who came to England. The whole set-up was so unsatisfactory that the child was removed and went into care. The question then was whether the child should go back to the natural parent—the father—but the problem was that he had put the child into the orphanage.
This is a very serious issue that is seriously underestimated and not well known. The very least the Government could do is to amend the Modern Slavery Act.
Baroness Sugg (Con)
My Lords, as my noble friend Lord Randall said, I too recently met the Hope and Homes for Children charity. This amendment helps to name, define and criminalise the form of exploitation my noble friend set out. As he said, it is often hidden behind humanitarianism or done in the name of childcare. The deception, exploitation, control and harm that children face in these institutions have all the hallmarks of modern slavery. That is why it is important not to treat it separately from modern slavery. By including it we will, I hope, help to ensure that traffickers cannot claim that they operate as charities, rather than being the exploitative institutions that they are. The amendment would help to close a legal gap and, hopefully, disrupt the financial incentives that create harm. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to my noble friend’s arguments.
Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville (LD)
My Lords, I support Amendment 247A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Randall of Uxbridge, who has laid out the case in detail.
It is a sad fact that children, some with living parents, are deliberately separated from their families and placed in residential institutions overseas. These institutions then present these children as orphans to attract donations from well-meaning supporters, often in the UK. The children become commodities: the more vulnerable they appear, the more money flows in. This is exploitation on a grand scale, masquerading as charity, and it is funded in part by British individuals and organisations who often have no idea that they are perpetuating abuse.
Amendment 247A proposes an overdue expansion of the definition of exploitation in Section 3 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to explicitly include orphanage trafficking. As the explanatory statement confirms, this new clause would insert a clear definition into the Act that orphanage trafficking means that
“The person is a child who has been recruited into a residential care institution overseas for the purpose of financial gain and exploitation”.
Our approach throughout the Bill’s scrutiny has been to ensure that our legislation is robust and responsive and specifically targets the modern tactics of abusers and exploiters, particularly concerning vulnerable children.
The phenomenon of orphanage trafficking was not adequately understood as a distinct form of modern slavery when the Modern Slavery Act 2015 was drafted a decade ago. In recent years, however, extensive research and reporting, including by UNICEF and specialist organisations working in south-east Asia and Africa, have revealed the scale and systematic nature of this exploitation. We now know that the practice uses the guise of charitable care to perpetrate sustained abuse for profit. This is unacceptable.
By explicitly defining this conduct, Amendment 247A would ensure that the MSA 2015 is fully equipped to address this tragic global issue. We have seen the importance of such clarity throughout the Bill. Just as we have recognised that exploitation evolves, we should now acknowledge orphanage trafficking as an identifiable and compatible form of abuse. This amendment applies the same principle to this particularly insidious form of overseas exploitation.
The amendment serves three critical functions. First, it would provide legal recognition and awareness. This is a necessary first step to legally recognise orphanage trafficking in UK law. This action would raise the profile of a genuine issue that, despite being recognised in jurisdictions such as Australia and New Zealand, remains poorly understood here. It is time this was addressed. Australia’s experience demonstrates that legislative recognition creates public awareness and shifts provision towards sustainable, family-based care models rather than institutional placements.
Secondly, the amendment targets financial facilitators. This is the amendment’s most powerful practical effect. Adding this specific definition to the MSA 2015 would mean that individuals and organisations which provide financial support to these exploitative overseas institutions could be in breach of the Modern Slavery Act. This would allow enforcement action to be taken against them.
Thirdly, it covers international obligations and UK leadership. This amendment aligns with our commitments under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and reinforces the UK’s role in setting global standards for combating modern slavery. It demonstrates that our child protection framework extends meaningfully beyond our borders.
Supporting Amendment 247A is a necessary evolution of our anti-slavery legal framework. It would ensure that our commitment to protecting exploited children extends effectively beyond our borders and covers every known facet of trafficking, reinforcing our foundational principle that the law must protect the vulnerable from financial and criminal exploitation.
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child should be upheld at every level. We hope the Government will support this amendment in order to protect innocent, vulnerable children from this very distressing practice.
The Lord Bishop of Manchester
My Lords, I too support this amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Randall of Uxbridge. It is my privilege, as I travel around the world visiting Anglican provinces, often to visit orphanages and see some of the work they do. As noble Lords have already said, many of these children still have a living parent somewhere, but that parent, for whatever reason, no longer feels able or wishes to look after them, particularly if the mother has died in childbirth.
Lord Polak (Con)
My Lords, I too support the noble Lord, Lord Randall, on Amendment 247A. I had the fortune of meeting Claire Wright over a year ago, and she explained to me what Hope and Homes for Children was doing as a charity. I too was bowled over by it, because it was an area that I did not have much knowledge of. She and the organisation have done amazing work. While this may be out of scope of the Bill, the one suggestion I make to the Minister is that he could bring together a round table of Ministers from relevant government departments to listen to Claire Wright and Hope and Homes for Children, so that their good work can be shared and built on.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Randall of Uxbridge for bringing forward this important amendment. It would ensure that this House does not overlook emerging and deeply troubling patterns of abuse that fall outside traditional definitions.
The amendment seeks to expand the definition of exploitation under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to include children who are recruited into residential care institutions overseas for the purpose of financial gain, commonly referred to as orphanage trafficking. As my noble friend highlighted, this is a practice that too often disguises itself as humanitarian intervention, while in fact it enables systematic exploitation and harm. Many so-called orphanages operate as profit-making enterprises, intentionally separating children from families and communities to attract funding and donations. The children involved may be subject to physical and emotional abuse, forced labour or trafficking into other forms of exploitation.
It is right that we recognise the growing international call to confront this practice and that we consider whether our legislative framework needs strengthening to support that effort. Ensuring that the Modern Slavery Act accurately reflects contemporary forms of exploitation is a legitimate objective, and I commend my noble friend for shining a spotlight on an issue that has far too long remained in the shadows.
We are sympathetic to the intention of the amendment and welcome the opportunity it provides to examine how the UK can play a stronger role in protecting vulnerable children globally. At the same time, we look forward to hearing from the Minister about the practical implications of such a change and how it might interact with existing powers and international co-operation mechanisms. I hope the Government will engage constructively with the concerns he has raised, and I very much look forward to hearing from the Minister.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, I thank everyone who contributed to this short but vital debate on an issue, which, speaking personally, I was not tremendously well aware of before looking at the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Randall. Many noble Lords have commented that it is the hard work of people such as Claire Wright and others that has brought to light this pernicious activity or—to use the words of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra—this evil trade.
As the noble Lord, Lord Randall of Uxbridge, has explained, Amendment 247A seeks to include so-called orphanage trafficking within the meaning of exploitation under Section 3 of the Modern Slavery Act. I know the noble Lord has concerns about modern slavery and trafficking in his wider work. I pay tribute to his work as chair of the Human Trafficking Foundation and the work of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Human Trafficking and Modern Slavery for highlighting this evil activity and the wider concerns around modern slavery.
As the noble Lord described, in our case, concerns about orphanage tourism would be about volunteers from the UK visiting orphanages overseas, fuelling this activity and contributing to a cycle of harm and exploitation of children. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester made a very relevant point: a lot of it is done in good faith. However, it can be undermined and exploited by those who are acting in bad faith.
I make it very clear to all noble Lords who spoke in the debate—the noble Baronesses, Lady Sugg and Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the noble Lords, Lord Polak and Lord Randall, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, on the Opposition Front Bench—that the Government share the same concerns. That is why the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office provides travel advice warning British nationals of the risk of volunteering with children and highlighting how volunteer visitors may unknowingly contribute to child exploitation and trafficking. The advice that the FCDO gives signposts travellers to the global standard for volunteering, which helps organisations provide responsible volunteering. By adopting the global standard, organisations commit to promoting child-safe volunteering in all environments, which includes not facilitating visits to orphanages or other institutional care facilities.
Section 3 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 already recognises the specific vulnerabilities of children and encompasses the exploitation of children for the provision of services of any kind and to enable someone to acquire benefits of any kind, including financial gain. Therefore, orphanage trafficking is already captured by the broad terms of the existing legislation. It is fair to say that the noble Lord, Lord Randall, anticipated that that may be the tenor of my contribution.
I point out to noble Lords that on 16 July this year, the Home Office launched a public call for evidence on how the Government can improve the process of identifying victims of modern slavery, human trafficking and exploitation. The call for evidence closed on 8 October, and the Home Office is now analysing responses received. A report summarising the key findings and themes from the call for evidence responses will be published in due course. Of course, the Home Office will consider the evidence gathered to explore any further changes that can be made to improve the identification of victims.
We are seeking to introduce new modern slavery legislation as part of our efforts to review and improve the modern slavery system. This new legislation will enable us to clearly articulate the UK’s responsibilities under international law regarding modern slavery, allowing us to reduce opportunities for misuse while ensuring the right protection for those who need it.
I make no commitments here to your Lordships’ Committee, but that may well be to an opportunity to revisit some of the issues raised in this debate. The noble Lord, Lord Polak, floated the suggestion of a wider round table; I will certainly take that back to colleagues and discuss it.
For the reasons I have outlined about Section 3 of the Modern Slavery Act already capturing orphanage trafficking in the broad terms, we do not believe it is necessary to amend Section 3 any further, as the conduct in question is already captured. In light of this explanation, and hoping that it does not disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Randall, and other noble Lords too much, I hope he will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Randall of Uxbridge (Con)
My Lords, I thank everybody who has taken part in this debate. As I said at the beginning of my contribution, one of the many benefits of this place is having people who know much more than I do about a subject and who are certainly much more eloquent. Everybody who spoke after me fit that description. It was extremely good to have the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester pointing out that it is not every orphanage, and so forth.
However, it is an important issue. My friend—I call her that because we work very closely together—the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, is right: we did not spot this in our debates during the passage of the Modern Slavery Act, but that is because modern slavery in all its forms is always developing; the traffickers and exploiters are always looking at something new.
I am very grateful for what the Minister said. If I could predict the lottery numbers as well as I can predict ministerial responses, I would be a very rich man. We will come back to this, not necessarily in this Bill, but we should be looking at it. It would be good if we could perhaps at some stage get a Minister—they are very busy at the moment with this Bill and goodness knows how many other things—to meet the lady we mentioned and others, just to get an idea of the scale of it. But there is so much of this exploitation—we have only to look at Ukraine and the children who are being trafficked into Russia. On that note, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
“Independent Commission on Grooming Gangs: timescaleWithin three months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must commence the work of the Independent Commission on Grooming Gangs by—(a) appointing a Chair,(b) publishing the inquiry’s terms of reference,(c) appointing a Minister with the sole task of overseeing the inquiry and related activities, and(d) directing the inquiry’s hearings to begin.”
Baroness Maclean of Redditch (Con)
My Lords, there is a dismal pattern in our country in response to serious failings of the state. First, we see denials and cover-ups, then the issue gains traction, but shock and outrage quickly follow. Calls for something to be done are heard but too often are followed by absolutely nothing—more delay, while victims are relegated to yesterday’s newspapers and the news cycle moves on. Unfortunately, the rape gang issue is a classic example of this pattern.
Victims deserve so much better from us than this. Has anyone else noticed that it has gone eerily quiet? Where is the national statutory inquiry promised by the Government? The Minister said earlier, in his responses in Oral Questions, that it was coming “very soonly”, and I give him credit for inventing another euphemism which even I have not heard before. But seriously, it is conspicuous by its absence. Neither the public nor the victims know when it is going to start or who is going to chair it and, because so many victims have lost confidence in the Safeguarding Minister in the other place, Jess Phillips, which Minister is going to oversee it. Perhaps it will be our Minister, in which case I am sure we will welcome that.
This is the reason behind my tabling of Amendments 247B and 535A. They are straightforward and designed simply to ensure that the grooming gangs inquiry begins at long last. The amendments are not designed to dictate the outcome, set the scope or limit its independence. We need it for one simple reason, which is to ensure that the state does not continue to mistreat those victims, who have already suffered so much by its collective failure.
I recognise that it is perhaps not conventional and may even be novel to legislate for the start date of an inquiry, and I anticipate that the Minister will say this when he comes to respond. However, I implore him to take this seriously. We have a position in this House and we should use it for this end. We should be speaking up for these girls and women who have been let down so shockingly. The very least we can do is to send the signal to the victims that we are not going to continue failing them and we are going to get justice for them.
What is more—I speak as a former Minister in the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice—I am sure the Minister will recognise what I am about to say: providing a deadline focuses minds and drives action and activity in all parts of the system, whether the delays are accidental or bureaucratic or, in fact, unfortunately, intentional. I also remind the Minister that, in the words of the famous sage, if you keep doing what you have always done, you are going to keep getting what you have always got—no action.
We should remember that some of the survivors at the heart of this scandal have been waiting 20 years or even longer. Fiona Goddard first reported her abuse to police in 2012. She was a child when the crimes were committed against her in the mid-2000s. She told her story, took the risk, trusted the system and, as she puts it, was met with silence, closed doors and disbelief. When she was asked recently how it felt to wait this long, she said, “It’s like living with a wound that’s never allowed to close, because every year I’m told justice will come but every year nothing begins”. The victims have to keep reliving the trauma, but nothing moves forward. Hope is being postponed, year after year. We know that the only thing worse than being failed by institutions once is being failed by them twice, thrice and more. As one survivor said, “We do not need perfection. We just need to know that somebody has finally begun the work”.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to the proposed new clauses in my Amendments 271C, 271D and 271E. I congratulate my noble friend Lady Maclean on her excellent amendments. She also has the advantage of that wonderful name of the great Highland clan the Macleans of Duart, which I used to have myself.
I was inspired to table my amendments when I read properly the brilliant but frightening report from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey of Blackstock. I had skim-read the media reports and the government comments on it when it was published, but it was not until recently, when I read the report properly, that I had confirmed to me the full horror of the conspiracy by those in lawful authority who had covered up child rape for the last 30 years. The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, said in blunt terms what we all knew was the case but were afraid to say in case we were accused of racism or Islamophobia. We could all see from the various court convictions that 90% of the perpetrators were Pakistani Muslim males and the victims were almost exclusively young white girls.
The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, pointed out that around 500,000 children a year are likely to experience sexual abuse of some kind. The police recorded data shows just over 100,000 offences of child sexual abuse and exploitation recorded in 2024, with around 60% of these being contact offences. We know that the sex crimes reported to the police are just the tip of the iceberg. The national police data confirms that the majority of victims of child sexual exploitation are girls—78% in 2023. The most common age for victims is between 10 and 15 years-old—57% are between 10 and 15 years old, for God’s sake. Putting that together suggests that, of just those reported to the police, we have at least 60,000 little children every year being victims of contact sexual abuse—and what an intriguing term that is. Let us start calling it out for what it really is.
The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, said:
“That term ‘group-based child sexual exploitation’ is actually a sanitised version of what it is. I want to set it out in unsanitised terms: we are talking about multiple sexual assaults committed against children by multiple men on multiple occasions; beatings and gang rapes. Girls having to have abortions, contracting sexually transmitted infections, having children removed from them at birth”.
These children were not abused by these Pakistani rape gangs. They were raped, raped and raped again by people who believed that the girls who were not Muslim were just prostitutes, deserving to be raped. Therefore, I say that “child abuse” is far too mild a term to describe the evil of what is happening. Abuse can expand over a wide range. It can be heavy smacking, not feeding a child property or failing to give love, care and attention. These things are bad in themselves, but we must make sure that we use the right terminology when talking about rape and sexual assault.
That is why I have tabled the proposed new clause in my Amendment 271C. The important words in it are “investigating authority”. Of course, after investigation, if the police find evidence of rape or sexual assault, the accused will be charged with those specific offences. The CPS will also use those correct terms. However, we have seen, time and time again, that the police, in their initial statements, say they are investigating “child abuse” and have a person or persons in custody with regard to “child abuse”. That is what the media are told and that is the message we get on our screens and in the press. By the time the police eventually say the person or persons have been charged with rape, the damage has been done. We all relax somewhat: just a bit of abuse, nothing to worry about.
The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, said:
“That is why I want the legislation on rape tightened up so that an adult having penetrative sex with a child under 16 is rape, no excuses, no defence. I believe many jaws across the country would drop if it was widely known that doing so is called anything but that”.
I am pleased to see that my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie and my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower have tabled Amendment 271B, which does exactly that. My proposed new clause is complementary, in a way: if a person is under investigation for child rape, let the police say that at the outset and not give the impression that it is something lesser.
The new clause proposed in my Amendment 271D sets out details on the full and proper investigation of historical child sexual abuse. I have used the commonly used term “historical”, but I do not like it either: it gives the impression that it is something way in the distant past, like the Battle of Waterloo. The proper terminology would be, “investigation of past child sexual abuse cases which were not properly investigated at the time”, since that is what we are talking about. It is not a very sexy title, but that is the reality.
I know that the National Crime Agency is looking at some of these past cases, and nearly 1,300 previously closed investigations involving allegations of group-based child sexual abuse and exploitation are currently being reviewed in Operation Beaconport, but my proposed new clause gives them wider authority.
We have all heard about Rochdale, Rotherham, Aylesbury and Telford, but there are at least 30 local authorities where child rape by gangs took place. Apparently, 23 police forces have submitted cases to the NCA, and the Met itself is looking at 9,000 cases. However, it seems that the NCA is looking only at police forces, when the conspiracy to not investigate and to cover up was led in many cases by elected councillors, local authorities and children’s homes.
I quote the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, again:
“I met many victims of child sexual exploitation when I conducted the inspection of Rotherham Council in 2016. I was outraged, shocked and appalled at their treatment—not only at the hands of their vile abusers, but at the treatment afforded them by those who were supposedly there to help, and to be accountable, such as their police force and their council. Those responsible in Rotherham denied any wrongdoing and tried to shirk accountability”.
She went on to say that
“I assumed we would all wake up to the fact that these were abused children and it would mean that the police, councils, health and other agencies would do their damnedest to make sure these victims were given as much care, respect and chance at justice as possible”.
Note her words: she thought that not just the police but
“councils, health and other agencies would do their damnedest”
to stop it, but they did not. In fact, we have seen from many cases that councils, councillors and their staff did their damnedest to conspire with some police forces to turn a blind eye, reduce and drop charges and cover up. The excuse was not to offend community relations and prosecute the mainly Pakistani men doing the raping.
So it is essential that the NCA, since there is no one better qualified to do it, has the powers in my proposed new clause to investigate all persons in lawful authority in the organisations I list in proposed new subsections (1) and (5), not just the police. These are
“staff of local authorities of whatever rank … elected council members of local authorities … police officers of all ranks … any police support staff … owners or managers of homes for children in care”.
Of course, the proposed new clause gives the NCA powers to get all papers and emails and sets penalties for any person trying to obstruct its inquiries.
Finally, the new clause proposed in my Amendment 271E is on offences and penalties. I need not go through them all, but I have listed eight different offences, ranging from failure to investigate and dismissing charges improperly up to and including bribes or sexual favours and the conspiracy to cover everything up.
I did not conjure these up from thin air: all these suggested offences are based on reports of crime cases and convictions, and these were allegations made in court and accepted as truthful—but then nothing was done about them. The persons were convicted of child rape or sexual assault, but then no one investigated the police or the council officers who failed to investigate or covered it up, and we have tens of thousands of cases which never got to court because of failures of investigation and good cover-ups.
Where any of these people were acting alone, I suggest a sentence of up to 10 years. However, where there was a conspiracy, with any of these people acting in concert to commit any of the offences in my list, the only penalty, in my opinion, can be up to life imprisonment. This has to be separate from the offence of perverting the course of justice, where the maximum penalty is generally seven years. I think that the heaviest sentence ever given for perverting the course of justice was 12 years for someone who planted incriminating evidence on an innocent person.
There is already a power to remove all or part of a police officer’s pension if the officer has been sentenced for a crime. Then the Home Secretary can initiate a procedure. We need to make it clear that that power can be used against any police officers and local authority employees who may be convicted of any of the crimes I have listed.
Some, perhaps many, noble Lords and the Minister will say that these penalties are far too draconian. Of course, they are draconian, and they need to be. What we are looking at are some of the vilest crimes committed against children short of murder.
The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, said:
“When those same girls get older, they face long-term physical and mental health impacts. Sometimes they have criminal convictions for actions they took while under coercion. They have to live with fear and the constant shadow over them of an injustice which has never been righted—the shame of not being believed. And, with a criminal justice system that can re-traumatise them all over again, often over many years. With an overall system that compounds and exacerbates the damage; rarely acknowledges its failures to victims. They never get to see those people who were in positions of power and let them down be held accountable … What makes child sexual exploitation particularly reprehensible, is that is consists of both formal and informal groups of men preying on girls, coercing, manipulating and deceiving them in pursuit of sexual gratification and power”.
News reports and inquests have detailed specific instances, such as the case of Charlotte Tetley, a survivor of the Rochdale grooming scandal who, after years of mental health struggles and self-harm, took her own life as an adult. Another victim, an anonymous woman, described having
“a lot of problems in the past, suicide attempts and drinking”
due to the abuse she suffered as a vulnerable teenager. Major studies and reports consistently find that survivors of child sexual abuse are at a significantly higher risk of suicide attempts than the general population. All those abusers have escaped any investigation or sanction and are in the same vile box as the rapists who raped all those children. They need to be investigated and prosecuted and to get exemplary sentences.
I am conscious that I am exceeding the 10-minute limit, but I hope the Committee will bear with me because there a couple more minutes to go. I promise that in the next debate I will speak for less than 30 seconds.
Over the past 30 years, 60,000 girls have been raped every year. We are appalled at Ukraine, where Putin has kidnapped 20,000 people and soldiers have raped about 4,000 over the past three years.
Finally, I look forward to hearing the wise words of my noble friend Lady Cash. It was two or three years before she qualified as a barrister that we created a precedent for prosecuting and bringing to justice those who committed crimes in the past. We passed, by the Parliament Act, the War Crimes Act 1991, after this House blocked it for many good reasons. We prosecuted one person under it, a 78 year-old Belarusian SS man called Anthony Sawoniuk. He murdered 18 Jews—well, he murdered a lot more than 18 Jews, but those are the ones we got names for—and we punished him. He was convicted and given a life sentence in grade C Norwich Prison, with three meals a day and his healthcare needs taken care of, and he died peacefully at age 84. Of course, the only appropriate punishment for him would have been if he appeared at Nuremburg and was hanged with all the others. We have a precedent for going back 50 years to bring to justice a war criminal who was not even British at the time it was done, so I hope that we will accept my noble friend’s view that we need to look back at historical cases and bring them forward.
Penultimately, the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, talked about taxis. I am afraid we have not got an amendment on taxis, but I want to get one. Let me conclude with these words from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey,
“one thing is abundantly clear; we as a society owe these women a debt. They should never have been allowed to have suffered the appalling abuse and violence they went through as children. This is especially so for those who were in the ‘care’ of local authorities, where the duty to protect them was left in the hands of professionals on the state’s behalf”.
These women are now in our care. It is our duty in this Parliament to ensure that they get justice for the appalling crimes they suffered.
Baroness Cash (Con)
My Lords, I support the amendments in this group, and I shall speak to the four amendments in my name. Those are in two parts. Amendments 288A and 288B are directed to the reporting of child sexual abuse and child criminal exploitation. The purpose of the amendments is to act. We have to actually do something since we have had so many reviews and inquiries.
Lord Meston (CB)
My Lords, to avoid any later confusion or doubt, I should explain that, on behalf of the unavoidably absent noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, I will be speaking to her Amendment 284 on the mandatory reporting duty. It is in a slightly different context, as it is not in the context of grooming gangs. I will not develop it at this stage but wait until that group is reached.
Baroness Walmsley (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 247B, from the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean of Redditch, seeks to advance and pre-empt the start of the work of the independent commission on grooming gangs. I would say to the noble Baroness that this process must be done properly rather than speedily, so that we can learn lessons for the future from what has happened.
To save the Minister the trouble, I will read to the noble Baroness a few morsels from the Government’s Statement, repeated here on 4 September, with which I agree:
“I know that everyone in the House and beyond wants to see the inquiry begin its work at the earliest opportunity. Colleagues will know that that requires the appointment of a chair and the agreement of terms of reference … Meaningful engagement with victims and survivors is paramount … this process must be done properly and thoroughly … three chairs were appointed and subsequently withdrew, from July 2014 onwards, prior to the eventual appointment of Professor Alexis Jay in 2016”
as the chair of IICSA—that shows how difficult it can be to get the right person—
“In line with the Inquiries Act 2025, the appointed chair will play a central role in shaping the commission’s terms of reference. These will be published and subject to consultation with stakeholders, including victims and survivors … The inquiry will begin by identifying priority areas for review … Where appropriate, the inquiry will issue recommendations at both local and national levels”.
Finally, the Minister said,
“we are determined to ensure that every survivor of grooming gangs gets the support and justice they deserve; that every perpetrator is put behind bars; that every case, historic or current, has been properly investigated; and that every person or institution who looked the other way is held accountable, as that is a stain on our society that should be finally removed for good”.—[Official Report, Commons, 2/9/25; col. 162-63]
I agree with every word of that, and I hope all noble Lords do.
The Minister repeated some of those points only today, at Oral Questions. I wonder what it is that the noble Baroness does not agree with. I hope I can assume that we all have the same objective of obtaining justice for victims, and learning valuable lessons and doing it right, rather than soon.
Amendments 271B and 271C relate to the Sexual Offences Act 2003. I worked for many weeks on that Act, and I think it was comprehensive and carefully drafted in laying out the offences. I believe that there is—I have taken very senior legal advice on this—a danger in describing offences in too much minute detail. I hope the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, will agree that it can make it more difficult to secure a conviction where a conviction should be secured, because additional elements need to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. That could open defences which are not overall justified. I also cannot see how changing terminology would add to justice, as the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, suggests.
On Amendments 271D and 271E, from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, I refer him to other parts of the Statement repeated on 4 September. I am sure the Minister will assure him in response that the Government have outlined all the work that has already been started much earlier this year to investigate historical child abuse investigation failings. I will leave it to the Minister to do that.
I welcome the concern of the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, about the system of mandatory reporting that we are offered in the Bill as it stands; it is simply not good enough, and we will come to a very wide debate about that in group 8. I hope that she will then add her support to amendments to improve that system tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, as well as my colleagues, my noble friends Lady Featherstone and Lord Clement-Jones, and me.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I rise very briefly perhaps to defend the noble Baroness, Lady Cash. Quite often in your Lordships’ House, we end up with amendments that are remarkably similar, and it appears to be a trait among some of your Lordships to consider working in co-operation with others systematically a somewhat eccentric behaviour. I personally feel that it should be encouraged.
What I wanted to say is the obvious: data is king. The situation that we have allowed to evolve over the last 20 or 30 years has been allowed to happen because of a dearth of reliable and systematic collection and utilisation of data. We have allowed what has been happening—largely to these young girls, in plain sight—because we have lacked the detail and the nitty-gritty information required to nail it. In a long career in business, the thing one disliked most was awaydays when you talked about strategy, when a large number of people would devote an enormous amount of hot air to talking about this, that or the other, usually in a slightly vague way. The thing that nails that sort of debate is reliable and accurate data. It deflates the rather pompous balloon who is spouting out, apparently knowledgeably but actually probably repeating what somebody else has said—it deflates that remarkably quickly.
Very simply, we need to follow the fourth recommendation of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, in her report. It is in bold and it is very brief, but it is extremely clear:
“The government should make mandatory the collection of ethnicity and nationality data for all suspects in child sexual abuse and criminal exploitation cases and work with the police to improve the collection of ethnicity data for victims”.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, it has been five months since the National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, undertaken by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, was published. I once again extend my thanks to her for her incredible work on this. The audit laid bare the systemic failures of local government, police leadership and safeguarding structures that allowed organised grooming gangs to operate in plain sight. The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, found a culture of denial, a fear of being labelled racist, an unwillingness to confront uncomfortable truths and a catastrophic failure to treat vulnerable young girls as victims. Her review documented how institutions minimised, dismissed or actively ignored evidence of horrific abuse. Perhaps the most sobering lesson from this is that these were not isolated failings; they were structural, cultural and tragically repeated in town after town across the country.
The national audit produced 12 recommendations. To their credit, the Government have accepted all 12, some of which have found their way into the Bill. However, unfortunately, the first and second recommendations of the audit have so far been left behind. The first recommendation of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, was to change the law so that any adult who intentionally has sexual intercourse with a child under 16 receives a mandatory charge of rape. In their response to the audit, the Government said:
“Our laws must never provide protection for the adult abusers rather than the child victims of these despicable crimes. We share Baroness Casey’s view … and we accept the recommendation to change the law in this area”.
If the Government agreed with this recommendation and said that they will implement it, why have they not done so? The Bill provides the perfect opportunity for this change in the law. That is why my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie and I tabled Amendment 271B. It would provide for a new, distinct offence of child rape. This would operate alongside the current offence of the rape of a child under 13 in Section 5 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
In her audit, the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, laid bare the loophole in the law. Currently, an adult who has sex with a child under the age of 13 is automatically guilty of rape, and this operates with strict liability. But, despite the age of consent being 16, when an adult has had sex with a child between the ages of 13 and 15, the decision to charge and which offence to charge with is left open to the Crown Prosecution Service. This has led to many cases of child sexual exploitation having the charges downgraded from rape to lesser charges, such as sexual activity with a child under Section 9 of the Sexual Offences Act. Not only is that offence not a charge of rape but it carries a maximum sentence of 14 years—not life, as in the case of an offence under Section 5. Our amendment would provide that, where a person over the age of 18 has penetrative sexual relations with a child between the ages of 13 and 15, they will be charged with the rape of a child in all cases and face a sentence of life imprisonment.
We have not included a so-called Romeo and Juliet provision in this amendment, because it applies only to those who are over 18. Children who are close in age and have consenting sexual relations would not be criminalised under the amendment. I want to make sure that that is clear.
Fundamentally, the law must be unambiguous on this matter. The penetration of a child is rape. It is not sexual activity; it is not exploitation; and it is not an unfortunate incident. It is rape. The Casey report describes girls as young as 13 being passed between adult men, yet institutional language frequently minimised the seriousness of what had occurred. Creating a specific offence would reinforce the fundamental point: children cannot consent to sex with adults—full stop. Given that the Government have accepted that this needs to happen, I hope that they will be able to accept my amendment.
The second recommendation from the national audit that the Government have failed to deliver is the national inquiry. Amendment 247B from my noble friend Lady Maclean of Redditch seeks to press the Government on what has become a chaotic process. I know we have discussed this on many occasions in this House, but the fact is that the inquiry is in disarray. Survivors have already resigned from the panel because they do not trust the Government. Those most impacted by the grooming gangs scandal have lost faith in the process that was meant to bring them long-overdue justice. Months on from the announcement, the Government were U-turning. The chair has not been appointed, the terms of reference have not been published and the inquiry has not begun. How much longer must the victims and survivors wait? My noble friend’s amendment would give the Government a timeline of three months, and there is no reason why they cannot live up to that.
My noble friend Lady Cash is a stalwart defender of the rights of children and young girls. She proposes two crucial amendments, which also link into the national audit on grooming gangs. Amendment 288A would complement the duty to report in Clause 72 of the Bill. It would establish a duty on professionals with safeguarding responsibilities to report where they know or reasonably believe that a child is being sexually abused or exploited. That would fill a long-identified and long-criticised gap. If this scandal has showed us anything, it is that vulnerable young girls were let down by the very people who were supposed to protect them. Institutions sometimes waited for absolute proof before acting, and children paid the price for that inaction.
Amendment 288B creates a new offence targeted at public officials who obstruct or frustrate investigations into child sexual abuse. This is not hypothetical. The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, found that public officials failed to record offences, failed to transmit intelligence and, in some cases, deliberately closed down avenues of inquiry. There must be consequences for such conduct. The noble Baroness was explicit that the fear of being accused of racism contributed to the reluctance of authorities to confront organised grooming gangs. More importantly, she also acknowledged that it remains impossible to provide a definitive assessment of the ethnic profile of the perpetrators, because the data collected by police forces has been woeful. That poor-quality data is one of the factors that permitted officials and authorities to claim they could not conclude any link between ethnicity or nationality and the prevalence of grooming gangs.
The large number of perpetrators whose ethnicity was recorded as “unknown” in the statistics creates a highly distorting picture. Inclusion of the “unknowns” shows 28% of group-based offenders as white, but exclusion of the “unknowns” shows 88% being white. This is obviously not the way to create datasets that could be used for accurate police intelligence and rigorous policy-making. Even today, we still have people trying to deny the fact that the vast majority of perpetrators in these grooming gangs were Pakistani, despite the evidence; they are able to continue this route because of the poor-quality data.
Because of this completely and shockingly inadequate collection of data, I strongly support this amendment from my noble friend Lady Cash. Her Amendments 288C and 288D compel the collection of ethnicity and nationality data for all child sexual offenders and victims. Consistent nationwide data gives us truth, and truth is the basis of action. I also pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Blencathra for his series of amendments. They probe the definitions of child sexual assault and rape, and also impose a statutory duty to investigate historic instances of child sexual abuse where the lawful authority has been negligent. I hope that the Government will consider these amendments with the seriousness they deserve.
These amendments together form a coherent, serious and necessary set of reforms that respond directly to the failures highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, and some of her solutions. The victims of grooming gangs were failed by the state. They were failed by those whose duty was to protect them, and they were failed by institutions that put political sensitivities above child safety.
Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)
Before my noble friend rises to reply, I want to emphasise, as someone who has practised at the Bar over many decades, like the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, the importance of our recognising in the course of these discussions that, while we are dealing here with a spate of offences clearly committed by gangs of Pakistani men, this is not confined to Pakistani men. The Epstein case has told us quite clearly that upper-class white men with power can abuse and groom and commit these crimes. I have seen it since my early years at the Bar. I see the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, sitting there, and we acted in cases involving East End gangs who passed around girls who were part and parcel of that world. Nowadays, in the drugs world, pass-around girls, who are often underage, are part and parcel of that world. So we must not become fixated on the idea that this happens only in certain communities. I just want that to be emphasised.
The Minister of State, Home Office ( Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I am grateful to all those who have spoken in what I think everybody in the Committee will accept is a very wide set of amendments, covering a large number of issues. I shall try my best to summarise and respond on behalf of the Government as a whole.
I start by saying that the horror of the events that have led to the discussions that we have had today need to be recognised, and I need to say from the Government Front Bench that we wish to ensure that we prevent those events happening in future. I just remind the Committee that the Government have been in office for 17 months so far, and the Bill before the Committee today includes a wide range of measures that have arisen out of reports published before the Government came to office, including the IICSA report under Alexis Jay, and are starting to look at some of the issues that have come out of the inquiries and discussions that we have had on issues, including the audit from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, on group-based child sexual abuse.
I also place on record, and remind the Committee, that the Government accept all the recommendations that the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, has made, and are seeking to put those recommendations into practice. I accept today that there are a number of amendments down and discussion points pressing the Government on a range of issues, but I hope that we all have the same objective in mind, which is to prevent further similar horrors.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
Why, then, was it legitimate to pass the War Crimes Act, bringing to justice someone who committed crimes, not even in this country, 50 years ago?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The noble Lord has made his case. I have put my view. If he wishes to examine it further, we can do so in due course. I understand that he wants to bring people to justice. So do I, but the approach we want to take is different from his, and we will have to accept that.
Amendment 271B, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and Amendment 271C, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, would give effect to recommendation 1 of the National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, that the law should be changed so that adults penetrating a child aged under 16 are charged with rape. As I have said, the Government have accepted this recommendation and have committed to changing the law. I reassure noble Lords that we are working fast to consider how that law change should be made. We are discussing this. I met the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, as part of that work and I will update Parliament soon about our proposed approach but, at the moment, I hope that the noble and learned Lord accepts that we are committed to that legislation and will table it as soon as time allows.
Amendment 271C, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, would mean that someone suspected of or charged with a sexual offence against a child that involved penetration would be described as having committed rape, whether the penetration was penile or non-penile, and regardless of what the offence is actually called in legislation. It would also mean that a wide range of other non-penetrative offending behaviour would be referred to simply as sexual assault. I do not think that that meets the intention of the recommendation from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, as it would not substantially change criminal law. Additionally, the difference in how offences are labelled in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and mandating how enforcement agencies then refer to those offences could lead to operational confusion, which I hope the noble Lord would seek to avoid.
Amendment 271B, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, which I have already mentioned, would create a new offence of rape which would apply when an adult penetrates with their penis the vagina, anus or mouth of a child aged 13 to 15. The offence would not require proof of an absence of consent or reasonable belief. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, who spoke to it on behalf of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, that the Government are committed to making this change in law. We have accepted the recommendations of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, and we strongly agree with the sentiment behind the amendment. However, we are also aware of the need to ensure a robust framework of sexual offences, which must work effectively across all types of child sexual abuse. This will be a significant change to the framework and, as such, if the noble Lord will allow me, we need to discuss it with the police and prosecutors to make sure that they have the tools needed to bring abusers to justice. When we have done that and taken those considerations into account, we will change the law, and we will update Parliament when we do that. I hope he can accept that intention.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, for her Amendments 288A and 288B. These overlap with the provisions in Chapter 2 of Part 5, which provide for a duty to report, which we will come on to later; she noted and accepted that. We believe, after extensive consultation with the relevant sectors, that the model in that chapter is the appropriate one to adopt. Again, we can debate that later, and I am sure we will, but that is the Government’s view at the moment.
Amendment 288B seeks to create a criminal offence specifically in respect of concealment by public officials. I am mindful that the type of offence proposed by this amendment may overlap with existing statutory provision, including obstruction of justice offences. Later, we will come on to consider the offence of preventing or deterring a reporter from carrying out their duty in Clause 79, and it will be part of the appropriate way forward at that stage.
Finally, the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, also tabled Amendments 288C and 288D, which are about the collection of the ethnicity and nationality data of child sexual abuse offenders and victims. I note what the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, said. The recommendation from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, is to work alongside the police to establish improvements which are required to assist the collection and publication of this data. We have accepted that recommendation. This includes reviewing and improving the existing data that the police collect, as well as considering future legislative measures if required. The objective the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, has set is one that we have accepted. We are working through that at the moment and, although it may not be satisfactory today, it is an objective to which she and the noble Lord, Lord Russell, can hold us to account.
This is an important debate. I think we are at one on these things, but it is the Government’s firm view that most of the amendments are not the way forward or need further refinement along the lines that I have already outlined to the Committee. As I have said, the Government are committed to changing the law in relation to rape. We will take away amendments and consider this further for Report.
Given these caveats, let us go back to where we started on this wide-ranging group, which is whether we should have a statutory timescale for the inquiry. Going back to the lead amendment in this group, I hope the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean, will withdraw her amendment because we are trying to do this as speedily as possible. The converse impact of her amendment may well be to create a further delay to a process that the Government are determined to get down as quickly as possible, as the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, said, to land the inquiry and get further recommendations to tighten up areas in which we need to reduce—and, we hope, stop—the number of further victims of these awful crimes.
Baroness Maclean of Redditch (Con)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for addressing my amendment and the others in such detail, and my noble friends Baroness Cash and Lord Blencathra for adding their support.
Even though the Minister has not accepted my amendment and stated that the others do not fit with the Government’s plans, I welcome the agreement across the Committee that we all support the principle of the work that is happening. However, I make no apologies for standing up and saying that the system is still not adequate in many ways. I am sure that the Minister can recognise some of this. I remember sitting in the Home Office in 2021-22, when I was a Minister there, and asking for the data about ethnicity and whether there was any connection. I was told, “No, Minister, there is none”. We all know now that that was not the case. I wish to God we had known that then so we could have done more for the victims. Collectively, we have all let them down; this is not a party-political issue, but one in which we should feel ashamed about what has happened to those vulnerable girls in our country.
I accept the Minister’s point about the timeline and the passage of the Bill, and that, were he to accept my amendment, it would potentially be delayed further than any of us would wish. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment spells out, on the face of the Bill, that “satisfied” here means satisfied on the balance of probabilities
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to Schedule 5, page 253, line 33.
(ii) doing anything in Scotland or Northern Ireland that would constitute an offence under that section (as it has effect in England and Wales) if done in England and Wales.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment expands the meaning of “engaging in child criminal exploitation” in the provisions about child criminal exploitation prevention orders in England and Wales, to encompass anything done anywhere in the UK that would be an offence under clause 40 if done in England and Wales.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment changes the meaning of “engaging in conduct associated with child criminal exploitation” in the provisions about child criminal exploitation prevention orders in England and Wales, to encompass anything done anywhere in the UK.
(a) by attending at an appropriate police station and”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is related to my amendments to Schedule 5, page 255, line 27.
(b) in a way specified in the CCE prevention order.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment allows for notifications to be made in a way specified in the CCE prevention order. This is likely to be used to provide for notifications other than in person when the offender lives outside England and Wales in cases where in person notification is considered unreasonable.
“(5A) An “appropriate police station” is a police station in the police area in which—(a) the offender’s home address is situated, or(b) the court which made the order is situated.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is related to my amendment to Schedule 5, page 255, line 20 and my other amendment to Schedule 5, page 255, line 27.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, together with my other amendment to this paragraph, changes the meaning of “home address” so that the home address of the subject of a CCE prevention order made on conviction in England and Wales may be anywhere in the UK.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, together with my other amendment to this paragraph, changes the meaning of “home address” so that the home address of the subject of a CCE prevention order made on conviction in England and Wales may be anywhere in the UK.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“ScheduleCCE prevention orders: ScotlandPower to make CCE prevention order
1 (1) This paragraph applies if—(a) the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland, in accordance with paragraph 3, makes an application to a sheriff for a CCE prevention order in respect of a person,(b) the Sheriff Appeal Court or the High Court allows a person’s appeal against a conviction for any offence,(c) a person is acquitted of any offence by or before a court by reason of the special defence set out in section 51A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,(d) a court finds under section 53F of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 that a person is unfit for trial and has done the act charged against them in respect of any offence, or(e) a court deals with a person convicted of an offence for that offence.(2) The court may make an order under paragraph 2 (a “CCE prevention order”) in respect of the person (“the adult”) if they are aged 18 or over and the conditions in sub-paragraphs (3) to (5) are met.(3) The first condition is that—(a) in any case, the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the adult has engaged in child criminal exploitation or in conduct associated with child criminal exploitation, or (b) in a case within paragraph (c), (d) or (e) of sub-paragraph (1), the offence in question is an offence under section 40.(4) The second condition is that the court considers that there is a risk that the adult will engage in child criminal exploitation.(5) The third condition is that the court considers that it is necessary to make the order to prevent the adult from engaging, or reduce the likelihood of the adult engaging, in child criminal exploitation.(6) In sub-paragraph (3)—(a) in paragraph (a), the reference to engaging in anything includes engaging in it before (as well as after) the time when this paragraph comes into force;(b) paragraph (b) applies in relation to findings made in respect of conduct occurring before (as well as after) that time.(7) In this paragraph—(a) a reference to an adult “engaging in child criminal exploitation” is to the adult—(i) doing anything that constitutes an offence under section 40 (as it has effect in Scotland), or(ii) doing anything in England and Wales or Northern Ireland that would constitute an offence under section 40 (as it has effect in Scotland) if done in Scotland;(b) a reference to an adult “engaging in conduct associated with child criminal exploitation” is to the adult doing anything, in any part of the United Kingdom, that is associated with the doing of anything within paragraph (a)(i) or (ii).CCE prevention orders
2 (1) A CCE prevention order is an order which—(a) prohibits the adult from doing anything described in the order;(b) requires that adult to do anything described in the order.The order may in particular require the adult to comply with paragraph 6 (notification requirements).(2) A court may include a prohibition or requirement only if it considers it necessary for the purpose of preventing the adult from engaging, or reducing the likelihood of the adult engaging, in child criminal exploitation.(3) Prohibitions and requirements must, so far as practicable, be such as to avoid—(a) any conflict with any religious beliefs of the adult;(b) any interference with the times, if any, at which the adult normally works or attends any educational establishment;(c) any conflict with the prohibitions and requirements of any other court order or interdict to which the adult is subject.(4) A prohibition or requirement applies throughout the United Kingdom unless expressly limited to a particular area.(5) A CCE prevention order must—(a) specify the period for which it has effect, which must be at least two years, or(b) state that it has effect until further order.(6) Where, in a case within paragraph 1(1)(e)—(a) the adult has been remanded in custody by an order of a court, or(b) a custodial sentence has been imposed on the adult or the adult is serving or otherwise subject to a such a sentence, a CCE prevention order may provide that it does not take effect until the adult is released from custody.(7) A CCE prevention order may specify periods for which particular prohibitions or requirements have effect.(8) Where a court makes a CCE prevention order in respect of a person who is already subject to such an order, the earlier order ceases to have effect.Applications for CCE prevention orders
3 (1) The Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland may make an application for a CCE prevention order.(2) An application under this paragraph must be made to the sheriff in whose sheriffdom—(a) the adult lives, or(b) the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland believes that adult is in or is intending to come to.Interim CCE prevention orders
4 (1) This paragraph applies where the sheriff adjourns the hearing of an application for a CCE prevention order made under paragraph 3.(2) The sheriff may, if they consider it necessary to do so, make a CCE prevention order lasting for a fixed period or until the determination of the application (an “interim CCE prevention order”).Paragraph 2(5) does not apply in relation to an interim CCE prevention order.(3) The only requirement that may be imposed by an interim CCE prevention order on the adult is a requirement to comply with paragraph 6 (notification requirements).(4) Subject to that, the sheriff has the same powers in relation to an interim CCE prevention order as in relation to an order made at a final hearing.(5) Nothing in sub-paragraph (2) prevents the variation of the duration of an interim CCE prevention order, or the discharge of such an order, under paragraph 7.CCE prevention orders in criminal proceedings: procedural powers
5 (1) This paragraph applies in the circumstances mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(b), (c), (d) or (e) of paragraph 1.(2) The court may make a CCE prevention order—(a) at its own instance, or(b) on the motion of the Lord Advocate, Crown Counsel or procurator fiscal (or any person duly authorised to represent or act for them).(3) For the purpose of deciding whether to make a CCE prevention order, the court may consider evidence led by the prosecution and evidence led by the adult.(4) It does not matter whether the evidence would have been admissible in the proceedings giving rise to the circumstances referred to in sub-paragraph (1).(5) The court may adjourn any proceedings relating to the making of a CCE prevention order.(6) If the adult does not appear for any adjourned proceedings, the court may—(a) further adjourn the proceedings,(b) issue a warrant for the adult’s arrest, or(c) hear the proceedings in the adult’s absence.(7) The court may act under sub-paragraph (6)(b) only if satisfied that the adult has had adequate notice of the time and place of the adjourned proceedings. (8) The court may act under sub-paragraph (6)(c) only if satisfied that the adult—(a) has had adequate notice of the time and place of the adjourned proceedings, and(b) has been informed that if the adult does not appear for those proceedings, the court may hear the proceedings in the adult’s absence.(9) Nothing in this paragraph limits any other powers of the court.Notification requirements
6 (1) This paragraph applies where a CCE prevention order requires the adult to comply with this paragraph.(2) Before the end of the period of three days beginning with the day on which a CCE prevention order requiring the adult to comply with this paragraph is first served, the adult must notify to the police—(a) the adult's name and, where the adult uses one or more other names, each of those names, and(b) the adult's home address.(3) If, while the adult is required to comply with this paragraph, the adult—(a) uses a name which has not been notified under the order, or(b) changes home address,the adult must notify, to the police, the new name or the new home address.(4) A notification under sub-paragraph (3) must be given before the end of the period of three days beginning with the day on which the adult uses the name or changes home address.(5) A notification under this paragraph must be made—(a) by attending at a police station for the time being specified in the document published under sub-paragraph (6) and giving an oral notification to a constable, or to a person authorised for the purpose by the officer in charge of the station, or(b) in a way specified in the CCE prevention order.(6) The Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland must publish, in such manner as the Chief Constable thinks fit, a document containing the name and address of each police station at which a person may give a notification under this paragraph.(7) The Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland must keep under review a document published under this paragraph and may, from time to time, publish a revised version of the document in such manner as the Chief Constable thinks fit.(8) A notification under this paragraph must be acknowledged in writing.(9) In this paragraph “home address” means—(a) the address of the adult’s sole or main residence in the United Kingdom, or(b) where the adult has no such residence, the address or location of a place in the United Kingdom where the adult can regularly be found and, if there is more than one such place, such one of those places as the adult may select.(10) In determining the period of three days mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) or (4), no account is to be taken of any time when the adult is—(a) lawfully detained or otherwise lawfully deprived of their liberty, in the United Kingdom, or(b) outside the United Kingdom.Variation and discharge of CCE prevention orders made on application
7 (1) This paragraph applies where a person mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) applies to the appropriate sheriff for the variation or discharge of a CCE prevention order made in the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1(1)(a).(2) The persons are—(a) the adult;(b) the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland.(3) On the application, the appropriate sheriff may (after hearing from the applicant and, if the other person mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) wishes to be heard, that person) make any order varying or discharging the order that the appropriate sheriff considers appropriate.This is subject to sub-paragraph (7).(4) The power to vary an order includes power to—(a) include an additional prohibition or requirement;(b) extend the period for which a prohibition or requirement has effect;(c) extend the period for which the order has effect.(5) The appropriate sheriff may make provision of a kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (4) only if they consider that the provision is necessary to prevent the adult from engaging, or reduce the likelihood of the adult engaging, in child criminal exploitation.(6) Sub-paragraphs (3), (4) and (7) of paragraph 2 apply to additional prohibitions or requirements included on a variation of an order.(7) The appropriate sheriff may not discharge an order before the end of the period of two years beginning with the day on which the order was made, without the consent of the adult and the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland.This sub-paragraph does not apply to an interim CCE prevention order.(8) In this paragraph “the appropriate sheriff” means—(a) the sheriff who made the order,(b) a sheriff in the sheriffdom of that sheriff, or(c) a sheriff in the sheriffdom—(i) in which the adult is resident at the time of the application,(ii) in which the chief constable believes that adult to be, or(iii) to which the chief constable believes that adult intends to come.Variation and discharge of CCE prevention orders made in criminal proceedings
8 (1) This paragraph applies where a person mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) applies to a relevant court for the variation or discharge of a CCE prevention order made in the circumstances mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(b), (c), (d) or (e) of paragraph 1.(2) The persons are—(a) the adult;(b) the Lord Advocate, Crown Counsel or procurator fiscal (and any person duly authorised to represent or act for them).(3) On the application, the court may (after hearing from the applicant and, if the other person mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) wishes to be heard, that person) make any order varying or discharging the order that the court considers appropriate.This is subject to sub-paragraph (7).(4) The power to vary an order includes power to—(a) include an additional prohibition or requirement; (b) extend the period for which a prohibition or requirement has effect;(c) extend the period for which the order has effect.(5) The court may make provision of a kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (4) only if it considers that the provision is necessary to prevent the adult from engaging, or reduce the likelihood of the adult engaging, in child criminal exploitation.(6) Sub-paragraphs (3), (4) and (7) of paragraph 2 apply to additional prohibitions or requirements included on a variation of an order.(7) The court may not discharge an order before the end of the period of two years beginning with the day on which the order was made, without the consent of the adult and the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland.This sub-paragraph does not apply to an interim CCE prevention order.(8) In this paragraph “relevant court” means—(a) where the High Court made the order, that court;(b) where the sheriff made the order, the sheriff.Appeals
9 (1) The adult or the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland may appeal to the relevant court against a decision made—(a) on an application under paragraph 3 (applications for CCE prevention orders);(b) under paragraph 4 (interim CCE prevention orders);(c) on an application under paragraph 7 (variation and discharge of CCE prevention orders made on application);(d) on an application under paragraph 8 (variation and discharge of CCE prevention orders made in criminal proceedings).(2) In this paragraph“relevant court” means—(a) in the case of a decision of a sheriff court, the Sheriff Appeal Court;(b) in the case of a decision of the High Court, the High Court.(3) On an appeal under sub-paragraph (1) the relevant court may make—(a) such orders as may be necessary to give effect to its determination of the appeal, and(b) such incidental and consequential orders as appear to it to be appropriate.(4) Where a CCE prevention order is made by virtue of sub-paragraph (1)(b), (c), (d) or (e) of paragraph 1, the order is taken to be a sentence for the purposes of any appeal.(5) Where a CCE prevention order is made on appeal, for the purposes of this Schedule (other than this paragraph) the order is to be treated as made by the court from which the appeal was made.Offence of breaching CCE prevention order
10 (1) A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with an order mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) commits an offence.(2) The orders are—(a) a CCE prevention order;(b) a CCE prevention order under Chapter 1 of Part 4 (CCE prevention orders on application or acquittal etc. in England and Wales);(c) a CCE prevention order under Chapter 2A of Part 11 of the Sentencing Code (CCE prevention orders on conviction in England and Wales); (d) a CCE prevention order under Schedule (CCE prevention orders: Northern Ireland) (CCE prevention orders in Northern Ireland).(3) A person who commits an offence under this paragraph is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine (or both).(4) The Scottish Ministers may by regulations amend sub-paragraph (2) so as to add to or remove from the list of orders any relevant UK order.(5) In proceedings for an offence under this paragraph, a copy of the original order mentioned in sub-paragraph (2), certified by the proper officer of the court that made it, is admissible as evidence of its having been made and of its contents to the same extent that oral evidence of those matters is admissible in those proceedings.(6) “Relevant UK order” means an order under the law of England and Wales or Northern Ireland which appears to the Scottish Ministers to be equivalent or similar to a CCE prevention order.Offences relating to notifications
11 (1) This paragraph applies where a CCE prevention order requires a person to comply with paragraph 6 (notification requirements).(2) The person commits an offence if—(a) without reasonable excuse, they fail to comply with that paragraph, or(b) in purported compliance with that paragraph, they notify to the police any information which they know to be false.(3) A person who commits an offence under this paragraph is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine (or both).(4) A person commits an offence under sub-paragraph (2)(a) on the day on which they first fail, without reasonable excuse, to comply with paragraph 6.(5) The person continues to commit the offence throughout any period during which the failure continues.(6) But the person may not be prosecuted more than once in respect of the same failure.(7) Paragraph 10(5) applies for the purposes of this paragraph.Interpretation
12 In this Schedule—“adult” has the meaning given by paragraph 1;“CCE prevention order”, except in paragraph 10(2)(b) to (d), means an order under paragraph 2 (and accordingly includes an interim order made by virtue of paragraph 4);“engaging in child criminal exploitation” has the meaning given by paragraph 1 (and related expressions are to be construed accordingly);“High Court” means the High Court of Justiciary.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment inserts a new Schedule about CCE prevention orders in Scotland.
“Schedule CCE prevention orders: Northern IrelandPower to make CCE prevention order
1 (1) This paragraph applies if—(a) an application for a CCE prevention order in respect of a person is made to a magistrates’ court, in accordance with paragraph 3,(b) a person is acquitted of any offence by or before a court,(c) the County Court allows a person’s appeal against a conviction for any offence,(d) a court deals with a person in respect of a finding that—(i) the person is not guilty of any offence by reason of insanity, or(ii) the person is unfit to plead and has done the act charged against them in respect of any offence, or(e) a court deals with a person convicted of an offence for that offence.(2) The court may make an order under paragraph 2 (a “CCE prevention order”) in respect of the person (“the defendant”) if they are aged 18 or over and the conditions in sub-paragraphs (3) to (5) are met.(3) The first condition is that—(a) in any case, the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the defendant has engaged in child criminal exploitation or in conduct associated with child criminal exploitation, or(b) in a case within paragraph (d) or (e) of sub-paragraph (1), the offence in question is an offence under section 40.(4) The second condition is that the court considers that there is a risk that the defendant will engage in child criminal exploitation.(5) The third condition is that the court considers that it is necessary to make the order to prevent the defendant from engaging, or reduce the likelihood of the defendant engaging, in child criminal exploitation.(6) In sub-paragraph (3)—(a) in paragraph (a), the reference to engaging in anything includes engaging in it before (as well as after) the time when this paragraph comes into force;(b) paragraph (b) applies in relation to findings made in respect of conduct occurring before (as well as after) that time.(7) In this paragraph—(a) a reference to the defendant “engaging in child criminal exploitation” is to the defendant—(i) doing anything that constitutes an offence under section 40 (as it has effect in Northern Ireland), or(ii) doing anything in England and Wales or Scotland that would constitute an offence under section 40 (as it has effect in Northern Ireland) if done in Northern Ireland;(b) a reference to the defendant “engaging in conduct associated with child criminal exploitation” is to the adult doing anything, in any part of the United Kingdom, that is associated with the doing of anything within paragraph (a)(i) or (ii).CCE prevention orders
2 (1) A CCE prevention order is an order which—(a) prohibits the defendant from doing anything described in the order;(b) requires the defendant to do anything described in the order. The order may in particular require the defendant to comply with paragraph 7 (notification requirements).(2) A court may include a prohibition or requirement only if it considers it necessary for the purpose of preventing the defendant from engaging, or reducing the likelihood of the defendant engaging, in child criminal exploitation.(3) Prohibitions and requirements must, so far as practicable, be such as to avoid—(a) any conflict with any religious beliefs of the defendant;(b) any interference with the times, if any, at which the defendant normally works or attends any educational establishment;(c) any conflict with the prohibitions and requirements of any other court order or injunction to which the defendant is subject.(4) A prohibition or requirement applies throughout the United Kingdom unless expressly limited to a particular area.(5) A CCE prevention order must—(a) specify the period for which it has effect, which must be—(i) at least five years in a case within paragraph 1(1)(e);(ii) at least two years in any other case, or(b) state that it has effect until further order.(6) Where, in a case within paragraph 1(1)(e)—(a) the defendant has been remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court, or(b) a custodial sentence has been imposed on the defendant or the defendant is serving or otherwise subject to a such a sentence,a CCE prevention order may provide that it does not take effect until the defendant is released from custody or ceases to be subject to a custodial sentence.(7) A CCE prevention order may specify periods for which particular prohibitions or requirements have effect.(8) Where a court makes a CCE prevention order in respect of a defendant who is already subject to such an order, the earlier order ceases to have effect.Applications for CCE prevention orders
3 An application for a CCE prevention order may be made by the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland.Applications without notice
4 (1) An application for a CCE prevention order may be made without notice to the defendant.(2) If an application is made without notice the court must do one of the following—(a) adjourn the proceedings and make an interim CCE prevention order (see paragraph 5);(b) adjourn the proceedings without making an interim order;(c) dismiss the application.Interim CCE prevention orders
5 (1) This paragraph applies where the court adjourns the hearing of an application (whether made with or without notice) for a CCE prevention order.(2) The court may, if it considers it necessary to do so, make a CCE prevention order lasting for a fixed period or until the determination of the application (an “interim CCE prevention order”).Paragraph 2(5) does not apply in relation to an interim CCE prevention order. (3) The only requirement that may be imposed by an interim CCE prevention order on the defendant is a requirement to comply with paragraph 7 (notification requirements).(4) Subject to that, the court has the same powers in relation to an interim CCE prevention order as in relation to an order made at a final hearing.(5) An interim CCE prevention order made at a hearing of which the defendant was not given notice takes effect on being served on the defendant.(6) Nothing in sub-paragraph (2) prevents the variation of the duration of an interim CCE prevention order, or the discharge of such an order, under paragraph 8.Procedural powers where no application made
6 (1) This paragraph applies in the circumstances mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(b), (c), (d) or (e) of paragraph 1.(2) For the purpose of deciding whether to make a CCE prevention order, the court may consider evidence led by the prosecution and evidence led by the defendant.(3) It does not matter whether the evidence would have been admissible in the proceedings giving rise to the circumstances referred to in sub-paragraph (1).(4) The court may adjourn any proceedings relating to the making of a CCE prevention order.(5) If the defendant does not appear for any adjourned proceedings, the court may—(a) further adjourn the proceedings,(b) issue a warrant for the defendant’s arrest, or(c) hear the proceedings in the defendant’s absence.(6) The court may act under sub-paragraph (5)(b) only if satisfied that the defendant has had adequate notice of the time and place of the adjourned proceedings.(7) The court may act under sub-paragraph (5)(c) only if satisfied that the defendant—(a) has had adequate notice of the time and place of the adjourned proceedings, and(b) has been informed that if the defendant does not appear for those proceedings, the court may hear the proceedings in the defendant’s absence.(8) Nothing in this paragraph limits any other powers of the court.Notification requirements
7 (1) This paragraph applies where a CCE prevention order requires the defendant to comply with this paragraph.(2) Before the end of the period of three days beginning with the day on which a CCE prevention order requiring the defendant to comply with this paragraph is first served, the defendant must notify to the police—(a) the defendant’s name and, where the defendant uses one or more other names, each of those names, and(b) the defendant’s home address.(3) If, while the defendant is required to comply with this paragraph, the defendant—(a) uses a name which has not been notified under the order, or(b) changes home address,the defendant must notify, to the police, the new name or the new home address. (4) A notification under sub-paragraph (3) must be given before the end of the period of three days beginning with the day on which the defendant uses the name or changes home address.(5) A notification under this paragraph is made—(a) by attending at any police station in Northern Ireland and giving an oral notification to a constable, or to a person authorised for the purpose by the officer in charge of the station, or(b) in a way specified in the CCE prevention order.(6) A notification under this paragraph must be acknowledged in writing.(7) In this paragraph “home address” means—(a) the address of the defendant’s sole or main residence in the United Kingdom, or(b) where the defendant has no such residence, the address or location of a place in the United Kingdom where the defendant can regularly be found and, if there is more than one such place, such one of those places as the defendant may select.(8) In determining the period of three days mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) or (4), no account is to be taken of any time when the defendant is—(a) lawfully detained or otherwise lawfully deprived of their liberty, in the United Kingdom, or(b) outside the United Kingdom.Variation and discharge of CCE prevention orders
8 (1) This paragraph applies where a person mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) applies to a relevant court for the variation or discharge of a CCE prevention order.(2) The persons are—(a) the defendant;(b) the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland.(3) On the application, the court may (after hearing from the applicant and any other person mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) who wishes to be heard) make any order varying or discharging the order that the court considers appropriate.This is subject to sub-paragraph (7).(4) The power to vary an order includes power to—(a) include an additional prohibition or requirement;(b) extend the period for which a prohibition or requirement has effect;(c) extend the period for which the order has effect.(5) The court may make provision of a kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (4) only if it considers that the provision is necessary to prevent the defendant from engaging, or reduce the likelihood of the defendant engaging, in child criminal exploitation.(6) Sub-paragraphs (3), (4) and (7) of paragraph 2 apply to additional prohibitions or requirements included on a variation of an order.(7) The court may not, without the consent of the defendant and the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, discharge an order before the end of the period of—(a) five years beginning with the day on which the order was made, in the case of an order made in the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1(1)(e);(b) two years beginning with the day on which the order was made, in any other case.This sub-paragraph does not apply to an interim CCE prevention order.(8) In this paragraph “relevant court” means— (a) where the Crown Court or Court of Appeal made the order, the Crown Court;(b) in any other case, the magistrates’ court.Appeals
9 (1) The defendant or the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland may appeal to the relevant court against a decision made—(a) on an application under paragraph 3 (applications for CCE prevention orders);(b) under paragraph 5 (interim CCE prevention orders);(c) on an application under paragraph 8 (variation and discharge of CCE prevention orders).(2) In this paragraph“relevant court” means—(a) in the case of a decision of the Crown Court, the Court of Appeal;(b) in any other case, the County Court.(3) On an appeal under sub-paragraph (1) the relevant court may make—(a) such orders as may be necessary to give effect to its determination of the appeal, and(b) such incidental and consequential orders as appear to it to be appropriate.(4) Where a CCE prevention order is made by virtue of sub-paragraph (1)(b), (c) or (d) of paragraph 1, the defendant may appeal against the making of the order (so far as they could not otherwise do) as if the defendant had been convicted of the offence and the order were a sentence passed on the defendant for the offence.(5) Where a CCE prevention order is made by virtue of sub-paragraph (1)(e) of paragraph 1, the defendant may appeal against the making of the order as if the order were a sentence passed on the defendant for the offence.(6) Where a CCE prevention order is made on appeal, for the purposes of this Schedule (other than this paragraph) the order is to be treated as made by the court from which the appeal was made.(7) Rules of court may provide that an appeal from a decision—(a) to dismiss an application for a CCE prevention order made without notice being given to the defendant, or(b) to refuse to make an interim CCE prevention order when adjourning proceedings following such an application,may be made without notice being given to the defendant.Offence of breaching CCE prevention order
10 (1) A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with an order mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) commits an offence.(2) The orders are—(a) a CCE prevention order;(b) a CCE prevention order under Chapter 1 of Part 4 (CCE prevention orders on application or acquittal etc. in England and Wales);(c) a CCE prevention order under Chapter 2A of Part 11 of the Sentencing Code (CCE prevention orders on conviction in England and Wales);(d) a CCE prevention order under Schedule (CCE prevention orders: Scotland) (CCE prevention orders in Scotland).(3) A person who commits an offence under this paragraph is liable— (a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine (or both).(4) Where a person is convicted of an offence under this paragraph, it is not open to the court by or before which the person is convicted to make, in respect of the offence, an order for conditional discharge.(5) In proceedings for an offence under this paragraph, a copy of the original order mentioned in sub-paragraph (2), certified by the proper officer of the court that made it, is admissible as evidence of its having been made and of its contents to the same extent that oral evidence of those matters is admissible in those proceedings.(6) The Department of Justice in Northern Ireland may by regulations amend sub-paragraph (2) so as to add to or remove from the list of orders any relevant UK order.(7) “Relevant UK order” means an order under the law of England and Wales or Scotland which appears to the Department of Justice to be equivalent or similar to a CCE prevention order.(8) In Article 4(1) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (S.I. 1996/3160 (N.I. 24)) after “2015” insert “or paragraph 10 of Schedule (CCE prevention orders: Northern Ireland) to the Crime and Policing Act 2025”.Offences relating to notifications
11 (1) This paragraph applies where a CCE prevention order requires a person to comply with paragraph 7 (notification requirements).(2) The person commits an offence if—(a) without reasonable excuse, they fail to comply with that paragraph, or(b) in purported compliance with that paragraph, they notify to the police any information which they know to be false.(3) A person who commits an offence under this paragraph is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine (or both).(4) A person commits an offence under sub-paragraph (2)(a) on the day on which they first fail, without reasonable excuse, to comply with paragraph 7.(5) The person continues to commit the offence throughout any period during which the failure continues.(6) But the person may not be prosecuted more than once in respect of the same failure.(7) Paragraph 10(5) applies for the purposes of this paragraph.Special measures for witnesses
12 (1) Part 2 of the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1999 (S.I. 1999/2789 (N.I. 8))(special measures directions in the case of vulnerable and intimidated witnesses) applies to relevant proceedings under this Schedule as it applies to criminal proceedings, but with—(a) the omission of Articles 5(4) to (5), 9(4C)(e), 10A and 20 of that Order (which make provision appropriate only in the context of criminal proceedings), and(b) any other necessary modifications. (2) Rules of court made under or for the purposes of Part 2 of that Order apply to relevant proceedings under this Schedule—(a) to the extent provided by rules of court, and(b) subject to any modifications provided by rules of court.(3) In this paragraph “relevant proceedings under this Schedule” means any proceedings under this Schedule except proceedings relating to an offence under paragraph 10 or 11.Interpretation and supplementary provision
13 (1) In this Schedule—“CCE prevention order”, except in paragraph 10(2)(b) to (d), means an order under paragraph 2 (and accordingly includes an interim order made by virtue of paragraph 5);“defendant” has the same meaning as in paragraph 1;“engaging in child criminal exploitation” has the meaning given by paragraph 1 (and related expressions are to be construed accordingly).(2) An application under this Schedule is to be made—(a) by complaint, where the application is made to a magistrates’ court;(b) in accordance with rules of court, in any other case.(3) Article 78 of the Magistrates’ Courts (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/1675 (N.I. 26))(time limit for civil complaints) does not apply to a complaint under this Schedule.(4) On the hearing of an application under this Schedule, Article 118 of that Order (summons to witness and warrant for arrest) does not apply in relation to any person for whose protection the order is sought, except where the person has given oral or written evidence at the hearing.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment inserts a new Schedule about CCE prevention orders in Northern Ireland.
Lord Blencathra
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to remove the possibility of offences under this section being tried in a magistrate’s court.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, before speaking to my Amendment 258A, I say in the nicest possible way to the Government Whip, the noble Lord, Lord Katz, that he must not get overexcited about a 10-minute advisory timescale. My noble friend Lady Cash had three major new clauses tabled; I had three major new clauses tabled. I decided not to degroup any of them, out of decency to the House, but I was limited to 10 minutes.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I do not think I have ever given an indication the noble Lord could not speak, but there was a 13-minute contribution on a 10-minute latitude.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Hanson; I was not referring to him. It was the Government Whip who was getting very agitated about my comments. I could have spoken for a lot longer if I had degrouped my amendments, but I am not going to do that.
Quite simply, Clause 56 lists all the crimes in Part 1 of Schedule 6 that are relevant to convicting someone of controlling another person’s home for criminal purposes. Schedule 6 is about two pages of big issues—very large crimes—which are completely inappropriate for a summary trial. This is about hijacking someone else’s home, where the homeowner is kept prisoner. That is such big stuff that it should not be triable by summary but only in a Crown Court.
I beg to move—after one minute and 21 seconds.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, we welcome government Amendment 262, which recognises that cases of cuckooing often involve a complex web of coercive control. The person who seems to be in charge may actually be being manipulated or exploited by somebody else, and this addresses that complexity. However, while I understand the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and recognise all too well the potential life-changing harm caused by cuckooing, we are not minded to support restricting the trial venue in that way.
Magistrates’ courts provide quicker access to justice for victims and less delay than Crown Courts, particularly given the current backlogs. This is particularly important as cuckooing is linked to ongoing exploitation, with offenders often moving on to repeat the offence elsewhere, so fast action to stop the creation of more victims may in some cases be the more sensible option. Magistrates’ courts can also be less intimidating for vulnerable victims, supporting them to testify. Many other exploitation and safeguarding offences can be tried either way, allowing the specific facts of each case to determine the appropriate court. Imposing a blanket restriction on trial venue risks delaying justice, undermines established practice, and limits judicial discretion.
The pattern of coercion and control is at the heart of all these issues, whether we are talking about the exploitation of vulnerable children or adults. The evidence shows that women—as well as children—who are coerced into offending, often by traffickers or abusive partners, are in practice more often punished than protected. Too many victims of coercive control are still unfairly prosecuted for offences linked to their own abuse. Many female victims do not report to the police for fear of being criminalised, and that concern is well-founded. If, for example, drugs are being stored or grown in their flat, it is all too often the woman who is prosecuted. The statistics bear this out: around 70% of women in prison are victims of coercion or domestic violence.
Turning to the issue of coerced internal concealment, Amendment 259 links the new offences of causing internal concealment and cuckooing, making it clearer and easier to prosecute these serious and often related behaviours. Coerced internal concealment, whereby a person hides items such as drugs inside their bodies, is a particularly stark illustration of the abuse of power. Anyone who puts another person’s life at risk in this way should be subject to the harshest of penalties, so we support the introduction of this new offence.
I take this opportunity to raise an issue which, regrettably and surprisingly, remains absent from the Bill. In the past five years in England and Wales, a child has been subjected to an intimate police search every 14 hours on average. Black children are four times more likely to be strip-searched compared to their proportion of the population. Half these searches lead to no further action.
In opposition, the Government promised stronger regulation, including a statutory duty to notify parents, which should be the bare minimum. Although a consultation began in April 2024, there have been no firm proposals since, which is disappointing given an earlier commitment from the former Home Secretary to new mandatory rules and safeguards being
“put in place as a matter of urgency”.
That pledge followed a series of recommendations from the IOPC, including a call to amend the law so that police forces are required to make a safeguarding referral for any child subjected to a search involving the exposure of intimate parts. It also called for clearer guidance, enhanced training, greater consistency across police forces and, again, for these reforms to be implemented “quickly”.
Some 18 months later, some forces have improved practice and made more safeguarding referrals, but there is still no legal requirement. The Children’s Commissioner confirms that poor strip search practice is widespread and is not limited to any one force or region; failures include not having an appropriate adult present. Can the Minister confirm that a timescale is in place for the implementation of these recommendations? If not, will the Government consider amending the Bill to reflect the need for urgent action?
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Blencathra for introducing his amendment. This is an opportunity to consider cuckooing more broadly.
We on these Benches recognise the need for a cuckooing offence, and we did so last year before the general election. I am glad to see that the Government are now following our lead. Data suggests that cuckooing offences have quadrupled in recent years; given that it is a crime largely associated with child exploitation, it is all the more pertinent that we tackle it head on now.
Children are used to conceal and traffic illegal drugs in order to fund the activities of criminal drug gangs. Some 22% of people involved in county lines drug trades are children—that is almost 3,000 vulnerable people under the age of 18 being made to do the dirty work for criminals. These county lines trades are often run out of the dilapidated homes of vulnerable people. Criminals appropriate and transform them to use them for their own ends. Children are ferried in and out; they are sent to similar locations all over the country. It is a very specific crime that requires a very specific law. We see force in my noble friend Lord Blencathra’s amendment, but we would not wish to tie the prosecutor’s hands.
Amendment 259, which addresses the offence of causing internal concealment, would prohibit cuckooed houses being used to house people who hide and then transport drugs. These people, as I have pointed out, are often children. Amendments 260 and 261 address that more broadly. Cuckooing—using children for criminal purposes—is a heinous and exploitative crime and it is right that it be given its own offence. However, while we welcome the Government agreeing to come with us on cuckooing, it is a shame that they have failed to address another root cause of the issue. As we have said, cuckooing is a crime primarily committed by gangs who co-opt homes to run their criminal operations. If you could break up those gangs, you would reduce cuckooing; the two feed off each other.
On the previous day of Committee, His Majesty’s Opposition had two amendments that would have done this. The first amendment would have created a statutory aggravating factor for gang-related offences. The second would have created an offence for specific gang-related graffiti. We appreciate the Government following our lead to create the offence of cuckooing, but if they are serious about this, they should do the same with gangs. Our measures would not, as some noble Lords suggested, criminalise fence-painting or church symbols. Neither is a gang sign. They would, however, deter gangs from their activities and lock up members who partake. This would be just as effective as this new offence.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to all those who have contributed to this short debate. I assure the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, that I was not agitated—if he thinks that that is me being agitated, he has not yet seen me agitated. I hope that noble Lords never will. I was just reflecting the conventions and guidelines to respect each other and the courtesies of the House. We will move on. I welcome the brief and succinct way in which he introduced his amendment, but if he will allow me, I will first deal with the government amendments in this group.
Amendment 262 would make it clear that controlling another person’s dwelling for the purposes of the new cuckooing offence may be carried out via another person. I welcome the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, and the principle behind them. While the existing drafting would already allow for the prosecution of a perpetrator who uses a third party to exercise control over another’s dwelling, the amendment would put this point beyond doubt, which we felt was important.
In cuckooing cases, particularly within the county lines context, gang leaders may exploit children or vulnerable adults to control another person’s home, as noted in the debate. The amendment would make it clear that the new cuckooing offence can, and should, be used to pursue the perpetrators who are responsible for directing the cuckooing rather than the individuals who may well be victims of exploitation. We will issue statutory guidance to the police to support the implementation of the offence.
Amendment 259 would add the offence of coerced internal concealment created by the Bill to the list of offences in Schedule 6, which are relevant offences in England and Wales, for the purpose of the cuckooing offence. Similarly, Amendments 260 and 261 would add the offence of child criminal exploitation, also created by the Bill and which we discussed earlier today, to the list of relevant offences in Scotland and Northern Ireland for the purpose of the cuckooing offence.
As noted, cuckooed properties may be used as a base for criminal exploitation. These amendments would therefore ensure that, where cuckooing is carried out for the purpose of enabling the commission of the coerced internal concealment offence in England and Wales, or the commission of the child criminal exploitation offence anywhere in the UK, the cuckooing offence will apply.
I turn to Amendment 258A, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. As he explained, the amendment seeks to remove the ability for cuckooing offences to be tried as a summary offence in a magistrates’ court, thereby limiting the offence to being tried in the Crown Court on indictment. While I am sympathetic to the noble Lord’s intention of ensuring that the perpetrators of this harmful practice receive appropriate sentencing, we, like the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, consider that the provision for the cuckooing offence to be triable either way is fair and proportionate.
Sentencing in individual cases is a matter for the courts, and we do not want to see that approach restricted. When deciding what sentence to impose, courts must consider the circumstances of each individual case. The courts may also have a statutory duty to follow any relevant sentencing guidelines developed by the independent Sentencing Council for England and Wales. The cuckooing offence is designed to capture a range of actions that may be involved in controlling another person’s dwelling, from occupying the property through to directing delivery of items, such as drugs, to and from the property. It may therefore be more proportionate for some cuckooing cases to be tried in a magistrates’ court.
More broadly, allowing offences to be tried in magistrates’ courts helps reduce the burden on the Crown Court and can enable quicker access to justice for victims. It is a sad fact that the lack of investment in the court system over recent years has meant that there is huge strain on the court system. As we always say, rightly, justice delayed is justice denied, so restricting the trial of a cuckooing offence to the Crown Courts would not necessarily deliver the justice that victims deserve and that society would seek to be meted out on the perpetrators.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, that was a good little 16-minute debate. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, that I rather admire his style in this House—I hope that does not damage his future career. There are many Ministers who are able, but in addition he brings a style of being decent, nice, pleasant in the way he deals with debates, thorough and meticulous, patient and even long-suffering. I rather admire the way he actually replies in detail to our amendments; his initial reaction might be to say, “What a load of rubbish!”, but he does not do that and is kind and courteous. I appeal to him: could he please have a word with his noble friend, the noble Lord, Lord Livermore, and teach him how to be as nice and decent as he is? Turning to the reply from the noble Lord, Lord Katz, I still think that he was wrong and I was right, but, nevertheless, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Hanson of Flint
(a) section 40 (child criminal exploitation);(b) section 59 (causing internal concealment of item for criminal purpose).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adds the offence of causing internal concealment of an item for a criminal purpose, created by this Bill, to the list of offences that are relevant offences in England and Wales for the purpose of the offence of control over another’s home for criminal purposes (clause 56).
“38A An offence under section 40 of this Act (child criminal exploitation).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adds the offence of child criminal exploitation, created by this Bill, to the list of offences that are relevant offences in Scotland for the purpose of the offence of control over another’s home for criminal purposes (clause 56).
“58A An offence under section 40 of this Act (child criminal exploitation).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adds the offence of child criminal exploitation, created by this Bill, to the list of offences that are relevant offences in Northern Ireland for the purpose of the offence of control over another’s home for criminal purposes (clause 56).
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(4A) The circumstances in which A exercises control over B’s dwelling include circumstances where—(a) A arranges for another person (C) to exercise control over B’s dwelling (including by exercising control over any of the matters mentioned in subsection (4)), and(b) C does exercise that control.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes it clear that control over another’s dwelling may be via another person, for the purposes of the offence in clause 56.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(c) CCE prevention orders under Schedule (CCE prevention orders: Northern Ireland).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment gives a power to the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland to issue guidance to the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland about the new CCE prevention orders for Northern Ireland.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This is a minor drafting change.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I will also speak to further amendments later. I just want to say thank you to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for his kind words before he goes. My reputation is ruined, but there we go. I thank him anyway.
The government amendments in this group and the clauses to which they relate are vital in safeguarding the public from some of the gravest harms emerging from the digital age. All the amendments in this group of government amendments, starting with Amendments 295A and 295B, pertain to the introduction of a defence for authorised persons to test and investigate technologies for child sexual abuse material, extreme pornography and non-consensual intimate imagery capabilities. These are abhorrent crimes and we must ensure that our laws keep pace with them.
Noble Lords will know that the rapid advancement and prevalence of AI technologies without adequate guardrails has increased the volume of AI-generated abuse imagery circulating online. These harms fall disproportionately on women and children. We must get ahead of these risks. At present, AI developers and public safety organisations seeking to test for these risks face significant legal jeopardy from testing. These legal blocks mean that testers could be liable to prosecution if they create illegal images during testing. We want to support government and public safety organisations in their commitment to research internet safety. If we are serious about AI safety, it is essential that we support continuous and rigorous testing so that testers can be confident that models are safe to use and support our ambition to drive down CSAM online.
This defence could give a technology company the ability to understand the capabilities of its models, identify weaknesses and design out harmful outputs. Amendment 295A introduces a power by regulations to create new testing defences. The Secretary of State will authorise persons to carry out technology testing subject to rigorous conditions. I confirm that any regulations that are brought forward will be subject to the affirmative parliamentary procedure and testing will be subject to rigorous oversight and strict mandatory operational safeguards. The regulation-making power will also extend to making provision for the enforcement of any breaches of conditions and may include creating criminal offences.
Amendment 295B lists the offences to which this defence applies. The Secretary of State will have the power to amend this list of offences as the law evolves. This will ensure that the defence remains fit for purpose. I hope the Committee welcomes that the Scottish Government and Northern Ireland Department of Justice want this defence to be extended to Scotland and Northern Ireland. The offences listed may be amended, as appropriate, for England and Wales as well as for Scotland and Northern Ireland. The Secretary of State will be required to consult Scottish Ministers and the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland before making any regulations that would affect the Scottish Parliament or the Northern Ireland Assembly.
Clause 63 criminalises artificial intelligence image generators, which are used by offenders to create child sexual abuse imagery. Our law is clear that AI-generated child sexual abuse material is illegal. However, these fine-tuned models that facilitate the creation of child sexual abuse material currently are not. Therefore, the Government are making it illegal to possess, make, adapt, supply or offer to supply a child sexual abuse image generator, punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment.
Government Amendments 267 and 268 ensure that we take a unified approach across the United Kingdom. This is why we are creating equivalent offences in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Clause 64 amends Section 69 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 to criminalise the possession of advice or guidance on using artificial intelligence to create child abuse imagery. Sadly, there are so-called paedophile manuals that contain guidance for offenders on how to abuse children sexually and how to create indecent photographs or pseudo-photographs—which are illegal under the existing offence in the Serious Crime Act 2015. However, this offence does not include guidance for offenders about how to use AI to create illegal images of children and is applicable only to England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Amendment 269 extends the offence, as amended by Clause 64, to Scotland, ensuring that these vile manuals can be tackled across the whole of the United Kingdom. The other amendments in this group are consequential on the main amendments that I have described.
Together, these government amendments will enhance the protection of women and children, prevent criminal use of AI technologies and improve long-term safety by design and the resilience of future AI development. I commend the amendments to the Committee. I beg to move.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
My Lords, if I could intervene for a moment, the Bill is going at a fine pace through the House, but I am a little concerned about Amendment 263. The problems of modern slavery that I have raised in the House are very severe.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
I know. I am just asking for some assistance with this—does the proposed new clause in Amendment 263 still stand?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The Committee has considered that amendment. If the noble Lord wishes to write to me on any details, I will certainly write back to him, but, in the interests of progress, it would be better if that was dealt with outside the Chamber, given that we have debated those matters already.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, very briefly, the government amendments set out the devolution arrangements to ensure that criminals cannot exploit differences between the four nations, and we are very happy to support them.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this is an important issue that I know there is cross-party support for, and I am largely supportive of the intentions behind the amendments in this group.
The first of the Minister’s amendments acts largely to tidy up the drafting of the Bill and ensure its thoroughness. I agree with this. Expanding the scope for technology testing regarding child sexual abuse materials is welcome.
Similarly, extending provisions to ensure that they are the same in all parts of the union is a minor but important amendment. Consistency across our internal borders is the best way to ensure that children are protected equally everywhere. It should help with cross-border co-ordination between authorities, and I therefore welcome it.
I see the logic behind government Amendments 295A and 295B. It is the right approach that, if the Government want to crack down on technology, they should first do so at the source. That means discovering which technologies are being used to create unlawful content, which requires people to test them. This would also, I hope, have the additional effect of not blanket banning content for people without nuance, instead targeting the specific pieces of software responsible. So long as the individuals able to use this as a defence remain strictly authorised by the Secretary of State, I appreciate the amendment’s aim.
This should go hand in hand with an initiative similar to the one suggested by my noble friend Lord Nash. If the Government can identify the technology used, they should attempt to shut it down. Unfortunately, this is often outside the Government’s jurisdiction and therefore some form of software to prevent the distribution of child sexual abuse material might be the next best approach. I hope that the Minister can confirm that they are perhaps looking at this.
As I said, this is a non-partisan issue. We all want to reduce child sexual abuse, online or offline, and these amendments should work to help the Bill achieve the former. I hope that the Minister can, in due course—perhaps at a later stage—fully outline how this new technology will be implemented and applied consistently, and will consider my noble friend Lord Nash’s amendment, but I broadly support the approach.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful for the support from the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. If the noble Lord will allow me, I will reflect on what he said and give him a fuller briefing on the detail of how we are approaching the AI issue. Obviously, we will come on to further amendments in the next group, which I will respond to once they have been moved.
Baroness Kidron
“46D Child sexual abuse image-generation risk assessment(1) A provider of an online service, including but not limited to a generative AI large language model, must risk assess the likelihood of their service being used to create or facilitate the creation of a CSA image or images as defined by section 46A.(2) If a risk is identified in a CSA risk assessment—(a) where the provider is regulated by the Online Safety Act 2023, a provider must report the risk and agree to steps to reduce, mitigate and manage the risks with OFCOM;(b) where the provider is not regulated by the Online Safety Act 2023, a provider must agree to steps to reduce, mitigate and manage the risks of their online service being used to create or facilitate the creation of CSA images with the National Crime Agency.(3) Where a provider regulated by the Online Safety Act 2023 fails to agree to or implement steps to reduce, mitigate and manage the risks with OFCOM (see subsection (2)(a)), they can be subjected to OFCOM’s enforcement powers set out in Part 7, Chapter 6 (enforcement powers) of that Act.(4) Where a provider not regulated by the Online Safety Act 2023 fails to agree to or implement steps to reduce, mitigate and manage the risks with the National Crime Agency (see subsection (2)(b)), they commit an offence.(5) A provider that commits an offence under this section is liable to be issued with a penalty notice by the National Crime Agency.(6) In this section a “penalty notice” means a notice requiring its recipient to pay a penalty of an amount not exceeding whichever is the greater of—(a) £18 million, or(b) 10% of a provider’s qualifying worldwide revenue for the most recent complete accounting period.(7) A penalty notice may be reissued where a provider continues to commit an offence under this section.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to ensure that services that do not fall into scope of Clause 63 as currently drafted still assess and mitigate the risk of their services being used as an AI child sexual abuse generator.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 266, I will speak also to Amendments 479 and 480, all of which are in my name. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Russell, and the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, for their support.
All three amendments concern illegal or harmful online activity. Amendment 266 places a legal duty on online services, including generative AI services, to conduct risk assessments evaluating the likelihood that their systems could be used to create or facilitate child sexual abuse material. Subsection (1) of the proposed new clause establishes that duty. Subsection (2) requires providers to report the results to Ofcom or the National Crime Agency, depending on whether or not they are regulated under the Online Safety Act. Subsections (3) to (7) set out the enforcement mechanisms, drawing on Ofcom’s existing enforcement powers under the OSA or equivalent powers for the NCA.
Amendment 266 complements Clause 63, which creates the new offence relating to the supply of CSA image generators to which the Minister has just spoken, but it is in addition to those powers. In June 2023, the BBC reported that the open-source AI model Stable Diffusion was being used to generate child sexual abuse material. Researchers at Stanford University subsequently found that Stable Diffusion had been trained on datasets containing child sexual abuse material. This issue is not confined to a single model. The Internet Watch Foundation and the chair of the AI Security Institute have warned of the potential for open-source AI models to be used for the creation of CSAM.
Lord Nash (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 271A is in my name and I support the other amendments in this group. As this is the first time I have spoken on the Bill, I draw attention to my interests on the register, particularly the fact that I am an investor in a wide range of companies, including many software companies.
My Amendment 271A, if passed, would have the effect of software being used to screen out all child sexual abuse material, including live-streaming, on smartphones and tablets, and in due course on all devices. It would also apply to private communications, which is where the majority of live-streamed child sexual abuse takes place and which is not covered by the Online Safety Act.
Viscount Colville of Culross (CB)
My Lords, I put my name to Amendments 479 and 480, and I support the other amendments in this group. I have once again to thank my noble friend Lady Kidron for raising an issue which I had missed and which, I fear, the regulator might have missed as well. After extensive research, I too am very worried about the Online Safety Act, which many of your Lordships spent many hours refining. It does not cover some of the new developments in the digital world, especially personalised AI chatbots. They are hugely popular with children under 18; 31% use Snapchat’s My AI and 32% use Google’s Gemini.
The Online Safety Act Network set up an account on ChatGPT-5 using a 13 year-old persona. Within two minutes, the chatbot was engaged with the user about mental health, eating disorders and advice about how to safely cut yourself. Within 40 minutes, it had generated a list of pills for overdosing. The OSA was intended to stop such online behaviour. Your Lordships worked so hard to ensure that the OSA covered search and user-to-user functions in the digital space, but AI chatbots have varied functionalities that, as my noble friend pointed out, are not clearly covered by the legislation.
My noble friend Lady Kidron pointed out that, although Dame Melanie Dawes confirmed to the Communications and Digital Committee that chatbots are covered by the OSA, Ofcom in its paper Era of Answer Engines admits:
“Under the OSA, a search service means a service that is, or which includes, a search engine, and this applies to some (though not all) GenAI search tools”.
There is doubt about whether the AI interpretive process, which can change the original search findings, excludes it from being in the scope of search under the OSA. More significantly, AI chatbots are not covered where the provider creates content that is personalised for one user and cannot be forwarded to another user. I am advised that this is not a user-to-user service as defined under the Act.
One chatbot that seems to fall under this category is Replika. I had never heard of it until I started my research for this amendment. However, 2% of all children aged nine to 17 say that they have used the chatbot, and 18% have heard of it. Its aim is to stimulate human interaction by creating a replica chatbot personal to each user. It is very sophisticated in its output, using avatars to create images of a human interlocutor on screen and a speaking voice to reply conversationally to requests. The concern is that, unlike traditional search engines, it is programmed for sycophancy, or, in other words, to affirm and engage the user’s response—the more positive the response, the more engaged the child user. This has led to conversations with the AI companion talking the child user into self-harm and even suicide ideation.
Research by Internet Matters found that a third of children users think that interacting with chatbots is like talking to a friend. Most concerning is the level of trust they generate in children, with two in five saying that they have no concerns about the advice they are getting. However, because the replies are supposed to be positive, what might have started as trustworthy advice develops into unsafe advice as the conversation continues. My concern is that chatbots are not only affirming the echo chambers that we have seen developing for over a decade as a result of social media polarisation but are reducing yet further children’s critical faculties. We cannot leave the development of critical faculties to the already inadequate media literacy campaigns that Ofcom is developing. The Government need to discourage sycophancy and a lack of critical thinking at its digital source.
A driving force behind the Online Safety Act was the realisation that tech developers were prioritising user engagement over user safety. Once again, we find new AI products that are based on the same harmful principles. In looking at the Government’s headlong rush to surrender to tech companies in the name of AI growth, I ask your Lordships to read the strategic vision for AI laid out in the AI Opportunities Action Plan. It focuses on accelerating innovation but fails to mention once any concern about children’s safety. Your Lordships have fought hard to make children’s safety a priority online in legislation. Once again, I ask for these amendments to be scrutinised by Ofcom and the Government to ensure that children’s safety is at the very centre of their thinking as AI develops.
Baroness Morgan of Cotes (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I support the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I was pleased to add my name to Amendments 266, 479 and 480. I also support the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Nash.
I do not want to repeat the points that were made—the noble Baroness ably set out the reasons why her amendments are very much needed—so I will make a couple of general points. As she demonstrated, what happens online has what I would call real-world consequences—although I was reminded this week by somebody much younger than me that of course, for the younger generation, there is no distinction between online and offline; it is all one world. For those of us who are older, it is worth remembering that, as the noble Baroness set out, what happens online has real-world, and sadly often fatal, consequences. We should not lose sight of that.
We have already heard many references to the Online Safety Act, which is inevitable. We all knew, even as we were debating the Bill before it was enacted, that there would have to be an Online Safety Act II, and no doubt other versions as well. As we have heard, technology is changing at an enormously fast rate, turbocharged by artificial intelligence. The Government recognise that in Clause 63. But surely the lesson from the past decade or more is that, although technology can be used for good, it can also be used to create and disseminate deeply harmful content. That is why the arguments around safety by design are absolutely critical, yet they have been lacking in some of the regulation and enforcement that we have seen. I very much hope that the Minister will be able to give the clarification that the noble Baroness asked for on the status of LLMs and chatbots under the Online Safety Act, although he may not be able to do so today.
I will make some general points. First, I do not think the Minister was involved in the debate on and scrutiny of—particularly in this Chamber—what became the Online Safety Act. As I have said before, it was a master class in what cross-party, cross-House working can achieve, in an area where, basically, we all want to get to the same point: the safety of children and vulnerable people. I hope that the Ministers and officials listening to and involved in this will work with this House, and with Members such as the noble Baroness who have huge experience, to improve the Bill, and no doubt lay down changes in the next piece of legislation and the one after that. We will always be chasing after developments in technology unless we are able to get that safety-by-design and preventive approach.
During the passage of the then Online Safety Bill, a number of Members of both Houses, working with experienced and knowledgeable outside bodies, spotted the harms and loopholes of the future. No one has all the answers, which is why it is worth working together to try to deal with the problems caused by new and developing technology. I urge the Government not to play belated catch-up as we did with internet regulation, platform regulation, search-engine regulation and more generally with the Online Safety Act. If we can work together to spot the dangers, whether from chatbots, LLMs, CSAM-generated content or deepfakes, we will do an enormous service to young people, both in this country and globally.
Baroness Berger (Lab)
My Lords, I support Amendments 479 and 480, which seek to prevent chatbots producing illegal content. I also support the other amendments in this group. AI chatbots are already producing harmful, manipulative and often racist content. They have no age protections and no warnings or information about the sources being used to generate the replies. Nor is there a requirement to ensure that AI does not produce illegal content. We know that chatbots draw their information from a wide range of sources that are often unreliable and open to manipulation, including blogs, open-edit sites such as Wikipedia, and messaging boards, and as a result they often produce significant misinformation and disinformation.
I will focus on one particular area. As we have heard in the contributions so far, we know that some platforms generate racist content. Looking specifically at antisemitism, we can see Holocaust denial, praise of Hitler and deeply damaging inaccuracies about Jewish history. We see Grok, the X platform, generating numerous antisemitic comments, denying the scale of the Holocaust, praising Adolf Hitler and, as recently as a couple of months ago, using Jewish-sounding surnames in the context of hate speech.
Impressionable children and young people, who may not know how to check the validity of the information they are presented with, can so easily be manipulated when exposed to such content. This is particularly concerning when we know that children as young as three are using some of these technologies. We have already heard about how chatbots in particular are designed in this emotionally manipulative way, in order to boost engagement. As we have heard—it is important to reiterate it—they are sycophantic, affirming and built to actively flatter.
If you want your AI chatbot or platform not to flatter you, you have to specifically go to the personalisation page, as I have done, and be very clear that you want responses that focus on substance over praise, and that it should skip compliments. Otherwise, these platforms are designed to act completely the other way. If a person acted like this in some circumstances, we would call it emotional abuse. These design choices mean that young people—teens and children—can become overly trusting and, as we have heard in the cases outlined, reliant on these bots. In the most devastating cases, we know that this focus on flattery has led to people such as Sophie Rottenberg and 16 year-old Adam Raine in America taking their own lives on the advice of these AI platforms. Assisting suicide is illegal, and we need to ensure that this illegality extends to chatbots.
Baroness Boycott (CB)
My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group, and in particular I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for her endless work in this capacity. This is the first time I have spoken on any of these groups of amendments. I find everything the noble Lord, Lord Nash, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and others have said truly shocking. Some 55 years ago, I started a magazine called Spare Rib. If I had ever dreamed, in my wildest and worst nightmares, that I would find myself listening to what everyone has been talking about, I suppose we would not have gone on. In so many ways, this is a worse situation that women find themselves in, and certainly young girls. I carried on riding a pony till I was 15—that was my childhood—and then I found boys. This is so terrible, and I congratulate every noble Lord, and particularly the noble Baronesses, on the work that they have done.
I will be very brief, as I just want to speak in support of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Nash, and Amendment 266, which simply says that AI is already being used to harm children. Unless we act decisively, this harm will just escalate. The systems that everyone has been discussing today are extraordinary technological achievements—and they are very dangerous. The Internet Watch Foundation has reported an explosion in AI-generated child sexual abuse material. Offenders can now share instructions on how to manipulate the models, how to train them on illegal material and how to evade all the filters. The tools are becoming so accessible and so frictionless that a determined offender can produce in minutes material that once would have involved an entire criminal enterprise. Against that backdrop, it is quite staggering that we do not already require AI providers to assess whether their systems can be used to generate illegal child abuse. Amendment 266 would plug this gap. Quite frankly, I cannot for the life of me see why any responsible company would resist such a requirement.
Amendment 479 addresses a confusion that has gone on for too long. We cannot have a situation where some companies argue that generative AI is a search service and therefore completely in scope of the Online Safety Act, while others argue the opposite. If a model can retrieve, repackage or generate harmful content in response to a query, the public deserve clarity about precisely where that law applies.
On Amendment 480, this really is an issue that keeps me awake at night. These chatbots can be astonishingly persuasive. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, says, they are also addictive: they are friendly, soothing and intimate, and are a perfect confidant for a lonely child. They also generate illegal material, encourage harmful behaviour and groom children. We have already seen chatbots modelled on sex offenders and heard reports of chatbots sending sexualised messages to children, including the appalling case of a young boy who took his life after weeks of interaction with AI. We will no doubt hear of more such cases. The idea that such systems might fall through the cracks is unthinkable.
What these amendments do is simple. They say that if a system can generate illegal or harmful content for a child, it should not be allowed to do so. Quite frankly, anything that man or woman can make, man or woman can unmake—that is still just true. We have often said in this Chamber that children deserve no less protection online than they do offline. With AI, however, we should demand more, because these systems are capable of things no human predator could ever manage. They work 24/7, they target thousands simultaneously and they adapt perfectly to the vulnerabilities of every child they encounter. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, is right to insist that we act now, not in two years—think how different it was two years ago. We have to act now. I say to the Government that this is a real chance to close some urgent gaps, and I very much hope that they will take it.
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group, but I will speak to Amendments 479 and 480 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I declare my interest as a guest of Google at their Future Forum, an AI policy conference.
These amendments are vital to ascertain the Government’s position on AI chatbots and where they stand in relation to the Online Safety Act, but I have to question how we can have been in a state of ambiguity for so long. We are very close to ChatGPT rolling out erotica on its platform for verified adults. Six months ago, the Wall Street Journal highlighted the deeply disturbing issue of digital companion bots engaging in sexual chat with users, which told them they were underage. Further, they willingly played out scenarios such as “submissive schoolgirl”. Another bot purporting to be a 12 year-old boy promised that it would not tell its parents about dating a user identifying himself as an adult man. Professor Clare McGlynn KC has already raised concerns about what she has coined chatbot-driven VAWG, the tech itself being designed to be sexually suggestive and to engage in grooming and coercive behaviours. Internet Matters found that 64 % of children use chatbots. The number of companion apps has rapidly developed and researchers at Bournemouth University are already warning about the addictive potential of these services.
The Government and the regulator cannot afford to be slow in clarifying the position of these services. It begs a wider question of how we can be much more agile in our response and continually horizon-scan, as legislation will always struggle to keep pace with the evolution of technology. This is the harm we are talking about now, but how will it evolve tomorrow? Where will we be next month or next year? It is vital that both the Government and the regulator become more agile and respond at pace. I look forward to the Minister’s response to the noble Baroness’s amendments.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I shall speak very briefly. Earlier—I suppose it was this morning—we talked about child criminal exploitation at some length, thanks particularly to the work of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, and Professor Jay. Essentially, what we are talking about in this group of amendments is child commercial exploitation. All these engines, all these technologies, are there for a commercial purpose. They have investors who are expecting a return and, to maximise the return, these technologies are designed to drive traffic, to drive addiction, and they do it very successfully. We are way behind the curve—we really are.
I echo what the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, said about the body of knowledge within Parliament, in both Houses, that was very involved in the passage of the Online Safety Act. There is a very high level of concern, in both Houses, that we were perhaps too ambitious in assuming that a regulator that had not previously had any responsibilities in this area would be able to live up to the expectations held, and indeed some of the promises made, by the Government during the passage of that Act. I think we need to face up to that: we need to accept that we have not got it off to as good a start as we wanted and hoped, and that what is happening now is that the technologies we have been hearing about are racing ahead so quickly that we are finding it hard to catch up. Indeed, looking at the body language and the physiognomies of your Lordships in the Chamber, looking at the expressions on our faces as some of what we were talking about is being described, if it is having that effect on us, imagine what effect it is having on the children who in many cases are the subjects of these technologies.
I plead with the Minister to work very closely with his new ministerial colleague, the noble Baroness, Lady Lloyd, and DSIT. We really need to get our act together and focus; otherwise, we will have repeats of these sorts of discussions where we raise issues that are happening at an increasing pace, not just here but all around the world. I fear that we are going to be holding our hands up, saying “We’re doing our best and we’re trying to catch up”, but that is not good enough. It is not good enough for my granddaughter and not good enough for the extended families of everybody here in this Chamber. We really have to get our act together and work together to try to catch up.
Lord Bethell (Con)
My Lords, I too support the amendments in this group, particularly those tabled by my noble friend Lord Nash on security software and by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, on AI-generated child sexual abuse material. I declare my interest as a trustee of the Royal Society for Public Health.
As others have noted, the Online Safety Act was a landmark achievement and, in many ways, something to be celebrated, but technology has not stood still—we said it at the time—and nor can our laws. It is important that we revisit it in examining this legislation, because generative AI presents such an egregious risk to our children which was barely imaginable even two years ago when we were discussing that Act. These amendments would ensure that our regulatory architecture keeps pace.
Amendment 266 on AI CSAM risk assessment is crucial. It addresses a simple but profound question: should the provider of a generative AI service be required to assess whether that service could be used to create or facilitate child sexual abuse material? Surely the answer is yes. This is not a theoretical risk, as we have heard in testimony from many noble Lords. We know that AI can generate vivid images, optimised on a dataset scraped from children themselves on the open internet, and that can be prompted to create CSAM-like content. On this, there is no ambiguity at all. We know that chatbots trained on the vast corpora of text from children can be manipulated to generate grooming scripts and sexualised narratives to engage children and make them semi-addicted to those conversations. We know that these tools are increasingly accessible, easy to use and almost impossible to monitor by parents and, it seems, regulators.
Baroness Bertin (Con)
My Lords, I support this group of amendments. What a speech my friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, made; I commend all the speeches that have been made. If the Government only do one thing with this Bill, it should be to take on this group of amendments.
It is utterly terrifying. I addressed a teaching conference this week, with the safeguarding leads of many schools around the country, and they are tearing their hair out about it. The kids are on this stuff 100%, as we have seen from the statistics. The other thing they said to me, which the noble Baroness mentioned, is that parents either know about it and are terrified about how to address it, or they do not know about it, and I am not sure which is worse.
I reiterate that we have to get ahead of this, as the noble Baroness said. The Government must get ahead of this; otherwise, the dangers are just too huge to think about. I will keep this brief because I will speak about it more in due course, but my team and I went on a chatbot and we were “Lily”, and within about three seconds we were having an incestuous conversation with our father. It was absolutely crackers—terrible—so I ask the Government to please take on board these recommendations.
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)
My Lords, I was not intending to speak and I have nothing to add to all the brilliant speeches that have been made. I did not participate in the debates on the Online Safety Act. I feel horribly naive; I find this debate utterly terrifying and the more that parents know about these things, the better. I very much hope that my noble friend will be able to take this back and discuss these issues with people in this Chamber and the House of Commons. We cannot be behind the curve all the time; we have got to grip this to protect our children and our grandchildren.
Lord Hampton (CB)
My Lords, I briefly add my support to all these amendments, particularly the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Nash, which is fascinating. If we can get the software to do this, then why would we not? I offer a challenge to Ofcom, the Government and tech firms. If they can produce such sophisticated software that it can persuade children to kill themselves, why are BT and eBay’s chatbots so rubbish? We have to make AI a force for good, not for evil.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
My Lords, having arrived in this House a very long time ago—53 years ago—I know this House works best if it treats legislation as an evolutionary process. The Online Safety Act seemed to be a very good Act when we passed it two years ago, but now we have further, drastic evidence, which we have heard in this debate. I am confident my noble friend the Minister will treat the speeches made in this debate as part of the evolutionary process which, I emphasise again, this House does best.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for bringing forward these amendments and for explaining them so clearly. The understanding of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall, is that AI chatbots do not trigger the illegal content duties since these tools are not considered to show mental intent. As a result, chatbots can generate prompts that are not classified as illegal, even though the exact same content would be illegal and subject to regulation if produced by a human. I find that quite extraordinary.
By accepting these amendments, the Government would be acting decisively to address the fast-evolving threat which this year saw abusive material of sexual content for children rise by 380%. In April 2024, the Internet Watch Foundation reported that a manual circulating on the dark web, which the Minister referred to earlier, instructed paedophiles to use AI to create nude images of children, then use these to extort or coerce money or extreme material from the young victims. The charity warned that AI was generating astoundingly realistic abusive content.
Text-to-image generative AI tools and AI companion apps have proliferated, enabling abusers to create AI chatbot companions specifically to enable realistic and abusive roleplay with child avatars. Not only do they normalise child sexual abuse, but evidence shows that those who abuse virtual children are much more likely to go on to abuse real ones. Real children are also increasingly subjected to virtual rape and sexual abuse online. It is wrong to dismiss this as less traumatic simply because it happens in a digital space.
The measures in the Bill are welcome but, given the speed at which technology is moving, how easy or otherwise will it be to future-proof it in order to keep pace with technology once the Bill is enacted?
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this extremely important debate, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and my noble friend Lord Nash for their continued efforts on the protection of children online.
This group should unite the whole Committee. We can be in no doubt about the need to safeguard children in an environment where technology is evolving at unprecedented speed and where the risk of harm, including the creation and dissemination of child sexual abuse material, is escalating. It is a sad truth that, historically, Governments have been unable to keep pace with evolving technology. As a consequence, this can mean legislation coming far too late.
Amendment 266, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, would require providers of online services, including generative AI systems, to conduct risk assessments on the potential use of their platforms to create child sexual abuse images. The Committee has heard compelling arguments about the need for meaningful responsibilities to be placed on platforms and developers, particularly where systems are capable of misuse at scale. We recognise the seriousness of the challenge that she has outlined, and I very much look forward to what the Government have to say in response.
On my noble friend Lord Nash’s amendment, we are particularly sympathetic to the concerns that underpin his proposal. His amendment would mandate the installation of tamper-proof software on relevant devices to prevent the creation, viewing and sharing of child sexual abuse material. My noble friend has made a powerful case that prevention at source must form part of the comprehensive strategy to protect children. While there are practical questions that will require careful examination, his amendment adds real value to the discussion. I am grateful for his determined focus on this issue, and I hope the Government also take this amendment very seriously.
Similarly, Amendments 479 and 480, also tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, speak to the responsibilities of AI search tools and AI chatbots. The risk of such technologies being co-opted for abusive purposes is not theoretical; these threats are emerging rapidly and require a response proportionate to the harm.
From these Benches, we are sympathetic to the objectives across this group of amendments and look forward to the Government’s detailed response and continuing cross-party work to ensure the strongest protections for children in an online world. As has been said several times throughout Committee, protecting children must remain our highest priority. I hope the Government take these amendments very seriously.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for the way she introduced this group of amendments and for her tireless work to protect children online. I say on behalf of all noble Lords that the support she has received today across the Committee shows that her work is vital, especially in the face of emerging technologies, such as generative AI, which present opportunities but, sadly, also have a darker side with new risks for criminal misuse.
She has received the support of the noble Baronesses, Lady Morgan of Cotes, Lady Boycott, Lady Bertin and Lady Doocey, my noble friends Lady Berger, Lady Royall of Blaisdon and Lord Hacking, the noble Lords, Lord Bethell, Lord Russell of Liverpool, Lord Hampton and Lord Davies of Gower, the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, and others to whom I will refer later. That is quite an array of colleagues in this House. It is my job to respond to this on behalf of the Government, and I will try to be as helpful as I can to the noble Baroness.
The Government share her desire to protect the public, especially children, online, and are committed to protecting all users from illegal online content. We will continue to act to keep citizens safe. Amendment 266 seeks to create a new duty on online service providers—including those already regulated under the Online Safety Act—to assess and report to Ofcom or the National Crime Agency on the risk that their services could be used to create or facilitate the generation of AI child sexual abuse material. The amendment would also require online service providers to implement measures to mitigate and manage the risks identified.
I say to the noble Baroness that UK law is already clear: creating, possessing or distributing child sexual abuse images, including those generated by AI, is already illegal, regardless of whether they depict a real child or not. Child sexual abuse material offences are priority offences under the Online Safety Act. The Act requires in-scope services to take proactive steps to prevent such material from appearing on their services and to remove it swiftly if it does.
As she will know, the Government have gone even further to tackle these appalling crimes through the measures in the Bill. I very much welcome her support for Clause 63. We are introducing a world-leading offence criminalising the possession, adaptation and supply of, or offer to supply, an AI model that has been fine-tuned by offenders to create child sexual abuse material. As I mentioned earlier, we are also extending the existing paedophile manual offence to cover advice on how to abuse AI to create child sexual abuse material.
We have also introduced measures that reflect the critical role that AI developers play in ensuring their systems are not misused. To support the crucial work of the Government’s AI Security Institute, we have just debated and agreed a series of amendments in the previous group to provide authorised bodies with the powers to legally test commercial AI models for extreme pornography and other child sexual abuse material. That is essential to allow experts to safely test measures, and I am pleased that we received the Committee’s support earlier.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
If it is beyond the remit of the National Crime Agency and Ofcom to do anything about this, perhaps the Minister will tell us who is going to take responsibility and actually enforce what the noble Baroness is trying to persuade the Government to do in the amendment.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
All chatbots are regulated under the Online Safety Act. If there is harmful or illegal content or advice in relation to children, it is up to Ofcom to take action on those matters. Many of these issues are for DSIT Ministers and Ofcom. I am a Home Office Minister. The noble Baroness has requested a meeting and I will put that to my DSIT ministerial colleagues. I hope they will be able to meet her to reflect upon these issues. Although I am answering for the Bill today, some of these issues are DSIT matters, and it is important that she has an opportunity to raise them with DSIT.
Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)
My Lords, I was stimulated to rise by something that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, said. She was speaking to the reply that had been given by the Minister, and it made me think that what has to be looked at here is the law and its inadequacies in dealing with those who are not human—that is the nature of a robot. The law is constructed around the mental element of mens rea to convict people of a crime. Surely it should be possible for us, in the limited area of dealing with robots, to be able to say that that mental element need not be present in dealing with this kind of offending and that one should be able to construct something that leads back to those who are creatively responsible for bringing them into being.
It reminds me of the argument that is made in the United States about not bothering to restrict guns because it is not guns that kill people but the people using the guns who are responsible. In fact, those who manufacture them might be looked at for the responsibility that they bear for some of this. We should be looking much more creatively at the law. There should be an opportunity for lawyers to look at whether, in this instance with this development—which is so out of the ordinary experience of humankind—we should think about legally changing the rule on mens rea when it comes to robots.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
There are a number of issues before the Committee today and the Government will reflect on all the points that have been mentioned. However, the view at the moment is that these amendments would risk creating significant legal uncertainty by duplicating and potentially undermining aspects of the Online Safety Act.
Lord Bethell (Con)
My Lords, I am enormously grateful to the Minister for reassuring us that all chatbots are captured by the Online Safety Act; that is very good news indeed. Can he reassure us that Ofcom will confirm that in writing to the House? I appreciate that he is a Home Office Minister, but he speaks on behalf of all of government. I think it is fair, given the nature of the Bill, that he seeks an answer from Ofcom in this matter.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My assessment is that the vast majority of chatbots are captured—
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
Many AI chatbots that enable users to share content with each other or search live websites for information are within the scope of the Online Safety Act’s duties. Providers of those services—
Viscount Colville of Culross (CB)
I want to repeat what I said in my speech. There are some chatbots, such as Replika, that do not have user-to-user functionality. They are created for just one user, and that user cannot pass it on to any other users. There is concern that the law does not cover that and that Ofcom does not regulate it.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
If I may, I will take away those comments. I am responsible for many things in this House, including the Bill, but some of those areas fall within other ministerial departments. I am listening to what noble Lords and noble Baronesses are saying today.
Currently, through Online Safety Act duties, providers of those services are required to undertake appropriate risk assessments and, under the Act’s illegal content duties, platforms must implement robust and timely measures to prevent illegal content appearing on their services. All in-scope providers are expected to have effective systems and processes in place to ensure that the risks of their platform being used for the types of offending mentioned today are appropriately reduced.
Ofcom currently has a role that is focused on civil enforcement of duties on providers to assess and mitigate the risks posed by illegal content. Where Ofcom may bring prosecutions in some circumstances, it will do so only in relation to regulatory matters where civil enforcement is insufficient. The proposed approach is not in line with the enforcement regime under the Act at the moment, which is the responsibility of Ofcom and DSIT.
Baroness Berger (Lab)
My noble friend is making really important comments in this regard, but on the specific issue of Ofcom, perhaps fuelling much of the concern across the Committee are the comments we have heard from Ofcom. I refer to a briefing from the Molly Rose Foundation, which I am sure other noble Lords have received, which says that uncertainty has been “actively fuelled” by the regulator Ofcom, which has told the Molly Rose Foundation that it intends to maintain “tactical ambiguity” about how the Act applies. That is the very issue that unites us in our concern.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to my noble friend for that and for her contribution to the debate and the experiences she has brought. The monitoring and evaluation of the online safety regime is a responsibility of DSIT and Ofcom, and they have developed a framework to monitor the implementation of the Act and evaluate core outcomes. This monitoring and evaluation is currently tracking the effect of the online safety regime and feeding into a post-implementation review of the 2023 Act. Where there is evidence of a need to go further to keep children safe online, including from AI-enabled harms, the Government will not hesitate to act.
If the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, will allow DSIT and Ofcom to look at those matters, I will make sure that DSIT Ministers are apprised of the discussion that we have had today. It is in this Bill, which is a Home Office Bill, but it is important that DSIT Ministers reflect on what has been said. I will ensure that we try to arrange that meeting for the noble Baroness in due course.
I want also to talk about Amendments 271A and 497ZA from the noble Lord, Lord Nash, which propose that smartphone and tablet manufacturers, importers and distributors are required to ensure that any device they have is preinstalled with technology that prevents the recording and viewing of child sexual abuse material or similar material accordingly. I acknowledge the noble Lord’s very valid intention concerning child safety and protection, and to prevent the spread of child sexual abuse material online. To that end, there is a shared agreement with the Government on the need to strengthen our already world-leading online safety regime wherever necessary.
I put to the noble Lord, and to the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, on his comments in support, that if nudity detection technology could be effectively deployed at scale, there could be a significant limiting impact on the production and sharing of child sexual abuse material. I accept that, but we must get this right. Application of detection technology that detects and blocks all nudity, adult and child, but which is primarily targeted at children, would be an effective intervention. I and colleagues across government want to gather evidence about the application of such technology and its effectiveness and impact. However, our assessment is that further work is needed to understand the accuracy of such tools and how they may be implemented.
We must also consider the risks that could arise from accepting this amendment, including legitimate questions about user privacy and data security. If it helps the noble Lord, Lord Nash, we will continue to assess the effect of detection tools on the performance of mobile device so that we can see how easy it is to circumvent them, how effective they are and a range of other matters accordingly. The Government’s focus is on protective measures within the Online Safety Act, but we are actively considering the potential benefits of the technology that the noble Lord has mentioned and others like it in parallel. There will be further future government interventions but they must be proportionate and driven by evidence. At the moment, we do not have sufficient evidence to ensure that we could accept the amendment from the noble Lord, but the direction of travel is one that we would support.
Lord Nash (Con)
Will the Minister meet me and representatives from software companies to explain why they say this technology works?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am very happy to arrange a meeting with an appropriate Minister. I would be very happy to sit in on it. Other Ministers may wish to take the lead on this, because there are technology issues as well. I have Home Office responsibilities across the board, but I have never refused a meeting with a Member of this House in my 16 months here and I am not going to start now, so the answer to that question is yes. The basic presumption at the moment is that we are not convinced that the technology is yet at the stage that the noble Lord believes it to be, but that is a matter for future operation. I again give him the assurance that, in the event that the technology proves to be successful, the Government will wish to examine it in some detail.
I have absolutely no doubt that we will revisit these matters but, for the moment, I hope that the noble Baroness can withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Nash, for his amendment and his fierce following of this issue, and for bringing it to our attention. I recognise that this is a Home Office Bill and that some of these things cross to DSIT, but we are also witnessing crime. The Home Office must understand that not everything can be pushed to DSIT.
Your Lordships have just met the tech Lords. These are incredibly informed people from all over the Chamber who share a view that we want a technological world that puts kids front and centre. We are united in that and, as the Minister has suggested, we will be back.
I have three very quick points. First, legal challenges, operational difficulties and the capacity of the NCA and Ofcom were the exact same reasons why Clause 63 was not in the Online Safety Bill or the Data (Use and Access) Bill. It is unacceptable for officials to always answer with those general things. Many noble Lords said, “It’s so difficult”, and, “This is new”, with the Online Safety Bill. It is not new: we raised these issues before. If we had acted three or four years ago, we would not be in this situation. I urge this Government to get on the front foot, because we know what is coming.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“Child sexual abuse image-generators: Northern Ireland(1) In the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (S.I. 2008/1769 (N.I. 2)), after Article 42 insert—“Creation of CSA material
42A Child sexual abuse image-generators(1) It is an offence for a person to make, adapt, possess, supply or offer to supply a CSA image-generator.(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this Article of possessing a CSA image-generator to prove that the person—(a) was sent the CSA image-generator without any request having been made for it (by or on behalf of the person), and(b) did not keep it for an unreasonable time.(3) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this Article of possessing, supplying or offering to supply a CSA image-generator to prove that the person did not know, and did not have cause to suspect, that the thing possessed, supplied or offered to be supplied was a CSA image-generator.(4) For further defences, see Article 42B.(5) A person who commits an offence under this Article is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine (or both).(6) In this Article—(a) “CSA image-generator” means anything (including any program and any information in electronic form) which is made or adapted for use for creating, or facilitating the creation of, CSA images;(b) “CSA image” means—(i) an indecent photograph or pseudo-photograph of a child, within the meaning of the Protection of Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1978 (S.I. 1978/1047 (N.I. 17));(ii) a prohibited image of a child, within the meaning of section 62 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, that is not an excluded image within the meaning of section 63 of that Act;(c) a reference to making a CSA image-generator includes adapting anything that is not a CSA image-generator in such a way that it becomes a CSA image-generator. 42B Article 42A: supplementary(1) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under Article 42A—(a) to prove that the person made, adapted, possessed, supplied or offered to supply the CSA image-generator for the purposes of the prevention, detection or investigation of crime, or for the purposes of criminal proceedings, in any part of the world,(b) to prove that the person was a member of the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service or GCHQ (a “security body”) and made, adapted, possessed, supplied or offered to supply the CSA image-generator for the purposes of the exercise of any function of the security body, or(c) to prove that the person—(i) was a member of OFCOM, was employed or engaged by OFCOM, or assisted OFCOM in the exercise of any of its online safety functions, and(ii) made, adapted, possessed, supplied or offered to supply the CSA image-generator for the purposes of OFCOM’s exercise of any of its online safety functions.(2) An internet service provider does not commit an offence under Article 42A by—(a) providing access to a communication network, or(b) transmitting, in a communication network, information provided by a user, if the provider does not—(i) initiate the transmission,(ii) select the recipient of the transmission, or(iii) select or modify the information contained in the transmission.(3) The references in paragraph (2) to providing access to, or transmitting information in, a communication network include storing the information transmitted so far as the storage—(a) is automatic, intermediate and transient,(b) is solely for the purpose of carrying out the transmission in the network, and(c) is for no longer than is reasonably necessary for the transmission.(4) An internet service provider does not commit an offence under Article 42A by storing information provided by a user for transmission in a communication network if—(a) the storage of the information—(i) is automatic, intermediate and temporary, and(ii) is solely for the purpose of making more efficient the onward transmission of the information to other users at their request, and(b) the internet service provider—(i) does not modify the information,(ii) complies with any conditions attached to having access to the information, and(iii) on obtaining actual knowledge of a matter within paragraph (5), promptly removes the information or disables access to it.(5) The matters within this paragraph are that—(a) the information at the initial source of the transmission has been removed from the network,(b) access to it has been disabled, or(c) a court or administrative authority has ordered the removal from the network of, or the disablement of access to, the information.(6) An internet service provider does not commit an offence under Article 42A by storing information provided by a user who is not acting under the authority or control of the provider if— (a) the provider had no actual knowledge when the information was provided that it was, or contained, a CSA image-generator, and(b) on obtaining actual knowledge that the information was, or contained, a CSA image-generator, the provider promptly removed the information or disabled access to it.(7) Article 76(1) applies in relation to an act which, if done in Northern Ireland, would constitute an offence under Article 42A as if references to a United Kingdom national included—(a) a body incorporated under the law of any part of the United Kingdom, or(b) an unincorporated association formed under the law of any part of the United Kingdom.(8) Article 42A(6) applies for the purposes of this Article.(9) In this Article—(a) “GCHQ” has the meaning given by section 3 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994;(b) “OFCOM” means the Office of Communications;(c) a reference to OFCOM’s “online safety functions” has the meaning given by section 235 of the Online Safety Act 2023;(d) “internet service provider” means a provider of—(i) a service that is made available by means of the internet, or(ii) a service that provides access to the internet;(e) “user” , in relation to an internet service provider, means a user of a service provided by the internet service provider.42C Liability for an offence under Article 42A committed by a body(1) This Article applies where an offence under Article 42A is committed by a body.(2) If the offence is committed with the consent or connivance of—(a) a relevant person in relation to the body, or(b) a person purporting to act in the capacity of a relevant person in relation to the body,the person (as well as the body) commits the offence and is liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.(3) In this Article—“body” means a body corporate, a partnership or an unincorporated association other than a partnership;“relevant person” , in relation to a body, means—(a) in the case of a body corporate other than one whose affairs are managed by its members, a director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body;(b) in the case of a limited liability partnership or other body corporate whose affairs are managed by its members, a member who exercises functions of management with respect to it;(c) in the case of a limited partnership, a general partner (within the meaning given by section 3 of the Limited Partnerships Act 1907);(d) in the case of any other partnership, a partner;(e) in the case of an unincorporated association other than a partnership, a person who exercises functions of management with respect to it.”.(2) In Schedule 3 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (offences for purposes of Part 2 of that Act) after paragraph 92O insert— “92OA An offence under Article 42A of that Order (child sexual abuse image-generators) if the offender is sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 6 months.”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause makes provision for Northern Ireland equivalent to that made by clause 63 for England and Wales.
“Child sexual abuse image-generators: Scotland(1) In the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982, after section 52C insert—“52D Child sexual abuse image generators(1) It is an offence for a person to make, adapt, possess, supply or offer to supply a CSA image-generator.(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section of possessing a CSA image-generator to prove that the person—(a) was sent the CSA image-generator without any request having been made for it (by or on behalf of the person), and(b) did not keep it for an unreasonable time.(3) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section of possessing, supplying or offering to supply a CSA image-generator to prove that the person did not know, and did not have cause to suspect, that the thing possessed, supplied or offered to be supplied was a CSA image-generator.(4) For further defences, see section 52E.(5) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine (or both).(6) In this section—(a) “CSA image-generator” means anything (including any program and any information in electronic form) which is made or adapted for use for creating, or facilitating the creation of, CSA images;(b) “CSA image” means an indecent photograph or pseudo-photograph of a child, within the meaning of section 52;(c) a reference to making a CSA image-generator includes adapting anything that is not a CSA image-generator in such a way that it becomes a CSA image-generator.52E Section 52D: supplementary(1) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 52D—(a) to prove that the person made, adapted, possessed, supplied or offered to supply the CSA image-generator for the purposes of the prevention, detection or investigation of crime, or for the purposes of criminal proceedings, in any part of the world,(b) to prove that the person was a member of the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service or GCHQ (a “security body”) and made, adapted, possessed, supplied or offered to supply the CSA image-generator for the purposes of the exercise of any function of the security body, or(c) to prove that the person—(i) was a member of OFCOM, was employed or engaged by OFCOM, or assisted OFCOM in the exercise of any of its online safety functions, and(ii) made, adapted, possessed, supplied or offered to supply the CSA image-generator for the purposes of OFCOM’s exercise of any of its online safety functions. (2) An internet service provider does not commit an offence under section 52D by—(a) providing access to a communication network, or(b) transmitting, in a communication network, information provided by a user, if the provider does not—(i) initiate the transmission,(ii) select the recipient of the transmission, or(iii) select or modify the information contained in the transmission.(3) The references in subsection (2) to providing access to, or transmitting information in, a communication network include storing the information transmitted so far as the storage—(a) is automatic, intermediate and transient,(b) is solely for the purpose of carrying out the transmission in the network, and(c) is for no longer than is reasonably necessary for the transmission.(4) An internet service provider does not commit an offence under section 52D by storing information provided by a user for transmission in a communication network if—(a) the storage of the information—(i) is automatic, intermediate and temporary, and(ii) is solely for the purpose of making more efficient the onward transmission of the information to other users at their request, and(b) the internet service provider—(i) does not modify the information,(ii) complies with any conditions attached to having access to the information, and(iii) on obtaining actual knowledge of a matter within subsection (5), promptly removes the information or disables access to it.(5) The matters within this subsection are that—(a) the information at the initial source of the transmission has been removed from the network,(b) access to it has been disabled, or(c) a court or administrative authority has ordered the removal from the network of, or the disablement of access to, the information.(6) An internet service provider does not commit an offence under section 52D by storing information provided by a user who is not acting under the authority or control of the provider if—(a) the provider had no actual knowledge when the information was provided that it was, or contained, a CSA image-generator, and(b) on obtaining actual knowledge that the information was, or contained, a CSA image-generator, the provider promptly removed the information or disabled access to it.(7) Section 52D(6) applies for the purposes of this section.(8) In this section—(a) “GCHQ” has the meaning given by section 3 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994;(b) “OFCOM” means the Office of Communications;(c) a reference to OFCOM’s “online safety functions” has the meaning given by section 235 of the Online Safety Act 2023;(d) “internet service provider” means a provider of—(i) a service that is made available by means of the internet, or(ii) a service that provides access to the internet; (e) “user” , in relation to an internet service provider, means a user of a service provided by the internet service provider.”.(2) In Schedule 3 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sexual offences for purposes of Part 2 of that Act) after paragraph 46 insert—“46A An offence under section 52D of that Act (child sexual abuse image-generators), if the offender is sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.”.(3) In the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009—(a) in section 55 (offences committed outside the UK) after subsection (7) insert—“(7A) Subsection (1) applies to an act which, if done in Scotland, would constitute an offence under section 52D of the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982, as if references to a United Kingdom national included—(a) a body incorporated under the law of any part of the United Kingdom, or(b) an unincorporated association formed under the law of any part of the United Kingdom.”;(b) in Schedule 4 (sexual offences for purposes of section 55 of that Act), after paragraph 12 insert—“12A An offence under section 52D of that Act (child sexual abuse image-generators).”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause makes provision for Scotland equivalent to that made by clause 63 for England and Wales.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“Possession of advice or guidance about child sexual abuse or CSA images: Scotland(1) In Part 4 of the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 after section 41 insert—“41A Possession of advice or guidance about abusing children sexually or creating CSA images(1) It is an offence to be in possession of any item that contains advice or guidance about abusing children sexually or creating CSA images.(2) “Abusing children sexually or creating CSA images” means doing anything that constitutes—(a) an offence under section 52 or 52D of the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982;(b) an offence under section 1, 2 or 7 of the Criminal Law Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1995 against a person under the age of 18;(c) an offence under section 10 of that Act;(d) an offence under section 1, or any of sections 9 to 12, of the Protection of Children and Prevention of Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2005;(e) an offence under Part 1 or section 46 of the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 against a person under the age of 18;(f) an offence under Part 4 or section 42 of that Act;(g) an offence under section 1 of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Scotland) Act 2015 against a person under the age of 18 that is committed with a view to exploitation that consists of or includes behaviour within section 3(3), (4) or (5) of that Act (prostitution and sexual exploitation), or doing anything outside Scotland that would constitute such an offence if done in Scotland.(3) It is a defence for a person (D) charged with an offence under this section—(a) to prove that D had a legitimate reason for being in possession of the item;(b) to prove that—(i) D had not read, viewed or (as appropriate) listened to the item, and(ii) D did not know, and had no reason to suspect, that it contained advice or guidance about abusing children sexually or creating CSA images; or(c) to prove that—(i) the item was sent to D without any request made by D or on D’s behalf, and(ii) D did not keep it for an unreasonable time.(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both;(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years or to a fine, or to both.(5) In this section “item” includes anything in which information of any description is recorded.41B Section 41A: supplementary provision(1) A service provider does not commit an offence under section 41A by—(a) providing access to a communication network, or(b) transmitting, in a communication network, information provided by a user, if the provider does not—(i) initiate the transmission,(ii) select the recipient of the transmission, or(iii) select or modify the information contained in the transmission.(2) The references in subsection (1) to providing access to, or transmitting information in, a communication network include storing the information transmitted so far as the storage—(a) is automatic, intermediate and transient,(b) is solely for the purpose of carrying out the transmission in the network, and(c) is for no longer than is reasonably necessary for the transmission.(3) A service provider does not commit an offence under section 41A by storing information provided by a user for transmission in a communication network if—(a) the storage of the information—(i) is automatic, intermediate and temporary, and(ii) is solely for the purpose of making more efficient the onward transmission of the information to other users at their request, and(b) the service provider—(i) does not modify the information,(ii) complies with any conditions attached to having access to the information, and(iii) on obtaining actual knowledge of a matter within subsection (4), promptly removes the information or disables access to it.(4) The matters within this subsection are that—(a) the information at the initial source of the transmission has been removed from the network,(b) access to it has been disabled, or (c) a court or administrative authority has ordered the removal from the network of, or the disablement of access to, the information.(5) A service provider does not commit an offence under section 41A by storing information provided by a user who is not acting under the authority or control of the provider if—(a) the provider had no actual knowledge when the information was provided that it was, or contained, advice or guidance about abusing children sexually or creating CSA images, and(b) on obtaining actual knowledge that the information was, or contained, advice or guidance about abusing children sexually or creating CSA images, the provider promptly removed the information or disabled access to it.(6) In this section—(a) “service provider” means a person providing an information society service;(b) “information society service” means a service normally provided—(i) for remuneration,(ii) at a distance,(iii) by electronic means, and(iv) at the individual request of a user of the services;(c) “user” , in relation to a service provider, means a user of a service provided by the service provider.(7) In subsection (6)(b)—(a) “at a distance” means that the service is provided without the parties being simultaneously present;(b) “by electronic means” means that the service is—(i) sent initially and received at its destination by means of electronic equipment for the processing (including digital compression) and storage of data, and(ii) entirely transmitted, conveyed and received by wire, by radio, by optical means or by other electromagnetic means;(c) “at the individual request of a user of the services” means that the service is provided through the transmission of data on individual request.”.(2) In Schedule 3 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sexual offences for purposes of Part 2 of that Act) after paragraph 59ZJ insert—“59ZJA An offence under section 41A of that Act (possession of paedophile manual) if the offender—(a) was 18 or over, and(b) is sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes provision for Scotland equivalent to that made for England and Wales and Northern Ireland by section 69 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, as amended by clause 64.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my new clause (Child sexual abuse image-generators: Scotland) inserted after clause 63.
“(vi) Article 42A (child sexual abuse image-generators);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my new clause (Child sexual abuse image generators: Northern Ireland) inserted after clause 63.
Lord Meston
Member’s explanatory statement
The purpose of this amendment is to align the wording with that of the equivalent duty to report money laundering as stated in section 330(2) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, and to extend the scope of the duty to cover Wales in addition to England.
Lord Meston (CB)
My noble friend Lady Grey-Thompson cannot be here and has asked me to speak to her amendments in this group, 12 in number, to which I had already added my name in support. I pay tribute to her dedicated campaigning on what we will now debate. All her amendments concern and seek to reinforce the Government’s decision to legislate for mandatory reporting of child sexual abuse in a wide range of contexts.
My noble friend Lady Grey-Thompson’s amendments are based on her earlier Private Member’s Bill and echo amendments by her to the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill, which was debated in June. I recall that in that debate the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, referred to a need for a clear and comprehensive system of mandatory reporting. Following the work of IICSA, which highlighted the widespread and endemic nature of child sexual abuse, the Government’s decision to put forward the duty set out in Chapter 2 is welcome and should be supported—but I would say, only as far as it goes.
The main point of difference is that whereas the Bill does not expressly provide for sanctions for non-compliance with the duty, many of us wish the duty to be underpinned by criminal sanctions, as IICSA recommended. Quite simply, a lesser sanction such as a possible referral to a professional regulator or to the Disclosure and Barring Service is not enough to enforce the new and important duty. We will get to this shortly with Amendment 280.
Before we move on, I would like to say that the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, was quite correct to emphasise the wide range of situations in which abuse can occur. It is not just child grooming gangs, well-known celebrity abuse cases or cases involving institutions such as churches or schools; the reality is that the majority of child sexual abuse occurs in domestic and family situations. It is therefore welcome that this Bill will potentially cover such a wide range of scenarios.
As someone who spent much of his working life dealing with child abuse cases, I suggest that these basic points should inform the debate on this part of the Bill and the amendments to it. First, safeguarding children should be seen as the responsibility of everyone. I quote my noble friend Lady Grey-Thompson:
“A well-designed mandatory reporting law is a key component of an effective safeguarding system”.—[Official Report, 17/1/25; col. 1382.]
I would add that a positive duty to report, with sanctions, is the only certain way of ensuring that steps will be promptly taken to investigate and prevent abuse when it is revealed or suspected.
Secondly, and fundamentally, doing nothing when suspicions of abuse are aroused should not be seen as an option. A failure to report is a culpable failure to protect, and it is a failure to prevent harm to the child concerned and to other children at risk. Thirdly, a child who has the courage to disclose abuse needs to be reassured that his or her anxieties will be quickly and properly dealt with. Fourthly, a strong mandatory law will convey to potential perpetrators that abuse will not be tolerated. Finally, difficult cases concerning historic sexual abuse, whether one likes that term or not, arise in all jurisdictional areas. These require courts to deal with alleged abuse that may have been undetected and/or unreported for many years. A later group of amendments will consider these. In the context of this group, I suggest that a duty to report suspicions of abuse as soon as possible should reduce the number of such historic cases, with all their evidential and emotional complexities.
I turn to the individual amendments. Amendment 272 aims to align the wording of the Bill with that of the equivalent duty to report money laundering in Section 330 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, and to extend the duty to cover Wales as well as England. The noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, makes the point that for the past 23 years the country has protected money in ways in which it has not yet protected children. I have compared other formulations of positive duties elsewhere—for example, in the Terrorism Act 2000 and the Female Genital Mutilation Act—and submit that what the amendment here proposes is clearer and more incisive than the wording in the Bill.
Amendment 274 would ensure that any report goes to the local authority that has the duty to protect the child, investigating the child’s circumstances and putting in place therapeutic treatment as well as protective measures. The local authority already has a duty to work with the police and to pass reports on to them if there is evidence of an offence. Amendment 275 is consequential.
Amendment 276 would ensure that a report is made in cases of suspected offences occurring outside England and Wales. Amendment 277 seeks to align the duty with existing statutory guidance, which expects a report to be made as soon as practicable. If there is a risk to the life or safety of a relevant child, the guidance expects the report to be expedited rather than delayed in order to enable fast consideration of necessary intervention.
Amendment 278 would remove the scope for people not to report when they believe that someone else will do so. Experience shows—certainly this is my own experience—that that is just one of the many ways in which people with knowledge or suspicion of abuse will convince themselves that it is all right to do nothing, and to hope that the problem will go away.
Amendment 279 is intended to make it clear that the management and proprietors of a setting have the duty to report suspected abuse—for example, when suspicions are reported to management by other staff. It should not be a prerequisite to have had any direct contact with the child, nor should it be an excuse that they did not have any direct contact with the child. It is not the responsibility or function of management to consider the merits of the complaint; they have a straightforward responsibility to report concerns.
Amendment 280 would make failure to report a criminal offence, and this is perhaps the central amendment as far as we are concerned. The IICSA report made a balanced and carefully considered recommendation that it should be, providing for defences as indicated in the amendment. I suggest that criminalising a failure to report is justified in helping to reduce a significant risk of substantial harm to children. Paragraph 116 of the IICSA report states:
“Where an individual to whom mandatory reporting laws apply has witnessed or received a disclosure of child sexual abuse, it should be a criminal offence to fail to report that to the relevant local authority or police force. Such a failure would amount to a deliberate decision not to pass on information about child sexual abuse to those authorities empowered to protect children from harm and to prevent future abuse by investigating and prosecuting it when it occurs. For those who work with children or are in a position of trust to fail to facilitate that is inexcusable, and the sanction for such an omission should be commensurate”.
Amendment 281 seeks to define “operators of a setting” in cases of private and corporate ownership, and Amendment 284 would clarify and describe the wide range of settings in which relevant activities covered by Clause 72 might occur. These are not exclusive lists, and I hope the Committee will recognise the wide extent of the activities that need to be covered. For example, the amendment refers outside mainstream religious organisations, to
“other organisations holding non-religious worldviews”.
That echoes cases I have dealt with involving sects and cults that are closed and secretive, and insist on loyalty.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Kennedy of Cradley) (Lab)
Before we move on, I clarify that the lead amendment in this group, Amendment 271F, was not moved so we have moved on to Amendment 272, which has been proposed as the lead amendment, and the group will continue as normal.
Lord Meston (CB)
Thank you for that. I was slightly confused, because the first amendment in the group was not moved.
Baroness Featherstone (LD)
My Lords, this follows on very well because I will speak to Amendment 283 in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, which would insert after Clause 72 the offence of intentionally concealing child sex abuse.
There is a real problem—and it is an omission from the Bill—because leadership and supervisory roles are completely excluded from the reporting duty. The duty applies only to individuals in contact with children, but we in this House and elsewhere all know that it is not just the social workers, the medics or the police who have direct contact with the child who know that there is sexual abuse at play. It is often the leaders, the CEOs, the chairs of boards, the staff who are too scared to mention it in case of reputational damage, and those in command who suppress incidents of child sexual abuse. This confines mandated reporters to only those who have regular unsupervised contact, creating a critical gap in the Bill.
It would be absolutely unforgivable to let this Bill to protect children go through with such a glaring gap in their protection. Furthermore, there are no criminal penalties proposed for failure to report, and without sanction it lacks teeth. An additional problem is that in two of the industrial-scale institutions of child sexual abuse that we have witnessed—the health service and religious institutions—confidentiality is a kind of get-out clause. We need to overcome that.
The UK Government launched the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, which was explicitly tasked with uncovering the systemic failures that allowed such abuse to flourish untrammelled. The key recommendation was that the UK must introduce a mandatory reporting law for child sexual abuse. We welcome that this is now happening, but noble Lords have all encountered or understood that, very often, the protection of an institution, a company or an entity silences many who work in that institution but know what is going on, and that takes priority. That silence—actually silencing staff or members—is commonplace.
Look at the obvious ones, such as the Catholic Church. Across multiple countries, investigations found that Church leaders reassigned accused priests, maintained secret files and prioritised avoiding scandal over reporting allegations. Church of England independent reviews found that senior clergy discouraged reporting and protected accused individuals to avoid damaging the institution’s standing. In the health service, the BBC exposure of Jimmy Savile’s years of abuse demonstrated beyond belief how many people knew but said nothing. Internal discussions showed that investigations were discouraged or blocked due to concerns about reputation, and Savile’s celebrity and connections. In private schools and boarding schools, multiple inquiries documented quiet dismissals of staff and minimised complaints to preserve reputation, funding and donor relationships. It happens in sports clubs and organisations. Various youth sports organisations protected coaches, dismissed complaints and pressurised victims to stay quiet to maintain prestige. So often companies and institutions are too big to fail. They use threats or non-disclosure agreements and so on to cover up misdeeds in fear of reputational damage. This is intentional, and that is why this amendment would put a criminal offence of intentionally concealing knowledge of child sex abuse on to the statute book.
I have personal knowledge of such a case. In this instance, it was child abuse rather than child sexual abuse. Great Ormond Street, our national treasure, suppressed a report, the Sibert-Hodes report, that it had commissioned. It showed the hospital to have responsibility for the failing clinic where baby P, Peter Connelly, was taken multiple times with multiple injuries and subsequently died, and where it had employed an underqualified doctor who failed. In that clinic there were three other doctors, none of whom was present. Two were on gardening leave and the other had left.
Cover-ups are happening all the time. The Bill is an opportunity to stop this practice, where NDAs, threats and gardening leave are all used to prevent exposure. I believe this follows on from what the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, is trying to do with her amendment; it would expand it. I hope and trust that the Government understand the importance of these amendments and move urgently to fill the gaping hole in this legislation as proposed.
While I am on my feet, I will speak to Amendment 287 in my name and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell, about training for those subject to the mandatory duty to report child sexual abuse. I am indebted to the NSPCC for its help on this vital aspect of this new duty. In this amendment we are seeking to make mandatory reporting of child sexual abuse a reality, because without training—proper training, probably expensive training—it will not happen as intended in the Bill. It is vital that all those responsible for reporting under the new duty be trained effectively so that they feel supported and able, and are effectively trained to a high standard on their obligations.
The new mandatory duty to report child sexual abuse has the potential to ensure that anyone working or volunteering with children knows that the sexual abuse of children cannot be tolerated or ignored. It will be illegal to tolerate or ignore it, and proper implementation must be embedded from the very start. Those who are responsible for reporting child sexual abuse must be properly trained to know what, how and where to report. The onus for ensuring this cannot rely solely on individual organisations. If this duty is to have a widespread impact, we need cross-sector, cross-government buy-in so that all reporters, no matter what organisation, community or area they come from, are empowered to protect children.
That is why this amendment is so vital: to ensure effective training for all mandated reporters within the mandatory reporting duty. Recognising, reporting and, crucially, responding to child sexual abuse is not easy or straightforward, because we know that disclosures from children do not usually happen in one conversation. They can happen in many forms, verbally or non-verbally, and emerge over a long period of time. They will often be the result of consistent and skilled engagement from a trusted adult that helps the child feel safe and ready to share their experiences.
Reporters may also struggle to decipher whether what they have seen is indeed child sexual abuse—such as if they came across child sexual abuse material online but were unsure of the age of the victim—particularly if they are not already trained to identify recognised signs and indicators of abuse. Their responsibility to the child cannot stop at disclosure or witnessing abuse. It is vital that any child who discloses their experience of abuse is met with an effective response.
We know that there is already a significant need for greater training and support for skilled professionals to improve their response to child sexual abuse, as detailed in the recent reports from the Child Safeguarding Practice Review Panel and the review into child exploitation of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey. This is a gap in our child protection system that must be closed to better protect children, and this duty provides us with both the impetus and the opportunity to do so by taking a whole-system approach to embedding the duty. Therefore, those who are responsible for reporting on abuse and disclosures such as these must be trained not only in how to identify what child sexual abuse is, what a disclosure is and where to report it, but also in how to provide vital support to a child all the way through to after the report has been made and beyond.
This duty will apply not only to safeguarding professionals but to volunteers, sports coaches, youth club leaders and faith leaders, to name but a few. We cannot assume that all mandated reporters will already have the necessary understanding of child protection required to carry out their responsibilities under this really serious duty. This is essential, not only on the practical level of understanding the duty itself but, arguably more importantly, in providing this sensitive support to children in a way that does not put them at risk. My amendment seeks to ensure that an understanding of child protection is intrinsic to the duty, guaranteeing that all those with responsibility as a mandated reporter receive, at a minimum, initial and ongoing training—essential elements of their new responsibilities.
In conclusion, from how to recognise signs and indicators to judging when reporting should be delayed for the safety of the child, reporters must be supported. Otherwise, we risk putting children in danger of being harmed by the reporting process, in addition to the hurt they have already received. By baking this guarantee into primary legislation, the Government can be confident that their duty will be implemented and regulated consistently across different sectors. It would also reassure reporters that they will not face sanctions because the organisation they work or volunteer for cannot afford to resource and train them appropriately. We owe it to all the victims and survivors who have bravely called for a mandatory reporting duty over so many years to ensure that it is done properly.
Lord Murphy of Torfaen (Lab)
My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 283B. Schedule 8 relates to the duty to report child sex offences. Paragraph 17 of that schedule applies this duty to
“Activities of a person in connection with training, supervising or instructing a child for the purposes of a religion or belief, if the person has regular … contact with the child in the course of those activities”.
Some Catholic schools and faith schools obviously have religious objects, and Schedule 8 applies to them. But the problem with that is that all schools are also regulated by Section 21(5) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. That effectively means double regulation, which would put a burden on faith schools, with unnecessary bureaucracy.
The Catholic Education Service, which represents about 2,000 schools in England—that is not counting Wales, Northern Ireland or Scotland, of course—has worked closely with the Home Office and has helped to draft my amendment. The amendment would remove from the scope of paragraph 17 activity that is already regulated and governed by the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, therefore preventing unnecessary double regulation. The Catholic Education Service has worked very closely with this Government and the previous one on ensuring the highest standards of children’s safeguards in schools. I would be grateful if my noble friend the Minister would react positively to this amendment in his wind-up.
Baroness Walmsley (LD)
My Lords, I agree with every word of the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and of my noble friend Lady Featherstone. I hope they will forgive me if I say no more about all that, because, if I do not catch my train tonight, I will have to sleep on the street. I will speak to Amendments 280A in the name of my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones and Amendments 282 and 285 in his name and mine.
Amendment 280A is straightforward in its intent. It seeks to fully implement recommendation 13 of IICSA’s final report. The current Clause 72 introduces a duty on adults engaged in relevant activity to notify police or local authorities when
“they are given reason to suspect that a child sex offence may have been committed”.
The Government propose non-criminal sanctions, such as referral to professional regulators or the DBS. We on these Benches maintain that this approach is insufficient. IICSA was clear: a failure to comply with the duty must be a criminal offence. Amendment 280A would insert proposed new subsections (10A) and (10B) into Clause 72, which would explicitly provide that:
“A person who fails to fulfil the duty under subsection (1) commits an offence”,
and that the person
“is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale”.
This criminal sanction is essential because relying solely on professional sanctions creates institutional loopholes. Professional sanctions apply to only a fraction of the mandated reporters and cannot effectively address failings in settings where professional regulation is absent, such as certain religious settings, where, as we have heard, many grievous failings have occurred. Nor do they cover volunteers in schools or other settings. Furthermore, criminalising non-compliance would align us with international best practice in countries such as France and Australia.
Amendment 280 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, is similar to this one, except that it offers some mitigations that the court could consider. Whether this offers a loophole or a reasonable consideration for the courts is a reasonable discussion point.
Amendment 285 addresses the second vital component of IICSA’s recommendation 13. Incorporating the duty to report when a person recognises the indicators of child sexual abuse, the amendment would expand the trigger for the duty to report beyond direct disclosure by a child or perpetrator, or witnessing child sexual abuse, all of which is vanishingly rare, to include circumstances where a person
“witnesses a child displaying sexualised, sexually harmful or other behaviour, physical signs of abuse or consequences of sexual abuse”.
It has to be remembered that only one in three victims of CSA ever discloses what happened, and often it is many years later.
The fact is that, if the Bill passes as it is without amendment, it will undoubtedly fail in its stated objective. The Government themselves recognise this, as witnessed by the figures in the impact assessment. It says that the number of extra anticipated reports of CSA each year for England and Wales under the existing terms of the Bill is only 310, which is an average of 7.9 extra reports for each of the 43 police forces. The total number of cases estimated to be proceeded against in England is 26—with 15 cases in the Crown Court and nine in the magistrates’ court—and only 11 of those would see the award of custodial sentences. The total estimated increase in CSA referrals to local authority-designated officers is 2% per annum.
It would therefore be nonsense to suggest that widening the scope of the duty to report CSA to something like that which exists in countries that have high-standard mandatory reporting systems that have been functioning well for years, as this amendment proposes, would overwhelm our system. It would not. Neither would it result in some cases being hidden in the mass of reports, as some have suggested. On the other hand, widening the scope, as this and other amendments seek to do, would uncover a lot of evil and save many children from terrible lifelong harm, which has a cost to public services. Not doing so would perpetuate the culture of cover-up that led to the IICSA inquiry in the first place.
However, recognising that assessing such indicators can be subjective, Amendment 285 would maintain proportionality, as recommended by IICSA, by ensuring that failure to comply with the duty based solely on those indicators is not a criminal offence, but compliance should be done by any conscientious professional. This careful balance would ensure that staff and volunteers are encouraged to report any sign of potential harm without the fear of criminal prosecution based on subjective observation. This is crucial to fostering a reporting culture that prioritises the immediate safety and protection of the child, which is what we all want to see. It is vital to remember that the investigation of the report of, or reasonable suspicion of, child sexual abuse is not for the reporter to do; it is for the experts to investigate and the courts to decide—but they cannot do that unless they get the report in the first place.
Amendment 282 is designed to include in the reporting duty a comprehensive range of people who care for children, as defined in Sections 21, 22 and 22A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. To ensure that no relevant person is left out, these sections ensure the inclusion in the duty to report the management of settings where some kind of care is given to children, which is one of the gaping holes in the current wording of the Bill. With that, having just reaffirmed my support for the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, and those of my noble friend Lady Featherstone, I will finish.
Lord Polak (Con)
I rise to speak to my Amendment 286A, which proposes to fill gaps in Clause 79 so we can hold accountable all those who go out of their way to conceal the horrendous crime of child sexual abuse. This amendment is supported by multiple child protection organisations, including the NSPCC, Barnardo’s, the Centre of Expertise on Child Sexual Abuse and the Lucy Faithfull Foundation. I particularly thank Gina Rees from the NSPCC, who has advised me.
Obviously, it can never be acceptable for anyone to turn a blind eye to abuse. Yet across the seven year-long investigation, the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse exposed countless instances where those whose organisations had a responsibility to protect children from harm not only failed to report child sexual abuse but took purposeful actions that actively sought to cover it up. These acts of intentionally concealing child sexual abuse are separate from, and go beyond, just failing to make a report, something which the Government’s mandatory reporting duty proposes to address. It means choosing and acting to prioritise something else, be that community, relationships or company reputation, over the safety of a child. I think we can agree across this House that that is unacceptable.
These acts of concealment are not a thing of the past. Take, for example, this real-life contact at the NSPCC helpline for those with concerns about a child. A special educational needs professional told the NSPCC:
“I’ve seen what happens when people report any concerns, even minor ones. Management bullies you, reduces your shifts, stops giving you what you need to support the kids. You’re expected to buy everything yourself for them instead of it being provided. If you thought you were on track for a permanent job, forget it”.
Bullying, threatening job stability and removing support for the children who are meant to be protected—these are actions, along with intimidation of witnesses and destroying vital evidence, that have happened for many years and still happen, with impunity, across our society. They not only undermine efforts to increase reports of child sexual abuse; they can deny victims their right to justice and hinder their access to vital support services in order to help them begin to recover from what they have suffered. As such, it is vital that our criminal justice system be equipped with new laws to catch these bad actors.
I appreciate that the Government’s current drafting of Clause 79 aims to do this by introducing a new criminal offence of preventing or deterring someone, under the mandatory reporting duty, from making a report. While that is an important part of thwarting the cover-up of child sexual abuse, this provision does not go far enough to cover the multitude of ways that reports of abuse can be concealed and could allow many of those who intentionally conceal this crime to slip through the net. This is because Clause 79 is triggered only when the person acting to conceal abuse does so by blocking or deterring someone, under the new duty, from making a report. This would not, for example, criminalise acts that could prevent abuse being discovered by a mandated reporter in the first place, such as intimidating victims or destroying vital evidence. Indeed, if the professional I referred to in my example earlier did not fall under the new duty to report, there is a strong chance that those who try to bully and intimidate someone in respect of doing the right thing would not be prosecutable under the current offence.
This feels to me like a glaring omission that could undermine the Government’s intentions with this clause. It also does not cover preventing those who are not mandated reporters from reporting, or acts to hinder this investigation of abuse after it has been reported. That is why I call on the Government and the Minister to look again at their current proposal and ensure that it is strengthened, so that those who intentionally act to cover up child sexual abuse, including those who threaten or deter those not under the reporting duty, are caught by this offence. I therefore urge the Government to accept Amendment 286A so that Clause 79 captures all individuals who intentionally cover up child sexual abuse.
Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer (LD)
My Lords, I rise to speak to my Amendment 273, which is a very simple amendment that aims to put into action what IICSA recommended: that mandatory reporting of child sexual abuse should happen with no exceptions. The inquiry argued that, even if abuse is disclosed in the context of confession, the person—in this case, the priest—should be legally required to report it. It proposes that failing to report such abuse should itself be a criminal offence.
I am very glad that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester is in his place, because I know he has spent a long time on working parties looking at this issue. In earlier discussions in the House, in response to the right reverend Prelate, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, said that he had received representations from churches on this issue and expressed the hope that this would be further debated as the Crime and Policing Bill went through Parliament. My amendment is simply here to enable that debate to happen.
Lord Bethell (Con)
My Lords, I rise to speak in support of my noble friend Lord Polak and his Amendment 286A. As he lucidly put it, this amendment proposes to close several glaring loopholes in the offences outlined in Clause 79; otherwise, I fear it will fail to meet the aims and expectations placed on it by this Committee.
Our criminal justice system should be equipped with new laws to hold accountable all those who cover up child sexual abuse. The noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, put that case incredibly well and touchingly. It needs to be known that if someone acts purposefully to stop child sexual abuse being properly investigated and so denies the victims and survivors the protection and justice they are entitled to, they will face strong criminal penalties. That is why I support the Bill’s inclusion of Clause 79, which seeks to introduce new criminal offences for preventing or deterring someone, under the new mandatory reporting duty, from making a report. However, its drafting means that it would be limited in its ability to contribute meaningfully to the important mission of tackling child sexual abuse that we across the Committee strongly support.
Clause 79 is dependent upon the new mandatory duty to report. The clause not only requires the action taken to directly involve a reporter under the duty, it requires the person attempting to conceal the abuse to know that the person that they are deterring is a mandated reporter. This brings with it a whole host of legal complexities. What does it mean to know that someone is under the duty? Does it require them to also know that the child sex offence has taken place to trigger the said duty? How could it be convincingly proved by the courts that someone accused of putting the needs of their institution above protecting a child also understood what the duty is, who it applies to and how that factored into their actions? These are important questions that need to be reconciled.
The Lord Bishop of Manchester
My Lords, I am grateful for the chance to speak in this debate. Probably the most harrowing date in my life as a bishop was when I had to give evidence in person to IICSA as the Church of England’s lead bishop on religious communities— we knew that some of the horrific abuse that had taken place was in religious communities. Ever since then, I have worked really hard on these matters. I sought to add my name to Amendments 286A and 287, but I missed the deadline, sadly, so I am grateful for the chance to support them now.
I was going to say quite a bit about Amendment 286A, but the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, said just about everything I wanted to say, so I will not detain the Committee any further on it. On Amendment 287 on training, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Polak, and others. It is important that the Bill will apply not only to already knowledgeable professionals but to volunteers, who will have a whole variety of levels of funding, of safeguarding experience and of experience in dealing with child sexual abuse. We cannot assume that mandated reporters will already have the necessary understanding to fulfil these new legal obligations, so I think this is an appropriate probing amendment to see what support there can be to ensure that those who will have a duty are equipped to discharge that duty properly. Without that, I think we will fail to hit what we are trying to do.
I am sorry that it has taken us this long to get this far with the IICSA report. I think we have made a bit more progress implementing its recommendations in the Church of England than we have in this House, but I am glad that we got this opportunity today. I am grateful to the many noble Lords who have proposed amendments.
I want to say a few words about Amendment 273, as the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, invited me to do so. On the seal of the confessional, if it is possible for a churchman to say this, I remain a bit agnostic. I am interested in what will actually produce good safeguarding. I have heard people say, including survivors sometimes, that the chance to go and talk to a priest, and know it would not go beyond that priest, was what gave them the courage—often with a priest going with them—to make a disclosure to the relevant authorities. I can see that if we change that, some disclosures would happen but some would not, so I am keen to hear a bit more about that.
The other part of the amendment talks about extending it to all those who volunteer. I am not quite sure how wide that needs to go. Certainly, I am happy for it to apply to Church leaders, lay or ordained, paid or unpaid, but it should not be the person who cleans the coffee cups in the church hall on a Sunday morning, or who puts out the “No parking” cones, or who photocopies the parish magazine or arranges the church flowers once a month. Let us be clear exactly what categories we are going to extend any duty to, and whether that is dealt with best in the Bill or in some sort of secondary advice, guidance, legislation or other instrument. I am keen to explore that more. I am very grateful for these matters being raised, and not before time.
Lord Hampton (CB)
My Lords, I too support Amendment 286A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Polak, to which I also would have added my name if I had been slightly more efficient. The right reverend Prelate and I need to do better from now on. I acknowledge and thank the NSPCC and declare my interest as a teacher. To quote Keeping Children Safe in Education, which we have to read every year, child protection is everybody’s responsibility.
I was surprised to hear that this issue was not already completely covered. As we have heard now and in previous groups, it is essential that if someone acts purposefully to stop child sexual abuse being properly investigated, they should face strong criminal penalties. Actions like these can delay, and sometimes outright deny, victims their access to justice and the vital support needed to help them recover from such abuse.
The much-quoted Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse uncovered instances in which teachers were transferred to another school with no police referral, after a student was told: “You must not tell the police. We will handle it in-house”. Priests were moved from parish to parish, and there were examples of local authorities destroying files relating to allegations, which survivors perceived as part of a cover-up.
These are actions that can and do continue to happen across our society. While Clause 79 introduces a new criminal offence of preventing or deterring someone under the mandatory reporting duty from making a report, this provision does not go far enough to cover the multitude of ways that reports of abuse can be concealed. This is because Clause 79 is built on the mandatory reporting duty and requires the act of concealment directly to involve someone under that duty. This proposal is separate from applying criminal sanctions directly to the mandatory duty to report child sexual abuse in Clause 72, which I fear could create a defensive fear and blame-based child protection sector that criminalises those who lack the knowledge and training to report effectively. However, intentionally taking actions to cover up child sexual abuse cannot be tolerated and should be criminalised. I believe that this amendment strikes the balance.
The Earl of Lytton (CB)
My Lords, this is the first time I have spoken at this stage of the Bill. I must say that, in the presence of such expertise, I find myself entirely inadequate for the purpose. At Second Reading, I raised a question about the interaction of Clause 80 with the clauses that precede it. I profess no track record on matters of child protection, but I thoroughly subscribe to the principle of the duty to report contained in this section of the Bill. Because of its profound significance, it certainly has my full support.
However, I have come to the matter through a rather different route: the way in which crimes are recorded and, in particular, why they may not be recorded accurately or at all. My point is quite simple and revolves around the reliable translation of the definition in Clause 72(1)—namely, a reason to believe that
“a child sex offence may have been committed (at any time)”—
into some sort of recording and/or further action. We cannot know what those reasons to believe might be, so variable is the range of circumstances, as we heard earlier. I note that “reasonable belief” has no definable limit, and nor should it have. However, it may very likely be based on the reporter’s knowledge, training, experience, powers of observation and so on, rather than hard evidence. Here is the point: otherwise, were that not the case, Clause 72 would surely have been differently worded.
I certainly expect that all such professionals involved with safeguarding in mind would have acute sensitivity in this area and, in reporting their beliefs, would themselves be believed as an evidential source. My concern is that their belief alone may still not be enough to generate action without further and better evidence. I think in particular of a situation where the child who is the subject of their belief is uncommunicative, if the information is partly second-hand, if it is about a child not in their immediate charge, and the myriad ways in which this information of relevance can come about. Then, the only purpose of reporting would be to get the matters into some sort of system for follow-up monitoring and investigations which necessarily involve the devotion of resources to confirm the commission of an offence or ultimately dispose of it on the basis that nothing sinister has actually occurred.
Therefore, reporting gets us only so far. What then? What is the follow-up process to be? Clause 80 does not actually tell us but makes a leap to police crime recording, in accordance with “applicable policy and procedure”—presumably meaning the Home Office guidance and the practices within the particular force concerned, attuned to local circumstances, resources and priorities within its area. This, as far as I can see, is the only backstop follow-up from the reporting of reasonable belief under the Bill. As such, its commendable aims are yoked to a general crime reporting principle that applies some way further down the line.
I hope I do not suffer from some sort of hallucinatory process in all of this, but I seek to plug a gap in which reasonable belief in any given instance is not guaranteed to pass the evidential standard for the purposes of police or, for that matter, any other recording of suspected crime. This is because the balance of probabilities test underlying the crime reporting guidance embodies a clear tendency towards such an evidential base. Home Office guidance places the duty on the reporting officer as to what they think has happened in the commission of a crime, not necessarily what the person reporting thinks. Any different approach, especially one involving time and energy in instances of hazy information in the circumstances described, might be difficult to get across the line.
My concern, notwithstanding the current focus on child sexual abuse in the press and everywhere else, is that things might easily erode over the long run and default to standard practices consistent with available finances, manpower and, not least, political pressures to show effective reduction in crime. This was highlighted by the Public Administration Select Committee in its June 2014 report, Caught Red-handed. Its findings were also associated with the demotion of police crime recordings and their removal for national statistics purposes.
The gap I see in the legislative architecture before us matters because of the special attention needed to protect young people. If we are now moving on to a situation where previous failings to protect the vulnerable from things too awful to contemplate are really a thing of the past, with better outcomes going forward, then, as I pointed out at Second Reading, Clause 80 risks merely undoing the policy objectives of Clauses 72 to 79.
Rather than tinker around with the detail, it seemed more appropriate to remove Clause 80 altogether—hence my intention for us to debate whether Clause 80 stands part—and simply leave in place the duty to report and the penalty for obstructing this duty. That would lead, I hope, to the establishment by the relevant duty holders, via their multi agency safeguarding processes, of other follow-up protocols to manage and monitor concerns falling outside police crime recording parameters, but on a structured basis. Otherwise, I cannot conceive of any route to ensure follow-up measures and resources being devoted to mere reasonable belief that does not require an evidential test for crime recording. Therefore, this needs a framework.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, as was clear from our debate, this is a very important group of amendments, which seek to clarify and improve a necessary measure in the Bill. When we discussed the fourth group today, we heard about the horrific crimes committed against some children in this country: the industrial-scale abuse of young, white, working-class girls over the past four decades, as well as abuse of other groups. This happened —and is still happening—because the people who commit these crimes are among the most depraved in our society. However, it has also happened because people familiar with the abuse, or even those who had mere suspicions, turned a blind eye or simply did not look at what was in front of them.
The victims were failed by everyone, from the police to the authorities, their teachers and community leaders. Too often, they were treated with a blind negligence that bordered on positively enabling the crimes that were occurring. We have heard many powerful speeches today; I cannot list them all, but I remind the Minister of the introduction by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, and the powerful speech from the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone.
I think we all now agree that safeguarding needs to be supported by sanctions. How else can we put a stop to bureaucratic failure to report? The difficult and important question is around striking the balance when doing that, to make certain that it is effective but that it does not have unintended, unhappy consequences. It is important also to make non-reporting a criminal offence, but, again, exactly how that is phrased will need considerable care. Many ideas have been canvassed today, and it would be dangerous for me to try to draft on the hoof at the Dispatch Box.
There was force in the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, as to why there should be an exception for what is learned in confession, and that was also important. I am not urging that there should be an exception, but it should be looked at. We have had arguments on both sides. What is the evidence? What are likely to be the benefits of opening that up? Personally, I think it should be opened up, but it should be looked at with care.
We heard earlier today from the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, all about the grooming gangs, so I will not go back to that, but they are an incredibly striking example of why we need a duty to report suspected child sex offences in general and why it is important that the clause is properly drafted.
One important oversight, which was spotted by noble Baronesses, Lady Cash and Lady Grey-Thompson, concerns the reference to Wales. As has been established, it is necessary to correct an oversight in the drafting. As things stand, local authorities and police forces in Wales will have to be informed of crimes, but only if they are considered crimes in England. That must be redrafted, and I hope the Minister will agree to that come Report stage.
Amendment 283A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Cash—which was not moved, but it is sensible to make the point—would implement another recommendation of the Casey review, adding child criminal exploitation to the crimes for which there is a duty to report. It is important to look at all these points when drafting the obligations.
We on this side are largely supportive of the principles behind the several amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson. Leaving out subsections (5) and (6) raises an interesting point. It is obviously better to be safe than sorry. We will have to look very carefully at what removing those subsections would actually do.
We on this side worry about removing defences in cases where an individual genuinely fears for the safety of the victim or believes that someone else has definitely submitted a report. That must be looked at, too. Perhaps the Minister can guide us on how to ensure that genuine defences with merit will remain available without providing a route to or excuse for shirking responsibility.
The noble Lord, Lord Murphy of Torfaen, raised an interesting point about the bureaucratic burden on faith schools. Government obviously must look at that. It should not be a let-out; equally, we on this side would not support any extra unnecessary burden being imposed. However, it must be done properly.
My noble friend Lord Polak’s Amendment 286A raises important considerations. It is worth noting that he is supported by Barnardo’s, the NSPCC and other organisations with great specialist expertise and knowledge—and not just anecdotal knowledge; they really know what is going on. He is looking to prevent the intentional concealment of child sex offences. That must be the absolute minimum. My noble friend Lord Bethell was supportive of that amendment, and he was right to caution us about going too far, so that it has the unintended consequence of not achieving what we all want to achieve. His words of caution should be heeded.
As to Amendment 274 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Meston, we are rather hesitant in our support. Ensuring that a report goes straight to the local authority, which then has a duty to inform the police, might risk slowing down a response that is often needed quickly. Indeed, it might never reach the police. If a child is in imminent danger of being abused, it is not the local authority which should know first; it must be the police, who have to respond. There should be a simultaneous notification, because it can be, in effect, simultaneous.
With this amendment, it seems that someone who reported child abuse to the police would be criminalised for not going to the local authority. That cannot be right. Leaving it to the discretion of the individual which authority to report to, while requiring that there be a duty to do so, seems to us to be the right thing. People will know generally where to go but they must go to one or the other, and not automatically to the local authority first.
I think I have addressed the amendments from the noble Baronesses, Lady Featherstone and Lady Walmsley. These are all interesting points. The Government and those behind the Minister must look at this very carefully. It is really important to get the drafting right.
Amendments 283 and 286A seek to create and expand the specific crime of preventing or concealing reports of abuse. These are largely in line with the amendments addressed in the group in which we debated grooming gangs, so we support the intentions behind them.
As I have said, this is a group of amendments that have been tabled with the best of intentions. The issue in question should be entirely non-partisan; it is simply a question of how best to manage it and get it right, making certain that children and young people in this country are not allowed to suffer in the way in which they have for the last 30 years. I hope that the Minister will take away the points which are being made and, not least, add Wales to the list of jurisdictions. That is all I need to say at this stage tonight.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Meston, for moving the amendment on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, and to colleagues who have spoken this evening. This has been a valuable debate on Chapter 2, Part 5. As noble Lords will know, introducing a statutory duty delivers the intention of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse. I am confident that the measures we have brought forward strike the balance that we need.
A number of amendments have been tabled, and I am sorry that Amendment 271F, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, was not moved. However, it is important to put on record that the reason the duty relates to the Welsh Government is that they have declined to legislate for a mandatory reporting duty in their own response to the independent inquiry. Therefore, we are respecting the devolution settlement by not including that legislation in the Bill. It is a devolved matter which requires the consent of the Senedd.
There are a number of other amendments which I will try to speak to. We know that child sexual abuse continues to go unreported. The reasons for this are complex, including fear, stigma and lack of awareness. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester covered some of those points in relation to the performance of the Church of England.
The unique nature of child sexual abuse as a type of harm requires the introduction of this new duty. I want to be clear that the introduction of the new duty establishes a floor, not a ceiling, and does not change or interfere with in any way the existing expectations set by government that all children at risk of harm should be referred to the appropriate authority for guidance and advice.
I want to first touch on Amendments 274 and 276, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, which seek to require that reports under the duty are made to local authorities only, removing, with minor exceptions, the option to notify the police. Allowing reports to be made to either the local authority or the police, as recommended by the independent inquiry, ensures that reporters can act swiftly, so I cannot accept that amendment.
The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester and others, including the noble Baronesses, Lady Walmsley, Lady Grey-Thompson and Lady Featherstone, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, sought to introduce a criminal offence for those who conceal or fail to report abuse. The Government do not consider this type of sanction, which risks creating fear and apprehension among those with reporting responsibilities, to be proportionate or effectively targeted. That is why we are empowering reporters by focusing the criminal sanctions in this Bill on anyone who seeks to interfere with them carrying out their duty, rather than on the reporters themselves. This issue has been carefully considered by a number of agencies and has the support of, among others, the NSPCC, the Lucy Faithfull Foundation, Barnardo’s, the Centre of Expertise on Child Sexual Abuse and the Children’s Commissioner, so I cannot support the amendments.
The noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer, the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson—via the noble Lord, Lord Meston—the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and my noble friend Lord Murphy of Torfaen seek to extend the duty to a number of additional contexts. The purpose of the duty is to report and place a clear requirement on those most likely to encounter information relating to sexual abuse. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, and the right reverend Prelate that this does include members of the clergy. Proposals to extend the ambit of a reporting duty to those who do not personally come into contact with children would introduce another layer of procedural complexity.
Lord Meston (CB)
My Lords, it is now appropriate for me to beg leave to withdraw Amendment 272, reserving our right to return to it, and others not moved, after proper discussion with the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, when she has seen our debate—and read and marked my homework.
Crime and Policing Bill
Tuesday 9th December 2025
(5 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-V(a) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Fifth Marshalled List) - (8 Dec 2025)
Lord Davies of Gower
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes the ability of the court to dismiss an action in respect of personal injuries attributable to child sexual abuse on the grounds that the defendant would suffer substantial prejudice.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 289 is a probing amendment through which I am seeking the Government’s justification for the substantial prejudice provision in Clause 82. By way of background, Clause 82 removes the three-year limitation period for personal injury claims in cases relating to child sexual abuse. As such, it implements recommendation 15 of the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse chaired by Professor Jay. The inquiry found that most personal inquiry claims relating to child sexual abuse are not only modest in value, but in many cases do not result in compensation being paid. The reason for the high rate of failure is that a significant number of those claims are prevented from proceeding as a result of the limitation period on bringing forward a claim under the Limitation Act 1980. That Act permits the three-year period for claims resulting from sexual abuse as a child to begin from age 18, therefore expiring at 21, but many survivors do not feel comfortable with coming forward and telling people what happened until much later, never mind gathering the courage to bring a lawsuit against their abuser. The result is a lack of justice for those who have been abused as a child, and it is welcome, therefore, that the Government have decided to bring this forward.
However, there is possibly an issue with the drafting of Section 11ZB, which is inserted by this clause. It establishes the situations in which the court must dismiss an action for injury arising from child sexual abuse. It states that for all cases brought after the commencement of this clause, the court must dismiss the action if the defendant can prove that a fair hearing cannot take place. However, for any case that started before this new clause comes into force, the test for dismissal is set considerably lower because in this instance, the court must dismiss the claim if the defendant can prove that they would suffer substantial prejudice, and thus the proceedings are inequitable.
This goes further than was recommended by the Jay inquiry. Its report referred to
“the express protection of the right to a fair trial, with the burden falling on defendants to show that a fair trial is not possible”.
The only test the independent inquiry wanted was that the test of whether a fair trial can take place applied to all past and future cases. I know there is concern that the ability of the court to dismiss actions due to substantial prejudice placed on the defendant will create uncertainty for survivors of child sexual abuse and delay access to justice. This has the potential to undermine the purpose of the recommendation of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse and might not provide the certainty and support survivors deserve.
I reiterate that this is simply a probing amendment, and I would be grateful if the Minister could elaborate on why the Government have gone further than recommended by the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse. I beg to move.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I have an amendment in this group. I repeat a declaration of interest I made at Second Reading: that I have appeared as a barrister in a number of the leading cases about limitation of the law of tort. The purpose of limitation periods is to give a claimant a fair chance to decide whether to bring a claim, but also to place some sort of time limit on claims. Limitation periods vary according to the cause of action—for example, defamation claims have to be brought within one year. Personal injury claims have always been in a special category. The normal limit is three years or, in the case of a young person, three years after attaining the age of majority. But because some personal injuries manifest themselves only some time after they have been caused, particularly those relating to disease claims, the law has responded by postponing the starting date to reflect something called the “date of knowledge”.
What constituted knowledge was difficult to encapsulate in statute and gave rise to a lot of litigation, particularly in the context of what are generally known as historic claims for child sexual abuse. But these difficulties were largely overcome by Section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980, which gave the court a complete discretion to disapply the limitation period. Although the section gave various sensible guidelines as to matters to be taken into consideration, the discretion was expressed to be entirely unfettered.
One difficulty of the law remained. In claims for deliberate acts of assault, there was a finite six-year limitation period, rather than a three-year extendable limit for claims in negligence, so some claimants did not have the advantage of Section 33. This problem was overcome by the decision of A v Hoare in 2008— I was one of the unsuccessful defendants in that case—when the House of Lords decided that, whether the claim was in negligence or in assault, there was still a discretion to disapply the limitation period.
The only question that remained was whether it would ever be too late to bring a claim in the light of Section 33. Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, a much-missed Member of your Lordships’ House, made this observation:
“If a complaint has been made and recorded, and more obviously still if the accused has been convicted of the abuse complained of, that will be one thing; if, however, a complaint comes out of the blue with no apparent support for it (other perhaps than that the alleged abuser has been accused or even convicted of similar abuse in the past), that would be quite another thing. By no means everyone who brings a late claim for damages for sexual abuse, however genuine his complaint may in fact be, can reasonably expect the court to exercise the section 33 discretion in his favour. On the contrary, a fair trial (which must surely include a fair opportunity for the defendant to investigate the allegations …) is in many cases likely to be found quite simply impossible”.
That passage was in fact referred to in the conclusions of IICSA, which decided that the three-year period should be removed, but that there should be
“express protection of the right to a fair trial, with the burden falling on defendants to show a fair trial is not possible”.
The Government responded to IICSA’s report and did not support getting rid of limitations. The Government acknowledged the importance of Section 33 and made this point:
“A limitation period also encourages disputes to be resolved timeously thus promoting finality and certainty. Both are key cornerstones of the legal system. As such, the Government’s opening position, ahead of consultation, is that it does not support this option”.
Nor did they support a special limit for claims arising from sexual abuse. I remind the Committee that, in 2017, in the case of Carroll v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police, the Court of Appeal emphasised the unfettered nature of the Section 33 discretion.
My question to the Government at Second Reading was essentially this: what cases do they envisage would now be allowed to proceed which would not have done under the current law? I do not expect an immediate answer, but the Government have now had plenty of time to consider their response. There was a consultation following the Government’s response that I referred to, but it was not particularly large and did not contain consistent answers.
Changing the law of limitation is best an exercise following the careful balancing of respective interests, perhaps by the Law Commission. What appears to have happened here is that the Government, notwithstanding the initial view that I referred to, have decided to come up with some sort of compromise. In doing so, I fear they have produced in Clause 82 a real dog’s dinner of a provision.
Clause 82 is headed:
“Removal of limitation period in child sexual abuse cases”,
but it does not do that. It specifically provides that sexual abuse is in a separate category from, for example, physical abuse, although this was precisely what the Government did not want when they responded to the original recommendations. It contains a rather unclear provision that, when a dispute has been settled, it will no longer be subject to these new provisions. It probably does not include discontinued claims or claims settled otherwise than by way of a formal agreement.
New Section 11ZB contains some very unclear provisions as to the circumstances in which the court can dismiss an action, while at the same time containing in new subsection (2) the provision:
“The court must dismiss the action if the defendant satisfies the court that it is not possible for a fair hearing to take place”.
The interrelationship of new subsections (2) and (3) is incoherent and will inevitably result in litigation. The lack of clarity on what is and is not sexual abuse, and what is and is not settlement, will, I fear, also give rise to litigation.
I agree with the Opposition Front Bench’s probing amendment that we should get rid of new Section 11ZB(3), but that would leave a repetition of what the law is anyway and would not deal with the points about what constitutes sexual abuse or settlement via agreement. My conclusion is that there is absolutely nothing wrong with the law as it is. This rather messy compromise will give rise to unnecessary litigation and I am unsure it will provide remedies where remedies are not already available.
Sexual abuse, particularly of children, is abhorrent, and we now know there has been far more of it than was originally perceived. It is, however, important to point out that claims are not usually made against individual perpetrators; one can understand why there would not be much sympathy for a claim being brought, however late, against such a perpetrator. The usual defendant is, for example, a school, religious organisation, local authority or even central government. They may or may not have any knowledge of what happened but, because of the expanded doctrine of vicarious liability, will be deemed in law to be responsible for what occurred. They may or may not be covered by insurance.
As Lord Brown pointed out, there will come a time when it is quite simply inappropriate, many years later, for claims to be brought before the court. However sympathetic one is to the victims of sexual abuse, the law currently caters adequately for the balance between the interests of claimants and defendants. If we include Clause 82 in the Bill, I fear we will make bad law. The clause should not stand part.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I have signed Amendment 289. This is the first opportunity I have had to speak in Committee because of family illness, and it is good to be back.
In a previous group of amendments last week, the Committee heard the concerns of a number of Peers worried that the Government’s proposals might not ensure a fair route to reporting child sexual abuse. This amendment is just as important, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for tabling it. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, for his helpful exposition of the legal details. I come to this as a champion for victims, rather than from the legal perspective.
Despite the many concerns about those accused of child sexual abuse being able to escape from the accountability provided by the courts, the Bill, in Clause 82, lines 3 to 11, lays out a specific route for those accused who the courts “must”—a strong word; we note that it does not say “consider”—cease action against if the defendant in question claims
“there would be substantial prejudice to the defendant”
if the proceedings were to proceed. To put it bluntly, this is a gift to any defence lawyer. Much of the evidence heard by the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse was scenario after scenario where senior people—clergy, politicians, police officers, magistrates and so on—were able to cover up what had happened because they were in a position of power over the victim, and, quite often, over potential witnesses too.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I think we all welcome the concept of Clause 82, because it provides a significant step forward towards justice for survivors of child sexual abuse. By removing the limitation period, the provision acknowledges the unique barriers facing victims in coming forward after many years of abuse.
Let us be clear: we all agree that child sexual abuse is a crime marked by profound trauma, secrecy and manipulation. As the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, pointed out, survivors often require years, possibly decades, to process their experience and feel able to seek justice. The limitation periods, while serving certain legal purposes, have historically denied victims their day in court. The removal of this barrier is a recognition of the lasting impact of abuse and the difficulty in disclosing it. I therefore cannot understand this “get out of jail free” card to permit a defendant to avoid liability on the grounds of substantial prejudice. In my inexpert, non-legal opinion, it risks undermining the legislative intent and perpetuating injustice, and it would send a message contrary to the spirit of the clause.
While the possibility of prejudice to defendants—such as faded memories, lost evidence or deceased witnesses—is real, it must be weighed against the injustice suffered by survivors who have been unable to seek redress due to the limitation period. I think all noble Lords here of a legal bent would say that our courts are perfectly well equipped to assess evidence, account for gaps and determine credibility, even in historic cases. The link of prejudice can be mitigated through fair trial procedures and should not override the fundamental right of survivors to have their claims heard.
We as legislators must ensure that perpetrators of child abuse are held to account, regardless of the time elapsed. Dismissing claims on the basis of substantial prejudices would not only deny justice to individuals but would undermine public confidence in the legal system’s ability to deal with some of the most serious wrongs to our children that we have witnessed over the last 30 years. It would risk protecting abusers from scrutiny, contrary to the principles of transparency and accountability.
To conclude, courts must prioritise the rights of survivors and the public interest in accountability, ensuring that the defence does not become a loophole that perpetuates injustice. Therefore, I support the probing amendment in the name of my noble friends and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, on these Benches we recognise the purpose of time limits and we recognise the right to fair trial, but survivors of child sexual abuse should not be barred from justice simply by the passage of time. The difficulty lies, of course, in striking that balance. At the moment, too many claims with merit are rejected at the outset or, more often, not brought at all. Clause 82 is therefore welcome in principle, yet new Section 11ZB(3) then proceeds to undermine it, mandating dismissal if defendants can show “substantial prejudice”—a vague term undefined in the Bill, which, as my noble friend Lady Brinton said, may be appealing to defence lawyers. A court already has the power to dismiss a case if it believes that the defendant cannot receive a fair trial, so we find it difficult to understand the justification for this extra layer of protection. The inclusion of this provision risks effectively undoing all the good work of the clause. Amendment 289 would close that escape hatch, ensuring that it brings meaningful change. I urge the Government to reconsider in the light of this amendment.
Lord Pannick (CB)
I add my voice to what has been said by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. The fundamental principle is set out in new Section 11ZB(2): if the defendant cannot have a fair trial, the hearing cannot proceed. The gravity of the allegations and the public interest demand that there be no hearing, notwithstanding the damage that this causes to the unfortunate alleged victim. I entirely agree that new Section 11ZB(3) confuses the position; it introduces uncertain concepts and will inevitably lead to unhelpful litigation.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, before I speak to Amendment 289, I thank my noble friend Lady Royall, who is not in her place today because she is ill, and Mr Stephen Bernard, both of whom met me recently. We discussed both the impact of the limitation period on victims and survivors of child sexual abuse and their concern over the test of substantial prejudice within this clause. I was moved by what Mr Bernard told me and I thank him for his courage in telling me about what happened to him.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for moving Amendment 289. I hope both my noble friend Lady Royall and the noble Lord will be reassured that I fully understand the sentiment behind the amendment. I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Doocey, and the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Blencathra, for welcoming the general spirit of the clause and for their constructive comments. I make it clear that we absolutely do not want to add additional or unnecessary barriers to stop victims of child sexual abuse from proceeding with their civil claims. So I have asked my officials to look closely at the issues this amendment raises for further consideration, and I aim to provide a further update to your Lordships on Report.
Turning to the opposition of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, to Clause 82 standing part of the Bill, I think he is well known for being very expert in this area and I pay tribute to that. But Clause 82 implements important recommendations made by the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse. The noble Lord raised concerns during Second Reading and again during this debate that the reform is unnecessary and would lead to greater uncertainty and litigation, but, with respect, I disagree. The inquiry looked at this in great detail. It found that the limitation period for civil claims itself acted as a deterrent to victims and survivors—just the very fact that it existed. The inquiry also found that it acted as a deterrent irrespective of the existence of the discretion in Section 33, and the inquiry therefore found that Section 33 did not provide sufficient protection for victims and survivors.
The inquiry found that the regime acted as a barrier to claimants at three stages: first, solicitors’ willingness to take on claims, because it can make it really hard for them to find a lawyer to represent them; secondly, the settlement and valuation of claims, because it can lead to victims accepting lower settlements because of uncertainty about the limitation issue; and, thirdly, the hearings themselves in relation to the limitation period, the effect of which on the claimants was described as “intrusive and traumatic”.
I think the noble Lord will find that it was not this Government who said they were not in favour of these recommendations; it was actually the previous Government. This Government accepted the recommendation in February of this year and are satisfied that Clause 82 is necessary and proportionate. The courts are perfectly capable, as the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, said, of deciding when a claim is inappropriate or unfair and should not succeed. This Government and my department put victims at the heart of everything we do. This is why we believe that this reform is necessary and important for victims and survivors. On that basis, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Davies, to withdraw his amendment and I hope the Committee will join me in supporting Clause 82.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)
The noble Baroness is quite right that the response to IICSA came from the previous Government. It was written by the Ministry of Justice and signed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy. While not in any way undermining his contribution to whatever was produced, I suspect that it was the work of government lawyers, approved by him. It was a careful study of the law by reference to, for example, the operation of Section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980. IICSA was not a Law Commission or law reform body, and it covered a huge area of inquisition. It had to cover so many areas that many people doubted whether it had any utility. I am not suggesting that, but it was not primarily concerned with civil claims as such. What I would like to ask the noble Baroness is this: Section 33 has been in operation since 1980. I can tell her, and I am sure she will accept from me, that it is used a great deal by many claimants represented by firms of solicitors. Very often, limitation is not even considered, because as she quite rightly says, very often somebody will delay a considerable time before bringing a claim, and quite rightly so. But why, I ask, is she satisfied, given the wideness of the discretion, that Section 33 does not work as it is?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, it is no answer to say that another Government considered it carefully: different Governments have different priorities. I am not sure that that is going to come as a great surprise to the noble Lord. As for Section 33, this Government are satisfied that it does not provide sufficient protection.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I shall be very brief in my response. As I say, this was a probing amendment, and I am grateful to those noble Lords who have contributed to this short debate. I thank the Minister for her clarification. I am content with the Government’s assurances, and I therefore beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Bertin
“Amendment of Protection of Children Act 1978(1) The Protection of Children Act 1978 is amended as follows.(2) In section 1(1)(a) (indecent photographs of children) after “child” insert “or a person who appears to be or is implied to be a child”.(3) After section 1 insert—“1ZA Offence of encouragement to sexual activity with a child or family member(1) It is an offence to produce or distribute any written material, visual representation or audio recording that glorifies, advocates or counsels sexual activity that would be an offence under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 either with—(a) a person under the age of eighteen years, or(b) a family member, where “family member” has the meaning set out in section 27 (family relationships) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.(2) After section 7(9) (interpretation) insert—“(10) When determining under section 1 whether an indecent photograph or pseudo-photograph is of a person who appears to be or is implied to be a child, reference may be had to—(a) how the image is or was described (whether the description is part of the image itself or otherwise);(b) any sounds accompanying the image;(c) where the image forms an integral part of a narrative constituted by a series of images—(i) any sounds accompanying the series of images;(ii) the context provided by that narrative;(d) the overall context in which the image appears, including but not limited to, the setting, the conduct and appearance of the depicted person or persons, and any other relevant factors.”.”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes a series of amendments to the Protection of Children Act 1978 to extend the offence of making an indecent photograph of a child to cases where the child depicted is an adult and creation of a new offence of producing or sharing content that advocates and celebrates child sexual abuse including text shared on internet forums and pornography websites.
Baroness Bertin (Con)
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 291, 292, 298 and 314 in my name and supported by my friends the noble Baronesses, Lady Kennedy, Lady Kidron and Lady Benjamin, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. These amendments have the support of many charities, including Barnardo’s, the Internet Watch Foundation, End Violence Against Women and Girls and the Lucy Faithfull Foundation, as well as, very importantly, the Children’s Commissioner.
The central mission of this group of amendments is to close the gap between the law governing offline and online pornography and to bring long overdue scrutiny to an industry that has operated with impunity for far too long. The review I led for the Government showed me corners of this world that you simply cannot unsee. Online pornography is now so extreme and pervasive that it does not just reflect sexual tastes; it shapes them. It normalises violence, distorts intimacy, grooms men and boys to perpetrate sexual violence and has driven child sexual abuse as well as child-on-child sexual abuse. Content titles regularly use words such as “brutal”, “attack”, “kidnap” and “torture”. Incest is fast becoming the most frequent form of this violence.
With 40% of young women reporting being strangled during sex, the link between online violence and offline harm is undeniable. According to the Children’s Commissioner, a 13 year-old boy is likely to have viewed incest, rape and strangulation porn before his first kiss. Adding to this, sexual dysfunction is rising among young men, who find real intimacy less stimulating than online extremes. Many now speak of addiction that has ruined their lives and prevents them forming real, lasting relationships.
Baroness Benjamin (LD)
My Lords, I have put my name to Amendments 290, 291 and 314. I also support Amendments 292 and 298 in this group, all in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, whom I hold in high esteem.
Before I set out some remarks in support of these amendments, it is difficult to comprehend why we are back here again in this House, eight years after debating the issue raised in the amendments in this group by me and other noble Lords. It feels like déjà vu.
However, there is one crucial difference: we now have the insight and recommendations of the comprehensive review of pornography regulations which I was promised by the previous Government and which has been undertaken by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. I commend the noble Baroness for her review, which sets out clearly why these amendments are needed.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
My Lords, it is a privilege to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin. I share much of her frustration about us being here discussing this again and hearing that litany of powerful images—that I would rather unhear—from the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. I do not propose to add to them, except to say that what the noble Baroness has said on the record, in Hansard, is not an exaggeration or cherry-picking; it is normal, and the House must consider whether that is the “normal” we would like to live in.
I have been proud to add my name to the noble Baroness’s amendments. I commend her on her work on the pornography review, which I know was an enormous effort and, as I understand it, quite a catastrophic personal experience. I also want to take the opportunity to commend the Government on recognising the issue of strangulation. I know we will come to it, but I wanted to mention it in this group, because it is this relationship between what happens online and how that then impacts offline that we have to concentrate on. A few weeks ago, I was with a group of very senior medical professionals, and one consultant radiologist talked about how post-mortem guidance is being changed to check for strangulation as a cause of death among young women. That is chilling. The entire room was chilled. It is an indictment of how prevalent and serious the consequences of violent pornography are. We must not hide behind thinking this is happening in another space; this is the space in which people are now living.
On the same theme, some time ago I was contacted by a lawyer who told me that she dreaded freshers’ week. Each year, an increasingly long line of barely adult young men would come through her door facing charges of acts of sexual violence which mimicked behaviour they had seen online. A wealth of talented young women are now traumatised at a crucial point in their life, and a litany of young men, probably equally talented, are now sex offenders. These lives are being ruined.
The amendments tabled by the noble Baroness are sensible—I believe that was the word the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, used. I do not know whether they are radical; I hope they are, and I hope they solve the problem, but they are sensible solutions. They seek to close the gaps, and have taken learnings from other jurisdictions, which is crucial. The whole world is tackling this, and we must learn from what other people understand. We do not need to make it all up ourselves. “Not made here” is about the worst thing that we keep on seeing in politics, particularly in the online sphere.
I support all the amendments in this group, and I wanted briefly to mention just two of them. First, Amendment 298 would prohibit ownership of software which we often call “nudification” apps. A Teacher Tapp survey last week found that one in 10 teachers were aware of pupils creating “deepfake, sexually explicit videos”, and the safeguarding lead who was quoted warned that deepfakes and nudifiers
“feel like the next train coming down the track”.
I know a lot of safeguarding staff, and this is what they are saying. Can we, as a Parliament and as a House, be ahead of the train coming down the track rather than waiting for it to come and ruin our schools?
The Children’s Commissioner points out in her briefing, which supports these amendments wholeheartedly, that nudification technology is harming girls. Even if they have not been directly targeted by the tools, girls report withdrawing from the online world—for example, not posting pictures of their full faces to reduce the chances of their being transplanted on to a naked body. Can we not, as a House, stand up for women in the public sphere? This is not okay. It is so regressive to look at a technology that silences young girls’ participation in this new world.
Rightly, this amendment does not create an offence for under-18s, so I have another request of the Government: that they accept the amendment but also commit to adopting a broader strategy to tackle the deepfake crisis in schools before it is too late.
Last week, we had a debate in which the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, said that this issue sits with DSIT and not the Home Office. My understanding is that the issue I am addressing could sit with DSIT and the DfE. However, the Government as a whole have a commitment to children, and as a whole they have committed to halving violence against women and girls. I will do a shout-out here and say that men do experience violence, but it is primarily experienced by women and girls. So, unless the Government start to act more swiftly on our concerns about technology-facilitated sexual abuse, they will be failing in both their responsibility to children and their commitment to women and girls.
Amendment 314 seeks to create parity between laws that regulate pornography online and offline. It is a perennial cause of harm that the tech sector lacks accountability. This lack of accountability, the lack of parity, seen through the lens of pornography, is the very definition of tech exceptionalism. The laws that apply to the rest of our lives in society do not apply in the technological sphere, protected by tens of millions of lobbying dollars. This is at the heart of the problem that we are discussing. Pornography has been a major engine of the tech sector. It is worth billions of dollars, responsible for millions of downloads and a significant driver of online traffic.
Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)
My Lords, when I became a practitioner at the Bar as a young woman in the late 1970s, freedom of expression was regularly used as the excuse to justify sometimes horrific porn. When there were discussions about this among lawyers, it was almost invariably said that women were being prudish and did not understand that erotica—that was always the word used, rather than pornography—was rather benign and had no effect on behaviour.
It has taken decades for that viewpoint to be challenged and research to be done to show the links between behaviours and exposure to extreme pornography—not that it has to be that extreme. Young women at the Bar tell me now that almost invariably when the computers of people who are brought to court for allegations of rape and sexual violations of all kinds are examined, they are full of pornography. The link between pornography and serious violation of women is now well established.
It is not about benign erotica. We are talking about the ways in which we have added to the menu of possibilities, often giving guidance to young men on how to perform sexually—in a way that does not involve any kind of tenderness and intimacy but is about objectifying women’s bodies and dealing with them in ways that are abusive, not hearing resistance or “no”, and never finding out whether something is acceptable.
The last time I wrote a book about the law was very interesting. This was 2018, and it was then republished a few years later after the Harvey Weinstein scandal. The book was being put on to audio, as nowadays happens, and I was doing the reading myself. A young woman was the technician in the sound lab where this was being done. There was a piece of the book about pornography, the way in which it was impacting on sexual offending and the serious influence that it brings to bear on the behaviour of many of the men who were coming before the courts.
She said to me, “I watch pornography every single day”, and I asked why. She said, “Because I wanted to know how to do sex—I wanted to know how it was done—but I’ve now become addicted to it”. It had replaced for her the possibility of having real sexual relationships. It was her confiding, in a sort of confessional box way, and saying, “What can I do about it to change my life? I find that it’s the only thing that can give me relief”. It was quite a shock to me as someone who thinks they know most things that happen under the human condition’s spread of behaviours. Here was this young woman, probably only about 18, describing how she was now addicted and how she had come to do it because boys felt that she was no good when it came to sexual behaviour.
I just want to say why I readily support the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, to whom I pay tribute. Over the years I have been exposed to pornography because it was part of the evidence in cases that I was doing. In war crimes, increasingly, there is on the phones of young soldiers all across the world a high level of pornography, and it leads to really vile and terrible abuses of women in conflict. For looking at the stuff that she has had to look at and the experience that she has had to bear, I really feel that we owe the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. People do not realise the toll that can take on somebody.
I was in chambers with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and the famous writer Sir John Mortimer, who wrote the Rumpole series. John Mortimer was a great believer in freedom of expression, and he had done a number of cases around literature and freedom of expression in rather explicit novels. He then was pursued by the porn industry and offered great sums of money if he would act in porn cases, which on occasions he did. He said he used to take his glasses off because it was the only way he could live with looking at the stuff he was having to watch.
We were all offered the opportunity of inheriting his porn practice when he left the Bar, and I have to tell noble Lords that none of us was very interested in doing it because of the toll it takes on the human imagination. You want a mind that is not contaminated by this stuff in your expressions of love and intimacy, and men at the Bar who are doing this stuff say that there are times when they cannot dismiss it. We have to learn from the reality of this. This is poison; it poisons our children, and it is probably poisoning many of the menfolk who sit in this House. We have to find ways of dealing with it—it is going to be difficult.
I have supported the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, including the one on the mimicking of children. I can tell noble Lords very clearly that that is a real problem that we have currently. There is the business of depicting incest and the poison that it brings into households and so on. We discussed it only last week, and it disturbed so many people when the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, described bots now doing that and the seeming inability to prosecute because it is not a human who is at the other end of it. Then there is business of not verifying age adequately. These are serious problems that we have.
One of the things that is inhibiting the response of jurisdictions, and I think ours might be one of them, is that we are concerned not to lose the confidence of the tech bros who are the billionaires making so much money out of many of the ways in which new technology exploits this and makes an incredible amount of money out of it.
One of the great Trumpian boasts is that our world should not be inhibited by regulation, but there are some areas where we need regulation and this is most definitely one of them. All of us need to come together and not feel that we should be obeisant to the American way.
I urge the Government, as sometimes happens with Governments of all complexions, not to make this an example of resistance to amendments that have been promoted largely by the other side. The noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, has the support of women from around this Committee and from men. I ask the Government please to listen to these submissions; they are made because of the real detriment to our society and quality of life that is created by virtue of this stuff.
Not very long ago, I did a report for Scotland on sexual harassment in the street and the public square. It was very clear that disinhibition online leads to disinhibition in other places and in the public square. It is why young women out for an evening are suddenly abused by men coming out of pubs, asking to have sex with them and talking about the size of their breasts or their behinds, and speaking to women in the most revolting way. The women were saying, “I go home feeling degraded. I feel that I do not have the equality and dignity that are promised to me in this new world in which we like to imagine that men and women will be treated as well as each other”.
I urge the Committee to go with Amendment 314 on the parity of pornography online and offline, because we have to start regulating this stuff. If we do not do it soon, we will pay an incredible price.
Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)
My Lords, I heartily support Amendment 314 and the others in this group. It is shocking that there is a disparity in the ways that online pornography and offline pornography are regulated. It rather makes a mockery of regulation in the offline sector, since anyone can circumvent it by watching material online that is banned offline.
As we have heard, material that is prohibited offline is prolific online. This includes content that depicts and/or promotes child sexual abuse, incest and harmful sexual acts such as sexual strangulation. The fact that the existing offline system of regulation has not been applied to the online world is a symptom of legislation not keeping pace with technological advances in the online world. Now is a golden opportunity to put that right.
Mainstream pornography sites host a vast amount of harmful content. Not only is that an inducement to participate in serious criminal activity but young people—boys and young men in particular—who access it are growing up with a totally warped view of what constitutes a normal, loving relationship. This surely risks seriously damaging their prospects of forming long and meaningful relationships in the future. We owe it to our younger generation to put this right and protect them from this horrific material.
Why on earth is access to such material not regulated effectively when exactly the same content offline is? It shows a naivety about the content and extent of damaging online material and the ease with which young and easily influenced minds can access it. It is shameful that there is no effective regulation of the age at which such material can be accessed. It needs to be put right urgently, and I urge the Government to seize this opportunity and accept Amendments 292 and 314 and the others in this group. Is there anything that we debate in this Chamber that is more important than protecting our children?
Baroness Boycott (CB)
My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group, so well put forward by the noble Baronesses, Lady Bertin, Lady Kidron, Lady Kennedy and Lady Benjamin, but I particularly want to say a few words about Amendment 298 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin.
I have been really alarmed by this. I was first alerted by my friend Laura Bates talking in her book about the “nudify” apps and how young children can be when they can get targeted—as young as eight or nine—and how this can happen to them in school, where they can be completely unaware and, suddenly, there is a picture of them naked circulating around, and a lot of girls want to drop out of school because of it.
It is not an accident that this is happening. It is driven by money, commerce and capitalism. It is not in any way inevitable that it happens. Something that is made by man—probably by a man, in this case, but maybe by a woman—can certainly be put right by government and by all of us. It is the result of a design choice, a market choice and a policy choice, and we can change it.
These apps are designed to strip girls’ photos and create sexualised images of them, often in seconds. They are incredibly easy to use, quite terrifyingly. I challenge anyone in this House who has not done it just to type in, “Can I have a nudify app?” You will get it in a minute. My great niece, who I work with, did it to herself, and the super weird thing about it is that it does not give you the body of Claudia Schiffer or Kate Moss or something that you are obviously not; it gives you the kind of body that you have.
The reality of it is very stark and horrible. Girls are harassed, threatened, coerced and manipulated before they even really understand what is happening. There is one major app that produces 200,000 fake nude images every day, and we are on track for 8 million of these deepfake images every year. They are an entire industry, which is functioning somewhere, taking money and doing this to our children. The police cannot act until after the harm has occurred, and schools cannot act pre-emptively. The platforms claim that they are not responsible because this is a tool, and it is not them. It is passing off the responsibility. They exist just to facilitate sexual abuse—for which, at the moment, very few people have to pay a price.
I would also like to speak about something that has happened but has not been mentioned very much in this debate. I am an ambassador and patron of a group called The Vavengers, which seeks to stop vaginal mutilation. The person who runs it is Turkish, and she has noticed now that the primary form of cosmetic surgery in Turkey is young women—though not all of them young—going there to have their vaginas reconstructed to look like the vaginas that you see in pornography, which look like those of 13 year-old girls. They are going to Turkey to have their labia cut off. Sema, who is the child of a slave and an extraordinary woman, says you can always tell when you are on the return plane from Istanbul because there are a lot of young women fidgeting because they are in pain. It seems to me that this is an extension of the world that we have arrived in and allowed to happen. It is shocking.
My granddaughter is three. I look at her and think that, in four or five years’ time, she could be the victim of this. As those in this House know, I got into this 55 years ago. If anyone had told me then that the day would come when I would have to ask for someone not to be able to have an app that would take my granddaughter’s clothes off and make her a neurotic, unhappy young woman because she is sexually not like the things she sees in pornography, and with my grandson, who is also three, going through the kind of things that I think young men do, I would say that we should be damned ashamed of ourselves. All of us women in this House, of different ages, have fought long and hard through the years to get where we are, and we and this Government owe it back to the next generation of children. I am very grateful to all the younger women such as the noble Baronesses, Lady Bertin and Lady Owen, for the work they have done. I can only say that I wish that I was not on this journey with them and that it did not exist.
Baroness Shawcross-Wolfson (Con)
My Lords, I too support my noble friend Lady Bertin’s amendments and I will particularly talk about Amendment 314. There is no debate about whether certain pornography is harmful. Parliament settled that question decades ago. There is no debate about whether it is right for our Parliament to ban harmful pornography. We already do. We are merely debating whether we have the determination to apply our existing laws to the latest distribution channels.
In the early 1980s, we saw a dramatic increase in video cassette recorders in the home and the subsequent emergence of video nasties. In that era, Parliament was quick to catch up to the latest technological innovation and, as we have heard, the Video Recordings Act 1984 was passed with cross-party support. As a result, pornography released on physical formats is and has always been strictly regulated in the UK. In 2003, Parliament extended those protections through the Communications Act to ensure that UK-based video-on-demand services, including those that specialised in pornography, could not distribute content that the British Board of Film Classification would refuse to classify. Amendment 314 simply takes the definition of harmful content in the Communications Act 2003 and seeks to apply it to online pornography, with a proper framework for enforcement. Some 41 years ago, we said that harmful content could not be distributed on video cassettes, 22 years ago we said it could not be distributed through video-on-demand services, and now it is time to close the gap in the law which allows it to be legally distributed on the internet.
Amendments 291 and 290 would ensure that incest material and depictions of child sexual abuse in online pornography are made illegal. My noble friend Lady Bertin and others have already outlined the immense damage that this content does. I welcome the Government’s commitment to end the depiction of strangulation in online pornography, not least because it demonstrates their conviction that such material can be banned. All it requires is political will. I hope that the Committee will find that same political will to make pornography that mimics child sex abuse or portrays incest illegal.
I support Amendment 292, which would introduce a statutory duty for platforms to verify the age and consent of individuals who feature in pornography. It is the bare minimum we need to start tackling the rampant exploitation in the porn industry.
I conclude by returning to my starting point. In previous generations, when the technology advanced, from cinema to video and from video to streaming, Parliament acted. Today is no different. We have acted because, as the sponsor of the Video Recordings Act said 40 years ago, incredibly presciently:
“Producers and suppliers of this base and debasing material have only one aim—to supply the worst elements of human nature for profit”.—[Official Report, Commons, 11/11/1983; col. 522.]
We have acted because we have long known that violent porn—the type of pornography that depicts acts that are illegal in real life—is damaging. At no point have we as a Parliament or a society proactively debated and agreed to accept the type of abusive pornography that is now mainstream and widespread on the internet. No Minister from any Government has stood at the Dispatch Box and argued that the public have a right to watch scenes depicting incest or child sex abuse—I doubt any Minister would. No Minister has made the case that this material is harmless, and no Minister could, given the evidence we have heard today. We allow this material to proliferate not because we think it is harmless, not because we think it is a matter of free speech, but because we think it is hard to stop. It is hard, but I am hopeful. Today, we have a regulator which is beginning to make great strides in tackling illegal material online. We have a regulator with 40 years’ experience of video classification, and we have a Government who, to echo the words of the Minister, are profoundly committed to halving violence against women and girls. Today, we have an opportunity to close this unconscionable gap in the law. I very much hope that we will do so.
Viscount Colville of Culross (CB)
I too support all the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, but I shall speak particularly to Amendment 298.
As other noble Lords have pointed out, these nudification apps are horrific and bring untold harm to the women and men who are victims of them. They are so prevalent in schools that they are effectively normalised, shocking and shaming thousands of children on a daily basis, as my noble friend Lady Boycott has just pointed out. This week, Ofcom fined the app Nudify for failing to implement the mandatory age-verification measures under the OSA. Amendment 298, if accepted, would increase the pressure on Ofcom and the Government to close down all nudification apps, for children and adults alike.
As with the AI companion amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Kidron, which was debated last week, this is yet another new technology that was not foreseen in the Online Safety Act. Despite your Lordships’ best efforts to future-proof protections for users, new functionalities and technologies will always be created that will need your Lordships’ attention. Nudification apps are just the latest in what will be a long line of new tech harms.
The problem is that, at the moment, there is a voluntary agreement for the big app stores not to sell nudification apps, but they are still being downloaded and are freely available on smaller app stores. Unfortunately, I do not believe voluntary protections by the tech companies work. Your Lordships have to look only at the Bletchley summit agreement in which tech companies signed up voluntarily to publishing the safety testing of new AI models prior to their release. Unfortunately, this has not happened in many instances, and in some egregious cases there is a failure to comply with this commitment.
Some AI models appear to have mundane uses but can subsequently be adapted for the purpose of nudification. These need to be safety tested to ensure that they cannot create harms—in this case, nudification—and, as has just been explained, the present voluntary agreement is not creating adequate protection. This amendment would go a long way to remedy this lacuna in the law and make the digital space safer for millions of people. I hope that it will be the first step in the Government bringing forward far-reaching AI safety legislation. I hope that the Minister listens to the voices from across the Committee and responds favourably to the proposal in the amendment for the creation of an offence of possession of nudification software.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, I support all these amendments for the reasons which have been given, and do not propose therefore to go through them. I want to give one extreme example of what happens when people watch a pornographic film and go on and carry out what the film did. I happen to have dealt with the case of one of the Bulger killers. I was told that they had watched a pornographic film belonging to the father of one of the two boys and then went out immediately and did exactly what the film did. That is why they killed the Bulger child. They followed the pornographic film. It did not, of course, stop them being convicted of murder. If that can happen to 10 year-olds then a large number of people are absolutely vulnerable to doing exactly what they watch. That is yet another reason why we should support these amendments. We have on the Front Bench, among the Ministers, those who are really caring. I hope, therefore, that they will not only listen to us but do something.
Baroness Berger (Lab)
My Lords, it is a privilege to follow the noble Baronesses, Lady Bertin, Lady Kidron, Lady Benjamin, Lady Kennedy, Lady Boycott and Lady Shawcross-Wolfson, the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, all of whom who have made significant contributions. I do not wish to reiterate what has been said too much, but I want to speak today in support of Amendments 290, 291, 292, 298 and 314 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, concerning sexualising children, pornography that mimics abuse and nudification. I put on record my thanks to the noble Baroness for her important and vital work in this area, and recognise the toll it must have taken.
The consumption of violent pornography is having a devastating effect on adults and on the children being exposed to it. We have heard the research from the Children’s Commissioner that indicates the average age at which children in the UK first see pornography to be around 13, but a substantial minority are encountering it significantly earlier, including in our primary schools. I should declare an interest: I have two primary-aged children. I have a daughter who is eight and a son who is six, and I am terrified at the prospect of either of them being exposed to this type of material. We know that this material is having an adverse effect on the physical, sexual and mental health of hundreds of thousands of people in our country. I want to touch on a couple of particularly concerning areas: pornography that mimics abuse and nudification.
We know that, for too long, companies hosting pornographic content have been allowed to host whatever material they like online, regardless of its harm. I echo some of the comments that have been made; it is extraordinary that we have a situation where it is not allowed offline, but it is allowed online and anyone can reach it from the phone that they hold in their pocket.
Amendment 290 would make it an offence to glorify or advocate for child sexual abuse. I do not know how anyone can question the aims of that amendment; it is critical. We heard about this on the previous day in Committee. It is both repulsive and shameful, but it is worth reiterating, that the UK is the third-largest consumer of child sexual abuse videos that are streamed from the Philippines. We rightly have laws on hate speech in this country. We must equally have laws that deal with this type of heinous advocation of child sexual abuse. This is not something over there; it is happening every single day in our country, and we have to take responsibility for it.
Baroness Sugg (Con)
My Lords, like everyone else, I am in favour of all the amendments in this group. The noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, set out very powerfully and alarmingly the reality of what is happening online. I do not think that I need to go through all the amendments in detail—other noble Lords have done that very well—but I was very struck by what the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, said about asking ourselves if this is the normal that we want to live in.
Do we want to allow content that makes child abuse appear acceptable? Surely not. Do we want to see websites trivialise and, indeed, promote incest as some form of entertainment? Surely not. Should we allow tools that enable the nudification of images, which are overwhelmingly used to target women and girls, and which, as we have heard, are being used in schools? Surely not. Instead, do we want to ensure that age and consent are clearly verified, and that consent can be withdrawn at any time? Yes, we do. Do we want to see a parity between what is prohibited offline and what is prohibited online? Surely yes.
That is what this group sets out to do. I hope that the Minister will accept all the amendments in this group to ensure that we have a new normal that we all want to see.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I too support these amendments. I will make two points that are additional to the powerful factors that have been addressed so far. First, I am very concerned to hear from the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, that the Government have not yet responded in full to her review. Can the Minister tell us why that is, given the importance of the subject, and when there will be a full response?
Secondly, although I support the objective of Amendment 314 to apply the same principles to material online as to material offline, I am very doubtful that the way the amendment seeks to achieve this is sensible. The amendment seeks to incorporate into the Bill the definition of “harmful material” found in Section 368E(3)(a) and Section 368E(3)(b) of the Communications Act 2003. However, those provisions refer simply to the decisions and criteria of the British Board of Film Classification without specifying the criteria applied by that body. The criteria that that body applies, as set out in its guidelines, are helpful, but they are not categorical. For example, the guidelines say:
“Exceptions are most likely in the following areas”,
and the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, helpfully set out the factors that they have regard to.
This is perfectly appropriate in the context of the BBFC, from whose decisions appeals are possible, because the context is the licensing of an R18 video, which, of course, can only be sold in a licensed sex shop. However, we are concerned here with criminal law, which needs to be defined with precision so that people know exactly what cannot be published online. Therefore, we need a revised Amendment 314, which I hope the Government will accept in principle, to set out in specific terms what Parliament is prohibiting online, such as material that depicts conduct in breach of the criminal law and material that depicts or appears to suggest non-consensual sexual conduct. There may well be other categories; let us set them out so that everybody knows what is prohibited online.
Lord Nash (Con)
My Lords, I support the amendments in this group. It is shameful that we have not yet legislated for parity between the regulation of online and offline pornography and that we are so very late in playing catch-up. What people can view online at a couple of clicks—including children often diverted to this sort of stuff without asking for it—is horrifying. As the report of the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, stated, over half of 11 to 13 year-olds have seen pornography, often accidentally, and many have seen appalling images of choking, strangulation or sex where one partner is asleep, which is of course a non-consensual act—rape.
Therapists and front-line practitioners often describe a growing number of clients stating that porn consumption led them to child sexual abuse material. In the late 1980s, the Home Office commissioned a study that showed that fewer than 10,000 child sexual abuse images were available online. Today, it is conservatively estimated that, worldwide, the number of child sexual abuse images is 70 million to 80 million.
The internet has become a place where you can search for and find absolutely anything. If you cannot find it, you can create it yourself using AI and LLMs that are on the market, with no guard-rails. For example, generative AI can be and has been used to create pictures of someone’s older self abusing their younger self, including, in one series of images, that self as an eight year-old abusing themself as a two year-old. This is not a problem of the dark web; this is available easily, at a few clicks, on popular social media sites. One social media site alone hosts and facilitates by far the greatest number of cases of sextortion and, in a number of cases, this has led to young people taking their own lives.
Bad actors are also exploiting generative AI to sexually extort. Com groups are driving abuse and exploitation behaviours that are unimaginable, including cutting competitions where the winner is the person who cuts the deepest. Other com groups are used by adults—bad actors—to groom the most vulnerable children and control them to engage in the most horrifying acts, including suicide. One survivor described watching multiple suicides in one group.
Children are using social media to create their own payment models for live sex shows, like the one the recent TV series “Wild Cherry” showed, but much worse. More than half of the 107,000 child sexual abuse and exploitation cases recorded in 2022—a figure that has quadrupled in the last 10 years—were committed by children. Pornography has to play a large part in this. The amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, have the support of the NSPCC, the Children’s Commissioner and many other organisations. We must listen to them. It would be completely morally irresponsible for us, as guardians of children, not to enact now.
In the last Committee session, the Minister promised me a meeting with the appropriate person and officials to talk about my amendment to allow new technology that is now available to block out child sexual abuse material. He indicated that officials were unsure whether this technology works. Since then, I have met with the providers of this technology again and they have assured me that it does work, certainly for young children, and that they are in active dialogue at a senior level with the head of the technical solutions team at the Home Office, DSIT, the Internet Watch Foundation, the NCA and GCHQ. I very much look forward to that meeting.
I should say that, although I do not think this will happen—I am fully aware of the rules—I have committed to a radio interview, so it is just possible that I may not be here to the end. I think I will be, but I apologise if I am not.
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
My Lords, I pay tribute to my noble friend Lady Bertin for her hard work and her review. I fully support all her amendments, but will focus my remarks on a couple of them. I declare my interest as a guest of Google at its Future Forum, an AI policy conference, and my interest as receiving pro bono legal advice from Mishcon de Reya on my work on intimate image abuse.
On Amendment 292, it is vital that we always remember that consent is a live process, and our law should protect those who have featured in pornographic content and wish to withdraw their consent, no matter how long after publication. One content creator said, “A lot of the videos, I have no rights under; otherwise, I would probably have deleted them all by now”, and went on to describe it as a stigma that will follow her for the rest of her life. Given the huge scale of the porn industry, it is vital that our law protects those who feature and offers them recourse to remove their content should they wish to.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, we have heard some very powerful and emotional speeches, and I very much hope that, having seen the unanimous support all around the Committee, the Minister will respond positively today. I wholeheartedly support the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin; I would have added my name to all of them, had there been space on the Order Paper.
This has been quite a dark debate, but as we heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, these are the direct, evidence-based conclusions of her independent pornography review. I very much welcome the questions the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, asked about the lack of a response to the Creating a Safer World review. It analysed 132,000 videos and clearly established an unambiguous link between the consumption of extreme pornography and violence against women and girls, both online and offline. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, said, it is poison; as the noble Baronesses, Lady Kidron and Lady Boycott, said, it is motivated by money; and as the noble Baroness, Lady Shawcross-Wolfson, said, it is the worst end of human nature for profit.
As we have heard today from all around the Committee, we are extremely mindful of the emotional impact on young women and girls in particular. I acknowledge that, in their later Amendments 294 and 295, the Government have made some progress on the possession and publication of pornographic images portraying strangulation and suffocation. The review by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, found that such content is rife on mainstream platforms and has normalised life-threatening violence, to the extent that 58% of young people have seen it, so I welcome the Government’s moves to close that specific gap.
However, while the Government have addressed the issue of strangulation, these amendments address the remaining glaring legislative gaps identified by the review. We cannot shut the door on one form of extreme violence, while leaving the windows wide open for others.
Amendment 314 seeks to establish a fundamental principle: parity between the online and offline worlds, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, and others, have explained. Since 1984, we have prohibited content offline that the British Board of Film Classification would refuse to classify, such as material promoting non-consensual acts or sexual violence. Again, like the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I hope that, given the extremely effective way the BBFC has carried out its duties, we will not find it too difficult to find a way of sharpening that amendment to make sure that there is a very clear definition of the kind of content online that is equivalent to that offline, which we are seeking to regulate.
Amendments 290 and 291 address content that mimics child sexual abuse and incest. The noble Baroness’s review highlighted that “teen” is one of the most frequently searched terms, often leading to videos featuring performers styled with props, such as lollipops and school uniforms, to look underage. Experts working with sex offenders have made it clear that viewing this type of violent or age-play pornography is a key risk factor. Men who offend against children are 11 times more likely to watch violent pornography than those who do not. By allowing this content to proliferate, we are effectively hosting a training ground for abuse. These amendments would extend the definition of extreme pornography to cover these specific, harmful depictions.
Amendment 292 would introduce a duty for pornography websites to verify not just age but consent. We know that the average age of entry into trafficking for pornography in the US is just 12.8 years. Currently, once a video is online, a woman who has been coerced, trafficked or simply changed her mind has often no legal mechanism to withdraw that consent. What the noble Baroness, Lady Berger, said on this was particularly telling. This amendment would provide a necessary right to erasure, ensuring that platforms must remove content if consent is withdrawn. If the banking sector can verify identity to secure our finances, the multi-billion pound pornography industry can verify identity to secure human dignity.
Amendment 298 addresses the rapid rise of AI nudification apps. As my noble friend Lady Benjamin said, the Internet Watch Foundation reported a 380% increase in AI-generated child exploitation imagery between 2023 and 2024—a staggering figure. These tools are being weaponised to humiliate women and children. This amendment would criminalise the possession of software designed to create non-consensual nude images, closing a loophole before it widens further. I add to what the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, said on the need for wider guard-rails on large language models in, I hope, future government legislation.
The Government have rightly recognised the harm of strangulation content, and I urge them now to accept the logic of their own position and to support these additional amendments to deal with incest, child-mimicking content and the fundamental issue of consent. As the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, said, we should be ashamed of ourselves, and I hope that we now ensure that the legislation catches up with the reality of the digital age.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Bertin not just for tabling and speaking to these amendments but for the excellent work she has done and continues to do in this area, which by all accounts has taken its toll. She has campaigned on these matters for a long time and deserves so much praise from all of us.
When I first discussed these amendments with my noble friend, I could hardly believe what she was telling me. Essentially, their underlying premise is that certain forms of extreme pornography are still allowed despite the fact that they have been proven to have highly damaging impacts on the development and behaviour of young boys and adolescents, not to mention the exploitation of children, women and so many victims and potential victims of this subject matter.
We have heard compelling speeches from the noble Baronesses, Lady Kidron and Lady Kennedy, and, in particular, the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, in support of these amendments. There are so many perspectives from which one can look at them. One slightly personal perspective I have is that of a father of teenage children. I have teenage sons. Like all teenagers, they are bombarded with technology, challenged by social media and confronted with the unlimited scope that access to the internet can provide, with all its positive possibilities but also all its temptations, and in particular the dangers inherent in online pornography of an extreme nature. My sons, in effect, are the target audience of much of this material and I do not want this to be the new normal, as one of my noble friends described it.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, spoke of poison and how we have to find ways of dealing with it. I concur completely. I think it was the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, who said so powerfully that technology is outpacing regulation. That is the real danger here. As my noble friend Lady Shawcross-Wolfson said, we have to close the loopholes.
My noble friend Lady Bertin has highlighted that, at present, we criminalise child sexual abuse in all its forms. We thus criminalise sexual activity within certain family relationships and the making of indecent images of children, yet, astonishingly, online content that depicts, fantasises about or encourages these same criminal acts is legally and widely available.
Amendment 290 confronts the deeply troubling reality that material which appears to portray a child—even when the performer is an adult—can be used to groom, normalise or encourage sexual interest in children. We know that such material is not harmless fantasy. Law enforcement, child protection organisations and international research bodies have all warned that material appearing to depict children fuels harmful attitudes and increases the risk that individuals progress towards real-world offending.
Crucially, Amendment 290 would also create a new offence of producing or distributing material that glorifies or encourages sexual activity with a child or family member. No one in this Chamber needs reminding that such conduct is criminal and profoundly harmful, yet text-based, audio and visual material explicitly celebrating child abuse and incest remains widely accessible on mainstream pornography sites and user-generated content platforms. The law should recognise the role of such material in grooming, desensitisation and normalisation of abuse.
Amendment 291 addresses the glaring inconsistency whereby extreme pornographic content is prohibited in many contexts yet explicit depictions of unlawful sexual acts between family members—including those involving persons described or portrayed as under 18 —are not necessarily captured by existing legislation. Incest is a criminal offence, reflecting both the safeguarding imperative and the inherent power imbalance within some familial relationships. Yet, again, pornographic content portraying incest, often stylised to appear illicit, coercive or involving younger family members, remains permissible to host, sell and distribute online so long as it is performed by adults.
This amendment would not criminalise lawful adult behaviour; it would criminalise the possession of extreme pornographic images depicting acts that would themselves be criminal if performed in reality. Once again, the principle is consistency. What is an offence offline should not be freely commodified online under the guise of entertainment.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, it would not be right to begin the Government’s response to this group of amendments without first thanking unequivocally the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. The whole Chamber will join me in saying that we have a great deal to thank her for. She has worked tirelessly on the independent pornography review and has long campaigned to raise awareness of the ways pornography shapes sexual behaviour. This Government share her determination to ensure that the online world is a safer place for everyone, and we are immensely grateful to her for her insights.
The motivation for these amendments is important and I make it absolutely clear that I take them seriously. I have not disagreed with a single word that has been said in the impassioned and sometimes angry contributions in this Chamber—I share that anger and outrage. The noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, is aware, following our meeting last week, of the reasons why the Government will resist her amendments at this stage. However, I look forward to continuing our discussions in greater detail over the coming weeks, including in meetings between my department, the Home Office and DSIT. I hope we will all work closely together to achieve our shared objectives.
I also take this opportunity to announce that the Government will accept, in part, one of the noble Baroness’s recommendations from her pornography review—namely, recommendation 24. The Government will review the criminal law relating to pornography, which will give us a chance to look at the law holistically and consider whether it is fit for purpose in an ever-developing online world. Importantly, the review I am announcing today will look into the effectiveness of the existing law in relation to criminalising, among other things, harmful depictions of incest and any forms of pornography that encourage child sexual abuse.
I know the noble Baroness is anxious that any review should not be used as a delaying tactic to avoid making any decisions. I hope she will take it from me that it is my wish to make sure that this takes place quickly. In addition, as I mentioned to her when we met, the Government are not completely opposed to considering swifter action where this is critically important, and I know we will discuss this further at our next meeting.
Given what I have just said, I hope your Lordships will forgive me if I address Amendments 290 to 292 briefly, in the light of the fact we are proposing a review. I am very grateful for the contributions of the noble Baronesses, Lady Benjamin, Lady Kidron, Lady Sugg and Lady Owen, my noble friends Lady Kennedy and Lady Berger, and the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Cameron of Lochiel—I hope I have mentioned everybody.
I appreciate the motivation behind these amendments, and I reassure my noble friend Lady Kennedy that the Government and I are very much in listening mode. Of course images of actual child incest or actual child sexual abuse are extremely harmful. The same is also true for intimate photos or videos shared without consent, and I note the concerns about how effectively this law is being enforced and regulated. I reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, that I am committed to working with her on the issues raised by these amendments and I very much look forward to meeting again to discuss them in greater detail to see where we can go with them.
Amendment 298 would criminalise the possession of nudification tools by users. Once again, I accept the intention behind this amendment and recognise the harm caused; it is horrifying. My noble friend Lady Berger spoke movingly about its impact on young women, and other noble Lords spoke strongly about this as well.
Our concern is that this amendment would not target those who provide these unpleasant tools to users in the UK. Additionally, as drafted, it would criminalise the possession of legitimate tools which are designed to create intimate images, such as those used in a medical context. I reiterate that we have significant sympathy for the amendment’s underlying objective, so we are actively considering what action is needed to ensure that any intervention in this area is effective. I assure the noble Baroness that we will reflect carefully on what she and other noble Lords—including the noble Baronesses, Lady Kidron, Lady Boycott and Lady Owen, my noble friend Lady Berger, and the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, among others—have said in this debate. I also assure her that we aim to provide an update on this matter ahead of Report.
Finally, Amendment 314 seeks to bring regulatory parity between offline and online pornography. I commend the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, for her continued advocacy on this topic over the years. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron—for whom huge respect is due, in this House and elsewhere—the noble Lords, Lord Carter of Haslemere and Lord Nash, and the noble Baroness, Lady Shawcross-Wolfson, among others, all spoke powerfully about this.
I stress once again that I do not disagree with the motivation that underlies this amendment. No one could disagree with the general principle as a matter of common sense, but extensive further work with the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, is needed to consider and define with sufficient certainty what currently legal online pornography should not be permitted. It is also important that we make a thorough exploration of the existing legislation and regulation to ensure any new offence is enforceable, protects users to the highest standard and works as intended.
Under the Video Recordings Act, the distribution of pornography on physical media formats is regulated by the BBFC, as we have heard. Obviously, the BBFC will not classify any content which breaches criminal law. Amendment 314 as drafted would create a criminal offence which would require a judgment to be made about whether the BBFC would classify content which has not been subject to the classification process. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, expressed concerns about the drafting of this amendment while supporting its underlying motivation. As I hope your Lordships will agree, creating this style of criminal offence requires a clearer and more certain definition of this pornographic content, as any individual would need to be able clearly to understand what they need to do to regulate their conduct, so as not to inadvertently commit a criminal offence.
I hope the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, will appreciate the reasons I have set out for the Government not supporting these amendments today. That said, I hope the announcement of the review into the criminal law and the Government’s commitment to work with the noble Baroness over the coming weeks will leave her sufficiently reassured not to press her amendments at this stage.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
I want to ask the Minister about the timing. Her tone is exceptionally welcome— I will leave the substance of her response to the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin—but I am watching facial recognition, edtech and AI being rolled out by the Government with impunity. Even earlier today, at Questions, the tool was put at a higher order than the safety. What is the timeframe for the reviews and in which we can expect these very urgent questions to be addressed? There is a Bill in front of us, but when will the next Bill come?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
Can the noble Baroness imagine just how unpopular I would be if I committed to an absolute timeframe? What I can say is that I hope she will take it from me that I regard this as important. The meetings with the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, have started. This matters but we need to get it right.
Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)
Will this review—yet another review—take place before Report? The Bill is before us, so once Report has passed, it will be too late to have the review. This is not something that we can leave until it is too late. Can we at least have an assurance that Report will be timed in a way that enables the Minister to come back and say, “This review has happened, and this is what we’re going to do”?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I entirely understand the sentiments. I cannot commit to that today, but I will take the point away.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
I will give the Minister a little bit of context, because she has not been in this House very long, for which she is probably very grateful. Many of us speaking today were very involved in the genesis and ultimate passage of the Online Safety Act. That took six years to happen. When we passed that Act, we thought we were being crystal clear, in both Houses of Parliament, on what we intended to happen and what we intended the regulator to do. One of reasons why her ministerial colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, got a pretty hard time from this Committee on 27 November was that we felt there was a certain unwillingness to recognise the degree of frustration many of us feel about how the Online Safety Act is being enacted.
In particular, on 27 November, the noble Baroness, Lady Berger, told us that the Molly Rose Foundation has, in effect, given up on hoping that Ofcom will actually do its job, because Ofcom has told the foundation that its attitude and strategy in enacting the Online Safety Act, when dealing with the large platforms, is what it calls “tactical ambiguity”. If I were a lawyer for one of the large platforms, I would think that having a regulator that was applying tactical ambiguity was absolutely wonderful; it would be exactly what I would hope for. What we are looking for is action from His Majesty’s Government, and when it happens, we are not looking for any kind of ambiguity.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I have already said that I have heard, and indeed share, the anger and frustration in Committee. I may not have been in your Lordships’ House for that long, but I have not been living underneath a stone. Given my previous existence, I am acutely aware of these debates. What is obvious to us all is that, however well-intentioned past attempts have been, these things are still happening. If we want them to stop, we have to do something about them. I do not believe I can go further than I have at the moment; all I can say is that the will is there.
Lord Sentamu (CB)
During Robert Runcie’s time in the Church of England, he was exasperated that when matters became very difficult, the General Synod was called to set up a committee. He saw the setting up of committees as a postponing of a decision that ought to be taken. These inquiries keep going on and on. Given the Government’s machinery and lawyers, I do not understand why this could not be looked at before Report.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I have already answered that, I am afraid. With the greatest of respect to the noble and right reverend Lord, I cannot give that commitment today, but he has heard what I have said.
Baroness Bertin (Con)
My Lords, this has been humbling for me, and it is very hard to know how to respond. There are big shoes to fill after so many amazing speeches. That is what we call teamwork and showing this Chamber at its very best. I assure noble Lords that I still have plenty of petrol left in the tank on this issue. I am very grateful for the acknowledgement that it has been a gruelling piece of work, but what would damage me more is if we did not get this right. I am not prepared to look back and think that we could have done more, and I believe that many others in this Committee would agree with that.
Baroness Brinton
“Removal of limitation period for historical child sexual offences(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as follows.(2) In section 9 (sexual activity with a child), after subsection (3), insert—“(4) An offence is committed under this section regardless of when the offending activity was committed.”.”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause ensures there is no limitation period for offences under section 9 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 293 in my name is very straightforward and necessary. Victims of child sexual abuse and other offences often do not come forward themselves at the time of the offences. Research has shown that, on average, it takes around three decades for a survivor to get the courage to come forward—and then even longer to get to court. As a result, almost all abuse claims are brought outside the statutory time limit. The problem is that, if the survivor cannot convince the court that a fair trial is possible, the claim falls and the victim can never get justice.
All the various strands of the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse, which were referred to earlier—including the Westminster report, the Anglican Church report, the Catholic Church report and the children in custodial sentences report—said that it was usually decades after the offences that victims reported what had happened. Frequently, this then gave other victims the confidence to come forward too, in exactly the way that happened after the BBC presenter Nicky Campbell spoke up in 2022 about the abuse at his school, the Edinburgh Academy, decades before. The abuse there involved arbitrary violence on boys under 11, including choking, throwing them down stairs and various other disgusting forms of abuse.
In September 2023 an ex-teacher, Russell Tillson, was jailed for sexually abusing boys. Beginning in the 1980s, it continued for 20 years, but allegations were first made only in 2018, nearly a further two decades after the teacher had retired. Both cases are absolutely typical of the behaviour of perpetrators and, indeed, of victims.
Earlier this year the Government said they were minded to consider removing the limitation period, but we believe that it needs to happen now and be in the Bill. The amendment seeks to remove any limitation period for historical child sex offences. It just must not be possible for a perpetrator to escape justice because the victims were too traumatised to come forward until years later. I beg to move Amendment 293.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, I support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I need not take very long, because she has explained her very straightforward amendment impeccably. After the brilliant previous group led by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, and her team, perhaps there is no need to go into all the quite serious sexual contact included in Section 9 of the Sexual Offences Act that need not necessarily be tried in the Crown Court.
I support the amendment for two simple but important reasons. First, there is some very serious sexual activity with children that could be tried in the magistrates’ courts—there is not necessarily a problem with that. Secondly, there is the obvious reason of historic child abuse and victims coming forward sometimes only many years after the fact. Those are very good reasons to depart from the norm of the six-month time limit and, indeed, to have no time limits at all.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I absolutely accept much of what the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has said about the awful nature of historic child abuse and the reasons why there is often a delay before bringing forward complaints, but it is important that we do not conflate civil proceedings and criminal proceedings. The earlier group was to do with people claiming damages, where the defendant is not usually the perpetrator. There may be reasons why we have reached a stage where there cannot be a fair trial. I will leave that aside for the moment.
This amendment is concerned with criminal offences. There is not a limitation period for criminal offences generally, subject to the prosecution deciding that so much time has elapsed that it is not appropriate to bring forward a claim. The noble Baroness has experience of occasionally making those decisions in very old cases. The Minister is pointing at me and is going to give a longer and more authoritative answer than I will attempt to do now. I make the point in general terms.
Lord Garnier (Con)
My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. While I entirely understand the motivation behind the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, I am not entirely sure that it is necessary. As the noble Lord said, there is no limitation for the bringing of this particular Section 9 offence.
I do not wish to get into my anecdotage, but I remember that, as a law officer, one very often had to deal with historic offences whereby a mature person, in their 50s, 60s or 70s, was being indicted or prosecuted for an offence they committed many years ago against a minor. Had the problem existed that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, envisages through her amendment, that would have been a matter we would have had to consider. As the Minister will no doubt tell us from her experience as someone who worked at a senior level in the Crown Prosecution Service, you have to consider whether there is an adequacy of evidence and whether it is in the public interest to bring that person to trial. The age of the offence might be considered by the prosecutor, but there is no time bar, as I understand it. While I may well be corrected for being out of date and ignorant, I certainly do not think that there is a need for this amendment, although it is well motivated.
I have a suspicion that I have got this entirely wrong and that the Minister is going to tell me that it would have been better if I had kept to my place, but there we are. There are plenty of things that we could do with the Bill—make it shorter, for example—but I am not sure that this amendment is one that we need to add to it.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, I speak in strong support of the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I do not know whether it is necessary. I declare an interest as a victim. My concern about the historic sex offences is the prison population. We have large numbers of historic sex offenders in prison. It creates great problems for the Prison Service. However, a custodial sentence is the only sensible disposal. We need to work out what to do with historic sex offenders within the prison system.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Brinton has made a powerful case for removing the limitation period. The Government have already signalled a willingness to act, so objections are likely about timing rather than policy—at least, I hope that is the case.
The amendment would align the law with what Parliament has already accepted, which is that child sexual abuse is distinct from other offences. This is a crime defined by secrecy, grooming and a stark power imbalance. We know that victims often take decades to come forward, so allowing offenders to shelter behind time would reward fear and coercion.
Amendment 293 provides clarity for all parties—victims, police, prosecutors and, indeed, defendants. It removes the scope for technical argument about whether a particular course of conduct falls outside time and instead focuses everyone on the core question, which is whether the evidence available can support a fair trial. It also brings coherence. Across the system, we are rightly moving away from arbitrary cut-offs that prevent past abuse ever being heard in court. The amendment is a modest step in the same direction in accordance with the recommendations of inquiries and the expectations of survivors.
There must be no time bar on prosecuting sexual activity with a child. If we are serious about saying that such conduct is never acceptable, surely we should also be serious about saying that it is never too late to pursue justice for it. The amendment achieves that and warrants the support of the Committee and the Government.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for bringing forward the amendment. Obviously, victims of child sexual offences should always be able to seek justice, no matter how long it takes them to come forward.
We absolutely understand and respect the intention behind this proposal. Many survivors of abuse do not feel able to disclose until years—sometimes decades—after the offence, and there is a very real sense of injustice when the law appears to stand in the way of accountability.
However—and on this point I side with my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier—I think there exists no limitation period for offences that would occur under Section 9 of the Sexual Offences Act. The Limitation Act 1980 applies only to civil cases, and indictable criminal cases do not have general limitation periods in England and Wales. As offences under Section 9 of the Sexual Offences Act are indictable only, we do not think the amendment is strictly necessary, despite the fact that it pursues a very noble aim. While sympathetic, therefore, to the principle—
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
Briefly, has the noble Lord opposite considered Section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act, which has a six-month time limit on prosecutions brought in the magistrates’ court? Has he considered that Section 9 is neither a way of—my noble friend the Minister is shaking her head at me, so maybe it is not necessary for the noble Lord to answer.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
I thank the noble Baroness for that. I will just wait for the Minister to explain to all of us what the position is.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for bringing forward this amendment today. As I have said when responding to the other amendments, I stress that I entirely understand the motivation underlying it. Victims and survivors of child sexual abuse have every right to see justice for the horrendous crimes they endured. I know perfectly well through my experience in other parts of public service, if you like, of how long it can take for victims to be able to come forward. To that extent, there is nothing between the noble Baroness and me, and indeed others who have spoken: the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, and my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. That said, I am afraid I am going to have to disappoint the noble Baroness when I say that the Government cannot accept her amendment, and I hope she will appreciate the reason for it when in a moment I explain why.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
Just because this is so important, and no doubt for our understanding, can I ask two questions? First, on there being no time limit, is that because there is some exception in the Magistrates’ Courts Act to the normal six-month time limit on summary conviction? Section 9(3)(a) of the Sexual Offences Act allows summary conviction, so this removal of the time bar must be somewhere either in the Sexual Offences Act or in the Magistrates’ Courts Act. My second question relates to Article 7. Of course, the prohibition on retroactive criminalisation does not apply when the crime in question would be thought of as criminal according to the laws of civilised nations. Of course, that was upheld as a principle when marital rape was finally criminalised in all these jurisdictions by the courts rather than by statute.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I will deal with my noble friend’s second point first. There are decisions of the domestic courts here that support the fact that you cannot bring prosecutions for what was the unlawful sexual intercourse offence under Section 6, nor can you even bring a prosecution for sexual assault based on the same facts, because that would transgress the prohibition in Article 7. As regards the time limit, Section 9 of the 2003 Act has no time limitations in it, which is the usual principle of criminal offences in this country, but for this tiny cohort of behaviour—it really is very small—you could not prosecute under Section 9 because of Article 7. Section 6 no longer exists, and you cannot get round it by using Section 9, but it really is a very small number of cases.
Lord Pannick (CB)
I suggest to the noble Baroness that, in addition, these offences are so serious that they would not be prosecuted in the magistrates’ court; they would be indictable offences, would they not?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
The noble Lord is quite correct: this has nothing to do with magistrates’ court time limits. There was a statutory time limit contained within Section 6 of the 1956 Act that said that all prosecutions for offences under Section 6 must be brought within 12 months in any court. It is nothing to do with the time limits in the Magistrates’ Courts Act.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I am so sorry to labour the point, but I think it is so important that we understand, and if it cannot be dealt with now, perhaps the Minister could write to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the Committee. I am looking at Section 9 of the Sexual Offences Act, on “Sexual activity with a child”, which I understand to be the section that the noble Baroness is seeking to amend in her amendment. Section 9(3)(a) allows summary conviction for that offence, and the maximum penalty is
“imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months”,
or the statutory maximum fine.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I am of course more than happy to write to my noble friend, and it must be my fault I am not explaining this properly. There is no time limit for prosecutions brought under Section 9 generally, unless it refers to particular behaviour—so that would be an offence committed against a girl aged between 13 and 15—that took place before the repeal of the 1956 Act and the bringing into force of the 2003 Act. You could not prosecute that under Section 9 because the time limit has expired for bringing it under Section 6, in the same way that you cannot prosecute for sexual assault for the same behaviour because you cannot bring a prosecution under Section 6. I had better write, because I can see from the puzzled look on my noble friend’s face that I have not explained it very well.
Lord Pannick (CB)
Perhaps the noble Baroness could also include in that letter reference to what is either a decision of the Appellate Committee or the Supreme Court—I think it is the former—which addresses this and explains precisely why those who are alleged to have committed offences before the relevant dates are protected by the 1956 Act and continue to be so.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
The noble Lord has explained it rather better than I did.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I am very grateful to everyone who has spoken. I am probably the only non-lawyer in this debate, and as it is my amendment I feel something of a duffer.
I am very grateful for the advice. I came to this amendment after reading the recommendations of IICSA, and what concerned me particularly was picking up that people who had come forward years afterwards were told that things were timed out—that might have been a decision by the CPS to say that it felt that it would not be effective going to trial. However, I very much appreciate the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, because I have experience of the issue of which court deals with issues through my interests in stalking and other domestic abuse cases, where often that is the place that things happen. All the description that has been given for “no time limits” has not been for the magistrates’ court, excepting the detail that the noble Baroness provided, which is way beyond my knowledge.
There is the difficulty that Professor Jay reported. In two cases where I was heavily involved with the victims, decisions were made initially by the CPS and the victims were told that they had timed out. That may not have been the case, but that is what they were told. In another case, when there were three pupils from the same school all giving evidence, none of them knowing each other, the first victim was told by the judge, “Yours is over 20 years ago; you can’t possibly remember what happened and therefore it’s timed out”. That is what is happening in the practice of the courts. Professor Jay’s report spoke to the experience of the victims. We have gone into extraordinary technical detail that many victims would be completely oblivious to. I would be very grateful for a letter. If there is an easy solution, it may just be that it needs to be clarified with the police and the CPS. There are a lot of unhappy victims out there. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Levitt
“Pornographic images of strangulation or suffocation: England and Wales and Northern Ireland(1) After section 67 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 insert—“67A Possession or publication of pornographic images of strangulation or suffocation(1) It is an offence for a person to be in possession of an image if—(a) the image is pornographic, within the meaning of section 63,(b) the image portrays, in an explicit and realistic way, a person strangling or suffocating another person, and(c) a reasonable person looking at the image would think that the persons were real.(2) It is an offence for a person to publish an image of the kind mentioned in subsection (1).(3) Publishing an image includes giving or making it available to another person by any means.(4) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to excluded images, within the meaning of section 64.(5) In this section“image” has the same meaning as in section 63.(6) Proceedings for an offence under this section may not be instituted—(a) in England and Wales, except by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions;(b) in Northern Ireland, except by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland.67B Defences to offences under section 67A(1) Where a person is charged with an offence under section 67A(1), it is a defence for the person to prove any of the matters mentioned in subsection (2).(2) The matters are—(a) that the person had a legitimate reason for being in possession of the image concerned;(b) that the person had not seen the image concerned and did not know, nor had any cause to suspect, it to be an image of the kind mentioned in section 67A(1);(c) that the person— (i) was sent the image concerned without any prior request having been made by or on behalf of the person, and(ii) did not keep it for an unreasonable time;(d) that the person directly participated in the act portrayed and the act did not involve the infliction of any non-consensual harm on any person.(3) Where a person is charged with an offence under section 67A(2), it is a defence for the person to prove any of the matters mentioned in subsection (4).(4) The matters are—(a) that the person had a legitimate reason for publishing the image concerned to the persons to whom they published it;(b) that the person had not seen the image concerned and did not know, nor had any cause to suspect, it to be an image of the kind mentioned in section 67A(1);(c) that the person directly participated in the act portrayed, the act did not involve the infliction of any non-consensual harm on any person, and the person only published the image to other persons who directly participated.(5) In this section“non-consensual harm” has the same meaning as in section 66.67C Penalties for offences under section 67A(1) A person who commits an offence under section 67A(1) is liable—(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);(b) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine (or both);(c) on conviction on indictment in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine (or both).(2) A person who commits an offence under section 67A(2) is liable—(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);(b) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine (or both);(c) on conviction on indictment in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine (or both).67D Possession of extreme pornographic images: alternative verdict in magistrates’ courtIf on the trial of a person charged with an offence under section 63 a magistrates’ court finds the person not guilty of the offence charged, the magistrates’ court may find the person guilty of an offence under section 67A(1).”.(2) In section 68 of that Act (special rules relating to providers of information society services) for “section 63” substitute “sections 63 and 67A”.(3) In Schedule 14 to that Act (special rules relating to providers of information society services)—(a) in paragraphs 3(1), 4(2) and 5(1) after “63” insert “or 67A”;(b) in paragraph 5(2)—(i) after “possession” insert “or publication”;(ii) for “an offence under section 63” substitute “the offence in question”. (4) In Schedule 34A to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (child sex offences for purposes of section 327A), after paragraph 13 insert—“13ZA An offence under section 67A of that Act (possession or publication of pornographic images of strangulation or suffocation) in relation to an image showing a person under 18.”(5) In Schedule 7 to the Online Safety Act 2023 (priority offences), in paragraph 29—(a) for “section 63” substitute “any of the following provisions”;(b) for the words in brackets substitute—“(a) section 63 (possession of extreme pornographic images);(b) section 67A (possession or publication of pornographic images of strangulation or suffocation)”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes it an offence in England and Wales and Northern Ireland to possess or publish a pornographic image that portrays strangulation (often referred to as “choking porn”) or suffocation.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, again it would not be right to speak to this group of amendments without first thanking the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. In her independent pornography review, the noble Baroness recommended that non-fatal strangulation pornography—commonly known as choking porn—should be illegal to possess, distribute and publish. The noble Baroness has identified, and many have already mentioned in your Lordships’ Committee as part of the debate on another group of amendments, that the prevalence of strangulation pornography is leading to this behaviour becoming more commonplace in real life. The noble Baroness is absolutely right. Evidence suggests that it is influencing what people, particularly young people, think is expected of them during sex. It is also right to point out that they are not necessarily aware of the serious harm it can cause.
In June this year, we committed to giving full effect to the noble Baroness’s recommendation. Today I am pleased to do just that. We have tabled Amendments 294, 295, 488, 494, 512, 515, 526, 548 and 555, which will criminalise the possession and publication of pornographic images that portray strangulation or suffocation—otherwise known as choking porn. These changes will extend UK-wide. The terms “strangulation” and “suffocation” are widely understood and carry their ordinary meaning. Strangulation requires the application of pressure to the neck and suffocation requires a person to be deprived of air, affecting their ability to breathe. For this offence, the strangulation or suffocation portrayed must be explicit and realistic, but it does not have to be real. For example, it can be acted or posed, or the image may be AI-generated—provided that the people in the image look real to a reasonable person.
The maximum penalty for the possession offence is imprisonment for two years. This mirrors penalties under Section 3 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. The penalty reflects that while the content is harmful, much of it will not depict an unlawful act actually taking place, depending on the circumstances. For publication of such images, the maximum penalty will be imprisonment for five years, commensurate with penalties for publication under the Obscene Publications Act 1959. This reflects the underlying aims of this amendment to restrict the availability of this type of pornography.
In addition, we are amending the Online Safety Act 2023 to ensure that the offences are listed as priority offences. This will oblige platforms to take the necessary steps to stop this harmful material appearing online. This change is a vital step towards our mission to halve violence against women and girls, and as I move these amendments today it is right that the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, is credited for this change. I beg to move.
Baroness Bertin (Con)
My Lords, I rightly praise the Government and the Prime Minister for making this change. It shows real leadership. I speak for so many in saying thank you for taking that recommendation on board.
This amendment to ban depictions of strangulation in pornography has raised awareness more widely of how out of control online pornography has become and how it is affecting real life behaviour. I am not easily shocked these days, but I was very shocked by the example given by my friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, of how those carrying out post-mortems are now having to be trained to look for signs of strangulation. That says it all.
Baroness Gohir (CB)
I too would like to thank the Government for these amendments, because helplines have seen a rise in non-fatal strangulation offences, and not everything gets reported to the police. We have seen a rise at the charity that I run, the Muslim Women’s Network helpline. Research shows that if a victim is subject to a non-fatal strangulation, they are seven times more likely to be a victim of domestic homicide. Analysis of the domestic homicide data shows that strangulation is one of the two main methods of killing women. I hope that the long-term trend, once these amendments are introduced, will be a decline in these types of offences being reported on helplines. I commend the Government.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, these dangerous practices of strangulation and suffocation are often used to control, intimidate and silence in domestic abuse situations. The growing normalisation of strangulation during sex risks giving abusers a veneer of acceptability and a false sense of impunity. Strangulation was the cause of death of over a quarter of the women killed between 2014 and 2025—about 550 in total. In that context, the case for criminalising such images is compelling. Mainstream platforms must be put under a duty to remove this material or face sanction.
The related amendments in this group are welcome, in order to ensure that the new offences operate coherently across England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. We on these Benches very much support this group of amendments, which sends a clear signal that such material is totally unacceptable.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
I thank the Minister for tabling this group of amendments, and I am happy to offer the support of these Benches. The criminalisation of strangulation in pornography is part of a wider initiative that has been championed across the House and discussed today, particularly on this side by my noble friend Lady Bertin, but by many others as well.
The prevalence of strangulation in pornography and the harm it causes are very clear. Distributing such material is already illegal offline; the fact that its online equivalent is not is a gap in the law, and these amendments correct that. They close that gap and prohibit the distribution of a practice that is both dangerous and extreme. I know that there are reports from some GPs of an exponential rise in incidents of non-fatal strangulation and suffocation among younger generations, which they largely attribute to pornography; the least we can do is to provide restrictions on dangerous content that should not be normalised. As has been said, distributing non-fatal strangulation images is unlawful offline; it makes little sense that that is not replicated in our online legislation. This group aims to correct that, and I willingly offer the support of these Benches.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I thank all noble Lords for their support for these amendments, particularly the noble Baronesses, Lady Bertin, Lady Gohir and Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Cameron. I also note the concerns raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, about enforcement and regulation. As I said in the debate on the second group, I am very keen to continue working with the noble Baroness on other matters related to online pornography— there is much more to be done.
I hope that, in the meantime, your Lordships will join me in supporting the important steps the Government are taking in relation to strangulation pornography. I beg to move.
Baroness Levitt
“Pornographic images of strangulation or suffocation: Scotland(1) After section 51C of the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 insert— “51D Pornographic images of strangulation or suffocation(1) It is an offence for a person to be in possession of an image if—(a) the image is pornographic, within the meaning of section 51A,(b) the image depicts, in an explicit and realistic way, a person strangling or suffocating another person, and(c) a reasonable person looking at the image would think that the persons were real.(2) It is an offence for a person to publish an image of the kind mentioned in subsection (1).(3) Publishing an image includes giving or making it available to another person by any means.(4) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to excluded images, within the meaning of section 51B.(5) In this section“image” is to be construed in accordance with section 51A.51E Defences to offences under section 51D(1) Where a person is charged with an offence under section 51D(1), it is a defence for the person to prove any of the matters mentioned in subsection (2).(2) The matters are—(a) that the person had a legitimate reason for being in possession of the image concerned;(b) that the person had not seen the image concerned and did not know, nor had any cause to suspect, it to be an image of the kind mentioned in section 51D(1);(c) that the person—(i) was sent the image concerned without any prior request having been made by or on behalf of the person, and(ii) did not keep it for an unreasonable time;(d) that the person directly participated in the act depicted and the act did not actually involve strangulation or suffocation of any person.(3) Where a person is charged with an offence under section 51D(2), it is a defence for the person to prove any of the matters mentioned in subsection (4).(4) The matters are—(a) that the person had a legitimate reason for publishing the image concerned to the persons to whom they published it;(b) that the person had not seen the image concerned and did not know, nor had any cause to suspect, it to be an image of the kind mentioned in section 51D(1);(c) that the person directly participated in the act depicted, the act did not actually involve strangulation or suffocation of any person, and the person only published the image to other persons who directly participated.51F Penalties for offences under section 51D(1) A person who commits an offence under section 51D(1) is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine (or both).(2) A person who commits an offence under section 51D(2) is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both); (b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine (or both).51G Possession of extreme pornographic images: alternative verdictIf on the trial of a person charged with an offence under section 51A a court finds the person not guilty of the offence charged, the court may find the person guilty of an offence under section 51D(1).”.(2) In the Extreme Pornography (Electronic Commerce Directive) (Scotland) Regulations 2011 (S.S.I. 2011/137)—(a) in regulation 2(1), in the definition of “relevant offence”—(i) after “51A” insert “(extreme pornography) or 51D (pornographic images of strangulation or suffocation)”;(ii) after “Act” omit “(extreme pornography)”;(b) in regulation 3(1) and (3) for “a relevant offence” substitute “an offence under section 51A of the 1982 Act”;(c) in regulation 6(2)—(i) after “possession” insert “or publication”;(ii) for “a relevant offence” substitute “the relevant offence in question”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment makes it an offence in Scotland to possess or publish a pornographic image that depicts strangulation (often referred to as “choking porn”) or suffocation.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“Obscenity etc offences: technology testing defence(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide defences to relevant offences for persons who are authorised by the Secretary of State to carry out technology testing activities.(2) “Technology testing activities” means activities which are carried out in the course of, or in connection with, testing technology for the purposes of—(a) investigating whether it may have been made or adapted for use for creating, or facilitating the creation of, prohibited material, or(b) testing whether it may be used to create, or facilitate the creation of, prohibited material.(3) “Prohibited material” means anything in relation to which a relevant offence may be committed.(4) The regulations may make provision about authorisations by the Secretary of State to carry out technology testing activities, including provision—(a) for authorisations to be subject to conditions (which may be specified in the regulations or determined by the Secretary of State);(b) for the variation, suspension, or withdrawal of authorisations and conditions;(c) for the enforcement of any breaches of conditions (which may include provision creating criminal offences punishable with a fine);(d) for fees to be payable to the Secretary of State, as a means of recovering costs incurred by the Secretary of State in exercising functions under the regulations.(5) The Secretary of State must consult the Scottish Ministers before making regulations under this section containing provision that would be within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament if it were contained in an Act of that Parliament. (6) The Secretary of State must consult the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland before making regulations under this section containing provision that—(a) would be within the legislative competence of the Northern Ireland Assembly if it were contained in an Act of that Assembly, and(b) would not, if it were contained in a Bill in the Northern Ireland Assembly, result in the Bill requiring the consent of the Secretary of State under section 8 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998.”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause creates a power to make regulations providing a defence to certain offences which may be committed in the course of technology testing, where the technology testing is authorised by the Secretary of State.
“Technology testing defence: meaning of “relevant offence”(1) For the purposes of section (Obscenity etc offences: technology testing defence) “relevant offence” means—(a) an offence listed in subsection (2),(b) an offence listed in subsection (3) (Scotland), and(c) an offence listed in subsection (4) (Northern Ireland).(2) The offences referred to in subsection (1)(a) are offences under any of the following provisions—
Act | Provision |
Obscene Publications Act 1959 | Section 2 (publication of obscene article) |
Protection of Children Act 1978 | Section 1(1)(a), (b) or(c) (indecent photographs of children) |
Criminal Justice Act 1988 | Section 160(1) (indecent photographs of children) |
Communications Act 2003 | Section 127(1) (sending indecent messages via public electronic communications network) |
Sexual Offences Act 2003 | Section 46A (child sexual abuse image generators) Section 66B(1) (sharing intimate photograph or film) Section 66E(1) (creating purported intimate image of adult) Section 66F(1) or (2) (requesting creation of purported intimate image of adult) |
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 | Section 63 (possession of extreme pornographic images), as it has effect under the law of England and Wales Section 67A (possession or publication of pornographic images of strangulation or suffocation), as it has effect under the law of England and Wales |
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 | Section 62 (possession of prohibited images of children), as it has effect under the law of England and Wales |
Serious Crime Act 2015 | Section 69 (possession of paedophile manual), as it has effect under the law of England and Wales |
Act | Provision |
Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 | Section 51 (obscene material) Section 51A (extreme pornography) Section 51D (pornographic images of strangulation or suffocation) Section 52(1)(a), (b) or(c) (indecent photographs of children) Section 52A (indecent photographs of children) Section 52D (child sexual abuse image generators) |
Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 | Section 41A (possession of advice or guidance about abusing children sexually or creating CSA images) |
Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm (Scotland) Act 2016 | Section 2 (disclosing or threatening to disclose intimate photograph or film) |
Act / Order | Provision |
Protection of Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1978 (S.I. 1978/1047 (N.I.17) | Article 3(1)(a), (b) or (c) (indecent photographs of children) |
Criminal Justice (Evidence, Etc.) (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 (S.I. 1988/1847 (N.I. 17)) | Article 15(1) (indecent photographs of children) |
Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (S.I. 2008/1769 (N.I. 2)) | Article 42A (child sexual abuse image generators) |
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 | Section 63 (possession of extreme pornographic images), as it has effect under the law of Northern Ireland Section 67A (possession or publication of pornographic images of strangulation or suffocation), as it has effect under the law of Northern Ireland |
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 | Section 62 (possession of prohibited images of children), as it has effect under the law of Northern Ireland |
Serious Crime Act 2015 | Section 69 (possession of paedophile manual), as it has effect under the law of Northern Ireland |
This new clause specifies the offences for which the technology testing defence is to be available.
“Content removal reporting and enforcement(1) No later than 12 months from the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for—(a) the way in which offences under section 66B of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sharing or threatening to share intimate photograph or film) can be reported, and(b) the mechanism by which content created as a result of offences under that section can be removed.(2) The mechanism must include—(a) a mandatory removal period for content that the reporting party reasonably believes to be in breach of section 66B of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 of 48 hours,(b) guidance on what constitutes clear and accessible reporting,(c) sanctions for malicious reporting,(d) sanctions for the failure to remove duplicates of offending material,(e) a review period after the initial 48 hours for assessing suspected offending content, and(f) guidance on which online platforms are within scope of this section.”
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 295BA and the other amendments in this group in my name and the names of the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Kidron, Lady Coffey and Lady Gohir. I am grateful for the wise legal counsel of Professor Clare McGlynn KC and the support of the Revenge Porn Helpline, My Image, My Choice, Not Your Porn and Jodie Campaigns.
Amendment 295BA is based on the precedent set in the Take It Down Act in the USA. It compels the Secretary of State to implement a 48-hour time limit for online platforms to remove non-consensually shared intimate content. It is important to note that there is also a clause that allows for sanctions for malicious actors. In this way, we seek to protect those who may consensually share content from being targeted by people who may wish to silence them.
Sophie Mortimer from the Revenge Porn Helpline said that while we have an excellent track record on removal, the reality in most cases is that it takes hours, days, or months. There are a number of clients who have been reporting content for over five years. Sophie has emphasised that the handful of responsible and responsive platforms should not be the yardstick for all, when the majority are painfully slow to respond or entirely non-compliant.
One Cornell University study found that violations of copyright are acted upon quicker than the reporting of NCII content. The amendment would ensure, vitally, that online services remove duplicates of the content. It is designed to complement the Online Safety Act, under which tech companies have to proactively ensure that this priority illegal content is removed from their sites. At present, however, there is no system in place for individuals to report directly to Ofcom. This amendment would ensure a reporting and removal mechanism for victims or any other person who believes a breach of Section 66(b) of the Sexual Offences Act has been committed, and it would provide a maximum time frame.
Amendment 295BB would strengthen the law on deletion orders. While I am pleased to see the Government’s clarification in the Bill that intimate images used to commit an offence, and anything containing them, should be seen as being used to commit an offence under Section 153 of the 2020 Sentencing Act, I believe we must go further.
Research by journalist Shanti Das published in February this year found that, of the 98 intimate image abuse cases prosecuted in magistrates’ courts in England and Wales in the preceding six months, only three resulted in deprivation orders. No one should have to live in the knowledge that their convicted abuser is allowed to retain content used to commit the crime. This amendment would direct the prosecutor to lodge a deletion verification report within 28 days, verifying the destruction of the content and ordering the defendant to hand over the passwords and authenticators needed to access the material. There is still too much ambiguity in the law around this, and the victims of intimate image abuse are paying the price.
Amendments 295BC and 295BD would compel the Secretary of State to implement a hash registry for non-consensual intimate content, which providers must use to prevent the re-upload or distribution of NCII material. The amendment implements a hash-sharing system that offers survivors the peace of mind that their non-consensual content will remain offline. A hash is a unique value assigned to an image. Importantly, duplicates have the same hash value. Hashing preserves the victim’s privacy, as only the hash and not the content itself would be stored in the register.
This system means that victims can use two options to ensure that their content stays offline: prosecuting and going through a criminal court or privately hashing the content without prosecuting. Some survivors may use both options, but hashing is an important option for those who feel unable to face criminal proceedings. We already have a precedent for how this would work, as CSAM content is hashed in the same way. These amendments are a vital step to assure victims that their content will no longer trend online.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, I rise in support of all the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Owen of Alderley Edge. I signed two of the offences in relation to the time-limit extension, and therefore I share the noble Baroness’s pleasure that the Government have effectively accepted that principle and brought forward their own amendments as I understand it.
The noble Baroness’s other amendments, it seems to me, are worthy of an equivalent response. I need not repeat the reasons for this, because her speech was so comprehensive and clear. I will just say that, in a still relatively short period of time, not just in this Committee but in this House, the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, has raised herself to one of the leading human rights campaigners in this country. Let that silence all those who think that relative youth is a disqualification for being in your Lordships’ House.
With that in mind, and as a brief reminder of the two new sections of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 that are really down to the campaigning of the noble Baroness, I wonder if my noble friend the Minister, in her reply to the group, could give the Committee some insight into the timetable for implementing what will be, I believe, Sections 66E and 66F of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. These are the new offences of creating, and of requesting the creation of, sexually explicit deepfake images without consent. These were passed in the Data (Use and Access) Act earlier this year, after a great deal of sweat, toil and solidarity from around the House for the noble Baroness, Lady Owen. I am sure that my noble friend the Minister will be keen to get these implemented as soon as possible. In the light of frustrations expressed in earlier groups about the speed of implementing these policies, I wonder if we could hear on that.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
My Lords, I enthusiastically join my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti in praising the noble Baroness, Lady Owen. I was in the House—it was on a Friday—when she first moved her Private Member’s Bill. The Minister then was the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and he promised that the Government would review and come to the assistance of the noble Baroness. What she is doing now is quite amazing, with a number of very detailed amendments. I will hold myself here to await what my noble friend the Minister will say in reply, but I do hope she will be very positive.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
My Lords, I rise to add my voice to the praise for the noble Baroness, Lady Owen—me too—and to put on record my support. I believe the noble Baroness did such a detailed, forensic laying out of her amendments. I would just like to make a couple of points.
During the passage of the Online Safety Act, we had a lot of discussion about an ombudsman. It was very much resisted. At the same time—in the same time- frame as that Bill took place—I was an adviser to the Irish Government, who put in an ombudsman. I think we are missing something. It was a very big part of the previous discussion about chatbots and so on in an earlier group. I very firmly agree with what the noble Baroness said as she laid out her amendments: we really need a way of alerting the regulator to what is going on, and it is not adequate for the regulator to have only an emerging harms unit that is waiting for us to fill in a form, which is the current state of play. I leave that with the Minister as a problem that needs solving.
Baroness Bertin (Con)
My Lords, I rise to support my noble friend Lady Owen. I will be mercifully brief, because I have spoken a lot this evening, but I want to reiterate—me too—that she has done an amazing job. She is so determined, she gets down into the detail and is so thorough, and she gets it over the line—she gets stuff done. Thank goodness for people like her in this House. I thank her for that.
My noble friend made the case very powerfully about how threatening and insidious the sharing of intimate images is, particularly with the location layered on. This is all about degradation, intimidation and scaring and threatening women, essentially. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, said in an earlier debate, this is not the dignity and respect that we were promised, frankly, and technology is being used to take that away and is incredibly regressive.
I support all the amendments, but I want to talk briefly about the amendment on upgrading domestic abuse protection orders to make them fit for the digital age. I cannot tell the Committee how many victims I have encountered who 100% say that the abuse by their perpetrator carries on. It gets worse, arguably. We must make sure that those orders reflect that, because that is where so much of the abuse is happening. It also affects the children involved in this situation. In a particular case that I am concerned about at the moment, the perpetrator is constantly posting on social media, knowing full well that his children are going to see those posts, and on it continues. I hope the Government will take on board these amendments. Again, I say well done to my noble friend.
Viscount Colville of Culross (CB)
My Lords, I am pleased to support the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, in the latest stage of her campaign to stop online image abuse. I too applaud her success against deepfakes in the Data (Use and Access) Act. The Government have done much good work to progress that campaign in this Bill, but the distribution of these images, which causes so much harm, must be stopped. As many other noble Lords have said, we need to ensure that the Bill creates the powers to stop the sharing of these images across the internet. Noble Lords who were involved in the debates on the Online Safety Bill understand that ensuring that the tech companies stop the prioritisation and dissemination of harms is central to stopping harm being spread on the internet. Amendment 299 and the others in this group will do that.
I shall focus on Amendments 295BC on hashing and 295BD on the NCII register, which will be crucial to ensuring that any sharing of intimate images will be radically reduced and, I hope, stopped. There has been good work by the Internet Watch Foundation in hash matching and setting up a register of illegal intimate images of children. It is funded by the industry and has been effective in massively reducing the traffic in CSAM. If these amendments are adopted, it will be a great thing to bring these protections to the adult online world. Verification of NCII is already expanding. It happens at platform moderation level, where there are measures to increase the number of images verified by training NGOs on submissions to the StopNCII.org portal. This will ensure that they will submit hashes globally via a global clearing centre. There is work under way with the national centre for violence against women and girls to improve police response to NCII abuse, so they can proactively report content for removal and hashing. However, it needs to be mandated to ensure that this system becomes more extensive.
I urge that, if these amendments are accepted, hash-matching technology remains nimble. I understand that MD5 video hash-matching technology might not respond to slight tweaks of a video. As a result, the video cannot be checked against the register, rendering hash matching ineffective. Other technologies, such as PDQ for stills, looks at the perceptual nature of the image and can still create a match, even if the image is cropped or edited. I urge the creators of hash-matching technology to continue the arms race against AI and ensure that subtle AI tweaks to a hash-matched image can be matched on the NCII register. StopNCIA software is already doing an amazing job in generating 1.8 million hashes and preventing thousands of intimate images being shared across the internet. Imagine how effective it will be if this technology is mandated for adult NCII for all platforms and enforced by Ofcom. I urge the Minister to accept these amendments and save thousands of users from harm and misery.
Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Lab)
My Lords, I add my support to the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Owen. Since she arrived in your Lordships’ House, she has made the issue of online abuse her passion and her life’s work, and for that I congratulate her. These amendments deal with intimate image abuse, spiking, domestic abuse and the online abuse of women, by and large. Although there are many positive attributes of the internet and online and digital technology, there are also the downsides and how it is used as a weapon of abuse. Will the Minister see what she can do with her ministerial colleagues in the Home Department to try to accept some of these amendments by way of government amendments on Report? They are worthy of inclusion in this Bill.
Baroness Gohir (CB)
My Lords, I was unable to speak at Second Reading about the amendments to which I have added my name. I am extremely grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, for her persistence in pursuing the issues that she raised about a year ago. I highlighted the problem of sexually explicit audio recordings during the debate on her Non-Consensual Sexually Explicit Images and Videos (Offences) Bill. I am therefore thankful that she has brought forward amendments to this Bill to address audio abuse. I too admire her tenacity. I fully support everything that she has said today.
I will speak specifically about audio abuse and those amendments. Although I commend the Government on strengthening the law relating to non-consensual recording of intimate images and film, I cannot understand why audio has been excluded. It appears as though the Government wish to wait for there to be a significant number of cases before taking action, but why wait? How many cases do we need? It should surely be enough to recognise that this abuse is already occurring and that it can easily escalate further. Intimate audio can easily be captured on mobile phones. We can clearly foresee the consequences of sharing such recordings and how they can be used to humiliate and intimidate, and cause alarm and distress, because voices are recognisable. As I indicated last year, the helpline that my charity, Muslim Women’s Network, runs has had cases, and the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, gave examples of cases, so how many more do we need?
We are perpetually playing catch-up when it comes to responding to new forms of abuse. Perhaps for once we can get ahead of the problem before audio abuse becomes widespread. I want to borrow a phrase from my noble friend Lady Kidron, who said we should lay the tracks ahead of the train—or something like that. Today, time and again we have heard that the Government need to be one step ahead. The question is why they do not want to be one step ahead on so many of the amendments we are talking about today. As legislation around image abuse tightens, perpetrators will inevitably look for other avenues through which they can control, threaten and shame victims. I therefore urge the Minister to address intimate audio recordings in this Bill.
Baroness Sugg (Con)
My Lords, I support the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lady Owen, which have been signed by noble Lords across the Committee. I welcome the Government’s Amendment 300 to extend the time limit for the sharing offence, which my noble friend’s amendments also seek to do.
My noble friend’s amendments on deletion, audio abuse, doxing, semen images and the definition of “taking” already aim to deal with activity that is, sadly, on the rise, and to recognise the real trauma that these activities cause the victims—trauma that sadly continues long after the initial offence. The technology around non-consensual images is very complicated, but we have some precedents where solutions have been found elsewhere. I am particularly interested to hear from the Minister on two issues: the 48-hour takedown, which we seen happen in the US, and the hash registry and hash sharing—I was grateful to my noble friend for setting out so clearly what they do. It strikes me as a bit chicken and egg here. The tech is there, but we need to demand progress in order to see progress.
Extending pre-existing domestic abuse protection orders would recognise another development that we are sadly witnessing, with perpetrators using the online world to further their abuse. Taking this opportunity to extend the scope of domestic protection orders will help stop this form of abuse and reflect the reality of the digital age that we are living in.
Technology is rapidly evolving, as we have heard in the example of audio abuse. It is a challenge to ensure that our legislation continues to be fit for purpose, but that is what these amendments seek to do, and in some cases to future-proof it as well. Non-consensual intimate images are an escalating harm. These amendments address critical operational gaps and work towards the systemic protection that we should have in this area.
Lord Banner (Con)
My Lords, I too support these amendments. I declare an interest of sorts in that I have a young daughter who is fast approaching her teenage years. The idea that she might one day be the subject of the kind of despicable abuse that my noble friend Lady Owen and others have outlined is utterly terrifying, so I am determined to do my part to secure its eradication.
My noble friend Lady Owen outlined the case for her amendments with all the skill and more of any King’s Counsel, so I do not need to say very much, but I want to highlight, in particular, her call for Parliament to be agile on this subject. The speed of proliferation of the kinds of abuse she has talked about risks Parliament looking lead-footed and out of touch if we do not take the further steps that she advocates through her amendments. There is no place for wait-and-see incrementalism in this area.
Any concerns about freedom of expression under the Human Rights Act, which from time to time we hear whispers of, are in my view entirely misplaced. The right to freedom of expression is qualified; it is not absolute. It is plainly not a licence to abuse. I ask rhetorically, and genuinely seeking an answer from the Minister: why not do it?
Baroness Coffey (Con)
My Lords, I have signed Amendment 334 on spiking, but I want to congratulate my noble friend Lady Owen of Alderley Edge as she yet again leads the way on the important issues in her other amendments.
Clause 101, on spiking, is certainly welcome. The measure appeared in the previous version of the Bill in the previous Parliament, and I give credit to Richard Graham, the former MP for Gloucester, who brought this to the attention of Parliament. More broadly, I have a little question for the Minister. I am always very nervous when civil servants recommend that we remove things from existing legislation. I notice that the clause will remove Section 22 and Section 23 at the beginning and then there is the broader new Section 24. What has driven that? Too often things disappear and end up with some kind of defect or loophole. That is exactly what concerned my friend Joe Robertson MP, who tabled an amendment like my noble friend’s Amendment 334 on Report in the Commons, having tabled something similar in Committee. His concern was that there is a loophole and that spiking by a reckless act should also be an offence.
I do not need to persuade your Lordships that spiking is a hideous, heinous activity which can destroy people’s physical and mental health. The evidence given by Colin Mackie from Spike Aware UK at Committee stage in the Commons was compelling, especially as it was driven by his personal experience of his 18 year-old son Greg dying through suspected spiking of the kind now known as prank spiking.
At the moment, Clause 101 provides that there has to be an intent to injure, aggrieve or similar. I know that Ministers in the other place felt that the Bill covers recklessness, but I think it is pretty clear that the legislation does not particularly seem to cover prank spiking.
Recklessness is a well-trodden principle in criminal law, dating back a couple of hundred years. It is definitively an alternative to intent so, if the prosecution fails to establish that someone meant to do something, it can also establish that their actions were so reckless that they should be convicted. Indeed, this is what manslaughter is—somebody gets convicted of killing but without having the intent to commit murder. The other example, perhaps not quite so dramatic, is actual bodily harm. The prosecution must establish the harm but can do so on the basis that what was done was reckless so that harm was bound to follow rather than simply that someone intended for harm to happen.
I hope the Government will reconsider their conclusion that what we have before us in Clause 101 is sufficient. I understand that it may be that one MP has got particularly focused on this campaign, but it took Richard Graham to get focused on the issue of spiking for it to make any progress into legislation in the other place. I am grateful to this Administration for picking that up. I look forward to hearing from the Minister and hope again that there may be room for some consensus, not just compromise, on how we can make sure there are no loopholes in this law.
Baroness Shawcross-Wolfson (Con)
My Lords, I also support the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lady Owen and will try to keep my remarks as brief as possible. As we have heard today, technology continues to provide new avenues for abuse, in particular for the abuse of women. Abusers use technology in ever more inventive ways to harm, harass and try to humiliate their victims. Thanks to the work of my noble friend Lady Owen and others in this House, the law has made huge strides in recent years; however, more needs to be done.
Broadly, these amendments fall into two categories: those that seek to update the law to ensure that it addresses new and growing forms of tech-enabled abuse, and those that seek to provide more effective support to the victims of non-consensual intimate image abuse. We need action on both fronts. I will not go into detail here, as it has already been covered, but I will just reiterate that some of the gaps that need to be closed are: updating our definition of what constitutes taking an image; including audio recordings in the framework for tackling non-consensual intimate images; ensuring that images which may have been innocuous when they were taken but are then transformed into something sexual or degrading are also captured by the law; and, finally, recognising the practice of doxing as an aggregating factor.
Unfortunately, we know that, however the law changes, abuse will not be eliminated any time soon, so we must also ensure that the law supports victims in the aftermath of their abuse. As it stands, there is no proper framework to ensure that intimate images that the courts have found to be taken or shared illegally are then removed and destroyed. Instead, survivors see their images being repeatedly uploaded, posted on to pornography sites, shared in anonymous chat forums and even allowed to remain untouched on their abusers’ devices or cloud accounts. It cannot be right; the law must change. Between them, Amendments 295BA, 295BB, 295BC and 295BD would create a proper mechanism for victims to ensure that images are promptly removed from online platforms, deleted and then hashed to prevent them from resurfacing elsewhere.
Making progress on this issue is crucial. We know the trauma caused to victims who have to live with their images remaining online or live with the knowledge that they could be re-uploaded at any point. As one survivor told the Women and Equalities Committee:
“I am terrified of applying for jobs for fear that the prospective employer will google my name and see. I am terrified when meeting new people that they will google my name and see. I am terrified that every person I meet has seen”.
We cannot allow this situation to continue. The amendments from my noble friend Lady Owen would make the law more effective, more enforceable and more protective to victims, and I hope that we will be able to make progress on them in this House.
Baroness Maclean of Redditch (Con)
My Lords, I add my voice to the support for my noble friend Lady Owen from across the Committee. She has done a great service to victims of these crimes all across the country, most of whom we know are women and girls, but men and boys can be affected too.
I will focus on Amendment 334 which, as my noble friend Lady Coffey has mentioned, would add the word “reckless” in relation to the spiking offence. This is very important. I remember being the Home Office Minister when the phenomenon of needle spiking first hit the headlines. It focused a lot of attention on spiking in general as a phenomenon and meant the Home Office had to put its focus and resources behind it. We found it was very difficult to prosecute these crimes. Often, the substance had left the body. Often, victims were blamed for their behaviour, for putting themselves in those situations.
When I went to talk to the victims, I often heard that they thought that people were just doing it for a laugh, and a lot of the hospitality industry—bars, clubs and festivals—said the same thing. They said that it was really inadequate to have the requirement to prove harm or a sexual motive. That was part of the reason, though not the whole reason, why we have seen such a woefully low level of prosecutions for this. It is my belief that we need to make sure we include this recklessness element, and that is also the belief of most of the campaigners that I have worked with, including Stamp Out Spiking and, of course, Richard Graham, who did a tremendous job. I hope that the Government will adopt this amendment and all the others.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, it has been a privilege to take part in today’s Committee. I think anyone reading Hansard subsequently will get a much better insight than they ever had before of the risks and experience of young women and girls in today’s world, sadly. It has been a privilege listening to all the speeches, particularly on these amendments.
Like others, started by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Owen of Alderley Edge, for the forensic way she has identified the digital loopholes that currently allow abusers to evade justice. As we have been reminded, she has been a doughty campaigner on the Data (Use and Access) Act, with a winning streak that I hope will continue.
At the same time, I welcome the government amendments in this group, which at least signal a positive direction of travel. For far too long, victims of intimate image abuse have been timed out of justice by the six-month limit on summary offences. The noble Baroness, Lady Owen, identified this injustice, and I am delighted that the Government have listened with their Amendment 300. Then, of course, we have a number of other amendments. The noble Baroness’s amendments go further than time limits; they address harms that the Bill completely misses.
In particular, I highlight Amendment 298B, which addresses the malicious practice known as doxing. It is a terrifying reality for survivors that perpetrators often do not just share an intimate image; they weaponise it by publishing the victim’s address, employer or educational details alongside it. This is calculated to maximise distress, vulnerability and real-world danger. This amendment would rightly establish that providing such information is a statutory aggravating factor and would ensure that the court must treat this calculated destruction of a victim’s privacy with the severity it deserves.
While we welcome the government amendments regarding deprivation orders, I urge the Minister to look closely at Amendment 295BB, also in the name of the noble Baroness. Current police powers often focus on seizing the physical device—the phone or laptop—but we live in an age of cloud storage. Seizing a phone is meaningless if the image remains accessible in the cloud, ready to be downloaded the moment the offender buys a new device. Amendment 295BB would create a duty for verified deletion, including from cloud services. We must ensure that when we say an image is destroyed, it is truly gone.
I also strongly support the suite of amendments extending the law to cover audio recordings. As technology evolves, we are seeing the rise of AI-generated audio deepfakes—a new frontier of abuse highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Gohir, and the Revenge Porn Helpline, as we have heard today. I pay tribute to her for raising this issue. By explicitly including audio recordings in the definition of intimate image offences, these amendments could future-proof the legislation against these emerging AI threats.
Finally in this area, Amendment 295BD offers a systematic solution: a non-consensual intimate image register using hashing technology, which was so clearly described by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen. We cannot rely on a game of whack-a-mole, where victims must report the same image to platform after platform. A hash registry that identifies the unique digital fingerprint of an image to block its upload across providers is the only scalable technical solution to this problem.
Like the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, we also welcome the new offence of administering harmful substances in Clause 101, but the current drafting requires specific intent to “injure, aggrieve or annoy”. Perpetrators of spiking often hide behind the defence that it was just a prank or done to liven up a friend. This leaves prosecutors struggling to prove specific intent. Amendment 334 would close this gap by introducing recklessness into the offence. If you spike a person’s drink, you are inherently being reckless as to the danger you pose to that person. The law should reflect that reality, and I urge the Government to accept this strengthening of the clause.
Finally, we support Amendment 356B, which would modernise domestic abuse protection orders. Abusers are innovative; they use third parties and digital platforms to bypass physical restrictions. This amendment would explicitly prohibit indirect contact and digital harassment, ensuring that a protection order actually provides protection in the 21st century.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Owen of Alderley Edge for bringing these important matters to your Lordships’ Committee and for speaking so passionately and clearly about the subject matter of her amendments. There is very little that I can add. My noble friend has an impressive track record in this area, her Private Member’s Bill being a striking example of that, and these amendments are very much in the same vein. As she made clear, we must all remember what is truly important here, and that is the victims of these events. They must be at the centre of all our debates, and today they have been.
I am very pleased that my noble friend has retabled Amendments 333 and 334, which were brought forward in the other place by my honourable friend Joe Robertson MP. The omission of recklessness as part of the offence of spiking is, as many noble Lords have said, a severe oversight by this Government; we believe that it should be rectified. My noble friend Lady Owen has our full support for this amendment and our broad support for the rest of her amendments.
Finally, I draw the Minister’s attention to my Amendment 295C, which is a probing amendment. By way of background, Schedule 9 inserts new Sections 66AA and 66AB into the Sexual Offences Act 2003. New Section 66AB contains exceptions to the new offences of taking or recording intimate photographs or films, and its subsection (3) contains an exemption for healthcare professionals who are taking intimate photos of a person who is under 16 and lacks the capacity to consent. My probing amendment would remove the provision that the person has to be under 16 for the exemption to apply. It seeks to probe the Government about a situation where, for example, a doctor has a 30 year-old patient with severe learning disabilities or an 80 year-old patient with dementia. Neither has the capacity to consent, but the doctor has to take a photo of the patient in an intimate state to show the patient’s condition to their consultant, for example. That doctor would not be included in the exemption and therefore would be liable to prosecution.
This is simply to try to understand the Government’s reasoning because, if the exemption is to apply—and it should—there should be no distinction based on age. The doctor is performing the same professional duty to a person who is 15 and cannot consent and a person who is 18 and cannot consent. I will be grateful if the noble Baroness can clarify that particular point.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I join with all other Members of your Lordships’ Committee in expressing gratitude to the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, for bringing forward this large group of amendments, as well as to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, for bringing forward Amendment 295C. I am also pleased to commend government Amendments 300 to 307 in my name, which make two changes to the existing intimate image abuse provisions in Clause 84 and Schedule 9.
This is an eclectic, disparate and rather large group of amendments. I will endeavour to address them in as concise a manner as I can, but it is going to take a bit of time, so I hope your Lordships will forgive me. I start by stressing that the Government are committed to tackling the complete violation that is non-consensual intimate image abuse. However, before I turn to the noble Baroness’s amendments, I want to make a few general comments that apply to many of the amendments in this group, and to some of the others that are being considered by your Lordships’ Committee today.
I start with a comment with which I am sure we can all agree: it is essential that the law is clear and easy to interpret. In that context, I make the following observation, not so much as a Minister, but drawing on my past experience as a senior prosecutor and judge. It is very tempting to add new offences to the statute book. Some of these are intended to spell out the conduct of which society disapproves, even when it is already caught by more general offences—or, some would say, to make something that is already criminal, more criminal.
It is tempting to say that, if such an additional offence makes no substantive change, then why not—the Government should simply accept it. However, such changes are not always without consequence. In my experience, it can sometimes make it harder to prosecute, and thus secure convictions, when there are a number of different offences on the statute book, all of which cover the same behaviour but often with slightly different elements or maximum penalties. I know that that is absolutely not the intended effect of many of these amendments, but I would gently suggest to your Lordships that it is worth bearing in mind that legislating for large numbers of new offences may not be without adverse consequences.
That said, I have the utmost respect for the noble Baroness, Lady Owen. She and I share the determination to deal with some pretty repellent behaviour that has the ability to ruin victims’ lives; the question is how best to achieve it. As I said before, I want to make it absolutely clear that the Government and I are very much in listening mode. I was very pleased to meet the noble Baroness recently, and I thank her for that. I wanted to understand better the intentions underlying some of her amendments, and I look forward to working with her closely over the coming months.
I am thankful for the contributions of my noble friends Lord Hacking, Lady Curran and Lady Chakrabarti. I am afraid that I am going to have to disappoint my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti on the implementation date for the deepfake legislation, as she will probably not be surprised to hear. It will depend on a number of factors, and I cannot give her a date today. I also thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Bertin, Lady Maclean, Lady Sugg and Lady Shawcross-Wolfson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, who was kind enough to leave the question of the ombudsman with me. I am also thankful for the contributions of the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones, Lord Banner and Lord Cameron, and the noble Viscount, Lord Colville.
I turn now to this group of amendments. Amendment 295BA seeks to create a reporting mechanism for non-consensual intimate images to be removed within 48 hours. The Government recognise the calls to go further than the existing protections afforded by the Online Safety Act. We share the concern that some non-consensual intimate images remain online even after requests for removal have been made by the Revenge Porn Helpline. Worse still, some remain online following a successful conviction for non-consensual intimate image offences. We absolutely acknowledge this problem. I reassure the noble Baroness that we are considering how best to tackle this issue, and I hope to be able to provide more detail on the work in this area on Report.
I turn to Amendment 295BB. As I have just said, the Government recognise the harm caused by the continued circulation of intimate images and thus share the intention underlying this amendment. There are existing mechanisms that allow the courts to deprive offenders of images once they have been convicted of intimate image abuse offences. We are already amending deprivation orders so that they can be applied to seizing intimate images and any devices containing those images, regardless of whether the device was used in the offence itself. An example would be an external hard drive: even if it was not used to perpetrate the offence, it can be seized if it has the images on it. This will significantly limit the defendant’s ability to retain or access intimate image abuse material.
That said, we recognise that these existing powers were not originally designed with intimate images in mind, and that, as a result, they currently do not extend to devices that contain images but were not directly used to commit the offence. I reassure the noble Baroness that we are taking steps to strengthen the framework.
I turn to Amendments 295BC and 295BD, which were also spoken to by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville. I must say that the noble Viscount slightly lost me with some of the more technical details of what he was describing.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I am always delighted to meet with the noble Viscount.
Through these amendments, the noble Baroness wishes to create a statutory register of non-consensual intimate images and hashes. Once again, I commend the intention behind the amendments, but I believe that they will lead to duplication of work that I can confirm is already taking place. Organisations such as the Revenge Porn Helpline play a vital role in detecting and removing non-consensual intimate image abuse. That organisation has in place a database of existing hashes of non-consensual images that are shared with participating companies to detect and remove the images from circulation online.
Furthermore, in March this year, Ofcom published its first codes of practice for the Online Safety Act regulatory regime, which set out a range of measures that platforms should implement to tackle non-consensual intimate image abuse. Ofcom is currently reviewing consultation responses on new measures for the codes, which include measures for platforms to use scanning technology to detect intimate images by matching them against appropriate databases of digital fingerprints or hashes of such images. I reassure the noble Baroness that finalised measures will be published in due course.
Amendments 295BE to 295BG, 295BJ, 298A, 299A and 300B all share the purpose of expanding all intimate image offences to include real and purported audio recording of those in an intimate state. The noble Baroness, Lady Gohir, spoke powerfully about the need for this. However, the Government cannot accept these amendments for two reasons. The first is the difficulties in proving such offences, and the second is that we consider that the harm in question is covered in the main by existing offences.
As far as proof is concerned, it is a general truth that being able to identify voices is a great deal more problematic than identifying images. Awkward and possibly embarrassing though this is to be considering in your Lordships’ Committee in the middle of the working day, a few moments’ thought about the kinds of sounds recorded, given the context, will illustrate some of the difficulties. First, it would be difficult for tribunals of fact, whether magistrates, judges or juries, to determine whether the recorded audio is or purports to be that of a particular person. Secondly, the proposed definition of an intimate audio recording as one “which a reasonable person considers sexual in nature” might be hard to determine from the audio alone. In short, there are concerns about how this could be proved to the criminal standard.
In this context, I refer back to the point I made earlier: the law must be clear and enact only offences that are capable of enforcement. The Government have looked at this closely and seriously, and we have tried to identify cases where intimate audio abuse is alleged. It is our view that there does not appear to be a large number of cases where this happens in isolation. Instead, the reason for the audio abuse is usually to blackmail or harass someone. Both are criminal offences already, with blackmail carrying a significant maximum penalty of 14 years imprisonment. If we are wrong about this, I know that the noble Baroness has said that she will share further evidence with me, and I am sure that this will also apply to the noble Baroness, Lady Gohir. I am happy to discuss this issue further with both of them.
Amendment 295BH seeks to define “taking” for the purposes of the new intimate image-taking offences. In our recent meeting, following the question the noble Baroness raised at Second Reading, I confirmed to her that the proposed “taking” offences as currently defined would not include screenshots, but I understand the harm that the noble Baroness seeks to prevent, and I have asked officials to look at this issue closely. I hope to provide a further update on Report.
Amendment 295C, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Cameron of Lochiel and Lord Davies of Gower, seeks to amend the base offence set out in Schedule 9. This applies where an image of a person under 16 in an intimate state is taken or recorded for the purposes of medical care or treatment. The noble Lord’s amendment recognises the need for the medical exemption, but it would remove the age restriction to prevent the criminalisation of those taking or recording intimate images of a person of any age. Section 5 to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 already provides for specific medical exemptions in cases where an intimate image is taken of someone over 16. I hope the noble Lord will agree that it is therefore unnecessary to extend the provision in this Bill.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
I was spiked at the age of 16 at a dance by a cousin of the hosts where I was staying. He said afterwards, “I don’t know why I did it. I didn’t intend to hurt anyone”. So there are such situations—having listened to what the Minister said, I note that no one could prove that he had been anything other than rather silly. He was in his 20s and was probably drunk. He filled an orange juice jug with gin, and I spent two days in bed.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I am extremely sorry to hear about that experience. As ever, I am very grateful to the noble and learned Baroness, for whom the entire Committee has great respect.
As I was about to say, the Government are fortified in our belief that the concept of intention would be proved by the fact that there is case law that establishes that, where ecstasy was administered to another to “loosen them up”, that amounted to an intent to injure—intention being separate from the motive. The fact is that defendants say all sorts of things about what they did or did not mean; it will be for the tribunal of fact, looking at what happened, to see whether it can be sure that the intention was as specified in the statute.
We are confident that the types of behaviour that should be criminalised are already captured. Once again, I go back to the important point I set out at the beginning of this group: this new spiking offence aims to simplify the legal framework and to make enforcement straightforward. We do not want to do anything that risks undermining that by overcomplicating the offence.
Amendment 356B, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, proposes to expand the scope of prohibited conduct under domestic abuse protection orders. Although I appreciate the motive underpinning this amendment, these orders already allow courts to impose any conditions that they consider both necessary and proportionate to protect victims from domestic abuse. Put simply, setting out a prescriptive list risks narrowing the flexibility and discouraging conditions that are tailored to the conditions of the offender. The police statutory guidance already includes examples, such as prohibiting direct or indirect contact and restricting online harassment, but we are happy to update this guidance to include the additional behaviours mentioned.
This has been a long speech, and I hope your Lordships will forgive me. My intention has been to explain to the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, and all other noble Lords, for whom I have great regard, why the Government cannot support these amendments today. For the reasons I have set out, I invite them not to press their amendments, but I hope they will join me in supporting government Amendments 300 to 307, which I commend to the Committee.
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
Before the Minister sits down, can I just check something? On Amendment 299B, she knows that my intention is not to create something that is too broad but to tackle the very real and rapidly proliferating problem of semen images. It would be helpful to get clarification that the Government understand this to be an issue and are willing to work with me so that we can bring back an amendment on Report. Further, on Amendment 295BB, the Minister spoke about physical devices, but I am keen to know how the Government will tackle images shared on the cloud, because this is the real problem. Finally, on Amendment 295BA, the Minister said that more detail would be given. I just want to know whether that will be on Report or between now and Report, so that we can bring back something about the 48-hour takedown on Report. America has already won the battle on this.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
As far as the revolting practice of semen images is concerned—and I do not think anybody in your Lordships’ House would think it was anything other than that—if an offence can be drafted that is sufficiently specific, then of course we will consider it. Our concern is that the drafting of the proposed amended offence is so wide that it would capture a lot of behaviour that should not be criminalised. As for the other two matters raised by the noble Baroness, please may we discuss them?
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
I am sorry, I realise that people want to get to the dinner break, but will the noble Baroness commit to meeting me, the noble Viscount and the Revenge Porn Helpline on Amendments 295BC and 295BD? She spoke about duplication. These amendments are suggested by the Revenge Porn Helpline; therefore, I do not believe that it believes it duplicates its work. It would be very helpful for us to meet and clarify that.
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
I thank the Minister for her responses. I am grateful for the engagement so far with her and Minister Davies-Jones, and I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions. I am going to take these points away for further considerations, and I look forward to the meetings that we are going to have, but for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Levitt
“6A In section 66H (time limits for prosecuting summary offences)—(a) in subsection (1), for “under section 66E or 66F” substitute “to which this section applies”;(b) after subsection (1) insert—“(1A) This section applies to offences under—(a) section 66AA(1);(b) section 66AC(1);(c) section 66B(1);(d) section 66E;(e) section 66F.”;(c) for the heading substitute “Intimate images: time limit for prosecution of summary offences”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment extends the time limit for prosecuting the summary only offences in existing section 66B(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and new sections 66AA(1) and 66AC(1) (added by Schedule 9 to the Bill).
Baroness Levitt
Member’s explanatory statement
My amendments to Schedule 9 paragraph 18 amend section 177DA of the Armed Forces Act to add the provision the Bill currently inserts as section 177DZA. They also provide for images of breastfeeding recorded in circumstances which constitute an offence under section 67A(2B) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to be subject to deprivation orders.
“(za) in the heading, omit “Purported”;”Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to Schedule 9, page 278, line 24.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to Schedule 9, page 278, line 24.
“(aa) in subsection (2)—(i) for “purported intimate image to which the offence relates” substitute “item specified in column 2 of the table in relation to the corresponding offence”;(ii) after “the offence”, in the second place it occurs, insert “under section 42”;”Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to Schedule 9, page 278, line 24.
“(3) This is the table—
Provision of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 | Item |
Section 66AA(1), (2) or (3) | Photograph or film to which the offence relates |
Section 66E | Purported intimate image to which the offence relates |
Section 66F | Purported intimate image which is connected with the offence |
Section 67A(2B) | Image to which the offence relates” |
See my amendment to Schedule 9, page 278, line 24.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to Schedule 9, page 278, line 24.
“(2) In section 154A (purported intimate images to be treated as used for purposes of certain offences)—(a) in the heading, omit “Purported”;(b) for subsection (1) substitute—“(1) This section applies where a person commits an offence under a provision of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 which is listed in column 1 of the table in subsection (2A).”;(c) in subsection (2), for “The purported intimate image to which the offence relates” substitute “The item specified in column 2 of the table in relation to that offence”;(d) after subsection (2) insert—“(2A) This is the table—
Provision of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 | Item |
Section 66AA(1), (2) or(3) | Photograph or film to which the offence relates |
Section 66E | Purported intimate image to which the offence relates |
Section 66F | Purported intimate image which is connected with the offence |
Section 67A(2B) | Image to which the offence relates”; |
This amendment amends section 154A of the Sentencing Code to add the provision the Bill currently inserts as section 154ZA. It also provides for images of breastfeeding recorded in circumstances which constitute an offence under section 67A(2B) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to be subject to deprivation orders.
Crime and Policing Bill
Tuesday 9th December 2025
(5 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-V(a) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Fifth Marshalled List) - (8 Dec 2025)
Lord Hanson of Flint
“Disregarding convictions and cautions for loitering or soliciting when under 18(1) Part 5 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 is amended as follows.(2) In the heading of Chapter 4, omit “for buggery etc.”(3) For the italic heading before section 92, substitute “Sexual activity between persons of the same sex”. (4) After section 94 insert—“Loitering or soliciting: under 18s
94A Automatic disregard of convictions or cautions for loitering or soliciting when under 18(1) A conviction or caution is a disregarded conviction or caution if—(a) it was for an offence under section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959 (loitering or soliciting for the purpose of prostitution), and(b) the offender was aged under 18 at the time of the offence.(2) Sections 95 to 98 explain the effect of a conviction or caution being a disregarded conviction or caution.”.(5) In section 95 (effect of disregard on police and other records)—(a) before subsection (1) insert—“(A1) Subsections (1) to (4) apply in respect of a conviction or caution disregarded under section 92.”;(b) after subsection (4) insert—“(4A) A relevant data controller must delete from relevant official records, as soon as reasonably practicable, any details of which they are aware of a conviction or caution disregarded under section 94A.”(6) In section 99 (appeal against refusal to disregard convictions or cautions)—(a) in the heading, at the end insert “for sexual activity between persons of the same sex”;(b) in paragraph (a), after “application” insert “made under section 92”.(7) In section 100 (advisers)—(a) in the heading, at the end insert “on applications under section 92”;(b) in subsection (1), after “case” insert “under section 92”.(8) In section 101 (interpretation)—(a) in the definition of “disregarded caution”, after “which” insert “is or”;(b) in the definition of “disregarded conviction”, after “which” insert “is or”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for a conviction or caution for loitering or soliciting for the purpose of prostitution, where the offender was under 18 at the time of the offence, to be disregarded.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
My Lords, Amendments 308 and 309 are closely bound with Amendment 313 tabled by my noble friend Lady Goudie. If the Committee will allow me, I will ask my noble friend Lady Ritchie to speak to her amendments and on behalf of our noble friend Lady Goudie, who is unable to be here tonight. That being the case, I will then respond to both the Opposition Front Bench and any comments made by my noble friends, given that the lead amendment is mine but is very much tied up with a range of amendments. In that case, I will sit down and allow the proceedings to continue. I beg to move.
Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Lab)
My Lords, I will address the amendments in my own name, Amendments 316A and 316B, relating to prostitution, and Amendments 310 to 313 in the name of my noble friend Lady Goudie. I also support the amendments in the name of my noble friend the Minister.
Like my noble friend Lady Goudie, I wish to address the exploitation of women and girls. As she has outlined in the amendments, which have also been signed by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, women and girls are trafficked, exploited and routinely abused in prostitution for the profit of others. I fully support all her amendments, which would finally bring laws in England and Wales into alignment with those in Northern Ireland following the work of the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, when he was a Member of the Northern Ireland Assembly. The other amendments in this group in the name of my noble friend Lady Goudie are clearly needed, as they shift the burden of criminality from vulnerable women on to the men who buy sex, the traffickers, the pimps and the platforms that facilitate and profit from prostitution. Quite simply, my noble friend Lady Goudie has my full support.
I move on to address Amendments 316A and 316B in my name. Commercial sexual exploitation is a continuum. Women move from one form of prostitution to another. For example, a women may be involved in pornography production but moves to selling sex in person or vice versa. Women often go from in-person stripping to online camming sites. I hasten to add that I do not have any particular knowledge of this issue, but I am aware of it. I thought I would add that piece of information. While the location or act may change, what rarely changes is the exploitation of the women involved.
I will focus on just one aspect of this: online sexual exploitation via camming sites. These are websites where someone is requested to perform sexual activities in front of a webcam for paying subscribers. These content creators, as they are known—although I am reluctant to use the phrase, as it diminishes the exploitation—are usually women, and the subscribers are usually men; in other words, women sell sex, and men buy it. These sites come with their own specific dangers and types of exploitation.
Baroness Featherstone (LD)
My Lords, I speak against Amendment 310 on the prohibition of pimping. According to the Member’s explanatory statement, it would
“make it a criminal offence to enable or profit from the prostitution of another person, including by operating a website hosting adverts for prostitution”.
Specifically, the amendment would create the offence of assisting or facilitating another person to engage in sexual activity with another person in exchange for payment or other benefit, where the assister or facilitator knows or ought to know that payment for sexual activity is taking place, whether or not the person assisting or facilitating gains in any way. It would also criminalise the publishing or display of any digital advertisement for sexual activity.
The amendment conflates consensual sex work with sexual exploitation and trafficking. Adopting it would cause significant harm to sex workers. In seeking to criminalise those who facilitate the exploitation of victims of forced prostitution, which is already a crime, it would instead make sex workers’ lives more difficult and dangerous by removing their ability to advertise their services online and seek assistance or support from others in carrying out their services.
I will take those two separate elements in turn. First, on criminalising those who assist or facilitate another person engaging in sexual activity for payment where the assister or facilitator knows or ought to know that such activity is taking place, the impact of this would be disastrous for sex workers and the organisations that support them. It would mean that anybody acting to help sex workers work safely, including safety service operators such as National Ugly Mugs, would be guilty of an offence. I am sure that the intention of Amendment 310 was not to catch that, but it does.
I launched National Ugly Mugs when I was a Home Office Minister to reduce the violence that sex workers experience. The principle behind the scheme was not controversial. When a sex worker experiences violence or a threat, they can report it anonymously online. Other sex workers are therefore warned about a dodgy punter. That information, often the only line of defence, has saved lives, prevented repeated attacks and encouraged people who would never otherwise go to the police to start trusting them again. The ability to post online about a dangerous client is invaluable but would be caught by Amendment 310.
Since I launched it in 2012, National Ugly Mugs has disseminated more than 1.17 million alerts to sex workers warning of risks. Whatever one’s view of prostitution, no one should be assaulted, raped or murdered for the work they do. National Ugly Mugs was never about endorsing prostitution. It was about reducing harm and preventing homicide. The evidence is clear that where harm reduction schemes exist, sex workers are better able to report violence, share intelligence and access justice. Where they are removed, people go underground and the violence gets worse, not better.
The argument often put forward is that the Nordic or buyer criminalisation model would make the scheme unnecessary. But if you look honestly at the evidence from Sweden, Norway and France, you will see that violence did not disappear. It went into the shadows and underground. Sex workers in those countries report being more isolated, less able to screen clients and more fearful of the police. We should not repeat those mistakes here. It is a dangerous illusion to think that by abolishing the tools that keep people safe, we abolish the reality of prostitution. We do not. We simply make it more dangerous.
Amendment 310 would also criminalise family members and the extended support networks that many sex workers rely on in order to carry out their sex work, and it would criminalise the many sex workers who support other sex workers in carrying out their services. It would criminalise any business—such as banks, mobile phone providers, taxi services or web hosting providers—that knew or ought to know that it was providing services to sex workers and was thereby assisting them in carrying out their activities.
Sex workers are already among the most discriminated-against groups in the UK, suffering appalling stigma. To take just one of the examples set out above, the Financial Conduct Authority recently warned financial institutions not to close the bank accounts of those they suspect or know are carrying out sex work because of the significant harm caused by doing so. Providing a sex worker with a bank account enables them to receive payment for sexual services, and this would clearly be caught by the Bill because it is facilitating or assisting the sex worker in carrying out their work.
The amendment would compel banks to close sex workers’ accounts and would perpetuate such harm. The net result of the amendment would be to shut sex workers out of the economy and prevent them accessing the services and support they need to work safely, pushing them into more dangerous and more difficult working environments. The displacement of sex workers away from the support services they rely on would make it more difficult for sex workers to survive and make it more challenging for those who care about and serve those communities to locate and to help them.
My second issue is the move to criminalise the publishing or display of any advertisement for sexual activity. This section of the amendment seeks to criminalise the operations of the adult service websites, ASWs, and make it impossible for sex workers to advertise online. In the modern world, most sex workers do use adult service websites to advertise their services, and working in that way means that sex workers remain in control of the services they offer and the environment in which they work, and can take steps to screen the clients they are planning to meet in advance of doing so. For example, they can take ID information and/or prepayment, and use online checking tools such as the National Ugly Mugs scheme, which I launched, to see whether the phone number or email address contacting them has previously been linked to violent or abusive behaviour.
Supporters of the amendment will argue that because traffickers also attempt to use these platforms to advertise those they are criminally exploiting, they should be outlawed. However, outlawing the means for sex workers to advertise would not remove the sex workers themselves. They would instead be forced to adopt new approaches to sourcing clients, and that would have four main effects.
First, as evidenced by outcomes in other countries, online advertising for sex work would still exist but in a different form. Rather than sex workers advertising themselves openly as providing sexual services, they would instead advertise non-sexual companionship or massage services in such a way as to give the website proprietor grounds to demonstrate that they do not know that sexual activities are being advertised. This would make it harder to identify and provide outreach and support to those who are, in reality, carrying out sex work, and harder for law enforcement to screen adverts and assess risk.
Secondly, it would mean that advertising would be pushed to less visible areas of the internet, such as private messaging groups, social media and the dark web, where it would be out of sight of law enforcement and those seeking to provide support services to sex workers. UK national policing agencies have made clear that for this reason they do not support the outlawing of adult sex websites.
Thirdly, some ASWs would instead move offshore and carry on business out of reach of UK policing. They would also stop providing evidential materials to UK law enforcement, making it harder for police to investigate and prosecute genuine cases.
Fourthly, it would increase the levels of danger facing sex workers by forcing them off the internet and on to the streets. On-street work is universally acknowledged as being far more dangerous than online. In this scenario, sex buyers would hold all the power in negotiations and those who seek to harm sex workers would have greater opportunities to do so.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for the explanations of their amendments. I support the Government’s Amendments 308 and 309 for reasons that will be explained by the Minister. I go further and support the Amendments 312 and 313, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie. It must be so difficult for social workers and charities to steer sex workers away to a better life if they have to admit to these offences when seeking legitimate or conventional employment, when they have not even been found to be dishonest. I support the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, in her Amendment 316B for the reasons that she explained. This is yet another online problem.
I am afraid that I cannot support Amendments 310 and 311, which seek to make buying or organising the provision of sexual services illegal. I come at this from a similar position to that of the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone.
In the recent past, and for centuries before, we erroneously thought that we needed to stamp out gay sex because we did not like it. Thanks to the effort of great campaigners, people like me now recognise that the policy was absolutely bonkers. We made otherwise law-abiding citizens out to be criminals, we turned patriots into security risks, and we made sure that around 5% of the population could never reach their full potential—and we hurt them. We made sure that gay people could not have stable relationships, which then caused a variety of health issues for both the gay and the straight communities. We do much the same with prostitution.
We have an especially nasty name for sex workers—we call them prostitutes or worse. However, quite a lot of people, mainly men, are happy to use them for a variety of reasons—some understandable and some not so good. We do everything that we can to make it a dirty, horrible, seedy, disgusting business, in the vain hope that doing so will reduce the problem. It does anything but.
We ensure that only criminals can engage in managing the paid-for sex business, just like the drug trade. Worse still, and just like homophobia, we create a health problem with sexually transmitted diseases, when we could minimise the problem if we so desired. The noble Baroness explained the logic behind her amendments. If the policy were successful, there is no doubt that it would be a great moral success. However, to be successful, the police would have to devote huge resources to absolutely stamp out prostitution in the UK, and I am not confident that they can.
I see considerable problems with these amendments. The first is around the safety of sex workers, and the noble Baroness touched on this. I would imagine that, very often, appointments are made via an ordinary mobile phone. If something goes horribly wrong with the encounter, no doubt the police can access the mobile phone records and use relevant detection techniques. Sex workers can currently identify regular, and therefore safe, clients. If these amendments became law, clients would not use their main mobile; they would surely use burner phones, regularly change them and turn them on only at railway stations and the like. Of course, this activity would no longer be a red flag; it would be quite understandable. If the booking is online, clients would use a website that might be far away from the UK, in authorities such as Russia or the Far East. The noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, talked with great knowledge about this issue. It would lead to significant cyber and espionage risks compared with sex workers using certain well-known UK sites.
One would hope that someone who acquires a sexually transmitted disease would be honest with the health professionals seeking to identify the source of the infection, particularly if it were hard to treat. If the amendment is accepted, very few clients would agree to reveal that they have paid for sex, where and with whom.
I can understand why the noble Baroness has sought extraterritorial jurisdiction. If she did not, we would be exporting our problems—if they are problems—to another country, which might be as close as Germany, for instance, which has for many years done what I am about to propose. If the police are given concrete evidence that this offence has been committed somewhere on the continent, are they going to go in hot pursuit? I am not sure that the police in Berlin, for instance, would be very helpful, given that it is not an offence there.
When certain state employees are security vetted, it is necessary to understand the applicant’s sexuality because it could obviously be a major vulnerability, but there is never a problem if the applicant is honest and candid, and the vetting team is not easily shocked. However, it would be a problem if the applicant admits to serious criminal offences. If they successfully lie to the vetting team, they make themselves a security risk.
Unlike the online problems that we have been discussing, we are talking about the world’s oldest profession. If we think that we have stamped it out, we may only have driven it deep underground, as explained by the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone. Those seeking paid sex would have to use dangerous IT solutions, which would leave them, and possibly their employers, much more vulnerable to cyber attacks and blackmail. The sex workers involved would be involved in a very serious criminal undertaking—not just, as at the moment, perhaps three girls setting up a flat together.
What is to be done to address the ills that the noble Baroness has so skilfully articulated? I do not disagree with her analysis of the problem and the evils. Hitherto in the UK, we have taken a priggish and prudish attitude to these matters and made things far worse, just as we did with gay people. The answer is that we should regulate, license and tax this activity, just as we do with alcohol. We should license establishments, whether large or small—the larger establishments could be discreetly located so that they do not interfere with the local community. We should ensure that sex workers never again have to give the majority of their earnings to an immoral criminal who will abuse them if they do not. The economics of the profession would be favourable for sex workers if there were no immoral parasites involved. We should ensure that criminals are not able to be involved in the business at all. We should license sex workers to ensure that they have not been trafficked and are not being coerced into the business. This policy would make it far more difficult to force people into the business and would drastically reduce the risks for sex workers.
If we went down this route, there would be significant benefits apart from the tax take, which would be significant. We could require regular health checks and make sure that any drug dependencies were properly managed. We could make this a condition of the personal licence. It is reasonable to argue that sex workers would not have to entertain so many clients in a day, and in any case, as I have suggested, it would be a far less sordid activity for all. If the Minister is cautious in his response to these amendments, I will gladly support him.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in what has been a thoughtful and at points sobering debate on this group of amendments. Each amendment has been brought forward with a genuine desire to protect some of the most vulnerable people in our society, a shared goal among all of us.
On Amendments 308 and 309 in the name of the Minister, I of course understand and respect the intention that lies behind them, which is to ensure that individuals who were exploited as children, often in circumstances of profound vulnerability, are not burdened in adulthood by convictions or cautions that arose from their victimisation. We share the Minister’s desire to protect children from such exploitation and absolutely recognise that those under 18 involved in prostitution can very often be victims.
The amendments as drafted would create an automatic disregard or pardon for every offence of loitering or soliciting committed under the age of 18. Will the Minister explain whether a blanket approach of this kind is the right mechanism? Young people under 18 can be convicted of a wide range of offences, many of which the law rightly considers on a case-by-case basis with great care and nuance. It is not immediately clear why this category of offence should be given automatic treatment when others are subject to a case-by-case consideration. I totally accept that that is a difficult question. While we are very sympathetic to the concerns that underpin the amendments, we hope to hear from the Minister a more detailed rationale for them.
Amendments 310 and 311, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie, and spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, raise significant issues about the role of those who enable, promote or profit from prostitution, including through online platforms, and about the criminal liability of those who pay for sexual services. Again, we absolutely support the underlying principle that exploitation, whether offline or online, must be robustly tackled and that those who profit from the abuse or commodification of vulnerable people should face meaningful consequences. The growth of online facilitation has created new and disturbing avenues for exploitation, and we support efforts to ensure that our legislative framework keeps pace with these developments.
However, the approach that the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie, has suggested through these amendments, which is effectively to repeal the current offences in the Street Offences Act and replace them with the new offences in her amendments, is a very wide-ranging change to the law. Such a sweeping and significant alteration to our legal framework should not be undertaken, in our view, without a serious consideration of the impact and should be the subject of a serious examination, consultation with the police and other groups and the publication of proposals by the Home Office. It is not a change that we can simply make on a whim.
Finally, Amendments 316A and 316B, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick, concern the rapidly evolving landscape of online sexual exploitation. We share the noble Baroness’s concern about the ways in which digital platforms can facilitate harmful or coercive practices and about the need to ensure that those who profit from the exploitation of vulnerable individuals are held to account. We recognise the seriousness of the issues that she has raised this evening and the need for continued work to ensure that offenders cannot simply exploit technological advances to evade scrutiny or sanction. I hope the Government will consider these amendments very carefully.
There is clear recognition of the need to strengthen protections for vulnerable people and to ensure that those who exploit them, whether in person or online, are met with the full force of the law. I look forward to continuing discussions with the Government as the Bill progresses and to hearing from the Minister tonight so that we can ensure that the legislation is robust and proportionate and delivers the protections that victims so clearly deserve.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, the problem of prostitution has been around since biblical times. I can understand why the noble Lord might not be very supportive of Amendments 310 and 311, but does my noble friend on the Front Bench not offer any solution to the problem of prostitution?
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
I thank the noble Earl for that question. I have made the position of the Front Bench clear and think it is now for the Minister to answer such a testing question.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick for commencing this discussion and debate. A number of views have been expressed in Committee today and some go wider than the amendments that are before us. The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, raised a number of issues which go beyond what is before us. My noble friend Lady Ritchie also touched on the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lady Goudie. It is clear that there are differing views in the Committee—from the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, on the Front Bench opposite—which tells me that this is a truly complex area where there are very different legislative options open and where the Government need to consider very carefully what needs to be done.
The Government are absolutely committed to tackling the harms associated with prostitution and sexual exploitation, including where it takes place online. This is an important part of our work on tackling violence against women and girls which, as colleagues in the Committee will know, is a top government priority, and about which we will be saying more shortly. But we need to look at the evidence. We have limited evidence as to what will most effectively reduce demand for prostitution and disrupt exploitation without—and this is the key point that came out of some of the contributions—unintentionally causing harm to victims and survivors and making life more difficult for those who choose that lifestyle. I say to my noble friend that the Government are not in a position to accept the amendments today, but I want to make it absolutely clear that we are in the business of taking steps to tackle sexual exploitation and to gather evidence to inform further interventions in the future.
Amendment 310 in the name of my noble friend Lady Goudie would make it an offence to assist, facilitate, or control the prostitution of another person, regardless of whether the individual secures any personal gain from this facilitation. The broad wording of this offence could—and again this echoes what the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, said—have an adverse consequence for people who choose to be engaged in prostitution, for example, by criminalising professionals such as healthcare support workers, charities which provide sexually transmitted infections testing or those providing contraception or safety planning. The noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, made a compelling case around some of the issues that the Government have reflected on in relation to that amendment. My noble friend Lady Goudie’s amendment would also make it a criminal offence to operate a website hosting adverts for prostitution, and I will come back to that again in a moment, if I may.
My noble friend Lady Ritchie, in Amendments 316A and 316B, would introduce new criminal offences to tackle the sale of personalised sexual content online, including audiovisual and visual content. Amendment 316A would make it an offence to own, manage or facilitate one of these online platforms, while Amendment 316B would create an offence of causing or inciting an individual to sell personalised sexual content on these platforms. It would also introduce a duty on the online platform to remove personalised sexual content within 24 hours if an individual is convicted of the offence and if an individual who is incited to sell the content has requested its removal.
The Government recognise very strongly that we need to take action to tackle these websites. The so-called pimping websites need to be addressed and tackled. However, I would argue that criminalising those websites may have safety implications for people who sell sex and may result in displacement to on-street prostitution, which is more dangerous for individuals. It may also disrupt policing operations. The police can scan adult service websites for signs of vulnerability and exploitation and to gain data to support criminal investigations.
I accept that members of the Committee might want government Ministers to say that, but Changing Lives, an organisation supporting people who have been sexually exploited, also advocates against criminalising adult service websites. Instead, it is calling for stronger regulation, more referral mechanisms and more funding to support people affected by exploitation.
Amendment 311 in the name of my noble friend Lady Goudie would make it an offence for an individual to pay for or attempt to pay for sex either for themselves or on behalf of others. The Government have looked in detail at this approach in other countries which have taken it and have seen indications that the law can be misused to harass and victimise people engaged in prostitution. Again, that is a matter for debate and discussion, but that is the view the Government currently take.
Amendment 312, in the name of my noble friend Lady Goudie, would repeal the offence in Section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959 which criminalises a person aged 18 or over who persistently loiters or solicits
“in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution”.
Amendment 313 would disregard prior convictions and cautions. There may be some common ground here, because I absolutely recognise the concern that this offence may criminalise vulnerable individuals and restrict their opportunities for employment. However, I am also mindful that on-street prostitution can have an impact on local communities, and it is important that we consider their views.
My noble friend Lady Goudie, were she able to be here, would say that the criminal law rightly evolved in 2015 to make it clear that children cannot be prostitutes and that any child who is paid in exchange for sex is clearly a victim of child sexual exploitation. Therefore, I would argue that it is long overdue that individuals issued cautions or convictions for the offence in Section 1 of the Street Offences Act before 2015 have their criminal records expunged.
The noble Lord, Lord Cameron, asked for details. I simply repeat: children cannot be prostitutes. Children who are paid in exchange for sex are clearly victims of sexual exploitation. The records currently in place provide significant barriers to the employment and psychological rehabilitation of those who are now adults. It is important that we look at the long-term consequences of those incidences and help support them in rebuilding their lives. That is why we have tabled government Amendment 308, which will disregard convictions and cautions for Section 1 offences issued to under 18s. Amendment 309 will provide pardons for such convictions and cautions.
In each case, what we have tried to do—I hope the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, will reflect on this—is to ensure that the disregard and pardon are automatic. We do not want to retraumatise victims and survivors of childhood abuse by requiring them to go through an application process. I asked today in our internal Home Office discussions how many individuals this could impact. We have looked at the figures for the last 30 years and assess that 350 to 352 individuals would fall under the auspices of that. Someone aged under 18 30 years ago is now approaching their 50s. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, that for that person an offence committed as a child would still be on their record. Something they maybe did not have responsibility for at the time would therefore impact upon their employment and life chances. Therefore, I would welcome his support for that repeal.
Lord Pannick (CB)
I entirely support what the Minister is putting forward. Is it the intention of the Home Office to track down these 350 or so individuals and notify them of the consequences of this legislation when it is enacted?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
We will reflect on that, but, as I said, the disregard and pardon will be automatic, so it will happen if the Bill receives the support of both Houses and Royal Assent. I will reflect on what the noble Lord said, because there may be an opportunity to consider that. However, I do not want to commit to it today, because we do not necessarily know where someone who was that age in 1995 is now—the address, contact details and so on might all be different. The key point is that this is an automatic disregard for those individuals, so if publicity is given to this new clause and the Bill receives Royal Assent, it will potentially lift a burden for those who were under 18 at the time.
The Government cannot share in the support for repeal of the Section 1 offence for those over 18, and I can give reasons for that. We will consider in future, if the Section 1 offence is repealed in its entirety, whether the disregard and pardon should be extended to adults, because that is a separate issue. However, today I wanted to focus on those under 18.
Earl Attlee (Con)
Will the Minister consider separating the disregard and the pardon?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am trying to think how that would impact upon the issue we are talking about today. In effect, the disregard and pardon will be automatic for people under the age of 18. I will look at what the noble Earl said and discuss it with Home Office colleagues in that context.
As I have rejected the amendments in the name of my noble friend, I reassure her that there is a range of ongoing work to tackle sexual exploitation, and our intention is to continue working with the police, charities and those affected to ensure that we take action. It is important that we draw attention—as the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, did—to online platforms’ legal duties under the Online Safety Act 2023, which came into play on 17 March. That Act sets out priority offences that platforms must take additional steps to tackle. In addition, I hope it will help my noble friend Lady Ritchie to know that the Sexual Offences Act 2003 makes it an offence to cause, incite or control prostitution for gain. Those offences, together with human trafficking offences, are priority offences under the 2023 Act.
As I think the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, indicated, platforms should now already be completing risk assessments and implementing measures to mitigate against the risk of their services being used for illegal activity and having illegal content present. Ofcom is providing recommended measures for compliance through the illegal content codes, and platforms must be able to demonstrate the measures they have taken to comply with their duties. Very significant fines of 10% of global revenue are in place, or, in extreme cases, business disruption measures.
To show that we are not ignoring the issues my noble friend has raised, I also point out that we have introduced provisions in Schedule 13 that will enable law enforcement agencies to apply to the courts to temporarily suspend for up to 12 months IP and domain names used for serious crimes such as sexual exploitation. We are also working closely with the police and other law enforcement partners to ensure that the laws we already have are effectively enforced.
Through our law enforcement partners, we are running a pilot whereby adverts are referred to the Home Office- funded Tackling Organised Exploitation Programme to consider if offences have been committed on adult service websites. In addition, as my noble friend has mentioned, our law enforcement partners are working closely with Ofcom on the issue of adult service websites to ensure that the right measures are put in place to identify and remove illegal content and safeguard people from sexual exploitation.
It may help my noble friend to know that we are providing £450,000 to the National Police Chiefs’ Council this year to pilot a national law enforcement intelligence and investigation hub for sexual exploitation, collating information on victims and perpetrators. We are also providing £475,000 to Changing Lives to provide support to those affected by sexual exploitation.
I hope the Committee can reflect on this difficult and challenging topic. I commend Amendments 308 and 309 to the Committee. I am grateful to noble Lords who have contributed—
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
Picking up what the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, said about licensing sex workers, I wonder whether the Minister knows what goes on in Holland, where each individual woman is licensed as an individual business. I walked through the red-light district of a small town and saw women in all the windows, and I was told by a local Dutch councillor that all of them had pimps. They were either on the phone to their pimp or the curtains were pulled. So I suggest that licensing does not stop pimping.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful for that. As I said, the Home Office has examined and looked at a range of alternative methods of regulation and legislation from other countries. The issue of licensing is outside these amendments and the legislative proposals in the Bill, so I do not wish to go down that route today. But obviously we look at all experiences. Our main objective is to ensure that we support, and protect the safety of, individuals who choose to involve themselves in this work, and at the same time to ensure that no harm comes to wider society as a result of those actions. I am grateful to the noble Earl for raising this today, but it is not an issue that I can explore at this moment, for the reasons I have outlined.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“Pardons for convictions and cautions for loitering or soliciting when under 18(1) The Policing and Crime Act 2017 is amended as follows.(2) After section 165 insert—“165A Pardons for convictions etc for loitering or soliciting when under 18: England and Wales(1) Subsection (2) applies in respect of a person (whether living or deceased) who—(a) was convicted of, or cautioned for, an offence under section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959 (loitering or soliciting for the purpose of prostitution), and(b) was aged under 18 at the time of the offence.(2) The person is pardoned for the offence.(3) Expressions used in this section or section 167(1) (so far as relating to this section) and in Chapter 4 of Part 5 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 have the same meaning in this section or (as the case may be) section 167(1) as in that Chapter (see section 101 of that Act).”.(3) In section 167 (sections 164 to 166: supplementary)—(a) in subsection (1) for “or 165” substitute “, 165 or 165A”;(b) in subsection (2) for “or 165” substitute “, 165 or 165A”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would provide for pardons for persons convicted of or cautioned for loitering or soliciting for the purpose of prostitution when they were under 18.
Baroness Brinton
“Commencement of the Protection from Sex-based Harassment in Public Act(1) Section 4 of the Protection from Sex-based Harassment in Public Act 2023 is amended as follows.(2) Leave out subsection (3) and insert—“(3) Sections 1, 2 and 3 come into force on the day that the Crime and Policing Act 2025 receives Royal Assent.”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause automatically commences the Protection from Sex-based Harassment in Public Act 2023 when the Crime and Policing Bill receives Royal Assent, removing the need for regulations to bring the Act into force. The Act criminalises the public harassment of individuals where that harassment is based on an individual’s sex.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 315 seeks to do something very simple but long overdue: automatically commence the Protection from Sex-based Harassment in Public Act 2023 when the Crime and Policing Bill receives Royal Assent. The Act requires the Government to pass a statutory instrument to commence its provisions. We have been waiting two years now for this SI, so the Act is not in force. Of the four sections in the Act, the only one in force is Section 4, on the extent, commencement and Short Title of the Act.
As with other groups this evening, this amendment has a cross-party background. It is worth noting and giving credit to Greg Clark, the former MP for Tunbridge Wells, because this was his Private Member’s Bill, sponsored by him and given time by the then Conservative Government. Greg said he had heard some harrowing experiences of school students in his constituency. It is really shocking that one in three girls reports being sexually harassed while wearing a school uniform. In our society in 2025, that is unacceptable. The 2023 Act creates a new specific offence of harassment on account of an individual’s sex.
The amendment to this Bill was tabled in the Commons by my honourable friend Mike Martin MP, who is now the MP for Tunbridge Wells. Like Greg Clark, Mike Martin believes that the Government need to create the statutory instrument to bring it into effect, but there has been nothing other than warm words from Ministers—no action has happened. The Act criminalises harassing, following, shouting degrading words or making obscene gestures at women and girls in public places with the deliberate intention of causing them harm or distress. This offence will carry a maximum sentence of two years’ imprisonment and under the Government’s new proposal would clearly still come under the magistrates’ courts, whereas in the past it would have not been able to, but would have had to go to a Crown Court. As Mike Martin MP said in the Commons debate, sexual harassment is a blot on our society.
The statistics are damning. Some 71% of women in the UK have experienced sexual harassment in public; this rises to 86% among women aged 18 to 24. The lack of action from this Government on ending the sexual harassment of women, especially young women, is not good. Mike Martin MP tabled a Written Question on this back in the spring, and the Government said then that they would publish their next steps. However, more recently, the Government said that it will be done in due course. To be honest, this sounds as though it is further away than the next-steps offer made earlier this year. The amendment says that now is the time.
Greg Clark’s Private Member’s Bill had cross-party support and this amendment also had cross-party support when the Bill was debated in the Commons. I worry that this Government cannot deliver on their manifesto commitment to halve violence against women and girls when they will not take this straightforward first step to challenge and prevent the appalling sex-based harassment that continues to be so evident everywhere in the UK. I look forward to the Minister’s reply but, above all, I urge that now is the time for action on this matter. I beg to move.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I support the noble Baroness’s amendment for the reasons she gives and for a further reason, which is that I deprecate the practice of Ministers of all Governments of not bringing into force legislation which has been enacted by Parliament. Parliament intends legislation to come into effect; otherwise, we are wasting our time debating and approving it. Parliament enacts legislation to address a mischief, as, in this case, the mischief that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has identified. Of course, I understand that sometimes time is needed to prepare for the effects of legislation, perhaps because implementing regulations are needed, but after two years, it is high time for this legislation to come into force.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, this amendment exposes the indefensible gap between Parliament’s clear intent and women’s lived reality. The new offence was deliberately framed to capture deliberate, targeted and deeply damaging conduct, with a suitably serious maximum penalty, but without commencement, there are no consequences for offenders and no visible progress for the public. The Government’s delay sits uneasily alongside their stated ambition to halve violence against women and girls, particularly given previous assurances that implementation would follow swiftly as part of their wider strategy.
From these Benches, the message is simple: Parliament has already done the hard work in legislating; what is now required is immediate commencement, not further consultation or prevarication, so that this cross-party achievement can finally begin to offer real protection on the streets and in public spaces.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for moving this amendment, which, as she says, seeks to accelerate the commencement of the 2023 Act. The intention behind the amendment is clear and wholly understandable: to ensure that victims of sex-based harassment benefit from protections that Parliament has already approved, and to do so without further delay.
Without doubt, there is a shared desire across this House to see individuals, particularly women and girls, better protected from harassment in public spaces, and while I entirely understand that commencement provisions often involve important practical and operational considerations, including the readiness of policing and guidance frameworks, and that there has to be an explanation of the implications of altering the timetable set out in the original Act, we on these Benches recognise the motivation behind the amendment and the concerns that it seeks to address.
If the Government do not agree with the amendment, we look forward to hearing from the Minister what progress there has been towards commencement and whether the approach proposed here would assist the effective implementation of the Act’s provisions.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for raising the important issue of public sexual harassment. As has been discussed, Amendment 315 seeks to automatically commence the Protection from Sex-based Harassment in Public Act 2023 when the Crime and Policing Bill receives Royal Assent. I remind the Committee that this Government have been responsible for periods of activity since July 2024, not for two years. As members of the Committee will know, tackling public sexual harassment is an important part of the Government’s mission to halve the levels of violence against women and girls in a decade.
As the Committee knows, and as I have said on numerous occasions, including today, the new violence against women and girls strategy is to be produced as soon as possible. It will include a range of actions to tackle sexual harassment. I reassure the noble Baroness, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, from the Liberal Democrat Front Bench, that the measures we are developing within this to address sex-based harassment include options for commencement of the 2023 Act.
I echo fully the sentiments of the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and agree that timely implementation of legislation is an important principle to follow. I share the view of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that, if we pass legislation, we must look to introduce it. The Government have heard what noble Lords have said: namely, that we need to set a timeline for the commencement of the 2023 Act. It is important to fully consider the issues of implementation of the new offence, including engagement with the police and operational partners. We want to ensure that, when the offence comes into force, it is used often and well.
I assure all noble Lords who have spoken today that the Government intend to commence this offence as soon as is reasonably practicable. By bringing the provisions of the 2023 Act into force through the usual commencement regulations, we can ensure that this can be timed so that the police and others are ready. Accordingly, I suggest that the amendment is unnecessary. I ask the noble Baroness to be patient and wait for our violence against women and girls strategy, which will appear in short order. In the meantime, I hope she is content to withdraw the amendment.
I say that because we are looking at options to commence the Protection from Sex-based Harassment in Public Act 2023. We believe that it will tackle this issue and ensure that women feel safer on our streets. On the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, as with all primary legislation, we need a preparatory period, but my officials in the Home Office, along with my ministerial colleagues, are working through the next steps. We are taking the time to get this right. I assure noble Lords that we will provide an update in due course and that they will not have too long to wait.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I am struggling to get what I have just heard right. Earlier this evening, we discussed a number of amendments in which we were not supported because we expect to see the strategy on violence against women and girls. This is completely different. There is legislation that is on the books but has not been commenced. Can the Minister explain why it cannot be commenced now? It is a completely different issue from what is going to be in the strategy, where there may be surprises. The Minister has told us that it will be commenced. What is the delay?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
We are looking with police and other partners at the stage at which we wish to commence the legislation. We have been in office since July last year; my honourable friend Jess Phillips, the Minister for Safeguarding, is undertaking a considerable amount of work to pull together the strategy, which we expect to be able to announce in very short order. As part of that strategy, we are looking at a range of measures, including harassment. I accept that that is on the statute book now, but it is important that we produce a package of measures that is whole and includes a range of things, which I am not at liberty to talk about today but are in genesis for the violence against women and girls strategy that we will publish shortly.
We are now in Committee. Report will happen at a later stage in this Session. I very much expect that by then we will have published our violence against women and girls strategy, and I hope that at that stage the noble Baroness will not need to look at pressing this amendment further. For the time being, I ask her to give us time to consult further, make sure we implement this correctly and allow the violence against women and girls strategy to be published. I would be grateful if she would not push her amendment at this stage but reflect on what I have said. If not, we will return to this in due course.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I am very grateful to the Minister for his response, even if I am still somewhat bemused about the hierarchy of decisions going on in relation to this Bill when there is actually something on the books. However, I will hold him to his word. If we do not have clear indications of the VAWG strategy and when things will happen by, I will bring back an amendment on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw.
Lord Black of Brentwood
“Animal sexual abuse(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended in accordance with subsection (2).(2) For section 69 (intercourse with an animal) substitute—“69 Animal sexual abuse(1) A person commits an offence of animal sexual abuse if they—(a) intentionally engage in sexual activity with an animal, whether penetrative or non-penetrative,(b) cause, coerce or permit another person (including a child) to engage in such activity with an animal, or(c) cause, coerce or permit an animal to be used for the purpose of sexual gratification, whether their own or another’swhether that animal is living or dead.(2) For the purposes of this section, “sexual activity” includes—(a) penetration, or an attempt to penetrate the vagina or anus by a penis or other body part as well as by the use of objects;(b) sexual touching or stimulation of an animal;(c) the sexual stimulation of a person through contact with an animal;(d) any other act undertaken for the purpose of sexual gratification of a person involving or directed at an animal.(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or to a fine, or both;(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.(4) Where a person is convicted of an offence under subsection (1), the court may make such order as it thinks fit with respect to the animal concerned and any dependent offspring, including—(a) depriving the offender of ownership of the animal and for its disposal, including by sale, gift, rehoming or destruction;(b) appointing a person to carry out, or arrange for the carrying out of, the order.(5) The court may also make an order under this section (a “disqualification order”) in the terms set out in section 34(2) of the Animal Welfare Act 2006, prohibiting the offender from one or more of the following—(a) owning animals;(b) keeping animals;(c) participating in the keeping of animals;(d) being party to an arrangement under which they are entitled to control or influence the way in which animals are kept;(e) dealing in animals;(f) transporting animals.(6) A disqualification order under subsection (5)—(a) must specify the period for which it has effect, including for life, and(b) shall be treated for all purposes as if made under section 34 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006. (7) A court by or before which a person is convicted of an offence under this section may also order that the offender be subject to the notification requirements of Part 2 of this Act.(8) Where a court decides not to make an order under subsection (4), (5) or (7) in relation to an offender, it must—(a) give its reasons for the decision in open court, and(b) if it is a magistrates’ court, cause them to be entered in the register of its proceedings.”.(3) The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 is amended as follows.(4) In section 63 (extreme pornographic images), omit subsection (7)(d) and insert—“(d) a person engaging in sexual activity with an animal whether dead or alive, whether penetrative or non-penetrative,”.(5) In section 67(5)(a) (penalties etc. for extreme pornographic images), after “63(7)(a)” omit “or (b)” and insert “, (b) or (d)”.(6) After section 67(5), insert—“(6) Where a person is convicted of an offence under section 63(7)(d), the court may make such order as it thinks fit with respect to the animal concerned and any dependent offspring, including—(a) depriving the offender of ownership of the animal and for its disposal, including by sale, gift, rehoming or destruction;(b) appointing a person to carry out, or arrange for the carrying out of, the order.(7) The court may also make an order in relation to an offence under section 63(7)(d) (a “disqualification order”) in the terms set out in section 34(2) of the Animal Welfare Act 2006, prohibiting the offender from one or more of the following—(a) owning animals;(b) keeping animals;(c) participating in the keeping of animals;(d) being party to an arrangement under which they are entitled to control or influence the way in which animals are kept;(e) dealing in animals;(f) transporting animals.(8) A disqualification order under subsection (7)—(a) must specify the period for which it has effect, including for life, and(b) shall be treated for all purposes as if made under section 34 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006.(9) A court by or before which a person is convicted of an offence under section 63(7)(d) may also order that the offender be subject to the notification requirements of Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.(10) Where a court decides not to make an order under subsection (6), (7) or (9) in relation to an offender, it must—(a) give its reasons for the decision in open court, and(b) if it is a magistrates' court, cause them to be entered in the register of its proceedings.”.(7) In section 34(10) of the Animal Welfare Act 2006, at end insert, “and section 69 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and section 67(7) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008.”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment expands and clarifies two distinct but related offences: 1. Animal sexual abuse offences – covering direct acts of sexual abuse or exploitation of animals; and 2. Offences involving images of animal sexual abuse – covering the creation, possession, and distribution of extreme pornographic material depicting sexual acts with animals.
Lord Black of Brentwood (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 316 stands in my name and those of the noble Lords, Lord Goddard of Stockport and Lord Trees, and the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey. They are all passionate supporters of animal welfare and I have had the pleasure of working with them on a number of important issues in the past. I am delighted to be able to do so again and thank them for their support. I am very grateful to the Animal Related Crime Working Group of the Chartered Society of Forensic Sciences for all the work it has done on this subject, along with other animal welfare charities including Cats Protection and Battersea Dogs & Cats Home.
Animal sexual abuse—to which, with apologies to my good friends at the Advertising Standards Authority, I will for ease refer to as ASA—is not an easy subject to address. It takes us to some dark places, evil crimes and some of the most depraved aspects of humanity. But it is vital that we discuss it in the context of this important Bill and take the opportunity to clarify and toughen the law.
We should do so in part because of the animal welfare issues. Animals subject to ASA often suffer terrible injuries or die. The lives of those that survive are damaged and they are scared and alone, with the perpetrators of these wicked crimes often those who should be caring for them. To harm a defenceless animal is one of the most terrible acts of cruelty imaginable and deserves to be dealt with by deploying the full force of the law. But it would be quite wrong to think of this as just a niche animal welfare matter, crucial though that is. The unpalatable and often unspoken truth is that this is a far more widespread issue about safeguarding, sitting four-square at the intersection of sexual offending, child protection, coercive control and domestic abuse.
Before I come on to the position of the law and why and how it needs to change, it is crucial to set out the background, because the evidence of the links between ASA and other serious offending, often involving children, is deeply disturbing. While evidence from the UK is sparse because of the difficulty of collecting data under current legislation, international studies underline the seriousness of the issues involved. A major study of ASA arrests over four decades in the United States found that nearly a third of animal sex offenders had also sexually offended against children and adults. Over half had prior or subsequent criminal records for human sexual abuse, ASA, interpersonal violence or related offences. A scoping review in 2024 found similarly consistent evidence that animal cruelty frequently co-occurs with intimate partner violence and child maltreatment, reinforcing the point that ASA is often part of a wider pattern of family violence.
Here in the UK, the charity Naturewatch Foundation has analysed prosecutions under Section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, which covers the possession of extreme pornographic images. It found that in the two years of 2019 and 2020, on 73% of occasions where child sex abuse had occurred, ASA was present in the same case. Its written evidence to an inquiry by the House of Commons Women and Equalities Committee summarises research showing that animal abuse occurs in around half of households that are affected by domestic abuse where there is also an animal on the premises. In one study, 71% of domestic abuse victims reported that the perpetrator also abused pets. That is sickening.
There are significant concerns regarding the use of extreme pornography, which has already been widely debated in Committee and which I have discussed with my noble friend Lady Bertin, who is supportive of this amendment. Here, a study reviewing FoI data provided by police forces across England and Wales and by the CPS found that nearly three quarters of extreme pornography cases involved ASA.
This issue is therefore clearly not just one about animal welfare, vital though that is. As a predictor offence, a red flag for broader sexual and domestic offending, it is about serious harm to often very vulnerable groups of people, and the law is currently not dealing with it effectively or comprehensively, or with the gravity it deserves. That has to change, which is why I have brought this amendment forward. To be legislating as we are on sexual offending and public protection without addressing these known gaps on ASA would be a serious missed opportunity, and in my view negligent on our behalf. It fits naturally with the structure of the Bill, as Part 5 deals with sexual offending, digital harms, sentencing and offender management, all covered by this amendment.
Let me say a word about the law as it stands. Currently, there is no clearly defined crime in law of animal sexual abuse, including under the Animal Welfare Act 2006. Offences are covered by two separate pieces of legislation. Section 69 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 relates to intercourse with an animal, but is limited in scope, covering only penile penetration. The maximum sentence is two years’ imprisonment on indictment. In the last full year, according to figures that the Minister kindly let me have in reply to a Written Question, there were no cases proceeded against and only one the year before. Section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 covers the possession of extreme pornographic images. These cover acts of intercourse or oral sex with an animal, whether dead or alive, and non-consensual penetration of a person’s vagina or anus by an animal.
In short, existing legislation is fragmented, imprecise, ineffective and incomplete. It is far too narrowly focused, failing adequately to reflect the range of behaviours encountered in modern police investigations, with many sexual acts falling outside of scope. Image-based offences are prosecuted under legislation designed for a very different digital age from the one we live in. All that causes real problems for the police, the CPS and the courts, which do not have the certainty and powers to investigate, prosecute and sentence. As a result, far too many heinous crimes are inevitably going unpunished. Even more importantly, far too many vulnerable people are being left at risk of sexual offences or domestic abuse because red flags and predictor offences were not registered and managed properly.
To deal with all this, my amendment would create two linked offences. First, it would create a comprehensive offence of animal sexual abuse, which would cover penetrative and non-penetrative sexual acts, including acts committed for sexual gratification whether or not there is physical penetration, and situations where children or others are involved or made to witness the abuse. The maximum penalty would be five years’ imprisonment, which is proportionate to the seriousness of the conduct and aligned with comparable sexual offences.
The second is a separate offence relating to images of ASA in line with the structure and sentencing framework of Section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, carrying a maximum of three years’ imprisonment. This would close the gap where images of ASA sit at the margins of extreme pornography, despite clear overlap in practice with child sexual abuse material.
The amendment would also equip the courts with: safeguarding tools that are already familiar in other sexual offending contexts; disqualification orders under Section 34 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006, preventing future ownership or control of animals where appropriate; deprivation and disposal powers in respect of animals used in the commission of the offence; and the application of the notification requirements of Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, so that the most serious offences can be monitored in the same way as other sexual offenders. All those would be discretionary—rightly preserving judicial flexibility—but crucially, they would ensure that, when the courts identify a pattern of offending, they have the tools they need to manage the risk to children, partners and animals.
The heart of the amendment, which is based on peer-reviewed research and evidence to Parliament, is about improving protection for both animals and vulnerable people. In line with existing sentencing and notification frameworks, it would ensure that those who commit these heinous offences can be properly prosecuted, monitored and managed. It would prevent so much suffering. I hope that the Committee will support the amendment. If the Government have any concerns about the wording, perhaps the Minister will be able to work with me and colleagues across the Committee to ensure we achieve robust modern animal sexual abuse provisions and include them in the Bill.
Finally, I will briefly say a few words about Amendments 316ZA to 316ZE, in the name of my noble friend Lord Blencathra, from whom we will hear in a moment. I know that he is a great champion of animal welfare, and it has been a pleasure to work with him in the past on important legislation. He is a great campaigner and champion. I know that he agrees with me on the principles involved here and the substance of the amendment; the issue is simply about terminology and the use of the word “bestiality”. He raises an important point, and I am glad that we will have the opportunity briefly to discuss it.
From my own discussions, I understand that the veterinary forensic and safeguarding communities have very deliberately moved away from the term in favour of “animal sexual abuse”, for a number of reasons. First, and most importantly, because of the evidence firmly establishing the links between ASA and the abuse of children, using the language of sexual abuse ensures that those shared risks are recognised consistently across disciplines and that we are talking about these behaviours in a way that supports safeguarding. Secondly, “bestiality”, sadly, is frequently misunderstood as pertaining only to farmed animals; in reality, we see such offending across a range of species, including companion animals, fish and even reptiles and cephalopods. The terminology of ASA reflects that wider reality. On those points, I beg to move.
Amendment 316ZA (to Amendment 316)
Lord Blencathra
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to alter the wording of Amendment 316 to refer to “animal bestiality” rather than “animal sexual abuse”.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Black of Brentwood on introducing his proposed new clause and on running through the sordid details, which we did not want to hear and do not want to think about, but had to hear if we are to have better legislation, which I believe his proposed new clause will introduce. His proposed new clause is far superior to Section 69 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, since it describes the abuse of the animal and not just the perversion of the offender. It links to all the other online offences we have in the Bill—where people are publishing dangerous and pornographic pictures of abuse, strangulation, et cetera—and animal sexual abuse needs to be included there too. Therefore, I strongly support his amendment, which has also been signed by other noble Lords and my noble friend Lady Coffey.
When I first saw his amendment, I was motivated to use the term “bestiality”, since I was brought up in Scots law, which had very robust words to describe illegal sexual activity—at least illegal a few years ago. Bestiality is still the term used in Scotland. I initially thought that the term “abuse” was milder than bestiality and that bestiality conveyed a more condemnatory stance of the filthy perverts who were doing this. However, after a discussion with my noble friend Lord Black of Brentwood, I now agree that bestiality is a more restrictive legal term focusing on the perverted behaviour of the man rather than the abuse of the animal. Abuse is the key word here. I accept that the terminology “animal sexual abuse” is a more contemporary term emphasising the act as cruel and exploitative rather than just a taboo behaviour.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, since the noble Lords, Lord Black and Lord Blencathra, have said that this is not an easy subject, I remind the Committee of what happened when Section 69 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 on sex with animals was debated in this House in Committee on 1 April 2003. I draw attention to what the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, said on that occasion:
“I hope that this matter is not something that most noble Lords come across. As we rarely have the opportunity to talk about such subjects, it seems right to ensure that any possible imperfections in the wording are covered, however difficult it may be to talk about them”.—[Official Report, 1/4/03; col. 1186.]
That wise advice applies today.
The prohibition of sex with animals has a long history. It was proscribed in Leviticus, chapter 18, verse 23. Coke’s 17th-century Institutes of the Lawes of England, volume 3, page 59, refer to the criminal offence by a “great Lady” who
“committed Buggery with a Baboon, and conceived by it”.
As the noble Lord, Lord Black, has explained, the limits of Section 69 of the Sexual Offences Act, like its predecessors, are that it covers only some sexual activity—penile penetration of the vagina or anus of the animal or of a human being by an animal—and does not apply to sexual activity with a dead animal. The exclusion of sex with a dead animal is particularly odd, as the next section of the 2003 Act, Section 70, does make it a criminal offence to engage in penetrative sex with a human corpse. The amendment would extend the scope of the offence to cover all “sexual activity” with an animal or using an animal for sexual gratification.
The noble Lord, Lord Black, has sought to define sexual activity in this context with a degree of precision in proposed new subsection (2), but has also left room for debate by stating that sexual activity “includes” what is specified. Of course, sexual activity is as broad as the human imagination. I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Black, that it would be preferable for an amendment to the law not to attempt a legislative Kama Sutra of possibilities but rather to adopt the approach seen in other sections of the 2003 Act.
The 2003 Act already uses the concept of “sexual activity”, for example in Section 4, and Section 78 provides a general definition of sexual activity. Sexual activity, says Section 78, means what a reasonable person would regard as sexual in nature, irrespective of the defendant’s purpose in relation to it. There is a slightly different definition in Section 71 relating to sexual activity in a lavatory, and I confess that I have not fully understood why Parliament in 2003 used a slightly different definition in that context. However, I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Black, that it would be better to have a portmanteau phrase, “sexual activity”, so defined, which is already the approach that the 2003 Act takes in Sections 4 and 78.
I am pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, will not pursue his original wish to substitute the term “bestiality”. My understanding is that, as a matter of law, bestiality is confined to penile penetration of the vagina or anus, which is contrary to the admirable intention of the noble Lord, Lord Black, to broaden the scope of the legislation.
It may also be helpful to include a definition of an “animal” in the new clause by cross-reference to other statutory definitions. As the Committee will know, the Animal Welfare Act 2006 provides by Section 1 that it applies to vertebrates other than man, but there is a power by regulations to extend the protection to cover classes of invertebrates. The Animal Welfare (Sentience) Act 2022 covers, in addition to non-human vertebrates, molluscs and crustaceans. I doubt—the noble Lord, Lord Black, may have broader knowledge than me —whether sexual activity with a mollusc or a crustacean is a mischief which the Bill needs to address.
I have one final point. As was mentioned, this amendment would increase the maximum sentence of imprisonment for the Section 69 offence from two years to five years. I am doubtful about that. I would expect that defendants who are found guilty of the sexual abuse of animals nowadays are, as they always were, sad, pathetic individuals who need help rather than a lengthy prison sentence of more than two years. I would be very interested to hear from the Minister whether in any of the cases under the current Section 69 in the last few years any defendant has received a sentence of two years, or whether any judge has complained that the current sentencing powers of a maximum of two years are inadequate.
Lord Goddard of Stockport (LD)
My Lords, I support Amendment 316 from the noble Lord, Lord Black of Brentwood. Unfortunately, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has just taken my entire speech away from me, so I will not quote Coke’s. I thank him for what he has said. He is a lawyer and he has tried to help with this.
On the point of this amendment—I declare an interest as a vice-chair of the APPG on Cats—the noble Lord, Lord Black of Brentwood, has our support on animal welfare, and indeed he has been driving this for a number of years via a number of APPGs. So the essence of what he is trying to do is right. The comments that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made are helpful: perhaps when we get to another place, we will have a better-worded amendment that carries more support.
For me, the reason I am supporting this is because of the animal side, but there is evidence that the abuse of animals leads to abuse of children. That link is clear, and there is evidence from everywhere that that is where it starts, but it ends with children and young people.
That is why this amendment, difficult as it is to speak about, is vital. When the evidence is there of a cause leading to a different cause that is worse, the amendment should get the support of this House and the Government. The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, is right; he is trying to right a wrong and he understands the points of law. His principle is right: this does need resolving, and it is an important issue to animal lovers. Lots of animal lovers in this country have no idea that this is going on around them. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, may be right, in that some of the people in question are poor people who are not part of society; but there are also those who kill animals for videos and live feeds, to be watched for money. That is going on all around the world; it is not just an English problem.
There is a bigger picture. This is not just about an unfortunate person abusing an animal; like everything else in today’s debate, it is a wider society problem. I hope that people approach this with the gravitas it deserves. Animal abuse is one thing; but transferring that to children and young people is equally important. That is why I support the amendment.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, this group of amendments reflects the realities that the police, the NCA and child protection agencies now face, with children being coerced online into self-abuse, harming siblings or even abusing their family pets under pressure to provide images or live streams as proof. The overlap between child sexual abuse—as the noble Lord, Lord Black, has so clearly demonstrated—offline offending and animal cruelty is now recognised in safeguarding and law enforcement practice. It comes alongside a wider surge in online animal abuse content, in which abuse is staged, filmed and shared for attention or gratification. Strengthening the law on animal sexual abuse so that it reflects how this behaviour is perpetrated and disseminated online is therefore necessary and overdue.
Two points are critical. First, terminology matters. Animal sexual abuse is now used in policing and safeguarding precisely because it captures a wide range of exploitative conduct that is formed, traded and used to control and terrorise victims, including children. Narrowing the language risks opening loopholes that offenders will exploit. Secondly, these reforms need to go hand in hand with better investigation, data sharing and sentencing so that the growing volume of image-based offending against children and animals results in real accountability rather than just statistics.
The sexual abuse of animals and the use of such material within wider abusive networks, which is reprehensible, must now be treated with the seriousness the evidence demands.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Black for his contribution this evening and for his amendments. I welcome the moving of Amendment 316.
As others have said, animal sexual abuse is one of the cruellest acts imaginable. It sees the taking advantage of defenceless creatures, often by those who are expected to be caring for them, and shows complete disregard for living, conscious, feeling creatures who frequently become damaged, traumatised and often die as a result of ASA. I wholeheartedly agree with all noble Lords that it is an offence that deserves to be dealt with using the full force of modern law. The amendment would ensure that the law reflects the severity of the crime. As has been outlined by other noble Lords, applicable legislation is currently fragmented and often parochial. At present, too many offences fall outside the scope of prosecution and the legislative framework is not reflective of the current reality.
I will not repeat all the statistics presented in my noble friend’s excellent opening speech, but it is worth emphasising a couple of his points. The first is the connection of ASA with child sexual abuse offences, general sexual offences, domestic abuse and coercive and exploitative behaviour. As was demonstrated, there exists empirical evidence that proves this correlation. In the United States of America, for example, nearly one-third of ASA offenders have also sexually offended against children and adults. In the UK, 71% of domestic abuse victims have reported that the abuser also targeted pets. There is clear evidence that certain offenders commit similarly related crimes.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, I do not think anyone could disagree that this is a deeply troubling and uncomfortable issue. I begin by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Black, for moving his amendment, and the noble Lords, Lord Goddard and Lord Cameron, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for their contributions. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Black, for sharing a copy of his speech with me yesterday—it was helpful and informative.
The Government are committed to protecting animals and holding to account those who abuse animals. I listened with care to the concerns raised by the noble Lord. These are horrible offences. That said, we believe that the criminal law as a whole already provides sufficient powers to tackle the sexual abuse of animals as well as the robust offences to tackle child sexual abuse and domestic abuse.
I pause here to say that while this is not a laughing matter in any way at all, I shall long remember the striking description of the Kama Sutra of sexual offences against animals given by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I will have to write to him about the sentences imposed for animal abuse, although I am rather minded to agree with those noble Lords who spoke about the fact that there are pathetic individuals but there are also some really wicked ones out there as well.
As the noble Lord, Lord Black, has said, sexual abuse of animals causes them suffering. It is therefore possible to prosecute sexual acts involving animals under broader animal cruelty offences, which bring with them additional powers for the courts to impose orders on offenders.
As the noble Lord said, this is in addition to Section 69 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and Section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. The latter two offences are listed in Schedule 3 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, meaning that if convicted, individuals are automatically subject to the notification requirements, which is colloquially known as being on the sex offenders register.
We acknowledge that the law in this area is set out across a number of different offences. However, we believe that, taken together, these offences ensure that there is sufficient coverage of the sexual abuse of animals in criminal law. We are not persuaded at present that these amendments would substantially increase protection for animals or for people who are victims of sexual abuse. There is plainly coexistence of the two groups of offences. We are less sure that there is evidence for a causative link between the two.
Having said that, I welcome the evidence that the noble Lord shared in his speech. To that end, I would welcome a discussion with him in the coming weeks to look at the issues he has raised; first, in relation to the need for specific further offences and, secondly, the evidence in relation to the possible causative links between the two groups of offending.
My notes say that I will now turn to Amendments 316ZA to 316ZE, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, but I shall not turn to those, as the noble Lord does not intend to press them. I am grateful to him for his temperate and constructive comments on this issue.
I was going to say that I would be happy to meet with either or both of the noble Lords to discuss any evidence suggesting that there are gaps in the law. That offer still holds good. In the meantime, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Black—
Lord Pannick (CB)
I am grateful to the Minister. Does she not agree, however, that it is arbitrary in the extreme that Section 69 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 addresses sex with animals, but that it covers only specific, very limited forms of sexual activity? If you are going to have a specific offence, surely it should cover a wider range of sexual activity with animals, not just the limited categories that we have discussed.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
The Government are satisfied that, when looked at as a whole, all the possible offences here cover the conduct complained of. However, I am conscious that there are ways of committing sexual offences that have not necessarily occurred to the draftsmen of earlier legislation. The best that I can offer the noble Lord is that I will reflect on the matter. I invite the noble Lord, Lord Black, to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Black of Brentwood (Con)
I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. It is always good to move an amendment when there is a unanimity of view across the Committee; it does not happen to me terribly often. I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, both for reminding us of the wise words of my noble friend Lord Lucas—that we do not get to talk about this horrible issue very often so, when we do, we need to make sure that we take the opportunity to tighten the law where necessary—and for his suggestions on the wording of the clause, which I will look at. His point about a portmanteau definition is a very good one.
I am grateful to the Minister for the offer of a meeting on this. I would like to take her up on it, perhaps with colleagues from across the Committee. I do not think it is satisfactory that the law is a patchwork and one has to take an overall view of it to ensure that these terrible offences are properly covered. The point that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made is right: the scope of the existing law is far too limited to capture the whole range of offences that are taking place, particularly online. Much of this law was written at a time before that was happening. So I would like to come and see the noble Baroness, perhaps with some of the charities involved, to talk further about this and what might be done. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Crime and Policing Bill
Monday 15th December 2025
(4 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-VI(b) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Sixth Marshalled List) - (15 Dec 2025)
Lord Clement-Jones
“(aa) if the name change is by deed poll, seven days prior to submitting an application for change of name (if that day is earlier than the day specified in paragraph (a)), or” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that if a person is changing their name by deed poll, they must notify a new name to the police prior to submitting the application.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, this group of amendments addresses a vital aspect of public protection, closing the loopholes that allow registered sex offenders to evade detection and monitoring by changing their identity. Effective management of offenders in the 21st century requires a justice system that is not only legally robust but properly resourced and technologically capable.
On these Benches, we strongly welcome Clause 87, which requires sex offenders to notify the police of a name change seven days before using that new name, in the words of the clause. This is a significant improvement on the current retrospective notification regime, which has allowed offenders to disappear from the radar of the authorities. However, my Amendment 317 seeks to tighten this provision further regarding deed polls. As currently drafted, an offender could theoretically go through the legal process of obtaining a deed poll to change their name without the police being aware until the moment they intend using it, again using the language of Clause 87.
My amendment specifies that if a name change is by deed poll, the offender must notify the police seven days prior to submitting the application. This would ensure that the police are alerted at the very start of the administrative process of changing identity rather than at the end. It provides authorities with the vital time needed to conduct appropriate risk assessments and, if necessary, intervene before a new legal identity is formally established. This proposal has been championed by campaigners such as Sarah Champion MP in the other place, and it is a common-sense safeguard to ensure that the police are always one step ahead.
I stress that the management of offenders today is not just about physical monitoring but about digital monitoring. Just as we have seen criminal recruitment drives for money mules take place on social media platforms, we know that the internet provides avenues for offenders to reoffend or breach their conditions. Although Amendment 317 seeks to tighten the management regime legislative framework, I urge the Government to ensure that the police and relevant agencies have the digital resources and data-sharing capabilities required to enforce these new powers effectively rather than relying on a fragmented system that allows offenders to slip through the net. This measure would strengthen the safety net around our communities immeasurably. I hope that the Minister will accept this amendment as a logical extension of the Government’s own objectives in Clause 87. I beg to move.
Baroness Maclean of Redditch (Con)
My Lords, the Gender Recognition Act 2004 was designed for a world with low demand for gender recognition certificates and did not anticipate modern safeguarding realities. I believe that that context has fundamentally changed, and that creates a serious gap that my amendment seeks to close. The system is no longer confined to a small number of older adults. New Ministry of Justice data shows that almost 10,000 GRCs have been issued. Last year alone, over 1,169 were granted. That is the highest number on record and more than triple the annual figure five years ago. This is quite a dramatic generational shift: almost a quarter of new certificates now go to people born since the year 2000. Demand has changed but safeguarding has not kept up.
I recently tabled a Written Question to the Government after I had seen multiple cases of male-born sex offenders changing their gender identity, so by the time they appeared in court or were sent to prison they identified as women. I was curious, so I asked the Government what safeguards would prevent a convicted rapist or sex offender going on to obtain a gender recognition certificate and being legally recognised as a woman. First, I was troubled that this Question, when it came to be answered, had been transferred to the Minister for Equalities rather than being answered by the Home Office. I believe it is fundamentally a matter of safety and not about equality. It should have been answered by the Home Office, so I worry that that demonstrates a confusion at the heart of the Government on this issue. Rape and sex offences are not about equality or identity but about safety.
Moreover, and more importantly, the response ignored the core issue. While of course we welcome the measures on name changes, passports and police notification, they do not prevent a convicted sex offender, if I understand it correctly, changing their legal sex under the Gender Recognition Act and going on to live the remainder of their life legally as a woman. To me, that highlights a serious safeguarding gap, and this amendment seeks to close that.
Noble Lords may ask why this is necessary and what this risk is that I speak about. We must be frank—sexual predators cannot be cured. The risk may be managed but it is not eliminated. That is why we have the lifelong monitoring regimes we have. That is why MAPPA exists and why I believe that the law must ensure that those who pose a permanent risk to women and girls, and men and boys, cannot access a legal mechanism that alters their status in ways that Parliament never intended.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I rise briefly to support the amendments in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean of Redditch. Both amendments have been spoken to very well and very strongly.
I want talk about one particular case, of a sex offender called Clive Bundy, who was in prison for some years for sexually abusing and raping his daughter, Ceri-Lee Galvin, from a young age. It was incestuous sexual abuse and rape. He went to prison in 2016 and before he was released, he declared he was a woman. Bundy then changed his name via deed poll, very generously helped and abetted by the prison authorities, to aid his release.
I have spoken about this issue in this House before, and there are a number of reasons why it has been brought to my attention. One reason is that Clive Bundy changed his name to Claire Fox—consequently, I know about it. Claire Fox now wanders freely. However, the most important reason is that I was contacted by his daughter, Ceri-Lee Galvin. Before we had the Supreme Court ruling, I raised this a number of times in a number of Bills to note that Ceri-Lee Galvin as a victim had been badly betrayed by this story. She was never told that her incestuous, rapist father was being released, because he was not—Claire Fox was. And of course, guess what? If you google Claire Fox, you will get horror stories, but they are about me and not him.
In all seriousness, it was a deed poll change. Therefore, Clive Bundy might well be on the sex offenders register, but Clive Bundy does not exist. Claire Fox exists, but Claire Fox is Clive Bundy the rapist and is therefore free to live in the same town as his daughter, which he has done, and he has harassed her. I will not go into the details, but Ceri-Lee Galvin has been incredibly brave in giving up her anonymity to talk about this story to the press various times. As she says, she cannot get anywhere when she tries to lobby on this point.
Therefore, in theory, Claire Fox—Clive Bundy—is not on the sex offenders register and can apply to work with young children in the local area, where her daughter goes to nursery, and nobody knows that this person is a child rapist. There must be something that the Government can do to strengthen the safeguarding, which I know is their intention in this group of amendments. Therefore, the two non-government amendments should be seriously taken up by them. They would not contradict their aims but would ensure that their aims are more than just written on paper but actually protect victims and future victims.
It is not a question of making a moral judgment. I do not care whether Clive Bundy thinks that he is a woman; that is irrelevant to me. I do not even care that he has taken my name—which, by the way, is a fashionable thing to do; to use a gender critical name is apparently a form of trolling which happens in America quite a lot. But that is irrelevant. The point is how we protect people when have a sex offenders register that does not reflect reality.
By the way, special privacy measures are given, meaning that when I have asked questions in the past, I have been told that because this person has chosen to change gender and is therefore now Claire Fox, they cannot investigate Clive Bundy. If Clive Bundy as Claire Fox turns up for a meeting to volunteer with the Girl Guides, no one can even ask whether they are the same person. We cannot even go there. This is ridiculous and it is not what the Government want. Therefore, I hope the Government are open to these two very important amendments on deed poll and gender recognition certificates.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I want first to pick up on the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean, and both her comments and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and ask the Minister a question. Am I right in thinking that given that the Prison Service—and I think also the Probation Service—must do a full assessment of risk on any transgender prisoner, the protections they seek are already there?
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean, for raising the case of Karen White. The Scottish Prison Service apologised because it did not do what it should have done: a full risk assessment. Had it done that, she would not have been placed on a women’s wing. I therefore hope the Minister can confirm that the protections for the public, particularly for victims, remain, because now, following the Karen White case in particular, real care is taken to make sure the law is followed. I would find it extraordinary if crimes were just dropped off the list because somebody had a transgender recognition certificate—so could the Minister confirm that this is not the case?
Turning now to my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones’s amendment, we on these Benches also welcome Clause 87, but it needs strengthening. My noble friend’s amendment is very clear: we have to be able to stop offenders changing their names without the knowledge of the police. That also plays into the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean. Research from the Safeguarding Alliance has shown that key legislation is being made redundant because of a loophole that people can use to get through the cracks. This is not just about transgender issues; it is about people just changing their name regardless of their gender. Frankly, this makes Sarah’s law and Clare’s law utterly useless. I hope the Minister is prepared to consider this.
The remaining amendments in this group, from the Government, look as though they are sensible adjustments to the arrangements regarding sex offenders obtaining driving licences in Northern Ireland. We look forward to hearing from the Minister in more detail on those.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I was not going to participate in this debate until I heard about the Scottish case and the Scottish Prison Service admitting that it got it wrong and that it did not carry out what they should have done.
I recall Julia Hartley-Brewer interviewing the SNP Scottish Justice Secretary. The Justice Secretary was saying that it was terribly difficult to reach an assessment, make a judgment and try to get it right. Julia Hartley-Brewer said, I believe, “What is the problem? Just look down his trousers and you will find the answer”. I commend that as the best answer I have ever heard.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, beginning with the amendments that regulate the name changes of sex offenders, I am glad that Members across your Lordships’ House agree on the necessity of regulations. Clause 87 is a sensible measure from the Government, and the amendments that build on its principle are similarly prudent. An individual who commits a crime as intrusive and offensive as a sexual offence demonstrates that they are a threat to public order and safety. After all, that is the reason why we have a sex offender register. Criminals who have proven that they pose a risk should be monitored by the authorities, and the authorities should have the necessary details to monitor and manage them.
Amendment 317 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would ensure that those who change their name by deed poll are legally required to alert the police of this change. The amendments in the name of the Minister extend the provision restricting the granting of driving licences in a new name to Northern Ireland. All these amendments seek to consolidate the existing legislation to ensure that there are no gaps there or in the Government’s new law, and we support the principle behind them.
The most consequential of the amendments in this group is that tabled by my noble friend Lady Maclean of Redditch. It would serve to bar those who commit sexual offences from obtaining a gender recognition certificate. This is a very necessary measure. I am glad that the Government have not yet granted an exemption for sex-offending transgender criminals, which would allow them to attend a prison different from their biological sex. Hailing from north of the border—where, as others have commented, there have been several incidents of that happening—I believe that it is a very worrying scenario indeed.
The Government have still not implemented the Supreme Court’s judgment in the For Women Scotland case, neither in statute nor in guidance. There is still the chance that those who commit sexual offences can end up in the wrong prison through obtaining a gender recognition certificate. I am not remotely suggesting that the Government would wilfully do this, but I hope that, given their record on prisoner administration, the Minister can understand our concerns.
No safeguards currently exist outside of ministerial discretion. A way to guarantee that this does not happen would be to bar sex offenders from obtaining a certificate in the first place; it is a bare minimum. In sending such people to prison, we are admitting that they are not trustworthy among the public; why, then, should we risk the safety of prisoners of the opposite sex? For those reasons, I support my noble friend’s amendment, and I hope the Minister can too.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful for the amendments in this group from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean of Redditch. There are also a number of amendments in my name, which I will formally move and explain what they mean in a moment.
Clause 94, which we will come to in more detail later, provides for the police to restrict changes of name on registered sex offenders’ identity documents. Where the police consider it necessary to prevent sexual harm, they will be able to issue a notice to a registered sex offender, which may require them to apply for the police’s authorisation to change their name on specified documents. This will ensure that registered sex offenders who are deemed to be at risk of using a name change to commit sexual harm are unable to continue offending under a new name and pass under the radar of law enforcement. I am grateful for noble Lords’ broad support for the Government’s general direction of travel on these points.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
Does that mean that if somebody changes a name and does not inform the police, the new name can be put on the sex offenders register?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
That is my understanding of the position. I hope that helps the noble and learned Baroness. That is the principle behind what we are proposing here today. Again, I say to the whole Committee that this is, ultimately, management based on risk, not on gender.
Baroness Maclean of Redditch (Con)
May I press the Minister on one specific point? I understand what he is saying about management of risk, but would it be possible for a convicted sex offender—a serious sex offender or rapist—to be prevented, on the basis of risk, from obtaining a gender recognition certificate, should they wish to do so? Would it be possible for that to be barred in a specific case, should that individual be assessed as posing a risk to public safety?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The Sexual Offences Act 2003 ensures that convicted sex offenders are already subject to post-conviction controls. They are managed according to their risk, and the sex offenders register is about looking at the position with regard to the individual having the risk on the basis of their actions. It would not be possible to stop someone applying for a gender recognition certificate. Ultimately, they would be placed on the sex offenders register based on their risk, not on their gender. With that, I hope that the noble Lords will not press the amendments.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)
My Lords, may I also ask a question for clarification? It is not really about GRC but about the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, made about name change. I know that the Minister covered that in his comments, but I am still left a little confused. Can a person who is a convicted sex offender and on the sex offenders register change their name by deed poll and have their new name omitted, therefore, from the sex offenders register? Surely, as soon as a sex offender changes their name, if they are changing their name from a male name to a female name, that needs to be updated on the sex offenders register.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My understanding of the position is that the individual is on the sex offenders register, regardless of the name that they are currently providing. The risk is around the individual. If a registered sex offender seeks to change their name, the provisions in the Bill will apply, as proposed in the Bill here today.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
On a final clarification—possibly the Minister will write to us, because there is some confusion—I have always said that it is about managing risk and that it has nothing to do with gender. When I have raised this issue in the past, my concern has been that once gender is added into the mix, risk somehow gets forgotten slightly.
First, the point of the sex offenders register is not just for the authorities to know that they are there but for all sorts of institutions to know. I have been told in the past that an enhanced privacy privilege is given to those who change gender. Is that not true? Therefore, even probing that means that we will leave it well alone.
Secondly, in relation to DBS checks and so on, a change of gender, a change of identity—forget the politics of it—can mean that nobody knows that you are the person on the sex offenders register. If the DBS check is in one name, there is no way of knowing that you are the same person who is the rapist. That was why I used the Clive Bundy-Claire Fox example—Clive Bundy, as Claire Fox, would not show up on DBS checks or be on the sex offenders register if they went to work with children. That cannot be right or what the Government intend.
Maybe I have got it all wrong, but nobody from the Government has reassured me. By the way, my questions and amendments in the past were to the previous Government, so this is not having a go at this Government. This has been an unholy mess over two Governments.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
It may help the Committee if I say that both the original name and the new name would be recorded. For clarity, where a DBS check applicant has changed their names, they are required to state all names that they have been previously known by on the application form. In submitting that form, applicants sign a legal declaration declaring that they have not knowingly provided false information. Failure to disclose previous names and deliberately avoiding detection of previous convictions would lead to an individual being liable for prosecution. I hope that helps to clarify the position with regard to the amendments. I invite the noble Lords not to press them at this stage.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I am on the “how to change your name” government website, which says that if you are a sex offender, violent offender or terrorist offender, you must go to your local prescribed police station where you are known within three days of changing your name. It is a criminal offence if you do not tell the police straightaway. There will be probation and other things going on in the background as well.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
It is worth clarifying that this group of people are not necessarily the kind of people I trust. This idea that a local sex offender—or terrorist, since we have been talking about Bondi Beach—thinks, “God, it would be against the law if I didn’t declare that I’ve changed my name”, and would be frightened by the possibility that they would be breaking the law, seems a tad naive.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I remind the Committee that the position of any of these individuals—as the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, mentioned in her initial contribution—will be subject to consistently heavy management. These are serious offenders. There is a Probation Service. There is a MAPPA process. There is the registration. I have given the assurance that both names will be included in that registration.
Every piece of legislation that any House of Commons and House of Lords passes is subject to people breaking it. That happens, but there will be significant consequences in the event of that occurring. I am simply saying to the noble Baroness who has proposed this amendment, and to the proposals in the Bill that are genuinely welcome across the Committee, that there is significant supervision of sex offenders, and the requirements are as I have outlined to the Committee already. I hope that on that basis, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. I am glad he focused on risk mitigation, and I think we got there in the final few paragraphs of his response. We need to take very seriously what he said, and I hope that if anything he said needs qualification, he will write to us subsequently, because this is a really important area.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my new clause (Child sexual abuse image-generators: Scotland) inserted after clause 63.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my new clause (Child sexual abuse image generators: Northern Ireland) inserted after clause 63.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with my amendment to clause 94, page 121, line 16, makes it possible for the regulations made by the Secretary of State to prevent a relevant offender getting a British driving licence in a new name as a replacement for a previous driving licence issued in Northern Ireland.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes provision that is no longer needed because of the general data protection override in section 183A of the Data Protection Act 2018, which was inserted by section 106(2) of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 and came into force on 20 August 2025.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 94, page 121, leave out lines 4 to 8.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with my amendment to clause 94, page 120, line 20, makes it possible for the regulations made by the Secretary of State to prevent a relevant offender getting a British driving licence in a new name as a replacement for a previous driving licence issued in Northern Ireland.
““section 93B relevant offender” means a relevant offender who is subject to the restriction in section 93B(1);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment inserts a definition of “section 93B relevant offender” into the new section about regulations restricting replacement of driving licences of sex offenders with new names in England and Wales and Scotland.
“(3) After section 93I of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (inserted by subsection (2)) insert—“93J Restriction on granting replacement driving licences in new name (Northern Ireland)(1) The Department for Infrastructure in Northern Ireland (“the Department”) may by regulations make provision to prevent a person from being granted a licence to drive a motor vehicle under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1)) (a “replacement licence”) if—(a) the person holds, or has held, a driving licence,(b) the name to be specified in the replacement licence (“the new name”) is different from the name specified in the driving licence most recently granted to the person, and(c) it appears to the Department, on the basis of information provided by the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (“the Chief Constable”), that the person is a section 93B relevant offender who was not authorised to apply for a driving licence in the new name.(2) The regulations may, in particular, include provision for authorising or requiring—(a) the Chief Constable to disclose specified information to the Department, and(b) the Department to disclose specified information to the Chief Constable,where the disclosure falls within subsection (3).(3) A disclosure falls within this subsection if it is made—(a) for the purposes of enabling the Department or the Chief Constable to carry out their functions under or by virtue of the regulations, or(b) in connection with the detection or investigation of an offence under section 93B(3).(4) The regulations may, in particular, make provision about how the Department or the Chief Constable may or must use information disclosed to them by virtue of subsection (2).(5) The regulations may include provision amending Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1)). (6) In this section—“driving licence” means a licence to drive a motor vehicle granted under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1)) or under Part 3 of the Road Traffic Act 1988;“section 93B relevant offender” means a relevant offender who is subject to the restriction in section 93B(1);“specified” means specified in regulations under this section.”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for the Department for Infrastructure to make regulations for Northern Ireland restricting replacement of driving licences of sex offenders in a new name.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“15A In section 136 (Part 2: Northern Ireland), in subsection (11), after “sections” insert “86B, 87A, 93A, 93H,”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that the term “Secretary of State” is not read, in relation to Northern Ireland, as meaning the Department of Justice in provisions inserted into Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 where there is different provision about Northern Ireland.
“(2A) In subsection (5) for “the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland” substitute “a Northern Ireland department”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 94, page 121, line 17.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes regulations of the Department for Infrastructure under section 93J inserted by my amendment to clause 94, page 121, line 17 subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.
“(b) for “the Department of Justice” substitute “a Northern Ireland department”.(4) In subsections (8) and (9) for “the Department of Justice”, in each place it occurs, substitute “a Northern Ireland department”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 94, page 121, line 17.
Lord Blencathra
“ScheduleDisqualification for riding a cycle: minor and consequential amendments1 The Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 has effect in relation to a person disqualified for riding a cycle as if it was amended as follows.2 In section 26 (interim disqualification)—(a) omit subsection (7) to (11);(b) in subsection (12), for “section 34 or 35” substitute “section 34”.3 Omit sections 34A to 37A (provisions relevant only to a person disqualified for driving a mechanically propelled vehicle).4 In section 38(1) (appeal against disqualification), for “section 34 or 35” substitute “section 34”.5 In section 39 (suspension of disqualification pending appeal) omit subsections (3) and (4).6 In subsection 40 (power of appellate courts in England and Wales to suspend disqualification) omit subsections (7) and (8).7 In section 41 (power of appellate courts in Scotland to suspend disqualification) omit subsections (3) and (4).8 Omit section 41A (suspension of disqualification pending determination of applications under section 34B).9 In section 42 (removal of disqualification)—(a) in subsection (3) omit “(disregarding any extension period)” wherever those words appear, and(b) omit subsection (3A)(b), (3B) and (5)(a).10 Omit sections 44, 44A and 45A (endorsement of licence and driving record).11 In section 46 (combination of disqualification with orders for discharge)—(a) in subsection (1), for “sections 34, 35, 36, 44 or 44A” substitute “section 34”;(b) in subsection (2)—(i) omit “or” at the end of paragraph (a), and(ii) omit paragraph (b);(c) in subsection (3), for “sections 34, 35, 36, 44 and 45A” substitute “section 34”.12 In section 47 (supplementary provisions as to disqualifications and endorsements)—(a) in subsection (1)—(i) for “section 34, 35 or 44” substitute “section 34”, and(ii) omit “or endorsement”;(b) omit subsections (2) to (4).13 Omit sections 48 to 50 (exemption from disqualification and endorsement for offences against construction and use regulations, etc).”Member’s explanatory statement
The purpose of this amendment is to amend the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 as it applies to persons disqualified for riding a cycle.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Lucas is making a good recovery from an operation and has asked me to move or speak to his amendments for him. I suspect that he is watching on parliamentlive.tv to see if I get it right, so I hope the Committee will forgive this awful breach of protocol when I say, “Ralph, switch off the TV; just rest up and recover”. I shall move his Amendment 330, speak to his other amendments in the group and speak to my own amendments at the end, if I have time.
The purpose of this amendment is to fine-tune Part II of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 as it applies to persons disqualified from riding a cycle. The proposed new schedule would omit Sections 34A to 37A, 41A and the other odd section on the ground that they are relevant only to disqualified drivers of mechanically propelled vehicles. For example, Sections 34A to 34C cater for reduced disqualification on successful attendance on a course and apply only to persons convicted of a specified motoring offence. Section 35 relates to persons convicted of an offence in which fixed penalty points are to be taken into account, but fixed penalty points do not apply to cyclists. Sections 35A to 35D, which relate to custodial sentences, do not sit well with the proposed new cycling offences. Sections 36 to 37A all relate to motor vehicles, whether it be by disqualification until a driving test is passed, the revocation of a driving licence or the surrender of a revoked driving licence to the Secretary of State. Accordingly, all those sections would be omitted.
Noble Lords may well ask which of the disqualification provisions in Part II would therefore remain, as they apply subject to those minor and consequential amendments set out in the schedule. My noble friend has listed them: Section 26, interim disqualification; Section 38, appeal against disqualification; Section 39, suspension of disqualification pending an appeal; Sections 40 and 41, power of appellate courts to suspend disqualification; Section 42, removal of disqualification; Section 43, the rule for determining the end of a period of disqualification; Section 46, combination of disqualification and orders for discharge; and Section 47, supplementary provisions as to disqualification. That concludes Amendment 330.
On Amendment 338, my noble friend says that new Clause 29A(7) introduces new subsections (8) to (12). This amendment would extend the clause to new subsection (12A), forming part of another amendment that I propose to speak to later.
On Amendment 339, the thrust of Clause 106 is to bring cycling offences pretty much into line with those that apply to motor vehicles. However, at present, provision for obligatory disqualification is omitted for the most serious offences, so it may be said that there will be a lacuna in the law—disqualification, with motor vehicles being, inter alia, an added deterrent to offending. Accordingly, the amendment now before the Committee would amend Section 34 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 by prescribing that the period of disqualification for the two most serious offences of causing death or serious injury by dangerous cycling will not be less than five years and two years respectively. The other two offences of causing death or serious injury by careless or inconsiderate cycling, where the culpability is less, will be subject to obligatory disqualification for not less than 12 months. No additional amendment of Section 34 would be required.
The only alteration that would be made by Amendment 340, in respect to the penalties for certain serious cycling offences, is the insertion of references to “obligatory” in column 5 of Part I of Schedule 2 to the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. The expression relates to disqualification. Without it, certain provision in the amendment of Section 34 would be of no effect.
Amendment 342 is my noble friend’s last amendment in this group. He says that it would insert three subsections. He proposes a substitute for new Section 29A(12) to extend the penalties for certain serious cycling offences set out there. The proposed new subsection (12A) would amplify the definition of “disqualified”, and subsection (12B) would introduce proposed new Schedule 11A.
The only amendment that would be made by proposed new subsection (12) is with respect to the penalties for certain other serious cycling offences not catered for in new subsection (11), again with the insertion of the word “obligatory” in column 5 of Part I of Schedule 2 to the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. As before, the expression relates to a disqualification. It too is necessary if Section 34 is to bite.
Proposed new subsection (12A) addresses the fact that “disqualified”, as currently defined, is couched in terms that at present can apply only to disqualified drivers of “mechanically propelled” vehicles. In other words, “disqualified” is for holding or obtaining a driving licence. That formulation is retained in paragraph (a).
As for the riders of cycles, I am sure noble Lords are well aware that a driving licence is not required for them. Therefore paragraph (b), in relation to them, inserts a different formulation. It redefines “disqualified” as disqualified for riding a cycle
“on a road or other public place”,
the latter expression being in conformity with the same wording in the new cycling offences created by this provision.
Finally, proposed new subsection (12B) would introduce a new Clause 106(11)(a), containing as it does
“minor and consequential amendments of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988”.
That concludes my noble friend’s amendments. If one thought that the debate on the last amendment was highly technical, this one is even more technical. I shall set a test at the end by asking questions to see whether all noble Lords have got it.
I turn now to my own Amendments 337B to 337F. I am certain that the Minister will see that in the Marshalled List there are four groups of amendments tabled by many more Peers than just me who are deeply concerned at the scourge of dangerous cycling inflicting serious damage on pedestrians and aiding criminality. I am sure the Minister saw the news item last week on the Met finally cracking down on the big, heavy, illegal bikes capable of 70 mph that are used for snatching phones. Many of them are driven by food delivery couriers—mainly Deliveroo. I encounter them every night on my way home on the pavements outside Millbank.
We also have the problem of thousands of e-bikes—mainly Lime—lying scattered over our pavements; of companies deliberately selling massive off-road bikes, which people then use on our streets; of some e-bikes being so heavy that they are breaking the legs of users; and of thousands of people riding on our pavements, with grossly inadequate enforcement to stop it.
The penalties under Clause 106 are inadequate and I have suggested increased penalties for anyone convicted, as has my noble friend Lord Lucas. However, I submit that no one will ever be convicted under its subsections, because a conviction depends on someone, presumably a police officer, concluding that the cycling
“falls far below what would be expected of a competent and careful cyclist”,
and that a competent cyclist would conclude that it was dangerous. Will the Minister tell me how many times the Home Office expects to find a police officer present to witness this behaviour and come to the subjective conclusions in subsections (4) and (6)? We need a simple objective test, as is in my Amendment 337E, which would mean that anyone
“who rides a cycle on any pavement … is to be regarded as cycling without due care and attention”.
I challenge any noble Lord to dispute that. It seems to me pretty obvious that that has to be the case.
My Amendment 337C introduces
“a presumption that it is automatically dangerous cycling if the person is riding a bicycle capable of exceeding the legal 15.5 mph speed limit and weighs more than 30 kilograms”.
Thirty kilograms is a new concept, but it is now essential. A non-electric bike weighs between 8 kilograms and 15 kilograms, and most electric bikes now weigh about 25 kilograms. However, the company Lime has increased the weight of its bikes to 35 kilograms, leading to a phenomenon known as “Lime bike leg”. In August, the Telegraph reported the following, which the BBC also covered:
“I’m a trauma surgeon and treat patients with ‘Lime bike leg’ weekly … It’s a really common cause of leg injuries today”.
Lime bikes are 25kg heavier than normal pedestrian bikes. The report continued:
“Doctors have observed an increase in lower leg injuries caused by heavy e-bike frames falling on their riders”
and breaking their legs.
I fed into a road safety algorithm, “What would be the effect of a 35-kilogram bike with a 70-kilogram man sitting on it hitting a pedestrian at 25 mph?” and the answer was, “Almost certainly in every case: fatal with pretty horrific, catastrophic injuries”. Even at 15.5 mph, the injuries would be life-threatening, and totally fatal in the case of a child. Therefore, we must introduce a weight restriction, as well as strictly enforcing the 15.5 mph speed limit.
Would a “competent and careful cyclist” ever ride a bike on a pavement, or ride a 35-kilogram bike faster than 15.5 mph? Of course not. If someone is riding one of these massive, heavy, fast bikes, we do not need a subjective judgment on the quality of the riding; the criterion for dangerous cycling has been met per se.
My Amendment 337D would add an aggravating factor. It simply makes the point that if an innocent pedestrian is killed by a person using an illegal e-bike capable of going faster than 15.5 miles per hour and weighing more than 30 kilograms, an additional penalty should be applied. I apologise for my typo in the amendment; it says 25 kilograms, but it should be 30 kilograms. I suggest an additional five years, and a minimum of 15 years where a life sentence has been given. This is not for the ordinary cyclist who is reckless but for someone deliberately using a big, heavy, fast, killer bike.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
My Lords, I take this opportunity to wish my noble friend Lord Lucas a very speedy recovery from his operation. I also thank the Minister and the Home Office for in part adopting my Private Member’s Bill, with which the Minister is very familiar, but they do not go far enough. That is why I have taken the opportunity to table Amendments 341, 343 and 344.
I have asked for a separate debate on Clause 106, because a number of us have had long discussions with the excellent clerks in the Public Bill Office. Although there is a clause in my Private Member’s Bill that relates to insurance—I put on record the concerns of the insurance industry, not least the Motor Insurers’ Bureau, about the lack of insurance provisions in this Bill—I am told that it is not in order to put it in this Bill. I will raise those issues when we discuss Clause 106 standing part.
My Private Member’s Bill is my third attempt at such a Bill. The first attempt was during Covid, when we had no Private Members’ Bills because we were quite rightly busy passing all the regulations for processing Covid at every level. Then another year was missed, but my current Private Member’s Bill still remains on the Order Paper. I still hope that it will be adopted in full before the end of this parliamentary Session.
The genesis of my Private Member’s Bill was the very sad case, with which I am sure the Minister and the Home Office are familiar, of Kim Briggs, who was mown down on a public road by a bike that was completely illegal. It did not have brakes that failed; there were no brakes fitted to it at all. It was designed to be used exclusively on the velodrome for speed trials. Poor Kim Briggs stood no chance at all: she was mown down and killed. I realised when I met Matt Briggs, Kim’s widower, that current laws do not treat road traffic offences the same way as any other incident caused by other motoring offences. That is completely wrong.
A bicycle is not a vehicle, but it can have devastating consequences, as in the case of the death of Kim Briggs and several others. E-bikes, as we have heard, are heavier and go faster. Then, of course, we have e-scooters, which are, in fact, vehicles and are meant to be completely illegal.
My Amendment 343 is taken straight from my Private Member’s Bill. We were promised that there were going to be trials for a period of time—there were going to be pilot schemes to use e-bikes on a rented basis in a number of cities. These trials have gone on and on for ever, and during that time there have been at least six, 10 or a dozen deaths and a number of injuries caused by the misuse of these electric scooters. They are used as delivery vehicles and are used by criminals to steal smartphones and other items—handbags and all sorts—particularly at this time of year.
I would like to understand why—I hope the Minister will agree to do this in summing up this debate—we cannot bring those trials and the pilot schemes to an end, report to both Houses and bring in appropriate legislation. It is meant to be completely illegal to ride—to drive, in fact—an e-scooter in a public place. You are allowed to own them and operate them on private land, which normally means a car park or some other part of your estate. The gist of the amendment is to ensure that the Government will assess whether it is appropriate to legalise the use of privately owned electric scooters in public places in order to regulate their safe use and introduce compulsory insurance. That is where I wish the Government to go.
The cost to the country and to all of us who drive a vehicle is horrendous. It runs into millions every year because there is no means of registering or insuring these e-bikes or, indeed, e-scooters, as I have mentioned. So that is the general thrust of my Amendment 343: to bring these pilots to a halt and, if there is a case for e-scooters to remain, making them legal, whether rented or privately owned, to ensure that they are safe and registered and can be insured. I think that would be a great step forward and much safer indeed.
Amendment 344 asks simply that there should be an annual report on cycling offences. I was almost mown down by a very fast-moving—I have to say younger—woman coming at me at speed on a pavement. Now, unless I am mistaken, it is currently illegal, it is against the Highway Code, to cycle or use an e-scooter or an e-bike on a pavement, but these cyclists are doing so with alacrity. Fortunately, I managed to hop out the way, even with my advanced years. I noticed that there was a police van, and I asked the police whether they had witnessed this incident. They assured me that they had witnessed the incident, but they told me there is a policy of no pursuit of any person who commits road traffic offences, whether in the Highway Code or earlier road traffic offences. The question I would like to ask the Minister and the Committee today is: what are we doing here passing new provisions if the current provisions are simply being flouted and ignored, giving free licence to people who want to ride an e-bike, an e-scooter or a pedal bike on the pavement when it is illegal to do so? I would welcome an answer to that question.
As far as my Private Member’s Bill goes, I am delighted that Clauses 1 and 2 are more or less incorporated in Clause 106 in full, so a big thank you to the Minister for doing that. With Clause 2, I would like to understand why it was considered appropriate to remove the reference to Section 28 of an earlier Act in the earlier subsections of Clause 106.
Amendment 341 would prefer 14 years as an offence for causing death or injury in those circumstances, which is the tariff for other road traffic accidents of that severity. I think that is the intention of the Government, not imprisonment for life. I would welcome the Minister’s consideration of the amendments and my remarks. It is entirely inappropriate that we have laws in existence which are simply being flouted and that the pilot scheme and trials for e-scooters have not been brought to a halt. In tribute to those who died, such as the late Kim Briggs, more needs to be done to ensure that these very serious road traffic offences are finally recognised for their gravity, whether caused by dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling and whether resulting in death or serious injury. There should be compulsory insurance and therefore registration going forward.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
I will speak to my Amendments 341A to 341D, 342A to 342F, 346A, 346B and 498A, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord McColl, the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for adding their names to some of those amendments.
In 2015, 444 pedestrians were injured by cyclists. In 2024, this had increased to 603. Of those, the number of seriously injured rose from 97 to 181, and 25 of the casualties died. These numbers are based on police reporting, so it is clear that they are a minimum. They do not include incidents where the police did not attend a collision or incidents where pedestrians either did not need immediate medical treatment or later attended their GP or a hospital setting without telling the police.
Every day, particularly in our large towns and cities such as London, we see cyclists ignoring traffic regulations and putting people at risk, particularly pedestrians who have a disability or a lack of mobility, even when those same people are using pedestrian crossings. At night many cyclists are not displaying lights, wear dark clothing and ride dark cycles, and pedestrians and other road users just cannot see them.
I do not believe that cyclists are a group of people who are more criminal than the rest of society or than any other road users. However, they are less accountable than people who drive buses and cars, and general deterrence theory does not work for them. General deterrence theory claims that the risk of detection is the most effective deterrent to crime. Drivers of motor cars, lorries and buses know that there is a good chance that their behaviour will be noticed and probably investigated because they will be identified.
This identification process has allowed major strategic road safety measures to take effect. First, the licensing of drivers has allowed drivers to be prohibited from driving by the suspension of their licence. The introduction of automated cameras monitoring traffic speed and regulation has produced mass enforcement at dangerous locations to enhance police enforcement, which had proved inadequate, given the rise in the number of vehicles on the road and the miles of roads available. But these two measures are not available against cyclists. They have no licence or registration mark. This means that not only does the technology not work against them, but they cannot be identified for other road users, and they have no identification mark to offer for an investigator to identify them after they have behaved badly.
My amendments are all designed to remedy that situation. The Government usually respond to my proposals in a few predictable ways. First, they say that the health benefits of cycling outweigh the regulatory costs. I propose that at least 603 people in 2024 would not agree. How can the blatant disregard of our laws, intended to keep us safe, be allowed for cyclists, and why does their right to a healthy life trump the rights of pedestrians to feel safe?
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 346A and 346B, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who has just spoken, as I have added my name to them. I support the other amendments in this group in general terms. There is a lot of dissatisfaction about the arrangements for cycles, e-bikes and e-scooters, and with the never-ending nature of e-scooter pilot schemes, which my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering has rightly condemned.
I am grateful to the Minister for introducing the new offences in Clause 106 to put cyclists on an equal footing with car drivers if they cause death or serious injury by dangerous or careless cycling. I am grateful to him for generously giving up time to meet me, with his officials, to discuss my various amendments to this Bill.
The truth is that, like others who have spoken, I do not believe that the Government’s proposals go far enough. I have been campaigning on the issue of the dangers of e-scooters and e-bikes for some years. It is a bit like online harm to children: you could see the matter getting worse day by day. We needed to take early action, yet nothing was done. I mainly blame the Department for Transport or its Ministers for this. They have a history of making the wrong judgment on important matters: investing in roads not railways in the 1950s and 1960s; pursuing HS2 rather than upgrading the existing railways, particularly in the north of England; and now prioritising cycling and e-scooters over pedestrians.
We have a Wild West. As a pedestrian, particularly in central London, you take your life in your hands every day. Scooters and cycles regularly ride on pavements and, because of electrification, they can go at high speeds—up to 70 miles per hour, according to the Sunday Telegraph. They cannot be heard and they steal up behind you, or approach at speed, making the pavement potentially as dangerous as the road. Those good enough to use the road or the huge number of cycle lanes that now pepper our capital have no compunction—they jump lights all the time. There is an arrogant culture of non-compliance with the law, made worse by recent legislation to give cycles priority. Both my husband and I have been knocked over.
The behaviour of cyclists and of some of those on scooters makes it dangerous to walk, particularly in the rush hour. Hired e-scooters are dumped on pavements, posing a hazard to walkers. If I was disabled, like my noble friend Lord Shinkwin, who has an amendment in a later group, I would now be extremely nervous about walking around town at all. The problem is relevant to everyone, not just those unlucky enough to be involved in a serious incident, so what can be done?
There has to be a major change in enforcement, since riding on pavements and through traffic lights is already illegal. I was glad to hear of the work by the City of London Police, and to read in the Metro last week that the Met have been having a bit of a crackdown, but these initiatives are, I fear, a drop in the ocean. I would add that some riders are criminals, out to steal your phone or your handbag, transporting drugs or riding bikes that have themselves been stolen. Three members of my family have had their bikes stolen in recent years.
The indulgent culture that I have described is fuelled by Department for Transport neglect and police failure to give this area of lawlessness any priority, although it actually represents a crime wave. It reminds me of those mopeds stealing handbags in Italy—that beloved country—when I was young, but experience here is now far worse. Who would have thought that this would happen in England?
The accident and fatality statistics are chilling. As we have heard, 603 pedestrians were struck by bikes in 2024, with one fatality; in 2023, four accidents were fatal and 188 people suffered broken bones. We have also heard from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, about the increase in lower leg injuries caused by Lime-style bikes, because they are so heavy. My conclusion is that there is a case for much stronger action, both from the perspective of neighbourhood safety and local crime prevention and as a contribution to reducing serious crime.
With his long experience at the Home Office, I know that the Minister is keen to take measures that work, so I would like him to make three changes. First, we need a national initiative to give scooter and cycle crime priority in enforcement by the police. I remember the Met’s Operation Bumblebee in the 1990s having a huge impact on burglary and its acceptability.
Secondly, we need to listen to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, with his knowledge, experience and common sense. We should agree to his proposal for a registration system, which, in an era of CCTV cameras, would hugely aid enforcement and be popular with every honest cycle or scooter owner, because it would make it easier for them to get stolen bikes back and deter the gangs from seizing banks of bikes for resale.
Thirdly, we should accept the noble Lord’s amendment to treat bikes and scooters that go more than 15.5 miles per hour like motorbikes or mopeds. They would need number plates and insurance, and riders would wear helmets, limiting head injuries and freeing up time in A&E. If riders cannot be shamed into keeping off pavements, the risk of being booked—what the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, described as the “risk of detection”—should be restored, at least for these ultra dangerous vehicles. It may help to persuade the Minister that New York, in the land of the free, has already imposed a 15 miles per hour limit on e-bikes. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and my noble friend Lady McIntosh also mentioned the benefits that insurance would bring. I realise that it does not seem to be in scope and, although everything they said is valid, I do not want that to be used as another excuse for delay.
I look forward to hearing from the Minister. This is his Bill, not the Department for Transport’s, and I hope he will be brave. For years, the department has done nothing to tackle this dreadful issue, having been persuaded by e-scooter and cycle lobbyists and, in his time, by Boris Johnson. As in other walks of life, and in the words of John F Kennedy, we pay a heavy price for allowing a problem to go unsolved.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I rise with a degree of trepidation after the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. I declare an interest in that I am a regular cyclist on both a normal road bike and an e-bike.
What we have going on in the world of cycling and e-scooters has some parallels with your Lordships’ House, in the sense that it is a giant experiment in self-regulation. As we know from your Lordships’ House, particularly from some recent arrivals, the individually subjective interpretation of “self-regulation” can mean, on the one hand, regulation that suits oneself or, on the other hand, regulation that thinks about everybody else. I will say no more on that subject.
We have made a huge strategic mistake alongside a great success. We have been very successful, more than we ever imagined, in encouraging cycling across this country. But, while we have successfully encouraged cycling and put cycling infrastructure in place, the element we have completely ignored is how to do it safely, and how to enforce rules and laws. With the benefit of hindsight, to do the one without the other is blindingly stupid. The results are all around us—I see them every day when the weather is nice enough for me to bicycle here. There is virtually no policing at all. The chances of you being caught are non-existent.
I recall, about 14 years ago, a fatal accident not far from where I live in Fulham. For a period of about a week, there was a very heavy and visible police presence in the area where there had been the accident. Your Lordships will be aware that at every major traffic light junction, there is an area in front of where the cars are meant to stop, which is a box with a bicycle logo inside it that is meant only for bicyclists. Noble Lords will be aware, if they are observant, that not only is that box usually full of moped delivery drivers trying to get ahead and go as fast as they can but, in many cases, it is also full of motorists, many of whom I suspect have no idea what that box is there for. That happens every day.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, I support the thrust of a number of the amendments that appear in this very broad group. Undoubtedly, as the noble Lord, Lord Russell, told us, we have a significant problem, particularly in London. My own anecdotal experience is of cyclists and e-cyclists totally flouting the law, riding on the pavement and riding the wrong way down one-way streets. This is particularly prevalent among delivery riders.
I tend to walk around London—probably a couple of miles a day; most days around the West End and to and fro your Lordships’ House—and I can confidently say that I have never once seen a cyclist or an e-cyclist stopped for any very overt offences. The noble Lord suggests that he has been stopped.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
I thought the noble Viscount was going to say “red light”.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
Perhaps so. It is not a question of having ineffective enforcement; I would say that we have no enforcement whatever—at least none that I have ever seen. If you have a law that is not enforced at all and is defined by people ignoring it, you have a serious problem. We should not be making additional laws on the subject if we do not have a high degree of confidence that they will be enforced, or else we are wasting everybody’s time here.
I invite the Minister, in the context of all the amendments in this big group, to give us a broad overview of what the Government are going to do about enforcement. I know there are other amendments later also talking about enforcement, but unless he can convince us about that, I suggest that there is not much point to many of the provisions in this part of the Bill.
I note that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, with whom I agree on many aspects of this and other Bills, knocks the ball into the Government’s court to come up with a registration scheme for cycles. This causes me some reflection. I think it would be extremely difficult to do and would be a very large step indeed, so my preference would be for more enforcement—in essence, people being stopped for those offences—rather than the amount of complication that such a scheme would generate. Children riding cycles on their way to school, for example, cannot have points because they do not have licences. I can imagine any number of unintended consequences. However, we need to do something, and if it is a licensing scheme for the heavier, faster e-bikes, maybe that is what has to happen, and I think the Government need to grasp that.
I was very taken with my noble friend Lord Blencathra’s Amendment 337E. Stating for the avoidance of doubt that if you cycle on a pavement, you are by definition cycling without due care and attention seems eminently sensible, just to make the law a bit clearer. Amendment 346B on e-bikes in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, is very important. I should declare an interest in that I have a mountain bike and an e-bike. I have two, as it happens, and I use them occasionally—not at the same time, I have to say; that would be too difficult.
People who want to move around London quickly have a choice. Either they buy a motorcycle and pass a complicated series of tests to get that motorcycle licence—if they go for the full licence; it is a lesser standard for smaller machines. They need to tax the vehicle; they need to insure it; and they need an MoT if it is of that age. Or they could ignore all that and get an illegal electric cycle with comparable performance to a moped, and no one seems to be stopping them, as far as I can see. They have no insurance, no tax, no registration and, happy days, no one is stopping them for any offences whatever.
There are, of course, proper electric motorbikes where you have to wear a helmet, have a registration and so forth—indeed, I think there are a few Peers who come to your Lordships’ House on such machines. We have a very broad spectrum, but at the moment a lot of people, particularly delivery drivers, are riding vehicles that are not being pedalled; they are just pushing an electric throttle, in essence. These are obviously illegal: even as an amateur, I can see that a policeman would have every right to stop them and impound that vehicle, so I think we have to make that clearer. I think by 15.5 miles an hour, we mean a maximum powered speed, because of course if you head downhill, you will go much faster, as with a conventional cycle. However, I think we have to say, for the avoidance of doubt, “That is a motorcycle”, if it does not meet the criteria, “and if you ride that without tax, registration, insurance and so forth, you are committing a series of significant offences, and you will be arrested and prosecuted for such”.
Lord Shinkwin (Con)
My Lords, I apologise to the Committee for not being in my seat when my noble friend Lord Blencathra began his remarks on Amendment 330. I am very grateful to the Government Whip for taking into account the rather pathetic speed with which I can get from the Library to the Chamber. I thank him for that.
At 429 pages in length, with 16 parts, 21 schedules and 159 pages of amendments, this Bill is truly a legislative Christmas tree. I am worried it is about to topple on the Minister, which would not be very festive. I will therefore keep my remarks disproportionately brief and save the bulk of them for my related amendment, Amendment 346C, which is due to be considered later in group 9.
However, I thank those noble Lords who tabled these important amendments on dangerous, careless and inconsiderate cycling. In my view, they are pure common sense. I would say that we are reinventing the wheel in ensuring public safety on our roads and pavements, but I am not sure we have progressed that far, such is the scale of the anarchy that currently plagues our streets. We have, as we have heard, so much to do to reverse it.
The worst thing is that the situation we find ourselves in is entirely self-inflicted, predictable and even logical. Our response needs to be equally as logical. That is why I support these amendments; they point a practical way forward in the struggle—and there is no denying this is a struggle—against the very real threat posed by dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling, especially to anyone with a mobility, visual or hearing impairment.
In conclusion, I welcome these amendments, and I look forward to the Minister’s reply.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)
My Lords, most of what I wanted to cover has already been spoken to, so I have very little to add. I did, however, want to pick up on a couple of points the noble Lord, Lord Russell, covered. For me, this is about disorder. There is a sense of unfairness for a lot of people that if you are a driver, you are subject to a huge number of restrictions—especially in London, with tighter-than-ever speed limits—and yet cyclists ride along in a way that seems to be flouting the laws of the road.
I will also pick up on something my noble friends Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lady McIntosh covered about the length of the trials that go on for e-scooters. I believe the same can be said for the seemingly never-ending approach to the consultation on pedicabs. We legislated for pedicabs to be subject to regulations 18 months ago, and it took us years to do that. TfL has done one consultation, has just completed another and it will be 2026 before regulations for pedicabs are in place. The length of time it takes for us to actually do anything which is seemingly common sense adds to people’s sense of frustration and disappointment that things that should not be happening are allowed to happen just because there is no simple enforcement.
The other thing I want to add is about delivery bikes. Often, they are the worst perpetrators of cycling on pavements, going through red lights and cycling at speed. We know they are doing this because there is a commercial imperative for them to act in that way.
Rather curiously, I was approached recently by one of the big digital delivery service businesses. It is concerned that the new provisions for additional protection against assault for retail workers do not apply to its delivery drivers. I am not advocating for what it is asking for, but, as I said to this particular company in reply to its email to me, my question to the company is: what is it doing as a business to make sure that its delivery drivers actually obey the law and do not drive in an anti-social way, on pavements, and so on?
Baroness Pidgeon (LD)
My Lords, this has been an interesting debate. Many of the amendments seem to be shaped by individuals’ bugbears that they experience a lot on the streets of London. This group of amendments looks to increase penalties for dangerous cycling and raises other issues regarding cycling and scootering which cause danger to others. I welcome some of the amendments; they have raised interesting points.
The Bill sees cycling offences updated and brought in line with driving offences. I will give some context to the debate today. It should be remembered that, according to figures released by the Department for Transport in September, in 2024, 82 pedal cyclists were killed in Great Britain, while 3,822 were reported to be seriously injured and 10,645 slightly injured. Going further, in the latest DfT accredited official statistics, published on 25 September, its pedestrian fact sheet shows that nine pedestrians were killed and 738 seriously injured by one pedal cycle. Let us compare this to the 1,047 pedestrians killed by one car, and the 19,241 seriously injured. Clearly, any death or serious injury on our roads is one too many, but it is important that, as we debate this legislation, we understand the full picture.
We on these Benches support a proportionate and evidence-based approach to updating the law, where any changes do not discourage people from cycling, which we believe is an important mode of sustainable transport. However, as we have heard in this debate, we have seen a rise in fast food deliveries by e-bikes and e-scooters, and in micromobility sharing schemes. They have become like an explosion across our cities. Time is literally money for all of these riders—those delivering food are being paid per minute to use these bikes or scooters. Therefore, riders take risks. They break the Highway Code, moving at high speeds across pavements and roads, as we have heard, putting themselves and others at risk. We want to see an end to this danger on our roads.
I am intrigued by the discussion on the e-scooter trials, which have gone on a long time. Let us be clear: they were extended five times by the previous Government. They started in 2020 and have now been extended to May 2028. It is clear that this has been going on under two different parties in government.
The amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, look to tackle the issue of dangerous cycling through the disqualification of a person from cycling. While at first glance this may appeal, in reality it would pose significant challenges with regard to enforcement, as cyclists, as we have heard, do not require licences. It is very unlikely that a person disqualified from cycling who decides to ignore that disqualification would be caught and convicted.
Logically, the only potential way to address this would be to introduce a licensing system for cyclists, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, proposes in Amendment 346A, where he has set out his thinking in detail. However, that is likely to be complicated, costly and disproportionate. In contrast, the noble Lord’s other amendments—seeking to add 12 points to a person’s driving licence for dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling that causes serious injury or death—seem more sensible and a reasonable way forward, which would give a greater range of options for the judge in such cases. We agree that this would be far more manageable than trying to bring in a national licensing scheme for all cyclists and cycles. Given that 84% of people aged 18 years or over who cycle hold a driving licence, according to the latest Cycling UK report, this could be an effective penalty.
Amendment 337F, from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, looks to define a “cycle” as including a pedal cycle, an e-bike and an electric scooter. Given the rise in different types of micromobility, we believe that this is a reasonable amendment to try to cover all types of cycles that can cause injury, as they may otherwise fall through a loophole.
Amendment 346B, from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, seeking to clarify the definition of e-bikes and motorbikes, looks reasonable—certainly on an initial reading—but we would like to hear the Minister’s thoughts on it. Are there any practical reasons that could make this difficult? We have sympathy with its aims, but we look forward to hearing the Government’s response.
The other amendments in this group are clearly looking to tighten up further the law on dangerous, careless and inconsiderate cycling. Some, such as Amendment 341, from the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, look to change the penalties for causing death by dangerous cycling. We do not believe that these amendments are needed and we do not support them. However, it is important that road traffic law is enforced with equal vigour for cyclists and all road users, to secure everyone’s safety. One of the challenges not covered in the Bill or in our discussions today—it is the elephant in the room—is the limited number of road traffic police officers across the country and the clear need to invest in this part of the police workforce.
I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to the many important points that have been raised by noble Lords today, to see how we can ensure that our streets are safer for all road users.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken to this important group of amendments.
Like the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, I believe that the data provides an important context to this area. In 2023, there were four pedestrian fatalities and 185 serious injuries where a pedestrian was hit by a cyclist. Over the past decade, the average number of pedestrians killed annually by a cyclist has been three per year. On the roads more widely, in 2023, there were 87 pedal cyclist fatalities in Great Britain, with almost 4,000 people seriously injured and a further 10,000 classed as slightly injured. The most recent data from 2024 shows that fatalities from pedal cycles fell to 82 but serious injuries remained significant, even as overall pedal cycle traffic increased.
Moreover, as the Government recognise, the current maximum penalties for dangerous or careless cycling—a fine of up to £2,500 for dangerous cycling or £1,000 for careless cycling—are plainly inadequate to reflect the severity of incidents that result in serious injury or death. I therefore welcome that the Bill introduces the new offences of causing death by dangerous cycling, punishable with up to life imprisonment, and of causing serious injury by dangerous cycling, punishable with up to 5 years’ imprisonment. Those are severe sentences, but rightly so. In my view, they are reasonable and proportionate measures.
My noble friend Lady McIntosh spoke to her Amendment 341, which would remove the life sentence from the causing-death offence and replace it with 14 years’ imprisonment. With all due respect to her, I believe that, on this occasion, the Government have got the maximum penalty right. The penalties for the new cycling offences exactly mirror the penalties for causing death or serious injury by dangerous driving in the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. Causing death by dangerous cycling is just as serious as causing death by dangerous driving. As such, it is entirely appropriate for the punishments to be the same. However, we must do more.
While cyclists are required to abide by the Highway Code and other relevant traffic legislation, we know that far too many do not. We have heard many descriptions from across your Lordships’ House this evening of the conduct of cyclists in London and elsewhere. One only has to walk down Whitehall and over Lambeth Bridge to witness the appalling conduct of a number of cyclists. We heard from my noble friend Lady McIntosh about her own experience, from the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and from my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe.
All too often, cyclists jump red lights, and they fail to stop at pedestrian crossings. While we rightly take injuries and death caused by cycling very seriously, the far greater problem is the general nuisance caused by cyclists who do not abide by the rules of the road. We currently hold drivers to a far higher standard than we do cyclists, and, quite frankly, enforcement needs to catch up.
This is even truer with regard to electric cycles. My Amendment 346 would create a new offence of altering the maximum speed and the rate of acceleration of an electric bike. Currently, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, referred to, an electrically assisted pedal cycle is defined by 2015 regulations as being a bike with a maximum speed of 15.5 miles per hour and having an electric motor not exceeding 250 watts of continuously rated power output. Any bike with a maximum speed above that should be classed as a motorbike for the purposes of road traffic policing. In this regard, I agree entirely with Amendments 337F and 346B tabled by my noble friend Lord Blencathra and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, respectively. The Bill as drafted focuses on cycles but does not explicitly include electrically assisted pedal bikes—e-bikes—or e-scooters. That legal ambiguity could quickly be exploited. Amendment 337F seeks to ensure that there is no loophole. Amendment 346B in the name of noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, seeks to make absolutely clear that where an electric bike is capable of exceeding 15.5 miles per hour, it should be treated as a moped or motorbike for policing purposes.
These amendments complement the new offence that I am proposing through my amendment. By placing penalties and sanctions on those who might try to modify their electric bikes to increase the speed above the limit, we give the police the necessary enforcement powers to prevent anti-social and reckless cycling that places pedestrians in harm’s way. Many modern e-bikes are heavy, fast and capable of inflicting severe harm, especially if ridden irresponsibly on pavements or in pedestrian zones. To treat such vehicles as equivalent to push bikes would be to ignore both the mechanics and the risks.
On Amendment 337E, I wholeheartedly agree with my noble friend Lord Blencathra. Pavements are designated for pedestrians. Cyclists riding on pavements or in pedestrian-only areas pose a clear danger to the most vulnerable. By making it explicit that cycling on a pavement or in another pedestrian-only area counts as
“cycling without due care and attention”,
the amendment eliminates the ambiguity that currently hampers consistent enforcement. It is another aspect of a cyclist’s behaviour that should not occur but is all too often the norm. It reflects a simple principle of equity. Where a pedestrian is hit by a vehicle on the road, the driver of such a vehicle may be prosecuted for careless or dangerous driving. A pedestrian hit by a cyclist on the pavement deserves to be treated with no less seriousness.
I also support the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, relating to putting penalty points on driving licences for serious offences. That recognises the true severity of such offences. Misconduct on a bike should impact the standing of those with driving licences, especially where the behaviour demonstrates a disregard for road and pedestrian safety. On all these amendments, I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, it seems an awful long time since my cycling proficiency test. We can debate whether standards have slipped in the 50-plus years since I took my test, but I think it is a common experience of all noble Lords who have spoken that a small minority of cyclists’ reckless actions potentially put people at risk. As a temporary resident of London during the week, I regularly see cyclists on pavements and going through red lights. I can report that, on crossing a zebra crossing one evening, I myself was almost hit by a cyclist, who was then pulled over by a police car not 100 metres later, much to my satisfaction. So it is possible for enforcement to happen.
I want to start with enforcement, because it is a thread that has run through a number of noble Lords’ contributions. It is right that strict legislation is already in place for cyclists, and the police do have the power to prosecute if these laws are broken. Cyclists have a duty to behave in a safe and responsible way that is reflected in the highway code. The Road Traffic Act, as the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, mentioned, imposes a fine of £2,500 for dangerous cycling and of £1,000 for careless cycling. The Road Traffic Act 1988 also makes it an offence to ride a bike if a person is unfit to do so due to drink or drugs. A considerable amount of activity is undertaken by the police to enforce these potential breaches of legislation. In fact, the Government themselves have pledged £2.7 million for each of the next three years to support police enforcement action on road traffic offences in the form of Operation Topaz, which is a strategic partnership between the Department for Transport, the Home Office and the National Police Chiefs’ Council.
I was pleased also to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, about the City of London Police, who I know have taken this matter extremely seriously. They have cycling police officers who can catch offenders who have gone off-road into areas where vehicles or police officers on foot could not catch them, so it is important we recognise that. We have had contributions today from the noble Lords, Lord Russell of Liverpool, Lord Shinkwin, Lord Hogan-Howe, and Lord Blencathra, who introduced amendments on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas. We have also heard from the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Stowell of Beeston, Lady Neville-Rolfe, Lady Pidgeon and Lady McIntosh of Pickering. All have touched on the issues of enforcement and whether the legislation is significant enough.
I want to draw the Committee’s attention to Clause 106, which is where these amendments are coming from. Clause 106 underlines the Government’s determination that cyclists who cause death or serious injury should face the full force of the law, as if that were done by a motor vehicle. The criminal justice system should not fail fully to hold to account the small minority of cyclists whose reckless actions lead to tragic consequences. A number of contributors to the debate have mentioned their personal experiences and have also witnessed incidents. There is a whole cohort of cyclists who obey the law and who perform well, and as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, would anticipate me saying, there is a health benefit to cycling that should be recognised and encouraged. However, there is certainly a holding to account of death and serious injury, and that is where the Government are coming from as a starting point to the debate today.
A wide group of amendments has been put forward, and I will try to touch on each amendment in turn. The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, spoke on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas. I spoke to him before he went on his short, I hope, leave of absence from the House and discussed these amendments with him briefly. I wish him well for his speedy recovery and thank the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for introducing the amendments on his behalf.
Amendments 330, 338, 339, 340 and 342 would allow persons to be disqualified from cycling upon conviction of any of the offences in Clause 106. Again, let us not forget that Clause 106 contains the penalty of significant jail time, and potentially a life sentence with significant jail time added to it. I agree that dangerous or careless cyclists are a serious risk to others, but disqualification would pose significant challenges. This may touch on other, later amendments, but self-evidently, cyclists are not currently required to have licences, and the only obvious way to address this would be to introduce a licensing system. However, such a system would be complicated, costly and, I would argue, potentially disproportionate, in that it would be created solely to enforce offences perpetrated by a small minority of people. Again, I do not think the noble Lord intended his amendment to serve as a barrier to cycling, but my concern is that it would risk implementation of this and would not really be workable.
In his own right, the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, introduced Amendments 337B and 337F. Again, these would introduce greater criminal penalties for cyclists riding heavier, faster e-bikes. I do understand that, as has been mentioned by a number of noble Lords, it is e-bikes that have been illegally modified for greater speed that represent an inherently greater risk to other road users. There is no longer any weight limit, following enactment of the Electrically Assisted Pedal Cycle Regulations 1983, but they do specify that the electrically assisted speed for e-bikes is limited to 15.5 miles per hour. E-bikes that can achieve greater speeds would not be compliant with these regulations and therefore would be classed as motor vehicles. Because they are motor vehicles, a person using such could already be prosecuted under the existing offences in the Road Traffic Act 1988 of causing death or serious injury, which carry the same penalties as proposed in the new cycling offences: a life sentence with a 14-year potential sentence.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
Just for clarification, the Minister said that they will be classed as motor vehicles. Does that mean they are still motor vehicles, even though they might not be registered or insured?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
They are classed as motor vehicles for the purposes of the legislation if they can travel above 15.5 miles per hour; but they are not, self-evidently, for the reasons I have already outlined, subject to the licensing arrangements that we have to date.
Mandatory uplifts based on specific vehicle type would be a novel but also an inconsistent approach to sentencing. Sentencing should always reflect the facts of the case and the level of culpability. Introducing rigid statutory additions could undermine the principle of proportionality, create inconsistency and risk setting an undesirable precedent. On the noble Lord’s amendments on changing the “careless and inconsiderate” cycling definition, I understand his desire to put beyond doubt that cycling on a pavement or in an area intended only for pedestrians should be considered as cycling without due care and attention. However, cycling on pavements is already an offence in its own right, as set out in Section 72 of the Highways Act 1835, which is an awfully long time ago and has stood the test of time. It is also an offence under Section 129 of the Roads (Scotland) Act 1984. Given that these offences are still in place, I would suggest that, along with those in the Bill for serious offences, that provides a sufficient deterrent.
Amendment 337F would insert the definition of a cycle. Again, I come back to Section 192 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, which already defines cycles, and this definition includes compliant electrically assisted pedal cycles. As I said earlier, an e-bike that does not comply with the relevant legislation is a motor vehicle for the purposes of the legislation, not a cycle.
I turn to a series of amendments—341A to 341D, 342A to 342F, 346A, 346B and 498A—in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, which propose that a person could receive up to 12 points on their driving licence upon conviction of any of the offences in Clause 106. Reaching 12 points on their driving licence would, of course, disqualify them from driving a motor vehicle.
As I have mentioned already, cyclists do not require any form of licence to cycle, therefore the noble Lord proposes points on a driving licence as an alternative penalty. In the Sentencing Bill, which is currently before your Lordships’ House, there is already a new driving prohibition requirement that the court can impose when giving a community or suspended sentence order. This prohibition will allow a court to take a more flexible and tailored approach to punishment than a driving disqualification, and it will be available irrespective of the offence that has been committed. I hope that the noble Lord agrees that the provision in the Sentencing Bill goes some way towards meeting his objective.
The noble Lord’s Amendments 346A and 498A seek to create a registration scheme for the purposes of enforcing the new offences in Clause 106—
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, on the point about the prohibition that might come from the Sentencing Bill, is the danger that unless the sentencing guidelines shift to reflect that new piece of legislation, you will end up with a very inconsistent approach in at least 43 police force areas as applied by the magistrates in those areas? If it is just a random event, they might lose their driving licence because of anti-social behaviour, some of which might be on a cycle. I understand the principal point that the Minister makes but I am not convinced that it will lead to a radical change in the way that cyclists are called to account through their driving licence.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
It is ultimately for the Ministry of Justice, which is responsible for the Sentencing Bill, to look at sentencing guideline issues later. I cannot give assurances on those points today. However, the Sentencing Bill is currently before this House and it is trying to look at those issues as a whole. When it is law, my noble friend Lady Levitt and others will look at guidelines and those potential enforcement issues as a matter of some urgency. The Sentencing Bill proposes, in some way, one of the issues that the noble Lord seeks to achieve.
Again, self-evidently, a registration scheme for cycles would make enforcement of offences easier. The absence of a registration scheme does not make enforcement impossible. As the noble Lord will know, the police would be expected to pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry that are open to them by examining other evidence before them at the time of any potential incident.
As with the example of licensing for cyclists that I referred to earlier, the House must accept that the likely significant cost and complexity of introducing a registration scheme for cyclists would mean, for example—this was mentioned in one of the contributions today—that all cycle owners, including children and those making new purchases, would have to submit their information to a central database. That central database would be required to keep the information and the ownership up to date, and some form of registration plate would need to be affixed to a cycle. To give the noble Lord one statistic, the Bicycle Association has estimated that nearly 1.5 million new cycles were sold in 2024. That is a big undertaking. I know that the noble Lord understands that, but the enforceability of the existing legislation is the key, and the work that we are doing, which I have opened my remarks with, would be key to that and would counterbalance the potential cost to the public purse of establishing the registration scheme.
Amendment 346B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, seeks for e-bikes, which are currently faster and more powerful, to be treated as motorbikes or mopeds for policing purposes. The Electrically Assisted Pedal Cycles Regulations 1983 mean that e-bikes which do not comply with existing regulations will be treated as motor vehicles for policing purposes. The Department for Transport, which has overall responsibility for these areas, has published fact sheets explaining that e-bikes which do not comply with regulations will be treated as motor vehicles.
The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, has tabled Amendments 341, 343 and 344, which seek to reduce the penalty for causing death by dangerous driving from life imprisonment to 14 years’ imprisonment. We have taken the view—I am pleased with the support of the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, on this—that the offences in the Bill bring into line this behaviour so that it is subject to maximum penalties equivalent to those already in place for dangerous driving offences, which is life imprisonment.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
The Minister referred in a debate last week to a Bill currently before the House with micromobility provisions. It would be interesting to know whether the consultation has already taken place before that aspect of the Bill. I am sure that it is in his notes, but I cannot for the life of me remember what Bill it was. Also, the amount of funding from the Home Office that the department has announced is an operational matter. It is very welcome, but how will he ensure that each individual force such as the Met will use that money and implement enforcement?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
There are operational issues. We put the money into Operation Topaz for all police forces to examine them, and ultimately it is for the forces to determine. The City of London Police has determined who is a problem in the City of London. There is a strong argument for parts of the country to face further enforcement measures because self-evidently there are problems. There will be public consultation before any new regulations come into force. It is a Department for Transport matter, so I hope that the noble Baroness will allow me to reflect on that with regard to when the consultation is. I will get back to her as a matter of course.
The noble Baroness’s Amendment 344 seeks to require reporting annually on cycling offences. We already publish annual statistics on those killed and seriously injured—in fact, a number of noble Lords and Ladies have quoted those in the debate today. Therefore, I suggest that this is already covered.
Amendment 346, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, seeks to make it an offence to tamper with an e-bike. I accept that some people may well tamper with or modify their e-bikes to increase their speed, but as I already mentioned, this is already an offence under Section 143 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. Should the police issue a fixed penalty notice, this would result in a £300 fine and six penalty points, and should the case go to court, it could result in an unlimited fine and driving disqualification.
I have tried to cover a number of points; I apologise for not referring individually to every point made by every noble Lord. The broad thrust is that there is a problem—we recognise that. There should be enforcement—we are trying to address that. There is a new measure in the Bill, Clause 106, to increase the level of penalty for causing death and serious injury by dangerous cycling. We recognise that and I welcome the support of the House. A range of discussion points and measures have been brought forward today around lifting, increasing or changing the penalties accordingly. We may well revisit those on Report, but the Government are right in recognising the problem, putting some money into enforcement and making dangerous cycling and causing death by cycling further offences with serious consequences.
I therefore invite the noble Lord to withdraw and not to press his amendments on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas.
Lord Berkeley (Lab)
I am sorry that I could not be here at the beginning of this group. My noble friend has given a very encouraging response to the many amendments—
Lord in waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, the Minister has gone over time, but in any case the noble Lord needed to be here at the start of the group to be able to intervene during the debate.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful. This Minister would not have gone over time had he not given way, but he now has gone over time and so will sit down. I commend the course of action that I suggested to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I am grateful to the Minister for his decency in replying as fully as he possibly could. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, that there are many more groups to go on cycling, and I think he will have a chance of input there.
The general thrust that the Minister detected is one thing, but, if I may say so, my forecast was right. I said at the beginning that the general thrust I would detect was that Peers from all sides would be highly critical that not enough is being done. Clause 106 is okay as far as it goes, but there is a much wider problem out there, as articulated by nine other Peers from all sides, in addition to me. My noble friends LadyMcIntosh of Pickering and Lady Stowell asked why this never-ending consultation is taking place. Someone said that, as this is a Home Office Bill, why does it not just get on with it? It may be a Home Office Bill, but it is the Department for Transport’s policy, and that is where the rot lies.
Those who criticised the last Government were absolutely right to do so. I condemn in no uncertain terms the Department for Transport under the leadership from 2019 to 2022 of Mr Grant Shapps, who was obsessed with getting more and more e-bikes and e-scooters on the road. The reason the consultations were extended was, in my view, and in what was tipped off to me, that he wanted to get so many more e-bikes out there that it would be impossible to pull back on them. It is like the police saying that everybody is shoplifting and so there is nothing they can do about it. Mr Shapps wanted to say, “Everyone has got e-bikes now, so we cannot put in a registration system and we cannot control them”.
If noble Lords want further evidence of the Department for Transport’s attitude, in February 2024 it went out to consultation again. The consultation was to double the size of the electric motor from 250 watts to 500 watts and to introduce an additional speeding system. There were 2,100 responses; the vast majority of professionals—police forces and others—totally condemned it, and the Department for Transport had to pull that back, and rightly so. But mark my words, it will try it on again and again.
The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, made a very good point: why should cyclists have a right to a healthy life but not the pedestrians who are getting mowed down? He tabled some good amendments that would be excellent. He made the point that although everyone has called for more enforcement, you cannot have more enforcement if you do not know the bike and the identity of the person riding it.
My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe made the point that the amendments just do not go far enough. She used the term Wild West. I assume she was quoting the press release—I have it here—from the Mayor of London, Mr Sadiq Khan, who said that very thing last month: London is now a Wild West for e-bikes.
The noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, made an absolutely excellent speech, and I commend him for it. He is right to say that we have boosted cycling, which is a good thing, but have not boosted the safety protocols. He is right about cyclists jumping red lights. You do not have to go far to see that; go to our prison gates at the Peers’ entrance and stand there and look at the pedestrian crossing and the lights. Last week, when the lights changed to red for the cars, I was halfway across when a cyclist tried to come through. I stopped and said: “Get back! Get back!” He did actually stop and move back a bit. That happens all the time. They use the red lights as an excuse; when cars stop, the cyclists belt through.
My noble friend Lord Goschen made the point that there is no enforcement at all. He wondered why anyone would bother to buy a moped or a small motorbike, when you have to have an MOT and insurance and pass a test, when they can buy an e-bike which goes 70 miles an hour and does everything you want, and you do not have to do anything to register or insure it, and no one will stop you when you break the law.
My noble friend Lord Shinkwin made the comment, rightly so, that there is a threat to disabled people. I am glad the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, welcomed my definition of cycles. It is possible that that was the only thing she agreed with me on, but I will take any little crumbs of comfort. I am glad that my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel supported most of my amendments, as I fully support his. I did ask for tougher penalties, but I am now content that the penalties are okay.
The Minister, in his speech, which was as courteous as usual, said that only a small minority break the law. He is right, I think, when that applies to the conventional cyclists and not e-bikes. In the past, it was my experience that it was a tiny minority of Lycra louts—the ones with their heads down between the handlebars and their backsides up in the air, belting through lights. I submit that I am certain that the majority of e-bike riders are breaking the law one way or another, either by excessive speed or by riding through lights or on the pavement. I can say with absolute certainty that 100% of the food delivery drivers are breaking the law, but more of that in another group. I disagree with the Minister that we cannot have a simple presumption that if people are riding a bike on the pavement then it is automatically, per se, and without any other judgment needed, seen as driving without due care and attention.
I simply say this again. I always come in with slightly more trenchant views than many other colleagues in the House, but we have had support today from colleagues with much more moderate amendments than mine. I am fairly certain we will see that when we come to the other groups. The Minister has to go back to the Department for Transport and tell it to get off its high horse and on to its bike. We must have proper amendments to toughen up the law and deal with all the other abuses of e-bikes, particularly in London. In those circumstances, on the assumption that we will be doing more work on this, I beg leave to withdraw my noble friend Lord Lucas’s Amendment 330.
“(b) in subsection (1) at the beginning insert “Subsection to subsection (1A),”;(c) after subsection (1), insert—“(1A) The court may only make a stalking protection order against a defendant if conditions A and B are met—(a) condition A is that the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the defendant has engaged in stalking behaviour towards a person; (b) condition B is that the order is necessary and proportionate to protect that person from stalking, or the risk of stalking, carried out by the defendant.”.”
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 330A, I will speak to Amendment 330B, tabled in my name and those of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and to Amendments 330AZA and 356E, tabled in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool. In doing so, I welcome this weekend’s announcements that were part of the Government’s strategy to halve violence against women and girls in the next 10 years, and I look forward to the publication of the strategy later this week.
We owe much to the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, for her 2019 stalking Bill that created stalking protection orders—SPOs—which were introduced in January 2020. The Government have recognised that the SPO process is in need of reform. Strengthening the use of SPOs was a manifesto commitment within their plan to have violence against women and girls over the next decade. His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services’ response to the stalking super-complaint highlighted the need to change the legal framework for SPOs and align them more closely to orders available in domestic abuse cases. The amendments in this group seek to reform SPOs to ensure the victims of stalking are swiftly protected from further harm.
Amendment 330A seeks to clarify the evidential threshold for obtaining an SPO, to bring this in line with domestic abuse protection orders—DAPOs—and so ensure swifter and less onerous access to these protective orders. The Stalking Protection Act 2019 provides that the magistrates’ court may make an SPO if it is satisfied that the offender has carried out acts associated with stalking. However, the legislation does not explicitly state the evidential standard to be applied. This lack of clarity can lead to inconsistent interpretation and application across police forces and courts in England and Wales. In practice, some courts have applied the criminal standard of proof when determining whether the conditions for an SPO are met. This approach means that police forces need to gather evidence similar to that required for a full criminal prosecution in order to secure an SPO. Consequently, victims face significant delays in obtaining protection, leaving them at risk.
For example, a woman called Juliana experienced online harassment, criminal damage and vexatious complaints to her employer by her stalker. She reported it to the police, and her perpetrator was arrested. While an SPO was considered throughout the investigation, there was slow progress made by the police to submit her application. Multiple witness statements were obtained to support her SPO and legal services within the police were contacted. Seven months later, Juliana is still awaiting a court date for the hearing. Due to the time elapsed, she is concerned that her perpetrator will soon be let out on bail and she will have no protective measures in place. By contrast, under Section 32 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, a court may issue a DAPO on the civil standard of proof. This lower evidential threshold allows for swifter intervention and the earlier safeguarding of victims.
According to the Suzy Lamplugh Trust, approximately half of stalking victims do not have a prior relationship with the offender, which means that there is a disparity in protection between the victims who qualify for a DAPO, who have a relationship with the offender, and those who must rely on an SPO. Given that stalking related to domestic abuse and stalking not related to domestic abuse have comparable impacts on victims, I suggest that the threshold should be consistent for both types of protective order.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I have Amendments 330AA, 330AB and 330C. I have also signed Amendments 331 and 332 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. I support the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, which start at Amendment 330A. She and I have been involved in strengthening the law for victims of stalking since the stalking law inquiry in 2011, which led to the first stalking laws, enacted 13 years ago on 25 November 2012.
Two decades ago, I was stalked for three years by my Conservative political opponent when I stood for Parliament in Watford. After he was caught in 2008, even though he pleaded guilty to over 60 crimes, including criminal damage to property and criminal damage using a knife, there was no separate crime of stalking from harassment. So the abusive and some sexual literature that was circulated widely on the streets, the anonymous letters to residents, the silent calls late at night when I was on my own in my flat and the feeling of always being watched just did not count in the court—other than as the same as an argument between neighbours over the height of a hedge.
The police came and advised us on security and precautions for our house, and my then teenage foster son had to learn from the police how to always put on plastic gloves before picking up any post. I never knew which of my supporters the stalker would target next. Now, we recognise that this is a tried and tested formula for stalkers—going for their friends, their family and, in this case, my political supporters.
When the stalking law came in it was much welcomed. However, after it was implemented, the practicalities became clear. Often, neither the police nor the CPS would use a charge of stalking until that case was proven beyond all possible doubt. So there was no mechanism to provide protection to victims of stalking earlier in the perpetrator’s fixation. That is why the stalking protection orders, introduced in 2019 by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, were thought to be a really helpful tool to help dissuade perpetrators and give reassurance to victims that they would be safe. But we have to consider now whether they are fully effective.
This group of amendments seeks to address the weaker points of SPOs, the result of which is causing considerable distress to victims of stalking, both domestic and non-domestic. My Amendment 330AA seeks to better protect victims from offenders who try falsely to use educational or religious reasons to gain proximity to their victims. The Bill currently states that the prohibitions or requirements in an SPO should
“avoid … any conflict with … religious beliefs”,
and with attending work and educational establishments. Although that is not inherently objectionable in itself, it should be a matter for guidance and probably not in the legislation, as this clause would give priority to an offender’s right to freedom over the safeguarding of the victim. We know that stalking perpetrators already use religious beliefs in attempts to contact their victims, in defiance of protective orders. There are examples of offenders claiming to attend the same religious institution as their victim in an attempt to be allowed into the area. The problem is that the inclusion of the clause in the Bill risks these claims becoming more commonplace. Thus, it should be dealt with in the form of guidance.
My Amendment 330AB would ensure consultation with victims when SPOs are varied, renewed or discharged. Currently, there is no requirement to hear the views of the victim—if they wish them to be heard—despite the fact that the victim is the individual being protected by the SPO and thus may have relevant information that the court should hear prior to making a decision. It is unreasonable to expect the police or other authorities to know all the details of a victim’s activities, so it is important that a victim’s views are sought prior to an application being decided upon.
This amendment would require police to consult with a victim following an application to change an SPO. As an illustration, Lisa is a victim of stalking, and her offender made an application to vary certain terms of a restraining order. The proposed changes—allowing the offender to travel down certain arterial roads on the pretence that it was their route in and out of London—seemed inherently reasonable. However, it was only when Lisa’s views were sought that it became evident that the road included a petrol station she frequented and cut through a park in which her children walked regularly. This information would not have been readily available if the victim was not consulted. In this case, the information provided by the victim enabled the CPS to mount an effective defence. The application to vary the terms of the restraining order was then denied.
Amendment 330C would create a requirement to issue guidance on SPOs. Currently, the Bill says that the Secretary of State “may” issue guidance in relation to stalking. A briefing, along with many other significant pieces of work, such as the stalking super-complaint and the HMICFRS reports, made clear the confusion and inconsistency when it comes to the response to stalking. The need for guidance is clear. The Domestic Abuse Act’s section on guidance states that the Secretary of State “must” issue guidance. This amendment proposes similar wording to support future clarity and consistency.
Amendment 331 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, to which I have added my name, is important. It would ensure that stalking is part of the VAWG strategy, which is due to be published this week, while also ensuring that the terms of reference for the Wright review cover non-domestic stalking; too often, the police do not take that seriously. I take the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, that the review is under way. We did not withdraw the amendment because we wanted to make sure that some of the details discussed today will be covered.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I was very happy to add my name to the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Royall. I arrived slightly later to the party than the noble Baronesses, Lady Royall and Lady Brinton, because I was not around when they nobly started tackling this difficult subject. However, once I arrived, I was happy to try to help in whatever way I could.
The amendments in this group are interwoven with an awful lot of other legislation that we have passed in recent years and are discussing today because many of the same traits, particularly behavioural traits, are still there, together with some of the challenges that the different authorities have in trying both to understand this behaviour and to do something about it. The parallel drawn in Amendment 330A between the DAPO, to which domestic abuse perpetrators are subject, and the stalking protection order, which has nothing like the same power or speed, is a good analogy. I ask the Government to look at and consider that very carefully. If the Government were to talk with the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, they would find, I suspect, that Dame Nicole Jacobs—a dame as of last week—would be very interested in discussing it further with them and would argue the case for that.
Amendments 330AZA and 356E, which deal with the ingenuity, frankly, of perpetrators in using online means to find different ways to get at their victims, has many parallels with what we look at in many areas that deal with online abuse. I appeal to the Government that we be joined up, in terms of the experience that different departments and specialist teams are gaining through the different pieces of legislation and guidance that we are enacting, so that we are learning from one another and not operating in silos, which, I fear, we sometimes do.
Amendment 330AA, which would remove the excuse of one’s religion or the need to be in an educational establishment—again, another ingenious excuse for finding a way to get to the perpetrator—is a loophole that I hope the Government will look at very carefully.
A stalking protection notice to accelerate and streamline the process would be extremely valuable. I am sure that, if the Minister and his team were to talk about this with some of the most advanced areas of the country and police forces—in particular, the county of Cheshire, which has five gold stars for doing this really well—and to ask whether they would find a stalking protection notice useful in order to move quickly, the answer would, I suspect, be a resounding yes. Going to talk to the people who are on the front line in dealing with this day in, day out would be a very useful use of time.
On Amendment 330C, of course the Secretary of State should have the power to issue stalking guidance, not least because, as stalkers get more and more ingenious and devious in some of the ways they find to make their victims’ lives horrible, it is important that the guidance keeps up. It is often two steps behind. The people who suffer because of that are the victims and the people who gain are the perpetrators, because it gives them the breathing room to do what they do and the law is quite slow to catch up.
I am broadly in sympathy with all these amendments. Stalking is one of the main causes of distress to victims in this country, alongside domestic abuse and anti-social behaviour. They are the unholy trinity and the largest volume affecting people, predominantly women. The ways perpetrators pursue their victims are often quite complex. These are quite devious and often quite intelligent individuals. We need an intelligent response in order to do something about it.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, this debate has underlined that stalking is not an occasional nuisance but a pattern of behaviour that our systems still struggle to recognise and act on early enough. The debate shows a familiar picture: warning signs are missed, threats are minimised and tools that Parliament has already provided are used patchily, if at all.
These amendments point towards a more joined-up and confident response, in which the police, prosecutors and other agencies share information, understand the particular dynamics of stalking and intervene at a much earlier stage, including online, before behaviour escalates into something far more dangerous. Looking ahead, there is now a real opportunity to embed that approach in the forthcoming review and in the VAWG strategy. Many of the ideas we have discussed—stronger use of stalking protection orders and notices, better guidance and training, and clearer expectations of consistency across forces—could and should be reflected on here.
The underlying purpose of these amendments is surely uncontroversial: to ensure that the law and practice keep pace with the reality of stalking and to give victims a response that matches the seriousness of the threat they face, so that this debate becomes a turning point rather than a missed opportunity.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, stalking is an offence which constitutes severe harassment and can instil grave fear into victims, as we have just heard. It is absolutely right that the law bears down on perpetrators of stalking. The Stalking Protection Act 2019 gave magistrates’ courts the power to impose stalking protection orders on application by the chief officer of police. Clause 97 extends this power so that a Crown Court can impose such an order where a person has been acquitted of any other offence.
The Government will no doubt argue that they are taking the necessary action to further prevent cases of stalking through this part of the Bill, but let us not forget another Bill they are currently taking through your Lordships’ House. The Sentencing Bill will suspend sentences for anyone charged with the offence of stalking. Section 2A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 states that a person found guilty of stalking is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for up to 51 weeks—less than the 12-month time limit for the presumption of a suspended sentence order.
Furthermore, the offence of breaking a stalking protection order is also likely to lead to a suspended sentence under the Sentencing Bill. Although a custodial sentence of up to five years can theoretically be imposed on conviction on indictment, the Sentencing Council’s guidelines state that in most cases of culpability and severity the starting point will be one year’s custody, and the ranges can go down to 12 weeks in custody and even a community order. This may very well be proportionate for low-level stalking offences, but the fact is that a person with a high degree of culpability and a medium to high level of harm will fall into the range that will mean their sentence is highly likely to be suspended.
If the Government are serious about bearing down on stalking, I suggest that letting anyone convicted of that offence walk free is not a good move for the safety of the victim. The Minister might try to rebut this argument by talking about the stalking protection orders, but I gently say to him that there is no good in letting a stalker roam the streets just because they have an order slapped on them. Given the falling police numbers, what is the likelihood of a person who violates their order actually being arrested? I also suggest that victims of stalking will not feel safer simply because their stalker has been given a court order.
What makes this even worse is that there is a very real possibility that a person who breaks the terms of their suspended sentence order will still not receive a custodial sentence. Although the automatic presumption will not apply in that case, the Government have opposed Conservative amendments to explicitly exempt people with a history of non-compliance from suspended sentences. They have also resisted our amendments to exempt repeat offenders from being handed suspended sentences.
Under this Government’s legislation, there is a very real possibility that a stalker could continually stalk their victim, break their stalking protection order and their suspended sentence order and never face jail time. That is not protecting victims. Against this backdrop, I suggest that it does not matter what we do in this place regarding stalking; we can table all the amendments we like to toughen up the protection orders, but they will not protect victims or prevent stalkers if the Government let than walk free. I will be very interested to hear what the Minister has to say in response.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I noticed that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, did not have much to say about what is in this Bill. He has opportunities to talk about another Bill; let him do that at another time. I am talking about this Bill. He never mentioned what was going on in this Bill, the measures within it or, indeed, the amendments before us in his opening contribution—not a single word. Maybe he should reflect on that, because he has not endeared himself to me in these discussions.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The noble Lord asks, “Do I ever?”—he does occasionally, and I will give him the benefit of the doubt, but I was not really impressed that he did not say one single word about what is currently before the Committee. Let us have a discussion about the Sentencing Bill with my noble friends Lady Levitt and Lord Timpson another time. That is being completed. Anyway, let us leave that to one side.
I hope to be helpful in part to the noble Baronesses and others who have spoken. I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Royall of Blaisdon, the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for bringing their experience, their views and their passion for this subject to this debate. A number of amendments are before the Committee. As I said, I hope to be helpful in part on some of them.
Amendments 330A, 330AZA, 330AA, 330AB, 330B and 330C all relate to stalking protection orders, which, as Members know, are civil orders introduced in 2020 to protect victims of stalking. Amendment 330A in the name of my noble friend Lady Royall seeks to reference explicitly the required civil burden of proof—that is, on the balance of probabilities—for determining whether the behaviour of a person to be made subject to a stalking protection order amounts to acts associated with stalking. Currently, statutory guidance for the police published by the Home Office references that it is likely the courts will apply the civil burden of proof when considering stalking protection orders, but I agree with my noble friend that there could be a case for making this clearer. I therefore undertake to consider her proposals in Amendment 330A ahead of the next stage on the Bill. I hope that helps the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, who also spoke on this matter and my noble friend.
I am grateful for Amendment 330AA in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I am particularly grateful to her for drawing her personal experience to the attention of the Committee. I had not realised the traumas that she had had in the run up to the 2010 election, but I had a quick chance to google those matters while she was speaking. It looks like it was an appalling experience. I am grateful to her for bringing it to the attention of the Committee.
The noble Baroness’s proposal in Amendment 330AA would remove the requirement for the restrictions in SPOs to avoid, where possible, conflict with the defendant’s religious beliefs and interference with their attendance at work or at an educational establishment. On this occasion, I understand the noble Baroness’s view that this could be brought out in statutory guidance, but it is our view in the Home Office that it is important to retain this within primary legislation, particularly regarding an individual’s rights through the European Convention on Human Rights, especially Article 9 on freedom of thought, conscience and religion, so I am afraid I cannot help her on that one.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
I understand that point of not wanting it to go into primary legislation, but given the way in which it is possible to use the online world to find all sorts of ways that circumvent the conventional ways in which one would try to intimidate someone, could one not have a look at the guidance to ensure that it includes descriptions of the slightly innovative ways in which perpetrators are using it to make those charged with policing this more aware of it?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful for that intervention, and I will certainly discuss those suggestions and points with colleagues from the police. The current statutory guidance for police on SPOs includes a non-exhaustive list of suggested conditions, many of which could align with Amendment 330AZA. For example, the guidance could include prohibitions on contacting the victim or referring to the victim on social media, either directly or indirectly. Similarly, the statutory guidance for the police on DAPOs also includes a non-exhaustive list of suggested conditions. It may well be that the points the noble Lord has mentioned are covered in that, but I will happily reflect on what he said.
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)
I am sure my noble friend is correct that it is, or should be, covered in guidance, but patently the judge looking at the case that I mentioned was not aware of this and said the fact that the victim had been contacted via LinkedIn was not something he could take a view on. He did not know that this was something he could take a view on. I am grateful to my noble friend for ensuring that the guidance is properly looked at.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful again to my noble friend for referring to the LinkedIn experience. My assessment, having discussed this with officials and with my colleague Ministers, is that the statutory guidance for police includes prohibitions on contacting the victim by any means, including social media. If my noble friend will let me, I will reflect on what she has said today, and I will discuss again with officials whether the guidance in its current format is sufficient to cover that point. That is my understanding, and I think it is a reasonable understanding to put before the Committee today.
Amendment 330C in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, would replace the power for the Secretary of State to issue multi-agency statutory guidance on stalking with a duty to do so. This would align the provision on guidance with the Stalking Protection Act 2019 and the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. The noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, supported the general direction of travel that the noble Baroness brought forward in her amendment. I agree that it is important, where appropriate, to ensure that legislative provisions tackling violence against women and girls are consistent. Accordingly, this is an amendment that I am happy to take away for further consideration and to discuss with officials.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I think the key question is why it is acceptable that there are different rules for “may” and “must” between this and domestic abuse protection orders.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
If the noble Baroness will allow me, we have agreed that we will take Amendment 330C away and have a look at it. That is not a guarantee that we will do something with it, but it is an opportunity to reflect on it. She can examine what, if anything, the Government do, and she can determine whether to table it again on Report.
Amendment 330B, again tabled by my noble friend Lady Royall, would introduce a stalking protection notice that could be imposed by a police superintendent. I think my noble friend’s motivation is to ensure that swift action can be taken. However, on reflection we view that introducing such a notice would potentially put further complexity into the legislative framework without significantly improving protection for victims. We also need to consider the proportionality of a police-issued notice backed by a criminal offence of breach that denies the respondent the opportunity to argue their case before an independent judicial tribunal. Failure to comply with a police-issued domestic abuse protection notice is not a criminal offence for this reason.
The noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, tabled Amendment 331, which would provide a statutory review of the effectiveness of two stalking offences, and Amendment 332, which seeks to provide a statutory review of stalking awareness guidance. I hope the noble Baroness can accept—this goes to points that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and my noble friend have also mentioned—that work is currently being undertaken on both these issues. In December 2024 we announced six new measures to tackle stalking, including a commitment to review the criminal law on stalking contained in the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. As a number of speakers have referenced, we have already appointed Richard Wright KC to lead the review. It is intended to be completed by the end of March 2026. We have given a timetable. I do not think it is right and proper that we change that timetable now, as a number of noble Lords suggested. The review will consider measures to achieve clarity in the legislation. On completion of the review, the Home Secretary will consider the findings and recommendations before determining next steps, potentially including further legislation. I hope that helps the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey.
There are a number of government amendments to the provisions in Clause 99. We have done this with guidance from stakeholders in the criminal justice system. Government Amendments 330AZB to 330AZE and 330AE clarify the process for appealing the making of a stalking order. Our Amendments 330AC and 330AD provide for applications to vary, renew or discharge a stalking protection order and avoid applications having to be heard by a higher court. Amendments 330BA, 330D, 522A and 547A extend the provisions in Clauses 97, 98 and 100 to Northern Ireland to allow the courts in Northern Ireland to make stalking protection orders. They have been introduced in conjunction with the Department of Justice and allow it to issue guidance to the chief constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland. The changes have been brought forward in amendment form at the request of the Minister of Justice in Northern Ireland.
I hope I have been able to assist in part my noble friend Lady Royall and the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton—supported by the noble Lord, Lord Russell—and Lady Doocey. I undertake to examine Amendments 330A and 330C further ahead of the next stage. On that basis, I hope that my noble friend will withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)
I am grateful to my noble friend for his positive response to so many of the amendments and I look forward to further discussions. I am sure that if any noble Lord who has participated in this debate can be of assistance in those discussions, we will be happy to have a meeting with the Minister. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(za) in subsection (1)(a) after “order” insert “by a magistrates’ court, a youth court or the Crown Court””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies the cases in which an appeal against the making of a stalking protection order can be brought under section 7 of the Stalking Protection Act 2019.
“(3B) An appeal under subsection (1), (2) or (3) to the Court of Appeal may be made only with the permission of that court.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies the need for permission of the Court of Appeal to appeal to it against an order made under section 4 of the Stalking Protection Act 2019.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that the reference to an appeal in new subsection (5)(a) of section 7 of the Stalking Protection Act 2019 is to an appeal under section 7.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that the reference to an appeal in new subsection (5)(b) of section 7 of the Stalking Protection Act 2019 is to an appeal under section 7.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment to inserted section 364D of the Sentencing Code, together with my amendment to clause 98, page 127, line 35, provides for applications to vary, renew or discharge a stalking protection order made by any court other than a magistrates’ or youth court to be made to the Crown Court.
“(c) where the order was made by any other court, the Crown Court;”Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 98, page 127, line 20.
“(3A) An appeal under subsection (2) to the Court of Appeal may be made only with the permission of that court.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies the need for permission of the Court of Appeal to appeal to it against an order made under section 364D of the Sentencing Code.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“Stalking protection orders: Northern Ireland(1) The Protection from Stalking Act (Northern Ireland) 2022 (c. 17 (N.I.)) is amended as follows.(2) In section 6 (meaning of act associated with stalking and risk associated with stalking), in subsection (1) for “7” substitute “6A”.(3) After section 6 insert—“Meaning of “stalking protection order”(1) In this Act “stalking protection order” means an order under this Act which, for the purpose of preventing a person from carrying out acts associated with stalking—(a) prohibits the person from doing anything described in the order, or(b) requires the person to do anything described in the order.(2) This Act provides for the making of a stalking protection order—(a) on an application under section 7, or(b) where a person is acquitted of an offence, successfully appeals against a conviction for an offence, is dealt with in respect of certain findings or is convicted of an offence (see section 8(1)).”(4) In section 7 (applications for orders) omit subsection (1).(5) In section 8 (power to make orders)—(a) for subsection (1) substitute—“(1) This section applies in respect of a person (“D”) where—(a) the Chief Constable has applied under section 7 to a court of summary jurisdiction for a stalking protection order against D,(b) D is acquitted of an offence by or before a court,(c) a court allows D’s appeal against a conviction for an offence,(d) a court deals with D in respect of a finding that—(i) D is not guilty of an offence by reason of insanity, or(ii) D is under a disability and has done the act charged against D in respect of an offence, or(e) D has been convicted of an offence and a court deals with D for the offence.”;(b) in subsection (2), in the words before paragraph (a), for “the order” substitute “a stalking protection order”. (6) In section 10 (variations, renewals and discharges)—(a) in subsection (1), for “a court of summary jurisdiction” substitute “an appropriate court”;(b) after subsection (3) insert—“(4) In subsection (1) “appropriate court” means—(a) where the stalking protection order was made by a court of summary jurisdiction other than a youth court, a court of summary jurisdiction which is not a youth court;(b) where the stalking protection order was made by a youth court—(i) if the defendant is under the age of 18 when the application for variation, renewal or discharge is made, a youth court;(ii) if the defendant is aged 18 or over at the time the application for variation, renewal or discharge is made, a court of summary jurisdiction which is not a youth court;(c) where the stalking protection order was made by any other court, the Crown Court.(5) For the purposes of subsection (4)—(a) a stalking protection order made by a court on an appeal is to be treated as made by the court whose decision was appealed against;(b) a stalking protection order that is confirmed, varied or renewed on an appeal remains an order of the court that first made it (or, if it was made on an appeal, the court that is treated as having made it under paragraph (a)).”(7) In section 11 (interim stalking protection orders), in subsection (2), after “application” in the first place it occurs insert “under section 7”.(8) In section 12 (procedure)—(a) after subsection (3) insert—“(3A) An application to the Crown Court under section 10 is to be made in accordance with Crown Court rules.”;(b) in subsection (5) omit “10 or”.(9) After section 12 insert—“Appeals(1) Where a stalking protection order is made in the circumstances mentioned in section 8(1)(b), (c) or (d), D may appeal against the making of the order as if—(a) D had been convicted of the offence and,(b) the order were a sentence passed on D for the offence by the court which made the order,(if an appeal would lie against such a sentence).(2) Where a stalking protection order is made in the circumstances mentioned in section 8(1)(e), D may appeal against the making of the order as if the order were a sentence passed on D for the offence by the court which made the order (if an appeal would lie against such a sentence).(3) The following may appeal against a decision under section 10 made by the Crown Court—(a) the person against whom the stalking protection order in question was made;(b) the Chief Constable.(4) An appeal under subsection (3) is to be made to the Court of Appeal, and may be made only with the permission of that court.(5) On an appeal under this section, the court may make—(a) such orders as may be necessary to give effect to its determination of the appeal, and (b) such incidental or consequential orders as appear to it to be appropriate.(6) For appeals against decisions of a court of summary jurisdiction on an application under section 7, 10 or 11, see Article 143 of the Magistrates’ Courts (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/1675 (N.I. 26) (appeal to county court against proceedings on complaint).”(10) In section 21 (interpretation)—(a) in the definition of “stalking protection order”, for “section 7(1)” substitute “section 6A(1)”;(b) at the end insert—““youth court” has the meaning given by section 12.”(11) In section 20(3) (report on the operation of Act)—(a) in paragraph (b) omit “and the number of orders made under section 8”;(b) after paragraph (b) insert—“(ba) the number of stalking protection orders made under each paragraph of section 8(1);”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes provision extending the power of courts in Northern Ireland to make stalking protection orders at the end of criminal proceedings, similar to the provision made for England and Wales by clauses 97 and 98.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“Guidance about disclosure of information by police: Northern IrelandIn the Protection from Stalking Act (Northern Ireland) 2022 (c. 17 (N.I.)), in section 17—(a) in subsection (2) for “this section” substitute “subsection (1)”;(b) after subsection (2) insert—“(2A) The Department must issue guidance to the Chief Constable about the disclosure of police information for the purpose of protecting persons from risks associated with stalking.(2B) The Chief Constable must have regard to guidance issued under subsection (2A).”;(c) in subsection (3) for “subsection (1)” substitute “this section”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This clause requires the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland to issue guidance to the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland about disclosure of police information about stalking.
Baroness Doocey
“(6) In determining the sentence for an offence under this section—(a) where the encouragement or assistance of self-harm is preceded by a history of domestic or “honour”-based abuse committed against the victim or other person by D, the court must treat their offence as aggravated by reason of such history;(b) where D has subjected the victim or other person mentioned in subsection (1)(a) or (b) to physical, psychiatric or psychological harm that results in that person’s death by suicide, the sentence shall be one of life imprisonment.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment recognises that where a victim has been subjected to domestic or “honour”-based abuse, any encouragement or assistance of self-harm is an aggravated offence for sentencing purposes, and that where such abuse, including physical, psychiatric or psychological harm, results in or significantly contributes to the victim’s death by suicide, the perpetrator can be subject to the same range of sentences as for murder.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 334A is in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Blower. I am grateful to Southall Black Sisters for the detailed evidence it has provided. On Wednesday we are going to cover broader issues around codes of honour and the deployment of these as a motivation and an excuse for horrendous crimes against the person. Amendment 334A deals with, in some ways, an even more insidious and hidden issue. It recognises the growing number of suicides and self-harm cases linked to domestic and so-called honour-based abuse.
I remember meeting a group of young women when I was a member of the London Assembly and hearing with horror the widespread acceptance that a murder could be justified by codes of honour in their community. It most certainly cannot. Culture does not transcend or trump the law, and nor should it. We are all familiar with the concept of death by a thousand cuts. Prolonged abuse and prolonged encouragement of self-harm can have devastating consequences beyond the physical and the immediate.
Last month, an inquest into the death of Michelle Sparman, a Caribbean woman who died by suicide in August 2021, reached a landmark verdict at Inner West London Coroner’s Court. The assistant coroner concluded that Michelle’s state of mind was “contributed to by neglect”, and that her prior relationship was marked by “toxicity”, highlighting an abusive pattern of relentless coercive messaging from her ex-partner that undermined her confidence and mental well-being. Crucially, the coroner identified this abusive conduct as the key causative factor in her death—a rare explicit recognition of prolonged domestic abuse that had contributed to her suicide. But there is a serious gap in the law. Michelle’s family were told by police that suicides were outside their remit and there was no case because Michelle had not reported domestic abuse when she was alive.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I follow my noble friend Lady Doocey in this small but perfectly formed group of amendments. My Amendment 335 would mandate a statutory consultation on the guidance to accompany the new encouraging or assisting serious self-harm offences contained in Clauses 102 and 103.
On these Benches we welcome the underlying intention of Clauses 102 and 103 to implement the Law Commission’s recommendations for a broader offence covering encouragement or assistance of serious self-harm, expanding beyond digital communication to include direct assistance. However, offences that involve encouraging self-harm must be handled with the utmost care, given the vulnerabilities inherent in such cases. The critical issue here is the risk of inadvertently criminalising legitimate support services, which has been raised with us by a number of support organisations.
The offence requires a specific intention to encourage or assist serious self-harm. This is intended to ensure that charitable organisations and mental health professionals who advise sufferers on how to moderate or manage self-harming behaviour are not criminalised. My amendment addresses this directly by requiring the Secretary of State to produce guidance and consult extensively with representatives of self-harm support charities and organisations; mental health professionals, including those providing trauma-informed care; and legal experts—prosecutors and defence practitioners—regarding the application of the specific intent requirement. This mandatory consultation is essential, in our view, to ensure that the statutory guidance clearly differentiates between criminal encouragement and legitimate therapeutic activity. Without ensuring that this guidance is informed by experts and laid before Parliament, we risk confusion among front-line practitioners and the inadvertent penalisation of those working hardest to help vulnerable people. I hope the Government will give serious consideration to this amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I fully appreciate the general principle behind these proposals. This is an incredibly serious subject, and I appreciate the sincerity with which the noble Baronesses have approached the debate.
On the amendment in the name of the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Blower, everyone wants to reach a scenario where all possibilities are accounted for, and there are no loopholes through which those who either encourage or abet self-harm can jump. It is for that reason that I cannot offer my support for proposed subsection (6) in the noble Baronesses’ amendment. First, I am sceptical of the need for more aggravating factors. The general offences that fall under loosely defined so-called honour-based abuse are crimes themselves, so I am unsure why there is a need to create an aggravating offence when a criminal will already be able to be tried for those offences individually.
Primarily, though, I do not think this is the right time to be incorporating new definitions into our legal framework. There is guidance for Crown prosecutors as to what might fall under honour-based abuse and examples as to how that might look, but it is yet to be enshrined in law and it is a rather broad and non-exclusive term within our law. That is not to say that it is not easy to spot—it often is—but it should have its own delineated legal definition before it is made an aggravating factor. I agree with the noble Baroness that honour-based abuse is an increasing issue that we must tackle head on, but that cannot be done with a single amendment. However, I offer my support to the principle behind proposed subsection (6)(b).
I welcome the sentiment behind Amendment 335 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. Policy rooted in pragmatism is crucial, and consultation and guidance are one of the primary ways to achieve that. The Government should base all the policy that they bring forward on the testimonies of people who dedicate their lives to the subjects that we legislate on, and that it is especially important for a policy in such a sensitive area as this. I hope the Minister agrees, and I look forward to her response.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for tabling Amendments 334A and 335 respectively.
I am aware of the cases that have motivated the desire to have an amendment such as Amendment 334A, and I completely understand; the stories that the noble Baroness outlined cannot fail to move anyone listening to them. Having said that, the Government will not be supporting either of these amendments today, for the following reasons.
I shall deal first with the amendment by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. When a defendant has previous convictions, including those relating to a history of domestic abuse, that is already recognised as a statutory aggravating factor in sentencing. In addition, aggravating factors that are associated with honour-based abuse, such as abuse of trust or targeting vulnerable victims, are already covered in the domestic abuse guidelines. The presence of aggravating factors such as these should therefore already result in the sentence reflecting those factors, and in my experience it always would. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies, about not adding an ever-increasing list of statutory aggravating factors. This is certainly the third group of amendments that I have dealt with that has proposed different forms of offences.
On the second aspect of the amendment, proposed subsection (6)(b) raises a sensitive and important issue. The Government wholeheartedly agree that, when it can be proved that suicide was the result of abuse or encouragement, the abuser should be held accountable. There are existing offences that cover this situation, such as manslaughter or encouraging or assisting suicide offences, which have maximum penalties of life imprisonment and 14 years’ imprisonment respectively. However, imposing a requirement for the court to sentence the defendant in those circumstances as though they had been convicted of murder, when in fact they have not been convicted of murder, would be at odds not only with the current sentencing approach but with the principle that people are sentenced only for matters that have been proved to the satisfaction of the court. I also make the perhaps obvious comment that there is no range of sentences for murder; there is only one sentence, which is life imprisonment. For those reasons, amending Clause 102 in this way would not be appropriate.
However, I reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that the Law Commission is currently undertaking a review of homicide offences and of sentencing for murder, and this will include a review of the use of, and the obstacles to using, manslaughter offences where abuse may have driven someone to suicide. I hope that the noble Baroness will understand why the Government are reluctant to make any piecemeal amendments in advance of the Law Commission reporting.
I turn to Amendment 335, from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I thank the noble Lord for his welcome of the offence. As to the guidance that he proposes in the consultation, as many in this Committee are aware, I was principal legal adviser to a rather well-known former Director of Public Prosecutions—I spent five years working for the Crown Process Service—so it is important to me to emphasise that it is in fact for the independent Crown Prosecution Service to update guidance on prosecuting offences under this new provision. It may well be that many noble Lords know this but, while the statutory Code for Crown Prosecutors governs in general terms how prosecutors make decisions on which cases to prosecute and which not, sitting underneath that is a raft of legal guidance that is published and publicly available. It exists for two reasons: the first is so that members of the public can see the basis on which the CPS makes its decisions, but the second is so that the CPS can be held to account. If it fails to follow its own guidance, that will often provide a ground for challenging the decision made.
I understand that the noble Lord’s amendment aims to ensure that legitimate support or therapeutic activity is not criminalised, so I reassure him that the offence has been carefully drafted to avoid capturing vulnerable individuals or those providing mental health support. The offence as drafted in the Bill was recommended by the Law Commission in its 2021 malicious communications report and contains two key safeguards: first, that the person must intend to encourage or assist serious self-harm and without such intent no offence would be committed; and, secondly, that serious self-harm is defined as harm amounting to grievous bodily harm. These safeguards ensure that the offence targets only the most serious and culpable behaviour and protects those who are, for example, sharing personal experience or discussing self-harm but not encouraging it.
The offence also does not cover the glorification or glamorisation of self-harm. The Law Commission found that that was too broad and would potentially capture vulnerable people who might then be exposed to prosecution: so, taking on board the commission’s comments, the Government have not included that.
In our view, this approach ensures that the offence is necessary, proportionate and focused on genuinely harmful acts. There is also a further protection for the vulnerable, which is provided by the public interest stage of the full code test. This requires that, even where there is sufficient evidence, prosecutors must consider whether or not a prosecution is required in the public interest, and plainly the vulnerabilities of the potential defendant would come into play at that stage.
I hope that the reasons I have provided clearly set out why the Government do not support either of these amendments today, and I ask that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, do not press their respective amendments.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
I thank the Minister, who has carefully taken us through three limbs, as far as I tell: first, there will be CPS guidance in terms of the specific offence, in the way that it decides whether or not to prosecute; secondly, the way that the offence itself has been drafted; and, thirdly, the public interest test. However, will she engage with the organisations that are concerned about the offences? I think I understand what she is saying about intent, grievous bodily harm and the other limbs that mean we will not see the kinds of prosecutions that people are concerned about, but will the MoJ engage with the organisations that have concerns?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord. As far as the first of the three protections is concerned, obviously I cannot bind the Crown Prosecution Service—the whole point about it is that it is independent of government. However, based on my own experiences, where there are areas of the law that plainly need clarification as to when the Crown Prosecution Service would prosecute and when it would not, it usually issues guidance. As regards engaging with the organisations, of course, it is sometimes not easy to explain the law and the thinking behind it. It is in everyone’s interests that the organisations which are concerned for vulnerable people understand that the Government have those interests very much at heart. I would welcome the opportunity to explain to them.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her response. I am not a lawyer and certainly do not understand the law, even vaguely, but I really do not understand this. If what I am asking for is not necessary—I totally accept what the Minister has said—how come we have three cases of suicide a week, which is suspected to be an underestimate, and only one conviction since 2017? Those numbers do not seem to add up to me.
I take the point the Minister made about the Law Commission’s review. Reviews are helpful, but a recent report by the Domestic Abuse Commissioner exposed ongoing failures by government to act on the lessons from domestic homicide reviews. Only a quarter of national recommendations were fully implemented between 2019 and 2021, and this extends to domestic abuse suicides. It is very sad that victims have waited years for concrete changes and it now seems that there is not a huge amount, according to what the Minister said in her response, that will make the difference. There needs to be something, so I will think carefully about everything she has said. I certainly plan to come back at the next stage with something that perhaps will not have so many holes in it. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment for now.
Baroness Brinton
“(1B) A person does not commit an offence under subsection (1A) where—(a) the person is a victim of domestic abuse within the meaning of section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, and(b) the act of detaining the child outside the United Kingdom was attributable wholly or mainly to safeguarding themselves or the child from domestic abuse.(1C) In determining whether subsection (1B) applies, the court must have particular regard to—(a) any evidence of domestic abuse directed towards the parent or the child, and(b) any risk that return of the child would expose the parent or child to further abuse.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, and another in the name of Baroness Brinton, is intended to probe the effect of Clause 104 on victims of domestic abuse.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I have tabled Amendments 335A and 335B, which relate specifically to child abduction across the United Kingdom. Government Amendments 336, 496, 521 and 549 relate specifically to the abduction, detaining and retention of children abroad who came from Northern Ireland—I was about to say “in Northern Ireland”, but that would be a tautology.
I am very grateful to all the organisations that have written to a number of Peers regarding child abduction. My two amendments are probing amendments, in which we seek to understand how Clause 104 will work and what the effect will be on a person who is a victim of domestic abuse, within the meaning of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, and who takes their child outside the UK to safeguard themselves or the child from domestic abuse, or who gets abroad and then decides to remain abroad to continue to safeguard themselves or their child.
Clause 104 arises from a recommendation from the Law Commission following the case of Nicolaou in 2012. That case focused on whether a parent commits an offence under Section 1 of the Child Abduction Act 1984 if they initially have the appropriate consent to take a child outside the UK, for a defined period, but then fail to return the child after that period expires. The background is this: a father took his son to Cyprus for an agreed contact visit but did not return him to the UK at the end of the specified time, despite court orders from both Cypriot and English courts for the child’s return. An arrest warrant was issued for the child abduction.
In June 2012, the High Court ruled that an offence had not been committed under Section 1 of that Act in this specific scenario. The section, as written at the time, applied to the act of taking or sending a child out of the UK without consent, not the failure to return them after a period of consented absence. This case, along with another, R v Kayani 2011, highlighted a significant loophole in the Child Abduction Act 1984, which the Law Commission subsequently made recommendations to address. Its recommendation in its report Simplification of Criminal Law: Kidnapping and Related Offences is very legalistic in its approach. It makes no reference to having considered domestic abuse as a defence, for example, or even a contributory factor.
Article 12 of the 1980 Hague convention on abduction provides that, where a year has elapsed after a child has been wrongfully removed to or retained in another contracting state, the court has a discretion not to require the child’s return if the child is
“settled in its new environment”.
Clause 104 makes it a criminal offence to retain a child outside the UK “at any time” after the child is taken or sent outside the UK without the appropriate consent. It therefore criminalises conduct in a situation where a court may decide not to order the return of the child to the UK. Clearly, this is not in keeping with either the spirit or the letter of the Hague convention.
Additionally, it could significantly hamper efforts to enable the safe return of children and their taking parents—the parents who removed them—and could increase the number of cases where children are compelled to return alone, without their mothers, possibly to the care of an abusive father or to state care. My question to the Minister is: what is the position of someone who uses a defence of being a victim of domestic abuse as the reason why they have not returned to the UK with the child? If a court were asked to adjudicate on such an issue, would it demand evidence of abuse? I ask that because your Lordships’ House knows that in such cases, often the victim mother—it usually is a mother—will have been living in the UK with the perpetrator of domestic abuse and coercive control, but not many would have been to the courts. On that basis, what protection is there for that victim and their child in this position?
The real problem is that the Law Commission report, which has informed Clause 104, does not cover this difficult territory at all—nor do the Explanatory Notes for the Bill. My amendments are genuinely to probe the Government’s intention on how they would manage a case that involved domestic abuse and coercive control. While we agree that Clause 104 is important, letting it pass without taking account of the complex issues relating to those parents who are fleeing domestic abuse will be problematic and could even lead to miscarriages of justice. I beg to move.
Lord Meston (CB)
My Lords, we should be grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for her probing Amendments 335A and 335B, raising the problem of wrongful retention of children in the context of the criminal law and, in particular, the Child Abduction Act 1984. Essentially, that Act criminalised the wrongful taking of children, but not their wrongful retention after the end of a permitted period of contact.
In 1984, when the omission of unlawful retention was pointed out in debate on the Child Abduction Bill, as it then was, in another place, it was not addressed by the then Government. Indeed, the opposition spokesman at the time, now the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, said that it must be “for another day”. Moving on to 2012, the continuing discrepancy was highlighted by the decision of the High Court in the case of Nicolaou, referred to by the noble Baroness, which was indeed a classic case of unilateral retention of a child abroad in the face of court orders. In 2014, a Law Commission report speculated about the rationale for the difference between removal and retention cases and recommended what the Bill now seeks to do in Clause 104.
So, 41 years after the noble Lord, Lord Dubbs, spoke of “another day”, it now seems to have arrived. Unjustified retention of a child can be both irresponsible and very harmful. Whether the decision to retain the child is planned or is more spontaneous, it can have a considerable emotional and practical consequence for all concerned, not least the child. I suspect that, with a little more analysis and resolve back in 1984, we would not be where we are today. However, there have been significant developments in the intervening period to make us think about what, if anything, is currently required in legislative terms.
First, as the noble Baroness has mentioned, the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction is now well established as a successful measure that deals with most cases of this sort, providing for the immediate protection and swift return of children to their home country when justified. In most cases, the use of the Hague convention, coupled with any necessary consequential proceedings in the home country, means that the wrongful retention of children is adequately and firmly dealt with in the family courts without recourse to criminal proceedings.
Secondly, there is now a far wider understanding of the nature and effects of abusive and alienating behaviour and attitudes as experienced by mothers and children, and, to some extent, by fathers. This is the sort of behaviour covered by the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. In reality, the retention of children by one parent occurs within a very wide range of scenarios. These are fact-sensitive cases. At one end of the range is the spiteful and vindictive parent who wants to remove the child from the other parent’s life. At the other end of the range are the cases of fearful and protective parents who realise that the child is at risk if returned to the other parent. In between those extremes are any number of variable situations and motivations.
The Law Commission report noted:
“The general policy of the law is that parental disputes about the care of children should be pursued in civil rather than criminal proceedings”.
If that is the general policy, criminalisation should be reserved to a limited number of cases of this sort, and criminal prosecution should be seen as a last resort to mark disapproval of plainly wrongful and harmful retention of a child. Moreover, overlapping criminal and family court proceedings should be avoided wherever possible, and the use of, or threats of, criminal prosecution should remain well out of the armoury of most warring parents. That is why, when resolving Hague proceedings, many parents often formally agree not to instigate or support criminal proceedings against each other. Such agreements remove one source of control and recrimination, and they serve to keep the focus on the children rather than on the parents’ grievances against each other.
I therefore hope that the Government will accept the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, or at least undertake some further analysis of what is needed for cases where the parent concerned is seeking to safeguard themselves or the child from harm. If not, will the Government confirm that any prosecution of these offences will continue to require the consent of the DPP under Section 4(2) of the 1984 Act? Will they confirm that there will be a restrictive approach to the prosecution, and that the guidance on prosecution will be reviewed and updated to cover the important points raised by the amendment?
Baroness Sugg (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 335A and 335B in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for setting out these probing amendments, because, as the Minister will know, there is concern that this change will criminalise domestic abuse survivors, who constitute the overwhelming majority of parents involved in retention cases.
As we have heard, Clause 104 is intended to close the gap in legislation, which the Law Commission recommended back in 2014. However, that recommendation did not take domestic abuse into account. Our understanding has evolved significantly since then, and, given our current knowledge of perpetrator behaviour, post-separation abuse and the Government’s stated commitment to end violence against women and girls, we should look at whether implementing that recommendation now would be appropriate. We need to consider the significance of domestic abuse in these proceedings.
On the difference between removal and retention, these actions are not equivalent. Treating them as equivalent fails to recognise that retention often reflects a delayed recognition of abuse, which the parent understands once they are safe among family and friends. As Clause 104 currently stands, these women would be criminalised and therefore deterred from returning with their child. The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, set out how we could see some perverse outcomes from this.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
My Lords, having heard a number of cogent arguments from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, I cannot remain silent. I was certainly persuaded on the noble Baroness’s Amendment 335A, and I hope that my noble friend the Minister has similarly been persuaded.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I will speak briefly to the amendments in this group concerning the important issue of child abduction. I am very grateful to noble Lords for their contributions this evening. I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for bringing forward Amendments 335A and 335B, which raise important questions about the interaction between Clause 104 and the lived reality of victims of domestic abuse. The amendments probe how the new offence will operate where a parent has acted out of fear for their own safety or that of their child, and they touch on the wider issue of how the criminal law recognises coercive, controlling and violent relationships.
We very much support the principle behind the noble Baroness’s amendments and the safeguarding concerns that they highlight. I look forward to hearing from the Minister about how the Government intend to ensure that the operation of Clause 104 does not inadvertently criminalise vulnerable parents acting in desperation to protect themselves or their children.
Government Amendments 336, 496, 521 and 549, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, create and support a parallel offence in Northern Ireland relating to the detention of a child overseas without consent. I recognise the importance of maintaining consistency across jurisdictions and ensuring that children in Northern Ireland benefit from equivalent protections. I would be grateful if the Minister can set out how the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland intends to exercise the new regulation-making and commencement powers. What discussions have taken place with relevant agencies to ensure that the offence can operate effectively in practice? I look forward to the Government’s response on these points.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I too thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for tabling Amendments 335A and 335B. Her amendments have been grouped with the modest collection of government amendments—336, 496, 521 and 549—tabled in my name, which extend the provisions contained in Clause 104 to Northern Ireland.
I note the concern raised by the noble Baroness and the noble Lords, Lord Meston and Lord Davies, my noble friend Lord Hacking and the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, that Clause 104 will criminalise parents who are fleeing domestic abuse where the detention of the child is primarily motivated by the intention of keeping themselves and/or the child safe. I reassure your Lordships that this absolutely is not the intention of the existing Clause 104. Indeed, in developing the provisions, very careful consideration was given to the implications of potentially criminalising a parent who has detained their child abroad.
Before I turn to the reasons why the Government will not be supporting these amendments today, I want to explain a little more about the purpose of Clause 104’s inclusion in the Bill. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for her clear and even-handed explanation of her understanding of the reason why the Government included it in the first place. The clause seeks to implement the Law Commission’s 2014 recommendation that the Government should close a small gap in the law by making it a criminal offence for a parent, or person with similar responsibility to a parent, to detain a child abroad without appropriate consent, once the original consent has expired.
I am sure that I do not need to explain to anyone that the abduction of a child by a parent is an extremely distressing experience for everyone involved. For any Government, the aim is to safeguard children from abduction by preventing the unlawful removal of a child, ensuring their swift and safe return when they have been taken and upholding custody rights through international co-operation and legal enforcement. The new measure is intended to be consistent with the existing criminal framework, to stand as a deterrent and a backstop where we know that a gap in the law is being exploited, even if by very few people. Some of those who have not returned a child are themselves abusers; they are abusive parents seeking to evade the law. We cannot leave that gap unclosed.
However, I have listened very carefully to the concerns raised by your Lordships this evening, and to some sent to me by organisations with an interest in this area. I remain satisfied that there is no risk of vulnerable parents who have been victims of domestic abuse being criminalised. I hope I shall be forgiven for setting out my reasons in a little more detail; I alluded to them earlier in relation to an amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, but that was in a slightly different context, and I think I need to give more detail.
Many of your Lordships will be aware that there is a two-stage test for the Crown Prosecution Service to apply when deciding whether a prosecution should be brought. The first is an “evidential sufficiency” test but, even if that stage is passed and it is felt that there is sufficient evidence to bring a prosecution, that is not the end of the matter. The second stage is the “public interest” test, which asks whether the public interest requires a prosecution to be brought. It is this stage of the test that is often applied in, for example, assisted dying cases. This is important, including in a domestic abuse context, because it means that prosecutors must consider the background, including whether the alleged offender was acting from benign motives or was themselves a victim of domestic abuse, before deciding whether a prosecution is required in the public interest. Additionally, and importantly, a third test applies for the new offence in Clause 104 which adds an additional safeguard: that the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions is required for a case to proceed.
Prosecutorial discretion remains a key safeguard, and evidence of domestic abuse would be a highly relevant factor in any decision to prosecute, or in whether the Director of Public Prosecutions would give his consent in addition. Factors that are relevant to the public interest do not require proof to the criminal standard. It is a much more “in the round” assessment than would be required if bringing some kind of criminal proceedings.
To be clear, in answer to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, the Government continue to believe that the civil courts remain best placed to deal with child abduction cases. That is why we support international co-operation and recourse to the 1980 Hague convention as a civil mechanism for facilitating the safe return of children. The UK continues to work with other state parties and the Hague Conference, especially in cases involving domestic abuse, to ensure that the convention operates effectively. The noble Lord, Lord Meston, said, and the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, in effect agreed, that this prosecution should be the act of last resort. We agree. We are conscious, however, that criminal proceedings may be needed in some cases. It has been suggested that some parents see detaining a child abroad following any earlier consent as an easier route to keeping their child permanently outside the UK with no criminal charges or police involvement. That clearly circumvents the law. This change to the criminal law is intended to sit alongside and supplement existing civil remedies, rather than filling the courts with people who have retained their child abroad.
The amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, asks whether the Government would be prepared to add a domestic abuse defence, in effect. The law on defences, including those relevant to domestic abuse, is highly complex. It requires definitions and decisions about where the burden of proof lies and what the standard of proof will be. It is precisely because of this complexity that the Law Commission is currently reviewing defences in domestic abuse cases as part of its wider project on homicide and sentencing. While the primary focus of its review is on homicide, the findings are likely to have broader implications for how defences operate in domestic abuse contexts and could be relevant across a broader range of offences. A bespoke defence of domestic abuse in the offence created by Clause 104 could have implications far beyond the child abduction framework.
I hope that the noble Baroness will accept from me that the Law Commission’s findings will be carefully reviewed before any changes to the law are considered, in order to ensure that any legislative changes are informed by evidence. In the meantime, we are exploring ways to strengthen our understanding of how defences operate in non-homicide cases by gathering more robust data. For these reasons, it would be premature to legislate before the Law Commission has completed its work, but I take the point about the equality impact assessment and the gendered nature of some of these offences. I will, if I may, write to the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, and, obviously, to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, as well.
I turn very briefly to government Amendments 336, 496, 521 and 549. Until now, the provisions in Clause 104 extended to England and Wales only. However, at the request of the Northern Ireland Executive, these provisions will now also apply to Northern Ireland. I note the concerns raised by the two amendments brought forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies, but I hope that, for the reasons I have set out, the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment at this stage. I hope your Lordships will join me in supporting the government amendments in this group.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I am very grateful to all those who have spoken. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Hacking and Lord Davies, for their implied support. I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, for their detailed responses to the amendment and the debate we are having. They rightly confirmed that criminal proceedings must be a last resort, and that we should always aim for these cases to be settled via the family court and through the Hague process.
I am particularly grateful to the Minister for her detailed response on the two-stage test, especially the public interest test. If that is where domestic abuse issues can be assessed, that is good. I am also grateful that she has repeated that the consent of the DPP must be obtained, and that this is not up to the criminal standard. That is very reassuring.
It is always difficult when the Law Commission is working on something, because one cannot say “When is it going to be done?” I hope that it will not be too long. If issues remain after the Law Commission reports, I hope that the Government, or a future Government, will be prepared to discuss this at that point. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Levitt
“Child abduction: Northern Ireland(1) The Child Abduction (Northern Ireland) Order 1985 (S.I. 1985/1638 (N.I. 17)) is amended as set out in subsections (2) and (3).(2) In Article 3 (offence of abduction of child by parent etc)—(a) after paragraph (1) insert—“(1A) Subject to paragraphs (2A) to (3A) and (7), a person connected with a child under the age of 16 commits an offence if—(a) the child is taken or sent out of the United Kingdom with the appropriate consent, and(b) at any time after the child is taken or sent, the person detains the child outside the United Kingdom without the appropriate consent.”;(b) in paragraph (2A)—(i) in the words before sub-paragraph (a), after “United Kingdom” insert “, or by detaining a child outside the United Kingdom,”;(ii) in sub-paragraph (b) (before its substitution by paragraph 4(3) of Schedule 3 to the 2022 Act), after “United Kingdom” insert “, or detains the child outside the United Kingdom,”;(iii) in each of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) (as substituted by paragraph 4(3) of Schedule 3 to the 2022 Act), after “United Kingdom” insert “, or detains the child outside the United Kingdom,”;(c) in paragraph (2B), after “United Kingdom” insert “, or detaining the child outside the United Kingdom,”;(d) in paragraph (3A), in paragraph (b) after “out of the United Kingdom” insert “, or detaining the child outside the United Kingdom,”. (3) In the Schedule (modifications of Article 3 for children in certain cases), in each of the following provisions after “paragraph (1)” insert “or (1A)”—(a) paragraph 1(2)(a);(b) paragraph 3(2)(a) (before its substitution by paragraph 5(2) of Schedule 3 to the 2022 Act);(c) paragraph 3(2)(a) (as substituted by paragraph 5(2) of Schedule 3 to the 2022 Act);(d) paragraph 4(2)(a).(4) The amendments made by this section apply only in cases where the taking or sending of the child out of the United Kingdom takes place on or after the date on which this section comes into force.(5) In this section “the 2022 Act” means the Adoption and Children Act (Northern Ireland) 2022 (c. 18 (N.I.)).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes it an offence in Northern Ireland for a parent etc to detain a child under 16 outside the UK without appropriate consent.
Crime and Policing Bill
Monday 15th December 2025
(4 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-VI(b) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Sixth Marshalled List) - (15 Dec 2025)
Lord Katz
“Safeguarding vulnerable groups: regulated activity (Northern Ireland)(1) Schedule 2 to the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups (Northern Ireland) Order 2007 (S.I. 2007/1351 (N.I. 11)) (regulated activity) is amended as follows.(2) In paragraph 1 omit—(a) in sub-paragraph (2A)(b), the words “(disregarding paragraph 2(3A) and (3B)(b))”;(b) in sub-paragraph (2B)—(i) in paragraph (a)(ii), the words “(disregarding paragraph 2(3A) and (3B)(b))”; (ii) paragraph (b) and the “or” immediately before it;(c) sub-paragraph (2C);(d) sub-paragraph (13).(3) In paragraph 2 omit—(a) sub-paragraph (3A);(b) in sub-paragraph (3B), paragraph (b) and the “and” immediately before it;(c) sub-paragraph (3C).(4) Omit paragraph 5A and the italic heading before it.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes provision for Northern Ireland which is equivalent to that made by clause 105 for England and Wales.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, Amendment 337 replicates for Northern Ireland the provisions of Clause 105, which apply to England and Wales. Amendments 520, 550, 559 and 561 are consequential to Amendment 337.
Currently, the definition of regulated activity—that is, roles that are subject to the highest level of enhanced Disclosure and Barring Service, or DBS, check, such as those working closely with vulnerable adults and children—includes an exemption for work which is
“subject to the day to day supervision of another person”.
This means that people in roles which involve close work with children are not in regulated activity if they are working under supervision.
In its final report, the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse recommended that anyone engaging an individual to work or volunteer with children on a frequent basis should be able to check whether they have been barred by the DBS from working with children, including where the role is supervised. The Government agree with this recommendation, and, at the request of the Department of Health, these amendments make the same change to the law for Northern Ireland.
The noble Lord, Lord Hampton, has Amendment 337A in this group. I will respond to that once we have heard from the noble Lord and others. For now, I beg to move.
Lord Hampton (CB)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 337A, in my name and those of the noble Baronesses, Lady Spielman and Lady Doocey. As ever, I declare my interest as a state secondary school teacher and as a level 2 ECB cricket coach, which is relevant here. I tried to table a similar amendment to the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill but was told that it would be better here, so here we are. I give thanks to Alistair Wood of Edapt, who has doggedly pursued this issue.
I was astounded to learn earlier this year that someone who has been barred from working with children can still privately tutor without having to reveal their conviction, as it is a private matter between tutor and parents or carers. Amendment 337A therefore seeks to address a simple but significant safeguarding loophole in the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 that allows individuals who have been barred from working with children to operate entirely legally as private tutors, coaches or instructors in out-of-school settings.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I am pleased to support Amendment 337A, which is about consistency and common sense. The same standard of protection should apply wherever a child is taught, whether in a classroom, online or in their own home. Parents assume that safeguards already exist, and they are shocked when they learn that someone barred from working with children can still legally offer tuition. In my experience, the vast majority of parents do not know this. As the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, has said, this is a huge loophole, and something needs to be done about it as a matter of urgency.
The targeted change would simply ensure that the law reflects modern patterns of learning and closes an indefensible gap without adding either bureaucracy or cost. It would strengthen public confidence in the DBS system and in the integrity of child protection as a whole. Tutoring is now a central part of many children’s education, especially those who are already vulnerable or struggling, and the law really does need to keep pace with this reality. By backing the amendment, the Government can demonstrate that safeguarding principles are applied consistently across all settings, formal and informal alike, and that known risks will never again be allowed to fall between the cracks of overlapping regulations. It is a modest step, but one entirely consistent with our shared commitment to protect every child from exploitation and harm. In the end, it is simply a test of resolve. If we know where the danger lies, we have a duty to act before another child is placed at risk.
Lord Garnier (Con)
My Lords, just to demonstrate the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, this is a cross-party matter and he has my support. I would be interested—he may or may not know—in the number of children affected by the failure of the regime to make sure that these tutors and so forth are properly registered. In any case, I wholeheartedly agree that this is a common-sense measure and needs to be brought in as soon as possible.
The Lord Bishop of Manchester
My Lords, one area that is of great concern to me is private music tuition. I have had some pretty horrendous safeguarding cases to deal with in churches, where a church musician who has committed some serious offences has gone on to privately tutor underage pupils. That particular form of tuition—which is very often done privately, arranged by parents who see an advertisement on the internet or in a newspaper—needs to be included.
Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)
My Lords, I have been a community worker for over 35 years now and I have dealt with many communities where one parent has found someone to do tuition, and that has acted as a bit of a kitemark. Other parents have felt they were safe because of the relationship they have with that particular parent. This very strong common-sense proposal would protect entire communities in one fell swoop. I really support this very important amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I will speak briefly to this group of amendments tabled by the Government and to Amendment 337A tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hampton. Amendment 337 provides Northern Ireland with provisions equivalent to those in Clause 105. As with similar amendments earlier in the Bill, we recognise the need for aligned protections across jurisdictions, and I would be grateful if the Minister could outline the engagement with Northern Ireland departments and confirm that operational partners are prepared for implementation. Similarly, Amendments 520 and 550 ensure appropriate territorial extent and commencement powers for Northern Ireland. These are direct drafting and procedural changes that appear entirely sensible.
Turning to Amendment 337A tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, we are supportive of the principle it raises. Closing a loophole that allows barred individuals to tutor children through so-called private arrangements seems an important and proportionate step, while the amendment sensibly preserves the long-standing exemptions for family and friends. I recognise, however, that extended regulated activity in this way may raise practical questions about enforcement and the potential impact on legitimate private tutoring arrangements, and it would be helpful to understand how these concerns would be managed in practice. I hope the Minister will respond constructively to the issues highlighted here.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, for setting out the case for his Amendment 337A. I pay tribute to his advocacy on this issue and on many other related issues as a teacher and—I did not realise this until tonight—as a cricket coach as well. I hope he is doing good work churning out a better set for the next encounter we have with the Australians, because I am afraid I have fears for the third Ashes Test, which is due to begin.
I also pay tribute to other noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, said, to demonstrate the cross-party nature of the issue that we are talking about and the consensus, we must make sure that there is protection for families and young people in every scenario and every setting. I thank the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester for bringing the specific issue of music tutoring to the Committee’s attention, and the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, for sharing his experience from his years as a youth worker.
As the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, has explained, this amendment seeks to prevent individuals who are barred from working in regulated activity with children from working as private tutors when hired directly by a parent. It does this by specifying that private tutoring is a regulated activity, even when provided under a private arrangement. I can assure the noble Lord that this amendment is unnecessary because the existing legal framework already achieves this outcome. Under the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, teaching, including private tutoring, that meets the statutory frequency criteria—for example, on more than three days in a 30-day period—is already a regulated activity. It is already an offence for a person on the children’s barred list to undertake such activity.
It is certainly the case, as the noble Lord pointed out, that parents are currently unable to check whether a private tutor is barred from working with children. This is because, under the current legislation, self-employed individuals cannot access higher-level DBS checks, which may include information on spent convictions, cautions and barred list status. However, I am pleased to inform your Lordships that on 20 November, the Government laid a statutory instrument, which was debated in the other place this very evening and is due to come into force on 21 January. It is an affirmative statutory instrument, so your Lordships’ House will be discussing it early in the new year.
This SI will allow individuals who are self-employed or employed directly by an individual or family where they are engaged in regulated activity with children and adults to access enhanced DBS checks, including checks of the relevant barred lists. As a result, private tutors who meet the statutory frequency criteria for regulated activity with children will be able to obtain an enhanced DBS certificate, including a check against the children’s barred list. Parents will be able to see this check before deciding whether to engage the tutor and will not become regulated activity providers by doing so.
This statutory instrument delivers the core safeguarding purpose of the amendment, enabling parents to check whether a prospective tutor is barred by the DBS from working with children and giving them the information that they need to make confident and informed decisions. I have already spoken about the government amendments, but in response to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, around engagement with the Northern Ireland Executive, they approached us to ensure that there was UK-wide coverage of the enhanced scheme. We have been working very much hand-in-glove with them to develop the regime that the government amendments put in place.
I hope that on that basis, the noble Lord will not move his amendment but will support the government amendments.
Lord Hampton (CB)
I am not quite sure that I understood properly. The statutory instrument will allow parents to check whether somebody is on the barred list, but it does not seem to affect the critical bit. People can still work with children or say that they are tutors even though they are on the barred list. Am I correct? This seems to be the crux of the whole thing more than where parents sit on this and whether they are regulated providers.
Lord Katz (Lab)
The important change that we are making is that it enables parents to access checks at the higher level, so they will be able to decide on whether to engage somebody. The parent will be able to access the check, see their history and, based on what the DBS check throws up, decide whether they will be engaged without necessarily becoming classified as a provider as in the current regime. That is an important distinction. It does not pull them into a different sphere of activity but allows them to ask a crucial question: is this person fit to be a tutor for my child?
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I am still not clear. There are 90,000 names on the DBS barred list. I understand the Minister to have said that parents will now be able to access the enhanced barred list, therefore things that would not be picked up in a lower-level DBS check will be picked up with the enhanced one. However, if somebody asks, “Is Fred Bloggs okay?”, can they just ask for his enhanced records or will it say that “Fred Bloggs is one of the 90,000 people that are on the DBS barred list”?
Lord Katz (Lab)
To be clear, they will have the same rights and access as a school has at the moment. We are equalising the scheme, so yes, they would be able to see that he is on the barred list and have access to the record. I hope that clarifies it for the noble Baroness.
Lord Hampton (CB)
As the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, and the right reverend Prelate were saying, the fact that these people can set themselves up as tutors or much respected musical educators is what I find astonishing. There seems to be no way of stopping these people posing as those even when they are on a barred list. They cannot work in a school or somewhere where they would be regulated, but they can work in people’s homes—in people’s bedrooms.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I understand the point that is made, but the system is about evaluating, classifying and giving information—in the current case to institutions—about the worthiness of the individual to work with children or with anybody in a safeguarding situation. We are levelling the playing field so that anybody who wants to engage someone in that capacity can do that and have the same knowledge and security that they are engaging with somebody who is—
Lord Garnier (Con)
My Lords, I know that the Minister is doing his best and this is not meant to be a controversial debate, but surely the paramount concern must be the welfare of the children. Sharing information is not just a mechanical exercise. It requires trust by the parent who is employing the music teacher in a private space that they are approved—that they are permitted to engage in one-to-one teaching activity in somebody’s home. The parent could be downstairs or in the next room, but I know that music teachers can get up to all sorts of tricks while the parent is in the next room. We need to be a little bit more robust in ensuring that this regime is there to protect children and not simply to make life easy for bureaucrats.
Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)
This supposes that a parent has the wherewithal, time and skill to interrogate this list. It is not making a level playing field. I have been a governor of many schools. We have people who are employed specifically to do these things. I have never met a parent who has done them. We should be sending a message to people who are deliberately trying to trick parents that they will be held directly responsible, not that the parent will have to catch them out. It only takes one predator to get lucky once to devastate a child’s life, whereas a parent will have to be lucky every single time to stop this. The emphasis is in the wrong place.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I appreciate the points that the noble Lord and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, are making. To be absolutely clear, anyone who is on the barred list who works with children is committing an offence. What we are doing by laying the statutory instrument is to allow anybody easy access to understand the nature of the person they are engaging with, whether that person is on the barred list or not. We are not trying to make life easy for bureaucrats here, but we are not trying to invent a whole new system. We are trying to make a system that is effective in all settings.
Obviously, we will have a debate on the statutory instruments, so there will be another opportunity in the very near future for your Lordships to come back to this discussion. But it is clear that this, as we have all agreed, is about safeguarding children. We do not want to disrupt a system or have different tiers and levels of access, or different ways of operating, depending on whether you are talking about private tutors in one setting or another. We are just trying to make a level playing field, and that is what the system we are proposing does.
The Northern Ireland Executive want to buy into it, and that is why they have asked us to lay the government amendments in this group. So I understand the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Hampton—we are all speaking from the right place and with the right motivation—so I hope he understands and will not move his amendment.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
I am grateful to have a short debate—not so much on Clause 106, which I welcome and congratulate the Government on bringing forward, but rather more on what is not in Clause 106. I am delighted to have my Private Member’s Bill still before the House, so it may yet be adopted before the end of the parliamentary Session. I know that my right honourable friend Iain Duncan Smith took some parts of it and ran with it in a previous Bill—I think it was criminal justice—now an Act.
There are two aspects omitted which concern me, and which we touched on. I will not go into great length, but I just want to float them before the Minister and the Committee this evening. One is the question of insurance. The Motor Insurers’ Bureau was first established in 1946 to compensate victims of accidents involving uninsured hit and run drivers under agreements with the Department for Transport. It aims to reduce the level and impact of uninsured driving in the UK, which is something we all commend and support.
Since 2019, the Motor Insurers’ Bureau responsibilities have also included compensating victims for Road Traffic Act liabilities arising from the use of a motor vehicle in an act of terrorism, whether or not the vehicle is insured. So, obviously, the funding to the MIB is quite considerable. The levy is set at £530 million for this year and it handles something like 25,000 claims every year.
What is really missing here is the insurance link. The department has brought forward, rightly, in Clause 106 offences which have been missing. Two of them, as I mentioned earlier, are the first two clauses of my Private Member’s Bill—so far so good. But then it goes rapidly downhill. If you are going to create these offences and these liabilities where someone cycling a pedal bike or an e-bike or driving an e-scooter causes death or injury by dangerous cycling and other forms of cycling—death by careless or inconsiderate cycling as well as dangerous cycling—the corollary must surely be that insurance cover must legally follow. That is what is missing from the Bill at the moment.
I have tried to plug that gap, and I think another noble Lord earlier also mentioned that they had tried to come forward with provisions in that regard. Obviously, the department is in the best position to do this. The Minister is doing a great job on the Bill and is listening to all sides of the Committee very carefully and considerably. That is greatly appreciated.
Before the Bill leaves Committee—I would like to bring this back on Report—I would like to leave it to the Minister’s good offices to plug that gap. The corollary of creating these motor offences is that there must be some form of compensation for the victims concerned. I do not see why I, as a motorist—unfortunately, I do not cycle any more; it is a question of balance, not a lack of good will—should have to pick up the compensation claims for those who have been injured in this way.
I touched earlier on the second point I want to raise, but I have now remembered the relevant Bill. Micromobility is also being dealt with in a small part of—I hope I have not forgotten it again. There are so many Bills coming through: you wait for one and 27 come along at once. It is the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill—not the most obvious place to have a chapter on micromobility.
This is the second request I have of the Minister this evening and, if he is not prepared to, I stand prepared to do it. There was an earlier amendment that did not go as far as the clause in my Private Member’s Bill. I would like to help the Minister. I know that, were we in the other place together, as we were once, he might find this a cynical approach, but I genuinely would like to help the Minister.
The definition that I propose is that which I have set out in my Private Member’s Bill, and I am grateful to the clerks for helping me draft it. I know your Lordships will all want to go away to read it, so I should say that it is the Road Traffic Offences (Cycling) Bill. I am prepared to answer any questions on it, at any stage.
I propose the following definition:
“a pedal cycle … an electrically assisted pedal cycle … a mechanically propelled personal transporter, including … an electric scooter, …. a self-balancing personal transporter (including a self-balancing scooter, self-balancing board or electric unicycle), and … any other mechanically propelled personal transporter provided for by the Secretary of State in regulations made under this section”.
The clause concludes by saying that, for the purposes of this subsection,
“mechanically propelled personal transporters are to be defined in regulations made by the Secretary of State under this section”.
I am very grateful to the clerks for coming up with that form of words.
The point I am trying to make is that we have two departments involved here: the Home Office for the purpose of the Bill before us this evening, and the Department for Transport in a Bill which is not its Bill but the English devolution Bill. I hope the Minister will agree that, for both Bills, we need a definition of these pedal bicycles or other such, and micromobility vehicles. I hope that he might come forward with a form of words in this regard and bring the two departments together, so that we are all on the same page for the purposes of this Bill and the English devolution Bill.
Baroness Pidgeon (LD)
My Lords, this clause stand part notice seeks to remove the clause that creates the new offences of dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling. I now understand why: it is to raise the issue of insurance and the noble Baroness’s Private Member’s Bill, which was raised and discussed in an earlier group today.
If we look at the figures from Cycling UK, we see that the proportion of cycling trips has returned to pre-pandemic levels. Some 41% of those aged five or above have access to or own a bike. We are looking at around 22% of people over five cycling more than once or twice a month, so it is a really important mode of transport. It is important for people to be able to get around, but we need to make sure that people who cycle are able to do so safely through good infrastructure and that they are considerate, obey the Highway Code and cycle in a safe and considerate way.
As I raised earlier, given that in the period 2020-2024, nine pedestrians were killed and 738 were seriously injured in incidents involving a pedal cycle, it is important that the law is up to date and provides the necessary penalties for such actions. Therefore, on these Benches we do not support the removal of the clause.
Lord Berkeley (Lab)
My Lords, I was very interested in the list of different types of wheeled movement produced by the noble Baroness, Lady Mcintosh of Pickering. It is easy to go into great detail—she mentioned monocycles. You could have further definitions depending on the diameter of the wheel, the pressure in the tyre and any other kind of thing. But where will it get us apart from more fines and a lack of enforcement? As my noble friend said in the last group of amendments, he is doing his very best with enforcement, particularly in the City of London. There is a limit to how much enforcement you can get.
You could then have a category for different-sized boxes on the back of these things. The noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, has got it right—we should just keep it simple; make it proportionate to the damage and effect that cycling and scootering have on other people, and leave it like that.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering for her clause stand part notice. On behalf of the Opposition Front Bench, we support Clause 106. As was set out in response to one of the earlier groups on cycling, we on this side strongly support the creation of the new offences of causing death or serious injury by dangerous cycling.
It is often said, and too rarely challenged, that cyclists are harmless; that their contribution to road danger is negligible. But the facts tell another story. As was said earlier, there were 82 pedal cycle fatalities in 2024 and many more serious injuries. Yet in the same period, the number of prosecutions for careless or dangerous cycling remained vanishingly small. In 2023, only 44 pedal cyclists were convicted for careless cycling and only five convicted for dangerous cycling. That discrepancy between actual harms and enforcement cannot stand.
Contrast that with motor vehicle driving—serious collisions involving cars or motorbikes routinely lead to formal investigations, charges, licence points, disqualifications and even long prison terms. The law, and indeed the public, treat death or serious injury caused by a motor vehicle as a major crime, but there is no comparable public or legal response when a cyclist injures or kills a pedestrian. That double standard undermines justice and safety and sends the wrong message.
Furthermore, with the rise of e-bikes and e-scooters, a dangerous tool is emerging that should not go unaddressed. As noted in the impact assessment for the Bill, prosecutions for existing offences are minimal and the penalties are insufficiently dissuasive. That suggests not only a failure to protect law-abiding cyclists and citizens but a broader pattern of underpolicing of cycle-related crime.
If we are serious about public safety and fair and equal enforcement, we cannot continue to treat dangerous cycling as a lesser category of offence. For that reason, I support Clause 106.
Lord Berkeley (Lab)
The noble Lord did not mention cars running over pedestrians and killing them—does that not matter?
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
Of course it matters. It is quite a serious matter, in my opinion.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
My Lords, I agree: it does matter. I welcome the support of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for Clause 106.
I will bring the debate back to what Clause 106 is about, which is ensuring that every road user complies with road traffic law in the interests of their safety and that of other road users. This includes cyclists, which is clear in the Highway Code. Clause 106 should stand part of the Bill. We put the clause in so that there is parity between cars and cyclists in the event of death and serious injury. I am grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, for that. If I accepted the recommendation that the clause should not stand part, we would not have that provision before the Committee today.
It is important that we agree to the clause for several reasons, not least of which is the fact that over the past 10 years an average of three pedestrians have been killed by cyclists per year. In total, there were 603 pedestrian injuries following a collision with a pedal cycle in Great Britain in 2023, which was a quite considerable rise on 2014.
In the earlier debate, we heard concern around cyclists riding on pavements and going through red lights and zebra crossings. This is not about putting cyclists in prison for serious offences; it is about trying to change behaviour. It is about ensuring that people recognise that there is a penalty for poor behaviour. If somebody is killed or seriously injured as a result of someone cycling badly, it is absolutely right that we take action with Clause 106.
The Government do not believe that the current offences for cyclists who exhibit dangerous or careless behaviour have appropriate penalties, particularly when it results in death or serious injury. That is why we are introducing the new dangerous cycling offences here in Clause 106. That will bring equality before the law. It will make sure that there is parity with motoring offences. If somebody is killed because of the poor performance of a road user, that road user should ultimately face a penalty whether they are on a bike or in a car.
I say again: this should be about trying to make cyclists aware that their vehicle is dangerous, even though it is a bike, and that it can lead to death or to serious injury. At the same time, we want to ensure, as we are doing, that we get the huge health and environmental benefits of cycling. The Government have committed £600 million in the spending review for new cycling and walking infrastructure, and that is the right thing to do.
I welcome the support of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, on these matters. She has asked two specific questions, about insurance and about defining the type of vehicle involved. They are both amendments to the clause, in effect, but I accept the discussion. The question is about the clause and its implementation, but the clause is not about insurance or about defining. Any change to insurance requirements would require some very careful consideration, as it could put people off cycling and have adverse effects on health and congestion. It might well stop people cycling; they would use cars for short journeys instead. It might involve an enforcement regime, which we have talked about earlier, being examined again. Some cyclists have third-party insurance and that is good.
This is predominantly a Department for Transport matter. I will examine both the issues, on insurance and on definition, that the noble Baroness raised and discuss them with the Department for Transport. Ultimately, Clause 106 is about prevention of death or serious injury by cycling. It should stay part of the Bill and should not be deleted. That is why I hope the noble Baroness will not take that option at an appropriate moment, if not today. I hope she reflects on what I said, and I will certainly reflect on what she said.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
I am not sure whether the noble Lord replied on the definition.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
With due respect, I am very happy to look at that. Essentially, there is a Home Office aspect to this clause, which is death and serious injury by dangerous cycling, but the issues the noble Baroness raised about insurance and the definition are for the Department for Transport. I will take those issues away and make sure that my noble friend Lord Hendy examines them, but it is not for me to look at issues that I have not thought through because they are Department for Transport issues. We have thought through this Bill and the clause before us, and it is about death and serious injury by dangerous cycling, not the two issues that the noble Baroness raised.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
I thank the Minister for responding. There will be another opportunity in the other Bill to do this. I tried to table an amendment on insurance, but we were told it was out of scope. However, it is a corollary of creating the offences, and we welcome the creation of the offences.
Lord Blencathra
“Police guidance and pilot: enforcement of criminal offences for illegal vehicles on roads(1) Within six months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must issue guidance to the college of policing and the National Police Chief’s Council on enforcement of criminal offences committed by drivers of vehicles illegally being driven on public roads.(2) The guidance under subsection (1) must include guidance on enforcement of criminal offences committed by drivers of vehicles which—(a) do not have a valid MOT;(b) are not registered with the DVLA;(c) are driven without a registration plate or one that is non-complaint or not associated to that vehicle;(d) are driven by drivers without a valid driving license;(e) are not insured;(f) are persistent evaders of toll, congestion or parking offences;(g) are displaying a stolen, ceased or fraudulent Blue Badge;(h) are vehicles registered overseas which have been in the UK for more than six months.(3) In conjunction with the guidance published under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must by Regulations make arrangements for an enforcement pilot, within the area of one or more police forces and for a period of not more than two years working with other public bodies that may lead to improving enforcement of the criminal offences in subsection (2).(4) In the context of the pilot under subsection (3), the Secretary of State may provide by regulations that—(a) outsource the operation (but not the oversight) of the pilot to another public body, or to a firm accredited by the Enforcement Conduct Board; (b) permit information sharing between relevant public bodies who hold information which will assist enforcement of those criminal offences in (2) and the operators of the pilot;(c) provide the operators of the pilot the powers that they need to detain vehicles where the owners have not responded to requests to regularise any of the offences in subsection (2).”
Lord Blencathra (Con)
Amendments 345 and 398 stand in the name of my noble friend Lord Lucas. As I said earlier, my noble friend is making a good recovery from an operation. Amendment 345 is straightforward. It asks the Secretary of State to give clear national guidance to policing bodies on how to enforce criminal offences committed by drivers of illegally operated vehicles and to run a short, tightly defined pilot to test practical improvements in enforcement. Across the country, too many dangerous and unlawful vehicles remain on our roads. We have vehicles without MOTs and without insurance, driven by drivers who are unlicensed or who are using stolen or fraudulent plates. These are not just paperwork problems; they are real risks to road users and communities. At the same time, persistent evasion of tolls, congestion charges and parking rules blights town centres and funds organised offending. The current responsibilities are fragmented between the DVLA, local authorities and the police, and that fragmentation creates gaps that offenders exploit.
My noble friend’s amendment would do three things. First, it would require the Secretary of State to issue guidance to the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council so that enforcement is consistent, proportionate and focused on the highest harms. Secondly, it would mandate a time-limited enforcement period so that we can test new operational models and information-sharing arrangements in a controlled way. Thirdly, it would allow a pilot to be run with accredited partners under strict oversight so that we can learn what works without rushing into permanent untested powers.
Why is a pilot the right approach? A pilot is the responsible way to proceed. It would let us trial better use of data, test targeted interventions against repeat and organised offenders, and measure the impact on road safety and community harm before any national rollout. It would also allow Parliament to see independent evidence about proportionality, costs and safeguards, which is exactly what the public expect. Let me be clear: this amendment is not a blank cheque. Any information-sharing would have to comply with data protection law, any detention powers would be narrowly defined and subject to review, and any outsourced delivery would operate under ministerial oversight and public reporting. The Secretary of State would have to build those safeguards into the regulations and the pilot design so that civil liberties and accountability are front and centre.
This would be a practical, evidence-led new clause. It would build on existing enforcement work and give police the tools to tackle the most dangerous and persistent offenders while protecting the public and taxpayers. I ask noble Lords to support this amendment so that we can make our roads safer, reduce organised and repeat offending and ensure that enforcement is effective and accountable.
I conclude by saying that I like the other amendments in this group, and I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and other Peers who have signed them. I look forward to hearing what she has to say. However, I am mystified as to why this amendment is in a group of amendments all about drunk-driving. Having said that, I beg to move.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 350 in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, Amendment 416B in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Ashcombe, and Amendments 356G and 398 to which I have added my name.
I will turn first to Amendments 350, 356G and 398, about drink-driving, something we all want to see end. Amendment 350 would bring the UK into line with virtually every other country by reducing the permitted blood alcohol level from 80 milligrams to 50 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood. This has widespread support among the public and has been endorsed by an impressive range of organisations, including the BMA—which is not very popular at the moment—the National Police Chiefs’ Council, IAM RoadSmart, PACTS, RoSPA, the Royal College of Physicians, the Royal College of General Practitioners, the Society for Acute Medicine, the College of Paramedics, the Royal College of Emergency Medicine, the Association of Ambulance Chief Executives, and the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners—in other words, exactly the people who have to pick up the pieces when drivers have been behind the wheel after drinking. As RoSPA’s strapline states,
“accidents don’t have to happen”
—never so true as with drink-related car crashes.
The arguments are clear. England and Wales are now the only countries in Europe with a limit as high as 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood. All the others, including Scotland, have a limit of 50 milligrams or lower, which the bodies I have name-checked want for new and commercial drivers. A 50-milligram limit leads to fewer crashes and fewer deaths and injuries. Drink-driving fatalities have risen to a fifth of all road deaths, the highest rate since 2009. That is 260 deaths a year, with the victims often an innocent passenger, a pedestrian or a driver from another car. That is only part of the problem, with over 7,000 casualties, some life-changing, because while wonderful medicine and brilliant ambulance staff can save lives, they cannot always save limbs. Public support for change is overwhelming, with three-quarters favouring a lower limit, and nearly this number wanting zero tolerance of drink-driving.
Amendment 398 allowing random breath tests, tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, would be a major disincentive to drivers, knowing they could be stopped on any road for a quick blow-into-the-bag test. Few would risk their licence if the chances of being stopped were increased and unpredictable. Regrettably, enforcement of our existing laws has nearly collapsed, with the number of breath tests more than halved since 2009. Meanwhile the proportion of drivers who admit to driving while over the limit has been rising, especially among the under-25s, with some one-third confessing to this. Random breath testing happens in many other countries and the effects are evident. In Queensland, Australia, a reduction from 80 milligrams to 50 milligrams with the added use of random testing saw fatal accidents drop by 18%. It is easy to see why. If the chance of being caught is slim, then the likelihood of risking it is high, but if the chance of being caught is high, then the likelihood of risking it is slim.
There is a further measure in Amendment 356G in this group, to which the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, will speak in more detail. This is aimed at the repeat drink-driver who, once caught, would then have to have an alcolock fitted to the car, meaning a compulsory unavoidable breath test before the ignition could be switched on. This measure is clear, effective and preventive, and widely used in other countries and widely supported by the public.
Finally, I turn to Amendment 416B, which might answer some of the questions asked by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. This is supported by the noble Lord, Lord Ashcombe, and it concerns something very different. It addresses an oddity that has grown over the years; namely, that the maximum fine for keeping or driving an uninsured car is now well below the cost of insuring a car. It is a real disincentive to bother with that small matter of purchasing insurance.
There are up to 400,000 uninsured cars on our roads every day, yet, as a result of inflation, the fixed penalty notice for uninsured driving remains at just £300, and for keeping such a vehicle a mere £100—this, when the average insurance is about £560. So the price of doing the wrong thing is half of doing the right thing.
Of course, any accident of an uninsured cover driver is covered by all the rest of us via our insurance premium, because some of that funds the Motor Insurers’ Bureau, which pays out. The victim of any crash caused by an uninsured driver is still compensated, so we are all paying for the uninsured driver. Every 20 minutes, someone is injured by an uninsured driver. Indeed, those drivers account for about 130 of the deaths that I have mentioned each year. Despite that, deterrence against non-insurance is minimal so long as the fine is half the average premium.
Our intention when we looked to table an amendment was simple: we wanted to increase the level of the fine, whether for keeping or driving an uninsured vehicle, to a figure well above the cost of insurance. However, that fell foul of the clerks, who advised that it was out of scope of the Bill, meaning that we could not table a change to increase the penalty. What is in scope is to allow the police to confiscate an uninsured vehicle and to hold it until it is insured or, failing that, for the police to take ownership of it—when I told my noble friend the Minister this, I think he hoped it was a Jaguar that was going to be uninsured, which would help the police no end.
Of course, it would be a real incentive if you would lose your car if it was not insured. It was not the original intention to call for that, but I have to say that now it is on paper I am rather attracted to it. However, my question to the Minister today is: please will the Government either take their own action to jack up these fines for having an uninsured car or take the more radical step of giving police the nod to confiscate any car on the road without insurance?
In summary, the amendments to which I put my name would deter people from keeping or driving an uninsured car. Via the random breath tests, about which we will hear shortly from the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, they would deter people from driving after drinking. Via the lower blood alcohol level, they would push down the rates of driving after drinking and, via the alcolocks, they would prevent a drink-driving offender taking to the car for a second time. I commend the amendments to the Committee.
Lord Hampton (CB)
I shall speak to Amendment 356G in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, who has spoken so forcefully on the subject.
Drink-driving remains one of the most preventable causes of death on UK roads. The latest Department for Transport figures show that an estimated 260 people were killed in crashes on Britain’s roads involving at least one driver over the legal alcohol limit in 2023, and approximately 1,600 people were seriously injured.
Alcohol interlock technology, or alcolocks, can reduce reoffending and save lives. Alcolocks prevent a vehicle from starting if alcohol is detected on the driver’s breath. The driver has to breathe into a tube, and the levels of alcohol are instantly detected before the engine is able to be turned on. According to the RAC Report on Motoring 2025, 82% of UK drivers support the introduction of alcolocks, so—stops, looks meaningfully at Ministers—it is very popular with voters. Research for the RAC report also found rates of admitted drink-driving near pre-pandemic levels, with more than one in 10 respondents, 12%, saying they had driven when they thought they were over the limit, either directly after drinking or on the morning after. The figures for younger drivers were even more pronounced, with 14% of those aged 25 to 44 admitting to drink-driving, and as many as 18% of those under 25.
The good news is that alcolocks are already in the Road Safety Act 2006, but the experimental wording in its Section 16 effectively turned the interlock provisions into a contingent pilot that ended in 2010. That pilot was never fully taken forward and the powers never came into effect. As a result, alcohol interlocks are not part of the UK courts’ sentencing toolkit. This has left the interlock scheme in limbo, despite years of persistent drink-driving offending and the accompanying road deaths and injuries. However, removing this experimental wording will mean that the interlock scheme under Section 15 of the Road Safety Act can be brought into force, restoring the original purpose of the Act to give courts a rehabilitative, safety-oriented sentencing tool for drink-drive offenders.
Section 16 meant that courts could impose an alcohol ignition interlock programme order only in designated pilots or trial court areas—that is, only in areas specifically chosen by the Secretary of State. This was a purposefully cautious approach for any scheme to be selective and closely monitored to build an evidence base. However, the evidence base is now robust and expansive, and the UK is behind the curve, with all 50 US states, most EU countries, New Zealand and more all introducing a form of alcohol interlock programme, with substantial research available that supports their effectiveness.
This provision is already there in legislation; it just needs a tweak. These international programmes show that alcolocks can reduce reoffending by up to 70% and are as effective as airbags in reducing road deaths. All the Government have to do is accept this amendment.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
May I ask for one point of clarification? These alcolocks sound fantastic. Do they have to be fitted by the manufacturers when the car is made, or can they be attached as a gadget afterwards?
Lord Hampton (CB)
I hear that they can be fitted in an hour for under £200.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, I have Amendment 398 in this group. I will first address my noble friend Lord Lucas’s Amendment 345. My noble friend Lord Blencathra expertly articulated it, but I fear that I did not find it convincing. As I understand it, he is really proposing a function that should be undertaken only by a police officer or the police. The power to detain a vehicle is a significant one and should not be undertaken lightly. I am not in favour of this amendment, and I hope that the Minister will speak in similar terms.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, is a tireless advocate of road safety; if she had not tabled her amendment, I would be worried for her. Had she run out of steam? Apparently not. I agree with much of what she said about the harm that alcohol can cause and will not repeat what she said so skilfully. While we are closely aligned, we part company over what is an appropriate blood alcohol concentration, or BAC. The Committee will recognise that the Grand Rapids study showed that the standard of driving deteriorates rapidly once a blood alcohol concentration of 80 milligrams is reached, and that is why our drink-drive limit is set at that level. However, I agree that there is no safe limit for driving a vehicle and that any alcohol will cause a deterioration in the standard of driving.
I suggest to the Committee that there are three broad classes of drink-driver offenders. I accept that there is a small cohort who regularly drink sufficient alcohol to take them to, or over, the limit. The next is a group who make a horrible mistake and, for one reason or another, unusually find themselves driving over the limit. I will not rehearse all the reasons why this may happen, but there is no excuse; they are relatively easily caught by a skilled traffic police officer. This is partly because they give themselves away with their style of driving. This offence is no longer socially acceptable and we rightly have severe minimum penalties in place.
I contend that the real problem lies with unregulated drinkers who are usually clinically dependent on alcohol, have no idea how much alcohol they have drunk and pay absolutely no attention to what the law says. Lowering the BAC will have no effect at all on them. The bad news is that their driving tends to be very fluid, so it is hard for the traffic police to detect them from their driving alone, and they often drive only short distances.
Lord Berkeley (Lab)
I thought that the noble Lord was going to tell us about the experience of driving tanks—I know he is a great expert on that—with or without the right alcohol limit, but he did not.
I have listened very carefully to all the speeches on this group of amendments. They seem to have one thing in common, which is that it is a way of trying to mitigate the previous scaredom, if you like, of previous Governments to upsetting the motorists: “Let’s do the minimum, because we don’t want to upset the motorists”. That applies to the random breath tests and many other things.
My noble friend Lady Hayter listed the various countries with the different blood alcohol limits. If you dig a bit further, you find that there are four European countries that have a zero-tolerance level, where you must not have any alcohol at all. They are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. Many of us have visited these places; maybe their driving is safer and maybe it is not. Then there is of course the question of bikes. Should you be under the influence of 80 milligrams or 50 milligrams if you are riding a bike? I will not go into that one now; we have talked a lot about bikes today. However, many noble Lords have been fighting to get it down from 80 milligrams to 50 milligrams for many years, led by my noble friend Lady Hayter and the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and I have tried to help. We have all failed because it appears that Governments of whichever hue—the Labour Party, the Tories, or whatever—have been so frightened of the motorists’ reaction that they have refused to go forward with it.
The evidence is uncontroversial now, and we should go for this. I favour a 50- milligram limit to start with, but—it is a big but after our discussions today—with much better enforcement and much better reduction in the number of different rules that have to be applied before anybody can be tested with a breathalyser. It has to be simple and, if people will be frightened by it, that, combined with a lower limit, will hopefully make the roads a great deal safer.
Lord Ashcombe (Con)
My Lords, I speak to Amendment 416B, tabled in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, which concerns the issue of uninsured drivers and to which I have added my name, as this is a serious crime. I declare my interest as an insurance broker with Marsh Ltd.
Within the motor industry, it is a regrettable truth that a significant number of vehicles on our roads are being driven without insurance. The Motor Insurers’ Bureau estimates that between 300,000 and 450,000 vehicles fall into this category. That figure alone should give us pause for thought. It represents not merely statistics but a vast unknown risk to every law-abiding citizen. When accidents occur involving these vehicles, there is no third-party insurance to provide protection or compensation. Instead, the burden falls upon the Motor Insurers’ Bureau, which must step in to provide cover where none exists. Sadly, we read of such occurrences all too often, particularly in the local press.
The scale of this problem is stark. The bureau receives a claim arising from an uninsured driver every 20 minutes. Every week, at least one person is killed as a result of uninsured driving and, every single day, another individual suffers injuries so severe that they require lifelong care. This is not a marginal issue but a persistent and devastating reality.
The financial consequences are equally sobering. The bureau spends approximately £400 million annually on claims, with its 2024 annual report noting reserves of around £3 billion. It estimates that uninsured driving costs the UK economy £1 billion each year and adds £260 million to motor insurance premiums. These figures are not abstract. They translate to an additional cost of around £15 on every policy paid by law-abiding drivers. In effect, responsible motorists are subsidising the reckless and the negligent. Anecdotally, when police apprehend uninsured drivers and ask who is their insurer, the response is simply, “The MIB”—the Motor Insurers’ Bureau. This casual reliance on the bureau underscores the inadequacy of current deterrence.
At present, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, has explained, the penalties stand at £100 for keeping an uninsured vehicle and £300 plus six penalty points for driving without insurance. These sums are significantly lower than the average premium of £550 and far below the £1,000 often paid by younger drivers. This disparity is glaring. The penalty for breaking the law is cheaper than the cost of compliance. It is little wonder, then, that uninsured drivers persist at such scale. Ideally, we would strengthen the financial penalties to reflect the gravity of the offence. However, as these measures have been ruled out of scope, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, mentioned, this amendment offers a practical and proportionate alternative. It would empower authorities to confiscate uninsured vehicles and, if insurance is not secured within 28 days, to have them permanently removed from the road. That, to you and I, means crushed—gone. This is not punitive for its own sake: it is a necessary step to protect the public and to uphold the principle that motor insurance is mandatory for the benefit of us all.
Uninsured driving is not a victimless crime. The law-abiding majority should not be asked to carry the burden of those who flout their responsibilities. Amendment 416B is a measured and effective response to this scourge and I commend it.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, just briefly, in 2011, I went out with Hampshire traffic police who were demonstrating ANPR systems to me. We detected an uninsured motorist and they relieved the motorist of the car. I absolutely agree with my noble friend about the problem he describes.
Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 416C in my name, but before I do that, I give my unequivocal support to my noble friend Lord Ashcombe’s amendment. We really need to take into account the confusion this causes for poor communities, because people will sit around and make a direct calculation about what is cheaper, and unless we send a very strong message about which is riskier, these numbers will continue to grow. As motoring becomes more expensive, insurance will become optional for many communities, whereas if you are involved in an accident, it will be anything but optional, so I really support the amendment.
I speak to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, as someone who last had a drink, I think, when I was 17 years old—I do not drink at all—but I deal with young people regularly and have been doing so for over three decades now. What is important about a limit is how easy it is to detect in the moment, so although the noble Baroness would lower it to 50, I think we should lower it to zilch, to nothing, to nada, because when you are out with your friends and you are 18, 19 or 21 and the night is going your way, you will not make that adjustment. To ask, “Have I jumped 50, have I done 80?” probably will not happen: you will take the risk. Young people are full of energy, they are risk takers and it is too much estimation, so I support the noble Baroness’s amendment as it stands but we should probably be going to zero, so that people have no confusion when they are out of a night enjoying themselves, particularly young people.
On my own amendment, this is a requirement for occupants to leave their car once they have been stopped on a traffic stop by a police officer—so that police officers have that power. There is a gap in the current law: the Road Traffic Act 1988 does not currently have powers for an officer to request that vehicle occupants exit the vehicle during a traffic stop. This leaves officers vulnerable to attack and ambush, particularly in the light of modern vehicles. If you are a police officer and you stop a vehicle, you may want to listen to the engine, but now electric vehicles can run silently and their ability to accelerate is unbelievable. They weigh more, so they tend to be more deadly when used in an attack, and I think we need the law to respond to that.
Baroness Coffey (Con)
I support Amendment 416B, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, and signed by my noble friend Lord Ashcombe. There is no real justification for any vehicle to be on the highway and uninsured. There will be a variety of reasons for it be uninsured—car insurance is very expensive, and the like—but, in reality, there is no excuse. Therefore, this is a sensible measure, recognising that a number of public bodies have the power to not only seize vehicles but crush them instantaneously. As a consequence, this seems like a modest measure to allow people 28 days, or four weeks, to make sure that the car has been insured.
As an aside, I should perhaps approach my noble friend because my car insurance went up massively this year. Perhaps I need to come and find him to discuss this. I am not quite sure what has happened in my life. Joining the House of Lords seems to have massively increased the risk, apparently.
That said, I am not as convinced by a number of the other amendments, although I understand the seriousness of drink-driving and the impact it can have. My noble friend Lord Attlee talked about the evidence, and the balance regarding whether the limit is 50 or 80. All the evidence so far has shown there is a massive distinction, so it not only covers England, but Wales and Northern Ireland. I appreciate that Scotland has gone to 50, recognising some of the other measures they have introduced in order to tackle the consumption of alcohol, such as minimum alcohol pricing. However, I am not convinced that this is the reason why.
I am not trying to advocate drink-driving at all, but I think of rural pubs and the like, where people believe that they can probably have a pint of beer and be able to drive their friends or family home safely without needing to make a calculation. I appreciate what the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, is trying to do in attempting to address something from the 2006 Act, but there is a reason why, 19 years on, it still has not been put into place. The evidence has shown it just has not been needed in that regard.
I was struck by what my noble friend Lord Bailey of Paddington said about the drive-away. I was genuinely interested in trying to understand where he was going with his amendment, and whether this was really an issue. I was struck by the number of significant accidents in that regard. It is worth considering whether this is an issue solely for the Met, in London, or whether it is an issue elsewhere, before the Government consider making any further changes.
I understand where my noble friend Lord Attlee is heading with the random breath test, but I take a different perspective. I am not sure of the best way to say this, other than to say that I do not want the police to have a reason to stop people for just anything. They should have a real reason to stop people going about their everyday lives. I understand what he is trying to achieve in his amendment, but we need to make sure that when the police use their already extraordinary powers, it is because they believe that somebody is genuinely doing something wrong. Therefore, the current position is sufficient. I hope that my noble friend, with whom I do not disagree very often, will understand why I disagree with him on his amendment tonight.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, to make a counterargument, I absolutely understand my noble friend’s concerns, but the fact of the matter is that if the police want to stop someone, they can.
Baroness Pidgeon (LD)
My Lords, this group of amendments looks at illegal vehicles on our streets, enforcement and guidance. Amendment 345 from the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, seeks guidance on enforcement in respect of illegal vehicles. However, having looked into this, my understanding is that a range of powers exists to enable the police to deal with these offences. The College of Policing already produces authorised professional practice on roads policing that sets out the existing powers and their operational application in detail. We therefore do not think the amendment is needed.
Amendments 350 and 356G, in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, and the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, on drink-driving, are very important. The first, as we heard, seeks to reduce the drink-driving limit so that it is in line with most other countries. The second is about alcohol ignition interlocks, which are in use in many jurisdictions.
As we have heard, drink-driving remains a major but preventable cause of death and serious injury on our streets. Reducing the drink-drive limit is one step in trying to tackle that, but it would need to go hand in hand with a publicity and enforcement campaign for maximum effect. When I was younger and learning to drive, it was absolutely drummed into us that we never went out and drank and drove. One person would be the designated driver, or we would use public transport or a taxi, or we would persuade someone’s parents to come and pick us up. This message needs to be amplified—as well as for drug-driving, which I have raised in this Chamber before, and which seems to be a growing trend. This needs to come as a package.
Alcolocks, which we have discussed, are an important development in trying to reduce drink-driving and people reoffending. It is a simple breathalyser linked to your ignition, which means that, if you are over the limit, you simply cannot start your vehicle. There was a drop-in, only a couple of weeks ago, in Portcullis House in which this was all demonstrated to us, and I thought it was a fantastic invention. As we have heard, it is already used in many EU countries, New Zealand, Australia and the United States. Given that around 260 people are killed in drink-driving collisions every year, and that drink-driving accounts for around 16% of all UK road deaths, this is an important yet simple development that has been shown to work successfully and to reduce repeat offending internationally. Why would we not want to bring it in here? We fully support this amendment and hope that the Government will respond positively. I note that a Minister from the other place also came to the drop-in, so I hope that the Government might be moving in that area.
On the amendment from the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, that, without suspicion, having random breath tests is not proportionate. Therefore, we on these Benches do not support it.
Amendment 416C, from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, highlights a potential loophole, which he outlined; it is interesting to consider given that technology has moved forward. Amendment 416B, from the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, makes a strong point about uninsured vehicles. I look forward to hearing the Government’s response to these and the other issues raised in this group.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, the amendments in this group consider a highly important issue that requires the utmost consideration, so I thank noble Lords who have contributed thus far.
We support the idea behind my noble friend Lord Lucas’s Amendment 345 that guidance, and a pilot based on that guidance, is a viable approach to stemming the proliferation of illegal vehicles and criminal offences by the drivers of those vehicles on our roads. A measure such as this is all the more urgent following the report published this week by the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Transport Safety, which laid bare the scale of criminality plaguing our roads. As many as one in 15 vehicles may carry modified and ghost number plates to evade ANPR detection. These modified vehicles, guilty of a crime in and of themselves, are then being used to bypass surveillance and undertake activities such as black market trading, drug dealing and organised crime.
Over 34,000 suppliers are registered with the DVLA to produce UK number plates, many of which are private and unregulated. A consultation and pilot should be the bare minimum. The APPG report has issued recommendations, but a more general consultation would be able to cover different types of road crime. Can the Minister confirm that the Government have acknowledged this report and are considering wider measures to deal with illegal vehicles and criminal activity on our roads?
I take much the same approach to Amendment 416B, in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, and my noble friend Lord Ashcombe, and Amendment 416C, in the name of my noble friend Lord Bailey of Paddington. Both measures aim to reduce crime on our roads by increasing police powers. I am not sure whether there is a power already under Section 165 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 for police to take possession of uninsured vehicles on the road; I stand to be corrected on that.
I support the principle behind the two amendments, particularly Amendment 416C, which closes an obvious gap in the law that has emerged as technology has developed. That said, simply increasing the powers of our police is meaningless if there is not the manpower to use those powers. New powers are welcome, but they should come with effective enforcement.
I am not opposed to the principle behind Amendment 350, in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town and Lady Finlay of Llandaff. Both Houses, when legislating on matters concerning public safety, as the amendment does, should err on the side of safety. It is the same reason why we are not opposed in principle to the Government’s announcement of their intention to reduce the drink-driving limit per 100 millilitres of breath.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, before I turn to the substance of the amendments in this group, I shall briefly set out the Government’s plans for road safety. As many noble Lords who have spoken in this debate will know, the Government are currently developing the first road safety strategy in a decade. The safety of road users is a top priority for the Government, and we are fully committed to considering the range of existing motoring offences and police powers, while implementing policies that will improve road safety for all. Our intention is to publish this strategy soon. Many of the issues raised in these amendments fall under the purview of this strategy, and I encourage noble Lords to study the strategy once it is available.
Amendment 345 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, and moved by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, on his behalf, seeks to make provision for a pilot to help tackle the problem of non-compliant vehicles on our roads—that is, vehicles which are uninsured, unregistered, untaxed or without an MoT. The police already have robust enforcement powers under the Road Traffic Act 1988 and the Police Reform Act 2002, including the ability to seize and dispose of vehicles for offences such as driving without insurance or a valid MoT. As the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, said, the College of Policing provides authorised, professional practice guidance on roads policing, and the strategic policing requirement prioritises this nationally.
Enforcement on the roads is a matter for the police, given their operational independence, and should remain so. We have already talked earlier at some length this evening in Committee about the impact of Operation Topaz on focusing efforts of all partners in improving road policing, and certainly the Government, as we have heard, are investing in this. It is for police forces to enforce road traffic legislation, with chief officers deciding how to deploy available resources, taking into account any specific local problems and demands. Given his experience in road transport matters, it is good to be on the same side of this argument as the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, at least on this one amendment tonight. For future days we shall see. Additional statutory guidance, as envisaged by the amendment, is therefore unnecessary. Mandating new guidance and pilots would place further strain on police resources without clear funding or staffing provisions.
I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, intends that the pilot would provide a self-funding solution, but it is not immediately apparent to us how this would be the case. For these reasons, we are not persuaded that enforcement pilots will deliver better outcomes than existing measures such as the automatic number plate recognition—ANPR—systems and intelligence-led approaches.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies, asked about the APPG report, which talked about ANPR. Of course, we welcome the contribution of the APPG’s report on the issue. I note that the ANPR system is, of course, a valuable tool—as we would all acknowledge—to help the police tackle crime and keep the roads safe. The Government assure your Lordships’ Committee that they keep the effectiveness of police use of ANPR systems under regular review so that it remains a robust tool for identifying vehicles of interest and drivers who break the law to the police. The DVLA and National Police Chiefs’ Council work closely with trading standards, local authorities and other government departments to improve the identification and enforcement of number plate crime.
The danger is that the well-intentioned amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, and moved by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, would duplicate existing frameworks, including the National Police Chiefs’ Council and the College of Policing guidance. The focus should remain on optimising the use of current enforcement powers and technology rather than introducing a duplicative statutory provision. Having said that, I will arrange for Home Office and Department for Transport officials to meet the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, in the new year.
I turn to Amendments 350 and 398, tabled by my noble friend Lady Hayter and the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, supported by the noble Lords, Lord Berkeley and Lord Bailey, and discussed with some thought and care by the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey. The Government fully share their—all our—commitment to reduce the numbers of those killed and seriously injured on our roads. Driving under the influence of drink or drugs is unacceptable and illegal. We are determined to combat this behaviour and to ensure that all such drivers are caught and punished. We have a combined approach of tough penalties and rigorous enforcement, along with our highly respected and effective THINK! campaign. This reinforces the social unacceptability of drink-driving, reminding people of the serious consequences such practices have for themselves and others.
I assure my noble friend that the upcoming road safety strategy includes serious consideration of lowering the drink-drive limits, as well as testing of suspects, and penalties. As part of this, we are considering concerns raised by campaigners, parliamentarians and bereaved families whom my ministerial colleagues in the Department for Transport have met. The Government are listening closely to the concerns of those affected by tragic cases of death or serious injury on our roads and want to put them at the heart of this work.
Amendment 356B, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, seeks to extend the alcohol ignition interlock programme to drivers convicted of certain drink-driving offences. Obviously, there is a very strong argument for alcolocks, not skipping over the fact that they have a lot of popularity with voters. I could not possibly comment on that in your Lordships’ House. As the noble Lord said, alcohol ignition interlock programmes are widespread in many jurisdictions. I reassure the noble Lord that the road safety strategy will consider the case for the use of alcolocks in dealing with drink-driving offenders.
It is worth considering the current regime in place for higher-risk offenders: those who have already engaged in what may be seen as repeated drink-driving or been involved in those alcohol misuse issues. There is a higher-risk offender—HRO—scheme for those who refuse to provide a breath sample, have had two drink-driving convictions in 10 years or were two and a half times over the legal limit. Currently, the practical consequences of becoming a drink-driver HRO is that the driver’s licence is not automatically reissued upon application once the period of disqualification has ended. Instead, the HRO must apply for a new licence, and the DVLA will issue a licence only after the HRO has proved their medical fitness to drive. Having said that, these alcolocks will be considered in the road safety strategy. I hope that gives the noble Lord some assurance and that he will look out for it and study it carefully.
Amendment 416B, tabled by my noble friend Lady Hayter, related to the confiscation—
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
Before my noble friend goes on to the issues that will come under the strategy, can he confirm whether, if anything is agreed along any of these lines, separate legislation will be brought in? Our fear otherwise is that this Bill goes, and it is then a long time before any legislation is brought in.
Lord Katz (Lab)
The road safety strategy review is being undertaken by the DfT, so it is a little outside my bailiwick to speak on it. There may well be lots of provisions in the strategy—this is more my speculation than anything else—that do not require primary or secondary legislation. The strategy will be out soon, and we are about halfway through Committee.
My noble friend’s amendment on confiscation of uninsured vehicles was supported by the noble Lord, Lord Ashcombe, who spoke with considerable knowledge of the insurance industry and the costs of free riding in car insurance and those who do not act responsibly. As I have indicated, the police already have powers under Section 165A of the Road Traffic Act 1988 to seize vehicles that are driven without insurance. This amendment goes further by making confiscation automatic and permanent after 28 days.
Under the existing regulations, the process for reclaiming a seized vehicle is clear and time-bound. Once the vehicle is seized, the registered keeper or driver has seven working days to reclaim it by paying all recovery and storage charges and providing proof of valid insurance. This ensures that enforcement is firm but fair, giving owners a reasonable opportunity to comply. If the vehicle is not reclaimed within the seven-day period, the police may proceed to dispose of it. Disposal can mean sale, destruction or other lawful means after issuing a formal notice of intent. This step ensures transparency, and due process for ownership is effectively transferred. These provisions strike an appropriate balance between enforcement, cost, recovery, and fairness to vehicle owners.
Having said that, my noble friend has indicated that her underlying point is about the inadequacy of the sanctions for driving without insurance, which the noble Lord, Lord Ashcombe, was discussing as well. My noble friend has pointed to the fact that at £300, the maximum fixed penalty notice for this offence is about half the cost of average annual car insurance. As I have said, we will soon be publishing a new road safety strategy. At the risk of sounding like a broken record, this will, among other things, set out our proposals for changes to motoring offences. I invite my noble friend to study the strategy and accompanying consultation documents once they are published.
Baroness Coffey (Con)
Clearly, the intention of noble Lords is to bring this forward because the feeling is that the power is not being used very often. Will this road strategy put in place the existing data or encourage its use to its full effect if this amendment is not required?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I am at no greater advantage than other Members of your Lordships’ House regarding what will be in the road safety strategy. There is a good reason why these amendments are grouped together: they all raise issues which will be covered in some way by the road safety strategy. As I said to my noble friend Lady Hayter, there could be things in the strategy that do not require changes to the guidance, or action in primary or secondary legislation that allows us to act quickly. However, I would be speaking well beyond my responsibilities in speaking for the DfT, for which I have absolutely no responsibility.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, I hope the Minister understands that he speaks for His Majesty’s Government and not the Home Office.
Lord Katz (Lab)
Of course I do—I slightly misspoke there. All I can say is that while I have been slaving away over the Crime and Policing Bill, I have not been slaving away over the road safety strategy. I can provide only so much clarity and guidance on the progress of that piece of work.
Lord Ashcombe (Con)
Before the Minister goes on, I think there is a real worry about the current situation on the face of a previous Bill and the insurance that is paid by law-abiding citizens today. I would like some reassurance that that is going to be seriously considered when this comes forward. It is way too far apart today and there is no incentive to buy insurance, which we all desperately need to be bought should anybody get hurt.
Lord Katz (Lab)
The noble Lord makes his point well. I am sure that it is a point that has been noticed and, indeed, there have been representations made to the DfT in the process of developing the road safety strategy. Once it is published, there will be a consultation and further opportunities for representations by organisations such as the ABI. I am sure that, as part of the process of preparing the new strategy, the DfT will be poring over the Hansard for this evening’s Committee to understand the debate and the issues raised.
Finally, turning to Amendment 416C in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, the Government are well aware of tragic instances where police officers have been injured by drivers during traffic stops. I thank him for speaking about and raising the tragic death of PC Harper, which demonstrates the real dangers that our police put themselves in every day of the week, doing something that you would think was quite humdrum and as everyday as attending to a vehicle that they had stopped. We are always right to remember the vital contribution they make to our safety by putting themselves in danger.
This behaviour is unacceptable, and we are determined that all such drivers are caught and punished. We are determined that police officers can do their vital jobs in as safe an environment as possible. As I said in response to a previous amendment, the Government are considering concerns that have been raised by the Police Federation on this issue and will look to address them in the road safety strategy.
In conclusion, I have sympathy for many of the points raised in this debate by noble Lords. We all want to see our roads safer for all road users, as well as the police in their vital role in enforcing our road traffic laws. As the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, said, for this to be effective, it needs to come as a package. We need the right laws, the right enforcement and the right awareness and education. Again, I would encourage all noble Lords to examine our forthcoming road safety strategy and respond to the associated consultations. Given the imminence of the strategy, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, would be content to withdraw his amendment.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, I think all noble Lords can agree that we have had a fabulous debate which we can be proud of, but can the Minister explain why he is considering lowering the blood alcohol level when the Scottish experiment shows that it does not work?
Lord Katz (Lab)
Without going into the detail of the Scottish experiment, I will say to the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, that for the road safety strategy to do a complete job, it is going into the exercise while keeping options on the table. I am not going to prejudge what it is going to say, but it would ill-behove it to rule everything out, just as we are not ruling out the potential measures on alcolocks or those on insurance. I will simply say—I feel a bit like a broken record in responding to this group of amendments—watch this space.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, this has been an eye-opener of a debate, not just for me but, I think, for many noble Peers; we have all learned something that we did not know before.
I feel a bit of a fraud doing this little wind up at the end. It really should be the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, after her superb speech and the amendments she spoke to. Let me just rattle through a few comments. I am sorry that my noble friend Lord Attlee did not like my noble friend’s amendment. Mind you, I did not like his amendment on random stops much either.
My noble friend Lady Coffey was right. The police should have good reason for stopping someone. I remember a few years ago that my constituents, way up in the wilds of Cumbria, used to complain that when they left the local pub late at night, they would drive a few yards and a police officer hiding in a car around the corner would stop them and say, “We have reason to think you have been drinking, sir”. Was that a random stop or was it done with good reason? The noble Lord himself said that the police do not need a reason to stop someone, so we do not need random stopping.
The points made by my noble friend Lord Bailey of Paddington were absolutely right. We read those horrible stories about policemen being dragged along, and I hope the gap there can be plugged.
I really liked what the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, said about interlock schemes. I think I first heard of those on “Tomorrow’s World” 20 years ago and they still have not been implemented. I simply do not understand what the problem is with doing a pilot. If the noble Lord brought that back on Report and it was in order, many of us would be tempted to support him.
I come now to the two big crunch amendments, which were the eye-opener for me. The noble Baroness was so right to talk about uninsured vehicles, and so was my noble friend Lord Ashcombe. I had no idea that the fine was less than half the insurance—that just cannot be right. Although we cannot put increased fines in the Bill, I like the idea of confiscation. Everyone says, “The police have the power to confiscate”, but are they actually doing it? I get the impression that very few vehicles are being confiscated.
We have automatic number plate recognition all over the country. If it is working, why are there tens of thousands of uninsured cars on the road? I say to the police, and perhaps to the Home Office to advise them: get out there and start grabbing those vehicles, getting the people and confiscating their cars. When they get them back, it will be not a £50 administrative fine but a £500 admin fine added to the current penalty to get their vehicle back. That might act as a disincentive for them until the government strategy comes along.
I conclude with the amendment from my noble friend Lord Lucas. The Minister seemed to make a very good case as to why his amendment was not necessary, and he did it in a courteous and nice way. I thank him for agreeing that my noble friend may come to the Home Office and meet the officials there and be briefed on it. With those words, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Crime and Policing Bill
Wednesday 17th December 2025
(4 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-VII(b) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Seventh Marshalled List) - (17 Dec 2025)
Lord Shinkwin
“Dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling: review(1) Within one year of the day on which section 106 comes into force, the Secretary of State must publish a review assessing the effectiveness with which operators of bicycle courier services ensure that their employees and contractors conduct themselves on the roads in such a way as to avoid committing the offences in section 106.(2) The review under subsection (1) must recommend any changes to the law which may be necessary.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to probe how the law could be changed to ensure that companies who contract the services of delivery cyclists bear some responsibility for the conduct of these cyclists on the road.
Lord Shinkwin (Con)
My Lords, in speaking to Amendment 346C, I welcome the other amendments in this group in the names of my noble friends, Lord Blencathra and Lord McColl of Dulwich.
Amendment 346C is a modest and reasonable amendment, which would do exactly what it says on the tin. It would require the Home Secretary to institute
“a review assessing the effectiveness with which operators of bicycle courier services ensure that their employees and contractors conduct themselves on the roads in such a way as to avoid committing the offences in section 106”.
The review, which must be published within a year of that section coming into force, would recommend any changes to the law which the review determines may be necessary. The rationale for this amendment is similarly simple: it seeks to probe how the law could be changed to ensure that companies which contract for the services of delivery cyclists bear some responsibility for the conduct of those cyclists on the road.
Noble Lords will not be surprised to hear that I approach this issue from the perspective of a severely disabled person, whose condition makes me extremely vulnerable to the impact—and I use the term advisedly to mean the actual physical impact—of being hit by an individual riding one of these e-bikes in, to use the legislative terminology, a “dangerous, careless or inconsiderate” way. To put it bluntly, the impact would be catastrophic; I would not expect to survive. So I completely agree with my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe, who said on day six of Committee that you take your life in your hands when you cross some roads in central London. I do so, quite literally, every day, on my way to and from your Lordships’ House.
Now I entirely appreciate that whether I live or die is neither here nor there in the grand scheme of things. It would be a shame if I were killed, but the earth would continue to turn. I know that. Equally, I know that I am just one person. I think of all those people with visual impairments, for example, who literally risk life and limb just stepping outside their front door. So the review should consider the impact on them as well, and not just in terms of their independence, mental health and well-being, all of which will of course bring associated costs for the NHS and social care services, but of their employment prospects. For why would anyone want to risk going to work, given they could end up in hospital before they have even got to the office as a result of being hit by a courier cyclist on an e-bike while they were walking along the pavement or trying to board a bus from one of those so-called floating bus stops?
I cite this group as just one example—and of course there are people with mobility impairments like mine, or simply older people whose reflexes are not as sharp as they once were—to highlight how the dangers presented by dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling on e-bikes, particularly by courier and delivery cyclists, are having a far greater impact on our society than we perhaps realise. I would go so far as to say that the effect has been to airbrush out of the bigger social picture whole swathes of society. So while I am not suggesting that an assessment of impact should be disability-exclusive, I would argue that such an impact alone merits a review.
I say to the Minister that I am not laying the blame at the door of Government per se. The Member’s explanatory statement accompanying the amendment refers to the companies which contract the services of delivery cyclists bearing
“some responsibility for the conduct of these cyclists”—
the point being that the responsibility is shared. But none of us, either in Parliament or the Government, can deny that we also share responsibility for addressing the problem; in our case, by providing the most effective legislative framework to facilitate the change we all want to see—safer streets.
I am reminded of what the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, said on day six in Committee, about us having made a “huge strategic mistake” by not factoring in the need for safety from the outset when these e-bikes were introduced. I agree with him. Sadly, some people, especially those in the Department for Transport, appear not to. They—and I dare say they are non-disabled and a bit slow on the uptake, bless them, so we need to make allowances—still do not seem to have woken up to the fact that this experiment has gone badly wrong.
That needs to be the starting point of the review. There must be a recognition—a fact which I sense the Minister implicitly acknowledges—that there is a significant and growing problem, which cannot simply be dismissed by officialdom’s obtuse obfuscation of, “Well, we are where we are”, because if we do not recognise that where we are is bad then we cannot move on.
Lime, the other e-bike hiring companies and companies such as Just Eat deserve to be in the dock and not in the saddle when it comes to this review. Yes, they will be part of the solution, but right now they are doing very nicely thank you very much from being a big part of the problem. They cannot be allowed to set or influence the review’s terms of reference or to sit on the review panel. That should be done by those most affected by dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling, not by those whose irresponsible indifference means they are profiting from putting people’s lives at risk.
In conclusion, I believe that the case for a review is compelling. As my noble friend Lady Stowell said on day six in Committee, courier delivery service e-bike users are “the worst perpetrators”. It is time we reviewed the situation. I beg to move.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, my Amendment 416K supports a targeted, enforceable measure that holds delivery platforms to account where their operational model and oversight failures contribute to dangerous cycling on our streets. This is not about blame for individual riders alone; it is about closing a regulatory gap so that companies that profit from rapid, app-driven deliveries also carry responsibility for foreseeable harms linked to their business models and practices.
If noble Lords want a bit more excitement in their lives than the excitement of participating in this debate then I invite them to accompany me, when we rise tonight, to walk along Millbank, Horseferry Road and Marsham Street, past the Home Office. The excitement will come from them dodging out of the way of dozens of Deliveroo couriers belting along the pavements delivering to the thousands of flats in this area.
Even more excitement may come when I manage to confront one of these riders and we have an exchange of views, but not usually a meeting of minds. When I see them belting along the pavement, I drive straight for them. My chair is heavier than theirs, so they are the ones who are forced to dodge out of the way. When I manage to stop one on those massive, fat tyre, illegal bikes and speak to them, I can say with all honesty that every single one I have seen is a recent arrival to this country. Half do not speak English and do not know the law on riding killer bikes on the pavement. The other half do know and tell me to go away sexually, that they will do what they like, and who will stop them.
If I had said that a month ago, I might have been accused of racist comments, but on 4 December this year, the Home Office issued a press release to say that, in targeted action, it and the police had arrested 171 food delivery couriers for criminal activity, and 60 of them were illegal migrants facing deportation. The Home Office press release said:
“It comes as Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood has been targeting people working unlawfully in the ‘gig economy’. Border Security Minister Alex Norris has also met representatives from food-delivery firms to encourage them to do more to tackle the issue—such as using facial recognition checks to prevent riders sharing their identities with people who do not have permission to take up work in the UK. Norris said that November’s action ought to ‘send a clear message: if you are working illegally in this country, you will be arrested and removed’. He added: ‘We are tightening the law to clamp down on illegal working in the delivery sector to root out this criminality from our communities’”.
Good on you, Minister, and good on the Home Office—they have provided proof of what I have encountered every night for the past two years on the streets of Westminster, within hundreds of yards of this building. Good luck to you in trying to send them back to Eritrea, Somalia or wherever, because there is bound to be some immigration judge who will block you and cite bogus human rights reasons for why they cannot be deported. But that is your problem and not for today.
My amendment supplements what Minister Norris was doing. He exhorted the food delivery companies to do more to tackle the issue. My proposed new clause would give the police the power to penalise the food delivery companies financially, since money is the only thing that will make them change.
Lord McColl of Dulwich (Con)
My Lords, my Amendment 481 seeks to address the specific part that delivery services play in broader criminal activity. Delivery riders make regular deliveries to residential accommodation, which often houses vulnerable people. The identity of these riders is unknown, because they wear masks and helmets. Despite the anonymity of these riders, they can wander around inside these residential accommodations with impunity, especially because the outside door of these flats is often controlled remotely. Some of the elevators actually open into private apartments.
As has been mentioned already, a vulnerable 80 year- old lady opened the door of her flat from the lift and was confronted by one of these helmeted, masked foreigners. When she tried to shut the door, he prevented her shutting the door by putting his foot across the threshold into her apartment. You can imagine how frightened she was. Besides the fear that these riders can stoke, they can also commit crimes within the building. Some of them have put graffiti all over the place, so there is a real problem here.
Another thing we have to bear in mind is that these people are often involved in human trafficking and can be in the country illegally, as has been mentioned. This month, 171 illegal delivery riders have been arrested. My amendment is the first step in addressing all this criminal behaviour. It would enable an accurate diagnosis of the problem, the impact of which is particularly felt by the most vulnerable in our society.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I support all three amendments, particularly the one tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin. I have tabled amendments with general concerns about cyclists putting pedestrians at risk. The Government did not accept those. These amendments are different. It is no coincidence that the three people who tabled them have physical challenges that they overcome every day. Although as pedestrians we all face challenges with cyclists, if you cannot get out of the way, cannot see them coming and will sustain more grievous injuries should you be hit, that group in society is even more vulnerable. We should listen carefully to the case that they have made.
This Government and even the Lib Dems are a little complacent about responding to the general point about cyclists being held to account. There is almost a patting on the head: “There are not that many people dying or getting injured compared with those being hit by cars”. Well, 25 people have been killed by cyclists over the last 10 years, and it mattered to those families. It should matter to the Government to take some action.
The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, merely asks for a review to gather evidence, particularly in the narrow area of commercial operations that employ cyclists, rather than just general cycling. The link between the cyclist and the employer has got more vicarious. Many of them are on zero-hour contracts and provide the cycles themselves. They do not always visit the operating centres of their employer. The employer says, “We didn’t buy the bikes; we don’t see the bikes. What has what they do when they are working for us got to do with us?”
I was out a few days ago with the City of London Police and saw that these people clearly are operating on behalf of a commercial company. There is a vicarious liability for the employer, but in no way is that link being established at the moment. The employers or companies could look at the data on the bikes. They could establish how often they were being operated. Sometimes this is beyond normal employment practice. They could establish which streets they went on. Many of them are going the wrong way down certain streets, which would be clear if they were to look at the data.
At the very least, this review might want to consider that an employer could do more positive things than just employ sanctions. They could start to educate their cyclists and reward them for better behaviour. Many employers of HGV drivers and bus drivers have schemes advertised on the rear of the vehicles: “If you don’t like how our driver is driving, please let us know”. They could do that for cyclists. You might say, “There’s no registration plate”. I argue for a registration plate. If you do not like that idea, they could have highlighters with details on the back advertising which company they were employed by and who you might report it to if you were not happy with the driving of that cycle. You are then starting to bear down on some of the accountability, which would gradually improve road safety. I am sure the Government are not blind to the problem, but people are worried about the amount of bureaucracy that would be needed and are frightened of having to establish it. I understand the administrative burden, but it is important to make incremental steps to start to have some impact in this important area.
At the very least, this review could establish some data on which we could all debate. It is insufficient for anecdotes to drive policy, but the anecdotes are so frequent and obvious that there is underpinning data that is not being collected. A review such as this would collect data, inform policy and make sure that any proposed changes were reasonable and likely to have some effect.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, I have a lot of sympathy with Amendments 346C and 481. I start from the premise of not seeking further reviews, but I am a bicyclist. I bicycle very regularly in London; I did so this very morning from King’s Cross to here on an electric bike, and that is my new usual means of transport when I come from Lincolnshire.
I think, in fact, that there are two quite distinct problems that need to be addressed. One is the simple behaviour of bicyclists on the road. There are already many regulations that apply, such as not to ride on pavements, to have batteries of an appropriate kind, to comply with traffic signs and all that. One thing that one sees all the time is an extraordinary denial of the law by riders. That is a matter of enforcement. I think it is very difficult to enforce, because, frankly, the police have better things to do with their time. I have some sympathy with that view. That is one discrete problem.
A much more worrying problem, which has been alluded to by my noble friends Lord Blencathra and Lord Shinkwin, is about the relationship between the delivery companies and the delivery riders. That relationship is worth looking into carefully. It is right to inquire about the following: what is the nature of the employment; by whom are the bicycles provided; what steps are taken to ensure that the riders comply with the law; and where does the liability to pay compensation arise? If the riders are regular employees, the ordinary principles of vicarious liability arise; if they are sort of independent contractors, presumably the delivery companies are not liable to pay compensation.
These are the sorts of questions that I think could sensibly be addressed by either the Department for Transport or the Home Office. I am not sure I want to see a review of a formal kind, as it takes a very long time, but I do think that there are issues seriously to be addressed about the relationship between the riders and the delivery companies.
With regard to Amendment 416K, tabled by my noble friend Lord Blencathra, while again I have sympathy with the point that he is seeking to make, I cannot support what he is proposing, for two reasons. The first is a technical one: if you look at his amendment, the liabilities ultimately on the company arise out of the bad and dangerous driving of the rider. On any ordinary view, the company itself is not directly responsible for the criminal act of the rider, so we would be taking a vicarious liability rather too far, in my opinion.
Secondly, and quite differently—and I say this with some diffidence in the presence of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe—there are no circumstances in which I would give the police the power to levy an unlimited fine. We have had far too many anxieties about the police—on occasion, the noble Lord himself has identified some—and, for the sake of preserving civil liberties, there is no way that this House should do that.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, I support this group of amendments, which very neatly follow on from the discussions we had on Monday, when there was a great deal of consensus around the Committee on the degree to which there is a problem, particularly with delivery riders on illegal e-bikes and delivery riders riding e-bikes illegally.
On my way back from your Lordships’ House on Monday, I saw a delivery rider riding the wrong way down Jermyn Street, about half a mile from here, doing about 20 mph. It is a one-way street and he was driving down it the wrong way. That is one anecdote, but walking here this afternoon, I saw a number of similar offences.
A number of different approaches to this problem have been suggested. The first is the major initiative that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, would like to see—the registration of all cycles. There was some feeling that that would be difficult and perhaps a bit of a sledgehammer to crack quite a large nut.
The issue we have is that these delivery riders are flying under the flag, and are de facto commissioned contractors of, large companies whose agents, for want of a better term, are acting illegally. They are using illegal vehicles and are riding them illegally—the whole time. It is removing the incentive for those who seek to ride legal vehicles.
My noble friends are quite right to put the emphasis on those who can do something about this—the large companies that are commissioning these individuals to utilise these vehicles. They have to take responsibility for the actions of their agents. My noble friend Lord Hailsham may well have said that this goes beyond the law as it stands, but we are Parliament; we are here to change the law where we think that a change in the law will make a specific difference.
I have only one point, which is to urge the Ministers on the Government Front Bench, who have been diligent throughout the Bill and no doubt will be in the weeks to come, not to look too closely at their folders. I have not had a peep but I dare say the words are along the lines of, “Yes, isn’t it awful? There is a real problem. But it’s all very difficult to do something about”. This is the opportunity to do something about it, and I believe the Committee will listen very carefully to the Minister’s response, because we can all see illegal activity and people flouting the law.
The law is being brought into disrepute. There is almost no enforcement at all on this. Yet the Government, in the form of the Minister, say, “Well it’s very difficult but I’m not sure that any of the solutions that have been proposed will make any sort of difference”. If the Government do not like the amendments that my noble friends have proposed, fair enough, but let us hear their initiatives.
I feel that, if we do not get a satisfactory response, the House should not let this opportunity pass, when we have a Bill with clauses that deal directly with the issue of illegal cycling and sanctions. We need to do something about it. This is our moment. We look forward to a substantive response from His Majesty’s Government.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
My Lords, I congratulate my noble friends Lord Shinkwin, Lord Blencathra and Lord McColl on speaking to their amendments so eloquently. They take the debate one step further than the general debate that we had about dangerous and careless cycling, particularly on pavements—the main perpetrators of which are in fact delivery riders, as a number of us recorded in that debate.
What is particularly helpful about these three amendments is that they refer to the duties and responsibilities of the Home Office. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, has spoken about this on a number of occasions and we applaud the work of the City of London in pulling these perpetrators off the street, whether they are cyclists, e-cyclists or e-scooter riders, where they have broken the law. What is particularly appealing in my noble friend Lord McColl’s amendment is that he refers in particular to criminal activity. We know that e-scooters are heavily used in the theft of goods and telephones and the supply of illegal drugs. I almost posted a photograph of an e-bike that was mounting the pavement not far from here in Strutton Ground. I thought I would place it on Facebook. I am rather pleased that I did not, because he went on to do a drugs drop on Strutton Ground. There were schoolchildren and families there. My noble friend Lord Shinkwin’s amendment also highlights how it is particularly the disabled, the less able and the elderly, but also young people with families and those using wheelchairs, who are put at great risk. That has been highlighted by this group of amendments.
I shall put two questions to the noble Lord, Lord Katz, for when he sums up. What actions is the Home Office taking in this regard, outside the City of London and the one-off operations we have heard of, where 70 bicycles were taken off the street in one day? My husband is convinced that, every time one of these operations takes place, the word goes round the delivery drivers and they tell each other not to go out that day because enforcement is out, and therefore they evade that enforcement. What are the Government going to do to improve enforcement by the Home Office? We have moved one step further from the debate on Monday. This is a debate not just about transport and cycling but about people using e-bikes, pedal bikes and e-scooters for illegal and criminal activities.
I have a second question for the noble Lord, Lord Katz. My noble friend Lord Blencathra asked what happens to bikes that have been seized, but I have a wider question. What is the power to seize and confiscate pedal bikes, e-bikes and e-scooters? Do we as private citizens have the power to conduct a private arrest where we see an illegal activity taking place? Are we putting ourselves at undue risk in that regard? I hope that we will get a full response to these questions. Perhaps the Government might come forward with their own amendments because, where this is leading to criminal activities, as we have established it is, it is nonsensical to let it continue to its current extent. I look forward to listening to the Minister’s reply.
Baroness Pidgeon (LD)
My Lords, the amendments in this group from the noble Lords, Lord Shinkwin, Lord Blencathra and Lord McColl, are trying to probe the issue of who is responsible for dangerous cycling by cyclists working for delivery companies. While I support their aims, I do not associate myself with all the points they have raised and, indeed, the language that they have used. However, this is a real issue and one that many of us have looked at over recent years as we have seen this rise of delivery companies, whether it is for your shopping, takeaways or virtually anything you want from the click on your device.
This does not cover just pedal cyclists; it applies equally to those who provide deliveries on motorcycles and e-scooters. In the past, I worked on this at London City Hall to see whether we could work with, for example, the food delivery companies that we have heard so much about today, to see whether we could provide additional training for their cyclists and motor- cyclists, perhaps looking at some sort of charter mark to show that they had higher standards to deliver goods around the city, ensuring that we have professional riders providing this service on our streets.
However, the challenge is that most riders and scooters, as has been mentioned, are not employees of these companies, whose legal advice is that they do not want to go anywhere near that, because then they may be responsible for their cyclists’ or motorcyclists’ behaviour. In fact, you may find that some of these riders are working at the same time for a number of these companies, so it becomes even more complex to work out and identify which company would be responsible. However, the amendments raise an important safety point and I look forward to hearing from the Minister on this area about any ways forward to try to address this growing concern.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I rise to speak to the group of amendments moved by my noble friend Lord Shinkwin in what I might say was rather a poignant way.
The amendments probe the liability of courier companies, specifically for the actions of their employees who use cycling as their method of transportation. My noble friend Lord Shinkwin spoke of the threat posed by these cyclists to a disabled person, for example. Amendment 346C, tabled by my noble friend Lord Shinkwin, asks for a review looking at how the law could be changed to ensure that bicycle courier companies are held accountable for their riders.
Noble Lords will be aware of the explosive growth of bicycle delivery and courier services, and many of those courier companies are not held responsible for the dangerous manner in which their riders behave. Many of the most dangerous incidents are caused by delivery riders under pressure to meet tight deadlines and often operating fast, heavy e-bikes. Holding companies responsible, or at least requiring a public review of their practices, would help deter irresponsible riding and shift the burden back on to the companies that profit from high-speed delivery models. A review of this kind would also allow us to examine the employment models used by these companies, the incentives placed on riders and the adequacy of training, supervision and enforcement mechanisms. It would provide a valuable evidence base for any future legislative change, rather than relying on piecemeal responses to individual incidents.
I thank my noble friend Lord Blencathra for Amendment 416K and the passion with which he spoke in support of it. It would give the police power to issue fines of an unlimited amount to delivery companies for dangerous cycling offences
“under sections 27A (causing death by dangerous cycling), 27B (causing serious injury by dangerous cycling), 28B (causing death by careless, or inconsiderate, cycling) or 28C (causing serious injury by careless, or inconsiderate, cycling) of the Road Traffic Act 1988”.
We support the intention behind the amendment, whose aim is to hold companies that hire large numbers of delivery drivers to account for the actions of their hired staff. This is an important principle and touches on the important points of what frameworks and policies companies have in place to ensure that their own staff are abiding by the laws of the road. While questions would clearly need to be addressed around proportionality, enforcement and evidential thresholds, the amendment raises legitimate concerns about the status quo. I hope the amendment has made the Government reflect on whether current penalties fall too heavily on individual riders, while the companies that benefit financially from the delivery model escape meaningful consequences. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Amendment 481, tabled by my noble friend Lord McColl of Dulwich, proposes a review into bicycle and motorcycle delivery services and their potential links to criminal activity. We are broadly supportive of the principle behind the amendment. It seeks to shine a light on a range of issues that are often raised by residents and local authorities, including concerns about organised crime, exploitation, immigration compliance and the impact of delivery riders on community safety.
Taken together, these amendments raise serious and timely questions about accountability, public safety and the responsibility of large delivery platforms. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, is absolutely right that the Government must acknowledge the argument and come up with answers. The words of my noble friend Lord Goschen summed it up perfectly: this is an opportunity to do something positive about a very real problem, and to do it now in this Bill. I hope the Government will engage constructively with the issues raised and set out how they intend to ensure that the rapid growth of this sector does not come at the expense of safety and public confidence.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, these amendments, in their different ways, seek to extend liability for the unlawful actions of cyclists to their employers or contractors. Amendment 346C, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, proposes a review of the new cycling offences provided for in Clause 106 one year after the clause comes into force. He set out its provisions with clarity, his customary humility and his personal perspective, and we are all grateful for him doing so. As I understand the noble Lord, the intention of such a review is to assess whether the new offences have impacted the standard of cycling by delivery riders, and whether further changes in the law are required to ensure that their employers or contractors take greater responsibility for the cycling standards of their workers.
To be clear, these offences apply to all cyclists regardless of the purpose of their journey or whether they are paid to do it. I, of course, recognise the very real concerns around the behaviour of delivery riders that we have discussed in this group of amendments, but I completely reject the idea from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, that we are somehow being complacent and ignoring the issue. The noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, talked about the importance of using the opportunity to do something positive, and I will come on to that in a second. I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, for sharing her experience from City Hall of the Greater London Authority, the mayor’s office and TfL.
We of course recognise the concerns about the behaviour of delivery riders, but it is harder to find firm evidence to suggest that their behaviour is so demonstrably worse than that of other groups that it is necessary to single them out for review—hard evidence, I would say, looking at the faces of some noble Lords opposite. Furthermore, it is not clear what such a review would achieve. The Health and Safety Executive’s guidance already makes it clear that those who drive or ride for work should have the skills and expertise required to be safe on the road. The key thing here is that the Department for Transport—we discussed this on Monday in Committee; certainly, I spoke to it on one of the later groups—is also developing a new road safety strategy, and we will set out more details shortly. That will be a holistic strategy around all elements of road safety including pedestrians, cyclists, motorcyclists, road users and public transport drivers—the whole gamut. I say to the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, that is the opportunity for us to do something positive and take a holistic approach to improving road safety. We are not playing down these issues but just trying to find the best way of approaching them in a sense that is complete and wholescale rather than piecemeal.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the Minister. In previous Bills, the Department for Transport has made exactly the point that he is making, which is that a strategy is coming. It was due in the summer of this year, we are now at Christmas and there is no date, so I am not reassured by that general point.
I was surprised to hear the Minister say that we are struggling to find evidence of the problem that we are all talking about, because you only have to walk outside. Our newspapers and broadcasters are carrying out surveys showing what we all know to be true—not to blame cyclists for everything in the world, but there is clear evidence it is happening, so I am surprised he said that.
Finally, I wonder whether the Minister would like to look into the health data. We have talked only about the police data. The health data is completely different. When people go to A&E, their GP et cetera for injuries caused by cyclists, it is not recorded in the same way as it is by the police. We have two sets of data which we are not bringing together; we only ever talk about the data collected by the police. I was surprised to hear the Minister say they could not find the data.
Lord Katz (Lab)
To be clear, I was talking about evidence of causality rather than necessarily data on incidents. Let me make some progress, and maybe the noble Lord will be a little mollified by the time I get to the end of my contribution—or maybe not.
The fundamental purpose of the new offence is to—
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I am sorry, but I am afraid that saying that there is no evidence of causality is just what the Department for Transport wants the Home Office to believe. The evidence is quite clear; there are no better words than from the Mayor of London himself, Sadiq Khan, who said it is a Wild West out there. Many other councils in London are now trying to ban bikes from their areas because of the danger they cause, and those heavy, gigantic food delivery couriers are the worst offenders of all.
Lord Katz (Lab)
Again, I say to the noble Lord that I will make some progress and then he may come back at me again before I finally sit down.
The fundamental purpose of the new offences is to appropriately punish offenders and deter dangerous cycling behaviours. There is no carve-out or special provision for delivery riders. To be clear, all road users will face equal treatment before the law under these provisions. I can also assure the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, that, like all new government enactments, the Crime and Policing Act will be subject to post-legislative review three to five years after Royal Assent, so there is the opportunity to review the action.
Amendment 416K from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, would allow for food delivery companies to receive an unlimited fine should any of their riders be convicted of any offences under Clause 106. A complicating factor around this, as many noble Lords recognised, is that many such riders operate in the gig economy—the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, set that out particularly well. We are not always talking about the relationship between an employer and an employee, so using what we would consider normal working relationship incentives and rule structures is not always the easiest thing to do.
It is worth stating, particularly as the Employment Rights Bill finally finished its passage through Parliament yesterday, that as part of that wider package of employment reforms, there will be a major consultation on employment status which will help to clarify these grey areas. Again, I cite the contribution that the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, made. I say in response to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that is probably the best place to have a review of the grey areas around contractors and employers working in the gig economy. A problem has clearly been identified in the delivery driving sector, but there are many other sectors— I remember from my time spent in Committee on the Employment Rights Bill that there are lots of areas where the lack of clarity on employment status is causing all sorts of consequences.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I am so grateful to the noble Lord for giving way again; I hope this will be the last time. If he and my noble friend Lord Hailsham are correct that the current law on vicarious liability might mean that Deliveroo and Uber Eats are not liable for the agents they are using, does he accept my noble friend Lord Goschen’s point that we are Parliament and, if the current law does not cover it, we can amend the law as we suggest to make sure that those companies are liable for the people who deliver food in their name, with a great big bag on their back advertising that?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I do not disagree with the proposition that the noble Lord makes. Of course, we are Parliament, but I suggest that we should legislate in a slightly more deliberative way than simply shooting at ducks ad hoc as they come up in the stall.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
On that point, does the noble Lord accept that there is an essential distinction between vicarious liability in civil law, which is to pay compensation for people injured by employers or whoever, and vicarious liability for criminal actions, which is something quite different and very rarely imposed?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I am certainly happy to defer to the noble Viscount’s legal experience and expertise. It is worth the Committee noting that distinction and I am grateful to him for making that point.
To that point, the individual must bear responsibility for their actions and face consequences for them, which is fundamentally the purpose of Clause 106. There is no hard evidence to suggest that the working practices of these companies either cause or contribute to serious injuries or fatalities involving cyclists or other road users. That is a relatively rare occurrence. We understand the point that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, made on the rareness; obviously, any death is one too many, but it is a relatively rare occurrence compared to, say, collisions involving cars and pedestrians. Where that happens, however, we are determined to ensure the individual is held fully to account.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
Before my noble friend responds to the Minister’s wind-up speech, I put a gentle challenge to the Minister that the Committee was looking for a substantive response. I believe he was supportive, in principle, of the need for enhanced road safety but was not seriously acknowledging that there is a specific problem around delivery drivers, often riding e-bikes, and that we need to do something about that. I did not note a wave of support around the Committee for his contention that there was no evidence that there was a specific problem. Frankly, that is not a credible response. There is a problem. Every Peer in this Committee and everybody outside these gates knows that there is a problem. We need to do something about it.
I very much hope that my noble friends Lord Shinkwin, Lord Blencathra and Lord McColl, when they come to give their intentions, will continue to press the Government hard. I hope that, on Report, if there is no movement—perhaps there are grounds for a discussion before then—they will bring forward amendments and see whether the Government have support or whether those who are seeking to change the law have support. Essentially, large companies are sponsoring and benefiting from law-breaking, and the Government are turning a blind eye. That is not acceptable.
Lord Katz (Lab)
In response to the noble Viscount, and perhaps anticipating what the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, will say, we are of course happy to do that. We have had a fair bit of engagement on many different aspects of this Bill, both before Committee and during it, and I imagine that will continue. Our collective doors remain open to discuss all the issues that the Bill raises. I would be very happy to meet all Peers interested in these issues.
Lord Shinkwin (Con)
My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken. This has been a very useful debate that has brought the Committee together on an issue that has affected and is affecting so many of us.
The Minister was very kind in his remarks to me personally. Can I reciprocate by applauding the loyalty with which he stuck to the Department for Transport’s brief? It is entirely commendable, but I do feel that that script will not wash. He will sense from across the Committee that there is real alarm at the situation that confronts us in the immediate vicinity of Westminster and beyond.
I agree with my noble friend Lord Blencathra that all these amendments, and, of course, as I would say, my own, are proportionate and necessary because, as my noble friend made clear, this is a case of our laws being flagrantly abused and broken. My noble friend Lord McColl is absolutely right, as I made clear in my speech, that this is really affecting those who are most vulnerable in our society, particularly those who, like me, have a mobility impairment or those who have a visual impairment.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for his remarks, because, as he said, this does matter. A review could be an incremental step to, in effect, reclaiming our streets and making them far more safe. Employers are falsely claiming wilful ignorance, and we need to stand up to them.
I thank my noble friend Lord Goschen, and I agree with him. This Bill presents the Committee with a unique opportunity to do something about this situation; this is, as he said, our moment. I also agree with my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering that it is nonsensical to allow crime to continue. I simply say to the Minister that I do not think his comment that the Bill will be subject to post-legislative review in three to five years quite reflects the urgency of the situation.
In closing, my condition means that I have to be a risk management expert, whether I like it or not. I have no choice. We have a choice here, and we need to act. I am very grateful to the Minister for saying that he is happy to meet in advance of Report. I believe that cycling is a very good thing. I use my manual chair for exercise—it is crucial for pain management—but cycling or using a manual chair also has wider health benefits. Equally, this sort of cycling, predominantly by delivery service couriers who frantically break every rule of the road to deliver a takeaway, is not good for pedestrians or cyclists. I look forward to bringing this back on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Blencathra
“Dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling offences: supply of batteries for modification of cycles(1) Where an offence under sections 27A (causing death by dangerous cycling), 27B (causing serious injury by dangerous cycling), 28B (causing death by careless, or inconsiderate, cycling) or 28C (causing serious injury by careless, or inconsiderate, cycling) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 is committed on a cycle which has been modified since purchase with a battery, a person who supplied the battery for the modification may be charged with an offence if the battery—(a) has a maximum continuous rated power which exceeds 250 watts, or(b) does not comply with statutory guidelines on lithium-ion battery safety for e-bikes issued by the Office for Product Safety and Standards.(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to put a penalty on the suppliers and sellers of batteries used for the modification of cycles used in the committing of offences under the Road Traffic Act 1988.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I neglected to say at the start of my previous remarks that although it may be the case, as my noble friend Lord Shinkwin said, that the world would not stop turning if he was killed by an e-bike on the streets, my orbit would certainly be destroyed, as would that of many of us, if that were to happen to him. One possible solution might be that, when I fit a bulldozer blade to my chair, I can precede him and he can ride safely behind me.
My Amendment 346D states that if anyone is convicted of causing death or injury by dangerous or careless cycling, and if the e-bike has an illegal battery with a power rating greater than 250 watts or does not meet the approved standard, then the supplier of the battery should receive an unlimited fine imposed by the court, not the police. I think we would all agree that the concept I am trying to get at here is right. We must get at the suppliers of the batteries that do not conform to UL 2849, the US standard, or EN 15194, the European standard.
I admit that the problem here will be enforcement. Just like all the other illegal stuff we have wrestled with in this Bill—from knives to pornography—if it is sold online, it is very difficult to stop. Furthermore, illegal sellers will say that they thought the battery was for an off-road bike, which would be perfectly legal.
However, this is where the proposed new clause in my Amendment 416J might work. It would give the police a power that could be delegated to a local authority or other agents to perform. The proposed new clause says:
“If a retailer supplies batteries which do not comply with statutory guidelines on lithium-ion battery safety for e-bikes … the police may issue notices requiring the retailer to … recall relevant batteries from consumers … suspend the sale of relevant batteries, and … warn consumers about the risks of relevant batteries”.
Again, it is not perfect, and in some ways it is not nearly strong enough to cut off the illegal supply of batteries that are not compliant with either US or European construction standards.
My proposed new clause and the Bill are concerned with dangerous cycling. Recent figures show that there were 11,266 incidents involving e-bikes and e-scooters in 2023-24, and this figure is rising rapidly. Therefore, for the purposes of this Bill, we have to get at the supply of illegally doctored and excessively overpowered batteries. These are the same batteries that cause the most fires, including fatal ones. That is because the number of dangerous and non-compliant batteries in circulation is a significant and fast-growing problem.
Authorities rely on data regarding fires and product recalls to gauge the scale of the issue. The Office for Product Safety and Standards has issued 21 product recalls and published 29 product safety reports for unsafe e-bikes, e-scooters and batteries since 2022. Specific enforcement action was taken against the brand Unit Pack Power’s e-bike batteries, which were linked to several fires across England, with withdrawal notices issued to four online marketplaces, 20 sellers and the manufacturer.
The number of fires caused by lithium-ion batteries is surging rapidly. London Fire Brigade data shows that it responded to 88 e-bike fires in 2022; that figure rose to 134 in 2025, as of late September. In 2023, almost 200 fires involving e-bikes or e-scooters were reported across the UK, resulting in 10 fatalities. The rise in fires is primarily linked to unregulated conversion kits and low-cost batteries, often purchased from online marketplaces—but fires are not our concern today.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, I am sorry again to rather disagree with my noble friend, although I have some sympathy with the underlying problem. I declare an interest in that I have three electric bikes, all of them, I hope, with fully approved batteries. One is the Brompton, on which I go from King’s Cross to this place—very good it is too, and, I hope, wholly safe.
There is a problem with batteries—my noble friend has addressed it—and particularly with regard to fires. Personally, I try never to charge a battery in a house, even with my bikes, which were both expensive and, I hope, very good. There is a problem with them that needs to be addressed, but the real problem with the amendment is that, other than providing the occasion for inspecting the battery, there is no obvious relationship between the criminal offences specified in the proposed new clause and looking at the battery. There is no necessary or, indeed, probable connection between the battery and the offence, so I am very much against linking those criminal offences with the inspection of the battery. Moreover, as my noble friend has said, the enforcement problems are very great here, because most or many of these batteries are bought online, and trying to identify the contract of supply would be next to impossible.
However, my noble friend is right to draw attention to the danger of batteries which are inherently unsafe, and right too to draw attention to the fact that people are disconnecting the controls on their bicycles so that they can go very much faster than the law allows. Those are matters which should be addressed by the Government, but not, I think, via this particular amendment.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, it is of course a criminal offence to ride your e-bike at more than a specified rate. I am sure that the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, when he rides any of his e-bikes, complies with those requirements at all times. But if it is already an offence to ride a bike at more than a specified speed, it must surely already be an offence to provide a battery for the specific purpose of enabling the rider to break the law. I do not understand why that is not already a criminal offence.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
I am afraid I disagree. On the roads, it is certainly an offence to use an e-bike beyond a certain speed—I think it is 15 miles an hour—but, of course, e-bikes are also used for off-road purposes, and at that point, the speed regulations are not in play.
Lord Pannick (CB)
Then the answer to the problem is to ensure that the speed limits apply whenever the e-bike is used. I fail to understand why it is a criminal offence to use your e-bike above a specified speed on the road, but not on the pavement. It seems ridiculous.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
I use one of my e-bikes to go around my fields. In fact, I do not go at more than 15 mph because, first, I would fall off; secondly, it is not necessary; and thirdly, the bike cannot do so. However, I cannot see why, as a matter of principle, I should be restrained from going at more than 15 mph on my own land.
Lord Pannick (CB)
I do not want to prolong this, but the purpose of this amendment is not to regulate the speed of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, on his field. The concern is e-bike riders on pavements, and I suggest that the answer is to ensure that people cannot ride more than a specified speed on the pavements, if at all. Of course, they are not allowed to ride on the pavement at all, so they should not be doing so. The point, surely, is that if there is a specified speed limit, it is already a criminal offence to conspire to provide a battery for the specific purpose of enabling e-bike riders to break the speed limit.
Lord Garnier (Con)
My Lords, we have heard some jolly clever speeches. It seems to me that the general point of this group of amendments, and indeed the previous one, is to bring this matter of great public concern to the attention of the Government during this debate. We are not now, this afternoon, looking for statutory perfection; we are looking for the Government to pay attention, and every one of us, be it my noble friend Lord Goschen walking here, or my noble friend Lord Hailsham riding at a reasonable speed from King’s Cross to this place, has our own experiences and anecdotal stories to inform the House and this debate.
I really do not think we need to get stuck in the weeds; we just need to get the Government to be a little braver. Yes, they should read out the departmental notes they have in front of them, but they should also realise that this is a matter of real and pressing public concern. The use of e-cycles by drug dealers and others, who wear the stolen uniforms of respectable companies to deliver drugs here, there and everywhere, with no lights on their bikes, wearing balaclavas and dark clothing, at night, placing themselves and other road users in danger, is a matter of deep concern. That is what we need to get across to the Government, and I hope they will take the general point on board, even if they disapprove of the niceties of the amendments tabled by my noble friends Lord Shinkwin and Lord Blencathra.
Baroness Pidgeon (LD)
My Lords, as we discussed earlier, we have seen a huge rise in fast food and other deliveries by e-bikes and e-scooters across our cities, and of course internationally too. The whole model for these deliveries is based on time— carrying out as many deliveries as possible in as short a time as possible. This constant pressure can lead to riders taking risks that endanger not only themselves but other road users and pedestrians. These risks include installing bigger batteries.
This group of amendments is timely and of the moment, given the rise in these bikes and scooters. However, kits are increasingly being bought online that are used to adapt regular cycles into e-cycles. These are causing not only serious safety issues on our streets but fire safety issues, as we have already heard. Therefore, the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, look to tackle both the fire and road safety issues associated with non-compliant lithium-ion batteries. It does feel like there is a loophole in the law whereby unsafe batteries are being sold in the UK and are having a devastating effect. These are important issues, and I hope we hear some clear progress in this area from the Government.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, as was mentioned earlier in Committee when speaking to Amendment 346, we take the issue of bike alterations very seriously. My noble friend Lord Blencathra raises a similar issue with these amendments, and, in placing the onus on suppliers, a two-pronged approach to tackling the issue is welcome.
We know that many of the most dangerous e-bikes on our roads are not the result of amateur tinkering alone. They are enabled by a market that supplies batteries far in excess of the 250-watt limit set out in law, or batteries that fail to meet even the most basic safety standards for lithium-ion technology. These batteries transform what should be a pedal-assisted cycle into something much closer to an unregistered electric motorcycle, which is often capable of significant speed and acceleration, and frequently used in dense urban areas, on pavements and in shared spaces.
There is also a wider public safety dimension. Unsafe lithium-ion batteries are not merely a road safety issue; they are a growing fire risk in homes, flats and shared accommodation. The London Fire Brigade and other services have repeatedly warned about fires caused by substandard e-bike batteries, often supplied online with little oversight and no meaningful accountability. This amendment would reinforce the message that safety standards are not optional, and that those who profit from ignoring them may—indeed, should—face consequences.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I am grateful to the nobleLord, Lord Blencathra, for his amendments on the regulation of e-bike batteries. Your Lordships’ House may recall the recent passage through this House of the Product Regulation and Metrology Act, which received Royal Assent in July and underlines the Government’s determination to take action on this point. Amendment 346D would provide for the prosecution of any person who had supplied an unsafe battery to an individual who was subsequently convicted of any of the offences in Clause 106 of the Bill.
While an unsafe battery—and by this I mean one that does not comply with existing product safety standards—could put the e-bike at risk of catching fire, particularly while placed on charge, as we have heard from many noble Lords, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, this would not directly lead to a person riding their cycle carelessly or dangerously. The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, anticipated my argument and posited it more eloquently than I might have done. The battery is simply that which powers the e-bike: it cannot, on its own, enable the rider to overcome speed or power restrictions provided for in regulations. This would come from a broader set of modifications concerning the electric motor and other component parts, and I will come on to that in a bit. As the battery would not play a direct role in any incident leading to a prosecution of the kind provided for at Clause 106, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, will see that this amendment is not required.
In moving his amendment, the noble Lord also talked about the chips that allow bikes to be driven at frankly hair-raising speeds that make them unsafe for the user, let alone others. To be clear, those modifications are already illegal: e-bikes with those chips do not comply with the electrically assisted pedal cycle regulations. Therefore, there is already a law in place to cover this.
Lord Mawson (CB)
The Minister talked about taking action. Those are very fine words, but every day, many of us watch e-bikes and ordinary bikes going past the outside of this building, driving through red lights. Many of us have experienced driving up and down roads with people coming down one-way systems at us in the wrong direction. We have watched police at the side of these road, including here, taking no action whatever. What does “taking action” actually mean, in practice and in detail, even outside this building?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I am not sure whether the noble Lord was here for the previous group, when we talked at length on the wider issue of the use of e-bikes. As I said then, the DfT is undertaking a road safety strategy consultation, which will take a holistic view of road safety across all motor transport, including, very importantly, protecting pedestrians and those in mobility scooters and wheelchairs. That is the right way to approach this and is at the heart of the discussion we had on the previous group.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his response and all noble Lords who have spoken in this short debate. I think that noble Lords and Ministers are getting the message from nearly all sides of the Committee—apart from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—that there is a real problem here that the Government are not addressing.
Lord Pannick (CB)
I entirely accept that there is mischief here. My comments were addressed at the specifics of the amendment—but I accept that there is a problem that needs to be addressed.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I am grateful for the clarification from the noble Lord; I did not wish to misquote him. Following his comments, I note that, of the thousands of batteries for sale, none of them specifically say, “Buy this battery and illegally break the law. Add it to your legal bike and break the law by going on the pavement”—they are more subtle than that. The closest I came was in the example I cited in the debate on the previous group, where one company said that its bike—capable of speeds of 64 kilometres per hour—was suitable for “off-road and commuting”. The advertising is much more subtle, but everyone knows what is going on. These batteries are being sold for illegal purposes.
The problem I had with these amendments was that, to get them in scope of the Bill, I had to pull my punches and narrowly tweak them in some ways. Therefore, of course the amendments are technically flawed. I would have liked to put down an amendment on the chips, but that, I think, was not in order. To try to get at the concept of the problem, which all noble Lords support, I had to put down amendments that I accept are flawed. However, what the amendments seek to achieve is consistent with the rest of the Bill: we have had problems with knife crime, so, in addition to penalties for the carriers and users, the Bill has clauses trying to cut off and penalise the online suppliers—and the same goes for crossbows. Then we have all the sexual offences in Part 5 of the Bill, again with attempts to tackle the online supply of illegal photos, as well as lots more clauses on the online supply of illegal material.
I am grateful to my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier. He pointed out that it is easy to pick out flaws—I can pick all the flaws myself—and the technical faults in these amendments. However, what we are getting at here is that every noble Lord who has spoken feels that the Government are not doing enough on this issue. I believe that we can do a lot more. Of course, I want the police to grab every massive, overweight and overfast illegal bike out there and destroy it, but they will never keep up with the supply. We have to cut off the supply, and my amendments, in their inadequate way, were seeking to do that.
I am grateful to the Minister, because I think we have had a bit of movement over the past two days, with the Home Office now offering to discuss with colleagues how we can get this a lot better. I hope that we can, with noble Lords around the Committee, agree something on Report that tackles the specific problem, without causing great new problems of enforcement. Something needs to be done. I do not think we are prepared to wait for the Department for Transport’s strategy on safer cycling or road use, which we may never see. I suspect that, when we do see it, it will be grossly inadequate in tackling the scourge of huge, heavy, illegal e-bikes mowing down pedestrians on the pavement. Since both Ministers have been kind enough to agree to meet us before Report, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, in opposing the proposition that Clause 107 should stand part of the Bill, I will speak also to my opposition to Clauses 108 and 109. These clauses were added by the Government without any debate on Report in the other place; therefore, they have not been subjected to the detailed scrutiny that they deserve. It is only right that, as the revising Chamber, we should fulfil our duty in that respect.
I will be clear from the outset that we on these Benches do not doubt for a moment the courage, dedication and indispensable role of our emergency workers. Indeed, the previous Conservative Government legislated to bring forward the specific offence of assaulting an emergency worker through the Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act 2018. However, we must also ensure that the criminal law remains proportionate, coherent and workable, and in our view these clauses fail that test. Clauses 107, 108 and 109 introduce a series of new offences on the racial or religiously aggravated abuse of emergency workers. The Government present these measures as necessary enhancements to the law to protect emergency workers from abuse motivated by racial or religious hostility. No one disputes the seriousness of such conduct. But these clauses do not simply strengthen existing protections; they create overlapping, confusing and potentially sweeping new offences that go beyond what is necessary or desirable in a free society.
The provisions duplicate offences that are already well established in our law. Threatening, abusive or insulting behaviour motivated by racial or religious hostility is already an offence under Sections 18 and 29B of the Public Order Act 1986. I completely understand that those offences cannot be committed inside a dwelling, while the new offences in Clauses 107 and 108 can be committed inside a person’s house. That is a key difference between these offences.
Both clauses also require the conduct to be racially or religiously hostile, but, again, that aggravation is already captured by the criminal law. Section 66 of the Sentencing Code creates a statutory aggravating factor for any offence based on racial and religious hostility. Furthermore, Section 31 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1988 creates a specific offence of using words or behaviour that cause “harassment, alarm or distress” and are religiously or racially aggravated. That offence can be committed inside a dwelling, so a person who racially abuses an emergency worker inside their home can already be prosecuted under the Crime and Disorder Act 1988. It is abundantly clear that there is absolutely no need for these new offences.
Clause 107 in particular casts an extraordinarily wide net. It includes not only threatening but insulting behaviour. This is a highly subjective term that will not create clarity or certainty—but do not take my word for it. The Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House has criticised these clauses for this precise reason. Its 11th report states:
“Clause 107 criminalises ‘insults’ and clause 108 introduces the term ‘distress’. This potentially leaves people open to criminal sanction on a subjective basis. In addition, clause 108 includes a defence for ‘reasonable conduct’, which is not defined. As a result, the precise scope of these clauses, and the criminal offences contained within them, is uncertain”.
In Clause 108, matters become even more troubling. The clause would criminalise conduct merely likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress, again with the addition of racial or religious hostility, but with penalties that do not align with the broader public order framework. Here we see threatening or abusive behaviour that is already covered elsewhere reframed in a way that risks catching behaviour far removed from the core of criminal wrongdoing. While a defendant may raise a defence, the burden-shifting mechanism in subsection (7) is unusual and risks being applied inconsistently.
It is a long-standing principle that the criminal law should be carefully calibrated, limited to what is necessary and drafted so that ordinary citizens can understand the boundaries of acceptable behaviour. The law must be strong where it matters, not sprawling and duplicative. When Parliament repeatedly layers offence upon offence, we risk incoherence, overcriminalisation and legal uncertainty, none of which helps emergency workers or the public. If the Government believe that the existing framework is insufficient, they should amend those statutes directly and not create parallel criminal regimes that overlap and contradict one another.
In conclusion, Clauses 107 and 108 are unnecessary and duplicative and risk expanding the criminal law in ways that Parliament has previously rejected. They confuse rather than clarify. They undermine coherence rather than strengthen protection. We owe emergency workers the best possible statutory safeguards, but they must be safeguards that work. These clauses do not. For that reason, and in the interests of principled and proportionate criminal law, I urge the Committee to oppose Clauses 107 and 108.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
My Lords, I will speak briefly because we have very important business in future amendments. I heartily endorse the comments of my noble friend on the Front Bench. Why were these proposals—which, after all, attract cross- party support, as indeed the 2018 legislation did—not brought forward for pre-legislative scrutiny or debate and discussion at an earlier stage in the other place? They were introduced only at a later stage. For all the reasons my noble friend gave, there would have been a proper debate about whether it is right to bring forward legislation that includes potential incarceration for up to two years for an offence. In fact, it is quite incongruent because it does not look at sexual orientation and disability, for instance, only racially biased hate crime in private dwellings. Why was it not brought forward at an earlier stage, when I think all sides of the House would have been predisposed to support it and debate it properly?
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, has explained all my reservations about these clauses very articulately, so I will not repeat them. They add an unnecessary implication that the public are a threat to emergency workers. Why are religiously and racially aggravated offences being highlighted here, as though members of the general public were somehow prone to that kind of behaviour? It is an unhelpful signposting because, as has been rightly pointed out, if emergency workers are dealt with aggressively or harassed in any way, we have laws to deal with it. To highlight this implies that there is something extra to be added, that there is a problem out there of the public going around racially abusing workers, and that there are particular offences in mind. Duplication of law ends up being virtue signalling. I am not sure that virtue is being signalled, but none the less it seems to be a box-ticking exercise rather than an effective piece of lawmaking.
I am also very worried about the notion of “insulting behaviour”. I am probably guilty of it; one does get frustrated sometimes. What on earth does it mean? It is entirely subjective. What is insulting behaviour? It would be helpful for the Minister to give us illustrations and examples of what constitutes insulting behaviour. How will people be charged with this? It immediately makes people fearful of raising complaints or of being frustrated in public. If the ambulance has not turned up for a long time and your husband is dying of a heart attack, you might be a bit fraught. Somebody might interpret that as insulting behaviour. It might be perfectly rational, reasonable behaviour and not criminal. I am worried that this is creating a toxic atmosphere where none need be there. I cannot understand why it is there.
The words “likely to cause” feel far too much like pre-crime. What is “likely to cause”? These are criminal offences. If you are charged with them, you will be seen potentially as a hate criminal. Therefore, the Government have to give us a very detailed explanation as to why they feel these clauses are needed, so that we can scrutinise it. As they are presently given, I am not happy at all. I will support any move to have them removed from the Bill.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, on these Benches we take a very different view and strongly support Clauses 107 and 108, which recognise a simple reality. Emergency workers can face racially or religiously aggravated abuse whenever and wherever they are carrying out their duties, including in private homes. They cannot choose their environment or walk away from hostility. Their professional duty is to step into what are at times chaotic, volatile situations, and to stay there until the job is done. The law should follow them into those settings and make clear that such targeted hostility is no more acceptable in a hallway or a living room than it is on a street corner. This debate has shown that the issue is not about policing opinion or curtailing lawful expression but about drawing a firm line between free speech and deliberate acts of intimidation directed at those who protect the public.
These clauses are drafted to catch only behaviour that crosses that line in aggravated circumstances, and they sit alongside, rather than in place of, the wider framework of public order and hate crime. In our view, striking them out would send the wrong message, undermining our commitment to those who protect us. Looking ahead, it will of course be vital that their use is monitored and that guidance for police and prosecutors is kept under review, so that the balance struck here remains both proportionate and effective in practice.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, before the Minister rises, could I ask a simple question? It would seem to me that, under the definition of emergency workers in Section 3(1)(j) of the Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act 2018, an emergency worker is
“a person employed for the purposes of providing, or engaged to provide ... NHS health services, or … services in the support of the provision of NHS health services”.
I think we all support the words of the Secretary of State for Health, but is he in danger of falling into the trap of criticising the BMJ for the action it has taken?
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I will come back to that point in a moment. I think the noble Lord is trying to inject a slight bit of topicality into a different argument, but I respect his opportunities in trying to raise those issues.
I say at the outset that I am with the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, on this, which is why we brought this forward. I am grateful to her for standing up and supporting the objectives of the Government in her contribution. I have to say to the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Jackson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that I cannot and will not support their approach to delete these clauses from the Bill.
Emergency workers, as the noble Baroness has said, risk their safety every day to protect the public. They deserve robust protection through legislation, especially against abuse directed towards them because of their protected characteristics, which is not only harmful but erodes the principle of respect and public service, which are core values of this democracy.
As the noble Baroness rightly said, when emergency workers walk through a door of a private dwelling, they are faced with the circumstances in that private dwelling; they cannot walk away. They are there because of an emergency—perhaps medical, police or fire—and, if they face abuse in that private dwelling, then they deserve our support, just as they have our support if they face abuse on the street for a racially aggravated reason. If somebody does something at the end of their path on a street in Acacia Avenue and abuses them, they will find themselves under the course of the law on those matters.
I believe—and this is what these clauses are about—that, if the emergency worker is racially abused in the property, then they deserve that protection. It is critical for sectors such as health, fire and policing to have that legal support. We cannot leave them, as the noble Baroness rightly said, to be abused. The law must recognise this and make sure we have proper protection.
Currently, as has been mentioned, the Public Order Act 1986 and Section 31 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 provide important safeguards in public spaces. It is not acceptable to call somebody a racially abusive name in a public space, so why is it to call them that name in a place of a private dwelling? It is not acceptable, so we are going to bring those clauses into play.
The noble Lord asks why we do this. We do this because Sergeant Candice Gill of Surrey Police, supported by the deputy chief constable—and, may I just say, by the Conservative police and crime commissioner for Surrey—has campaigned for this change in the law, having personally experienced racial abuse in a private home. It is not a sort of technical matter that the noble Baroness or the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, have mentioned; it is a real issue of racial abuse in a private dwelling to a police officer—who is doing her job, serving and trying to protect and support the public, and is being racially abused with no consequence whatsoever. Sergeant Candice Gill, after whom I would be proud to call this legislation Candice’s law, is campaigning and has campaigned to make this an amendment to the Bill.
The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, asked why we brought it forward in the House of Commons as an amendment. I will tell him why: it was brought to our attention, it is an action we do not support, and it is an area where we think action needs to be taken. That is why we have brought it. I do not think it is fair that people are racially abused in homes. Sergeant Candice Gill has campaigned on this and has brought it to the attention of the Government; we brought an amendment forward in the House of Commons which is now before this House, and I believe it should have support.
Clauses 107 to 109 will close that legislative loophole. The removal of the dwelling exception will make racially or religiously aggravated abuse of an emergency worker in a private dwelling an offence. The change will ensure that offenders prosecuted under Clause 107 face a maximum sentence of two years’ imprisonment. The offence in Clause 108 will be liable to a fine not exceeding level 4. As I have said, Lisa Townsend, the Conservative police and crime commissioner for Surrey, said:
“This long-overdue change to the law would never have happened without Sgt Gill’s courage and determination”.
I think we owe this to Sergeant Gill and any other officer, health worker, fire service worker or police officer who has been racially abused in a home where they have gone to help support individuals. They deserve our support.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
My Lords, for the avoidance of doubt, I think we need to put it on record that everyone deprecates racially aggravated abuse of hard-working, decent emergency workers—that is taken as read. But the noble Lord is asking us to consider legislation when we already have a situation, under Section 66 of the Sentencing Act 2020, which permits a court to consider any offence that has been racially or religiously aggravated. Section 31 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 provides for a separate offence where a person commits an offence under Sections 4, 4A or 5 of the Public Order Act.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
Much as I would love to be intervened on by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who I believe will be supporting my amendment later on, I am intervening on the Minister, and we are not allowed to intervene on interventions.
If I may beg the Committee’s indulgence, I finally say to the Minister that the Select Committee on the Constitution specifically said:
“Clause 107 criminalises ‘insults’ and clause 108 introduces the term ‘distress’. This potentially leaves people open to criminal sanction on a subjective basis”.
Not only do we already have existing legislation, but the language in this new legislation is sufficiently loose that it will give rise, I think, to unintended consequences.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I hope the noble Lord will accept that I am not indicating that he or anybody else would accept that language, but the point is that we have to define and be clearer about the definition in relation to racially aggravated insults. The reason that we brought this forward is that, on the back of police representations from senior officers in Surrey Police—and from Sergeant Candice Gill, who was herself racially abused—and with the support of the Police and Crime Commissioner for Surrey, having examined this internally, we believe that the law needs to be clarified, which is why we have brought this legislation forward.
The noble Lord also asked me to examine why it is covering only race and religion, why we do not cover protected characteristics of sexual orientation, transgender identity and disability, and why the Government have not tabled such an amendment. He will know that the Law Commission is already examining its review of hate crime laws. It is a complex area, and it is important we get the changes right. I will tell him this: we are considering that and have given a manifesto commitment to do so, and, ensuring that we do that, we will bring forward conclusions at Report stage in this House to give effect to those manifesto commitments on sexual orientation, transgender identity and disability to extend the proposals still further. I give him notice of that now so that he does not accuse me of pulling a fast one on Report. We will do that, but we will have to bring forward the details of it in due course.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
Briefly, the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, is quite right that I have long shared some concerns about the rubric and precise drafting of concepts of alarm and distress—we are coming to them later—so of course I have concerns about them being adopted into the precise drafting of the offence. But, on the basic principle, is not the answer to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, that there is no point in citing provisions on racially aggravated offences if the conduct is not an offence and that the justification for taking the serious step of applying Public Order Act principles to a domestic dwelling is that these emergency workers have no choice but to be in that dwelling, sometimes putting themselves in harm’s way as part of their service to the public? On the principle of having an offence such as this, I wonder whether my noble friend agrees.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I do agree with my noble friend. As I said in my introductory remarks and as the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, said, when an emergency worker turns up at a house and enters that property for a health reason concerning an individual in the property, a criminal justice reason involving activity that is causing threat and alarm and/or fire service duties, they do so to fulfil a duty. They have to stay in that property. If they are abused on the street before they enter the property, that is a punishable offence, yet unless this law change is accepted, when they enter the property that abuse is considered a principal part of the job that they have to just take on the chin. I do not accept that. That is why we included Clauses 107 to 109.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
I am inordinately grateful to the Minister for giving away, but he will know, because he was a diligent and assiduous constituency MP, that many of the people who go into clinical settings—for instance, A&E—are very distressed, discombobulated and upset about their condition, do not quite know what is going on and will sometimes say things they regret. I am not saying that is right. Some of them are not culturally sensitive, for instance. That may or may not reach a criminal threshold.
My main point—if we accept the principle that we need new legislation—is that, frankly, those people are in a very difficult position, and if we have loose and opaque language in primary legislation, we will have a situation where people who are not reaching the criminal threshold, or are doing so very marginally, are criminalised and are liable to go to prison for up to two years. Surely that is not something the Government are keen to encourage.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The Government are keen to discourage racial abuse against individuals who are doing their job, and that is what Clauses 107 to 109 do. The clauses set out in legislation a broad thrust of definitions. Ultimately, in these cases, police and health workers usually have body-worn cameras on and the police will judge evidential material to determine whether they wish to refer it to the CPS. The CPS will review the incident that has led to the potential referral and determine whether it meets the evidential threshold and is worthy of prosecution. Then, if it comes before a court, it will be for that court to determine whether that criminal threshold has been crossed.
With all that, it is not a simple matter of us passing the legislation; it is also a matter of the judgment of police officers, CPS officials and ultimately a judge or jury in determining the outcome of those cases. As with most legislation, I want none of this to go to court. I want it to change the behaviour of people who are looking at a charge of using racially abusive language not on the street but in their home. I hope it sets a minimum standard, which is what this Parliament should be about, in saying that we will not tolerate this. That is why I support the inclusion of the clauses.
Lord Pannick (CB)
The Minister is making a very strong case as to the principle behind these clauses, as did the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. But will he address the specific concern of the Constitution Committee that the language used in these provisions—the concepts of “insulting” and “distress”—is too broad?
As he knows, the Constitution Committee concluded:
“These clauses should be drawn more narrowly and the Government should more clearly define the terminology within the Bill”.
Will the Government reflect on that before Report and come back with a more precise definition in these provisions?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord. As ever, we will reflect on what has been said. The judgment we have made is as in the clauses before this House, as introduced and supported by the House of Commons. There will be opportunity, if the noble Lord so wishes, to table amendments on Report to reflect any view that he has, but this is the judgment we have made.
The principle of today’s discussion is that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, believes we should strike out these clauses. That is not a principle I can accept—I am grateful for the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, on that. Whatever reflection takes place on this, our principle is that we have included these clauses for a purpose, which I hope I have articulated, and I wish for the Committee to support that principle.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
Nobody here is going against the principle that we should not racially or religiously insult, harass or be vile to people. We are talking about changing the criminal law and ensuring that the concerns of the Constitution Committee—not mine or those of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, or anyone else—are looked at again, so that the “real life” that the Minister referred to in justifying this reflects the fact that in many instances emergency workers are called when people are at the height of distress. I appreciate that people will, can and do say all sorts of things, but I am concerned that that distress will be that much more aggravated, and a toxic atmosphere created, if people can too loosely start saying, “I’m going to call the police on you”, when somebody subjectively interprets behaviour as insulting.
It is reasonable for us to raise this in Committee. Instead of saying that he disagrees with us on principle, is the Minister prepared to look at what the Constitution Committee has said, and what is being reflected on here, to see whether, in order to keep to his principle, the wording of criminal law can be tightly drawn so that we do not criminalise ordinary people in distress who say things that somebody might subjectively see as insulting? That is dangerous, illiberal, potentially threatening behaviour from a Government to the public.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I do not think I am being illiberal, although I accept that the noble Baroness may have a different view on that. Later in the consideration of amendments, we will come to those of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, that seek to further define some of the aspects of Clause 109. I am happy to look at the points mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, but the judgment we have made is that these clauses should remain part of the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, has asked that they be removed. That is a clear difference between us. I have explained why they should be included; he has explained why he believes they should not. If he wishes to take that stance on Report, we can have a discussion about that.
For ease of recall, I have just been passed a copy of a long letter about the Bill and these clauses, which I have been reminded that I sent to the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, on 12 November. The letter answers some of the points that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, raised. I do not know whether this four-page letter has been made public, but I am happy to place a copy of it in the Library for the noble Lord and anybody else to examine.
Obviously, there will be the opportunity on Report for the noble Lord, Lord Davies, to again table his clause stand part notices and/or for any Member of the House, once they have had an opportunity to look at the letter to the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, to table amendments to meet the objectives that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has mentioned. We support these clauses, and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, will reflect on that and not seek to remove them.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for responding to this debate. I spent 32 years as a police officer and an emergency worker, and I am still not persuaded by these clauses. As I established in my opening speech, all scenarios for criminalising racially or religiously aggravated abuse of emergency workers are already covered by the criminal law, and this is mere repetition. There exists a raft of legislation which permits the prosecution of a person who commits such conduct. The Sentencing Code already provides for any offence to be aggravated by racial or religious hostility. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 creates a specific criminal offence for using racially or religiously hostile language. The Public Order Act 1986 also contains such provisions. It is absolutely not correct to claim that emergency workers need further protection under the law when it comes to abusive language.
The Bill therefore creates duplicate offences with different thresholds and different maximum penalties, all while leaving the existing offences untouched. How is this meant to improve enforcement? How are police officers supposed to choose which offence fits which circumstance? The Government have not offered an answer, I am afraid. By creating new stand-alone offences that replicate existing ones, the Government risk producing confusion rather than clarity. Police officers, paramedics and other emergency workers deserve a legal framework that is simple, enforceable and unambiguous.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I have said this already in my responses to the noble Lord in Committee, but I think it is important that I comment on what I said in the letter to the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, to re-emphasises the point. The offences under the Public Order Act 1986 have been interpreted by the law over the years, but, essentially, they do not relate to private dwellings. The clauses in the Bill are about private dwellings and give greater clarification. That is the point I put to the noble Lord. In the four-page letter to the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, which I will happily put in the Library, that is one of the key points that I make, as I have in this debate. I re-emphasise that in response to the noble Lord’s closing remarks.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
I am grateful for that. Perhaps it would be easier to amend the original law on this, rather than introduce it in these clauses.
As I said, police officers, paramedics and other emergency workers deserve a legal framework that is simple, enforceable and unambiguous, and what is before us is none of those things. Given the poor defence offered by the Government, I think this may be an issue that we have to return to on Report. For now, I beg leave to withdraw my opposition to the clause standing part of the Bill.
“Controlling or coercive behaviour by persons providing psychotherapy or counselling services(1) A person (“A”) commits an offence if—(a) A is a person providing or purporting to provide psychotherapy or counselling services to another person (“B”),(b) A repeatedly or continuously engages in behaviour towards B that is controlling or coercive,(c) the behaviour has a serious effect on B, and(d) A knows or ought to know that the behaviour will or may have a serious effect on B.(2) A’s behaviour has a “serious effect” on B if—(a) it causes B to fear, on at least two occasions, that violence will be used against B, or(b) it causes B psychological harm which has a substantial adverse effect on B’s usual day-to-day activities.(3) For the purposes of subsection (1)(d) A “ought to know” that which a reasonable person in possession of the same information would know.(4) In proceedings for an offence under this section it is a defence for A to show that—(a) in engaging in the behaviour in question, A believed that he or she was acting in B’s best interests, and(b) the behaviour was in all the circumstances reasonable.(5) A is to be taken to have shown the facts mentioned in subsection (4) if—(a) sufficient evidence of the facts is adduced to raise an issue with respect to them, and(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.(6) The defence in subsection (4) is not available to A in relation to behaviour that causes B to fear that violence will be used against B.(7) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or a fine, or both;(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or a fine, or both.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment creates an offence of controlling or coercive behaviour by providing psychotherapy or counselling services.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, this amendment is in exactly the same form as that which I, with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and my friend Lady Jolly, who is now retired, moved to the Domestic Abuse Bill in 2021. The aim of the amendment, which would introduce a new clause after Clause 109, is to criminalise controlling or coercive behaviour by so-called psychotherapists or counsellors who are in fact no better than charlatans or quacks who prey on their clients, generally young people, taking appalling advantage of their vulnerabilities, abusing their misplaced trust, and often charging them substantial fees in the process.
I should make it clear that this amendment does not imply any criticism of the many honest, altruistic and understanding psychotherapists and counsellors who daily help patients and clients up and down the country with advice and therapy. Such honest psycho- therapists offer counselling and help to their clients or patients and generally assist them through very difficult times in their lives.
Lord Garnier (Con)
My Lords, the wording and effect of Amendment 347, which I co-signed, are self-explanatory, but, if the amendment needed any further elaboration, the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, has just provided it. I cannot improve on what he said, but now is the moment when Parliament must, after several earlier attempts by the noble Lord and me to legislate, outlaw the quack counsellors who predate on vulnerable people through controlling or coercive behaviour in order to provide some sort of protection to their victims or intended victims.
I have been concerned about these quacks and tried without success to get previous Governments to legislate for some years. More than 10 years ago, I started work with Sir Oliver Letwin, then the Cabinet Office Minister in the Government of our noble friend Lord Cameron of Chipping Norton, and Tom Sackville, a former Home Office Minister, as well as parliamentary counsel and Ministry of Justice officials, with the support and encouragement of my noble friend Lord Cameron, the then Prime Minister, who had a constituency interest in the matter. I spoke about those quacks on Report on the Modern Slavery Bill in November 2014 and the Serious Crime Bill in February 2015 in the other place, in your Lordships’ House on 2 March 2020 in the debate on the unregulated treatment of mental health, and then again on 2 February 2021, with the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, on the Domestic Abuse Bill. Now, thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, we have another opportunity to make real progress rather than having a general discussion without resolution.
We have laws to protect children and those under a mental incapacity through intellectual impairment, disability or the effects of old age. We can prosecute those who dishonestly take old and frail people’s money, but we leave unprotected adults who may succumb to pressure exerted on them by others with malevolent intent, because their exploitative activities currently do not come within the criminal law.
For over a decade, I have had in mind the young adult women whose experiences were brought to my attention by their parents and families. In essence, they had been brainwashed or suborned by quack counsellors. They persuaded these young people to break off all contact with their families, infected them with false memories and got them to pay fees for the so-called counselling. Some of those young women were well off and suggestible, but all of them, for no apparent reason, broke off all contact with their families.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, I successfully acted in a libel action for Associated Newspapers, the publishers of the Daily Mail, who had exposed the activities of the Unification Church, commonly known as the Moonies, in brainwashing young adults and breaking up families for nefarious financial, political and bogus religious reasons. What the quacks I have in mind are doing is hideously reminiscent of the Moonies’ activities exposed by the Daily Mail over 45 years ago.
As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has just reminded us, France, Belgium and Luxembourg have laws to criminalise the behaviour of predatory charlatans who exploit others in a state of emotional or psychological weakness for financial or other gain. As he also reminded us, other countries require genuine counsellors to be registered as counsellors. It must be assumed that their laws do not conflict with the articles of the ECHR that protect the right to private life and family life, the right to freedom of expression and association and the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
To take the French example, in that jurisdiction it is an offence punishable by imprisonment and heavy fines to abuse the ignorance or state of weakness of a minor or of a person whose particular vulnerability due to age, sickness or infirmity due to a psychological or physical disability or to pregnancy is apparent or known to the offender. It is also an offence to abuse a person in a state of physical or psychological dependency resulting from serious or repeated pressure, or from techniques used to affect his judgment in order to induce the minor or other person to act, or to abstain from acting, in a way seriously harmful to him—for “him”, also read “her”.
This amendment is clearly different but just as useful. One way of considering whether the proposed offence and defence in Amendment 347 would work is to ask oneself the following questions. Would the offence be prosecutable in theory and in practice? Could each of the elements of the offence be proved in a real-life example? Would the measure deal with the mischief that was identified, and would it catch no one else? I suggest that the answer to those questions is yes. How would it affect partners, husbands, wives, teachers, gurus, salesmen, priests and employers, all of whom are likely to have power and influence? It need not do so. Would it allow the mentally capable who want to give away their fortunes and leave their families to do so? Of course it would. Would it make sufficiently clear what was criminal behaviour and what was not? Would it comply with the European Convention on Human Rights? Yes, I suggest it would. What effect would it have on religious freedom or freedom of expression or association? In my view, it would have none. Is the proposed defence just and workable? Yes, it is. It would place the burden of disproving the defence on the prosecution.
The victims of these bogus therapists have been waiting far too long for Parliament to help them. The amendment, I suggest, is humane and practical and has nothing whatever to do with party politics or, as I have recently been asked, anything to do with youngsters or their parents caught in the maelstrom of the current transsexual controversies. If the laws of France, Belgium and Luxembourg can protect the people this amendment seeks to protect, the law of England can and ought to do so as well. We have, if I may say so, had enough of sophistry and feeble opposition based on a lack of courage, decency and drafting niceties. Too often we have heard it is the wrong day, it is the wrong Bill, this is the wrong way to approach this particular problem. Amendment 347 or something like it should be added to the Bill and I urge the Government to do that. If the Government will not do that, we must return to this on Report.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)
My Lords, I wish to express my sympathy with the amendment in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. I hope my noble friend will be able to respond sympathetically but will also open the door to a discussion with his Health ministerial colleagues, because I believe that hand in hand with the amendment put forward today goes the need for statutory regulation of the psychotherapy profession. At the moment, anyone can put psychotherapy behind their name or on a label, and there is no protection whatever.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, referred to the years in which he had been involved in this. I am afraid I go back to 2001, when as a Health Minister I responded to an amendment to yet another NHS reorganisation Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, proposed statutory regulation for psychotherapists and we as a government agreed with the principle. What then happened was that the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, led work attempting to get agreement within the profession to statutory regulation. It fell down essentially because there were so many different schools of thought within the psychotherapy profession itself that it was impossible to get agreement. Sadly, it essentially died the death.
We debated this amendment in the legislation that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, mentioned, but previously he had a debate in which the regulation of the profession was raised. At that point, the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, the then Health Minister, said:
“The Government are committed to a proportionate system of safeguards for the professionals who work in … health and care … Where practitioners pose a direct risk of harm to the health and well-being of patients, legal avenues will and must be explored … However, more rules are not always the answer to every problem. While statutory regulation is sometimes necessary where significant risks to users of services cannot be mitigated … it is not always the most proportionate or effective means of assuring the safe and effective care of service users”.—[Official Report, 2/3/20; col. 480.]
The noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, were pretty convincing on why you need statutory regulation alongside the amendment to this Bill. One of the problems is a lack of hard research in this area. In 2017—it goes back some years—the Brighton Therapy Partnership commented:
“There is very little research into the harm that properly executed therapy can cause. This is an unusual anomaly for a medical field, as in every other area research is abundant into both efficacy and failure of all treatment options”.
Little research has been done in this area, but anecdotally we know that many thousands of people, particularly young people and their families, have been hugely damaged by the quack therapists the noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred to. I hope that, alongside this amendment, my noble friend will agree to a discussion with Health Ministers to look at statutory regulation, which I believe goes side by side with the proposals being made tonight.
Lord Deben (Con)
My Lords, I have not taken part in this Bill before, but I do so now because I have been closely connected with someone who was treated by a so-called psychotherapist and removed from her family as a result. These people do something almost inconceivable. They get inside people’s minds and teach them totally false memories, so they begin to imagine that their parents have abused them and behaved in appalling ways which are entirely untrue. They believe it and as long as they go on with the so-called therapy, they are imprisoned by these wicked people.
This is done for two reasons: money and control. I very much agree with what has just been said, but I do not wish that to be yet another excuse for not accepting this amendment. There are far too many people in this country being destroyed for money and power by wicked people, and our law does not protect them. We have now discussed this so often, so long and so convincingly that frankly, I want to beg the Minister: please do not be another Minister who finds a reason for not doing this. Because if so, he allows yet more young people to have their lives destroyed by some of the most evil people I have ever come across.
I think my contribution was worth while, not just because I have personal and direct connection with someone who was in this condition, but because I want to assure the House that there is no need to worry on a religious ground. I think I am known to have very strong religious views, and I do not think this is going to cause problems for any legitimate religious organisation. There may be some problems from some pretty illegitimate religious organisations such as the Moonies and the Scientologists, but the truth is these people work on their own. They are individuals and they do this for money. I beg the Minister not to let this chance go to protect the most vulnerable young people.
Lord Pannick (CB)
The noble Lord, Lord Marks, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and the other speakers have established that there is a very real mischief here. My concern is about the width of this amendment. If it is going to be brought back on Report, either by the Minister or by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, it really needs to be more specific. It is very broad in the concepts it uses, such as the concept of “psychological harm” and whether
“the behaviour was in all the circumstances reasonable”.
It seems to me that the mischief here is people who provide psychotherapy or counselling services in bad faith or dishonestly, and we need to have an amendment which more specifically addresses that mischief. The French legislation to which the noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred was much more specific and tailored than what we have here.
Baroness Gohir (CB)
My Lords, I was not going to speak on this amendment, but the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, have inspired me to speak. I support the amendment and would add another set of people who do exactly the same: spiritual faith healers. They do coercive and controlling behaviour and target the most vulnerable. They do all the things mentioned. In certain minority ethnic communities, they will target vulnerable women, for example, and take large amounts of cash from them. I do not expect noble Lords to amend this proposed new clause to add those sets of people, because they obviously want to maximise their chances of getting their clause through, but they have inspired me to think about replicating their amendment and perhaps proposing it for future legislation. So the Minister can expect a letter from me to discuss this further—which also amounts to spiritual abuse.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier for tabling this considered amendment. Controlling or coercive behaviour is currently legislated against if the offender is or has been
“in an intimate or family relationship”
with the victim. This amendment uses the framework of Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 and applies it to offenders providing psychotherapeutic or counselling services.
I understand the reasoning behind the noble Lord’s amendment. The original offence is in place because being in an intimate or familial relationship puts both parties in a unique position of proximity. These positions of trust carry a heightened risk of becoming exploitative, and thus legislation exists to recognize this. Psychotherapy and counselling services carry a similar risk; they put patients in extremely open and often vulnerable positions as they entrust the provider with their confidence. Controlling or coercive behaviour becomes more likely given the power dynamics in these relationships and I see no reason why, in principle, the law should not extend past protecting familial or intimate relationships to encompass certain intimate services.
This conclusion is backed up by recent research into mental health services. Earlier this year, the University of Hertfordshire found more than 750 incidents of violence and coercion by staff. These include instances of verbal abuse, intentional neglect and even cases of physical violence. I do not intend to extrapolate from that study and make it seem as if it represents the entirety of our mental health services—I hope it does not. This is an under-investigated area and we do not yet know the scale of neglect in our services, but the most serious conclusion that can be drawn from it is the fact that, of these 750 offences, only four official complaints were made and, of those four complaints, a single one was upheld. Whether the reason for that was ignorance of reporting mechanisms, intimidation by staff or the inexistence of the legal means, it represents a failure of the system.
The least we should do as legislators is promise to further examine the reasons behind those failings: something I hope the Minister can assure us the Government will do. If the Government conclude there is a gap in the law, and that vulnerable people attending psychotherapy or counselling services are being controlled or coerced without the legal means to get justice, I hope that they will consider the amendment in question.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for returning to this issue. I give him credit for his persistence. I welcome the support for these measures from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Deben, for sharing his personal experiences and to my noble friend Lord Hunt of Kings Heath for reminding us that this issue was raised even back as far as 2001. I am also grateful for my noble friend Lord Kennedy of Southwark making a guest appearance in the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Marks; it is always helpful to see that, as I am speaking for the Government on this occasion. I am also grateful for the constructive comments of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Gohir, with regard to these issues.
Amendment 347, as we are clear, seeks to create an offence of controlling or coercive behaviour for psychotherapists and counsellors providing services to clients, by replicating the coercive or controlling behaviour offence under Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015. I am aware that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has previously shared concerns—he has repeated them today—about unscrupulous therapists taking advantage of their clients’ vulnerabilities by supplanting parents and families in the affections and minds of their clients, for the purposes of turning them against their friends and family through the process called transference. I entirely agree with him that this is a serious issue that deserves careful consideration. Again, I reflect on what the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said in that regard. However, the question for the Committee is whether there is an argument to legislate at this time or whether there are other means to examine the outcomes that the noble Lord seeks. I suggest that for the moment that, for reasons I will explain, legislation would not necessarily be the way forward in this case.
Lord Garnier (Con)
My Lords, I do not wish to criticise the Minister’s intentions and motives, but what he has just said is reminiscent of what I have heard on previous occasions from Ministers of my party and I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, probably heard from Ministers in the Tony Blair Government back in 2001. We need to ratchet up the urgency here. Having further reviews is really a delightful departmental way of saying, “Not today, thanks, and possibly not even tomorrow”. We need to grip this. Calls for evidence are fine, so long as they are not calls for further delay or a “can’t be bothered” attitude. I know from my own knowledge of the Minister that he does not belong to the “can’t be bothered” department. If my good friend, the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and others who agree with him on this amendment are to be persuaded that we are not just being brushed off then we need to see some real action. That could mean the Minister, or a Health Minister, agreeing to meet with us, with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who has some views about the drafting, and with other Members of this House to have a very serious round-table discussion early in the new year. Otherwise, this will dribble away as it did under the previous Government, and I know that the Minister does not want that to happen.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, there is a case to be made that if, on several occasions, members of the Conservative Party have used the same argument in government, my noble friends in the Labour Party have used the same argument in previous Governments, and I myself use the same argument, then maybe that same argument has some validity. I put that to the noble and learned Lord.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I hear what the noble and learned Lord says. I have tried to tell the Committee that the Department of Health and Social Care is taking forward a programme of reform to professional regulation and legislative frameworks for healthcare professionals. Responsibility for that lies with the Department of Health. On this Bill, I speak in response to the amendments on behalf of the Home Office. I am arguing, and I have done so previously, that legislation would not be the appropriate route forward. There may be a common thread with previous Ministers there, but that is the argument that I am putting to the Committee.
I am happy to reflect with colleague as to whether I can ask my colleague Ministers to examine the issues that the noble and learned Lord has put to the Committee, but it is ultimately for them to consider the evidence provided. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, thinks that that is a brush-off. I hope it is not, but he can judge that in reflecting on what I have said today. If he wishes to then there is the opportunity to raise this issue on Report; the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has already shown his tenacity in doing so on several occasions.
I am happy to try to facilitate for a Minister of Health to examine the issues put before the Committee, and I think it is reasonable that I draw this debate to the attention of the appropriate Minister for Health, including the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, which test the assumptions of the proposed new clause as well. Ultimately, however, I am standing here on behalf of the Government and the Home Office, and speaking for all these matters now. The legislative route is not one that we consider appropriate. I have said what I have said, and I would be very happy, if the noble Lord wishes to withdraw his amendment, to draw the attention of the appropriate Health Minister to this debate, including the noble Lord’s comments and those of other Members. I have heard the request for a meeting from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and I will draw that request to the attention of the appropriate Health Minister. If Members remain unhappy after that process then there are a number of options open to them; they are experienced parliamentarians and no doubt they will exercise them.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I am very grateful to all those noble Lords who have spoken movingly and persuasively in favour of our amendment. I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Gohir, for giving the added suggestion in relation to spiritual abuse. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for the support for our amendment from the Opposition Benches. I am bound to say that I am disappointed by the position taken by the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, on behalf of the Government, for a number of reasons.
First, I have the greatest respect for the way that the noble Lord has handled matters in this House since becoming a Minister, but I have never heard him make a brush-off or an excuse quite as specious as the one that he just made, when he said that the fact that the same excuse made by him had been made by the Conservative Government gave it validity. It does not. There is no validity to such an excuse and, as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said, the excuses really do have to stop now, because we raise a very real issue.
Secondly, I will consider the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, whom I count as a friend as well as a very wise lawyer. If he has doubts about the drafting then those are something we will discuss, and no doubt can discuss with the Government. I also agree with the points made by those noble Lords who said that regulation is desperately needed for psycho- therapists and therapists. Of course it is, but the fact that we need regulation does not mean that we do not also need the help of the criminal law for those who are unscrupulous enough to use quack psychotherapy and false counselling to dupe people into parting with money and ruining their lives in the process. It is all very well for the Minister to say that he will get the Department of Health involved. We heard that from the Conservative Government, and it is not enough. This is a Crime and Policing Bill that introduces new offences: the protection of victims and vulnerable people, and the visiting of penalties upon unscrupulous and criminal behaviour, is what the criminal law is and ought to be about. The time has come to deal with it.
We have heard about the approach of the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, to regulation. He has worked on that for many years. He wanted to be here this evening, but I am afraid that he was stuck in traffic in south Oxfordshire—something that happens to many of us, even in south Oxfordshire. The noble Lord has also supported the proposition that this behaviour ought to be criminal, and he supports it now. I suggest that the Government need to take that very seriously indeed.
I do not accept that the wording of the offence is so broad that it does not penalise the correct behaviour. The way that it is phrased in subsection 1(a) is that A commits an offence if
“A is a person providing or purporting to provide psychotherapy or counselling services to another person”.
The point taken by the noble Lord, Lord Hanson—that there may be other people who need regulating—does not count. The number of counsellors that he described would all be caught by this.
This should not now be the subject for an excuse. It is a time for action. We need to legislate now. I would like to meet the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and anybody else who is interested. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, who has also co-signed this amendment, for which I am very grateful, has worked on this for years and so has the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath. If we can have a meeting, work out between now and Report how to get the drafting right, and produce a criminal offence that will work and will outlaw this behaviour then that is something that I would very much like to do, and I will have achieved the end that I seek. I invite the Minister—indeed, as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, put it, I beg him—to take this seriously and end this scourge once and for all with this Crime and Policing Bill. With that said, and at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment, but we will come back to it on Report.
Baroness Smith of Llanfaes
“Duty to prevent illegal violence and harassment in the workplace(1) Section 2 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (general duties of employers to their employees) is amended as follows.(2) After subsection (2)(e) insert—“(f) the adoption of proactive and preventative measures to protect all persons working in their workplace from illegal violence and harassment, including—(i) gender-based violence;(ii) sexual harassment;(iii) illegal psychological and emotional abuse;(iv) physical and sexual abuse;(v) stalking and illegal harassment, including online illegal harassment;(vi) threats of illegal violence.”.(3) After subsection (3) insert—“(3A) It shall be the duty of every employer to prepare, and as often as may be appropriate revise, an assessment to identify potential risks of illegal violence and harassment in the workplace and implement policies and procedures to eliminate these risks so far as is reasonably practicable.(3B) It shall be the duty of every employer to provide training to all employees on recognising and preventing illegal violence and harassment in the workplace, with a focus on gender-responsive approaches.(3C) In subsection (3B) a “gender-responsive approach” means taking into account the various needs, interests, and experiences of people of different gender identities, including women and girls, when designing and implementing policies and procedures.(3D) In this section, “persons working in the workplace” includes—(a) employees,(b) full-time, part-time, and temporary workers, and(c) interns and apprentices.(3E) In subsection (2)(f) and subsections (3A) and (3B), a reference to the workplace includes remote and hybrid work environments.”.”
Baroness Smith of Llanfaes (PC)
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 348 and 349, in my name. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Russell of Liverpool and Lord Hendy, for adding their names. These amendments seek to tackle one of the most pressing issues in our society, gender-based violence and harassment, with a clear focus on workplaces. As I open this debate, I look forward to hearing contributions from across the Committee on how we can strengthen protections for workers and make our workplaces truly safe.
Amendments 348 and 349 would establish a health and safety framework to address violence against women and girls in the workplace and create a new duty on employers to prevent violence and harassment by amending Section 2 of the Health and Safety at Work Act. This is not the first time I have brought this proposal before noble Lords. During the passage of the Employment Rights Bill, we had a constructive debate on the proposal. Since then, support has grown both inside and outside Parliament. Just last month, the End Not Defend campaign held an event here in Parliament attended by Peers and Members of the other place. Survivors shared harrowing experiences of how the law is failing them. Trade unions, specialist organisations and survivors themselves are calling for action. Their courage in sharing their experiences demands a response from us.
This Bill already introduces a new offence to protect retail workers. It is a welcome step, but why stop there? Violence and harassment affect workers across all sectors. If we are serious about halving violence against women and girls within the next decade, as His Majesty’s Government have pledged, we need a cross-departmental approach that moves beyond a sole focus on criminalisation to prevention and tackling the root causes. Leveraging health and safety law is one way to achieve this. It would make VAWG prevention everybody’s business. These amendments were co-written with the Suzy Lamplugh Trust and Rights of Women—organisations with decades of experience in supporting victims. The amendments’ aims are also supported by several workers unions.
Current legislation falls short. The Worker Protection (Amendment of Equality Act 2010) Act 2023 introduced a preventive duty on sexual harassment, but in practice enforcement occurs only after harm has happened. The Employment Rights Bill will strengthen this requirement when it introduces protections around third-party harassment. However, enforcement can occur only after sexual harassment has been experienced, limiting its preventive function. It also excludes other forms of violence against women and girls in the workplace, such as other forms of harassment and all forms of violence, including physical, psychological and emotional abuse.
The UK ratified ILO Convention No. 190, which requires a gender-responsive approach to workplace safety, yet our laws do not reflect this obligation. Recent cases show the urgency of this, including the tragic murder of Gracie Spinks by a colleague who stalked her, despite repeated reports. Female NHS surgeons report harassment and even rape in operating theatres, described as “surgery’s open secret”. Royal Artillery Gunner Jaysley Beck took her own life after relentless harassment by her superior. There have been reports of sexual assault and rape at Harrods, the CBI, the BBC and McDonald’s.
The Harrods case was not a failure of individual courage; it was a failure of structural responsibility. Multiple institutions had sight of risk, but none had a duty to prevent it. Harrods looked like a modern employer, but it functioned as a closed environment in which power went unchecked and young women were left unprotected. These amendments would have required the risk assessments that never happened. Survivors of al-Fayed’s abuse, represented by no one above, say the same thing again and again: no one stopped him. Legislators must ensure that no workplace in the UK can ever operate with that level of impunity again. Where accountability is optional, exploitation becomes operational. The Harrods redress scheme shows exactly why voluntary arrangements cannot substitute for enforceable duties on employers.
These are not isolated incidents. Rights of Women reports that 56% of calls to its advice line involve harassment or violence from colleagues. The Suzy Lamplugh Trust found that women are eight times more likely than men to experience sexual misconduct at work, yet there is no government data collection, no reporting requirement, and outdated attitudes persist that VAWG is a private matter.
I would like to illustrate the lack of regulation for VAWG in the workplace and why these amendments are necessary. The Equality Act addresses sexual harassment as discrimination but excludes other forms of VAWG, leaving significant safety issues unregulated by the Equality and Human Rights Commission. Employers can adopt domestic abuse policies voluntarily, as recommended by the EHRC in guidance to employers on domestic abuse—although the Welsh version is actually over a decade old. However, much of the currently available guidance assumes domestic abuse occurs outside the workplace and outside the remit of the employer’s liability. This does not align with the statutory guidance to employers in the Domestic Abuse Act, which states that employers should consider the impact of domestic abuse on their employees as part of their duty of care under health and safety law, as regulated by the Health and Safety Executive.
Despite the growing evidence that gender-based violence and harassment harm workers’ health and safety, the Health and Safety Executive does not recognise gender-based violence as a workplace hazard. In its evidence to the Women and Equalities Select Committee 2018 inquiry on sexual harassment, the Health and Safety Executive stated clearly that it has a policy of not applying the Health and Safety at Work Act when it deems that other agencies or regulators have more specific responsibilities. The Health and Safety Executive is currently advising workers to report harassment to bodies that lack enforcement powers. This must change, and harassment and violence in the workplace should be recognised as a health and safety at work matter.
Health and safety frameworks provide a structured, enforceable approach. Updating them to include VAWG would ensure employers have a positive duty to prevent harm, not just to respond after an incident. As with existing health and safety duties, this would be proportionate. These amendments are practical and scalable. They would require risk assessment, clear policies, training, and confidential reporting mechanisms—all proportionate to the size and risk profile of the workplace and consistent with the existing health and safety frameworks.
Amendments 348 and 349 prioritise prevention and victim protection. They reflect expert advice and growing public demand. They align with the Government’s own commitment to halving violence against women and girls within the next decade. Tomorrow, the VAWG strategy will be published. The Safeguarding Minister in the other place said on Monday that
“the strategy has to be for everybody … It has to be for employers as well. It is for businesses, charities—everybody in society”.—[Official Report, Commons, 15/12/25; col. 651.]
I hope that these amendments are viewed as one way to make that vision a reality.
We know what happens when accountability is optional. We have seen it in shops, in hospitals, in the Armed Forces, and we owe it to those who have spoken up and to those who still feel unable to, to act. I look forward to the Minister’s response and hope His Majesty’s Government will consider these arguments as the Crime and Policing Bill progresses through this House. I beg to move.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I was happy once again to add my name to these two amendments from the noble Baroness, because we had a very similar debate on 21 May during the passage of the Employment Rights Bill. On 11 July, the noble Baroness followed up with a letter to the then Minister—the noble Baroness, Lady Jones—laying out the case very clearly.
The Government have the laudable intention of trying to reduce violence against women and girls by 50%, but there is a strange incongruence in respect of that ambition. I wonder if noble Lords are aware of how much time people, if they are fortunate enough to be employed, spend in the workplace during an average year? It is 52% of the year. In a year, more than half of an average employee’s time is spent in and around the workplace. Therefore, when one is putting together a comprehensive strategy to try and reduce violence against women and girls, excluding the workplace from close scrutiny and oversight seems somewhat of an oversight. What the noble Baroness is suggesting in these two amendments therefore seems eminently sensible. Without looking at this very carefully and ensuring that it is effectively included within the strategy in some way, shape or form, the strategy will be fundamentally flawed from the start.
The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act, which is often cited by Governments of whatever persuasion as being the bedrock of trying to ensure rights in the workplace, is now exactly 51 years old. I am sure the Government will wheel out, as they have on previous occasions, the many other Acts and regulations that have been put on the statute book at various points over the past 51 years. However, during the last 51 years, for better or worse—I think for worse—the situation in the workplace, for women and girls in particular but also for men, has fundamentally changed, and the regulations and legislation have not kept up. There is clearly an imbalance.
One need only look at the range of organisations that have suffered quite a lot of reputational damage as a result of not trying to put in place regulations and rules and of not instilling, primarily through leadership, a culture to ensure that the sort of behaviour that we are talking about and trying to stop is called out. I could go through an exhaustive list, but we can look at the embarrassment that various police forces have had to endure in the last few years. We can also look at the embarrassment that the Church of England has had to face and is still facing; that is an institution that not only finds it extraordinarily difficult to acknowledge the existence of that sort of behaviour within its ranks but has the strange anomaly that it is an organisation part of whose purpose in life is to forgive. However, it is not enough to forgive things going wrong if you are not prioritising the needs of those who are being wronged, and that is unfortunately the case in the Church of England and, of course, in the Roman Catholic Church throughout the world, as is very well known.
The military is also an embarrassing example. To have lost a First Sea Lord through impropriety at work is not exactly an example of stellar leadership. It makes one wonder how it was possible for an individual to reach that level of rank—with fundamental and comprehensive reviews and training taking place, in theory, right the way through their career—and to arrive at the pinnacle of their military profession only then to be publicly found very wanting. Clearly, there was something fundamentally wrong with the culture there. We have also had Cabinet Ministers who have had to resign on the basis of inappropriate behaviour in the workplace, particularly harassment and bullying. This is a problem that is endemic; to ignore it is simply not acceptable.
I hope and expect that the Minister’s reply will not be a carbon copy of the answer that the noble Lord, Lord Leong, gave in the debate on the 21 May. That answer was, in effect, a list of all the various regulations and legislation that, in theory, are meant to enable one to address and stop this, but which clearly are not working. To try and defend it, when clearly it is not working, makes one feel that the Minister, if he does do that, is unfortunately taking King Canute as a role model. It is simply not acceptable.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and to support the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, not least because my noble friend Lord Hendy—who is, sadly, not able to be in the country this evening—co-signed her amendment.
If anyone imagines or suggests that the job of the Health and Safety Executive should be limited to the inspection of heavy machinery or physical infrastructure, as opposed to social infrastructure, then they are not just living in the last century but arguably the one before that. For the Health and Safety Executive to look at its role in such a limited way is also incredibly gendered.
I hope that my noble friend the Minister will look favourably on the intention of these amendments, because they sit so comfortably with other measures that the Government are attempting. The noble Baroness put it very well when she said that this is essential for the credible functioning of the violence against women and girls strategy. Last night, during the course of the Second Reading debate on the Victims and Courts Bill, it was wonderful to hear another Minister, my noble friend Lady Levitt, talk about further work and an expanded regime on allowing whistleblowing and the busting open of non-disclosure agreements that cover up illegal activity—which often means violence against women at work. What the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, is proposing sits so comfortably with that.
I cannot believe that my noble friend the Minister will think anything different not least because, just a few minutes ago, he spoke so passionately about protecting emergency workers when they have to go into difficult and dangerous settings and how they should be protected even from abuse, let alone from violence and more serious criminality. It would be odd if there was no duty on the employers of emergency workers to look at risk, adequate training and culture in the workplace and at what measures might be taken within teams and with training for those same emergency workers. As was suggested by the noble Baroness, this is about joined-up thinking and coming up with a violence against women and girls strategy that the whole Committee and all parties can get behind. I am feeling optimistic about my noble friend the Minister’s reply.
To Committee colleagues on the opposition Front Bench, I would say that there are inevitable concerns about any additional burden on employers. I am seeing nods that suggest that my suspicions are correct. But these duties can be as appropriate. If noble Lords and Committee members have concerns about the precise drafting of the amendments, those can be dealt with before Report. The duties would be to prepare and revise assessments that are appropriate for a particular business—and businesses and workplace settings are so different; they include very vulnerable and secluded settings, with visits and travel, including to people’s homes. This only need be about strategies and training as appropriate; the duties need not be an undue burden on good employers of good faith who have many women workers in particular, although I would like to see all protected.
I hope that the entire Committee can get behind the noble Baroness. I am delighted to see the first ever woman general secretary of the TUC looking as if she might be due to speak after me.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I first seek clarification from the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, on his sums. I do not do sums either but, if I heard him correctly, he said that a worker spends 50% of his life at work. If that is what I heard correctly, that is 84 hours a week.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
What I said was that a person fortunate enough to be employed spends on average 52% of one year in and around the workplace.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I shall need to go back later and do my own sums, but that still seems to me a little bit excessive.
I am not opposed to the proposed new clauses, and I agree with the thrust of them; this is an important issue. But my concern is with turning a broad legal duty, which these two proposed clauses suggest, into concrete and repeatable workplace practice. There are some practical difficulties. First, you get hidden and underreported incidents. We all know that victims often do not report harassment or stalking—and then there are no incident logs, which may underrate the risk. The risk can come from colleagues, managers, contractors, clients, customers or the public, including online, making responsibility and control much harder to map. That might put a simply impossible obligation on employers and impose a very heavy burden on small employers, which would probably not have an HR or personnel department or the security expertise to assess all the potential risk.
Designing “gender-responsive” measures into practical and proportionate steps seems to me to be a very difficult thing to do; a lot of careful tailoring would be required to deal with different people and roles. That may be beyond the capability of many employers, particularly small ones. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, has looked at the HSE advice, already published, which I think includes detailed guidance on managing work-related stress and preventing work-related violence. That includes information on creating policies to address unacceptable behaviour. Perhaps the voluntary advice it gives could be expanded to deal with the elements at the core of these new clauses.
I also look to what ACAS does. This is what it says on its website:
“‘Vicarious liability’ is when an employer could be held responsible if one of their workers discriminates against someone … The law (Equality Act 2010) says a worker and an employer could both be held responsible if the discrimination happens ‘in the course of employment’. This means something that’s linked to work … This could be at work or outside the workplace, for example at a work party or through social media that’s linked to work”.
That is what ACAS says about discrimination, but I simply wonder whether the better course of action might be not to pass this proposed new clause into law but to get HSE and ACAS to take the thrust of the suggestions and design new guidance that delivers what the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Russell, want.
The noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington, has just left the Chamber, but when I saw him here, I assumed that he was going to speak on this matter. Had he spoken, he would probably have said, “Please do not give any more powers to the Health and Safety Executive”. He was a victim of one of the excessive criminal trials. When he was commissioner of the Met, one of his officers was pursuing a burglar. The burglar ran on to the roof of a factory, and the police officer chased him, fell through the skylight and was seriously injured. The Health and Safety Executive took the commissioner of the Metropolitan Police to court for failing to provide a safe working environment for the officer. The noble Lord, Lord Stevens, said: “I stood in No. 1 court of the Old Bailey—the court that had the trials of murderers, serious criminals and traitors—accused by the Health and Safety Executive of not taking enough care of my workers. When my lawyer asked the chap from the Health and Safety Executive, ‘What should the officer have done?’, he said, ‘Well, he should have stopped; he should have sent for a cherry-picker and scaffolding to make sure it was safe’”. The noble Lord said, “I looked at the jury, and the jury looked at the face of this idiot, and within minutes I was cleared, because a sensible jury knew that that was a ridiculous thing to say”.
That is the only danger of giving these powers to an organisation like the Health and Safety Executive. It may use the bulk of them safely most of the time, but on occasions you will get silly decisions. I should say in conclusion that that case of the noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington, is a very good reason why we should keep juries, rather than having a single judge.
I perceive difficulties in putting this proposal into law, but I hope that a solution can be found whereby the Health and Safety Executive, ACAS or others can pursue the contents of new clauses without recourse to legislation.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I have some serious reservations about Amendment 348 and the related Amendment 349. I spoke at length against them when a similar amendment was tabled to the Employment Rights Bill, and I shall not repeat everything that I said then.
The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, talked about looking at the drafting. That was interesting, because one of my problems is with the wording of this repeated amendment. It is all over the place, quite dangerous and very broad, and it could get us into all sorts of unintended trouble. Let me illustrate.
The noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, spoke passionately and excellently about some the real live problems of sexual harassment at work, and many of us will recognise that. As I say, I have concerns about the language of this amendment. It refers to having a legal mandate for employers to introduce
“proactive and preventative measures to protect all persons working in their workplace from … psychological and emotional abuse”.
We heard from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that “psychological and emotional abuse” is a very broad term. The nature of “proactive and preventative measures” might involve stopping something that is very hard to define and could result in real overreach. It could be quite coercive and manipulative.
However, I am particularly nervous about the use of the “gender-responsive” approach that is advocated, particularly in relation to training. We are told in the amendment that
“a ‘gender-responsive approach’ means taking into account the various needs, interests, and experiences of people of different gender identities, including women and girls”.
Women and girls are not a subset of “gender identities”—whatever they are. That is insulting, and gender identities are at the very least contentious. This language confusion, for me, drags the amendment into a potential political minefield. I am familiar with the way in which gender-responsive approaches are being used in the workplace at the present time to undermine women and girls.
I was fortunate enough today to have a meeting here in Parliament with the Darlington Nurses Union. The Darlington nurses are in dispute with their NHS employer because they felt sexually unsafe in their single-sex nurses’ changing room—which, by the way, was fought for as part of health and safety at work in the past. They had a place where they could get changed and they felt unsafe when a gender-inclusive policy allowed a male who identifies as a woman to use their space. This has led to all sorts of problems in relation to what safety at work is. They felt as though there was a degree of sexual harassment going on, and so forth. I am just pointing out that this is a difficult area, so can we at least acknowledge it?
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, is repeating, to some extent, some of the perfectly sensible points that she made in the debate earlier in the year. I just point out that, in Committee, these are probing amendments: no more, no less. It is accepted from the get-go that they could be improved, and what I think would be helpful for the Committee is not a long list of the things that are wrong with the amendment—we accept that there may be some things that are wrong with it—but some suggestions, if the noble Baroness is unhappy with the wording, as to what might be put in its place if, as I think is the case, she acknowledges that there is a problem that needs to be dealt with.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
That is a fair comment. The point that I was going on to make was that she was suspended for misgendering using a gender-inclusive policy similar to that advocated in this amendment.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
I suggested then that I was not happy with the wording of an amendment, and it has simply been repeated. I made a speech that I thought was reasonable at the time. This is actually not the same speech, but I am raising some of the issues. I ask, as I asked earlier, why would we use that approach to protecting women and girls when women in the workplace are at present actually the victims of some of these gender-related policies? Therefore, if the amendment comes back as a more straightforward, narrowly defined amendment about sexual harassment at work, I would be much more interested in hearing about it. It is the amendment that is repeated, not just my speech. It is exactly the same wording that I objected to before. No account has been taken of any of the criticisms made in Committee, at the probing stage, so I think I can reasonably say that I would like us all to not repeat ourselves, including with this amendment.
Baroness Smith of Llanfaes (PC)
I want to come back really briefly on the language of “gender-responsive approach”. That is not a “gender-inclusive approach”: it is based on the ILO convention that our Government ratified, along with the rest of the global community, and relates to the fact that more women than men face misconduct at work. I wanted to clarify the language there, but I do take those points.
Baroness O’Grady of Upper Holloway (Lab)
My Lords, I add my support for these probing amendments and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for her work on this issue. I strongly welcome the Government’s promise to launch the largest crackdown in history to reduce violence against women and girls. While of course the misery of experiencing violence and harassment is not exclusive to women, surveys from the TUC and others have shown that it is overwhelmingly women who suffer this abuse. I also welcome the Government’s recognition that we need a whole-system approach that places prevention and survivors at its heart. As we have heard already, every part of society has to step up if we are to achieve the goal of every woman feeling safe everywhere, and that must include action to make the workplace a place of safety for women, too.
I had hoped that we had moved on from the notion that violence against women is somehow a private or domestic matter, but let us take the practical example of the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations. This is the UK’s health and safety law that requires employers to report specific serious work-related incidents, such as fatalities and major injuries, to the Health and Safety Executive. These reports help the HSE track risks and prevent future harm, making it a vital legal duty to maintain workplace safety and accountability. But, if you look at it today, you see that the HSE website explicitly states that, while acts of violence to a person at work that result in death or a major injury are reportable, a physical injury inflicted on one employee by another during a dispute about a so-called “personal matter”, or an employee at work
“being injured by a relative or a friend who visits them at work about a domestic matter”
is not reportable. So, the HSE has no responsibility to track violence against women that happens in the workplace which is deemed to be a personal or domestic matter. I find that pretty shocking. You have to question why women’s experience of violence at work is disregarded in this way.
As we have also heard, the Equality and Human Rights Commission has responsibility for the duty on employers to prevent sexual harassment, but it is open and public that it will investigate only what it describes as “strategic cases”, as it simply does not have adequate resources to deliver comprehensive enforcement. Surely, health and safety inspectors who have the powers and ability to go into workplaces have a role to play in enforcing prevention of sexual harassment.
The UK has fallen far behind the ILO’s recommended standard for the ratio of labour inspectors to the size of workforce. In effect, the safety and welfare of British workers has been deprioritised over the last decade and more compared with other countries. But it seems that the safety and welfare of women workers have been deprioritised even more. There is an opportunity for an update and a reset. The new fair work agency and boosting the number of labour inspectors will be vital, but we must get the health and safety framework right, too. For the sake of women workers, I hope the Minister will talk to other colleagues, for sure, but also give careful consideration to the amendments before us.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I too support the objective of Amendment 348—who would not support the objective of preventing illegal violence and harassment in the workplace? I suspect that the main argument against Amendment 348 will be the burden that it would impose on employers, particularly small ones, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, made that point very eloquently.
I will briefly identify one reason why it is very much in the interests of the employer to have these duties. It is because if there is illegal violence and harassment in the workplace which causes, as it will, damage to the victim, she—and it normally will be she—will be looking for remedies, and the person against whom she is most likely to be advised to sue is not the rogue other employee but the employer. The employer is particularly vulnerable to such a civil claim if they have not, as required by Amendment 348—which no doubt can be improved in its drafting—conducted any sort of assessment to identify potential risks, have not implemented policies and procedures to eliminate those risks, and, in particular, have not provided at least basic training to all employees on the importance of these matters. So, yes, this will impose a burden on employers, particularly small ones, but it is very much in their interests to protect themselves against legal liability and to deter such action taking place.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, these amendments ask employers not only to react when something goes wrong but to look ahead, identify the risks and take sensible steps to prevent harm before it happens. That is especially important for women and those in insecure or public-facing roles, who we know are more likely to be targeted and less likely to feel safe reporting what has happened to them.
The statistics are damning. There were nearly 700,000 incidents last year alone, with attacks on lone workers surging by 132% over three years. We strongly support the aim of these amendments; however, as we did previously, we have questions around how a duty to eliminate risks, so far as reasonably practicable, would work in small businesses on tight margins. Layering new mandates on top of existing duties under the Equality Act and employment law risks confusion, which could dilute accountability. This is not an argument against doing more, but a practical issue which needs to be addressed.
There is also a wider cultural point. Legislation can set clear expectations, but workers will be safer only if staff feel confident to report incidents and these reports lead to action, not to victims being sidelined or blamed. Training, confidential reporting routes and proper follow-up, all mentioned in the amendments, are not extras; they are essential if any new duty is to change what has sadly become everyday reality for many people just trying to do their jobs.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for her thoughtful amendments, which seek to place prevention of illegal violence and harassment in the workplace on a clear statutory footing and to expand the duties of the Health and Safety Executive accordingly.
It is clear from the debate that, across your Lordships’ House, we take violence against women and girls extremely seriously, whether that violence occurs at home, on the street, online or in the workplace. We know that gender-based violence remains alarmingly prevalent. Data for the year ending March 2024 shows that 6% of women aged 16 and over experienced domestic abuse, 4% experienced sexual assault and 4% experienced stalking.
These amendments focus on violence at work, in the employment context. Sexual harassment at work is far from uncommon. A recent study by UCL found that nearly one in seven UK workers encountered workplace abuse in the past year, with women reporting significantly higher levels of harassment and assault. Those figures remind us that work must of course be a place of safety, dignity and respect for all employees.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, for tabling the amendments and explaining them, and for the support given to her by my noble friends Lady Chakrabarti and Lady O’Grady of Upper Holloway, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and for the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, on the Front Benches, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra.
The Government’s concerns about the amendment do not reflect those expressed by the noble Lords, Lord Cameron and Lord Blencathra, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Fox. They made valid points, but they are not ones I will deploy in the argument against the contributions in the debate. I am grateful also for the comments on the amendments by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.
I start by saying to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, that the violence against women and girls strategy will be published tomorrow, as has been recognised. It is ambitious. It sets a target to reduce violence against women and girls per se over a 10-year period, and I am grateful to my noble friend for her endorsement of that approach.
I hope I do not disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, in deploying some of these arguments, because I was not party to the arguments in previous Bills, but I will explain to the Committee where the Government are coming from in relation to the points the noble Baroness made. It is important and absolutely right that we reduce violence against women and girls in the workplace, as well as in domestic or public settings. This may reflect some of the arguments that the noble Lord may have heard before, but under existing health and safety at work legislation—the 1974 Act and its related secondary legislation—employers have a clear duty to protect their workers from health and safety risks, including workplace violence. They are required, under the legislation from 1974— which was passed by a previous Labour Government 51 years ago but is still relevant today—to assess and take appropriate steps to eliminate or reduce those risks.
The 1974 Act, along with a range of related regulations, further mandates employers to take measures to reduce the risks of workplace violence. As part of this, the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999—again, a measure from a Labour Government some 26 years ago—requires employers to assess risks in the workplace, including the potential for violence, and take suitable action to reduce or eliminate those risks. The Health and Safety Executive and local authorities, which are both responsible for enforcing the 1974 Act, implement proactive and reactive measures to ensure that employers comply with their duties, which my noble friend Lady O’Grady will be aware of from her previous life experience. This includes ensuring that employers assess risks and implement appropriate controls to protect their workforce, and anyone else affected by their work, from workplace violence. The Health and Safety Executive has also published accessible guidance on its website to help employers comply with their legal obligations.
I heard what my noble friend Lady O’Grady said, but Amendment 349, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, would require the HSE to publish a health and safety framework specifically focused on illegal violence and harassment in the workplace. As I have set out, employers already have duties under the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations to manage such risks, including violence and aggression. Although workplace harassment could be addressed under the 1974 Act, as has been mentioned, the HSE does not intervene where there is a more appropriate regulator or where more directly applicable legislation applies.
Harassment offences in the workplace are covered under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, which, again, was passed by my predecessors in office. Additionally, the Equality and Human Rights Commission can act under the Equality Act 2010, which was also passed by my party’s predecessors in office. Recent amendments to the Equality Act 2010, which came into force in October 2024, require employers to take proactive measures to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace. This provision is enforced by the EHRC. In the VAWG strategy, which will be published tomorrow—so I am not able to divulge every aspect—there are measures on stalking and on domestic violence protection orders, as well as a whole range of things, including measures in the Bill.
I therefore reassure the noble Baroness that there is a legal framework, which is both robust and comprehensive, for addressing illegal violence and harassment in the workplace. The Government remain committed to raising awareness of this issue and want to examine, as they are doing now, how to apply the violence against women and girls strategy to reduce violence against women and girls across the piece. I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment, because the proposals in the VAWG strategy tomorrow and the outline I have given of the performance of the Health and Safety Executive are, I hope, sufficient to show that we take this issue seriously and that the Government will not tolerate violence in the workplace.
Baroness Smith of Llanfaes (PC)
It is very clear, from what we have heard in this debate, that the status quo is not working, so what does the Minister propose that the Government actually do to improve this? As we have heard, the Minister has listed all these pieces of legislation, which are clearly not working because so many women still face these issues in the workplace.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for that, and I hope I can give her assurance. My honourable friend Jess Phillips is the Minister directly responsible for the violence against women and girls strategy, although I obviously account to this House for it. She has a history of ensuring that we focus on the reduction of violence against women and girls. The strategy she will publish tomorrow is a strategy for across the piece; it is not just, as we have discussed today, for domestic or public violence against women and girls but a comprehensive strategy. I hope the noble Baroness will give my colleague the benefit of the doubt that she shares the view to reduce and eliminate domestic violence or violence in a workplace setting against women and girls. I speak for the Government in expressing that view.
I therefore hope the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment and examine in detail the strategy which will be published tomorrow. I will make sure my honourable friend Jess Phillips sees the debate we have had and looks at the points made by noble Lords from across the Committee on how the Health and Safety Executive operates, particularly on the personal basis that has been discussed today.
I hope, with those reassurances, that the noble Baroness will know that this Government are committed to taking action to reduce violence against women and girls by half over a decade. The points she has raised about the workplace are valid but we believe the measures are there to ensure enforcement takes place. I am sure we can reflect with colleague Ministers on how the Health and Safety Executive operates its responsibilities to help achieve the objectives the Government have set in the VAWG strategy.
Baroness Smith of Llanfaes (PC)
I thank all noble Lords who have participated in this debate. I say in response to the Minister that I welcome the publication of the VAWG strategy tomorrow and will look in detail for anything which addresses the workplace.
I turn back to this debate. These specific probing amendments have set out a clear objective and I am grateful to all those who have contributed. It is clear that the Committee agrees with the objective these amendments are trying to achieve, yet they perhaps need more work in terms of the wording.
I will respond to a few of the comments made by noble Lords. The reminder by the noble Lord, Lord Russell, of just how much time individuals spend in the workplace highlights how we cannot achieve the Government’s aim to halve violence against women and girls within this decade by ignoring the workplace and how important it is.
In response to the point from the Conservative Front Bench on employers, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, raised an interesting point about how having a framework of this kind can help protect employers. That is a positive. Having more guidance, a framework and risk assessments also protects employers’ liability in the future. There were a few points raised there—
Captain of the King’s Bodyguard of the Yeomen of the Guard and Deputy Chief Whip (Baroness Wheeler) (Lab)
I remind the noble Baroness that, in withdrawing amendments, statements need to be brief. She does not need to summarise the debate.
Baroness Smith of Llanfaes (PC)
I appreciate those comments. However, this is about how we will take the amendments further. This has been a really useful discussion in Committee and I value the contributions that people have made. I will not press my amendments today. However, this is not the end of this discussion. I value the comments from the Minister about how we will progress this, particularly with the wording of the amendments and by taking on board the comments raised by noble Lords in this debate. I hope that His Majesty’s Government will reflect on the debate— I am grateful that this will be shared with the Minister in the other place, Jess Phillips—and I would welcome further engagement. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Crime and Policing Bill
Wednesday 17th December 2025
(4 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-VII(b) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Seventh Marshalled List) - (17 Dec 2025)
“Offences of causing harassment, alarm or distress: amendments(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended as follows.(2) In section 4A (intentional harassment, alarm or distress) omit “, alarm” in each place where it occurs (including the heading) and omit “, alarmed” in subsection (2).(3) In section 5 (harassment, alarm or distress) omit “, alarm” in each place where it occurs (including the heading).”
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to have the opportunity to contribute to Committee proceedings. My Amendment 352 is quite straightforward. It would omit the word “alarm” from the appropriate legislation, by way of a new clause. In the landmark 1976 case, Handyside v United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights established that freedom of expression under Article 10 extends to ideas that “offend, shock or disturb” the state or any sector of the population. The court emphasised that tolerance and pluralism are essential for a democratic society, and that this protection applies to both popular and unpopular expression.
The cut and thrust of debate, whether political, religious or philosophical, means being able to challenge long-standing and sometimes deeply cherished assumptions. It can be shocking and disturbing—even alarming—to have the pillars of one’s world view challenged. It can be deeply uncomfortable, but it should not be a matter for the criminal law. That is why I have tabled this amendment to the Public Order Act 1986.
My amendment would remove “alarm” from Sections 4A and 5 of the 1986 Act. Section 4A currently criminalises “words or behaviour” that are intended to cause
“another person harassment, alarm or distress”.
Section 5 criminalises
“words or behaviour … within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress”,
even where that impact is not intended or, indeed, actually caused.
It seems to me that there should be no place in the criminal law of England and Wales for criminalising a citizen on the basis that his words or behaviour cause or are deemed likely to cause alarm. Of course, the law should seek to protect the citizen from harassment and distress: these are impacts that can have untold negative effects on people. In a democratic society, freedom of speech should always be balanced with civility and kindness. But, unlike harassment or distress, being alarmed is not inherently a negative impact. Indeed, it may be positive.
For some years now, we have been warned that our planet is hurtling towards destructive and irreversible climate change—I notice the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, temporarily sitting on my Benches—such that it might not be able to support life as we know it. The science and the prescribed remedy are by no means universally accepted. I make no point about that, but I do observe that those seeking to change our economic behaviour have not flinched at alarming us about the peril we face.
Of course, if you believe that bad consequences will follow bad decisions, you will naturally warn of those dangers, as exemplified by the proponents of Project Fear during the EU referendum. If the perceived dangers are said to be catastrophic, it will inevitably alarm some people. This is seen in the expression of religious or philosophical belief. If a Christian preacher believes, as Christians do, that the Day of Judgment is approaching, in which all people will be judged for the lives they have lived in the here and now, it should come as no surprise that the preacher will seek to ring the alarm bell. If you believe that the world consumption of meat is causing the decimation of the rainforests and leading to the overproduction of carbon dioxide gases, you might well want to alarm the complacent beef eater of those catastrophic consequences in order to make the case for veganism.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
Is the noble Lord saying that, when I was on the Bench here and he hissed at me that I should shut up because I was rude, that was okay because it did not alarm me? Does he remember doing that? We almost came to blows outside.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
I recollect that we have always had a robust exchange of views. I did not in any sense seek to alarm the noble Baroness, but, from memory, she arrived late for a group of amendments, pontificated for a few minutes on issues that she had not heard and then—
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, I am going to call a halt at this point. This is remembrance of things past. We have an important amendment to discuss today, and we should focus on the amendments.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
I thank the Whip. I was merely elucidating for the benefit of the Committee the context of the noble Baroness’s rather strange intervention on my remarks. I do not quite have the same recollection that she does—
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Beith) (LD)
My Lords, the noble Lord has moved the amendment, and the opportunity is there for other Members to speak to it.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, I of course wish the Committee a very happy Christmas when that moment comes, but it was not just in seasonal spirit that I signed the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough. As he indicated, free expression is a two-way street, and I suggest that it is a two-way street in at least two ways: first, because all democrats, of whichever side of the aisle, ought to guard it jealously, and, secondly, because it must be applied with an even hand, even to people, ideas and causes with which we seriously disagree.
Before entering your Lordships’ House, I worked for 15 years at Liberty, the National Council for Civil Liberties. In that time, I saw the concept of behaviour causing or even just likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress used and abused to arrest and even prosecute people in a way that I believe all Members of the Committee would consider abusive, certainly when applied to people like us or causes with which we agree.
“Alarm” and arguably even “distress”, as opposed to a reasonable fear of a threat or of harm, are very broad. Harassment is a course of conduct and therefore a bit more objective and less broad. Sections 4A and 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 obviously create two specific criminal offences, but the rubric of “harassment, alarm or distress” also now forms the linchpin of anti-social behaviour, with its quasi-civil and criminal orders and the even broader approach that police guidance and police websites take to the concept of anti-social behaviour. However, that matter was discussed earlier in Committee.
The two offences that the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, has identified have, in my direct experience over many years, been applied broadly, indiscriminately and, ironically, in a discriminatory way to, for example, peaceful protesters and to anti-monarchists for wearing republican slogans on their T-shirts when a member of the Royal Family is in town. The noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, gave other examples of words that can offend or cause alarm and distress, as opposed to fear or the threat of real harm. I gave the example of the anti-monarchist who was not just arrested but, I believe, charged for the T-shirt in question, but there are also cases of youngsters being charged, certainly being arrested, for being cheeky with the police. I think this cannot just be blamed on the police when these concepts on the public order statute book are just too vague and too broad.
To attempt to leaven the spirit yet again the week before Christmas, I am reminded that today at PMQs, and not for the first time, the leader of the Opposition made reference, if euphemistically, to the Prime Minister’s private parts. Of course, that sort of thing would never happen in your Lordships’ House, but whatever noble Lords think of that approach to parliamentary debate, people on our streets, ordinary people, have been arrested and charged for less. Can that really be right? I think not.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
My Lords, I will say a few words in support of the amendment. I agree with the difficulty of categorising alarm in the same manner as harassment and distress. Harassment and distress can be objectively measured or distress objectively assessed, but when it comes to alarm, I think what noble Lords have said so far is that it may cause a shock to hear somebody in your group saying something so different to anything you could imagine being said.
I can give an example of a representative image or a representation which may be designed to shock. I was a supporter of Brexit in a very remain constituency, Cambridge. We usually invite people at the end of term, and I had a Vote Leave poster in my window, but as they were coming to a party to celebrate the end of term, I said to my husband that I would take it down because I did not want to upset them. Afterwards, none of them ever could imagine that I might support leave. When I told them, they said, “We had no idea. We couldn’t have imagined we knew anybody in Cambridge who voted leave”. I suppose you could say that I was trying not to spoil their day because people take these matters very seriously, but you could say that alarm could be equated to an instance of thoughtlessness, bad manners or a deliberate intention to shock, as some people will do, but it is not a matter to criminalise. For those reasons, I support removing “alarm” from Sections 4A and 5 but would leave harassment and distress because they can more objectively be measured.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for raising a point that really had not occurred to me in years of gazing at Sections 4A and 5 of the Public Order Act. I also thank the noble Lord for his reference to the Handyside case, quite correctly observing that freedom of speech means nothing if it does not include the freedom to offend, shock and disturb. But, of course, Handyside was about ideas that offend, shock and disturb. Sections 4A and 5 are not talking about ideas; as the noble Lord said, they refer to threats, abuse and insult.
Outside the rarefied walls of academe, the cases in which Sections 4A and 5 are applied are to the objectionable drunk, on a train or in a doorway, who yells at somebody and can cause, in the words of the statute, distress or alarm. I agree with the noble Lord that they are not very different. In fact, he said it would be otiose to have both “distress” and “alarm” in the sections, but surely there is a shade of difference between the two. If there is some lasting upset, we could call that distress, but if it is a question of frightening or unsettling somebody by yelling an insult in their ear, that is probably closer to alarm. Although I agree with the noble Lord and the noble Baroness about the evils of overzealous prosecutors, I suggest that there is some purpose to these two very similar words both appearing in these two sections.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I have listened to this rather short debate against the particular backdrop of the Government’s increasingly unsettling approach to public order—a direction of travel that raises real concerns on these Benches. The current stance seems to involve simply doubling down on the pattern set by the previous Administration, which, in our view, risks overpolicing protest, overburdening an already stretched justice system, diverting resources from serious crime and threatening legitimate speech.
In that context, we have sympathy with this proposal. However, I have some concerns about changing a standard legal formula in public order and anti-social behaviour law. It is widely embedded in guidance and operational policy; in removing it, there is a risk of creating uncertainty and confusion within the police, local authorities and the courts. At the same time, it is equally clear that the concepts of alarm and distress have, in practice, been stretched far beyond what Parliament ever intended. Some people are very easily alarmed or distressed by noisy but peaceful demonstrations, or simply by views with which they profoundly disagree. These cannot be a sound basis for criminal liability.
There is a real risk that an overbroad test inhibits free expression, penalises vulnerability and hands too much discretion to those who are most intolerant of difference. If the Government will not support this amendment, will the Minister explain how they intend to ensure that public order powers are not used to criminalise mere annoyance, eccentricity or disagreement, but are focused on genuinely threatening, abusive and harassing behaviour?
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
I thank my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough for tabling Amendment 352. It is welcome to see such a cross-party collection of noble Lords supporting it: the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, are not names always seen together on an amendment.
The amendment proposes to remove “alarm” from Sections 4A and 5 of the 1986 Act, as we have heard. As others have said, alarm is a word that denotes impression, mood and temperament. It is a word that allows the criminal law to stray beyond the prevention of genuine disorder and into the policing of irritation, discomfort or unease. Several legal cases have shown where this can lead. In a case called DPP v Orum in 1989, a conviction was upheld under Section 5 for shouting abuse at police officers. The court accepted that even trained officers, accustomed as they might be to a degree of verbal abuse, could none the less be persons likely to be caused “harassment, alarm or distress”. Although that may be understandable up to a point, it demonstrates how low the threshold has been set. If professionals whose job it is to face confrontation can be alarmed by rude language, one begins to wonder who cannot be.
Another case is called Norwood v DPP in 2003, in which a man was convicted for displaying a poster saying “Islam out of Britain” in his window. The reasoning again rested partly on the likelihood of causing alarm. Whatever one thinks of the views expressed—many of us would deplore them—the case illustrates how “alarm” can operate as a gateway through which deeply subjective reactions become the basis for criminal liability. It seems that these cases represent symptoms of a statutory provision that has no clear boundary. “Alarm” does not mean “fear of violence”—it does not require intimidation; it does not even require serious upset. It has been stretched to cover being offended, unsettled or merely uncomfortable. I suggest that is not a sound basis for criminal liability.
As others have said, the law retains and contains safeguards where genuine harm arises: “harassment” would remain in the wording of the statute, “distress” would remain in the wording of the provision, and Section 4 remains available for
“Fear or provocation of violence”.
Other statutes address stalking, threats and coercive conduct. My noble friend’s amendment would remove nothing that is truly necessary to protect the public. It would restore a measure of seriousness to public order law. Criminal offences should address conduct that is objectively wrongful, not speech or behaviour that happens to alarm someone whose threshold for alarm may be very low. This amendment has our wholehearted support, and I hope that it has the support of the Minister too.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
My Lords, I confess that when I woke up this morning I did not anticipate having a discussion about Thames Valley Police and a gay horse. Such is political life on the Government Front Bench. Nor did I anticipate talking about the Prime Minister’s private parts, referred to by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti.
On a more serious note, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, for his amendment. I begin by confirming what my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti said, which is that the right to express views, even those that may be unpopular, is a vital part of our democratic society, and freedom of expression is vital. The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, and my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti have argued to remove “alarm” from Sections 4A and 5 of the Public Order Act 1986. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for giving some balance to the argument and coming to a conclusion that I share. To remove from these offences behaviour that causes alarm would mean that behaviour that frightens or unsettles someone but which does not amount to harassment or distress would no longer be covered. Why does that matter? It matters because it would narrow the scope of the law and reduce the police’s ability to intervene early in potentially volatile situations. An example was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, in relation to activity on a train, late at night, by an individual with too many beers in their body. That is a valuable cause of alarm.
I say to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, that these provisions have been in place for many years: in fact, they were passed under the Government of Mrs Thatcher, which is not usually a thing I pray in aid when discussing legislation in this House. Removing “alarm” at this stage —this goes to the point mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey—would affect how offences operate in practice, including the thresholds that have developed through case law. It would impact on the existing legal framework, which already ensures that enforcement decisions are made proportionately and in line with human rights obligations. This includes the important right, as my noble friend said, to freedom of expression.
The balance that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, struck is the one that I would strike as well. It is a long-standing, 39 year-old piece of legislation that has held up and has been interpreted in a sensible way by those who have legal powers to use it, both police officers and the CPS. Ultimately, we should ensure that the alarm element remains.
Having said all of that, noble Lords will be aware that the Home Secretary has commissioned an independent review of public order and hate crime legislation, which the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, KC, is considering. He will consider the thresholds relating to public order and hate crime legislation, whether they remain fit for purpose, if legislative changes are required and if we could have more consistent approaches to the offence of inciting hatred. He will also consider how we ensure offence thresholds do not interfere with free speech and how we deal with the type of issues that the noble Lord has mentioned.
I believe we should stay where we are for the reasons I have outlined, but a review is ongoing. It is important that we allow that review to conclude, which it will do by spring next year. The Government will consider and respond to whatever recommendations come forward. We do not know what those recommendations might be, but they are there to be done, and that is one of the reasons the Home Secretary commissioned the review. I understand where the noble Lord is coming from, but I hope I have put a defence of why we should maintain where we are. In the light of the potential review, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
I thank the Minister for his typically thoughtful and considered response. I think he would concede that this has been a very interesting and intelligent debate. I thank all noble Lords who took part, particularly my noble friend Lady Lawlor, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, who was hoping to take part in the debate but, because this Committee has overrun somewhat, was not able to be here. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley.
The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, touched upon the fact that the real meaning of alarm is a fine judgment. I take on board the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. However, it is important to look in the context of the advice and guidance that the police are given on the use of Section 4A and Section 5 of the Public Order Act. For instance, to breach Section 5, a person needs to act in either a threatening or abusive manner. He also needs to intend his words or behaviour to be threatening or abusive, or be aware that they may be threatening or abusive. I would say that alarm is a lower standard of criminality—a lower bar—than that.
According to police guidance, Section 4A is designed to deal with:
“More serious, planned and malicious incidents of insulting behaviour”.
You are more likely to be accused of a Section 4A offence in relation to a comment directed to a particular individual—for example, publicly singling out someone in a crowd. I think those are the differences, and we will have a different view as to the appropriateness of whether alarm is apposite for dealing with these offences.
Having said all that, we may come back to this. I am grateful for the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, on this—it is very unusual, but it is a seasonal phenomenon that we agree from time to time. I even agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, from time to time. On the basis of Christmas spirit and all that, and the fact that we will no doubt return to this on Report, I am happy to beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Sugg
“Interpretation: sections (Honour as an aggravating factor in sentencing) and (Duty to issue statutory multi-agency guidance)For the purposes of criminal law “Honour-based abuse” means an incident or pattern of violence, threats of violence, intimidation, coercion, control or abuse (including but not limited to psychological, physical, sexual, economic, spiritual, faith-related or emotional abuse) motivated by the perpetrator’s perception that an individual has shamed, or may shame, the perpetrator, the family, or community, or has otherwise broken, or may break, the perceived norms of the community’s accepted behaviours, including by speaking out about the abuse, and where the perception of shame may also prevent a victim from accessing support or help.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides a statutory definition of “Honour-Based Abuse”. It defines the term as an incident or pattern of abuse motivated by a perception that a person has brought or may bring shame or dishonour upon a family or community. The definition is intended to capture the range of behaviours that can constitute such abuse, including physical, psychological, sexual, economic, or other forms of coercive control.
Baroness Sugg (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to the amendments in my name in this group. Amendments 353 and 355, co-signed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester and the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, relate to a statutory definition of honour-based abuse and a duty to issue multi-agency statutory guidance.
Honour-based abuse is a form of domestic abuse motivated by an abuser’s perception that a person has brought, or may bring, dishonour or shame to themselves, their family or their community. It can take many forms and is often complex to identify, but it centres on controlling individuals to compel them to behave in certain ways or subscribe to certain beliefs. For some, the concept of honour is prized above the safety and well-being of individuals, and to compromise a family’s honour is to bring dishonour and shame. In extreme cases, this is used to justify abuse, disownment or physical harm. Honour-based abuse is not a cultural tradition or religious practice. It is a form of abuse that can occur within any community, regardless of faith or background.
Despite increased reporting to the national honour-based abuse helpline, commissioned by the Home Office, it remains the least prosecuted form of violence against women and girls. Across agencies, it is inconsistently recognised, poorly understood and inadequately responded to. Without clarity, front-line professionals are unsure how to spot the signs, and victims can slip through the cracks.
The need for change is starkly illustrated by the story of Fawziyah Javed. Fawziyah was a lawyer; she understood the importance of evidence and tried to protect herself and her unborn child. She repeatedly sought help, reporting to health professionals, contacting the police and gathering evidence against her abusers, but her situation was not taken seriously. Her case exposes a persistent and systemic failure to recognise honour-based abuse within statutory systems. Multiple perpetrators were involved, but they were overlooked because investigations often focused on a single individual, reflecting approaches designed for intimate-partner domestic abuse rather than the extended, collective and coercive nature of honour-based abuse.
In late August 2021, when Fawziyah made a second report to the police, the risks she faced had still not been recognised. On 2 September 2021, Fawziyah, aged 31, and 17 weeks pregnant with a baby boy, was tragically murdered when her husband pushed her from Arthur’s Seat in Edinburgh. Immediately after this, as was shown in the Channel 4 documentary “The Push: Murder on the Cliff”, he did not call 999; the first call he made was to his own father. This illustrates the family-involved dynamics of honour-based abuse, which are too often overlooked by statutory systems.
Fawziyah’s mother, Yasmin Javed, has led the campaign to ensure that her daughter’s legacy drives meaningful change, and has permitted me to share Fawziyah’s story. Yasmin’s courage and advocacy ensures that survivors’ voices are heard and their experiences are recognised. She believes strongly that the lack of understanding of honour-based abuse and the absence of a universal statutory definition meant that Fawziyah’s experience and the perpetrators were missed.
Fawziyah’s story demonstrates why we urgently need a statutory definition and accompanying guidance, not just for the police and prosecutors but for teachers, social workers, healthcare professionals and everyone who has an opportunity to identify abuse early before it escalates. It will help professionals understand its complex dynamics and act decisively to protect victims.
In August, the Government announced six new measures to tackle honour-based abuse, including legislating, at the earliest opportunity, to introduce a statutory definition and multi-agency guidance. I am very pleased that we are on the same page on that.
Turning to the definition itself, Amendment 353 puts forward a suggested definition that has been developed over a number of years. It is not my definition but the product of sustained work by the sector, legal experts and, most importantly, survivors with lived experience. From 2022, survivors worked with the University of Nottingham to develop a survivor-informed definition. This work identified serious limitations in existing non-statutory definitions and provided a framework that captures the collective and coercive nature of this abuse. Building on this survivor-informed foundation, barrister Naomi Wiseman, drawing on extensive experience in this field, led further work with violence against women and girls sector partners to draft a statutory definition. Through multiple iterations, consensus was reached upon a definition that reflects the complexity of honour-based abuse.
To date, this work has engaged survivors, over 60 organisations and specialist legal expertise. It combines lived experience with professional knowledge to bring clarity, consistency and stronger protections. This process has been truly sector-wide and survivor-led. Survivors’ voices have shaped every iteration, ensuring that the definition reflects the realities of honour-based abuse. I wish to put on the record my sincere thanks to all those involved, particularly the survivors. Their dedication and insight, born from personal experience and gaps in professional responses, has ensured that future victims can be recognised, protected and believed in the ways that they were not.
This survivor-led process has required significant time, expertise and emotional labour, often carried out amid ongoing abuse, ostracism and bereavement. Every consultation involves survivors and bereaved families retelling painful and traumatic experiences. They do this out of a sense of duty, so that their survival can mean something for the many who are not able to speak out. Dame Nicole Jacobs, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, has welcomed this work. She said: “I recognise the significant progress that has been made to date and emphasise the importance of grounding any definition in survivor experience. I support the ongoing work led by survivors, the specialist sector and Karma Nirvana to ensure the definition is effective”.
Of course, we all want a definition that works, and I therefore welcome the debate to come, so we can agree a definition that is fit for purpose—one that respects survivors’ lived experience and treats their contribution with the seriousness that it deserves. I am grateful to the noble Baroness the Minister and Home Office officials for their engagement to date. I know that work is ongoing on a revised definition, and I hope that we can work together, with survivors, experts and the sector, to return on Report with a workable, legally sound definition that reflects survivors’ experiences, strengthens protection and supports effective multi-agency working.
Timing matters here. For years, survivors, the sector and front-line professionals have called for a statutory definition, and this Bill is the vehicle through which change must be delivered—it really cannot wait any longer. The CPS and police are revising their guidance, which is due mid-next year, and they need a statutory definition in place to do so effectively. The success of this reform will also depend on the rollout of clear, comprehensive communication and training, a commitment that I am pleased to say that the Government have already made for next year. We need the definition to make that effective. For too long, perpetrators have escaped accountability, while victims have been failed. The time to act is now.
I turn to Amendment 354 in my name, co-signed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester and the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws; the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, has tabled a similar amendment in this group. Amendment 354 would recognise honour as an aggravating factor in sentencing. It would ensure earlier identification of honour-based abuse in investigations and prosecutions, and that sentences properly reflect the gravity of the offending. Safeguarding would be strengthened for victims facing risk from multiple perpetrators, and it would also act as a stronger deterrent.
The murder of Somaiya Begum, a 20-year-old biomedical student, exposed a critical gap in the criminal justice system. Despite an active forced marriage protection order, Somaiya was murdered by a family member. Evidence at trial demonstrated the role of family pressures and honour dynamics, yet the court concluded:
“It is not possible to identify a motive for this dreadful attack”.
In his defence statement, the defendant explicitly relied on notions of honour to shift blame on to other family members. Despite this, the judge did not recognise honour in sentencing. This demonstrates how the absence of formal recognition allows key motivations to be overlooked, weakening justice and accountability.
Somaiya’s case and other cases such as the terrible murder of Banaz Mahmod, to which I know the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, will refer, illustrate several wider systemic failures. Yesterday would have been Banaz’s 40th birthday—and I pay tribute to Banaz’s sister, Payzee Mahmod, who has been a tireless advocate for changes to the law in Banaz’s memory, and whom I have worked closely with on this campaign. I also want to acknowledge Banaz’s sister Bekhal, who is calling for change in this area too.
When we do not recognise the aggravation of honour in the perpetration of these crimes, there are multiple consequences. First, there is the erasure of victims; when honour motivations are not named, survivors and families feel unseen and invalidated, deepening mistrust in the justice system and perpetuating silence. Secondly, there is unreliable data: judgments rarely reference honour, creating the false impression that such cases are infrequent or absent, despite evidence to the contrary. Thirdly, there are low prosecution rates: between April 2024 and March 2025, only 95 honour-based prosecutions were brought, with fewer than half resulting in conviction. Supporting this amendment would address these failures, improve data, strengthen accountability and ensure that courts formally acknowledge honour-based motivations, giving survivors and families the recognition and justice that they deserve.
Given that we are a little later than planned, many noble Lords who were going to speak in favour of these amendments are sadly no longer in their place. That includes the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, who, given her long experience, fully supports these amendments, in particular making honour-based abuse an aggravating feature, to send a clear message to communities and sentencing judges.
I pass on my sincere thanks to the Minister for the meeting to discuss this issue with not just her but three Ministers and officials across both departments. I am also very grateful for her own suggestion that she speak to the sector and survivor representatives ahead of this debate to hear from them directly. I listened with interest to the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, earlier in response to the Urgent Question on the VAWG strategy, and I look forward to reading that strategy tomorrow, given his reference a number of times to honour-based abuse.
I appreciate that the Government are clearly working to make progress on this, and I have two questions for the Minister. Will she commit to continuing to work with the sector to bring forward amendments on an agreed definition and guidance for Report? Secondly, while I heard the Minister’s explanation on Monday on existing aggravating factors and sentencing practice, we know from reviewing sentencing remarks in cases of clear honour-based abuse that, in practice, these factors are inconsistently applied and often fail to capture the collective, coercive and family or community-driven nature of the abuse. In that context, could the Minister set out the Government’s position on formally recognising honour-based abuse as an aggravating factor in sentencing?
In conclusion, I pay tribute again to the tireless work and bravery of survivors. Without them the progress on this work to date would not be possible. I would also like to thank Karma Nirvana, whose incredible work supports victims and survivors, brings the sector together collaboratively and campaigns for these life-saving changes alongside over 60 leading organisations. I am deeply grateful to the survivors and sector representatives who attended a briefing for noble Lords here last month. They reminded us plainly that honour-based abuse remains an invisible crime, with invisible perpetrators and, tragically, invisible victims. They told us that making progress on these amendments will save lives, prevent immeasurable harm and deliver recognition and justice for those who deserve it. Fawziyah, Somaiya, Banaz and so many others cannot speak for themselves, but through the courage of their families and advocates, we have the opportunity to act. In their names, I beg to move.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, for moving her amendment. This group also includes Amendment 356 in my name and in the name of the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady Blower, whose support I greatly appreciate. I also thank Southall Black Sisters for their tireless campaigning in this vital area.
I echo the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, in paying tribute to Banaz Mahmod and to the extraordinary courage of her sisters, Bekhal and Payzee, whose tireless campaigning has kept the spotlight on honour-based abuse in the hope that Banaz’s legacy will drive real and lasting change. Banaz was just 20 when she was murdered by her father, uncle and five male cousins. Her crime? Leaving her abusive husband and having a boyfriend she wished to marry. Her family convened a council of war to plan her killing, claiming that her wish for divorce and choice of partner brought shame on the family and the wider community. She did everything that we tell victims to do. On five separate occasions, she reported rape, violence and threats to kill—even an attempt on her life by her own father. She named those who would later murder her, yet she was not believed or protected. Her murder is not an isolated tragedy but emblematic of wider patterns of institutional failure to identify and respond to honour-based abuse.
That is why I have I have also added my name to Amendments 353 and 355, calling for a statutory definition to be brought forward as quickly as possible, alongside guidance, so that the thousands of incidents of such abuse reported in the UK each year are treated with the gravity they deserve. I too urge the Government not to miss the opportunity presented by the Bill, and I hope that the Minister will provide that reassurance.
Amendment 356 would make honour a statutory aggravating factor in sentencing. A similar amendment in the other place limited this to murder, but here it is deliberately broader. This would ensure that any offence committed in the name of honour is explicitly treated as aggravated in sentencing. It shares the aim of Amendment 354 but, in the absence of an existing statutory definition, it defines the aggravating factor independently, focusing instead on the perpetrator’s conduct and mirroring existing language from racial and religious aggravation laws. This approach would allow the aggravating factor to take effect immediately, while consultations on the definition take place between the Government and the sector.
Critically, Amendment 356 also recognises the frequent involvement of multiple perpetrators and colluders. In Banaz’s case, police estimated that around 50 men were involved, either in the killing or in shielding those responsible. This recognition is vital for improving how agencies identify and respond to such abuse.
I have reflected on the comments made during Monday’s Committee about the concept of honour already being adequately covered in legislation. I do not want to anticipate the Minister’s response, but I imagine she will say that judges are already familiar with the concept of honour and that evidence of its presence will already result in a stiffer sentence.
Baroness Gohir (CB)
My Lords, I declare my interest of CEO of the Muslim Women’s Network UK. We have a helpline and we deal with honour-based abuse cases.
While I support in principle the introduction of a statutory definition of honour-based abuse, it is essential that the Home Office concludes its work on the definition. I am part of the advisory group on this, alongside many other stakeholders. We must ensure that a final version is workable and fair, and includes statutory guidance, as recommended in Amendment 355.
However, I oppose the definition that has been put forward, although I appreciate that the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, has suggested it to create debate and discussion. I have a number of concerns. While I appreciate that a number of organisations have put their names to the proposed definition, I suspect that many have not gone through it line by line, as we do in here, and probably just accepted it at face value without thinking about whether it is applicable in law.
First, the definition lists types of abuse that could be motivated by shame. However, I note that stalking and harassment, which are specific offences under the law, are not mentioned and could be motivated by honour, particularly when a victim has escaped from the family or partner and attempts are made to track down, contact and bring back the person. Also, non-fatal strangulation and suffocation are not included in the list, and I would like to see them included.
Secondly, what does the wording actually mean when it refers to
“the perceived norms of the community’s accepted behaviours”
and the community being “shamed”? What do we mean by “the community”, “perceived norms” and “accepted behaviours”? This has to be legally clear for it to be applied. What community are we referring to? The use of this word has not been challenged for decades; we just blindly accept that terminology.
Let us take Birmingham, the city where I live. It has a population of more than 1 million. More than 500,000 are from a minority ethnic background; let us delve deeper into this population. Around 190,000 are from a Pakistani background, 20,000 are Arab, 66,000 are of Indian heritage and 17,000 are of Somali heritage —I could go on with that breakdown. If somebody commits an honour-based abuse crime in Birmingham, are we then suggesting that all those communities—for example, the 190,000 Pakistani community, including myself—are shamed by that crime? Well, that is not true: we would be stereotyping the whole community, and the communities are so diverse.
Even if we amended the wording to “the perpetrator and/or their family feeling they have been shamed or will lose honour and respect within their community”, tens or hundreds of thousands of people will not know who they are. A more accurate description, in my opinion, would be to cite “perpetrators’ perception of being dishonoured among their family and their social circle and their kinship group”.
By using this description, the honour-based abuse definition could even have a wider application. While this type of abuse is mostly associated with minority ethnic communities, honour-based abuse can occur in other contexts, even if to a much lesser extent. For example, it can happen in white, non-minority contexts too, particularly with the rise of toxic masculinity and the manosphere. Violence could be justified as “She embarrassed me”, and “She shamed me”. Then, abuse is committed for that reason. It could also be applied to gang-related contexts where violence is sometimes used to restore and protect honour.
I now turn to “accepted behaviours”. How will this be interpreted in law? This wording opens up the definition to subjective interpretation, risking inconsistent application. Legal risks could include prosecutors struggling to prove a motive beyond reasonable doubt. The defence could argue alternative motivations such as control, jealousy and anger. We must also ensure that those applying a legal definition are provided with clear guidance when any form of abuse is motivated by honour and shame: otherwise, automatic assumptions cannot be made that abuse is motivated by shame and honour just because the perpetrator is from a particular background, for example from a south Asian background. Evidence will be needed to justify why that motivation is linked to honour. As accepted behaviours may vary, it would be wise to list some key ones if it is not possible to provide an exhaustive list.
The very last part of the definition talks about the perception of shame preventing a victim accessing support and help. If honour-based abuse is going to be used as an aggravating factor to increase sentencing, this part needs to be strengthened further. This section needs to be linked to the behaviour of the perpetrator. Instead, it should be framed as where the perpetrator exploits concepts of shame and honour through threats, intimidation, coercion or blackmail, to prevent or deter the victim from seeking support, protection or assistance. An example of this is using intimate images to prevent a victim from speaking out by threatening to share those images.
Putting all of that together, I propose the following definition, some of which could be put in guidance. Honour-based abuse is an incident or pattern of abuse where the perpetrator is motivated by their belief that the victim has caused or may cause them and/or their family to lose honour or respect within their social circle or kinship group because of behaviours that are perceived to bring shame to them that may include: choosing one’s own partner; refusing a forced marriage, female genital mutilation or other harmful practices; having premarital sex, a relationship or pregnancy outside marriage; having interfaith, interethnic, intercaste relationships; ending a marriage or seeking divorce; having LGBTQ+ identity or relationships; seeking education or employment against family wishes; not dressing or having an appearance according to family expectations; having friends of the opposite sex; refusing family control over decisions; disclosing abuse and seeking help; and acts of betrayal within gang-related relationships.
Types of abuse may include: physical or sexual abuse; violent or threatening behaviour; stalking and harassment; non-fatal strangulation or suffocation; controlling or coercive behaviour; economic abuse; spiritual or faith-related abuse; psychological and emotional abuse; isolation; harmful cultural practices such as forced marriage; and intimate image abuse, especially in relation to silencing victims. The definition is long, some of it could be in guidance, and it would need tweaking.
I turn to Amendment 354, which proposes making honour-based abuse an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes. I would support the amendment once we have defined honour-based abuse. I too acknowledge the long-standing campaign called Banaz’s law to get this very law passed. Banaz Mahmod was murdered by her family in an honour killing in 2006. Her sister, Bekhal Mahmod, has been campaigning to have honour-based abuse become a statutory aggravating factor in sentencing. She is supported by Southall Black Sisters in her campaign, and I hope the Government will join us in acknowledging its campaign and hard work. I look forward to hearing from the Minister whether the Government are committed to adding a definition of honour-based abuse to this Bill.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I completely agree with all these proposed new clauses, which are long overdue. I congratulate my noble friend Lady Sugg on her excellent exposition and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, on her strong support.
I want first to criticise the term “honour-based abuse”, since there is nothing honourable about it. The term was invented by the perpetrators to make their actions seem more honourable than they were. In reality, these acts are abusive and destructive, involve the horrible murders of girls and women, and are morally wrong and thoroughly evil. I understand that, in an ideal world, we would have different terminology; however, as we are not, we probably cannot change the name now, since it is widely used and understood, including in law. Still, calling it what it is helps us refute the false framing that protects abusers as if they were doing something decent instead of evil.
What is the extent of the problem in the United Kingdom? It is estimated that at least 12 so-called honour killings occur in the UK each year, which averages out to at least one woman or girl murdered per month. The exact number is not known, as these crimes are often hidden and underreported. The figures provided by excellent charities such as Karma Nirvana are expert estimations; I congratulate them on the superb work they do, and I wish Karma Nirvana well in developing its national e-learning modules. The actual number of cases is widely believed to be much higher, because, as I said, many go unreported or are misidentified by authorities. Some police forces simply do not want to add that label, for the same misguided reasons that they covered up the rape of children in certain communities.
This is not a cultural problem to be tolerated or explained away. Since at least one girl or woman is murdered every month in this country, we can imagine that many thousands of other abuses, less than murder, are occurring. They can include physical assault, emotional and psychological control, forced marriage, female genital mutilation, and sexual violence—up to murder itself. Victims are often isolated and silenced by those closest to them. The abuse can be carried out, as we have heard from noble Baronesses, by multiple family members or by members of the wider community. The honour-based abuse includes violence, murder, threats, intimidation, coercion and other forms of abuse carried out to protect or defend the perceived honour of a family or community.
Honour-based abuse is not a private family dispute; it is a serious human rights violation. It strips people of their autonomy, their choice and their safety. As it is hidden, many victims never reach out for help. When they do, they need responses that are informed, compassionate and co-ordinated, and they need to be taken seriously by the police, education authorities and the health service.
Despite some excellent initiatives being taken by the charities and the Home Office, I feel we are still talking about it sotto voce. We all need to denounce aspects of honour-based abuse for the evil that it is and not tolerate excuses—that it is mandated by some people with a perverted misinterpretation of religion and practised by ignorant people.
I turn to my Amendment 355A. The College of Policing already provides extensive guidance on how to identify honour-based abuse. Officers are advised to look for a wide range of indicators: control of movement, restrictions on communication, coercive family behaviour, fear, anxiety, unexplained absences, threats of being taken abroad and the collective involvement of extended family members. I have just read out a small selection; I believe that the college has about 15 different indicators that tell police officers, “These are things you can look for that might add up collectively to honour-based abuse”. If one wants a definition, one can look at the College of Policing indicators and the suggestions from the noble Baroness, Lady Gohir—and there you have a definition of all the factors that could encompass honour-based abuse. The college’s guidance is detailed, thoughtful and clearly written; it recognises that honour-based abuse is not a single incident but a pattern that is often hidden, often escalating and often involving multiple perpetrators acting together.
However, after setting out all these excellent warning signs, the guidance stops short of the critical next step. It tells the professionals what to look for but gives them no instruction on how to record what they have found. There is no requirement to flag up an incident as honour-based abuse. There is no standardised data field, no multi-agency reporting framework and no clarity on whether a case should be logged as domestic abuse, forced marriage, coercive control, child safeguarding or all the above. In short, the system trains police officers to recognise honour-based abuse but then leaves them with no mechanism to ensure the system itself recognises it.
Baroness Cash (Con)
My Lords, I support all the amendments in this important group. I am conscious of time, and it is late, but I really wanted to come back to a few things that the noble Baroness, Lady Gohir, said. I hope that I have not misunderstood, but I confess to feeling a little confused.
It is very clear in the history of our criminal legislation in this country that introducing previous offences regarding violence against women and girls has had a significant impact and made a difference—for example, coercive and controlling behaviour; stalking, which, of course, does not apply just to women or girls; and female genital mutilation. In all cases, reporting, prosecutions and convictions increased, so the protections have been manifest.
The same applies here. I support wholeheartedly this group of amendments and am very grateful for the indication from the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, that there have been conversations. I trust that we are pushing at an open door on this. I declare an interest: as well as being a barrister, I spent many years running a behavioural science business. The naming of offences is extremely important in order for people to feel able to come forward. There is a wealth of behavioural science. I hope that a few of my points will reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Gohir, on some of the points she mentioned around the definition, because the reasons why we introduce these offences matter so very much. Honour abuse is so often defined as a family dispute, a cultural issue or something that is too sensitive for others to name. It does not matter which culture we are talking about or which motivation. The noble Baroness is absolutely right about that.
Something in behavioural science tells us, as we know from a wealth of research, that the cognitive availability, the salience of being able to name something, changes the outcome. Kahneman, Cialdini and others talk about how we need injunctive norms in society. It is why the criminal justice system operates so effectively. It tells communities and individuals, “This behaviour is not tolerated”. In the United Kingdom, domestic abuse reforms have consistently shown that explicitly naming conduct, whether it is coercive control, stalking or honour-based abuse—or, as it should really be called, honour-based excuse—shifts police practice, community practice and public understanding. It does not legitimise it. On the contrary, it shows that naming it in a prohibitive framework delegitimises it, collapses ambiguity and increases protection from all parts of the community around those victims. Public health research also shows that people seek help much more readily and quickly when they know that their experience matches a recognised category in law. The stigma is reduced and having recognition and validation of harm increases disclosure.
Naming something operates as a community-level intervention as well. We break pluralistic ignorance when we name a phenomenon such as honour-based abuse. Some noble Lords may know about a study carried out at Harvard University by the famous psychologists Prentice and Miller, who looked at students’ attitudes towards a culture of drinking. They all thought it was accepted by everyone else. The majority did not like it. They continued to go along with it because they did not realise that others felt the same as they did and that the majority view was not to support it. By doing that study and revealing that, Prentice and Miller empowered the students to take a stance and change their own behaviours. That is now well-established psychological research. That is why communities and individuals such as the very tragic victims that we have heard about today and their families, who continue to work, need this legislation and these offences to be named in the way that we are seeking.
It also increases bystander activation. People will get more involved and will understand that there is safety and support around them when they intervene as third parties. People are much more likely to act when they can say, “This is illegal, this feels wrong, this is wrong”. Teachers, GPs, neighbours and extended family members then all have the infrastructure within which to act.
The law functions in a very important way—sometimes, it feels, almost in a magical way. Maybe as a lawyer I would say that, but it does signal to everyone a focal point. It creates a place around which we can all convene and focus. It co-ordinates action where previously things might have gone unsaid and there may have been fear about raising an issue and talking about it. Families and professionals often know that something is wrong but fear acting alone. A statutory definition removes that hesitation and makes it clear where the authority and the power lie.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I rise, mercifully briefly, to come at this from a slightly different direction. Four years ago, when I was a member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, we had a debate in the assembly specifically about honour-based abuse in the part-session in September 2021. The point I want to raise is that this is not a UK-only phenomenon but an international phenomenon, and I am putting forward the idea that there is something to be gained from looking at the experience and examples of attempts to deal with honour-based abuse in different jurisdictions. The report that the debate was about looked at the incidence of honour-based abuse and how it is being dealt with in countries such as Switzerland, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Austria and the Netherlands. That was four years ago, so I suspect things have moved on since then. All I ask is that the Government are conscious of that when they are looking at the current state of international knowledge and the degree to which we can benefit from that.
Honour-based abuse comes underneath the Istanbul convention, which we have finally signed up to. Within that, there is an organisation called the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, which has the acronym GREVIO. It has been in existence for about 15 years. I have just checked, and I am ashamed to say that, at the moment, while there is a lot of international representation on this body, there is not a single UK representative, nor has there ever been. I suggest that looking at what this committee does—because it focuses very much on this area—and seeing whether we could not potentially nominate somebody who could go and participate in that and learn from it would be a very good idea.
The only other thing I would say is in the context of the research that the rapporteur for this, who was a representative from Monaco, did. She spoke quite extensively to Nazir Afzal—somebody who I suspect the Minister knows—a prosecutor from the north of England who has been particularly heavily involved in this. One of the things he said really struck me. The report says:
“The crimes were strongly linked to cultural factors”,
particularly factors
“which strengthened … male power and aimed to prevent women from making choices”.
What really struck me was this:
“A 21-year-old man born and raised in England had told him that a man was like a piece of gold which you could clean if you dropped it in the mud, whereas a woman was like a piece of silk, which would be stained forever”.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 356, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. First, I would like to apologise for my intervention earlier. I am afraid I am getting very grumpy, and the Christmas Recess has arrived just in time.
All the amendments in this group have validity, and it might be worth trying to combine them on Report, because this is such an important issue. When serious crimes are committed in the name of so-called honour, the law should recognise that for what it is: a particularly severe and controlling form of abuse. This amendment is to ensure that our justice system understands the dynamics at play in so-called honour-based abuse—abuse that is often collective, prolonged and enforced through fear and the threat of extreme violence.
The case of Banaz Mahmod illustrates this with devastating clarity. Despite reporting rape, violence and repeated threats to her life, and naming those responsible, she was not protected. After her murder, a police watchdog investigation found serious institutional failings, including a failure to grasp the specific risks posed by so-called honour-based abuse.
This amendment reflects the Women and Equalities Committee’s recommendation to explicitly recognise so-called honour in sentencing guidelines to ensure an understanding of such abuse. Recognising so-called honour as an aggravating factor in sentencing would send a clear and necessary signal that crimes motivated by perceived shame or dishonour are deliberate acts of gender-based violence.
This amendment is also supported by victims, survivors, specialist organisations, including Southall Black Sisters, and Banaz’s sister, who has campaigned tirelessly and at huge personal risk. However, there is one thing about all these amendments that I feel is totally wrong and we need to rethink, and that is the fact that I have been saying “so-called honour”. This has nothing to do with honour. This is dishonour, and that is what we should call it.
Lord Hampton (CB)
My Lords, I have added my name to Amendments 353 and 355, which were so powerfully introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg. I express due deference to the thought-provoking input from my noble friend Lady Gohir.
I am a teacher and, before one is accepted as a teacher, one has to do five days of observation in various schools, just to see whether you like the look of it. On my first day of observation at a school in Hackney, we were at the staff briefing at the beginning of the day and we were reminded to be sensitive to the fact that that week was the anniversary of one student’s mother and sister having been killed by their father and brother. That was my first experience of honour-based abuse, and a pretty stark lesson in the responsibilities that school staff shoulder.
Schools are uniquely placed to spot abuse. Dirty collars can be a sign of neglect, expensive trainers can be a sign of grooming and unexpected holidays could be FGM: the list goes on. Schools are often the first place where honour-based abuse is visible, through changes in behaviour, attendance or disclosure. Yet, without a clear definition, warning signs are too often missed.
Because honour-based abuse differs from other safeguarding risks, it is frequently collective, hidden and fast-escalating. Generic safeguarding guidance does not equip schools to recognise or respond safely. Inconsistent understanding creates dangerous inconsistencies in response, leaving children’s safety dependent on where they go to school. Statutory guidance would set a clear national standard. A lack of clarity leads to hesitation and harmful mistakes, including inappropriate family contact or mediation. A statutory framework gives staff confidence to act decisively and safely.
Early identification in schools can prevent serious harm and tragic loss of life, but only if honour-based abuse is properly defined and schools are properly trained, supported and embedded in a clear multi-agency safeguarding and response. It seems logical. I hope the Government agree.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
My Lords, I support the general aims of these amendments. I am broadly sympathetic to the group and I agree with the need to address the problem of honour-based abuse specifically. I understand that it will be a difficult matter, and not simple, to define it tightly. Some honour-based offences are criminal offences, as we know: they involve murder. We have heard already about the murder of Banaz Mahmod in 2006 in Handsworth, in Birmingham, where she was strangled and her body put in a suitcase. For that crime, the perpetrators were found and convicted.
There is also voter impersonation, which I think we could be stronger on because it involves controlling and coercive behaviour. I have been told by members of one community in particular in an area of London with which I am very familiar that they are not allowed to go to the polls and they are not allowed to vote. The women there will laugh at you and tell you that their husbands vote for them. They are just not allowed to go to the polls. In fact, grown women who are married are not allowed to go out except when accompanied by their husband, an uncle or their husband’s brother. That, to my mind, is pretty specific coercive or controlling behaviour for grown women.
We have the law to deal with clear breaches of the law, but I agree that it is difficult to define abusive and coercive behaviour that is not immediately an offence within the law. I therefore support the desire to define it and the need to recognise that this controlling behaviour does exist. It does not fall within an easily definable way of dealing with it, but we must address it. There are reasons to address it, for instance, with grown-up people past the age of 18 who are obliged to wear a certain sort of dress to conform to community norms that will set them apart from their community, or with women I have spoken to who are not allowed to continue their education. This is not for reasons of finance or because money is needed from a job. They have to stay at home, quite often because there is a coercive husband at home who does not want his wife to go out for any reason, unless or until there are children whom she may take to school or bring to the hospital. Any thought of continuing studies after a certain age is absolutely ruled out.
These are not easy things to deal with. They fall within that difficult area of family arrangements and the rightful place we award the family in arranging its affairs internally. But unless we are going to become a society where different groups of people remain segregated socially, educationally and in terms of the very law, and we allow borderline abuse to continue in the family setting because we do not have a definition of it, which denies basic freedoms to certain groups of girls and, indeed, young women, and can often lead to far worse things, we should try to tackle it. I support these amendments for that reason. We need some definition and some guidance, and we need to cover them within the abuse framework.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
My Lords, I entirely agree with everything that has been said about the need to highlight this appalling practice and, so far as possible, bring it to an end. But if one’s chosen means is the fettering of the discretion of a sentencer, one has to be extraordinarily careful about definitions. There, I rather echo what has just been said.
I understand how difficult this is, but, for example, the definition in Amendment 353 would mean that if there is an incident motivated by the perpetrator’s perception that an individual has shamed the perpetrator, the sentencing judge would be required to treat that as an aggravating factor. That could be two young lads outside a nightclub; one of them has shown a compromising picture of the other, and the other feels shamed or that he may be shamed if he shows it. That is how the violence begins. Violence is always bad and it always has to be punished, but of all the possible motivations for violence, is that really one that we are going to single out as a mandatory aggravating factor?
I must admit that I slightly wonder whether the best way to achieve the spotlight that the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, so rightly wants to place on this is by amending the sentencing guidelines. I thought that inherent in a lot of what she said was perhaps the implication that there ought to be a specific offence, rather as we managed to do with non-fatal strangulation and suffocation. If we are to adopt this means, imperfect and relatively low profile as it may be, we must be very careful about the words. As the Minister knows better than any of us, it is very easy to legislate for what one has in mind, but the unintended consequences are also there, and the law of unintended consequences is, I am afraid, one of the strongest on the statute book.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Sugg for bringing this matter to the Committee and for her eloquent elaboration of the rationale behind her amendments. I also thank other noble Lords for speaking, particularly those who recounted the moving stories of specific women who have been victims of this abuse.
It is safe to say that this is an issue that unites us all; no one wants to see any form of abuse perpetrated against women and girls, but honour-based abuse is perhaps one of the most pernicious forms of abuse. Due to its specific character and profile, it can all too often be swept under the carpet, hidden by communities that perpetrate it and ignored by authorities that should put a stop to it. I welcome in particular the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for making the important point that this is an international criminal phenomenon. It is very easy to see it within a UK bubble, but it is incredibly important to remind ourselves of that context.
The many victims of honour-based abuse are left without justice because of fears of inflaming what are termed community tensions. That is borne out by the facts. Only 95 prosecutions were brought forward for honour-based abuse cases in the year 2024-25, and of those cases only 46 led to convictions. The reason behind these appallingly low conviction rates is the persistent failure to recognise the unique characteristics of honour-based abuse—the fact that it often involves numerous perpetrators, many of whom are family members or members of an extended community, acting collectively to abuse and in many cases, as we have heard, murder the victim.
It is important to recognise that there has been a concerted effort more recently to better recognise and respond to honour-based abuse. The Government should be commended for committing—on 26 August, I think—to legislating for a statutory definition and the publication of multiagency guidance on how to deal most appropriately with such abuse.
Again in August this year, the College of Policing, as referenced by my noble friend Lord Blencathra, launched a new advice note to police forces to support officers in their efforts to identify and tackle these forms of abuse. That followed the recommendations that emerged from the Tees Valley super-complaint, which was an important investigation for many reasons but especially because it found that police forces generally tended to include the risk of honour-based abuse only in their domestic abuse policies, not in other policies, thereby leading to an incoherent approach. The investigation also found that police forces generally lacked the cultural awareness to recognise the wider religious and cultural drivers behind this form of violence, and that this had led to police officers failing to recognise the wider risks of honour-based abuse after victims reported it.
I commend and fully support Amendments 353 and 355 by my noble friend Lady Sugg. They simply attempt to put into the Bill two of the measures that the Government have already committed to: a statutory definition informed by the actual experiences and the reality of the victims, and a comprehensive set of multiagency guidance. That is an important step and the Government should be commended for committing to it, but it will be of no use if the Government do not speedily implement these measures.
I echo the sense of urgency expressed by noble Lords from across the Chamber. I believe that the Bill is the legislative vehicle for these changes, and if they are not included in this Bill then there will likely not be another opportunity for quite some time. I urge the Minister to bring forward amendments on Report to make good on the Government’s promise to the victims of what can only be termed the most horrific patterns of abuse and violence.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Sugg and Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for tabling Amendments 353, 354, 355, 355A and 356. I thank all noble Lords for what has been a powerful, moving and interesting debate on this subject. Honour-based abuse is a dreadful thing. I add my voice to those who want to thank all the survivors for their courage and determination in speaking out.
I remember that, when I received judicial training, we were told that we as judges should refer to these horrible crimes as so-called honour-based abuse to make it clear—as was noted by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra—that there is nothing to do with honour about them. That said, the Government have listened to the preferences of survivors and the specialist sector, and for this reason I will refer to it only as honour-based abuse. I can see the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, nodding her head.
The amendments seek to ensure that front-line professionals such as the police, social workers and teachers properly understand and spot this abuse and accurately record and store this information. We absolutely share that objective. As your Lordships will be aware, the Government have already committed, as the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, has reminded us, to introducing multi-agency statutory guidance on honour-based abuse, alongside a statutory definition. We recognise that doing so is a vital step towards providing a clear framework for professionals with statutory safeguarding responsibilities as to how they should identify honour-based abuse. To that end, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, for meeting me last week to discuss Amendments 353 and 355. I thank Natasha Rattu of Karma Nirvana, whom I met this morning.
I congratulate your Lordships on the strength of feeling about getting this measure on the statute book as soon as possible. The Government agree that swift action is needed to ensure that professionals have a strong foundation for tackling honour-based abuse, but I would just say that this is an extremely nuanced and complex form of abuse. We need to ensure that the range of abuse experienced is captured and that we do not build in any unintended consequences, to use the phrase used powerfully by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. To that extent, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Gohir, and we are happy to work with her to ensure that we have covered all eventualities.
We must do this once and we must get it right. We owe that to the victims and survivors who have suffered. I am not able today to give a timeline for this commitment or say whether this Bill will be used as a suitable legislative vehicle, but I assure your Lordships that we are getting on with this work and are doing so quickly. My speaking note said “at pace”, but I asked the officials to take it out because it tends not to gain favour in this House. We are doing it quickly, and I can confidently commit to the Government updating the noble Baronesses and the noble Lord on the progress of this work ahead of Report. I hope that provides reassurance to various Members who raised the question of timeliness.
I now turn to Amendment 355A, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, which makes the important point that we need to ensure that data collection and storage by statutory agencies is consistent and accurate. The Home Office already requires all police forces to share data on criminal offences that have been flagged as related to honour-based abuse. This is published annually. But I agree with the sentiment of his amendment and can confirm that, in developing the multi-agency statutory guidance, the Government will consider how to ensure that data in relation to suspected and confirmed criminal offences related to honour-based abuse is properly recorded and stored by front-line agencies.
Amendments 354 and 356 seek to add honour-based abuse as a statutory aggravating factor. As your Lordships are aware, doing so would require courts to treat such offences as having increased seriousness because of the presence of this factor. We completely agree that in principle this is a good thing but, as both noble Baronesses correctly anticipated, we do not believe that creating a statutory aggravating factor is either necessary or desirable.
The reason we think it is not necessary is that the specific elements that make honour-based abuse so serious are already covered in the sentencing guidelines. Judges are already required to treat the fact that an offence involved an abuse of trust or that the victim was vulnerable as aggravating factors. In cases where the abuse is part of a domestic relationship, there is the entire overarching guideline specifying additional factors, which explicitly mentions honour-based abuse. These amendments would therefore unnecessarily duplicate existing guidelines, which the courts are required by law to follow.
I said it was neither necessary nor desirable; I turn now to why it is not desirable. I also speak from experience when I say that the workload of a Crown Court judge is an extremely heavy one, in large part due to the backlog in the Crown Courts inherited by this Government. Adding to the list of statutory aggravating factors significantly adds to the workload of judges when sentencing. For every new aggravating factor, the list of items that a judge needs to state that they have considered, and their sentencing remarks, get longer and longer. I therefore feel strongly that we ought not continually to increase this list, especially when existing guidelines already apply.
The noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, alluded to the fact that I had said this in relation to another group of amendments earlier in the week. These two proposed aggravating factors are the sixth and seventh time that new aggravating factors have been debated in this Committee so far, and I know that there are more proposals for different aggravating factors yet to come. As I hope your Lordships will appreciate, our judges already have a huge undertaking as part of the sentencing process. We wish to avoid unnecessarily burdening them or the process any further, because to do so would risk lengthening individual sentencing hearings, just at the time when we are trying to reduce the backlog in the interests of the very victims we are discussing, among others.
That said, the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, makes a powerful case and I would welcome further discussion with her as to how we can achieve the objectives, even if not necessarily by adding a further statutory factor—I mention both noble Baronesses in that context. This Government’s priority is to strengthen identification and response through robust statutory guidance and a clear definition, ensuring that professionals have the tools they need to tackle this complex form of abuse effectively. So, on the understanding that we will consider Amendments 353 and 355, which I know are the top priority for the key stakeholders, ahead of Report, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Sugg (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for taking part in this debate. As I said, it is slightly later than hoped but really is much appreciated. I am grateful for the Minister’s reply and, as I said earlier, her openness to engage on these issues.
On the aggravating factor, I will consider carefully what the Minister had to say and look forward to having ongoing conversations on that. On the definition and statutory guidance, I very much agree that we must ensure that it is fit for prosecution, but we also need to make sure it works for interventions to protect earlier, ideally before any crime is committed. The definition really needs to be survivor-grounded: it needs to reflect their lived experiences and must recognise the impact of multiple perpetrators, the presence of community dynamics, layered coercion and collective control.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Gohir, for her contribution. I know that everyone involved in developing the definition and, crucially, survivors themselves are very keen to engage directly with her.
We have been discussing this for many years. The definition and the guidance are the crucial amendments, as they would act as the foundation for the systemic changes we need to see, and this Bill really is the right place to do that. I very much hope that the Government will bring back a revised definition and guidance amendment on Report that is agreed by the sector and survivors. I will do all I can to help on that. If that is not the case, I reserve the right to return to this again, but, on that basis, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Morris of Bolton) (Con)
I cannot call Amendment 355A, as it is an amendment to Amendment 355.
Crime and Policing Bill
Wednesday 7th January 2026
(4 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-VIII(a) Amendment for Committee (Supplementary to the Eighth Marshalled List) - (6 Jan 2026)
Baroness Morgan of Cotes
“Duty to prevent violence against women and girls on trains(1) The British Transport Police must take all reasonable steps to prevent violence against women and girls on trains.(2) In subsection (1), “violence against women and girls” means abuse aimed at women and girls including, but not limited to—(a) rape and sexual offences;(b) stalking;(c) upskirting;(d) domestic abuse.(3) “Reasonable steps” in accordance with subsection (1) must include—(a) data sharing arrangements with rolling stock companies in relation to cases of violence against women and girls, and(b) participation in rolling stock design to ensure trains are designed to minimise incidences of violence against women and girls.”
Baroness Morgan of Cotes (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I had hoped, as the Minister knows, that we might have reached this amendment last month, in the same week the Government published their long-awaited violence against women and girls strategy—which would have been appropriate—but I left him to debate another extremely important issue. It is a pleasure to open the proceedings on the Bill in 2026 with this amendment.
I am sure all noble Lords support the Government’s ambition of halving violence against women and girls. The challenge with any such strategy is of course in its delivery. Securing safer public spaces for women and girls is essential, and safer streets was of course a key demand, and continues to be, following the terrible murder of Sarah Everard. But there are of course many places where women and girls feel unsafe, and that includes trains and public transport.
I noted this paragraph, on page 65 of the Government’s December strategy, which is headed “Every corner of public life will be safe”:
“Women and girls must both feel safe and be safe in every aspect of public life. … Safety is not just about reducing risk, it is about creating environments that foster confidence, dignity, and freedom of movement. Design and planning are critical tools in achieving this. Well-lit streets, accessible transport, and thoughtful urban design can deter violence, reduce opportunities for harm, and send a clear message that public spaces belong to everyone. By embedding considerations of VAWG into planning and transport guidance, we can ensure that safety is built into the fabric of our communities, making public spaces welcoming and secure for all. To support this, we”,
the Government,
“will update national design guidance to reflect a VAWG perspective, ensuring that safety considerations inform how public spaces are designed”.
Turning to this amendment, I think that the Committee should be aware that, since 2021, there has been an alarming rise in violence against women and girls on our railways—it is up 59%. Sexual offences specifically have risen by 10% and harassment is up 6%. To put this in actual numbers, in 2022-23, there were 2,475 sexual offences; that was up from 2,246 the year before. In 2021, 7,561 crimes against women and girls on railways were recorded by British Transport Police; that had risen by 2023-24 to 11,357.
It is therefore no surprise that these crimes are now classed as a national emergency by the National Police Chiefs’ Council. Due to this, nearly two thirds—63%—of women say they avoid travelling alone, and even women who continue to use public transport often undertake what is called “normalised behaviour”, like being very choosy as to where they sit or assiduously avoiding making eye contact with any fellow passengers.
Of course, numbers tell only half the story. For each survivor of an offence or an attempted offence, their experience stays with them, as we heard just in the last couple of weeks in the powerful testimony given by Her Majesty the Queen. But there are of course many others who have bravely shared their experiences of vulnerability in a place that they should not feel vulnerable at all. It is clear from the numbers I have just given to the Committee that action is needed to ensure measures can be put in place to reduce this level of crime against women and girls on our national rail network, and the Government need to take a lead on this.
This is, of course, a probing amendment. The wording in subsection (1) would place a clear duty:
“The British Transport Police must take all reasonable steps to prevent violence against women and girls on trains”.
Subsection (2) sets out what such abuse could entail but is not limited to those offences. Subsection (3) sets out what “reasonable steps” must include. The reason that this is a probing amendment is that I suspect that the Minister will tell me shortly that this is not the right Bill for such an amendment, so I want to take this opportunity to say that, while I might have some limited sympathy for his argument—
He is looking slightly surprised, so perhaps I have pre-empted his argument or that is not the argument that he is going to make, in which case I will be delighted. But if it is, Ministers will not be able to use the same argument in the forthcoming Railways Bill, where the Government will be accepting a clear responsibility for what happens on trains operating as part of their newly nationalised services.
The reason for subsection (3) is that enforcement after the event for perpetrators is not sufficient if the Government are to stand any chance of cutting violence against women and girls by 50%. Prevention is key to achieving anything like that goal. The suggestion in subsection (3) about what could constitute “reasonable steps” is vital if we are to move to a preventative and safety-by-design model. A crucial first step would be, as the amendment suggests, the sharing of data about cases and levels of violence against women and girls between the British Transport Police and the rolling stock companies. Of course, this is not just about violence against and women and girls in relation to passengers but is highly relevant to female staff operating on the rail network.
Following Royal Assent of the Passenger Railway Services (Public Ownership) Bill 2024, the Department for Transport instructed DfT Operator to assume responsibility for train operators’ ownership in England and provide
“safe, secure and sustainable transport”.
However, since then, there has been no clarification as to how this will occur. These amendments provide a way in which there can be a review of safety issues and standards on trains.
Better and more synchronised technology, subject to government standards and fitted at the point that a train is manufactured, would truly create that safe, secure and sustainable transport. It would also ensure that the Government could have true oversight of this issue and that all modern technology and innovation used by rail operating companies to help drive confidence in passengers, especially women, that are used by manufacturers subject to a gold standard. In addition, as long as manufacturers have the option not to include extra specifications that cost them money but do not seem to bring them monetary benefit, and merely bring societal benefit, they are less likely to install such measures, especially in the current economic environment, where every penny will count.
It is worth remembering that the previous Government created the secure stations scheme, which emphasised collaborative working and station design that deters crime and aids the safeguarding of vulnerable individuals. Using advanced technologies created by innovative companies that provide rolling stock with custom-made parts and technology, these amendments would allow the extension of this scheme to further improve passenger confidence. Just including more CCTV is insufficient. Design features such as improved lighting deployed by companies such as Belvoir Rail are very relevant here.
This amendment is an early opportunity for the Government to show that they are ready to stand behind their December violence against women and girls strategy. It would also demonstrate that delivery of the strategy is a priority across all government departments and is not just being left to the Home Office. I beg to move Amendment 356A.
Lord Hendy (Lab)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes. My proposed Amendment 356F is complementary, in a sense, to hers. My amendment would create a specific offence of assaulting a transport worker at work. It would be an equivalent protection to that given to retail workers by Clause 37 of the Bill, and there is of course existing legislation protecting emergency workers. I confess to a certain unease in proposing specific offences for specific groups of workers, but in the case of transport workers there are particular circumstances which justify an offence to protect them.
There has been a marked increase in violence against transport workers. Of course, the situation was highlighted by the multiple stabbings at Huntington on 1 November 2025. But violent offences against rail staff increased by 35% in 2024, according to the British Transport Police Authority. The overall increase in both incidents and the severity of violence against transport workers is to be noted. Of course, it is not just railway workers; transport workers protected would include those on the Underground, the Metro, trams, ferries and buses, and all other transport workers.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
My Lords, I speak particularly in support of Amendment 356A in the name of my noble friend Lady Morgan of Cotes. I hope that the Minister might see fit to include this in the Bill, as the noble Lord opposite argued for his amendment. It is difficult to find the right Bill. The Railways Bill is one possibility; I have tried to put some aspects into the Crime and Policing Bill but was told that it was not the right place; and now I am told that the English devolution Bill is not the right place—but we will keep seeking it.
I am particularly supportive of the comments that my noble friend made in moving her amendment on protecting public spaces, and not just on the tragic case of Sarah Everard but on one that is closer to home for me: that of Claudia Lawrence. As I mentioned briefly before the House rose in December, Claudia Lawrence disappeared in the most bizarre circumstances, walking from her flat to work as a chef at York University, and has never been seen since. The police inquiries have been intermittent, partly ongoing and partly not, and obviously this is causing extreme regret and anxiety to her family, not least to her mother, who I remain in contact with.
I should declare an interest: I was not the MP when Claudia disappeared, but I tried to help her family subsequently when, for five years, I was the MP for Malton. I believe that this Bill could be the right opportunity to address these issues; in particular, serious and aggravated attacks on women on public transport. It affects every age group—younger women perhaps feel more vulnerable, but as one gets older one thinks about what time of day or night one should be travelling. Elderly men are also affected, but attacks on women are a particular problem that my noble friend is right to address. Might she or the Government seek to expand this to public spaces to make sure that, where there are incidents, there can be closure for families—such as in the case of Claudia Lawrence, so that her mother, Joan, can find some settlement and closure?
The Lord Bishop of Manchester
My Lords, I am grateful for this short debate. I would like to widen it a little beyond railways. I am blessed in living in Greater Manchester at the heart of a major Metrolink tram network, which has many similarities to the railways. There are often very few staff late at night, particularly on the trams, and women and girls are especially vulnerable on those occasions. This Bill, if it is not just about the rail network, may be the better Bill to cover these issues and ensure that women and girls are safe and protected from violence on our whole public transport network.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)
My Lords, it is Amendment 356F from the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, that attracts me to the Chamber, although I do not necessarily share his arguments or reasoning. The main purpose of my speaking, the Minister will not be surprised to hear, is that it affords an opportunity for me to highlight again that the Government’s decision to introduce in Clause 37 a new offence of assault against a retail worker—and only a retail worker—risks creating a new problem.
As I have said before, I know that the Government’s intentions are good and I have no desire to mount a campaign against Clause 37, but the fact that a new offence of assault against a retailer is otiose does not mean that it will have no negative effects if it causes other public-facing workers to believe they are not protected if assaulted. As I have argued before, the workers referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, clearly will be protected without his amendment—because they will be—but I worry about people fearing that they will not be, deterring employees from exercising the delegated authority that we need them to exercise to uphold good order when in charge of a public place or space.
It is because of this that I urge the Minister—he and I will continue to have this discussion, which he knows I look forward to very much—to think again. I find it hard to understand how the Government can legislate for some and not others in this way. While it is not where I would start, we have to be very conscious of the unintended consequences of Clause 37, which the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, has highlighted today.
Lord Goddard of Stockport (LD)
My Lords, I speak to Amendment 399 in the names of my noble friend Lady Pidgeon, who cannot attend today, and my noble friend Lady Doocey. This amendment would enable CCTV systems on the railways to be quickly available to the police and continuously for 30 days, alongside defining the technical standards to support this access. It is about ensuring that investigations on the railways can be carried out efficiently.
The amendment was first tabled by our colleague Daisy Cooper following a spate of bike thefts at St Albans station. In trying to resolve this issue, the correspondence from the British Transport Police was quite revealing. The CCTV system at St Albans station is operated by Govia Thameslink Railway—GTR—as part of a commercial franchise agreement. GTR manages CCTV across 238 stations, with over 6,000 cameras. Although British Transport Police and other forces have established information-sharing agreements with GTR and similar operators, these agreements are designed to govern data management, including storage and access protocols. They do not constitute contracts with commitments to supply CCTV footage within specific timeframes or of specific volumes.
Currently, there are no provisions for rail franchise agreements that mandate specific service levels for supplying CCTV footage—it is not established in law yet. While this may change over coming years, as the franchises may be nationalised, this remains an issue. Unlike council-owned CCTV systems, which often feature integrated platforms allowing direct access, many rail CCTV systems are standalone, not remotely connected. Retrieval often requires physical visits to stations, which can delay access, and sometimes operators impose limits on the duration and length of footage they can supply.
While I acknowledge that these are challenges resulting from the current franchise arrangements, which will gradually be resolved, other constraints are rooted in the operational systems. I am aware that in September, the Government announced that they will be providing funding of almost £70 million so that Network Rail can make some improvements to CCTV. Although this is welcome, Amendment 399 would ensure that a legal obligation exists, and I hope the Minister will look carefully at the issues we are raising today.
Amendment 356A from the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, would put a duty on British Transport Police to take steps to prevent violence against women and girls on trains. This is a national emergency: one in four women have experienced domestic abuse, and a woman is killed by a man once every three days. Given that fewer than one in six victims of rape or attempted rape report their assault to the police—the reasons cited including that the police would not believe them or could not help them, or that they would not be understood—and given that only 2.6% of rape offences result in a charge or summons, it is crucial we do everything we can to assist in this process.
We fully support specialised teams tackling violence against women and girls in every police station, including British Transport Police stations, and we welcome the Government’s overall work in this important area.
The amendment also raises the issue of rolling stock design. As the railway comes under public ownership, there is a real opportunity for the Government to lead on the right design of the interior of their new fleets of trains; procedures to cut out crime and ensure safety and accessibility for everybody should be the heart of that design. However, it should be noted that the rolling stock would not be publicly owned; rather, it would continue to be leased, as now. That issue may need to be looked at again.
Amendment 356F from the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, would create the offence of assaulting a public transport worker, which is similar to the offences of assaulting retail workers and emergency workers. We are sympathetic to this amendment but as the noble Lord himself indicated, the wording may need refining. However, the principle behind it is clear, and it is obvious that protection is needed.
This is an important group of amendments that addresses the safety of our railway networks, systems and travelling public. I look forward to the Minister’s response to the many serious points that have been raised.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
In rising to support Amendment 356A in the name of my noble friend, I recognise that the problem will probably be enforcement, and the answer may have to be a lot more British Transport Police routinely patrolling certain trains.
I also want to raise another issue which affects women. The amendment deals with the big crimes—rape and other sexual offences, stalking, upskirting and domestic abuse—but women and girls also suffer bad behaviour on trains. For example, if a woman or girl gets on to a train and the only seat left has some yob’s rucksack on it, how many would say, “Could you move your rucksack, please?” They would probably stay silent, afraid that if they did speak up, they would be attacked.
The same things happen late at night, when groups of youths have been drinking and are making a noise or playing their music loudly, causing a complete disturbance. A few weeks ago, I had the guts to tell someone to take his feet off the seats, and he did. But I wonder how many women and girls would actually take that action, asking people to turn the music down, behave themselves, stop the swearing and loutish behaviour, and stop throwing their empty beer cans about. Women will not do that sort of thing—they will not take action—and are therefore suffering.
I do not have an answer to this problem, but it has to involve improving behaviour on trains generally. Perhaps, like the US Transportation Secretary, who told people to dress properly on planes and not like scruffs just off the beach, we should say similar about Great British Railways: when you are on trains in future, behave yourselves, because women and girls are suffering.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this has been an interesting short debate. I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this group of amendments, each of which addresses the issue of safety on our public transport networks, whether of passengers, workers or those tasked with policing them. The amendments before us reflect genuine concern about how effectively our current frameworks protect people from violence, intimidation and abuse in transport settings, and they deserve careful consideration from the Minister.
I begin with Amendment 356A, tabled by my noble friend Lady Morgan, which would place a duty on the British Transport Police to
“take all reasonable steps to prevent violence against women and girls on trains”.
Violence against women and girls remains an appalling and persistent problem. Just yesterday, the Government and Liberal Democrats joined together to defeat a Conservative amendment to the Sentencing Bill that would have exempted sexual offenders and domestic abusers from the automatic presumption of a suspended sentence. For victims of sexual assault or domestic abuse, the distinction between a custodial sentence and a suspended sentence is not an abstract policy question; it is the difference between knowing that their abuser has been removed from the community, and knowing that they remain at liberty.
That point is reinforced by the Government’s recent recognition of the scale of the problem. Violence against women and girls has been described by the Home Secretary as a “national emergency”. The Government have trialled domestic abuse protection orders to track domestic abusers. But the most effective way to protect victims is to ensure that offenders face custodial sentences for their crimes. A Government who oppose that principle are not a Government who can claim to hold violence against women and girls as a priority.
In the year ending 2024, police recorded more than 106,000 sexual offences in England and Wales—an increase of around 10% on the previous year. Women continue to report feeling unsafe on public transport, particularly during off-peak hours and at night. This amendment recognises that prevention must go beyond enforcement alone. Its emphasis on data sharing and engagement with train design reflects the reality that safety is shaped by visibility and co-ordination. These are practical, forward-looking measures that deserve serious engagement from the Government. I hope the Minister considers them carefully.
Amendment 356F, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, proposes a new offence of assaulting a public transport worker. Abuse and violence directed at front-line transport staff has increased markedly in recent years, with British Transport Police data showing a significant rise in assaults on railway employees. Public transport workers perform an essential public service, often in challenging circumstances, and they should be able to do so without fear of violence or intimidation.
Amendment 399, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, addresses a long-standing operational problem: inconsistent and delayed access to railway CCTV footage. Timely access to high-quality CCTV is often critical to identifying suspects, supporting victims and securing prosecutions. Establishing clear legal requirements for accessibility and technical standards would help to remove the barriers that currently frustrate investigations and undermine confidence.
Taken together, these amendments highlight a broader concern. Although the Government have articulated ambitions around tackling violence against women and girls and improving safety on public transport, there remains a gap between aspiration and implementation. Too often, victims, police and front-line workers encounter fragmented responsibilities, inconsistent standards and slow operational responses. What is needed is clear leadership, stronger co-ordination between agencies and a willingness to embed prevention into the everyday operation of our transport networks.
We on these Benches are clear that public transport must be safe and accessible for all, and that violence, whether against women passengers or workers, must be actively prevented, not merely responded to after the fact. I look forward to hearing from the Minister how the Government intend to ensure that the objectives reflected in these amendments are delivered in practice and how they will translate stated commitments into real-world safety improvements.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, for Amendment 356A, and I am glad we have reached it today. We hoped to reach it prior to Christmas, but time did not permit. I know that she has championed this issue in the House before, and I welcome her contribution pressing the Government today. I also welcome the slight widening of the debate by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester to look at metro services.
I note the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, and the terrible case of Claudia Lawrence. She has written to me separately on that. I have already instigated with my colleagues in the Home Office a response to the issues that she has raised. I hope she will forgive me if I concentrate on other matters today, but that is not off my agenda.
I know the whole Committee will support the fact that the Government have taken action on violence against women and girls, which is intolerable anywhere, including on the railway. The noble Baroness referenced the Government’s strategy on halving violence against women and girls, which was published in the House of Commons on the last day before Christmas. The Statement repeat has not happened in this House because the Opposition did not want it. That is fine—I understand that—but the commitment from the Government is very clear, and the recently published strategy to halve violence against women and girls is vital.
I also take the points on behaviour made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, which is an encouraging comment as part of that because the points he made are valid, and I accept them. The British Transport Police is essential in helping us to deliver that objective of halving violence against women and girls, alongside police counterparts in Home Office forces. It may be helpful to the Committee to say that the British Transport Police, as the police force for the railway, is already required to prevent crime, and that includes the offences set out in the amendment. The British Transport Police undertakes activities across the railway to encourage victims and bystanders to report offences, and indeed poor behaviour, and will relentlessly pursue offenders. In BTP Policing Plan 2025-27, it has given specific commitments to prevent violence against women and girls through:
“Effective and sensitive investigation and robust offender management”,
and:
“Targeted activity to identify and apprehend those intent on offending”.
If it helps the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, I am very happy to provide, through my colleagues in the Department for Transport, a further meeting for her to look at that work and understand it at first hand.
The noble Baroness also mentioned rolling stock companies and the manufacture and leasing of trains to train operating companies. The design of trains is defined not by the rolling stock company but by the train operating company. Therefore, the proposal that the British Transport Police shares data on violence against women and girls with rolling stock companies would not lead to improvements in the design of train carriages, but I take her point. The British Transport Police already shares crime data with train operating companies, which can feed into the British Transport Police policing plans.
The noble Baroness will also, I hope, be aware that the Rail Safety and Standards Board already publishes key train requirement guidance that is used by train operating companies when ordering new trains. This helps detail the features that are to be included in the specification. The content of the document is prepared by a group of rolling stock experts representing train operating companies, manufacturers, leasing companies, industry bodies and the Department for Transport. Following input from security experts in the Department for Transport and BTP, new content has recently been prepared that includes additional measures to do exactly what the noble Baroness wishes, to enhance personal security, including those that seek to reduce violence against women and girls. The content has been included in a draft of the document that will be submitted for consultation with the rail industry. The intention— I hope this is helpful for the noble Baroness—is that it will be published in spring 2026. While it is not the legislative back-up that she is seeking in the amendment, I hope it meets the objective of the very valid points she has made today.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, mentioned sentencing. We had a full debate yesterday on the Sentencing Bill and the House made its decisions on it. There is a difference between us on that, but I want to see offenders brought to justice and people caught. That is an important part of our proposals regarding the prevention measures and the performance of the British Transport Police on these issues.
Amendment 356F in the name of my noble friend Lord Hendy includes the introduction of a stand-alone offence of assaulting a public transport worker. Before I refer to what he has said, I will address the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell. First, I confirm that we are having a meeting. It is in the plan; it will be sorted and is coming down the line very quickly. She referred to Clause 37 and the stand-alone offence on retail workers. We have taken the view that there should be a stand-alone offence because retail workers are upholding the law for the state on sales of alcohol, drugs, knives, cigarettes and a range of other matters. But I agree with her that it is essential that transport workers feel safe going about their job. There is no place for abuse and assault of any worker, and I know we will all agree with that.
The attack in Huntingdon in early November shocked and horrified us all. Tributes were paid at the time to the railway staff who stood in the way of alleged attackers and did their duty, and those matters will come to court in due course. But I must stress the important point—this goes to the heart of what my noble friend said—that if a public transport worker suffers violence or abuse at work, it is essential that they report it to the police so it can be investigated. We take that seriously in the police, the transport police and the railway, and elsewhere in the Home Office. As the dedicated police service for the railway, the British Transport Police is able to provide further reassurance to rail staff that it is there to protect them and will arrest offenders quickly.
The key point I want to make to my noble friend is that transport workers are already protected in legislation, as the noble Baroness touched on. The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 makes offences against public-facing workers, in which transport workers would be included, an aggravating factor that the courts must consider in sentencing. As I said earlier in Committee, everybody is protected from assault. It is criminalised under the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and that long-standing piece of legislation, the Offences against the Person Act 1861. The key point in this case is that transport workers are covered by that legislation, whereas—to return to Clause 37—retail workers were not covered in the way that public-facing workers are in relation to police and others. They are still covered by the main offences of the Criminal Justice Act, but the aggravating factor that we are introducing under Clause 37 deals with retail workers specifically. I am happy to discuss Clause 37 with the noble Baroness when we have the opportunity to meet very shortly regarding her concerns about the legislation.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)
I am grateful to the Minister and I look forward to us discussing that at that time. I am not an expert in the law in this area, but I am genuinely surprised by what he has just said about the current legal provisions and protections for retail workers and the need for that which has been included in the Bill on the grounds that he has argued. If, as a result of this short debate, there is any need for him to clarify that further, that would be really helpful.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
We are in danger of the Committee revisiting Clause 37. I have an opportunity to meet the noble Baroness, and we can discuss those issues then. I am saying to my noble friend, in relation to his amendment, that the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 makes offences against public-facing workers an aggravating offence. We are strengthening that for retail workers in the context of Clause 37, but we will revisit that when we have our further discussion.
Amendment 399, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, but spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, would introduce a requirement that all CCTV camera images on the railway are made immediately accessible to BTP and to the relevant Home Office police force. I say to the noble Lord and the noble Baroness that I welcome the aims of the amendment, as historically the lack of immediate access to railway CCTV images has been a significant issue for BTP that can reduce its ability to investigate crimes quickly.
However, and this is where we may differ, I do not believe that legislation is necessary to address this issue. The noble Lord rightly said in his contribution that the Department for Transport has secured £17 million in funding to implement a system to provide more remote immediate access to station CCTV to the British Transport Police and the railway industry, and he welcomed that. I can say to him today that the Department for Transport will be funding Network Rail on behalf of the rail industry to deliver the project, which will cover the whole of the railway in England, Scotland and Wales, and prioritise stations where there are most passenger journeys.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
Will the Minister take this idea to the British Transport Police? By the time one has done a three-hour journey, one is heartily sick of hearing, for the 20th time, “See it. Say it. Sorted”. Could it possibly intersperse between those announcements something like: “This coach has video recording. We will take action against any passengers who harass or cause trouble for others”? That may not be the right wording, but something warning about that might be helpful.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I will give consideration to that with my colleagues in the Department for Transport. As somebody who travels every week on the train to this House, “See it. Say it. Sorted” appears on my journey on a number of occasions—in my case, in both English and Welsh. The noble Lord makes a valid point: there should be an acceptance and acknowledgment that the type of antisocial behaviour which he has referred to, at a low level, can be intimidating for individuals. The ability to undertake physical violence in the extreme form that allegedly took place in Huntingdon—I have to use the word “allegedly”—and the low-level abuse that might occur are significant issues. Transport staff on railways, from whichever railway company, and the teams that are operating require the support of the state to give them that back-up.
Under the current legislation, I believe that my noble friend’s amendment is not necessary. However, the general principle that we have heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, and other speakers, including my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, via the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, is absolutely valid and was well worth raising. I hope that I have been able to give assurances on that and that the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, will withdraw her amendment.
Lord Hendy (Lab)
My Lords, I wonder whether my noble friend the Minister could find time in his busy timetable to see me and the RMT about this, because I did not quite understand what the distinction was between the creation of an offence of assaulting a retail worker at work, in Clause 37, and assaulting a transport worker at work, as in my amendment. I take the point about an aggravating factor in sentencing but the question is really about the creation of an offence. It seemed that there might be room for further discussion outside the Chamber.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My noble friend mentioned his noble kinsman, my noble friend Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill, who is the Transport Minister. The British Transport Police are the responsibility of and answer to the Department for Transport. My other noble friend Lord Hendy is the Minister responsible for transport. If I may, I will refer that request to the Minister directly responsible for that policy in this Bill, so that they can consider what my noble friend has just said.
There is a distinction between the existing legislation that I have mentioned, which provides security against attack for public-facing workers, and the Clause 37 issue, which we have already debated. We may undoubtedly return to this on Report in several forms but, in the meantime, I would be grateful if the noble Baroness would withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Morgan of Cotes (Non-Afl)
I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this short debate. It is one of those that shows the Chamber at its finest, when there is a genuine discussion of some important issues. This was a deliberately narrow amendment, but I welcome the comments that have been made across the Committee on how it could be widened. I particularly welcome that of my noble friend Lady McIntosh about public spaces more broadly, but also the suggestion relating to other forms of public transport, especially trams. I expect that we could apply this to the Underground, not just in London but in other cities too.
I welcome the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, about behaviour on trains. The list of offences in proposed new subsection (2) is not exhaustive, and I fully take his point. There is an irony to debating this amendment at a rather more civilised time of the day than we might otherwise have done, had we reached it in December. One reason why I wanted to know whether we were going to reach the debate was that, because we sat late previously, I had to get a 10.30 pm train home to Leicestershire. I would describe myself as being rather robust, but I do not want to travel at half past 10 at night and get home to a deserted car park at nearly midnight. I do not think that anybody wants to do that, nor should we ask members of the House staff to do so. However, I will leave that debate about sitting hours for a very different set of noble Lords to consider.
I thank the Minister for his very helpful and constructive comments on my amendment. The Committee has identified that this is an issue about prevention of violence against women and girls, not just enforcement after the event. He rightly took the point that it is not just about British Transport Police but about working with the train operating companies, as he mentioned. I would very much like to take up his offer of a meeting, whether with Department for Transport officials or with the Rail Safety and Standards Board; he mentioned its forthcoming consultation. I think that we will return to this issue in the Railways Bill, so he can let the other noble Lord, Lord Hendy, know to expect such a debate. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower
“(2A) It is an offence for a person—(a) to have in their possession with intent to supply, or(b) be concerned in the supplying of, or the making of an offer to supply,an electronic device in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the device will be used in connection with a relevant offence.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would include a person concerned in the supplying of an electric device for use in vehicle offences within the scope of the offence in clause 110.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 356H is in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel. It seeks to strengthen Clause 110 by ensuring that those who are concerned in the supplying of electronic devices used in vehicle theft are brought within the scope of the new offence.
Vehicle crime remains a persistent and evolving challenge. Organised criminal networks are increasingly turning to sophisticated electronic devices—such as signal jammers, key programmers, and relay attack tools—to bypass modern vehicle security systems. These devices are not sold in back alleys alone: they are traded online, often under the guise of legitimate diagnostic equipment, and then misused to facilitate theft. The law must keep pace with this reality. Clause 110 rightly takes some steps towards addressing this growing problem, and I welcome the new provisions.
However, I have one particular question for the Minister. What is the difference between this new offence and the offence of going equipped for stealing under Section 25 of the Theft Act 1968? I note the different maximum penalties, being three years’ imprisonment for the Section 25 offence and five years’ imprisonment for the new offence in Clause 110, but is that the only difference? I ask this not to be overly critical but simply to understand the rationale behind the inclusion of this new offence.
I recognise that electronic devices for stealing vehicles are a new and evolving problem, and, as such, the new offence must be watertight. That is why I have tabled my amendment. I am sure the Minister will have a sense of déjà vu when speaking to this amendment. It is similar in nature to the amendment we tabled in Committee to Clause 13 of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill last year. In that Bill, our amendment sought to add possession with the intent to supply to the new criminal offence of supplying an article for use in immigration crime. The Government listened to us and tabled their own amendment on Report to widen the scope of that offence to include being concerned in the supply of a relevant article. Amendment 356H is intended to close the same possible loophole in Clause 110 as existed in the original drafting of Clause 13 of the border security Bill.
Clause 110 contains two separate offences. Subsection (1) states:
“It is an offence to possess an electronic device in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the device will be used in connection with a relevant offence”.
Subsection (2) states:
“It is an offence to import, make, adapt, supply or offer to supply”
such a device. That captures quite a wide range of activities, but what is missing from this aspect of the offence is possession with intent to supply such a device, or any other activity relating to the supply of these devices.
My amendment would address this gap by including two further offences. It explicitly includes possession with intent to supply an electronic device in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the device would be used in connection with the theft offence. It contains the same language that the Government brought forward for the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill. Proposed new paragraph (b) in the amendment therefore states that a person commits an offence if they are
“concerned in the supplying of, or the making of an offer to supply”
such an electronic device. This would, I believe, capture those who are knowingly involved in the chain of supply: those who broker deals, advertise devices or otherwise facilitate their distribution.
Without this amendment, there is a risk that individuals who play a crucial role in enabling vehicle theft will escape liability simply because they are not the final supplier. That is a loophole we cannot afford to leave open. Given that the Government accepted that this was a gap in what is now the Section 13 offence in the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act, I hope the Minister will agree that it is a loophole in this offence that should be closed. I beg to move.
Lord Goddard of Stockport (LD)
My Lords, we support the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. He has hit the nail on the head with this amendment about the intent to supply electronic devices for car theft, which has become an epidemic in this country. Data assessed by colleagues in the other House revealed that, in 2024, 75% of vehicle thefts were unsolved and only 2% resulted in a suspect being charged or summonsed, with 95,000 cases being unsolved. In November 2025, a BBC report showed that keyless car theft devices used by criminals can be found online and retail for around £20,000. According to that report, video guides and devices can be easily found online, allowing access to high-end cars such as Jaguars and Range Rovers and upwards. The Bill provides an offence for owning such a device. This amendment would address the potential loophole for those supplying the device.
I wait with interest to hear the Minister’s response. Motorists are taxed to the hilt, and pay road charges and congestion charges. I do not think it is unreasonable that the Government try to do something to protect motorists’ vehicles. All the money goes in—we pay our road taxes and our insurance. The numbers are staggering, with 95,000 cases last year unsolved. If you own a reasonably priced car, after working hard, there should be something to protect you from the people supplying the equipment rather just than the person using the equipment. I will be interested to hear the Minister’s response.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, briefly, I support my noble friend’s amendment, which seeks to fill a lacuna in Bill. It seems that the Government and my noble friend will be very close in what they trying to achieve, which is to remove these devices from sale and use and to make it more difficult for the criminals.
When the Minister responds, can he take the opportunity to say a word or two about enforcement? As the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, said, these devices are advertised for sale online. I think the Committee would like to know what efforts the authorities will take to try to pursue proactively those suppliers—we heard an awful lot in another Bill about smashing the gangs. The Committee would benefit from some explanation of how this provision will be used. Clearly, if a criminal in a stolen motor vehicle has a device on them when they are arrested, that is pretty straightforward: they are on their way to do that. However, I am interested in tackling the root of the problem and the pursuit of the individuals who are supplying these devices. What measures can be taken to prevent that at source? I would be very grateful to know.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for explaining the purpose of this amendment. He is right to highlight the importance of the issue that it raises. The Met estimates that electronic devices are used in approximately 60% of vehicle theft, so I am glad that we have the opportunity to debate Clause 110 and the important measures it takes in relation to vehicle theft.
I certainly understand the desire of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, to make the offence in Clause 110 as tight as possible, but I hope to persuade him, and your Lordships’ Committee, that the amendment is unnecessary. In particular, I do not believe that there is a gap in the offences provided for in Clause 110. Further, the amendment would require the police and prosecution to prove intent, rather than the burden being on the defendant to do so. This would have the effect of weakening the offence, as it would place a higher bar on the prosecution to secure a conviction.
By way of background, Clause 110 provides for two new criminal offences in relation to electronic devices used in vehicle theft. The first will criminalise the possession of such devices and the second will criminalise the importing, making, adapting, supplying or offering to supply these devices. Both offences require a reasonable suspicion that the device will be used in connection with the theft of a vehicle or the theft of anything in a vehicle.
This amendment seeks to extend those offences to include a person concerned in the supplying of an electronic device for use in vehicle offences. However, Clause 110 already makes provision for it to be an offence to possess a device where it appears that there could be an intention to supply. It outlines that the court may assume that the defendant possessed the relevant article where it was on the premises at the same time as the accused, or on the premises of which the accused was the occupier or a habitual user other than as a member of the public. I point out that the amendment would require the prosecution to prove intent to use the device to commit theft. As I have already said, this is a higher bar than the clause as drafted.
Clause 110 outlines:
“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence … to show that the person did not intend or suspect that the device would be used in connection”
with the theft of a vehicle or anything in a vehicle. A court can therefore infer that the articles in question are intended for use in vehicle theft. This reflects the fact that there are likely to be few legitimate uses for those specified articles. It is appropriate to expect that those who are involved with such articles should be alert to the possible use of the articles for criminal purposes. The amendment states that it would be
“an offence for a person to … be concerned in the supplying of, or the making of an offer to supply, an electronic device”.
I am not sure that such wording materially expands the scope of the offence. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine who may be captured by such wording who will not already be captured by the existing wording in the Bill.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies, asked a specific question around whether offenders could be charged with going equipped to commit theft under Section 25 of the Theft Act 1968. These existing offences put the burden on the prosecution to prove the defendant’s intention to steal a vehicle or something from inside the vehicle. This new offence places the burden on the defendant to prove that they were not intending to steal a vehicle, or that the device would not be used to steal a vehicle or commit vehicle crime.
I note that, in his contribution, the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, asked about the online sale of devices. Under the Online Safety Act 2023, there is a new duty placed on social media and tech companies to prevent the advertisement of stolen goods and devices that facilitate crime. Online sales platforms will block adverts and listings for items that are illegal to sell; sales platforms already do this for other illegal items.
On the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, with respect to the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act, it is fair to say the offence deals with a different set of circumstances from the offences in that Act. However, we will take away the comments and ensure that there are no gaps in the offence. I appreciate him raising the point.
For all these reasons, I am not persuaded that the amendment is required, and I hope that the noble Lord will be content to withdraw it.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Goschen and to the Liberal Democrats for their support for this amendment. The purpose of the amendment is not to widen the offence indiscriminately but to ensure that Clause 110 operates as Parliament clearly intends. Without explicitly including those who are concerned in supplying these devices, the offence risks capturing only the least sophisticated actors, while leaving untouched those who organise, promote and enable the trade from behind the scenes.
The reality of modern vehicle crime is that it is technologically advanced and often commercially organised, and those involved in supply chains are frequently well aware of the criminal end use of the devices they help distribute. Yet they structure their involvement precisely to avoid possession, and that is a gap that criminals will exploit if we allow it to remain. I hope that the Minister will reflect on the constructive nature of this proposal, given that the Government are aware of and have acknowledged the potential gap in the legislation. But for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Doocey
“Prevention of resale of stolen GPS products(1) The Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023 is amended as follows.(2) In Section 1(2)(b), after “commercial activities” insert, “including GPS equipment”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause extends the Equipment Theft Act 2023 to specifically include the theft of GPS equipment.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 357, first tabled by my party in the other place last year, would extend the operation of the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act by making explicit reference to GPS equipment or, as the industry now prefers, global navigation satellite systems.
For several years, Liberal Democrats have highlighted the sharp rise in rural crime, with organised gangs systematically targeting farms and rural businesses. Their focus has been on stealing high-value GPS drones, receivers and in-cab screens from tractors and harvesters. This equipment is worth thousands of pounds and is essential for modern precision farming. The loss of these units leaves farmers facing costly delays and crop losses at critical times of the year. These thefts have formed part of a well-organised international trade whereby equipment is stripped, containerised and shipped overseas, often beyond recovery. Crucially, offences spiked as rural policing came under ever-increasing strain. Local stations were closed and experienced neighbourhood teams hollowed out, taking with them the deep local knowledge that underpins effective intelligence gathering.
Organised gangs stepped into that vacuum, criss-crossing county boundaries with little deterrence. We recognise that real progress has been made over the last year, with insurance claims for GPS theft now starting to fall, thanks to greater collaboration between farmers, insurers, police and the National Rural Crime Network, whose invaluable work is now rightly benefiting from strengthened national funding and support. The Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act should build on that work, offering a strong framework for prevention, giving the Secretary of State powers to require immobilisers and the marking and registration of agricultural machinery, and to extend these measures to other equipment by regulation.
Amendment 357 would strengthen that framework by naming GPS units explicitly in the primary legislation. This would give a clear signal of intent, ensure momentum and guard against any further delay in bringing the provisions into effect. We welcome the Government’s recent commitment to include removable GPS units in future regulations and I am pleased that Ministers have listened to evidence presented from these Benches and others. The reality, however, is that the key provisions of the Act have not yet been brought into force and the secondary legislation required to implement them is still pending. Our amendment would ensure timely and decisive action, so that farmers and rural businesses see the benefits on the ground sooner rather than later. This is a simple, practical step that would support the Government’s aims and help stop the theft and resale of vital agricultural technology. I beg to move.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I start with a simple question: where on earth are the regulations that we were promised way back in 2023 when we passed the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act? I took that Bill through this House with all-party support, getting Royal Assent in July 2023. The Home Office promised that it would consult urgently on the necessary regulations and started that consultation immediately.
The consultation closed in July 2024, but the Government announced their conclusions only on 17 October 2025 and have dumped some of the most important provisions of the Act. It will now apply only to new all-terrain vehicles with forensic marking and registration, and to removable GPS units. Dumped are the proposals for immobilisers and extending it to other agricultural machinery. A £5,000 quad bike is protected, but not the £500,000 combine harvester. If someone breaks into the £300,000 John Deere tractor and steals the £10,000 GPS unit, that is covered, but not the John Deere itself. I saw one advert for a GPS that said, “Put this in your tractor, and you will be able to track it if the tractor is stolen”. Well, that is only if a farmer makes it impossible to remove and the thief has to steal the tractor as well as the GPS unit.
Dumping the proposals covering hand tools may be a wise measure, even though an incredible number are stolen. I accept that a forensic marking and registration scheme for power tools needs more time if it is ever to happen. It is estimated that the power tools market may have reached £1.5 billion in 2025. Professional power tools average about £200 each; a DeWalt combi kit of six tools sharing the same battery will come in at about £1,000. Therefore, if tradesmen are spending about £1.5 billion on £200 per item tools, that is over 7 million new tools bought per annum—I think I have half of them in my own garage, actually, but that is another matter. It would be a massive logistical task to register those 7 million tools, but large machinery is different.
Last year, 10,241 tractors, worth £1.6 billion, and 400 combine harvesters, worth £160 million, were registered in the UK. Some 34,000 excavators, diggers and earth-moving machines were sold, worth £1.5 billion, while 8,000 ATVs were sold with a total value of just £80 million. We will therefore have 44,000 big machines worth £3.4 billion with no forensic marking or isolator scheme, but we will have one for just 8,000 ATVs worth a mere £80 million. I do not understand the sense or wisdom of that. If it is possible to devise a forensic marking registration scheme for 8,000 vehicles, it should not be rocket science to devise one for 44,000 vehicles worth 42 times more. I therefore urge the Home Office to lay the ATV and GPS regulations immediately and then get on with drafting the next phase of those regulations to apply them to big farm machinery and construction equipment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this group of amendments addresses an issue that will be immediately recognisable to many people across the country: the theft of essential equipment from those who rely on it for their living. Turning first to Amendment 357, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, we broadly support the intention behind extending the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023. This was an Act brought in by the Conservative Government to protect businessmen and tradespeople, and the noble Baroness’s amendment would ensure that it explicitly includes GPS equipment. Technology becomes ever more central to commercial activity, particularly in agriculture, construction and logistics. It is therefore right that the law keeps pace with the evolving nature of equipment theft. GPS units are high-value, easily resold and frequently targeted. Bringing them clearly within scope of the Act is a sensible and proportionate step to help disrupt illicit resale markets.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for speaking in this debate and raising these important issues. Turning first to Amendment 357, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, I can confirm that the Government remain committed to the implementation of the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023 and fully support the intentions behind its introduction. Informed by responses to the call for evidence and direct consultation with industry, the Act will cover the forensic marking and registration on a database of new all-terrain vehicles, quad bikes and, I am pleased to say, removable GPS systems.
The NFU Mutual Rural Crime Report 2025 highlights that GPS theft cost an estimated £1.2 million in 2024. GPS units are particularly vulnerable to theft and their theft massively disrupts day-to-day farming operations, which is exactly why we have included them in the legislation. I am pleased to echo the acknowledgement by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, of the progress that has been made in this important area, with, as she said, falling insurance claims thanks to the concerted efforts of the police and other parties.
The Act requires secondary legislation before it can come into effect and we intend to bring this forward as soon as possible. As the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, said, the Government’s response to the call for evidence was published quite recently, in October 2025. We are very grateful to all those who took the time to respond, and we carefully considered the views and evidence provided in those responses. Significant technical concerns were raised and we needed to assess the impact before we committed to introducing secondary legislation. We did not want to introduce regulations that were not fit for purpose or, more importantly, that would adversely impact vehicle safety.
The noble Lord talked about the comparison between smaller vehicles and larger, more expensive farming machinery, such as tractors. We have carefully considered the benefits and implications of including other agricultural equipment in the regulations. The installation of immobilisers into other large pieces of machinery post manufacture poses a similar risk to ATVs, so there is a delicate balance to be struck between the costs to businesses and the achievability of the ends of the regulations.
Should the Act become more effective in tackling rural theft, the legislation would be widened in the future by introducing other large agricultural machinery in a further tranche of regulations. We are looking at the situation and the way the regulations operate, and will see whether we can apply them further.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
Can the Minister give a rough timescale for a consultation on extending this to include heavy agricultural machinery or contracting equipment?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I do not want to commit to any particular timescale. It probably ill behoves me to do so, but I will point out that, having published our response to the call for evidence a couple of months before Christmas, we are obviously trying to motor ahead with it, if noble Lords will forgive the pun.
I turn now to Amendment 368, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, which proposes two changes: first, to expand enforcement provisions under the 2023 Act and, secondly, to introduce a statutory aggravating factor for theft of tools from tradesmen under the Sentencing Act 2020. The Government recognise the distress caused by tool theft and its impact on tradespeople and small businesses, which the noble Lord, Lord Davies, spoke to. As he said, these tools are essential to livelihoods, and their loss can cause real financial and emotional harm. That is why we are already taking action through the National Vehicle Crime Working Group, which brings together specialists from every police force to share intelligence and tackle emerging trends in vehicle-related crime, including tool theft.
On sentencing, the current framework is sufficient and robust. Courts must follow guidelines issued by the Sentencing Council, which already require consideration of harm, culpability and aggravating factors such as financial loss, business impact and emotional distress. Courts also have powers to impose compensation orders to ensure that victims receive financial compensation. Introducing a statutory aggravating factor, as this amendment calls for, would duplicate existing provisions unnecessarily and have limited impact on outcomes. Indeed, I am reminded that a wise man once said,
“I am sceptical of the need for more aggravating factors”.—[Official Report, 15/12/25; col. 585.]
That was of course the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, speaking just three weeks ago, on 15 December, in response to an amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, to Clause 102 on self-harm. I could not have put it better myself.
I hope I have been able to reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that we accept the spirit of her Amendment 357 and we are working to give effect to this issue. I hope too that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, will understand why we do not consider his Amendment 368 to be necessary, and forgive my light ribbing a moment ago. For all these reasons, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his response and to the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra and Lord Davies of Gower, for their support. We all want this legislation to be effective, but we want swift implementation of the Act, not in the fullness of time, and stronger rural crime prevention, including forensic marking, to deter the theft and resale of tradespeople’s tools.
GPS theft cost farmers over £1 million last year. Frankly, this just cannot be allowed to continue. There is legislation ready to go—there is an Act of Parliament—and it needs to be implemented now. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to ensure that SIM farms would also include devices capable of using virtual SIM cards rather than only physical SIM cards.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
My Lords, as this is the first time I have spoken on the Bill, I apologise that I was unable to take part in the Second Reading debate due to a clash with other House business.
Amendment 358 is a very simple extension to what the Bill already does, and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, and the noble Lords, Lord Young of Cookham and Lord Holmes of Richmond, for adding their support to it.
I was a member of the Fraud Act 2006 and Digital Fraud Committee, chaired brilliantly by the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, which reported in November 2022. It was a lengthy report—fraud is a huge subject—with many recommendations. One area we raised was the use of SIM farms by fraudsters to send out bulk texts and make bulk calls, so I am very pleased that we are at last bringing in restrictions on the use and supply of SIM farms in Clauses 112 to 117. I am glad that the Bill allows other articles to be added to this. Both technology and the ways in which fraudsters use that technology to make contact with potential victims are constantly changing, so having the flexibility to react is important. It is also important to recognise, as the Bill does, that there are some legitimate reasons for the use of a SIM farm.
Unfortunately, however, the world has moved on since we reported in 2022. Clause 114 defines a SIM farm as
“a device which is capable of using five or more SIM cards simultaneously or interchangeably”.
It then goes on to define a SIM card as being
“a removable physical subscriber identity module”.
The problem is that physical SIMs are being overtaken by virtual SIMs, or eSIMs. A number of the latest phones no longer even have slots for physical SIM cards, and the trend is accelerating. The SIM farm restrictions that the Bill introduces are already at risk of being redundant before the Bill is even passed.
Amendment 358 simply attempts to fix this by including virtual SIMs in the definition, so that SIM farms that utilise eSIMs will also be covered from day one. If we do not make this change, the SIM farm restrictions will quickly be pointless. I realise that this might be a little more complicated, as a number of newer phones can store more than five eSIMs—although most only allow two to be active at any one time—so we might need to make some tweaks to the wording of Clause 114 a little further than this amendment does. But the point remains: we know that physical SIM cards are being phased out over time, to be replaced by eSIMs, so we should act now to ensure that this part of the Bill is not redundant as soon as it comes into force. That is the point of this amendment.
However, the use of SIM farms raises a wider issue, on which I would be interested to hear the Minister’s views. We can ban the sale and use of SIM farms in this country, and we should, but fraud increasingly comes from overseas, where a UK ban will have little or no impact. The real problem is that fraudsters are able to acquire an apparently limitless supply of UK mobile phone numbers. I do not know about other noble Lords, but I am currently receiving almost daily calls from UK mobile numbers, where someone who speaks poor English tells me they are calling from O2 and there is a problem with my SIM card. It does not matter how many I block; they just keep coming, each time on a different number, and I am sure I am not alone in that.
In November 2022, Ofcom issued guidance to telecoms companies about the allocation and supply of UK phone numbers. The guide set out the steps that Ofcom expects providers to take when suballocating and assigning numbers. Numbers can be suballocated an unlimited number of times, which makes controlling who ultimately acquires them difficult, and the guidance is only as good as the final link in that chain.
The guide covers three areas: due diligence checks before suballocating or assigning numbers; ensuring continued compliance and reassessing risk after the transfer of the numbers; and responding to incidents of misuse. But despite this guide, it remains almost comically easy to acquire pay-as-you-go SIM cards in bulk. A quick Google search shows myriad websites of varying legitimacy selling bulk SIMs, both physical and eSIMs. The very first listing on an eBay search for bulk SIMs is a package of 1,000 EE pay-as-you-go SIM cards for £999 or best offer. Many of the websites have reseller arrangements where anyone can earn commission by selling SIMs on to further end-users.
There are legitimate reasons why someone might buy SIMs in bulk: internet of things connectivity, company travel or legitimate mass marketing, for example. But they can also be used for mass scam phishing messages or calls, identity theft, SIM swapping, money laundering and creating bulk social media accounts, to list just a few.
It is too easy for fraudsters to acquire large numbers of genuine UK numbers under the current system. This is not about spoofing numbers; these are real numbers. KYC checks on end-users of bulk SIMS appear to be laughably weak and do not appear to be policed in any meaningful way. When was a telco last fined for this? What meaningful monitoring actually takes place of where these numbers end up and how they are used?
The new voluntary UK Telecommunications Fraud Sector Charter, published in November, says only that signatories will:
“Continue to implement existing CCUK guidance on preventing misuse of sub-allocated and assigned numbers and monitoring for fraudulent calling patterns”.
That is clearly not working at present. We need to do more.
In addition to his response to the specific amendment on eSIMS, I would be grateful to hear the thoughts of the Minister on how we might make life more difficult for the fraudsters who are able to operate easily on an industrial scale from foreign countries using real UK phone numbers. Does he agree that it is time to strengthen, monitor and enforce KYC rules on the bulk sale of phone numbers? I beg to move.
Lord Young of Cookham (Con)
My Lords, I added my name to the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. Like him, I served on the Select Committee on fraud, ably chaired by my noble friend Lady Morgan of Cotes, that produced a very substantial document indeed. After we produced our report, the Government published a consultation document headed Preventing the Use of SIM Farms for Fraud. In December 2023, the Government published their response to that document. I want to quote briefly from three paragraphs of that response.
Referring to the responses they got, the Government said:
“A few responses noted that banning physical SIM farms alone is likely to result in displacement to eSIM farms”,
which is the point that has just been made. They went on:
“However they acknowledged that if eSIMs were included to the proposed ban, the Government’s definition of SIM farms should be adapted to ensure it excludes smartphones that can hold more than four eSIMs”.
The Government’s response to that section was:
“Responses noted that the definition could also include eSIMs and mobile apps. However, we did not receive sufficient evidence at consultation to include them in a proposed ban, due to their complexity and ongoing pace of development. This could be further addressed by the proposed powers to extend the ban to other forms of telecommunications equipment and articles used to perpetrate fraud”.
They referred to a further final paragraph headed “Government response”:
“The Government considers it important to ensure that the ban is flexible and can be used to rapidly prohibit other types of technology where these are identified in the future. Some such technologies are mentioned above, whilst others may emerge in future and the Government will continue to review fraud methodologies closely for changing patterns and new technologies being used, such as eSIM farms and others. However, the Government agrees with respondents that any powers to ban through secondary legislation ought to have clear parameters for their use”.
That was the last Administration, of course, and it would be helpful to know whether the Government agree with that line.
The question I want to ask the Minister is this. Referring to the clauses on SIM farms, Clause 114(4) says:
“The Secretary of State may by regulations amend this section (other than this subsection)”.
Is that in effect giving the Secretary of State powers to introduce by secondary legislation something that the previous Government said should not be done by secondary legislation? I leave that question hanging in the air while the Government seek advice from the Bench to see what the answer is.
Baroness Morgan of Cotes (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I will briefly speak to Amendment 358. It is a pleasure to follow the noble Lords, Lord Vaux and Lord Young of Cookham. Because we are going to be discussing this and a later amendment on fraud, I declare my interest as a director of Santander UK.
It was a huge pleasure and privilege to chair the Lords inquiry into online and digital fraud, which reported in 2022, and I would like to think that we had some impact in raising the issues, which are of huge importance to the public. Fraud is one of the crimes that people are most likely to be victims of. I know the Minister knows that because he is the Anti-Fraud Minister in the department.
Noble Lords have already spoken about the importance of this amendment, the need for the law to be kept up to date as the technology develops, and the fact that allowing as much flexibility in legislation as possible to enable that to happen is important. The reason we talked about the “fraud chain” in the report is that, obviously, people encounter fraud in myriad ways. Fraudsters are, as we have heard, incredibly flexible, and entrepreneurial—for all the wrong reasons. Of course, telecoms—people’s smartphones or phones—is where many people will first encounter the fraudster, who will then try, as we heard in our evidence, to get them away from technology and strike up some kind of relationship which unfortunately ends in people often losing life-changing amounts of money.
I do not want to pre-empt the debate on Amendment 367, which I hope we will also reach today, but the question, perhaps now or for later, is whether the Minister is confident that the previous Government’s and this current Government’s ask of the telecoms industry is strong enough given the frequency with which the public encounter fraud via their telephones. I will ask the question now, but I am sure we will come back to it. We are all waiting for the forthcoming fraud strategy from the Government, which we understand is—I hope—close. Can the Minister give us a little precursor of whether that will impose tougher asks and potential penalties on the telecoms companies for the reasons that we have already heard?
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, we strongly support Amendment 358 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Vaux, Lord Young of Cookham and Lord Holmes of Richmond, and the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, who have made the case extremely well today. I pay tribute to the Fraud Act committee chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, and I shall quote from it extensively in the next group.
This amendment would rightly ensure that the definition of a specified article included devices capable of using virtual subscriber identity modules, not just physical SIM cards. As we have heard, the criminal landscape evolves rapidly. If we legislate only for plastic SIMs, criminals will simply pivot to readily available virtual SIM technology. By incorporating virtual SIMs into the definition now, we will help to future-proof these provisions and make them genuinely effective against highly scalable, technology-enabled fraud.
Clauses 112 to 117 quite rightly seek to address the serious and growing problem of SIM farms being used at scale to perpetrate fraud and other abuses—it was very interesting to hear the quotes of the noble Lord, Lord Young, from the Select Committee’s report, which demonstrates that the problem has been with us for several years now—but, as drafted, Clause 114 risks being a technological step behind the criminals. As we have heard, it refers to devices capable of using physical SIM cards, but the market is already rapidly moving towards virtual or embedded SIMs. Indeed, I have an iPad in my hand that has a virtual SIM inside it—no physical SIM card at all. If the Bill focuses only on the plastic card and not the underlying functionality, it will leave an obvious loophole that organised criminals will quickly exploit.
The noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, spoke of “entrepreneurial” but not in a good way. We know that fraudsters are highly adaptive. As mobile operators deploy more robust controls on physical SIMs—I suspect not enough for the noble Lord, Lord Vaux—and as handsets and routers increasingly use eSIMs or other virtual identities, those intent on running industrial-scale smishing and scam operations will migrate to those platforms. If we legislate today for yesterday’s technology, we will simply displace the problem from one category of device to another and be back here in a few years’ time having the same debate. I hope the Minister will be able either to accept the amendment or to confirm that the Government will bring forward their own wording—there is always a bit of “not invented here” with these things. Without that assurance, there is a real risk that this part of the Bill will be lacking in force from the day it comes into effect.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, for speaking to this group. On his Amendment 358, I agree that the Government should look to make provisions that account for all forms of SIM cards used in SIM farms. As the noble Lord stated, the current drafting of Clause 114 does not encompass eSIM cards in the devices used for SIM farming. Given the number of mobile phones that now use eSIMs, this really should be amended.
This speaks to the larger issue of defining provisions ahead of legislation coming into force. When changes are being made to the legality of certain products, suppliers and consumers should be made aware well in advance; behaviours will have to change with reform. This is a case of not just courtesy but constitutional propriety. That is the reasoning behind my Amendments 358A and 538A.
Legislating for the criminalisation of specific devices and software related to fraud should not be done on a whim. Individuals should not wake up one day and possess an illegal device or software that was considered legal a day before, with no warning of the coming change. Some notice must be given. Currently, the Bill simply permits Ministers to specify a device whenever they wish. There is no requirement for those regulations to come into force before the new offences of possession and supply come into force. My amendments would ensure, in the interests of fairness and the rule of law, that the new offences could not come into force until at least three months had passed from the making of the regulations defining the articles.
I believe that a period of three months before the possession and supply of certain articles becomes illegal is sufficient for people to change their habits and businesses to change their models. We in this House would be doing the public a disservice if we did not provide them with the necessary time to adapt. I hope the Minister agrees with this reasoning. I hope he will consider the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, and, as always, I look forward very much to hearing his reply.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I first give my appreciation to the work of the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, and the noble Lords, Lord Young of Cookham and Lord Vaux of Harrowden, in producing their report on this matter. It was during my enforced sabbatical from Parliament, so I was not party to the discussions at that stage. It is useful to have that continuum of discussion, and the previous Government’s initial intentions have been carried forward by this Government as a whole.
Amendment 358, as the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, mentioned, would expand the definition of SIM cards. To be clear, the Government’s consultation and evidence gathering as part of the preparation for this Bill focused on physical SIM cards, which are where the current and most significant threats arise and what these clauses seek to address. The provisions in the Bill are designed to tackle the misuse of physical SIM farms, which are widely used for criminal purposes such as fraud and spam. We are all aware of how that manifests on our phones and those of people we know and work with.
Virtual SIM technology is developing, but it is not currently presenting the same scale of risk, and the evidence we have from the consultation does not support extending the ban at this time. Physical SIM farms pose a significant and immediate threat because they enable large-scale criminal activity. Unlike virtual SIMs, physical SIM cards are harder to trace, as they are not inherently linked to a specific handset or verified identity. Their anonymity makes them ideal for fraud, phishing and mass spam campaigns.
Furthermore, the trade in physical SIM cards creates a black market where thousands of cards can be bought and sold with minimal or no oversight. This flow of unregistered SIMs fuels organised crime, facilitates money laundering and undermines law enforcement efforts. Virtual SIM technology, by contrast, is generally more secure and traceable because it requires integration with the device software and often involves stronger identity checks. At present, I say again, there is no evidence of virtual SIMs being exploited at scale for criminal purposes. Our focus therefore remains on the tangible and proven harm caused by physical SIM cards.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this short but important debate. I am grateful to the Minister for his detailed response. I think I speak for all of us in saying that we look forward enormously to seeing the long-awaited fraud strategy. I think it will be the third one since I have been in this House. Anyway, a lot of what the Minister said definitely moves in the right direction.
On the amendment, I am a little disappointed because, although I hear what the Minister says about the evidence base, which is obviously backward-looking, we know that the situation is changing. Physical SIMs are being replaced by eSIMs at a fairly rapid rate. This is something that we know is changing and it would be better to future-proof the Bill at this stage if we can. I take on board his point that eSIMs are more traceable than physical SIMs. But part of the problem is that that is not always the case in a lot of countries, and eSIMs can be from anywhere. So, I take only a certain amount of comfort from that.
That said, and given the Minister’s assurances that this will continue to be looked at and, if the evidence base supports it, changed, at this stage I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Clement-Jones
“Digital identity theft(1) A person commits an offence of digital identity theft if—(a) the person obtains, or attempts to obtain, personal or sensitive information relating to an individual, including but not limited to passwords, identification numbers, credit card numbers, national insurance numbers, biometric data, or other unique digital identifiers, and(b) the person intends to use this personal or sensitive information to impersonate that individual, or to enable another person to impersonate that individual, with the purpose of carrying out any transaction, activity, or communication in their name without their consent or lawful authority.(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)—(a) “personal or sensitive information” refers to any data, whether digital, physical, or otherwise, that can be used to identify, authenticate, or impersonate an individual;(b) “obtains” includes acquiring, accessing, collecting, or otherwise coming into possession of such information.(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a fine, or both;(b) on conviction on indictment in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to a fine, or both.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment creates an offence of digital identity theft.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, my Amendment 359 would create a new offence of digital identity theft. I am very pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, has signed and supports it.
The amendment is deliberately tightly framed. It targets the foundational act that underpins so much modern fraud and serious criminality: the deliberate harvesting of someone else’s personal and sensitive information with the intent to impersonate them and conduct transactions, activities or communications in their name without their knowledge or consent. It is about criminalising the act of stealing and weaponising a digital identity before the fraud or other downstream offending takes place.
As things stand—and I hope the Minister will confirm this and, indeed, that the promised fraud strategy will recognise—the act of identity theft is not recognised in our law as a criminal offence in its own right. The Fraud Act 2006, the Computer Misuse Act 1990, the Data Protection Act 2018 and subsequent data protection Acts all play an important role, but they are concerned primarily with what happens after the identity has been stolen—after the account has been opened, the loan has been taken out or the money has been moved. They address the fraud, the unauthorised access or the misuse of data. What they do not do is grapple squarely with the initial acquisition of personal and sensitive information with the purpose of impersonation.
Indeed, as the House of Lords Fraud Act 2006 and Digital Fraud Committee, chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, heard in evidence, identity theft is still formally regarded in much official material as a social rather than a legal concept. That might have been tolerable in a predominantly analogue world, but it is simply not credible in the age of data breaches, credential stuffing, deepfakes and synthetic identities. Treating identity theft as a mere background condition rather than as a legal wrong in itself leaves people’s most intimate identifiers—biometric data, passwords, national insurance numbers and digital credentials—fundamentally underprotected.
The effect in practice is that law enforcement may feel it has limited tools to intervene at an early stage, even where there is clear evidence that large quantities of personal data have been harvested and traded with a view to impersonation. Instead, the system waits for the fraud, money laundering or other downstream crime to crystallise. By then, the victim’s credit record may be shredded, their bank accounts compromised and their reputation damaged. Yet the initial act of stealing their identity remains conceptually elusive.
The scale and nature of digital identity theft make this gap increasingly untenable. We now know that organised criminals and fraudsters operate, in effect, industrial-scale harvesting operations, feeding on the constant stream of data breaches and leaks from both public and private sector systems. Those databases of stolen credentials are then traded, refined and recombined, very often on the dark web, to facilitate mass impersonation and fraud. This activity is not just an adjunct to fraud. It is, as the Fraud Act 2006 and Digital Fraud Committee rightly described it, a “predicate action”—a necessary precursor to a great deal of online financial crime and, in some cases, to other serious and organised criminality, including terrorism financing.
The threat is being turbocharged by new technologies. Large language models enable highly convincing phishing and social engineering communications at scale and with very low cost. Deepfake audio and video systems allow criminals to mimic a person’s voice or image in ways that can be all but indistinguishable from the real thing. When those tools are combined with rich stolen identity data, criminals can construct synthetic identities or impersonate genuine individuals to open bank accounts, obtain credit cards, register mobile phones and pass remote know your customer checks with alarming ease. In that ecosystem, the act of stealing and collating identity data is itself a sophisticated, harmful criminal enterprise, not simply background noise.
The Bill is rightly concerned with modernising a range of policing and crime powers for the digital age. It updates police powers in relation to electronic devices and remotely stored data and seeks to equip the criminal justice system to deal with contemporary threats, yet it does not deal with this most basic of digital harms: the theft of a person’s identity. That is why this amendment would define a clear, free-standing offence of digital identity theft.
The test that the amendment proposes is straight- forward and proportionate. A person would commit the offence if
“the person intends to use this personal or sensitive information to impersonate that individual, or to enable another person to impersonate that individual, with the purpose of carrying out any transaction, activity, or communication in their name without their consent or lawful authority”.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to speak in this Committee and to follow my friend the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, who perfectly and proportionately set out the principles in this amendment, which I support to every last sentence. We are now discussing a number of amendments on areas where the existing law, and this Bill as drafted, are clearly out of date and full of gaps—not least when we consider how our nation, our economy and the state itself are seeking to move to digitisation, which has such benefits for citizens and communities, our cities and our entire country. But one key element which enables, empowers and underpins almost every element of that digital transformation is effective digital ID.
There are a number of arguments that could be made at another time about the correct approach to digital ID. I would suggest that the principles around self-sovereign ID should strongly be considered. Mandation is clearly problematic, while the reasons for introducing a digital ID should be clearly made and the benefits set out. But the specifics of this amendment are clear, proportionate and timely, because a digital ID is critical and essential to availing oneself of the opportunities—and, indeed, to protecting oneself against many of the harms. To not have a digital ID protected by the criminal law would be a huge, inexplicable and indefensible gap.
If the Government want digital ID to be the means of accessing government services and to see greater digital inclusion—and, through that, the attendant and very necessary financial inclusion—action to protect our digital ID is critical. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones effectively set out his amendment, which is proportionate, valid, timely and necessary. I very much look forward to the Minister accepting the principle as set out.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, identity theft, as my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond said, is no longer a niche crime; it is the dominant fraud type in the UK and getting worse. In 2024, over 421,000 fraud cases were filed to the national fraud database and almost 250,000 were identity fraud filings, making identity theft the single largest category recorded by industry partners. CIFAS, the credit industry fraud avoidance system, recorded a record number of cases on the national fraud database in 2024. The organisations themselves prevented more than £2.1 billion of attempted loss, yet criminals are shifting tactics. Account takeovers rose by 76% and unauthorised SIM swaps surged, driven by the rapid adoption of AI and generative tools that let fraudsters create convincing fake documents and synthetic identities at scale.
We have all read of some of the high-profile examples: celebrity impersonation via deepfakes and cloned voices has been widely reported; manipulated videos and voice clones purporting to show public figures from Elon Musk to Martin Lewis, Holly Willoughby and others, have been used to generate investment scams and phishing campaigns. Documented victim losses include large individual losses linked to celebrity impersonation scams. One NatWest customer is reported to have lost £150,000 after responding to a scam impersonating Martin Lewis.
However, I think we are all more concerned with the tens of thousands of ordinary people who are not celebrities and who lose all their savings to these crooks. They are the victims who suffer real financial loss and damage, with long and costly recovery processes, while businesses face rising prevention costs and operational strain. I therefore strongly support the concept of the draft clause and the need for it. While it is well intentioned, I fear that it has some technical difficulties. It is a bit broad and vague about what “obtains” and “impersonate” mean. It also risks overlap with the Fraud Act, the Computer Misuse Act and the Data Protection Act, and lacks some clear defences for legitimate security research and lawful investigations. It also needs to address AI and the deepfake-specific methods, and set out what we can do about extraterritorial reach, for example, or aggravating factors for organised, large-scale operations.
We all know that my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond is, as we have just heard, an absolute expert on AI; he recently addressed a top-level group of the Council of Europe on this subject. May I suggest that he and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, get together with the Home Office or other government digital experts and bring back on Report a more tightly drafted amendment? Among other things, it should tighten the definitions of “obtain”, “impersonate” and “sensitive”; ensure that the mens rea is tied to dishonesty or intent to cause loss or gain; include recklessness in enabling others; limit the scope to unlawfully obtained data or use that bypasses authentication; and explicitly include AI/deepfake methods when used to bypass checks or cause reliance. It should also have clear defences for lawful authority and make sure that duplication is avoided, whether it be with the Fraud Act, the Computer Misuse Act or the Data Protection Act. Finally—I know this is an impossible ask, and that Governments find it almost impossible to do—something should be done about extraterritorial reach, because that is terribly important.
I say to the Minister: there is a gap in the legislation here. We should plug it, and we may have time to bring back on Report a more tightly drawn amendment that would deal with all the concerns of noble Lords and the possible problems I have just raised.
Lord Fuller (Con)
My Lords, I rise briefly to support strongly the comments of my noble friend Lord Blencathra and the principle of the amendment laid by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. This is a timely amendment, possibly timelier than the noble Lord anticipated, because today the Government have announced the promotion of a Minister to promulgate digital IDs among the population.
Digital IDs are going to have a huge vista and connection, not just in linking to personal data but in other areas of life: in the relationship between the state and the individual; and in the payment of parking tickets, road tolls, stamp duty and fishing licences—a different sort of fishing, as it begins with an “f”, not a “p”. So I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, on the thrust of the amendment, although I accept that some polishing is required.
If the Government are to promote digital IDs, the population at large need to have confidence not just that they will be correctly introduced but that there are safeguards against such impersonation. I strongly support the principle of this amendment and say to the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, that if the Government resist it in principle, what confidence can the man in the street have that the Government are sincere about the safeguards they intend to introduce, alongside their intention for digital IDs—to get that balance right between the state and the individual, coupled together against the criminal?
We need to bring this back on Report. I hope the Minister is prepared to meet the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and others to address this principle, so that the Government get off on the right foot, if they intend to promote digital IDs, and not resist this, because there is a world of pain if they do.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for tabling this amendment. I know that the creation of a specific identity offence has been a long-standing concern of his, so I appreciate the opportunity to contribute to this debate. I tentatively support the principle behind his amendment, although this issue is deserving of more scrutiny and thought than we are perhaps able to give it as an amendment in Committee.
I recognise the impetus for this amendment. Identity theft has long been the primary means by which criminals commit fraud; and, with a booming online world exacerbated by the introduction of artificial intelligence, digital identity theft is fast becoming a serious issue. CIFAS, the leading non-profit fraud prevention service, has documented the rise in identity theft. Last year, as we have heard from my noble friend Lord Blencathra, over 420,000 fraud cases were filed to the national fraud database, a 13% increase on the previous year. The main driver of this increase was identity fraud, with 250,000 filings, representing a 5% annual increase.
CIFAS cites online fraud as a primary cause of this increase; AI and generative technologies enable criminals to exploit people at speed and scale. Documents and identity cards are being forged at a more sophisticated level than before, with many now able to pass verification checks. Targets are often the elderly, as criminals target the least technologically capable and therefore most vulnerable victims.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for tabling the amendment, which would introduce a bespoke criminal offence of digital identity theft. I know that he has tabled similar amendments—he was persistent on these matters during the Data (Use and Access) Bill. I heard the support from the noble Lords, Lord Holmes of Richmond, Lord Fuller and Lord Blencathra, and note that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, put forward a number of caveats to his broad support. These are caveats I share.
The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, asked whether I would read out a number of amendments to previous legislation. I may disappoint him by reaffirming those issues, as he would expect. Although digital identity theft is not a stand-alone offence, there are, as he recognises, several criminal offences already in existence to cover the behaviour targeted by his amendment. The Fraud Act 2006 made it a criminal offence to gain from the use of another person’s fraud. Cases where accounts or databases are hacked into are criminalised under the Computer Misuse Act 1990. I could read him the offences captured in Sections 2 and 6 of the Fraud Act, Sections 1 and 2 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990, and Section 170 of the Data Protection Act 2018. All apply to the online sphere.
My argument, which the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, might have some sympathy with, is that to create a new criminal offence could be unnecessary duplication. The Fraud Act 2006 captures cases where someone uses another person’s identity and there is an equivalent common-law offence in Scotland. The Fraud Act establishes the offence of someone having in their possession or control an article which includes data or programmes in electronic form. The Computer Misuse Act criminalises unauthorised access and Section 170 of the Data Protection Act covers the deliberate or reckless obtaining, disclosing and procuring of personal data.
That is not to downplay the issue that the noble Lord mentioned. It is important and I recognise the concerns he raised. I hope that the Government will act decisively on these matters. We are currently in the process of transitioning from the Action Fraud service to a new, upgraded platform that will provide a better reporting tool for victims, stronger intelligence flows for police forces and enhanced support for victims. We are looking at doing what the noble Lord wants and upskilling police officers. We have completed a full review of police skills and the recommendations are being delivered through updated police training on this important matter. He will know that this Government have made sure that His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services has now updated the strategic police requirement. That will be published this year and will drive forces to upskill their staff on wider police reform on fraud matters. We want to try to upscale and upskill capability, to ensure the police keep pace with the challenges that the noble Lord has rightly identified.
It is important to take on board the points that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, mentioned in his supportive critique of the proposals in the amendment. The Home Office has commissioned an independent review into disclosure and fraud offences. Part 1 of the review, which addressed disclosure, has been conducted; part 2, with Jonathan Fisher KC leading for the Government, will examine whether the current fraud offences are fit for purpose, and specifically whether they meet the challenges of investigating and prosecuting fraud, and whether existing penalties remain proportionate. I am awaiting that report, which may cover the areas that the noble Lord has mentioned. It is important that we have proper examination of that, and that is currently ongoing.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
Without wishing to interrupt the Minister, could he give us an idea of the timescale? Would it be deliriously possibly to see this report before Report?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I should have tattooed on my forehead the words, “due course”. As ever, the commitment I can give is that it will be produced in due course. Report on the Bill will be some significant time away. We have another five days of Committee, with a gap for recess, and we will have a statutory gap before our consideration on Report after Committee has finished. It is some while away. The noble Lord is very adept at tabling further amendments on Report, should he so wish.
Part 2 of the report is being considered by the Government; we want to examine that and will publish in due course. I expect that, in the very near future, we will be producing the newly updated fraud strategy, which will address the evolving threat of fraud, including the harm caused by identity theft. Before the noble Lord intervenes, I cannot yet give him a date for that either, but I will try to help the Committee by saying that it will be soon. I will bring the fraud strategy to the House in due course, which will potentially cover some of the areas that the noble Lord has mentioned.
There is a lot going on, but there is existing legislation. I anticipate and understand that this is a genuine issue, and I very much welcome the fact that the noble Lord has brought it before us. I hope that on the basis of what I have said, he will—today, at least—withdraw the amendment.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister and I will respond in a second.
First, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, for agreeing with the thrust of the amendment, in his words, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for his in principle support. I entirely accept the points that he made—indeed, if the additions are not there, they should be. Any amendment that is brought back on Report should definitely take heed of the reservations he raised.
For the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, I was anticipating that, in a sense, there might be too much continuity. During the Data (Use and Access) Bill, his colleagues pushed back on the idea of a digital identity theft offence in rather more adamant terms than the Minister has today. I am grateful for his in principle support, with all the reservations that he had.
The noble Lord, Lord Holmes, encapsulated quite a lot of this. As we move into the world of digital ID, having your digital identity stolen is an issue of digital and financial exclusion. It is going to be increasingly important. I was very interested that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, dug out the figures on this; the scale of digital identity theft is huge, so the number of people affected by what is effectively financial and digital exclusion is only going to grow.
However, I did take some comfort. There was a glimmer of light coming out of the Home Office, and I am not always used to that. I celebrate that, particularly in view of the fact that a review is taking place that may well report in the near future. Whatever the Minister has stamped on his forehead, I am sure he is impatient to see it, given his specific role as the Fraud Minister.
I agree with the Minister about the need for the police to have specific powers and skills. I welcome what he said about the upgraded platform in terms of understanding the evidence that is going to be under- pinning any move towards creating an offence. I think, almost inevitably, I am going to come back with something more refined on Report in the hope that the Home Office review of current fraud offences will come up with the goods. I live in hope, but often where the Home Office is concerned my hopes are only too frequently dashed. I live in hope, and I beg to withdraw Amendment 359.
Lord Clement-Jones
“Defences to charges under the Computer Misuse Act 1990(1) The Computer Misuse Act 1990 is amended as follows.(2) In section 1, after subsection (2) insert—“(2A) It is a defence to a charge under subsection (1) to prove that—(a) the person’s actions were necessary for the detection or prevention of crime, or(b) the person’s actions were justified as being in the public interest.”.(3) In section 3, after subsection (5) insert—“(5A) It is a defence to a charge under subsection (1) to prove that—(a) the person’s actions were necessary for the detection or prevention of crime, or(b) the person’s actions were justified as being in the public interest.”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment creates defences to charges under the Computer Misuse Act 1990.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 360 seeks to introduce statutory defences to charges under the Computer Misuse Act 1990. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, again for his support. He has tabled a number of amendments which are companions to this amendment.
The Computer Misuse Act 1990 is widely recognised as outdated. It inadvertently criminalises legitimate and beneficial cyber security research, making the UK a difficult place for cyber experts to operate in. There has been a very vigorous campaign, as I am sure the Minister is aware, the CyberUp campaign, which has made the case very clearly. This anomaly risks undermining our national cyber resilience and the ability of researchers proactively to detect vulnerabilities. This amendment would address this by inserting a statutory defence where unauthorised access was demonstrably necessary for the detection or prevention of crime or carried out in the public interest.
This reform is vital for supporting responsible cyber research and aligning our laws with the needs of the 21st century digital landscape. The CMA was passed in 1990, when cyber security, as we know it today, simply did not exist. At the time, only 0.5% of the UK population regularly used the internet. Critics, including 93% of cyber security professionals surveyed, believe the Act is no longer fit for this century. The current criminal law criminalises unauthorised access irrespective of the good intentions or defensive motivations of the professional.
This has created a perverse situation in which the UK’s cyber defenders are forced to act with one hand tied behind their back. Threat intelligence researchers investigating criminal infrastructure, for instance, are often unable to obtain the explicit consent required under the Act. This has resulted in 80% of surveyed cyber security professionals having worried about breaking the law while investigating cyber threats. This ambiguity and restriction deters a large proportion of the research needed to assess and defend against emerging threats posed by organised criminals and geopolitical actors.
It also limits the UK industry’s capability compared with foreign competitors in countries such as France, Israel and the US, which already offer more permissive legislative regimes. Consequently, the UK cyber industry is held at a competitive disadvantage. This is a clear economic issue, not merely a legal one. Reform of the CMA is essential to securing a robust digital economy. Updating the Act is estimated to unlock up to £2.4 billion in additional annual sector revenue and support the creation of thousands of highly skilled jobs.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure again to follow my friend, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, whose amendment I agree with. I will speak to my Amendments 361 through 364, which are, as he rightly put, companions to the intent of his Amendment 360.
In simple terms we have an opportunity to change the law to benefit our cyber professionals and everything that they do to keep us safe, often—rightly and understandably—in the shadows. They deserve not only our respect but our support, and this is one small way we can support them.
I would also like to put on record my thanks and congratulations to CyberUp. It is an effective campaign because it has taken an issue, understood it at its essence and been clear, consistent and proportionate in its campaigning. It has not only been campaigning around the difficulties but offering practical and proportionate solutions. It is the very model of what a campaigning organisation should be.
We are told that 2026 is going to be the year smart glasses really take off—we will see. In 2007, the iPhone was launched. Yet the Computer Misuse Act still sits comfortably, dustily, fustily out of date on the statute book since 1990, a year when 0.5% of us UKers were online.
What has happened in the intervening 35 and a half years? Has that 0.5% doubled, trebled, increased tenfold or twentyfold? What was 0.5% in 1990 has moved on to 98.7% of the UK being online in 2025. That percentage alone should be enough to make the case for the need to urgently update the Computer Misuse Act. That Act came into being to address the issue of attacks on telephone exchanges. If the Government, or any polling organisation, went on to the streets of our country and asked anybody under the age of that of your Lordships about a telephone exchange, they might get some interesting results, but none of any benefit to the issues that we are discussing. It would be the greatest understatement to say that things have moved on since 1990.
There is a case for change, which the previous Government and this Government have largely accepted. Since 2021, work has been done on reviewing this issue, yet still we await any legislative change. What we are talking about is incredibly straightforward: giving a legal defence to legitimate cyber activities that is clear, concise, precise and proportionate.
The CMA being so chronically out of date would be a good enough reason to update it, but it is not just out of date, it is doing harm—harm to our cyber professionals, who, as I have already mentioned, do so much to keep us safe; harm to the security of our nation; and harm to the UK cyber industry.
I will share some numbers. There are 36.77 million reasons to make a change, because there have been 36.77 million cyber attacks on UK businesses and charities. There are another 27 billion reasons to make this change, because cyber attacks cost UK businesses and our economy £27 billion—not in total but year on year. Since 2021, when these various reviews began, £27 billion has been taken out of our economy year on year.
The changes in these amendments would bring the legal clarity and certainty required by our cyber professionals. If we look at other parts of the Bill, we can see where legal defences and clarity around public interest are being brought in. That would be completely analogous with what we are suggesting here with the Computer Misuse Act.
We are falling behind in terms of security, societal and economic benefits. The United States, France, Germany, Israel, Belgium and more countries already have a more appropriate regime than we do in the United Kingdom. The Government talk about growth, and quite right too. We already have a £13 billion cyber industry in this country. This change could unlock growth in the region of £3 billion, as well as in skills, training, jobs and careers, just by dint of making this very straightforward, clear, concise and proportionate change.
Dan Jarvis—partly in another place and largely at the Financial Times summit on 5 December last year—acknowledged this issue, stating that he understood the points behind it and that it was a priority for the Home Office. I therefore ask the Minister: is this a key, pressing and urgent priority? I suggest that it should be one of the Home Office’s top priorities. To that end, will the Minister agree to meet me and other colleagues across your Lordships’ House to update us on exactly where the Home Office’s thinking is, and where and when it is looking to make this change?
We have the ideal opportunity with this Bill. The time is now. In many ways, we are well overdue for the time being now. I ask the Minister: if not this Bill, what Bill? If not now, when?
Baroness Neville-Jones (Con)
My Lords, I support the amendments in this group, especially Amendments 360 and 362, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and my noble friend Lord Holmes.
Like others, I welcome that the Government appear to have seen value in the introduction of a statutory defence for cyber security researchers. I hope that this will result in the updating of the Computer Misuse Act, for which, like others, I have been campaigning for about a decade. When it was passed, that Act was perfectly valid, but the market conditions, which have been described by colleagues, were extraordinarily different. As my noble friend Lord Holmes has rightly said, the Act is now not just neutral in the scene but actively doing damage to our national security.
The Act prevents or discourages those professionals whose work lies in researching things such as vulnerabilities in the system or threat intelligence from doing that work, because of the possibility of finding themselves in trouble with the law. It is therefore very important that we organise ourselves so that such challenges, if they exist, can be defended against as they come forward, and that the activities of our professionals can be both supported and encouraged.
I hope that, in drafting the legislation, the Government will ensure that they cover all aspects of this particular difficulty—not just vulnerabilities in the system but particularly threat intelligence, which, if we think about it for a moment, is becoming increasingly important. We need to know what is wrong with the system, and we need to know it early and before it is capable of doing real damage in each case.
This is an important amendment. When he replies, can the Minister give an assurance that the amendments that the Government will bring forward, I hope, will cover both the question of vulnerabilities and the issue of threat intelligence?
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond for tabling the amendments in this group.
To start with Amendment 360, I welcome the noble Lord’s aims. When a crime is detected or prevented, it is a sensible principle that the individual responsible for detection or prevention should not be punished. That said, the amendment is perhaps too wide in its scope. It mentions nothing of proportionality, which leads me to worry that it could end up being used as a defence for an individual who has committed a far greater crime than that which they claim to have been preventing. Similarly, “public interest” is broad and undefined, and I would appreciate it if the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, could clarify what would fall under this defence.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, with support from the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, for raising this topic in the amendments today. I am grateful also to the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, for bringing her vast experience in this area to the debate.
I can say genuinely to all the noble Lords that they have a point. It is a point that the Government have recognised today: that we need to ensure that we update the Act accordingly. There is no doubt that UK cyber security professionals contribute greatly to enhancing and protecting the country’s security, and supporting them is vital. The figures that the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, gave in terms of growth since the original Act took place are absolutely valid and understood. He mentioned, rightly, that the previous Government—at ministerial or official level; I am not party to how that worked—commissioned the review in 2021. We are now in 2026, and this Government have had custody of this issue since July 2024. It is a reasonable presumption that we need to come to some conclusions on the review.
The Government have listened to the concerns raised by noble Lords. The noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, mentioned my colleague Dan Jarvis, who is the Minister directly responsible for these areas. They have listened to the concerns and have over the past year made real progress in developing a proposal for a limited defence to the offence at Section 1 of the Computer Misuse Act; namely, unauthorised access to computer material. Crucially, this includes safeguards to prevent misuse. However—and this is where my caveat comes in—this is an immensely complex area. Noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, have pointed to that complexity, but engagement is under way, including with the cyber security industry, to refine the approach, and I hope that we shall be able to provide an update at some point.
Further work is required to consider the safeguards that would be needed to accompany any introduction of statutory defences, and my colleagues at official level in the Home Office are working with the National Cyber Security Centre, law enforcement and the industry on this issue to try to come to some conclusions. The Home Office is actively considering wider changes to the Computer Misuse Act. As part of the review that we are undertaking, we are scoping several proposals to update the Act, including the very point that has been mentioned by a number of noble Lords, which is on the Act’s extraterritorial provisions and the maximum penalties that were introduced.
In relation to proposals to increase maximum penalties for computer misuse offences, the Act already provides for a range of penalties, including life imprisonment for offences that cause or create a significant risk of serious damage to human welfare or national security. While the Government share the noble Lord’s concern regarding appropriate sentencing and are considering this as part of the wider review of the 1990 Act, we do not consider the proposal to update the majority of offences and uplift them under the Act to 14 years to be proportionate. However—and I hope this is accepted —and as I have said in a number of areas today, this Government are still just over 18 months into office. A review is being undertaken and I hope it will come to some conclusion on those issues, but at the moment those complexities are still under consideration.
Amendment 364 would introduce personal criminal liability for directors and managers who failed to prevent or otherwise consented to offending under the Computer Misuse Act. Again, I recognise the intent to strengthen accountability. Our current view is that it is unnecessary, given the existing offences applicable to persons who enable or facilitate offending. I know that this will be entirely unsatisfactory to noble Lords, both to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and to the supporters who have spoken in this debate today, but while this review of the 1990 Act is ongoing, I am limited in regard to what I can say about the Government’s plans to reform the Act, but I hope that I have acknowledged that the points that have been raised are absolutely valid.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)
Is the Minister able to clarify whether the review is still ongoing, or are the Government currently reviewing the review?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I say to the noble Lord—and I hope that he takes this in the way in which I respond—that the review commenced in 2021, and it is now 2026. That is a long time for a review, and I would want to ensure that we come to some conclusions on the 1990 Act. However, at this stage, I cannot give him a timescale for the reasons that I have mentioned, about the complexity of this matter. I along with Minister Jarvis have had custody in the Home Office of these issues since July 2024; that is still three years into a review that was commissioned in 2021. I cannot give him a definitive timescale today, but I hope that the House can accept that there is active consideration of these very important matters raised by Members and that the Home Office plans to reform the Act. I hope that I will demonstrate that we are progressing this work at pace, but we need to get it right. Sadly, we are not going to be able to legislate in this Bill, but there is scope to examine issues at a later date. With those reassurances, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, unusually, light is flooding through the windows of the Home Office, and I thank the Minister, but I shall come back to what he had to say. First, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, for her support. As the Minister said, her huge experience in this area is valuable, and it is really valuable to have her support in those circumstances.
I also say a big thank you to the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, who thinks these things through in a very eloquent fashion. He more or less reminded me that, back in 1990, the thing that I was using was a dial-up Apple Mac Classic—probably a Classic II—which just shows how long ago the Act was.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I do not wish to disturb the noble Lord in full flow, but I have just remembered that I missed an important point for the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, who requested a meeting with either me or another appropriate Minister. I will take that request away and get back to the noble Lord in due course about a meeting with me or my colleague, Minister Dan Jarvis—or both of us—and anybody the noble Lord wishes to bring with him.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
That is a very useful offer for those who are involved in or have an interest in pushing this agenda forward. As the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, also emphasised following the speech from the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, it is not just about being out of date; it is positively harmful. The Home Office appears to be aware of that, despite the stately progress on the review. The fact that the Minister has said there is a recognition of the need to update the Act is very helpful. He said that they have made progress in formulating a limited defence, but I am not quite so sure about that—let us see when it arrives. I am sure that he has engraved across his forehead the phrase “an update at some point”. That is not quite as good as “shortly”, but it is perhaps better than “in due course”. One has to take away the crumbs of comfort that one can.
What I take most comfort from is the fact that we have a cyber security and resilience Bill, which will come to this House after hitting the Commons, where it had its Second Reading yesterday. If the Home Office picks up a bit of pace, there might well be the opportunity to produce a clause there to provide the kind of defence that we are talking about today. I understand that the Minister has a rather Trappist vow at this point, in terms of being limited in what can be said, but we very much hope that he can be let loose at some stage in the future. We look forward to that but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower
“Increased penalties for fare dodging(1) Section 5 of the Regulations of Railways Act 1889 (penalty for avoiding payment of fare) is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (1), for “level 2” substitute “level 4”.(3) In subsection (3)—(a) for “level 3”, in each place in which it appears, substitute “level 5”, and(b) for “three months” substitute “six months”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to increase the penalties for passengers who fail or refuse to pay railway fares and those who travel or attempt to travel without having paid for previous fares.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this group addresses two of the most significant criminal challenges facing our railways: fare dodging and freight crime. First, my Amendment 365 seeks to increase the penalties for fare dodging on the railways. It was reported towards the end of last year that one in 20 London Underground passengers was dodging fares. Transport for London has estimated its losses at around £130 million over the last year, with losses across the whole railway network potentially reaching £330 million. This is not a victimless crime. Those losses do not simply disappear into the ether. Every penny not paid in rail fare means less money for improvements to services, less money for infrastructure upgrades and higher fares for the vast majority of law-abiding passengers who do pay their fares.
Often, fare evasion is a crime committed in conjunction with other more serious offences. Some of those who have been stopped and searched by police for fare evasion have been found with knives and drugs. This amendment would increase the maximum fine that can be issued by officers of the railway operators for fare evasion from level 2 to level 4 on the standard scale, therefore bringing the maximum penalty from £500 to £2,500. Furthermore, it would increase the maximum penalties that can be handed out on summary conviction to a level 5 fine or a term of imprisonment of up to six months.
The existing penalties were fixed at the current levels through the Criminal Justice Act 1982, meaning they were set a number of decades ago. Given the scale of the problem, it is clear that these penalties do not reflect either the seriousness of persistent fare evasion or the reality that some offenders treat the current regime as a calculated risk. This amendment would also increase the maximum penalties available to the courts, particularly for repeat or aggravated offenders, while leaving full discretion with magistrates to distinguish between genuine error and deliberate fraud.
This is about not just punishment but enforcement. Railway staff, especially at Transport for London, need to be trained to confront those bumping barriers and take action. It is an all too common occurrence to see staff simply watching as people jump the barriers.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I support my noble friend’s Amendment 365 after Clause 117, which would increase penalties for those who deliberately avoid paying rail fares. Deliberate fare evasion undermines the integrity of our railway and costs taxpayers and passengers hundreds of millions each year. We must be firm in protecting revenue that funds services and investment.
However, there is another side to this issue that we cannot ignore. Recent reviews and watchdog recommendations show a system that is complex, inconsistent and at times unfair to passengers who make genuine mistakes. The passenger watchdog has called for a national yellow card warning for first-time errors and a central railcard database to prevent innocent people being prosecuted for technical or administrative errors. I always book advance tickets on the train; they are slightly cheaper than the full-fare ones. A few weeks ago, business here finished early, so I got to Euston early and caught an earlier train than I had booked. When I produced my ticket, I said to the manager, “I’m on an earlier train. Is that all right?” He said, “I’ll let you off on this occasion”. I think what he meant was that he would let me off paying the full fare because I was on an earlier train. But I have heard of people, with a ticket that they have paid for, being accused of fare evasion for being on the train at the wrong time. That is a perfect example of where the yellow card system should be used.
The Office of Rail and Road was asked to review revenue protection practices precisely because enforcement has been uneven and opaque. We have seen the consequences of those failures. Thousands of prosecutions were quashed after courts found that operators had used inappropriate fast-track procedures and many passengers faced the threat of criminal records for minor errors. These are not abstract concerns; they are real harms to livelihoods and trust in the system.
I support the principle of tougher penalties for deliberate evasion, but only if there are clear safeguards. Those safeguards should be: a statutory first-warning step; a consistent published test before any prosecution; improved point-of-sale information and standardised enforcement guidance for all the different train operators; and mandatory staff training and data sharing to identify repeat offenders rather than punishing honest mistakes. I understand that the Government have accepted the ORR’s recommendations and must now legislate to ensure that enforcement is proportionate and transparent.
In short, tough penalties and fairness are not mutually exclusive. We can deter deliberate evasion while protecting innocent travellers, but only if this amendment is paired with the reforms that the ORR and passenger bodies have recommended. I urge the Minister to support the amendment on that basis and to press the Government to enshrine these other safeguards in law.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Blencathra has made a very pragmatic speech on the difficulties of fare evasion and the extraordinary complexities of the ticketing and fares system in the UK. Of course, I note that the Government are legislating in this area as part of the broader GB Railways Bill that is coming down the tracks, as it were. I really do not believe that there is a single individual in the United Kingdom who could answer 20 questions about the cheapest fare from A to B crossing C and get it right. It is an extraordinary system, and I quite agree that many people are making inadvertent errors, which should absolutely be taken into consideration.
Equally, the Minister will have heard me talking about enforcement on many occasions throughout the passage of the Bill. The law is brought very quickly into disrepute if the laws that law-abiding people see as absolutely necessary are avoided by a determined criminal element. We have all seen it. We have all seen it on the Tube, with people barging through, tailgating and hopping over the barriers. I have seen two officials of London Underground at Green Park station late in the evening, chatting to one another—someone comes barging past and they do absolutely nothing. If that continues, then I suggest we get ourselves into a very difficult situation indeed. So, when the Minister comes to respond, I ask that he talks about enforcement and about the attitude of the police to combat this serious issue which robs the railways and London Underground of hundreds of millions of pounds and is unsustainable.
I think that, on the ticketing issue and the fare issues, the answer really lies in technology. I think that apps have made this much more straightforward. It is absolutely a task for computers to find the best ticket from A to B, but there are plenty of people who do not use those, who are not particularly computer literate and who prefer a paper ticket. So, it is perhaps more complex than it seems from the outside, but I really think we have to put more effort on enforcement in this difficult area.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, briefly, because very good points have been made, I am tempted to say, yes, we need to increase penalties or threaten people with prison, because fare dodging does drive me mad, particularly on the Tube. It is partly the brazen, quite violent and intimidatory way that it happens for ordinary people: you are pushed out of the way and you just do not know what to do. We are not all Robert Jenrick with a camera: you want to intervene, you want to say something, you want to have something happen, but it does not happen. What has occurred is a normalisation of anti-social behaviour. The difficulty is whether we can legislate against that, because it seems to me that, partly at least, this is cultural and we have a situation where members of the public look away.
But I do think there is a problem with staffing. Whether TfL staff in particular are intimidated or whether they are indifferent, it is hard to tell, but I can assure noble Lords that they are not intervening very much. Despite the fact that this has had a lot of publicity recently, I have seen that it carries on, it seems to me, all the time. Even if you talk to the staff, they look the other way. It is one of those things: you do not want to be a grass and so on—by “you” I do not mean the noble Viscount—but I can see people feeling “I don’t necessarily want to go and report on that person, and I’m not sure what to do”. In other words, the public are stymied and are not quite sure how to respond. It is ironic, because we are constantly told that we should respect public-facing staff, and that is absolutely right, but if the public-facing staff do not respect us as members of the public, it makes it difficult. So, I am not convinced, despite the good intentions of this amendment, that it is the solution, because I am fed up with laws being added to the statute book that nobody enforces—it seems to me to bring the law into disrepute.
I want to add a note about the difficulties of buying tickets on national rail and knowing whether you are using the right ticket. I can assure noble Lords that I have made mistakes, but one reason that you can make a mistake is if you have a ticket for a fixed time and the train is late and you get on another train, you can actually be reprimanded for being on the wrong train when in fact it has just arrived at the time that the train that you were going to get should have arrived or has not arrived. I will not bore noble Lords with the details, but anyone who has travelled on trains regularly will know what I am talking about—and then to be sneered at by a member of staff. It seems to me that the danger here is that the innocent could indeed find themselves at the receiving end of a more draconian enforcement, whereas the culprit, as it were, gets away with it.
I also want to draw attention to the dangers of fast-track court processes. I really hate this single justice procedure, and it is worth noting that TfL are the people who use it most to prosecute people. The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, made the point that you can appeal to magistrates. Well, not in that instance, because you are not in the courtroom; it is all happening behind your back. I just worry about injustice occurring. On the other hand, I would like to hear from the Government what strategy they have: not relying on one person with a video camera to expose this, but a campaign about fare dodging would do no harm, because it is public money and the public get very irritated by it. I do not think we need an amendment, but I would not mind some action being taken.
Lord Goddard of Stockport (LD)
My Lords, this is an interesting group of amendments, although I think we have strayed slightly away from the intentions of the mover of the amendment. Amendment 365 is another amendment from the Conservative Benches increasing penalties for fare dodging. As other speakers have said—and I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, acknowledged this—the key to enforcement is consistency in how these regulations are applied and, currently, that is not the case. I hope that Great British Railways, when it takes over the franchises, will guarantee some common training and work in that area, which will stop the blindingly obvious things that we see. I have seen it at Westminster station here, where three people have just burst a barrier and there have been two staff members there with their arms folded almost waving them through: “It’s not my job, go”, and off they went.
I will just make one comment. I do not think the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said it with any intention, but I have never found any staff on British railways to be sneering and offensive, but we have to understand that sometimes they are dealing with people who make a professional life of travelling on the railways without paying. I have been on a train down to London, and sitting across from me was a gentleman with a son who looked about 10 years of age with a little iPad. When we had got almost to Milton Keynes, about two miles out, a ticket collector came through and the man had a single off-peak ticket to Macclesfield, which is the next station from Stockport. He was not going buy another ticket—“I’m not buying a ticket. You can’t throw me off this train. I’ve got a child with me”. That is the dilemma that the train manager faces. It is emotional blackmail, and how often does this happen? But the train manager was very polite. He dealt with him, and just asked him to either buy a ticket with his credit card, or he would have to get off at Milton Keynes and there would be a policeman waiting for him there. That seemed impossible to do, but he made a quick phone call, we pulled into Milton Keynes and the chap had to get off, because there was some peer pressure from other passengers, I must admit, and there was a policeman waiting for him. That sends a real message about the connectivity of what guards can do without having to get into a confrontation with passengers.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I want to comment on something the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, said and endorse it. I regularly travel to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg and I use the marvellous level-access tram system. There are no barriers or gates, but periodically four people come on in a team with their little electronic machines, go between one station and another, and check we all have our little “aller simple” travelcard. If someone does not have it, they are hauled off. It is only one team of about four people in all of Strasbourg, but everyone is terrified of not having a valid ticket. That may be the solution: check people on the trains rather than at the barriers.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I thank all noble Lords for speaking in this short but important debate, and raising these important issues. As we are discussing rail issues, I should first draw noble Lords’ attention to my interests, as declared in the register. I am former employee and current shareholder of a transport operator, FirstGroup, and a former employee and current member of a rail union, the Transport Salaried Staffs’ Association. So I am both staff side and management: it balances out.
I turn first to Amendment 365, put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, which seeks to increase the fines for fare dodging. The Government are committed to ensuring that everyone who travels on the railway pays the correct fare for their journey, and train operating companies have multiple mechanisms in place to prevent passengers travelling without the correct ticket. This includes the provisions set out in the Railways Act, but also use of the civil enforcement regime for penalty fares. In 2022, the penalty was raised from £20 to £100, and this has had a positive impact on reducing fare evasion and preventing fraud on the railway, which of course we all want to see.
Issuing penalty fares is one way of tackling fare dodging, but other measures can be taken. I am pleased to say that we had quite an extensive debate on these. As the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, acknowledged, the Office of Rail and Road has been asked to consider improvements to the industry’s revenue protection practices. Last year, it published its review setting out five recommendations, which my colleague the Secretary of State for Transport accepted in full.
It is probably worth very quickly going through the recommendations, which were: make buying the right ticket simpler and easier, strengthen consistency in how passengers are treated when ticket issues arise, introduce greater consistency and fairness in the use of prosecutions, make information and revenue protection easy to access and understand, and provide greater co-ordination, oversight and transparency of revenue protection activity. I hope, to an extent, those address the very valid concerns that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, expressed about complexity, which were shared by the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. We all want to encourage rail travel; we do not want to discourage it by making the system too complex, and we do not want to penalise those who are truly acting in good faith. At the same time, it is important that we prevent fare dodging and make sure that there is a proper regime to prevent it.
Fare simplification is at the heart of this, as many noble Lords said in the debate on these amendments. I can confirm that this is very much part of the Government’s plans for rail reforms as part of the creation of Great British Railways. It is probably up to individual train operators and other public transport operators to promote their own campaigns on fare dodging but, to pick up the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, it is the case that whether you are travelling on the Tube or national rail, you cannot go far without seeing posters and public information about fare dodging. This is about the balance between promoting responsible behaviour and a penalising and enforcement regime.
The noble Lord, Lord Goddard, and others talked about enforcement. On TfL, I share his experience. Maybe I use the Tube a little more than he does, but multiple times I have seen plainclothes crews both on Tube trains and at ticket barriers. I saw one at King’s Cross Tube station ticket barrier just last week. There was a large gang of enforcement officers waiting to catch people trying to get in by tailgating those who were paying fares through the automatic gates. So transport operators are very much aware of their responsibilities.
To be clear on the ORR review, a number of contributions focused not on national rail but on the Tube, and obviously that is operated by Transport for London, a devolved body that is overseen ultimately by the Mayor of London. I want to inform noble Lords that the ORR spoke to TfL as part of its review and it is of course up to TfL whether it takes on its recommendations. When it comes to national rail operators, the ORR has a full purview.
On Amendment 368A, the Government are very aware of the rising frequency of freight crime and the significant and damaging impact it can have on businesses and drivers. We are determined to crack down on it. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, talked very much in the context of rail freight, but of course this is a problem for road freight as well. The incidence of cargo theft, where criminals are ripping the sides of lorries and taking the goods inside, is frightening for dedicated HGV drivers across the UK, and the perception that this crime is low-risk and high-reward is unacceptable and one that we want to change. Whether it is on the rail or the road, we share the noble Lord’s determination to do something about it.
Working with the police, the Home Office has agreed to create a freight crime flag which will be attached to any applicable crime, whether it is on the road or on rail. It will apply across all police forces, including the British Transport Police, which of course polices the railways. The data will be collected as part of the annual data return to the Home Office. The flag is currently being piloted in a small number of forces and, following this, the intention is to roll it out across all forces. The benefit of using a flag, as opposed to creating new crime classifications, is that in a case where, for instance, a driver has their vehicle or load stolen and violence is used or threatened against them, the crime that would be recorded would be robbery, as opposed to vehicle crime. The flag, however, would identify the robbery as a freight crime.
However, we will monitor the implementation of the flag. We are about half way through the six-month pilot, so we will keep a close eye on how this is panning out and consider whether further steps are required in the future. We know that having a code or a flag would not of itself solve the problem. Victims should always report crime to the police, and we expect police to investigate. However, as noble Lords would expect me to say, it is for chief constables to allocate resources for such investigations in line with local policing priorities.
I also acknowledge the worrying involvement of serious and organised criminals in committing freight crime. These individuals are damaging this country’s global reputation and are costing us billions each year. The Government are committed to tackling serious and organised crime in all its forms and are working with policing to that end. We are working closely with the National Vehicle Crime Intelligence Service and with Opal, the police’s national intelligence unit focused on serious organised acquisitive crime, including a vehicle crime intelligence desk which covers freight crime.
I hope in my response I have been able to reassure the noble Lord, Lord, Davies, that we accept the spirit of his Amendment 368A and are working to address the issues he has raised in tabling the amendment. I hope too that the noble Lord will understand why we do not consider his Amendment 365 to be necessary. For all of these reasons, I invite him to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions: my noble friends Lord Blencathra and Lord Goschen, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, for his very interesting examples.
I hope we have been able to impress on the Government the importance of tackling railway crime. I have travelled for over 50 years now on the London Underground, and things have improved immensely with the new security gates, et cetera, but still we see people avoiding payment by tailgating, which is something we have to challenge and stop. I hope the Government will look at addressing these issues, but for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe
“Cloud service access restrictions: lost or stolen mobile phone devices(1) A provider of cloud-based services that support smartphone functionality must, upon receiving verified notification from a registered user that their device has been lost or stolen, take reasonable and timely steps to prevent that device from accessing its services, in order to discourage the resale of illegally-gained devices.(2) The provider must block access to cloud services from the identified device, including but not limited to—(a) data synchronisation services,(b) remote storage access,(c) account authentication services, and(d) app store or software update services.(3) The provider must inform, as soon as practically possible, the National Crime Agency and the police service in the area in which the theft or loss of the device was first reported.(4) Providers must, subject to appropriate safeguards, establish a process for users to appeal or reverse a block on a device in cases of error, fraud, or device recovery.(5) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for—(a) the technical standards required to enforce the steps outlined in subsection (1),(b) the implementation timeline for providers, and(c) sanctions for non-compliance.(6) In this section, “the provider” means a provider of cloud-based services to mobile phone users.” Member's explanatory statement
The amendment seeks to ensure that technology companies use technical measures such as cloud-based blocking and IMEI linked device locks to make the resale of stolen mobile phone devices abroad more difficult and thus reduce the incidents of phone thefts in the UK.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I rise to move Amendment 366 and speak to Amendment 538 in the name of my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough, who has commitments overseas today. I am particularly delighted to have the support of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, with his experience as Met Commissioner and the wisdom he showed when we served together on the Cabinet Office Board, and also of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, not a Conservative but my partner over the last decade in the defence of intellectual property.
Given its importance in cutting crime, this is rightly a cross-party amendment, and we have drawn heavily on the work of Dame Chi Onwurah MP, her Select Committee on Science, Innovation and Technology and her well known tech expertise.
There is a serious problem. Politicians, spurred on by their advisers, boast far too often that they are “world-leading”. Unfortunately, we are a world leader in the sphere of phone theft. We are the phone theft capital of Europe with a horrific 70% of UK thefts in London, many of them from tourists so important to UK growth. In 2024, around 80,000 smartphones were reported as stolen compared with just 64,000 in the previous year; just the sort of growth we do not want to see.
On the streets, the value of a phone is roughly £300 to £400, and because they are the most valuable, about 80% are iPhones, Apple’s brilliant device. According to the Met, stolen phones had a street value of around £20 million in 2024. But the replacement value of these phones—members of the public and insurance companies having to pay out to replace them—was estimated by the Met at around £50 million last year.
Commander Conway of the Met told the Select Committee in June that 65% to 70% of our knife crime is produced by our robbery problem, and that it also drives a significant chunk of our violence challenge in the capital and across the UK. In that space lies the exploitation of young children and young people, into gangs; and this is largely an international organised crime phenomenon driven by criminal economics and the difficulty of getting hold of smartphones legitimately in some parts of the world.
Analysis of data relating to an industry sample of some 4,000 Apple devices stolen in London in 2023 shows that Algeria, with 22%, is the most common internet address of connected devices, followed by China, at 16%. In total, 78% of the stolen devices were connected to overseas networks. This means that the devices are, for the most part, being sold to be used as devices in other countries—not as parts, a current focus of Apple.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I am pleased to support Amendments 366 and 538, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, and introduced so cogently by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. I thank her for the reference to my honourable friend Martin Wrigley, who helped to identify this particular issue, which addresses the growing problem of mobile phone and device theft, often fuelled by the profitability of reselling these stolen goods overseas.
We are currently facing an epidemic of mobile phone theft, as the noble Baroness said, with reports indicating that phone snatches have increased by as much as 150% in certain areas. Every single day, approximately 200 mobile phones are stolen across the country, with many being destined for a lucrative resale market abroad. These stolen devices remain valuable criminal assets, because, currently, they often can still be accessed or resold even after being reported.
We support Amendment 366 because it seeks to strike at the heart of this criminal profit model. The amendment would ensure that technology companies actively employ technical measures, specifically cloud-based blocking and IMEI-linked device locks, as the noble Baroness described, to deter the resale of stolen mobile phone devices. Without compulsory co-operation from cloud service providers and manufacturers, stolen data and devices will remain valuable criminal assets, even if the physical device is recovered. This is an essential step towards forcing technical solutions from technology companies to counter the incentives for theft.
Amendment 538 would provide the industry with a necessary and reasonable lead-in period, specifying that these cloud service access restrictions will come into force six months after the Act is passed. This would ensure that technology companies have the time required to implement the necessary technical standards and administrative processes.
For too long, the manufacturers and cloud providers have treated device theft as a secondary concern. It is time that they work in a much more customer-friendly manner, in the way that the noble Baroness described, and use their immense technical capabilities to simply turn these devices into mute bricks the moment they are stolen, thereby removing the incentive for the crime altogether. I very much hope that the Minister will accept these common-sense measures to protect our property and safety.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I have added my name to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, ably explained by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. I may cover some of the same ground—I was only grateful that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, intervened, because people might have forgotten some of the points made, but if I amplify them too much I am sure that somebody will remind me. I was particularly keen to support the amendment because, in the past, I have criticised the police for a lack of enforcement and detection—but of course, they cannot do everything.
We know that organised crime, which I will come to later, is about money; it is just another form of business. Theft is driven by people trying to make a profit. The amendment is all about the commercial business of mobile phone sales—some of it legal but some of it criminal. Apparently, there are about 88 million mobile phones in this country. They can be about £1,000 each, so that is a market of about £88 billion or something of that order. It is a massive market. In 2023, the purchase of these devices totalled £5.8 billion, and there is another £2.5 billion-worth of services that they provide and that we all pay for, from data to the general use of a mobile phone. This, by any measure, is a massive business.
The value of the phones stolen, as the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, mentioned, was about £20 million, with a reinsurance value of £50 million. The number of phones stolen in the UK is about 120,000, with two-thirds of this happening in London. It is a big city, and there are an awful lot of targets for the criminals wandering about. As they leave the Tube, people take their phone out to get a signal, as we all want, and to check on the messages they have not received while they were on the Tube. That is where the criminals spot them, and they then follow them to a place where they relieve them of their phone. I suspect that is one reason why we see so much of this in London. Clearly, the business model works very well here.
These are the crimes that are reported. An awful lot of phones that are stolen are never reported. I have talked to people in this place who have not reported their phone as stolen because there has been a level of embarrassment about the fact that it has happened to them on the street—they have just got another phone. We only know about the bare minimum of the number of phones that have been stolen in the course of a year.
On many occasions, violence is used. Just the ripping of a phone from a hand can lead to somebody trying to hold on to it, and we never know where that contest might end. If somebody ends up on the floor, violence can follow and the physical consequences can be quite severe.
As far as the mobile phone industry is concerned, £20 million is a very small number compared to an £88 billion market. More importantly, as the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, pointed out, the industry benefits, because when you have your phone stolen you go back to get another one. So why would it stop this? There is no financial incentive to actually do anything about it. There might be a moral one, but I am afraid it looks as though the moral incentive is not having an awful lot of effect. Of course, none of the manufacturers or the networks tries to lead in the market by saying that if their phone is stolen then it cannot be used. There is no market incentive for one manufacturer to say that its phone is better because it cannot be stolen, or, alternatively, that if it is stolen then it has no value. There is no effect on the market that is helping to prevent the theft of phones.
It is all to do with organised crime. There are some fancy definitions—one or two people in the Chamber may know of them—of organised crime and what is it all about. It is about money. It is about being organised enough to steal things in such a volume and have somebody to buy them which means that they have been worth stealing in the first place. The market they are involved in is enforced by violence. There is no monopolies commission supervision of this market, whether it be drugs or mobile phones; it is enforced by violence to ensure that they succeed and that other people fail. It is therefore really important that we get this right.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, said, the resale value of a mobile phone that has been stolen is about £300 to £400. The thief does not get £300 to £400, but, by the time it has gone through a few hands, that is the return that they are expecting. To pay everybody out, they need to get £300 to £400 to make sure that it works.
The problem is that 78% of the phones that are stolen are going abroad, as has been said, and we cannot seem to stop them at the border. This is not entirely surprising. Phones are very small items and some 90% of the world’s goods travel by sea, in containers. Without intelligence, the chance of finding mobile phones is very limited. Therefore, we are not able to physically stop the phones leaving the country and going to places such as Algeria and China. At the moment, the police are fighting a losing battle to catch the thieves, who are low down the organised crime chain, and trying to prevent the export of stolen phones. As I said, given the size of a phone, that is quite difficult: they are looking for a very small needle in a very large haystack.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Jackson on the quality of the amendment he drafted. I also congratulate my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe on the superb speech she made setting out why this amendment is necessary. As we know, it addresses one of the fastest-growing forms of organised crime in the UK: the theft and rapid export of mobile phones—thousands and thousands of them. These are no longer opportunistic street offences. As noble Lords have said, they are part of a highly profitable, highly mobile criminal market that depends on one thing above all else: the ability to reactivate and resell the stolen devices abroad.
A couple of years ago, I was outside Victoria station, at the end of Victoria Street, waiting to cross the road. I saw a woman waiting for the pedestrian lights to change, holding her mobile phone out—I think she was trying to read the map—almost like a Geiger counter. Then I saw two guys on a motor scooter coming around the corner and I tried to shout to her to put her phone away, but too late—it was snatched in seconds.
That was a couple of years ago, when I think there were motor scooter gangs doing it. Now, as we have seen—we were talking about the e-bike problem in our debates on the Bill before Christmas—there are lots of videos of these guys on their very fast bikes, snatching phones, and I believe the Met now has a response squad on those high-powered bikes chasing the phone thieves. So it is a big problem, particularly in London.
At present, our defences are simply not keeping pace. IMEI blocking helps, but criminals now routinely bypass it by altering identifiers or moving devices to jurisdictions where UK blacklists are ignored. What they cannot bypass is the cloud. As noble Lords have said, modern smartphones are useless without access to the cloud-based services that power authentication, updates, storage and app ecosystems.
The amendment therefore introduces a very simple, proportionate requirement. When a user reports their phone lost or stolen, cloud service providers must take reasonable steps to block that specific device from accessing their services. If a stolen phone cannot be reactivated, it cannot be resold. If it cannot be resold, it is not worth stealing. It is as simple as that.
My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe hinted that the phone companies may possibly have a financial benefit from not co-operating here. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan- Howe, was more blatant. I will be more blatant still. I am absolutely certain that they are conspiring not to co-operate so that they can sell more phones. We were discussing all-terrain vehicles a couple of hours ago. When the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Bill was going through, the police officers who were advising us said that they had heard from some of the big manufacturers of ATVs—the ones which make motorbikes with locks you cannot penetrate—that they were deliberately putting rubbish locks on the ATVs because when the £8,000 quad bike was stolen, the farmer immediately replaced it. They saw a market in goods being stolen. I think the big phone companies see exactly the same thing: there is a market in replacement phones.
The noble Lord asked: why do the British Government not do something about it? I suspect it is mega US-UK politics. If we said we were going to restrict the ability of Apple, Google and others to sell their phones here, I think we would have Mr Trump seeking to invade us next week, so I suspect there are geopolitical problems there.
The amendment also ensures proper safeguards: verification before blocking, a clear appeals process, and a role for the Secretary of State in setting technical standards. It strengthens law enforcement by requiring timely notification to the National Crime Agency and local police, giving them valuable intelligence on organised theft. This is not about burdening industry. It is about ensuring that all providers meet a consistent baseline of responsible behaviour—one that many already follow voluntarily, but which criminals exploit when it is not universal.
I conclude by saying that we have an opportunity here to collapse the economic incentive that drives mobile phone theft. Cloud-based blocking is practical, proportionate and overdue, and I commend the amendment to the Minister.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough for tabling these excellent amendments, and to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for moving Amendment 366 on his behalf.
This amendment is driven by a simple proposition: if we are to bear down on the scourge of phone theft, we must remove the profit motive, because it is precisely this incentive to profit that drives the vast industry behind phone theft. Too often, the criminal justice system is left trying to deal with the consequences of crime after the event, rather than addressing the incentives that fuel it in the first place. Phone theft is now a high-volume, high-impact crime, particularly in our cities, and it causes not only financial loss but real fear and disruption to victims’ lives.
What this amendment seeks to do is eminently practical. It asks cloud service providers, which already control the digital lifeline that makes a smartphone valuable, to take responsible and timely steps to deny access to those services once a device is verified as lost or stolen. A phone that cannot access cloud backups, app stores, authentication, service or updates rapidly becomes worthless on the secondary market, whether at home or abroad.
This is not a novel idea nor an untested one. As many noble Lords will know, the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee has examined this issue in detail. In its recent correspondence with Ministers and technology companies, the committee highlighted both the scale of the problem and the frustrating gap between what is technically possible and what is currently being done. The committee made it clear that voluntary action has been uneven, that existing measures are inconsistently applied across platforms, and that stronger co-ordination, potentially underpinned by legislation, may be required if we are serious about prevention. This amendment directly reflects that evidence-based work and gives effect to its central recommendations.
Importantly, the amendment builds in safeguards for users to appeal or reverse a block where a mistake has been made or a device is recovered. It leaves the detailed technical standards, timelines and sanctions to secondary legislation, allowing flexibility and proper consultation with industry, and it recognises the importance of law enforcement by requiring prompt notification to the National Crime Agency and local police, strengthening intelligence and disruption efforts. Fundamentally, if we can force cloud service providers to implement this provision, we can break the cycle of phone theft. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, for taking up the cudgels on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson. I thought I had got away with it when I did not see him in the Chamber, but the noble Baroness turned up at the last minute, like the cavalry, and charged in to raise this very important issue, which I appreciate her doing. She is right to do so because, self-evidently, mobile phone theft is unacceptable. It is a significant criminal operation—as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said, it involves overseas criminal gangs—and a great inconvenience, cost and discomfort to many people. We need collectively to take action to support the reduction of mobile phone theft.
Amendment 366, moved by the noble Baroness on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, would require technology companies which offer cloud-based services to use technical measures, such as cloud-based blocking, to prevent access to cloud-based services after a device by a registered user has been lost or stolen. The noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Blencathra—and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, from the Front Bench of His Majesty’s Opposition—expressed support for that principle and indicated that it is one method of tackling the scourge of mobile phone theft.
I share the noble Baroness’s concern about the theft of mobile phones and other devices that host cloud-based services. The number of thefts is too high and we are determined to get it down. I agree that urgent action is required to make sure that the companies which design these devices—to take up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe—play their part and do absolutely everything they can to ensure that a stolen mobile phone is not a valuable commodity and therefore not worth stealing.
I share the intent to reduce mobile phone theft, but I suggest to the noble Baroness that there are a number of potential practical challenges in the proposed approach that I am uncertain whether we would currently be able to overcome. Many apps on mobile phone devices have some element of cloud access, so the range of companies in scope of the provision would appear to be extremely broad. In addition, disabling all cloud services could, for example, stop tracking and recovery of mobile phones, especially if the tracking function relies on cloud connectivity. That would impede law enforcement’s ability to identify locations to which stolen devices are taken.
As noble Lords will note, there is a measure in the Bill to ensure that tracking of mobile phones is dealt with in a much speedier and more effective way without the need for warrants. The Government are working with industry and law enforcement partners on the delivery of practical and effective measures. As the noble Baroness said, there was a very productive round table in February which brought together police, technology companies and others to look at how we can do what the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, recommended: break the business model of mobile phone theft.
The summit resulted in clear commitments from attendees, including data sharing on mobile phone theft to get a comprehensive picture. There was also a range of other measures, including the police stepping up their operational response. Members will have seen this particularly in London, where the Metropolitan Police—I also pay tribute to the City of London Police—has targeted high areas of that activity as an operational response to catching criminals responsible for these crimes. As I have mentioned, the Bill gives police powers to enter premises to search for and seize stolen items, which would be negated if the tracking element was not allowed. That will help in seriously tackling this issue by enabling the tracking down of stolen mobile phones to particular properties.
As a result of the summit, technology companies and policing partners have continued to work together and there have been a number of working groups looking collectively at tech, operational issues of street action by police forces and other issues, although the main committee has not been reconvened. We have had a change of Home Secretary since the summit took place, so I will go back to the Home Secretary’s office about the potential for reconvening the major group, because it is important that that is done and seen through.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
I acknowledge that the Minister is trying hard to give a positive response, but I wonder whether he wants to challenge the reasons being offered when he goes back to the Home Office.
For most of these mobile phones, if the thieves have any sense they will turn them off, because the risk of being tracked is not insignificant, although clearly they do not always. That could be managed in two ways. First, there could be a time limit before the phone is blocked, such as 48 hours—the owner will not be looking for this phone for the next six years. Secondly, and probably more importantly, this is a bit Catch-22; if we argue, as I think the Government accept, that it is valuable because it can still connect to the network, once the thief knows it will not be connected to the network there will be no need to track it when it is stolen, because nobody will be stealing it. I know this will not be perfect, but if you could reduce it by 90%, that would have a massive impact.
I accept that the point on tracking is well intended, but if we made this difference, the device would not be reconnected and there would be no need for tracking. If there is a need, perhaps we should just time-limit it. I accept the advice the Minister has been given, but there is a way round that argument.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am content, with the noble Lord’s experience of how these matters can be dealt with, to reflect on what he has said, but it does not get away from the fact that the problems I have outlined with the amendment as drafted would still be present. I cannot accept the amendment today but, in principle, we are all looking for solutions to stopping mobile phones being stolen, either by effective police action on the ground or by use of neighbourhood policing targeting hotspot areas with high levels of mobile phone theft. The noble Lord mentioned Tube exits, for example.
I cannot accept the amendment in this form because the reasons I have given need to be thought through. The noble Lord’s contribution points to another area where thought can be given. In light of what I have said, I hope the noble Baroness will withdraw the amendment for now, but not the general concern of this Committee and this Government that we need to take action on this issue.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
I thank the Minister for his constructive response to this important amendment, and all those who took part in the debate. The powerful combination of the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Hogan-Howe, my noble friends Lord Blencathra and Lord Davies of Gower and the Minister himself represent a lot of expertise in this area and concern to tackle this criminal activity. I am very grateful for that.
The former Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, was absolutely right to convene interested parties to try to tackle the appalling damage being done to victims of this criminal activity. Theft of phones and their onward sale overseas is a very profitable business. The theft statistics probably understate the problem, as we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and the providers do not at present have an incentive to solve it. It is highly regrettable but, as a result, not enough has been done.
I am not convinced that tracking, data sharing and hotspot enforcement, of which I am very supportive and have spoken in favour of to the Minister before, are quite enough. I am glad to hear that working groups are continuing, and the undertaking to have a further meeting of the Home Secretary’s group is very valuable.
I hope the Minister will also reflect on the debate, think what can be done and perhaps come back with a government amendment or undertakings as to what can be done. But failing that, and probably in any event, I think we will wish to return to this important issue on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Crime and Policing Bill
Wednesday 7th January 2026
(4 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-VIII(a) Amendment for Committee (Supplementary to the Eighth Marshalled List) - (6 Jan 2026)
Lord Vaux of Harrowden
“Technology and telecommunications companies’ liability for APP fraud reimbursementWithin six months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must prepare and publish a report, and lay it before Parliament, setting out proposals for ensuring that technology and telecommunications companies—(a) owe a duty of care to their customers to prevent fraud being originated on platforms or services that they provide, and(b) contribute to the costs of reimbursing victims of Authorised Push Payment fraud, where such fraud has originated on services or platforms provided by the relevant company.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to bring forward proposals to ensure that technology and telecommunications companies have a duty of care to prevent fraud and meet a share of the costs of reimbursing APP fraud victims.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
My Lords, we come back to fraud. As the Minister will be well aware, this is not the first time I have raised the issue of ensuring that the technology and telecoms companies take their share of responsibility for the use of their services or platforms by fraudsters and are made to contribute to the costs of reimbursing victims. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, and the noble Lords, Lord Young of Cookham and Lord Holmes of Richmond, for their support on this amendment.
On a previous group I mentioned the Fraud Act 2006 and Digital Fraud Committee, on which I was privileged to sit. Our report, Fighting Fraud: Breaking the Chain, which was published in November 2022, made the very clear conclusion:
“Until all fraud-enabling industries fear significant financial, legal and reputational risk for their failure to prevent fraud, they will not act”.
That has been borne out over the three years since. There has been no significant improvement, despite the voluntary charters that have been agreed. Only the banks are on the hook for the costs of fraud under the mandatory APP reimbursement rules that were brought in by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023. The banks must now pick up 100% of the reimbursement liability, and there is evidence to suggest that this is having a positive impact on the efforts that the banks are making to identify and prevent fraud.
Similarly, the Payment Systems Regulator’s six-monthly reports on the performance of the banks has provided welcome transparency as to which banks and payment services are doing most, and least, to combat fraud. As an aside, it would be good to have confirmation from the Minister that the subsuming of the PSR into the FCA will not reduce the important reporting and oversight of APP fraud that the PSR has been providing.
The banks are picking up the liability, but they are not where the fraud originates. According to UK Finance statistics, around 70% by volume and 30% by value arises from online platforms, and 16% by volume and 36% by value arises from telecoms—calls and texts. Let us name names. According to the PSR, over half of APP scams originate on Meta platforms—Facebook and so on.
Nothing has changed that would change the conclusion of the committee that these industries will not take the issue seriously until they face liability for what they allow to happen on their platforms or services. The banks have sharpened up their acts, in part because of the mandatory reimbursement requirement that we have imposed on them. The banks face real liabilities for the fraud that goes through their accounts.
The Online Safety Act includes some important measures to prevent fraudulent content and scam advertising, but it does not make the companies liable for the losses. We have mandated that the banks should reimburse victims of APP scams after we decided that the voluntary code was not working, and it is now time that those who enable the frauds should pick up their share on a compulsory, not voluntary, basis. There are many possible ways to achieve this, so I have not been prescriptive in the amendment. It could be as simple as bringing the telcos and tech companies into the reimbursement requirements, or we could look at extending the new failure to prevent fraud offence so that it covers the use by third parties of services provided by a company. The failure to prevent offence currently covers only actions by employees or associates, so it would not cover scams in this situation.
Amendment 67 would simply require the Government to bring forward proposals for how to do this within six months of this Bill passing. It is not enough to keep publishing more fraud strategies. The one that is due to be published shortly, which I am sure the Minister will refer to, will be the third fraud strategy since I have been a Member of this House. The Minister said earlier that the fraud strategy would be published soon—I think he said, “in very short order”. I know that he cannot give a date, but it would be helpful to know whether that will be before Report. The content of the strategy might make this amendment unnecessary, so it would be very helpful if we could see it before Report.
Fraud and scam figures are not falling; they still make up around 40% of all crime in the UK. It really is time that we make those who allow their services to be used by the fraudsters, and those who enable the fraud, liable for their actions—or, rather, lack of action. It is the only way to make them take the issue seriously. I beg to move.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
We are very happy on these Benches to support this amendment. We all know the grim scale of fraud, now our most common crime. Authorised push payment scams are driven by online platforms, adverts on social media fuelling shopping and investment frauds, and hacked accounts enabling ticket scams. Yet, as has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, platforms such as Meta, which owns Facebook and Instagram, can still take six weeks to remove illegal content, allowing scammers to resurface again and again—so-called “life-boating”.
This amendment is designed to cut through that inertia. It would provide a clear statutory duty of care on tech and telecom firms to prevent scams at source, using their own AI and tools. It would also require them to share the financial burden with payment providers, which must already imburse many victims of authorised push payment fraud. That seems a fair step, given that the platforms host most of the scams and profit from the engagement that keeps users scrolling. Weak voluntary charters, non-binding Ofcom guidance and even the Online Safety Act’s proportionate measures have let these firms do the bare minimum—reacting to reports rather than proactively detecting fraud through verification, AI-driven scans and systematic audits. Big tech has unparalleled know-how—the AI, software and manpower to spot fraudster patterns and take them down. Banks cannot fight this alone and nor can the police. This amendment would compel these companies to protect their users, stopping scams upstream.
We hope that the Government’s fraud strategy follows the example of this amendment and goes even further with a failure to prevent fraud offence, backed by strong fines and tougher binding Ofcom standards. Meanwhile, Amendment 367 would provide some timely backbone, giving tech and telecom firms a real incentive to act swiftly before yet more victims lose potentially everything.
Lord Young of Cookham (Con)
My Lords, I put my name to the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. I want to add a brief footnote to the speech that he made in support. In an earlier debate, the Minister was very complimentary about the work of the fraud committee on which we both served, and he can convert that praise into action by accepting one of the recommendations which we made in our report.
It is worth quoting the relevant sections of the report that led up to that recommendation. On page 162, paragraph 57 states:
“However, banks are the last link in the fraud chain and cannot be expected to foot the fraud bill alone”.
Then we come on to our recommendation:
“To incentivise companies to act on fraud and more accurately reflect the balance of responsibility for fraud, the Government must establish a mechanism by which fraud-enabling sectors—in addition to the outgoing and recipient PSP—are required to contribute to the costs of reimbursement in cases where their platforms and services helped to facilitate the fraud”.
That is a very clear recommendation. We came to that conclusion after taking evidence from, for example, TSB and academics. They all made the point that there was absolutely no incentive on the part of the telecommunications companies to do anything, because their business case rested on generating revenue and they faced no penalties. That was our recommendation.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, for bringing forward this amendment, which addresses a very important issue. According to UK Finance, authorised push payment fraud accounted for almost 41% of fraud losses in the first half of last year, while unauthorised fraud decreased by 3% on the year. APP increased by 12%. It is clearly a pressing issue, and I am grateful that we have the opportunity to debate it.
The proposition in question would require technology and telecommunications companies, first, to owe a duty of care to their customers to prevent fraud occurring on their platforms and services in general. I do not see an issue with this in principle. Companies should attempt to protect their customers from fraud by implementing general safeguarding measures that prevent against common tactics such as impersonation. I would rather that this did not come from government intervention but was instead the product of a competitive industry, but I recognise that there is only so much that the market can achieve in the short term. I look forward to hearing the Government’s position on this.
I am a little more hesitant to offer support to the second condition of the noble Lord’s amendment, which would require technology and telecommunications companies to contribute to the costs of reimbursing victims of APP fraud that has occurred on their platforms or services. While I acknowledge that there is already an existing framework for company reimbursement in the form of the PSR’s mandatory reimbursement measures of October 2024, I am not certain that the policy is transferable to technology and communications companies.
The PSR requires banks and payment firms to split reimbursement costs evenly between the sending and receiving institutions, and it is very easy to discern which companies are responsible and therefore liable for payment. Adding technology and communication companies into that framework is not so straightforward. These companies are essentially a third party in the actual fraud occurring: they are neither the sender nor the recipient of the defrauded money; they are the medium through which fraud is made possible but not through which it actually occurs. Responsibility for the fraud and subsequent reimbursement does not seem to me to be as clear cut with technology companies as it is with banks and payment firms.
Secondly, the second measure in the noble Lord’s amendment is not thorough enough to support, even if my worries were addressed. The PSR mandatory reimbursement policy, enacted a year and a half ago, was the product of almost seven years of deliberation and policy-making; extending this measure to a whole new industry should face more scrutiny than that which can be achieved for a single amendment. The amendment itself raises questions as to which companies will qualify, what will their contributions be, and how these will fit within the existing requirements placed upon banks and payment firms. These are just a few questions, but there are many more that will need answering if we are seriously to consider this measure as a law.
That is not to say that APP reimbursement has not proved an effective tool in mitigating the harmful effects of fraud. According to the 12 months of available data since the PSR introduced mandatory reimbursement for APP fraud victims by banks and payment firms, 88% of lost money in scope has been returned to victims. Nor is it to say that technology and communication companies will not in future be the vehicle by which APP is committed—ever-popular social media and the ever-increasing AI industry will make sure of that. It is simply to say that we do not know enough about the implementation of this measure to support it. I appreciate its aim, and I agree that something must be done to tackle this specific type of APP, but at the moment I am not sure that the amendment adequately achieves that, so I look forward to hearing what the noble Lord has to say in closing.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, this Government are deeply concerned by the devastating impact online fraud can have on individual victims, both financially and emotionally. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, for tabling this amendment, to the noble Lord, Lord Young, and to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for helping us to understand and acknowledge the importance of this issue. The Government recognise the importance of preserving trust in digital communications and online spaces in order that all our hard-working businesses operating in the UK can grow and prosper. We recognise that incentives are important for accountability for all stakeholders.
The Government have seen a significant contribution from the banking sector in preventing fraud and supporting victims in response to the Payment Systems Regulator’s new authorised push payment scams reimbursement requirement. In the first nine months of the APP reimbursement scheme, 88% of eligible losses were reimbursed, with £112 million returned to victims. These figures reflect a strong and sustained commitment to protecting consumers—a positive trajectory that deserves recognition. While we are on the PSR scheme, the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, asked about the transition of PSR into the FCA. It is worth noting that we consulted on that planned merger of PSR into the FCA in September and October last year. We are currently considering the responses to that consultation and will bring forward further proposals in due course. He would expect me to say that we want to manage this process in a way that very much does not undermine the work that the Payment Systems Regulator is already doing to ensure that this system works well.
However, every part of an ecosystem must play a meaningful role in fraud prevention, including the telecommunications and tech sector. The Government have already taken steps to ensure that the tech and telecommunications sectors are rightly incentivised to proactively tackle fraud on their networks. The Online Safety Act requires in-scope companies to take proactive steps to stop fraudulent content appearing on the platform and to remove fraudulent material quickly when they become aware of it. If they do not, they risk facing the full regulatory costs of failing to comply, which can extend to 10% of their global revenue.
Ofcom’s duties on user-generated content are now in force in relation to several online harms, including fraud, and the regulator is already assessing platforms’ compliance. Further duties concerning action against fraudulent advertising will be consulted on this year and are likely to come into effect in 2027.
The telecoms sector is subject to regulation that requires providers to block calls that appear to be from scammers and to prevent scammers from using telephone numbers. It is fair to point out that there has been a fair amount of success already in that effort. Voluntary action has proved effective, and under the first telecoms charter operators have introduced firewalls that have stopped more than 1 billion scam text messages since January 2022, so that indicates the scale of both the problem and the progress that has been made.
We are also working with the sector and Ofcom on a number of innovative further actions to tackle the criminal abuse of telecoms networks. The Government launched the second Telecoms Fraud Charter in November 2025. This is an ambitious charter that covers 50 actions the telecoms industry will implement to tackle fraud within the sector. It includes developing new AI systems to detect and prevent fraud, building a new call-tracing system to track down fraudulent communications and upgrading the UK’s networks to enable new features to protect customers from spoof calls. This is a voluntary commitment from the telecoms sector that aims to strengthen efforts to further identify, block and disrupt telecoms fraud through enhanced industry collaboration and robust duty of care towards UK consumers and smaller telecoms businesses that have themselves been victims of fraud. The previous Telecoms Fraud Charter helped UK mobile network operators to block over 1 billion scam messages through the implementation of firewalls. We want to go further than that, which is what the new telecoms charter seeks to achieve.
In addition, Ofcom launched a consultation in October, outlining new rules on how mobile providers must stop scammers sending mobile messages. These proposals draw on existing best practice in the mobile sector and are intended to both prevent scammers accessing mobile messaging services and stop their activities where they have gained access. Last July, Ofcom also published a consultation on new rules to stop scammers outside the UK reaching people and businesses with calls that imitate UK mobile numbers, and these are likely to be introduced this year. We expect these measures to address gaps in the industry’s existing counterscam measures, and to significantly reduce the risk of individuals and businesses receiving scam messages.
Furthermore, in the upcoming fraud strategy, which we discussed earlier in Committee, and which was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, the Government will explore options to make it harder for criminals to exploit UK telecoms networks to commit fraud. The noble Lord tempted me to stray off the primrose path of prudence when it comes to timing; I am afraid I cannot do any better than repeat what my noble friend the Minister said: it will be coming in due course. Obviously, we have some time left even in Committee, let alone further stages of this Bill, so I am afraid I can make no commitments there.
The Government will continue monitoring developments in this area to ensure the telecommunications and tech industries remain accountable for delivering on their commitments to tackle fraud and the criminal abuse of their services, in line with the plan we will set out in our soon-to-be-published fraud strategy. However, where insufficient progress is being made in reducing abuse of telecoms networks or tech platforms for the purposes of fraud, the Government, and regulators, will not hesitate to take necessary measures to compel further action. I am on common ground with the noble Lord, Lord Davies, who critiqued the amendment, describing the concern it shows for the intermediary nature of the liability some telecoms platforms would be under. It is a fact that a tech sector reimbursement scheme would undermine the UK’s long-standing intermediary liability regime, which means that platforms are not liable for illegal content posted by users provided they are unaware of the unlawful activity, and which underpins the interactive internet and is a cornerstone of digital innovation. I share his concern that a departure from intermediary liability would leave the UK out of sync with our international partners and potentially threaten growth of the UK’s digital economy.
Therefore, in view of the clear plan we are putting in place to tackle fraud, it is the Government’s assessment that the measures set out in this amendment are not necessary at this time, and I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
My Lords, I thank every noble Lord who has taken part in this short debate, in particular the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Young, who both pointed out the question of incentivisation, which is core to this. We need to incentivise the people who are facilitating or enabling fraud, or enabling the fraudsters to make contact with the victims, to do the right thing.
“The right to protestBefore section 11 of the Public Order Act 1986 (advance notice of public processions), insert—“10A The right to protest(1) Everyone has the right to engage in peaceful protest, both alone and with others.(2) Public authorities have a duty to—(a) respect the right to protest,(b) protect the right to protest, and(c) facilitate the right to protest.(3) A public authority may only interfere with the right to protest, including by placing restrictions upon its exercise, when it is necessary and proportionate to do so to—(a) protect national security or public safety,(b) prevent disorder or crime, or(c) protect public health, or the rights and freedoms of others.(4) For the purposes of this section “public authority” has the same meaning as in section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (acts of public authorities).”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would introduce an express statutory right to protest, imposing both negative and positive obligations on public authorities while recognising that the right to protest may need to be limited to protect other legitimate public interests.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, in this group I have Amendments 369 and 371. Amendment 369 is co-signed by my noble friend Lady Doocey and the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox of Buckley and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and is itself subject to two amendments by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra—Amendments 369ZA and 369ZB. Our other Amendment 371 is co-signed by my noble friends Lady Doocey and Lord Strasburger, and by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. I am grateful to them all for their support.
Amendment 369 seeks to enshrine in statute the right to protest as it has long been enjoyed in this country. The right to protest is, of course, enshrined in the ECHR. Article 10 concerns the right to freedom of expression and Article 11 concerns the right to freedom of assembly and association. The right to protest is, and always has been, circumscribed in English law, just as Articles 10 and 11 rights are circumscribed in the convention.
It is worth reminding ourselves reasonably briefly of the limits placed on the two freedoms by the convention. The right to freedom of expression under Article 10 expressly includes the
“freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority”,
but it is limited, as it may be
“subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society”,
and, most relevantly,
“in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals”,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The Article 11 right to freedom of association and assembly accords to everyone
“the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests”.
It limits the restrictions that may be placed on those rights to those that are
“prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety”,
and the list goes on in the same way as Article 10.
I repeat the words of the two convention articles not because they are in any sense new but because they demonstrate the balancing exercise that the state must carry out when considering how far it may or may not be legitimate to restrict the exercise of the convention freedoms in this country, not as a matter simply of compliance with the convention but as a matter of sound public policy.
The right to protest has never been explicitly enshrined in English or UK legislation, although the restrictions on it have been. Considerable changes were made by the Conservative Government in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, with new statutory offences of public nuisance, more police powers to impose conditions on demonstrations that were deemed likely to be noisy or disruptive, and harsher penalties for obstructing highways.
The Bill now proposes further restrictions. For example, Clauses 118 to 121, to be considered in the next group, would create a new offence of concealing identity at protests in localities designated by the police. In the light of the development of live facial recognition technology, that looks and sounds ominous. Clause 121 will ban the use of pyrotechnic articles at protests, which I take to include any type of firework, unless exempted by the regulations. Collectively, the new restrictions on liberty and the further police powers, particularly taken with the new powers and conditions legislated for in the 2022 Act, mean that the right to protest is being progressively restricted. That highlights, we say, the need for a very public statement in domestic law of the right to protest and of the criteria to be applied when limiting it.
Our amendments seek to provide that in a way that is proportionate and balanced, but firm. We start Amendment 369 with the statement:
“Everyone has the right to engage in peaceful protest, both alone and with others”.
Our amendment then imposes on public authorities three-pronged duties to respect, protect and facilitate the right to protest. We appreciate that there are or can be significant resource implications for police and public authorities in policing protests. It can be an expensive exercise. We also appreciate that there is a difficult balance for the police to draw between overpolicing protests and underpolicing them, and that it is very often difficult to predict what is the right level of policing to maintain the balance between protecting the right to protest and risking disturbance if things go wrong. But the right to protest is a very valuable right, and it is extremely important to freedom and democracy that public authorities appreciate that they have the legal duty to respect, protect and facilitate it that our amendment describes. That legal duty must be backed by resources for the police and local authorities to ensure that this duty can be effectively performed.
The Government have appointed the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, to carry out a review of public order and hate crime legislation. Its terms of reference were published last month, and the final report is expected next month, February 2026. In spite of the tight timescale, the noble Lord will, no doubt, carry out a thorough review of the law in this area, guided by the three principles that are set out in his terms of reference. The review will consider, first,
“whether the legislation is fit for purpose”,
secondly,
“whether it adequately protects communities from intimidation and hate”,
and thirdly,
“whether it strikes a fair balance between freedom of expression and the right to protest with the need to prevent disorder and keep communities safe”.
We maintain that proposed new subsections (2) and (3) in our amendment set out succinctly and clearly that balance. In order to be permissible, interference with or restriction of the right to protest must be necessary and proportionate and for the purpose of protecting national security or public safety, preventing disorder or crime, or protecting public health or the rights and freedoms of others. Those, we say, are the public interests that justify restriction of the right to protest.
In many ways, it is a pity that the Macdonald review was not commissioned before the Bill was introduced, given that deferring this legislation until after the report might have given the Government and Parliament a better opportunity to look afresh at some of the provisions in the 2022 Act and consider the proposals in the Bill. But we are where we are, and it is for Parliament to set out the policy objectives. So I suggest that it is more important than ever that we set out in statute the balance that is to be struck, even if this Bill will not be passed in its final form before the Macdonald review is published.
Our Amendment 371 seeks a review of the existing legal framework of protest and its interaction with Article 9, which covers freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as well as Articles 10 and 11, which I have considered above. If our Amendment 371 is accepted, that review will no doubt build on the work of the Macdonald review in the light of the passage of the Bill.
I turn to the two amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, with the balance between the right to protest and justifiable restrictions thereon as the touchstone. Amendment 369ZA would put public authorities under a duty to
“ensure that all other members of the public … are not hindered in any way from going about their daily business”,
and 369ZB would say that public authorities could interfere with the right to protest by restriction to
“prevent inconvenience to any member of the public”
or to
“permit any persons from going about their daily business”—
I suspect that the noble Lord must mean to “permit any persons to go about their daily business”.
The implication of both amendments is that it could be legitimately seen as necessary and proportionate to interfere with or restrict the right to protest for such a reason. Yet there is no requirement in either amendment that a significant number of people have to be inconvenienced or troubled in their daily business for a restriction to be justified. Far from it: Amendment 369ZA talks about any member of the public and Amendment 369ZB talks about permitting “any persons”. Those amendments are far too draconian.
Lord Blencathra
“(d) ensure that all other members of the public who are not protesting are not hindered in any way from going about their daily business.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment to Amendment 369 seeks to ensure that members of the public who are not protesting are able to go about their daily business.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I support the proposed new clause establishing an express statutory right to protest and will speak to my amendments which, I believe, would make that right workable, balanced and fair to all members of the public. I begin by saying that the right to protest is a cornerstone of any free society. It is a mark of confidence, not weakness, when a nation allows its citizens to gather, speak, dissent and challenge those in authority.
I support that principle wholeheartedly, but rights do not exist in isolation. They exist in a framework of mutual respect, where the rights of one group cannot simply extinguish the rights of another. That is why I have tabled these amendments: to ensure that alongside the duty to respect, protect and facilitate protest, public authorities must also ensure that those who are not protesting are not hindered in going about their daily business.
My amendment proposes a new subsection (2)(d), which makes that duty explicit. I have proposed two further subsections in Amendment 369ZB, (3)(d) and (3)(e), to make it clear that preventing inconvenience to any member of the public and permitting people to go about their daily lives are legitimate grounds for proportionate restrictions on protest.
This is not an attempt to water down the right to protest; it is an attempt to anchor it in the real world. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, in the words of the convention, it is to protect the rights and freedoms of others as well. In the real world, “the public” is not an abstract; the public are individuals: it is a nurse trying to reach her shift on time; it is a carer who must get to an elderly relative; it is a parent taking their child to school; it is a worker who risks losing wages, even a job, because the road has been blocked; it is a small business owner whose customers cannot reach them; it is the disabled Peer in this wheelchair who could not get across Westminster Bridge three years ago because Just Stop Oil were blocking me getting across—I should have borrowed one of their banners and then the police would have helped me across.
All these people matter every bit as much as those who are protesting. Their rights are not secondary. Their needs are not trivial, and their lives should not be treated as collateral damage in someone else’s political campaign.
Some argue—I think the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said so—that inconvenience is a part of protest, but inconvenience is not a theoretical concept. Inconvenience has consequences—missed medical appointments, missed exams, missed care visits, missed wages, missed opportunities. For many people, what is dismissed as mere inconvenience is in fact material harm.
I want to be absolutely clear that a legitimate public interest does not need to be a crowd of thousands. It does not need to be a major national event. It does not need to be a threat to infrastructure. Sometimes a legitimate public interest is one person, one individual, who simply needs to get to work or go to school or go to hospital. A democracy protects minorities, and sometimes the minority is a minority of one.
My amendments recognise that reality. They would ensure that the right to protest was balanced with the right of everyone else to live their lives. They would give public authorities clarity rather than ambiguity, because at present the police are often placed in an impossible position. If they intervene, they are accused of supporting protests. If they do not intervene, they are accused of failing to protect the public. My amendments would give them a clear statutory duty: protect protests, yes, but protect the public and ensure that daily life can continue.
This is not about silencing anyone; it is about ensuring that protest remains peaceful, proportionate and legitimate. If protests routinely prevent ordinary people going about their lives, public support for them will erode. When public support erodes, the right itself becomes more fragile. I think we all saw on television recently motorists getting out of their cars and dragging people off the road. That should not happen. They had to become vigilantes to clear the road. That was because they felt the authorities were not doing their duty in keeping the roads clear.
My amendments would strengthen the right to protest by ensuring that it was exercised responsibly, in a way that commands public respect rather than public resentment. The proposed new clause before them is well intentioned, but without my amendments it risks creating a one-sided right that elevates the interests of protesters above the interests of everyone else. That is not balance, that is not fairness, and it is not how rights should operate in a democratic society. My amendments would restore that balance. They recognise that the right to protest is vital but not absolute. They recognise that the rights of protesters must coexist with the rights of those who are not protesting. They recognise that sometimes the legitimate public interest is not a grand principle but a simple human need—the need to get to work, to keep an appointment, to reach a hospital or simply to go about one’s daily business without obstruction. I commend my amendments to the Committee. I beg to move.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, it was quite difficult to sit here and listen to that, but I will come to that. I very strongly support Amendment 369, and I do so with a real sense of fury that we are in this position, that we actually have to do this, and that it is not obvious to any Government that in a democracy we need the right to protest to be protected. To engage in peaceful protest means irritating other people. I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, but, unfortunately, what he said just now was complete and utter nonsense.
Over recent years, we have seen a real erosion of protest rights through one Bill after another. I sat here and watched it all and protested at every single move. Each was justified on a narrow, technical or operational point but, taken together, they amounted to a clear political direction—making protests harder, riskier and much easier to shut down.
Amendment 369 does not invent new rights. It states in clear and accessible language that peaceful protest is a fundamental democratic right and that public authorities have a duty to respect, protect and facilitate that right.
Amendments 369ZA and 369ZB seek to qualify that right by reference to whether members of the public are “hindered”, experience “inconvenience” or are able to go about “their daily business”. These amendments fundamentally misunderstand the nature of protest. Almost all meaningful protest causes some degree of hindrance or inconvenience. If it does not, it is very easy to ignore. From the suffragettes to trade unionists to civil rights campaigners, protest has always disrupted business as usual, precisely because that is how attention is drawn to injustice. For example, proscribing Palestine Action was such a stupid move by the Government and has caused more problems for them and the police than if they had just left it alone and arrested its members for criminal damage and similar.
I come back to these embarrassing amendments. It is not just the problem of their intent, which I disagree very strongly with, but their vagueness. Terms such as “hindered” and “inconvenience” are entirely undefined. Being delayed by five minutes could be an inconvenience. Noise could be an inconvenience. Simply being reminded of a cause that one disagrees with could, for some, be considered an inconvenience. If those concepts become legal thresholds for restricting protest, the right itself becomes meaningless.
The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, used the phrase “in the real world”. I live in the real world, and I understand what protest does and why it is needed. Under these amendments, any protest that is visible, noisy or effective could be banned on the basis that someone somewhere was inconvenienced. Democracy is by its nature sometimes noisy, disruptive and inconvenient. It is very inconvenient being here at night debating these issues, quite honestly, in a moderately cold Chamber.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
Moderately?
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
All right, in a cold Chamber.
If we prioritise convenience over conscience, we should not be surprised when people feel shut out of political decision-making altogether. For those reasons, I support Amendments 369 and 371. In essence, protest law is a terrible mess, and we have got here by a long series of government decisions and government weirdnesses. The whole thing is confusing for the police, as we have been told by senior police officers. It means that police officers make mistakes based on their own judgment. That is a terrible thing to happen in a democracy. Let us get this into the Bill to make clear exactly what a democracy looks like.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, the right to protest, like most of the rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, requires a balance. A balance is required here between the rights of protesters and the rights of others.
The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, is absolutely right. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, may not wish to recognise that, but there are other rights that need to be balanced against the rights of protesters. For her to dismiss as “nonsense” the noble Lord’s concerns will trouble many people here in this Committee, because the protester has to accept that there are other rights and interests that need to be taken into account. So, I am with the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, on this issue.
I am also unpersuaded that we need Amendment 369, which the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has eloquently advanced today. I doubt it because, as he rightly says, it echoes almost word for word what is in Article 11, read with Article 10, of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is already part of our law under the Human Rights Act. I am very doubtful that we need an express statutory provision that repeats what is already part of the law of this land.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 369 because I like the fact that it creates a duty on public authorities to respect, protect and facilitate the right to protest so that:
“A public authority may only interfere with the right to protest, including by placing restrictions upon its exercise, when it is necessary and proportionate”.
That is the balancing that the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, explained so well in his introduction. It is undoubtedly the case that there is a balancing act.
I am pleased to support the amendment because I feel it has never been more necessary to reassert why the right to protest matters. Despite the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, advising us to not panic—I did not mean that to be quite the pun that it came out as—I feel there is a danger of complacency here. I think that restating this in this amendment is essential. The fact that we need to restate the importance of the right to protest as a fundamental right in a healthy democracy gives us an urgency in championing and guarding carefully and closely what I think is under threat. It allows protest that, as the UN notes,
“enables individuals to express themselves collectively and to participate in shaping their societies”.
It is
“a system of participatory governance”.
I worry that if people believe that that right to protest is being eroded consistently, that leads them to take more dangerous, extreme measures. The right to protest is political free expression. We have all watched over the last week or so the protests in Iran and the absolute bravery of those protesters; it strikes me that we are happy to cheer them on and say how important it is. Closer to home, we have to carry on and expressly say that political ideas expressed on the streets that challenge the status quo allow people to express anger and their dissidence and opposition. That is worth restating.
I think there has been a relentless attempt at curbing such democratic expression. Since I have been in this House, which is for more than five years, there seems to have been a relentless stream of laws threatening the right to protest. As the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, just explained, the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 and the Public Order Act 2023 have substantially expanded police powers to impose restrictions on protests and to arrest people for breach of these restrictions, as well as increasing sentences for peaceful protest offences and lowering the threshold for what would constitute serious disruption to the life of the community.
Those laws have been passed and are ongoing, and they have led to legislative crackdowns on peaceful protests—but here we are again, because it is never enough. It seems to me, as I have argued before, that every time the law is changed those laws are not enforced, or the police or people in authority say, “We can’t do anything. We need more laws and more restrictions”, and so it goes on and on. As this has been the third piece of primary legislation in less than five years to chip away at the right to protest, we should be worried.
That is why I put my name to Amendment 371 looking for a review of the existing protest framework. There is an awful lot of legislation now that can control and curb one’s right to protest. I am delighted about the Macdonald review, by the way, but we need to make sure that the law is fit for purpose. We should not just keep adding on laws all the time. I fear the impact of the Acts on freedom of association, freedom of expression and so on, so I support both amendments.
I want to admit something, though. I do not want to be naive. Despite what I have just said, I know that protests have changed in many ways. This is the balancing act. As we enter into a new discussion now on all aspects of protest, I am aware that I also need to be open-minded. I am completely principled on the right to protest, but I understand that we have to take certain things into account. I have watched demonstrations and protests over the last few years in which intimidation, antisemitic slogans and toxic, intimidating behaviour have happened. I have seen that myself; I cannot deny it. It is also true that there is a more violent vibe around some protests. I genuinely could not believe that pro-Palestinian protests happened after the Manchester synagogue murders; I just could not get over that.
It is not just on that question—I do not want to obsess on that question. There is a whole range of issues in which I am interested. When I have been to events, I have been approached, or rather screamed at, by masked-up, unpleasant, scary protesters. I do not want to deny that. I am also aware of the fact that, as the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, pointed out—he was using the examples of the likes of Just Stop Oil in the past—in some protests it is almost as though disruption has been used to bully people into adherence rather than persuading the public to agree, and that has made me feel uncomfortable. But that is all the more reason why we need to review what is on the statute book. Is it fit for purpose? We cannot just keep adding laws, becoming more repressive and more draconian, and hoping that we are going to sort it all out. That is what I fear.
By the way, in response to the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, which I do not support, I remind him of the kind of disruptions that one gets at modern demonstrations. You have a situation where, for example, a protest outside an asylum hotel organised by the Pink Ladies—for those who know who they are—is met with Stand Up to Racism protesters, who are protesting against the protesters, and there is a clash. It is then argued that it is disrupting the local community and that both protests should be banned.
It strikes me that that is not very helpful, because it is perfectly legitimate, for example, to say that you are worried about people being put into local hotels as asylum seekers. I cannot just say that, because I support those concerns, I then want to ban the Stand Up to Racism protesters who are worried about them.
We also have to be aware of the fact that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, has explained, protest does disrupt communities. Somebody—I cannot remember who now—talked about the farmers. I was actually outside Downing Street on a protest with farmers on Budget Day. What was shocking was that the farmers had been banned from driving their tractors even though, until the day before, it had been long agreed that they would be allowed to have a protest of tractors on that stretch. The night before, the tractors were banned and farmers were arrested for trying to drive them in the vicinity. I am aware that the argument that it is too disruptive and would disrupt people can be used in ways that are very unhelpful.
I would remind people as well about the terrible scandal that is emerging in relation to what happened at the Aston Villa match, from which Israeli fans were banned. I know people who went to that match. When protesters went in solidarity with the action of people who were fighting antisemitism, they organised a vigil at that football match in Birmingham. They were fenced in by the police and treated almost as criminals, even though in fact they were showing solidarity with Jewish people in the local area.
The reason I am giving those examples is that we have to admit that it is a bit complex. Therefore, just saying that protests that are disruptive of everyday life will be banned would be a very dangerous precedent, and I disagree with it. But I concede that it is a hard argument and we should therefore take it seriously, not just keep passing laws to ban protesting even more.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
My Lords, I draw the Committee’s attention to my interest as chair of Big Brother Watch. I will speak about Amendments 369 and 371 in the name of my colleague and noble friend Lord Marks.
Protest is the lifeblood of any vibrant democracy, and in the United Kingdom it is one of the most powerful ways for ordinary citizens to make their voices heard. Our democratic system depends not only on elections but on the active participation of the people between elections. Protest is essential because it allows us to challenge decisions, hold leaders accountable and demand change when systems seem slow or unresponsive.
Throughout our history, protest has driven meaningful progress. Universal male suffrage in Britain was pushed forward by mass movements such as the Chartists and later reform campaigns which used strikes, mass meetings and demonstrations to pressure Parliament into extending the franchise and paying MPs so that working-class men could serve. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, that I imagine those were quite inconvenient to a few people. Women’s suffrage in the UK was won by the suffragettes only after decades of marches, processions, civil disobedience and hunger strikes, culminating in the Representation of the People Act.
Peaceful protest educates the public, sparks debate and creates the pressure necessary for reform. In a healthy democracy, disagreement is not a threat but a sign that citizens care deeply about their society. However, our right to protest is, as has already been said, under relentless attack. Through the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 and the Public Order Act 2023, the previous Government introduced multiple restrictions on our precious right to protest. Then last year, the current Government found a way to further suppress peaceful demonstrations by misusing terrorism legislation to stop protests. This led to 2,700 arrests of mostly elderly people who were protesting about what was happening in Gaza. We had the bizarre sight, week after week, of police arresting vicars and old ladies in Parliament Square when they posed no threat whatever to anyone.
Lord Pannick (CB)
Can I just point out to the noble Lord, if he will allow me to, that these people were not arrested for expressing a view about Gaza? They were arrested for supporting Palestine Action, which is a violent terrorist group.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
Not so far as I know.
It was absolutely farcical, but not very funny, when you consider that the hundreds of police officers involved had far more useful things that they could have been doing. But it seems even that was not enough for the Government. Through this Bill, they are attempting to introduce a raft of further constraints on the right of the British people to express themselves via peaceful street demonstrations.
The law surrounding protest is in a complete mess. Recent legislation has been knee-jerk and reactionary, leaving the legal landscape a complete muddle. Police often struggle to know how to police demonstrations properly, which usually leads to excessive heavy-handed policing and people being charged with all sorts of offences when they may not have been. This has also made the law extremely unpredictable: the mission creep of legislation and case law over recent years has meant that there is now a raft of serious criminal offences —that is, indictable offences—tried in the Crown Court that are no doubt adding to the unacceptable backlog in the courts. It is very easy for someone to attend a peaceful demonstration and inadvertently commit an offence or a more serious offence than they would have reasonably expected their conduct to amount to.
For example, a protester who temporarily blocks a road—as many do—would historically have been charged with wilful obstruction of the highway under Section 137 of the Highways Act. This was a summary-only offence, which used to have a maximum sentence of a fine, although this was increased to six months’ custody in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. Section 7 of the Public Order Act 2023 introduced a new offence of interfering with national infrastructure, which includes all A and B roads, with a maximum sentence of 12 months’ custody. Section 78 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 also created a new statutory offence of public nuisance, which only requires the doing of an act that obstructs a public right. This is far wider than the old common-law offence that required the obstruction to be “significant”. The effect of all the above, as an illustration, is that someone who stands or sits in a road, as part of a protest, could be charged with any of the four offences that I have just mentioned. There is no real consistency in the charging decisions between different police forces or different CPS regions, meaning that people are often charged with very serious offences for minor conduct. There have even been cases in which different people are charged with different offences arising from identical conduct at the same protest.
The various laws about protest overlap with each other and have not been developed as a coherent framework. Protesters and police are unsure about which laws apply in particular situations. This results in inadvertently heavy-handed policing, inconsistent prosecution, miscarriages of justice, waste of the public purse and clogging up the courts. More importantly, it results in a cumulative chilling effect on our democracy and a stifling of debate. It is high time that the disorganised and disjointed framework of statutes covering the democratically vital activity of protest is subject to a root-and-branch review—one that is truly independent and thorough—and that is precisely what Amendment 371 calls for.
However, since Amendment 371 was laid, the Government have announced a review of public order and hate crime legislation. It is being chaired by the noble Lord, Macdonald of River Glaven, for whom I have the greatest respect. But the terms of reference for the review seem to be focused rather narrowly and do not appear to cover the matters I have just raised—namely, the unco-ordinated and overlapping legislation on protests. I doubt that, in the short period until the review reports next month, the noble Lord will be able to examine the different approaches to arresting and charging between the different police forces. Perhaps the Minister can reassure the Committee that the current review will be broad enough to cover all the shortfalls in the existing regime I have outlined. If he cannot give that assurance, Amendment 371 will need to be passed on Report to generate the full review that is needed.
Amendment 369, if passed, will hopefully prevent future Governments cumulatively eroding protest rights, as has been customary for the last few years.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I would vote against Amendment 371. It is a difficult area and there has to be balance. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, put it very well. We get more disruption from Remembrance Day every year across the country because roads are closed and people cannot do what they want to do. There are many times in society when we do things which cause disruption to others, but, if pushed, I would be more towards the position of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, than I would Amendment 371.
I have three points to make on Amendment 371. First, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, it duplicates what is already in the convention rights, and I cannot see the purpose of that. Secondly, it says nothing about the basic dilemma, which the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, demonstrated very well: most protest is intended to cause disruption in order to attract attention. People say that causing disruption is a right in a democracy, and I agree with that entirely, but I have to say that it is one of the most inefficient mechanisms for getting an argument over. A guy shouted about Brexit outside my office for about three years. All I could hear was one word about not liking Brexit; I never heard what his argument was. I am not sure a protest ever does any of that. It just attracts attention.
Disruption does cause that attention, but making Amendment 371 the only reason why the police would have to decide whether a march went ahead and if conditions were to be imposed would not address that basic dilemma. Nor would it address the dilemma that mass disobedience has, as the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, said, achieved far more in the way of democratic change than many forms of parliamentary intervention. It is a mechanism, but a balance has to be struck. Individuals have a right, in addition to the police allowing them to do so, to make sure they can get to a hospital or that a fire engine can get through when it needs to, rather than simply when someone concludes that they will let it through.
Thirdly, the criminal law is the wrong place to state convention rights. If you are going to state them, there may be a place in law, but the criminal law is for declaring offences. If you want to start declaring rights, you might want to start declaring human responsibilities. The start of the Human Rights Act talks about human responsibilities but never got around to providing any enforcement mechanisms. All those things we ought to have as duties towards each other are articulated nowhere. Protestors can have their right to protest, but they do not have to worry about the rights of the poor child who cannot get to school or people who are trying to attend a place of worship. They have rights too, but the protestor apparently does not have to balance their rights when considering exercising his or her own.
My final point is a direct challenge to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, who I really like and respect, and the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, was quite right: it is quite unfair to criticise the police for arresting people at marches who are supporting a proscribed terrorist organisation. You may not like the proscription, but this place passed the legislation. We also passed legislation saying that it is an offence to support a proscribed organisation. Therefore, if you start waving banners about and saying you support these organisations, there will be a consequence. I do not see how it is okay to argue that the police, in taking action on the laws we passed, are doing something wrong. You may not agree with the law, but it is not right to blame the police for exercising it. That is a confusion that has arisen over the last few months, and it is one we can put right.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
The objection was to the way that terrorism legislation was misused to, in effect, suppress protest. It was misused by combining as a group Palestine Action with two other desperately terrorist organisations, so that MPs and Peers had no opportunity to decide on one and not the other two. It was a bit of a fix.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
I understand the point from the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger. My only challenge is that I do not think it is fair or accurate to blame the police for that confusion. I would stand up for the police, of course, but it would be better of this place to acknowledge that dilemma without blaming them for exercising the powers that we gave them.
Lord Walney (CB)
My Lords, the hour is late, so I will resist the temptation to go further into the rights and wrongs and logical inconsistencies of some noble Lords’ views on the proscription of Palestine Action.
I hope that I offer the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lords Strasburger, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, some reassurance that, in my view, they do not necessarily need to put Amendment 371 on the statute book or even wait for the review lead by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald. There is an excellent review into protest law, Protecting our Democracy from Coercion, which I was privileged to lay before the House in my then role as the Government’s independent adviser on political violence and disruption. The review covers this whole area. I am pleased that the last Government enacted some of its recommendations, and I am still urging this Government to go somewhat further. It may not strike quite the same chord, but it is there, and it has been done. Some of the recommendations from that review are related to this topic, but they will come in later groupings, so we will get to them when we do.
I will offer a couple of brief thoughts on these fascinating amendments. Many noble Lords have mentioned the balance here, and clearly there is one. It is probably true that the amendments from noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, take a maximalist approach. I am not sure that even I would go that far, and it might well prove to be unworkable. However, it is important for any legislator looking at this area to understand where the public are on this. If we talk about defending democracy, but so gratuitously ignore and act against the very strongly held views of the public on this, then we are getting ourselves into a very difficult place.
None of this detracts from the right to protest. I mentioned my own review, which was published last year. In that review there is polling, which accords with a great deal of polling done by other sources, that shows just how strongly the public object to and oppose disruptive protests. Big majorities of the public are in favour of the right to protest, which is reassuring, but, as soon as it becomes disruptive, they oppose it by a margin of about nine to one.
The proposed new clause in Amendment 369 raises an interesting challenge by explicitly stating the right to protest. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is, of course, right that this is unnecessary, in the sense that the right is already enshrined in other areas. Further, where the proposers of this amendment seek to draw the balance glaringly omits the issue of disruption—it completely omits it.
The prospect of avoiding all disruption in protests is clearly not realistic and would go against the point. But we are in an era when much protest is increasingly organised and designed to cause significant economic damage through the disruption of people’s daily lives, often preventing working people from getting to work. I am seeing senior trade unionists scowl at me for making this point, but I would just ask those who have been in trade unions to consider what it feels like for working people to be stopped from being able to go to their workplace and contribute fairly, and being intimidated and shouted at as they go through the doors of their factory or try to go through them and are blocked.
Any attempt to place a balance, whether it is on the statute book, or in an attempt to create new laws, or to shift that balance, which does not acknowledge the harmful effect of disruptive protests on the economy or acknowledge that these things need to be properly balanced, is destined to make very bad law and be intensely unpopular with the public.
Lord Goodman of Wycombe (Con)
My Lords, I strongly commend the report of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, which I have read. My purpose in speaking, very briefly, is to interrogate Amendment 369, in the light of what we already have.
What we already have was very well put in a report by David Spencer of Policy Exchange, the director of which is my noble friend Lord Godson. David Spencer put the current balance very well, I think in his report A Long, Long Way to Go. He wrote:
“The Human Rights Act 1998 does not refer to a ‘Right to Protest’ – the relevant rights are the ‘Right to freedom of expression’ (Article 10) and ‘Right to freedom of peaceful assembly’ (Article 11). However, the sense that many of the recent wave of protests have been ‘peaceful’ by any ordinary understanding of the word – particularly when filled with antisemitic chanting through mobile sound amplifiers, calls for ‘jihad’ on the streets of London, or the use of criminal damage as a tactic – is clearly false. Further, Articles 10 and 11 are qualified rights”—
and this is the point about balance that other noble Lords have made—
“in that they can be restricted where it is necessary and proportionate to protect public safety, prevent crime and protect the rights and freedoms of others”.
I myself think that the balance in the Human Rights Act really puts the matter rather well when it refers to this right of peaceful assembly. Peaceful assembly surely does not mean that the protest must be meek and mild. One must expect protests to be noisy, turbulent, robust and, up to a point, disruptive. But the right of protests to be disruptive, as the noble Lord, Lord Walney, said a few moments ago, must be balanced against the right of others not to have their lives disrupted. That is the balance of the thing.
Furthermore, just in closing, there is a very difficult issue here that David Spencer raises very profoundly about some of the language that has been used in demonstrations that is very close to—trembling on the verge of—incitement. In a country where we have seen what happened in the synagogue in Manchester, and where attacks are carried out on other institutions, we have to bear that in mind.
In short, it seems to me this amendment is either reproducing what is already in the Human Rights Act, in which case it is unnecessary, or it is complicating it, in which case it should not really be there. My own sense is that it is complicating it, and that it makes no sense at all to scatter different rights willy-nilly in different pieces of legislation, rather than—if one is going to set positive rights out in statute—putting them in one place in the Human Rights Act, which is what has been done. So I think that the balance we have got is satisfactory and that the amendment does not really stand up to robust interrogation.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for bringing forward these amendments. The importance of peaceful protest in a free and democratic society is of course a principle supported by all noble Lords. I want to be clear at the outset that no one on the Benches on this side questions either the legitimacy or the constitutional right to protest.
I first turn to Amendment 369, which seeks to place an express statutory right to protest into the Public Order Act 1986. This amendment risks solving a problem that does not exist. That is our belief. The right to protest is already deeply embedded in our constitutional and legal framework, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has so carefully explained. It is recognised in common law, it long predates our membership of the European Convention on Human Rights and it has been repeatedly affirmed by the courts as a fundamental freedom in our democratic tradition. Crucially, this right has never been absolute. Historically, it has always existed alongside the equally important duties of the state to maintain public order, protect public safety and safeguard the rights and freedoms of others. That careful balance has evolved over centuries through common law and legislation. It is not at all clear that reinstating the right to protest in statutory form would add meaningful protection beyond what already exists.
There is a real risk that codifying such a broad and long-standing right in statue could have unintended consequences. By setting out open-ended duties on public authorities to respect, protect and facilitate protest, the amendment would inevitably invite further litigation and judicial interpretation. Decisions about the proper balance between protest rights and competing public interests, such as disruption to essential services or public safety, could increasingly be determined in the courts rather than by Parliament or accountable Ministers. That risks further frustrating the will of the Executive and of Parliament. I do not believe that placing an express right to protest into statute is either necessary or desirable. Our system has functioned for generations without such a provision and it is not evident that this long-standing settlement is now deficient.
I turn to Amendment 371, which would require an independent review of the existing legislative framework governing protest. We on these Benches are unconvinced of the case for such a review. The Acts listed have been subject to extensive parliamentary scrutiny and their compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights has been debated at length in both Houses. We do not support proposed new subsection (5) in this amendment, which would require the review to have regard to the impacts of legislation on the exercise of rights under the ECHR. The ECHR is already subject to unwelcome litigation which brings about perverse outcomes that were never intended at its commencement: there are plenty of examples of that. An additional independent review would be unnecessarily burdensome and duplicative, consuming time and public resources without a clear or compelling purpose. For these reasons, we on these Benches do not support either amendment. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response and to further discussion of how best to uphold both the right to protest and the rule of law in a balanced and proportionate way.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I hope it does not surprise noble Lords if I confess that I have been on the odd protest in my time. I have quite enjoyed the freedom to have a protest. I have protested against the apartheid Government, against the National Front and, if the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, will bear with me, against his Government when he served as a Minister.
The right to peaceful protest is an important part of our democratic society. It is a long-standing tradition in this country that people are free to gather together and demonstrate their views, provided they do so within the law. This Government are committed to protecting and preserving that right. I hope that that gives some succour to the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Strasburger, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and indeed others who have spoken in favour.
The noble Lord, Lord Marks, set out his case for the two amendments on public order. Amendment 369 seeks to introduce a statutory right to protest into the Public Order Act 1986, along with a duty on public authorities to respect, protect and facilitate that right. I understand the concerns that he has put and I accept and appreciate those concerns, but, as has been said, not least by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, these protections are already firmly established in UK law. Public authorities are required under the Human Rights Act 1998, passed by a previous Government in which I was pleased to serve, to act in accordance with the rights to freedom of expression and assembly set out in Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
However, as has been said by a number of noble Lords today, including the noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Davies of Gower, and as set out in the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, these rights are qualified. This point is illustrated by Amendments 369ZA and 369ZB, put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. On that qualification, I am not going to get into the argument between the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Blencathra, but for the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and others who have argued for the amendment today, the key point is that that right, as has been said, can be restricted only where restriction is lawful, proportionate and justified. The right to peaceful protest is also recognised under the common law and creating a separate statutory provision risks duplicating existing protections, which could lead to confusion in how the law is interpreted and applied. It might also complicate operational policing without offering any additional legal safeguards.
I have to say that I agreed with the noble Lord, Lord Goodman of Wycombe, that there is a fundamental right to protest. But I respectfully submit, as I think he argued in his contribution, that the amendment would not strengthen that commitments and might indeed introduce uncertainty into the law. That is a very valid and important point, because existing legislation under the Human Rights Act 1998 and Articles 10 and 11, qualified rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, set out the issues that again were ably outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that the right to protest exists: it is one that I cherish and have exercised myself and may even exercise myself again in the future, who knows? It is an important right, but his amendment would cause confusion and water down the ability to provide that security of protest under the existing legislation. Therefore, I ask him ultimately to not press it further.
I turn to Amendment 371, which would require the Government to commission an independent review of the existing protest legislation within 12 months of the Bill receiving Royal Assent. The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, said that the Government called the review post the tabling of this amendment. We proposed the review on 5 October last year. The Home Secretary announced an independent review of public order and hate crime legislation on 5 October last year and I suggest that Amendment 371, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, would essentially be what the Government have already ordered and would, if agreed today, negate the purpose of what the Government have already ordered and extend the review that we have already ordered still further by establishing that review in law.
We announced the review on 5 October because of the very issues that all noble Lords have mentioned about balancing the right to peaceful protest and the right to enjoy non-harassment, the right to potentially go to a synagogue, or the right to go about your daily business. Those issues are extremely important, which is why the Home Secretary has appointed the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, KC, a former Director of Public Prosecutions, as one of the people to undertake the review. His independence and expertise will ensure a rigorous, impartial review. He will have the help and support of former assistant chief constable Owen Weatherill, who brings operational experience from his role with the National Police Chiefs’ Council as lead for civil contingencies and national mobilisation. That independent review reaffirms this Government’s ongoing commitment to keep public order legislation under review.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
I am sorry to intervene so late. Could the Minister please confirm whether the review led by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, will consider the issue I was raising, which was the incoherence and overlap between the various pieces of legislation on protest?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The terms of the noble Lord’s review have been published and they are available to the Committee now. The review will examine whether current public order legislation is fit for purpose in the light of contemporary protest tactics, community impacts and the need to safeguard democracy. It will examine how effectively police are using the powers available to them. It will consider whether further measures are needed to reassure the communities who are most affected by current tensions, while respecting the right to protest. Those are all important issues. The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, expects to submit the review to the Home Secretary by spring 2026 and, in doing so, will give an overview of all the legislation that is in place.
The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, commented on Palestine Action and the right to protest of Palestine Action. I want to reaffirm that both the House of Commons and this House had an opportunity to vote in favour or against that legislation. Both the House of Commons and this House voted in favour of the legislation, which is why, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said, police officers are implementing the legislation that was passed by both Houses. As I recall, although I cannot remember the exact figures, a number of Members of this House voted against that order, including Members from my own side. It was a difficult debate in July. It was a free vote; many Members voted against it in the Commons and this House, but both measures were passed in both Houses.
It is not illegal for anybody to go outside now and campaign against the Israeli Government or any actions by the Israeli Government, or to campaign in favour of the Palestine organisations that are seeking to change the status quo in that part of the Middle East. What is illegal is to show support for an organisation that I, Ministers and the Government, on advice from the security services and others, determined was engaged in activities that crossed the threshold of the Terrorism Act. The noble Lord, Lord Walney, is well aware of the complexities of that, as a former adviser, but that was the advice we got.
If an organisation is breaching the threshold for terrorism, it is the duty of this Government to act, and that is what we did in those circumstances. So I want to place on record again, for clarity, that the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, can go outside tonight and campaign for a Palestine state and against the Israeli Government, and no police will arrest him or, as he mentioned, any grandparent, teacher or professional. But if he goes out and supports Palestine Action, which has been determined to have crossed the threshold of the Terrorism Act, he will face the full force of the law. If he does not like the law, he can try to change it, but that is the law passed by both Houses and therefore the police have a duty to uphold it. It does not stop peaceful protest.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
I would love to reopen the Palestine Action debate, because I was the person who pushed for the vote and, as we exited the Chamber, several Peers said to me, “This is going to cause trouble”. So people knew.
However, on the review led by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, can the Minister say whether the noble Lord set the time limit or whether the Government did, because it seems a lot of work for such a short time?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I always try to be helpful to the House. I was not directly party to the issue with the Home Secretary and the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, about the time limit, so I cannot say with any certainty whether the Home Secretary said to the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, to do it by April, or the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, said that he will deliver it by April. If the noble Baroness wants me to write to her to make that point, I will do so.
The key thing at the heart of Amendment 371 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, is that it provides for the review to be undertaken within 12 months of the Bill receiving Royal Assent. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that the review we are doing currently will have been completed by April 2026.
Lord Walney (CB)
Many of us in this Committee would be absolutely amazed if the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, stuck to his timetable of being able to publish something next month. He does not need to take four years, as I did, but it is a ferociously tight timetable.
If you follow the logic of those arguing that people who were protesting in support of Palestine Action should not face legal charge, is it not the case that they would then have to say that support for any terrorist organisation, if it was so-called peaceful, should be allowed—so you should be able to peacefully give your support for Hamas or any violent organisation? If that is their argument they need to properly say it, because many people would have problems with that.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Walney, on that point. The right to free speech is extremely important, and there is no stopping the right to free speech about the issue of Palestine in any way, shape or form. If a determination is made under the Terrorism Act 2000 that an organisation has crossed that threshold, the Government have a duty to act on that, which is what we have done in this case. With due respect to the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, I just did not want to allow the comments he made to colour the position on a protest around Palestine. He can protest around that, but he cannot support an organisation that still has some outstanding court cases and has undertaken some severe action to date.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
May I press the Minister on that? I quite understand his analysis of the law: that the Palestine Action group became a proscribed organisation when Parliament said it should and, as a result of that, it follows from the terms of the Terrorism Act that there were and are continuing to be prosecutions of people who express support by perhaps sitting wearing a placard, or by wearing an item of clothing that expresses such support.
The proscription is of course the subject of challenge in the courts here and may well be the subject of challenge in the European Court of Human Rights, so I will say nothing further about that. But subject to that, have the Government not had any concern about the fact that because of the way the Terrorism Act works, the proscription of any organisation means that any expression of support, as the noble Lord said —however peaceable or however others might regard it as simply peaceable protest—renders it illegal and renders the person expressing such support liable to being prosecuted? Do the Government not feel that this is a reason for having a review of the validity and sense of the law in this area, where the Terrorism Act carries, as it stands, that unfortunate consequence?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
We have strayed, with due respect to all noble Lords, slightly wider than the amendment. I just wanted to make the point about Palestine Action because the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, mentioned it.
The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, is looking at all aspects of prosecution and all aspects relating to legislation. We keep all matters under review at all times.
The 2000 Act sets down certain criteria. That threshold was passed and crossed in this case. I defended that in this House, and the House supported it on a cross-party basis. That is political life. The noble Lord can move an amendment at any time to strike that legislation down, if he wishes to.
I hope that the noble Lords will not press the amendments before us today. The right to peaceful protest is vital. The Government support it. The Government are making changes still to allow that right but also to try to get a fair balance so that communities and others can also enjoy life when a protest occurs. We have the wider review from the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, which will report in due course and which will colour, no doubt, further discussions. I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I will be as brief as I can. On the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, I welcome his support for the principle of Amendment 369, but our amendment does fully respect the rights and freedoms of others and does so expressly in proposed new subsection (3)(c). That does not mean that any inconvenience to citizens should be accepted as a reason for restricting the right to protest. I make the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and others have made: that nearly all protests cause some inconvenience and noise without unduly infringing the rights of others. I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, that, certainly as they are framed, his amendments smack of intolerance in their failure to countenance any inconvenience.
All noble Lords have accepted that the rights of neither side of the argument are absolute—the noble Lords, Lord Walney and Lord Goodman, made the same point. I believe, along with others, that the toleration of some inconvenience is the price of the democratic right to protest.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is absolutely right that we have the ECHR rights, and he knows that I regard them as of critical importance. He makes the point—supported by the others, and it would be echoed by me—that Amendment 369, in part, duplicates the ECHR rights; I am bound to say that I do not regard it as likely that there will be satellite litigation about the difference between the two sets of rights. One point that bears on his argument is that the statement in domestic legislation that directly bears on the right to protest—whereas the Article 10 and Article 11 rights do bear on it but not as directly as our amendment —is of great importance. But that is only part of the picture.
I am also absolutely clear that I am not criticising and have at no stage criticised the police for enforcing the law. Indeed, as it happens, I take the contrary view. I do not believe that the police should have discretion not to enforce the law except on quite serious grounds of convenience.
I criticise the fact—I say it is relevant, when the Minister said it was not relevant—that the need for reconsideration of the Terrorism Act in the light of what has happened, and it has left us in the position that peaceful protest can lead to prosecutions that are unintended, means that a full review is necessary. I, of course, welcome the review of noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, and I welcome the fact that the Government have put that in train, but a further full review over a longer period is necessary.
However, the absolutely crucial point about the need for Amendment 369 is the one the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, made: it would impose an express statutory duty on public authorities to respect, protect and facilitate the right to protest, which is not anywhere in the ECHR. There may be resource implications to that, but it only reflects the importance we place on preserving democracy and the right to protest along with it.
For the time being, I will of course seek leave to withdraw the amendment, but I will reconsider the position between now and Report, having regard to the support I have received from some quarters around the House, but not universally.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Viscount Stansgate) (Lab)
My Lords, the noble Lord is slightly premature. Technically, we are debating Amendment 369ZA, to which the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, is entitled to reply.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
Yes, my Lords, procedurally I have to be the tail-end Charlie here and seek leave to withdraw the amendment. However, I am so pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, was able to get in and do a summing up of his amendment.
As soon as I saw Amendment 369, I thought, “This is too extreme; it is unbalanced, and I’ve got to rebalance it”. But I could not rebalance it by tweaking it, so I adopted the maximalist approach of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, and that approach, which I agree is also slightly unbalanced, managed to provoke an important debate on the balance of rights and the right to protest. Of course, it provoked the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, but if one is to be beaten up in this House, there is no one better to beat me up than the noble Baroness, because she does it with a smile on her face. I know that, deep down, she does not mean it.
I was delighted to be defended by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. He was right: we already have all the law we need here—we do not need a new statute. I was interested in one of the points the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, made, which I have seen too. Protests have changed. She said that they have become more violent and toxic and that she was screamed at by nasty protesters. That is not very good. I like what the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said: that disruption does not often work but persuasion does. He said that disruption is a mechanism for change, but people have rights as well, and that the criminal law is not the place to put in a new law on rights.
I am also grateful for the wise contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Walney. You cannot ignore the public’s views on the disruption protesters cause, and if the protesters go too far, the public will take their own action and will rebel. I mentioned seeing motorists getting out of their cars and dragging protesters off the roads. The noble Lord also mentioned the damage to the economy, and I agree with him on that.
I agree with my noble friend Lord Goodman, who gave an excellent exposition of the balance of rights and duties. I thank my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower. I agree with him and welcome his view that the amendments are not essential.
Finally, I say again to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that I profoundly disagree with his amendment and what he said, but he had a very powerful and persuasive case, and I congratulate him on the way he set it out.
In his usual courteous way, the Minister took all our points of view into account, and he agreed with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that we already have all the rights we need and do not need a new law. So with that, and at this wonderful hour of the night, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Viscount Stansgate) (Lab)
It is now appropriate for the noble Lord, Lord Marks, to tell the Committee whether he wishes to withdraw Amendment 369.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
I apologise for intervening too early, and I seek leave to withdraw my amendment.
Crime and Policing Bill
Tuesday 13th January 2026
(3 months, 4 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-IX(a) Amendment for Committee (Supplementary to the Ninth Marshalled List) - (13 Jan 2026)
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
How nice it is to be back here again. I oppose Clauses 118, 119 and 120 standing part of the Bill. These clauses introduce a pre-emptive targeting of people based on location rather than behaviour. That should concern anyone who cares about the right to peaceful protest. Under these clauses, a senior police officer may designate an area in anticipation of a protest, based on a belief that an offence is likely to occur. Once that designation is in place, simply wearing an item said to conceal identity becomes a criminal offence. This applies to everyone in a designated area. Criminal liability comes not from conduct but from being in a certain place and from what a person is wearing. That is a profound shift in approach and one that I cannot support.
It is also a massively broad discretion. An inspector can designate a locality for up to 24 hours, extendable, on the basis of a prediction or guess, rather than evidence, of immediate serious violence. The result is a huge power to ban everyday protective coverings across a place at a time based only on an estimate of what might happen. That is exactly the kind of power that leads to overenforcement and a chilling effect on protest, particularly for those who already face risks from being identified.
The Government may say that defences to these provisions exist for health, religion or work, but those protections operate after arrest and charge, not at the point where the person decides whether it is safe for them to attend a protest at all. That is the key issue here. Liberty’s supporters have been clear about the real-world impact. One disabled person wrote:
“I am clinically vulnerable … Forcing disabled people like me to unmask is surely disability discrimination”.
Another said:
“As a single woman, I do not want to be identified”.
Women who have experienced domestic abuse may cover their faces for the same reason.
For others, including diaspora activists and those with credible fears of transnational repression, anonymity is not a political statement but a basic safeguard. We have already seen reporting on how mask restrictions at solidarity protests in the UK, including those linked to Hong Kong, have deterred participation because surveillance and reprisals are real concerns. This then becomes about who feels safe enough to exercise their democratic rights.
I must also ask: are these clauses really necessary? The police already have a targeted power, under Section 60AA of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, to require the removal of certain items where this is justified. That power has been used in recent protest policing, including at protests outside a migrant hotel in Epping. Can the Minister say what evidence the Government have of a gap in existing targeted powers that they cannot meet, rather than simply a desire for broader, pre-emptive control? The Government have not demonstrated an operational gap so far. What we appear to have instead is a preference for wider, pre-emptive control rather than targeted, evidence-based policing.
That matters because Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights are absolutely clear: any restriction on protest must be necessary and proportionate, and the Strasbourg court has repeatedly warned against measures that deter peaceful participation through fear of sanction. A clause that criminalises ordinary behaviour across a designated area, without reference to a person’s actual behaviour, is precisely the kind of measure that risks crossing that line.
Will the Government consider narrowing the trigger to “imminent and serious violence or disorder” and introducing a clear front-end reasonable excuse protection, rather than relying on defences only after arrest? If the Government’s concern is intimidation or disorder, then the answer is the better use of existing targeted powers, not a blanket approach that sweeps up disabled people, women concerned about safety and minority communities, along with everybody else. For all those reasons, I support removing Clauses 118, 119 and 120 from the Bill.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I stand to oppose the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and to suggest that it is vital that these clauses stand part of the Bill, because protest is strongest when it is open, accountable and proud. A movement that hides its face borrows the language of secrecy; a movement that stands unmasked invites public judgment and moral authority.
History teaches us that the most effective and morally persuasive movements were led openly. Emmeline Pankhurst marched into the public square and faced arrest and imprisonment without concealment, because the suffragette cause depended on moral clarity and public witness. Arthur Scargill led the miners in mass action, visible and unhidden, because solidarity is built on faces and names, not anonymity. Martin Luther King Jr stood on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial and in the streets of Birmingham with nothing to hide, because non-violence and moral authority require openness. Mahatma Gandhi led millions in acts of civil resistance with a visible, symbolic presence that made the movement impossible to ignore.
The Government’s own summary of the Bill is clear about the purpose of these measures. It refers to:
“A new criminal offence which prohibits the wearing or otherwise using of an item that conceals identity when in an area designated by police under the new provisions”.
That designation is constrained by a statutory trigger:
“A designation can only be made … when the police reasonably believe that a protest may or is taking place in that area, the protest is likely to involve or has involved the commission of offences and that a designation would prevent or control the commission of offences”.
These are targeted powers, aimed at preventing criminality while protecting lawful assembly. It is not about silencing dissent; it is about responsibility and transparency. The fact sheet also notes a practical enforcement tool:
“The bill also creates a new power for the police to require someone to remove a face covering during a protest”.
That power underlines the expectation that those who lead and speak for causes should be prepared to be seen and held to account.
I mentioned older historical protest leaders, but I can bring the Committee more up to date. Contemporary political figures continue to lead visibly. We all have tremendous respect for the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, who has led a few protests in the past. I have looked at about 50 absolutely magnificent photos of the noble Baroness protesting in Westminster and other areas. She has been at the forefront of various Green Party protests. She said that she had been protesting all her life, but I could not find any of her as a schoolgirl at the anti-Vietnam War or Aldermaston protests.
She has a varied repertoire: stop the police Bill; stop pension financing; outside the Royal Court of Justice with a banner saying “Neither Confirm Nor Deny”; stop fracking in Lancashire; stop dumping sewage, South West Water; renters’ rights; and many more—all with her trusty loudhailer. She also said that part of protest was to cause inconvenience and disruption. I suggest that the three of them on the green holding up a banner against Guantanamo Bay did not cause much inconvenience.
The serious point, as I tease the noble Baroness, is this: in every single photo, after her last 50 years of protest, she and her colleagues had their faces uncovered, demonstrating modern political leadership in public demonstrations. To all other organisations I say that, if the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, whom I admire as a conviction politician, can protest so frequently with her face uncovered, so can and should everyone else. So I say, “Go on, organisers: encourage openness, train you marshals and make sure your aims are clear”. To the police I say, “Use these powers proportionately and protect lawful assembly”. To the public I say, “Support the right to protest and expect those who lead to do so with courage and transparency”.
I conclude by saying that, when protest is unmasked, it persuades rather than intimidates; it invites debate rather than hiding behind anonymity. That is how movements achieve lasting change.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, that was a powerful speech, but it really is not the case that all protesters are in the position of Martin Luther King, Emmeline Pankhurst, Mahatma Gandhi and the noble Baroness herself. There are protesters who have good reason for wishing to conceal their identity. If I am a protester against the current regime in Tehran and join a protest in London in order to express my views, I will be genuinely and properly concerned that my identity being revealed may well lead to action being taken against my family and associates in Tehran, and I have a very good reason for not wanting to have my identity disclosed.
I am concerned that Clause 118(2) is too narrow. It provides a defence for a person who has concealed their identity: showing that the reason they are wearing a mask is for
“a purpose relating to the health of the person or others, the purposes of religious observance, or … a purpose relating to the person’s work”.
Those are the only defences. That does not cover the example I gave—I could give many other examples—of the protester concerned about what is going on in Tehran. So I suggest to the Minister that, although I do not support the wish of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, to remove these clauses, I do think she has a point about the narrow scope of the defences in the clause.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, made her point so ably that I was not tempted to speak, until I heard the counter-speech from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. It is simply ahistoric to suggest that the suffragettes—those protesters who everybody loves now but who were once incarcerated and tortured by the British state—
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
Indeed, they went on hunger strike. It is simply ahistoric to suggest there was not a significant clandestine element to their operations. I am sure that, if one were to examine other examples the noble Lord gave, one would find greater complexity than he offered us in his very glib comments about protest.
Just minutes ago in this Chamber, noble Lords from across the House expressed their horror at what has been happening in Iran. On any given day in your Lordships’ House, similar comments will be made about Hong Kong or protests anywhere else in the world. It is of concern that organisations that many of us respect, such as JUSTICE, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and so on, are now writing very concerning reports about silencing the streets of the UK.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. I agree with everything that she said. I start by reminding the Committee that I have an interest as chair of Big Brother Watch. In this group we are considering Clauses 118, 119 and 120, which are not only draconian in their effect but very poorly drafted. In the course of my speech, I have five questions about these clauses for the Minister, which I ask him to respond to when he replies.
Clauses 118, 119 and 120 create a new offence of concealing identity at protests. However, as I will demonstrate, and as has already been said, it is vital that individuals are able to preserve their anonymity at protests. Other clauses in the Bill promote the use of highly intrusive and totally unregulated facial recognition technology at protests. We are currently in the Wild West with this mass surveillance technology. It is being used by law enforcement and private firms without any permission, regulation or oversight from Parliament. The Bill contains the first mention of the phrase “facial recognition” in any legislation, yet it does nothing to control or monitor its use. Perhaps the Minister could explain why the Bill fails again to regulate and control this mass surveillance technology?
Authorising the use of this technology, as the Bill does, without first controlling how it is used, puts the cart way ahead of the horse. The combination of this mass surveillance and prohibiting face coverings at protests, as these clauses do, has a seriously chilling effect on people’s willingness to participate in demonstrations.
There are many categories of law-abiding citizens—we heard some from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—who may prefer to conceal their identity at protests for entirely legitimate reasons, such as those protesting against a hostile foreign state who fear retribution for themselves or their families; those who prefer that their employer does not know their political views; those who criticise their own religious or cultural communities; survivors of sexual violence and harassment, who need to stay below the radar; or those who simply do not wish to be the subject of mass surveillance by totally unregulated facial recognition technology. Anonymity is an important enabler of freedom of assembly and association. It allows participants a certain level of protection against authorities singling out or identifying specific individuals.
There are serious problems with the drafting of Clauses 118 to 120. Clause 119 does not require that a person knows they are in a designated area for them to commit an offence. This compares unfavourably with Sections 12(5A) and 14(5A) of the Public Order Act 1986, which also imposes conditions on processions and assemblies. That Act includes the requirement that, at the time of the offence,
“the person knows or ought to know that the condition has been imposed”.
There is no such requirement in Clause 119, so a protestor who knows nothing of such a designation could well be arrested and prosecuted. Can the Minister explain why that is right?
Worse still, Clause 118 appears to reverse the burden of proof, which means a defendant would have the burden—presumably on the balance of probabilities—to prove that they were wearing a face covering for health or other reasons. Why is this not the criminal burden or standard? This risks people being wrongly convicted on the lower standard of proof, which is especially concerning as the offence has such wide application. Furthermore, anyone wearing a Covid-style mask in the locality of a protest, even if they are there for a completely different reason, could be caught by this offence and would not have the protections of the normal burden and standard of proof at trial. Can the Minister explain why that is the case?
Clause 119 has no limit on the types of offences that would give rise to the power to make the designation. That means that the designation could be made disproportionately, such as on the basis of only minor offences. In addition, there is no protection from the offence itself and its designation being circular, which means that an officer may justify a designation against concealing identity on the basis that they believe the offence of concealing one’s identity may be committed.
Another problem with these clauses is that the maximum sentence of one month’s custody is the same as for the offence of refusing to remove a face covering under Section 60AA of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. I think the Committee will agree that the conduct element of the Section 60AA offence—refusing to comply with the lawful direction of a police officer—is significantly more serious and by definition implies awareness of the condition, unlike the new offence. It seems disproportionate that the new offence would attract the same sentence. Does the Minister agree?
Clauses 118 to 120 are defective in many important ways. In any case, even if they were better written, they would still unreasonably and unnecessarily inhibit and have a chilling effect on lawful protests. For all these reasons, they must be strongly opposed and removed from the Bill.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I am quite open- minded about the clause on face coverings and whether it is a good or bad thing to have face coverings at protests. I have just a couple of points for the Government in considering whether to change the provisions in any way.
First, imposing more conditions, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, suggested, to narrow the provisions might be laudable but will make them harder and harder to enforce. The officers on the street can take action only on what they see, and if the person alleges that they have a member of their family in Iran, or wherever it happens to be, it will be quite hard for the officer on the street, so it may make no difference at all to the initial action. At the ongoing investigation and prosecution that might follow, they may then want to rebut—if they intend to—the claim that that defence is available. It will impose more burden on the prosecution, so we must be very careful about the conditions that we impose on it.
Secondly, although we tend to think about face masks being worn by only some people in the crowd, we could anticipate that everybody in the crowd wears a mask. If that is the case, it can be quite intimidating, and it makes normal policing quite difficult to embark on. For example, one way in which you would notice if someone has a bail condition that they should not attend a protest is whether you can recognise them. In terms of general investigation, if everybody has a mask, it is quite difficult to distinguish one person from another. We might anticipate some of the things that we saw in the 1930s. We have the Public Order Act 1936, which was intended to stop people from wearing uniforms. It could become a kind of uniform, or at least an aspect of a uniform, to signify support for a political purpose.
This clause needs some thought if it is to go forward. I ask for as much consideration as possible for the enforcers, who will be criticised if they get it wrong, but we can anticipate now whether they might be left in an invidious position.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I rather agree with the noble Lord’s concern about how ever more protest laws are to be operated in practice by police officers, who are dealing with a growing and ever more complex statute book. But I wonder what he thinks about the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, that the powers already exist to require and direct people to remove a mask, which could be done to individuals. In the hypothetical situation that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, gives of everyone wearing a mask as a form of intimidatory uniform, what does he think about the fact that the power already exists? What is an officer to do, faced with those duplicative powers and offences?
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
It is a fair question. I would only say that, generally speaking, if you have a large crowd and a significant number within it wearing masks, the chances of you telling them all to take them off are very limited. If I understand the proposal, it is to prevent people arriving at the march with a mask rather than having to deal with it once they arrive. If you have to deal with it, you will have to deal with it. That is the only thing I would say: having allowed people to mask up, you cannot then expect officers to deal with a crowd of 5,000 or 6,000—it is just impractical. That is the argument against it, but I understand why the argument is made.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I broadly agree with the excellent comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, in moving this, as well as the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger. I was reminded, when the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, reminded us of the exemptions, that retrospectively, having been arrested or having had your mask removed, or what have you, you can say, “I was wearing this mask for health reasons”, or for work reasons, or for religious observance. The fact that there are exemptions for those reasons and not for others indicates what a ridiculous situation it is. Why have those three things only as reasons why you are allowed to wear masks? Let us just think about it. At what work would you be allowed to wear a mask? Could you say, “Well, I deliver pizzas so I have a helmet on”? Everyone could then turn up wearing a helmet saying that it was to do with their work. That just does not make any sense.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I too support the position of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, that Clauses 118 to 120 should be removed altogether from the Bill.
My reasons are twofold. First, I regard it as wrong and unjustified to prohibit people from concealing their identities at demonstrations, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, has said, let alone prohibiting anyone in a designated locality concealing their identity if they so wish. That is what the Bill does, as my noble friend Lord Strasburger pointed out. My second point is that the purpose of the clause can only be to enable the use of live facial recognition technology to monitor demonstrations, to enable the authorities to determine who is attending them and, frankly, to take action against them subsequently. I regard that as an offensive justification, certainly given the present state of the technology and the present lack of regulation of live facial recognition.
On the first reason, overall, the prohibition of individuals concealing their identity involves introducing a Big Brother role for the state that is unwelcome and foreign to our notions of democratic freedom. The power may not be Orwellian in scale, but it has nasty totalitarian echoes of Nineteen Eighty-Four. We should remember that the catchphrase of the dictatorship in that novel is, “Big Brother is watching you”, the justified implication being that state observation of individuals is a principal instrument in the toolkit of dictatorship.
No doubt that is the reason why the power to prohibit such concealment is hedged around in the Bill by the complicated regime of designated localities, exempted purposes and limited durations. Those limits on the prohibition of concealing identity are intended to act as a brake on the power, but, in fact, all the weaknesses—mentioned by my noble friend Lord Strasburger, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and others—emphasise how far the power is a fetter on individual freedom.
I fully appreciate that the power to designate a locality under Clause 119 would arise only if a senior police officer reasonably believed that a protest was likely to involve, or has involved, the commission of offences, and that it would be expedient to exercise the power to prevent or limit the commission of offences. However, that must be measured against not only the seriousness of the offences to be avoided, as my noble friend Lord Strasburger pointed out, but the right of individuals to wear a disguise, which may be, as others have pointed out, a perfectly reasonable thing to do.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, spoke of protesters against the Iranian regime. What about journalists, of whatever political persuasion, who wish to report on a protest but do not want to be recognised by the protesters or the public? What about employees, who would rather not be recognised attending a protest by their employers? The employers may have a political objection to the cause that the protesters are pursuing. Any figure who may be publicly recognisable who wishes to take part in, or even just attend, a protest, and wishes not to be recognised, may legitimately have that right to conceal their identity. What about parents who do not want to be recognised at a protest by their children, or adult children who do not want to be recognised at a protest by their parents?
The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, relied on the public protests of Emmeline Pankhurst and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, rightly objected to that comparison. There were countless other suffragettes who did not want friends or family to know of their support for, or activity as, suffragettes in protests because they might disagree with their family, parents, husbands, wives or friends, or simply out of concern for their own safety. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, expressed the position of ordinary citizens who wish to keep their identities private. I go further: in peacetime, it is the right of people to keep their identities private. The state would have to justify any limit on that power, and it has not done that.
We all agree that everyone has a right to protest but we must all acknowledge that protests can, and often do, involve the commission of offences by some. But the fact that protest may involve, or be likely to involve, the commission of offences by some people does not justify the police or the state in denying everybody in the designated locality the right to conceal their identities. This prohibition says to people that if you take part in or attend the protest, or are in the locality covered by the designation, you must be recognisable. I say to the Minister that that is an unjustifiable arrogation of power by the state. It must be justified by the Government if they wish to legislate for it, and they have not gone anywhere near justifying that arrogation of power.
My second reason for opposing this clause is that the prohibition on concealment of a citizen’s identity can have only the one purpose of enabling them to be monitored on camera, with a view to being identified later. Let us examine that. At its most benign, the power may be directed only against those who commit offences. Where it is for that limited purpose, it can be argued that preventing offences by the persons identified on camera may be a legitimate exercise of the power of the state, but I will repeat the points made by my noble friend Lord Strasburger on that. Just as police officers justify surveillance, so this power, if it were sufficiently defined and limited, might be justifiable, but the purposes of surveillance in the Bill go much further and unacceptably so. A dictatorial state may regard it as permissible to identify supporters of a particular view, political party or cause for the purpose of keeping them under further surveillance; worse still, branding them as trouble-makers for the future; or, at the extreme, taking action against them, ranging from pulling them in for questioning to arrest and unlawful imprisonment.
We have seen abuse of powers such as that in countries all over the world; the country that is currently under consideration is Iran, but it has happened in many others. We prevent abuse of power only by being astute to limit police powers and state infringement of individual liberties in the first place. This is not just an argument about live facial recognition technology, which my noble friend considered—we will discuss that more later—but an important argument about the legitimate limits on state power. Clauses 118 to 120 come nowhere near falling within those limits, even had they been tightly drawn—which they are not, as my noble friend and others have pointed out. For that reason, these clauses really ought to go.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for tabling these stand part notices. However, we on these Benches are unable to support her as we have general support for Clauses 118 to 120.
The clauses address a very real and increasingly familiar problem in modern protest policing: the deliberate concealment of identity to frustrate lawful policing and avoid accountability for criminal acts. I am sure that all noble Lords have seen videos circulating on the news and online of protests where large groups of people arrive masked or disguising their identity. Often, the only reason for that is to embolden themselves and each other to commit offences, knowing that their identification and subsequent prosecution will be next to impossible. This undermines both public confidence and the rule of law.
Clause 118 creates a relatively tightly drawn offence that would apply only where a locality has been designated by the police because there is a reasonable belief that a protest is likely to involve, or has involved, criminality. It is not a blanket ban on face coverings. Rather, the clause provides clear statutory defences for those wearing items for health reasons, religious observance or work-related purposes. I do not have concerns that these defences may be abused, and I hope the Minister will be able to provide some assurances as to how he intends that this will not be the practical reality.
Clauses 119 and 120 provide for necessary safeguards and structures relating to the powers of Clause 118. They stipulate that designation must be time limited, based on a reasonable belief and authorised at an appropriate level. There are explicit requirements to notify the public of the designation, the nature of the offence and the period for which it applies. These safeguards are consistent with other provisions of the Public Order Act that relate to police powers to impose conditions on assemblies and processions.
Removing these clauses would make policing protests even more difficult, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, outlined. Offenders who attend protests with the primary intent to commit crimes, whether related to the protest topic or not, will be able to evade justice more easily. The vast majority of peaceful protesters are unfairly associated with disorder that they did not cause. Effective policing protects the right to protest by isolating and deterring criminal behaviour within it. For those reasons, we cannot support the stand part notices in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for tabling her intention to remove Clauses 118 to 120. The Committee is aware of the purpose of those clauses. I am grateful for the support of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Blencathra, for the broad principle of the clauses.
I start by referring the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, to the front page of the Bill. She will see that the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint—which is me—has made the statement that the provisions of the Bill are compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights, which answers the first point that she put to me.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I am so grateful to my noble friend the Minister for giving way. I am glad to hear him restate his commitment to the European Convention on Human Rights. He will know that that statement at the beginning of any Bill is not a certificate of compliance but a belief in the compliance of the contents of the Bill. I wonder whether my noble friend could help me understand whether there has been any assessment in the department of measures such as this in the hands of a future Government who do not share his commitment to human rights and how such powers might be used.
On the issue of having powers to limit expression when offences are taking place, as my noble friend said a couple of moments ago, I remind him that in Clause 119, which is the mechanism for designation, the test is not that offences are taking place; it includes preventing the possibility of offences. In relation to compliance, he will know that any limits on convention rights must be proportionate, yet the test for designation in Clause 119 is not proportionality but expedience. Can my noble friend help the Committee understand why the human rights language of proportionality has been substituted for the test of expedience?
Finally, can my noble friend say why protest has been singled out in this way and not, for example, carnivals, religious prayer vigils or other gatherings of people where they might conceal their identity?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
There were a number of points there. If my noble friend will allow me, I intend to answer the points made during the course of the debate. I say to her straightaway that we have published our analysis of the ECHR obligations; I can refer her to it. I will ensure that if she does not have it to hand, I will send it to her. It is published and is available for that.
As I will come on to in a moment, the rights that we are seeking in this piece of legislation for protesters, the community, the Government and police forces are measured in a way that I believe is acceptable. In recent years, policing large-scale protests has posed significant challenges; the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, referred to that. While most participants exercise their rights peacefully and lawfully, a small minority have engaged in criminal acts while concealing their identity. It is because the police have highlighted this issue with existing powers to identify those committing offences during protests that we have brought these issues forward. It is essential that the police can identify those committing offences during protests, not only to ensure accountability and justice but to protect peaceful demonstrators and the wider public from harm.
As a whole, Clauses 118 to 120 strike a careful balance. This will not apply to all protests. It applies only to protests that have been designated by a senior police officer of inspector rank or above. In addition, as was mentioned by a number of contributors to the debate, although the police currently have powers to remove face coverings in designated areas, they themselves have said to us—this goes back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe—that those measures are not always effective in the context of managing protests. People often comply but then replace a face covering later, which is difficult to monitor in large gatherings. The new offence addresses this by making it unlawful to wear a face covering once a locality has been designated by a police officer—not by a Minister or by the Government—in the light of upholding rights as a whole.
That senior police officer, who will be at least of the rank of inspector, must reasonably believe that a protest is likely to occur, that it is likely to lead to criminal behaviour—that is the critical point, which comes to the contributions from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and others—and that it is necessary to act to prevent or reduce such offences. That is an important caveat, not the Nineteen Eighty-Four dystopia that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, seems to—
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
In a moment. It is not a Nineteen Eighty-Four dystopia, me becoming Orwellian or the Government becoming Big Brother and being all-seeing. It is about potential criminal activity where a police officer—not the Government, this House or the House of Commons—determines that this action should be taken. If a police officer determines that that designation needs to occur at that space and time, that is a reasonable thing, allowing protests but also stopping criminal behaviour.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I simply want to ask him this question: how far have the Government stress-tested these clauses against the test posed by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti? Under the auspices of a future Government less benign than this Labour Government—whom I respect, and he knows that—to what extent has that stress-testing tested, for instance, how far the promotion of police officers to the rank of inspector may produce benign results, or how far the results could be Orwellian? I do not suggest that this Government are Orwellian. My suggestion is that there is potential, in these clauses as drawn, for bad consequences.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I will say two things to the noble Lord in our defence. His presumption assumes that a police force in five years’ time will be dominated by right-wing Conservatives, Reform members or Socialist Workers Party members, who instruct the police force to instigate that designated area. I happen to believe— I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, would agree with me—that the police are independent of government, they have integrity, and they determine policies based on legislation.
This does not give a police officer the power to be a political commissar, whether of right or left, but gives the police the power to say, “There is potentially criminal action in this designated space; therefore, in this space we need to ensure that we can remove face coverings”. If there is another Government who he fears in the future—all of us may fear different Governments of different authoritarian natures—I guess that they will have won an election and will have 400 or so Members of Parliament, and they can pass what the heck they like anyway.
Therefore, there is an argument to say to the noble Lord that his fears are undermining the integrity and the independence of the police force, and all I am doing in this legislation is giving the police the power to take action should they, as the police, determine that they want to do it.
The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, mentioned that it does not require someone to know they are committing the offence. Clause 119(2) requires the police to notify in writing that the designation has been made, the nature of the offence, the locality to which the designation applies and the period for which it applies. So it could even be a designation in writing for a limited time and in a limited place, but it is important that we do so.
A number of noble colleagues have raised religious and medical exemptions and further loopholes. The purpose of the new offence is, as I have said, to prevent protesters concealing their identity in order to avoid conviction for criminal activity in the designated place.
The measure does provide a reverse legal burden on the defendant to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that they wore a face covering for work purposes, or religious or health reasons. But, as with any charge, that is a defence in the Bill, in the future Act, in law, that allows people to say, “I am a paint sprayer”, or that they were seeking to prevent illness that might cause further illness if they did not wear a mask, or that, potentially, they had a religious reason to wear a mask. That is a defence in the event of any charge being made. But, again, it is a defence at the time when the police officer might well say to an individual that that mask needs to be removed.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
Be that as it may, what does the Minister say to people in all the other categories which are not mentioned in the clause as exemptions? People who have work reasons or marital reasons or whatever are not mentioned as exemptions; what do you say to them about attending protests? Are they just to avoid protests on that basis?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
There are designations that we have set down in law and there are designations that are not set down in law, but the measure is a proportionate one that the police can undertake, and in the event of an individual knowing that that is happening, they can accordingly take their own measures and decide to either protest or not protest. That does not curtail the right to protest.
The measure does not ban face coverings at every protest. An individual can go to a protest; they can wear a face covering for the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, has outlined, and only if the police believe that criminal actions could be taken is that area designated. Then it is a matter for the individual, and I believe a majority of peaceful, legitimate protests will not be captured by this legislation, and the police must take great—
Lord Pannick (CB)
The Minister is making a very powerful case but I ask him to focus on the defences which he has recognised. I do not understand why it is a defence for me to show that I wore a face mask because of my religion, but it is not a defence for me to prove, the onus being on me, that I wore a face mask because I was protesting against the Iranian regime and I have family in Iran.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I hear the point that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, makes. We have drawn a line in the defences. I come back to the principle that the power to be used by the police officer, not the Government, is to determine this in the event of suspected criminality occurring.
There may not be, in the case that the noble Lord has mentioned, the need for that designation, because the police may make a judgment, which is their judgment to make, that a protest outside the Iranian embassy, for example, would not lead to potential criminal activity. That is the judgment that we are making. That is the line that we have drawn. I see the point that he has made, but that is the defence that I can put to him today. Because—
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
I very much support what the Minister is saying. The only question is: will the police have the power not to require this person to take his mask off if they accept his view that that would cause some danger to him or his family in Iran?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The exemptions in the Bill are very clear, and I have already talked about those that relate to religious, work or health reasons. Police officers will make a judgment on those issues on the ground and, as in the experience of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, they have a significantly difficult job to do at any demonstration.
If I can give any comfort to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Baroness, all the offences under the Bill are currently under review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, as part of the review that he is undertaking, to be completed by spring 2026. I have no doubt that he will pay close attention to the comments that are made in this debate and make an assessment to government about whether the points made by noble Lords are ones that he should reflect on. I would say to the Committee—
Lord Strasburger (LD)
I am astonished by that statement. Is the Minister saying that we should knowingly pass faulty legislation because we know that the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, will pick it up and sort it out later?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The noble Lord opposes the clauses; I do not. We have a difference of opinion on that. This is what Parliament is about. On Report we may have a vote on it. I have heard the support of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower, Lord Blencathra, and others. I will seek their support in a Division and the House will determine what the House of Commons has already determined, which is whether those clauses are right or wrong for inclusion.
What I am saying is that, on all occasions, there are things that can be looked at and examined. If the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, are worthy of consideration, we will have opportunities to have those reviewed, because the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, is going to produce a report for the Home Secretary on protest generally. I cannot say what he is going to say or what recommendations he is going to make, or whether we will accept those recommendations. I simply say to the noble Lord today that I believe Clauses 118, 119 and 120 should stand. He does not. I believe that they are right and proper and effective and give powers to the police to do business in a co-ordinated way to prevent crime. There are points that have been made today which no doubt the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, will reflect on. He may make recommendations to government accordingly, and we may make issues later on. But I say to him now, and to anybody else in the Committee, that these powers are ones that the police have asked for to ensure better policing to prevent crime. They are compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights, in my view. They are proportionate and they provide a mechanism to ensure that people at a protest who commit crimes do not commit those crimes without any understanding.
I will make one final point before giving way to my noble friend. The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, also talked about facial recognition. He will know that, later on in this Bill, we will deal with issues to do with facial recognition. He will also know that the Government are currently undertaking a consultation on facial recognition, pending comments from anybody who wishes to make them and pending, therefore, better regulation of how any facial recognition is utilised in later legislation at some future point post this Bill. So, whatever concerns the noble Lord has on facial recognition, I believe it is still a valuable tool for policing, but we can examine them at some point downstream and there will be an opportunity to test his views versus the House’s at some point.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I am grateful to my noble friend for his detailed responses and for his patience in taking interventions. Could he in a moment deal with my point about why the word “expedient” has been used in Clause 119 rather than “proportionate”? He himself has talked of proportionality many times, and of course he will know that the test for lawful interference with convention rights is proportionality rather than expedience. And, in the light of comments made in this Committee by noble Lords such as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who does not oppose the provision outright, would he consider, between now and Report, adding an additional defence of fear of reprisal to the health provision, for example?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The wording in the Bill is the wording the Government have agreed. That is the position that we have taken. We may have a disagreement on that. If my noble friend wishes to put an amendment down on Report to change that wording, that is a matter for her. She has made a further suggestion about a further defence. Those are matters that I suggest should be considered by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. If she wishes to expediate that quickly, she has the opportunity along with anybody else to table an amendment on Report. But the Government have given serious consideration to this and Clauses 118, 119 and 120 are the result of those considerations. They are at the request of the police, they are proportionate, and they are, in my view, compliant with human rights. I commend them to the House and in a gentle way urge the noble Baroness, either today or in the future, not to seek to withdraw them.
Lord Sentamu (CB)
I happen to support these clauses, but I have the same concern as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that this has been drawn rather too narrowly and there may be areas that may have to be considered.
Secondly, the noble Lord is quite right: the clauses give this power to the police to prevent crimes being committed. What happens if the police get it wrong? We all know what happened with the sus law and reasonable grounds to suspect: they suspected and stopped people again and again, and nothing was actually worth suspecting. I do not want an answer; I want the possibility of considering what will happen if the police get it wrong. We have the Birmingham question still; I do not want to talk about it, because there are inquiries going on. What measures does the noble Lord want to address the particular conundrum that is there?
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I add this, to save time. I know people are trying to expand the number of conditions, but I would like us not to run away with the assumption that the work face mask makes sense. Intuitively, it does, but I do not understand the paint sprayer who is at a protest wearing their mask. They are either at the protest or at work; I am not sure why they are wearing the mask at the protest. I do not understand that juxtaposition, and it may be for the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, to consider as well.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, time is pressing for the response, but that is largely due to interventions. I say to the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, that the main objective of the police in this process will be to ensure that there is a peaceful demonstration, with no trouble for the community at large. If the police overpolice an issue, that is potentially an area where trouble can commence. So I give the judgment to the police to do this in a proper and effective way.
A number of comments have been made, and we will always reflect on those comments, but I stick, particularly because of time, to the contention that the clauses should stand part of the Bill.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, I cannot tell you how much energy and self-control it has taken to stay seated, with all these interventions and comments. First, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for his very kind comments and the photographs, which have obviously brought back a lot of very nice, happy memories. I thank him for that. The other aspect to my having to exercise loads of self- control in staying sitting down is that I get very agitated —very irritated, in fact—and I scribble all over the papers I have in front of me, which sometimes makes it difficult to reply fully. I am going to do my best, and I beg the patience of the House in allowing me to go through all my scribbles.
I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Fox, and the noble Lords, Lord Strasburger and Lord Marks, for their support. I am very grateful. Obviously, this is a day that will go in my diary: the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, actually agreed with something I said. That is quite rare.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I did not necessarily agree that the Baroness, Lady Jones, should be mentioned in the same sentence as Martin Luther King and Emmeline Pankhurst—I just wanted to make that clear.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
I thank the noble Lord. I would like to say, by the way, that I did go to Aldermaston, but my first real protest was in 1968 when I was 18. I went on a CND rally, and it was peaceful—at least, I think it was; I cannot remember.
It is not difficult to counter the arguments from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. He talked about my being brave enough—perhaps he did not use the word “brave”—to go to protests without a mask, but, of course, I am a highly privileged white female and he is a highly privileged white male. It is not for us to say who might be vulnerable and who might not, and who might fear reprisals and who might not. Let us remember that there are people who live in fear of other people, and those people could easily be deterred from going to protests.
On the points from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and the Minister, the fact is that the police have enough powers already. If they really are requesting this, surely the Government should have a little bit more pragmatism about what they are passing. The fact that the Minister is so happy that two Tories are supporting him is something I honestly find quite shocking. If they are the only people he can rouse to support him in your Lordships’ House, that really says something—and I do not mean for any of you to stand up and support him: it is not necessary.
On the issue of the police getting confused, because the legislation at the moment is very confused—there is so much of it—
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
Thank you. The noble Lord, Lord Hacking, is absolutely right. For example, Steve Bray, the man who does all the loud Brexit protests in Parliament Square—
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
I will thank Members on this side not to comment on my speech if possible.
Apparently last week the police tried to close Mr Bray down in spite of the court ruling that said that what he was doing was legal. They made, I am told, the absurd and fatuous claim that the judgment had been repealed. That is completely wrong; it is complete nonsense. That is what the police said. They are confused. I do not blame the police for that; I think that the law on protest has now reached such proportions that they really cannot be expected to stay up with what is happening. The Minister said that the police are going to make these decisions and that we have to trust the police and have lots of confidence in them, but if you make bad law, you are responsible and not the police. You are responsible for passing laws that are, first, unnecessary and, secondly, plain wrong. The police have to try to put that into practice, and that is not fair.
I think I might have said everything actually.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
I think this is terrible; these clauses should be thrown out or should at least be rewritten, because they are not useful. They are not useful to people who are in genuine fear of their lives but who want to protest about something, and they are not useful for the police, who already have the powers. I asked in my opening speech whether the Minister could point me to the gap in legislation. If the police have really asked for these clauses, then they do not even know the legislation properly.
Very unwillingly—and I am glad the Minister suggested I bring this back on Report—I will withdraw my opposition to the clause standing part of the Bill.
Lord Davies of Gower
“(3A) For the purposes of the defence in subsection (3), a person does not have a reasonable excuse by way of an honestly or sincerely held political belief, irrespective of the nature of the belief.” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would ensure that a person cannot claim a reasonable excuse for the possession of a pyrotechnic article at a protest because of a sincerely held political belief.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, ever since the Supreme Court ruled in the DPP v Ziegler in 2021, the state of public order and protest law in this country has been nothing less than a confused mess. As Policy Exchange noted in its report, ‘Might is Right?’, we have entered an era of increasingly disruptive protests. We have seen severe disruption from the likes of Just Stop Oil, Extinction Rebellion and pro-Palestinian groups. My amendments together seek to restore clarity and proportionality to our public order law following the deeply troubling consequences of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ziegler.
The starting point must be an uncomfortable truth: the law as it now stands has tilted too far in favour of those who seek to justify criminality and serious disruption on the basis of contentious political beliefs. That tilt did not arise from legislation passed by Parliament but from judicial interpretation. It has been Parliament’s clear intention to prevent such actions occurring in the name of protest—that is evident in the legislation that has been passed in recent years—but the will of Parliament has been, to at least some degree, undermined by the judiciary, most notably in the Ziegler ruling, which has elevated protest-related rights under Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights above the practical ability of the state to prevent intimidation, obstruction and damage. I argue that the proportionality analysis mandated by the Human Rights Act 1998 has migrated from being a safeguard of last resort to being a routine defence for conduct that Parliament has plainly intended to criminalise.
In effect, the courts are being invited to weigh the importance of a cause against the harm done to the public. That is not the rule of law; it is moral relativism dressed up as jurisprudence. These amendments offer a direct and refreshingly simple response.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)
My Lords, my Amendment 382H, to which the noble Lords, Lord Godson and Lord Hogan- Howe, have added their names, covers the use in this area of the law of the defence of lawful or reasonable excuse in relation to public order offences.
As the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has said, the law is in a state of incoherence at the moment. It is important, of course, that the law in this area adequately reflects the right to protest, about which there is no issue among any of your Lordships. It also must reflect the interests of third parties significantly affected by protests. The law must be sufficiently clear for the police to be able to know what their powers are and to exercise them sensibly and lawfully. Finally, the law has to be sufficiently clear that members of the public think that it reflects the various interests reasonably involved in the whole question of what lawful protest is and its limits.
The decision in Ziegler was, I think it is broadly accepted, a wrong turning by the Supreme Court; it is accepted by people across political persuasions. I too, like the noble Lord, Lord Davies, very much praise the long and persistent work of Policy Exchange to expose the shortcomings of that decision and the uncertainty it has created in terms of the application of the law. It is never easy for a court to decide what is a reasonable or lawful excuse, but the amendment we have put down assumes that there is sufficient evidence for there to be an offence in the first place. That is a significant rider, of course, but it also provides, in proposed subsection (2), that there is no excuse for the conduct if:
“(a) it is intended to intimidate, provoke, inconvenience or otherwise harm members of the public by interrupting or disrupting their freedom to carry on a lawful activity, or (b) it is designed to influence the government or public opinion by subjecting any person, or their property, to a risk, or increased risk, of loss or damage”.
What is perhaps somewhat unusual about this amendment, as opposed to the other amendments in the group, is subsection (5) of the proposed new clause, which says:
“For the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, this section must be treated as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.
As the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said, the European convention and its incorporation in our law by the Human Rights Act has very much changed, or potentially changed, the analysis of all sorts of legal situations, particularly in this area. The common law provides that there are certain rights that we recognise, such as the right to free speech or freedom of association. But, as those of us who remember our legal lectures will be told, those rights exist only in so far as they are not made unlawful by some other intervention, either of the courts or of Parliament. Those rights do not trump anything but, none the less, nobody would doubt that we have freedom of speech and freedom of assembly.
One of the problems about the European convention is that it states rights, and some of the rights are absolute and some of the rights are qualified, such as—relevant to this particular area of the law—Articles 10 and Articles 11. Therefore, it does not provide an absolute trump card that you can never, as it were, contravene a law on the basis that you have an absolute right to freedom of expression under Article 10 or a right to peaceful assembly under Article 11. In fact, the European court in Strasbourg has not said that it is not open to individual countries to decide what are reasonable limits of those rights.
Where I think Ziegler went seriously wrong was, as it were, ducking the issue by simply saying that, quite apart from what Parliament has said about reasonable excuse and the like, a particular court has to decide proportionality for itself, whether that is by a judge or a jury. In particular, paragraph 59 said:
“Determination of the proportionality … with ECHR rights is a fact-specific enquiry which requires the evaluation of the circumstances in the individual case”.
With great respect, that is not very helpful for a court in deciding whether an offence has been committed or whether a defence is permitted in law.
In fact, I think it went too far because the European Court of Human Rights does not say that individual legislatures should not attempt to legislate by striking the balance, to reflect those matters that I referred to at the beginning of my remarks. For example, in the case of Laurijsen v Netherlands, in 2024, the court said that,
“physical conduct purposely obstructing traffic and the ordinary course of life in order to seriously disrupt the activities carried out by others is not at the core of that freedom as protected by Article 11 of the Convention”.
In other words, Strasbourg does not say that Parliament cannot legislate in this space if it thinks it appropriate to reflect the various matters that are so important in deciding what the limits of lawful protest are.
My amendment—and I support other amendments in this group—would make the law a great deal clearer. It says that you should not invoke some vague notion of proportionality; you simply decide whether there is a lawful excuse, in accordance with the fairly straight- forward provisions we have contained in our amendment, and you may remove from your considerations any of the vagueness of proportionality that emanates from the European court at Strasbourg. That is because we can take it that Parliament has decided that, in all the circumstances, it has taken into account all those rights—whether they be rights of common law or rights in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights—and it has satisfied itself, just as the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, satisfied himself about this Bill, that it complies with the European Convention on Human Rights. That is clarity; that is what this amendment seeks.
I imagine that the Minister may have in his notes, when responding to this group, the name of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. By the look on his face, I am not wrong about that. I greatly respect the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, and am sure that he will come up with some extremely sensible suggestions. However, we know that the law is not in a good place at the moment and that protest is a particular feature—and why not at the moment, when there are, after all, so many things to protest about? We need the law to be clearer sooner than even the diligence of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, may produce. I therefore suggest that the Minister, who I know will be taking on board all the ideas in this space, should consider carefully whether we can remedy this wrong and make the law clearer, so that all involved in this sphere of law can know what the law is.
The Lord Bishop of Manchester
My Lords, the more I listen to the debate this afternoon, the more worried I am getting. It seems to me that, over recent years, we have successively tightened up regulations around protests, including quite peaceful protests, making it harder and harder for people to express publicly their deep concerns around a whole range of issues. I am not sure that we need more clarity; that is for judges and juries to determine on the details of a particular case. The whole principle of the jury system is that we are judged by our peers and that, if we have undertaken some activity which has brought us before the courts, it is for other people like us to determine on the particular instances. They can take into account the culture and context, in a way that is impossible to do by way of legislation. I am quite wary about over- specifying here. Sometimes clarity is not necessarily the best thing to achieve.
I have one final small point. A number of amendments in this group and others refer to processions. In the area I grew up in, the Whit Friday processions in Mossley and Saddleworth in Greater Manchester are a thing of beauty and a joy for ever. In whole towns and villages, many roads are closed for much of the day, clearly causing massive disruption to people who would otherwise be travelling on those through roads. I want some assurances from the Minister that there is no intention for Bill to be used to prevent traditional religious processions or other processions simply because they happen to close the road for a while.
I think of the procession in Liverpool city centre a few months ago, when that dreadful incident happened; I guess the bloke driving his car felt that his journey was being impeded. But people must have the right to hold their processions to celebrate the victories of their football teams—even in Liverpool, which, as a Mancunian, I struggle with—to have civic processions, football processions and, please, in Greater Manchester, religious processions. I would be grateful if the Minister could assure us that nothing in this Bill could be used to limit those kinds of peaceful, traditional celebrations and processions.
Lord Pannick (CB)
The amendments in this group are motivated by understandable concern about the decision of the Supreme Court in the Ziegler case, which is [2021] UKSC 23. The noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Faulks, made powerful submissions relating to that case.
The Committee may wish to be reminded that the Supreme Court reconsidered the statements made in Ziegler in the abortion services case, which was [2022] UKSC 32. Further guidance on the issues in Ziegler was given by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, as the Lord Chief Justice in the Cuciurean case, which is [2022] 3 WLR 446. The Supreme Court said, in the abortion services case, that it is not for the jury or the magistrates in each individual case to assess whether the conduct of the defendant is protected by human rights law. That was the concern, as I understand it, of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester suggested that that is highly desirable, but that is not the law.
In the abortion services case, in paragraphs 63 to 66, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, who is the President of the Supreme Court, spoke for a seven person Supreme Court. It was an enlarged court because of the importance of the issue. He addressed the principles. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, said at paragraph 63:
“The first question was whether, in a case where the exercise of rights under articles 9 to 11 of the Convention is raised by the defendant to a criminal prosecution, there must always be an assessment of the proportionality of any interference with those rights on the facts of the individual case. The answer is no”.
In paragraph 64, he said:
“The second question was whether, where an offence is liable to give rise to an interference with the exercise of rights under articles 9, 10 or 11 of the Convention, it is necessary for the ingredients of the offence to include (or be interpreted as including) the absence of reasonable or lawful excuse in order for a conviction to be compatible with the Convention rights. The answer is no”.
Paragraph 65, says:
“The third question was whether it is possible for the ingredients of an offence in themselves to ensure the compatibility of a conviction with the Convention rights under articles 9, 10 and 11. The answer is yes”.
The position under the law is that the prosecution will say that Parliament has enacted a specific offence; that is the law of the land, and it is simply not open to the defendant to say that they are entitled to seek to overturn the ingredients of the offence by reference to convention rights. The law of the land is set out in the criminal offence. Therefore, respectfully, much of the criticism of Ziegler fails to recognise that the courts themselves have understood that Ziegler went too far, and that what Parliament has determined in relation to the law is the governing law—notwithstanding Articles 9 to 11 of the convention.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I have a couple of amendments in this group. First, I say to the right reverend Prelate that the peaceful religious processions that he had in mind, such as those at Easter, were not the sort of processions that the chief constable of Greater Manchester Police had in mind when he recently said something to the effect of him having seen an appalling increase in aggro and violence in demonstrations, and that:
“The intolerable has become normalised”.
That is quite different from the peaceful processions that the right reverend Prelate had in mind.
Before I turn to my amendments, I want to say how much I enjoyed the Minister’s winding-up speech in the previous debate. He was in absolutely top form, especially in his demolition of the noble Lord, Lord Marks. I suspect that most of the best bits in his speech were not written by his officials; I shall treasure them. I hope that I do not become a victim of such a wonderful oration against me.
I have two amendments in this group. The first is quite small, simple and titchy, and the second is slightly more complicated.
Clause 122(2) says:
“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that they—
(a) had a good reason for climbing on the specified memorial,
(b) were the owner or occupier of the specified memorial, or
(c) had the consent of the owner or occupier”
to do so. My first amendment would delete the general excuse of having a “good reason”. The only defences left for a person charged with an offence under Clause 122 would be that they were the owner or occupier of the memorial or had the consent of the owner or occupier to climb on it. I wonder about “occupier”; I presume that that is to cover memorials that are not just statues but buildings, such as the Hall of Memory in Birmingham. I would be grateful for a slight elucidation on what is meant by the occupier of a memorial.
I turn to the proposed new clause in my Amendment 378B. It is simple in principle but looks a bit complicated. It simply reproduces the operative test, as well as the definition of “community”, in the Public Order Act 1986 (Serious Disruption to the Life of the Community) Regulations 2023 and would put them in the Bill, giving them primary law status. This would improve legal certainty and parliamentary scrutiny.
Many clauses in the Bill, and many of the amendments, speak of
“serious disruption to the life of the community”.
We may conclude from this that the disruption must be pretty serious indeed to qualify as “serious”. However, that is not the case since the previous Government passed the 2023 regulations, which defined and, some commentators would say, diluted the concept of serious disruption.
In plain terms, my proposed new clause would place in the Bill all the illustrative examples and interpretive tests introduced in the Public Order Act 1986 (Serious Disruption to the Life of the Community) Regulations. As I suggested, those regulations make amendments to provisions in the Public Order Act 1986 concerning the meaning of the expression
“serious disruption to the life of the community”.
Section 12 of the Act gives the police the power to impose conditions on people organising and taking part in public processions. A senior police officer can exercise this power if they reasonably believe that a procession may result in
“serious disruption to the life of the community”.
Serious disruption to the life of the community is not defined in the Act itself, but Section 12(2A) sets out a non-exhaustive list of examples that may constitute serious disruption.
The 2023 regulations refine that list. The amendments to Section 12(2A) and (2B) of the Act also provide that, when considering whether a public procession in England and Wales may result in serious disruption, a senior police officer must take into account the disruption that may occur regardless of whether the procession is held, as well as the disruption that may result from the procession, and may take into account the cumulative disruption that may be caused by more than one public procession or public assembly in the same area. The amendments also provide that the term “community” extends to anyone who may be affected by the public procession regardless of whether they live or work in the vicinity of the procession. They state that “disruption” is anything
“that is more than minor”,
in particular to
“the making of a journey”
or access to goods and services. The regulations define this as
“access to any essential goods or any essential service”,
including access to
“the supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel … a system of communication … a place of worship … a transport facility … an educational institution, or … a service relating to health”.
That is what the regulations say in redefining
“serious disruption to the life of the community”
in the Act. Although my amendment looks complicated, it simply suggests that those regulations should be incorporated into the Bill as primary legislation. Transferring the regulations into the Bill would bring legal clarity—the police, courts and organisers would read the statutory test directly from the Act rather than a separate statutory instrument, reducing uncertainty about where the operative tests are located. It would mirror the stated purposes of the 2023 regulations to provide greater clarity. It would bring consistency of application—putting the tests in primary legislation would reduce the risk of interpretive divergence between different SIs or guidance and make the threshold for imposing conditions more visible to Parliament and the public. The cumulative effects would be preserved—the clause could, and should, reproduce the regulations’ treatment of cumulative effects so that multiple impacts are properly captured, as the regulations already contemplate cumulative assessment.
Of course, the Minister will say that embedding illustrative examples in primary law makes future policy adjustments harder and might require primary legislation and time to respond to unforeseen operational guidance. However, I suggest that retaining my proposed new clause, to secure clarity and parliamentary oversight but add a short delegated powers safeguard—a power to change it in future by regulations—would be perfectly okay.
I support Amendment 369A on pyrotechnics at protests tabled by my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower on the Front Bench, but it does not go far enough. I cannot think of any lawful excuse for possessing pyrotechnic articles while taking part in a protest. Protests are a vital part of our democratic life. They are a place for voices to be heard, grievances to be aired and change to be sought. But they are not a place for devices that can cause panic, injury or irreversible escalation. Pyrotechnics are designed to startle, burn, explode and smoke; they are not tools of peaceful persuasion. To allow a defence based on an honestly held political belief risks turning lawful protest into a dangerous theatre of risk and fear. Public safety must be paramount.
There are a few other things I could say about pyrotechnics at protests, but I will cut short my remarks in the interests of time. I see no justification whatever for anyone to have pyrotechnics at any protest or for there to be a lawful defence for it.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I support and have added my name to Amendment 382H. I also support the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. My support is based on the concerns over and consequences of the Ziegler case. Noble Lords have said today that it was wrong in law, but that is not for me to say. The policy consequences for policing the streets of this country have been profound and negative, particularly in the area of public protest and disorder policing.
The Ziegler case was one of the simplest offences to prove in the criminal law. It was an offence of wilful obstruction of the highway. There were only three parts to prove; it was wilful, it was obstruction and they were on a highway. That was the offence, and it is one of the simplest we have policed over the years. It became complex only when people alleged that there was a reasonable excuse—for which read “a political purpose”—for their obstruction of the highway.
In the past, all the police needed to prove was that it was a highway—which is well established in law—that it had been obstructed and, usually, that they had asked someone to move on and they had either returned or not moved. That was about as complicated as it was. But as soon as you have to import intent, recklessness or reasonable excuse, the offence starts to become more complex and the police have to think carefully before intervening. I know that in this House people sometimes talk about the police being careless with the law, reactive and reactionary—I am not talking about any individual; I am just saying, as a general comment, that it has been said—but my experience is that, on the whole, they try to get it right and to balance everybody’s rights, often in very difficult circumstances.
My reading of Ziegler is that the Supreme Court seemed to say that dealing with obstruction of the highway is far too simple when dealing with protesters—that it is okay for everybody else but for protesters it gets a little more complicated. The Supreme Court ruled that the exercise of the convention rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association, sometimes grouped together as the right to protest, constituted a lawful excuse, which means that before a person can be convicted for obstructing the highway, the prosecution must prove that a conviction would be a proportionate, and thus justified, interference with that person’s convention rights. The Ziegler judgment has caused very real difficulties for police in dealing with environmental and many other protests and, I argue, for judges in attempting to run trials fairly and efficiently and instruct juries about what must be proved.
Lord Walney (CB)
My Lords, I will speak briefly to commend the noble Lords who have brought this amendment. I add my praise and gratitude for Policy Exchange in having led the charge on this. I benefited greatly from Richard Ekins’s report in producing my own review, which was published in May last year. One of the recommendations of my review was for the then Government—it falls now to this Government—to set out a clear plan to move on and clarify after the Ziegler judgment. There have been a number of pertinent cases since then. The Court of Appeal’s ruling on the Colston statue case has, in my understanding, made it clear that this is not an unqualified defence. Nevertheless, it has left a level of confusion, for magistrates and for the police, over more minor but still significant criminal damage, such as spraying paint on statues or throwing soup over a painting. This situation is highly complex and difficult for the police and the courts to navigate now. Leadership from the Government and Parliament is needed to put the matter right.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
My Lords, I find myself in complete agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Walney, and in particular I draw attention to the excellent work of Professor Ekins and Policy Exchange in this area.
As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, observed in his opening remarks in respect of Amendment 382H, it is plain that the Supreme Court took a wrong turn in the Ziegler case. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, notes that a number of subsequent cases have touched on the finding in Ziegler and come to an apparently inconsistent conclusion, the most notable of those being DPP v Cuciurean and the Bristol Colston statue case. As the noble Lord, Lord Walney, observes, the Court of Appeal in that case found that the Ziegler judgment had prominently spilled over into trials concerning criminal damage. The Court of Appeal, in its criminal context, made it clear that the defence of lawful excuse was not available in that context, and that sits uneasily with the Supreme Court’s findings in Ziegler.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, pre-eminent member of the Bar that he is, says that the law is tolerably clear and should survive with the embellishments of the subsequent cases. I am afraid that, in this context, for the reasons so ably set out by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan- Howe, that is not adequate for the purposes of either the protesters or the police.
In my submission, Amendment 382H is a model amendment, in that it is clear and brief, and sets out with admirable clarity what it is seeking to do. In particular, I draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that it would apply, across the gamut of all offences which contain a lawful excuse provision, the words,
“the excuse must be a lawful excuse or … must be a reasonable one”.
There are many areas across the canon of criminal law that can be engaged with protest that may give rise to this, thus the application of this amendment would be wide-ranging and provide considerable clarity.
Amendment 382H sets out, in proposed new subsection (2), when it is no excuse, and does so with great clarity. I submit that the various judges trying these cases would be greatly aided when making decisions in summary offences and when giving directions to juries on this area in the light of this amendment.
Finally, in proposed new subsection (5), the amendment directly addresses the provision in the Human Rights Act, which takes into account whether or not this is the exercise of a qualified right and provides that this provision is necessary in a democratic society. It therefore sits happily with the human rights arrangements, so ably highlighted by the Minister in his closing speech on the last group. For those reasons, I hope that this amendment is brought back on Report. I, for one, will heartily support it.
Lord De Mauley (Con)
My Lords, I declare an interest as chairman of the War Memorials Trust. I am grateful to the Government for including Clause 122 in the Bill and what I have to say goes to my noble friends’ Amendments 369A and 369B.
I have some quick questions for the Minister. First, where can I find the Government’s definition of a war memorial? It is clearly important that there is one. Secondly, I make the point that certain war memorials are specifically designed as immersive experiences or paths people can walk or even climb on—examples are the Carnoustie war memorial and the tomb of the unknown warrior. Can I assume that the walker or climber will have to rely on the defence that he or she had the consent of the owner or occupier of the war memorial? Thirdly, on Clause 122, I ask the Minister— I know we will come to this in more detail in due course—why Schedule 12 is confined to 24 war memorials, which I think are simply the top 24 from the national heritage list. He will know that there are tens of thousands of war memorials across the UK and that many more than 24 are very important and in prominent positions, and therefore arguably just as vulnerable as those listed in Schedule 12.
Lord Hendy (Lab)
I raise a point on Amendment 378B, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. Unless I have missed something in that lengthy amendment, the effect of it might well be to interfere with the exercise of the right to picket in an industrial dispute. The right to picket is protected by Section 220 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act and, in a lawful industrial dispute, by Section 219. I doubt that that was the intention of the mover of the amendment. Is it possible to have some clarity on that point?
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I am grateful to the noble Lord. It is my intention, and I believe it is the case—possibly the Minister will confirm—that my amendment would not change one iota. It would simply incorporate all the current regulations from the 2023 regulations and move them verbatim into the Bill, making it a primary case. It would not change any of the provisions at all. If there are technical drafting issues then they can be corrected later, but there is no intention to change any of the concept.
Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)
My Lords, I support all the amendments and will speak to a point that comes up in Amendment 378B. Because it arises in 378B, I am raising it now, but it affects the subsequent amendments in the next few groupings, particularly my amendments. It all flows from Section 12 of the Public Order Act 1986.
Essentially, there is some concern that so much discretion will be left to the police. It is clear that, for one reason or another, the police have not been effective in controlling protesters to date. Noble Lords may have seen the video clip on social media showing Gideon Falter, CEO of the Campaign Against Antisemitism, being told by police he was “quite openly Jewish”, and therefore causing a breach of the peace.
We are in the middle of assessing the appalling decisions by the West Midlands police, who consulted a large number of mosques, including some very radical ones that housed an imam who stated that women should not leave their home without their husband’s permission. These people were consulted on whether or not Israeli tourists should be allowed to visit the West Midlands. The police claimed they had consulted the Jewish community in the area: that was not true. It is clear they realised that the Israeli tourists would be in danger, but they decided to ban them from coming on the false excuse that they would be the aggressors. So they turned the victims into the guilty ones.
Your Lordships may have seen another video clip— on Friday or Sunday night—outside an Israeli-owned restaurant in Notting Hill called Miznon. There were some very aggressive and intimidating protesters and the police simply stood there. There may have been one arrest, but that was it. So innocent employees, eaters, diners and members of the public faced a very unpleasant situation.
Baroness Cash (Con)
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord for raising the issue of Miznon and Erev in Notting Hill. There have been a number of protests outside that restaurant, which is actually on my street. The owners of the restaurant and the residents who use it, including me, have been subjected to the vilest form of antisemitism, and the police have done nothing.
So I support this and will ask the Minister a number of questions about it. It is not enough to say that the senior officer should be responsible for this; much clearer principles and rules are needed around what is and is not acceptable, if the police are evidently—based on recent events—not capable of exercising that judgment themselves. So I support this and hope that the Minister will take it seriously.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I will confine what I say to a few points in response to some of the speakers we have heard from.
I found myself in considerable agreement with the general concerns about balance expressed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester. It seems to me that, in some of the consideration of these clauses, we have lost sight of what we agreed in Committee last week. Everybody agreed that questions for the courts and others about considering breaches of public order law—as well as the introduction of new public order provisions—do raise the question of balance between, on the one hand, the right to protest and, on the other, the rights and freedoms of others.
I will resist the temptation to respond in detail to the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, in spite of his claim that he relished the Minister’s demolition of my arguments about stress-testing this legislation for the future and not relying on the benign intentions of this Government. I have concerns about the noble Lord’s amendments; I am sure that the Minister will deal with them. They include questions about what “serious disruption” is and what should amount to “essential services” within the meaning of the Act, as well as he whole question of cumulative disruption, to which we will turn later.
Those concerns—and the Minister’s comments in the previous group on the publication of the review of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven—raise an important issue about the timing of this legislation, compared with the timing of the noble Lord’s expected report. I share the confidence that he will consider all these issues with great care, but might it not have been better had the review come first and the introduction of this legislation and its consideration in this House come second? From what the Minister said in his speech on the previous group, I take it that it is the Government’s present intention to give further consideration to public order law in the light of the noble Lord’s expected report. If that is the case—and if that attention will be given objectively and carefully, and then lead to such legislation as is necessary—that may be the best we can do with the timing that we have now. But my comments stand about the order in which this has been done stand.
I turn to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. I do not propose to give him many hours of pleasure in listening again to arguments about balance as a matter of law; however, I do repeat the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, about how confident he is that police officers, including senior police officers, always get the balance right. That is a difficult assertion to make or defend. I am not suggesting that he went as far as that, but it is very important, not only for the Government but for us as parliamentarians, to consider the possibility that police officers sometimes fail to get the balance right.
I take the point that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, made that it is often a very difficult balance to strike. We need to be very careful in commenting on how the police should strike it and not place too much confidence in the police in the future and, in particular, in the event of changes in government that, as the noble Lord recognised, might be unwelcome to many of us. Nevertheless, they could be changes of an elected Government.
That brings me to Amendment 382H, which was welcomed by the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, and elegantly presented by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. I will draw the Committee’s attention to one problem. Proposed new subsection (5) is not simply definitional; it is designed to act—and would act, in some sense—as an ouster for the purposes of domestic courts of the effect of the convention rights. It uses the language of Article 11 when it states:
“For the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, this section must be treated as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.
Article 11 requires that the rights that are respected
“are necessary in a democratic society … for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.
If Parliament legislates that a section must be treated as necessary, it precludes within this jurisdiction any testing of the proposition that such provisions, as interpreted, are necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. That is the province of the European Court of Human Rights to consider. It is a requirement of the Human Rights Act that domestic courts here give effect to the European convention and interpret legislation, where they can, as compatible with the convention.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)
Of course, this is an amendment, so the Government will not have given the certification of compliance with the European convention. Were the Minister to accept the amendment and it to become part of the Bill, the Government could then certify that it did comply with the European convention and it would be unnecessary to put that particular provision in. But, as an amendment, it is making clear that that particular provision takes into account that there are convention rights and, notwithstanding those convention rights, the amendment is to have the effect that it does.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, that is a complicated justification of the inclusion of that subsection in the amendment. I just about understand what the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, is saying there. But were his amendment to be accepted, it would raise difficulties about the compliance or cohesion of that amendment with the European Convention on Human Rights. I leave the point there. It is for the Minister to deal with it. If he says he can accept the amendment, subject to later adjustment to take out that subsection, so be it.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I will try to respond to what has been a wide but, at the same time, restricted debate, if that makes sense.
The amendments deal principally with the reasonable excuse defences applicable to various public order and criminal damage-related offences. Amendments 369A and 369B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, which had the support of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, and others, would exclude a political belief from being considered a reasonable excuse or good reason under the new offences in Clauses 121 and 122.
My view is that this would narrow the scope of the statutory defences and reduce flexibility for the police, the Crown Prosecution Service and the courts to consider individual circumstances, particularly given that political belief is a broad and loosely defined concept and not a term commonly used in legislation. The lack of clarity could create uncertainty in its application.
The amendments would also have wider operational implications. By prescribing what cannot constitute a defence, the amendments limit the discretion of the courts, the CPS and the police to make case-by-case judgments. This is important because it could restrict the operational independence of the police, the prosecutors and the judiciary, which must weigh factors such as motive and proportionality when deciding to take enforcement action or to prosecute. That goes to the heart of the noble Lord’s amendments, but the Government consider that the current provisions are sufficient and proportionate, and the defences, as drafted, ensure that enforcement and prosecution decisions are made proportionally and in line with the important human rights legislation and obligations that we adopt and accept.
Amendment 369AA, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra—and I thank him for his comments—would remove the good reason defence in Clause 122. I say to the noble Lord simply that this defence is intended to cover circumstances which are also important. For example, it could be that someone needs to climb on a specified memorial to repair or clean it. We should not be criminalising people in such circumstances, but the acceptance of that amendment would mean that could, in theory, be the case.
Amendment 382D in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, seeks to remove the reasonable excuse defence available to individuals charged with specific offences under the Public Order Act 2023 and Section 137 of the Highways Act 1980. These offences include locking on to an object, tunnelling, or interfering with key national infrastructure. Again, the Government are of the view that the reasonable excuse defence is necessary in these instances to ensure an appropriate balance between protecting the wider community and the right to protest.
Lord Pannick (CB)
The Minister responded to the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, and the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, and their understandable concerns about the protests outside the Israeli-owned restaurant in Notting Hill by saying that this is a matter for the police. Have the Government no position on whether it is acceptable for people who are dining in an Israeli-owned restaurant to be subject to abuse and intimidation of the sort that we have seen on London streets?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I hope the noble Lord did not take my comments in that vein. It is completely unacceptable for individuals to have their lives disrupted by that level of protest, but it is for the police on site to determine. I was not there on the night; I did not witness the protest. I read about the concerns prior to today, and during the course of this debate I have examined again the reports that have occurred. But it is for a police officer on site to determine. Under existing legislation, there are offences of harassment, of inciting violence and other offences and, as the noble Lord knows, because we have debated this at Second Reading, there are measures in the Bill to ensure that people can, with the police, determine a protest route and the regularity of a protest as part of the proposals in this legislation. I am not ducking the question; it is important that people have the right to live their lives in freedom, and to enjoy a restaurant meal. But I cannot be the police on the night, determining whether the offences that are potentially covered currently by law are exercised by the police. I hope the noble Lord will accept the comments that I have made. With that, I invite the noble Lord not to press the proposed amendments, and to revisit them should he so wish.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, to those who have supported my amendments and even to noble Lords who disagreed with them, because this discussion has laid down the real issue before us: who decides where the limits of protest lie —Parliament or the courts?
Much of the criticism rests on the claim that removing reasonable excuse defences is somehow draconian. I profoundly disagree. I say to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester and indeed to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, that peaceful protest remains fully protected. These amendments address not expression but coercion, not persuasion but disruption, not dissent but deliberate law-breaking carried out in the expectation that the courts will excuse it after the fact.
That expectation is not hypothetical. It is precisely what flowed from the Supreme Court’s judgment in Ziegler. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for his interpretation of the law as it stands, and the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, for his further clarification. The Ziegler decision has encouraged protesters to view arrest as a tactical step, confident that they can later invoke proportionality, sincerity of belief and human rights arguments to defeat prosecution. We saw this with a recent case, whereby Just Stop Oil protesters threw powder paint at the historic Stonehenge. They were acquitted, of course, on all counts. The result is uncertainty for the police, frustration for the public and an erosion of respect for the law.
Noble Lords may agree that the answer lies in better guidance or more nuanced drafting, but we have been down that road. The debates on the Public Order Act 2023, particularly those led by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom, were an earnest attempt to clarify the law while retaining reasonable excuse defences, but Labour denied the opportunity to do so. The outcome has been complexity layered upon complexity, and still the courts are left to decide case by case whether obstruction, damage, or intimidation was worth it, given the cause advanced.
Lord Davies of Gower
“Causing serious disruption to road transport infrastructureAfter section 8 of the Public Order Act 2023 (key national infrastructure) insert—“8A Causing serious disruption to road transport infrastructure(1) A person commits an offence if—(a) they do an act which causes, or is capable of causing, serious disruption to—(i) two or more individuals, or(ii) an organisation,in their use or operation of road transport infrastructure, and(b) they intend that act to have a consequence mentioned in paragraph (a).(3) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or a fine (or both).(4) In this section—“the maximum term for summary offences” has the meaning given by section 6(4); “road transport infrastructure” has the meaning given by section 8(2);“trade dispute” has the meaning given by section 7(10).””Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause creates a new offence of creating serious disruption to road transport infrastructure.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, my Amendment 370 would create an offence of intentionally causing disruption to road traffic infrastructure where the action in question affects multiple individuals or organisations. The amendment originates from the growth, in recent years, of protests designed to cause maximum public disruption to further narrow ideological ends. Activist groups comprising self-aggrandizing ideologues began to realise that, by taking part in large-scale obstructions that affected the law-abiding public, they could get their causes into newspaper headlines and Twitter feeds. The consequence was that groups such as Just Stop Oil became household names through their disruptive tactics. They targeted the lives of everyday people, disrupting people’s livelihoods and hampering the functioning of society.
The most damaging of these protests has become the disruption to road traffic. Protesters sit on busy roads and grind traffic to a halt. People are late for jobs, emergency services are delayed and police time is wasted, and it is the public who, ultimately, must pay the price. In 2022, Just Stop Oil shut down the M25 for four successive days, causing more than 50,000 hours of vehicle delay to over 700,000 vehicles. This cost the public over £700,000, and the cost to the Metropolitan Police was over £1.1 million. Despite 45 people engaging in the protest, only five organisers were arrested and held in custody. If we do not punish those who cause such obscene disruption, we leave the public vulnerable to further disorder.
The Government have taken forward several measures from our previous Criminal Justice Bill, including the provisions to ban possession of pyrotechnics at protests, the new offence of concealing one’s identity at a protest and the prohibition on climbing on specified memorials. However, it is a shame they have neglected to carry forward this particular measure to prevent serious disruption on roads. Avoiding prosecuting disruptive individuals ultimately comes at the expense of the public. I hope the Government can recognise this and will reconsider the amendment.
My further two amendments in this group respond to a stark reality. We have seen successive waves of disruptive protests that have strained our communities, stretched the capacity of our police forces, and left the public questioning whether the law was operating as intended. It is abundantly clear that undue weight has too often been placed on the rights of disruptive activists at the expense of the rights, well-being and interests of the wider public.
Take, for example, the recent Palestine-related demonstrations. The Metropolitan Police has stated that the costs of policing these protests in London between October 2023 and June 2024 were £42.9 million. Some 51,799 Metropolitan Police officers’ shifts and 9,639 police officer shifts from officers usually based outside the Metropolitan Police area were required. Further, 6,339 police officers have had rest days cancelled between October 2023 and April 2024, all of which will eventually have to be repaid to those officers. Such demands on police capacity inevitably divert resources away from policing crime and protecting vulnerable communities.
It is against this backdrop that Amendment 382A seeks to empower chief officers to act decisively. By way of background, Section 13 of the Public Order Act 1986 currently permits the chief officer of a police force to apply to the local council for an order to prohibit the holding of all demonstrations in a particular area for a period of up to three months. The threshold, as it currently stands, is that the chief officer of police reasonably believes that the powers in Section 12 of the Act—that is, the power to impose conditions on protests—are insufficient to prevent serious public disorder.
However, this threshold of “serious public disorder” overlooks a number of further factors. It does not consider the potential for property damage, the impact on the rights of others not involved in those protests, or the demands placed on police resources. My amendment would replace Section 13(1) of the Public Order Act 1986 to introduce the ability for the relevant chief officer to consider the risk of
“serious public disorder … serious damage to property … serious disruption to the life of the community”
and
“undue demands on the police”.
There is precedent for this. Section 11 of the Public Processions (Northern Ireland) Act 1998 permits the police to prohibit processions if they believe that the protest would place undue demands on the police or military forces. Although I recognise the unique historical context of public processions and assemblies in Northern Ireland, there is no reason why, with modern protest tactics, police forces in England and Wales should not also be able to consider the cost and burden on the police imposed by the policing of the protest.
On Amendment 382C, the existing six-day notice period for marches under Section 11 of the Public Order Act 1986 simply is not fit for modern policing needs. When tens of thousands of officers must be mobilised at short notice to manage demonstrations that may span multiple days and locations, six days’ advance notice does not provide sufficient time for intelligence assessment, resourcing and engagement with organisers. Extending this to 28 days would acknowledge the complexity and scale of contemporary protest events. It is a proportionate adjustment that gives police forces the lead-in they need without unduly restricting peaceful protest.
I emphasise that these amendments support peaceful, lawful expression, which is a cornerstone of our democracy. They do not, and are not intended to, curtail genuine dissent. They do, however, ensure that, in protecting the ability to protest, we do not trample the rights of those affected by serious destruction.
We are often reminded that the right to protest must be balanced with the rights of others. I put it to noble Lords that these amendments deliver that balance. I beg to move.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, I strongly support my noble friend on the Front Bench. I think we grossly underestimate how much damage to the UK economy is caused by stopping motorways, particularly the M25. I have not seen authoritative figures for how much it costs to block a motorway, which happens with road traffic accidents. Years ago, I saw a figure of £0.75 million per hour. I do not know whether the Minister has a figure for how much it costs when the M25 or another important motorway is closed. It is not just the effect on motorists; it is the effect on industry, transport and supply chains, and the need to build in extra float in the transport system to allow for that. So, I strongly support my noble friend in everything he said.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, some months ago I was trying to get to Oxford Street and at Oxford Circus a large number of people were sitting on the ground, making it impossible for either end of Regent Street or Oxford Street to move. I believe they were there for several days. All I can say is that, as an ordinary member of the public, I found it extremely irritating, so I am very sympathetic to Amendment 370.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
My Lords, I will comment briefly on Amendments 382A and 382C. Amendment 382A amounts to the banning of protests in almost any circumstances at the behest of the police. Proposed new subsection (2)(1B) is particularly guilty in this respect, allowing, as it does, for a protest to be banned because, in the opinion of a chief officer of police, it would place undue demands on the police. But the police, as a public authority, have a duty to facilitate protests, not prevent them. Of course, that duty to facilitate protests has resource implications for the police, sometimes serious implications. That means that the police must be provided with adequate resources by the Government, but it does not mean that, as an alternative to proper resourcing, financial corners should be cut by the Government, thus making it impossible for the police to carry out their duty to facilitate protest. But that is precisely what Amendment 382A would do. It says that protests should be banned because the police are underresourced. It would be better if it said that the police must be sufficiently resourced to allow them to facilitate protest. It does not, and for that reason Amendment 382A must be opposed.
Amendment 382C seeks to extend from six days to 28 the notice period for informing the police of a demonstration, but many demonstrations are spontaneous or are, by necessity, organised at short notice. In any case, the amendment would appear to not achieve anything, because this section of the Bill already contains a provision for late notice as soon as practicable, so there is nothing to be gained by increasing the formal notice period, unless the goal is to make it ever more difficult to organise a protest. Amendment 382C should also be opposed.
Lord Walney (CB)
I will briefly comment on the issue of notice periods for protests, because I have sympathy for the desire to create an ordered system where there is more notice for protests, although I struggle to see how it could be practical in some ways. But the main issue that I would like the Government to reflect on is the now fairly routine practice of the police disregarding the fact that many protests do not meet the current seven days. They may have their reasons, but they take a view to not have any form of prosecution for that. Even if they were to prosecute, the fines are relatively low and therefore not a deterrent. So any change in the notice period needs to be wrapped in with looking at the issue that this law is simply not being enforced at all officially at the moment.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for his Amendment 370 seeking to update public order legislation. For the benefit of any doubt, let me echo the words of the noble Earl, Lord Atlee, that this is a serious disruption to key infrastructure caused by protest tactics, and I understand the difficulties and challenges met by those types of protests. The amendment seeks to criminalise acts that cause serious disruption to road transport infrastructure. I say gently to the noble Lord that our view is that, under Section 6 of the Public Order Act 2023, there is an offence already on the statute book of obstructing major transport works, and Section 7 makes it an offence to interfere with key national infrastructure, including roads and other transport infrastructure, as defined by Section 8 of that Act. Introducing a new offence that closely mirrors existing provisions risks unnecessary duplication. It could create confusion for police and prosecutors and it could add complexity where clarity is needed. That does not take away the disruption that can be caused, even the occasional minimal disruption where an individual might be stopped by an ambulance, for example. Those are real key issues, but I suggest that existing legislation covers those proposals.
Amendment 382A seeks to amend Section 13 of the Public Order Act to enable a chief officer of police to consider serious damage to property, serious disruption to the life of the community, and the demands on police resources when determining whether to apply for an order prohibiting public processions. Section 13 of the 1986 Act already rightly sets a high threshold for considering whether public processions should be prohibited. It is one thing to place conditions on protests, as provided by elements of the 1986 Act, to enable them to take place peacefully and with minimum disruption; it is quite another to ban processions altogether. I find myself at one with the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, on these matters. On occasion, I can reach out with the hand of friendship to him, as well as to other Members of the House.
It is important that all public order legislation continues to be compatible with Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR, and Section 13 of the 1986 Act allows for the banning of a protest only where it is necessary to prevent serious public disorder. Widening the scope of the power to include taking into account police resources would risk undermining the right to peaceful protest and the legislation becoming incompatible with the obligations that we seek to maintain under the ECHR.
Finally, on Amendment 382C, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, takes this in the best way possible, but I agree with him again on the matter of the requirement to increase the notice period for a protest from six days to 28 days. Six days is an adequate time for the police to be able to determine whether a protest should occur. As the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, said, there are occasions where protests flare up because of incidents that have occurred. Guidance to police already provides the necessary operational flexibility to allow forces to work with organisers planning protests to ensure that the conditions imposed are necessary and proportionate. I say regretfully to the noble Lord that I believe increasing the statutory notice period is unnecessary, and the following is an important point. Sometimes I come to the House and say that the police have requested matters and that is why I am bringing them forward. We have had no requests from the police to look at increasing the number of days from six to 28.
Having said all that again—and I know the House will become tired of the record that I am playing this evening—all matters of public order legislation fall within the terms of reference of the review from the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. If his review brings forward issues that need to be examined, we will examine them and consider the findings and recommendations very carefully. But, at the moment, with regret, because he has been so supportive this evening on some other matters, I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, that I cannot accept his amendments tonight, although I do understand his references and those of the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, to the disruption these matters can cause. We believe it is covered by existing legislation and I therefore ask him to withdraw his amendment.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, I have been in your Lordships’ House for 33 years. I have lost count of the number of times that Ministers have said that an amendment is unnecessary, and I have used the same argument myself. That being the case, how is it that we saw the M25 being blocked?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I have had 30 years in Parliament, not all in this House, and I have used it occasionally and had it used against me occasionally. It is unnecessary given that we have had the legislation on the statute book to date. The noble Earl asks the quite reasonable question of how the M25 gets blocked. I put it to him that this House, this Government, this Parliament and any other parliament passes legislation. It is not for Ministers to implement that: it is for the local police, at a local level, to take a judgment on the legislation at that time. In the cases where there is legislation on the statute book, the police could exercise that legislation. They may or may not choose to do so, because it may inflame the situation or not. It is a matter for judgment by the local police. I simply say to him that the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, are already in place. For that reason, I ask him to not to press them.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, raised the issue of facilitating protest, which is often cited. It made me think, “I don’t know where that is”. I have just had a quick look, and I do not think it exists. I think Article 11 of the ECHR suggests that the police should not inhibit public protests and certainly should not try to intimidate protesters; that is different from making it sound as though they are there to market protest or to be the arrangers of protests so that they achieve their aim. The trouble is that the police have got into that mindset. They would have to do everything to protect the protester and, if they are not careful, forget the rest. That is why I challenge the Minister, not because I think it is badly intended but because I do not think it is accurate in terms of the ECHR.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I will take that as a comment for me and the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, to reflect on, but I maintain the position. The police have a difficult job. Legislation is in place currently, and the proposals brought forward would replicate that. I am trying to sit down, but I see the noble Lord, Lord Harper, so once again I will take an intervention.
Lord Harper (Con)
Very briefly, in the spirit of trying to be helpful, and in answering my noble friend Lord Attlee, one of the things that was very helpful in my time at the Department for Transport was that National Highways sought a pre-emptive injunction to set out certain behaviours that should be prohibited and was successful in getting that, which was very effective at giving the necessary tools to the police to keep the motorway open.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful for that contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Harper. I add that into the mix of the debate today, but I still come to the conclusion that existing legislation, however it is interpreted, covers this. Therefore—for the last time, I hope—I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this has been a short debate, but I am grateful to those noble Lords who have contributed and to my noble friend Lord Attlee for supporting my amendments.
The police are charged not only with facilitating lawful protest but with protecting the safety and liberties of all citizens, yet the current legal framework, I suggest, often leaves officers with insufficient tools to intervene meaningfully before disruption becomes entrenched. Amendment 382A strikes at the core of this problem by allowing chief officers to seek prohibition in defined circumstances, including where marches are likely to cause serious disorder, damage or disruption or to place undue demand on limited policing resources. We align the law with operational reality and public expectations.
What do the public expect? Polling shows that large majorities support police intervention in protest scenarios that go beyond peaceful lawful conduct. They reveal a public who very much distinguish between legitimate expression and conduct that crosses into intimidation and disorder. Similarly, extending the notice period to 28 days is a common-sense enhancement that gives police and local authorities the time needed to prepare for large and potentially complex processions. This is about ensuring the responsible ordering of protest in a way that protects public safety, minimises disruption and allows ordinary citizens to go about their lives.
These amendments are a measured, evidence-based response to the challenge of protest policing in the 21st century. I hear what the Minister says, but I hope the Government can give them some serious consideration. For now, I beg leave to withdraw.
Lord Walney
“Designation and restriction of Extreme Criminal Protest Groups(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations designate a group as an Extreme Criminal Protest Group (“ECPG”) where the Secretary of State reasonably believes that—(a) the group has as its purpose, object or practice the deliberate commission of imprisonable offences, including but not limited to sabotage, criminal damage, obstruction of critical national infrastructure, or serious public order offences,(b) such offences are carried out with the intention of influencing public policy, parliamentary debate, ministerial decision-making, or the exercise of democratic functions, and(c) the activities of the group create a risk of serious harm to public safety, democratic institutions, or the rights of others.(2) A designation under subsection (1) does not amount to terrorist proscription for the purposes of the Terrorism Act 2000.(3) The following are offences in relation to group designated as an ECPG under subsection (1)—(a) membership of a designated ECPG;(b) promotion of a designated ECPG, including public advocacy, recruitment, or dissemination of the group is materials;(c) fundraising for a designated ECPG, including soliciting or providing funds or financial benefit;(d) organising, directing or coordinating activities of the group;(e) providing material support, training, funds or equipment to the group where the person knows or ought reasonably to know that the recipient is a designated ECPG.(4) Any offence under subsection (3) is punishable on conviction—(a) on indictment, by imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or a fine, or both;(b) on summary conviction, by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or a fine, or both.(5) Before making a designation under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a statement of reasons, subject to the protection of sensitive information.”
Lord Walney (CB)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to move Amendment 370A in my name and those of the noble Lords, Lord Polak and Lord Goodman of Wycombe. I also intend to speak to Amendment 371AA in my name and those of the noble Lords, Lord Leigh of Hurley and Lord Mendelsohn, Amendment 378A in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and Amendment 380 in my name and those of the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Polak, and the noble Baroness, Lady Foster of Aghadrumsee.
Several of these amendments seek to enact recommendations from my review, Protecting our Democracy from Coercion, laid before Parliament in May 2024 in my then role as the Government’s independent adviser on political violence and disruption. These remain an excellent set of recommendations that the Government are entirely free to accept at any point, notwithstanding the new review set up by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, which has already been mentioned a number of times by the Minister’s colleague.
Let me pre-empt his response and enable him to give a subtly different response from his colleague’s. He will say, or is probably gearing up to say, at the end of this debate that we must all wait for the review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, to conclude and then wait and see after that. I gently put it to the Government that they have chosen not to do that themselves in one of the amendments that they have put forward on cumulative disruption. If it is good enough for His Majesty’s Government on that amendment, it is entirely within their power, and proper, to move on some of these other issues while the noble Lord looks at the wider picture. He has about 45 minutes—probably a bit more—to make up his mind on that, and I am sure we will see.
I will try to be brief. Amendment 370A, on extreme criminal protest groups, would create a power for the Secretary of State by regulations to designate an extreme criminal protest group
“where the Secretary of State reasonably believes that … the group has as its purpose, object or practice the deliberate commission of imprisonable offences, including … sabotage, criminal damage, obstruction of critical national infrastructure, or serious public order offences”
in order to influence public policy or democratic decision-making, and where those activities
“create a risk of serious harm to public safety, democratic institutions, or the rights of others”.
This amendment is carefully framed. It makes explicit that designation is not terrorist proscription, and it would seek to restrict membership, promotion, fundraising, organising and material support, with proportionate penalties less than those that a proscribed terrorist group would attract.
I think we can see a reason why this amendment—having this power available to the Government—would have been so valuable in recent years. For that, we should look at the example of Palestine Action. Now, there are deeply opposed views in this House on whether it was appropriate to designate Palestine Action as a terrorist organisation. It has divided the House, it has divided some of my friends with whom I usually agree on the vast majority of issues, and it certainly would divide the country. But I put it to the Committee and the Government that there would be a much greater consensus if it had been available to the Government to stop this organisation, which was avowed in its criminal intent and carried out criminal operations for a period of five years before it was eventually seen to reach the terrorism threshold and was designated.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
This is a slightly delayed response, but I have just realised that the noble Lord was speaking to Amendment 371AA. I realise that there are a lot of amendments in this group, and there have been some changes in the groupings since the previous day in Committee. Amendment 371AA is in group 6. I apologise for interrupting the noble Lord’s flow, but I wanted to make that clear for the Committee.
Lord Walney (CB)
I will leave the clerks to unpick that mess. Forgive me. Does that mean we all have to stay incredibly late for group 6? It probably does, does it not?
Lord Walney (CB)
Oh good, that is such great news. Amendment 378A is not about shielding politicians from criticism but about ensuring that elected representatives, working people and members of the public can access democratic institutions and that those who work in and around them can do so without the fear of intimidation. There is clearly a divide in this Chamber on the kind of noisy, disruptive protest to which elected Members and Parliament are now exposed with increasing regularity. I think it is important that we draw a firmer line, and that the Government set the lead in this, in saying that engagement with the democratic process can actually be diminished by aggressive, angry protests, which implicitly can be a menace, a threat of implied force, rather than freedom of expression and making the views of individuals or groups known to their elected representatives, which there are myriad ways of doing in our advanced society.
Amendment 380 is related to the shadow Minister’s previous set of amendments on cumulative disruption. It is in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Pannick, the noble Lord, Lord Polak, and the noble Baroness, Lady Foster. This builds on the Government’s own amendments to put the principle of cumulative disruption more clearly into Sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act, which is welcome. It has been shown to be necessary by the detrimental impact, primarily on Jewish communities, since the Gaza conflict. Many Jewish people have felt intimidated from coming into central London and other places by regular marches and have been beseeching the Government and the police to do something about this—not to ban protests, but to strike a better balance so that they are able to go about their lives and not find themselves in the situation where if a protest group, such as the Palestine Solidarity Campaign, wants to organise a march in central London every Saturday, then, in effect, many Jewish people find that area out of bounds.
It is welcome that the Government have sought to strengthen the ability of the police to place conditions on those protests, but Amendment 380 is necessary because when I, members of the Jewish community and other Peers discussed this with the Metropolitan Police in the thick of the protests, it was clear that its understanding was that that was simply about choosing one street rather than another or perhaps limiting the time, but did not give the ability to say, “You have already been in the centre of London on two Saturdays, so you have to pick a different day”, or “You have to give it a rest this Saturday. Come back the Saturday after”. Under Section 13, that would require recommending that the Secretary of State says no to a march. Therefore, the cumulative impact proposal from the Government will prove insufficient unless it is extended to Section 13 —the ability, on occasion, to say no.
Finally, and briefly—because time is marching on and the issue has been raised in a previous amendment— I turn to Amendment 382E concerning the cumulative impact on policing resources. At the moment, the police are not able to factor in the huge drain on resources that weekly mass marches have been placing on their ability to regulate a protest. Therefore, the bill is racking up to tens of millions of pounds. Bluntly, that is either being placed on taxpayers at a time of increasing fiscal scarcity, or it is going to impact on other front-line policing priorities.
Yes, absolutely, there is a right to protest in this country, but that right is qualified and balanced with other factors. I put it to the Government that ensuring the ability of the police to factor in their own depleted resources in making decisions on repeat processions would be absolutely proportionate. Going out on the streets in mass numbers is probably not the most effective way of getting your view across anyway, in my entirely subjective judgment. It is certainly only one of a myriad of ways in which we have the privilege in our liberal democracy to be able to get our views across. Ultimately, we can also choose to change them every election if we wish.
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)
Before the noble Lord sits down, I just wanted clarification on Amendment 370A. Am I to understand that, if this amendment had existed in law, there would not have been any need to use terrorism laws to proscribe Palestine Action?
Lord Walney (CB)
My view on this is, admittedly, from the outside; I had some access as the Government’s independent adviser on political violence for a number of years while this issue was being debated. But, yes, my clear view on looking at this is that you would have been able to place a restriction on Palestine Action much earlier in the process, which would have stopped or been able to inhibit much of the criminal damage. Crucially, it would have meant restrictions before they got to the terrorism threshold, and much of this controversy could have been avoided. I beg to move.
Baroness Blower (Lab)
My Lords, I have a number of amendments in this group, and I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Hain for having signed them. It will not come as a great surprise to the noble Lord, Lord Walney, that I have differences with his presentation. My amendments represent a compromise rather than the stand part objection in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, although I have to say that the stand part argument does have some attractions.
The first of my sets of amendments is on the question of “in the vicinity”. When discussing a different Bill in this House, the phrase “in the vicinity” was taken to mean within 10 miles. I imagine that that is not the intention of this clause, but it is imprecise. I hope that many noble and learned Lords in the Committee might agree with me that precision in this aspect of the legislation would be helpful and, perhaps, is even necessary. This is what Amendments 371A, 371C and 371E seek to address.
It is accepted from all sides of the Committee that the right to protest should operate in a free, democratic and pluralist society such as ours. It therefore behoves us that, if we infringe on that right, as this Bill clearly does, we do so with clarity in law—I apologise to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, but I do think that, in this case, clarity would help—so as to do the least damage to that right, particularly as, in my view, we must always seek to protect the Article 11 right to freedom of assembly.
Lord Polak (Con)
My Lords, perhaps I should just begin by agreeing with the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, about the farmers, but I note that they did not call to globalise the intifada.
I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Walney, and thank him for the work that he has done and continues to do on counterterrorism. It is deeply appreciated by many, and, from the point of view of the Jewish community, he is a leading non-Jew—a righteous gentile, if I may add—in everything he does.
I have added my name to Amendment 370A and to two or three other amendments in this group. Supporting this amendment would ensure that those creating a risk of serious harm to public safety, democratic institutions and the rights of others are curtailed. This can include all sorts of groups, and we know some of them. These groups can pose a clear and tangible threat to public order and public safety, even where their activities may not, in every instance, meet the statutory threshold for terrorism.
The Committee will recall, for example, the incident in November 2023, when Just Stop Oil protesters obstructed an emergency ambulance with its blue lights flashing on Waterloo Bridge—an action that plainly placed lives at risk. An amendment of the nature of Amendment 370A would ensure that such groups, which demonstrably endanger the public and interfere with essential services, could be addressed at an early stage. It would enable more timely and effective intervention where there is a sustained pattern of reckless, disruptive conduct, before serious harm occurs.
On Amendment 370AA, “intifada” is not a neutral expression but one rooted in campaigns of organised violence and terrorism, yet the Government seem to fail to understand, or choose to ignore, what intifada really was and what it truly means, with tragic consequences. I look over at the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester and think of Heaton Park synagogue at Yom Kippur. Melvin Cravitz and Adrian Daulby are no longer with us. Sydney might be the other end of the world, but what went on there—15 innocent people murdered—was a massacre that shows the results that antisemitism can lead to. These people are the victims of the so-called global intifada. When this Government and Governments around the world do not heed the warnings about the severe and dangerous impact that these words have, this is what happens. This amendment would help stop Manchester or Bondi Beach happening again and would provide clarity for CPS enforcement, in ensuring that Parliament draws a clear line before more lives are lost rather than afterwards. Waiting until loss of life to act is, quite simply, deeply shameful.
I have added my name to Amendment 380. It cannot be right in a free society that any community feels unable to go about its daily life because of repeated demonstrations, however lawful they may each be. This was starkly illustrated by the protest that took place the day after the Manchester synagogue attack, when a traumatised community was given no space to grieve. In such circumstances, managing or conditioning a protest is not always enough. The police must have clear legal authority to prevent such protest going ahead where the cumulative effect tips into serious disruption and intimidation. This amendment would provide that clarity and ensure that the law properly protects public order and the right of communities to live without fear. I would be very interested in the views of the Minister on that.
Finally, Amendment 486B would address a serious problem in our framework for public funding. This problem was exposed most clearly, I guess, by the debacle surrounding the band Kneecap, which was permitted to retain a grant of £14,250 from the British taxpayer, despite a catalogue of deeply troubling activity. This includes behaviour glorifying terrorism, when one of the band members held up a Hezbollah flag on stage, shouting, “Up Hamas! Up Hezbollah!” Artistic expression must be protected but it must never be allowed to cross the line into incitement—and when it does, public money should certainly not be supporting it. This incident demonstrates how ill equipped our current law is to prevent funds flowing to individuals or organisations whose conduct runs directly counter to our values and our security.
However, the problem is not just Kneecap. An organisation funded by the UK taxpayer, the Collections Trust, issued guidance referring to Hamas, a proscribed terrorist organisation, as “anti-colonial freedom fighters”. That language is not accidental or trivial. It legitimises and sanitises terrorism, and it was disseminated with public funds.
This amendment would make it clear that no organisation should be permitted to receive or retain taxpayer support if it promotes or excuses criminal conduct or narratives that undermine our democratic values. Again, I ask the Minister whether he agrees that public money must never be used, directly or indirectly, to legitimise extremism, and that we here in Parliament have a duty to draw that line clearly and unequivocally.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, I have given notice of my opposition to Clause 124 standing part of the Bill. I have done this for two reasons. First, I think it is unnecessary and, secondly, it could be even more repressive than the law that this Labour Government have already passed.
Let me be clear: I support the right to worship and to access places of worship freely and safely. I would go along to anywhere where people are protesting and making life difficult for anybody who wants to worship, as that is unacceptable. However, this clause is not a targeted protection against genuinely threatening behaviour. It is a broad, low-threshold power that risks sweeping up lawful, peaceful protest on the basis of guesswork rather than evidence, exactly the same as was discussed in the previous group.
Clause 124 allows conditions to be imposed where a protest
“may intimidate persons of reasonable firmness”
in “the vicinity” of a place of worship. The word “may” is doing a lot of work here, as is “vicinity”; neither is defined and together they create a power that is open to misuse. This is not about stopping harassment or threats—we already have strong laws for that. If someone is genuinely intimidating worshippers, the police already have plenty of powers to intervene. What does this clause actually add?
The real problem is that the clause allows restrictions to be imposed even where the protest is peaceful, so long as someone claims they might feel intimidated. That is not a hypothetical risk. Almost any protest that touches on controversial issues could be said to intimidate somebody. Pride marches, trade union demos, climate protests and peaceful protests against war or injustice could all be caught by this wording if they happen to be near a place of worship. In many places in our cities, including London—particularly central Westminster, where so many protests happen—it is very difficult not to be near a place of worship. That creates a very real danger of rolling exclusion zones where protest is progressively pushed out of public space altogether, not because of evidence of harm but because of location and perception.
Lord Hain (Lab)
My Lords, I agree with and endorse what the noble Lord, Lord Polak, said about Bondi and the Manchester synagogue, because those terrible attacks were modern examples of the persecution and pogroms that Jewish communities have suffered for centuries. He was right to remind us about that.
I wish to speak to the amendments to Clause 124 tabled by my noble friend Lady Blower, to which I have added my name, and, most importantly, on my opposition to the new clause tabled as Amendment 372 by my noble friend the Minister. He has been a long-standing friend for decades, as a fellow Welsh MP and a valued member of my ministerial team when I was Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
Freedom of expression and the right to peaceful protest form the bedrock of any liberal democracy like our own. These rights are not a mere courtesy granted by the state; they are a fundamental part of British liberty, also enshrined by the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act. These freedoms are deeply woven into our history, through iconic protest movements from the Tolpuddle Martyrs and Peterloo to the Chartists, the suffragettes and the Anti-Apartheid Movement. Each of these causes, I stress, was disruptive—indeed, vilified—at the time, but they are now recognised as vital movements, successfully winning fundamental rights for millions of British citizens and others abroad. Yet that long tradition of assembly and free protest is now, sadly, under threat.
Any proposal that hands the police unprecedented powers to restrict this right should give this House and every British citizen serious cause for alarm. That is precisely why I find Clause 124 so worrying. First, it would allow protests to be banned and restricted in the so-called “vicinity” of places of religious worship, yet this House is being asked to legislate without clarity. As my noble friend Lady Blower said, “vicinity” is undefined; the term “may intimidate” is equally vague. Such imprecision invites arbitrary interpretation and risks handing law enforcement sweeping discretionary powers to curtail lawful protest. It may also put police officers in an impossible position when doing their jobs.
Secondly, let us be honest about the context here. Clause 124 does not arise in a vacuum. It is clearly framed as a response to national demonstrations in support of Palestinian rights, demonstrations that have been repeatedly and wrongly labelled as hate marches. These protests have never targeted places of worship; they never would and indeed never should. What is more, Jewish campaigners and organisations have been integral to many of those marches and, despite hundreds of thousands of people taking to the streets, arrests have routinely been fewer than at most football matches. Indeed, the police themselves acknowledge that there has been no evidence of any threat to places of worship linked to these marches and, across more than 33 national demonstrations, not one has targeted or deliberately passed a synagogue.
Of course, the appalling antisemitic attack on a synagogue in Manchester and the Islamophobic attack on a mosque in Peacehaven remind us why our Jewish citizens and all religious communities must be properly protected, but surely Ministers must agree that those terrible attacks were entirely unrelated to protest. Crucially, the police already possess robust and extensive powers to safeguard places of worship and individuals under genuine threat. We must also ask: would these powers be applied to far-right mobilisations outside asylum hotels, where vulnerable refugee communities are explicitly targeted and intimidated, or is enforcement selective?
Clause 124 risks introducing political censorship through the backdoor. The right to worship freely and the right to protest peacefully are not competing freedoms; both must be upheld. This clause sets them against one another and, in doing so, weakens both. Existing powers have already been used repressively against campaigners and at great public cost. Clause 124 would further entrench that approach in law. For these reasons, I support the stand part notice tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lady Blower. I ask the Government to think again. If there is no such rethink and if it comes to it, I will vote against Clause 124.
The proposed new clause after Clause 124, although presented as a response to public inconvenience, poses a serious danger to freedom of speech and peaceful protest. Expanding the definition of serious disruption by introducing the concept of so-called “cumulative disruption”, it imposes a sweeping duty on the police to restrict or prohibit protests based not on their conduct but on their frequency or persistence in a particular area. Restricting protest simply because it disrupts daily life undermines the very mechanism that gives protest its power. It was precisely cumulative disruption over many years that made early trade unionists, the suffragettes and the civil rights and anti-apartheid movements so effective. No protest movement has ever brought about change through a single demonstration; it is through cumulative protests. To criminalise that principle is to hollow out that very right itself.
The new clause re-characterises protest as an inconvenience to be managed rather than a democratic right to be protected. Its language is dangerously broad. It fails to define when disruption becomes “cumulative”, over what timeframe this is to be assessed or how significant that disruption must be. Such elasticity gives the police sweeping powers to apply arbitrary and inconsistent enforcement, and creates a serious chilling effect on free expression. It would also allow the police to relocate protests to areas of minimal visibility or impact, permitting demonstrations for politically favourable causes in prominent locations while pushing unpopular dissent to the margins.
If this power had been statutorily available from 1969, when I was leading protests at Twickenham rugby stadium and Lord’s cricket ground, among many other sporting venues right across Britain, against touring apartheid all-white South African teams, surely they would have been blocked—thereby blocking the subsequent sports boycott almost universally imposed against whites-only sports tours from apartheid South Africa, which Nelson Mandela, among others, judged to have been decisive in bringing about the downfall of apartheid.
The term “area” is to be widely interpreted. Would restrictions be imposed on entire towns, or even the whole of central London? Non-violent disruption is often the only way that marginalised communities and civil rights protesters can make themselves heard by those who would otherwise ignore them. Neutral policing is a laudable objective, and I upheld that principle when I was Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, but this new clause would make policing politically oppressive.
It is difficult to ignore the political context. The amendment follows sustained marches in support of Palestinian rights and in opposition to the war in Gaza. I have already opposed the proscription of Palestine Action as a terrorist group—I am not going to rehash those arguments—because that proscription equates it with the appalling terrorism of al-Qaeda and Islamic State. For objecting to the shameful proscription, it is no surprise—to me, at least—that hundreds of peaceful protesters, including disabled people, the elderly, the young, retired vicars and magistrates, have been arrested as terrorists. Now there are protesters in prison on bail on hunger strike. If they die, that will be an even more shameful stain on this Government and this Parliament.
The new clause contained in government Amendment 372 risks compounding those injustices rather than correcting them. It is oppressive and unjust. Yet it will not just be marches for Palestinian rights that are affected; the impact will be much more wide-ranging. The amendment is also open to abuse by future Governments—Governments of the right, which could urge the police to stamp out political demonstrations.
This House has been here before. In February 2023, your Lordships rejected a similar Conservative amendment to the Public Order Act, which sought to restrict protests on the basis of cumulative disruption. In May 2023, the then Home Secretary, Suella Braverman, attempted to introduce the same concept by statutory instrument, only for the High Court to rule it unlawful a year later. I am afraid the new clause contained in government Amendment 372 is simply the latest chapter in a familiar and troubling pattern.
While I acknowledge that some protests can be upsetting or experienced by some as intimidating, sweeping restrictions on peaceful assembly are not the solution. Freedom of expression is not absolute and the police already possess a huge range of extensive powers to deal with hate speech, incitement to violence and serious threats—as indeed they should. The new clause contained in government Amendment 372 goes much further, allowing the state to pre-emptively silence thousands of people based on an ill-defined and speculative concept of disruption that is disproportionate, dangerous and profoundly undemocratic. Eroding protest rights weakens accountability between elections and risks fostering authoritarianism. Once such powers exist, they rarely contract. They expand, often exponentially, and could well do so, especially under future Governments if they were less committed to the right of democratic dissent.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Wilson of Sedgefield) (Lab)
Can I ask I the noble Lord to bring his remarks to an end? He has gone well over 10 minutes.
Lord Hain (Lab)
This amendment invites misuse and undermines trust in both policing and Parliament. That is why, in a joint statement, trade unions, charities, non-governmental organisations, and faith, climate justice and human rights organisations have been vocal in their opposition to it only this week. In rejecting it, I hope noble Lords will honour our democratic heritage and safeguard those freedoms for future generations. I urge your Lordships to vote against the new clause contained in government Amendment 372 if it is retabled on Report.
The Lord Bishop of Manchester
My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity to speak as these amendments deeply affect places of worship and religious practice. It is always an honour to follow the noble Lord, Lord Hain, whose track record around protests over so many years is one we can all learn a great deal from.
Noble Lords have referred to the attack in Manchester on Yom Kippur. That took place 15 minutes’ walk from my house. I know that because I walked there the day after to meet people. The rabbi is Daniel Walker. We share a surname and an initial, but we do not think we are related—the noble Lord is quite right to say that he has more beard than me. He and I have been good friends for many years. He is an extraordinarily brave man, and I am glad that we are able to reflect on that tonight.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I join the noble Lord, Lord Polak, in thanking my noble friend Lord Walney for all his hard work and leadership in seeking to secure a fairer balance in this context. Unlike the noble Lord, Lord Hain, I positively welcome government Amendment 372, because it will ensure that the police must take account of cumulative disruption when exercising their power to impose conditions on public processions and assemblies.
The amendment will be, and is, particularly welcomed by synagogues and their members, whose access to and from Saturday prayers has been regularly disrupted by hostile, abusive and intimidating crowds of protesters. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester suggested that we should look at intention here, but whether that is the intention of the protestors, it is the effect, and it is very damaging to the right—and it is a right—of worship.
With great respect, the noble Lord, Lord Hain, should recognise that there are competing rights here. There is not just the right to protest but the right to go to a synagogue, to have access to a synagogue, to be able to leave a synagogue, and not to be deterred by hundreds of abusive protesters protesting in favour of a particular cause. The noble Lord made the point that cumulative protests may be very effective, and I am sure he is right about that in many contexts. However, the point of government Amendment 372 is not to stop protests or people expressing their view about matters of public policy. The question concerns where the protest takes place, and why it is necessary to go past the same synagogue with hundreds of people every Saturday, preventing those who wish to exercise their right of religious observance—and their right to get there and to leave—doing so peacefully and securely. Yes, protest, but you do not have to do it in the same place, along the same street, every week. The street has no significance for the protester, but it has a real significance for those who want to go to the synagogue.
The noble Lord, Lord Hain, says that the right to protest is not in conflict with the right to religious observance, and he is right. The problem arises, as here, where the protesters go along the same road each week. As I say, they do not have to go along that road; they can protest somewhere else, and that is what this amendment is concerned to achieve.
The amendment would reintroduce, with an improvement, the secondary legislation introduced by the previous Government which was held to be unlawful by the Court of Appeal in a case brought by Liberty. Contrary to what the noble Lord, Lord Hain, suggested, the secondary legislation was held unlawful by reason of matters other than cumulative disruption. The Court of Appeal did not say that the cumulative disruption provisions in the statutory instrument were unlawful. It said that other parts of the statutory instrument that sought to define the circumstances in which protest was unacceptable were unlawful, not those on cumulative disruption. Amendment 372 is an improvement on what the previous Government introduced because it imposes a duty on the police to have regard to cumulative disruption. The statutory instrument introduced by the previous Government merely conferred a discretion.
I turn to Amendments 373 to 378 from the Opposition Front Bench. I am grateful to the Opposition Front Bench for producing these amendments, which would vary the criteria in government Amendment 372 by focusing attention, for the purposes of cumulative disruption, not on the geographical area in which the public procession or assembly is repeatedly held but on whether the repeated procession or assembly concerns “the same subject matter”.
I recognise that these amendments are well motivated, but I do not support them. The vice of cumulative disruption is that it occurs repeatedly in the same geographical area—for example, in the same street near the synagogue—and causes disruption every Saturday. To focus on whether the repeated protests concern “the same subject matter” misses the point. I am also concerned that legislating with reference to the same subject matter will inevitably provoke disputes over how the police should apply such a criterion. Protesters would inevitably say that last week’s march was in support of Gaza, this week’s is against the Netanyahu Government and next week’s is against the policy of the Trump Administration. I am very doubtful that a specific reference to 50 metres, as proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, and the noble Lord, Lord Hain, would suffice. It all depends on the size of the protest and the nature of the premises, does it not? This is a context where police discretion is desirable.
Finally, I have added my name to Amendment 380, tabled by my noble friend Lord Walney, which would apply the duty to take account of cumulative disruption to the power to prohibit public processions. The same reasoning that justifies the Government’s wish to require cumulative disruption to be considered in relation to the power to impose conditions also justifies a duty to take account of cumulative disruption in relation to the power to ban a public procession.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, I had not intended to speak; I have been listening with great interest to the competing arguments. However, I am utterly convinced by the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, on the government amendment.
It crosses my mind that, just as Jews and synagogues are currently at risk, I can see a situation in the future where mosques and people who support Muslims, or indeed the gurdwaras of the Sikhs, are under threat. You might get an extremist group of Sikhs opposed to the current Sikh processes who decide to have a demonstration every single week against a series of gurdwaras in a certain area. What the Government are seeking to do is entirely sensible. It will impose on the police a duty and give them a power to decide whether to carry out what may or may not be needed. We need to accept this government amendment. I am also very attracted to the amendment from the noble Lords, Lord Walney and Lord Pannick, which would add a bit to the government amendment. Having listened, I really think that the government amendment must get through.
Lord Mendelsohn (Lab)
My Lords, I support Amendment 370AA, which stands in my name as well as that of the noble Lord, Lord Austin, and the noble Lord, Lord Polak, who has already spoken to it. I also support Amendment 486C, which I tabled with the noble Baroness, Lady Deech.
I start by thanking the Government for introducing this clause and their amendment, both of which are very important measures. I am grateful to them for introducing them, and I hope that they remain as strong and as resolute as they can be in pushing them through.
I will try to give noble Lords the context of what we are doing. The reason we are here is that we are facing the considerable problem of non-prosecutions. This is the type of thing happening in our society that is undermining democratic resilience and social cohesion, and which is particularly targeting the Jewish community. That is the area where my amendments are particularly relevant, and they apply in that context.
It is absolutely clear that one of the issues coming up is that a lot of existing powers are not used. I fear to mention Policy Exchange again, but I note that that Jonathan Hall KC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, made a significant point in his speech there today. He said:
“My perception is that if you don’t deal with anti-Israeli hatred, you leave wriggle room for those who indulge in antisemitism but formally disavow it. Once hatred to Israelis is tolerated then it is carried around like a flame”.
He made the further point, which I think is immensely significant:
“The truth is that hatred of nationality fits onto hatred of race like a glove. And importantly, our law recognizes this. The Public Order Act 1986 prohibits stirring up racial hatred. Let me read section 17 of the 1986 Act which defines racial hatred, and I am going to do this slowly: ‘In this Part “racial hatred” means hatred against a group of persons defined by reference to colour, race, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or national origins’”.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, the Committee is in the business of precision and proportionality. Those two concepts have rightly been raised by a number of noble Lords and my noble friends. It is because of reasons of proportionality and precision that I agree that the concept of “the vicinity” is too vague and too broad. I say that while completely acknowledging that places of worship are sensitive places and that it is completely proportionate within the European Convention on Human Rights to give them some extra protection.
There is precedent in Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 for the concepts of “area” and “vicinity” being too flabby and too broad. Noble Lords may remember that this allowed an area not defined to be designated for the purpose of suspicionless stop and search. In 2003, in response to the anti-arms demonstrations at the ExCeL centre in the Docklands, a number of protesters were stopped and searched and issued notices. Only through the parliamentary debates and litigation that followed did the public become aware that all of England and Wales had been designated during the Iraq war. That was the breadth of the area for suspicionless stop and search—a power that was used as an anti-protest power.
That does not mean that there cannot be limitations, but they need some definition. After many years of litigation in the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, the UK Government were found wanting because of that breadth and the blanket nature of the power, because there was no definition. I am trying to help my noble friends in government by suggesting that concepts such as areas and vicinities will be better for definition, so I support my noble friend Lady Blower and commend her remarks in speaking to her amendment.
I also commend my noble friend Lord Hain and remind the Committee that he was not just an anti-apartheid activist in his day, digging up sports fields and whatever else he was digging up—
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I am sorry. He was sitting on them. I do not mean to defame him.
My noble friend of course went on to be Northern Ireland Secretary and therefore has some understanding of the need to balance rights—the rights of peaceful dissent but also the rights of people to go about their business, particularly in their homes and places of worship and so on. That is proportionality and precision.
This vice of vagueness with the concept of “vicinity” is mirrored in the concept of “area” for the purposes of cumulative disruption. As with the Section 44 provision that ended up being impugned in the Strasbourg court, “area” for the purposes of cumulative disruption is not defined, so we are looking at a very broad power here. I say to noble Lords, with all solidarity with their concerns about, for example, synagogues and places of faith and worship, that provisions such as these can be applied as much to a counterprotest as to a protest, and to one group or another group at different times. When we legislate, we need to have a mind to how these powers might be used in the future.
To those noble Lords who spoke of a new quasi-terrorist proscription but for groups that do not quite meet the threshold—
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
Not for terrorism but for extreme protest et cetera that by definition does not meet the test of terrorism but something less than that, I urge extreme caution. There is a reason why powers to proscribe have to date been limited to terrorist groups—that exceptional threat—and the reason is that guilt by association is extremely dangerous when you are dealing with broad communities, potentially millions of people, and protest movements.
I have no doubt that some of the activities by some suffragettes—and we saint them now; everyone in this Committee saints and canonises the suffragettes—would meet the terrorist threshold. But does that mean that we want to tar them all in the same way and suggest that the entire movement should be subject to proscription? I urge caution with that and with any amendments in this group that go further than is precise or proportionate.
Crime and Policing Bill
Tuesday 13th January 2026
(3 months, 4 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-IX(a) Amendment for Committee (Supplementary to the Ninth Marshalled List) - (13 Jan 2026)
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I rise to speak to this group, in particular to Amendment 372 from the Government, and Amendment 380, to which I have added my name. Before I speak to those, on Amendment 371B from the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, and the noble Lord, Lord Hain, I have listened very carefully to the differences between “may intimidate” and “the intention to intimidate”. If I may, I think there may be a middle way through this and I hope we can use the time between Committee and Report to look at that and perhaps talk about how a reasonable person—or, for lawyers, the man on the Clapham omnibus—would see such acts. I accept that “may intimidate” may be slightly wide in terms of the purpose piece; I think it is very difficult to prove intention to intimidate, and we have seen that many times in Northern Ireland. So I make that suggestion in respect of that.
I also listened very carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Hain—of course, a respected Secretary of State for Northern Ireland—had to say when he referred to the inalienable British right to protest. But of course he knows that, when he was Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the Parades Commission for Northern Ireland was given powers by the Government to deal with parades and protests there. That was in the wake of difficulties surrounding parades and the rights of freedom of assembly, and those in nationalist areas did not want those parades to happen in their areas.
It is no secret that many unionists, including myself, were not supportive of the Parades Commission receiving those powers: we saw it as an unaccountable body taking decisions on parades, many of which have taken place not just for decades but for hundreds of years. The situation since that legislation went through is that everybody who organises a parade or protest in Northern Ireland has to put in an 11/1 form, which has become a very famous form in Northern Ireland, to the Police Service. We have to notify the police that a parade or a protest is taking place, and we have to tell them the route, the date, the time and the organiser of the parade or the protest, so that people can be held accountable.
I do not want, in the context of this group, to speak to the merits of the existence or, indeed, the decision-making of the Parades Commission, because I probably would agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hain, on that—the noble Lord today, not when he was Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Rather, I want to look at what the commission can consider when making its decisions on whether to place conditions or limit a parade or a protest.
I think it is instructive that, in my part of the United Kingdom, the body taking decisions on contentious parades or protests can take into account the cumulative impact that such a parade or protest would have on the community. The legislation states:
“The Commission may issue a determination in respect of a proposed protest”
or parade. The conditions
“may include conditions as to the place at which the meeting may be held, its maximum duration, or the maximum number of persons who may constitute it … In considering in any particular case”
whether a determination should happen,
“the Commission shall have regard to the guidelines”
and indeed the code of conduct. In its guidelines, which I have here, it takes into consideration
“any disruption to the life of the community which the meeting may cause”
or
“any impact which the meeting may have on relationships within the community”.
Indeed, the guidelines for the Parades Commission take into account the
“frequency of such public processions or related protests along the route”.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
I shall speak to Amendments 372 and 380 and various other amendments in this group. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, for his kind remarks at the end of the previous group, but I fear that, after this speech, normal service might be resumed. There are many issues to cover in this group, and I will try to be as brief as possible.
Government Amendment 372 amends the Public Order Act 1986 to impose a duty on the police to consider so-called “cumulative disruption” caused by repeated protests in a given area. The amendment gives the police unprecedented powers to restrict or prohibit protests that are expected to be too disruptive. This amendment represents a grievous attack on the right to protest, which is vital to our democracy, and has many unintended consequences, as I shall outline. The overly broad framework would empower the police routinely to curb freedom of expression and assembly as exercised through peaceful protest. It would significantly expand the definition of serious disruption to include so-called cumulative disruption caused by repeated protests in an area. This would allow the police pre-emptively to prohibit peaceful demonstrations if, in their opinion, an area has been the site of too many protests, which is an extremely broad discretion.
Until this debate started, I had no idea that this provision is aimed at frequent protests outside synagogues. The amendment says nothing to that effect, and it has very broad application to all protests, so I shall carry on on that basis.
Presumably it would apply if the protests in question were organised by different groups who advocate for different causes. This could create a first-come, first-served version of free speech, where areas are given what could be described as a protest allowance at the whim of the local constabulary. The police would be within their rights to prohibit peaceful assemblies once that allowance had been used up. This opens up the concerning opportunity for groups of citizens to censor their political opponents by using up an area’s protest allowance before their opponents have had a chance to protest themselves.
Furthermore, as has already been said this evening, the amendment is silent on what constitutes an area. We do not know whether this power would permit the police to move a demonstration to a different part of a square, to another part of town or even to a difficult-to-reach rural area, resulting in decreased attendance and visibility. Perhaps the Minister could enlighten the Committee on that.
Similarly, Amendment 372 does not specify within what timeframe disruption would have to be repeated to be considered cumulative. This is another question for the Minister. The suggestion that so-called cumulative disruption should be taken into account in considering conditions for restrictions or prohibitions of protests is also disproportionate. Will the Minister please explain why one person’s right to protest should be extinguished simply because somebody else has already protested in the same location about the same cause, or about a different cause?
What about causes that evolve or develop over time, legitimately calling for further protests to coincide with the next stage of public debate? The courts have also repeatedly concluded that a relevant consideration regarding the proportionality of Article 10 and Article 11 rights is whether the views giving rise to the protest relate to “very important issues”. That would de facto be more likely to apply to causes that have led to repeated protests than it would to causes that have given rise to a single protest. This provision, if enacted, would give the police an additional power to ban or curtail protests on the most important causes: the ones most worthy of protest and the ones most protected by the courts. Will the Minister please explain if that is the intention?
Amendment 372 is poorly drafted. It is far too broad to prevent the problems that I have described, and it gives the police far too much power to curtail or prevent peaceful protest on the most important matters. Government Amendments 372 and 380 should both be withdrawn or, if necessary, voted down.
Government Amendment 381 would create a new offence about protesting outside the homes of public officeholders. This may be sensible but should it not have a reasonable conduct defence, as appears in other harassment-type offences, to cover, for example, situations where a neighbour speaks amicably to a politician about a local issue as they are leaving home? Would it be proportionate to criminalise that perfectly normal interaction? That is another question for the Minister.
On Clause 124, which caused so much heat rather than light earlier, it goes without saying that worshipers must be free to access their places of worship, be they synagogues, mosques, churches, or whatever, and worshippers must be able to do so without intimidation or threats or fear of the same. But those rights are already fully protected by the Public Order Act 1986. Under the Act, conditions may be imposed on protests by senior police officers if they believe that the procession may result in serious public disorder or where the purpose of the organisers is the intimidation of others. Section 12(2)(a) of the Act specifically includes places of worship, so Clause 124 may be completely unnecessary.
The amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, and the noble Lord, Lord Hain, seek to clarify what is meant by “in the vicinity”. They are all well and good, but just about every place where people demonstrate is close to a church or another place of worship. For example, Parliament Square and Trafalgar Square would fail the test. Clause 124 could enable the police to ban or restrict just about any protest on that basis. That is probably not the intention, but it would be the result.
Amendment 378A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, would allow restrictions to be placed on protest or assembly if they take place in the vicinity of places used for “democratic decision-making”. Given the high standing of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, in this House, I find this idea rather strange. It would restrict protest close to Parliament, which is where the people who make the decisions, the people the protesters most want to influence, are to be found. The whole point of protest is to engage in a democratic process and seek to persuade decision-makers to a particular point of view. If anything, protest is more proportionate where it takes place in the vicinity of decision-makers. There is no sensible argument for Amendment 378A; it should be rejected.
Turning briefly to Amendment 370A, I understand that the idea of designating as an “extreme criminal protest group” is something that the noble Lord, Lord Walney, has been advocating for a long time. I oppose it because it is an oppressive and draconian restriction on the right to protest, in essence banning specific protest organisations. It is, of course, right that the law steps in to criminalise unlawful protest activity, but this is already done frequently on an individual basis. Criminalising association with others who share the same cause is wholly disproportionate; not everyone associated with a group shares any criminal intent. Designation or restriction of ECPGs will serve only to criminalise other law-abiding citizens because of their shared, but reasonably held, political views about a particular cause.
Taken as a whole, this group of amendments extends the regressive and anti-democratic tendencies of the previous Government—and now this one—to suppress or ban legitimate and peaceful protests in whatever way they can. Substantial pruning is required to get the Bill into a state where it no longer threatens our cherished democratic processes. Peaceful protest educates the public. It sparks debate. It creates the pressure needed for reform. In a healthy democracy, disagreement is not a threat but a sign that citizens care deeply about their society.
Baroness O’Grady of Upper Holloway (Lab)
My Lords, I support what I understand to be probing amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, but first I want to seek clarification from my noble friend the Minister on government Amendment 372. I do so from the perspective of someone who had direct responsibility for organising mass demonstrations when I was at the TUC, which now could be caught in this net.
First, can the Minister clarify the definition of disruption and whether that applies to conduct or location, and the safeguards that will be applied under “cumulative impact” to ensure that any restrictions and conditions imposed by the police are proportionate? As cumulative impact, as we have heard, will be applied collectively to demonstration organisers, this could lead to a rationing of protests in a particular area, presumably even when they are entirely peaceful. In practical terms, can the Minister explain how such a ration would be distributed between, as we have heard, potentially very different organisations with very different aims? Who will decide and on what basis or are organisations supposed to figure it out for themselves?
In central London, there are really only one or two routes, which have viable assembly points at the start and finish, available for very large demonstrations. How realistic is it for the Home Office to suggest, as it did in a press release, that the police could instruct organisers of national demonstrations to divert their demonstrations to alternative routes when in central London there may be none? Crucially, can the Minister tell us whether consideration of the cumulative impact of demonstrations will be weighed against the public’s right to protest in response to the cumulative impact of real-world events? For example, hundreds of thousands of people turned out for successive TUC marches through the 2010s—I recognise that not everybody here may have joined them, but plenty did—in response to the mounting harm that austerity and public service cuts were inflicting on workers, families and communities.
More recently, hundreds of thousands have joined demonstrations in solidarity with the Palestinian people. Again, the frequency of these very large protests is not happening in a vacuum, nor is it divorced from the strength of public feeling. While the International Court of Justice may not reach its verdict on genocide in Gaza for some years, much of the UK population, according to a YouGov poll published in June last year, has already made its mind up. Have the Government really considered the societal impact of making expression through peaceful protest much more difficult?
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I have just one large amendment in this group but I thought I would wait until the end—or what might be close to the end, with a bit of luck—before speaking to it, because it is different from others in the group. I had considered degrouping it, and now wish that I had, to deal with it at lunchtime on Thursday.
Before dealing with that, what a privilege it was to sit here and listen to the very powerful speech by the noble Lord, Lord Mendelsohn, who is not currently in his place, the wise words of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and those of my noble friend Lord Polak. What struck me was something that my noble friend said: when we hear the chants of “Support the intifada” and “From the river to the sea”, those are not just catchy phrases for protest marches. What they mean is kill the Jews, destroy the State of Israel and wipe out 8 million people. You cannot get more evil a hate crime than that.
However, my amendment is different and it is a terribly important one, if I may say so, because it would impose a duty on the Metropolitan Police to ensure access to Parliament. There have been disturbing incidents in recent years where the Met has failed to do so, and MPs and Peers could not access our home of democracy or had to run the gauntlet of a mob.
I need to take noble Lords through the recent history of this problem to let the Committee see how we have got to the current state and what I think we can do about it. The minutes of our State Opening on 17 July of the 2024-2026 Session state, under the heading “Stoppages in the Streets”:
“It was ordered that the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis do take care that the passages through the streets leading to this House be kept free and open and that no obstruction be permitted to hinder the passage of Lords to and from this House during the sitting of Parliament; or to hinder Lords in the pursuit of their parliamentary duties on the Parliamentary Estate; and that the Lady Usher of the Black Rod attending this House do communicate this Order to the Commissioner”.
That is our sessional order, which the Metropolitan Police Commissioner enforces, primarily through Section 52 of the Metropolitan Police Act 1839. It allows the police to issue directions to prevent street obstruction near Parliament during sittings.
The Commons used to pass the same Motion until 2005, but in 2003 the House of Commons Procedure Committee concluded that passing the sessional order did
“not confer any extra legal powers on the police”,
and the only way to ensure the police had the adequate powers to achieve the result intended by the sessional order was through legislation. The committee recommended that, until such legislation came into force, the House should continue with the sessional order in a modified form
“to reflect the House’s concerns and to act as a marker that it expects Members’ access to Parliament to be maintained as far as the existing law allows”.
The Government implemented that and included provisions in the Serious and Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 intended to meet the requirement identified by the committee. The House of Commons then dropped the sessional order in 2005.
In 2013, the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege recommended that the practice of passing sessional orders in the House of Commons be restored. In response, the Government said that they were
“not convinced that their revival would serve any legal or practical purpose”.
The Government are legally right. The sessional orders are not statute law and have no legal effect, but they had a massive symbolic effect, and the Met used to keep access free for all Members of both Houses.
Restrictions on protests around Parliament were introduced under Sections 132 to 138 of SOCPA 2005. In those sections, it says:
“The Commissioner must give authorisation for the demonstration to which the notice relates”,
and that in giving that authorisation, the commissioner should try to ensure, as far as possible, that people were free to enter Parliament. We moved from an instruction that no hindrance must be permitted, to one where the commissioner can decide on a case by case basis to grant protest.
Sections 132 to 138 were abolished by Section 141 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 and replaced with restrictions that applied only to the controlled area of Parliament Square, which was delineated for the first time. That was, and is, very sensible. Under Section 143 of the 2011 Act, it is no longer an offence for demonstrations to be held without the authorisation of the Metropolitan Police Commissioner. However, a constable or authorised officer who has reasonable grounds for believing that a person is doing, or is about to do, a prohibited activity may direct the person to cease doing that activity or not to start doing it. Noble Lords should note the term prohibited activity.
Much of the emphasis of the sections in that Act is on tents and equipment in Parliament Square, the controlled use of Whitehall and loudspeakers. Why was that? Older Members of the Committee will recall that, for 10 years, a Mr Brian Haw had an anti-war tent on the grass opposite the MPs’ entrance at Carriage Gates, and the Government and MPs were very vexed that there seemed to be nothing they could do about it and no law to remove him. That is the thrust of the parliamentary provisions in the 2011 Act, to deal with that one man and his tent. I believe he died just as the Act come into force. By accident, the need to secure access to Parliament became downgraded once again. The emphasis was on prohibiting tents, accoutrements and loudspeakers outside the Commons.
Technically, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner and his officers have full legal powers to ensure that MPs, Peers, officers and staff have free and unfettered access at all times, but the reality is that the duty to do so has been subliminally watered down over the years. We have moved from a position that protests outside Parliament had to have permission to one where they did not need permission but the Met could stop them if they thought it necessary. There is no duty for free and unfettered access. That is why my amendment is necessary, without disturbing 99% of the current controls, powers and responsibilities.
Why is it necessary? In November 2021, Insulate Britain, with more than 60 activists, blocked two main roads leading to the Parliamentary Estate, including Bridge Street and Peers’ Entrance. In April 2019, Extinction Rebellion blocked access in Parliament Square, and the police had to take action to maintain a clear route for access for MPs and Peers reaching the estate. In October 2022, Just Stop Oil activists, as part of a month-long occupation of Westminster, sat in the road surrounding Parliament Square, specifically aiming to disrupt access to the seat of government.
The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 added an offence of blocking vehicular access to the Parliamentary Estate, but it said nothing about pedestrians. The current laws are therefore slightly inadequate.
The first thing in my proposed new clause that the Metropolitan Police commissioner would see are the words:
“Duty of the Metropolitan Police to ensure access to Parliament”.
It begins:
“It is the duty of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis to secure that members of either House of Parliament, all parliamentary officers and staff have free and unfettered access to the Palace of Westminster controlled area on any day on which either House is sitting”.
That puts access to Parliament front and centre of the legislation, sending a very strong signal that democracy trumps protest—you can still protest if you want to, but do not block access to Parliament.
I say to the noble Lord, Lord Hain, that, under ECHR laws, there is no right to protest. The Human Rights Act 1998 does not refer to a right to protest. The relevant rights are the right to freedom of expression in Article 10 and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly in Article 11. Moreover, Articles 10 and 11 are qualified rights, in that they can be restricted where it is necessary and proportionate to protect public safety, prevent crime and protect the rights and freedoms of others. I submit that the rights and freedoms of others include Members and staff of both Houses. We should also be protected to do our job, because we are the “others”. We have allowed a myth to grow that there is a right to block access to Parliament as part of a non-existent right to protest.
I have a few other small amendments. The 2011 Act designates the controlled area around Parliament but does not stretch as far as 1 Millbank, which did not open until after the 2011 Act passed. I have included it, as well as the road from Downing Street to Parliament, since, although the current law states that Parliament Street is part of the controlled area, Downing Street may be on that no man’s land between Whitehall and Parliament.
The 2022 Act added an offence of blocking vehicular access. I have added that pedestrian access for Members and staff must be maintained, and a requirement that any protesters must be kept back at least 10 metres from pavements used by Members to access Parliament. That would not stop protests; it would just let Peers and Members get in.
Apart from these small changes, I have retained the whole structure of the existing legislation, but with a new duty requirement on the Met. Putting at the beginning of the legislation a sentence that it is the duty of the Metropolitan Police to secure access to Parliament is more than just tokenistic or symbolic. We have allowed our freedoms to access and egress Parliament without hindrance to be eroded over the past 20 years. We have permitted a belief that people protesting outside our gates have more rights and are more important than the legislators working inside.
It cannot be acceptable that the very people entrusted with the responsibility to ensure our legal rights and freedoms under the law cannot get into the building to do it. My proposed new clause would restore that balance. It would make it clear to the commissioner where his primary duty lies, and it should make it safer for all of us, as parliamentarians and staff, to carry out all our duties. I commend my proposed new clause to the Committee.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, this huge group was always going be pivotal for us to discuss, and it is full of moral dilemmas. I am genuinely torn on many of the amendments; I do not know where I stand on some of them. I therefore appreciate the debates that we have had so far. It has been very worth while to hear the different sides of the argument.
When the noble Lord, Lord Mendelsohn, spoke earlier, he stirred me up. Every time I say “stirred up” I think of stirring up hatred; it was not that, but his contribution was very important. He emphasised that a lot is at stake, which it is. On the first day in Committee, I said that I knew that simply reiterating the formal importance of the right to protest is not sufficient for the period that we are living in, because we face new types of protest. We face some vicious and abusive gatherings that call themselves protests. That leaves somebody like me in a difficult dilemma. I am a free-speecher, but I have witnessed the visceral rise of Jew hatred in public and on our streets, so I am torn.
I have a lot of sympathy with the intentions of the noble Lords, Lord Walney, Lord Polak, Lord Leigh of Hurley and Lord Pannick, and of the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, to name just some noble Lords, and I understand where they are coming from. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Mendelsohn, himself admitted, there are a lot of existing powers that are not used. That strikes me as the problem.
We have a policing crisis and powers that are not being used, for cultural or deeper political reasons, so we try to compensate by making more laws. That will not solve the problem of the culture of normalisation of antisemitism—if anything, those new laws, which might also not be enforced, could be a distraction. Despite my reservations, my fear is that the deeper problem will lead to bad lawmaking and abandoning key principles that stand up for western civilisation, democracy and so on, because we are so desperate to do something.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 370A, which seeks to grant the Secretary of State the power to designate and restrict extreme criminal protest groups—and I declare an interest as the director of the Free Speech Union.
Last Monday, the Free Speech Union was the victim of an attack by a group that meets the definition in this amendment of an extreme criminal protest group. It is a group called Bash Back, which is a militant pro-trans group; it broke into the website of the Free Speech Union, stole confidential information about some of our donors and then published that information on its website and its social media accounts. To get that information removed, we had to apply for an emergency injunction; we then had to go back to court to put that injunction on a firmer footing; and there will be a third hearing or trial at which we try to make that injunction permanent. In the meantime, even though the information has been removed from the group’s website and social media accounts, that website and those social media accounts are still up. It has been extremely traumatic and disruptive—our website is still down. Applying for emergency injunctions and seeing that process through is by no means cheap; it is not entirely covered by our insurance.
One of the arguments we have heard this evening as to why the Secretary of State should not be granted this power is that the existing criminal law framework is adequate to deal with extreme criminal protest groups. I am glad to say that the Metropolitan Police does appear to be taking seriously what is a criminal offence—the data breach and the publication of that confidential data, in our case. The pro-trans group Bash Back has been active for at least six months and the criminal law as it stands has not been adequate to restrain it. This group took responsibility for vandalising the constituency office of Wes Streeting, the Secretary of State for Health. In addition to smashing up his constituency office in Ilford North, it daubed the words “Child Killer” on the wall of his office because he said that he does not want the NHS to prescribe puberty blockers any longer. No one, as far as I know, has been interviewed by the police in connection with that violent assault on the offices of a Member of Parliament: certainly, no one has been arrested. The group followed up with an attack on a feminist conference in Brighton, and the threats and intimidation meant that that conference could not take place.
More recently, the group launched a violent attack on the offices of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, presumably because of the guidance note that the commission submitted to the Government about how to interpret the Supreme Court’s judgment about the meaning of the word “sex” in the Equality Act, which presumably the group does not agree with. It daubed graffiti on the walls of the office and used hammers to smash the glass on the office’s front. I do not suppose that I need to remind noble Lords that the chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission at the time was the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, and one of the commissioners at the time was my noble friend Lady Cash. This is an extreme criminal protest group which has seemingly been allowed to operate with impunity because the existing—
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)
Forgive me for interrupting—and I have hiccups, which is why I am trying not to interrupt—but the more important point about the attack on the EHRC’s London offices is that it is in a large building shared by several other organisations. Not only were the staff of the EHRC threatened by the very act of the attack, but the other organisations that use the building were also extremely disturbed by what happened, and there have been repercussions for the EHRC as a consequence as a tenant. I cannot say any more than that, but I wanted to make that point.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
I thank the noble Baroness for that intervention.
The group in question advertises the fact that it breaks the law in order to shut down and silence its political opponents, people with whom it disagrees. It advertises the fact that it engages in criminal activity to advance its point of view, its agenda, on its website and its social media accounts. It uses its social media accounts to recruit additional members of the group. It operates with impunity in the public square, so I do not think it can plausibly be claimed that the existing criminal law is sufficient to rein in a group like this.
Now, I take the point of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that we should be cautious before granting the Secretary of State additional powers to restrict the activities of protest groups. But I think it is worth bearing in mind that one of the reasons, perhaps, for the overdesignation of groups as terrorist groups under the powers granted to the Secretary of State by the Terrorism Act may be because the Secretary of State does not have enough flexible ways of responding to the threats posed by extreme criminal protest groups. Either he or she designates them as terrorist groups or they are allowed to continue to organise, protest and recruit. This would be an additional power—less extreme, I think, than designating a group a terrorist group.
One critical difference is that if a group is designated a terrorist group and someone expresses support publicly for that group, that can be a criminal offence. That is not the proposal in the case of what the consequences would be of designating a group an extreme criminal protest group. That is one respect in which it would be a less extreme restriction than designating a group a terrorist group. I hope that there would be less tendency to overdesignate.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I am so grateful for the thoughtful way that the noble Lord is attempting to grapple with these difficult issues. Does he remember the spy cops scandal, for example? Does he understand the difficulty when we constantly try to find ways to treat people who are not terrorists, but who we disagree with even quite viscerally, as quasi-terrorists? Does he understand the difference between the importance of prosecuting individuals for their actions and the dangers of guilt by association, with its chilling effect on free speech? I say this to him as a free speech campaigner.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
I thank the noble Baroness for her intervention. The issue is not that the groups in question are advocating points of view with which I profoundly disagree. That is not the basis on which I am supporting this amendment. It is that the groups in question advocate and engage in criminal activity to restrict the liberties of others.
I anticipate that people will say that it is hypocritical of me to support this amendment because I am a free speech campaigner. But the Free Speech Union has always made it clear that we do not think that the right to free speech includes the right to break the law to try to silence other people and to try to deprive them of their right to free speech through fear and intimidation. That is why I have been able to reconcile myself to this amendment, which is an attractive alternative to designating groups such as Palestine Action as terrorist groups.
Lord Godson (Con)
My Lords, I support the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Blencathra. I pay tribute to him in this context, because of his own lived experiences during the explosion of demos in the last few years in this area, and his own issues in obtaining access to the Palace. Likewise, I have taken testimony for Policy Exchange, which I direct, from my noble friend Lord Shinkwin. My noble friends’ lived experiences should be noted. Of course, it is not just them. Overall, it is part of a coarsening of political life, perhaps as a whole in this country, but certainly in this particular area in which we work, where we legislate.
It is not just about those we agree with and those we do not agree with. It has been said, by one or two speakers, that we do not like Palestine Action, and we do not like the Palestine Solidarity Campaign. This problem pre-dates 7 October. It predates the explosions in those demos. It relates to Just Stop Oil and Extinction Rebellion, which I do not agree with. But it also relates to the conduct, for example, of some ex-servicemen, whom I agree with on legacy issues and lawfare in Northern Ireland but who I have seen behave extremely badly towards some female colleagues of mine who do not work in this place. Similarly, I did not like the conduct of every person who was recently engaged in the farmers’ demonstration here; again, it is a cause which I support. It is across the piece and across the political spectrum. That is a problem which we need to take account of when we say that it is just people we do or do not like.
The issue at hand is the idea—which has been implied by one or two speakers in this debate—that we will become like Belarus or some other right-wing, authoritarian country if we go ahead with these amendments. The problem here is the very reverse: it is not the excessive power of the British state but its weakness and its failure to protect us—most dramatically demonstrated by the demonstrations that we have seen.
The blunt truth, as my noble friend has pointed out, is that too often we have had too many difficulties getting in and out of this House. Indeed, at some stages, we simply cannot get in at all. In my interviews with some senior police officers, they are basically saying, “You cannot seriously expect us to privilege the political classes by having extra protections” of the kind that my noble friend has talked about. Conversely, some noble Lords are quite demoralised themselves; when I have asked them about this, they say, “Well, we’re not very popular, so we’ve got to suck it up”. That is a tragic situation. What is so attractive to me about my noble friend’s amendment is that it asserts the absoluteness of our right to go in through the plenitude of entrances and exits of this House.
We all know that the future of this Chamber is being debated all the time, but for so long as we are here, we must have the right to do the work that we come here to do. One of the glories of today’s debate—including even the speeches of those whom I disagree with—is that we have all been able to get here to this House. I never want again to be in a situation where people cannot get in or out, or feel frightened to do so.
As my noble friend pointed out, the chilling effect is not just for us or for members of staff—I do not think we should be too precious about it; all of us are in public life, so noble Lords will have had death threats and various other forms of intimidation. The status quo ante, as described by my noble friend Lord Blencathra —which certainly obtained when he was first elected to the lower House in 1983—is light years away. We have to revert to that. That is why the necessary rectification that he is proposing is so important.
I agree with my noble friend on several other things, including charting the demise of the Sessional Orders in the House of Commons, and the legislative changes relating to protests in proximity to the Palace. He has already provided examples of the disruptive and obstructive protests around here in recent years. He was able to do that because it has increasingly become a feature of all our lives, and that needs to come to an end as quickly as possible.
There is one foreign example that is important for us all to note: the Dáil of the Oireachtas in Dublin. The Republic of Ireland provides protection for the workings of its national parliament through Section 7(1) of its Offences Against the State Act 1939, which forbids the obstruction or intimidation of any branch of government, including the legislature, from carrying out their functions. If we have anything to look at, it is among other foreign legislatures that are perhaps more zealous and solicitous in the protection of their well-being than we have seen in some quarters here in recent years.
Finally, there is the question of who is doing the demonstrations. As I said, I have been distressed by watching people on my side of the debate not behave properly. I remember watching Anna Soubry, whom I disagreed with on Brexit, being abused. But when one looks at recent history, one will find that we need to go back to a far more rigorous set of processes, where our needs are placed squarely—because of our public duties, not because of any private advantage—to ensure that we can discharge our responsibilities for as long as any of us choose to remain in this place.
Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)
My Lords, I welcome the proposed legislation, in particular Clause 124 and Amendment 372, which would ban marches outside places of worship. Except, of course, it would not. It would empower a senior police officer to make a decision specifically if access to those places of worship is being denied to people who desire that access. So, the point the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, and the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady, made about this meaning you cannot have any marches in London because London is full of places of worship would have been a good point, but it is only where there is going to be access—in other words, specific services—and it is only where a senior police officer makes that decision. I am not sure that that is right.
When there have been complaints about the terrible marches, which I will come on to in a minute, politicians have just put their hands up and said, “Terribly sorry, nothing we can do. It’s not down to us. It’s down to the police”. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, in an excellent speech also made the point that we are piling on the legislation, but the police are not doing what they are supposed to be doing, as is. That is my reservation about some of this. It is perhaps for people with better legal abilities and experience than mine to think through how we might circumvent a situation where, for whatever reason and in whatever part of the country, the senior police officer is not taking the action that one might have hoped they would.
I speak also as president of Westminster Synagogue. Westminster Synagogue is on the corner of Rutland Gardens and Knightsbridge, not, as some people think, in the Palace of Westminster. We have had two marches past us recently, both on a Saturday. We negotiated with the police to ensure they did not pass on a Saturday morning, when we had services, but they did pass by us at lunchtime, so we had to abandon our community lunch events. We were told we had to leave the building before we had the lunch that we had planned.
On the second march, the demonstrators stopped some 20 metres away from our building and continued chanting while they stopped marching for some six minutes. It could be audibly heard from inside the building. I am sympathetic to the amendments that want to be specific about marches having be further away from the building than just in the area.
As your Lordships know, each and every one of the marches demonstrating about Gaza has contained vile, antisemitic slogans. These chants are not the sorts of chants we would have heard on British streets over many years, or indeed centuries, in marches by people wanting to express a view. These marches are populated by some calling for the extinction of Jewish life in Israel. On their call for Palestine to be free from the river to the sea, I had to explain to my daughter, when we were in Manchester and heard these chants, that that meant the slaughter and eradication of Jews in Israel. Their chants for a global intifada, or even death to the IDF, are chilling.
I salute the noble Lord, Lord Hain, for his anti-apartheid work and his campaigning. I have also marched in campaigns on other issues, but neither of us has called for the eradication of a people. Shockingly, we know that the calls for the death of innocent Israeli and Jewish citizens were answered in Manchester on the holiest day of the Jewish year, and again on Bondi beach on another Jewish festival. Yet, they would do it again. We cannot allow this to happen. We cannot allow anything which accelerates the radicalisation of lone wolves, or even gangs, against our own citizens—and they are being radicalised by these chants.
Of course, many of the people on the marches are no more than useful idiots who have no idea what they are chanting for. When questioned—I have seen a video—about which river and which sea, they have no idea. But others know exactly what they are doing. They are trying to stir up community hate against the indigenous British Jewish population and anyone connected to the State of Israel, which they want destroyed, even to the point of an Israeli restaurant in Notting Hill, as we discussed earlier. They are not a response to perceived, although mainly false, injustices in Gaza. We know that to be the case, because the protests started well before the IDF went into Gaza. In fact, the first one in the UK was on 8 October. That was well before any event took place in Gaza, but after the horrific crimes by Hamas in southern Israel.
Baroness Cash (Con)
My Lords, mindful of time, I will limit my comments to the first amendment of the group, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Walney, and spoken to by my noble friend Lord Young.
A few people have mentioned that laws already cover the incidents referred to by groups such as Bash Back; I will focus on Bash Back because, as my noble friend Lord Young referenced, I was a commissioner at the EHRC at the time of that attack. There are laws that currently cover those incidents. There are criminal laws: there is aiding and abetting, criminal damage, attempted criminal damage, intimidation, harassment—all sorts of laws cover those attacks. But they are not implemented, and that is the second point I will come to in a moment: the behaviour of the police currently.
At the moment, when you have an organisation such as Bash Back advertising, encouraging, boasting about and celebrating criminal plans and then executed criminal acts, the police have a mountain to climb in order to identify all the individuals, all the individual offences, and the means by which to prosecute each one. I support this amendment because the noble Lord, Lord Walney, has very thoughtfully set out a means by which, when a group is advertising and encouraging criminal behaviour, and when a group—let us be honest—is seeking not to express an opinion but to close down the opinions of others using criminal behaviour, we have a means of addressing that, and doing so early, facilitating a way of managing the safety of the others.
I will just add that, for the individual members of staff in the building, and within the EHRC, in the particular incident of violence referenced by my noble friend Lord Young, all the windows were smashed in what was quite a large building owned by other people. It was really very frightening for the mostly young people who were there. I cannot say more than that at this time, but it was frightening. My noble friend Lord Young and I are both quite tough cookies, so for us it was probably easier to manage, but for the individual young people who experienced that, it was quite something, and it leads them to a situation where they have to question where they are working, what they are doing, how they are going to behave, and how they are going to express themselves in their workplace.
At the moment, although laws exist to address those individual events, they do not assist the police in the way that they need to be assisted, and nor do they assist the Government in the way they needed to be assisted to address Palestine Action. This is a step in between which would assist greatly, whether with Bash Back, Extinction Rebellion or any of the other groups that deploy criminal activity.
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)
I wonder if I might interject. The noble Baroness has raised Bash Back, as did the noble Lord, Lord Young. In its advertising, it makes a great deal of face coverings—which we discussed earlier today in the debate on whether Clause 118 stand part of the Bill—and the fact that no one needs to worry about being detected for this criminal damage because they can wear face coverings.
Baroness Cash (Con)
I am grateful for that reminder. It is another point in support of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Walney. The overall position of the group is much more easily managed by the police when there are deliberate attempts to evade any type of prosecution.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, we have had a difficult and long debate on a major group on public order. Because it is so late and because there have been some central points, I shall confine what I say to a few of those.
I turn first, if I may, to Amendment 370A, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Walney, on extreme criminal protest groups. I accept, and indeed agree, that, at first consideration, it appears beneficial to have an alternative to proscription that does not involve the Terrorism Act and does not involve branding peaceful protest as an offence of terrorism. That would, of course, be the effect of Amendment 370A. I note that, in answer to an intervention from the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, the noble Lord, Lord Walney, confirmed that it was his clear view that that would be the position. Indeed, I have spoken on a number of occasions against the use of the Terrorism Act to make any support for a proscribed organisation, however peaceable, an offence under the Terrorism Act.
The designation provision in the proposed new clause from the noble Lord, Lord Walney—designation as an extreme criminal protest group—is not the problem, because there is a condition in proposed new paragraph (a) that
“the group has as its purpose, object or practice the deliberate commission of imprisonable offences, including but not limited to sabotage, criminal damage, obstruction of critical national infrastructure, or serious public order offences”.
At proposed new paragraphs (b) and (c), it refers to
“the intention of influencing public policy”,
and “democratic functions” and
“a risk of serious harm to public safety”.
The effect is the concern, not the designation as an extreme criminal protest group. The effect would be to criminalise extreme criminal protest groups’ activities to include in the formulation of offences under the proposed new clause, particularly at paragraph (b), public advocacy or the dissemination of groups’ materials, and those are offences that would be similar to the offence of support for a proscribed organisation under Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, or offences of being a supporter, which can be proved by suspicion.
Amendment 370A would, I suggest, constitute a curb on free speech and on the legitimate freedom of expression, and would therefore run the same risks as the Terrorism Act of prosecutions of peaceful protesters. I am afraid I question the view expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, that criminal behaviour of the kinds that he described is not covered by other criminal legislation. I note the views of the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, that other legislation may cover such behaviours but may not be implemented by the police. That may highlight a need for an alternative approach to policing, rather than for new legislation of the kind advocated by the noble Lord, Lord Walney.
Although I understand and applaud the aim of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, for a less serious alternative to the Terrorism Act, also advocated by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, in practice, I doubt that it would be an attractive alternative to proscription under the Terrorism Act. Indeed, I do not believe that the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, had an answer to the intervention by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, on the chilling effect of limiting freedom of expression with the criminal law. I doubt that the amendment would have the effect that the noble Lord, Lord Walney, seeks, so I do not support it.
The second area of concern that I would like to cover today is Clause 124 and the amendments to that clause—Amendments 371A to 371F—persuasively spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, and the noble Lord, Lord Hain. I support the analysis of the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, of the word “vicinity”, also supported by the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady O’Grady. It is quite simply too vague. For my part, I am not convinced, for a number of reasons, that a 50-metre limit would produce the intended result either, so I agree with the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, on that.
As I understood it—I will be corrected if I am wrong, and I invite the Minister to comment on this—the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, contended that the words “may intimidate” should be changed to,
“has the purpose of intimidating individuals accessing that place of worship … and would intimidate”.
I suggest that that may not be right. This part of the clause may be saved by the words in subsection (2)(c). Again, this is a point I would like the Minister to consider, because the clause requires that for an offence to be committed it must be
“in the vicinity of a place of worship and may intimidate persons of reasonable firmness with the result that those persons are deterred from … accessing that place of worship for the purpose of carrying out religious activities”.
The result has to be achieved before the offence is committed.
However, it is quite clear, as my noble friend Lord Strasburger said, that it is completely right to protect the rights of worshippers to worship at their synagogues, mosques or other places of worship—although as my noble friend pointed out, Clause 124 may be unnecessary in view of other legislation. But subject to clarification and limitation, the purposes of Clause 124 seem to me to be right.
The third argument that I wish to consider concerns government Amendment 372 and the whole question of cumulative disruption. For my part, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that the principal object appears to be a legitimate one to avoid repeated disruption on successive occasions of particular areas where there are places of worship, as in the streets around synagogues. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, mentioned protests and assemblies on repeated Sabbath days in the vicinity of synagogues.
Weighing the right to protest in balance against the interference with the rights and freedoms of others, as we all agree that we must, it is plainly right that the freedom of Jewish people to go to synagogue on successive Saturdays without repeated protests amounting to harassment of them should be protected. If that is what cumulative disruption is to mean then it is plainly right to take account of it. However, the use of the word “area” is, I suggest, subject to the same flaw of imprecision as the word “vicinity” that we considered earlier. I invite the Minister to consider between now and Report whether the use of the word “area” is appropriate.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this is a very large grouping, and I shall be as brief as I possibly can, but there is quite a bit to cover. I support the principle behind Amendment 370A by the noble Lord, Lord Walney. We have seen a growth in the number of protest groups who engage in severe criminal activity to further their ends and yet, as organisations, are shielded from the full force of the law. There is a spectrum on which protest groups sit, from peaceful and non-violent to those proscribed as terrorist organisations. Inevitably, there will be groups that sit towards the more extreme end of the spectrum and yet do not meet the criterion to be designated as terrorists.
Bash Back is a transgender activist group which has used vandalism and intimidation to attack those who might disagree with its views. We have heard first-hand from my noble friend Lord Young of Acton as to their criminal activities. Whether this group’s behaviour qualifies a group as a terrorist organisation is a matter for the Government’s lawyers. But when Bash Back’s action guide, now taken offline, provides a step-by-step manual on how to commit extreme criminal offences and evade prosecution, there must be legal recourse that goes beyond targeting the individuals responsible and attacks the structure of the group. The noble Lord’s amendment provides a good framework for this, and I hope that the Government take it away and consider it further.
Similarly, I support the principle behind Amendment 370AA in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Mendelsohn, Lord Austin of Dudley and Lord Polak. For far too long have our cities been occupied on a weekly basis by angry and unruly marches that go well past their stated aims. Too often are innocent members of the public intimidated by calls for an intifada or for jihad. We have been too lax, I am afraid, in reining this in.
I broadly support the amendments tabled by noble Baroness, Lady Blower, and my noble friend Lord Leigh to Clause 124. Regardless of the merits of the clause in question, the measures would greatly clarify the legislation and remove the inevitable conflicts of interpretation that will currently result from it. I hope that the Government consider these improvements before Report, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Amendment 486B in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, raises the important issue of public funding. We support the principle that organisations that promote, support or condone criminal conduct, or seek to undermine our democratic institutions through violent or illegal means, should not be eligible for public funds. Public money should never be used.
Amendment 486C, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Mendelsohn, speaks to the deeply troubling rise in antisemitic offences. I am sure noble Lords are united in complete condemnation of the events at Bondi Beach last year. The proposal for a dedicated CPS unit reflects serious concern to ensure that such crimes are prosecuted effectively and consistently.
I turn to the two government amendments. Amendment 381 creates a new criminal offence of making representation outside a public officeholder’s home. The offence contains two elements. First, it criminalises a person being present outside a public officeholder’s dwelling for the purpose of representing to or persuading that public officeholder to do or not to do something in connection with their official duties. The second element is that a person will be committing an offence if they are present outside public officeholder’s dwelling for the purpose of representing or persuading them in relation to something
“otherwise than in connection with their role as a public officeholder”.
In other words, the amendment criminalises representations in relation to their public capacity and in a personal capacity.
I completely understand that the Government are seeking to take action against the intimidation or harassment of public officeholders, but serious concerns arise from this amendment. First, proposed new Section 42B(2) and (3) state that a person is to be considered as making representations
“by the person’s presence or otherwise”.
This implies that a person simply standing or holding a sign without saying anything could be criminalised. Can the Minister confirm that this is true?
Secondly, there is a distinct possibility that these provisions might capture political campaigners within its scope. As I have understood it, the second prohibited purpose in the offence captures making representation in relation to a public officeholder’s capacity as a private citizen, meaning that attempting to convince them to vote for another political party by campaigning could in theory be captured by the offence. For instance, say I am a party activist canvassing on the doorsteps, and I knock on the door of councillor of an opposing party. Would that, by my presence or otherwise, not be sufficient to constitute an offence? Let us say I post a leaflet for my party through the letterbox of the PCC of an opposing party. Would I be liable to arrest? Are the Government now saying that people should not be able to canvass or campaign? Again, I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify whether this would be the case.
Thirdly, it is the case that the law already provides significant protections for people in their own home. Section 42 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 permits a police officer to force a person to leave the vicinity of another person’s home if the officer believes the person is likely to cause alarm or distress to the resident. It is a criminal offence to breach such a direction, and that covers both members of the public and officeholders. Does the Minister agree that this already provides quite a substantial protection for public officeholders from intimidation, harassment and abuse outside their own homes? On the basis that we do not need duplication, as the Minister said earlier, I suggest that this may well be the case here.
I have today posed a number of questions to the Minister regarding the amendment, and I look forward to what he has to say in answering them, but I must add that we do not think that this amendment should be made to the Bill today. The proposed change is a serious legal issue with profound questions about the nature of democracy and the relationship between public officeholders and those we serve. It has been introduced in your Lordships’ House in Committee and debated among 24 other amendments. It has not been considered by the other place, and it certainly has not received sufficiently detailed scrutiny in this place. I therefore do not believe it is appropriate simply to wave this through after so little consideration, and I hope the Minister will be willing to withdraw the amendment for now and bring it back on Report, when we can have a full and proper debate.
Finally, Amendment 372 would ensure that the police take into account the cumulative impact of protests when deciding whether to impose conditions on demonstrations and assemblies. We completely support this, but I am surprised that the Government now support this too. During the passage of the Public Order Act 2023, this exact same proposal was brought forward by the then Conservative Government. My noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom, who was the Minister at the time, moved Amendment 48 on the first day of Report on that Bill. While not identical in wording to Amendment 372, the government amendment to the 2023 Act would have permitted the police to consider the cumulative disruption to the life of the community.
The Labour Party opposed that amendment, and 133 of its Peers voted it down. Now the Minister comes back to the House and asks us to support the very thing that his party was previously opposed to. It would be eminently helpful if the Minister could explain to the Committee why his party has suddenly had a damascene conversion and now supports these measures.
The amendments in my name to government Amendment 372 are simply probing amendments. The text of the government amendment as it stands permits the police to consider only the cumulative impact of protests in the same geographic location. It does not permit them to consider the cumulative impact on communities arising from the content of the protest, nor the cumulative impact of protests organised by that same organisation in the past. The potential impact of permitting the police to consider only geographical location is that protests organised by completely different groups on entirely different matters, but held in the same place, could see conditions imposed on them that have no bearing on their own behaviour.
We see many protests down Whitehall by different groups protesting about completely different issues. Would it be right for the police to be able to restrict a protest by farmers in Whitehall simply because there has been a pro-Palestinian protest there the day before? We must also remember that certain groups are far more disruptive and prone to disorder and violence than others. If only geographical location was considered, the police would be forced to treat all protests the same regardless of the conduct of the protest group in question.
It is clear from polling conducted by Policy Exchange that a significant proportion of the British public believes that police should consider the cumulative impact of particular groups protesting for the same cause. Yet this is not what is proposed by the Government’s amendment.
In conclusion, I would be grateful if the Minister could explain the Government’s thinking as to why they have included only geographical location and not the subject matter, the context or the content of the protest in this amendment.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, this has been a long and wide-ranging debate, and rightly so. The issues that we are discussing in this rather large group of amendments go to the heart of who we are as a nation. I will try to do justice to the sincerely held, if somewhat, at times, diametrically opposed views expressed across the Committee.
Let me deal first with the two government amendments in the group. First, government Amendment 372 places a duty on a senior police officer to take cumulative disruption into account when assessing whether the serious disruption to the life of the community threshold is met and, in turn, whether conditions should be applied to a public prosecution or public assembly.
This Government are committed to upholding the democratic right to peaceful protest. However, this must not come at the expense of the right of others to feel safe in their own neighbourhoods. Over the last few years, we have seen the impact of repeat protests on the life of some of our communities. We saw this in the wake of the antisemitic terror attack on the Heaton Park synagogue in Manchester on 2 October 2025, which resulted in the tragic murders of Adrian Daulby and Melvin Cravitz, as mentioned already by the noble Lord, Lord Polak.
As the noble Lord pointed out, protests continued in Manchester over the subsequent days, highlighting concerns around the need to protect specific communities and others impacted by the cumulative impact of protest. At this point I thank the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester for praising not just Rabbi Walker of Heaton Park Shul—who I had the pleasure and privilege of meeting during Hanukkah; he is an amazing individual and the way that he has held his community together is truly inspiring—but the CST, which continues to protect our Jewish community and lead the fight against antisemitism in our country.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
I thank the noble Lord for taking the intervention, but my question was not about protest. It was more that, if an officeholder and a constituent met outside and had a conversation, I did not want that sort of interaction to be criminalised—not a protest, just a conversation.
Lord Katz (Lab)
That is a helpful clarification. Ultimately, there are still the basic safeguard backstops of the CPS decisions to prosecute and police decisions to make arrests. There will always be discretion and flexibility, and one might posit that the CPS would not risk a prosecution where it was clear that there was not necessarily any offence caused. If the officeholder is engaged in mutual conversation, there would be no wish to see a charge brought, so I hope that addresses the concern the noble Lord raises.
Amendment 382 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, would seek to strike out the new offence from the government amendment. The new offence gives the police clearer and broader powers to act swiftly to deal with protests outside the homes of public officeholders. It is right that we protect them and their families from the harassment, alarm and distress that such protests inevitably give rise to. We have purposefully limited the offence to the homes of public officeholders; as such, it would remain open to anyone to protest outside an MP’s constituency office, a council chamber, a town hall or indeed the Houses of Parliament.
I hope that I have been able to persuade the noble Lord, Lord Davies, of the need for the new offence in subsection (4) of the proposed new clause in Amendment 381. The new offence is targeted and proportionate in defending those dedicated public servants, in this House and elsewhere, who put themselves forward to take part in our democratic institutions. They should be able to do this without a fear of being harassed in their own home. If, however, the noble Lord continues to have concerns about Amendment 381 then we will not move it in Committee, but he should be clear that we will bring the amendment back on Report.
Let me now respond to the other non-government amendments in this group. Clause 124 strengthens police powers to impose conditions on protests in the vicinity of places of worship. I put it to noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, that we have seen a clear need for this measure as a result of the protests we have seen following the conflict in Gaza, and indeed thugs targeting mosques as part of the disorder in the summer of 2024.
Frequent large-scale protests since 7 October 2023 across the UK have significantly impacted the Jewish community, particularly in London and in Manchester, Leeds and other cities. We have heard reports of fear and disrupted access to places of worship. To reassure the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, it is absolutely clear that this is related to the impact that we have seen in the wake of the protests arising from the conflict in Gaza, in the wake of 7 October 2023. I am slightly surprised that that was news to him, but fair enough.
Current police powers under the 1986 Act are insufficient to address the intimidating effects of protests that are currently being experienced by religious communities. Let me be clear to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, that this is the lived experience of the Jewish community over the past two years. It is not about assuming the potential of harassment; it is about assessing and preventing the actual impact of harassment. Again, I commend the clarity and force of the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who spoke forcefully about the fact that it is about intention and impact. I am also grateful to him for raising the rationale for the Court of Appeal ruling out the judgment on cumulative impact in the previous secondary legislation. It had nothing to do with the cumulative nature of those regulations.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, touched on a number of things. We will probably not get to it tonight, but we are talking about facial recognition later in Committee, and indeed we have a consultation on it. We are not ignoring that, and we can attend to it. A number of Peers mentioned Palestine Action and the proscription. I am not going to relitigate discussions that we have had. My noble friend Lord Hanson has dealt with that very well on a number of occasions, but I will just add my tuppence-worth. You can very easily support the cause of Palestinian statehood and freedom and criticise the Israeli Government by supporting a range of organisations that does not include one such as Palestine Action, which has been proven to organise and behave like a terrorist organisation. I will say no more on that.
I fully appreciate the intent behind Amendments 371A to 371F, tabled by my noble friend Lady Blower, but the law must be clear to all concerned. I put it to my noble friend that this is already the case. The term “in the vicinity” is already used in Sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 and is clearly understood in that context. Substituting reference to
“within 50 metres from the outer perimeter”
of a place of worship could be unduly restrictive.
Moreover, the power to impose conditions purposefully applies regardless of whether the organisers of the protest intended for the protest to have that effect. What matters is the impact of the protest on worshippers, not the intentions of the protesters. There is a question that arises from the formulation that my noble friend Lady Blower uses in her amendment. If you are using a place of worship but not necessarily for the act of worship—say, you are taking your child to a Sunday school or to a youth club at your synagogue, your mosque or your gurdwara—would that be covered by her amendment? But that may be dancing on the head of a pin slightly.
The question from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, of harm having to occur for the offence to have taken place and the formulation of the wording gets the cart before the horse. He saying that harm has to occur for the offence to have been caused. I say that this is about preventing harm and harassment being caused in the first place.
The noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Walney, and my noble friend Lord Mendelsohn have put forward various other new public order-related proposals. The noble Lord, Lord Walney, seeks to give effect to various recommendations contained in the report Protecting our Democracy from Coercion, which he submitted to the previous Administration. Of course, I pay tribute to his long-standing work in this area on political violence and extremism.
I do not propose to get too far into the detail of these particular amendments, given that the Government have commissioned a review of public order legislation led by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. It seems like hours ago—actually, it was hours ago—that he showed perspicacity in guessing that I might pray this in aid. His review will publish its findings in the spring, and it is right that we wait for the outcome of the review before bringing forward further public order legislation.
On the cumulative impact proposals that we are adding to the Bill, the Government consider the need, as demonstrated by recent events, to impose a duty on the police to take into account the impact of cumulative disruption. Because we have had these repeated protests that have left communities, particularly religious communities, feeling unsafe and intimidated, the legislation is an important step in ensuring that everyone feels safe in this country, while protecting the right to protest. This is a first step, but we will of course await the words of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, in the spring to see how we might develop these issues further.
Baroness Cash (Con)
I am sorry to intervene, particularly because of the time, but to clarify, I said that there are many individual laws that one could use to pursue individuals. It is incredibly difficult for the police to do that. They exist, but they are not applied in the way that we need them to, hence the need for the amendment.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I appreciate that clarification. Considering the time, I say to the noble Baroness that the review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, is forthcoming. I dare say he will be reading this debate in Hansard with some interest.
Amendment 380, from the noble Lord, Lord Walney, seeks to apply the changes made by government Amendment 372 to Sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act to the provisions of Section 13 of the Act. I simply say that, in a democratic society, the threshold for banning a protest should always be markedly higher than that of imposing conditions on a protest. That is why, sadly, we will resist his amendment.
Amendment 382E, from the noble Lord, Lord Walney, similarly touches on one of the guiding principles of the review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald—namely, whether our public order legislation strikes a fair balance between freedom of expression and the right to protest with the need to prevent disorder and keep communities safe. The ability to impose conditions on, or indeed ban, a protest based on the cumulative impact of protests on policing resources goes to the very heart of how we strike that balance.
Finally, Amendment 486B, also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Walney, is concerned with access to public funds for organisations promoting or supporting criminal conduct. I understand from what he said that this amendment may stem from comments made by the Irish hip-hop group Kneecap, which previously received funding from the Government through the music export growth scheme. I want to make it clear that I unequivocally condemn the comments that were made, which the noble Lord, Lord Polak, and others mentioned. In the light of that case, DCMS has made changes to the scheme, including requiring applicants to declare activity that may bring the scheme into disrepute, introducing further due diligence processes, adding a clawback clause to the grant agreement, and, where concerns are raised, escalating decisions to Ministers.
This has been a wide-ranging and thoughtful debate. We recognise the vital part played by peaceful protest in the functioning of our democracy. For the Government’s part, the measures in Part 9, together with Amendments 372 and 381, address gaps that we and the police have identified in the current legislative framework. We stand ready to address other operational gaps in the law, but before doing so we should await the outcome of the review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald. I hope that that addresses all the questions that have been posed tonight. We will of course review Hansard and write if we need to. In response to the specific request from my noble friend Lady Blower, we are of course always keen to have conversations, and we can take that offline outside the Chamber.
We all have a part to play here and I observe that those organising, stewarding and attending protests, as well as having a right to protest, have a responsibility to ensure that what they chant and the placards they wave are not racist and do not threaten communities or intimidate fellow citizens. Sadly, that has not always been the case. With that, I commend the government amendments to the Committee.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
I have two small points to make. First, there seems to be a lot of prejudgment of the report by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald—the Minister seemed to say that the noble Lord will not disagree with anything that has gone through in the Bill. I do not understand why we did not wait for the report to be published before the Bill was introduced. Secondly, I did not hear an answer to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Davies, about why Labour has done a complete 180-degree turn on Amendment 372.
Lord Katz (Lab)
In answer to both the noble Baroness’s points, the lived experience of the Jewish community, and that of other communities—the actions we saw against mosques and the Muslim community in parts of this country during the summer and since October 2023 provide a different context and this was recognised in the Metropolitan Police and GMP statement on chants to “Globalise the intifada”—over the past couple of years leads one to draw different conclusions. It is absolutely the case that the Home Secretary saw the importance of putting cumulative impact and providing reassurance to communities as a priority that could be folded into part of the review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, and that there was no need to wait for it and we could use the Bill to do it. That is what we have done, and I will be proud to move those amendments.
Lord Walney (CB)
My Lords, it has indeed been a mammoth grouping. I am grateful to all noble Lords for the eloquence, passion and knowledge that they have brought to the many amendments that have been discussed. I will be happy to withdraw my amendment, pending Report, but I urge the Government to keep an open mind on this. I shall make a couple of points on why I think that this is really important.
My Amendment 380, on Section 13 of the Public Order Act and cumulative disruption, is important for this issue specifically but also on a wider issue. I do not need to tell my noble friend the Minister about the difficult position that much of the Jewish community in this country feel they are in, given the challenges that they face—but also in not necessarily always knowing that this Government have their back. There is real peril for the Government in saying to the Jewish community, “Yes, we hear you on cumulative disruption, and finally we are moving”, after years, but then not doing sufficient to make a genuine difference on protests. The proposals in Section 13 are absolutely in tune with what the Government have already put down; they do not prejudge the Macdonald review, any more than their own amendments do. I urge them to keep an open mind on that issue.
On a final, wider point, there have been eloquent speeches on both sides. Given the particular eloquence of those who have argued against the kind of changes that I have proposed and that the Government are bringing forward, I think that it is really important to acknowledge the situation that we are in. I took the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that it could be dangerous, if wrongly applied, to overly restrict protests around buildings that are important to democracy, such as Parliament, but let us just remember that two Members of Parliament have been assassinated for their political beliefs in recent years—our friend Jo Cox and Sir David Amess. We have a public risk register that suggests that the assassination of a political figure is one of the highest threats that we have. We had a situation in recent years when Parliament was surrounded by an angry mob, and the Speaker of the House of Commons was so concerned for the safety of MPs that he changed the regulations.
This is not an idle thing about MPs being able to take a bit of rough and tumble, and because someone had glory days in the 1970s in the anti-apartheid movement then, frankly, anything goes. We are in a really serious situation as a country, and it deserves to be taken seriously by this Parliament and this Government.
“24A Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein Memorial, Whitehall, London. 24B Field Marshal The Viscount Alanbrooke Memorial, Whitehall, London.24C Field Marshal The Viscount Slim Memorial, Whitehall, London.24D The Women of World War II Memorial, Whitehall, London.24E Field Marshal The Earl Haig Memorial, Whitehall, London.24F George, Duke of Cambridge Memorial, Whitehall, London.24G Equestrian Statue of King George IV, Trafalgar Square, London.24H Major General Sir Henry Havelock Memorial, Trafalgar Square, London.24I General Sir Charles James Napier Memorial, Trafalgar Square, London.24J Air Marshal The Viscount Portal Memorial, Victoria Embankment Gardens, London.24K Fleet Air Arm Memorial, Victoria Embankment Gardens, London.24L Korean War Memorial, Victoria Embankment Gardens, London.24M Air Marshal The Viscount Trenchard Memorial, Victoria Embankment Gardens, London.24N Iraq and Afghanistan Memorial, Victoria Embankment Gardens, London.24O Chindit Memorial, Victoria Embankment Gardens, London.24P The Battle of Britain Monument, Victoria Embankment, London.24Q Royal Air Force Memorial, Victoria Embankment, London.24R Boadicea and Her Daughters Memorial, Westminster Bridge, London.”
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 370B, I shall speak to my further Amendment 370C. I must admit that I felt a little bit indulgent when I asked for them to be taken separately—but, as the noble Lord, Lord Katz, said, the previous group was rather a large one, which took us four and a quarter hours from start to finish. I hope that we can be a bit brisker in this group.
As vice-president of the Public Statues and Sculpture Association, I welcome measures in the Bill to protect some of our most venerable monuments. There is a long and lively history of such memorials serving as a backdrop to or focus of protest. As key ingredients of our public realm, it is understandable—perhaps even desirable—that they continue to form part of our national conversations today.
As long as those protests leave no lasting damage, many, including, I think, many of the people who are memorialised in them, might well say, “Fair enough”, but war memorials and memorials to wartime leaders hold a special significance in our national life. They stand as monuments to those who gave their lives for the freedom and prosperity that we now enjoy, including, of course, the freedom to protest. It is an insult to subjects and sculptors alike if these monuments are desecrated or dragooned into regular and unthinking protests. It is especially distressing when it happens to monuments that commemorate conflicts of which veterans or bereaved families are still among us.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I support Amendments 370B and 370C—
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Wilson of Sedgefield) (Lab)
We agreed that we would finish at about 11 pm, which we have come to. I suggest that we adjourn further debate on this group of amendments.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
I do not think that the group will take long, if the Minister is happy to respond.
Captain of the Honourable Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms and Chief Whip (Lord Kennedy of Southwark) (Lab Co-op)
I am conscious that we agreed 11 pm with the House staff. If it is going to be quick, then that is fine. But we do not want to be sitting here later, because it is not fair on the House staff. We agreed 11 pm.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I have about four minutes, if that is acceptable. I do not think there are many other speakers in this crowded House tonight who wish to speak on it. I am in complete agreement with the list of memorials to be added to Schedule 12. They should be protected. All we are seeking to do here is add that there are some important ones missing. It is not a technicality; it is a matter of national memory, public safety and simple consistency in the law.
These additions matter because memorials named in the amendments are at the heart of our civic life. They stand in Whitehall, Trafalgar Square, Victoria Embankment and Parliament Square. That is where the nation gathers. That is where tourists and schoolchildren come to learn. That is where the machinery of Government operates. They are not just isolated pieces of stone and bronze; they are focal points for our national life and public ritual. They commemorate the service, sacrifice and leadership of men and women whose actions shaped our history and whose memory we owe to future generations.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay for highlighting the importance of protecting the public realm. We support fully the inclusion of Clause 122 in the Bill. The prohibition on climbing on specified memorials was first introduced by the previous Conservative Government’s Criminal Justice Bill, and I welcome the current Government carrying this forward.
My noble friend Lord Parkinson has, in his customary eloquent way, spoken to the rationale and the substance of his amendments. In light of the late hour, I am going to very briefly comment on a few of the points made. I was going to select from his list in the amendments of the various people whose statutes he seeks to protect, but, given the lateness of the hour, I will just comment that these amendments do not ask us to agree with every decision made by the individuals whose statues we have. They simply ask us to recognise that our history is not something to be curated by omission or protected only in part. If the purpose of Clause 122 is to protect memorials and monuments from desecration and safeguard, in so doing, the shared inheritance of this nation, the memorials and statues in the amendments plainly belong within its scope. To exclude them would not be an act of neutrality; it would be an act of judgment by silence. For those reasons, I hope the Minister will give my noble friend’s amendments very serious consideration.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, Amendments 370B and 370C, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, seek to expand the list of war and other memorials covered by the new offence of climbing on a memorial, which is provided for in Clause 122.
I fully acknowledge that many of the memorials listed in these amendments commemorate events and individuals of great national importance. However, the lists of war memorials in Parts 1 and 2 of Schedule 12 include only those on Historic England’s list of grade 1 war memorials, as the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, pointed out. This provides an objective basis for inclusion in the legislation, as being those of the greatest historical interest, and ensures consistency and avoids arbitrary additions.
The one exception currently—and I will not go into all the variations that the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, mentioned, because of the lateness of the hour—is the statue of Sir Winston Churchill. This is included in Part 3 of Schedule 12 because there have been repeated incidents of intentional targeting of this statue during protests. The Government consider that as a prominent national symbol of Britain’s wartime leadership, and due to the targeting of the statue by protesters, it is right that Churchill’s statue is included.
The Government are also committed to including the national Holocaust memorial and the national Muslim war memorial, once they are built. The provision includes a power for the Home Secretary to add further memorials by secondary legislation, and she will no doubt want to ensure that any further additions follow a methodical approach.
The noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, specifically mentioned the issue of inserting “animals” as well as “individuals” in the legislation, and he got it in one—that is around the potential consideration of the national Animals in War Memorial on Park Lane that he mentioned. But, again, that is about leaving options open so as not to rule out including that at a later date.
In the knowledge that we have a power to add to the list of memorials to which the new offence applies, I hope that the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, that group took 21 minutes. I apologise for keeping the House five minutes past 11 pm, but after four and a quarter hours on the last group, I do not think it was unreasonable to ask the Minister to respond to my amendment, which I have sat and waited patiently to move, and I am grateful to the Government Chief Whip for allowing his noble friend to do so.
Sadly, the noble Lord did not have much longer to set out the Government’s case, but, even if he had taken longer, I do not think he would have persuaded me. This sounds like very curious logic. As I say, the problem with picking two dozen memorials that are presently listed at grade 1 is that those may not always be listed at grade 1, and future memorials may be added in. He curiously said that they might add the memorial to the animals of World War II, but not the monument to the women of World War II. I urge him to take that away and reflect more coolly.
I am grateful to noble Lords who have stayed to listen to this and I will reflect on this as we head to Report, but for tonight, and given the hour, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment 370B.
Crime and Policing Bill
Thursday 15th January 2026
(3 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-X Tenth marshalled list for Committee - (14 Jan 2026)
Lord Leigh of Hurley
Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)
My Lords, my amendments seek to improve Clause 124. It is worth reminding ourselves that this clause seeks to amend Section 12 of the Public Order Act 1986. Curiously, that section was itself amended in 2022 to allow the senior police officer to impose conditions on a march if it resulted in
“serious disruption to the life of the community”,
in particular where it results in
“a significant delay to the delivery of a time-sensitive product to consumers”,
or
“disruption of access to any essential goods”
or services to be delivered to places of worship. It is somewhat strange that the Act was amended to allow goods and services to be delivered, but did not mention disruption to the services themselves, so Clause 124 is a great improvement and a great help.
However, I wish to draw to the attention of the Ministers, the noble Lords, Lord Hanson and Lord Katz, that Section 12 is dependent upon the actions of a “senior police officer”, who “may”—the Act is specific on that word—decide to take action. I guess that he may not, as he is not required so to do. The Home Office will still be totally and solely reliant on the decisions of the senior police officer being put into action. There is no override envisaged that the Home Office can apply.
While I am on my feet, I believe that exactly the same point applies to Amendment 372 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hanson; again, it says that a senior police officer may choose to do this. I suggest that does not deal with the problem that when complaints are made by members of the public, politicians currently simply put their hands up and say, “It’s nothing to do with us; this is a police matter”. As we have seen in the West Midlands, we cannot rely on the police in every instance to do their duty and act fairly.
At the risk of repeating myself, this is the third time I have raised this point in debates on this Bill. In the previous two discussions, I have not really had an answer from the Ministers. In fact, I am not expecting them to answer it right now. What I am asking is for a commitment to consider this point, reflect on it and possibly meet those with an interest in the matter, and for it to be addressed by the time of Report.
My amendments are needed so that we can be sure that if protesters are banned from being near synagogues, they are stopped from simply heading towards Jewish faith schools and Jewish community centres. Of course, if my amendments protect schools and community centres of other faiths then I would be absolutely delighted, so I hope that these amendments will receive support from all sides of the House. Disappointingly, there is not a Bishop on their Bench, because, in my view, places of worship of all denominations need to be addressed by the Bill.
Make no mistake: Jewish people are leaving the UK as they no longer feel safe, particularly with the marches threatening to come back. I was in Israel last week on a parliamentary Conservative Friends of Israel trip, and Israelis were asking me, “Is it safe to be in London or Manchester any more?”. Businesspeople, academics, scientists, tourists and clerics are all nervous about coming to the UK. As we know, by the way, the marches in Westcliff-on-Sea led to synagogue attendance falling, which cannot be acceptable. We now need to be ahead of the protesters, not behind them. We need to protect faith schools and community centres.
Indeed, there have already been protests outside a Jewish community centre; there is one called JW3, which I support. When protesters were outside it on 27 October, there were unpleasant and aggressive slogans, and the police were powerless to move them on. Ironically, they were protesting at an event which was a conference to talk about future peace progress, with Palestinian representatives speaking.
My amendments attempt to pre-empt what we fear will happen after Clause 124 is passed. I have the support of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, of the Jewish Leadership Council—I declare that I serve as a vice-president—and of the Community Security Trust. All these organisations urge that my amendments be passed. As the noble Lord, Lord Walney, said the other day, these proposals do not conflict with anything the Macdonald review might say. The Government need no persuasion of this, because they themselves have proposed Clause 124 and Amendment 372, both of which would ordinarily be covered by the Macdonald review. There is no reason, then, to wait for his report to put through the proposed amendments.
I hope that by Report, the Minister will be able to signal his acceptance of these amendments, because we will keep pressing them. I am sure that the Government will want to play their part in trying to dial down the anti-Israel, and consequently antisemitic, febrile activities and mood. In my opinion, it is most unfortunate that the Government chose to recognise the State of Palestine when they did. This risked giving the organisations of protest the message that their aggressive and unpleasant actions were being rewarded. The Government now have an opportunity to try to show some even-handedness. I beg to move.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I support these amendments for the reasons that have been mentioned. Lists are always difficult, because wherever you draw the line, there may be another group to be added, but this is a sensible pair of additions to the definition as applied in the Bill. It is difficult, not least because this week we have seen complaints about what is happening in Notting Hill, where an Israeli restaurant seems to have had a protest directly outside it for no other reason than that it happens to be Israeli. This does not seem to have anything to do with the people attending or running the place, other than the connection to Israel. No matter where we draw the line on the list, there may always be others to add. But if we cannot protect children, and we cannot protect where minority and faith groups gather to share their faith, then our society will probably be worse for it. Providing this definition will make the police’s job easier. While others may argue for more to be added to the list, these are two reasonable, well-founded additions.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I share the concern expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, that senior police officers do not always act as they should. On Tuesday in particular, I expressed that concern in these proceedings and was rather rebuffed by the Minister. I assure the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, that I do not believe that senior police officers in particular cannot generally be relied upon to act in the best interests of their community, but I urge the Government to beware of legislating in the confident expectation that they always will. The reservations of the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, are justified. As he explained, Clause 124, if unamended, will permit a senior police officer to impose restrictions where processions or protests are
“in the vicinity of a place of worship and may intimidate persons of reasonable firmness”,
and deter them from attending
“a place of worship for the purpose of carrying out religious activities”,
or from actually carrying out such activities. As the noble Lord has explained, the amendments would add faith schools and faith community centres to list of institutions where conditions might be imposed.
On Tuesday, we went through considerable argument about the purposes of Clause 124. There was a great deal of discussion about protecting synagogues on successive Saturdays, and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, has raised the important point that communities gather together, worship or carry out religious activities and celebrations in areas quite apart from synagogues. Bondi Beach, after all, is not a synagogue: it is a public beach where Hanukkah celebrations had been organised and were being attended by Jewish communities.
I add my voice to those of the noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe, and Lord Leigh of Hurley: our faith communities need protecting wherever they are gathering for the purposes of their faith. That said, I certainly agree, as does the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, with the extension of this power to cover religious activities at faith schools and faith community centres. That would be a proportionate protection, and well defined. Faith schools are a particular sensitivity, because they are principally for young people of given faiths, who may be damaged psychologically for life by being attacked in or in the vicinity of those schools. The same goes for faith community centres, where Sunday school activities or religious education may be taking place. Of course, this is of particular importance to the Jewish community in the present climate, in the light of the horrific attacks that have taken place, about which we have heard a great deal. But it is also very important that Muslim faith schools and community centres should be protected too in the presence of considerable xenophobia and Islamophobia.
We need these protections; we need to combat the fear that is now beginning to permeate the whole of our national life, and which has a really unpleasant and damaging effect. It destroys community cohesion, national spirit and the tolerance for which this country has long been famous.
Lord Massey of Hampstead (Con)
My Lords, I rise to support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, and to add to the dialogue by saying that we are becoming desensitised to violent, harassing and intimidatory protests. The ideal of having local senior police officers in charge of restricting these protests is becoming much riskier, so the need to legislate has become much more urgent. I endorse the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, in supporting this amendment.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, the amendments in this group, tabled by my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley and spoken to by him so powerfully today, address an important gap in the Bill as drafted. They would ensure that faith schools and community centres are included within the definition of religious sites for the purpose of restrictions on protests. At their core, these amendments are about protecting people’s ability to practise their faith freely and without intimidation. Places of worship are more than simply buildings used for ceremonial services; they are frequently part of a wider religious campus that often includes schools, halls and community sites. It is wrong to draw an artificial distinction, even if inadvertently so, between a synagogue, a church or a temple and their adjoining faith school or community centre.
Clause 124 itself, and these amendments, do not seek to ban protest, nor to diminish the right to peaceful assembly. Instead, they allow the police to impose proportionate conditions where a protest in the vicinity of a religious site may intimidate people of “reasonable firmness” and deter them from accessing or carrying out religious activities. We had a long and vigorous debate on Tuesday about the clause itself. It is crucial, as many said on that day, that the test be rooted in reasonableness and necessity, and is not used as a guise for police forces to stifle people’s free speech and right to protest. Self-evidently, that must be counterbalanced against people’s safety, particularly that of children, which is where these amendments are so apposite.
This is particularly important given the heinous terrorist attack that took place at Heaton Park synagogue. The aftermath of that attack saw armed police required to stand guard at Jewish schools and community centres. That this had to happen should shame us all. In a civilised country, no one should have to live in such fear. Not only that but in recent years there has been a troubling rise in protests which target religious communities in ways that stray from robust political expression into sheer intimidation.
Faith schools and community centres are where children and families in particular gather, who should never be subject to threatening activity simply due to their faith. They are often places of education, as we have heard from noble Lord, Lord Marks. They are places of leisure and places of play—all in a religious setting.
With that said, it is my submission that the amendments in the name of my noble friend are a welcome step. I hope that the Minister pays them very close regard. I look forward to hearing his response.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to all who have contributed to this short but focused and important debate on the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, which seek to extend the power for police to restrict protests near places of worship to cover faith schools and faith community centres. The amendments were spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, and supported by the noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe, Lord Marks and Lord Massey of Hampstead, and from the opposition Front Bench by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron.
I acknowledge the wider societal problem that the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, powerfully described in moving the amendment. I think it is fair to say that he acknowledged the need for Clause 124 and hence its inclusion in the Bill. We are as government very aware of the problem. In the discussion on the previous mega group of amendments on public order on Tuesday evening, there were some assertions by noble Lord that synagogues are not impacted by marches or protests. I neglected to say it at that time, but this is an opportunity for me to say from the Dispatch Box that that is clearly not the case. We know that there are synagogues in central London that have been directly impacted by marches. They have had to change their service times and have had their normal pattern of worship disrupted by those marches. It is clear proof that, in respect of the Jewish community over the last couple of years at least, we need the provisions of Clause 124.
Before I move on to the amendments, I hope that, in responding to those in Israel and the US who raised with him whether it is safe for Jews to live in Britain and to be in Britain, the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, provided them reassurance that this is still one of the best places to be Jewish. We have fantastic values of tolerance and a liberal approach to enjoying any lifestyle that you wish and any religion that you wish to follow. As a British Jew, I am certainly very happy still, despite the concerns that we are discussing, to say that Britain is a great place to be a Jewish person. I hope that he responded in a similar manner.
On the amendments, under Sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act 1986, the police must have a reasonable belief that a public procession or assembly may result in serious public disorder, serious damage to property or serious disruption to the life of the community, or that the purpose of those organising the protest is the intimidation of others. The police must have a similar reasonable belief under Section 14ZA in respect to noise generated by a one-person protest.
Clause 124 will strengthen the police’s ability to manage intimidatory protests near places of worship by allowing them to impose conditions on a public procession, public assembly or one-person protest, specifically if they have a reasonable belief that the protests may result in intimidation and deter those seeking to access places of worship for the purpose of carrying out religious activities or conducting religious activities there.
Clause 124 does not define places of worship, which means that, where community centres may be used as a place of worship, there is flexibility for the police to consider using this measure and imposing conditions if appropriate. We believe this is a proportionate approach, because it allows the police to exercise their independent operational judgment rather than being constrained by prescriptive lists in legislation. Non-statutory guidance from the College of Policing will assist in clarifying marginal cases without removing the police’s discretion.
I appreciate the point that the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, made—and has made in previous debates—on police discretion. To respond to him directly, I am of course very happy to meet him with department officials to discuss this as we move through Committee and before we get to Report. That offer is open to him and to other noble Lords who would care to discuss the issue.
Regarding faith schools, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, there is particular sensitivity around schools because it involves young people. I declare an interest; I have two daughters who attend a Jewish faith school. It is incredibly concerning that they could be exposed to this in the manner of going to school and that the most normal everyday activity that a child or young person undertakes could be so disrupted. We very much share his concern, and his concern that it is not simply about Jewish faith schools; we are talking about all manner of faith schools, particularly, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, pointed out, Muslim schools—they are very much at the cutting edge as a very visible place in a community where protests could be mounted and could be a focus for local community opposition or aggression, which is why we need to be careful about it. However, the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 gave local authorities the power to make expedited public space protection orders which protect those attending schools from intimidation, harassment or impeded access in the course of a protest or demonstration. Combined with the wide range of powers the police already have to address intimidation and harassment, these amendments would, I submit to your Lordship’s Committee, unnecessarily duplicate existing law.
Given that, I hope—although I am realistic—that I might have been able to reassure the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, a little. I hope that, taking an account of the offer of a meeting and further discussion on the points that his amendments raise, he would agree that his amendments are not necessary and, at least for the time being, that he will not press them.
Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for his contribution. I was tempted to add restaurants to the amendment, but I had already tabled it. I have instead just made a booking there. Members of the House of Lords are welcome to join me to support the restaurant.
I thank my riparian neighbour, down the river at Henley-on-Thames from Hurley, for his most welcome contribution. Of course, I thank my noble friends Lord Massey and Lord Cameron.
I assure the noble Lord, Lord Katz, that I told everyone who made that comment to me that the UK was a very safe space for Israeli citizens to come and visit. However, it really was a concern that was expressed to me, quite shockingly. I assure him that I am totally in agreement with him on that.
I would argue that community centres could not be defined as places of worship. The JW3 centre specifically, as the noble Lord knows, could not be described as such, so it would not come within that definition. However, I can see that he is sympathetic and understanding, and I am very grateful for that. I am grateful to the Government for putting in Clause 124. Clearly, the 2022 Act was not sufficient, which is why they had to put in Clause 124, so perhaps there is a discussion to be had. I am grateful for his agreement to do that. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“Public processions and assemblies: duty to take account of cumulative disruption(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended as follows.(2) In section 12 (power to impose conditions on public processions), after subsection (2B) insert—“(2BA) In considering for the purposes of subsection (1)(a) whether a public procession in England and Wales may result in serious disruption to the life of the community, a senior police officer must take into account any relevant cumulative disruption.(2BB) In subsection (2BA) “relevant cumulative disruption” means the cumulative disruption to the life of the community resulting from—(a) the procession,(b) any other public procession in England and Wales that was held, is being held or is intended to be held in the same area as the area in which the procession mentioned in paragraph (a) is being held or is intended to be held (whether or not directions have been given under subsection (1) in relation to that other procession), and(c) any public assembly in England and Wales that was held, is being held or is intended to be held in the same area as the area in which the procession mentioned in paragraph (a) is being held or is intended to be held (whether or not directions have been given under section 14(1A) in relation to that assembly),and it does not matter whether or not the procession mentioned in paragraph (a) and any procession or assembly within paragraph (b) or (c) are organised by the same person, are attended by any of the same persons or are held or are intended to be held at the same time.(2BC) In subsection (2BB) “area”, in relation to a public procession or public assembly, means such area as the senior police officer considers appropriate, having regard to the nature and extent of the disruption that may result from the procession or assembly.”.(3) In section 14 (power to impose conditions on public assemblies) after subsection (2B) insert—“(2BA) In considering for the purposes of subsection (1)(a) whether a public assembly in England and Wales may result in serious disruption to the life of the community, a senior police officer must take into account any relevant cumulative disruption.(2BB) In subsection (2BA) “relevant cumulative disruption” means the cumulative disruption to the life of the community resulting from—(a) the assembly,(b) any other public assembly in England and Wales that was held, is being held or is intended to be held in the same area as the area in which the assembly mentioned in paragraph (a) is being held or is intended to be held (whether or not directions have been given under subsection (1A) in relation to that other assembly), and(c) any public procession in England and Wales that was held, is being held or is intended to be held in the same area as the area in which the assembly mentioned in paragraph (a) is being held or is intended to be held (whether or not directions have been given under section 12(1) in relation to that procession),and it does not matter whether or not the assembly mentioned in paragraph (a) and any assembly or procession within paragraph (b) or (c) are organised by the same person, are attended by any of the same persons or are held or are intended to be held at the same time.(2BC) In subsection (2BB) “area”, in relation to a public assembly or public procession, means such area as the senior police officer considers appropriate, having regard to the nature and extent of the disruption that may result from the assembly or procession.”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause amends sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 to require police officers, when deciding whether the serious disruption to the life of the community threshold is met in England and Wales, to take account of the cumulative effect of processions and assemblies in the same area.
Baroness Doocey
“(4) After section 14, insert—“14A Imposition of conditions: live facial recognitionPrior to imposing conditions under either section 12 or 14, the senior officer of the Police Force in question must confirm that live facial recognition will not be in use, unless a new statutory code of practice for the use of live facial recognition surveillance in public spaces in England and Wales had previously been presented to, and approved by, both Houses of Parliament.”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that police cannot use live facial recognition technology when imposing conditions on public assemblies or processions under Sections 12 or 14, unless a new, specific code of practice governing its use in public spaces has first been formally approved by both Houses of Parliament. It is intended to safeguard public privacy and civil liberties by requiring democratic oversight before this surveillance technology is deployed in such contexts.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 379, I will speak also to Amendment 471. When used responsibly, live facial recognition can help to protect the public. The real question before us is not whether it is used but how, under what safeguards, with what scrutiny and by what authority from Parliament? At present, the answer is deeply unsatisfactory.
Police forces are rolling out live facial recognition at speed, without a clear legal framework, consistent oversight or meaningful public consultation. Its operational use has more than doubled in a year. Millions of pounds are being spent on new systems and mobile vans, yet there is still no reference to facial recognition in any Act of Parliament. Instead, the police rely on a patchwork of data protection law, the Human Rights Act and non-binding guidance. Parliament must now act urgently to put its use on a clear statutory footing. The police themselves say that this is vital to maintain public trust.
Recent Home Office testing of the police national database’s retrospective facial recognition tool found significantly higher error rates for black and Asian people than for white people. For black women, the false positive rate was almost one in 10 when the system was run on lower settings. It also performs less reliably with children and young people. The human consequences are already here: schoolchildren in uniform wrongly flagged and told to prove their identity, and a black anti-knife campaigner stopped on his way home from volunteering and asked for his fingerprints because the system got it wrong. These are not theoretical risks; they are happening now.
When this became public, Ministers ordered a review and testing of a new algorithm, which is welcome. But questions remain. Why was the bias not disclosed earlier? Why on earth was the regulator not informed? Why are biased algorithms still in use today? A false match rate of nearly one in 10 for black women is not a technical glitch; it is a civil rights issue. Running thousands of searches every month before strengthening statutory oversight only deepens public mistrust. That is why the measures in Amendment 471 deserve very serious consideration.
Amendment 379 is modest and practical. It focuses on one of the most sensitive uses of live facial recognition: protests and public assemblies. It would require the police to pause its use at such events until a new statutory code of practice, approved by Parliament, is in place. That code would set out clearly when surveillance is justified, how watch lists are compiled, what safeguards apply and, crucially, what redress is available when things go wrong.
This Committee has already heard concerns about the gradual narrowing of protest rights. Each new restriction may seem small in isolation, but together they add up. Elsewhere in the Bill, as we heard on Monday, the Government seek to criminalise those who wish to remain anonymous at protests. Combined with expanding facial recognition, that places even greater pressure on protest rights. Taken together, these measures risk discouraging peaceful dissent and undermining freedom of expression.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I rise to oppose Amendment 379 and support most of Amendment 471, inadequate though it is. My views may not be the same as those of my noble friends on the Front Bench, of course. We all value the right to protest, but rights are not a shield for criminality. The Government and Policing Ministers have been very clear that live facial recognition is being developed and deployed as a targeted, intelligence-led tool to identify known or wanted individuals or criminals on watch lists. It is not a blanket surveillance tool of the public. The Home Office has opened a consultation and asked for stronger statutory rules and oversight precisely to ensure proportionate lawful use.
Amendment 379 would in effect tie the hands of senior officers at the very moment when targeted identification can prevent or stop serious crime. If a protest contains people who are wanted for violent offences, sexual offences or other serious crimes, the ability to identify them quickly and safely is not an abstract technicality; it is how we protect victims and uphold the rule of law. To say that demonstrations are somehow sacrosanct and must be free from tools that help catch criminals is to place form above substance. That is not to dismiss legitimate concerns about privacy and bias. We should legislate a clear statutory framework, independent oversight and robust safeguards, and I know that the Government are consulting on exactly that path.
I will want to see strong action to correct mistakes and address suggestions that it cannot tell the difference in some ethnic groups. That has to be remedied if that allegation is true. But the right response is to legislate proportionate limits and accountability, not to pre-emptively ban a narrowly targeted operational capability at protests and thereby risk letting wanted suspects slip away. For those reasons, I urge the Committee to reject Amendment 379 and instead press the Government to bring forward the statutory code and independent oversight that the public rightly expect.
Amendment 471 is a different kettle of fish—and possibly “off” fish as well. The amendment is far too liberal and fails to protect the public from out-of-control public authorities. I will explain why. As a person relieved of ministerial duties in 1997, I found myself a rather bored Back-Bencher on the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000—the famous RIPA. The Minister at the time—I think it was Alun Michael—was waxing lyrical about how it would tackle serious crime, terrorism and paedophiles. He mentioned how it would help the police, the National Crime Agency—or whatever it was called then—MI5, MI6, HMRC and a couple of other big national government departments.
We were all in agreement that it was a jolly good thing for these agencies to have that power. Then something the Minister said prompted me to table a Question on what other public bodies could use RIPA powers, and we were shocked to discover that there were actually 32, including at that time something called the egg inspectorate of MAFF, responsible for enforcing the little lion mark on eggs. Schedule 1, listing the public authorities with phone-tapping powers, has expanded a bit since those days, and it now numbers 79. However, that is not the correct number because one of the 79 entries says “every local authority”, so we can add another 317 principal local authorities to that list. I think “every government department” covers all the agencies and arm’s-length bodies under their command, so they also have access to RIPA. In other words, a worthy proposal to let some key government agencies have power to snoop on our mobile phones to detect serious crime, terrorism or paedophilia has now become available, to some extent, to hundreds and possibly thousands of public bodies.
The relevance of this is that if we agree that facial recognition technology can be extended beyond the police, immigration, the National Crime Agency, the security services and possibly a few other big government departments that are concerned with organised crime, people trafficking and immigration, I believe our civil liberties will be at stake if local authorities and some others get to use it as well. If local authorities get the power of facial recognition, I am certain that they will abuse it. A Scottish council uses RIPA to monitor dog barking. Allerdale district council, next to me in Cumbria, used it to catch someone feeding pigeons. Of course it would be brilliant, in my opinion, to catch all those carrying out anti-social behaviour, such as riding dangerously on the pavement with their bikes, not picking up dog mess or generally causing a disturbance. But that is why I think this amendment does not go far enough.
We do not need codes of practice and safeguards—we need a complete ban on all other public authorities using it until it has been tried and tested by the police and we are satisfied that it does not cause false positives and is operationally secure. Then, if it is ever extended to other public authorities, it must be solely, as proposed new subsection (1)(a) says,
“used for the purpose of preventing, detecting, or investigating serious crimes as defined under the Serious Crime Act 2007”.
If we do not have these protections, local councils will end up checking our recycling, what library books we take out and what shops and pubs we use, and will justify it by saying it will help them deliver a better spatial strategy or design services to user patterns.
I look forward to the Liberals going back to their original roots as real liberals and bringing forward a better amendment that will protect our liberties.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
My Lords, I rise to support Amendment 379, to which I have added my name, and to very strongly support it. But before I do, I hope the Committee will forgive me if I digress very briefly to tidy up a matter that arose in Committee on Tuesday. I made the point that the police have the duty to facilitate protest rather than prevent it, and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, intervened to ask me where he might find a justification for that statement. Well, I have good news. I have here the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s protest operational advice document, and on page 10, under the heading “Role of the police”, it says that authorised professional practice
“identifies two duties associated with the policing of protest. Broadly these require that the police must … not prevent, hinder or restrict peaceful assembly … in certain circumstances, take reasonable steps to protect those who want to exercise their rights peacefully. Taken together, these duties (the first a negative duty, the second a positive one) are often described as an obligation to facilitate the exercise of the freedoms of assembly and expression”.
I also have here a very handy flow chart entitled “Facilitating Peaceful Protest”, and I will make it available to the noble Lord following this debate.
To return to this group, it is now eight years since South Wales Police started deploying early versions of live facial recognition technology. When it did so, the technology was extremely inaccurate and there was absolutely no legislation in place to regulate or oversee the use of this mass surveillance technology—and that is what it is.
For those noble Lords who have not had the opportunity to experience facial recognition technology, I will give a quick overview of how it is used. It currently involves a large van full of electronics being parked in a location, such as a busy shopping street, where large numbers of ordinary people will walk past going about their daily business. On the top of the van are cameras pointing in all directions; they are scanning and recording the faces of all the passers-by. The technology tries to match them to a pre-prepared watch-list, which is a set of images of people the police want to find for some reason. Throughout the many hours of the deployment, something like 20 police officers will be standing around chatting and waiting for the system to decide, rightly or wrongly, that somebody whose face matches a person on the watch-list has just walked past. Several of the otherwise unoccupied police officers then detain the target and try to determine whether it is a true match.
Big Brother Watch, which I chair, has observed many deployments of facial recognition by the Metropolitan Police, and has seen many false matches happen. As well as false positives, the system is also susceptible to false negatives, where it fails to recognise somebody who is on the watch-list, and anyone who the police would like to speak to but was not put on the watch-list can wander by undetected. The Committee can form its own view on whether this is a productive use of scarce police time and money, but one thing is clear: this is a highly intrusive mass surveillance of thousands of citizens, almost all of whom are completely innocent and should be of no interest to the police.
The UK already has one of the highest densities of CCTV cameras in the world. Facial recognition technology will in time be added to those fixed cameras in public spaces. The police, your local authority, supermarkets or whoever will be able to keep tabs on who you are and what you are doing. This technology is far more intrusive than fingerprints or DNA. Live facial recognition can capture your face and location from a distance without you having any idea it has happened. It is as if you have a barcode on your forehead that can be read without your knowledge.
The collection and retention of fingerprints is tightly regulated by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Crime and Security Act 2010. Similarly, the use of DNA is strictly regulated by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. But what regulation is there for facial recognition, the most intrusive technology of the lot? Since the first deployment in 2017, absolutely no legislation, none at all, has been introduced to control this serious threat to our privacy. As we have already heard, the phrase “facial recognition” is not mentioned once in UK legislation.
Police forces, including the Met, have had a go at writing their own rules and marking their own homework, but that is obviously not their skill set; it is the job of legislators. The police’s homemade rules vary from force to force, and nobody is monitoring what is actually happening on the ground. For example, they assure us that all images they collect that do not match someone on the watch-list are instantly and permanently destroyed to preserve the privacy of innocent passers-by, but whether that always happens cannot be verified because there is no scrutiny, as there would be with, for example, DNA. This serious legislative vacuum is not the fault of the police; it is the fault of all the Governments since 2017, who were asleep at the wheel and did nothing to control the use of this highly intrusive technology.
You might ask: “Why does it matter to me? Why should I care if the state knows where I am and what I am doing? I am an honest, law-abiding, clean-living citizen. There is nothing in my life that I need to conceal from the police, my boss or my spouse”. You might be told by advocates of mass surveillance, “If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear”. Well, that claim is first attributed to the great democrat Joseph Goebbels. The Chinese state, where much of the technology for facial recognition comes from, uses it to monitor the behaviour of its citizens. It is used not just to keep track of where they are, but to assess whether they are being good citizens in accordance with the state’s definition of what a “good citizen” is.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I agree and disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, in equal measure, which may surprise him. On the protest point, he reaffirmed what I tried to say the other day, which is that the ECHR does not give the term “facilitation of protest”, but the police have given that term and put that sobriquet over the articles. The danger is—and I am afraid it is what materialised—that it has been interpreted as almost arranging some of the protests rather than the simplistic expression of “facilitation”. I do not think that we are a mile apart on it, but I come at it from a slightly different angle.
I think that facial recognition is an incredibly good thing. People during the debate have agreed that it has a value. It has two purposes: one is to try retrospectively to match a crime scene suspect with the database that the police hold of convicted people; and the other one, which has caused more concern and on which there may be common ground, is about the live use of it.
One thing that I think needs to be amplified—the Minister may mention it when he responds—is that the Court of Appeal has decided that the police use of facial recognition is legal. However, it did raise concerns—this is where I certainly agree with the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones and Lady Doocey, who already made this point—that it needs to treat all people equally. It is not okay to have a high failure rate against one group by race and a different success rate against another race. That is not acceptable. I was surprised, as I know the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, was, when this had not been made public and was discovered in whatever way it was discovered. That needs to be got right. There is no justification for that error rate, and it must be resolved.
Secondly, this may surprise the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, but I agree that there should be more regulation of its use, and that it should be regulation by Parliament, not by the police. Where I disagree is on whether this Act, and this proposed amendment, is the right way to do it. We are going to have to learn, first, how the technology works, how it is applied by the police, where its benefits are and where its risks are. I also agree that there ought to be independent oversight of it and that anybody who is offended by its use should have the opportunity to get someone to check into it to see whether it has been misused. They should also be provided with a remedy. A remedy may be financial compensation, but I would argue that it is probably better that something happens to the database to make it less likely to be ineffective in the future. There needs to be some reassurance that somebody is improving this system rather than not. I am for facial recognition, but there should be regulation and I do not think that this Act is the right time. As has already been said, the consultation that started just before Christmas and concludes, I think, in February will give us a good way forward, but it will need a bit more thought than this Bill, when it becomes an Act, might offer us.
Finally, there are an awful lot of regulators out there, and we all pay for them. There are surveillance commissioners, intrusive surveillance commissioners and biometric commissioners. They are all examining the same area—if they ever get together and decide to have one commissioner to look at the lot, we would probably save quite a lot of money. This is an area in which the existing commissioners probably could do two things. One is to regulate and the other, potentially, is to approve, either in retrospect or prospectively depending on the emergency or the urgency with which it should be used. There is therefore some need for help but, for me, I do not think that this Bill is the right opportunity.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, I have signed this amendment because I think it is very sensible and covers some ground that really needs tackling. It would ensure that the police could not use live facial recognition technology when imposing conditions on public assemblies or processions under Sections 12 or 14 unless a new specific code of practice governing its use in public spaces has first been formally approved by both Houses of Parliament—that sounds quite democratic, does it not? It is intended to safeguard public privacy and civil liberties by requiring democratic oversight before this surveillance technology is deployed in such contexts.
It is always interesting to hear the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, former Met Commissioner, on the tiny little areas where we do overlap in agreement; I think it is very healthy. However, I disagree deeply when he says this is not the legislation and it should be something else. We keep hearing that. I cannot tell noble Lords how many times I, and indeed the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, have raised this issue here in Parliament and in other places. The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, asked a quite interesting question: why should we care? Quite honestly, I care because I believe in justice and in fairness, and I want those in society. As I pointed out yesterday, I am a highly privileged white female; I have been arrested, but I was de-arrested almost immediately by the Met Police when all the surrounding people started saying, “Do you know who she is?” and they immediately took the handcuffs off.
At some point we have to accept that this needs regulation. We cannot accept that the police constantly mark their own homework. We were reassured that all the flaws in the algorithm and so on had been fixed, but clearly we cannot be sure of that because we do not have any way of knowing exactly what the flaws were and who has fixed them. Live facial recognition represents a huge departure from long-established principles of British policing. In this country, people are not required to identify themselves to the police unless they are suspected of wrongdoing. Live facial recognition turns that principle on its head by subjecting everyone in range of a camera to an automated identity check. It treats innocent members of the public as potential suspects and undermines the presumption of innocence.
I disagree deeply with the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, when he says that it is not a blanket surveillance tool—of course it is. It is a blanket surveillance tool and is highly dangerous from that point of view. It is a mass biometric surveillance tool. It scans faces in real time, retains images of those flagged by the system and does so without individuals’ knowledge or consent.
If the police randomly stopped people in the street to check their fingerprints against a database, for example, we would rightly be alarmed. Live facial recognition performs the same function, only invisibly and at scale. Its use in the context of protest is a dangerous crossing of a constitutional line. We already have evidence that facial recognition has been deployed at demos and major public events, with a chilling effect on lawful protest. People will not go to these protests because they feel vulnerable. They are deterred from exercising their rights to freedom of expression and assembly because they fear being identified, tracked or wrongly stopped. While this amendment proposes a safeguard through parliamentary approval of a statutory code, we should not allow that to imply acceptance of live facial recognition at protests in principle. In my view, this technology has absolutely no place in the policing of democratic dissent.
We should reflect on the broader direction of travel. Live facial recognition is most enthusiastically embraced by authoritarian regimes, while a number of democratic countries have moved to restrict or even prohibit its use. That alone should surely give this Government pause to reflect on whether this is the right legislation to bring in. Independent observers have witnessed cases in which live facial recognition has misidentified children in school uniform, leading to lengthy and very distressing police stops. In some instances, those wrongly flagged were young black children, subjected to aggressive questioning and fingerprinting despite having done nothing wrong. What safeguards are in place to prevent misidentification, particularly of children and people from UK minority-ethnic communities? That is a basic question that we should be asking before we pass this legislation. I support the amendment as an essential check, but I hope that this debate sends a wider message that Parliament will not allow the routine use of intrusive biometric surveillance to become the price of exercising fundamental democratic rights.
I want to pick up something that the Minister said on Tuesday. He directed the Committee to the front page of the Bill and said that, in his view, the Bill was compliant with the ECHR. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, pointed out, that is his belief and his view. It is absolutely not a certificate of accuracy. I am not suggesting for one moment that there is any intent to deceive; I am merely saying that it is not a certificate of truth. With claims about seemingly authoritarian laws being compliant with human rights, that assessment can be challenged and should be challenged as much as possible. It remains subjective and is challenged by the organisation Justice, for example. We are clearly going to disagree about a lot in this Bill, but we are trying our best over here to make the law fair and representative of a justice that we think should exist here in Britain.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)
My Lords, I was hesitant as to whether to speak here, but some years ago I had very close acquaintance with facial recognition software, so I thought it might be useful to say a couple of things.
First, I very much agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, that this is an extremely good technology. I will get to the concerns expressed about it in a minute. This software has been used to apprehend murderers. For example, I think the Australian outback murderer was apprehended because of it and a far-right group of extremists in Sweden was identified by some very clever use of this facial recognition technology. It can be used successfully in preventing crime. Now, that is not all live use of the technology, and these amendments are about live use of the technology.
I very much respect the work of the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger. I am a great supporter of Big Brother Watch, and he and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, make good points. Much is made of the disparity in accuracy between white and black faces. The software I was involved with had that problem. The reason for that is that it was trained on white faces—they were afraid of being thought of as racist if they focused on black faces. Therefore, the accuracy for black faces was much worse, they discovered, and so they quickly started training the software on black faces and the disparity closed right up. As far as I know, the disparity, if it still exists, is quite small, but others may know better than me. This was several years ago, but that definitely happened with this set of facial recognition software.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)
Shifty is a great description—the noble Baroness could have said far worse than that.
I was given a hard time and then let go. We have to accept that there will be errors, but we have to understand where this is going. We can less and less afford to have police on the streets—we have seen that problem—and technology has to take over. Look at the super-spotters, a very successful crime-fighting group in New York. They would go to an area where there was a lot of crime—noble Lords will know that there was a process in New York where they directed people to crime hotspots—where they looked at the gait of individuals to see whether they were carrying guns or knives. Soon, people in those areas discovered that they had better not carry guns because they would be stopped by these super-spotters and arrested. If you are not carrying a gun, which they had all stopped doing, you cannot kill somebody because you do not have a gun to kill them with. It was a tremendously successful operation in lowering crime.
State-of-the-art facial recognition, at least before I stopped looking at it a couple of years ago, was more in gait than in face. We have to understand that you can start training technology to be much more effective than even these super-spotters at spotting people who are carrying, using their gait to recognise an individual rather than their face. There are all sorts of ways in which this software will be used to recognise people. It will get better and better, and fewer mistakes will be made; mistakes will always be made none the less, but that is the way of policing. They were mistaken when they stopped me—I was this tremendously law-abiding good chap, but they stopped me, and so will the facial recognition.
I loved the description from the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, of the 20 police hanging around, which I am sure resonated with noble Lords around the entire Chamber as the sort of thing that happens, but over time we will have to depend on technology such as this. We will have to be extremely careful about civil liberties, but we cannot blanket get rid of this technology, because it will be very important to policing.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I had sought to intervene on the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, before he sat down, but the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, beat me to it. I want to ask him a simple question but, first, I am sorry that we are on different sides of this—when we served together on the snoopers’ charter Bill, we were totally united that it was a bad Bill and we worked hand in glove to amend it. Can he tell me the substantive difference between a camera and a computer watching everyone in the crowd and picking out the wanted troublemakers and those 20 policemen he talked about looking at everybody in the crowd and picking out the wanted troublemakers from their briefing or their memory? What is the real difference between them?
Lord Strasburger (LD)
When I observed these deployments of facial recognition and looked at the 20 policemen standing around, it occurred to me that they would probably find a lot more of the people they were looking for if they just went round to their houses and knocked on the door, rather than working on the off-chance that they might walk past them in the high street.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Doocey for eliciting a very useful debate, as was the intention. I particularly welcome some of the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, but say to him that a Crime and Policing Bill might possibly be the place for discussion of the use of live facial recognition in policing. Maybe we can make some progress with the Government, we hope, responding or at least giving an indication ahead of their consultation of their approach to the legislative framework around live facial recognition. I very much hope that they will take this debate on board as part of that consultation.
As my noble friend Lady Doocey clearly stated, these amendments are necessary because live facial recognition currently operates, effectively, in a legislative void, yet the police are rolling out this technology at speed. There is no explicit Act of Parliament authorising its deployment, meaning that police forces are in effect, as my noble friend Lord Strasburger indicated, writing their own rules as they go. This technology represents a fundamental shift in the relationship between citizen and state. When LFR cameras are deployed, our public spaces become biometric checkpoints where every face is indiscriminately scanned. By treating every citizen as a suspect in a permanent digital line-up, we are abandoning the presumption of innocence. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, made that point very well. As a result, there is a clear issue of public trust.
Amendment 379 would prohibit the use of LFR during public assemblies or processions unless a specific code of practice has been formally approved by resolution of both Houses of Parliament. This is essential to protect our freedoms of expression and assembly under Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR. The pervasive tracking capability of LFR creates what the courts have recognised as a chilling effect, as described by my noble friend Lady Doocey and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. Law-abiding citizens are discouraged from attending protests or expressing dissenting views for fear of permanent state monitoring. We know that police forces have already used this technology to target peaceful protesters who were not wanted for any crime. People should not have to hand over their sensitive biometric data as the price of engaging in democratic processes. Without explicit parliamentary consent and an approved code of practice, we are sleepwalking into a surveillance state that bypasses democratic oversight entirely.
Amendment 471 would establish that LFR use in public spaces must be limited to narrowly defined serious cases—such as preventing major crimes or locating missing persons—and requires prior judicial authorisation specifying the scope and purpose of each deployment. The need for this oversight was made absolutely clear by the 2020 Court of Appeal ruling in R (Bridges) v Chief Constable of South Wales Police, which found LFR use unlawful due to fundamental deficiencies in the legal framework. The court identified that far too much discretion is left to individual officers regarding who ends up on a watchlist and where cameras are placed. We must replace operational discretion with judicial scrutiny.
The Government themselves now acknowledge the inadequacy of the current framework, which they describe as a “patchwork framework” and say it is
“complicated and difficult to understand”.
Well, that is at least some progress towards the Government acknowledging the situation. They say that the current framework does not provide sufficient confidence for expanded use—hear, hear. The former Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner made clear his concerns about the College of Policing guidance, questioning whether these fundamental issues require
“more than an authorised professional practice document from the College of Policing”
and instead demand parliamentary debate. The former commissioner raised a profound question:
“Is the status of the UK citizen shifting from our jealously guarded presumption of innocence to that of ‘suspected until we have proved our identity to the satisfaction of the examining officer’?”
Such a fundamental shift in the relationship between citizen and state cannot, and should not, be determined by guidance alone.
The College of Policing’s APP on LFR, while attempting to provide operational guidance, falls short of providing the robust legal framework that this technology demands. It remains non-statutory guidance that can be revised without parliamentary scrutiny, lacks enforceable standards for deployment decisions, provides insufficient detail on bias testing and mitigation requirements, and does not establish independent oversight mechanisms with real teeth.
Most critically, the guidance permits watch-list compilation based on subjective assessments without clear statutory criteria or independent review. This leaves fundamental decisions about who gets surveilled to operational discretion rather than judicial oversight. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, who was keen on one bit of our amendment but not the other, I say that this intelligence-led tool effectively delegates it to a senior police officer and they, in a sense, have a conflict of interest. They are the ones who make the operational decisions.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. It seems that he and his noble friends keep talking about the police and the restrictions which will be imposed on the police. But Amendment 471 seems to extend facial recognition to hundreds and hundreds of public authorities, provided they adhere to a code or comply with certain practices. Does he still stand by the idea that facial recognition should be extended to hundreds of public authorities, in addition to the police?
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
If the noble Lord accepts the fact that controls are required, which he did not in his earlier comments, I think he would be greatly reassured if you had to have judicial oversight of the use of live facial recognition, which is useful in circumstances other than purely policing. What we are talking about is a greater level of control over the deployment of live facial recognition. We can argue perfectly satisfactorily about whether or not it should be extended beyond the police, but we are suggesting that, alongside that greater deployment, or possible greater deployment, there should be a much greater degree of oversight. I think that effectively answers the noble Lord.
The Metropolitan Police’s own data from recent LFR operations shows a false alert rate requiring officers to make numerous stops of innocent people. Even with claimed accuracy improvements, when a system processes thousands of faces, even a small error translates to significant numbers of misidentifications affecting law-abiding citizens.
More concerning is the evidence on differential performance, and that is where I fundamentally agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. The National Physical Laboratory’s 2020 testing of facial recognition systems found significant variation in performance across demographic groups. While contemporary LFR systems used by UK police show better performance than earlier algorithms, independent research continues to identify measurable differences in accuracy rates across ethnicity and gender. The Court of Appeal in Bridges ruled that South Wales Police breached the public sector equality duty by failing to satisfy itself that the software was free from racial or gender bias, yet current deployment practices suggest insufficient progress in addressing these equality obligations.
We should also address the secrecy surrounding police watch-lists. The Justice and Home Affairs Committee of this House recommended that these lists be subject to compulsory statutory criteria and standardised training. There is no independent review of watch-list inclusion, no notification to those placed on lists and no clear route for challenge or removal.
I also very much appreciated what the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, had to say about the problems with software. But the chilling sentence he delivered was “Technology has to take over”. That is precisely the problem that we are living with. If technology is to take over, we need a legal framework to govern it. The current patchwork of overlapping laws addressing human rights, data protection and criminal justice is not fit for purpose.
These amendments provide the democratic and judicial guard-rails needed to contain this technology, and we cannot allow the convenience of new tools to erode our established civil liberties. Only Parliament should determine the framework for how LFR is used in our society, and only the courts should authorise its deployment in individual cases.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
Before the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, sits down, can he address an issue that none of us has addressed yet? These amendments concern the state’s use of facial recognition, for all the reasons that we have talked about. But the private sector is far in advance of this. Some 12 or 13 years ago, it was using a product called Facewatch, which was started at Gordon’s Wine Bar because Gordon was sick of people walking into the bar and either violently assaulting his patrons or stealing things. He put a clever camera on the door and patrons did not get into the bar if they had been accused of something in the past. That product has moved right around the world, and certainly it is extensively used in the UK in different settings.
I am not arguing that that is good or bad; I merely observe that, if we end up in a position where the police have less access to something that can be a good technology, and private commerce is getting benefits that presumably it is able to justify, that inequality of arms does not benefit anyone. It should at least be considered in the consultation that the Government started, which is particularly focused on the police. But as well as the police, we should consider airports, railway stations, et cetera.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
Very briefly, I do not think that the noble Lord is making a bad case at all. Live facial recognition, whether in the hands of the public sector or the private sector, needs a proper legal framework: there is no doubt about that. My noble friend made it clear that we believe it is a useful technology, but, the more useful it is, the more we need to make sure that it is under proper control.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, this group of amendments touches on how the police should deal with modern threats and how we balance civil liberties with the clear duty of the state to protect the public.
I listened very carefully to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, when she introduced her Amendment 379, which, as she said, would prevent the police using live facial recognition when imposing conditions on public processions or assemblies under the relevant provisions of the Public Order Act, unless and until a new statutory code of practice had been approved. If we accept—as we on these Benches and, I think, others in your Lordships’ House do—that live facial recognition can be a legitimate and valuable policing tool in preventing crime, identifying suspects and protecting the public, it is difficult to justify singling out its use in this specific context for an additional and likely onerous layer of bureaucracy. The police already operate within an extensive framework of legal safeguards, such as data protection law. To require a further code of practice, subject to affirmative approval by both Houses of Parliament, risks delaying or deterring the deployment of technology precisely where it may be most needed. So, regretfully, we cannot support the amendment.
Amendment 471, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, goes further in seeking to affect the Government’s ability to use live facial recognition technology. It would restrict the circumstances in which live facial recognition could be used; it would require prior judicial authorisation in the specific circumstances of its use; and it would create an extensive new enforcement and oversight architecture. Public order situations are often fast-moving and unpredictable. Senior officers must be able to make operational decisions quickly, based on risk and intelligence on the ground. Introducing additional procedural hurdles at the point of use risks undermining that agility. We should focus on rolling out effective technology at pace to combat crime and disorder, while ensuring robust safeguards and scrutiny.
In particular, the requirement for prior judicial authorisation is, in our view, particularly problematic. One of the principal advantages of live facial recognition is its speed and flexibility. It can be deployed rapidly in response to emerging intelligence, acute threats or serious risks to public safety, and requiring prior judicial approval risks rendering the technology ineffective in precisely the circumstances where it could prevent serious harm. In dynamic operational scenarios, such as events of violent disorder, knife crime hot spots or rapidly evolving threats, delay can mean failure.
I was particularly taken by the speech of my noble friend Lord Moynihan, who spoke about the position in New York, where, because of there being fewer police on the streets, the technology had to take over. He was right to say that.
We on these Benches are concerned by the attempt to narrow the scope of live facial recognition to a tightly defined set of purposes, because, if Parliament accepts the use of this technology in principle, it makes little sense to confine it to only a small number of scenarios. Crime does not present itself neatly within statutory categories. Policing requires judgment and discretion. Artificially restricting the use of a tool that has demonstrated value risks depriving the police of one of the most effective capabilities available to them.
We of course recognise the need for appropriate safeguards to be implemented in the use of this technology. This new and expanded use of people’s data, even if to facilitate an objective that we support, must be enacted with transparency and proportionality. But these amendments would constrain the police’s operations and weaken our ability to respond to modern threats. At a time when criminals are increasingly sophisticated and technologically adept, Parliament should be empowering the police to use lawful, proportionate and effective tools rather than tying their hands.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for tabling the amendments and starting this important debate. Facial recognition is an increasingly important tool that helps the police, and I am grateful for the support of the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra, Lord Cameron of Lochiel and Lord Hogan-Howe. I was particularly struck by the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, on gait and movement, which point to why this is valuable.
Currently, facial recognition technology is used to identify those suspected of committing crime, those who may be in breach of a court order and, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones said, those who are missing persons and could be found. To put some context to it, for example, there were 127 people arrested following the use of facial technology during the disturbances in the summer of 2024 around asylum protests. According to the Metropolitan Police’s figures, between January 2024 and September 2025, 1,300 people were arrested for offences including rape, robbery and GBH, and, in that period, 100 sex offenders were arrested for breaching their conditions: that is, going to an area where they should not have gone. That is quite a valuable action, tool and resource. But that does not mean—which goes to the heart of the amendment the noble Baroness moved—that the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, the noble Baroness herself and the Liberal Democrat Front Bench are not ones that need to be examined.
Noble Lords will be aware that, currently, the use of facial recognition technology is already subject to safeguards, including the Human Rights Act and Data Protection Act. The Government accept that there is a need to consider whether a bespoke legislative framework is needed. We need to get it right. We need to balance the need to protect communities from crime and disorder with the need to safeguard individual rights.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, will know, and as has been referenced in this debate, on 4 December, the Government launched a consultation: I have a copy available for the House. It is a 10-week consultation on a new framework for the enforcement of the use of facial recognition and similar technologies. The consultation explores when and how these technologies should be used, what safeguards are required to protect the issues that noble Lords and Baronesses have raised today and how to ensure that their use is proportionate to the seriousness of the harm being addressed.
I refer the Committee to page 5 of the summary to the consultation:
“The government is therefore committed to developing and introducing a new legal framework that sets out rules for the overt use of facial recognition by law enforcement organisations”.
That is a clear government objective. The consultation is about how we achieve that government objective. It runs until 12 February and I encourage all those who have spoken to submit their views.
I take Amendment 471 as a positive contribution to the consultation. Some aspects would cause difficulties, but it is a fair point to put to the Committee today. I hope noble Lords will accept that I cannot pre-empt the outcome of the consultation, which runs until 12 February. However, the clear objective, which I have read out, is to find the framework that noble Lords are seeking. We will need legislation to put in place the new legal framework, and that will come when parliamentary time allows.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
The Minister says that he cannot pre-empt the outcome of the consultation, but surely Clause 125 already pre-empts the outcome of the consultation.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I do not think that it does. We will leave it at that. There is a proper and full consultation document, a copy of which is, I am sure, available in the House for Members to look at.
I revert to my starting point. For the reasons that have been laid out by a number of Members in the Committee today, across the political divide and none, it is a valuable tool. Do the noble Lord and the noble Baroness who raised this have an objection to automatic number plate recognition? Under current regulations, every vehicle that goes past a camera at the side of the road is an “innocent” vehicle but some of those number plates will lead to crime being solved or individuals being caught. The principle is there. If they object to the principle then we will not find common ground on this. We need regulation—I have accepted that. We are bringing forward the consultation, but, ultimately it is a valuable tool to stop and prevent crime and to catch criminals.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
The Minister cannot compare cars with people—that is a completely false comparison. I do not know whether the Minister has been in a van with a camera looking at number plates. There is no mistaking number plates; there is a lot of mistaking human faces.
The Minister earlier used the word “proportionately”. There is a significant distinction between proportionately and expediently. The test for lawful interference with ECHR rights is proportionality rather than expediency. We have covered this before, but it has come up again now. Having expediency in the Bill gives police the powers beyond what is reasonable for human rights. We are not sitting here for hours into the night doing this for fun—we can all agree that this is not fun. We are doing this because we believe that the Bill is wrong.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am doing it because I believe that we need to catch criminals and reduce crime. That is a fair disagreement between us. That is why I am doing this Bill and that is what this Bill is about. We may disagree, but facial recognition technology is an important mechanism to prevent crime and to reduce crime. I can tell the noble Baroness that we have agreed to bring forward regulations and are consulting on what those will include. I hope she will submit some views. I remain convinced that the type of technology that we have is valid and useful.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
I do not normally disagree with the Minister, although we might be on different sides of an argument, but I found that last comment very bad. We are all on the same side—we all want to catch criminals and prevent crime. That needs to go on the record. From what he just said, it was almost as though he was suggesting that he is on the side of that but we are not. To make it clear, we are not sitting here for the sake of it; we are here because we genuinely believe in this and we want to catch criminals and prevent crime.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
Let us put out the hand of friendship and make common cause on those issues.
To respond to the noble Baroness’s amendment, I simply say that the consultation is there. Amendment 471 would go quite a long way beyond even that which the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, brought forward. I believe this to be a potential future crime-fighting tool. It needs regulation around it and that is what the Government are intending to do. We are very clear about that on page 5 of the consultation. How it is regulated and what is regulated, and how this is approached, is what the consultation is about, but I agree with the basic principle of the noble Baroness’s amendment. Therefore, I ask her to withdraw it.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
I would like that in writing.
I thank the Minister for his response and thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. The Minister mentioned the consultation, and I am pleased that the Government will legislate, but I hope Parliament will be very much involved, because, like anything, the devil will be in the detail. Whatever comes out of that will be very important.
Can the Minister tell me what happens if, in response to the consultation, the public say that they do not want the police to access particular databases? Will the Government then take those clauses out of the Bill? Perhaps he could just clarify that.
I have a concern that, even before the consultation began, the Home Office was saying that it hoped the process would pave the way for wider rollout. That does not really inspire confidence that Ministers are keeping an open mind. A consultation should not be used as a rubber stamp; it should be the start of a genuine national conversation about the limits that a free society wants to place on mass biometric data surveillance. For that conversation to mean anything, the public need to know the full picture, how accurate the systems are, and where and when they are being used. Right now, that transparency is not there.
We have heard that the Home Office thinks that:
“Any new laws informed by the consultation would take about two years to be passed by Parliament”.
That is far too slow, given the pace of technological change, and that comment was made in December 2025. All we are asking is that Parliament sets the rules before the technology sets them for us. I hope Parliament will be involved in setting those rules. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea
“Amendment to speech offences(1) The Malicious Communications Act 1988 is repealed.(2) Omit section 127 of the Communications Act 2003.(3) In the table in section 1(1) of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 (offences leading to penalties on the spot) omit the entry relating to section 127(2) of the Communications Act 2003.(4) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended as follows.(5) In section 4—(a) in subsection (1)(a) after “threatening” omit “, abusive or insulting”, and(b) in subsection (1)(b) after “threatening” omit “, abusive or insulting”.(6) Omit sections 4A and 5.(7) In section 6—(a) in subsection (3)—(i) after the first “threatening,” omit “abusive or insulting”,(ii) after the second “threatening” omit “, abusive or insulting”, and(b) omit subsection (4).(8) In section 18(1)—(a) after the first “threatening” omit “, abusive or insulting”, and(b) after the second “threatening” omit “, abusive or insulting”.(9) In section 19(1) after “threatening,” omit “abusive or insulting”.(10) In section 20(1) after “threatening,” omit “abusive or insulting”.(11) In section 21(1) after “threatening,” omit “abusive or insulting”.(12) In section 22(1) after “threatening,” omit “abusive or insulting”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would amend a number of different Acts to ensure that freedom of speech is protected, so that a person cannot be prosecuted for causing “anxiety” or for “insulting” another person.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)
My Lords, the amendments in this and the next group set out to remove criminalisation of elements of so-called hate crime on grounds that include incoherence, ineffectiveness and divisiveness. Anyone proposing an amendment of this sort risks being seen as favouring hate crime and hate speech, or of being careless or reckless about the real hurt that individuals at the receiving end of hate speech or hate crime might feel. The opposite is the case here. I vigorously oppose racism and any other form of discrimination, but I believe that the concept and the implementation of hate crime law are not just ineffective but counterproductive.
There are three types of hate crime law that I seek to amend in this and the following amendment: first, direct criminalisation of certain offensive words; secondly, an enhanced sentence when a crime is aggravated by directing certain offensive words towards individuals with certain protected characteristics; and thirdly, stirring up offences based on use of offensive words, behaviour or material so as to arouse hatred against an individual with certain protected characteristics. My first amendment would abolish the criminalisation of particular offensive words that are merely grossly offensive, while still leaving in place the sanctioning of any words that would cause or provoke actual violence or fear of violence.
In our national history, hate crime law is new. We got along perfectly well without it for many centuries until the Race Relations Act 1965 was passed to prevent race violence and discrimination. We have now gone a long way further than that first law, with hate crime legislation embedded in a number of different Acts, covering both deeds and thoughts, and going beyond race into a number of different protected characteristics, the most recent of these being transgender. Sometimes all that is needed for a conviction is if the victim or, indeed, any person takes offence, sometimes with no test of reasonableness. Many see this as having divided society into warring grievance groups.
These laws are not working. Unintended consequences roll in. Hard cases make bad law. Criminalise one obviously appalling thing and, by doing that, it is hard not to criminalise other not so appalling things—so Graham Linehan is arrested by five armed police at the airport. You get police incentivised to pursue soft targets for soft crimes. You get police encouraged into a Stasi mindset, telling ordinary citizens, “I need to check your thinking”. Have these laws created social cohesion? No. Antisemitism, for example, has suddenly become widespread in our country.
These laws are confusing. Late last year, the College of Policing issued guidance on female genital mutilation stating that trans women—which is to say men—whether holding a gender recognition certificate or not, are just as threatened by female genital mutilation as are women and girls. This was utterly absurd—but if you say it is wrong, you have to be prepared for possible investigation by well-meaning but improperly informed police.
These laws are cluttering up the justice system. I think noble Lords understand this, but I will talk about it in greater detail when I get to my second amendment later.
These laws are onerous on the innocent. It is difficult to exaggerate the devastating effect that an arrest and a subsequent multi-month legal process can have on a law-abiding citizen, even when, at the end of it, they are exonerated.
An overall hate narrative has spread across politics and society, with so many random accusations of hate speech or hate crime leading to controversy, or worse. Charlie Kirk was shot dead in America by someone who had been persuaded that Kirk had been hateful against the trans community. Last month, a teacher was referred to the national counterterror programme and forced out of his job after showing videos of Donald Trump to his sixth-form politics students.
These laws are crushing our country’s free speech tradition—the heartland of our national character and the driver of our national success over the centuries. In America, the First Amendment is:
“Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech”.
In our history, George Orwell is venerated for saying that free speech is worthless unless it extends to things that people do not want to hear. Lord Justice Sedley is venerated for saying:
“Free speech includes not only the inoffensive but the irritating, the contentious, the eccentric, the heretical, the unwelcome and the provocative provided it does not tend to promote violence. Freedom only to speak only inoffensively is not worth having”.
We revere Queen Elizabeth I for saying that she had no desire to look into a man’s soul, but now we have judges looking into men’s souls on a regular basis.
Along with the suppression of free speech, cancel culture has flourished. A woman in a Stoke-on-Trent focus group that I observed shocked me when she said to general agreement in the group, “Of course, none of us can say what we’re really thinking”. Freedom in the Arts ran a large UK survey in 2024-25 that found that 84% of artists said that they never, rarely, or only sometimes feel free to speak about their social or political opinions for fear of ostracism, bullying or loss of work. Until people can say what they are thinking—so long as, of course, they do not incite imminent violence—we do not have our traditionally free country.
Turning to the key provisions in my amendment, proposed new subsections (1), (2), (5), (6) and (8) to (12) would remove the criminalisation of specific offensive words. Proposed new subsection (1) would repeal the Malicious Communications Act 1988. A person can currently be sentenced under that Act to up to two years if they send a letter or electronic message that is either intended to “cause distress or anxiety” or employs “indecent or grossly offensive” words. A well-known report from Big Brother Watch found that, over a three-year period, there were more than 1,000 charges and more than 600 cautions under that Act.
Proposed new subsection (2) would omit Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003, which provides for jail for up to six months for sending a “grossly offensive” message, or a message that is
“of an indecent, obscene or menacing character”,
or knowingly sending a false message to cause
“annoyance, inconvenience or needless anxiety”.
The Big Brother Watch report showed nearly 3,000 charges and more than 1,000 cautions under Section 127. These various numbers have probably increased, not declined, since that report. A lad stupidly joked on Twitter that if Robin Hood Airport was not going to be open next week, he would blow it up. He was convicted under Section 127, and it took three appeals before that was overturned. The process was his punishment, for someone who was innocent. The Big Brother Watch report found at least 355 cases under these two Acts involving social media, with the rate increasing, not declining.
Proposed new subsection (5) would amend Section 4 of the Public Order Act 1986, which provides for up to six months for intending to make likely or cause someone to believe that “immediate unlawful violence” will take place when using
“threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour”
or distributing or displaying “threatening, abusive or insulting” signs. My amendment would leave “threatening” in place, but remove “abusive” and “insulting”. Threatening behaviour involving imminent unlawful violence should clearly be illegal, but surely that is enough.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 382F, an amendment that, carefully and proportionately, takes on tackling the problems of the ever-growing number of overlapping Acts and statutes that are used to limit free speech. If public order laws on protest are, to quote the Liberal Democrat Benches from the other day, a confused mess, the labyrinthine patchwork affecting free speech is an impenetrable quagmire. The noble Lord has done a real public service here by carefully going through how, inadvertently and often by mission creep, censorious laws undermine democratic speech rights and are actually damaging the UK’s reputation internationally.
I am not just talking about JD Vance or Elon Musk, who I have heard commented on in this House and dismissed sneeringly by many in Westminster as spreading just Trumpist misinformation or hyperbole. We need to recognise that even the bible of globalist liberalism, the Economist, no less, featured a cover last May proclaiming “Europe’s free-speech problem”, identified the UK as one of the most censorious on the continent and provided a lot of evidence. There has been lots of discussion all over the political spectrum in relation to the idea of 12,000 arrests a year, 30 a day, for speech offences that spring from laws that the amendment seeks to rein in, and for which this House is responsible. We are talking here about crime and policing, and the police are expected to treat speech offences as criminal acts and to police them.
Since the introduction of hate crime laws, which I remind the Committee is a relatively recent concept popularised from the mid-1980s, the legislative and regulatory implications of restricting hate and words that are said to have caused distress have proliferated, and it has grown into a real tangle of tripwires. In that tangle, many people in the police and the CPS, and even politicians, seem confused about what one can say legally and what is verboten.
I am sure that noble Lords will remember the extraordinary story of the Times Radio producer, Maxie Allen, and his partner, Rosalind Levine. They were the couple who were arrested by six uniformed officers, in front of their young children, for posting disparaging messages about their daughter’s school in a private WhatsApp group. It received a lot of publicity, and they have just been paid £20,000 for wrongful arrest, although they have not received an apology. What stood out for me about that story was that when the police officers went into her house, Ms Levine asked what malicious communication offence they were being accused of. The detective did not know, had to Google it and then read out what Google said. That strikes me as not healthy. We as legislators have a responsibility to tackle this. Too often, we just pass more and more laws, with more restrictions on freedom, and never stop to look at whether anything on the statute book can be repealed, streamlined or rolled back.
I commend the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, for his detailed, well-thought out and proportionate attempt at tackling the way the law has grown and the negative impact that is having on democratic free speech. I also want to commend him for his courage in taking on this issue. As we know, and he referred to this, if anyone takes on hate speech laws, you just think, “Oh, my goodness, he’s going to be accused of all sorts of things. He’s going to be accused of being a bigot. It’s a risk”, so when he told me he was doing this, I gulped. It is horrible to be accused of being a racist, a misogynist, homophobic, a hatemonger, or whatever, but that is the very point. Being accused of being pro-hate speech, if you oppose hate speech legislation, is itself silencing of a democratic discussion on laws and we as legislators should not be bullied or silenced in that way. Ironically, the best tool for any cultural shift in relation to prejudice, in my view, is free speech. To be able to take on bigotry, we need to be able to expose it, argue against it and use the disinfectant of free speech to get rid of the hate, whereas censorship via hate speech laws does not eliminate or defeat regressive ideas; it just drives them underground to fester unchallenged.
The noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, has laid out the key legal problems in his approach to this, especially in relation to the lack of precision in terminology used across speech-restricting laws. He has raised a lot of real food for thought. Perhaps I can add a concern from a slightly different perspective, to avoid repeating the points he has made. For me, there is another cost when law fails to clearly define concepts such as abusive or insulting words, grossly offensive speech, and what causes annoyance, inconvenience and needless anxiety—these things are littered all over the law. It is that the dangerously elastic framing of what speech constitutes harm or hate has been deeply regressive in its impact on our cultural norms. There has been a sort of cultural mission creep which has especially undermined the resilience of new generations of young people. The language of hate speech legislation now trips off the tongues of sixth-formers in schools and university campus activists. When they complain that they disagree with or are made to feel uncomfortable by a speaker or a lecturer and say that they should be banned for their views, they will cite things straight out of the law such as, “That lecturer has caused me harassment, alarm and distress”. Where did they get that from? They will say that those words are perceived as harmful and that if they heard them, it would trigger anxiety—even claiming post-traumatic stress disorder is fashionable. It is because we have socialised the young into the world of believing that speech is a danger to their mental well-being, which has cultivated a grievance victimhood. It is a sort of circular firing squad, because the young, who feel frightened by words which they have picked up and been imbued with from the way the law operates, then demand even more lawfare to protect themselves and their feelings from further distress. They are even encouraged to go round taking screenshots of private messages, which they take to the police, or they scroll through the social media of people they do not like to see whether there is anything they can use in the law.
The law has enabled the emergence of a thin-skinned approach to speech, and this has been institutionalised via our statute book. The police do not seem immune to such interpretations of harmful words, either, and I am afraid that this can cause them to weaponise the power they have through this muddle. It wastes police resources and energy, an issue very pertinent to this Bill.
I will finish with an example. In August 2023, an autistic 16 year-old girl was arrested for reportedly telling a female police officer that she looked like her lesbian nana. The teenager’s mother explained that this was a literal observation, in that the police officer looked like her grandmother, who is a lesbian. The officer understood it as homophobic abuse, so a Section 5 public order offence kicked in on the basis of causing “alarm or distress” by using abusive language. If you witness the film of the incident, seven police officers entered the teenage girl’s home, where she was hiding in the closet, screaming in fear and punching herself in the face. You may ask who was distressed in that instance. The girl was held in custody for 20 hours and ultimately no charges were brought. But we must ask whether the statute book has created such confused laws and encouraged police overreach, and whether it encouraged that young police officer, who heard someone say the words “lesbian nana”, to immediately think, “arrest her, hold her for 20 hours and say that she is causing distress”. What has happened to the instincts of a police officer when they think that this would be the answer?
Many people to whom I speak about the problem addressed by this amendment suggest that it has been overstated. They say that, yes, the police are a bit too promiscuous in arresting people, but the numbers charged and convicted are fairly stable. In fact, a journalist recently told me that in some instances they are going down. But as legislators, should we not query whether this implies that the laws are giving too much leeway to the police to follow up malicious, trivial and politicised complaints? This creates the chilling consequence of the notion of process as punishment: you might not be charged, but you are arrested, and law-abiding citizens are humiliated and embarrassed with the cops at the door. We must take this amendment very seriously, and I hope that the Minister will give us a positive response.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, it is a delight to listen to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, who hit the nail on the head: in fact, she hit many nails on the head, and I agree with everything she said.
I support Amendment 382F because it restores the proper boundary between criminal law and free expression. Criminal sanctions must be reserved for conduct that poses a real risk of harm, threats, menaces and conduct intended to intimidate, not for speech that merely offends or causes hurt feelings. Section 127 of the Communications Act and related provisions currently include abusive and insulting material, and even communication that causes “anxiety”—a formulation that has produced inconsistent enforcement and a chilling effect on legitimate debate.
Should I have reported my MS consultant when he told me the good news and the bad news? The good news was that he knew what it was, and the bad news was that it was MS. He wanted to check how spastic I was. That word, “spastic”, can sound like a terribly insulting term, but it was a medical reference to my condition. This morning, I got a text message reminder: “Your UCLH appointment with the spasticity walk-in clinic at Queen Square will take place early tomorrow morning”. We must make sure that we do not treat all words which may seem insulting as actually being so. The law should be precise and proportionate. Vague criminal offences that hinge on subjective reactions invite over-policing in online life and risk criminalising satire, political argument and robust journalism. Recent parliamentary analysis shows that arrests under communications offences have increased, while convictions have not kept pace, suggesting that resources are being spent on low-value prosecutions rather than on genuine threats to safety. Legal commentary also suggests the difficulties courts face in applying terms like “grossly offensive” and “insulting”, and that undermines predictability and fairness.
This amendment would not leave victims without recourse. Civil remedies, harassment injunctions, platform moderation and targeted civil criminal offences for stalking, doxing and credible threats remain available and should be strengthened. That combination protects vulnerable people while ensuring that criminal law is not used as a blunt instrument against free expression.
Of course, there are trade-offs. Decriminalising insults means some distress will no longer attract criminal penalties, but the correct response is not to expand criminal law; it is to improve support for civil remedies and focus policing on genuine threats. That approach better protects both free speech and personal safety.
For these reasons, I urge the Minister to support Amendment 382F in order to defend free expression, sharpen the law so that it targets real harm, and ensure that our criminal justice system focuses on threats that endanger people rather than on words that merely offend them.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
My Lords, I support the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. I declare my interest as the director of the Free Speech Union.
The strongest argument for repealing the Malicious Communications Act and Section 127 of the Communications Act is that these laws were made during an analogue era and are clearly not fit for purpose during our current digital era. That is one reason why the Law Commission of England and Wales, in its 2021 report on which communications laws should be reformed, recommended that both the Malicious Communications Act and Section 127 of the Communications Act be repealed.
That has not happened, but a good illustration of just how unfit these two laws are was alluded to by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. The Times submitted FOI requests to all 43 police forces in England and Wales, asking them how many arrests were made in England and Wales in 2023 and in previous years for online offences under the Malicious Communications Act and Section 127 of the Communications Act. Of the 43 police forces, 37 responded to the FOI request. In just those 37 police forces, in 2023 12,183 people were arrested on suspicion of having committed just one of these two offences through something they had said online. That is a huge increase on the number of people arrested in 2018—just 5,502—on suspicion of committing these two offences for things they posted online. The figure more than quadrupled in a five-year period. That boils down to 33 people being arrested every day in 2023 on suspicion of having committed just one of these two offences under the Malicious Communications Act and Section 127 of the Communications Act.
That happened because of the explosion of speech which is supposedly offensive, annoying, distressing, alarming or indecent, et cetera, online on social media. This is something the framers of these laws could not possibly have anticipated, and it is causing the police to waste a colossal amount of time. In addition, the number of people who were charged—bear in mind that 12,183 people were arrested—was 1,119. The police are clearly being overzealous in responding to complaints about supposed offences under these two laws relating to things people have said online.
Another index of just how much time is being wasted is that many of the people who are not charged end up having the episode recorded as a non-crime hate incident. The Free Speech Union has estimated that, as best we can tell, something like a quarter of a million non-crime hate incidents have been recorded since the concept was introduced by the College of Policing in 2014—and that is in England and Wales alone. That is an average of around 65 a day.
One reason so many NCHIs are being recorded is that, when the police arrest someone under suspicion of having committed an offence under the Malicious Communications Act or Section 127 of the Communications Act and conclude that in fact no offence has been committed, the incident is recorded as an NCHI. As I have said before in this House, one of the penalties for having an NCHI recorded against your name is that it can show up in enhanced criminal record checks when you apply for a job as a teacher or a carer or try to volunteer for a charity such as the Samaritans. According to Policy Exchange, in a report published last year, police in the UK as a whole are spending 6,000 hours a year investigating episodes and incidents that turn out to be NCHIs and are recorded as such. That is a strong argument for repealing the Malicious Communications Act and Section 127 of the Communications Act.
I will give two examples, from the FSU’s case files, of just how absurd the police’s overzealous policing of social media has become. We went to bat for one of our members, Julian Foulkes, a former special constable in Kent. He said in a spat online with a pro-Palestinian activist that some of the pro-Palestinian marchers were once step away from heading to Heathrow and stopping people disembarking from flights from Israel. That person complained, as I understand it, and six police officers—six—turned up at Julian Foulkes’s home, arrested him, took him down to the station and would not release him until he had agreed to accept a caution. With our help, he got that caution expunged and went on to sue the police for wrongful arrest. He was given £20,000 in compensation and got an apology from the chief constable of the police force concerned. That is a good example of the kind of time-wasting that the police are being led into because of the difficulty of enforcing these analogue laws in a digital era.
The second example is Maxie Allen and Rosalind Levine, the parents of two daughters, who were arrested, again by six police officers, in front of their youngest daughter because of things they had said in a WhatsApp group that parents at their daughter’s school were members of and something they had said in an email to the head teacher of their daughter’s school. It is incredible that the police thought that six police officers were needed to take these parents into custody. Julian Foulkes was under suspicion of having committed an offence under the Malicious Communications Act. In their case, they were under suspicion of having committed an offence under Section 127 of the Communications Act. Again, in due course, no further action was taken. We helped them sue the police for wrongful arrest and they too were given compensation of £20,000.
Be in no doubt that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and my noble friend Lord Moynihan are correct when they say that the process is the punishment. Even though no action was taken and no prosecutions were made in those two cases, Julian Foulkes and those parents were caused huge anxiety and distress by what they went through before the police decided to take no further action. That is a strong case for following the Law Commission of England and Wales’s advice and repealing the Malicious Communications Act and Section 127 of the Communications Act.
Briefly, I absolutely agree with the proposal in the amendment to remove the word “insulting” from the sections of the Public Order Act in which it remains. Noble Lords will not need reminding that the word “insulting” was removed from some sections of the Public Order Act, specifically Section 5 and related provisions, by the Crime and Courts Act 2013, following a campaign by Rowan Atkinson and others which pointed out how absurd it was to criminalise insulting. In one case, a young man was arrested for insulting a police officer’s horse, as noble Lords may recall. It was an effective campaign and it resulted in the word “insulting” being removed from Section 5, but it remains in many other parts of the Public Order Act. To my mind, the same arguments forcefully made by Rowan Atkinson and others at the time for removing the word “insulting” from Section 5 equally apply to the other sections of the Public Order Act where it remains. Just as we do not have a right not to be offended, we do not have a right not to be insulted.
I close with a quote from JS Mill, which I believe is from On Liberty. Mill warned that the criminal proscription of uncivil language is intrinsically likely to protect the holders of received opinion at the expense of dissidents. He wrote:
“With regard to what is commonly meant by intemperate discussion, namely invective, sarcasm, personality, and the like”—
we could add the word “insulting” to that list—
“the denunciation of these weapons would deserve more sympathy if it were ever proposed to interdict them equally to both sides; but it is only desired to restrain the employment of them against the prevailing opinion: against the unprevailing they may not only be used without general disapproval, but will be likely to obtain for him who uses them the praise of honest zeal and righteous indignation”.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, on his courage in raising these issues. I am going to say little more than that, other than that I was instrumental in getting a sentence added to the code of conduct for members of the Liberal Democrats, which says that no one has the right to not be offended.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, set out the principles that he believes are important to secure freedom of speech by removing the words “abusive or insulting” from a number of pieces of legislation. From these Benches, we absolutely accept freedom of speech. But I want to pick up on the point that the noble Lord, Lord Young, made when he quoted John Stuart Mill. There is a second half to the sentence about the right to free speech. Mill says that
“the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others”.
It is on preventing harm to others that this entire debate is balanced.
I am sure that there are many justifications for feeling that freedom of speech is being curtailed for people who just want to express their opinion. But the reason that we have the laws we do at the moment, particularly since the 1950s, is due to the harm that has been done to others. I think there was reference made earlier to the Race Relations Act of 60 years ago; that was in the consequence of very overt racial harm done to entire communities in our society. John Stuart Mill would have absolutely supported that legislation to protect. That is what the balance is between our freedom of speech and our responsibility as parliamentarians to protect those, particularly the most vulnerable, in our society.
That is why I want to go back briefly—not quite as far back as the Race Relations Act 1965—to when the original provisions on hate crimes were first introduced by the Blair Government in 1998. There is no doubt that this was partly in response to growing concerns relating to the ineffective policing of and legal responses to racist violence, which, again, was then very evident on our streets. The noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, and her family had campaigned for this more robust legislative framework, and not just because it was much clearer that, as a society, we did not and should not accept hate-motivated crimes, especially towards particular communities and those with protected characteristics.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
Before the noble Baroness finishes, I did not want to interrupt what I thought was a very helpful contribution that laid out the kind of dilemmas that we face, but I will just ask for a couple of points of clarification to see where we might agree or disagree. In relation to John Stuart Mill’s harm principle, does she recognise that the concept of harm has now become so broad—in terms of psychological harm, for example—that it has become possible to say that any speech is harmful, and that this has led to the mess that we are in? There is physical harm, as opposed to, “I think that speech is harmful”. Anytime I have been cancelled from speaking, it was on the basis that I would cause harm to the students or pupils. It is a concept of me turning up with a baseball bat, about to do some harm to them, whereas actually they were anticipating, ahead of me speaking on issues usually related to free speech, that I would harm them psychologically and they would be damaged. Is that not a problem for legislators in the context of this amendment? Secondly—
Lord Katz (Lab)
I remind the noble Baroness that while she is able to ask questions for clarification, interventions are meant to be brief and I urge some brevity, given the progress we have made in Committee so far this afternoon.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
I will ask this very briefly, then. Is there a problem that young people and the police do not appear to be able to distinguish between microaggressions and genocide? Is it one line?
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for her intervention and her questions. I say, with great courtesy to the Government Whip, that her first question does not relate to the amendment because it is not about an offence. She was talking about the pre-banning of people and asking whether harm is so broad. However, that is a debate we need to have as society.
That leads into the noble Baroness’s second question about whether young people can distinguish. I think young people can distinguish. Part of the issue is that we as an older generation do not understand that a lot of them take a great deal of care about their colleagues because they have been brought up in a society with the rules, as opposed to having to introduce them, and they have seen exactly the concerns that I was raising. We need to continue to debate this but, bringing it back to this amendment, the point is that none of those issues is about offences.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for this interesting debate. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea for moving Amendment 382F, which I support. Although it ranges across several statutes, it is in truth a coherent proposal with a clear constitutional purpose: to restore the proper limits of the criminal law so that freedom of speech is protected, while of course ensuring that genuinely threatening conduct remains criminal.
At the outset, I recognise the political sensitivity of this area. Any proposal to amend or repeal so-called hate speech provisions risks being misrepresented as indifference to racism, misogyny, homophobia or other forms of discrimination. Let me be absolutely clear: that is not the motivation behind this amendment. As my noble friend said, we on this side of the House oppose racism and discrimination in all their forms. The case for this amendment is not moral indifference but legal realism. The current framework has proved incoherent, ineffective and, in some respects, actively counterproductive.
As my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea most ably set out, the current legislative framework dealing with offensive language, hate speech and the like is a messy, tangled web of patchwork offences. We have the Malicious Communications Act 1988, Sections 4A and 5 and Parts III and 3A of the Public Order Act 1986, and Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003. These provisions criminalise speech not because it threatens direct harm but because it is deemed “abusive” or “insulting” or said to cause a person “needless anxiety”.
I am not ignorant to the fact that we have had laws in this country prohibiting the usage of threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour for almost a century. Section 5 of the Public Order Act 1936, now repealed, stated:
“Any person who in any public place or at any public meeting uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned, shall be guilty of an offence”.
But there are two crucial differences between that legislation and this. The 1936 Act was set against the background of rising fascist paramilitaries, first in Italy and then in Germany and, indeed, in Britain. Secondly, use of the language
“with intent to provoke a breach of the peace”
is very different from outlawing insulting language likely to cause a person “needless anxiety”. I think even a child could understand the difference between inciting a riot and causing a person mild offence.
Yet this is where we are. A person can claim to have been caused “annoyance” or even “inconvenience”, complain to the police and have another individual investigated and potentially arrested. That is not hyperbole; it is the truth. There is a litany of recent examples that we could trawl through, but many have been mentioned by noble Lords today so I will mention only a few, as briefly as I can.
As we have heard, the Malicious Communications Act 1988 was used to arrest Maxie Allen and Rosalind Levine, the two parents who have been referred to. The same Act was used to arrest a 17 year-old boy for comments he posted on Tom Daley’s Twitter account:
“You let your dad down i hope you know that”.
While this is obviously poor behaviour, to claim it should be a matter for the law and constitutes criminality is deeply concerning. Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003 was used to prosecute a person who posted a picture online with a phallus drawn on it; Jordan Barrack was ordered to pay £400 in compensation for a post that did not cause any harm to anyone. Again, how this case ended up as a matter for the authorities is beyond me.
Of fundamental importance is the fact that the terms we are dealing with here are not precise legal concepts. They are elastic, subjective and dependent on perception rather than consequence. The result is uncertainty for the public, inconsistency in enforcement and an unhealthy transfer of quasi-judicial discretion to individual police officers who have recently taken to very liberal and, indeed, unequal enforcement of these laws.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, for the way in which he put his arguments. I fully accept his contention that they are not designed to include his belief in racism or discrimination and the fair and open way in which he made his points. The same comments apply to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra and Lord Young of Acton. I understand their motivation and where they are coming from, but I have to say straightaway to the Committee that I do not agree with the direction of travel. We will resist it and I will explain why in my comments.
Before I do so, let me say that—and I hope this is helpful for the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton—on the issues he raised around non-crime hate incidents, we are going to come to those in a later debate on Amendment 416E. The College of Policing is producing a report and review, chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Herbert, as the chair of the College of Policing. I commit to the Committee that that review will come forward before Report on this Bill, and we intend to look at it as a Government and respond to it. The points that the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, mentioned are probably more relevant when we have the debate on Amendment 416E, if he accepts my comments. We will revisit that in due course.
Amendment 382F proposes to repeal to the Malicious Communications Act 1988 and make significant changes to the Communications Act 2003 and the Public Order Act 1986. I understand the motivation for the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, to bring them forward, but they include removing key provisions that have been in place for many years, were passed under different Governments of political complexity and have been consistently applied in case law.
The terms the noble Lord seeks to omit from the Public Order Act 1986 are understood by the police and the CPS, and there is case law interpreted by the courts. These provisions provide police with proportionate tools to manage low-level public disorder and protect the public from threatening or abusive behaviour, as well from those who seek to stir up racial hatred. The existing legal framework already ensures that enforcement decisions are made proportionately and in line with human rights obligations, including the right to freedom of expression.
I emphasise to the Committee that the personal example cited by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, shows that these laws are here for a purpose. Her comments have highlighted the question: how would each of us like to be on the receiving end of an abusive or insulting comment or phrase about a personal characteristic of our lives that we cannot change? Attack me for my politics by all means, because that is the view I have taken, but attacking individuals, or showing insulting or offensive behaviour towards individuals for characteristics they cannot change, is a step that we need to consider very carefully.
Let us look at what Amendment 382F from the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, seeks to remove. The amendment would repeal the Malicious Communications Act 1988, including the offence of sending a
“letter, electronic communication or article”
to someone
“which is indecent or grossly offensive”,
if the purpose of sending it is to
“cause distress or anxiety to the recipient”.
That is quite a heavy protection for people that the noble Lord is seeking to remove.
The amendment also seeks to remove Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003, including the offence of sending, or causing to be sent,
“by means of a public electronic communications network a message or other matter that is grossly offensive … indecent, obscene or menacing”.
Again, those protections are included in the 2003 Act to protect individuals from grossly offensive, obscene, indecent or menacing communication, yet the noble Lord seeks to remove that today, for the reasons he outlined to the Committee.
The amendment also seeks to repeal Sections 4A and 5 of the Public Order Act 1986, including the offences of causing:
“Intentional harassment, alarm, or distress”,
or harassment, alarm or distress without intent. The amendment would remove, from the same Act, “abusive or insulting” from the following offences:
“Fear or provocation of violence … Use of words or behaviour … written … to stir up racial hatred … Publishing or distributing written material … to stir up racial hatred”,
and public performances of a play intended to stir up racial hatred. I want to protect free speech—protecting free speech is absolutely right—but we also have to protect the rights of individuals to enjoy a life free from “grossly offensive” insults, “intentional harassment”, and “abusive or insulting” material.
The noble Lord seeks to repeal “abusive or insulting” from Section 21 of the Public Order Act:
“Distributing … or playing a recording … to stir up racial hatred”.
The amendment, it appears, intends to strengthen protections for free speech. I understand where the noble Lord wishes to come from on that—that is a fair and open debate between us—but it does so by decriminalising behaviour that is, in the law and under all those Acts, “abusive and insulting”. I am sorry, in this Committee I am not going to accept that approach on behalf of the Government.
As we know, we will have the review from the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, who will look at the wider issues of hate crime legislation and the independent review of public order. I take the strictures of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, that we cannot stick everything into the review, but we also have the review from the College of Policing—which I will refer to again; I have already done so in response to the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton—which is looking at those issues.
I still think, given what the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, said, that there is a basic floor from which society needs to protect individuals from abuse and insulting behaviour. The existing offences are not just used to put that floor in place; they are also used—this is a really important point which I hope the noble Lord will accept—to ensure that the police have the ability to intervene early in public order situations where they could support the protection of vulnerable people, who may be alarmed by abusive or insulting conduct, which has a disproportionate impact. The existing offences are used to manage public order and racial hatred and provide the police with proportionate tools to respond to a range of behaviours.
The offence thresholds should not and do not interfere with free speech. The review is going to conclude very shortly and the Government will consider and respond to those recommendations afterwards.
I simply say to the noble Lord that I hope that he thinks very carefully—as I know he has already; I do not want to be patronising—about the content of the debate we have had today, the comments that I have put to him about why those legislation aspects have been passed by a Thatcher Government and a Blair Government, and why there is a need to protect individuals, along the lines of the experience of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, which she mentioned. They are there for a purpose and I believe that the Committee should ask the noble Lord, having heard the debate, to withdraw his amendment and, I hope, not visit it on Report.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)
I thank noble Lords for what I hope everybody felt was a stimulating and useful debate, with a great number of differing views expressed by different noble Lords. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for her eloquent support of the amendment. It was so depressing to hear her point out that we, the original home of free speech, are now seen around the world as one of the worst countries in suppressing it.
My noble friend Lord Blencathra presented the case for the amendment rather more eloquently than I was able to and, equally, with eloquent personal experience, which I felt was interesting, as indeed—I will talk about this in a minute—did the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. My noble friend Lord Young, again in far more eloquent terms than I, gave stark evidence of the dysfunctionality of the law, with the huge numbers of interventions by the police. Some 12,183 arrests was one statistic he quoted, in one year alone for just one act.
I add to the various mentions of where the police were forced to pay £10,000 or £20,000 in compensation that we should remember that that is not police money; it is our money. I would rather like to see that money spent in better ways and police time to be spent in better ways.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, for his brief intervention and move on to the very affecting speech from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. She was talking about how hate material should be legislated against. I will address that in the next amendment, which comes immediately after this. By the way, I can assure her that I played no part in the degrouping of my amendments from those of my noble friend Lord Young. I was deeply sorry to hear of that awful and appalling incident that the noble Baroness had to suffer at the railway station. I entirely agree that the people there should have intervened and supported her. It must have been just dreadful to have been sitting there with no support—until, of course, after the event, when there was plenty of it.
The noble Baroness may want to look at Hansard tomorrow, but my amendment would leave in place the ability of the police to go after that dreadful person who abused her because she was threatening imminent violence with that kick. Whether it was accurately placed or not, that was violence. I agree with that law, which should have gone after her. Facial recognition might have helped.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
The issue we are trying to get to is where the boundary is between free speech and abusive behaviour. The police would have had problems saying that it was threatening if she said, “Oh, I was just dancing around the chair”. This is what they explained to me at the time. The issue that protected me was that she was abusive and insulting, and they could record it. Had they been able to find her, they could have checked to see whether it had happened elsewhere, which they thought would have been likely. That moves into the area of the next group, so I will not talk any further, but I am very grateful to the noble Lord for raising that.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)
I thank the noble Baroness for that explanation. She clearly demarcated our difference in view as to where the line should be drawn. I suggest to noble Lords that it is important to draw the line at the threat of imminent violence. That has been a principle in the past, but it has been breached by recent laws and actions by the police.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies, kindly supported this amendment—
Lord Katz (Lab)
I hate to interrupt the noble Lord’s flow, but I thought this an apposite time to point out that Members should normally be brief when pressing or withdrawing an amendment. The Companion is clear that you do not have to respond to all points raised in the debate. We are now over five minutes. I urge the noble Lord to conclude his remarks.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)
I remember the noble Lord, Lord Katz, taking almost 30 minutes the night before last when he had a time limit of 20 minutes. His remarks were so interesting that I did not feel like repining. I certainly would have finished by now had there not been interventions.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for kindly and eloquently supporting my views and turn finally to the Minister who, although speaking as always in the kindliest way, gave a most disappointing reply. I hope that, after the debate on the next amendment, he might reconsider. I was surprised that he still supported criminalisation of offending feelings after such a comprehensive listing by many speakers of the problems created by that in the various laws. I will talk more on this on the next amendment. In the meantime, and for now, I beg leave to withdraw this amendment.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea
“Abolition of hate crime and offences related to hate(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) and (3).(2) In the long title, omit “to control the stirring up of racial hatred;”.(3) Part III and Part 3A are repealed.(4) The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 is amended in accordance with subsections (5) and (6).(5) In the long title, omit “to create certain racially aggravated offences;”.(6) Omit sections 28 to 33.(7) In the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, omit section 39.(8) The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 is repealed.(9) In the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, omit section 74 and Schedule 16.(10) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows.(11) Omit section 66.(12) In section 160(1), in the table, omit the entry relating to “section 25 or 29I of the Public Order Act 1986”.(13) In Schedule 18, omit paragraph 22.(14) In Schedule 21, in paragraph 3 omit—(a) sub-paragraph (2)(g) and (2)(h), and(b) sub-paragraph (3).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would abolish all classes of “hate crime”, aggravating factors based upon “hate” and stand-alone offences relating to “hate”.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)
My Lords, my prior amendment would have removed criminalisation of offensive speech. This second amendment would remove criminalisation of hate as a motive. Mostly this relates to where, if a particular kind of hate directed at particular protected characteristics is proved to be involved, then the crime is considered to be aggravated and so the sentence is then increased. It also includes crimes associated with the stirring up of hatred.
Enhancing a convicted person’s sentence to an aggravated offence is a peculiar idea. In his latest Netflix special, which I am quite sure that most noble Lords have watched at least once, the comedian Ricky Gervais directly mocks this law—to loud audience applause. Recognition of the foolishness of the idea has now spread into popular culture. If I kick someone to the ground—I am not very good at fighting so I probably would not, but if I did—either for no reason or, let us say, because I hated their ginger hair, and I caused them grievous damage, I would go to jail for five years. But if I did exactly the same because I hated their sexual orientation or some other protected characteristic, that could be 10 years. Ricky Gervais pointed out that this implies that motiveless crime or a crime motivated by hate against a non-protected characteristic is not as bad as the same crime where there is hatred against a particular protected characteristic. I find that nonsensical and so did he. As he said to applause, “It’s a crime. Punish the crime”.
Prosecution would certainly be far simpler and investigations far more straightforward if we just addressed the crime and not the thoughts behind it. The whole idea of punishing thought is what used to be described as happening in a totalitarian state: thought crime. Stirring up violence directly should, of course, be criminalised, but criminalising the stirring up of hatred towards people with protected characteristics falls foul of free speech concerns in two different ways. First, it criminalises someone’s words by proving an intent to stir up based on the individual’s protected characteristics, which is very hard to discern. Secondly, it criminalises the stirring up of certain, specified thoughts about people with those protected characteristics in other people’s minds, which is equally hard to discern.
Note that the current popularity of the TV series “The Traitors” is precisely because of how impossible it is to detect another’s hidden thoughts. If those clever people on TV cannot do it, what chance has a court? It would be far better to criminalise just the stirring up of violence: after all, if violence is stirred up, a conviction occurs, so no further prosecution is necessary; if no violence is stirred up, given the concerns that will be raised about free speech and the like, why criminalise the words?
The key provisions in this amendment are, first, to repeal or omit Parts III and 3A of the Public Order Act 1986, which increase the imprisonment term to up to seven years when, in addition to the original crime, there is also the intentional stirring up of hate or likelihood that hate will be stirred up based on race, religion or sexual orientation—not disability, interestingly enough, as the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, will note. Secondly, it would omit Sections 28 to 33 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which increase the imprisonment term to up to 14 years when an assault, criminal damage, public order offences or harassment are “racially or religiously aggravated”. Thirdly, it would omit Section 66 of the Sentencing Code, which increases sentences for certain crimes where there is, in addition, hostility to actual or presumed racial, religious, disability, sexual orientation or transgender characteristics. Stirring up, intentional or otherwise, is considered an aggravator that leads to higher sentences, although there is a somewhat ambiguous partial get-out for religious hostility.
I will not repeat the points that I made in my speech on the previous amendment about the multiple ways in which these laws fail to work, but I promised then to talk in particular in the speech on this amendment about the way in which hate crime law is clogging up the judicial system—so here goes. First, police forces are wasting thousands of hours on investigating hate crime allegations. As my noble friend Lord Young of Acton pointed out, dozens are arrested every day for online posts. Around 140,000 hate crimes are recorded annually across race, sexual orientation, religion, disability and transgender issues.
The police are now being sued for wrongful arrest by, among many, Graham Linehan. The noble Baroness, Lady Nicholson, has alleged that, in that case, the police were manipulated into the arrest by a transgender former police constable who had been dismissed for gross misconduct some time before.
A general public perception now arises that phone theft is downplayed, shoplifting ignored, and carjacking, burglaries and sexual offences all have less time spent on them than if the police could focus on them rather than being distracted by their pursuit of hate crime.
Secondly, the Crown Prosecution Service is flummoxed by what the law actually says. Isabel Vaughan-Spruce has been left in legal limbo for almost a year after being arrested for standing in silence in an abortion buffer zone, with the CPS still unable to decide whether she should be prosecuted. She has already received five-figure payouts from the police—as I mentioned, that is our money—for previous unlawful arrests, but, again, the year-long process is her punishment. The Koran burner’s violent knife attacker was given only a suspended sentence, yet the CPS is still seeking to convict the Koran burner himself of a criminal offence using the violence of his attacker as proof that the Koran burning stirred up disorder. This is a blasphemy law in all but name.
The Law Lord Jonathan Sumption has pointed out that the CPS has issued official advice that hatred can include “ill-will”, or ill feeling,
“spite, contempt, prejudice, unfriendliness”—
so now we have compelled friendliness—and
“antagonism, resentment and dislike”.
The CPS showed its advanced level of confusion by advising that:
“Evidence of … hostility is not required for an incident or crime to be recorded as a hate crime or hate incident”.
It has now withdrawn that last piece of advice, but not before sowing much confusion. We cannot blame the CPS too much; the legislation is, overall, a dog’s dinner.
The list of hate words in the actual legislation is long, including anxiety, insulting, distress, harassment, alarm, threatening, annoyance, inconvenience and abusive. In some of the hate crime laws, only one or two of these words appear; in others, up to five appear, but never the full nine words in any of the legislation. The word “distress” happens to be the most favoured in the legislation, appearing in seven out of the 11 laws. Poor old “annoyance” appears in only one of these laws. As for the five protected characteristics that are mentioned in the various laws, again, it is an incoherent mishmash. Some hate laws mention only one protected characteristic, while only the Sentencing Code mentions all of them. “Transgender” appears the least frequently.
We could, with difficulty, make an attempt to help the CPS by clearing all of this up, but we could also sort out the problem much more easily by abandoning the whole hate crime approach, focusing on the deed rather than the thought in what we prosecute.
Thirdly, the courts are burdened. The Government are proposing to abolish many jury trials because the courts are overworked. If we got rid of hate crime laws, is that not a better way to free up court time? Because of the ambiguity in the law, it is a postcode lottery at the courts, with acquittals on the silent prayer issue in Birmingham but convictions in Bournemouth.
Fourthly, the prisons are overburdened. I estimate that there are just a few hundred, very likely fewer, hate crime offenders currently imprisoned. But given the recent reports of a crime wave due to violent prisoners having been released early, surely every single freed-up prison place that could come from the abolition of these laws should count as a blessing.
I had almost forgotten to include the Probation Service, but was handily reminded that it is burdened as well by a newspaper article today revealing that Lucy Connolly—I do not think I need to say who she is—has been told by her probation officer that she was risking being sent back to jail, after spending around a year there for a tweet, after some random, unknown member of the public complained that they were offended and that she was inciting violence because she had retweeted a meme suggesting that Donald Trump should send troops to kidnap Keir Starmer. As far as I know, there are quite possibly some Labour Peers and MPs who share her sentiment, but, even if they express that sentiment in public, I would argue that they should definitely not go to jail for doing that. It is yet another example of the metastasis of these hate laws and a waste of probation officers’ time.
All these problems could be resolved were we to cut out or severely cut back on this large and recently introduced body of hate crime law. I urge noble Lords to embrace the benefits of cleaning up and slimming down our criminal law, focusing better on the real physical and cybercrime that besets our country at this time, which in many cases goes unpursued and unpunished because there are not enough judicial resources to pursue those crimes vigorously enough. To that end, I beg to move this amendment.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I apologise, but it is the return of the double act.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, for tabling this amendment and for his excellent explanation of it. If the previous group was tricky then, yikes, getting rid of hate crime has me asking what I am doing here. I am going to carry on regardless and try to unpack why I think this is so important.
One thing that I am very aware of is that the accusation of hate crime or hate speech in any way can make you stutter and stammer and look the other way. The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, told of the abuse that she received and how everybody stayed quiet until the incident was over and then rushed up to her. That reminded me of what it feels like at the moment to have unpopular views. Very often, you are attacked, and then people will come up to you afterwards, squeeze your arm and whisper, “I agree with what you said”, but they do not say it out loud. There are an awful lot of people who look away because they are frightened that they will be accused of supporting hate.
The best example, and one that this House has discussed endlessly, is the consequences for the thousands of young women in towns throughout the land who were abused, raped and sexually assaulted because people in official positions—social workers, teachers and people who knew that young women were being abused in that way—were frightened that, if they complained, they would be accused of Islamophobic racist hate. And so they were quiet. The report by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, makes that clear, as does all the other discussion on that question. In other words, this one is difficult, but we have got to keep going.
What is a hate crime? For the purposes of legislators, Lord Sumption, who has already been quoted, explains it this way:
“The Crown Prosecution Service and the police have agreed to define a hate crime as anything which is perceived by the victim or anyone else to be motivated by hostility or prejudice. In other words, the definition which they use is subjective. If the complainant thinks it is a hate crime, then it is a hate crime”.
That is extraordinarily dangerous, as it inevitably makes it impossible to deny the charge, to say, “I am not a hate criminal, and what I have just said is not a crime”. You have no defence, but it empowers a complainant as a victim who cannot be challenged. It has been proven that this is incredibly divisive in society. It incites people to adopt a victim label. In a period of identity politics and protected characteristics, it undermines equality before the law.
In reference to something else that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, said, in the 1980s, I was active in anti-racist politics. We sought equality before the law rather than discrimination, and made an argument focusing not so much on words but on making sure that people were treated equally, not spoken to nicely in different terms—although that was a bit of an argument, it was never something that was demanded by those of us involved in those fights.
Ironically, the aim of hate speech laws for many people is to create a kinder and nicer society, but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who is not in her place, reminded us at Second Reading, and I am paraphrasing here, certain legislation in the early 1990s raised public expectations that Governments could legislate their way to a harmonious society and eradicate an emotion like hate. Indeed, that is a theme that the Economist feature that I mentioned earlier picks up. It says:
“The aim of hate-speech laws is to promote social harmony. Yet there is scant evidence that they work. Suppressing speech with the threat of prosecution appears to foster division … When the law forbids giving offence, it also creates an incentive for people to claim to be offended, thereby using the police to silence a critic or settle a score with a neighbour. When some groups are protected by hate-speech laws … others … demand protection, too. Thus, the effort to stamp out hurtful words can create a ‘taboo ratchet’, with more and more areas deemed off-limits. Before long, this hampers public debate. It is hard to have an open, frank exchange about”
controversial issues such as
“immigration, say, if one side fears that expressing its views will invite a visit from the police”.
That is really what the amendment is getting at. Removing hate crime from the statute books would not mean living in a hateful society. Hate crime on the statute books actually encourages people to be divisively, toxically antagonistic to each other.
On aggravated offences—the idea that you get a longer sentence if it is alleged that you are motivated by hate and the concept of stirring up hate—removing specific acts that are crimes from thoughts or the speech behind them dangerously conflates speech and action. When hate crime laws require that the authorities infer a perpetrator’s belief and assign greater punishment based on ideological motive, that can lead to some perverse criminal justice outcomes, which matter to legislators. In the CPS report on recent hate crime prosecutions there was a telling, shocking example. A man was put in jail for 20 weeks for
“assaulting his father, sister and a police officer, and using racist slurs against his sister’s partner”.
Actually, 20 weeks seems a bit low to me, as it goes. Then the detail was revealed: the CPS explains that, for assaulting his father, his sister and a police officer, the person who was found guilty received a community order. They received the 20 weeks in prison for the racist slur. So for the assault you can retain your freedom, but for the racist words you get 20 weeks in jail. Is that not confusing?
There are endless examples that I could cite. It is no wonder that young people in particular, rather than being super-sensitive, as was described earlier, are actually super-sensitive to words they find difficult. They think that speech is violence and cannot distinguish between physical threats, physical harm and what they imagine to be harmful speech, which in turn justifies using physical violence against hate speech that they hear. That was brutally illustrated by the assassination of Charlie Kirk—someone whose politics I did not agree with but who was basically seen to be a hate criminal and, if all speech is violence, you can use violence back. I think these are regressive cultural fruits of vaguely drafted laws that give a vast and subjective discretion, and that is adding to the atmosphere of toxicity and cancel culture.
I know that all roads lead back to the review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, but I ask the Minister whether he can explain the point of the review if, when he is looking at provisions such as public order offences and some of these issues—I know he is very concerned about free speech—we are going to just say that the status quo works. Hate crime legislation is getting us in a mess. The Minister says that he absolutely disagrees, but the Government have asked for a review of these very ideas.
Surely the Minister might be open-minded to that review, if not to the proposals from the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, and me, or other people who have spoken. Might there be some flexibility from the Minister in thinking that, just possibly, legislators before this Government brought in some bad laws and that, at the very least, we should look at them again? It just may be that hate crime legislation is making society more hateful, is making young people more anxious and frightened and is bad for democracy.
Baroness Hunt of Bethnal Green (CB)
My Lords, I wish to speak briefly in opposition to this amendment, but I will resist the temptation to give a Second Reading speech. My understanding is that it would abolish the entire statutory framework relating to hate crime and hatred-based offending.
I have been a blatant homosexual for many decades, and part of that look means that you evoke some hatred as you walk around the streets—the streets of Cardiff in 1993, certainly, when no hate crime legislation existed in relation to sexual orientation. The message I got at that age was that the state agreed with the offences that I was experiencing, because I did not know that the state supported me.
Within the last year, when I was in Shoreditch, a group of men surrounded me and my partner. They got up in our faces and used unequivocally homophobic language. We did not report it as a hate crime, but we were frightened and discombobulated. My response was, “But it’s Shoreditch”, which was my middle-class shorthand for, “There are so many lesbians in this area. What exactly are you going to do if you think that this hate is going to be acceptable here?” I did, however, feel utterly supported by the state a year ago, because I knew that legislation existed that made that kind of offence unacceptable.
As has been outlined, there is no single offence of hate crime. What exists is a framework across several Acts. There are aggravated forms of certain basic offences, and I look forward to the Government’s amendment on Report, as in their manifesto, relating to disability, sexual orientation and gender identity. There is enhanced sentencing, where hostility is proved on grounds of race, religion, sexual orientation, disability or gender identity. There are offences such as stirring up racial or religious hatred. It is my understanding that this amendment would dismantle that network in its entirety.
Those who have concerns about the recording of non-crime hate incidents, which I have sympathy with, or about proportionality in relation to hate crime, which I also have sympathy with, can and should address those matters directly. But those issues are distinct: wholesale repeal of criminal protections is not a measured response, in my view, to broader free speech concerns.
I find it impossible to ignore the context. Official Home Office figures record 137,550 hate crimes in England and Wales in the year ending March 2025. As a resident of Bethnal Green, I am acutely aware of hate crime in relation to antisemitism and anti-Muslim sentiment. It exists across all the streets; the graffiti is going up and up in relation to both those things. On antisemitism specifically, the same Home Office bulletin records 2,873 religious hate crimes targeted at Jewish people in the year ending March 2025, and notes that the previous year saw a very sharp rise and spike following the start of the Israel-Hamas conflict. In addition, the Community Security Trust recorded 3,528 antisemitic incidents across the UK in the calendar year 2024. I share that data because what we measure, we manage. Understanding these spikes and seeing these patterns matter. What the hate crime legislation gives us is a mechanism for measuring and managing those spikes and incidents.
Where reporting shows acute risk, His Majesty’s Government have acted. In October 2023, the Conservative Government increased the Jewish community protective security grant to £18 million for 2023-24, and that figure was maintained in 2024-25. That is right and proper as a reasonable and justified response to that spike in hate crime, which was measured because this legislation exists.
One can believe deeply in freedom of expression; I sympathise and actually agree more than people might think with the previous amendment, and with some of the comments we have had so far. But the law must recognise and respond to crimes intended to intimidate whole communities. In my view, this amendment would remove the very tools that allow the police and the courts to identify, mark and properly sentence hostility-motivated offending. For those reasons, I would request that this amendment be withdrawn.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
That was a very useful and nuanced contribution from the noble Baroness. She is absolutely right to notice the rise, for example, of antisemitic hate against Jews. The amount of hate crimes being recorded, however, has gone up hugely, despite the proliferation of hate crime legislation. Does that not rather imply that hate crime legislation is not stopping hate crime?
Baroness Hunt of Bethnal Green (CB)
I thank the noble Baroness for her intervention. It is a really important question, and I will try to remember to keep speaking in the third person, because I do want to just talk.
Has the proliferation of legislation helped prevent hate crime? During the past two decades we often saw increases, and we would question whether those increases were a product of increased hate crime, or an increased awareness of the legislation that led people to report. I am aware that, being of my generation, I am reluctant to report. There is a part of me that thinks, “You had it coming, and you should probably have taken your tie off for that walk down that street. You brought it on yourself”, added to which I do not want to waste police time. There is a conditioning that goes on with minority communities, and it takes some changing in how we think about these things to give communities permission to say that they did not have it coming, they do not deserve it, and that they have the right to talk to the police about those incidents.
I welcome the increase in reporting. Nevertheless, there has been an overreliance on using some of this legislation for incidents that should not constitute a hate crime. What happens when those cases are brought and those complaints are made, and how they are investigated, absolutely requires examination and thought. However, that does not justify the wholesale removal of hate crime legislation, which is a disproportionate response to the problem that has been identified.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
My Lords, I rise to support the amendment of my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. I also declare my interest as a director of the Free Speech Union. I will make three arguments against the statutory hate crime regime, and against embedding the concept of hate crime in British law. As we have heard, and as we are all aware, the concept of hate crime is inextricably bound up with protected characteristics. A hate crime is either the stirring up of hatred against the bearers of certain protected characteristics, or it is a crime that becomes a hate crime because the perpetrator is motivated by hostility towards one or more of the protected characteristics of the victim.
The number of protected characteristics in this statutory framework, however, varies from law to law. Hate crime law, on the face of it, is for that reason slightly confusing and incoherent. There are three protected characteristics in the stirring-up offences in the Public Order Act, five are referenced in the aggravated offences regime, seven in the Hate Crime and Public Order (Scotland) Act, and nine in the Equality Act. How can we rationalise this anomaly? The solution of successive Governments has been constantly to add new protected characteristics to the statute book. I dare say it is possible that, in due course, amendments will be made to the Crime and Policing Bill to add yet more protected characteristics to the criminal law.
The direction of travel is clear: the number of protected characteristics is constantly expanding, and various lobby groups are constantly petitioning parliamentarians to add ever more protected characteristics to the statute book. The end point of this process will be that every characteristic is protected; but if every characteristic is protected, then no particular characteristic will enjoy special protection and we will, in effect, be back to where we started pre-1965, before the concept of hate crime raised its head in British law.
My first argument is that, in the interests of saving us all a great deal of time and effort, can we not just short-circuit the process of getting to the point where every characteristic is protected by stripping out the concept of hate crime and protected characteristics from British law and returning to the pre-1965 status quo?
My second argument has been touched upon by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, which is that the concept of hate crime is at odds with the sacrosanct principle of equality before the law. Why should bearers of protected characteristics enjoy more robust legal protections than non-bearers? Why is a criminal offence motivated by hostility towards a victim’s transgender identity punished more severely than exactly the same crime motivated by the victim’s sex? Sex is not a protected characteristic, apart from in the Equality Act. This two-tier justice—this sense that some people, because they happen to belong to protected groups, enjoy additional legal protections—fosters grievance, breeds resentment and undermines public trust in the law and in the police in particular. In 1981, around 87% of Britons reported having confidence in the police. By 2022, that had fallen to about 67%, a substantial long-term decline. I would suggest that one of the reasons for declining public trust in the police is this sense that some groups are better protected than others because of the hate crime, protected characteristic regime.
My third argument, which is probably the strongest argument, is that the aggravated offences regime introduces the concept of thought crime into British law. We need to distinguish between mens rea and the particular thought someone is having towards the victim while committing a particular crime. I do not think, when assessing the seriousness of an offence, you could exclude motive. It would be absurd not to take motive into account, but that is different from punishing a crime more severely if a person is experiencing a particular emotion—hostility, hatred—towards a particular group that the victim of the crime belongs to. Mens rea is universal and does not discriminate, but hate crime does. It says that if you are having particular thoughts about the victim when you commit the crime—importantly, not hatred in general, but hatred based on their possession of one or more protected characteristics—you should be punished more severely.
Not only is this criminalisation of certain thoughts a hallmark of a totalitarian society, but, as my noble friend Lord Moynihan pointed out, it is very hard to prove. It is very hard for a court to determine whether the person accused of the crime had the verboten thoughts while committing the crime. To paraphrase Queen Elizabeth I, we cannot open a window and see into men’s souls.
I am perfectly aware that an amendment stripping the concept of hate crime from British law has little chance of winning a Division in this House, so let me close with some more modest proposals. Do not add any more protected characteristics to the list of aggravators. Extend Section 29J of the Public Order Act, which protects various forms of criticism of religion and makes it more difficult for people to be prosecuted for stirring up religious hatred. You can criticise a religion, even quite robustly, thanks to Section 29J and not be prosecuted for stirring up religious hatred.
One useful improvement to the hate crime statutory regime would be to extend Section 29J to the other stirring-up offences. For example, the Free Speech Union paid for the legal defence of a former Royal Marine called Jamie Michael. He robustly criticised illegal immigrants in a Facebook video and, as a consequence, he was prosecuted for intending to stir up racial hatred. It took a jury in Merthyr Tydfil all of 17 minutes to unanimously acquit him of that offence. He should never have been prosecuted. We need a protection in the Public Order Act whereby, if you make robust criticisms, even of legal migration, you should not be vulnerable to a charge of stirring up racial hatred.
Finally, an anomaly in the stirring-up offences is that you can be prosecuted for stirring up racial hatred if the effect of your words or behaviour is likely to stir up racial hatred, even if that is not your intention—whereas you can be prosecuted for stirring up religious hatred or hatred on the basis of sexual orientation only if you intended to do that. That is an anomaly, and my recommendation would be that a two-limb test has to be satisfied before one of the stirring-up offences can be made out. To successfully prosecute someone, it should be incumbent on the Crown to show not only that what they said or did was likely to stir up hatred against the protected group in question but that they intended to as well. That would bring British law to a certain extent into line with the Brandenburg test in the US first amendment, whereby you can be prosecuted only if your words or actions are not only likely to but were intended to cause imminent lawless action.
So, accepting that this controversial proposal that my two colleagues have bravely made is unlikely to ever win enough support in this House as presently constituted to win a Division, I urge the Committee to consider those more modest reforms.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, for setting out his arguments for abolishing hate crimes. He started with the issue of freedom of speech again—I absolutely understand that that is where he and those supporting him are coming from—and, interestingly, he cited the case of Lucy Connolly. I thought it might be helpful to remind the Committee of part of Article 10 in our Human Rights Act 1998, which says:
“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression”—
we are shorthanding that to “speech”—but it goes on to say:
“The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary”.
I have carefully quoted all of it, but I will focus on the part that relates to what she was convicted for.
Coming back to our debate on the previous group, the problem is that there is a lot of concern about big figurehead cases when, actually, the law, the judge and the jury—actually there was no jury because Connolly pleaded guilty—were clear that she was inciting racial hatred. She pleaded guilty of saying threatening and abusive material, which is interesting given what we debated on the last group. She said:
“set fire to all the”—
effing—
“hotels full of the bastards”.
She said that at exactly the time that people were on the streets, some of whom were trying to set fire to the hotels. The tweet was viewed 310,000 times before it was deleted, and the judge specifically cited that in his summary at the end of the case.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
I thank the noble Baroness for accepting my intervention. I just wanted to point out that the noble Baroness did not quote Lucy Connolly’s tweet in full. She added the caveat “for all I care”, which suggested not that she was intending to encourage people to burn down asylum hotels but that she was indifferent as to whether they did so.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
Fortunately, the judge took a different view. I think that we have to accept—and I was not the judge and do not know what his thoughts were—that the tweet was clearly seen enough times by the public at the moment when a small number of people were causing real concern outside hotels that had asylum seekers in them who had absolutely nothing to do with the Southport stabbing. That was the issue. Therefore, I believe that this is exactly where the balance lies between rights and responsibility, to go back to John Stuart Mill, where we started in the previous group.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)
I thank the noble Baroness for letting me intervene. Will she agree that it is unfortunate that there is a general perception that this lady—on whose case I do not rest any of my argument, or place any reliance, as I discussed in my 40-page submission to the Macdonald review—was inveigled into pleading guilty by being kept on remand in a case where it would not have been usual to keep such a person with such an alleged crime on remand? She pled guilty because she thought that she would be released early—more fool her, it turns out—and as a result of her pleading guilty, the matter referred to by my noble friend Lord Young, that she said “for all I care”, which may have turned out to be an excuse that led to her exoneration in front of a jury, much like that 17-minute jury decision that he mentioned, was never litigated, so that we could have discovered what the law said as to whether her tweet reached the standards for criminal conviction. Does the noble Baroness not think that unfortunate?
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I do not think that it is unfortunate given that the judge said that 310,000 views of that tweet happened at a time when there was discord on the streets. My argument is not about Connolly’s case; it goes back to Article 10 in the Human Rights Act, which says that along with freedom of expression or freedom of speech there are rights and responsibilities, and it is the role of the state to have laws to protect people. It cannot have been right to think that even one person seeing that tweet could have started one of the arsons in the bins outside one of the asylum seeker hotels. I do not know whether that happened; the point is that 310,000 people saw it, and that is the difference with her last phrase, which probably most people did not see or did not take in the way that the noble Lord has indicated—he has raised his eyebrows at me, but there are different ways of taking it. I do not want to get into the detail of that; I am trying to make the argument that, for every instance of freedom of speech by an individual, there are quite often consequences that may or may not end up as a crime as well. That brings me back to the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Hunt, raised earlier—that the level of hate crimes is increasing. We also know that hate crimes are seriously underreported.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)
I apologise for intervening again, but does the noble Baroness not accept that had that matter been litigated it would not have been before the judge? It would not have been for the judge to rule; it would have been before a jury, which is something that we in this country enjoy and that unfortunately there are moves to suppress. It would have been in front of a jury, and a jury would have been able to decide whether that final point justified her exoneration.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
The noble Lord said that he did not rely on Lucy Connolly in his earlier argument; he is now trying to rely on that case here. I am trying to make the point that it is more complex than he made out in his earlier contribution. I would like to make some progress, if I may.
The previous Government’s LGBT survey in 2018 showed that fewer than one in 10 LGBT people reported hate crimes or incidents. The noble Baroness, Lady Hunt, has explained one of the reasons for that. The other reason, I know from friends who have also experienced this sort of hate crime, is they do not believe that the police will do anything. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Young, that that is one of the reasons why there is concern about the police: too often, people who are targeted in this way feel that they do not get the help that they need.
As has been described, there is no single piece of hate crime legislation. It includes aggravated assault, which the noble Lord, Lord Young, was particularly concerned about. The point about hate crime is that it is not just the individual; the protected characteristic means that they and their community are also affected by it. We have spent many hours on previous groups on this Bill discussing the absolute abhorrence of antisemitism. If actions in Israel can cause people in the UK to start attacking members of our Jewish community, either verbally or against a person or their property, then that is absolutely unacceptable. That is one of the reasons why I would never want hate crimes to be removed.
Research by Professor Mark Walters of Sussex University shows that hate crimes do not affect just those individuals targeted; he describes them as having a “ripple effect” through their wider communities. Some people will avoid certain routes and places, and others will not leave home at all, particularly in our Jewish communities at the moment, but the same is true in certain areas for our Muslim communities. If laws about hate crime are weakened or repealed, it would send an appalling message to these communities of faith, as well as to LGBT and disabled people. Do the supporters of the amendment really no longer regard it as important that the state recognises the communities that have protected characteristics—their vulnerability—as warranting distinct legal recognition and criminalisation?
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, once again, this has been a very interesting debate and I thank all noble Lords who have taken part. I particularly thank my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea for tabling Amendment 382G. This amendment contains a line of argument that the Committee began to consider in the previous group: namely, whether the criminal law should concern itself with what people do or whether it should also punish what people are thought to feel or believe.
The provisions targeted by this amendment fall broadly into two categories. First, there are ordinary criminal offences—assault, criminal damage, harassment and public order offences—where existing penalties are increased if the court concludes that the offender was motivated by hostility towards a protected characteristic. Secondly, there are freestanding offences, particularly under the Public Order Act 1986 and the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which criminalised the stirring up of hatred, even where no violence or other recognised criminal harm has occurred.
The crux of the debate comes down to this: two identical acts can result in radically different sentences depending not on the harm caused but on an inferred state of mind. That inference might be drawn from sparse or ambiguous evidence, yet it carries profound consequences for liberty. This could make prosecutions more complex, investigations longer and outcomes less predictable—hardly a recipe for clarity or fairness. These laws have grown incrementally and unevenly; they overlap, diverge, and sometimes contradict one another. The result is a body of legislation that is difficult to understand, inconsistently applied and increasingly divorced from public confidence.
This amendment offers the Committee an opportunity to step back and ask whether this approach has genuinely improved justice or whether it has instead distracted our criminal justice system from its core task of tackling real and harmful crime. This is a point that I would particularly like to emphasise. As a former police officer myself, I understand the difficulties in enforcing laws that are passed by a well-meaning Parliament but are incoherent and ill thought through. Part of this problem does indeed lie with us, the lawmakers. Successive Governments and Parliaments have not taken a coherent approach to public order and speech legislation. They have passed statute after statute, simply adding to the already long list of different defences, not thinking to consolidate or repeal existing laws.
When the Public Order Act 1986 passed, it contained seven offences of this nature. The previous Labour Government passed the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Sections 28 to 33 of which created racially aggravated offences. They then passed the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, which added a new Part 3A to the 1986 Act, and the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 added hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation to the list of hate crimes. The Sentencing Act 2020 also permits for any offence to be aggravated by hostility expressed towards any of five characteristics.
This Government are going down the same path, as we have already discussed in Committee. Clauses 107 and 108 of this very Bill contain further provisions criminalising the use of offensive language based on racial hatred aimed towards an emergency worker. If the Government think it is coherent to simply bolt new offences on to the already vast array of legislation, then I respectfully suggest that they are somewhat misguided.
Furthermore, far from promoting cohesion, these provisions have too often deepened division. They have encouraged grievance politics and fostered public mistrust. They have also placed the police in an impossible position, asking them to arbitrate not just behaviour but belief and expression.
There is a further concern about effectiveness. These laws, as my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea mentioned, are clogging the justice system with cases that pose no real threat to public safety, while doing little to address genuine hatred or violence. At the same time, they have fed a broader culture in which accusations of hate are used to silence debate, discourage inquiry and deter people—artists, teachers, academics and ordinary citizens—from speaking openly.
Freedom of speech is not an abstract luxury; it is a defining feature of our national character and a cornerstone of democratic legitimacy. I thank my noble friend for enabling this fruitful debate and hope that the Government will consider it carefully.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
Before my noble friend the Minister stands up, I will briefly intervene to say that at Second Reading, I counted 44 previous statutes that were being amended by the Bill. I just counted five in Amendment 382G. I do not know whether they join the 44 statutes in the Bill itself or whether they stand alone, but the Bill is extremely complex. In the word I used at Second Reading, it is, in this sense, a “monster” of a Bill, not because of the many provisions in it and the other provisions that noble Lords have brought out in it: that is not my point. My point is just on the complexity of the Bill. I beg that there may be a change of mind by Governments and parliamentary draftsmen and that they do not inflict Bills like this on the House.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
Follow that, my Lords.
I appreciate the measured approach of the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, to the significant measures that he proposes in his amendments, and I appreciate the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, from the Front Bench, and the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, in support of the measured way in which he brought forward his amendments. Having said that, I stand with the noble Baronesses, Lady Hunt of Bethnal Green and Lady Brinton, in saying that I cannot and would not wish to accept those amendments. Hate crime legislation exists because offences motivated by prejudice inflict deep harm on victims and on entire communities. These crimes target people for who they are, undermining social cohesion and spreading fear. It is my view that repeal would not just send a wrong signal but say that identity-based hostility is no more serious an offence than any other offence, and I am afraid that it is. Our laws rightly recognise its heightened impact and ensure that justice outcomes reflect that gravity.
Despite the fact that the noble Lord and others have mentioned and prayed in aid figures that have risen, hate crime laws deter abuse. They uphold the shared values of society. The noble Baroness, Lady Hunt, made the very good point that they provide a measure of awareness and of the potential for those offences. Ultimately, they protect victims with protected characteristics that they cannot change. It is really important to remember that they are being attacked, or preyed on in many ways, for characteristics that they cannot change.
Let us be clear, because the noble Lord has been measured and clear, that this amendment would remove offences of stirring up racial hatred. It would abolish—
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)
My Lords, it took me a few seconds to react to and think about what the Minister said. For the information of the House, I think it would be fair to recognise that several of the nine protected characteristics are not immutable and are capable of change. Gender identity is one; marriage and civil partnership is another. Let us be clear: some are immutable, but others are capable of change. I am not expressing an opinion on this proposed new clause, but in general it is fair to say that protected characteristics socially evolve and develop over time.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
Let what the noble Baroness has said stand. I am making the point that disability, transgender identity—in my view—sexual orientation and race are things that you have and that are part of you. If the offences proposed for removal are removed by this House, that would send a signal to society that we are happy for people to stir up hatred on the grounds of those characteristics. That is not acceptable to me and I hope the noble Lord recognises that I cannot accept those amendments today, although I accept the way they have been put.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
Surely the signal that scrapping hate crime from British law would send is not that we do not care about vulnerable groups but that we think they should enjoy the same legal protections as everyone else, and that everyone should be equal in the eyes of the law.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
That is a view, but not one that I share. There are protections in the Public Order Act 1986 against stirring up hatred on racial or religious grounds because, yes, I am equal under the law if I have that hatred against me, but that hatred may be generated because I happen to have a racial or religious characteristic that is subject to attack. So, we are not equal under the law, because if I did not have that racial or religious characteristic I would not have been attacked. For me, that is therefore an aggravating factor and a reason why we should maintain those offences.
I go back to what I was saying a moment ago. This would remove offences of stirring up hatred under the Racial and Religious Hatred Act. It would abolish racial and religiously aggravated offences under the Crime and Disorder Act and delete aggravating factors of race, religion, sexual orientation, disability and transgender identity from the Sentencing Code. At the very time when Jewish people are being attacked for being Jewish and transgender people are being attacked for being transgender, that is not acceptable. I am not saying that either noble Lord wishes to encourage or support that type of activity—I recognise from the measured way in which they put their arguments that they do not. They have an honestly held opinion that removing that legislation would be of benefit to society. I happen to disagree and I am trying to put the reason why. If there is clear water between us, that is the nature of political life. I am not imputing any characteristics to the noble Lord for bringing this measure forward.
However, the effect of this would be to compromise the ability of the courts to reflect the greater harm—as the noble Baroness, Lady Hunt of Bethnal Green, said—to undermine deterrence and clarity for police and prosecutors and to signal that those crimes are no more serious when they are motivated by hostility toward protected characteristics, contrary to long-standing principle. It would also risk eroding public confidence, particularly among people with those protected characteristics. The underreporting that the noble Baroness mentioned would absolutely nosedive if these provisions were taken away, because people would think that society had not put that down as a benchmark by which people should be judged. I am therefore afraid that I cannot accept the amendment.
I must also give notice to the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, who made a very helpful plea that we should not bring forward further protected characteristics. I regret to inform him that, on Report, I will be very proud to stand here and move an amendment which puts transgender and disability as protected characteristics, in line with the manifesto on which my party stood and won an election in July 2024. We will be bringing forward amendments in the Crime and Policing Bill on Report to give effect to this change. We can have that debate openly and honestly, but I say to the Committee that society has some basic principles of respect that it should enshrine in law. The legislation that the noble Lord is seeking to remove would undermine that principle and I will not support it.
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)
I have listened carefully to this debate and the previous one without intervening. I have a lot of sympathy with the Minister, as he knows, on many of the measures in the Bill, but I am a little surprised at his unequivocal rejection of several of these kinds of amendments, only because we have the Macdonald review going on. Will he accept that, if it comes up with recommendations while the Bill is not yet an Act, he will accept amendments to take on board those recommendations?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
Let me say two things in response to that. We have commissioned the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, to look at a review of protests and a range of matters to do with that legislation. However—and this is where I accept what the noble Baroness said—we will have to look at what the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, brings forward and the Government will have to take political decisions on whether we accept it.
I am defending a principle here today. The noble Lord will be looking at potential issues around implementation, tweaks, et cetera, but the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, has made a well-measured assault on legislative tenets. I cannot ever see this Government accepting the removal of those legislative tenets, but we will always accept the recommendations being looked at. Going back to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hunt of Bethnal Green, on how we can improve the monitoring, policing and understanding of these issues, it is a complex area, as the noble Baroness knows through her experience and recent appointments.
We will also be bringing forward on Report offences relating to transgender and disability, which was in our manifesto commitment. That is another complex area, which is why it has taken time for us to get to the stage of bringing forward the amendment. When we do so, we will have to look at it in the context of the whole package that the noble Baroness has worked on, that this Committee is looking at now and on which the noble Lord made his comments.
From this Dispatch Box today, I simply say that I cannot accept his amendments. I think he knew that before he introduced them. The noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, hinted as much in his contribution, but I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment. If he revisits this on Report, we will have that discussion again in a fair, open and measured way, as we have today.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
Perhaps I might ask one important question. I understand that the report from the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, is going to be produced before Report. Does my noble friend the Minister agree that it should be made available to us before we settle into Report?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, is expected to produce a report at some point during the next couple of months. I cannot give a definitive time for that, but I can tell the Committee that we will obviously make sure that it is published. There are likely to be Statements or an Urgent Question in this House on the report. We will first look at how we as a Government consider the recommendations and, secondly, if we need legislation, what mechanism that would be and when it would be brought forward. I can tell my noble friend that there will be a full discussion on the report when it comes. I cannot, as yet, constrain the discussion from the perspective of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, by answering the question my noble friend posed.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)
My Lords, I thought that too was a great debate and that the Minister managed to articulate very clearly that there is clear water between two opposing groups of thought on these matters. I am gagging to launch into a half-hour speech to attempt to respond to what he and others said, but I am mindful of the earlier admonitions from the noble Lord, Lord Katz. I merely thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox, Lady Hunt and Lady Brinton, my noble friends Lord Young and Lord Davies, and the Minister for their contributions.
I believe that it is time to call an end to this hate crime law experiment. The criminalisation of hate speech and hate crime was overambitious. It punishes ideas and motives, as opposed to actions. As I have shown, I believe it is choking up the justice system and shutting down free speech. I will close by slightly misquoting Samuel Johnson:
“How small, of all that human hearts endure,
That part which laws ”—
or Lords—“can cause or cure”. Having said that, for now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment removes the requirement for an officer to have electronically tracked information to enter and search a premises.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, we now come to a group of amendments that seeks to improve the Government’s legislation as it currently stands. We broadly agree with the need to expand the police’s search powers, given the rise in shoplifting—that is not a term I particularly like, as it is really Section 1 theft, but I will refer to it as shoplifting for the purposes of this debate—and theft of personal property. Our only divergence is the extent to which we should extend these new powers.
The measures in the Bill are extremely necessary. We are facing an epidemic of petty theft, with phone theft and shoplifting reaching highs. One-third of adults were victims of phone theft last year, with the United Kingdom accounting for roughly 40% of all such thefts in Europe. These phones are then dismantled, deactivated and often sent abroad, with little chance of their owners getting them back.
Shoplifting gangs are terrorising high streets. Theft from shops reached over £2.2 billion last year, narrowing the margins of small independent stores and pushing up costs for the law-abiding public. Electronic stores are often targeted, with owners left helpless by the lack of power bestowed on security guards and the high costs of surveillance. The police must have the means to tackle this crime past their current capabilities. The fact that, once a criminal enters a premises, he can store the stolen goods until a search warrant is issued is not justice—it is an affront to the victim. It is not good enough to hope that officers arrive in time to arrest criminals in public for individuals to have a chance of retrieving their stolen goods. Officers must be able to enter premises without a warrant if the situation requires it.
That is why the Government’s measure is a welcome step. However, they have watered down the measures that we proposed in the Criminal Justice Bill in 2023. Where our measures would have allowed specified officers to search for stolen goods without a warrant if it is not practicable to obtain one, the Government have limited this to goods with obtainable electronic tracking data. The amendments in my name and the names of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie attempt to revert this measure back to its original intent so that it does not solely pertain to electronically tracked goods.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, this group addresses the extension of warrantless search powers for electronically tracked stolen goods to the service police, in Clause 129, alongside civilian police, in Clause 128. While we recognise the need for police to tackle high-tech crime, such sweeping powers, particularly warrantless searches, must be meticulously governed to avoid abuse and uphold civil liberties. I have tabled Amendments 386 to 389, which would ensure that robust governance and accountability mechanisms are embedded in these provisions.
Amendment 386 would require the Secretary of State to produce a code of practice for the operation of Clause 129, specifically mandating consultation with civil liberties and human rights organisations and relevant service police bodies. This would ensure due process regarding the authorisation, seizure, retention and disposal of evidence.
Amendment 388 would require the Secretary of State to provide appropriate training for service police personnel on how to exercise these powers proportionately and lawfully.
Amendment 387 would mandate the establishment of an independent mechanism for handling, investigating and reviewing public complaints arising from the exercise of these powers, giving complainants similar statutory rights to victims reporting to the Independent Office for Police Conduct.
Amendment 389 would mandate that the Secretary of State produces an annual report detailing the exercise of these warrantless search powers under Clause 128, ensuring transparency and accountability to Parliament. Further, these new obligations would require the affirmative procedure for their governing regulations, ensuring full parliamentary debate before they are enacted, as sought in Amendments 499 to 501.
We on these Benches are opposed to Amendments 383 to 385 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies, which seek to remove the requirement, as we have heard from the noble Lord, for an officer to even possess electronic tracking data before conducting a warrantless search. By stripping away this technologically justified threshold, these amendments would transform a specific investigative tool into an arbitrary power of entry, undermining the core principle that a person’s home is his castle.
In contrast, Amendments 386 to 389 provide the necessary basis for these intrusive powers to be overseen. Specifically, Amendment 386 mandates a statutory code of practice for the Armed Forces to ensure that their exercise of these powers is necessary, proportionate and strictly compliant with the Human Rights Act. Furthermore, Amendment 387 would establish an independent mechanism for handling public complaints, ensuring that any misuse of power is investigated by a body demonstrably independent of the service police.
Finally, my amendments would require post-implementation reporting to Parliament every 12 months. We must see the data on the demographic profile of those targeted and the subsequent criminal justice outcomes to guard against disproportionate application or mission creep. Without these safeguards, we risk creating a shortcut—as other provisions might do—to a surveillance state, where convenience is prioritised over constitutional protection.
The safeguards that I have proposed in Amendments 386 to 389 regarding service police are only as strong as the parliamentary scrutiny that would underpin them. We must ensure that these powers are exercised with not just efficiency but a regular check of parliamentary accountability.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, this group of amendments addresses Clauses 128 and 129 granting new powers to the police to enter premises to search for and seize stolen items that can be electronically tracked there, without the need to first apply to a court for a warrant. I welcome the welcome given to these new clauses by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, on behalf of the Opposition.
These new powers are intended, as he said, to be exercised where a stolen item is electronically tracked to a specific location. This is in direct response to public concern that the police are not able to act swiftly in response to crimes such as mobile phone theft, even when victims have clear, real-time electronic evidence of the phone’s location. It will reduce the risk that stolen goods are quickly moved on or used to facilitate other crime. I suggest to the Committee that the main benefit of these clauses is ensuring that mobile phone theft is addressed and combated.
The noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, is no longer in his place, but when speaking to an earlier group he suggested that there is an impression that the police do not prioritise criminal behaviour such as mobile phone theft but instead concentrate on other issues, which I will not go into. I suggest that the police being able to more quickly and effectively tackle very common criminal behaviour such as mobile phone theft would also very much enhance the reputation of the police. As the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, said, it is sometimes at risk of being downplayed.
I will first address the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. Amendments 383 to 385 would remove the requirement in Clause 128 that the power may be exercised by police only in relation to stolen goods electronically tracked to specified premises. They would also remove the condition that before the use of power is authorised by a senior police officer, he or she must be satisfied that there is electronic tracking data linking the stolen item and a specific premises. These amendments would significantly broaden the scope of the proposed powers and remove important safeguards.
Powers of entry are inherently intrusive, and there is a balance to be struck between ensuring that the police can act quickly and decisively against thieves, and retrieve victims’ stolen property, and safeguarding the right to a private and family life. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, put it very well when he referred to it as a technically justified threshold. I contend to the Committee that people generally accept the need for warrants to be used in detecting stolen goods, but some devices can be tracked electronically in real time. The police turn around and say, “We can’t do anything about this because we have to go and get a warrant”, but you can point to the address where you know that phone is and you know that, if the police do not act quickly, there is a good chance that phone will be moved out of the country. It is only right that we use that as an apposite threshold to introduce these powers, rather than saying that they should be used for any stolen good of whatever nature, where there is no electronic tracking data involved. It will do much to improve confidence in the police in catching up with the 21st century and current technology, but we do not see the need to go further.
The requirement for electronic tracking data linking at least one stolen item to the premises before powers can be exercised provides a further layer of reliability in their use, while ensuring, as I said, that the police can act swiftly when they need to. I say again that removing these requirements would dilute the safeguards intended to ensure that police officers use these powers lawfully, proportionately and only in specific circumstances.
That brings me neatly to Amendments 386 to 389 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I commend his intent to ensure that there is strong accountability, independent oversight and scrutiny of the use of these powers. As I have said, the Government recognise that these new powers are intrusive by their nature, particularly as they can be exercised by officers without them first needing to seek authorisation from a court by obtaining a search warrant. We have, accordingly, built in appropriate safeguards to ensure that the new powers are used appropriately and within well-established independent oversight and scrutiny mechanisms.
Amendment 386 would require the Secretary of State to issue a statutory code of practice to which the service police must have regard when exercising the new powers. I stress to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that these new powers will be subject to the relevant provisions in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and its codes of practice. The Government will amend PACE Code B, and Code B of the service police codes of practice, to reflect the new powers, providing clear and detailed guidance around their use for both territorial and service police. These revisions to the codes will be completed before the powers are commenced. This will provide robust statutory guidance to police and will be complemented by the College of Policing’s authorised professional practice.
Amendment 387 would require the creation of an independent oversight mechanism to investigate public complaints about the use of these powers by service police. Any complaints about their use by territorial police would be addressed in the normal way through internal police complaints procedures and referrals to the Independent Office for Police Conduct, where required.
The service police are the focus of the noble Lord’s amendment, and any complaints would be dealt with under the complaints system for service police. As set out in the Service Police (Complaints etc.) Regulations 2023, this is overseen by the Service Police Complaints Commissioner, whose role is similar to that of the IOPC. The commissioner is independent of the service police and the MoD, and has a statutory duty to secure, maintain and review arrangements for procedures that deal with complaints and conduct. They deal with the most serious complaints and set the standard by which service police should handle complaints. The Service Police Complaints Commissioner has the same powers as the service police where it has been determined that they will carry out an investigation, and they can also determine that a complaint can be reinvestigated, if they are satisfied that there are compelling reasons to do so.
Amendment 388 would require service police to undertake training before they could exercise the new powers. All members of the service police undergo training that addresses each element set out in the noble Lord’s amendment, including on the legal requirements and limitations of search and seizure powers, proportionality, maintenance of clear records and compliance with Article 8 of the ECHR and the Human Rights Act 1998. Service police trainees are tested on arrest, entry, search and seizure before they can exercise these powers. Training is updated in response to any change in legislation that would affect service police officers’ exercise of their powers. Specifically, training will be updated in light of the new powers in this Bill.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt. The Minister is clearly getting to the end of what he has to say. What raised my eyebrows reading Clause 129 is the fact that these powers have been given to the service police in the first place. What is the rationale for them having these powers in particular, how much mobile phone theft are the service police dealing with, and why are we putting them on all fours with the civilian police? The Minister will have noticed that I have not tried to amend Clause 128; all my focus is on the service police. If a military policeman turned up on my doorstep and asked to check out my house, I certainly would be rather concerned, hence the need for safeguards. But there seems to be no rationale for the service police being brought into this and being given these pretty extensive powers.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, the bad news is that not all service personnel are absolute angels: it could be one junior soldier stealing a mobile phone from another junior serviceman. These arrangements are very sensible, and I agree with everything that the Minister has had to say. My only question for him, while I am on my feet, is this: is there any evidence that the service police make mistakes on the procedures when they are exercising their powers? I am not aware of any problem.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I will take the last one first. I am not sure there is any evidence; I would have to look into that. To answer the more substantive intervention by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, as to why service police need the powers to deal with electronically tracked stolen goods, while service police deal with crime in the defence context, it is important that they are equipped to respond effectively to current and future trends in criminal behaviour. Obviously, the provisions in the Bill help to ensure that service police can respond with lawful, fair and proportionate action, now and in the future, to the full spectrum of criminality that threatens the cohesion and operational effectiveness of our Armed Forces. These new powers will give officers more chance of quickly finding and retrieving stolen items that are electronically tracked at premises, and reduce the risk they are lost or moved on. Maybe put it down to an overabundance of caution but also an acknowledgement that crimes that affect and have to be investigated by civilian forces can also affect and be investigated by the Armed Forces.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, all I will say is that, faced with an abundance of caution—that is to say, if in doubt— “give the police powers” is not an approach that is particularly favoured on these Benches.
Lord Katz (Lab)
That is a point well made and well taken. I add that the powers would, of course, be exercised only within the jurisdiction of the service police, so service police would not suddenly be moving into areas of activity that you would expect the territorial police to be pursuing.
The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, anticipated that I was winding up. I hope that my comments have reassured the noble Lord that the spirit and intention behind his amendments have been incorporated within the proposals in the Bill. In the light of my remarks, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I give thanks to noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. I will reiterate my opening speech by saying that I know we all have the same end goal of arresting criminals and preventing thefts. We may have different roads that we believe to be the best way of arriving at that goal, but I am confident that this debate has taken place in a productive and open-minded manner.
At the risk of repeating myself, phone theft and shoplifting, frequently targeted at electronic stores, are not just epidemics but growing ones. Crime is thriving, businesses are closing, and the public are becoming increasingly anxious. A phone is stolen every seven and a half minutes in our capital city. We cannot simply look on at the situation with the hope that it gets better.
The Government must resolve to adopt the framework from our 2023 Bill, and they must now go further. Amendments 383, 384 and 385 in my name would achieve this. They would remove the requirement that a stolen good be electronically traceable and would permit senior officers to use discretion to search premises without a warrant. These amendments answer a problem that requires immediate action. The Government must get a grip on the theft epidemic. Our measures provide them with one of many necessary solutions, and I hope the Minister takes them away for consideration.
Moving on to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, I largely agree with his principle that the new clause that introduces new powers should be accompanied by checks and balances. Establishing a code of practice, having an independent mechanism for investigating complaints, providing mandatory training for senior officers and requiring an annual report on the use of the powers in question would act to safeguard the heightened powers officers will gain. This especially holds should the Government incorporate our amendments. We trust the judgment of our officers and believe that they will always make the judgment they think best, but I am conscious that we are entrusting them with more intrusive powers. Mechanisms must exist that counteract any tendencies for this power to be misused, and I believe that the noble Lord’s amendments would achieve that. However, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, with my other amendments to clause 132, correct references to members of the service police forces.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, these amendments build on Clauses 130 to 137, which confer powers on law enforcement agencies to extract information from online accounts as part of their investigations into immigration crime and sexual abuse cases, and to protect national security and our borders. Taken together, Amendments 441 to 444, 452, 393 and 394 ensure that the police can access information held in the online accounts of individuals subject to national security-related civil orders. These include terrorism and state threat prevention and investigation measures, as well as youth diversion orders, which are being introduced by clauses earlier in this Bill.
It is increasingly common for individuals to store data in the cloud for various reasons, such as to free up space on devices and, increasingly, because of the way devices or applications are designed, but also, regrettably, in some cases deliberately to make it less accessible to law enforcement. This is particularly the case with young people: police operational experience has shown that this cohort will regularly store data in online accounts. This data can be critical in supporting law enforcement to manage terrorist and broader national security risks. The increasing reliance on cloud data means that the police are likely to have an increased need to access cloud data as part of compliance checks where an individual—this is the important thing for the Committee—is subject to online restrictions as part of a civil order, such as the youth diversion order. These amendments will provide a clear statutory basis for officers to access cloud data when conducting a compliance check for an individual—again, this is the important point—who is subject to either a youth diversion order or a terrorism, state threat prevention or investigation measures order.
The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 contains a provision allowing for the extraction of information from electronic devices in cases where the user has died. Amendment 392 will clarify that this power also now applies to online information, as long as the authorised person is satisfied that the power is proportionate and there is no other practical way of obtaining the information.
Lastly, Amendments 389A to 389F are small but important drafting changes to Clause 132. The clause before the Committee identifies which senior officers may authorise the use of a power in Clause 130, which provides for a general extraction power for law enforcement agencies to obtain online information. Currently, the table refers to “Navy”, “Military” and “Force” but does not explicitly mention the police. I think noble Lords would wish the police to be mentioned, and therefore the amendments insert the term “Police” after each of those references to correct the omission. I hope that is clear to the Committee. This is in the specific circumstances that I have outlined in my speech, and I hope that noble Lords can accept the amendments at the appropriate time.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, this grouping deals with the complex landscape of remotely stored electronic data, or what is commonly known as cloud access. Government amendments in this group, such as Amendments 393, 394 and 441, significantly expand the ability of the state to inspect online accounts through seized devices, including the interception of authentication codes. We acknowledge that, as evidence shifts from hardware to the cloud, the law must evolve. However, we remain deeply concerned by the widened scope for investigation, which carries an inherent risk of excessive prying.
These powers go beyond merely searching a phone. They allow law enforcement to walk through the digital doors of a person’s entire life—their private communications, financial history and medical records. As the Minister said, under Clause 169 these intrusive inspections can now be included as conditions of a youth diversion order. While the Government maintain that these are necessary to identify harmful online activity early, we must ensure that they are used only when strictly necessary and proportionate to protect the public from serious harm.
I ask the Minister to clarify the oversight mechanisms for these powers. We cannot allow the inspection of a child’s entire digital history to rest on a subjective belief, rather than a rigorous, objective assessment of risk. The digital ecosystem must not be a safe haven for perpetrators, but neither can it become a borderless opportunity for state surveillance.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
I thank the Minister for tabling, and setting out the rationale behind, this group of government amendments. Amendments 393 and 394 authorise the interception of certain communications in order to access online accounts. These amendments represent an additional measure to youth diversion orders on top of the existing powers provided to the authorities under the current drafting of the Bill.
Public safety is and should be the first priority of any Government. Youth diversion orders exist in order to curb and prevent young people from engaging in terrorist activity or associating with those affiliated to terrorist groups that seek to radicalise children. We are supportive of the measures in the Bill to increase the scope and applicability of youth diversion orders, such as Clause 167, which enables chief officers of police with the power to apply for a youth diversion order. These are necessary and proportionate measures that should be implemented in order to mitigate terrorist risk.
We on these Benches are equally supportive of the amendments in this group that are aimed at ensuring that, when youth diversion orders are made, they contain the necessary provisions to enable authorities to carry out their operations as effectively as possible. There is no point in making a youth diversion order if the provisions of that order do not sufficiently provide police with the ability to execute its objective. Terrorists and extremist groups are increasingly turning to online forums and communities in order to identify individuals for radicalisation and to spread misinformation. Therefore, where the courts deem it necessary to issue a youth diversion order, it is right that a provision of such an order can contain the inspection of any online account. Not only will that ensure that young people are kept safe from dangerous and hateful rhetoric, but it will enable authorities to understand who is targeting children and their methods of radicalisation.
It is also important that the imperative to keep the public safe is counterbalanced with appropriate regard for individual liberty. Youth diversion orders contain a number of provisions which impact on people’s daily lives, so it is right that they are sanctioned only where it is considered strictly necessary. I therefore seek assurances from the Minister that these amendments, and youth diversion orders more generally, are accompanied by having the appropriate safeguards in place to mitigate state overreach and the unnecessary deprivation of people’s freedoms and, of course, their right to privacy.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I hope I can answer the questions from the noble Lords on the Liberal Democrat Benches and the Opposition Front Bench. I can say to them, on the amendments we have brought forward today, that the measures in them apply only to the terrorism and state threats prevention and investigation measures, as well as the new youth diversion orders. There are safeguards on what type of data the police are allowed to access. For example, there are limitations on accessing information which might include legally privileged material.
In a similar way to accessing local data on a device, nothing in this legislation changes the existing duties on the police imposed by the Data Protection Act 2018. UK legislation offers important safeguards for law enforcement in processing that personal data. That includes the requirement not to retain personal data longer than necessary. It also includes that the police may come across information that is not directly relevant to their investigation and, in such circumstances, the police aim to mitigate the risks of collateral intrusion on people’s privacy, by focusing on the information. There will be a similar approach adopted for the measures that I put down in the amendment today.
We are also working with the police on plans to implement those new youth diversion orders. As part of that, the police will have their own operational procedures and data protection impact assessments. As I said already, the legislation does not affect any existing duty on police forces that is a fundamental part of the Data Protection Act 2018. I hope that will help the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Davies of Gower. Again, I just remind the Committee that it is only in the specific cases of the two types of order—youth diversion and, effectively, the TPIM-type order that we have under existing legislation—so it is a relatively small number. I hope that, with those protections, the noble Lords can allow the Committee to agree the amendments today.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, with my other amendments to clause 132, correct references to members of the service police forces.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, with my other amendments to clause 132, correct references to members of the service police forces.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, with my other amendments to clause 132, correct references to members of the service police forces.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, with my other amendments to clause 132, correct references to members of the service police forces.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, with my other amendments to clause 132, correct references to members of the service police forces.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich
“11D When information has been copied by virtue of paragraph 11A or extracted by virtue of paragraph 11B, and it is wished to retain such information under paragraph 11A(3)(a) or paragraph 11C(a) for a period exceeding three months beginning with the day on which detention commences, such information may be retained only where the constable has reasonable grounds to suspect that a person falls within section 40(1)(b).”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, building on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Beghal v DPP [2015] UKSC 49 §58, requires reasonable suspicion as a condition for the retention beyond three months of information extracted from an electronic device or from online accounts associated with an electronic device, when that retention is said to be necessary for the purpose of determining whether a person is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
My Lords, the amendments in this group are designed to probe a proposed extension of counterterrorism and national security powers, usable only at ports, airports and places near the land border with Ireland, that are among the very strongest of all those powers vested in the police. I have consistently supported those powers, controversial though they once were, and I support the extension of them to data on the cloud by Clause 137. The issue raised by these amendments is whether those powers and their extension should be attended by improved but streamlined safeguards. My amendments suggest two simple and modest ways of achieving this.
Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 and Schedule 3 to the National Security Act 2023 authorise counterterrorism police to stop any person passing through a port or airport, on a no-suspicion basis, for the purpose of determining whether they are or have been involved in terrorism or hostile activity. Such persons may be searched; they may be detained and questioned for up to six hours; they are denied the right of silence in the face of the officers’ questions; indeed, they are liable to be prosecuted if they refuse to speak. All these powers are exercisable, I repeat, on a no-suspicion basis.
There are some thousands of Schedule 7 examinations every year—well down from the peak, but still a significant number. That is not all: any “thing” that a traveller has with them can be seized and inspected, again without any need for suspicion. That power has its origins in the historical power to rummage through hand baggage, and there are all kinds of “things” in there. Thanks to modern technology, such “things” now include laptops and mobile phones. Under the existing law, the contents of these electronic devices may be copied and retained for as long as the examining officer believes that they may be needed for use as evidence in criminal proceedings, or in connection with deportation. That is fair enough in my book. In addition, however, and relevant to my proposed amendments, the contents may be copied and retained
“for as long as is necessary for the purpose of determining”
whether a person is or has been involved in terrorism or hostile activity.
Clause 137 would extend this power so that it applies not only to data that can be extracted from the phone itself but—as touched on in the previous group—to data that is accessible from the phone and stored on the cloud. This includes, for example, the entirety of a person’s Gmail account and all their iCloud photos. The operational logic of the extension is faultless: cloud storage is a fact of life. I have no problem with Clauses 130 to 134, which apply the same principle to powers that are already well attended by safeguards. But Clause 137 gives us an opportunity to reflect, not least in the light of comments from the courts, on whether the Government and your Lordships are content for data that has been seized without the need for suspicion—and which, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, said in the previously group, increasingly encapsulates every aspect of a person’s private life—should be retained by the police without clearer parameters.
We are urged to take that opportunity to reflect by Jonathan Hall KC, my successor but one as the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. In a note published last October, he suggested that Parliament might want to consider: what safeguards will prevent excessive data being extracted and copied; how journalistic and legally privileged material on an online account will be protected; and, given the quantity of personal data that members of the public knowingly or unknowingly hold on the cloud, accessible from their device, whether, as he put it,
“merely travelling through a port or border”
is
“a sufficient reason to surrender so much of their privacy”.
Jonathan Hall does not say for how long data is, in practice, retained for the purpose of determining whether a person is involved in terrorism or hostile activity. The experience of the old management of police information, or MoPI, regime suggests, however, that personal data may be retained in police systems for very long periods indeed, particularly when the grounds for doing so are very broadly and vaguely expressed.
As one would expect, powers as strong as these have attracted legal challenge. The leading case was brought by Mrs Beghal, who was questioned under Schedule 7 at East Midlands Airport in 2011. The essentials of Schedule 7, as it then stood, were found, in 2015, to be compatible with the European convention by a majority of the Supreme Court. Lord Kerr, followed by a unanimous first section of the European Court of Human Rights, found otherwise. Fortunately, for those tasked with defending the power in the courts, Mrs Beghal was not subject to the inspection, copying, or retention of data on her phone, let alone, of course, on the cloud, but the Supreme Court was sufficiently troubled by this aspect of the power to address the issue anyway. It did not object to the suspicionless seizure, copying and retention of data belonging to a person going through a port or airport, but it did express the view, by way of obiter dictum, in paragraph 58 of its judgment that retention beyond an initial period for the purposes of determining whether a person is involved in terrorism should require objective grounds for suspicion.
My Amendment 390 would act on that dictum of the Supreme Court in relation to the existing Schedule 7 power and the proposed amendment to it. It would fix the initial period during which no suspicion is required at three months. This might be considered rather generous to the police, given that the Supreme Court appears provisionally to have had a period closer to seven days in mind. Should Amendment 390 find favour with your Lordships, a similar amendment to Schedule 3 to the National Security Act could be tabled alongside it on Report.
My Amendment 391 is directed exclusively to the National Security Act 2023. Its Schedule 3 allows an even broader basis for retaining cloud data than the Terrorism Act. As proposed by the Government, it will be sufficient reason for retaining such data that
“the constable believes it necessary … in the interests of national security”
or the
“economic well-being of the United Kingdom”—
national security being a concept that is famously undefined in our legislation.
The test of subjective belief on the part of a constable in relation to these weighty matters is about the least onerous threshold that could be imagined. Amendment 391 would replace it with an objective test—the same objective test proposed in relation to the alternative ground for retention in new paragraph 22B(a) in the Bill. This is keyhole surgery of the most minor kind, but I suggest it is the least this situation requires.
These are probing amendments, but they go some way to meeting the challenge we have been posed by the independent reviewer. They invite discussion of a question that is surely significant by any measure: are we or are we not prepared to contemplate meaningful limits on police retention of the most extensive private details of the lives of people who have done nothing more suspicious than pass through a port or airport? I beg to move.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I support Amendments 390 and 391 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, which I have signed. As he has explained, these amendments are designed to probe the proposed extension of border powers. These are powers which are already among the strongest vested in the police, which are useable at ports, airports and near the land border with Ireland.
The Committee needs very little reminder of the pedigree of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, as the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. This informs his view of these new powers under Clauses 135 to 137, which represent a major extension of state reach. They extend the existing power to seize a physical device to include data that is accessible from a phone but stored in the cloud. We are no longer talking about just a handset, but the entirety of a person’s Gmail account, iCloud photo library and private digital history. Although the operational logic of following data in the cloud is understandable, we should reflect that this information is seized without the need for prior suspicion of an offence. As the successor of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, has asked,
“is merely travelling through a port of border a sufficient reason”
for a citizen
“to surrender so much of their privacy?”
As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said, Amendment 390 would introduce a vital safeguard based on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Beghal v DPP, which stipulates that if the police wish to retain the extracted cloud data for longer than three months they must have reasonable grounds to suspect the individual is involved in terrorism or hostile activity. We cannot allow the digital core of an innocent traveller to be duplicated and kept indefinitely by the state simply because they pass through a port of entry, as the noble Lord said.
As the noble Lord said, Amendment 391 is directed at the National Security Act 2023. As it is currently drafted, the Government would allow the retention of cloud data based on the purely subjective test that the constable believes that it is necessary. This is perhaps the least onerous threshold imaginable in our law. Amendment 391 would perform what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, described as minor “keyhole surgery” by replacing this subjective belief with an objective test of necessity, which would ensure that the retention of highly sensitive personal data, which may include journalistic or legally privileged material, was governed by an actual legal standard that can be scrutinised, rather than a mere hunch or the personal belief of an individual officer.
Lord Garnier (Con)
My Lords, I intervene briefly because the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Clement-Jones, have set out with great clarity the thinking behind their two amendments, and I am very convinced by them. I am convinced by them particularly because this applies to without-suspicion seizure, which is, from my point of view, the nub of the argument that they have deployed. Although they have said on a number of occasions that these are probing amendments, they go deep into the heart of our constitutional arrangements. I need to say no more than that I hope that the Government when they come to respond to the noble Lords do so with a very probing response, because these arguments bear considerable scrutiny. From my experience of both noble Lords on the Government Front Bench, I know that they will give these amendments the due attention that they require and indeed that I would hope this Committee demands.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, I am a bit taken aback by what I have just heard. I shall be travelling to the United States shortly, and I carry with me not only my phone but an iPad. Those two hold virtually everything that matters in my life, apart from my address book: everybody I know, and so on. The “keyhole surgery” offered by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, seems extraordinarily sensible. The idea, currently under this Bill, that the police could hold information for years and years seems absolutely unacceptable. If the Government do not accept this very modest intervention, they really have to do something else. Otherwise, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, said, privacy goes out of the window.
Lord Deben (Con)
My Lords, I rise for two reasons. First, I think it is dangerous to leave lawyers to talk about these matters without the intervention of non-lawyers. Secondly, although I can claim no legal background, I am a historian, and what really worries me is that the whole of history shows how often we make mistakes in the heat of dealing with a very real issue. That is my concern. We have a very real issue of terrorism. We know that our enemies are using every possible mechanism to interfere with everything, from our elections to the way in which our motor cars are driven. We know that and, therefore, we want to protect ourselves as much as possible. But very often, when we do that, we go two steps too far, and I believe we have done so here. Indeed, if I have a complaint about these amendments, it is that I am not sure that this “keyhole surgery” will entirely dig out all the fetid wrongness in this decision. We need to go further.
I would ask that this Committee remembers that one of the roles of this House is to bring to bear long experience, and it should be the long experience of this House that it is always dangerous to legislate on things like terrorism without thinking extremely carefully about how far we are going. I believe that part of the reason why people accept the rule of law generally in Britain is that they are not afraid of the kind of intervention which this makes possible. There are two things that we have to put right. First, in the circumstances of no suspicion, it is simply not good enough to say that a constable should have his own view about the national security situation, and that that should inform a decision so certain and important as this.
The second thing we should have in mind is that we live in a world in which people do not want to share with everyone their perfectly reasonable and perfectly decent information. I believe that we have a right to privacy. It is not just because people might have an unfortunate interaction with other people that happens to be found, or that they have looked at something which perhaps would have been better not looked at, or any of those things. That is not what I am concerned about; I am concerned about the way in which human beings in this country think of the law. They believe that the law protects their personal integrity and their right to privacy. Therefore, what I want to say to the Minister, for whom, as he knows, I have great respect, is that this is not just about not going too far because of the fight against terrorism; it is also about remembering constantly what maintains our respect for the rule of law. We only have to have one example of this being used in a ridiculous manner to find people much more widely criticising the way in which the law works. Therefore, I beg of him to look rather carefully at this and see how he can meet what is an obvious problem.
Lord Berkeley of Knighton (CB)
My Lords, I shall speak extremely briefly, because, compared to the expertise of my noble friends on the Cross Benches who have spoken thus far, I would probably merit nothing like the status of a keyhole surgeon—more like a butcher, really—in terms of legal matters. But I would just say that what I have heard is very convincing, coming from people with such expertise. I very much look forward to hearing the Minister’s reasons for rejecting the amendment, if that is what he feels he must do.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
My Lords, I am absolutely astonished. Until 10 minutes ago, I had no idea that these provisions existed—that a constable without suspicion could seize a person’s devices, interrogate their data and hold on to them more or less indefinitely. Could somebody, perhaps a Minister, tell me in what circumstances suspicionless search like this is justified?
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Anderson of Ipswich and Lord Clement-Jones, for bringing forward the amendments in question. Amendments 390 and 391 have been well reasoned, and I am particularly happy to offer my support to the principle behind them. Objectivity should be the aim of every piece of legislation, and I welcome any measures towards that end. That is particularly the case when we are dealing with laws that provide the police with powers that can be used at the expense of people’s privacy. Clause 135 does this, allowing constables to extract online information from defendants’ devices should they need to determine whether the person has been involved in an act of terrorism.
I understand the Government’s intention behind this clause, and that it may have implications for national security. However, because of the importance, we should leave as little of its interpretation to human discretion as possible. We are all aware that, while we continue to support our forces, there are occasional instances of bad faith actors and, more generally, mistakes are a natural product of human enterprise. Allowing a constable’s belief to determine whether it is necessary to retain held information is an unnecessary risk that the Government do not need to take.
Similarly, we are not opposed to the principle behind Amendment 390. Individuals who are subjected to these new powers should not have the anxiety of an indefinite investigation hanging over their heads if the authorities do not have reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed. For that reason, introducing a limit on the amount of time that information can be held without reasonable suspicion is sensible. That said, I am unsure whether three months is long enough for police forces to determine whether retention is necessary. This is especially the case given the heightened stress that a decrease in officer numbers will put forces under. Despite this, I hope the Minister can agree that a limit is a sensible suggestion and update the Committee on the Government’s position.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for attempting keyhole surgery at this late stage. I suspect that some noble Lords want to go a little further in the surgery than keyhole, but I will try to assuage those fears as part of the response to the debate that we have had.
In answer initially to the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 and Schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 are important national security powers available at the UK border. They already allow a counterterrorism police officer to stop, question, search and detain a person travelling through a port or the border area in Northern Ireland to determine whether the person is or has been involved in terrorism or hostile activity. These powers do not require an examining officer to have any degree of suspicion to use them. They are already in place and have been since 2000, so they are not new powers.
This clause introduces a power for law enforcement agencies to extract information from online accounts—the cloud, wherever that cloud currently exists—that are accessible via a device examined under existing powers that allow suspicionless stop and search at ports for national security purposes. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, has rightly said, this responds directly to a long-standing concern raised by the independent reviewer, who noted that current legislation does not adequately address cloud access. I hope that, to some extent, this assuages the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Deben, on these matters. I accept and understand that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and, in moving his amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, are concerned about these issues and ensuring that we have enhanced safeguards around these powers; notably, that the retention of this cloud data for counterterrorism purposes must be reviewed after three months and that it can be retained only where a constable has reasonable grounds to suspect that the person is involved in terrorism.
The noble Lord’s Amendment 391 builds on this. In respect of the information retained, it looks to put in an objective test for assessing necessity of retention. Let me just say, including to the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, that the Government fully recognise the need for robust safeguards. I accept the points that have been made around the Committee on that. We need to have robust safeguards when exercising powers to extract or retain information from electronic devices under Schedules 7 and 3. However—this is normal practice, and I hope it will assuage the Committee’s concern—normally, and, I strongly believe, in this case, the statutory codes of practice for examining officers are the appropriate place to set out the detailed operational safeguards. If it helps the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and other noble Lords who have spoken, we are seeking to address the concerns raised by updating the code of practice that already exists to include the measures in the Bill to provide the safeguards of the requirements that have been mentioned by noble Lords in their contributions today.
Codes of practice are a long-standing approach that allows the Government to update protections flexibly and promptly and ensures that they can remain fit for purpose as operational needs and legal standards evolve. I hope I can help all those who have spoken on this and who have requested keyhole surgery on the legislation. The codes of practice are subject to parliamentary approval, so in order to take this matter forward, in the event that the Bill and these clauses become law, the clauses themselves are not brought into effect until such time as the codes of practice have received parliamentary scrutiny of an affirmative nature. We would not seek to implement the clause until the codes of practice were approved by both Houses of Parliament. It is the normal practice that, following Royal Assent, there would be consultation on what the code of practice could potentially involve before it was passed by both Houses.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
Why should something as significant as this, raised by the Supreme Court and by the very man the Government speak to about how counterterrorism should be dealt with, not be in the Bill, rather than in statutory guidance?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
Because there is already statutory guidance in relation to the operation of the 2000 legislation. The purpose of the revised codes of practice is that it is normal practice to have a code of practice approved by Parliament for how the Act is implemented by officers on the ground at the port of entry. The code of practice is approved or not approved by both Houses, it is subject to consultation, and I have given a commitment from this Dispatch Box that that code of practice and this clause, if the Bill is enacted, will not be introduced until the code of practice has achieved the assent of both Houses.
Lord Deben (Con)
The noble Lord explained that I should be happy because this had been requested by those who knew. Those who knew also requested that in the document itself, in the actual Act, there should be these changes. I do not understand why it is reasonable to accept their advice to put this in, but not reasonable to accept equally sensible advice to have the restrictions proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I have made the case and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and others can accept that case or not. If he believes that keyhole surgery is still required, he has a mechanism to begin the operation. I hope the Committee can accept the assurances I have given, based on the fact that this is an amendment to the 2000 Act. The normal practice already in place is to have codes of practice, and I am proposing, via the discussion, to have revised codes of practice, subject to parliamentary affirmative scrutiny, and that the clauses will not be implemented until such a time as both Houses give their assent to those measures. I hope that assuages the noble Lord; if it does not, he knows what to do.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
I am sorry, I must be missing something here. There is a provision to conduct a really draconian intervention on a traveller as they pass through an airport, but it is not on the basis of suspicion. On what basis does the constable, or whatever he or she is, choose that traveller rather than another traveller, if there is no suspicion involved?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I hope I can help the noble Lord. The Schedule 7 and Schedule 3 powers are exercised at pace. Some investigations, particularly those involving complex or sensitive matters, could well extend beyond three months. Evidence often emerges gradually and may be fragmented.
Statutory codes of practice provide a flexible and responsive mechanism for setting out detailed safeguards and allow for timely updates on operational and legal contexts. If we embed such details in primary legislation, with due respect to the noble and learned Baroness, that would create inflexibility and mean that we may not keep pace with changing threats or operational realities. The codes are subject to parliamentary scrutiny; they can be revised as needed and ensure robust protection. That is why I have put that argument before the Committee. If it feels that that argument is not acceptable, we will have to have that discussion later on. That is my defence against having keyhole surgery at this time.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, will respond shortly, but I am sure the Minister realises that he cannot sit down quite yet. He talked about the process, the statutory guidance and so on, but does he accept the substance of the amendments and has he given an assurance to the Committee that, if it were agreed hypothetically that the statutory code guidance was an acceptable way forward, the substance of these amendments would be incorporated into it? Does he accept the case made so eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I think I have said that the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, are worthy of reflection, but we will put the discussion ultimately into the code of practice. The final settlement will be a consultation on the code of practice. I have heard what has been said today. There will be a consultation and an opportunity for the noble Lord, with his former hat on and his position in this House, and others to comment on it. That is the case I am making and I hope I have convinced the Committee. If not, methods are available. Given the late hour and the amendment target we are trying to reach, I will rest my case.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
I thank the Minister and all noble Lords who have contributed to this excellent debate. Frankly, I am overwhelmed by the quality and quantity of the interventions. With the exception of the noble Lord who signed the amendment, I have not approached any noble Lords who spoke or even notified them that this debate was coming up. It is remarkable that so many spoke so strongly in support. I single out the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for whom we all have enormous respect as a former police officer. I hope that his approval in principle for these amendments will be heard on the Government Front Bench.
These amendments are operationally perfectly simple. Nobody has suggested that this would be a great burden on the police or any bureaucratic impediment to them doing their job. If they had been, I would have been very reluctant to propose them. Although they are operationally simple, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, said, they are of constitutional importance. They may look technical, but they are important.
On that theme, I will address the Minister’s remarks on the code of practice and the consultation on it. That really is not enough. If the law says it is enough for a constable to have a subjective belief that the economic well-being of the United Kingdom is being harmed, it will avail nobody to complain that there was no objective evidence or reasonable suspicion. The Minister perhaps heard an indication from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, of what the reaction of the courts might be to an argument of that kind. I thank him for his offer, but I am afraid it is simply a deflection. This issue pre-eminently needs to be addressed in the Bill.
I end with two further thoughts for the Minister to consider. First, for most of the last decade, Schedule 7 was the most controversial aspect of our counterterrorism laws. One reason is that it potentially affects a lot of people; a lot of people used to be stopped and questioned at airports. It took over from the old “no suspicion stop and search power”, which was repealed when Theresa May was Home Secretary in 2011 or 2012 and defused as an issue of major public concern because of some sensible but quite minor changes made to it. For example, nine hours of detention were taken down to six, alongside several other technical changes. People who were upset by Schedule 7 and saw it as targeted at them and their community were reassured that Parliament was looking at it and prepared to respond to some of their concerns.
Although this may look very technical on the pages of the Bill, I ask the Minister to remember that we have reached a sort of equilibrium on Schedule 7, but it is a very delicate one. If you are going to increase the powers in this manner, it is really important to think about safeguards as well.
I ask the Minister to reflect on a second point. He may not accept my arguments, but I put the pragmatic case to him that these arguments have been put not only by me and previous independent reviewers—the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, was also a great reformer of Schedule 7—but by the Supreme Court, which felt strongly enough about this issue to single it out for comment in a case in which the issue did not arise. As a lawyer and a member of the brotherhood of the law, I am delighted by anything that could produce more excuses for litigation. However, at such little cost, administratively or otherwise, the Minister has it in his power to do what the Supreme Court suggested and neutralise a lengthy, and one might almost say pointless, bout of litigation.
I know the Minister has a lot on his plate, but in view of the way this debate has gone and the points that have been made right around the House, I hope the Minister will find time to meet with me and perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and others if they want to come, and discuss this properly. I was sorry to hear him say he had a defence against keyhole surgery. Keyhole surgery is designed to help; it is not the sort of thing one should have to defend against. He should count himself lucky he is meeting surgeons and not butchers. However, we are very keen to meet him and I hope he might agree. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(7A) In subsection (6), after “the power” insert “in subsection (1) or (1A)”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment inserts a further consequential amendment to section 41 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022.
Lord Hanson of Flint
(i) has been authorised under a relevant power to access one or more online accounts, or(ii) is entitled by virtue of a relevant requirement to access one or more online accounts, and”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, together with my other amendment to this clause, authorise the interception of certain communications which are carried out for the purpose of accessing certain online accounts further to a prevention and investigation measure or youth diversion order.
“(3A) A “relevant requirement” means a requirement imposed under—(a) paragraph 7(1) of Schedule 1 to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011;(b) paragraph 8(1) of Schedule 7 to the National Security Act 2023;(c) section 169(2)(c) of the Crime and Policing Act 2025.”Member's explanatory statement
See my other amendment to clause 137.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(5A) The Secretary of State may not make driver information regulations in relation to Northern Ireland authorised persons without the consent of the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland.(5B) “Northern Ireland authorised persons” means authorised persons who—(a) are under the direction and control of—(i) the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland,(ii) the Belfast Harbour Commissioners, or(iii) Belfast International Airport Limited, or(b) are officers of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the Secretary of State may not make driver information regulations in relation to the Northern Ireland police without the consent of the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I hope I can be brief with these amendments because they are relatively straightforward. Clause 138 enables the Secretary of State to make driver information regulations about access to the driver licensing information held by the DVLA, the police and other law enforcement agencies. The provision applies UK-wide and, in so far as it applies to Northern Ireland, relates to a mix of reserved and transferred matters.
We have had discussions with the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland, and Amendment 394A provides that the Secretary of State may only make the driver information regulations, in so far as they relate to devolved policing agencies in Northern Ireland, in particular the Police Service of Northern Ireland, with the consent of the Department of Justice. The Northern Ireland Executive are taking forward a legislative consent motion in the Northern Ireland Assembly on this basis, and I hope the Committee can support that proposal.
Amendments 397A and 397B are technical amendments that simply clarify the period covered by the first annual report on the use of driver licensing information. Under Clause 138 as drafted, that period begins with the commencement day, which is the day on which Clause 138 comes into force. However, there will be not a single day for Clause 138 coming into force, as Clause 210 partially brings Clause 138 into force on Royal Assent for the purpose of making regulations.
With these amendments, the first annual report will cover the period beginning with the date that Clause 138 comes into force and ending on 31 December of the year in question. That is relatively straightforward. We have had discussions with the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland, which respects the devolution settlement as it applies to Northern Ireland; I commend to the Committee the amendments that tidy that up.
I will make two points about Amendment 396 from the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, to help inform her contribution. First, Clause 138 is intended only to tidy up existing legislation to ensure that all those who need access to DVLA driving licence data have clear legal powers to do so. Secondly, as she is aware—we have discussed it before—a new legal framework is being developed for law enforcement use of facial recognition and similar technologies. I will not repeat what I said earlier, but I encourage her and other noble Lords to submit their views to the consultation by 12 February. I hope that that has been helpful, but I am happy to hear what the noble Baroness has to say.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 396 in my name raises fundamental issues about this part of the Bill. My concern is about Clause 138 and its clear potential to enable facial recognition searches of the DVLA’s vast image database. That would be a dramatic change. At present, drivers’ data can be accessed only for road traffic purposes.
Amendment 396 would place a safeguard in the Bill to prevent authorised persons using information obtained under these powers for the purposes of biometric searches using facial recognition technology. It would ensure that the private images of millions of citizens cannot be repurposed to feed live or retrospective facial recognition systems without full parliamentary debate and explicit consent. Around 55 million facial images are held by the DVLA; they are collected in good faith and with a clear expectation of privacy, alongside names, addresses and medical records, for the routine purposes of getting a driving licence. Turning that repository into a police biometric pool would mark a profound shift in the relationship between the state and the citizen. Combined with live facial recognition on our streets, it would create the infrastructure for real-time, population-scale surveillance, scanning the faces of tens of millions of law-abiding people as they go about their daily lives.
In effect, most of us would find ourselves on a perpetual digital watch list, our faces repeatedly checked for potential wrongdoing. That is troubling not only because of the bias and misidentification in these systems but because it is simply not proportionate policing. The public broadly support the use of technology to catch criminals, but they also want limits and safeguards. A 2024 survey by the Centre for Emerging Technology and Security and the Alan Turing Institute found that only one in five people—just 19%—trusted police forces to use biometric tools responsibly.
That anxiety is particularly strong among women. Barely three years ago, the Casey review exposed appalling misogyny and a serious abuse of data access within policing. Against that backdrop, granting digital access to millions of female drivers’ personal details and photographs is hardly reassuring, especially when previous safeguards have failed so spectacularly. Last year alone, 229 serving police officers and staff were arrested for domestic abuse-related offences, and a further 1,200 were on restricted duties linked to such allegations. The fear is real that combining facial recognition with DVLA access could allow abusers within policing to misuse these powers to trace survivors, to remove their freedom to hide and to undermine public trust still further. We also know that this technology misidentifies members of ethnic-minority communities far more frequently, compounding injustice and eroding confidence in policing by consent.
I share the ambition for policing to use data more intelligently. Forces need joined-up intelligence systems across the entire criminal justice network, but there is a world of difference between targeted access to high-risk offender data and a blank cheque to harvest the personal information of millions of people.
Clause 138 is far too wide. It allows the Secretary of State to authorise digital access for policing or law enforcement purposes, which frankly could mean anything. What information may be accessed, and for what purpose, would later be set by regulation made under the negative procedure, giving Parliament only the most cursory scrutiny of measures, with huge implications for privacy and liberty. Such sweeping powers should not be slipped through in secondary legislation. The public did not give their driving licence photographs to become part of a national face search system. There has been no debate, no consent and no assessment of the risk to those who have good reason to remain hidden. Once civic freedoms are eroded, they are very rarely rebuilt.
When the Minister replies, I hope we will hear what the Government’s policy intention is. If their intention is to keep open the possibility of using DVLA data for surveillance, they should say so and try to justify it. We know that the police have specifically asked for this. It is not good enough to say, “This is our intention”; my amendment would ensure it cannot happen. That is the safeguard the public expect and the least this Committee should demand.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
My Lords, I rise to speak in favour of Amendment 396, to which I have added my name—my notes are only two pages long. It would ensure that the DVLA drivers database was not used for a purpose for which it was never intended; namely, to search drivers’ photos for a match with images collected by live facial recognition.
Facial recognition technology could be a useful tool in fighting serious crime if it was properly regulated and supervised, which is the case with other biometric technologies such as fingerprint and DNA, but currently it is open season on facial recognition, with no statutory constraints on its use or misuse. That means that this deeply invasive, mass surveillance tool poses a serious threat to the civil liberties and human rights of UK citizens. If used in combination with the DVLA drivers database, it would be a disproportionate expansion of police powers to identify and track innocent citizens across time and locations for low-level policing needs. It would give the authorities access to the biometric data of tens of millions of our fellow citizens. It is vital that safeguards are introduced in law to prevent this happening. This is precisely what Amendment 396 would do.
In Committee in the other place, the Policing Minister said that
“police forces do not conduct facial matching against images contained on the DVLA database, and the clause will not change that”.—[Official Report, Commons, Crime and Policing Bill Committee, 29/4/25; col. 442.]
But Clause 138 allows regulations to be made at a later date setting out how driver licensing information will be made accessible to law enforcement. All that Amendment 396 does is create safeguards to ensure that the regulations made under Clause 138 cannot provide for facial recognition searches of the DVLA database. I commend it to the Committee.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I am afraid that noble Lords are going to get the full set today. I support my noble friend’s Amendment 396, which is the meat of this group of amendments. It was proposed by my noble friend Lady Doocey and signed by me, and it addresses the profound privacy implications of Clause 138. While the Government describe the clause as a technical clarification of access to DVLA records, we on these Benches and groups such as Big Brother Watch see it as the foundation for a vast national facial recognition database. It is also a massive pre-emption, in our view, of the consultation on live facial recognition which is currently being conducted by the Government.
This amendment provides a specific and essential statutory bar. Authorised persons may not use DVLA information for biometric searches using facial recognition technology. Members of the public applying for driving licences do so to drive cars, not to be placed in a permanent digital lineup without their consent—and we know that facial recognition technology is demonstrably biased, as we discussed earlier today. Expanding its use to a database of tens of millions of law-abiding citizens would be a grossly disproportionate interference with the right to privacy under Article 8 of the ECHR. The Government claim that this is not their intention, yet they have not put that promise in the Bill.
If the Minister is sincere that this power will not be used for mass biometric surveillance, he should have no objection to this amendment. We cannot allow the end of anonymity in public spaces to be achieved through a legislative back door. We are being asked to buy into a massive extension of police access to biometric information. The technology represents a monumental shift in the relationship between the citizen and the state. Such a shift must be governed by Parliament, not by secret police watch lists. As my noble friend Lady Doocey said, this can only lead to further erosion of public trust in the police unless these safeguards are installed.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this group of amendments raises important questions about the use of data, modern policing techniques and the appropriate safeguards that must accompany them. We are sympathetic to the principle that underpins government Amendment 394A. It respects the devolution settlement in Northern Ireland and the constitutional and operational sensitivities around policing. There is a careful balance that must be struck between maintaining consistency across the United Kingdom, respecting the powers of devolved Administrations and ensuring that law enforcement agencies have the tools they need to keep the public safe.
There is also a parallel balance that must be struck between safeguarding individual liberties and being robust in tackling crime. While we recognise the intent behind the amendment, we also acknowledge that the Government must retain sufficient flexibility to ensure effective and coherent law enforcement arrangements across all parts of the UK. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response in addressing both these issues.
Amendment 396 would prohibit the use of the DVLA database for searches using live facial recognition technology. It will probably come as no surprise that we are firmly opposed to that restriction, as it would undermine one of the key inputs on which the success of live facial recognition hinges. Live facial recognition is an important and increasingly effective tool in modern policing. Used lawfully and proportionately, it has already demonstrated its value in identifying serious offenders, locating wanted individuals and preventing violent crime before it occurs. It is particularly effective in high-crime environments and transport hubs, where the risk of serious harm is elevated and where rapid identification can make a decisive difference.
Equally, across the DVLA, using driver licensing data for law enforcement purposes is not new: nor is it unregulated. Clause 138 ensures that the use of this is accompanied by safeguards, regulation-making powers to the Secretary of State, consultation requirements, a statutory code of practice and annual reporting to Parliament. These measures are designed to ensure proportionality and accountability. To carve out facial recognition from this framework would unnecessarily impede law enforcement’s ability to use the technology effectively. It would also deny the police the ability to use accurate and targeted technology to identify individuals suspected of serious criminality, even where strong safeguards are in place.
I therefore welcome the opportunity for the Minister to expand on how facial recognition fits within this framework and on the safeguards that will ensure that its use is proportionate and effective. But we should be clear that this technology, which can save lives, disrupt violent crime and protect the public, should not be ruled out by default.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her explanation on the comments and I am grateful for the general acceptance of the government amendments, which just tidy up where we are to date.
I hope I can reassure the noble Baroness on the concerns that she expressed in Amendment 396. First, I am clear that Clause 138 is intended only to tidy up existing legislation to ensure that all those who need access to DVLA driving licence data have a clear legal basis to do so. The police currently use automatically accessed DVLA data for Road Traffic Act enforcement, but are unable to use such data when investigating serious crime. The Bill, together with future regulations and a code of practice, will allow wider use of data obtained automatically.
I want to be absolutely clear for the noble Baroness that the aim is to allow the DVLA to provide information to the police. It is not designed to allow the police to send an image to the DVLA and for the DVLA to search its database for the identity of an unknown person. I hope that that gives some clarity.
I say to all three noble Lords from the Liberal Democrat Benches who have spoken that the code of practice and future regulations that we are producing under Clause 138 will be tabled under the affirmative procedure in both Houses of Parliament. I say to the noble Baroness that this is only tidying up and the revised legislation will be under the affirmative procedure.
I hope that I gave a considerable amount of detail on facial recognition in our previous discussions. We have a consultation, which closes on 12 February. We want to provide strong regulation of facial recognition and, as I said previously in Committee, I hope to have a useful, constructive dialogue on that going forward. Based on those comments, I hope that the noble Baroness will not press her amendment and I commend the amendments in my name on the Marshalled List.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes provision that is no longer needed because of the general data protection override in section 183A of the Data Protection Act 2018, which was inserted by section 106(2) of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 and came into force on 20 August 2025.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 138, page 171, leave out lines 12 to 16.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 138, page 175, line 5.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment means that the period to be covered by the Secretary of State’s first annual report starts when clause 138 comes into force for a purpose other than making regulations.
Earl Attlee
“Traffic Regulation Dispensation Order(1) The Chief Officer of police may, on receipt of a notification of a proposed movement of a vehicle or trailer carrying a load of exceptional dimensions, grant a Traffic Regulation Dispensation Order (the Order) to an operator engaged in the movement or the escorting of the vehicle or trailer.(2) The Order can permit designated traffic regulations to be disregarded for the purposes of allowing the vehicle or trailer to negotiate the notified route.(3) The Secretary of State may make regulations designating which traffic regulations the Chief Officer of Police can relax.(4) The Chief Officer of Police may relax a traffic regulation for the whole of the movement or only at a specific point in the journey and different relaxations can be made for different traffic regulations.(5) The Order may impose conditions including the number of escort vehicles and attendants required, if any.(6) When considering whether or not to grant an order and the extent of the Order, the Chief Officer of Police may take into consideration the operator’s experience, resources and capability(7) The Chief Officer must link the Order to a specific notification of the movement of a vehicle or trailer carrying a load of exceptional dimensions but the Order can cover several movements under one notification(8) In this section “vehicle or trailer carrying a load of exceptional dimensions” means a vehicle or trailer the use of which is authorised by an order made under section 44(1)(d) of the Road Traffic Act 1988.(9) In this section “operator” means the person who is remunerating the driver of the vehicle carrying the load.”Member's explanatory statement
The amendment seeks to allow the police to authorise an abnormal load driver to break normal traffic rules in order the negotiate the chosen route for the load (for example, crossing double white lines and passing a traffic island on the wrong side).
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, as well as moving my Amendment 403, I shall also speak to my Amendments 403A, 404, 413, 416D and 416M. We now come to amendments concerned with abnormal load movements and how the police manage them. At Second Reading, I outlined the problem, which is partly about certain officers taking unnecessary steps to justify their existence but mostly it is about the money. I understand that the video clip of my Second Reading speech has been shared through industry social media at least 15,000 times.
I am very grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Hanson and Lord Katz, for organising a meeting with the policy-determining Minister at the Home Office and appropriate officials and police representatives next week. This will be very helpful. This means that I can avoid wearying the Committee with several highly technical groups of amendments and instead have only one group.
I remind the Committee that I own and operate a tank transporter on behalf of the REME Museum; Ministers have full details. I have not been personally affected by the problems that I will seek to address.
Before going any further, I would like to say a word about traffic officers. We should all be really grateful to these officers, who work tirelessly to improve road safety. I have never been proceeded against for a traffic offence, but I can understand how irritating that must be. However, prosecutions and enforcement action are necessary to reduce casualties on the road. We must also remember that it is traffic police officers who have to attend the scene of devastating road traffic accidents.
There are 43 police forces in England and Wales, and my amendments concern only about eight, which I will politely describe as being errant. The 35 others operate the legislation known as the special types general order—SDGO—as intended. They are not a problem, and they should be proud of their work. The legislation is fit for purpose so long as all involved act in good faith.
Guess which police force does not do so and seeks to lead the others astray? As I explained at Second Reading, West Midlands Police—WMP—has increased its income from escorting abnormal loads from £14,000 to £1.1 million in five years. Not surprisingly, West Midlands Police is stalling on FoI requests from industry, as is West Yorkshire Police. WMP and about seven others are persecuting and harassing the heavy haulage industry when it is not necessary or proportionate. If it were, we would see the excellent commercial vehicle unit of the Metropolitan Police adopting the same tactics and policies. We do not. The Met’s income from escorting abnormal loads has remained static and modest.
The tactics employed by West Midlands Police are the ones that you would expect to see used by a corrupt police force in a slowly developing country. These include seeking unnecessary technical details that can later be checked for preciseness, deliberately misquoting or misapplying regulations, and prohibiting vehicle movements when there is no power to do so. By unnecessarily insisting that each abnormal load notification refers to only one vehicle registration number, the number of abnormal load notifications, but not movements, has increased by about 100% nationally. The regulations have not changed; this is purely the result of a few junior police officers screwing up the system.
I produced a report—it was dated 10 May 2024, so I am not jumping on the bandwagon—in which I stated, on my personal honour as a Member of your Lordships’ House, that I personally witnessed officers of the West Midlands Police harass drivers and crew of one of the most professional heavy haulage companies in the land. They did this by checking every conceivable document and measuring and examining everything possible. I knew that they would be doing this, because I was told that they had done it on each of the preceding three days.
Such excessive and overzealous checks are interfering with the smooth running of the heavy haulage industry, which is racking up significant extra costs in all the wasted time spent responding to these demands. Some businesses are having to take on extra staff just to deal with the bureaucracy generated by these police forces. I look forward to the contribution of the noble Lord, Faulkner of Worcester. As I said, these repetitive checks are largely unnecessary and serve only to justify the productivity-reducing activities of the police officers involved.
The Committee may ask itself why the industry does not just complain to the IOPC. I am sorry to say that the IOPC is not well placed to understand these technical issues. Furthermore, for reasons of resources and practicality, the IOPC has to refer relatively minor matters back to the professional standards department of the police force that gave rise to the industry complaint.
It is obvious that such a complaint being referred back to West Midlands Police would have no effect, as that police force is hopelessly compromised by the amount of money involved, and, as we have seen recently, it is dysfunctional. I am sure that I do not need to remind your Lordships that, in addition to my concerns, we have all seen this week that the Home Secretary has lost confidence in the Chief Constable of West Midlands Police, and I support her.
Even at the highest level, West Midlands Police officers appear to be unable to separate fact from fiction. In my dealings with the Assistant Chief Constable of West Midlands Police, Mike O’Hara, it appears that he has done nothing about the documentary evidence that I presented to him setting out that something is going very seriously wrong with its internal procedures. I can privately share the evidence with your Lordships.
The Committee may also ask why the industry does not resort to judicial review. The answer is that it did about 12 months ago. Unfortunately, as the Committee will understand, the judicial system is collapsing, because both this Government and the previous Government have not properly resourced it. It also appears to be overwhelmed by numerous people-type cases, often involving convention rights. As a result, JRs of a commercial nature are not being considered by the court with any great priority.
I now turn to the issue of police escort charges. There are no regulations about how much a police force can charge for providing a police escort and in what circumstances. Nearly every day, West Midlands Police will charge several different heavy hauliers for a minimum six-hour shift, even though the actual time spent escorting the load could be as short as 30 minutes. It will use the same team of officers for each job. The charge is £2,500 per time, which far exceeds the total cost of the heavy haulage itself, which commands only about £2,000 per day. My Amendment 413 would require the Secretary of State to make regulations about charging for police escorts, and it is expected largely to deal with the behaviour issues. It is very strongly supported by the industry.
If the Minister wants to claim that this is an operational matter for the police, surely the same should apply to firearms licensing fees. That is what is behind my probing Amendment 414, which I hope that the Minister will not accept.
In most police forces, the officers or officials who make the decision about whether a load needs to be escorted by the police are not the ones who pick up the overtime payments. In West Midlands Police, they very much are. My Amendment 416M would prevent this.
Earl Attlee
“(7A) An Order granted under subsection (1) must be considered a “lawful authority or excuse” under section 137(1) of the Highways Act 1980 (penalty for wilful obstruction).”
Lord Faulkner of Worcester (Lab)
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, on tabling these important amendments, on working so hard on this clause over many years and on speaking so persuasively about it tonight. I have added my name to Amendment 413, as has his noble friend, the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, who unfortunately cannot be here today.
A sector that makes particular use of abnormal load road movements is that of our heritage railways. I remind the Committee of my interest as president of the Heritage Railway Association. The movement of most heritage rolling stock between railways, whether historic steam or diesel locomotives or vintage carriages, is undertaken by road on low-loaders. Most commonly, this takes place in connection with gala events featuring visiting locomotives, but it also occurs when items of rolling stock are transported for specialist maintenance or overhaul.
Such road movements, classified as abnormal loads, are undertaken by specialist haulage contractors, sometimes accompanied by an escort vehicle. A number of police forces, though not all, as the noble Earl explained, but particularly the Staffordshire, West Midlands and West Yorkshire forces, now make charges for escorting abnormal loads within their constabulary area. These are typically between £2,500 and £5,000 per trip, but they can be higher and exceed the haulier’s charges, with some charges in excess of £7,000. Charges are also levied in Derbyshire, Greater Manchester, South Yorkshire and parts of Scotland. This is seriously disrupting the business activities of heritage railways and adding significantly to their costs in an already challenging economic and business climate.
The reasons for the escort charges do not appear to have ever been explained and there is widespread inconsistency, with some forces making charges and others not. Most determine whether a police escort is required based on weight—say, a gross weight of 80 to 100-plus tonnes—though some determine it on length: for example, 28 metres from the front to the rear of a lorry. Crucially, no national policy or framework regulates how or when police forces may charge for escorting or authorising these essential movements. This inconsistency results in these arbitrary and often excessive fees in certain police force areas. In some cases, an escort is required only for a few miles to a county boundary, with the rest of the journey then being unescorted. To avoid charges, some hauliers are now having to take massive detours around a police force area, which of course adds mileage and cost, and increases the negative environmental impact.
The National Police Chiefs’ Council has issued guidance that, while intended to provide consistency and clarification, still leaves decisions on the provision of escorts and charging to individual forces, as police forces are autonomous bodies. Several heritage railways and their haulage contractors have written to those police forces that make charges, but no changes to their charging regimes have been forthcoming. I could quote many examples but, given the lateness of the hour, I do not intend to mention more than one.
This is evidence from Noel Hartley, the operations manager of the Keighley & Worth Valley Railway. He says:
“The KWVR is suffering significantly from movements out of Ingrow—
that is the intermediate station on the line—
“in West Yorkshire and is deciding not to run certain events or we are no longer able to make enthusiast events a gold standard because we simply can’t justify the charges … For a return movement of a visiting loco it’s nearly costing five and a half thousand pounds on top of the movement costs. For an event with gross revenue of £80 or £90,000 it just isn’t feasible to stand these sort of costs which can wipe out a significant amount of the profit … In addition to the facts of police charges, the hauliers are trying to mitigate the costs of charges by avoiding the routes where they are charging—
which I referred to a moment ago. He continues:
“This means that some lorries can be diverted up to 100 miles to avoid these areas. This means that the police charges are avoided but there is still an impact on costs due to additional fuel required”.
West Midlands Police, about which we have heard a lot from the noble Earl, Lord Attlee—and a force which is much in the news this week for other reasons—is the main culprit, which hauliers avoid, because it charges for escorts on so-called straight-line routes.
Mr Hartley points out that the areas particularly affected are railways in West Yorkshire and the Midlands —that includes Kidderminster, Burton, Ecclesbourne and Chesterfield—but south Wales and east Lancashire are also affected by having to make huge detours to avoid travelling within the territory of the least helpful and most expensive police forces.
The lengths to which hauliers are having to go to in order to avoid charges mean that there is an impact on the amount of emissions produced from road transport. This could be avoided; it amounts to thousands of additional and unnecessary miles per year.
At a time when the heritage railway sector is struggling with increases in costs, not only from general utility increases and staff costs—plus the tripling of the cost of coal—these police escort charges are compounding the problem and sometimes making it impossible for railways to provide that unique visitor experience for which our country is admired all over the world.
Overall, these excessive and inconsistent charges create uncertainty, delays and significant financial pressure for heritage railways, which, as I have said many times in your Lordships’ House, are a key part of the UK’s visitor economy and in many cases are the primary, anchor tourist attractions within their areas, generating significant economic and employment benefits for their regions. I congratulate the noble Earl, and I support his amendment.
Lord Garnier (Con)
My Lords, I want to speak briefly to the amendment that my noble friend Lord Attlee spent about 15 seconds talking about; that is, his Amendment 414. At the outset of his remarks, I was worried that he might be positively going to support his own amendment, but he very quickly said that he hoped that the Minister would not accept it, and so do I.
If one looks at the draft of Amendment 414, one sees that it is designed to allow chief officers of police to set and vary any fee payable for shotguns and firearms. It is not quite clear from the draft of the proposed new clause whether this would, if enacted, cover just England and Wales, or whether it would cover England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. If the latter, that would be 45 separate chief officers of police who may well decide to set separate fees for each of the 45 police territorial areas; if it is only England and Wales, there would be 43, and that is bad enough.
I declare an interest as a holder of a shotgun certificate. While I admire, in every possible way, the chief constable of my own police area, I do not wish him to have the ability to set the level of the firearm certificate fee. It is a tax, and if it is not a tax, it is a fee that should be set by one person who is accountable to Parliament; namely, the Secretary of State. I think I need to say no more, not least because my noble friend Lord Attlee encouraged me greatly by saying precisely very little about the amendment himself.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, the only purpose of Amendment 414 is to stop the Minister saying it is an operational matter for the police. If police charges for abnormal load escorts are operational matters for the police, surely firearms licensing charges are. We have been screwing down the cost of a firearms certificate, which means that police forces are not able to do as good a job as they would like. The cost of a firearms certificate is less than the cost of the visit to the dentist.
Baroness Pidgeon (LD)
My Lords, these amendments from the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, covering the safe, proportionate and fair oversight of abnormal loads, raise an important issue. It was one that I was not particularly aware of until looking into this group of amendments. Clearly, I had not appreciated that this area had been such a social media hit since Second Reading.
We have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, about the heritage rail industry and its use of abnormal loads. I have received correspondence via Helen Morgan MP outlining the real challenges for those in the heavy transport sector working with specialist contractors who operate abnormal loads across the UK highways infrastructure. As this correspondence rightly points out, no infrastructure or major engineering project is possible without the heavy transport industry. A number of the amendments seek to address the inconsistencies in how police forces handle heavy transport, abnormal loads and mobile crane movements—issues that directly impact these businesses.
As I understand the situation, there is no national framework regulating when or how police forces charge for escorting or authorising these essential movements. This is leading to, as we have heard, arbitrary and excessive fees in some areas while others provide the service at no cost, creating uncertainty, delays and financial burdens that undermine operational efficiency and investment confidence. One example I have seen is a project to transfer a piling rig through the West Midlands, which we have heard a lot about today. It was delayed due to the unexpected police escort charges and the availability of those escort services.
These amendments, among other things, are looking for the Home Secretary to introduce clear regulations on police charging for escorts and the authorisations, ensuring that we have transparency, proportionality and national consistency. I understand that these amendments have strong industry backing from organisations, including the HTA, the Construction Plant-hire Association and the Road Haulage Association, among others.
I completely understand the thinking behind some of the amendments from the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, on the charging for special police services for abnormal loads. I also agree that there is a concern about different charging regimes and practices. I understand that this may have already been partly addressed by the National Police Chiefs’ Council guidance and a legal framework, but I would like assurance from the Minister that this is the case.
I am sure the Government will not want to change the road vehicles order 2003 without a full consultation and impact assessment, given that this is about the safe movement of abnormal loads on our highways infrastructure. However, there is clearly a need for a consistent national approach across all police forces. Given that many of these abnormal loads are supporting infrastructure and the growth agenda, I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Attlee for his long-standing commitment to this very important issue. I would venture to say that there is not another noble Lord in the Committee who cares as deeply as my noble friend does about the topic of abnormal loads.
Amendment 403 seeks to allow the police to authorise an abnormal load driver to break normal traffic rules in order to negotiate the chosen route for the load. Amendment 404 seeks to repeal the power of the police to grant certain police powers to a person escorting an abnormal load. It seems that the original intention of Schedule 5 to the Police Reform Act 2002 was that the police have the powers to direct traffic and permit regulations to be broken where necessary. However, few accreditations have made it, as it would effectively allow a self-escorter not to comply with the rules of the road.
Amendment 403 and 404, taken together, would repeal this problem and offer a more flexible solution. Instead of accreditation, Amendment 403 enables the chief constable to grant a traffic regulation dispensation order to a person escorting an abnormal load. It seems common sense to provide the Secretary of State with the flexibility needed to decide which regulations should be dispensed with. Moreover, the chief constable would have the authority to outline any conditions they consider necessary, such as the number of escort vehicles to be allowed. These amendments are well thought out, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Amendment 413 would require the Secretary of State to establish a regulatory framework to manage the fees charged to hauliers by police forces for escorting a vehicle or trailer carrying a load of exceptional dimensions. This amendment has industry support. A regulatory framework will ensure that the fees charged by police forces are consistent among forces across the country. I know that my noble friend has spent much time engaging with industry stakeholders, so I hope the Minister takes his remarks and amendments seriously. I look forward to the Government’s response.
On Amendment 414, I declare myself as an owner of a shotgun. I associate myself completely with the words of my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier. I will leave it there.
I support the principle behind my noble friend’s Amendments 416D and 416M. They are, in essence, clarifying amendments that ensure that the scope of the original measure in question is not used for the abuse of police services for personal gain. The provision of special services is a helpful law that chief officers should be able to draw on with discretion, but the compensation for the use of those services should not come at the expense of the police force’s integrity.
Compensation should ideally be monetary, with, if necessary, the short-term loan of items for specific use, as my noble friend’s amendment lays out, but it should not be equipment for personal use. Similarly, as my noble friend said, it should not be the officers making the decision on the use of special police services who gain financially from overtime payments; it should be those actually working overtime. My noble friend has laid out cases where both these incidents have happened and, once again, we hear of malpractice in the West Midlands Police.
My noble friend is infinitely wiser in his knowledge on this subject than I am, so I will defer to him, but I hope the Minister can address his undoubtedly well-informed points in depth, especially given the questions certain police forces currently face. I once again thank my noble friend for bringing these amendments forward, and I look forward to hearing both his and the Minister’s closing remarks.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I welcome the amendments from the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and his engagement with me and officials from the Home Office and the Department for Transport on abnormal loads. He brings huge—abnormally large, perhaps I should say—expertise to your Lordships’ House on these matters, and certainly expertise that is unique for this House. I thank him for raising his concerns.
It is good to hear from my noble friend Lord Faulkner of Worcester on this, bringing his experience, particularly as it pertains to the operation of heritage railways. Committee on a Bill is not complete, as far as I am concerned, if I have not talked to my noble friend Lord Faulkner about heritage railways. I have done so a few times—at least on the Employment Rights Act, I remember. Obviously, I note with added respect the new status of the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, as a social media influencer, so we should freight his words with even greater import.
On the broader issues raised by these amendments, I am aware that the noble Earl has previously written to the DfT with a report that highlighted specific concerns about the interactions between the West Midlands Police and the heavy haulage industry. He made comments about the chief constable, which are obviously relevant and topical. I think we know what he is talking about, and I will just leave it there; it does not really pertain to the issues in these amendments. That report was appreciated, but it will come as no surprise to the noble Earl—although it may sadden him—that I remind noble Lords that the police are operationally independent from government. Therefore, individual police forces are responsible for making decisions on vehicle escorts based on an assessment of risks to infrastructure and the safety of all road users.
As the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, acknowledged, the majority of police forces are making those decisions using their operational independence in a way that he is very satisfied with. The final decision in each case is for the relevant chief officer in discussion with interested local parties. That is set out in public guidance produced by the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency, National Highways and the College of Policing. However, I fully recognise the importance of constructive dialogue on these operational matters. In that spirit, the policing Minister and I are pleased to have arranged a further meeting with the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, which I believe is going to happen next week, as he said, along with the national policing lead for abnormal loads, so that these concerns can be discussed in more detail. This would provide an opportunity to ensure that the guidance issued by the National Police Chiefs’ Council is being applied consistently and that any unintended consequences for the heavy haulage industry are perfectly understood.
As a further general observation on these amendments, I reassure the noble Earl that the Government keep the special types general order 2003 under regular review to ensure that it remains fit for purpose and reflects operational needs and legal requirements. Where improvements are necessary, these can be made via an amending order, using existing powers under Section 44 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. This approach ensures that any changes are subject to the established processes for regulatory scrutiny, including impact assessments and public consultation. I hope that that provides the reassurance that the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, sought in her remarks.
In addition, I acknowledge the representations made by the Heavy Transport Association on this matter in support of the noble Earl’s amendments. The Government recognise the importance of the abnormal load and heavy haulage industry to the UK economy and its critical role in delivering major infrastructure projects across the country, be they in transport, civil engineering or housebuilding. We as a Government are committed to growth, and this is an important part of delivering that commitment. In recognition of this, the Government have supported the efforts made by the NPCC to standardise policing practices for abnormal loads. We strongly encourage police forces across the country to make full use of the new guidance on abnormal loads that was published by the NPCC in May 2025, to ensure that abnormal load hauliers receive a consistent service from the police, no matter where they are operating from. Given this ongoing work to support the industry by the NPCC, I contend that we should allow sufficient time for the new guidance to bed in before considering whether changes to the 2003 order are needed. The guidance is due to be reviewed in May 2027.
As to the specifics of these amendments, as the noble Earl explained, Amendment 403 seeks to confer on the police a power to make traffic regulation dispensation orders. This would allow abnormal load drivers to break normal traffic rules to negotiate their chosen route. While I understand the intention behind this proposal, the Government are not persuaded that it is necessary. Traffic authorities already have the power to make traffic regulation orders under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, and these can provide for precisely the situations described. The Government’s view is that traffic management should remain the responsibility of traffic authorities, which are best placed to consider the wider implications for road safety and network efficiency. Giving this power to the police would blur responsibilities and could lead to inconsistent decision-making.
The Government are also unpersuaded of the case for repealing the provision in the Police Reform Act 2002 that allows the police to accredit certain persons with limited powers to control traffic for the purpose of escorting abnormal loads. Removing this power would mean that only police officers could direct traffic during these movements. The noble Earl has suggested that few accreditations have been made by chief officers utilising these powers. That may be the case, but where such designations have been made, it is inevitably the case that the repeal of these provisions would shift the burden back on to warranted police officers, reduce flexibility in managing abnormal load movements, and lead to delays and higher costs for the haulage industry. These movements often support major infrastructure projects and time-sensitive logistics, so any additional delays could have serious economic consequences. The current system strikes a sensible balance by allowing accredited persons to assist under police oversight, ensuring safety while avoiding unnecessary demands on police time.
I turn to the amendments relating to charges levied by the police for escorting abnormal loads. Amendments 413 and 502 seek to require the Secretary of State to establish a regulatory framework for fees charged by police forces, while Amendment 416D details how payments should be made and received, and Amendment 416M seeks to prevent individuals who could be financially impacted by a decision concerning escorting an abnormal load from being involved in that decision. While I recognise that the aim of these amendments is to improve consistency and predictability for operators moving such loads, we do not believe such a statutory framework is necessary.
Further, a national framework for charging for escorting these loads also already exists. Section 25 of the Police Act 1996 contains a power for the police to recharge the costs of policing that has been requested by an individual or organisation. Fee levels are set out in NPCC guidance on special police services and updated annually. Introducing a standardised regulatory framework as envisaged in Amendment 413 would also risk undermining the ability of forces to respond flexibly and proportionately to local needs. The operational demands placed on police forces by abnormal load movements can differ across the country, influenced by a range of local factors, including geography, road infrastructure, traffic conditions and the availability of police resources.
Earl Attlee (Con)
I am grateful for the response of all noble Lords, including the Minister. On the NPCC guidance, a lot of work was done by Chief Superintendent Marc Clothier of the National Police Chiefs’ Council. He has done a great job and is highly regarded in industry. There is a lot of collaboration with industry and about 35 police forces are strictly adhering to the guidance. The problem is that a few are not, and the Minister, as he admitted, has no power to tell police forces what they should be doing. The only way the Minister can do it is by agreeing my Amendment 413.
The Minister said, quite correctly, that we can amend STGO—the 2003 order—if necessary, but that order is made under Section 44 of the Road Traffic Act and all it does is allow the Minister to make an order to allow the movement of a load that cannot comply with the construction and use regulations. It will not allow the Minister to make an order about charging regimes or the relaxation of traffic regulations.
The Minister thought that my Amendment 413 would have no flexibility. It actually has a provision for flexibility where, if it is necessary in certain circumstances to diverge from any regulations, you can go back to the Secretary of State—in other words, a Home Office official—and get permission to do something slightly different. But I am very grateful for the Minister’s response and I hope we can have a successful meeting next week. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Crime and Policing Bill
Tuesday 20th January 2026
(3 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-XI(a) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Eleventh Marshalled List) - (20 Jan 2026)
Lord Davies of Gower
“Stop and searchIn section 60(1) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (powers to stop and search in anticipation of, or after, violence)— (a) in paragraph (a) omit “serious”, and(b) in paragraph (aa)(i) omit “serious”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would lower the threshold for stop and search to “violence” rather than “serious violence”.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 411 is in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie. The amendment was championed by my honourable friend Matt Vickers in Committee in the other place.
The amendment alters the statutory threshold for the exercise of the powers under Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. That section permits a police officer of at least the rank of inspector to authorise stop and search powers within a defined locality for a period of 24 hours. Where such an authorisation has been given, a police officer may stop any member of the public to search them for offensive weapons or dangerous instruments without suspicion of the commission of an offence—so, essentially, it allows for a temporary adjustment to standard stop and search powers.
The current test that must be met is for the officer of sufficient rank to reasonably believe that incidents involving serious violence may take place in any locality in his police area. Our amendment would lower the threshold so that the police would be able to use Section 60 powers where there is a reasonable likelihood of violence, not serious violence. The fundamental principle behind this amendment is that the police should be able to act where there is a threat of violence—any form of violence—without being required to weigh the seriousness of that violence. This would remove the more subjective element of the test.
We know that stop and search powers are highly effective in combating crime and preventing violent offences. In the year ending March 2025, there were a total of 528,582 stops and searches conducted by officers in England and Wales. This represented a slight decrease of 1.4% from the previous year. Of those, 5,572 were conducted under Section 60 powers, which actually represented an increase of 5.4%. This is welcome; I am pleased to see the police making good use of their powers. But, given that there were 1.1 million incidents of violence with or without injury recorded by the police in the year ending June 2025, that the figure that the ONS has given shows no statistically significant change compared with the previous year, and that there were still 51,527 knife offences, there is more work that needs to be done. Lowering the threshold for the use of Section 60 is another tool that the Government could utilise in their efforts to crack down on the use of offensive weapons and the incidence of violence. I beg to move.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of my noble friend on the Front Bench. At this juncture, I also thank the Committee for its forbearance when I was not able to move my previous amendment on mobile phone theft. I put on record my warmest thanks to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for moving it so eloquently on that occasion.
This is an issue about the difference between “serious violence” and “violence”, but the wider context is the fact that the UK has a knife crime problem. In London, the number of incidents up to June 2025 was 15,639, which was an increase of nearly 72% from the data recorded in 2015-16. Unfortunately, it has to be said that the number of stop and search encounters peaked at the end of the last Labour Government and dramatically decreased under the two previous Governments. Between 2003 and 2011, stop and search numbers increased, peaking at 1.2 million, but by 2018 this had fallen by 77%. The number of arrests resulting from stop and search encounters had fallen from 120,000 to 48,000.
The fact is that there is significant evidence that stop and search does demonstrably have an impact on the incidence of knife crime, and therefore reduces crime. In a study released in 2025, the two criminologists Alexis Piquero and Lawrence Sherman analysed data between 2008 and 2023, and found that stop and search encounters were successful in reducing deaths and injuries related to weapons. The conclusion of the study was that
“increased stop and search encounters can significantly reduce knife-related injuries and homicides in public places”.
Evidence from a number of bodies and think tanks, including Policy Exchange, suggests that, while there may be a range of causal factors, a link between rates of knife crime and rates of stop and search exists. As the rate of stop and search decreases, the amount of knife crime increases. As stop and search rises, the amount of knife crime falls. The Chief Constable of Greater Manchester, Sir Stephen Watson, said last year:
“If you don’t back your officers to do stop and search, they will stop doing stop and search. And if you stop doing stop and search, you’ll see street robberies going up”.
The issue is the difference between “serious violence” and “violence” within that context. My simple point to the Committee is that, if we want to take weapons off the street and prevent incidents of knife crime and other crime, we have to increase stop and search. Therefore, you have to give warranted officers the legal underpinning and the authority to make the appropriate decisions for stop and search. In 2023, there were 5,014 occasions when a police officer found a weapon or firearm when looking for a different prohibited item. In 3,221 of those cases, they were looking for drugs. This is a case of effective policing and not just getting lucky. So, if they could stop for “violence”, they might find weapons that could have led to a more serious situation. If not, there is a potential for people to just walk away.
On that basis, it is wise for the Government to consider this amendment, because it allows flexibility in operational policing. Fundamentally, it will prevent crime and may even in the long run prevent serious injury or death. Therefore, I invite Ministers and the Committee to give this amendment their strong support.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I support my noble friend’s Amendment 411, because it brings clarity and accountability to the exceptional power in Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. This is not a call to strengthen police powers; it is a call to describe them accurately, so the public understand their narrow scope and the safeguards that constrain them.
Section 60 is triggered only when
“a police officer of or above the rank of inspector reasonably believes”
one of a small number of factors: that incidents of violence may take place in a locality; that a weapon used in a recent incident is being carried locally; or that people are carrying weapons without good reason; and that there has already been an incident of serious violence. The statute requires the authorisation to be for
“any place within that locality for a specified period not exceeding 24 hours”.
These are tight operational limits.
Changing the definition from “serious violence” to “violence” keeps all the safeguards that make this power exceptional rather than just routine: the inspector-level threshold; the written and recorded authorisation; the geographic and temporal limits; the ability to seize weapons; and the requirement to provide records to those stopped. Those are not peripheral details; they are the legal guardrails that protect civil liberties while enabling targeted public safety action.
I simply ask: where is the dividing line between violence and serious violence? If someone gets stabbed multiple times and it is life-threatening, we would all agree that is serious violence, but what about the person who gets stabbed once and suffers a non-life-threatening cut? Is that merely violence and so does not count? That is why we have to change this definition to any violence, no matter how serious it may be called. This is not a wide-ranging opening of the stop and search powers applying everywhere for all time. Using “violence” in operational documents with an explicit cross-reference to the Section 60 triggers reduces confusion with broader strategic programmes labelled “serious violence”. It prevents the normalisation of suspicionless searches and makes it easier for Parliament, oversight bodies and the public to scrutinise each authorisation against the statutory test.
This amendment is modest, practical and proportionate. It highlights the statutory safeguards and does not remove any of them, but it gives the police a sensible power to save lives and prevent injury where they think that there may be more violence. I urge the Committee and the Minister to support Amendment 411.
Lord Sentamu (CB)
My Lords, I agree with the wording as it is in the Bill. The word “serious” is quite important. Stop and search, particularly in the London area, has been abused. You are supposed to stop somebody because of “reasonable” grounds to suspect, but as somebody who was stopped and searched six times, and every time I did not have anything they thought I would have, I see it as a sort of overpolicing.
It is a pity that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, is not here, because when he became the chief police officer in this place, he realised that some of this was not working and was antagonising communities, not delivering the result that was expected. The Bill is worded in terms of “serious”; the amendment tries to lower the threshold. As the intention of the Bill is to stop serious crime, “serious” to me is quite important. I do not support the amendment and would like to retain the wording in the Bill.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, I am pleased to follow the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, and share some of his concerns about this amendment. Before I share those concerns, I ask the noble Lords opposite to explain the relationship and potential contradictions between this amendment and their amendment in the next group on digital identity. It is a shame that these amendments do not sit in a single group, because it would have been easier to expose the thinking behind and relationship between them. That amendment, prohibiting the police requiring someone to show a digital identity document in the event that they are stopped and searched, could have been drafted by my former colleagues at Liberty. This amendment, on diluting protections against arbitrary stop and search, would certainly not have been drafted by my former colleagues at Liberty, so noble Lords opposite seem to be pointing in two different directions when it comes to the relationship between the citizen and the state on the street.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
As usual, the noble Baroness is making a cogent and persuasive case, but I do not think she concedes that we are not talking about suspicionless searches; we are talking about an expectation that violence will happen—there will be a violent incident rather than a seriously violent incident.
I just leave her with the figures: in London, from 2021, there were 311,352 stop and searches, and they had fallen to 135,739 in 2024. At the same time, there was an 86% rise in knife crime. The argument that those of us on this side are making is that there has to be a balance. None of us wants racially profiled overpolicing, but at the same time, we have to find a reason why when we reduce stop and searches, there is an inevitable increase in knife crime.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I hear the noble Lord, but with respect, this provision relates to suspicionless stop and search. That is a term we use to describe a stop and search power that does not require reasonable suspicion that the person who is about to be stopped and searched is a criminal, is equipped or whatever it is.
The power in Section 60, therefore, is a suspicionless stop and search power, which is why it needs to be circumscribed and why there have to be certain conditions met before an area can be designated, because the normal law of the land, as noble Lords will recognise, is that anywhere in the land a constable can stop and search an individual whom they reasonably suspect of carrying a knife or being otherwise involved in criminality.
Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)
Section 60 in and of itself is a special circumstance, so whether it is suspicionless needs to be looked at in that context, and I would just like to offer the noble Baroness this context. There is no such thing as non-serious violence. Let us be very clear, when we are talking about the impact of knife carrying in particular, that any knife that has ended up in the body of a person has been shown to multiple members of the community and been used to create terror before that tragedy has happened. The idea that a stop and search is only potent when it leads to an arrest or a charge is simply incorrect. Having been a youth worker for over 35 years, I have worked with some of the most gang-involved people in the entire country, and they will tell you that they will be armed because they do not believe they are going to be stopped. Every time you do a stop and search, it sends a ripple, particularly to those who need to hear the ripple, that it could happen, so it lowers their propensity to go armed. Just because it does not lead to a charge, that does not mean it has not been effective.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord for his intervention, but I return to my central point, which is, as he pointed out in his intervention, that the normal law of the land is for stop and search on reasonable suspicion that the individual in question is a cause for concern: “I have reasonable suspicion that that person may be carrying a knife, et cetera, or otherwise involved in criminality”. These are special powers given to a relatively junior police officer; this is not a chief constable, let alone a magistrate or a judge. It allows a police officer to change the law of the land for a time-limited period for that area, to change what the stop and search regime is in that area. It is quite right that a power of that kind be tightly circumscribed because of the problems that the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, spoke about and because citizens do have rights to go about their business without fear of arbitrary stop and search.
This brings me back to my question about the relationship between Amendment 411, which is in this group on its own, and Amendment 415, which noble Lords opposite have in a separate group, and the apparent dichotomy between them. Amendment 415 says that, where there is a stop and search, an officer should not be allowed to require the presentation of digital ID; it does not even say “compulsory digital ID”. So if, as I think the Government now propose, digital ID becomes available to people to partake of, if they want, as a more convenient method of ID, we are going to have circumstances where noble Lords opposite will have more routine stop and search, but when a stop and search happens, an officer would not be able to ask the person searched to identify themselves if all they have with them is digital ID. That seems like a contradiction to me. I, for one, have always been very concerned and opposed to compulsory single identifiers, not least for the reason that they will lead to routine stop and search with people required to identify themselves to the police when they have done nothing wrong. I should be very interested if noble Lords opposite could square the relationship between this amendment and the one that follows.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, there is now considerable evidence about how stop and search powers are used in practice, their impact and long-term consequences, not least in building trust, which is so vital for effective community policing. Stop and search powers, especially under Section 60—suspicionless powers —already fall disproportionately on marginalised communities, particularly black and minority ethnic young men. Lowering the threshold from “serious violence” to “violence” can only increase the frequency and breadth of those powers and with it the disproportionality. This is not an abstract civil liberties concern but goes directly to trust and confidence.
It is also just 18 months since the Home Office accepted the findings of a police inspectorate report that identified serious shortcomings in the use of Section 60 powers, including low arrest and seizure rates for weapons, inadequate training and failures to adhere to statutory duties, such as PACE Code A or voluntary frameworks such as College of Policing APP guidance.
From a Liberal Democrat perspective, the test for expanding intrusive powers is a simple one. Is there a clear and compelling operational case, supported by evidence, that the existing powers are inadequate and that widening them will improve outcomes without unacceptable collateral damage to rights and community relations? We do not believe that the case has been made here. What is on offer is a lower legal bar for the most intrusive stop and search powers we have, imposed on communities that already experience it acutely, with no serious account taken of the long-term impact on policing by consent. On that basis, we cannot support the amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this has been a very interesting short debate, and I thank my noble friends—
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I am grateful that we are trying to make some progress—it is really good news—and I look forward to even more progress as we carry on today, but if the noble Lord will allow me, I will respond to the debate first.
The noble Lord has made some points that I accept, and he had the support of the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra and Lord Jackson of Peterborough. However, I hope I can persuade him that the amendment is not necessary, for the reasons that I will outline in a moment.
Stop and search remains a vital tool in our efforts to reduce knife crime and protect communities. The Government fully support its use, but, as my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti and indeed the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, said, it has to be done in a fair and effective manner. We want officers to have confidence in exercising those powers, but also for the community to have confidence as well.
The amendment concerns Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, which, as was outlined, allows senior officers to authorise searches for offensive weapons without reasonable suspicion for a limited time in a defined area where serious violence has occurred or is anticipated. The powers are purposely tightly framed and tightly targeted. Section 60 is intended for exceptional circumstances where serious violence is anticipated or has occurred. As this is a power to search for offensive weapons such as knives, “serious violence” remains the appropriate threshold. It would not be appropriate, in my view, to reduce that threshold in response to what might be minor scuffles, which is what the noble Lord’s amendment would in practice achieve.
There is no legal evidence that the threshold is an undue barrier to use this power. In 2008-09, under the same rules, police conducted over 150,000 Section 60 searches, while last year there were 5,288, which is a significant drop. That shows that the law has not changed in that period of time, but the issue is really one of proportionality, targeting and police practice. That is the best way forward, which helps give confidence when it is needed but also gives confidence to communities at large; the noble Lord’s amendment would widen the scope considerably. I have to say to the noble Lord that that does not mean that we are not interested in tackling knife crime.
The noble Lord, Lord Bailey—he has gone now; no, he is back, so I will let him resume his place—made a number of points about what we need to do on knife crime. I say to him and to other noble Lords who have raised issues today that the use of smarter policing through hotspot patrols, the strong partnership with communities, and prevention initiatives such as Young Futures panels are all ways in which we can help prevent knife crime without necessarily scaling down the amount of stop and search that happens and making it more available. We can already see that those approaches we have taken have worked: knife homicides are down 20%; overall, knife crime has fallen for the first time in four years; and hospital admissions for knife crime have dropped by 10%. That progress suggests that changes to existing stop and search Section 60 powers would not necessarily make progress on knife crime.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
I wonder whether the Minister could help us. I listened carefully to his remarks but I am not sure that I really understood the difference, as the Government define it, between “violence” and “serious violence”. We all perhaps have some ideas in our minds, and it has been a balanced and considered debate on both sides, but could the Minister help the Committee by helping us to define rather more clearly the difference between “violence” and “serious violence”, and how that might affect the use of these powers? I would be very much obliged if he did that.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
Section 60 powers are in operation and have been there for some significant time. As I shared with the Committee a moment ago, the use of those powers by police officers was significantly higher in the mid to late 2000s than it is now. That is because we are trying to ensure that there is operational guidance—not ministerial guidance—on the use of stop and search powers. Stop and search is seen by the police as a tool of last resort in an area where there is serious violence. I am not going to speculate for the noble Viscount on what that serious violence barrier is; that is an operational decision for the police at a local level in a particular circumstance.
The legislation is clear. The level of use has dropped because the police recognise that this is a tool of last resort which has to have the confidence of the community. I cannot differentiate between levels of violence in a way that may help the noble Viscount today, but the level of violence must be deemed at the time by a local senior police officer on the ground to be sufficiently worrying that he or she determines an area in which stop and search powers will operate. That may not answer the point, but I hope it is of some help to the noble Viscount.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
On that issue, notwithstanding the fact that these powers have to be sanctioned by a police inspector, they are often accompanied by a public information initiative from the police force concerned, and their time limit is 24 hours. If this amendment were accepted, would it not give the police the opportunity to use these powers at football matches, at which there is a chance not of serious violence but of public disorder leading to lower-level violence? In the last year or so, they have used them 357 times. Therefore, they would not necessarily use the more draconian dispersal orders which are sometimes used at football matches. What this side is asking for is more flexibility not just in respect of knife crime but of public order-related events such as football matches.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I say this as best I can to the Committee: to my knowledge, there has been no request from the police for that reduction in threshold to allow them to exercise further stop and search powers. Indeed, as has been shown over the last 15 or 16 years, the use of stop and search has significantly decreased to around the 5,000 figure, as I mentioned earlier. I hear what the noble Lord says, but I am not sure that the police themselves want to exercise that power to control crowds at football matches. I will leave it at that, if I may.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
Does my noble friend the Minister agree with me on this issue? I think he does, because he said earlier, when the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, was momentarily not with us, that minor scuffles are not serious violence and that stabbings and so on clearly are. To my own mind, a common assault between people outside the pub on a Friday night probably does not meet the threshold of serious violence, but knife robbery et cetera does.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I did indicate that minor scuffles would not be seen as serious violence. I am not trying to determine from this Dispatch Box the use of a Section 60 power by a police officer on the ground because of the level of violence the police have witnessed and wish to act upon. If we look at the figure 16 years ago, it was significantly higher than in the 12 months prior to now, at just over 5,000. The law has not changed but, going back to the point made by the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, police practice and police assessments have meant that they do not need to use that power. In parallel with that, the Government believe that if we wish to make an impact on knife crime, stop and search is a tool in extremis but better education, youth futures programmes and policing hot spots are more effective ways of reducing the problem overall. With that, I hope that the noble Lord can withdraw his amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this has become an even more interesting debate, and I thank noble Lords for their contributions, particularly my noble friends Lord Jackson and Lord Blencathra.
I say to the Minister and to noble Lords that this amendment is intended to help the Government. Regardless of our politics, everyone would like to see a reduction in violent offences, and increasing police use of stop and search is an incredibly powerful tool to do just that. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Sentamu, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that there is nothing wrong with stop and search. Stop and search is one of the most useful tools in the box. Having spent 32 years on front-line policing in London, I know that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, said, it is an issue of training and adherence to the codes of practice. There is no question about that in my mind. That is what police need to be concentrating on when it comes to the issues around stop and search.
Lowering the threshold to the likelihood of violence would enable officers to intervene earlier to prevent harm, protect the public and de-escalate potentially dangerous situations before they result in injury or worse, and before becoming serious violence cases. I know full well that officers often face rapidly evolving situations in which it is difficult to draw a clear line between violence and serious violence. I hope that the Government take this away and reflect, but for now I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower
“Prohibition on police use of digital ID(1) The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is amended as follows.(2) After section 6 insert—“6A Police not to require digital identity document(1) If, at any time, His Majesty’s Government introduce a digital identity document scheme, a constable may not—(a) require a person to produce a digital identity card on request,(b) ask a person to produce a digital identity document for inspection, or(c) use any information contained within, or obtained from, a digital identity card for the purposes of investigating a criminal offence.(2) In this section a “digital identity document” means a document which—(a) is issued to an individual by a relevant authority,(b) is available only digitally, and(c) contains or records information which could be used to identify the person.”.”
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, it has become a cliché to say that a week is a long time in politics, but it is an idiom that forever rings true. We began a couple of weeks ago with the Government still firmly wed to the idea that digital ID cards were going to save us all, and we ended the week with the policy relegated to a footnote in future history books. As with everything the Government touch these days, the digital ID policy had become completely toxic and incredibly unpopular, forcing them into the U-turn. It is a U-turn I am supportive of, and I am pleased that the Government have finally seen sense and ditched this policy.
I suppose I should be grateful to the Minister for somewhat negating the need for this amendment. It is quite easy being in opposition when the Government do your job for you.
The amendment is intended as a safeguard to prevent the police being able to require a person to show them a digital identity card when—or should I say if—such a scheme is ever introduced. Fundamentally, this whole debate comes down to who we are as a nation. Britain has never been a country where, in peacetime, one must have an identity card simply because the state mandates it.
I heard much Newspeak about the policy from Government Ministers soon after the announcement. Following the immediate backlash, many started claiming that it was not going to be mandatory after all, and that it was simply mandatory if you wanted to work. The Prime Minister said at the announcement of the policy:
“Let me spell that out: you will not be able to work in the United Kingdom if you do not have digital ID. It’s as simple as that”.
But requiring everyone who wants a job to have digital ID does make it mandatory—we all need to go to work to earn a living. We heard the justification change more times than we could count. First, it was needed to stop illegal migration and illegal working. That argument was soon blown out of the water by the fact that employers are already required to undertake right-to-work checks, and those who violate the law already were never going to suddenly start conducting such checks simply because of the existence of digital ID. Then we heard that it was necessary for efficiency and joined-up services. I can only wonder what the next justification would have been.
That is why I tabled this amendment. It was always a probing amendment, but we must make these arguments to stand up for the principle. The Government might have U-turned on this now, but what is to say that we do not see this pernicious policy creep back towards becoming mandatory in the future? In such a scenario, having such a legislative guardrail against potential police use of digital ID would make sense.
Fundamentally, the principle is that Britain is not a country where police officers require the presentation of mandatory ID cards. A person should be able, if they so wish, to go about their lives with as minimal interference by the state as possible. Digital ID cards were a wrong-headed and poorly thought-through policy, costing large sums of money that we do not have and coming at the expense of fundamental British values. I am glad to see the back of the mandatory element, but we must guard against any future expansions of this scheme. I beg to move.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I am, of course, also delighted that this amendment is now unnecessary and irrelevant, but it fits into some broader concerns that have been expressed in Committee, such as the planned nationwide rollout of police-operated live facial recognition cameras and a whole range of technology used to introduce a surveillance state. The use of digital ID would have not only created that very unpleasant checking of one’s papers by the police but introduced an element of technology which, without being anti-technology, could be seen as problematic.
I noted and would like the Minister’s response to an interview that the Home Secretary, Shabana Mahmood, did with Sir Tony Blair last week, in which she talked about AI and technology having a transformative impact on
“the whole of the law and order space”,
which would therefore mean that digital ID was not totally off the table. The Home Secretary said
“my ultimate vision for that part of the criminal justice system was to achieve, by means of AI and technology, what Jeremy Bentham tried to do with his Panopticon. That is that the eyes of the state can be on you at all times”—
a rather chilling declaration, I must say. At this stage, as we are not going to have to discuss digital ID, that broad use of technology and surveillance might be something that the Minister could reassure us on specifically. It is good to see the back of digital ID, but I am not keen on the eyes of the state being on us at all times as a justification for tackling crime and disorder.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness: I read that quote as well and was very worried about it, and the idea that we should all aspire to total surveillance and living in a panopticon. When I saw that—it has been doing the rounds on social media—I assumed it was fake news. I cannot believe that from a Labour Cabinet Minister, even from a Home Secretary—we know funny things happen to people when they go in the Home Office; I was there myself for a bit. I hope that my noble friend the Minister will assure us when he responds that there is no question of building a total surveillance state or, indeed, Bentham’s panopticon. I share the noble Baroness’s concerns, and I am grateful to her for raising them.
I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for, I think, answering the question that I put to him in the previous group, which is that his objection is to a single compulsory identifier. I share his concerns if that is the problem. I would not want us all to have to carry a single compulsory identifier, digital or otherwise, which becomes a licence to live that you can have demanded of you at any time. The compulsory element was always the problem, not having an optional identifier —for instance, if you choose to have your passport or driving licence on your phone instead of as a physical document. I understand that even lots of noble Lords now pay for their refreshments with their mobile phone; this is the world that we live in. The problem is with a single compulsory identifier, not with the option of having a digital ID, as opposed to a paper ID. I hope he will nod and indicate that we are in the same place on that.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I also support Amendment 415 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, which seeks to introduce a new safeguard for the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 regarding the potential future use of digital identification by law enforcement. I too am grateful for his explanation about the single identifier. I remind your Lordships that there were a number of amendments in some Home Office Bills about three years ago when the Home Office was trying to get access to DVLA data and, indeed, to personal medical data for anyone who might have been present at the scene of a possible crime—not the victim or the possible perpetrator, but anyone who was literally just present. I am glad that, in opposition, his party has decided to change its approach on this. It is very welcome.
I also echo the good news that the amendment is, I hope, fully redundant because of the Government’s announcement, but I look forward to making sure that some of the very minor concerns being expressed are recognised by the Government.
This amendment would provide the protection to individuals, should the Government introduce a digital identity document scheme, that a constable would be expressly prohibited from requiring a person to produce such a document on request or asking for it to be produced for inspection. Crucially, it would also prevent the police using
“any information contained within, or obtained from, a digital identity card for the purposes of investigating a criminal offence”.
That echoes the amendments that our Benches tabled to earlier Home Office Bills.
We on these Benches are fundamentally opposed to any form of compulsory digital ID. We must ensure that a digital identity scheme does not become a tool for “papers, please” policing in a digital format. As organisations such as Big Brother Watch have warned, the expansion of digital identification, such as the proposed access to the DVLA database for facial recognition, risks creating a huge and disproportionate surveillance power that, in effect, places the majority of law-abiding citizens in a permanent digital police line-up without their consent. Can the Minister confirm that it is the case that surveillance will not be used?
The Government have previously suggested that digital ID could serve as an alternative form of ID for specific purposes such as age verification for online sales. However, without the explicit prohibition contained in Amendment 415, there is a significant risk of mission creep. If we allow the police routinely to use digital ID as part of their investigative toolkit, we fundamentally shift the relationship between the individual and the state. This amendment is not about obstructing modern policing; it is about ensuring that privacy rights and civil liberties remain the default. We must codify these protections now to ensure that any future digital identity framework cannot be weaponised into a widespread surveillance system.
From these Benches we are glad about the Government U-turn, but we need more detail to ensure that those protections remain. It is for Parliament and not for operational police discretion to set the boundaries for how the state identifies its citizens. I urge the Committee to support this amendment and hope that the Ministers will give us an encouragement that it is not needed.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for setting out the case for Amendment 415. He says a week is a long time in politics, but I am going to take him all the way back to the announcement on 26 September from the Prime Minister that the Government were intending to introduce a national digital ID scheme for all British and Irish citizens and those with permission to be in the United Kingdom.
The national digital ID will empower people in their lives and their interactions with the state. It will make it easier to access public services, cut back on bureaucratic processes and support fairness across society. The national digital ID scheme will be subject to full parliamentary scrutiny in due course. In the short term, we will examine options for appropriate oversight and safeguards of the digital ID, with a public consultation set to launch soon.
As has already been said publicly, the digital ID will not be required when a person is stopped by the police using stop and search powers. This was picked up in this debate and the debate on the previous amendment by, among others, my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. It will not be mandatory for those eligible to obtain the digital ID and, as such, there will be no penalty for not having one.
Law enforcement use of data is governed by Part 3 of the Data Protection Act 2018. This places a range of obligations on law enforcement, including requirements that law enforcement processing of data must be necessary and proportionate, for a specific purpose and not excessive. All three noble Baronesses who spoke raised concerns over a move towards a surveillance state—certainly, that was the theme of the speeches by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. To be clear, the new digital ID will not be used for mass surveillance of the population and will be designed in accordance with high standards of security and privacy. We will ensure safeguards are in place to make sure that any access to data is both necessary and proportionate.
As I said, the public consultation will be launched in the coming weeks. This will ensure that any legislation includes appropriate safeguards. I am sure that, without much prompting, my noble friend and the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Fox of Buckley, will be first in the queue to contribute to that public consultation.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
Can the noble Lord clarify something? Initially, those of us who spoke suggested that possibly this amendment was not needed because digital ID was not an immediate issue and was not going to be brought in as a single identifier. So far, the Minister’s arguments have been a justification for digital ID. Is it back on? It would be useful for campaigners to understand that, let alone those of us here. When campaigners argue that digital ID is part of a surveillance state and so on, one wants to say, “Don’t be too paranoid”. I am now getting paranoid myself, having been told that the digital ID scheme had been put to one side, that it has sneaked back into the House of Lords in response to an amendment that most of us thought was not necessary.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I am going to try to stay roughly on the topic of the amendment, rather than turn this into a wider debate on the introduction of digital ID, because I am not entirely sure that my briefing will cover all the points that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, has addressed.
To be absolutely clear, we are not stepping back from the idea of introducing a digital ID. On 15 January, there was an Urgent Question on the issue in the other place that was repeated here. We have been very clear that we are introducing a digital ID programme. There are two core objectives: first, to make accessing public services easier and to make the state work better for ordinary people, and, secondly, to aid with right-to-work checks and catching those who are working illegally. To be clear, that is still happening. As I say, there is a public consultation coming that will set out the scope of the scheme, and those who wish to respond will be able to respond in those terms.
To respond directly to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, around the use of ID by policing and enforcement agencies, there are already safeguards in place to ensure that the use of any such measures is balanced against the need to protect individual privacy rights. That will be the same for digital ID as it is for existing police access to information contained within the passport and immigration databases, for example, which is done in specific circumstances where that is lawful, necessary and proportionate. An example of a legal safeguard already in place is contained in the UK Borders Act 2007, which makes it clear that holders of e-visas cannot be required to carry them at all times.
I think I have already touched on the issue of stop and search, but I cannot quite remember because of the flow of the interventions. To be clear, the digital ID will not be used as part of stop and search, and police officers will never demand to see it as part of stop and search. However, consistent with current powers where immigration enforcement are carrying out an enforcement visit or warrant, they have powers to ensure that all those who are employed have the right to work in the UK. These powers include the ability to demand ID, take biometrics, and detain, search and seize property to assist their investigation. I hope that provides some clarity on that point.
Given the considerations that I have set out, particularly the fact that the introduction of the digital ID scheme will require its own legislation in future, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank all those who have contributed to this short debate, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley.
At the time when this amendment was tabled, the Government were pressing ahead with plans that would have fundamentally altered the relationship between the citizen and the state. The prospect of compulsory digital ID, coupled with the possibility of routine police access to digital identity data, raised serious concerns about privacy and subsequent state overreach. It was precisely because of those concerns and the lack of apparent or clear safeguards that the amendment was necessary. Indeed, I am still not clear from what the Minister said in his response as to whether it will be introduced in future or whether it will be compulsory.
Since then, as we have heard, the Government have performed a U-turn, announcing that digital ID will no longer be mandatory. The amendment before us was therefore not speculative or hypothetical; it was a direct response to a live and deeply unpopular government policy. We can only hope that this sudden enthusiasm for reversing course is not confined to digital ID alone. While the U-turn means that the immediate threat that prompted it has receded, the wider issue remains unresolved. The Government’s approach to digital identity remains unclear and may change again before Report. For the time being, I will withdraw the amendment, but it is something that we will continue to consider. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe
“Wearing a face covering while cycling(1) A constable may stop any person to whom subsection (2) applies.(2) This subsection applies to a person who wears a face covering while cycling or riding a scooter in such a way as to conceal their identity.(3) A person who fails to stop when required to do so by a constable in the exercise of their powers under this section commits an offence.(4) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month or a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale (or both).”
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, my Amendment 416 would get around the problem of cyclists hiding themselves from the police by covering their faces when breaking the law.
I was extremely grateful to the Minister for taking time to meet me to discuss the various amendments to the Bill that I had tabled or supported. I endorse much of the Bill, as he knows, in its efforts to prevent and reduce crime. That includes the Government’s new offences on cycling and e-scooters, and the amendments discussed on 15 December and moved by the former Met Commissioner, the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who, like me, felt that we could go further. I just hope that action will follow.
My noble friend Lord Blencathra, who spoke so eloquently in that debate, may be amused to know that the comparison with the Wild West was a repeat of what I had said many months before. My reference to the Wild West was taken up by, I think, the Daily Mail, only to be requoted by the Mayor of London—no doubt because he agrees that it represents the problem well.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I am generally with the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and we have done an awful lot together to look at cyclists being held more accountable. On this, however, I am probably going to suggest an amendment to her amendment. As it stands, the problem with her amendment is that the police currently have the power to stop any vehicle on the road without reason. They can stop somebody with or without a mask, or for no reason at all. This power would therefore not add anything, given that the police already have the power to stop any vehicle.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, acknowledged, whether it be in the cool of the winter, or even sometimes on a cool summer’s day, there is a reason to wear a mask or a face covering if you are cycling, because it gets cold. We have probably all been there. However, something to look at in the future—perhaps on Report—is whether someone, having been stopped, can be ordered to remove their face mask. There is not an awful lot of point in stopping them and they can keep their face mask on if their identity is in question. That is also true for motorcyclists, who wear helmets. Their faces are obviously encased in a helmet and there is no power to ask them to remove the helmet. Most of them do, because it gets pretty uncomfortable after a few minutes—in fact, if you prolong the conversation long enough, they always take it off—but there is no power to compel them to do it. That may be something that could be considered in the future.
On the police needing powers to stop cyclists, there is no power to stop an e-scooter, but any vehicle on the road can be stopped by an officer for any reason—not the least of which is that the police are expected to direct traffic. That is one of the reasons that they are given the power to either redirect or stop vehicles. So, as it stands, I am not sure about this amendment.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
My Lords, I support the excellent and tightly drafted amendment from my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe. I say that it is tightly drawn because proposed new subsection (2) is about concealing one’s identity, not about wearing the clothes themselves: the scarf or the hat. I speak as a cyclist who frequently cycles in the winter, when of course you need to wear protective clothing to keep you warm. However, this is about allowing a police officer, or another person who is entitled to know your identity, to know your identity, and it is about failing to stop when required to do so by a constable.
I am glad that my noble friend mentioned the issue of live facial recognition. I am just about to finish my four-year term on the British Transport Police Authority. In terms of clear-up rates, one of the issues we have in unfortunately failing to tackle violence against women and girls—which, of course, is a government priority and a priority of the Department for Transport—is that we have way too many persistent, repeat offenders on bail who are travelling on the rail network and who are able to enter stations and get on trains. Live facial recognition, were it to be rolled out for a good reason, with proper checks and balances, would significantly reduce the incidence of those people being able to get on trains and Tubes and assault women and girls, and others. Live facial recognition is important because, if people are going to be wearing face coverings, that will naturally circumscribe the powers used in live facial recognition.
Rates of crime on bikes and scooters have gone up. Many people who are committing those crimes are hiding their identity and I believe that, in most cases, there is a legitimate reason for the police to stop them. In 2024, Sky News received figures from FoI requests that showed that crimes involving e-bikes and e-scooters had risen by more than 730% in the preceding five years. These crimes included theft, robbery, burglary, drug trafficking, stalking, rape, violent crimes and weapons offences. In 2023-24, 11,266 crimes were recorded that mentioned an e-bike or e-scooter—up from just 1,354 in 2019-20. These figures do not include data from the Metropolitan Police and the West Midlands Police—I know that West Midlands Police have been busy doing other things, not always to their great credit —so the actual numbers were likely higher.
On 30 December 2025, the Metropolitan Police reported that it had seized 37 e-bikes and scooters in an attempt to tackle crime and anti-social behaviour. That resulted in 52 arrests and weapons being seized. Between January and December 2025, Merseyside Police seized 1,000 unregistered vehicles, e-bikes, e-scooters and scramblers. It launched Operation Gears in July 2024 to deal with crime and anti-social behaviour linked specifically to bikes and scooters. In its words, two-wheeled vehicles
“are increasingly linked to serious criminal activity, including violence, robberies, and serious organised crime (SOC) offences”.
The Metropolitan Police has also produced reasonably new data—up to the end of 2023. They show that there were 4,985 cases of robbery and theft of a mobile phone in London using a motorcycle or an e-bike in 2023, and a face covering was worn in over 1,000 of those. These statistics demonstrate that it is legitimate to link bikes and scooters to crimes. Therefore, if someone is covering their face specifically to avoid identity while using these vehicles, it does raise suspicion, and it most emphatically gives police a legitimate reason to exercise their due and proper powers. On that basis, I support my noble friend’s amendment.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, as someone who regularly jumps out of the way on a pavement from e-bikes, electric scooters and so on, I think this amendment is probably very sensible, but we should listen to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, because, as far as I can see, it does not go sufficiently far. We need to add to it, perhaps on Report, a provision that the police can require someone to take their face covering off, because without that, I do not think it goes very far.
Lord Shamash (Lab)
My Lords, in my experience, the fastest and most dangerous group of cyclists are Deliveroo and Uber Eats riders. That would be the case because they have to get as many deliveries in as they can. In my experience, an awful lot of them wear face masks. I would be interested to hear from the Minister and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe—we have heard what the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, had to say—what you would begin to do about that. They have great big things on their backs saying Deliveroo or Uber Eats, but they drive fast and wear masks. Will the police stop them?
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I rise to support my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe and her Amendment 416, because it addresses a very real and rapidly accelerating problem on our streets: the use of face coverings by criminals on e-bikes and e-scooters to hide their identity while committing thefts, robberies and drug-related offences. I did not know that the Mayor of London had stolen my noble friend’s “Wild West” quote; I have lots of pages of newspaper reports on the “Wild West”. We should make sure that it is properly attributed to her; she was the inventor of the slogan.
We are not dealing with petty opportunism here, but with organised, masked offenders using high-powered electric bikes capable of 50, 60 or even 70 miles per hour, weaving through pedestrians and traffic with impunity. That may partly be the answer to the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. I agree that the amendment may need to be tweaked on Report. We are not talking here about an ordinary man or woman on an ordinary bike pedalling along and wearing a mask to keep out the cold; we are talking about people on big electric bikes, often fat-tyre bikes, belting along at phenomenal speed, wearing balaclavas rather than masks. There is certainly an element of criminality; it is not just ordinary cyclists trying to protect themselves from catching flies while they are riding.
Police forces across the country report that these vehicles are now central to a surge in mobile phone snatching and associated criminality. The scale is stark. Mobile phone thefts have almost doubled to 83,000 a year, with London at the epicentre, recording 65,000 thefts in the last reporting period. The crimes are not only fast; they are deliberately anonymous. Officers and victims consistently describe offenders wearing balaclava masks and full facial coverings. Schools in London have issued warnings about males in balaclavas targeting children for their phones on the way to school. In Newcastle, residents report masked riders armed with crowbars and knives terrorising neighbourhoods, snatching phones and intimidating women walking home.
This is not a marginal issue; it is a pattern. The police are clear: illegal e-bikes and e-scooters are being used for “all sorts of criminality”, including drug dealing, robbery and organised theft. The City of London Police states explicitly that illegal e-bikes are frequently used to commit crimes such as phone snatching, and its targeted operations have reduced such offences by 40% in the square mile. But officers say that identification is the greatest barrier to enforcement. When a rider is masked, unregistered and travelling at 50 miles an hour, the chances of apprehension are vanishingly small. As we discussed the other day, I commend the Met unit using its own fast electric e-bikes to chase these guys on bikes.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, this is somewhat Groundhog Day for the Committee, as we have considered very similar amendments and issues on earlier days. All Peers who have spoken, including my noble friends Lord Shinkwin and Lord Blencathra, the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, me and many others, have agreed that there is a significant problem—we see it very much in London but also, I am sure, in other parts of the country—of people completely ignoring the Road Traffic Act and the police doing nothing about it, to be entirely frank.
I repeat the assertion that I made from these Benches: I have never, on a single occasion in the last two or three years, seen a policeman stopping a cyclist, an e-bike rider or a delivery rider for riding the wrong way down the street. This happens the whole time; it is now the norm. If you go out after 5 pm—I often walk into the West End from your Lordships’ House to go home—there are limitless delivery riders riding very fast on electric-powered bicycles. As the Committee may know, I ride an electric bike on occasion, but they ride without lights and the wrong way down the road. The police have the powers to stop them, but they do not do it.
I ask for some answer from the Minister about how we square that circle of enforcement, while respecting the division of powers between what the police are charged with—the independence of various police forces —and the will of Parliament. One way or another, we need to get to a point where the House is confident that this problem will be addressed. I am absolutely with my noble friend in what she is trying to do with her amendment, but there are certainly difficulties. I was interested in what the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said about how the police already have the power to stop any vehicle.
I am sure we will come back to these issues on Report, and there will be determined attempts to pass amendments to this Bill, but when the Minister winds up, can he please specifically address what confidence he can give, if this House and Parliament as a whole wish this issue to be addressed, about how that will translate into action, while respecting the independence of the police force, which has such a tough job to do, does so much of it so well and has many different priorities?
Baroness Pidgeon (LD)
My Lords, as the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, said, this is Groundhog Day, and I fear we are rehearsing many of the points raised on earlier groups. We on these Benches do not support Amendment 416 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. As we have heard, there are many reasons why someone might choose to wear a face covering while cycling or scooting, ranging from the practical to the health related. As we have heard, if it is cold weather, of course you are going to wear a scarf or a face covering to keep yourself warm and prevent wind burn. Quite frankly, in the recent cold weather, that might even prevent you getting frostbite while you are cycling along.
In urban areas, there are specific masks that people wear to tackle the pollution that we still have in many of our cities, to deal with and filter out pollutants, dust and exhaust fumes. How is that wrong? Why would we want to prevent people doing that? Likewise, if we have extreme heat, people sometimes wear masks because they want to block out pollen and other allergens, and also to protect themselves from UV rays. While in this Chamber we have heard often, in my experience so far, quite negative debate about cyclists, there are many cyclists here, and they will know that covering your face prevents bugs, dirt and small debris hitting their mouth or nose while they are riding. I am an occasional cyclist, and I wear sunglasses and wrap up warm when I am out cycling to protect myself from the glare and debris. It is practical. How would we make that a problem? Why is it a cause for concern? It is practical clothing for people who choose to cycle or scoot. Why are we treating those people as criminals?
There is a separate need for management of micromobility, which has come out in all these discussions. It would be good to hear from the Minister when we might expect some legislation around managing micromobility, the explosion of e-bikes and e-scooters on our streets, and the extension of trial after trial by the previous Government. But this amendment treats all cyclists and those riding scooters as criminals, rather than as individuals dressing for their mode of transport. I hope that the Government will agree with me and these Benches that it is disproportionate and not needed in the Bill.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for tabling Amendment 416, which I entirely support. I also thank noble Lords who have contributed, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for his contribution.
The amendment, as my noble friend ably set out, would give constables the power to stop individuals cycling while wearing a face covering. Failing to do so would constitute an offence liable to a month’s imprisonment or a fine of up to £1,000. While I know that opposition to this amendment has claimed that this means police powers encroaching into an entirely innocuous activity, it is unfortunately now a necessary measure. What previously would have been a harmless and inoffensive act has been perverted by criminals into a means by which to commit crime and escape justice. We are facing a theft epidemic in this country, largely concentrated in our cities, where youths, often in gangs, shoplift and snatch phones.
Our capital city is now the phone theft capital of Europe, where a phone is snatched every seven and a half minutes. The United Kingdom accounts for almost 40% of all phone thefts on the continent. I task any Member of the Committee to watch footage of these phone thefts and deny that there is a problem with face coverings and bikes. Face coverings mean that they are not detected by CCTV, while electric bikes, often modified, mean that the victim has no chance of chasing and retrieving the stolen property. The same is true for shoplifting. CCTV footage consistently shows offenders using face coverings to evade detection, then using bikes and scooters to flee the scene. The cost to retailers of this shoplifting inevitably is passed on to consumers, and last year amounted to £2 billion.
The police must have the power to stop these criminals, and this amendment provides the grounds for it. It is often impossible to see where a thief has a stolen item on their possession, so we must look for other pointers as to who is committing these crimes. Allowing the police to intervene when they are in public on a bike or scooter is the next necessary step. It would dramatically increase the chances of victims being returned their stolen property and allow the police to begin to tackle the epidemic that we find ourselves in.
I once again thank my noble friend for her amendment, and I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say in response.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, for tabling Amendment 416. I recognise the concerns that she set out, and those set out very clearly by the many noble Lords who contributed to the debate, particularly the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra and Lord Jackson of Peterborough, about the use of bicycles and scooters in facilitating crime and anti-social behaviour.
The Government have committed to the winter of action initiative, which is running from 1 December 2025 to the end of January. This initiative is intended to focus on making town centres across England and Wales safer by building on the safer streets summer initiative and continuing efforts to tackle crime and anti-social behaviour, while addressing retail crime and night-time economy offences, particularly during the darker evenings that we have in winter, when there are higher risks to public safety.
I say directly to the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, that we are setting a framework. We always say, and I think all sides of the Committee agree, that it is for good reasons of operational independence that the police decide their priorities and how they deploy their resources, which will always be scarce however much we want to give them—there will never be enough. These initiatives give us confidence that the police are treating these sorts of offences as a priority and understand the concerns not only of this Committee but across wider society about the sorts of offences that the noble Viscount and other noble Lords set out.
The police do have powers to act here, and we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, about police powers to stop any vehicles, which is a good point. However, the powers to which I am going to refer are different, and this goes to the point raised by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. Section 60AA of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 requires individuals to remove face coverings in designated areas where they are being used for the purposes of concealing their identity and gives police the power to seize the face covering. Areas can be designated when an officer of the rank of at least inspector reasonably believes that crime is likely to take place there. We encourage police forces to make full use of these powers in areas they know to be crime hotspots. This includes any road users or cyclists, including those working for food delivery companies, as my noble friend Lord Shamash set out, when the police have due course, and irrespective of the type of vehicle being used, as the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, went to some lengths to describe.
In addition, local authorities have powers to make public spaces protection orders, which can prohibit specified acts in designated areas. I understand that a number of local authorities already have in place PSPOs that ban the wearing of face coverings in the area covered by the order, to deal with exactly this kind of anti-social behaviour by Balaclava-wearing cyclists.
This is probably as good a point as any to mention that the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, mentioned live facial recognition. I am not sure that either was in their place for the debate we had in Committee last Thursday, but I reiterate that there is a live consultation on live facial recognition, so I once again encourage noble Lords, if interested, to contribute to that and set out their views on live facial recognition.
There are of course legitimate reasons why cyclists may wear a face covering, as we heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, including health reasons or just to keep out the cold. That is often, but not always, seasonal. Notwithstanding the Stakhanovite efforts made, at least in London by the mayor, to tackle air quality through ULEZ and other measures, it is sometimes about protecting cyclists from inhaling particulates and the like. It would be disproportionate to introduce a blanket prohibition of the kind envisaged by Amendment 416 or, for that matter, to extend the Section 60AA powers, to which I have already referred, to situations where there are no grounds to reasonably believe that criminal activity may take place in a particular location. Given these considerations, I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, to withdraw her amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
We are saying here that the requirement to remove this would be accompanied by some sort of reasonable suspicion that that person had been committing a crime, so it is not just a person who has a cough or a cold.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I completely agree. I was talking more about the rationale for wearing face coverings. Without too much speculation, one could contend that some seasonal conditions might pertain to somebody wearing a full face covering or a balaclava. More importantly than anything else, this being accompanied by anti-social or suspicious behaviour would give police the rationale to use the powers I have already set out. I am not in any sense trying to make light of or excuse the situations we are talking about. I am just observing that there are reasons why people would wear a partial face covering, such as a mask, when cycling. It was just an observation; I agree with the point the noble Lord made.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for recognising the concern across the Committee—it is a serious problem—and for trying out his winter of action. However, I am disappointed by his response. The existing 1994 Act powers and the local authority arrangements he mentioned are too narrow and specific.
I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, that I am not against cyclists or masks. I am trying to make sure that, where they are being used by criminals to hide from the police, it is easier to take action. It is quite a light amendment. It is stop, not search, which we were discussing earlier.
I am grateful for the support I have had from my own Front Bench: from my very experienced noble friend Lord Davies of Gower; from my noble friend Lord Jackson, whose evidence that face coverings in particular are an issue I liked; from my noble friend Lord Blencathra, who spoke about the scale of the problem, of which there are lots more examples; and from my noble friend Lord Goschen, who spoke about his concerns around lack of enforcement, which I know the Government are trying to address but which is a serious priority. I appreciated the moral support, if I might put it like that, of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan- Howe. I will take up his offer to talk to him further about the exact character of this amendment before we get to Report—something may need to be added, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said. It sounds as if there is a definite lacuna in relation to e-scooters, presumably because they are not usually regarded as vehicles in all legislation. For now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
“Review: compliance and enforcement mechanisms in relation to police powers(1) Within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must publish a proposal for approval by the House of Commons on the establishment of an independent commission to investigate the enforcement powers of His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS) in relation to the police.(2) The proposal for an independent commission must include terms of reference, which must include, but may not be limited to—(a) a review of the powers available to other independent regulatory and investigative bodies, such as Ofqual, the Care Quality Commission, the Financial Conduct Authority, and Ofsted, for the purposes of comparison,(b) the lessons learned from other regulatory bodies with stronger enforcement powers, and(c) an examination of whether a statutory framework of coordination between HMICFRS, the Independent Office for Police Conduct, and Police and Crime Commissioners, could enhance the enforcement powers available to all three sets of bodies and the accountability of policing in England and Wales.(3) The proposal for an independent commission must set out a timetable for its work including that—(a) the commission should conclude its deliberations within nine months of its establishment, and(b) the Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before both Houses of Parliament and ensure that time is made available, within a fortnight of the report being laid, in both Houses for a substantive debate on the report’s conclusions.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to require the Government to publish a proposal for an independent commission for approval by the House of Commons to review the enforcement powers of His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS), including consideration of a statutory framework to enhance the collective enforcement powers of bodies supervising Police Forces in England and Wales.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, this is an unusual amendment for me because it is very exploratory. At the end, I am going to ask the Minister three questions, which I would really like an answer to, perhaps in writing if it is not possible today. This amendment is supported by StopWatch, an organisation that seeks accountable and fair policing. This is a crucial element of creating fair policing. When serious problems are found, how confident are we that the system can put them right? The system as it stands is a little jumbled. I suggest that it could do with some streamlining.
His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services does really important work in shining a light on what is going wrong, but inspection takes us only so far. My amendment asks whether the follow-through is strong enough and whether lessons from other regulated sectors could help turn findings into lasting improvements. In healthcare, education and financial services, regulators are able to require change. Those systems exist because inspection without action does not protect the public. The amendment invites us to consider whether policing oversight could benefit from similar clarity and grip. The amendment also raises the issue of co-ordination. Are HMICFRS, the Independent Office for Police Conduct, and police and crime commissioners working together as effectively as they can when forces fail to improve? Would clearer statutory alignment help ensure that warnings are acted on and not simply repeated?
Where concerns about proportionality and legitimacy keep resurfacing, it is right to ask whether the oversight framework is strong enough to drive change. As this Bill and others give more and more power to the police, this is the perfect time to ask. I would welcome the Minister’s response on three points. First, how do the Government judge whether inspection findings are actually leading to improvement on the ground? Secondly, have the Government considered whether closer co-operation between oversight bodies could strengthen accountability? Thirdly, are there lessons from other regulatory systems that the Government believe policing can learn from? I look forward to the Minister’s reply and to continuing this discussion as the Bill progresses.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for moving her amendment. Noble Lords will recall my work on a particular police force and abnormal loads. I am confused that it was the chief inspector who informed the Home Secretary that there was a big problem. I am grateful to her for dealing with it, but I thought that the IOPC was responsible for dealing with misconduct and that the chief inspector was looking more at efficiency and the proper use of resources. It would be extremely useful to the Committee if the Minister could explain where the dividing line is between the activities of the IOPC, which I see as being concerned with conduct and discipline, and of the chief inspector, who is concerned more about efficiency.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, the amendment rightly exposes a serious weakness in our current system. As the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, points out, HMICFRS can diagnose deep-seated problems within police forces but it does not have the power to make sure these problems are fixed. There are simply too few national levers to deal with police underperformance. Labour’s manifesto included a clear commitment to give HMICFRS new powers to intervene in failing forces, and Ministers have signalled that they want to legislate to do this. We welcome that, but the Bill contains no such clause. I appreciate that a White Paper might be imminent. Even so, I urge the Government not to miss this golden opportunity to legislate now for clear, time-bound duties and proper escalation mechanisms, so that police forces are required to act on inspectorate findings.
Amendment 416A seeks to take the Government further by building this question into a wider statutory review of policing oversight. We support that intention, but we part company with the noble Baroness on the mechanism she proposes. Setting up yet another independent commission, with the terms of reference to be devised by the Secretary of State, approved by the Commons and then followed by nine months of deliberation, risks delaying change for at least another year. The evidence base is already substantial. What is missing is not diagnosis but the authority to enforce it. The noble Baroness is quite right that enforcement is a wider problem, one that extends beyond HMICFRS to the Independent Office for Police Conduct, where lessons are not always learned, to put it mildly. I agree with the spirit of co-ordination, but we must remember that the IOPC’s role is distinct—to oversee complaints and investigate the most serious misconduct. It is not, and should not become, a general performance regulator for police forces. That role properly lies with HMICFRS and, ultimately, with Ministers.
From these Benches, our preference is clear: do not commission another review and, instead, move directly and decisively to give the inspectorate the power it so clearly needs. For too long, we have had excellent reports, full of well-reasoned recommendations, almost all accepted by the police and the Government, but nothing happens. That inaction is rarely followed up. Measures that ensure that we no longer see the same failures repeated again and again would be very welcome.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for bringing forward Amendment 416A. While I recognise the intention to ensure that policing is subject to effective scrutiny and that regulatory bodies have the tools they need to drive improvement, I do not believe this amendment is necessary, nor do I think it would represent a proportionate or effective use of time and resources. His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services already plays a well-established role in ensuring accountability. It has extensive powers to inspect, report and make recommendations, and these reports are published and robust. They are laid before Parliament and used by the Home Office and policing bodies to drive reform. Where forces fall short, the existing framework already enables escalation, follow-up inspections and external pressure.
I was also worried that this amendment risks duplicating work already being carried out within existing structures. The policing oversight landscape includes His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, the Independent Office for Police Conduct, police and crime commissioners and parliamentary scrutiny through Select Committees. Co-ordination between these bodies is important, and I suggest it would be more constructive to ensure the better use of these mechanisms rather than create a new independent commission.
It is also worth noting the practical burden imposed by this amendment. It would require the Government to establish a commission, set detailed terms of reference, run a comparative review across multiple regulators, and timetable parliamentary debates in both Houses within a very tight timeframe. That is a significant undertaking that may not be justified, given the absence of clear evidence that His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services lacks the necessary authority to fulfil its core function. For those reasons, while I very much respect the motivation behind the amendment, I do not believe it necessary or proportionate and therefore cannot support it.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for Amendment 416A. It gives me an opportunity, if nothing else, to pay tribute to His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services for the work it does; she was right to point out its professionalism. Moreover, I want to pay tribute to the current chief inspector, Sir Andy Cooke, who has announced his intention to retire in March. He has served as chief inspector with distinction, has 40 years of service to policing and was Chief Constable of Merseyside. I hope that your Lordships’ House will join me in thanking Sir Andy for his dedicated service.
The Police Act 1996 requires His Majesty’s inspectorate to publish an inspection programme and an inspection framework which, following consultation, are laid before Parliament. The latest versions of these were put before the House on 4 March 2025. As part of its work, HMICFRS inspects every police force as part of its Police Effectiveness, Efficiency and Legitimacy programme, and gives the force a grading on a series of indicators. All these findings are published and are available to chief constables, local policing bodies, the PCC, the public and, importantly, Ministers. HMICFRS also publishes a number of thematic reports covering every aspect of policing, and these form a useful tool for the policing sector to drive performance.
I agree with the noble Baroness that it is important that recommendations made by HMICFRS do not just sit on the shelf, are taken seriously and are implemented, and that those affected make sure that the public are receiving the best possible service as a whole. It is important that the three points she mentioned are examined: inspection findings, closer co-operation, and lessons learned. She quoted to the Committee the manifesto, in which we did say we would give HMICFRS new powers to intervene with failing forces. She is right to point to the fact that there is a police White Paper, which the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, also mentioned, which is expected to be published shortly. By shortly—I know this is always a topic of interest to the Committee— I do mean shortly in this case. I encourage your Lordships to study that document carefully when it is published, because it contains a wide-ranging set of proposals for improving policing in England and Wales. I hope it will go some way toward shining a light, at least, on the three questions the noble Baroness has put to the Committee today.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
Will the White Paper deal with action rather than consultation?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The White Paper will set out a number of proposals that the Government intend to bring forward in policy, legislation or executive action. There are a number of areas around police efficiency—what is done centrally and what is done locally, how it is done centrally and how it is done locally—that will form part of the wider debate on the police White Paper. The noble and learned Baroness will not have long to wait for the police White Paper. When it does come, undoubtedly there will be a Statement in the House of Commons and, as ever, I will have to repeat the Statement here in this House. There will be an opportunity to look at that direction of travel and how, importantly, we are going to implement the measures that we are putting in the White Paper, which, again, will be produced very shortly. I am sorry that I cannot give the noble Baroness any more comfort than that.
I share the reservations of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, that the proposal in the amendment would kick this matter of efficiency, co-ordination, performance and implementation further down the line than is already planned with our police White Paper proposals very shortly. So I hope the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment on the basis of those comments.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
I thank all noble Lords who have spoken, and I take to heart the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies. Of course I want fast action. I want it all and I want it now—that is my motto for life. It seems that this Committee is always hearing, “Oh, it’s all right, the Government’s dealing with this but you can have it shortly”. It does not matter whether it is talking about protest law or this particular point about accountability and action; there is always a White Paper coming along and we are going to have to wait for that, and why are we doing this Bill now if we do not have all the information we need? Anyway, I do note the Minister’s good intentions, I very much hope to see them put into action, and I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Young of Acton
“Abolition of non-crime hate incidents(1) Sections 60 and 61 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (code of practice relating to non-crime hate incidents and related procedural requirements) are repealed.(2) Non-crime hate incidents shall not be recognised as a category of incident by any police authority in the United Kingdom.(3) No police authority or police officer may record, retain or otherwise process any personal data relating to a non-crime hate incident.(4) Subsection (3) does not mean a police authority or police officer cannot record information they regard as relevant about a suspect’s motives in the course of an ongoing criminal investigation or prosecution.(5) Within three months of the coming into force of this section, any police authority which has retained any record of a non-crime hate incident, save in accordance with the provisions of subsection (4), must delete such record.(6) For the purposes of this section—“non-crime hate incident” means any incident or alleged incident which does not constitute a criminal offence, but is perceived, by any person, to have been motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility or prejudice towards a person or group on the grounds of race, religion, sexual orientation, disability or transgender identity;“police authority” means a person specified in sub-section 158(1);“police officer” means any person acting under the authority a police authority.”
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
My Lords, I declare my interest as the director of the Free Speech Union, which has been campaigning against non-crime hate incidents for at least five years.
I thought it might be helpful to begin with a definition of what an NCHI is. The amendment itself says that it is
“any incident or alleged incident which does not constitute a criminal offence, but is perceived, by any person, to have been motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility or prejudice towards a person or group on the grounds of race, religion, sexual orientation, disability or transgender identity”.
How many of these incidents have been recorded by the police since the concept of NCHIs was introduced by the College of Policing in 2014? The Telegraph submitted an FoI request to all 43 police forces in England and Wales in early 2020, and 34 of the 43 —about three-quarters of the police forces in England and Wales—responded and disclosed that 119,934 NCHIs had been recorded in England and Wales in the five years from 2014 to 2019. By my calculation, that is an average of 65 a day—and remember, that that is just in England and Wales, and just three-quarters of the real total. There is no reason to think that the number being recorded every day by police forces in England and Wales has declined from that average of 65 since then, in the subsequent six years.
How long does it take the police? How many police hours are spent recording NCHIs? Policy Exchange published a report last November in which it concluded that the police spend 60,000 hours a year—again, that is just the police in England and Wales—investigating and recording non-crime hate incidents. If you factor in that they have been around since 2014, that means the police have spent at least 660,000 hours investigating and recording non-crimes since 2014.
What sort of incidents are we talking about? “Non-crime hate incident” sounds quite serious. I will give just a handful of examples. A man had an NCHI recorded against him after a neighbour complained that his whistling the theme tune to “Bob the Builder” was racist. A woman had an NCHI recorded against her name because she posted on X that she thought her cat was a Methodist. A nine year-old girl had an NCHI recorded against her because she called another girl in the school playground a “retard”. Two secondary school pupils had NCHIs recorded against them for saying about another girl, again in the school playground, that she smelled like fish. This is the kind of thing that the police have been spending 660,000 hours investigating and recording since 2014.
Incidentally, I know of at least one Member of this House who has had an NCHI recorded against her, and a Conservative Home Secretary, Amber Rudd, had an NCHI recorded against her because of a complaint made about the contents of her speech at a Conservative Party conference that she was addressed in her capacity as Home Secretary.
So it seems that it is not terribly difficult to make the argument that the police have been wasting a huge amount of time investigating and recording relatively trivial incidents. Again, I stress that the definition says that if it is merely “perceived”, not just by the “victim” but by any person, as being motivated by hostility or prejudice towards the “victim’s” protected characteristics, it can be recorded as an NCHI. Sometimes, when NCHIs are recorded, the person against whom the NCHI is recorded is not informed—so you might well have an NCHI recorded against you without knowing it.
All this sounds quite trivial, but having an NCHI recorded against your name can be quite serious, because chief constables, at their discretion, can disclose the fact that an NCHI has been recorded against a person when they apply for a job that requires them to do an enhanced DBS check. So, you can end up not getting a job as a teacher or a carer, or a voluntary position with a charity such as the Samaritans, because you have an NCHI recorded against your name.
I will just point out one more, I think unintended, consequence of the NCHI regime, which is that records are deleted after six years. So if you have an NCHI recorded against you at the age of 17, it remains on what is in effect your criminal record until you are 23, whereas quite serious criminal offences, if you are convicted, are spent when you reach the age of majority. The fact that you have committed a non-crime can hang about your neck like a bad smell long after you have reached the age of majority, even if it was recorded against you when you were a child. So, in some senses, not committing a crime and having that recorded against you can have more serious consequences than committing quite a serious crime and being convicted of it.
I believe that I am pushing at an open door. A report on NCHIs has been commissioned by the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council. They have published a provisional version of the report, in which they declare the NCHI regime unfit for purpose. I do not think that they have submitted the final report to the Home Secretary yet, but I know that, when they do, the Home Secretary is likely to take up the recommendations, and I think we will see the end of the NCHI regime.
I have four issues on which I hope the Minister can provide some reassurance. The first is that, as I understand it, the new regime will be that incidents are no longer recorded as non-crime hate incidents; some cases will be recorded as anti-social behaviour incidents, but they will not be logged on the police national database. I ask for the Minister’s assurance that anti-social behaviour incidents that would have been recorded as NCHIs under the old regime will not, unlike NCHIs, be recorded on the police national database.
I also ask for the Minister’s assurance that, once the new regime is in place, previous NCHIs recorded under the old regime will be deleted and will not hang around for six years as they do currently, given that there is acceptance that the regime is not fit for purpose. If the regime is not fit for purpose, I hope the Minister can assure us that existing NCHIs—it is not inconceivable that they number in the hundreds of thousands—will be deleted. Finally, I seek reassurance that these anti-social behaviour incidents will not be disclosed in enhanced DBS checks.
I hope that the review by the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council will be submitted and digested in time for the new regime to be put in place on Report. I beg to move.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I have added my name to this amendment because we need to move on from the recording of non-crime hate incidents by removing them altogether from police systems.
Non-crime hate recording had an honourable start, following on from the Macpherson inquiry. There were two problems at the time. The first was that recordable crime was lower than it should have been because it was not being recorded accurately, due to misrecording and it sometimes not being recorded at all. This was linked to police performance being measured by the amount of crime in society. Therefore, the police service was incentivised to record less rather than more crime, thereby, ironically, undermining its own bid for more resourcing.
The murder of Stephen Lawrence showed us that, sometimes, before a crime is committed, there are signals that someone may be a racist, for example, and that, if we take the right action, we could prevent those crimes occurring and someone getting hurt or any other crime being committed. That system worked well at the start, because it allowed the police to collect intelligence and spot patterns—for example, by geography, suspect or victims. That relied on the basic repeat offender victim location theory, which shows that 10% of repeat offenders can account for over half of some crimes.
The problem is that the same system is now being used to police the social harms caused by causing offence. Causing offence is not a crime. The internet amplifies the problem—first, because it has a permanent record of the offensive but not criminal behaviour, and, secondly, because it allows millions of people, sometimes worldwide, to see the communication. For everybody involved, it is then very hard to ignore. This has led to some bizarre police interventions—the noble Lord, Lord Young, has already mentioned some—on issues that are not crimes or even non-crime hate. The public have juxtaposed these with significant complaints—such as shoplifting, car theft and other serious crimes—that, meanwhile, the police say they are too busy to deal with, even when a suspect is available to arrest. The two issues do not sit well together.
There is a need to record intelligence about incidents that may later become significant if crimes are committed. This can be on the police command and control log, where the incident can be given an anti-social behaviour coding, or on the criminal intelligence system. The problem arises if the name of a person who is said to have caused offence is recorded. In my view, if the police say that they will record what is being alleged because someone has called the control room and they need to log all calls—the police later denying that a call had come in would not be sensible—then it is necessary to record those incidents in the control room. However, if, on the face of what a person tells the police, they see no crime or incident, they will not investigate and will not record the name of the person the caller says has offended them.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, I also very much support this amendment as, I hope, a nudge towards an opening door that the Government are already looking at. Following on from the powerful speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, it seems that, quite apart from the recipients of these NCHIs, there are two further issues: the waste of time and the waste of money. The police are always short of money and of time. That is obvious and has been said by the noble Lords, Lord Young and Lord Hogan-Howe. If this was removed, they could get on and do their job. They would save a great deal of money and something even more important, because they would be dealing with the crimes that people really need them to deal with.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, this is already proving to be a crucial debate in the passage of this Bill. I support Amendment 416E, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton. Sadly, my noble friend Lord Strasburger is unable to be with us to support the amendment, which he has signed, but I hope that I reflect his views in speaking today.
Non-crime hate incidents, although born from the well-intentioned Macpherson report in 1993—which the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, called “an honourable start”—have morphed into a mechanism that frequently harasses and silences legitimate debate. In doing so, they consume prodigious quantities of police time, as we have heard—time that is desperately needed to investigate the crimes that we have discussed throughout Committee. Non-crime hate incidents, which started from benign motivations in 1993, have morphed into an ugly and frequently used technique for harassing and silencing somebody whose views the complainant does not like. In the process, prodigious quantities of police time are being wasted on non-criminal matters, meaning that real crimes that would otherwise be investigated are being ignored.
The seeds of what has gone wrong were sown by the Macpherson inquiry into the murder of Stephen Lawrence. The inquiry concluded that a racist incident should be defined as being
“any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person”.
In essence, that means that anyone—whether involved in an incident or not, whether a reasonable person or otherwise—would be able to determine that an incident, no matter how harmless, was racist in nature. The inquiry went on to recommend that
“the term ‘racist incident’ must be understood to include crimes and non-crimes in policing terms. Both must be reported, recorded and investigated with equal commitment”.
It is remarkable that the inquiry concluded that incidents which are not criminal offences as defined by Parliament should be investigated by the police with equal vigour as those which are criminal offences. That raises fundamental questions about the purpose of the police and what their priorities should be, particularly in a world of potentially limitless demand and highly constrained resource.
Nevertheless, Macpherson’s recommendations relating to racist incidents and their recording were rapidly accepted and implemented by the police and government. Following a 2006 review by Sir Adrian Fulford, a shared definition of hate crimes and non-crime hate incidents was adopted across the criminal justice system, including by the police and the Crown Prosecution Service. This expanded the recording of NCHIs beyond purely racist incidents to cover all those characteristics that are covered by hate crime legislation in England and Wales—race, religion, disability, sexual orientation and gender identity.
Key to the expansion of alleged NCHIs was the creation, in 2014, of the College of Policing’s Hate Crime Operational Guidance for police forces. Perhaps recognising that the guidance was likely to cause grave concerns to many, the College of Policing made a pre-emptive defence of their policy, saying:
“The recording of, and response to, non-crime hate incidents does not have universal support in society. Some people use this as evidence to accuse the police of becoming ‘the thought police’, trying to control what citizens think or believe, rather than what they do”.
The guidance goes on to say, in relation to hate incidents:
“Where any person, including police personnel, reports a hate incident which would not be the primary responsibility of another agency, it must be recorded regardless of whether or not they are the victim, and irrespective of whether there is any evidence to identify the hate element”.
The use of “must” in the guidance leaves no latitude for police discretion or the balancing of rights exercise, which would be necessary in considering the subject’s right to freedom of expression under Article 10.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
With the advent of social media, the number of NCHIs being recorded has rocketed. Policy Exchange reported in 2024 that over 13,000 are being logged annually in England and Wales, consuming 60,000 police hours a year. Some keyboard warriors with an axe to grind have made a full-time occupation out of submitting prolific quantities of NCHI complaints with little or no justification. These include a disgraced former policeman who prodigiously exploits the system to frequently harass his political opponents. Some incidents have hit the press, such as when Graham Linehan, the co-creator of “Father Ted”, was arrested on the tarmac at Heathrow over an NCHI.
However, many victims of spurious NCHIs are not even aware that a complaint has been logged against their name. One campaigner found out only when the complainant launched a judicial review of the police’s refusal to take the matter further. As we have heard, the impact of having an unproven NCHI secretly logged against your name can be severe and mean that you are refused a visa to visit certain countries, including America, or that you fail an enhanced DBS check for a job in areas such as education or health.
Freedom of information requests to 43 police forces found zero examples of NCHIs preventing crime. The Metropolitan Police announced last October that it has stopped investigating NCHIs entirely. Last month, the National Police Chiefs’ Council and the College of Policing reported to the Government that NCHIs are “not fit for purpose”.
NCHIs must go. The Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, stated during our debates on the seventh day in Committee that the College of Policing is reviewing this guidance and that we would see this review before Report. I hope that the Minister can confirm whether that review will address the chilling effect on free speech identified in the Miller judgment and whether he accepts that the police must prioritise actual criminality over the recording of NCHIs.
I support this amendment as a necessary check on the expansion of the surveillance state. When will the Government act to abolish NCHIs? If the Minister cannot answer that question, we will have to return to this matter on Report.
Lord Herbert of South Downs (Con)
My Lords, I draw attention to my declaration in the register of interests that I am chair of the College of Policing.
As I said at Second Reading, we need to remember that there were benign reasons for the introduction of this regime over three decades ago; what the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, said in this regard was helpful. The purpose was to ensure that the police would pursue intelligence that could build a pattern of behaviour that would result in harm to an individual. That was the case not just in relation to the dreadful murder of Stephen Lawrence but subsequently in the case of Fiona Pilkington, where a repeated pattern of anti-social behaviour had been ignored. It was not criminal behaviour—it fell below that threshold—but it nevertheless resulted in a tragic loss of life.
Nevertheless, as has been noted, there has been considerable change over that three decades, with the advent of social media, smartphones and a much more contested policy space in many of the areas relating to hate crimes or alleged hate crimes. There is the risk of a number of consequences. Those have been drawn attention to by noble Lords, but they include the chilling effect on free speech, the tying up of resources unnecessarily —I will come to that—and, I suggest, at least as serious, damage to the reputation of the police, if it is perceived that they are prioritising the wrong things and getting themselves involved in matters that they should not be.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I am delighted to rise to support my noble friend Lord Young of Acton’s excellent Amendment 416E, which seeks to abolish the non-crime hate incident regime, which is long overdue. The principle at stake is quite simple and fundamental. The state must not brand people as potential wrongdoers when no criminal offence has been committed. So I congratulate my noble friend on moving the amendment and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, whose masterful speech made an absolutely compelling case for the immediate abolition of this obnoxious regime.
I am delighted to hear the wise words of my noble friend Lord Herbert of South Downs, in his role as chair of the College of Policing. If it looks like, as the noble Lord said, the regime is not fit for purpose, and if that report gets to the Home Office before Report, we want amendments on Report to abolish it, rather than putting it out to consultation for another three months to decide whether to do it in some future criminal justice Bill. If it is not fit for purpose now, it should not be fit for purpose a moment longer than necessary.
For far too long, under all Governments, this gross abuse of our fundamental freedoms has been tolerated. I cannot count the number of times I have heard police and Ministers justify it on the basis that it is an essential intelligence-gathering tool which would be helpful in heading off future crimes. I strongly believe in intelligence-led policing and recording secretly any information on potential criminal activity. But it is not intelligence if you record it on a database and give it to prospective employers with, in the immortal words of Monty Python, a “nudge nudge, wink wink, say no more” sort of thing.
Recent reporting makes this danger painfully clear. As my noble friend said, we now have the documented cases of a nine year-old boy logged for calling another pupil a retard; two schoolgirls accused of saying someone else smelled like fish; and the extraordinary case of Harry Miller, a former police officer, who was visited at work by Humberside Police because he tweeted this joke:
“I was assigned Mammal at Birth, but my orientation is Fish”—
it is not a very funny joke, but nevertheless—which the force recorded as a non-crime hate incident until the High Court ruled its actions a “disproportionate interference” with his freedom of expression, and rightly so.
The case of Allison Pearson was mentioned by my noble friend: the national newspaper columnist had police officers knock on her door on Remembrance Sunday to accuse her of “stirring up racial hatred” over a tweet she had already deleted. It was never told what she was being investigated for, because no offence had been committed. A person who has committed no crime can be questioned, placed on a police record and left with a stain that follows them into job applications, community life and future interactions with the state.
This is not a harmless administrative note. A police record, even where no offence has been committed, can surface in enhanced checks, damage careers and stigmatise people in their communities. It creates a two-tier system of reputational punishment: one for those convicted of crimes and another, less visible but no less damaging, for those who have merely expressed opinions or made mistakes. That is a grave injustice. The state must not be in the business of branding citizens as potential wrongdoers when no criminality has been established. Recording non-criminal speech as a hate incident treats lawful expression as if it were a criminal matter.
This practice chills debate, deters whistleblowers and journalists, and discourages civic participation. It stops harmless jokes and humour. If this system had existed 30 years ago in the British Army, hundreds of thousands of sergeant-majors would have had millions of records against them, because the wonderful terms of abuse and insults they had for us when we got our marching wrong and made mistakes were absolutely astronomical. I do not think we suffered any harm because of those jokes and humour at our expense.
Amendment 416E restores the proper boundary between policing and free expression. It does not prevent the police investigating genuine criminal offences or using intelligence proportionately where there is a real threat to safety. What it does is prevent the indefinite administrative stigmatisation of people who have committed no crime. It protects employment prospects, reputations and the right to speak without fear of being treated as a suspect.
To me, the key subsection is not on stopping them doing it in future but on purging current records, as proposed new subsection (5) says:
“Within three months of the coming into force of this section, any police authority which has retained any record of a non-crime hate incident, save in accordance with the provisions of subsection (4), must delete such record”.
I agree entirely, but I warn noble Lords that the police, in many cases, will try not to do it. They will find every excuse to hang on to that database and not delete it immediately.
I have tremendous respect for the police and the brave work they do on our behalf, and I pay tribute to the 4,000 officers killed in the last 200 years, since the first salaried officers went on duty. All the police I have ever met have wanted to save lives, crack down on crime and keep the King’s peace—but if you gave them a completely free hand, they would want to collect from every person over the age of five their fingerprints, DNA and biometric data and use them to stop crime. They would succeed—it would make a tremendous difference—but I think that is not the sort of society we want to allow. Therefore, we should not permit the retention of data on individuals who have not committed any crime.
I was interested in what the noble Lord, Lord Hogan- Howe, said about recording. When I heard the Metropolitan Police commissioner say a few weeks ago that it was not going to investigate non-crime hate incidents and was just going to record them, I thought, “Hang on”. That means that if someone accuses someone else of being racist, the police will not investigate to see whether it is right or wrong but will still record it as a crime. If keeping it recorded means in the call centre, on the record, that is okay, but it should not be recorded on any other database if it is not actually a crime.
I conclude by saying that this reform is practical. As my noble friend said, police resources are finite. Recording and managing non-crime entries diverts police officers from investigating real criminality and protecting victims. If the state wants to monitor tensions, it can do so through proportionate, anonymised intelligence and community safety work, not by placing individuals on quasi-criminal registers for conduct that is lawful. I support my noble friend’s amendment, and I support what my noble friend Lord Herbert of South Downs said about the College of Policing saying it is not fit for purpose. I therefore look forward to a commitment from the Minister that we will have an amendment on Report that implements what my noble friend Lord Young has said in Amendment 416E.
Lord Kempsell (Con)
My Lords, I declare my interest as a freelance journalist and, therefore, somebody who has a very great care for freedom of speech. What a pleasure it is to follow the speech of my noble friend Lord Blencathra, which so brilliantly summarised all the reasons there are to support Amendment 416E in the name of my noble friend Lord Young and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
My Lords, I strongly support the excellent amendment of my noble friend Lord Young of Acton. I declare an interest as a paid-up member of the Free Speech Union.
I was brought up in Plumstead in south-east London, as was Stephen Lawrence. I can absolutely understand the horror and the imperative for action that arose from the disgraceful racist murder of that young man in 1993: there was a clamour to tackle the culture that gave rise to five racist thugs taking that young man’s life. That is a very important context, but I am afraid that things have developed in a way that we did not foresee way back in 1993.
In preparing for this debate, I was reminded of the remarks of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Stephen Parkinson, in 2024:
“I had to look up what on earth the term”—
non-crime hate incidents—
“meant—I was puzzled by it”.
Coming from the DPP, that reveals a lot about what a strange anomaly NCHIs have been.
The idea that there is a kind of police record that can result in ordinary people who have committed no crime being visited by police at their home or workplace because an investigation has been launched into whether their views or attitudes may one day lead to criminal activity should be seen as entirely incongruent with British justice and freedom of expression. It brings to mind the film “Minority Report” and the fictional idea of pre-crime. But this is not fiction: it is the real world. The idea that, in the real world, a person could lose their job because an NCHI shows up on an enhanced DBS check ought to be anathema to us.
Mention was made earlier of Allison Pearson. My noble friend Lord Herbert of South Downs is absolutely right: it was the Communications Act or another piece of legislation that was involved when Essex Police visited her on Remembrance Sunday 2024. She has nevertheless raised the public profile of the impact of NCHIs on people and, for that, we should thank her, as we should Harry Miller and others.
The Times reported that year that 13,200 NCHIs were recorded by 45 police forces in the 12 months to June 2024. That includes allegations against doctors, vicars, social workers and even primary school children. As we have heard, Policy Exchange calculated that this had amounted to at least 60,000 hours of officer time. It surely was never a defensible use of police time, especially while so many serious crimes such as burglaries and sexual offences remain unsolved and uninvestigated. There are too many stories to tell, but one elderly woman was shocked to find herself the subject of an NCHI after taking a photograph of a sticker which read: “Keep males out of women-only spaces”. She did not even put the sticker up; she just took a photo of it. The 73 year-old received a visit from police officers after she was caught on CCTV taking the photo of the sticker, which someone had put up on an LGBT Pride poster. She said she agreed with its sentiments and wanted to show it to her partner. Apparently, the police thought this made her a likely future criminal.
My noble friend Lord Herbert said that these cases have been bad for public confidence in the service, and he is right. It is therefore welcome that over the last year or so there has been a growing realisation and consensus in the Government that there is a need to address the problem. In particular, I welcome the recent press reports that the college and the NPCC are set to recommend scrapping non-crime hate incidents as a result of the review.
My noble friend Lord Herbert has promised that there will be a sea change. We must wait and see the final detail on how the changes are delivered in practice. I say this partly because what we are attempting to do in turning policing away from an excessive focus on what we might call DEI issues towards the criminal matters that the public care about goes against the grain of the last two decades of police culture. We have seen before how difficult this is to uproot. The previous Government published new statutory guidance on NCHIs in 2023. Training should have been given to call handlers on the raised thresholds and common-sense tests, and we should have seen a reduction in the number of non-crime hate incidents recorded, but, sadly, the report published the following year by His Majesty’s inspectorate, An Inspection into Activism and Impartiality in Policing, concluded that there was
“inconsistency in the way forces have responded to the new guidance”
and that
“We often found that call takers hadn’t received training about NCHIs, and had limited, if any, knowledge”
of the statutory guidance.
First, can the Minister say how we will ensure that police training on the new regime is not undercut by an obsession with DEI issues and the politicisation of policing which has clouded police judgments too often in recent years? Secondly, we need to see a clearer commitment from the Government on how they plan to respond to the NPCC report and what the timelines will be. I know there are ongoing reviews into police discretion and hate crime, and I particularly welcome the review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, of hate crime legislation. I hope that he will feel emboldened to address one of the more fundamental issues; namely, the injustice resulting from the creation of a hierarchy of victims by legislating for certain protected characteristics rather than treating all victims equally.
However, these ongoing reviews should not be an excuse for inaction. Will the Minister make the commitment that, should the NCHI review require primary legislation to implement its recommendations, this will be done via amendments on Report—a point made by my noble friend Lord Blencathra—preferably adopting my noble friend’s carefully crafted amendment?
While I understand the previous Government’s decision to introduce statutory guidance via the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 as a first step towards introducing some common sense in this area, it had the unfortunate consequence of providing a statutory basis for recording NCHIs. If this is to be corrected, the law will need to change.
Again, the devil will be in the detail. The NPCC’s final report has not yet been published, but it did publish a progress report last October. There were a number of points where I would want to see improvements in the final report before I could feel confident that the new system will avoid the pitfalls of the current regime. One of those relates to the NPCC’s recommendation that the Home Office introduce a new national standard of incident recording. As I alluded to earlier, the current threshold, which dates back to 2011, is too low and does not adequately cater for contemporary policing demands.
We ought to think carefully, too, about any new definition. The current draft proposition put forward by the NPCC defines an incident as
“a single distinct event or occurrence which may be relevant to policing for preventing or solving crime, safeguarding individuals or communities or fulfilling other statutory policing purposes”.
This helpfully makes it clear that there needs to be a clear policing purpose for this data to be recorded. I am concerned about the words “may be relevant”. At the very least, would it not be better for it to say, “likely to be relevant”? My concern is that an activist police officer would record practically anything on the basis of “may”. We all know hoarders—the kind of people who keep everything because they tell themselves it may be useful in the future.
Finally, we need greater clarity on enhanced DBS checks. The progress report recommends that the Home Office consider whether there needs to be further guidance, but key questions are ignored. Will the police delete NCHIs that they have already recorded, and will the new anti-social behaviour incidents be disclosable in enhanced DBS checks? I am pleased to support this very good and sensible amendment.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I want to say a heartfelt thank you to the noble Lords, Lord Young of Acton and Lord Hogan-Howe, for leading on this. It is telling that there is cross-party support for this amendment. The Government should take note of such rich and excellent speeches from across the House. There is widespread concern for all sorts of reasons, and action should be taken.
I feel a bit cynical because I have celebrated the demise of non-crime hate incidents on a number of occasions in the past. When the Fair Cop founder Harry Miller won his High Court challenge in 2020, the judge declared that non-crime hate incidents had a chilling effect and unlawfully infringed on Harry’s freedom of speech. I remember that a lot of us thought that would be the end of that. I then listened to a number of Home Secretaries declaring that there was a problem with non-crime hate incidents, and I thought, “Oh, good, something will be done”, because politicians like to do something. But I am most reassured, genuinely, by the present Home Secretary, Shabana Mahmood, who seems to be determined to get to the bottom of this and to sort it out. Her emphasis that the police should focus on streets and not tweets is quite a good summation of where we are. However, despite that universal acknowledgement that non-crime hate incidents are not fit for purpose in many ways, I worry that, as with the Greek mythological Hydra, all the various attempts at cutting off the monstrous NCHI serpent’s head will result in another couple of heads growing instead. It is important that we do not just console ourselves with getting rid of the name while allowing the sentiment and the politics of it to remain.
As somebody who has spoken many times on this issue in this House, often greeted by some eye-rolling but also offered endless assurances that it was all being sorted—not by this Government but by a previous Government—I now believe that assurances are not enough, and we need to make this issue watertight. We need primary legislation as a guarantee that there will be no more non-crime hate incidents and a full deletion of the historic records held by the police. The noble Lord, Lord Herbert, made the point that when there have been changes in the criminal law, records have not been deleted, but these are not crimes, so they should be deleted. Even if they are not used, the idea that the state has a file on hundreds of thousands of people with the words “bigot” or “hate criminals” across them, even if they are hate non-criminal, is not right and they should be deleted.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Herbert, for his contribution because he set out the balance between non-crime hate incidents and non-crime incidents and the difference between the two. One of our concerns on these Benches is that—I am going to use the phrase he used, for which I apologise, but I had already written it down—in looking at this amendment, we must not throw the baby out with the bathwater. That is really important, and I will explain why in some detail later.
I remind the Committee that, in considering our two amendments about hate crime last week, I referred to the recommendation Combating Hate Crime by the Council of Europe, which says that
“hate can be manifested with different degrees of severity, ranging from everyday stigmatisation and discrimination, microaggressions and verbal abuse, to violence, terrorism, war crimes and genocide”,
which is an enormous spectrum. The reason why non-crime incidents, whether hate-related or not, need to be recorded is that often, the perpetrators go on to escalate their behaviour.
I have referred before in this House to being stalked by a political opponent for three years. Before we could get the police to take it seriously, we had recorded some 75 incidents, probably half of which were crimes but half were not. As things escalated, it went from minor crimes to the perpetrator using a very large knife on tyres. The police psychologist said, “If we don’t get him now, it will be people next”. It is that entire spectrum of behaviour, with some incidents ending up being part of a crime, that means we cannot just throw out all non-crime incidents.
I am afraid that the same is also true for non-crime hate incidents. I am grateful that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, referred to the appalling case of the antisemitic attacks, because those would go as well if this amendment were accepted, since there would be no capacity for the police to start monitoring and recording such things until they tipped the balance into a crime, even though the damage was done in those earlier incidents, repeatedly to the same group of people. I think of friends of mine who go to synagogue in one town, and of young Muslim friends in my home town of Watford who are shouted at on their way to worship every single week by the same small group of people. Probably neither of those would even get to the first bar of being recorded as a non-crime hate incident; but, if their behaviour follows the typical course and escalates, and the police have not recorded anything, they have nothing to go back over. So I beg the movers of this amendment to—
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
What the noble Baroness has described is a crime. Those people shouting racist abuse at Jewish people or Muslims on the way to a mosque are committing a crime under the existing legislation that has been in place for many years. It has nothing to do with the recording of police intelligence, which is unfettered by this amendment, and it is certainly the case that what she has described is de facto a criminal offence.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I referred to the comments made by previous speakers on this group who talked about police wasting their time recording. The two groups of people I have just referred to have tried to report these incidents and have not been able to get them taken particularly seriously. Therein lies the problem. I absolutely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Herbert, that there has to be new, revised, clear guidance about how the police need to process these things. It may be that there will be many that are not now processed, but we cannot just say that we should get rid of non-crime hate incidents in their entirety.
A lot of the other speeches during this debate have talked about the polarisation in our society being because people are now saying things to others, with people becoming offended. We discussed this briefly last week. The things being said to people on the street would not have been said five or six years ago. People might have thought them as they walked past, but it was quite rare. We are deeply offended if it targets us. We often do not recognise when we are being offensive to other people. I say again: there is something about the way our society is working at the moment that means we have to learn to look at ourselves, not just at the others we do not like. The police, who are literally trying to police all this, are in a very invidious position. They need tools to record information because it helps them to assess and understand when other things happen. It is much broader than non-crime hate incidents, as I have alluded to already.
Paul Giannasi OBE, the national hate crime lead for the police, has been reviewing the current protocols and his recommendations for a new code of practice will be very welcome. I am sure, from what the noble Lord, Lord Herbert, has said and from what I have heard elsewhere, that there certainly will be changes. We have to understand that the key issue here is balancing those individual rights: the absolute freedom of expression as expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton—he and I had a debate about JS Mill last week—alongside the state’s obligation to protect citizens against targeted victimisation. The police must be able to gather intelligence and evidence and log symbolic messaging to targeted groups. All the other things—about whether those end up on DBS—can be looked at as part of this review, and I am sure they will be. But the police need to see that bigger, wider picture.
One of the problems about the Lawrence murder was that the police were not watching what was happening in that community in the months and years running up to it. That institutional blindness was certainly one of the things that came out of the inquiry. As others have said, the monitoring of such incidents was the result of the recommendations by Sir William Macpherson as part of his public inquiry in response to Stephen Lawrence’s murder.
I come back to this point: in terms of practical value, the police must be able to record incidents that do not in and of themselves amount to criminal offence, because many crimes, such as I described with harassment, and indeed with stalking, require evidence of a course of conduct. People say to me, “Oh, but stalking is always about relationships; that’s not about a hate crime”. Quite a lot of stalking is actually non-domestic, and it is targeted at somebody because of a particular characteristic.
I finish on the point I made right at the start about the evidence that police need for this course of conduct if behaviour escalates. If a group of people go out and do things again and again, there is a point at which it is going to tip over. I was party to and a survivor of something that ended up as 132 crimes; once the police saw all the evidence that we had been holding of the earlier non-crime hate, it was extremely helpful when things started to escalate. Reform is absolutely needed. We hope that the review will have recommendations for a new regime. But I also hope that it will not leave victims vulnerable, either from perpetrators whose behaviour escalates or from police who are not quite clear about the role they have in recording non-crime incidents.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken on this very important amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Young. I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and my noble friend Lord Herbert of South Downs.
The status quo is untenable. It undermines free speech, diverts police resources from real crime and risks criminalising people for behaviour that is lawful and should remain outside the criminal justice system. We on these Benches firmly support the abolition of non-crime hate incidents. Non-crime hate incidents in essence are reports of conduct perceived by someone to be motivated by hostility or prejudice against a protected characteristic which do not meet the threshold of a criminal offence. Under current law, police forces record and retain personal data about those incidents, even though no crime has occurred and no legal breach has been established. That alone is problematic but, in practice, the effects are far worse. Current figures estimate that around 13,000 non-crime hate incidents are logged annually, consuming an estimated 60,000-plus hours of police time that could be better directed to tackling burglary, serious violence, organised crime and other priority areas.
Recording an incident and retaining personal data about motives that are merely perceived rather than proven also has a detrimental and unwelcome effect on free speech. People who express lawful opinions, engage in robust debate or even make clumsy social media posts can find themselves on a police database, not because they have committed a crime but because someone has taken offence to those remarks.
This is not a hypothetical shortcoming of policy: there have been cases where almost trivial or schoolyard remarks became the subject of police records. In one high-profile instance, the arrest of a public figure over a social media post was initially associated with a non-crime hate incident, sparking national debate about policing speech and proportionality. It is no surprise, then, that police leaders and independent watchdogs are reassessing the value of non-crime hate incidents. The Chief Inspector of Constabulary has publicly stated that non-crime hate incidents should not be recorded by police because they risk conflating the offensive with the criminal, diminishing public trust and harming legitimate free expression.
Similarly, the Metropolitan Police recently announced that it will no longer investigate non-crime hate incidents, recognising the difficulty that officers face when drawn into matters that are not criminal by definition. The Government’s response to date has been to commission yet another review, with the suggestion that policy decisions should wait until later in the year. But on an issue that so directly impacts both civil liberties and police effectiveness, delay is not a defensible option.
Amendment 416E would go further than reviews. It would abolish the concept of non-crime hate incidents entirely, prohibit any police authority from recording or processing related personal data and require the deletion of existing records. In doing so, it draws a clear distinction between criminal behaviour, which it is right that the police investigate, and lawful expression or debate that should not be subject to police recording or sanction.
We cannot allow a system that treats controversial yet lawful speech as if it were a matter for the criminal justice system. This amendment is a sensible and necessary step to realign policing with its once core mission of protecting people from crime and harm, not policing speech or perceptions. Therefore, we on these Benches very much support this amendment.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, for tabling this amendment. This has been a useful debate, and I hope that we can at least look at the common direction of travel on this matter: the need for reform.
I have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, and His Majesty’s loyal Opposition, through the noble Lord, Lord Davies. I have also heard from the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra, Lord Kempsell, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, Lord Hogan-Howe, Lord Clement-Jones, Lord Herbert of South Downs, the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Fox of Buckley, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler- Sloss. They have raised a range of issues that, in essence, point to the need for change in this system.
I think it is fair to say, and I hope that the Committee will accept, that the current Government have held office since July 2024. There has been a lot of discussion on the issues caused by, and effect of, non-crime hate incidents since the guidance was published in 2014. I do not want to lose the principle, which was mentioned by the noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Herbert of South Downs, that the non-crime hate incident regime had its genesis in the Macpherson report, and in trying to anticipate and examine where crimes were being committed, potentially in the future, and monitor a range of abuses that were present.
However, I say to the Committee—and I think this was recognised by Members in their contributions today —that how the police should respond to hate incidents that fall below the criminal threshold is a complex and sensitive issue. That is precisely why the then Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, the Member for Pontefract, Castleford and Normanton, and the current Home Secretary, my right honourable friend Shabana Mahmood, the Member for Ladywood, have asked the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council to conduct a thorough review into non-crime hate incidents.
The review is examining whether the current approach is proportionate, consistent and compatible with the fundamental right to free expression—which goes to very point that was made. As the noble Lord, Lord Herbert of South Downs, said, the review is being led by policing experts and is expected to conclude, in his words, “shortly”. The publication date is one for the College of Policing. We have had the interim report, which has said that there are significant concerns in the way non-crime hate incidents are operating.
Given the points that have been made today, and given that the Government have commissioned a review, seen the interim report and, in the words of the noble Lord, Lord Herbert of South Downs, expect to receive the final report shortly, I would again ask the Committee to bear with us—I know that I have asked for this on a number of occasions—to examine what professional police officers and the College of Policing are recommending on non-crime hate incidents.
The noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, rightly asked some significant questions. What is happening to database logging of anti-social behaviour incidents? What is happening to people who have previously had non-crime hate incidents put against their name? What is happening with regard to non-disclosure? What is happening in terms of the publication of the report and the Government’s response? Those are all fair and legitimate questions.
However, I say to the noble Lord and the Committee that the current Government have come in, recognised that there is an issue, commissioned the College of Policing to look at that issue and have received an independent report, and we expect a full report on how we can deal with those issues and tweak the regime so that we do not lose the very good things that have sometimes been brought out of non-crime hate incidents and we do not throw everything out immediately. I do not know what the final report is going to say.
At Second Reading, the noble Lord, Lord Herbert of South Downs, said:
“The review has found that the current approach and use of non-crime hate incidents is not fit for purpose, and there is a need for broad reform to ensure that policing can focus on genuine harm and risk within communities. The recording of hurt feelings and differing views should not continue”.—[Official Report, 16/10/25; col. 406.]
That is a very clear statement. However, in moving from that in the interim report to whatever the new regime might be, it is incumbent on the Government to reflect on what the final report says. I am not ducking the amendment that the noble Lord has brought forward, nor his challenge that we need to make some changes. As he says, there is an open door. If we did not want this to be reviewed, we would not have asked the College of Policing and the Police Chiefs’ Council to review the incidence of non-crime hate incidents. Self-evidently, some of the examples given today are not what the original purpose of that legislation and approach was meant to be.
Going back to the Macpherson report, there was a serious element as to how assessments have been made. In Committee today, Members have talked about anti- semitism, racism and a range of incidents where the collection of information might give a bigger intelligence picture that requires a policing response, but which may or may not be a policing response that requires individuals to have their names put against them.
The concerns of everybody, from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, through to the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, are legitimate, and the Government want to look at and address them. I hope that this can be examined. However, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment and await the outcome of the police review, so that any reforms are grounded in both robust evidence and a consensus.
Ultimately, the Government must and will take some decisions, and we will be held to account in the House of Commons and in this House as well. In the absence of that detailed response, I am not sure that I can come to this Committee and say, “This is what we will do”, because we need to examine that in detail.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I am very grateful to the noble Lord for his customary courtesy. I can accept his point that, since the Home Office has not yet received the final report, and Report may start in two or three-weeks’ time, it may not be possible to bring forward detailed primary legislation on Report. However, it seems to me—and perhaps my noble friend Lord Herbert can confirm this—that many of the changes may be administrative matters for the police and may not require legislation. What may require legislation may therefore be quite small. This Government, like the last one, love Henry VIII clauses. So would it not be possible for the Government to accept a simple Henry VIII clause so that, where legislation is required on this, a proper regulation can be brought in in the future, once the Government have consulted on what is required, to implement any of the legal changes necessary to give effect to my noble friend’s amendment.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I say to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, in the nicest possible way, that my noble and learned friend Lord Hermer has given strict instructions to Government Ministers on Henry VIII clauses, and the various statutory instrument committees in this House and in the House of Commons have also expressed a grave view on them.
I put it to the Committee—and I hope that the Committee will accept this in good faith, as I am trying to do it in good faith—that the Government have recognised that there is a problem, and the Government have asked the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council to examine that problem. The Government have received an interim report, which the noble Lord, Lord Herbert of South Downs, referred to at Second Reading. The Government are awaiting the final report, which the noble Lord has said is coming shortly. I have not seen the final report. There may be things in it that maintain, change or revoke altogether the issues that have, quite rightly, been raised. But, if the Government had not realised that there was a problem, we would not have asked for solutions to be brought forward.
I know that I occasionally say, “Something will be happening very shortly”, but I say, in genuine help and support for the Committee, that we know that there is a problem. We want to change that problem, but we are trying to make sure that we get sufficiently robust professional advice to be able to make some political decisions based on the advice that we receive. With that, I have tried to help the noble Lord and I hope that he will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
I am sorry to interrupt the Minster as he was getting towards the end of his speech. I have just one point: whatever advice the college gives, there will need to be a litmus test for whether the Government will support it. Whatever advice is given, I encourage the Government to make sure that it is clear, so that officers on the street understand it. If we end up with another series of 20 conditions, that will not simplify things. We must have a litmus test. For me, it might be, “If the officer acted in good faith and within the law as they believed it, we will support them”. I am not saying that that is the answer in this case, but it should be something simple.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, brings great experience to this. In his initial contribution, and in these comments, he gives food for thought as to how we implement the decisions of any review and how Ministers ultimately give guidance to police, which chief constables then put in place for police officers on the ground to deal with. We will look at that. The whole purpose of the review is to simplify this procedure, looking at what is necessary and helpful, and to get the police to focus on the things that really matter. Some of the examples that have been given today are things that the police should not be focusing on because they do not matter at all.
To answer the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, it is important that we look at what the regulations and the review say. We can act administratively on much of what happens. I have no doubt that the Government will do so, once we receive the final review.
I simply ask the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, for the moment, to withdraw the amendment. He has the right to bring his amendments back on Report. We will have a clearer picture at some point in the very near future. I hope this has been a helpful debate.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
I thank the Minister for his gracious response. I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for co-sponsoring the amendment and for his excellent contributions to this debate. I thank the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for their contributions. I wish the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, a speedy recovery. I thank my noble friends Lord Kempsell, Lord Jackson and Lord Blencathra.
I agree with my noble friend Lord Blencathra that the police, under very difficult circumstances, do an excellent job on the whole and I admire what they do. But I think he is right that having to record and investigate non-crime hate incidents is as unpopular with ordinary police officers on the front line as it is with free speech campaigners. They do not want to be wasting their time in this way. Many of them have reached out to me to tell me that and to support this amendment. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for her contribution.
If you look at proposed new subsection (4), you will find that nothing in the amendment would prevent the police recording information they regard as relevant about a suspect’s motive in the course of an ongoing criminal investigation or prosecution. I am sceptical whether the police should be allowed to record incidents that clearly do not meet the threshold of being crimes for intelligence-gathering purposes, not least because there is very little persuasive evidence that that is helpful when it comes to preventing crimes, and I am generally suspicious of the concept of pre-crime—of trying to nip potential crimes in the bud by monitoring carefully incidents that do not quite meet the threshold of criminal offences. However, I am not going to die in a ditch and say that the police should never, under any circumstances, be able to record incidents that do not meet the threshold of being a criminal offence for intelligence-gathering purposes, provided that the recording of those incidents has no adverse consequences for the people they are recorded against.
That brings me to the remarks of my noble friend Lord Herbert of South Downs, which, on the whole, were very welcome. I am pleased that the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council recognise that NCHIs are not fit for purpose and that the regime should be scrapped and replaced with something much better, but I want to respond briefly to two points made by my noble friend.
First, my noble friend acknowledged, I think, that the recording threshold for NCHIs is currently too low, and that when the regime is replaced by another, such as the anti-social behaviour incident regime, the threshold as to what incidents should be recorded will be higher. The implicit acknowledgement that the threshold has hitherto been too low strikes me as a persuasive argument for scrapping those incidents that have been recorded under the lower threshold. If the threshold was too low, that is an acknowledgement that the incidents should not have been recorded. That is a good argument for why they should be deleted once this system has been overhauled.
Secondly, my noble friend Lord Herbert maintains that, even though chief constables have the discretion to disclose NCHIs when responding to enhanced DBS checks, the College of Policing could not find a single example of chief constables having done that. If that is the case then there is no cost to the Home Office agreeing that, henceforth, under the new regime, anti-social behaviour incidents—if that is what we are going to call them—should not be disclosed in enhanced DBS checks. The fear that they might be—that, not having committed a crime, that is recorded against your name and could stop you getting a job or volunteering at a school or for a charity—is why the current regime has had such a chilling effect on free speech. If none has been disclosed, why not go that one small step further and say that, henceforth, they will not be disclosed?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I hope the noble Lord is coming to the end of his remarks. When responding on amendments, you are meant to be relatively brief. He has had five and a half minutes now.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
I apologise to the Committee for taking up its time. On that note, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Blencathra
“Police power to confiscate undocked electric cycles and scooters for hire(1) The police may confiscate any undocked electric cycle or scooter for hire which has been left on—(a) a public pavement,(b) a public highway,(c) any other public place, including pedestrian precincts, or(d) any other place where the owners have not given consent for electric cycles or scooters to be collected.(2) The police must take reasonable steps to notify the hire company responsible for the electric cycle or scooter confiscated under subsection (1).(3) The police may charge the hire company with responsibility for the electric cycle or scooter confiscated under this section a fee of up to £1,000 for the release of the electric cycle or scooter.(4) The Secretary of State may, by regulations, delegate local authorities or authorised agents to exercise powers on behalf of the police under this section.(5) If the Secretary of State delegates powers under subsection (4), they must publish a code of practice for local authorities and authorised agents on the implementation of confiscation powers and the charging of fees under this section.(6) For the purposes of this section—“local authority” means any council, unitary authority, district or other body with statutory responsibility for highways, public order, or refuse disposal, and“authorised agent” means any person or organisation appointed in writing by a local authority.”
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, the Committee will be pleased to know that this is my last batch of amendments on the scourge of illegal bikes scattering our pavements and those big bikes the size of motorbikes mowing us down on the pavement. The Committee will also be pleased to know that, as I am attending the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, this is probably the last speech I will be making on the Bill for a short time.
The problem we face is plain and immediate. Thousands of dockless e-bikes and e-scooters have been dumped across our pavements and public spaces, creating a chaotic, inconsistent and dangerous environment for pedestrians. It is not often that I can agree with the Mayor of London, who described the rollout of these services as having become something of a “Wild West”, a term I understand that he took from my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe. There has been a rapid commercial expansion of cycling without the regulatory framework or parking infrastructure needed to protect the public and preserve access to our streets.
This is not an abstract nuisance but a daily reality for people trying to get to work, for parents with pushchairs, for older people, and for blind and visually impaired citizens, who rely on clear and unobstructed tactile routes. It is a public safety and accessibility crisis that has been documented repeatedly by local authorities, clinicians and charities, and it demands a statutory response. Amendments 416H and 416I would provide that response. One would create a targeted operator charge to fund enforcement and drive better operational systems; the other would give clear and proportionate powers to remove and permanently dispose of manifestly illegal high-powered machines that pose acute safety and criminal use risks.
The evidence from the ground is clear. Local authorities are already acting because the problem is real and costly. Local enforcement teams in Kensington and Chelsea have seized over 1,000 dangerously parked rental e-bikes this year and recovered more than £81,000 in release and storage fees to fund further enforcement action. They did that after repeated complaints about pavement obstruction and trip hazards. Councils have recovered significant sums in seizure and storage fees and have reinvested that money to expand enforcement activities. These are not isolated seizures but the tip of a systemic problem.
Clinicians are seeing new patterns of injury directly attributed to heavy hire bikes. Trauma and orthopaedic surgeons report a rise in lower leg injuries caused when heavy e-bike frames fall on riders or pedestrians, a phenomenon that has been labelled in clinical and medical circles as “Lime bike leg”. These are not minor bruises: the weight and construction of modern e-bikes, particularly the overheavy Lime ones, mean that even low-speed falls can produce fractures and soft tissue damage requiring hospital treatment.
Charities representing blind and visually impaired people have described how dumped e-bikes block tactile paving and prevent safe access to crossings, forcing people to alter or abandon journeys. One campaigner described repeatedly walking into e-bikes and being “put off” visiting central areas because of the unpredictability and danger of obstructed pavements. Residents and local councillors are vocal. Councils report that residents are “sick” of e-bikes blocking footpaths and that the current situation is undermining confidence in local streets. These are not rhetorical flourishes; they reflect sustained public pressure and the failure of voluntary operator-led measures to deliver consistent outcomes.
So who is responsible, and why have voluntary measures failed? The nuisance is concentrated among a small number of large operators that have scaled fleets rapidly: Lime, Forest, Voi and newer entrants such as Bolt. These companies operate dockless models that rely on users to park responsibly. Where that expectation is not met, the public realm becomes cluttered and dangerous.
Operators have taken some steps—funding parking bays, running in-app messages and offering incentives for correct parking—but these voluntary measures have not been sufficient to prevent widespread obstruction or to ensure rapid removal of dangerous or blocking bikes. The result is a patchwork of local rules and inconsistent enforcement that leaves vulnerable people exposed and councils bearing the cost of removal.
Councils are not standing idly by, but the tools they currently have are reactive and costly. Seizure and storage operations require staff time, secure storage facilities and administrative processing. Councils are forced into an expensive cycle of removal and storage because operators do not consistently prevent or properly remedy dangerous parking. I go further and submit that they simply do not care. They are making big money from e-bike hire, so why should they bother about safe parking when there is no penalty on them for letting their users dump them anywhere they like?
I turn to my Amendment 416H, on the operator charge, its justification and its effect. The proposed operator charge is a proportionate “polluter pays” mechanism that would ensure that those who profit from dockless fleets meet the real costs their services impose on the public realm. Operators make big profits from large fleets and dense urban coverage. Where voluntary agreements fail, statutes should set clear duties to ensure safe parking and fund the use of designated bays, to remove and relocate dangerously parked bikes within a short enforceable timeframe, and to be accountable for repeat non-compliance.
Where operators’ business models externalise the costs of pavement obstruction and enforcement, it is fair and efficient to require them to internalise those costs and pay for them themselves. Revenues from the charge could be used by local authorities to fund enforcement teams and rapid removal to secure storage; invest in parking infrastructure, such as a designated parking spaces, where required; and fund data-sharing and monitoring systems, which would enable councils to identify repeat non-compliance and target enforcement.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, I would like briefly to support my noble friend Lord Blencathra in his Amendment 416I, as the Committee will not be massively surprised to hear, given that we have covered this on previous occasions.
The police are turning a blind eye to the use of illegal vehicles on our streets. Why is that? I should like the Minister to answer that question, if at all possible. Illegal vehicles on our streets should be seized and destroyed. There should be a campaign to do that; if that happened, they would not come back. At the moment, the use of illegal vehicles is tolerated. If people were riding illegal petrol-powered motorcycles around London, they would very quickly find themselves in trouble. If people were driving trucks with no licence plates on them, they would very quickly find themselves on the wrong side of the law. At the moment, the large delivery companies in particular are facilitating this. They are contractors, but, none the less, their agents are using illegal vehicles for commercial purposes. That should not be allowed and the Government should put a stop to it.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, that fact that someone has brought forward these two amendments makes me feel like saying, “Hurrah!” It is not just in Kensington and Chelsea. I live in EC4, and I spend my time walking on the road to get round the huge groups of mainly Lime bikes. I have not checked as to whether they are illegal, but the fact is that a great many of them take up a great deal of space and it seems absolutely extraordinary that nothing is being done about it. I watch other people, particularly women with pushchairs—even in EC4 there are women with pushchairs—and sometimes people in wheelchairs, either negotiating gingerly these bikes or walking, as I find myself walking, on the road. I hope that the Minister will consider carefully what is being suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, because this really is a scourge. I say “Hurrah” to the noble Lord for bringing this amendment forward.
Baroness Pidgeon (LD)
My Lords, these two amendments after Clause 144 from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, are trying to give further powers to address the issue of dockless bikes and scooters, which we have discussed many times in this Chamber and which have become an issue on many streets in cities across the country, whether they are part of a scheme or privately owned. This is a big issue for pedestrians, as we have heard, as they find their route blocked by bikes and scooters, despite a number of local authorities installing dedicated parking places for such micromobility schemes.
We are all aware, as we have heard in this debate, of the challenges that local authorities have faced trying to manage these vehicles on pavements and highways. However, there is a further issue. As City AM reported last month, a London property firm had to invoice Lime for nearly £8,000 for removing, storing and returning dockless bikes left on private land. Despite the ability to geofence where bikes can be left, I understand from reading this article that it took Lime 11 months to fence off this bit of private land as a no-parking zone on its app—and even then bikes continued to appear. This is about the management and regulation of these schemes. There are many stories like this, where riders park up their bikes near stations or other transport hubs, cluttering pavements or indeed parking on private land, causing issues with access and deliveries for residents.
The devolution Bill making its way through the House will start to help with the management of micromobility schemes across the country, some of which, as we discussed earlier in this Committee, have been on trial many times over many years, partly extended by the previous Government. We need legislation on this issue. I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm whether future legislation will come to tighten up the rules on what is safely allowed on our streets, on how people park and the regulations, and on what a safe and legal vehicle is on our streets.
These amendments are trying to deal with the inevitable consequence of recent Governments not acting to keep up with the explosion of different types of micromobility on our streets. I hope to hear some assurance from the Minister about future legislation to deal with the understandable concerns across the Committee.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, has just said, we have spent much time in our previous debates in Committee on provisions regarding the use or misuse of electric cycles and scooters. Much of what can be said has already been said, so I hope not to detain the Committee for long.
As always, my noble friend Lord Blencathra raises a strong argument in favour of his amendments in this group. I thank him for his tenacity in this area. There are strong feelings on this in your Lordships’ House, as many of us have had negative experiences with users of electric bikes and scooters, but these amendments address a slightly different problem.
Amendment 416H would permit the police to confiscate electric bikes and scooters that have been abandoned in a public place. As other noble Lords have said, if one requires any evidence as to the extent of this problem, they need only take a stroll down any major road in London. The pavements seem to have become obstacle courses of undocked electric bikes. All this presents serious challenges; they block users of wheelchairs and parents with pushchairs, as well as those with visual impairments, creating hazards for pedestrians, who may be forced into the road. For this reason, these Benches see no reason to object to the police being given greater powers to confiscate such scooters and electric bikes. If the Government have any objection to this proposal, I look forward to the Minister outlining precisely what they plan on doing to tackle this issue.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I was slightly sad to hear that this is the last of the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, on tackling e-bikes and scooters and, as someone coined, the Wild West that is our streets. Before he rides into the sunset on this subject, I would like to say that we share the intention behind these amendments, which seek to tackle obstructive parking and other use of hire e-scooters and bicycles. It may not surprise the noble Lord to hear, however, that the Government are not persuaded that these amendments are necessary.
I have to be very unfair before the dinner break and say that, if the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, is Butch Cassidy, we had the Sundance Kid of this debate in the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen. Once again, he asked about action being taken. I repeat what I said earlier, on Amendment 416, and say to him and to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that the police are taking action. I refer again to the winter action initiative, running from the start of December last year to the end of January. That is focused on making town centres across England and Wales safer as a whole by building on the summer streets initiative, continuing efforts to tackle crime and anti-social behaviour. This is not an issue that the police are blind to. Ultimately, we cannot want them to have operational independence in theory but not let that be carried out in practice.
I will not detain the Committee any further and will move on to the meat of the amendments. Amendments 416H and 416I would risk creating confusion in an area where the Government are already establishing a clear and proportionate regulatory framework. We are empowering local leaders to license shared cycle schemes, and potentially shared e-scooter schemes, in future through the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill, which, as we speak, has started its Committee stage next door in the Grand Committee. This licensing framework, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, referred, will empower local authorities to set parking requirements and act quickly and decisively where these are not met. To respond to the noble Baroness directly on micromobility, this is something that we have signalled an intention to act on when parliamentary time allows. I am afraid that I cannot be any clearer on that.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
I thank the Minister for giving way. If the powers exist, are the police actually using them?
Lord Katz (Lab)
They are, but we always leave it to chief officers to direct their police forces to use the full waterfront of different powers and regulations under their purview. We can always encourage them. I am sure that a number of chief officers will be looking intently at the debates in all the days of Committee on the Crime and Policing Bill and will understand the priorities the Committee voices. Certainly, with no little thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and others, we have had plenty of debate on this issue and they will have heard that it is one of extreme concern.
Clause 8 will allow the police to act immediately to stop offending behaviour and confiscate vehicles without delay. In addition, the Government have consulted on changes to secondary legislation to enable quicker disposal of seized vehicles, and our response will be published in due course. These measures demonstrate the Government’s commitment to effectively tackling the illegal and anti-social use of micro-mobility devices such as e-bikes and e-scooters without duplicating powers that are already in place.
I want to stress that riding a privately owned electric scooter on public roads is illegal, and the police have powers to take enforcement action against offenders, including seizure of the e-scooter for the offence of driving without insurance or a licence. The enforcement of road traffic law remains an operational matter for chief officers, who are best placed to allocate resources according to local needs, threats, risks and priorities. The Government will continue to support the police with the tools and powers they need, but this amendment would add unnecessary complexity without improving public safety. With that in mind, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I am grateful to noble Lords and the Minister for speaking in this short but important little debate on cycling. I am particularly grateful to my noble friends Lord Goschen and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss—and, for the first time, a Lib Dem spokesperson has supported, in concept, one of my cycling amendments. I am either on the right side, maybe, or I am doing something terribly wrong if the Lib Dems are backing me.
Over the past few weeks, as we debated various amendments that I put down on bikes of all sorts, and looked at delivery couriers cycling on pavements on these big, fast, heavy, illegal bikes, and the scooters and bikes dumped on the pavements, the general mood was, “Well, your amendments are not perfect, Lord Blencathra, but there’s a problem here and something needs to be done about it”. I hear what the Minister has said, as far as these big, illegal bikes like motorbikes are concerned: they are already illegal and the police have power to do something about them. He suggested that the powers in the devolution Bill will deal with all these cycling problems. Between now and Report, I shall look more carefully at the Bill to see if it does cover all the gaps, but it may be that on Report we will still want to bring back some little amendment on one of these issues—possibly on the precarious criminal liability of delivery couriers, which we discussed last time. A lot of colleagues thought this was terribly wrong and that something needed to be done about it. However, if the Government do something about it, I will not need to, but if they do not do what we think we need to do, I will do something on Report. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Crime and Policing Bill
Tuesday 20th January 2026
(3 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-XI(a) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Eleventh Marshalled List) - (20 Jan 2026)
Lord Banner
“Amendment to the Sentencing Act 2020 to introduce public interest compensation orders(1) The Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.(2) After section 133(b) (compensation orders), insert “, or(c) to make a payment to one or more relevant organisations for public interest or social purposes (“public interest compensation order”).(2) In this Chapter, “relevant organisation” means an organisation listed in Schedule 22A (Relevant organisations for public interest compensation orders).”.(3) After section 135 (making a compensation order), insert—“135A Public interest compensation orders(1) When convicting a person of a relevant offence, the court shall consider whether to issue a public interest compensation order, and what the terms of that order should be.(2) In this section “relevant offence” means an offence listed in Schedule 22B (Relevant offences for public interest compensation orders).(3) The Secretary of State may by order amend the relevant offences listed in Schedule 22B.(4) In determining whether to make a public interest compensation order against an offender, the amount to be paid under such an order, or to which relevant organisation(s) the payment(s) should be made, the court must, in addition to the factor in section 135(3), have regard to—(a) the rights of victims of human rights violations (inside or outside the United Kingdom) to receive effective reparation and remedy,(b) the fact that individuals who are not proven to be direct victims of the offender’s offence may nevertheless be victims of human rights violations to which the offender’s offence is related,(c) the broader impact of the offender’s offence on victims of human rights violations in the United Kingdom or in other countries,(d) where there is a large number of victims of human rights violations to which the offender’s offence is related, the urgency of victims’ needs (which may vary depending on the harms that they have suffered),(e) where the relevant offence is an offence under regulations imposed under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, the purposes of the relevant regulations and any human rights violations arising in connection with conduct that these regulations seek to discourage, and (f) whether it would be appropriate to make another type of compensation order and, if so, whether the offender has sufficient means to pay both orders, as well as the need to prioritise compensation to direct victims of the offender’s offence.(5) If the court considers issuing a public interest compensation order, the court may (but is not required to) ask the Secretary of State to recommend the relevant organisation(s) to which the funds subject to the order should be paid and if the court makes such a request—(a) the Secretary of State shall, within 90 days (the “relevant period”), recommend to the court in writing one or more organisations to which the funds subject to the order should be paid (the “recommendation”) and in doing so, the Secretary of State must have regard to the same factors as under subsection (4) above(b) the court may issue a public interest compensation order after the earlier of—(i) the court having received a recommendation, and(ii) the relevant period having expired,(c) if a recommendation has been made within the relevant period, the court may take it into account in issuing a public interest compensation order but shall not be bound by it.(6) The court may direct that confiscated funds be paid to a relevant organisation subject to such conditions as it considers appropriate.(7) The Secretary of State may by order amend the organisations listed in Schedule 22A and the Secretary of State shall review the organisations listed in Schedule 22A at least annually.(8) If, under subsection (5) above, the Secretary of State recommends one or more organisations that are not listed in Schedule 22B, the organisation(s) recommended by the Secretary of State shall be considered relevant organisation(s) for the purposes of the public interest compensation order at issue.(9) For the purposes of this section, a court may issue a public interest compensation order regardless of whether there is a direct connection between the offender’s conduct and the harm suffered by the ultimate recipients or beneficiaries of the public interest compensation order.”.(4) After Schedule 22 (Amendments of the Sentencing Code and related amendments of other legislation), insert the following new Schedule—“Schedule 22ARelevant organisations for public interest compensation orders1 The following organisations—The Trust Fund for Victims, created by the Assembly of States Parties in accordance with article 79 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.The Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, established within the framework of the Council of Europe by Resolution CM/Res(2023)3, or any successor body or attached fund.The United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture, established by the United Nations General Assembly through resolution 36/151 of 16 December 1981.”.(5) After Schedule 22A (Relevant organisations for public interest compensation orders), insert the following new Schedule— “Schedule 22BRelevant offences for public interest compensation orders1 The following offences to the extent that they are offences under the law of England and Wales—Offences arising under regulations imposed under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018.”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to amend the Sentencing Act 2020. It would allow the courts to award compensation orders not only to individuals but also for public interest or social purposes, thereby enabling the proceeds of confiscated criminal assets to be more readily used to compensate victims of offences under the UK’s sanctions legislation.
Lord Banner (Con)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 417 I will speak to the associated Amendment 419, both in my name and with named support across the Committee. The purpose of these amendments is to provide a clear and easy-to-use legal basis for those found guilty of sanctions breaches and other similar offences to pay compensation in the public interest to specified victims’ organisations listed in the proposed Schedule 22A and any other similar organisations added to that list through regulations.
There is a clear case for legislative intervention in this area. By way of overview, the existing law provides only a very narrow basis for using the proceeds of confiscated criminal assets to compensate victims, and only in straightforward cases. Victims are rarely allocated any share of the sums recovered. Amendments 417 and 419 would empower courts to award compensation for public interest or social purposes, addressing a significant gap in the law by enabling compensation in the more complex cases for which the existing law is ill suited—for example, supporting Ukrainians who are most impacted by breaches of the UK’s targeted sanctions against the Putin regime and its corrupt cronies.
Against that overview, I turn to the main features of the existing law to demonstrate why they do not go far enough. First, compensation orders under the Sentencing Act 2020 are designed to compensate direct victims of criminal conduct. Where a conviction has been secured, the court is empowered to order the offender to pay compensation for any personal injury, loss or damage arising from the offence in question. The courts have, however, held that these kinds of compensation orders are intended only for clear and simple cases, where there is an obvious direct victim and the amount of compensation can readily and easily be ascertained. Thus, for example, a builder may take a £15,000 deposit to complete building work for a home owner and fraudulently make no attempt to carry out the work. There is a clear victim and a clear loss: the home owner and the £15,000. The compensation order is well suited to handle that sort of case.
By contrast, a court is highly unlikely to be able to make a standard compensation order in a sanctions breach or similar case. Sanctions breaches are rarely clear and simple cases because, by the nature of the offence, the consequences are wide reaching, and they can violate the rights of a large number of people. Victims of the breach, or indeed the precise loss or damage suffered, will typically be very difficult to identify or quantify with the necessary precision required by the current law.
Courts are ill equipped to handle victim compensation in such cases, given the vast and multifaceted harms at issue and the indirect connection between the harms and the sanctions breach. The NGO Redress has advised that its experts are not aware of any single sanctions breach case in the UK in which the court has issued a compensation order for victims. I would be interested to know whether the Minister can provide us with any such examples. Such compensation orders are simply not suited to complex economic crime, such as sanctions offences.
The second area of the existing law is confiscation orders under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. In the event of a conviction, the court can order the confiscation of a portion of an offender’s assets, provided they have been found to have benefited from their criminal conduct. These confiscation orders are intended to deprive the defendant of the proceeds of the crime, rather than to compensate victims. The amounts confiscated are usually paid to the Government’s bank account and then sometimes shared across certain government departments and arm’s-length bodies. No amount is typically paid to victims, subject to very limited exceptions.
The third category of the existing law is forfeiture orders, also under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. In this respect, agencies such as the National Crime Agency, HMRC and the Serious Fraud Office, among others, can institute civil forfeiture proceedings in some situations, in which a court may issue a forfeiture order in respect of funds associated with unlawful conduct. Here too, however, the law is inadequate to deal with sanctions breaches. There is a statutory requirement for funds that have been forfeited under such an order to be paid, again, to the Government’s general bank account, with very limited exceptions relating to situations where someone can show that the amount belongs to them and that they were deprived of it by the offender’s unlawful conduct. Again, that is ill suited to the sanctions context.
Pulling this together, I suggest that, unless the law is changed, in the vast majority of cases judges will have no real ability to award compensation to the victims of sanctions and associated crimes. Not a penny will go to the very people most harmed by the criminal violation in question, not because they are undeserving or have not suffered a harm, but simply because there is a gap in the law that means their position cannot be addressed. This shortcoming is increasingly indefensible in the current world in which we live and will only grow as the UK rightly takes more sanctions enforcement action, most immediately in the context of Ukraine but also in any future cases.
Dealing with the context of Ukraine, the UK positions itself, quite admirably, as a global leader on Russian sanctions. Some 3,000 targets have been sanctioned to date. Yet, when it comes to enforcing these sanctions and penalising any breaches of them, it is the UK, not the victims, that retains the proceeds. Having dedicated unprecedented diplomatic and financial resources to seeking to bring an end to Putin’s war for the benefit of the Ukrainian people, it is striking that the courts have practically no legal basis to channel any of the proceeds of Russian sanctions breaches to Ukrainian victims, whom the sanctions programme is ultimately intended to protect.
I turn to alternatives. In correspondence between Redress and the Home Office, which I have seen, the Minister referred to other amendments proposed to the Bill to ensure that the uplifts to existing confiscation orders can similarly be redirected. However, these are subject to the same or similar limitations as the existing law. In particular, the limitation of the concepts of victim and loss being narrowly defined means that redress is not available for indirect victims. It is that gap that my Amendments 417 and 419 are intended to address.
In the light of that, I stress that my challenge to the Minister is a constructive one, because I want to put on the record the personal experience I have of the deeply conscientious engagement he has had on matters of Ukraine that I have raised with him. I thank him publicly for that, as I have done privately. Can he offer a cast-iron guarantee that the existing law, coupled with any proposed amendments the Government are putting forward, goes as far as Amendments 417 and 419, or does he accept that there is a gap? If he does, can he explain the justification for it? I beg to move.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Banner. I have signed Amendments 417 and 419. The noble Lord has made a powerful, constructive and eloquent case for we should try to tackle the public interest compensation orders and deal with the gap that is left by confiscation orders, compensation orders and forfeiture, which he mentioned in his speech.
Baroness Goudie (Lab)
I support the noble Lord, Lord Banner, on Amendments 417 and 419. I will not repeat what I and my colleagues have said many times in this House. I am, however, most anxious about the compensation money that does not go to these countries and these people. We are told that it is in the Treasury in some cases; we ask about interest; and we have had a debate with, and letters from, the noble Lord, Lord Livermore. But these amendments could really change things, so that everybody would know where the interest is going, where the money for the victims is going, where it is held, how it is given, how it is sent, and who is in receipt of it. This is vital, because we can see what is happening in Ukraine, which will need much more support; and we know that this is happening in Russia and elsewhere.
Also, we work on the case of the DRC all the time; we know what is happening there and in other countries. It is vital that this be included in the Bill. It would make such a difference to so many people around the world, and it would deal with the perpetrators. So I hope the Government will look at this. Finally, I would like to thank Redress for all the support it has given to us, along with writing to the departments and so on.
Baroness D'Souza (CB)
My Lords, I had hoped to speak to this Bill on Second Reading, but was unable to do so; I hope noble Lords will allow me to jump in in Committee.
As has been pointed out elegantly by previous speakers, standard compensation orders are simply not suited to complex economic crimes such as sanctions offences. We now have these two amendments, which seek to ensure that victims are not excluded from receiving compensation simply because their harm is deemed too indirect or too complex for UK law to handle. We also know that it is highly likely that the UK will bring in yet more sanctions, particularly in the context of Russia and Ukraine. It is therefore timely to adjust our laws now.
In the comprehensive briefing that we all received from Redress, of which I am honoured to be a patron, it has been estimated that, at present, there are almost 3,000 targets of sanctions imposed by the UK Government, and more are likely to follow. However, as we have learned, at present the courts have almost no legal basis to channel any of the proceeds to Ukrainian victims, who the sanctions are intended to protect.
Achieving a way to compensate victims of Russian aggression from the criminal assets of oligarchs breaching UK sanctions will be perceived by the Ukrainians as a form of justice that is not to be sniffed at. These amendments would strengthen UK law by empowering courts to award compensation orders for
“public interest or social purposes”
by means of compensation forfeiture orders arising from criminal conduct under the UK’s sanction laws. I thoroughly support these amendments.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 418. I also support Amendments 417 and 419, which were spoken to so well by the noble Lords, Lord Banner and Lord Alton, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Goudie and Lady D’Souza—powerful testimony. Collectively, these amendments provide a necessary pathway for turning the proceeds of international crime into a force for restorative justice.
Currently, when the Crown Court makes a confiscation order, the primary objective is to deprive a defendant of their benefit from crime. While we support this, a significant gap remains in how these recovered funds are used, particularly when the criminal conduct involves serious human rights violations, mass-atrocity crimes or grand corruption. At present, funds not directly owed to a specific claimant in the immediate proceedings often flow into the general consolidated fund.
The Minister, in his recent letter to the human rights organisation Redress—of which I know there are many supporters in the Chamber today—suggests that current mechanisms are sufficient. He argued that the UK already shares over 50% of proceeds recovered through international co-operation with other Governments. However, as Redress compellingly points out, state-level sharing is not the same as victim redress. When funds are returned to a foreign state, the level of support victims receive depends entirely on the political will and potential corruption risks within that recipient state. Victims of mass atrocities and grand corruption have a clear preference for reparations paid for by their abusers and enablers. It is a matter of human dignity, justice and their own healing journey.
Amendment 418 would give courts the discretion to direct a portion of these confiscated proceeds towards
“public interest or social purposes”.
This is not a mere accounting change but a mechanism to provide support, redress or therapeutic services to victims of international human rights violations who might otherwise have no procedural pathway to compensation. To ensure that these funds are managed with the highest level of integrity, my Amendment 418 would require the Secretary of State to establish a public purpose fund. This fund would be subject to strict regulations, operation and auditing. It would ensure that recovered sums are applied to defined social purposes before any remaining balance reverts to the state under Section 55(1) of the Proceeds of Crime Act, and it would require the court to calculate directives while respecting the duty to ensure full payment of any existing priority orders or compensation directives for direct victims.
Lord Kempsell (Con)
My Lords, I support Amendment 417, from the noble Lord, Lord Banner, to which I have attached my name. I think there is very little I can add to the technical, financial and legal arguments in support that have already been made from all sides of the Committee. I will simply confine myself to a diagonal point on the effectiveness of the UK sanctions regime, which is funded by taxpayers’ money. A huge amount of work and official time goes into ensuring that it is effectively implemented, but the funds and the proceeds remain largely in the UK. It would be a better return on the intention of that public time and effort if those funds ultimately reached victims. That is what the public expect when they support a sanctions regime.
I attach to that the recent debate over the effectiveness of sanctions in general. Surely the measures in these amendments would increase public confidence in the overall sanctions policy of the Government, if the public are able to see that victims themselves are truly the beneficiaries of funds sequestered by their use. I consider the current position to be a rationing of justice and, as Sophocles said, there is no justice if it is rationed.
Lord Garnier (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Banner for introducing this series of amendments and congratulate those who supported him. This is an important public policy question that can, from time to time, raise its ugly head—although it is then ignored. I hope that, as my noble friend has so attractively argued for his amendments just now, we will gain some momentum.
I turn to a related but not exactly identical subject: compensation for overseas victims of crimes committed by British defendants. I raised that question during Second Reading of the Victims and Courts Bill on 16 December, just before Christmas. The Minister there, who is in her place—I think it is the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, who will kindly respond to this group, and I am, as always, grateful to him for bearing that burden—recognised that the question of compensation for overseas victims was a matter of some importance that she would think about. Indeed, she suggested that she might like to meet me to discuss it further. I am open to that invitation, as I am sure would be my noble friend Lord Banner.
My noble friend has opened up a discussion about a lacuna in our law, in that we fail adequately to compensate victims. The victims could be those who have suffered at the hands of the Russians or of those that we, the European Union or the United States have sanctioned. I say in parenthesis that part of my practice at the Bar involves sanctions law, so anything that legislates to increase the size of my practice is to be welcomed. More to the point, it seems to me that we have two parallel streams, which demonstrate that the way we treat victims is insufficient and inadequate.
I thank my noble friend for bringing this to the attention of the Committee and the Government more directly. I trust that, when the Minister comes to respond, he will do so positively. If he is unable to do so, I invite my noble friend to reintroduce his amendment to the Victims and Courts Bill when it comes back to us in Committee at some as yet unannounced date.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Banner and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for their amendments in this group, and all noble Lords who spoke.
Amendments 417 and 419, tabled by my noble friend Lord Banner, would provide courts with the power to make public interest compensation orders during the sentencing of certain offences. He made a typically eloquent and compelling case for these amendments. He has consistently and powerfully campaigned, especially on Ukraine and the proceeds of sanctions, and I pay tribute to him for that.
Public interest compensation orders would grant the courts the ability to compel offenders to pay money to approved international or public interest bodies that support victims of serious human rights violations, such as torture or aggression. The courts would have to consider relevant factors, such as the broader human rights impact of the crime and the need to prioritise direct victims where relevant.
The amendment also lists relevant eligible recipient organisations with powers for the Secretary of State to update them, creating a structured mechanism for using the proceeds of sanctions-related crime in reparative funding for victims in the wider public interest. The amendment proposes a reasonable and practical process through which courts could divert illegally obtained funds to support victims, and I hope that the Government consider it very carefully. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Amendment 418 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, similarly proposes a mechanism through which the courts could direct a portion of confiscated proceeds for public interest or social purposes. It is very similar in nature to Amendment 417; it differs slightly in that it specifically requires the courts to consider whether the crime in question
“involved serious human rights violations, mass atrocity crimes, or grand corruption”.
But like Amendment 417, it raises very important issues as well as a broader question: if we are to make public compensation orders, what crimes should they apply to? I look forward to the Minister’s thoughts on that matter too.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Banner, for his amendments. He has had a wide level of support today from, among others, the noble Lords, Lord Kempsell, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Alton of Liverpool, the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and my noble friend Lady Goudie. They have all spoken well on this series of amendments. I will try to address the amendments, self-evidently, but I also say to the noble Lord, Lord Banner, in particular, that I know how committed he is to Ukraine. He has my support in addressing the viciousness of the Russian regime and the international crimes that it has committed by invading Ukraine. There are obviously a number of consequences to that, but the principles that he puts forward today could apply to a number of other regimes as well.
The amendments seek to amend the Sentencing Act 2020 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to enable courts to issue public interest compensation orders. These orders would be for public interest or social purposes to support those who may be impacted by offences under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, including victims of human rights violations, as well as other offences added by the Secretary of State via secondary legislation. I recognise the intentions behind these amendments and affirm the Government’s support for victims of human rights abuses and our commitment to tackling economic crime.
On Amendment 417, courts already have the power to impose a compensation order on an offender, which would require them to make financial reparation to a direct victim of a specific offence for any resulting personal injury, loss or damage. Therefore, in seeking to amend the Sentencing Act to allow courts to award compensation orders for public interest or social purposes, there is a danger that it would undermine the current victim-centred approach of the legislation to date.
In passing, I say to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, that I know he is seeking a meeting with my noble friend Lady Levitt. It may be my fault that it has not happened, because of a diary clash, but we are agreeing to examine that, and either my noble friend’s office or mine will get back to him with regard to a meeting on those issues.
I recognise the critical importance of supporting victims of crime. As noble Lords will know, the victim surcharge is imposed on offenders by the court in the public interest to ensure that they hold some responsibility towards the cost of supporting victims and witnesses. The revenue raised from this surcharge is currently used to fund victim services through the victims and witnesses general fund, so the principle has been established.
The UK provides support for victims of human rights and sanctions violations worldwide. Noble Lords may wish to know that we have committed to provide £22 billion of funding to Ukraine. The Government are currently exploring further avenues—such as the extraordinary revenue acceleration loan to Ukraine—alongside our colleagues in the G7 and the EU. This has seen a $50 billion loan to Ukraine, which—this goes to the heart of the amendments tabled—is to be serviced and repaid by future profits generated from frozen Russian sovereign assets.
Lord Banner (Con)
I thank the Minister for his comments, and indeed all speakers. The force of the unanimity on this issue across the Committee is telling. I hope it is the beginning of the momentum that my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier called for.
With respect to a couple of points the Minister mentioned, the proposal would not distract from the existing law because it applies only to relevant offences, which are defined in the amendment as, essentially, sanctions and money laundering. The option of a public interest compensation order would not be available for the dodgy builder-type case that I outlined before. It would not, in fact, distract from direct victims but, in precisely those kinds of offences where the existing law is inapt, it would provide for a remedy for victims. It is true that this category is relatively narrowly defined, but it is precisely that category of offences where the law is currently deficient.
I therefore urge the Minister and officials to give this further consideration. If he is not sick of meeting me on Ukraine-related matters, I am very happy to meet him again to talk through how the wording could perhaps be tweaked to deal with some of the issues he has outlined. If we cannot reach agreement, I would be inclined to bring this back on Report, and/or in the context of the Victims and Courts Bill, as my noble friend mentioned. Against all that background, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“Duty to review treatment of childhood convictions and cautions(1) Within a year of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report on the management of childhood convictions and cautions.(2) The report must consider at least—(a) the prevention of automatic disclosure of childhood conditional cautions;(b) the prevention of adult treatment of offences committed by individuals who were minors at the time of the offences in question taking place;(c) the range of childhood convictions which are removed from standard and enhanced checks after five and a half years.(3) In considering the areas outlined in subsection (2), the report must consider the policy merits of reform of the existing management of childhood convictions and cautions, and which actions would be required in each case for reform to take place.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish a report reviewing how childhood convictions and cautions are handled within one year of this Act being passed.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, in this group on childhood convictions, Amendment 420 in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Brinton seeks a general review and report on the management of childhood convictions and cautions. Later in the group, there are four specific amendments. Three are tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, with all his wide experience of working as a magistrate, particularly in the youth court, and is also in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Spellar and Lord Hampton; the other is tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere. I support all four specific amendments. They are all consistent with our general proposition that we should be very careful before we mark people out with a criminal record for mistakes committed when they were children.
I am grateful for the briefing we have received from Unlock and Transform Justice. They make a number of helpful proposals for reform. Our amendment calls for a report to be commissioned and laid before Parliament within a year to enable Parliament to be fully informed on the issues and possible reforms in this difficult area —and it is a difficult area. We must not only consider the position of young people who acquire criminal records that may blight their futures but balance their position against the need to protect future employers and others who might be affected by repeat offences in the future, in particular vulnerable children, and society as a whole.
The position of children in England and Wales is exacerbated because we have a very young age of criminal responsibility—10 years old—with the result that, in this jurisdiction, children aged between 10 and 17 can be convicted of criminal offences. This compares with the Netherlands, Belgium, and Scotland, which raised the age of criminal responsibility in 2019, and with Germany, Spain, and Italy, where it is 14, along with many other countries. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child requires states to set a minimum age of criminal responsibility without expressing what that should be, but the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child urges states to raise the age to 14.
The reasons why this matters are not confined to the unfairness of punishing children for crimes when they lack the maturity or responsibility to be held criminally responsible by state laws. The unfairness extends to exposing them to the long-term disadvantage of being scarred with criminal records acquired for childhood offences for longer than is necessary for the protection of the public and often well into their adulthood.
There is a wealth of evidence of the ages at which young people’s brains and cognition mature. Although it differs, the best evidence provides that full maturity is not reached until the early 20s and that full responsibility does not develop until the late teens at least. That matches the obvious and instinctively understood reality that children and young people are that much more likely to get into trouble than adults. Yet, we do not presently match our law on the acquisition, collation and disclosure of criminal records to that obvious reality.
There are many injustices. Children from disadvantaged backgrounds and minority communities are much more likely to acquire criminal records than children from more privileged backgrounds. There is a vicious circle in operation here. Disadvantaged children are overwhelmingly more likely to be in care, to be excluded from school and to develop personality disorders and other mental health issues. Those factors make them significantly more likely to commit offences and get into trouble with the law.
By saddling children with criminal records, we make their disadvantages worse in securing employment or training opportunities, and even in further education. Fines and community orders generally stay on a child’s record for two years on a basic check, and maybe for much longer if an enhanced check is sought, which it is likely to be for any work in a school, for example.
It is not just convictions, though, that damage children. Cautions in childhood can prevent children and young adults securing employment. A basic DBS check provided by the Disclosure and Barring Service, which it is open to any potential employer to seek, will disclose youth conditional cautions, which are intended to be an alternative to formal criminal proceedings. Such conditional cautions can be given to anyone aged between 10 and 17 and avoid the need for criminal proceedings. That is clearly a sensible strategy to provide an alternative criminal justice solution to avoid the need for proceedings and a formal conviction. However, the caution will stay on the child’s record on a basic DBS check for three months or until the conditions have been complied with, whichever is earlier. Even in that time, the caution is capable of being really damaging to that child’s prospects.
Then again, the effect of court backlogs has been, as we know, that convictions are delayed. Such delays may last from the date when a person charged with an offence was a child to a date long after that child’s 18th birthday, so they are then an adult. So, a person can commit an offence as a child and be convicted as an adult but, for the purposes of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, the date when the conviction becomes spent depends on the date of conviction rather than the date of the offence. So, through no fault of their own, children’s convictions for offences that ought to have been spent are unspent for far longer.
This is an area in serious need of review. We need wider consideration of all the issues concerning the treatment of criminal records acquired for childhood offences, including: whether and for how long children’s offences should stay on their records; how far the seriousness of the sentence passed should be the sole or even the main criterion for convictions becoming spent; what other criteria there should be; whether conditional cautions should be treated as giving rise to a criminal record; how far it should be open to children convicted of offences committed in childhood to apply for their records to be expunged—when, to whom and on what basis; and how far such offences should still be disclosed on standard and enhanced higher-level DBS checks.
These are serious issues affecting many lives that are currently blighted by a past that sticks with them, and they are important to society as a whole. I beg to move.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, I open by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for so fully setting out his and the other amendments in this group. I agreed with his opening points, and I support all the amendments—I suspect all the speakers in this short debate will support them too. In a sense, they offer a range of possible changes, from a broad review to addressing specific anomalies, which the noble Lord did.
I am absolutely confident that our Lord Chancellor would be very sympathetic to these amendments. I know that he has said in recent speeches that he wants to look at criminal records, and those for young people in particular. That is an excellent starting point, and I hope that the Minister can reinforce that point when she comes to sum up.
Touching on the amendments in my name, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and my noble friend Lord Spellar, who will speak on these matters as well. My Amendment 476 seeks to prevent the automatic disclosure of childhood conditional cautions in a DBS check by amending the definition of a criminal conviction certificate in the Police Act 1997.
My Amendment 477, which was touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, addresses a clear anomaly in the law as it stands. The amendment seeks to ensure that the criminal record for a juvenile is dated from the offence rather than the conviction date. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, these could be really quite far apart, so the way the conviction is treated will be different, because the young adult will be convicted even though the offence was committed when he was a youth.
Amendment 478 seeks to ensure that custodial sentences, except for the most serious sentences, will be removed from an individual’s criminal record after five and a half years if the offence was committed before the age of 18.
Sitting here earlier today and at previous Committee sittings of this Bill, the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, drew something to my attention which I was not aware of involving non-crime hate incidents. He pointed out that, for youths, a non-crime hate incident is treated the same as for an adult, and that means a six-year retention of the information. That is another example of an anomaly, and I hope, when the Home Office comes to report on non-crime hate incidents, it can ensure that that is tied up with the Ministry of Justice considering the way youth convictions are looked at for DBS checks.
I also want to say something about Amendment 486D, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carter. That is specifically about transport-related convictions of young people. I support what he is going to say, I am sure, but I have to say that, as a youth magistrate for nearly 20 years, I cannot remember ever seeing a young person in court for evasion of a fare. If he has figures—he is nodding his head—I will listen to them with interest, because it is not my personal experience of what I saw in youth court. I tend to see much more serious cases, but nevertheless I will listen to and support what he says with interest.
The overarching point is that this is a difficult area. It is very easy to point out anomalies. I am sure that we have a very sympathetic Lord Chancellor, and I really hope that the Government seize this opportunity to address the overarching issue of the way we treat our young people, so that they are not held back when they go into the adult world and the world of work.
Lord Spellar (Lab)
My Lords, I support the amendments standing in the name of my noble friend Lord Ponsonby and the noble Lord, Lord Marks. I have been arguing for some years in the House of Commons that the DBS scheme has, frankly, run out of control. I can quote from June 2020, when I said to the then Prime Minister Boris Johnson that it was
“a major obstacle to people turning their lives around. It is inefficient, unfair and, frankly, discriminatory. The Lammy report dealt with this in some depth nearly two years ago, so we do not need any more … inquiries. We need action”.
Reference has been made to the impact in different parts of the country. In smaller police forces, not only are cases often not taken to court but cautions are not issued, and instead people are very informally told to mend their ways. In cities, it can often be very different, and this also still lies on the record. The then Prime Minister Boris Johnson said in his reply to me:
“Any MP will have had very hard cases caused by the DBS system”.—[Official Report, Commons, 24/6/20; col. 1309.]
I think there is a general recognition at the political level that this is a problem. I have to say from all my experience that there is deep inertial resistance inside the Civil Service to changing this, and I urge Ministers vigorously to overcome it, particularly given the report done by David Lammy, who was commissioned by the then Conservative Government to look into this area.
We also saw similar problems with the first elections for police and crime commissioners. Unwisely, a requirement was put in that someone should have no criminal conviction. We had a candidate who had to stand down as he had been convicted for possessing an offensive weapon when he was 13. We had another candidate who had committed a minor offence 22 years previously. These are people with long records of public service, and in no way should that have been held against them.
Whatever steps we take should also relate to proportionality and relevance. When I was a Transport Minister, there were proposals to introduce DBS checks at airports—I fully understood that—but if somebody had a conviction for an assault outside a nightclub in Southall on a Saturday night, I was not really worried if he was throwing my bags around in the luggage section. I would have been concerned if he had had a conviction for theft or for dealing in stolen goods. That also needs to be taken into account and be put right.
As a constituency Member of Parliament, I also had a woman who had been given a suspended sentence for an assault, age 18, in an argument with another girl over a partner. In her 40s, this was still preventing her. This does not just affect young people; it blights people right the way through their lives—and not just their lives but their children’s lives, as they are not able to provide support for them and have all the frustration of not developing their skills of life. It does not let people move on but also deprives the workforce of talent.
We are told sometimes that DBS checks and the ongoing system are fine, and that employers will look at them and take proportional action. They do not. Once a DBS check comes back with anything on the record, the fact is that people automatically get dropped. What is even more outrageous is that those same employers then go bleating to government, saying, “We can’t get workers here”, and so we have to bring them in from abroad. That was one factor that led to the huge surge of care workers being brought into this country in recent years—a considerable amount of exploitation and fraud accompanied it, by the way. At the same time, people were being kept off work, on benefits, not able to provide for themselves or their families.
My plea to the Committee is to support change and give people hope that they can turn their lives around, to take the opportunity to reinstate what I would argue were the principles of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act when it was first brought forward, and to make some progress. We may need to make further changes in the future, but these amendments provide a very good start.
Lord Garnier (Con)
My Lords, I am very glad that I waited for the noble Lord, Lord Spellar, to contribute to the debate, as I agree with just about everything that he has said. Noble Lords may say that that is not terribly difficult, given that I have co-signed the amendments that he has signed. I share his view that —I am paraphrasing what he said and will probably get it wrong—reviews can sometimes go nowhere. Having listened to him and to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, I am much attracted to our amendment.
Equally, having heard the noble Lord, Lord Marks, introducing his amendment, and having studied it a little more closely, I am attracted by his idea that the review should look into what I think we all admit is a quite complicated area, in public policy terms, of discussion. I am attracted to the proposal from the noble Lord, Lord Marks. If this amendment is accepted by the Government, we would have a report within a year of the Bill’s enactment—we could be talking about, say, June 2027, by the time the review has taken place and the Government have reported. Further, subsection (2) of the proposed new clause in Amendment 420 begins by saying:
“The report must consider at least”,
and then identifies three broad subject areas. It would be able to take on board the points that the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Spellar, have so far outlined.
A combination of these four separate proposals need to grip the Government’s attention, so that we can come back with a coherent, thought-through and workable set of policies that recognise the need for these two public interests to be borne in mind; that is to say, the protection of the public and employers and so forth, set against the need to allow youngsters who may have made some terrible mistakes to get on and live their lives.
I will finish with an anecdote. I used to make a habit of visiting prisons and so forth, when I was shadow Minister of Prisons—before the ark was set afloat. The adult male prison population was once largely aged between 21 and 30. It was an unscientific approach but I noticed that, since around the first decade of this century, the average age of the adult male prison population has risen, largely because of the conviction of historic sex offenders. People have been convicted in, say, the 2010s, in their 60s or 70s, for offences committed when they were youngsters, so the average age of the prison population has to some extent risen. It is a generalisation, and something that the review could look into, but, by and large, people grow out of criminal behaviour. Once they have found a partner and somewhere to live, and got a job—as long as they have not been ruined by Rehabilitation of Offenders Act antipathy—they will get on, earn a living and live their lives. The stupidity of their teenage years falls away behind them, and it should be allowed to stay there.
Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)
My Lords, I support these amendments. As is my way, I must sound a note of caution for one group of people. I know that many noble Lords have a problem with our very low age of criminal responsibility, but it affords a level of protection to young children being groomed for gangs. We need to bear that in mind.
I have great sympathy for these amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Spellar, spoke about the Lammy review. I was on the Lammy review. I ran a job club for over 12 years, and many of the young men I dealt with were unable to seek employment because of what we used to call a blip when they were younger that was still appearing on their DBS. That small blip often drove them to much more serious crime, because they were older and needed to raise more money.
We should do a review, because it is a complicated area, but there are two things to focus on. First, returning to my theme, the single biggest driver of crime is the idea that you have got away with it. If we are going to remove some of the consequences, we need to think clearly and carefully about how that will be perceived by people who are involved in criminal activity—particularly if they are young and do not have all the experiences to risk-assess their own behaviour. We must bear that in mind, because, inadvertently we might be encouraging them to approach criminal behaviour. The myth on the street will be that when you are 18, it is wiped out anyway. We might argue about the nuance of what we are prepared to wipe out or not, but that will not be the conversation on a dark night in the park when the boys are planning their next manoeuvre. It is important that we bear that in mind.
Secondly, there are people in gangs whose sole job is to recruit young people. One of the big things they say to those young people is, “You are too young to go to court”. We have to be careful about making that true, or at least appear to be true. Removing these spent convictions would be such a powerful thing to help people move on, and I support it, but let us think very carefully about how we talk about it, where we draw the lines, how we explain it and how it is enacted in reality rather than just in concept as we sit in this Chamber.
Baroness Sater (Con)
My Lords, I will speak briefly to all these amendments, particularly Amendments 476, 477 and 478. These amendments highlight how the system of criminal record disclosure, particularly as it relates to children, is complex and very confusing. I am an advocate for criminal record reform, having been a youth magistrate for over 20 years and having been on the Youth Justice Board. Those roles have consistently demonstrated to me how decisions made in childhood, often in relation to relatively minor offences, can have consequences that extend well into adult life, as we have heard this evening.
As noble Lords will know, I recently tabled an amendment to the Sentencing Bill to address the anomaly in youth sentencing whereby the first court appearance, rather than the date of the offence, determines whether a young person is treated as an adult. I am therefore very conscious of the unfair impact these technicalities beyond a child’s control can have on their future.
Although we have had success in reducing the number of children in custody because we wanted to keep young people out of prison, we have at the same time increased the threshold of seriousness of offending in these disposals of conditional cautions over a number of years.
I know that the Justice Secretary has recently acknowledged publicly that aspects of the criminal records and disclosure system are in need of reform. Rehabilitation is about giving people a chance to change, and, where appropriate, we should work to ensure that childhood mistakes do not turn into lifelong punishments, giving them the opportunity to get on with their lives.
I am also attracted to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, to which my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier referred. It is very important that the Minister view these amendments on childhood as an opportunity to reflect on a broader review of criminal records and the DBS disclosure system, which might now be appropriate.
These amendments highlight just how complex the system has become. Ensuring that the system is fairer, while keeping in mind the importance of rehabilitation and protection to the public, would, in my view, be a worthwhile objective.
Lord Hampton (CB)
My Lords, I rise to speak briefly to Amendments 476, 477 and 478 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, to which I have added my name. I am also sympathetic to the other amendments in this group and declare, as ever, that I am a schoolteacher in Hackney. I would also like to acknowledge the help of Transform Justice.
I rather innocently assumed that one of the cornerstones of the justice system in this country is rehabilitation, but this does not seem to be the case with our young people. As we have heard, every year in England and Wales there are 13,000 convictions of children aged 10 to 17, who are disproportionately from poor backgrounds, minoritised communities, in care or excluded from school. Those convicted acquire criminal records which only add to their disadvantage.
Some of these criminal records remain through life. A child charged for affray for a playground fight would have to disclose that for ever on a standard and enhanced DBS check. Also, currently, as we have heard, a criminal record is acquired on conviction rather than according to the date of the offence itself. This means that many people commit offences as children but acquire an adult criminal record because, through no fault of their own, the hearing at which they are convicted happens after their 18th birthday. This situation has got worse because of the recent delays in the court system. This is patently absurd.
As the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, has said, brains do not mature until people are well into their twenties. Also, research has shown that teenagers take more risks when they have an audience. As I see in the playground every week, children are immature and often reckless, not seeing the consequences of their actions.
Our criminal records should allow for rehabilitation in order to allow young people to move on from childhood mistakes. These amendments would mean that young people should be able to be free of their childhood offences at a specific interval after they have finished their sentence, so they do not have to explain old and no longer relevant childhood offences to potential employers—even if they manage to get as far as an interview. We are not talking about the most serious crimes here.
For everyone else, these amendments would mean that childhood offences should automatically be taken off the records five and a half years after conviction. We also propose that a conditional caution, when accepted by a child, should not appear on the records. We propose that those whose conviction is delayed until after their 18th birthday should not acquire an adult criminal record.
With the number of NEETs approaching 1 million, we should be doing everything we can to remove barriers to employment and let rehabilitation of the young be truly part of the justice system.
Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)
My Lords, I am going to speak to Amendment 486D, and I support all the other amendments in this group. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for his compelling introduction, and for the other powerful speeches. You may wonder why I have tabled this very specific amendment. The best way I can relate it is to tell a brief story. I was truly shocked when a friend drew my attention to an incident involving his teenage daughter a few years ago, but which, I believe, affects many of our young people, receives very little publicity and ruins many lives.
My friend’s daughter had arrived at a railway station to find that the ticket machines were not working and there was a long queue for the ticket office. Desperate to catch a train to get her vaccinations for charitable work abroad, she foolishly jumped on a train without a ticket.
When she got out at her destination, she offered to pay at the barrier. The inspector told her to get a ticket at the ticket office. However, there was a long queue, so, knowing that she would not have time to do that, she went to the machines, but she found that she could not get a machine ticket for a journey from the station where she had left to the station she had arrived at.
Very naively, she thought she would therefore get the ticket after her appointment for vaccinations, and she left the station in a state of some panic. It was then that she was approached by the ticket inspector and told she was to be prosecuted under Section 5(3)(a) of the Regulation of Railways Act 1889 for travelling without paying the fare with intent to avoid payment. It was the first time she had ever done something like this. Her ticket would have cost £3.20. That is less than a cappuccino coffee.
I discovered that, if convicted, she might not only face a fine of up to £1,000 or imprisonment for up to three months, but her conviction would be recorded on the Police National Database and future potential employers would see it after a basic criminal records search for up to six years and for up to 11 years, I believe, after an enhanced check. Through just one moment’s teenage lack of judgment, her prospects of obtaining a job and a career would be blighted during a crucial period when most young people are trying to get on the career ladder—all for a £3.20 fare.
Acting as a friend, I had many exchanges of correspondence with the rail company, all to no avail. The upshot was that I ended up joining her and her desperately worried parents at the local magistrates’ court for her hearing, where I intended to plead the mitigating circumstances of her case. To my horror, I discovered she was one of dozens of other children and young people queuing up that morning, charged with exactly the same offence, which was a regular occurrence at that magistrates’ court, I found. It was nothing unusual. I managed to persuade the train company to drop her case if she paid a fine, but thousands of other young people are not so lucky.
This was a young teenage woman who was on an important journey in connection with unpaid charitable work abroad. Her heart was in exactly the right place. On the spur of the moment, she panicked and thought she might miss her train. She had tried to pay the fare at the train barriers when she arrived, so she emphatically did not intend to avoid it. Of course—and I emphasise this—she thoroughly deserved the fine, but did she really deserve the likely prospect of being unable to obtain a decent job for the next six to 11 years, all for a one-off, first-time offence relating to a £3.20 train ticket? She was no serial offender.
The charity FairChecks has demonstrated that, with a criminal record, young people can be locked out of future employment opportunities and even voluntary work. Research shows that at least 30% of employers automatically exclude a candidate with an unspent conviction. But the facts show that, as we have heard, young peoples’ brains are still developing, which makes them more impulsive and less able fully to understand the consequences of their actions. It is therefore crucial that they be given the opportunity to move on from their mistakes without carrying the weight of those childhood errors during early adulthood. In all honesty, might not many of us say, “There but for the grace of God go our children”?
My amendment would give our children a second chance if they are found without a valid ticket on the railways. They would still be liable for a penalty fare or a fine but, provided it was a first offence, their lives would not be ruined by being given a disclosable criminal record. I emphasise that my amendment would not apply if they were caught a second time. In those circumstances, they would not have learned from their mistakes and potential employers would have just cause in wanting to know they were dishonest.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I have signed my noble friend Lord Marks’s Amendment 420 and thank him for his excellent explanation. I am also reminded that our noble friend Lord Dholakia has campaigned for decades for a review of the way in which society deals with children in the criminal justice system. His principal concern, and the subject of a number of Private Members’ Bills, was on increasing the age of criminal responsibility, and we will address that specific issue in the next couple of Committee days. He also expressed some concerns about the treatment that children and young people who had entered the criminal justice system would face later on.
Reference has been made to David Lammy’s review. I also remind the Committee about Iain Duncan Smith’s report for the Centre for Social Justice in 2012, in which he said:
“There is now a significant body of research evidence indicating that early adolescence (under 13-14 years of age) is a period of marked neurodevelopmental immaturity, during which children’s capacity is not equivalent to that of an older adolescent or adult. Such findings cast doubt on the culpability and competency of early adolescents to participate in the criminal process and this raises the question of whether the current MACR”—
minimum age of criminal responsibility—“at ten, is appropriate”. I think that also reflects on cautions and convictions for that age group, although I recognise that my noble friend’s amendment goes right up to the end of childhood.
All the amendments in front of us look at how convictions and cautions are handled and how they are disclosed. Mention has already been made of the organisation FairChecks. It has called for a major review of the criminal records disclosure system. Interestingly, it produced the same evidence as Iain Duncan Smith about the capacity of people of this age to understand and take responsibility for their actions. As has already been mentioned, young people hoping to move on suddenly discover that in trying to get work or a promotion they have to disclose their criminal records, and too often, on top of the almost inevitable rejection letters, their shame emerges once again, destroying their chance of creating a new life once they have served their time.
FairChecks proposes that there should be an automatic disclosure of a caution in criminal records, the slate should be wiped clean for childhood offences and we should stop forcing people to reveal short and suspended prison sentences for ever. But, it says—as has every other speaker so far today—safeguards must remain in place for more serious offenders in order to protect the public. At the same time, it would give individuals the chance to move beyond their childhood criminal record so they could get work and forge a new life as an adult, and the first steps towards that would be a review. I hope the Minister will look favourably on Amendment 420.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for his Amendment 420. In general, of course, these Benches abide by the notion that policy and practice should be guided by the feedback of evidence and outcomes, and the amendment would support that objective with regard to childhood convictions and cautions. I believe the data that currently exists on this would have to be thoroughly analysed to determine whether the measure is necessary, and I hope the Minister can shed some light on that existing evidence in her response.
We have great sympathy with the general thrust of Amendments 476 to 478. I have some reservations about Amendment 476, in that we have already removed the automatic disclosure of youth cautions on DBS certificates and I am unsure whether that should be extended now to the more serious youth conditional cautions, which of course include duties alongside the original caution. But I completely understand the principle behind Amendment 477, in the name of the same noble Lords, and why the legislation as currently drafted may lead to individuals being treated as adults when they commit an offence as a juvenile—all the more so given the backlog that the courts are currently suffering and delays in the court system, as the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, pointed out. Likewise, I see the rationale behind Amendment 478, which seeks to ensure that custodial sentences received by youths are removed from their criminal records after five and a half years.
On Amendment 486D in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, as others have said, children of course make mistakes, and there is a spectrum of offences, where avoiding a fare payment and travelling without a ticket is certainly on the less severe end. There is plainly a case that, as first-time offences, these do not warrant a criminal conviction certificate being issued.
My only point in conclusion is to echo what my noble friend Lord Bailey of Paddington said: we have to be a little careful not to increase the incentives for petty crime. As he pointed out, that can perhaps lead—especially with regard to criminal gangs—to a potential for danger. With that said, I look forward to the Minister’s response.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and Lord Carter of Haslemere, and my noble friend Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede for tabling Amendments 420, 476 to 478 and 486D. They form a formidable trio in terms of not just their expertise but the respect that they rightly command in your Lordships’ House.
A number of noble Lords have raised the question of the age of criminal responsibility. I hope I will be forgiven for not addressing that now; I know for certain that we will be addressing it at least twice in the days and weeks to come.
The Government acknowledge the principle that underpins these amendments—namely, that having a criminal record will have a significant impact on children and that such a record can, in some circumstances, follow them into later life as adults, again with profound consequences. That said, as I think all noble Lords agreed, it is critical that our criminal records disclosure regime strikes the right balance. On the one hand, we want to support people who have committed criminal offences, either some time ago or when they were very young, to be able to move on with their lives. But there is also a need for appropriate risk management in the public interest, as well as to safeguard the most vulnerable.
I will deal first with Amendments 420 and 476 to 478. The existing regime helps employers make informed recruitment decisions through the disclosure of appropriate and relevant information. This will mean that some serious offences, even when committed as a child, will always need to be disclosed, particularly where a person is applying to work with children or vulnerable adults. As some of your Lordships will be aware, in his recent independent review of the criminal courts, Sir Brian Leveson recommended that the Government review the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. In the Statement I made to your Lordships’ House on 2 December, I said that we will consider opportunities to simplify the criminal records regime to ensure that it is both clear and proportionate, particularly in relation to childhood offences.
I would be very happy to meet with any of your Lordships over the coming weeks to discuss this in more detail. It is of the utmost importance to the Government that we work together to ensure that we get this right. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, I was very struck by the observations made by the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, that this is not always as straightforward as it might appear, hence the need to make sure that we do this carefully, in a structured and thoughtful way. As I said, I would be delighted to see any of your Lordships. Given the offer made by my noble friend Lord Hanson in the previous group, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and I may be seeing rather more of each other than perhaps he had intended—but it is always a pleasure on my part.
Turning to Amendment 486D, I am very surprised to hear what the noble Lord, Lord Carter, says because the Government’s view echoes what my noble friend Lord Ponsonby said: children are generally treated leniently when fare evasion occurs. This offence is most commonly dealt with by transport staff, so usually no question arises of a child acquiring a criminal record for fare evasion and similar offences. The police usually become involved only in cases of a refusal to pay for a ticket, for repeat offences or because of some other complicating factor. Even when the police become involved, this does not usually result in a prosecution taking place because the Code for Crown Prosecutors requires prosecutors to consider, as a specific public interest factor tending against prosecution, where a child is young or where it is a first offence.
Police officers can give out-of-court disposals, which allow them to respond to low-level offending proportionately and effectively. These out-of-court disposals, of which there are a variety, provide opportunities for children to make reparation and restoration to victims, and to be diverted into courses or services which can help to change their offending behaviour. Most types of out-of-court disposals are not automatically disclosed on criminal record certificates.
The Government believe that it would be very unusual for a child or young person to get a criminal conviction for this type of offence but, were that to happen, the disclosure time limits under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act are very different from those that affect adults. Rehabilitation periods for children are typically half the length of those for an adult. For example, if a court were to impose a fine for fare evasion, there would usually be a requirement that the child disclose their conviction for only six months, as opposed to the case of an adult, who would have to disclose it for a year.
For all these reasons, under the existing legislation, the Government’s view is that there is a very small chance of a child who is a first-time offender getting a criminal record for a fare evasion offence in the first place, and an equally small chance of such a conviction following them into adult life. I will, however, make inquiries and write to the noble Lord giving such statistics as I am able to find.
Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)
I am extremely grateful. To some extent mine is a probing amendment—I need more facts and evidence around this—but the Minister referred to the Code for Crown Prosecutors. The cases I spoke about were prosecuted by the train operating company. I am not really convinced that it had even heard of the Code for Crown Prosecutors; judging from all the correspondence I had with it, I do not think it had, to be honest. I believe there is something there to be investigated more closely, because I saw the evidence with my own eyes.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I do not think that I can improve on what I have said. I will make inquiries into the statistical evidence that we hold and write to the noble Lord.
I reiterate that I am very happy to meet any of your Lordships, including, of course, the noble Lord, Lord Carter, ahead of Report to discuss these issues in more detail. In the meantime, I hope that the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I am very grateful for the support that I have had from across the Committee, and for the very detailed and helpful response from the Minister. I will gladly take up her invitation to have a discussion. It is important that the Government intend to review this area, at least in part. If we can commission a review of the sort that I have suggested, I would be very pleased to help with that. On that basis, I am happy to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel
“Child cruelty offences: notification and offender management requirements(1) A person (“relevant offender”) is subject to the notification requirements of subsections (2) and (3) for the period set out in subsection (4) if the relevant offender is convicted of an offence listed in subsection (6). (2) A relevant offender must notify to the police within the three days of the time of their conviction or their release from custody, and annually thereafter, providing —(a) the relevant offender’s date of birth,(b) their national insurance number,(c) their name on the notification date and, where using one or more other names on that date, each of those names,(d) their place of residence on the date of notification,((e) the address of any other premises in the United Kingdom at which, at the time the notification is given, they regularly reside or stay, and(f) any information that may be prescribed in regulations by the Secretary of State.(3) A relevant offender must notify to the police, within the period of three days beginning with the event occurring, about—(a) their use of a name which has not been notified to the police under subsection (2);(b) a change to their place or residence;(c) any other prescribed change of circumstances as defined in regulations made under this section.(4) The dates of discharge from notification requirements under this section are the same as those set out in Section 88B of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.(5) The information required by subsections (2) and (3), once received, must be—(a) monitored regularly by the police and probation service, and(b) retained for the purposes of offender management.(6) The relevant offences are—(a) causing or allowing the death of a child or vulnerable adult, or allowing them to suffer serious harm (section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004);(b) child cruelty, neglect and violence (section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933);(c) infanticide (section 1 of the Infanticide Act 1938);(d) exposing children whereby life is endangered (section 27 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861);(e) an offence under sections 4, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23 or 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1860, if the victim is under the age of 16;(f) an offence under any of the following provisions of the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003—(i) female genital mutilation (section 1);(ii) assisting a girl to mutilate her own genitalia (section 2);(iii) assisting a non-UK person to mutilate overseas a girl’s genitalia (section 3);(g) cruelty to children (section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933).”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would create notification requirements for people convicted of child cruelty, analogous to the Sex Offenders Register. Their information and personal details would be kept on record by the police for the purposes of offender management, with the aim of reducing the risk to children from future offences.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I am pleased to move Amendment 420A. Although it is in my name, it is a product of tireless campaigning from my honourable friend Helen Grant MP. I thank her for her long-standing commitment to this issue. It is thanks to her unwavering commitment that we are one step closer to making a child cruelty register a reality.
I thank the Government for their ongoing communication with us on this important topic and their assurances that they would like to implement a policy that supports a child cruelty register. When this amendment was tabled during the passage of the Sentencing Bill in your Lordships’ House, government officials requested that it be reserved for Home Office legislation, rather than that of the Ministry of Justice. That is why I am moving this amendment today.
This proposed register would be very similar in kind to the register for convicted child sex offenders, for whom notification requirements already exist. It would ensure that those convicted of cruelty to vulnerable children must notify the police of their home address and other relevant details following their release from prison. The register would act as a safeguard by providing the police with the oversight needed to manage offenders and reduce the risk to children. It would mean that those who commit cruelty to children in a non-sexual manner cannot simply disappear back into the community.
These provisions already exist for sex offenders, and we see no reason why they should not similarly pertain to those convicted of child cruelty. Although the offence is different, its effects are detrimentally serious in nature. Child cruelty is a heinous crime that can have a lifelong impact on victims and affects the most vulnerable individuals in society.
Common sense requires that those who commit crimes such as allowing the death of a child, neglect of a child, violence towards a child, infanticide or female genital mutilation should not be able to slip under the radar in local communities once their custodial sentence is spent. There should be a centralised mechanism for the police to know where these people live. This is particularly so given that, in the vast majority of child cruelty cases, the offender has parental responsibility for the victim. They are therefore likely to have connections to the child’s guardian, who, in many cases, will be a family member.
There is a clear gap in the child protection systems that unnecessarily endangers children. The child protection system must exist to free children from the conditions of cruelty towards them, but it must also contain preventive measures to ensure that children are not placed in such appalling situations. Child cruelty offences have doubled in the past few years; now more than ever, it is important to act swiftly to curb this rise. Given the Government’s previously stated support for this measure, I hope that the Minister will be equally able to offer her support today.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, my colleagues in the Commons very much supported Helen Grant in her campaign for this amendment. I pay particular tribute to Jess Brown-Fuller MP. It is very helpful that it has been directed to this Bill, and we on these Benches are very pleased that the Opposition have laid the amendment to this Bill.
It is getting late, and I will not speak for very long. The only other people we need to credit are Tony Hudgell and his parents. After being taken away from his birth parents, he has lived for many years with his foster parents, who he describes as his parents. He has endured 23 operations after injuries that resulted in him losing both legs when he was a toddler. That is the sort of cruelty—although unusually bad in this case—that the amendment is intended to address. For all the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, outlined, we absolutely support the progress of this amendment, and we hope that the Government will look favourably on it.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, notification requirements received attention during the passage of the Government’s Sentencing Bill. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for ensuring this important matter remains firmly on our agenda. I join the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, in paying tribute to Helen Grant MP and to Paula Hudgell, both of whose tireless campaigning has done so much to advance the protection of children. As my noble friend Lord Timpson set out in Committee on the Sentencing Bill, this Government are committed to safeguarding children and ensuring robust measures are in place to protect them from those who seek to cause them harm. We are working hard to consider the best way to manage such offenders effectively.
We are unable to support the amendment at present, as further work is needed to determine the most effective way to strengthen offender management. We need to consider fully all aspects of implementation when it comes to adding notification requirements to a new cohort of offenders, particularly in light of the Government’s recently published violence against women and girls strategy, which sets out significant reforms to offender management.
It is right that we take the time to understand the potential impact of these proposals. One of the issues is that adding notification requirements to a new cohort of offenders would involve significant costs for policing. For example, notification duties such as taking biometric data, verifying personal details, recording changes, conducting compliance visits and managing ViSOR data must all be absorbed into the general workload of the police. One of the tasks for the Government is to reflect that this could mean shifting resource from other important areas of police work.
I can reassure noble Lords, however, that since December, Home Office and Justice Ministers have met regularly to discuss options in this space and have held initial discussions with national policing representatives. So, I can add my reassurances to those already given by my noble friend Lord Timpson: Ministers will continue to pursue this issue with vigour. With these reassurances, I hope that at this stage the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful both to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and to the Minister for their contributions. I think we can all agree that child protection should be a priority for any Government and that we must ensure that any gaps in the law are plugged with immediate effect.
This amendment, unlike many in this Bill, is not about creating a new category of offender or about an expansion of the criminal law; it simply reflects and seeks to fix the troubling reality that individuals who commit acts of cruelty or violence or neglect do not have a monitoring regime upon leaving custody. That is what we believe needs to be corrected. We already accept, as a matter of principle, that where an offence demonstrates a clear and ongoing risk to children, the state has a responsibility to ensure appropriate oversight in the community, and that is why notification requirements exist for child sex offenders. This amendment merely extends the same logic to offences that, while different in nature, can be as devastating in their consequences and no less indicative of future risk.
I am grateful to the Government for acknowledging the need and the advantages of this amendment both inside and outside of this Chamber. I am grateful for the Minister’s words of support tonight, and I understand the point she made about considering this properly, but the rise in child cruelty offences demands action rather than any kind of delay. Every year that passes without a mechanism of this kind leaves children unnecessarily exposed to harm. Therefore, I want to give, with the greatest of respect, notice to the Minister that unless there is an amendment from the Government on Report that supports the substance of this amendment, it is likely that I would want to bring it back. I re-emphasise my gratitude for the Government’s co-operation on this point, but for present purposes I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Doocey
“Removal of Chief Constables(1) The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 is amended as follows.(2) In section 38 (Appointment, suspension and removal of chief constables), after subsection (4) insert—“(4A) Before exercising the power under subsection (3), the police and crime commissioner must consult with His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, or relevant successor inspectorate.”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires a Police and Crime Commissioner to consult with His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services before calling upon a Chief Constable to resign or retire.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 421 is now a hot topic. The West Midlands Police chief constable has resigned, and the Government are pledging to restore the Home Secretary’s power to dismiss chiefs who “fail their communities”. Last week’s events bring the motivation behind this amendment into sharp focus, underlining the need to shield operational policing from political interference.
Contrary to some recent reporting, police and crime commissioners are not required by law to consult the police inspectorate before sacking a chief constable. Although they are expected to seek its advice, it is not a statutory duty. Amendment 421 would put that safeguard clearly into primary legislation, requiring HMICFRS to be consulted before a chief constable is removed.
When PCCs were created, they were given the power to hire and fire the chief officer, but concentrating that power in one pair of hands has had damaging consequences. Across England and Wales, around a quarter of forces now lose their chief constable every year—an astonishing level of churn for such a senior role. That is both wasteful of talent and destabilising for forces. Too often, these departures are driven not by incompetence or misconduct but by political disagreement, with some PCCs permanently in election mode and prioritising their own political agenda rather than responding impartially to the real policing challenges on the ground.
We must never reach a point where a chief constable fears upsetting the Home Secretary, or where any politician can bully a police leader to serve their own political ends. That would take us dangerously close to the American model of political control over policing. In the British tradition, officers swear allegiance to the Crown, not to any politician, and they are expected to act independently without fear or favour. It is a model that has stood the test of time, commands public confidence and deserves to be preserved. Although PCCs have used the formal Section 38 removal process only twice, several more have threatened to invoke proceedings, usually starting with suspension. In all these cases, this has resulted in the chief constable choosing to retire or resign rather than fight a public battle they are unlikely to win.
The Government now propose to move responsibility from PCCs to elected mayors, with council leaders taking the lead elsewhere through new policing and crime boards. On these Benches, we fear that this simply repeats the same mistakes in a different guise. The mayoral route in particular concentrates even more power in a single individual, often elected on a low turnout and with limited day-to-day scrutiny. What replaces PCCs must be better, not just different, and for the Liberal Democrats that means local police boards drawn from councillors and community representatives. Moving powers from one underscrutinised politician to another is not a solution.
Amendment 438EC would allow the Home Secretary to instruct a PCC to begin the dismissal process, effectively giving central government the power to fire chief constables. No individual, whether a PCC, mayor, council leader or Home Secretary, should hold unilateral power to dismiss a chief constable. Dismissal must remain possible where justified, but only through a fair and transparent process, with mandatory independent scrutiny.
That is the role of HMICFRS—to provide an external check, ensuring that decisions are based on competence, conduct and the public interest, not political convenience. I welcome the fact that the Home Secretary sought the inspectorate’s view in the West Midlands case, but that essential safeguard is missing from Amendment 438EC, which allows appointment of a person outside government or policing with too much scope for political influence, and only after the Home Secretary has already decided, making the process look uncomfortably like a rubber stamp. That is what Amendment 421 is designed to prevent.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, said, if ever there was a pertinent time to debate this matter, it is now. The mechanism by which chief constables can be removed has faced significant scrutiny, given the very controversial actions taken by West Midlands Police in the Maccabi Tel Aviv scandal. I pay tribute to my honourable friend Nick Timothy MP for his tenacity in pursuing the truth of that matter. I think it is now axiomatic that the former chief constable of West Midlands Police failed in his professional duties, and it is welcome that he has now accepted that his position is no longer tenable and has announced his retirement. It is against this backdrop that we discuss the amendments in this group.
On Amendment 421, I am of course aware of the Government’s indication that they will abolish PCCs in due course; that is important context to this amendment. For the time being, of course, they remain in place. I am not entirely convinced about the necessity of Amendment 421. With the Maccabi Tel Aviv affair, it was evident for quite some time that the PCC for the West Midlands should have dismissed the chief constable. As it happens, he did not, but I am not sure that consulting His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services beforehand would have had any bearing on the PCC’s decision. Furthermore, if the PCC was required by statute to consult the inspectorate, would that not have provided further delays to any decision?
Amendment 438EC seeks to grant the Home Secretary the power to remove chief constables. In her Statement to the other place on the 14 January, the Home Secretary said that until 2011, the Home Secretary had the authority to dismiss a chief constable, but the power was removed by the previous Conservative Government. On the face of it, that is correct. The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 repealed the direct power of the Home Secretary to remove the chief constable of a police force, and Section 38 of that Act grants the power of dismissal to the PCC of the police area. However, the Home Secretary has the power to give directions in relation to police forces and local policing bodies under Sections 40 and 40A of the Police Act 1996. If, for instance, it was clear that West Midlands Police was failing to discharge its functions in an effective manner, the appropriate measure to remedy that failure would have been the removal of the chief constable. Therefore, according to those sections, the Secretary of State has perhaps an indirect ability to remove chief constables.
In her Statement to the other place, the Home Secretary also said that the Government are going to reintroduce the Home Secretary’s power to dismiss chief constables and that this will be part of the Government’s upcoming White Paper on wider police reform, with legislation to follow. Does the Minister have a timeline for when the police reform White Paper might be published, and, if he does not have precise date, can he give us an indication of its rough progress? Will any change in the law be brought forward in time for Report on this Bill, or will we have to wait until the next Session for another policing Bill?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for her amendment, which concerns the process by which police and crime commissioners may call on a chief constable to resign or retire. As the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, has mentioned, the Government’s intention is to replace police and crime commissioners with a mayoral model or, in some cases in which the mayoral model is inappropriate, with a policing board made up of local councillors, and that will be brought forward in due course. Further details will be set out again in the policing White Paper. The noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, asked me when that would be produced. I say again to him the time-honoured phrase of “shortly”, but by shortly I do mean shortly; I hope he will not have too long to wait for the report be published as a White Paper. Self-evidently, it is a very complex document with lots of discussion items in it. Again, any legislative proposals in it will be brought forward when parliamentary time allows. I am not trying to short-change him, but we will give that detail in the near future.
As the noble Baroness has explained, the purpose of her amendment is to ensure that, before taking steps to dismiss a chief constable, a police and crime commissioner must first seek the views of HMICFRS. I agree that this is a desirable approach, and I am pleased to tell your Lordships that this is already in place as a requirement. The noble Baroness should know, and I hope that it is helpful to her, that under Section 38(3) of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, PCCs may call upon the relevant chief constable to resign or retire. Before exercising this power, and under regulation 11A of the Police Regulations 2003, police and crime commissioners are required to seek the views of HM inspectorate in writing and provide them to the chief constable and the relevant police and crime panel, alongside their rationale for why the PCC is proposing to call for retirement or resignation. I appreciate that it is a confusing landscape to have regulations under the Act and under police regulations. However, the position currently is there in black and white, and what her amendment seeks to do is already enshrined in law.
The noble Lord, Lord Walney, is not in his place so I will not say too much now, if anything, about Amendment 438EC. However, because it was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, I want to place on record for the Committee the fact that the Home Secretary has already announced the Government’s intention to reintroduce the Home Secretary’s power to remove chief constables. It has been a difficult few weeks in the West Midlands and, following the changes that were mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, it has highlighted the absence of such a power allowing the Home Secretary to act. We believe that action is needed, and I can assure your Lordships that this is high on the Government’s agenda. The White Paper is due in very short order. It will set out exactly the Government’s intentions in this regard and will be followed by legislation as soon as parliamentary time allows, because we need to make changes on a range of matters, not least the abolition of PCCs. I look forward to debating this with noble Lords across the House. However, if the noble Baroness accepts that, difficult though they are to find, the regulations and the requirement are there, I hope she will be able to withdraw her amendment for the moment. I look forward to further discussion when the other matters come before the House at some future point.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
In view of what the Minister has just said, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness O'Loan
“Police disciplinary proceedings: use of force(1) Schedule 2 of the The Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/4) (standards of professional behaviour) is amended as follows.(2) In the heading “Use of Force”, at end insert—“Where a police officer uses force on the basis of an honestly held but mistaken belief, they can rely on that belief as justification for the use of force only if the mistake was an objectively reasonable one to have made.”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to (1) codify the decision in W(80) UKSC 24, that in police disciplinary proceedings involving use of force, an officer may rely on a mistaken belief only if that belief was both honestly held and objectively reasonable, and (2) and enable parliamentary consideration of the appropriate test in this context.
Baroness O'Loan (CB)
My Lords, Amendment 422 relates to the test used to determine whether an officer acted in breach of discipline when he or she used force in self-defence. We come late to this, but it is a very important issue. Currently, the test used in police disciplinary law is the civil law test. Under the current law, an officer must hold an honest belief that they or others are in immediate danger, must use only proportionate and necessary force, and, critically, where their belief is mistaken, their mistake must have been an objectively reasonable one.
The amendment is necessary because, following the police accountability rapid review report, published in October 2025, a recommendation was made to change the legal test to the criminal test. This would allow officers to rely on an honestly held but mistaken belief, even if it was unreasonable. The Government have said they will implement this change through a statutory instrument without public consultation. At this stage, I thank Justince and Inquest for their research on this matter.
The criminal law test, which the Government propose, would allow officers to rely on a mistaken belief, even if it was unreasonable, so long as it was honestly held. I fully understand that officers are under great pressure when faced with possible or actual violence. Split-second decisions must be made on the ground in the immediate context. That is why it is critical that officers are properly trained and managed. However, it is not a good reason to move from the civil to the criminal law test.
This determination arose from a criminal law test where the Supreme Court made a decision in the W80 case, where an officer shot a man. When misconduct proceedings were brought, he claimed he had done so in self-defence. The IOPC recommended to the MPS that the officer should face misconduct proceedings, the MPS declined to initiate those proceedings, and the IOPC wrote to the MPS directing disciplinary proceedings. That decision was challenged by judicial review. The Divisional Court allowed the appellant’s claim. The IOPC appealed to the Court of Appeal, and the appeal was allowed. On further appeal to the Supreme Court, the decision of the Court of Appeal was upheld. In dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court judges commented:
“This is an area of the law of vital importance to the public and to the police. It is essential that the public and the police should be informed in straightforward terms of the law which applies. We hope that it will now be possible to recast legislation and guidance so as to achieve this result”.
This amendment is not about criminal law, and it is not about whether an officer should be prosecuted for the use of force. It seeks only to provide the clarity that the Supreme Court advocated.
The criminal law test is simply not appropriate for disciplinary proceedings. Applying it would undermine public confidence in the police disciplinary process, weaken accountability and make meaningful scrutiny of police use of force far more difficult. The Home Office’s statutory guidance makes it clear that the disciplinary framework is intended to encourage a culture of learning and development for individuals in the organisation. This focus on learning and development is part of what makes disciplinary procedures distinct from criminal procedures. Misconduct processes are an important and excellent opportunity for forces to identify mistakes, learn from them and prevent recurrence.
The Supreme Court in W80 made clear that the criminal law test conflicts with the fundamental principle of the disciplinary process, which is
“to contribute to learning and development for the individual officer concerned or for the organisation as to the reasonableness of mistakes”.
If the objective reasonableness of an officer’s mistaken belief is no longer relevant, unreasonable beliefs, however dangerous and widespread, may never be identified. Allowing unreasonable but honestly held beliefs to serve as a defence would strip away the incentive to examine, understand and remedy the factors that led officers to hold those beliefs in the first place. For public safety it is essential that unreasonable mistakes and the conditions that enabled them are identified and addressed.
Moreover, the introduction of the criminal law test would risk allowing honestly held beliefs based on prejudice or stereotyping, however unreasonable, to provide a defence following police use of force. Police use of force is continually increasing, with over 812,000 recorded uses in 2024-25, an increase of 9% on the previous year. Police complaints about use of force rarely lead to investigation by the IOPC, because most complaints are referred back to the officer’s force for investigation. Fewer still result in disciplinary proceedings, and hence the opportunity to identify training or management deficiencies to enable institutional learning and improvement is not there.
Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)
My Lords, my Amendment 423 would implement a recommendation of the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords in the judgment in the Lee Clegg case in the 1990s. Briefly, the facts of that case were that, on 30 September 1990, Private Lee Clegg was on patrol in west Belfast, when a passenger in a stolen car was shot and killed. Lee Clegg was charged with murder, and his defence was that he fired in self-defence. He was convicted of murder on the grounds that he used disproportionate force.
On an appeal, the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords had to decide whether a soldier on duty in defence of the civil power—in a similar position, therefore, to police firearm officers—who kills a person and who would be entitled to rely on self-defence but for the excessive use of force, is guilty of murder or manslaughter. A manslaughter verdict would have meant a change in the law. Lord Lloyd of Berwick said that the arguments in favour of such a change were very persuasive. Quoting from the Court of Appeal, he said:
“There is one obvious and striking difference between Private Clegg and other persons found guilty of murder. The great majority of persons found guilty of murder, whether they are terrorists or domestic murderers, kill from an evil and wicked motive. But when Private Clegg set out on patrol on the night of 30 September 1990 he did so to assist in the maintenance of law and order and we have no doubt that as he commenced the patrol he had no intention of unlawfully killing or wounding anyone. However, he was suddenly faced with a car driving through an army checkpoint and, being armed with a high velocity rifle to enable him to combat the threat of terrorism, he decided to fire the … shot from his rifle in circumstances which cannot be justified”.
Lord Lloyd continued:
“It is right that Private Clegg should be convicted in respect of the unlawful killing … and that he should receive a just punishment for committing an offence which ended a young life and caused great sorrow to her parents and relatives and friends. But this court considers, and we believe that many other fair-minded citizens would share this view, that the law would be much fairer if it had been open to the trial judge to have convicted Private Clegg of the lesser crime of manslaughter on the ground that he did not kill … from an evil motive but because his duties as a soldier”
meant he had a high-velocity rifle, and
“he reacted wrongly to a situation which suddenly confronted him in the course of his duties … we consider that a law which would permit a conviction for manslaughter would reflect more clearly the nature of the offence which he had committed”.
However, Lord Lloyd ruled it was inappropriate for the courts to change the law, and it was for Parliament to do so.
Here we are, 30 years on, with that opportunity, and the issue has never been more important, given the analogous position of police firearms officers. Since 2010, British police have shot dead 30 people—an average of two a year. Most recently, we have seen the prosecution last year for murder in the case of Sergeant Martyn Blake. Police officers are being deterred from volunteering for firearms training and the National Police Chiefs’ Council says police forces across England and Wales are grappling with a significant shortage of firearms officers, exacerbated by the lack of legal protections afforded to armed officers, particularly regarding criminal and misconduct hearings. The move to anonymity in criminal proceedings is welcome but not enough.
Parliament enacted legislation in 2008, the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act, which set out the law of self-defence in Section 76. This provides that the question whether the degree of force used by D—the defendant—was reasonable in the circumstances is to be decided by reference to the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be, but, crucially, the degree of force used by the defendant is not to be regarded as having been reasonable in the circumstances if it was disproportionate. Therefore, the upshot is that a police officer cannot rely on self-defence to a murder charge if he used disproportionate force. This is unlike in the case of householders who, since the Crime and Courts Act 2013, will now generally have a defence if the force was disproportionate, but not if it was grossly disproportionate.
This confirms my belief that there is a lacuna that needs to be addressed, just as the House of Lords said in the appeal in the case of Lee Clegg. I should add a brief postscript here to the Lee Clegg case, since I believe he was subsequently acquitted on the grounds of new evidence.
On 23 October 2024, the then Home Secretary made a Statement on the Martyn Blake case. She said that
“the current system for holding police officers to account is not commanding the confidence of either the public or the police”,
and that although the public are entitled
“to expect that when officers exceed the lawful use of their powers … there will be … robust processes in place to hold them to account”,
she continued:
“Police officers who act with integrity and bravery to keep us safe each day need to know they have strong public support. If officers lack the confidence to use their powers … public safety is put at risk”.—[Official Report, Commons, 23/10/24; col. 300.]
My amendment seeks to strike this balance by implementing the recommendation of the House of Lords in the Lee Clegg case all those years ago. If passed, it would not, as in the householder’s case, result in an officer’s acquittal, since I do not think that can be justified in the case of trained firearms officers. There needs to be accountability and a criminal penalty. The House of Lords in Clegg seemed to agree, since it recommended manslaughter, not acquittal, for such cases. I will be very interested to hear the views of the Government on this long-standing issue.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
My Lords, I support the excellent amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere. Firearms officers provide a valuable and necessary service, and are an important part of UK policing. They do a very difficult and dangerous job and deserve our thanks. The current climate is not conducive to good policing and does not support our officers. This amendment is a positive one which will help them.
This is a topical amendment. Several days ago, the Independent Office for Police Conduct ruled on the case of Sean Fitzgerald being shot during a raid by West Midlands Police. He was holding a black mobile phone, which the officer who shot him believed was a gun.
This ruling was the conclusion of a long, complex investigation that included experts whose reconstruction corroborated the officer’s testimony that the phone could have been mistaken for a gun. The director of the IOPC said:
“The determination over whether the officer should face disciplinary proceedings largely came down to a split-second decision in what was a dynamic, fast-moving, armed police operation”.
This was a tragic accident, but it highlights the fact that firearms officers have to make very difficult, instantaneous decisions that can result in life or death. They have to quickly make a call on what is the safest option for themselves, their fellow officers and the public. In order for them to make the best judgments for themselves and for the public, they need to be confident that they will be supported in making that endeavour.
It is striking that in a piece in the Daily Telegraph, former firearms officer Sergeant Harry Tangye said that his and his fellow officers’ main fear was not being shot themselves; it was facing the investigation that would happen after they discharged their weapon while doing their job. The case of the shooting of Chris Kaba demonstrates this. In response to how the officer was treated, up to 300 Metropolitan Police officers stepped back from firearms roles, and the Army had to be put on standby to support the Met.
Firearms officers go through intensive training, including in how to respond in high-pressure situations. These are dedicated people with a strong desire to protect the public and serve their communities. Tangye said:
“But each time an AFO attends a scene, they face an uncomfortable truth: if I get this wrong I could be jailed. In my 30-year career I never once met an officer who wanted to ‘bag’ a scalp; no-one who hoped for the chance to use their gun to bring down a criminal. Most of us weren’t even keen on firearms at all. If you were a weapons enthusiast, you would be viewed with great suspicion by your force and probably removed”.
Authorised firearms officers, or AFOs, he said,
“shouldn’t have to do their jobs in fear of being jailed, or in fear of their careers, their lives, being ruined”.
The Police Federation also shares these concerns: that firearm officers,
“even when they follow the tactics and training they have received, will face significant struggles and hardships over what are usually split-second decisions taken by them in dangerous and fast-moving situations”.
Firearms officers need to be protected in primary legislation to make sure it is certain that they will be treated fairly when they have to make a very difficult decision. This amendment from the noble Lord is not a “get out of jail free” card; it still holds them to account for their actions. It means that officers who do their job properly, who make a decision that would be impossible for most people in this Chamber to comprehend, are protected under the law, and on that basis, I strongly support the amendment.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 423A and will talk a little about the two other amendments.
In England and Wales, police firearms officers have intentionally discharged conventional weapons at people around 120 times over the last 20 years, between 2006 and 2026, so that is a discharge of a weapon at a person about six times a year. This figure represents less than 0.05% of all authorised firearms operations during that period.
In 2024-25—in just one year, the latest—there were 17,249 firearms operations. During that 20-year period, as the noble Lord, Lord Carter, said, the police shot dead on average around three people a year, each one a tragedy. There is no way that any officer should celebrate what happened, nor the families, of course, or all the people who are hurt by these terrible things. At the same time, the police injured a further two people a year.
This is not a trigger-happy group of people. They are the only people in this country who can go forward to deal with criminals or situations where a person is armed or similarly dangerous. They are a unique group of around 5,500 people in England and Wales who protect the population of 60 million of us and our visitors, and on our behalf they go forward.
They then expect, as I think we all do, that they will be held accountable. They do not expect immunity in the criminal or any court, but they do have a reasonable expectation that the system will understand the challenges they face, as the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, mentioned. In that fraction of a second, they have to make their decision on whether to shoot.
They suffer from the further challenge that they are only human beings with all our human strengths and frailties. Despite the fact that they are selected from still a reasonably large group of police officers who apply—not all who put themselves forward are selected—and then go through some rigorous training, at the end of the day they remain a human being, with all our frailties, fears and, at times, courage.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
I did not say that the noble Baroness did. My point is that after a public inquiry, where it was found that W80 had lawfully killed Jermaine Baker in 2015, and a series of further hearings that led eventually to the Supreme Court, W80 appeared before a gross misconduct hearing by an independent body—nothing to do with the police; it was ordered by the IOPC—and was found to have no case to answer. It was not found that there was an arguable case, or that there was mitigation. There was no case to answer, 10 years later. It had been through the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, and nobody had noticed that there was no case to answer.
One of the central problems in these cases is that they are rare. Every time an officer waits years to be cleared, there is an outcry asking why they were charged in the first place or why it took so long to resolve. Every Government affected by this has said, “We will review it, and improve”. In fact, the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, has just mentioned the latest example of that.
My broad point is that all the reviews in the world have produced absolutely nothing. Nothing has changed. I have given two examples but there are many more, where people have been waiting 10 years for something to be shown to be not a criminal offence. I am afraid that the reviews have not produced anything, which has led to me tabling this amendment.
The officers are under a triple jeopardy. First, the IOPC considers whether there is a criminal offence or an offence of misconduct. That can take around 18 months. If there is a claim of a criminal offence, that is considered by the CPS, which probably takes another year. In the event that there is a criminal charge, the officer will go to court. During this period, the inquest into the person’s death will have been suspended. If there has been no charge, the inquest, usually with a jury, will be resumed. Those juries can find, and have found, that there was an unlawful killing, which then must be reconsidered by the CPS, usually leading to a criminal charge to go through a criminal court and then back through the IOPC. It has been hard to establish the facts, but by my calculation there have been around five officers charged with murder following cases over the last 20 years, each leading to a finding of not guilty at a Crown Court. The people who seem to be able to appreciate this issue, and deal with it with some wisdom, are called jurors.
My amendment is designed to give some comfort to firearms officers that their case will have to reach a higher bar before a prosecution can be started. It is modelled, as the noble Lord, Lord Carter, has mentioned—he is the one who pointed this out to me—on the householder defence to murder that already exists in criminal law. If a householder is attacked in their home and, in the process of defending themselves, kills the intruder, there is a higher legal threshold to pass before a prosecution for murder can follow. All I am asking is for the same to apply to a firearms officer.
I have talked to the Attorney-General about this. He reminded me that lawyers generally have concerns about this because it creates a unique group, a group of people who are treated differently by the criminal law, but I have two points in response to that general principle. First, householders are already a unique group. The criminal law has decided that they are a unique group and that is okay, but that it would not be all right for police firearms officers, who—I argue—are also a unique group. Why can we not add one more group? This was decided by Parliament on the advice of lawyers. What is different about this group? More importantly, for the reasons that I have given, they are a unique group. They the only people in society who use a firearm to prevent a crime, save a life or make an arrest. We say that no one can carry a firearm for that purpose, even if they are a legal firearm owner.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
I end with this. I know that it is late. All our firearms officers are volunteers. They cannot be ordered to carry a gun. Unlike in the USA, it is not a condition of service. We rely on their honour and willingness to come forward and take on these roles. There is evidence that this is not happening in the numbers we need. There are not many noble Lords in the Chamber, but I ask those who are here whether they would do it. Could they do it? Would they take that responsibility, facing the inevitable inquiries that would follow? It involves not only the officer but their family.
Lord Katz (Lab)
If the noble Lord could conclude his remarks, that would be helpful for everyone.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
There are just too many times when officers are faced with the challenge, which is unfair. The solution I propose is that we should treat firearms officers fairly and differently. I am not a lawyer. The Government may be able to come up with a better proposal, but the position that we have at the moment is untenable and something that I am not prepared to let rest. I ask for support from the Government in some respect.
My final point is that I support, to some extent, the proposal of the noble Lords, Lord Carter and Lord Jackson. My concern is that it might lead to more people being charged more often, and I am arguing that they should be charged less often for doing their job.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
My Lords, forgive me, if I can beg your indulgence. In order for there not to be any confusion, I neglected to advise the Committee that my brother is a serving Metropolitan Police officer. I should have mentioned that earlier.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, these three amendments raise a difficult but important question: how should the law treat the use of lethal force by authorised firearms officers so as to protect both the public and those officers who act in good faith in dangerous situations?
Amendment 422 would make it clear in the Police (Conduct) Regulations that when an officer uses force based on a mistaken belief, that belief must be both honestly held and objectively reasonable. This reflects the Supreme Court’s decision in W80 and would give bereaved families, and communities that often feel over-policed, greater clarity and confidence in the system.
Amendment 423A would update Section 76 of the 2008 Act so that force used by an authorised firearms officer could never be treated as reasonable if it was grossly disproportionate to the situation as they saw it. That would set a clear upper limit on what can count as lawful force, drawing a boundary beyond which self-defence cannot reach, however real the threat appears.
From these Benches, we understand the intentions behind both amendments: the first writes the W80 test into disciplinary rules; the second provides clearer statutory guidance in firearms cases.
Amendment 423 goes further. It proposes that if an authorised firearms officer kills someone while acting under an honest but mistaken belief that the force used was necessary and reasonable, the conviction should be manslaughter rather than murder. We are concerned that this would, in effect, create a special route from murder to manslaughter for authorised firearms officers, one not available to others who also face life-and-death decisions.
When police use potentially unlawful lethal force, there must be full investigation, prosecution where appropriate, and robust disciplinary proceedings. The central question, then, is whether these amendments strike the right balance between public accountability and fair protection for officers who must make split-second decisions in life-threatening situations.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 422 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, has had a detailed introduction, and I would like to abbreviate my remarks as a result.
The issue under consideration in that case was whether, in police disciplinary proceedings, a police officer could have a finding of misconduct against them if their use of force was found to be honest and mistaken but unreasonable. Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate test was the civil law test and that an honest but mistaken belief that the use of force is necessary is justification for that use of force only if the belief is objectively reasonable.
Amendment 422 would place that judgment into statute. Regardless of the merits or otherwise of the Supreme Court’s ruling on whether the criminal or civil test should be applicable, I am not convinced that it needs to be codified into statute, because there now exists relevant case law at the highest level which can be applied by the IOPC and the courts in the future. It is not clear to me what benefit there would be in placing this into the regulations.
I would like to concentrate my remarks on Amendment 423 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, because I want to express my strong support for it. I believe firmly that we must support our armed police officers who regularly put themselves in danger. This amendment presents an opportunity to do that. It would create a defence to a charge of murder for authorised firearms officers who used lethal force in the honest but mistaken belief that such force was necessary and reasonable and convert a conviction for murder into manslaughter.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
This is one of my major objections to the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Carter, proposes. Can the noble Lord explain to me why a firearms officer would feel more supported by a discretionary life sentence, which is what would be available for the charge of manslaughter, compared with a mandatory sentence of life for murder? I am not sure I would.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
The point I was making is that the prospect of a murder conviction may have an effect on an officer if they feared that an error that they made may result in a murder charge. On the noble Lord’s own amendment, as I said, I listened with sympathy to it, and I await the Government’s response on it and, indeed, all the amendments in this group.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, as we have heard during this short but important debate, these amendments all relate to the same matter of principle—namely, the legal standard by which an authorised firearms officer should be judged on the thankfully rare occasions when they discharge a firearm.
The Government pay tribute to our armed officers. Theirs is a difficult, dangerous and stressful job. They do it to keep us all safe, and we have a great deal for which to thank them. Of course we recognise that they often find themselves in exceptionally difficult circumstances, having to make life and death decisions in an instant. That said, there is the matter of public confidence in the police. I do not think that any of your Lordships would disagree that confidence in the police is of equal importance. I would not be doing justice to this debate if I did not recognise and mark the fact that some of our citizens feel great anxiety about the accountability of firearms officers. In the past, when there have been high-profile fatal shootings by the police, this anxiety has boiled over into anger and social unrest.
The Government’s job is to balance these factors. We must ensure that the law offers protection to our brave police officers while at the same time providing reassurance to our fellow citizens that, if officers do fire their weapons, their conduct will be rigorously scrutinised. It is only right that the public should have confidence that any officer whose actions fall below the high standards we rightly expect will be held to account in the public interest.
Our conclusion is that we should not create a two-tier justice system where police officers who kill or injure in the course of their duties are judged by a more lenient standard than applies to the rest of the population. Our reason is this: we are confident that the criminal law which covers self-defence, defence of others and the use of force in the prevention of crime already provides sufficient protection for police officers. Because of the lateness of the hour, I am not going to go through the details of this, which I had intended to do, but will move straight to the amendments.
Amendment 423, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, would change the law so that an authorised firearms officer who acts with disproportionate—in other words, unreasonable—force would still be guilty of an offence, but it would be manslaughter, not murder.
I want to say a few words about what the law says about how a jury must consider whether the amount of force used by the officer was reasonable, sometimes described as proportionate. While this is an objective test, if the jury is told that what the officer did in the heat of the moment, when fine judgments are difficult, was no more than they genuinely believed was necessary, even if they were mistaken in that belief, that would be strong evidence that what they did was reasonable. If the jury also considers that the officer may have done no more than was reasonable in the light of what they believed to be happening, they are not guilty of anything. In other words, the law provides a full defence.
It is unclear whether Amendment 423 is intended to replace this full defence with a partial one, or whether, as I think is the case, it is intended to work alongside it in some way. If the noble Lord’s intention is to create a partial defence, then what he is saying is that officers who use unreasonable or excessive force should be held to a different standard from the rest of the population. We cannot accept this because the Government believe that to do so would fundamentally damage confidence in the police and in the justice system.
I turn to Amendment 423A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, which seeks to amend Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. As your Lordships have heard, Section 76 deals with householder cases. The noble Lord’s amendment seeks to make authorised firearms officers subject to the same standard as the householder confronted by an intruder. The amendment attempts to raise the threshold for when force becomes unreasonable from disproportionate to grossly disproportionate for firearms officers. In effect, this means that firearms officers could rely on the defences of self-defence, preventing crime or making a lawful arrest if they used force that was disproportionate in the circumstances, provided it was not grossly disproportionate.
For the reasons I have already given, the Government are of the strong belief that it would be wrong in principle to authorise the police to use excessive force and that this would be extremely damaging to public confidence. In any event, we do not think there is a proper comparison to be made between householders facing an unexpected intruder and trained firearms officers. The threshold was raised in householder cases to recognise the exceptional nature of being unexpectedly confronted by an intruder in one’s home. The unique stress and shock of a home invasion justifies greater legal protection, allowing a higher level of force than in other self-defence contexts. The same logic does not apply to firearms officers, who are trained and equipped to use lethal force and are deployed only in the most high-risk situations. They are subject to strict command, control and training protocols to ensure that lethal force is used only when necessary and in accordance with the current legal framework.
I turn finally to Amendment 422, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan. As the noble Baroness has explained during the debate, her amendment deals not with criminal trials but with police conduct hearings. The previous Home Secretary commissioned Timothy Godwin and Sir Adrian Fulford to carry out an independent police accountability rapid review because it was recognised that there was ongoing complexity and confusion, and that there were concerns that this was having an impact on recruitment and retention of these essential and much valued officers. Sir Adrian and Mr Godwin examined the matter thoroughly and heard evidence from a wide range of stakeholders. Their conclusions and recommendations, published in October 2025, were clear that the Government should change the legal test for use of force in police misconduct cases from the civil to the criminal law test.
The reviewers found that police officers need confidence and greater consistency in the disciplinary system and that this would improve fairness and public confidence. The Government have taken on board that recommendation and we are in the process of making the necessary changes to The Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020. Our intention is that these changes will come into force in the spring. We accept that the amendment is well intended, but I hope that the noble Baroness will understand why the Government cannot support it and, for the reasons I have given, I invite her to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness O'Loan (CB)
My Lords, I thank the Minister and everyone who has spoken. There is a major issue of public trust in policing which has yet to be fully explored, but for the moment I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Crime and Policing Bill
Thursday 22nd January 2026
(3 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-XII Twelfth marshalled list for Committee - (21 Jan 2026)
Lord Hogan-Howe
“Scrutiny of investigation timeliness(1) The Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2020 (S.I.2020/2) are amended as follows.(2) After Regulation 13 (timeliness of investigations), insert—“13A Scrutiny of investigation timeliness(1) A legally qualified person must be appointed to scrutinise any investigations of misconduct or gross misconduct which have not been completed within 12 months.(2) The legally qualified person must determine whether there is good and sufficient reason for the time already taken, and how much time is anticipated to be needed for completion of the investigation.(3) In determining whether there is good and sufficient reason, the legally qualified person may have regard to any relevant matter, and must have particular regard to—(a) whether the investigation has been efficient and effective;(b) whether there has been unnecessary or unreasonable delay, having regard to the complexity and seriousness of the case;(c) the impact upon the officer and others;(d) any anticipated further delay;(e) the public interest and effect on confidence in the police disciplinary system;(f) representations made on behalf of any person entitled to receive a copy of the information provided.(4) If the legally qualified person determines that there is good and sufficient reason to continue the investigation, then the legally qualified person must set a date for the conclusion of all proceedings. (5) Nothing in this provision shall have any effect in relation to any criminal investigation.”(3) The Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 (S.I.2020/4) are amended as follows.(4) After Regulation 19 (timeliness of investigation), insert—“19A Scrutiny of investigation timeliness(1) A legally qualified person must be appointed to scrutinise any investigations of misconduct or gross misconduct which have not been completed within 12 months.(2) The legally qualified person must determine whether there is good and sufficient reason for the time already taken, and how much time is anticipated to be needed for completion of the investigation.(3) In determining whether there is good and sufficient reason, the legally qualified person may have regard to any relevant matter, and must have particular regard to—(a) whether the investigation has been efficient and effective;(b) whether there has been unnecessary or unreasonable delay, having regard to the complexity and seriousness of the case;(c) the impact upon the officer and others;(d) any anticipated further delay;(e) the public interest and effect on confidence in the police disciplinary system;(f) representations made on behalf of any person entitled to receive a copy of the information provided.(4) If the legally qualified person determines that there is good and sufficient reason to continue the investigation, then the legally qualified person must set a date for the conclusion of all proceedings.(5) Nothing in this provision shall have any effect in relation to any criminal investigation.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment proposes a 12-month limit, unless extraordinary circumstances reviewed by a legally qualified person dictate otherwise, which would encourage forces and external bodies to complete misconduct and gross misconduct processes quicker, allowing officers to resume duties and limiting the negative impact on their health and wellbeing.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, has made a good suggestion with this amendment. He makes the broad point that the police misconduct process takes far too long, and I agree. To be fair, it is not the only misconduct process that takes a long time, but this one is particularly challenged.
I will particularly mention two things. First, time deadlines would be helpful. There are two ways to approach that. One is that there might be an absolute deadline of 12 months, as the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, suggests, and then some independent, legally qualified person looks at the case. That could work. The alternative is to set some deadlines so that, for example, 90% of cases are resolved in one year, which at least would give the system a kick. At the moment, I am afraid the system is not getting any better—rather, it is getting worse—so either something statutory or some kind of guidelines would be a good idea.
On Tuesday I raised the issue of firearms officers, a group particularly affected by this, and that is what I want to speak to here. I have argued that there should be a higher bar before they are prosecuted for murder, but the Government do not accept that at the moment. They have offered anonymity, and we are to debate that shortly.
Part of the problem, particularly for firearms officers, is the incredible length of time in some cases. There have been two cases over the last 20 years that took 10 years: the case of PC Long, who was prosecuted after a series of legal machinations only to be found not guilty 10 years later, and that of W80, where after a public inquiry—basically an inquest led by a High Court judge because intercept evidence was involved in the case—the High Court judge decided that there was no unlawful killing, the IOPC or its predecessor decided that there should be some gross misconduct, the Metropolitan Police disagreed, the Supreme Court ordered that there would be a misconduct hearing and the legally qualified chair of the independent tribunal said there was no case to answer. After consideration by the Supreme Court, an officer had been under investigation for 10 years. That cannot be right.
Some of the problems are to do with the sequential nature of the decision-making in these cases. Officers are often under jeopardy, first from the IOPC and then from the CPS. Then obviously it could go to court and there may be a finding of not guilty, but then—for firearms officers in cases where someone has died—the case can go back to a coroner’s inquest, which can find an unlawful killing verdict, at which point it goes back through the cycle again. That is one of the reasons why some of these problems are arising.
First, deadlines would be a good idea as either an advisory or a mandatory limit. Secondly, I do not understand why some of the people involved in the decision-making that I have described have to do it sequentially, not in parallel. For example, why can the CPS and the IOPC not decide together whether something is a crime or misconduct?
At the moment, not only are there many links in the chain that sometimes come to contradictory conclusions but, more importantly, it is taking too long. I argue that in all this there are two groups of people who suffer: one is firearms officers, the group whose case I am arguing, but the other is the families waiting to hear what is happening. If people have lost someone, they deserve to hear whether or not this is a crime or misconduct, but at the moment that is not happening.
This amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, is a sensible suggestion and I support it. If the Government do not, perhaps they would like to make some indication of how they intend to improve the misconduct system, particularly as it affects firearms officers in the circumstances I have described.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, this has been a short debate. I agree with many of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. I find it almost extraordinary that misconduct investigations linger on for so long; it really is a disgrace for everybody involved. Police professional standards departments have for too long been seen as something of a Cinderella function within forces, chronically underprioritised, underfunded and understaffed, and now they are buckling under the surge in the volume of complaints. This is combined with a narrowing of the remit of the IOPC, which increasingly takes on only the most serious and high-profile cases, resulting in a growing backlog and indefinite drift.
Amendment 422A confronts this head on. Such independent legal oversight could act as a checkpoint, strengthening individual case oversights and extracting timely lessons from failures. Criminal investigations would stay exempt, protecting the pursuit of serious crime.
There are risks in setting time targets for investigations—there is no question about that—not least the incentive for officers to delay co-operation if the clock is ticking. We have concerns that a rigid cap could risk corner-cutting on complex investigations. At the very least, stronger guidance on the expected length of inquiries is now required, as well as real scrutiny when these expectations are missed.
There also needs to be a much sharper focus on leadership and case management. Complainants should not face long waits, especially knowing time will diminish the strength of their evidence; neither should innocent officers endure years in limbo, with their careers stalled and well-being eroded. Taxpayers should not bear the rising cost of suspensions while losing front-line capacity at the same time.
Amendment 422A would restore some balance by prioritising fairness to officers, closure for victims and credibility for policing. We are happy to support it, and I look forward to the Minister’s reply.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Bailey of Paddington for tabling his Amendment 422A and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for ably stepping into the breach to allow it to be debated. It is a very important matter and I am glad we have had a chance to debate it.
I am very sympathetic to the amendment’s goals. It aims to set a 12-month time limit for misconduct and gross misconduct investigations within police forces. As others have said, timely legal restitution is the only way that justice is effectively served. That applies both to those in the police who are under investigation and, obviously, to victims who are let down by delays that are needlessly, but often, the result of administrative workload. Applying a strict deadline for remedies, excepted under only extraordinary circumstances, is an easy way by which institutions can be encouraged to proceed with investigations in a timely fashion.
That said, I am a little wary of fully endorsing a blanket time limit on police forces for investigations. Although in some cases, perhaps even most, misconduct investigations can and should be sped up, it would be heedless to assume that all forces are simply being inefficient in the time that investigations take. There is a vast disparity between forces’ capacity to deal with their primary function of investigating crime, let alone with administrative internal matters, such as misconduct matters. Certain forces’ ability to spare the resources to source, for instance, legally qualified adjudicators should not, therefore, be assumed. Officer numbers are down, crime is up, and we should be careful about placing additional requirements on police forces that expedited conduct investigations might entail.
Of course, we support the aim of increasing efficiency and ensuring justice is delivered. I thank my noble friend for his amendment and look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I am grateful to the Committee, and in particular to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for moving the amendment. To be fair to the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, he stayed here very late—until the end—on the previous day on this. I am sorry that he is not able to be in his place today. He was here to move the amendment when we pulled stumps on Tuesday night at gone 11 pm.
Having said that, the noble Lord’s amendment seeks to introduce a new system of independent legal adjudicators with powers to close down investigations. I think I can agree with the noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that delays in investigations are in nobody’s interests—of police officers who subsequently are proved innocent, of victims, or of speedy justice for those who have strayed and committed potential offences. Lengthy delays risk impacting the confidence of complainants and the welfare of the police officers involved.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
It is certainly a first for me.
I thank the Minister for his reply and other people for their comments. I thought I might make only a couple of points in response. I indicated that although the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, suggests a mandatory limit, there may be difficulties with that. I wonder whether the Government, might consider three things in their review, which the Minister mentioned. First, they could set an expectation so that, for example, cases should be completed within 12 months unless, for example, the director-general of the IOPC or some arbiter concludes otherwise. Secondly, I raised the sequential nature of the decision-making. That compound effect gives a longer time than I regard as necessary.
I am trying to work out now whether I should let the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, speak—
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
The noble Lord was not here for the start of the group, so I am afraid that he cannot contribute.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
I will conclude. I wonder whether, in the review, the Government could consider this sequential decision-making, which I do not think helps speed. Thirdly, if they are really adventurous they could look at whether police officers should be employees, because then you would get lawyers out of the system—I sit surrounded by them, but they never make it quicker or cheaper. Everyone else who is an employee can go to the employment tribunal, but officers cannot; it is on these grounds that lawyers get involved. I am afraid that is one of the major factors in why this takes so long and is expensive. I have taken my life in my hands, so I will sit down and withdraw the amendment.
Lord Black of Brentwood (Con)
My Lords, I oppose Clauses 152 to 155 standing part of the Bill. I declare my interests as deputy chairman of the Telegraph Media Group and chairman of the News Media Association. This stand part notice is in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who unfortunately cannot be here today as he is on business abroad. I added my name to it along with the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, to whom I am very grateful. Like the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, I am aware that I am surrounded by lawyers wherever I look, but I must admit to not being one of them.
These clauses introduce a statutory presumption of anonymity for firearms officers charged with a qualifying offence involving the discharge of a lethal weapon. Clause 152 creates a presumption that the criminal courts grant anonymity to any firearms officers charged with a “qualifying offence”, unless to do so would be
“contrary to the interests of justice”.
Clause 153 allows the court to preserve or reimpose anonymity after conviction if there is an appeal. Clause 154 defines the reporting direction as barring the publication of any matter that might lead to identification, including name, address, place of work, photographs and video. Clause 155 sets out the kinds of measures that may be required to be taken under an anonymity order, including screening or voice modulation during a court appearance.
Under the clauses, anonymity would apply from the point of charge until conviction and sentence or, where relevant, an appeal is abandoned or dismissed. If an officer is acquitted or charges are dropped, anonymity, including reporting restrictions, can persist indefinitely. Taken together, these measures are a significant attack on open justice, press and media freedom, and the public’s right to receive information, something that should be curtailed in only the most exceptional circumstances. They would undermine the already fragile trust in the police, limit opportunities for public scrutiny of those entrusted with firearms—which is a most serious manifestation of state power—and have a profound chilling impact on public interest reporting.
I will outline the reasons why I believe these clauses are wrong. First, their provision is unnecessary. Judges already have the power to grant anonymity where there is clear evidence of a real and immediate risk to an officer or their family, with proper and proportionate safeguards in place for fairness and review. Under the current law, a defendant applying to the court for anonymity must rightly demonstrate, with clear and cogent evidence, that anonymity is strictly necessary to protect their rights. Such orders are tailored, time-limited and subject to review. They therefore do not interfere with the rights of the media or the expectations of the public, and they strike the right balance between officer safety, which we must obviously be very concerned about, and open justice. That is a workable and trusted balance between safety and open justice. These clauses reverse that position for a special category of alleged offender and are therefore an unprecedented shift in English law.
Secondly, there is no evidence for making such sweeping changes to the law. The Home Office has never provided evidence that police officers as a group are more likely to be subject to harm by being identified as a defendant in a criminal case than any other defendant in a high-profile or controversial case. There is therefore no need to upend the existing law to give firearms officers greater protection from legitimate scrutiny than anyone else. That would create a justifiable perception in the public’s mind that there is one rule for firearms officers and another for everyone else, and they would be right.
Thirdly, these provisions clearly undermine the long-standing principles of open justice that are a fundamental tenet of our legal system and essential to our free society. Justice must not only be done; it must also always be seen to be done by the public, and therefore by the press. Such a sweeping privacy regime, which would apply automatically, regardless of any actual risk posed to an officer, and which gives protection to state agents, would clearly undermine confidence in the system. If anything, there is the clearest possible public interest in serious criminal cases involving police officers being subject to the highest form of rigorous public scrutiny and transparency, not the most lax. Anything that undermines open justice risks increasing the possibility of miscarriages of justice.
Fourthly, one of the most practical advantages of open justice and transparency is the critical role of a robust media in identifying systemic issues and patterns of offending. These clauses would make that impossible. Clause 155, for instance, allows for a wide range of contextual information to be kept from the public, including, vitally, an officer’s workplace. How can the press and the public help identify patterns or bring additional information to light in the absence of such basic information? That would hamper investigations and make public appeals for information far less effective. Indeed, Metropolitan Police Commissioner Mark Rowley has recently supported calls to share more details, not fewer, about suspects with the public earlier, in a bid to stop the spread of misinformation.
Fifthly, and on that very point, these clauses create a heightened risk of jigsaw identification of a suspect, where separate, anonymised details are combined with publicly available information to identify an individual. This is inevitable, particularly in small communities with their own online networks. The danger of false identification, with very serious repercussions for an individual, is all too obvious. That would also produce a chilling effect on legitimate, verified journalism, because editors would inevitably act with extreme caution in reporting, needlessly censoring it to avoid harsh penalties for breaching a court order.
Finally, there are issues about the compatibility of these clauses with the ECHR. Others are far more expert on this than I am, and I will let them deal with it during this debate, but it is clear to me as a lay person that the interference with freedom of expression contained in these clauses is wholly disproportionate given that no pressing social need has been demonstrated.
In summary, no evidence has been provided as the basis for such a sweeping change in the law set out in these clauses, which would produce a two-tier justice system. They would interfere with press and media freedom in a wholly disproportionate way and create a profound chilling effect on public interest reporting. They undermine the principles of open justice that are the bedrock of our judicial system and vital to our open democratic society. They risk further damaging public confidence in the police, already at an all-time low after the appalling murder of Sarah Everard, and in our judicial system. Above all, they are unnecessary because suitable safeguards that balance officer safety with public accountability and scrutiny already exist and have proved themselves workable and effective. For all these reasons, these clauses should not stand part of the Bill. I hope the Minister will indicate that the Government are going to think again.
Baroness Cash (Con)
My Lords, I support the stand part notices tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Black of Brentwood. Clauses 152 to 155 should be removed from the Bill in their entirety.
Before I begin, I want to make absolutely clear to the Committee that there is no question of whether authorised firearms officers encounter danger, because of course they do. I pay tribute to them and their families for the risks they assume in the course of their daily lives to protect us all. Nor is this about whether the court should protect individuals where there is a real and immediate risk to life or safety, because that already exists. I spent 15 years in chambers as a libel and media barrister with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, defending freedom of expression with great passion against the imposition of reporting restrictions. It is that defence that I am here to speak about today, because these clauses would see a constitutional cornerstone of our democracy overturned.
Open justice is not a concession to the media; it is about the public. It is about understanding what is going on in our criminal justice system. It protects the very sacred principle in this country of policing by consent, in which we rely on the public’s confidence and belief in transparency. It maintains confidence in the legitimacy of criminal proceedings. When, tragically—let us be realistic, it is what we are talking here—the state, represented by a fire officer, has killed or maimed someone by the use of force, open justice provides accountability to the public, and the public should have that accountability. That is why anonymity has always been exceptional. It is justified only on evidence and where strictly necessary. Even in cases of national security and terrorism, that remains the case.
Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)
My Lords, I respectfully disagree with the proposition that these clauses should be removed from the Bill. My views will come as no surprise to the 10 noble Lords who were present in the Chamber on Tuesday night at 11.15 pm to debate my amendment on why police officers who use excessive force on the spur of the moment, in the honest but mistaken belief that their use of force was reasonable, should be sentenced differently. There will be an opportunity to debate that further at on Report.
The underlying principles here as to whether anonymity should be given to police firearms officers in criminal proceedings where they are charged with a qualifying offence are exactly the same. As the House of Lords Judicial Committee said 30 years ago in the case of Lee Clegg, law enforcement officers deserve to be treated differently, since they go on patrol to assist in the maintenance of law and order with no intention of killing or wounding anyone. They face evil people who get out of bed with the full intention of trying to kill them and us. That life and death situation does not normally confront the rest of us. These officers have to make split-second decisions in order to protect us and deserve, at the very least, to be given anonymity if they are charged with a criminal offence, so that they and their families are protected from adverse publicity during those proceedings.
The last thing we want is such brave officers being deterred from volunteering for firearms training when the National Police Chiefs’ Council says that police forces across England and Wales are grappling with a significant shortage of firearms officers, exacerbated by the lack of legal protections afforded to them, particularly regarding criminal and misconduct proceedings.
Clauses 152 to 155 are a welcome recognition by the Government that police firearms officers are in a unique position. As I have said, I would take this further to address how such officers are sentenced, but that must wait for Report. In the meantime, the modest protection of anonymity during criminal proceedings, with an exception built in where anonymity would not be in the interest of justice, is a proportionate measure which is long overdue.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I share with the noble Lord, Lord Carter, concern and admiration for our firearms officers and officers generally, who have a very difficult job. I declare an interest having acted for police forces in cases involving the use of firearms. However, I do not share his conclusions about these provisions.
I should also declare an interest as the chairman of the Independent Press Standards Organisation, which regulates the press or those bodies that choose to be regulated by it. I hope that has given me some indication of some of the challenges that journalists face, particularly in reporting court proceedings. Very often, they struggle to cover court cases because of the reduced number of journalists and the general facilities available to newspapers. Were this provision to become law, they would be faced with a presumption that changes the balance and represents, on the face of it, a challenge to our principles of open justice.
Given that there is already a discretion available to the courts on anonymity, I ask the Minister this: what is wrong with the existing law, which provides that there is such a balance to be exercised by the judge? If there is nothing wrong with the law, there is no need to change it. This is a significant change, and the Government must have some very clear thoughts as to why they are making it. What is the situation that now persists which requires a fundamental change in questions of reporting and free speech?
Supposing it is possible to persuade a judge to rebut the presumption which will now exist in these provisions, what would be a good reason for lifting the anonymity which prima facie is going to be imposed by them? It is important, before we make such a significant change in the law, that the rationale is clearly understood.
While not in any way undermining or questioning the importance of protecting officers in appropriate circumstances, I say that the balance is a very subtle one, and that balance should not be disturbed by these provisions. I do not think we even need to consider the European Court of Human Rights’ position. This is an ancient tradition of open justice, and it is one which is, I am afraid to say, threatened by these provisions.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I oppose the stand part notices and support the Government in their clauses. I have heard the proposers of the stand part notices make much of what is a relatively weak argument, suggesting that this is a constitutional outrage, when all that is happening is a change in the assumption about anonymity. Anonymity is already available; this is just about who has to prove whether it should be granted. A lot of hyperbole has been used about this. I accept that the media will make this argument; I do not deny that. I agree that the police should be held accountable; that is not the issue. It is about a very small group of people. I will try to address the point about evidence. A point was made about what evidence had been advanced; I will try to address at least two things.
First, of course, this was built on the Chris Kaba case. Frankly, I think the judge made the wrong decision about anonymity. I believe that because Mr Kaba was arrested having been connected to two shootings and linked to an organised crime gang who had access to firearms. Naming the officer put him at risk of attacks by connected people. Bear in mind that, three years later, within three hours a jury found him not guilty. It was never a very strong case, but why did the judge order the anonymity order to be lifted in those circumstances?
Lord Garnier (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Carter, for reminding us of his late-night work the other night, and I look forward to discussing that subject when we come back to it on Report. I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for bringing a practical police view to this very difficult debate. I come at this from a position essentially in favour of these clauses not standing part, for the reasons so far advanced by my noble friends Lady Cash and Lord Black, and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks.
This is a difficult question. Unquestionably, it is a difficult question. If it were not, we would not be here. We have, as parliamentarians, as legislators, to work out where the balance should lie between the desire for anonymity for police officers in these circumstances and the desire for openness, open justice and the ability of the public—not just the press but the public as a whole—to see what is being done in their name in the court system.
I hope I shall not go on too long merely repeating what others have already said, but it is worth reminding ourselves that the courts work on the basis of open justice. The public are entitled to watch, to read and to comment about trials, and to know who has been charged and prosecuted and with what result. There are exceptions to protect national security, vulnerable witnesses, victims of sexual offences and children. We have a regime for, first of all, providing for reporting restrictions; secondly, for restricting public access to the courtroom and for holding all or part of some trials in private; and, thirdly, for withholding the name of witnesses—for example, under a witness order under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. But a witness order under that provision is a special measure of the last practical resort, and requires the court to be vigorous in its consideration of the statutory hurdles that have to be overcome and to ensure that the defendant is not irreparably disadvantaged or denied a fair trial. Fourthly, we have within that regime provision for anonymity in investigations—for example, when considering fatal gang crimes involving the use of guns and knives by those aged 11 to 30.
Police officers are human—I underline the word “human”. They are a human example of state power—and I underline the word “state”. We respect and we admire them for their often dangerous and selfless work. We know from our own work here in Parliament how vital police officers are for our own protection. I was not far away from the scene of PC Palmer’s murder in March 2017. He was unarmed and later awarded a posthumous George Medal, but there were armed officers there who had to kill PC Palmer’s murderer. I heard those shots as I walked along the colonnade in New Palace Yard from my office in Portcullis House to take part in a Division in the other place. The noble Lord, Lord Hanson, may well have gone through the same experience. I was grateful then, as I am to this day, to the police men and women on duty that day who ushered me and other Members of the other place to safety, regardless of their own.
But it is, in the final analysis, a matter of judgment on which side of this argument we need to come down—on the side of anonymity or on that of open justice. I bear in mind the need for armed police officers and their families to be protected from reprisals, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, mentioned. I bear in mind the operational need not to discourage volunteers suitably qualified to become armed response officers or armed officers. We have been reminded this morning of the case of Martyn Blake, which created, I think, the genesis of these clauses.
However, I also bear in mind the constitutional and public policy demands. I would not describe this as a constitutional outrage; it is a perfectly rational debate about which side of a difficult line one wishes to land. It is not a constitutional outrage to do one thing or the other. It is just advancing an argument. But I bear in mind the constitutional and public policy demands for open justice, for public trust and for transparency in a justice system that applies to us all without creating different categories of defendant as a question of blanket rule. Blanket rules of the sort envisaged by Clauses 152 to 155 are, I suggest, best avoided where a stronger, focused case-by-case approval approach can be achieved—and it is, in my experience, already achieved under our current system.
In the last few days, we have seen the ICE officer shoot that woman driving her car in Minnesota. Of course I have only seen the news footage, but I suggest that, here, that ICE officer would be prosecuted for murder, subject to any defence he could advance. That case aside, we face the problem of some lawyers and campaigners using every police shooting as the basis of an anti-police pile-on, or for some other political campaign that they happen to support. In short, if we are, as I hope we will be, sceptical about Clauses 152 to 155 standing part of the Bill, we must prevent the appalling hunting parties against the police. Let us then pause and reflect before agreeing to these clauses.
I dare say we will not make a decision today, other than that the issue advanced by my noble friend Lord Black will be withdrawn. But we all have a little time between now and Report—we come here with the best of intentions and good will—to think a little more carefully about the practical solution to this, and whether we need to use the blunderbuss of legislation or whether we can still rely on judicial discretion, vigorously applied and well argued for in each separate case, to see where justice can be found.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, may I ask him this? I respect his opinion, for obvious reasons, but one issue he did not address—it was one of my arguments for why these clauses should stand part—is the difficulty of proving the threat at the beginning of an investigation. It is not straightforward. We have to say that someone out there is going to kill this officer or try to attack them—that there is a threat to them in some way. Of course we all make our best attempts to assess whether that is accurate or not. He describes the present system as a blanket arrangement, but actually there is only an assumption, which can be removed, and in the Kaba case was removed. That leaves the officer at risk of that decision being automatic—that is, to be named if they cannot prove otherwise. Why should they bear the risk of being named, when the reverse could allow, first, an assumption they would not be named, and if later that changed, they could be named. What we can never do is name someone, then introduce anonymity—so it is a one-way valve that surely the law might help to respect.
Lord Garnier (Con)
The matter that the noble Lord is bringing up is the very sort of discussion that ought to be had in front of the judge. Presumably, no prosecutor, and no one acting on behalf of a police officer who wished to maintain his anonymity, would advance an argument unless there were some basis for it. If someone went in front of the judge and said, “I’m generally fearful that, just because he’s a police officer who bears arms, he is likely to be the victim of reprisal”, I think they would probably need to do a bit better than that. I suspect nobody would go in front of the judge and make that argument unless they had something better than that.
I suspect that, in the usual run of things, there will be information. It may not be information that the court would wish the world at large to know about. It could be intelligence evidence. It could be other information that both the applicant—the applicant police officer or the applicant prosecutor—and the judge would agree should be kept private. That surely can be done now. We have all sorts of national security cases where evidence is not disclosed to the world at large. All I ask is: let us just think a little bit further. It may well be that, at the end of the day, we shall come to the same conclusion as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and as the Government do in their clauses. But I have yet to be persuaded that we have got to the right answer today.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, I strongly support keeping these clauses in the Bill. I admire the moral courage of Ministers in this Government for putting these clauses in the Bill, despite the well-made arguments against doing so.
My calculation is that, in central London, a rampaging terrorist’s life expectancy is about nine minutes. Not surprisingly, these events are infrequent, because they are not likely to be successful. This is primarily due to the fortitude, courage and training of the armed police officers of the Metropolitan Police.
I have been on duty in an operational military headquarters, in the field, overseas, when we had to deal with life-threatening emergencies. There is nearly always an information fog, and it is exceptionally difficult for commanders to understand what is actually happening on the ground. The same will apply to police control rooms during a terrorist attack. I understand the difficulties; I have been there. Nevertheless, the Metropolitan Police and other forces usually manage to suppress an attack within a few minutes, for which we should all be really grateful. Unfortunately, it is inevitable that, if there are enough such incidents, perceived or real problems will arise. We only need to think of the difficulties that arose with the Bondi Beach tragedy. We must accept that things might not go as desired.
I am not a lawyer, but the Committee will be aware that I have engaged in armed military operations. I knew that I was accountable for my actions, as well as any troops under my command. That was an obvious risk, but one that, as a prudent risk-taker, I was prepared to accept because I was confident that I would be fairly and promptly dealt with if something went wrong. I am not convinced that the same applies to armed police operations. We have already discussed in the last group delays in the disciplinary machinery. Unfortunately, I was late attending, but I agreed with everything that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said—I apologise for not being there at the start.
In questionable police firearms cases, the CPS has the very difficult task of balancing two conflicting factors. On one hand, there is the very low probability of conviction in these cases—perhaps the Minister will tell us how many armed officers on duty have been convicted of such offences. If that were the only consideration, it would be difficult to authorise a prosecution because the prospect of a conviction would be very low. But, on the other hand, we need to secure public confidence that the police and the state are not above the law and that the evidence against a relevant police officer will be tested by a jury in court. If we do not agree these clauses, we run the risk of prudent risk-takers declining to be trained or to keep their firearms ticket.
The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, touched on the use of the military instead of the police. The military is not correctly trained to undertake civil policing duties. It can in certain circumstances be used, but the military will apply overwhelming military force to resolve the issue.
This lack of willingness to volunteer for firearms duty could, in turn, result in standards being surreptitiously lowered in order to meet demand for authorised firearms officers, leading to precisely the opposite effect to the one we desire. I am sure the Minister will deny that there is any possibility of standards being surreptitiously lowered, but I assure noble Lords that, in the military—not so much in firearms training but in other areas—we are surreptitiously lowering the standards, so this is a very real risk. The noble Lord, Lord Carter, touched on existing recruiting difficulties.
When, regrettably, an armed police officer has to do his or her duty, we cannot allow the lives of his or her family and friends to be turned upside down by media attention that serves no useful purpose.
Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers (CB)
My Lords, this is not a small matter that we are debating. I have listened to both sides of the argument. The argument in favour of these stand part notices was made in detail, initially by the noble Lord, Lord Black, and was then supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Cash. I listened to those submissions, and they strongly reflected my own. I asked myself: is there anything I can usefully add? I do not think there is, but we are dealing with a matter of high principle. The noble Baroness, Lady Cash, reminded us of the statement that hard cases make bad law. What we have heard in opposition to these stand part notices exemplifies that proposition. We are dealing with a very important matter, and we should not allow a few hard cases to make bad law.
Lord Sentamu (CB)
My Lords, I find myself persuaded by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. This is a moment when, as legislators, we have to pause and ask where the balance really lies. For me, this is not an either/or. When legislators try to legislate, they must not pass the burden of coming to terms with difficult conundrums to someone else to resolve. I would be quite unhappy if we were to leave it to the judge to decide. If they go for anonymity, the courts could then be seen by some people as being on the side not of the citizen but of a few. We have to resolve this and come to a common mind on where we think this should be done. It seems to me that we should not burden the courts with coming to a decision. Legislators should make up their minds on what way they want to go.
I am persuaded by the arguments of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. I have always been in favour of open courts, trial by jury and no citizen being above the law. We should all have equality before the law, but that argument can sometimes, unfortunately, ignore circumstances that need to be differentiated—not because you do not want fairness and equality but because, if you blindly go down a particular road, you may cause a greater injustice. That is why I am not in favour of people who are so moralist and who keep to their morals: if you are not careful, you could end up with an injustice.
To those who oppose these clauses and to the Government, who bravely want to put this particular way of doing it in the Bill, I suggest that a further conversation needs to be had. How do we resolve this? Clearly, some of us—and I am one of them—would like to defend police officers who have to decide in a split-second to do something, without a lot of thought. They see a danger and they want to neutralise it—not like in Minnesota, where I do not think there was any danger; I would not want to defend those kinds of actions. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, has given us the figures, and actually the statistics are very low. In the unfortunate cases where this has happened, most of our armed police officers are disciplined and well trained. However, in life, you always end up with risks you did not anticipate.
I would want to go the way that the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, argued for—that if somebody took a decision because they saw greater danger and they took somebody out, I can tell you, the media and other people will focus on their family, not on the decision that was taken. We who are legislators cannot ignore the difficulty that that raises for families.
I do not think that volunteers will disappear immediately if these clauses are not part of the Bill. I still think there are people who, for the sake of security and the well-being of society, will continue to volunteer—but you are going to make it more difficult. I plead with all of us in that regard. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, has encapsulated my thoughts on this but I am still in a quandary: will I vote for this or for that? I just hope that the mover of this stand part notice will withdraw it, knowing that Report is still to come, so that it is a clear conversation, and then we can all make up our mind where this is going to lie.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, can I just make an observation that the question is whether we agree these clauses in the Bill or not? If we do not agree the clauses in the Bill, they will fall out of the Bill and then we cannot consider them at a later stage. If we want to consider them at a later stage, we must agree them today.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, it is with great trepidation that I speak, very briefly. Having heard such powerful legal voices discussing these issues—and I hugely respect the legal expertise that we have in the House—on the basis of what we have heard and how the Government have approached this issue, I am minded to support the Government in the initiatives that they are taking here. I feel that we really ought to support these highly disciplined firearms officers. We are living in the era of lawfare and of the courts being used not to the advantage of those who seek to protect us all.
We are very fortunate in this country, unlike in other countries, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, mentioned, to have a situation where the discharge of police firearms is a very rare eventuality. Those who hold that responsibility are highly trained, highly disciplined and highly motivated individuals. If there is a situation where they end up in a court of law because of the discharge of their firearm in the course of their duty, we should support them until there is a decision of that court. Of course, everything changes at that point. But this is about them being endangered, and having the threat of being endangered. I listened very carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said about how difficult it is to describe that threat in the beginning—and you cannot go backwards on this. In this very specific and rare eventuality, I believe that we should give those who put their lives in danger to protect us the benefit of the doubt.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, I may be wrong, but I had never understood that until there was a vote anything in a Bill disappeared. Consequently, unless I am wrong, unless we vote on these three clauses, they will remain until Report. Consequently, I do not entirely understand what the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, was telling us.
To move on, I shall speak extremely briefly—and, I have to say, unlike some noble Lords, I genuinely mean briefly. First, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips, has pointed out, this is a profoundly important issue. Secondly, hard cases do not make good law. I am very unhappy at the idea that anyone should automatically be given anonymity in a situation in which they have behaved in a way where there is at least a possibility that they may be guilty of some crime. I would prefer to see the situation as it remains today—but I also listened to, and think that it is a very sensible suggestion from, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, that the pause should give us time to discuss further how on earth this should be dealt with.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, from these Benches we support a carefully framed presumption of anonymity for firearms officers facing criminal charges, but we believe that it should be tightly drawn and subject to clear judicial safeguards.
Giving automatic anonymity to firearms officers who face criminal charges would mark a major and highly sensitive change. It deserves careful and measured consideration and scrutiny to strike the right balance. The public must have confidence that wrongdoing by officers will be dealt with fairly and transparently. But equally—and I think this is very important—officers must feel assured that if they act in good faith and follow their training, the system will protect and not punish them.
We welcome the wider provisions of the Bill to strengthen police accountability, particularly those speeding up investigations by the IOPC, but we understand why firearms officers seek reassurance. These are exceptionally difficult and high-risk roles, where hesitation can have tragic consequences. With fewer than 6,000 operational firearms officers across England and Wales, those concerns cannot be lightly dismissed.
At the same time, we recognise the force of the arguments made by those noble Lords who support the stand part notices proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and accept that a broad, inflexible anonymity system sits uneasily with the principle of open justice. The public have a legitimate right to know when those entrusted with legal powers are alleged to have acted unlawfully. Our preference is for a statutory presumption in favour of anonymity in firearms cases, rebuttable when the court is satisfied that identification is necessary in the interests of justice or public confidence.
We should trust our judges to apply a clear statutory test, protecting officers where necessary, while safeguarding the principles of open justice on which confidence in policing depends. A narrowly tailored presumption, coupled with robust judicial oversight, can provide the reassurance that firearms officers need without creating the perception of a two-tier justice system that treats police officers differently from everyone else. Of course, rebuilding trust in policing must be our shared priority, and ultimately that rests not on secrecy but on transparency, fairness and confidence that accountability will apply equally to all.
Thankfully, fatal police shootings are rare, and it is even rarer still for such cases to reach the courts. In these exceptional, highly charged cases, a carefully limited presumption of anonymity is a reasonable and proportionate step to keep skilled officers in these vital roles, while upholding open justice.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, as I think we all agree, this is a profoundly important issue, and one in which there is realistically no perfectly right answer. But let us start with the position that it remains one of the greatest triumphs of British policing that to this day we do not routinely have armed police officers. The image envisaged by Sir Robert Peel when he established the Metropolitan Police—that of policing by consent and the avoidance of a militarised police force, when he had the example of what he saw on continental Europe at the time—has endured. I have listened anxiously to the speeches today, which have been thoughtful and balanced. But we start, on this side, in His Majesty’s Opposition, with the view that on balance the approach of Clauses 152 to 155 is the right one. I shall say more about that in a moment.
While the vast majority of police officers in this country are unarmed, we know that, in order to protect the public, a few thousand brave officers volunteer to put themselves in harm’s way and become authorised firearms officers. The latest figures show that, as of 31 March 2025, there were 6,367 firearms officers in England and Wales. Of those, 5,753 were operationally deployable. That represented a decrease of 108—or 2%—from the previous year. There is a downward trend in the number of armed police officers, which should be a matter of concern to us all. It has to be arrested.
It is not hard to see why fewer and fewer officers are willing to take on this role. The recent prosecution of, and events surrounding, Martyn Blake demonstrate what can go wrong. Throughout, Martyn Blake was public property. He was left in limbo for two years while awaiting an IOPC investigation, a CPS decision and then a murder trial. As we have heard, he was eventually acquitted in October 2024. Despite that acquittal, the IOPC then announced that it was launching a further investigation for gross misconduct. This remains unresolved. Through all of that, he has been publicly known to everyone.
Matt Cane, the general secretary of the Metropolitan Police Federation, has criticised that in the strongest terms—with which we, on this side, broadly agree. The concern and criticisms which he raised have real-world consequences. Police officers feel that their reasonable use of force may be treated disproportionately or unreasonably after the event in a manner which does not recognise the pressures they face when they make split-second decisions.
During the trial of Martyn Blake, dozens of officers handed in their weapons. There was a serious concern that, in the event of a guilty verdict, police forces across the country would be faced with real, severe shortages of armed officers. The publicity given to all that must have been an aggravating factor for Mr Blake. We have to protect these police officers.
We have heard powerful speeches, from the proposer, my noble friend Lord Black, my noble friend Lady Cash and others, not least the noble and learned Lords, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers and Lord Garnier, either in full support of these stand part notices or asking us to look very carefully at them with a view to doing something along those lines.
There are important issues to consider: open justice; whether or not there should be special treatment for police officers; and concerns about unintended consequences. I remind the Committee of the provisions in Clause 152(3), which says that the court must, first,
“cause the following information to be withheld from the public in proceedings before the court, in each case unless satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so”;
then come the identification details. The court must also
“give a reporting direction … in respect of D”—
the defendant—
“(if one does not already have effect), unless satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so”.
This is putting in place a presumption which can be rebutted.
I feel that this is rather broad. In practice, it would be helpful for the courts and for those who have to deal with applications to act on that presumption and to lift that bar, if this was put rather more clearly, with some examples. I do not have any to put before the Committee today, but I came to that view when listening to the debate. I invite the Government to think very carefully about whether something should be done about the terms in the clause. This might go quite a way to addressing the concerns of those who are legitimately concerned about the wrong sort of special treatment being given to police officers, and about open justice more generally.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)
His Majesty’s Opposition are broadly in favour of these provisions, but I ask the noble Lord: if this becomes law, how is a judge going to change his or her approach to the issue of anonymity from the position that prevailed before this change? How is it going to alter things?
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
He is going to start—assuming that the judge is a he—from the position that, unless there is an application to the contrary, the bar against publication is in force. I am asking the Government to consider, before we return on Report, whether guidance can be developed and something put into the Bill which addresses the concerns about it being too difficult and imprecise to address in practice. We can listen to and address this on Report. At the moment, we support the provisions in the Bill, but I advance certain—I would not say reservations—anxieties about how this will work in practice and whether, in fact, it would be an absolute bar. Clearly, one hopes that this is not what is intended and that these words are not there just as some sort of fig leaf.
This is not an easy position. We heard some powerful and very persuasive speeches on the other side from the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, calling for support for our officers, and from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who, perhaps, more than any of us, knows what is truly involved for these police officers.
We support the clauses as they are. I remind the Committee that, as we stand here debating the issue of anonymity for firearms officers, outside this building, we are being protected by members of this very special group. In and around this building, they work every day—day in, day out—to keep us safe. We are able to continue with our important work of legislating only because of the safety which armed police officers provide. We owe those who protect us a real degree of protection. On the assumption that they are acting in good faith, they must be spared from the anxiety that if something goes wrong—and it will have gone wrong if they feel they have to shoot—they must not then be left exposed, as Martyn Blake was. We have seen how that went wrong. On this basis, for the time being at least, we support these clauses.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for giving notice of his opposition that Clauses 152 to 155 stand part of the Bill, and the noble Lord, Lord Black of Brentwood, for introducing the clause stand part debate and allowing this important and interesting discussion. I acknowledge from the outset that the Government agree these are not easy issues.
Clauses 152 to 155 largely stand or fall together, creating a bespoke system for a very small and discrete category of defendants in criminal trials; namely, authorised firearms officers charged with offences arising from the discharge of their weapon during the course of their official duties.
Notwithstanding the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, about lawyers—of which, of course, I am one—made during the course of the debate on the last group, I agree with much of what he has said. The starting point for the Government is that armed police officers perform a unique and high-risk role. They are trained to use lethal force, on behalf of the state, to protect the public, often in fast-moving and dangerous situations. This puts them personally at risk of death or serious injury every day in the course of their duties. They deserve our thanks and admiration for putting themselves in harm’s way to protect the public—and that, a point made by many of your Lordships, includes you and me. Because many of those with whom they engage are involved in serious crime, it exposes them and their families to the risk of retribution. That is the Government’s starting point.
There is another equally important principle in play: we do not have secret trials in this country. The principles of open justice and the ability for the press to report on cases continues to be one of our proudest and most carefully and jealously guarded traditions. I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, for whom I have the utmost respect, for putting in impassioned terms the importance of freedom of the press and freedom of speech.
So why then have the Government decided to introduce a presumption of anonymity in trials for authorised firearms officers? This limited presumption is being introduced due to the unique nature of firearms officers’ roles and the risks that arise from them being identified during court proceedings. What marks them out from other categories of defendant is that these are not risks merely to their reputation but to their lives. These are not theoretical risks. Firearms officers who have been charged with an offence can face serious death threats and other forms of intimidation. The threats do not stop with them but extend to their families as well. The real and present nature of this danger cannot be ignored.
I want to give two illustrations of incidents which demonstrate how extreme the consequences can be for those who serve as firearms officers. In one case, a contract for murder was issued against an officer who had acted in the line of duty and who was later found to have acted entirely within the law. In another, a bounty was placed on an officer who, as things turned out, had been lawfully carrying out their responsibilities. The threat is not theoretical; it is a stark reality. The safety of our officers and those they love must not be compromised. Some of these officers may later be found not guilty by a jury, but if they and their families have faced real and credible threats, by then the damage is done.
The time has come for action to be taken. The National Police Chiefs’ Council has said that firearms officers are fearful of the consequences and processes for them if they are involved in a death or serious injury case because of what has happened to colleagues, mostly so because of how it has played out in the media.
The noble Lord, Lord Black, and the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, made the point that the courts already have the power to order reporting restrictions in a case where the court judges that disclosure of a defendant’s identity would give rise to a real and immediate risk to life, and asked why a presumption is necessary. Our answer is this. It must be remembered, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, pointed out, that police officers volunteer for armed roles and they are not compelled to undertake such duties, nor are they paid more to do so. Data from armed policing shows the start of a slow decline in the number of those wishing to serve as armed officers. The armed policing attrition and retention document records that, since 2019, there has been a loss of 583 armed officers. That is an 8.8% reduction. Everyone hearing this should be worried. We rely on these officers to keep us and those we love, as well as our fellow citizens, safe. We, a Labour Government, are persuaded and have decided to act.
We have concluded that we need to strike a balance between the safety and security of our brave firearms officers, who are presumed innocent unless or until convicted by a court of law, and their families and our inviolable principles of open justice and freedom of the press. I venture to suggest that this is what these provisions achieve. The most important things to note are that these. First, once a jury has decided that the defendant is guilty then of course their identity will be made public. Secondly, these provisions establish only a presumption of anonymity during the trial. The judge at any stage has the ability to order that part or all of the defendant’s identifying characteristics should be revealed. It changes only where we start, not necessarily where we end up. Thirdly, the media and others will be informed, as is usual, of cases where there is a reporting restriction in place. Journalists and others will be able to make representations to the judge as to why they say that the identity should be known at an early stage, to help the judge decide where the balance should be struck in any individual case.
I remind your Lordships of the old truism about the difference between what is in the public interest and matters in which the public are interested. It is judges who make decisions of this kind every day and are best placed to do so. I add the reassurance that, where a judge concludes that narrower steps will suffice, the court will order only the minimum necessary. I can say to your Lordships from my own experience, and knowing my former judicial colleagues as I do, that they take the freedom of the press to report trials very seriously indeed. I venture to say that the two distinguished former judges who have spoken in this debate—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss—have shown just that.
Open justice remains the starting point. This measure introduces a narrow, rebuttable presumption for a small, clearly defined cohort. Proceedings will remain public, evidence will be tested in open court, and judicial reasons are given. Only the defendant’s details may be withheld, where necessary, until the point of conviction. It expressly allows the court to lift anonymity wherever it would be
“contrary to the interests of justice”
for the anonymity to remain.
I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, that this is a difficult issue that needs to be approached with care and that everyone should be moderate in the way they approach it. However, this measure does not compromise transparency or judicial independence. All it does it ensure that officers are not exposed to undue risk before the facts have been tested and decided upon by a court. It is about fairness, safety, and maintaining confidence in policing and justice.
I hope that my explanation of these clauses has gone some way to reassuring your Lordships. It would, as always, be a pleasure to meet the noble Lords, Lord Black and Lord Faulks, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, again—I think this is the third time in 48 hours that I have offered to meet him—as well as representatives of the News Media Association, who have written to me at least twice on this important topic. I would be more than happy to discuss all of their concerns. In the meantime, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Black, to withdraw his opposition to the clause standing part.
Lord Black of Brentwood (Con)
I thank the Minister very much for her comments and the offer to meet. I suspect she is involved in a large number of meetings at the moment, and we will try not to add too much to the burden.
This has been a very good debate on a difficult subject, but one, as we have heard from a number of people, that is of profound importance. We have to get the balance right, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, said, and that is what this debate has shown.
I will make three quick points, if I may. First, to underline what we heard a number of times in this debate, of course we all have huge admiration and respect for firearms officers. They are a very brave group of people who do a great deal here to protect us, and we are in their debt. They deserve protection. The points we have tried to make are that they have it at the moment. The difficulty with these clauses is that it is made automatic. That means, as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said, it is not always going to be easy to rebut.
There is an issue, as far as the media is concerned, that a presumption of anonymity could mean that the media is not put on proper notice and therefore is unable to challenge the presumption, if indeed those media outlets possess the resources to do so. If it is left to potluck that reporters become aware then open justice erodes, because the media has not got a chance to consider whether it should contest the presumption.
Secondly, the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and others have said that, thankfully, it is a very small number of cases such as this that ever come to court. It is not about that; this is a matter, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said, of high principle. In my experience, open justice and press freedom do not perish because of obvious assaults against them but because of apparently innocuous incremental changes such as this and the provision of special cases. The point, as my noble friend Lady Cash said, is that if anonymity becomes the default, openness has to be justified. That is the end of a very slippery slope, which is one of the things the Minister and I can talk about when we meet.
Finally, to echo a point that the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, made, at the end of the day, this is about state power and the exercise of state power. We chip away at the scrutiny of that at our peril. To do so, we should have overwhelming evidence. I appreciate what the Minister said in summing up, but I still do not believe that the case has been made. A number of noble Lords have said that we have time before Report to consider this further. It is a matter of huge importance, so let us take the time before Report to do so. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my opposition to the clause.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes provision that is no longer needed because of the general data protection override in section 183A of the Data Protection Act 2018, which was inserted by section 106(2) of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 and came into force on 20 August 2025.
Baroness Chakrabarti
“Service as a police officer: aggravating factor in criminal sentencing(1) On sentencing for any criminal offence, current or past service as a police officer shall be presumed to be an aggravating factor.(2) Where in a particular case, a court decides against any such aggravation justifying an increased penalty, it shall state the reasons for this decision.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause and another in the name of Baroness Chakrabarti relate to the criminal sentencing of serving or retired police officers. This amendment creates a rebuttable presumption that such service should be an aggravating factor.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, I will rise slowly to allow for the appropriate exodus.
I have Amendments 425 and 426 in this group. They are probing amendments only, and therefore I do not propose to detain the Committee for too long, not least as these follow the excellent previous debate, for which I commend the noble Lord, Lord Black of Brentwood, and all the participants. Many of the sentiments in that discussion informed my thinking behind these two amendments.
Let me explain. Like other noble Lords, I have a huge amount of respect for the overwhelming majority of police officers in this country, perhaps best exemplified by those who keep us safe outside and inside this building, and indeed those former officers who contribute so ably to debates in your Lordships’ House. Unfortunately, that is not the whole story of policing.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, I am never sure what a probing amendment means, because surely all our amendments are probing, and I certainly would support both these amendments on Report, because they are actually crucial. Although I am vastly older than the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, I, too, have been working on this for quite a long time, but only for two and a half decades. The number of police officers who have, in some way, been found guilty of a crime and yet still get their police pensions and all the benefits of having been a police officer for some years, however badly it has ended, really is annoying.
Police officers do a very difficult job—I am very appreciative of that and understand the problems—and most do it well. But when someone abuses that role, the damage is much greater for public trust. It is wider than any single case. Trust in policing depends on people believing that no one is above the law. In the previous debate the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, made the point that the rule of law is for us all, and I will bring that issue up again when we get to the public whatsit Bill, on—
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
I thank the noble Baroness very much.
At the moment the rule of law is not for us all, as exemplified by the way we treat police in some cases. On pensions, why do the Government prefer decisions about pension forfeiture to be taken later behind closed doors rather than in open court, where reasons are given and can be tested on appeal? If a judge has heard all the evidence in a criminal case involving a police officer, and has seen the harm done and the abuse of trust, why do the Government think that a judge should have no say at all over a publicly funded police pension?
I ask this out of long experience. We have been told for decades now that existing systems are enough or that reforms are coming, and clearly that is not happening. I personally would like to see, instead of these little baby steps, a bold, straightforward move towards the kind of accountability that people can see and understand. Time and again, in cases of serious police misconduct, the consequences remain unclear and invisible to the public.
From the public’s point of view, the current system makes very little sense. Some serious criminal convictions of police officers fall outside the pensions rule altogether, simply because they do not meet a narrow legal definition. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain why judges who hear the evidence are excluded and why transparency in court is still seen as a step too far.
When this Labour Government got elected, I really hoped for some changes in the way that we apply a sense of fairness to the whole of our legal system. Quite honestly, they have disappointed me very badly. They are no better than this side of the Chamber. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, we have been waiting a long time for this, and a Labour Government should really put it right.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, both these amendments seek to sharpen the consequences for police officers, serving or retired, who commit criminal offences. High-profile cases and damning reports have exposed toxic elements of policing culture, eroding public trust. Yet the vast majority of police officers do an excellent job and are let down by a small minority. Recent cases highlight public expectations that the law should rightly demand higher standards of personal integrity from police officers and, at the very least, adherence to the law of the land.
There is also no question but that public confidence in policing’s ability to police its own is fragile. While the latest figures from the Independent Office for Police Conduct show record high complaints, over a quarter of the public lack confidence in the organisation itself, most cannot even describe what it does, and nearly half distrust the police complaints system. That should give us pause for thought, because it is really quite serious.
When officers are seen to evade scrutiny or punishment, trust erodes further. This has major repercussions for those doing the job properly, because many members of the public then say, “Well, they’re all the same, aren’t they?” I fully accept the noble Baroness’s argument that more can and should be done.
Amendment 425 would create a rebuttable presumption that police service can be treated as an aggravating factor in sentencing. This rightly recognises the unique betrayal of public trust when those entrusted to uphold the law instead break it. However, I have a concern that in marginal cases, being a police officer could flip from helping to reduce the sentence, as somebody who has served the public, to becoming an automatic burden.
Amendment 426 goes further, granting courts the power to forfeit a sizeable chunk of an offender’s police pension. This could serve as a highly effective deterrent. However, I worry on two counts. First, it could discourage quality recruits, who fear that one mistake could destroy their and their family’s lifetime financial security. Secondly, it could entail taking away pension benefits that the officer has already earned fairly during what were presumably good years of service.
These amendments definitely merit serious consideration, but they also focus on symptoms rather than causes. From these Benches, we want to see the Government go further to strengthen the front line of police misconduct systems, with vetting that catches risks early and misconduct processes that are swift, transparent and trusted. Only then will sentencing reforms such as this land with any amount of force.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, Amendments 425 and 426 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, relate to the criminal sentencing of serving or retired police officers. We on this side of the Committee cannot support them. These amendments are well intentioned, and we understand where the noble Baroness is coming from, but we believe they will cause more problems than the issues they are trying to address. I do not see, for example, that they would have had any impact on the behaviour of the officer in the Everard murder or in other cases of police misconduct.
Amendment 425 would create a rebuttable presumption that current or former police officers should have their service as a police officer treated as an aggravating factor when being sentenced for a criminal offence. We, like the noble Baroness, believe that police officers should be held to a high standard. Abuses of power should be treated with the utmost seriousness, but the amendment is far too wide and risks creating unintended outcomes. Sentencing should, as far as is reasonably possible, be a specific exercise based on the facts of the case before the court.
At present, the courts already have the ability to treat an abusive position of trust or authority as an aggravating factor where relevant. This will allow for judges to distinguish between offences that may have been connected to an individual’s role as a police officer and those that are completely independent of it. They should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Amendment 425 would apply regardless of whether the offence had any connection to police service, resulting in the inclusion of offences that were wholly unconnected to an officer’s professional role and committed perhaps many years after the officer had retired or left the force.
Introducing such a provision, even as a rebuttable presumption, risks introducing an unnecessary and inappropriate counterproductive legal complexity. In practice, judges reflect on the defendant’s status and whether it is an aggravating factor. Furthermore, it would require the court to judge a person by their job and quite possibly what they were doing many years before. It could be 20 years before the commission of the offence and wholly unconnected with their service.
Similarly, we have significant concerns about Amendment 426. Pensions are deferred pay. They have been earned by service. I appreciate that issues arise where, while being so paid, the officer embarks on perhaps corrupt behaviour, but the police service will have to think about how it addresses that. It requires careful consideration of terms of service. If the police service wishes to include appropriate terms to address that sort of conduct, it is a matter for careful and balanced drafting, not for the relative sledgehammer—I mean that politely—proposed here. Once money has been earned and transferred to the relevant individual, that money is now their property. This amendment would undermine that principle and give the courts the power to deprive someone of money that may be entirely unrelated to the crime of which they are being convicted. It is potentially a large mandatory fine on top of any other sentence. We all know that police officers who go to prison face undoubted unpleasantness and very often have to be offered solitary confinement and protection. That in itself is a very substantial penalty.
We agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, about the risks of these amendments and the steps that should equally be taken to improve the way in which the police service operates. But the forfeiture of pension rights for just any criminal offence, especially in cases distinct from instances of abuse of police powers, could lead to disproportionate unintended consequences. We recognise that maintaining public confidence in policing is essential, but that confidence must be upheld through clear standards and conviction when things go wrong, then more effective punishment if needed; and, if necessary, by revision of the terms of service, but done by a matter of the terms of service, not by this rather blunt instrument. We look to the Minister for assurances on those points.
Relevant penalties must be imposed on the basis of conduct, not just status, so we cannot support the amendments. The context in which the sentence is passed is the fact of service; that would be relevant, but it is relevant only if that particular case comes before the court.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti indicated that this was a probing amendment and I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss these points.
I start by saying to the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady Doocey, and my noble friend that this Labour Government are committed to making improvements in police standards. That is why we have introduced significant reforms to strengthen police vetting and to act on misconduct and performance systems. This includes placing a duty on officers to hold and maintain vetting clearances and introducing a presumption of dismissal for proven gross misconduct. There are a number of measures in the Bill, but also in secondary legislation—and I trail the White Paper on police reform, shortly to be produced—that will show that this Labour Government, to answer the noble Baroness’s point, are committed to upholding standards and improving them, particularly in the wake of the murder of Sarah Everard and the conviction of police officers for simply heinous crimes. I put that on the record as a starting point because, with due respect, I do not accept the noble Baroness’s position that we are not doing anything on these matters.
I also support my noble friend’s broader position on strengthening accountability in the police service. I wish to see that happen but, in probing these amendments, I ask her to consider whether they are proportionate, fair or necessary. I take up and share some of the points that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, made in his contribution.
Amendment 425 would make an individual’s current or former service as a police officer a statutory aggravating factor when sentencing them for any criminal offence. It is right that an officer’s service should be an aggravating factor where an offence has been committed in connection with their service, particularly where officers have abused their position of trust. It cannot be right that individuals should be sentenced more harshly than other members of the public based on their occupation or, as the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, said, their former occupation. That is why the existing sentencing guidelines issued by the Sentencing Council must be followed by the courts, unless it is not in the interest of justice to do so, and make clear that abuse of power or position is an aggravating factor in sentencing. My noble friend knows that, because she mentioned it in her contribution. Introducing a statutory provision is therefore unnecessary. I submit to my noble friend that there is no gap in law or practice, and it would be neither fair nor proportionate to presume that a person’s current or previous service as a police officer was an aggravating factor in all cases.
Amendment 426 would give powers to the Crown Court to make decisions on the forfeiture of police officers’ pensions where an officer has been convicted of a criminal offence. As I have mentioned already, I am sympathetic to strengthening accountability in the police service, but responsibility for the forfeiture of a police officer’s pension is already set out in legislation. I know that my noble friend knows this, because she referred to it. In most cases, the matter is in the hands of elected police and crime commissioners. Police and crime commissioners are not only the pension supervising authority for police officers but the locally elected officials designed to represent the public and local communities. I therefore contend to my noble friend that they are clearly well positioned to consider the impact of such offending on public confidence in policing.
However, it is also worth mentioning to the Committee that the Home Secretary has a role in this matter. Pension forfeiture cannot happen without a conviction having been first certified by the Home Secretary as being gravely injurious to the interests of the state or liable to lead to serious loss of confidence. While the Crown Court has an existing role as the relevant appeal body following a forfeiture decision, the process of considering whether to pursue and apply for pension forfeiture is not, I suggest, properly the responsibility of the criminal courts, especially given that they have an appeal role in that process and that there is no mechanism in the amendment that would allow the Home Secretary to make submissions to the Crown Court on public interest factors that should be considered.
I know that my noble friend has probed in this amendment, and I know she knows this because she referenced it in her speech: those two mechanisms are available. We are trying to look at the key issue, which in my view is sorting out vetting issues and standards and making sure that we maintain those standards. That is what we are doing in the Bill, and in the White Paper that will shortly be before the House of Commons and the House of Lords. I therefore ask my noble friend, at least on this occasion, to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
I did not hear an answer to my question about why a judge should not hear about pension forfeiture in an open court. The forfeiting of pensions does happen, but it happens outside the court in closed rooms, and we never really understand the reasons given. Why not allow it to happen in court in front of a judge?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
As I just said, it can be done in court in front of a judge on appeal. The decisions are taken by the police and crime commissioner and/or the Home Secretary, who is accountable for those matters, and the Government intend to hold to that position. It may not satisfy the noble Baroness, as ever, but I look forward to her support on the key issue, which is improving vetting to make sure that we do not have those significant bad apples in the police force in the first place. That is our key focus in the White Paper and the measures in the Bill.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I am grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in this short debate. I said these were probing amendments because I thought it was important that we discussed in Committee on this Bill the issues of police standards, discipline and public confidence, as well as all the other measures that we are constantly debating to do with additional police powers. I am so grateful.
I say gently to the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, that in his response to the pension forfeiture provision he spoke as if this was not already an established principle. I think the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, got it right when she said the issue here is about how you will inspire most public confidence when forfeiture proceedings are happening. Would there not be some benefit in this being part of the sentence and therefore being given greater publicity because it has been announced in an open Crown Court? I think that is really the only difference between us.
I am grasping at any straw of how we might try to improve confidence in policing in this country, where, year on year, this is not happening. I was particularly grateful to my noble friend the Minister for, in a sense, responding to the provocation of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, to talk about what he plans with the White Paper and so on. I am sure we all look forward to engaging with all that. For the moment, though, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Doocey
“Police training – independent review(1) Within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must establish an independent review of the quality of in-service police officer training within police forces in England and Wales. (2) The review must—(a) assess the consistency, effectiveness and outcomes of all training provided to police officers after completion of their initial entry-level training, including all—(i) in-service training,(ii) workforce development programmes,(iii) refresher courses, and(iv) specialist training,(b) consider the extent to which training equips officers with the necessary skills, knowledge and professional standards to reflect the demands of modern policing, including—(i) digital skills,(ii) investigative skills,(iii) trauma awareness and conflict management, and(iv) processes by which police officers are informed of, and trained in, changes to the law, and(c) make recommendations for improvement, where appropriate.(3) The review established under subsection (1) must complete its work within 12 months of its establishment.(4) Within three months of receiving the review, the Secretary of State must lay a statement before Parliament containing their response and proposals to take forward the recommendations in the review.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to establish an independent review on police training.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 427 concerns one of the most vital levers for improving the performance and professionalism of our police service: the training of front-line officers. The amendment would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review of the training that officers receive once deployed by their forces. At present, the College of Policing sets national standards and issues codes and regulations, but it cannot force them to comply. Implementation depends on the forces themselves, the Home Office and inspectorates to give those standards real force. The result is uneven training and a postcode lottery for the public.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to support the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, on Amendment 427, and I have signed Amendment 428, which I will address. I come to the issue of mental health because I was present at and contributed to the debate the last time your Lordships’ House reviewed and improved the Armed Forces covenant. Mental health plays a vital part in that. I have friends and family members who are past and present members of the military, and I have seen how the military, over the last 15 to 20 years, has managed and improved its mental health.
That is the position I took when trying to have a look at how our police, not just officers but ancillary staff, are supported when they face difficult circumstances that might put their mental health under pressure. The difference between the MoD’s approach and the College of Policing’s approach is really quite stark. To start with, the College of Policing—I looked at some individual constabularies as well—is all about signposting elsewhere to outside organisations. There is virtually nothing on what happens inside your own organisation if you are a police officer. The front page of the advice rightly refers to the Samaritans first; it then talks about Mind, social media support, and support for police officers and staff experiencing mental illness or distress. Then, and only then, on page four, does it start to talk about what happens inside your own place of employment and how you can find support there.
The contrast with the MoD advice on mental health is that soon after the headline
“Armed forces covenant and mental health”,
it has a massive headline that says:
“Getting advice or help urgently”
for “serving personnel”; it goes through that and then it does it for “veterans”. It starts by saying that
“your first point of call should be your chain of command, unit medical officer, welfare officer or chaplain if you are in the UK or overseas”,
so if you are a serving member of staff you know instantly that your first place is the place in which you live and work, and you have your chain of command—the people above you and the people who may be junior to you.
I recognise that the details of the Armed Forces covenant are different from the employment relationship that police officers have, but before I move specifically on to the amendment I want to say that one of the other things that the armed services learned as a consequence of the Afghan campaign was that they needed to get a much better dialogue going on between staff. They were almost the first people to start introducing mental health first-aiders. It absolutely transformed areas of the military where it was introduced with gusto. This idea about the chain of command meant that there was an instant response from somebody who, like a first-aid trainer, could go and say to a colleague, “Are you all right? Have you got some problems?”, or whatever.
In policing, it appears very patchy as to whether mental health first-aiders are properly encouraged. In fact, the only thing that I could find online was that Staffordshire Police said in 2023 that it had over 50 mental health first-aiders. That is a really good standard, but there is no evidence held centrally about that level. It also indicates the seriousness with which a service, in its entirety, looks after its personnel.
I looked at the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, which sets out some criteria to start to gather that information about the response to mental health—not just mental health first-aiders. Again, I could not find anything online that was solely about policing. However, there was a recent report by the King’s Centre for Military Health Research, jointly researched by King’s College London, the OU and the Royal Foundation, entitled Assessing the Mental Health and Wellbeing of the Emergency Responder Community in the UK. That obviously is not just the police; it includes the ambulance service and firefighters.
In its very good research paper, the centre noted that, across the three emergency responder services, there was generally an absence of definitions and very little monitoring and evaluation. The paper talked about the importance of trauma support, including for PTSD. It emphasised, as I have already mentioned, the reliance on signposting to outside bodies and a lack of involvement inside police forces, and it certainly emphasised the lack of data collection and evaluation, including on self-harm, suicide, and alcohol and substance misuse.
The paper noted that there was no real sense of how emergency responder services were going to address what worked and did not work, and therefore whether any training that they were doing was going to be relevant. The paper recommended a promotion of good practice, so that responders know what good practice is, as well as the promotion and extension of support for “mental health/wellbeing ‘champions’”, which I think means mental health first aiders and some of the other forms of that.
The key thing the paper said was that there should be access to a single “Universal Gateway” website, analogous to the MoD page, and that to have that universal gateway there must be a single, universal collection of data and evaluation, so that across the board the police can understand what works and what does not work.
The UK systematic review found 81 recent results of ad hoc research projects, of which 43 were from police forces. Frankly, everybody needs to work together much better to make this work. That brings me back to the amendment, which, at the very least, sets out a route to collect that data right across the police forces in England and Wales. It focuses on a series of issues that I have already mentioned, and it would be a good start to approaching issues of mental health in the way that the military does for its people, which is having success. I hope that the Home Office Minister will look at that when deciding whether or not this amendment should be supported.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, Amendments 427 and 428, both in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, raise important questions about police training and how best to ensure that officers are properly equipped for the demands of modern policing.
Amendment 427 would require the Secretary of State to establish an independent review of in-service police training. We recognise the important underlying principle of the point being made here. Policing has changed significantly in recent years, not least because of the growth of digital crime, involving investigative techniques and greater awareness of trauma and professional standards. It is entirely right that we ask whether training keeps pace with these demands and whether there is sufficient consistency and effectiveness across forces. An independent review is one way of taking stock of that landscape and identifying gaps or best practice.
However, reviews of this nature inevitably come with costs in time and resource and risk introducing potential further bureaucratic hurdles for the police. It is worth reflecting on whether there may be other mechanisms, such as through existing inspection or the monitoring of professional standards frameworks, that could achieve similar outcomes. I look forward to hearing from the Minister how the Government currently assess the quality and consistency of in-service training and whether further work of this kind is already under way.
Amendment 428 focuses specifically on mandatory mental health training for front-line officers. The intention behind this amendment is clear. Police officers are often the first responders in highly distressing situations involving individuals in mental health crises. A degree of appropriate training in de-escalation and communication is clearly valuable. However, we on this side have some concerns that I hope the Minister can address.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for raising these issues. I know she feels strongly about them. We have an interchangeable Front Bench here between the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Brinton. It is always of interest to me that we have a good dual ability between the two noble Baronesses on these matters; I am grateful for the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for her colleague, the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, from the Front Bench/Back Bench.
The noble Baroness is right that training and support are vital. Police officers do a difficult job. They need to identify and have that support. I am grateful to her for shining a light on this in the amendment today. She knows—I just want to put this on the record again—that the College of Policing currently sets standards for police training and development, including the national policing curriculum, to support initial learning for new recruits, and standards and an accreditation for those who work in high-risk or specialist roles. The College of Policing also works strongly with police forces to support standards and to look at ongoing training and development. Again, our White Paper, which will appear in very short order, will consider the future workforce and will set out reform proposals on leadership and on culture to ensure that the Government’s safer streets and other projects and the mission that we have is equipped with support to achieve those objectives.
The noble Baroness will also know that my noble friend Lord Blunkett and the noble Lord, Lord Herbert, who is currently the chair of the College of Policing, have been appointed to review police leadership in a new commission, which the Government support. I expect that that will include looking at the wider training issues that the noble Baroness has made reference to today. I do not want to pre-empt that work, but it is important that we just recognise that. The request for the Home Secretary to commission as independent review, as Amendment 427 suggests, would potentially duplicate or pre-empt what is already being undertaken by the White Paper and by the two colleagues from this House.
Amendment 428 would ensure that police officers are equipped to deal with people suffering a mental health crisis. It is an extremely important issue. It is important that our police have the training and skills to not just be able to identify when a person is vulnerable but to understand how to intervene appropriately when people are experiencing a mental health crisis. For the reasons that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has given, very often officers will be the first port of call when mental health crises happen, because they are the first port of call in every circumstance. It is important that officers are equipped to make appropriate decisions in that range of circumstances and to treat people fairly, with humanity, and understand the issues accordingly.
Evidence shows that they are doing a reasonable job. The Mental Health Act review by Professor Sir Simon Wessely noted that
“numerous examples of police treating those with mental health problems with kindness and compassion”
were identified. That is what the public can expect, and that is what we want to see.
I say to both the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Doocey, that the College of Policing sets relevant standards, guidance and training on these operational matters. The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, said that she tried to find examples of that. The College of Policing currently has a mental health learning programme available via College Learn. It has programme specification and training guides which are updated and have been updated very recently—in the last few years. There are module titles on mental health and the police, providing a first response to mental health incidents, responding to suicide, providing specialist support at incidents of mental health and developing a strategic response to mental health.
With operational support from chief constables, who are independent of government, how they use that resource is a matter for the police. Different police forces will face different challenges and pressures and have different ways of doing it. But there is a level of support, which the outcomes of the police White Paper and the reviews by the two noble Lords I have mentioned will assist and support. It is important that we recognise that work is ongoing.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I am very grateful to the noble Lord. I think I was making a very slightly different point. I am aware of these courses, but my argument was that what the military has achieved has been through culture change within the entire organisation, rather than just sending people on a course to get a qualification.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
It is important to do that, but I also say to the noble Baroness that the police are not mental health experts, nor should we expect them to be. At the end of the day, they will be the first responders who have to identify and support people. The work on the Right Care, Right Person project over the last two years by police and health partners, to ensure that people who are in mental health crisis get the right response from the right person with the right training and skills at the right time, is important. That work has shown a decrease in unwarranted police intervention in mental health pathways. We want people with a mental health challenge to have support. The police are dealing with the crisis in the moment, and perhaps the consequential behaviour of the crisis, rather than the underlying long-term trends.
There will always be a role for police in dealing with mental health calls where there is a risk of serious harm. It is important that police have access to relevant health information and use their police powers to do that.
Importantly, as I have mentioned already, there is an important set of training material available, which goes to points that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, mentioned. The College of Police’s mental health training is for all new officers to go through. There is an additional suite of training material I have referred to that provide, I hope, the approach to the culture change that the noble Baroness is seeking. This training provides officers with knowledge to recognise what mental health challenges there are and to communicate with and support people exhibiting such indicators.
I think this is a worthwhile discussion, but I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that it would be helpful to withdraw the amendment now, and we will reflect on the outcome of the White Paper in due course.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response and my noble friend Lady Brinton for her summing up, which I thought was excellent. I just want to make a couple of quick points.
I am very much aware that the College of Policing determines what training should be provided for police officers. However, the point I was making—perhaps not strongly enough—is that the training does not work. The training is inappropriate; every police chief will tell you that. HMICFRS, which is the inspectorate, has said on multiple occasions and in multiple reports that the training is inadequate and there need to be changes, and nothing has happened. I honestly think that, whatever happens, there has to be an independent national audit of police training because there has not been one since 2012. The last one was a PEEL inspection, which examined individual forces but not the national picture.
I am so looking forward to the Minister’s White Paper. I cannot even begin to describe how excited I am about it. I think I am correct in saying that the Minister has referred to it—that it will solve all our problems—in almost every topic we have ever discussed. My only concern is that, if it contains as many subjects and if it is going to solve as many problems as the Minister suggests, it will probably be more like an encyclopaedia than a White Paper. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Doocey
“Neighbourhood policing(1) The Secretary of State must ensure that every local authority area in England and Wales has a neighbourhood policing team which must be assigned exclusively to community-based duties, including—(a) high-visibility foot patrols,(b) community engagement and intelligence gathering,(c) crime prevention initiatives, and(d)s solving crime.(2) The Home Office must publish proposals detailing the additional funding that will be required to ensure that police forces can meet these requirements without reducing officer numbers in other frontline policing roles.(3) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report detailing—(a) the number of officers and PCSOs deployed in neighbourhood policing roles,(b) the total cost of maintaining the required levels, and(c) the impact on crime reduction and public confidence in policing.(4) If a police force fails to meet the minimum staffing levels required under subsection (1), the Home Office must intervene and provide emergency funding to ensure compliance within six months.”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to ensure that every local authority area in England and Wales has a neighbourhood policing team which must be assigned exclusively to community-based duties.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 429 and 430, in my name. An effective, responsive and trusted police service must be built from the ground up, not imposed from the top down. I hope the forthcoming White Paper will start from that premise and reflect the Government’s stated commitment to community policing.
The Minister will no doubt highlight the neighbourhood policing guarantee and the promise of named officers in every community, and much of the Bill is described as strengthening neighbourhood officers’ ability to tackle the priorities of most concern to local communities—respect orders, tighter shoplifting laws and new vehicle seizure powers. However, none of this addresses the central challenge for chief constables: how to deliver on these promises amid rising demand, high turnover and chronic funding shortfalls. Front-line delivery depends on forces retaining officers in visible community roles rather than constantly redeploying them to plug shortages elsewhere.
Despite the new neighbourhood policing grant, the early signs are troubling. Last month, Cheshire police announced a 70% cut in PCSO numbers, from 87 to 27, despite public opposition, citing the need to save £13 million. Nationally too, PCSO numbers fell by 3.3% in the year to March 2025—a loss equivalent to 253 full-time officers—while front counters continue to close, and more and more school liaison programmes disappear.
This simply is not good enough. Public confidence rests on local responsiveness, yet neighbourhood policing teams today have about 10,000 fewer officers and PCSOs than in 2015. The police inspectorate has warned that some forces lack sufficient neighbourhood officers to deal effectively with anti-social behaviour, with huge variations of service across the country. Between 2019 and 2023, over 4 million anti-social behaviour incidents were not attended by an officer in person. Some forces responded to every report; others to very few. Of course, trusted neighbourhood officers are critical to tackling not only anti-social behaviour but knife crime, domestic abuse and retail theft, to name just a few.
Amendment 429 therefore seeks to guarantee for every local authority area a dedicated neighbourhood policing team protected from being routinely diverted to fill response gaps, and to require an annual Home Office report on the state of community policing.
Amendment 430 would make it a statutory duty for forces to maintain neighbourhood teams at effective staffing levels, the level to be determined by forces, councils, communities and ward panels to ensure that resources meet local demand. To support this, we propose ring-fencing 20% of future police grants, supplemented by a share of recovered proceeds of crime. This approach preserves operational flexibility. Forces could, of course, choose to exceed the minimum level if they so wished. I urge the Government to work with these Benches towards our shared goal—restoring visible, trusted and effective neighbourhood policing. I beg to move.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for tabling Amendments 429 and 430. Neighbourhood policing is one of the most important facets of the job, and we support any approach that intends to increase the presence of officers within neighbourhood communities. It is all consistent and very much part of the approach of that great Conservative Sir Robert Peel. Visible police presence on the streets of local communities is an incredibly important role. There is the obvious consequence that more officers out on patrol results in more crime being deterred and prevented, but the latent impact is that more noticeable, familiar and engaged officers contribute to an atmosphere of order and civility within local neighbourhoods—in other words, generally better behaviour.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for her amendments. I start, however, with the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, who prayed in aid the great Conservative, as he said, Robert Peel. From my recollection, Robert Peel was certainly not in charge of the police force during the 14 years of the previous Government, under which the noble Lord served. I was Police Minister in 2009-10 and know that we lost 20,000 police officers—I repeat, 20,000—in the first years of the Conservative Government. I think Sir Robert Peel had gone walkabout during that period and was not serving as a neighbourhood police officer under the Conservative Government’s watch at that particular time.
There was a lamentable decline in neighbourhood policing between 2010 and the last election. This Government have delivered on our commitment in the election to restore neighbourhood policing. We have already announced that police forces will be supported to deliver an increase of 13,000 officers for neighbourhood policing by the end of this Parliament. In the previous six months, we have delivered 80% of our year-one target, with nearly 2,400 additional neighbourhood officers in post. We remain on track to reach a full 3,000 uplift by April this year, which goes to the heart of the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. We backed that with £200 million of additional investment in the current financial year, as part of a total funding settlement to police forces of £17.6 billion. Total funding will again rise next year, 2026-27, by £746 million, taking the total funding for police forces up to £18.3 billion next year. That is a major level of investment in policing that this Government have brought forward, and I argue that it meets the objective of the noble Baroness’s amendment.
It is because of our neighbourhood policing guarantee that every neighbourhood across England and Wales now has named and contactable officers. These neighbourhood teams are dedicated to engaging with communities, gathering intelligence, and preventing crime and anti-social behaviour. Forces are ensuring that regular beat meetings take place, providing local people and businesses with a direct platform to shape policing priorities. We have more visible patrols, and officers and PCSOs have started to complete the new neighbourhood policing programme. There is career pathway training, launched in June 2025. There are designated leads for anti-social behaviour in every police force and a commitment to 72-hour response times to neighbourhood queries. These are all measures that I am sure Robert Peel would have welcomed had he been in charge for the previous 14 years—but he was not, and it did not happen, but it is now.
The new police standards and performance improvement unit will ensure that police performance is consistently and accurately measured. The work of the unit is going to reinforce our commitment to transparency and, for the noble Baroness, I pray in aid the upcoming White Paper on police reform—she will not have too long to wait for it now. It will detail how wider reforms will support the Government’s pledge to rebuild neighbourhood policing.
The amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, are absolutely in the right direction of travel. The question is whether she wants to constrain chief constables with the demands that she seeks to put centrally. I argue that the Government will continue to bolster neighbourhood policing and have reversed the cuts imposed by the previous Government—the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, seems to have had a memory blank around what happened over that time. The Government have set clear standards of local policing, and will work with the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the College of Policing and others. We are heading in the direction of the noble Baroness’s amendment, without the need to legislate.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
Could the Minister say something about the Police Federation’s attitude to the list of changes to enforcement that he has laid out?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The Government work closely with the Police Federation and will always listen and gauge the situation with them. I have met the chair of the Police Federation on a number of occasions, and other Ministers in government do the same. We will engage with that body. Like other federations or any form of trade union—although it is not a trade union—there will on occasion be differences between the organisation, the police chiefs and the Government, as is perfectly natural. I believe that we are investing in supporting police officers on the ground to do a better job in what they are trying to do and ensuring that the Government undertake a focus on neighbourhood policing, as the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, seeks. On that basis, I urge her to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
I thank the Minister for his response. I do not think that we are miles and miles apart. To be clear, I would never do anything that I thought chief constables would not be very much in favour of. They do a fantastic and astonishing job, and I would never do anything that I thought would be operationally wrong for them.
Our amendments are designed to complement what the Government are trying to do, but our aim is to ensure that all communities receive a guaranteed minimum level of visible local policing attached to the funding that makes that happen. I look forward to discussing in further detail with the Minister how that can happen. We are not miles apart and I am sure that when we see this mythical White Paper it will give us all the answers that we require. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Doocey
“Duty to record algorithmic tools(1) Each police force in England and Wales must disclose its use of any algorithmic tool used in the exercise of its functions that may affect the rights, entitlements or obligations of individuals by completing entries in the Algorithmic Transparency Recording Standard (ATRS).(2) Under subsection (1) “algorithmic tool” means a product, application or device that supports or solves a specific problem using complex algorithms.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment places a duty on police forces to disclose any algorithmic tool used in the exercise of its functions.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, powerful AI tools are transforming policing and reshaping how forces investigate, patrol and make decisions, often with profound implications. This amendment would make it a legal requirement for forces to disclose any algorithmic tool used in this way that might affect a person’s rights or freedoms.
The Government’s algorithmic transparency recording standard, ATRS, provides a consistent way for public bodies to explain how their algorithmic tools work, what data they use and how human oversight is maintained. Its goal is a public, searchable record of these systems. Use of the ATRS is mandatory for arm’s-length bodies delivering public services, though the previous Government did not extend that to the police, despite calls from the Committee on Standards in Public Life and from the Justice and Home Affairs Committee.
The College of Policing has now integrated the ATRS into its authorised professional practice. Forces are expected to complete an ATRS report for all relevant tools. That is welcome progress. The hope is that forces will increasingly comply to build public trust and meet their equality and data protection duties. However, while compliance is now expected, failure to record a tool is still not a legal requirement. A force could still choose not to use the ATRS, citing operational necessity, and it would not be breaking any law.
Transparency is vital across public services but nowhere more so than in policing, where these systems have the power to alter lives and restrict liberty. That is why Justice and civil liberties groups such as the Ada Lovelace and Alan Turing institutes want police use of these tools to be publicly declared and for this to be placed on a statutory footing. What is ultimately needed is a national register with real legal force—something the NPCC’s own AI lead has called for.
Government work on such a register is under way. I welcome that project but it will take time, while AI capabilities advance very rapidly indeed. The ATRS is the mechanism we have for now. This amendment would immediately strengthen it, requiring every operational AI tool from facial recognition to predictive mapping to be publicly declared.
Why does this matter? Take gait analysis, identifying people by how they move. No UK force has declared that it uses it, but its potential is recognised. Ireland is already legislating for its use in serious crime. Without a legal duty here, a UK force could deploy gait analysis tomorrow, with no public knowledge or oversight, just as facial recognition pilots proceed today with limited transparency.
This year, forces will spend nearly £2 billion on digital technology and analytics. With growing demand and limited resources, it is no surprise at all that forces turn to AI for efficiency. Yet, without total transparency, this technological shift risks further eroding public trust. Recognition of that need is growing. No one wants to return to the Met’s unlawful gangs matrix, quietly risk-scoring individuals on dubious grounds. For that reason, I urge the Government to accept this vital safeguard. It is a foundation for accountability in a field that will only grow in power and in consequence. I beg to move.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, as my noble friend Lady Doocey explained, Amendment 431 seeks to place a statutory duty on every police force in England and Wales to disclose its use of algorithmic tools where they affect the rights, entitlements or obligations of individuals.
We are witnessing a rapid proliferation of algorithmic decision-making in policing, from predictive mapping to risk assessment tools used in custody suites. Algorithms are increasingly informing how the state interacts with the citizen, yet too often these tools operate in a black box, hidden from public view and democratic scrutiny. As we have discussed in relation to other technologies such as facial recognition, the deployment of advanced technology without a clear framework undermines public trust.
This amendment requires police forces, as my noble friend explained, to complete entries in the algorithmic transparency recording standard. The ATRS is the Government’s own standard for algorithmic transparency, developed to ensure public sector accountability. My Private Member’s Bill on public authority algorithmic and automated decision-making allows for a more advanced form of reporting. In my view, the ATRS is the bare minimum required for accountability for AI use in the public sector.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, the noble Baroness’s amendment would place a duty on police forces in England and Wales to disclose their use of any algorithmic tool that may affect the rights, entitlements or obligations of individuals by completing entries in the algorithmic transparency recording standard.
That standard, ATRS, was developed as part of the Government’s wider digital and AI policy to ensure transparency about how public sector bodies use algorithmic tools in decision-making that impacts the public. It provides a template to publish information about such tools—specifically, information concerning what the tools are, why they are used and how they influence outcomes. This is seen as an important step to build public understanding of and trust in algorithmic systems used by government.
ATRS is already mandatory for central government departments and their arm’s-length bodies when tools have a significant influence on decisions with public effect or interact directly with the public, and guidance has been issued to support the publication of records. I recognise the intention behind this amendment, to promote transparency, accountability and public confidence in the use of algorithmic tools in policing. The use of complex algorithms and artificial intelligence in law enforcement raises legitimate questions about fairness, oversight and the protection of fundamental rights. It is right that Parliament scrutinises how we manage such risks.
I look forward to the Minister’s response, including the Government’s assessment of whether the ATRS framework as it currently applies can readily be extended to policing and what further measures might be needed to ensure that transparency and accountability are enhanced, without unintended consequences for operational effectiveness.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, Amendment 431 deals with the use of algorithmic tools in policing. While the Government agree on the importance of transparency in the use of algorithmic tools by police forces, we do not believe that the amendment would be the optimal means of delivering either meaningful improvements in public confidence or operational benefits for policing.
The proposed duty would require police forces to disclose all algorithmic tools through the Algorithmic Transparency Recording Standard—the ATRS. The ATRS was designed for government departments and arm’s-length bodies, not for operationally independent police forces. While it is an effective tool for those organisations, its high level of technical detail and lack of narrative explanation mean that disclosures would not provide the clarity expected by the public and would risk burying key information in jargon. More importantly, mandating disclosure of all tools beyond the exemptions policy of the ATRS could inadvertently compromise operational security and policing tactics.
The Government are, however, keen to encourage transparency in the use of algorithmic tools by police forces in England and Wales to maintain the support of the public for their use and in keeping with the core tradition of policing by consent. In line with this, the Government have commissioned work on transparency measures for police use of AI and are working closely with the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s AI portfolio and the National Policing Chief Scientific Adviser to develop policies encouraging and supporting appropriate levels of transparency while safeguarding operational integrity. This approach will ensure that transparency is meaningful, proportionate and does not undermine the effectiveness of policing.
It is important to recognise that we are listening to the public in dealing with concerns that have been raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, around policing encroaching on civil liberties. Indeed, the Government commissioned and published research into public attitudes on the police’s use of AI last year. The research demonstrated strong support for AI use by the police. There are rightful concerns about the need for AI use to be underpinned by rigorous oversight, humans always being clearly involved in decision-making and transparency. These findings have been supported elsewhere; for example, in recently published research by CENTRIC, which surveyed 10,000 members of the public. That is why we are working closely with the NPCC to build upon and implement the principles of the covenant for the use of AI in policing, to which all forces in England and Wales have signed up. Of course, it is important.
The noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, referred to the use of gait analysis, and there was a comparison to live facial recognition. It is important that we understand the risks of bias and discriminatory outcomes from using any policing tool.
To be clear, police deployments must comply with the Equality Act 2010 and data protection law. Forces are required to assess potential discrimination risks and should be able to evidence that tools are necessary, proportionate and fair. Humans remain clearly involved in decision-making, and forces are expected to monitor performance against protected characteristics so that any bias is identified and addressed. Where tools cannot meet these standards in practice, they should not be deployed or must be withdrawn pending remediation.
The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, referred to black box systems. To be clear, we are not comfortable with black box systems being used in policing. Policing requires—
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
I thank the Minister. Much of what he said about developing an alternative to the ATRS has been encouraging, but, obviously, quite a lot will also depend on—and he went on to talk about data protection—whether officers are trained in how Article 22 of the GDPR operates in terms of automated decision-making. What assurance can the Minister give about the level of knowledge and training in that area?
Lord Katz (Lab)
As I said, police deployments must comply with the Equality Act 2010 and data protection law, which, of course, include the latest data protection law under the GDPR. In relation to that specific point on Article 22 of the GDPR, I will have to write to the noble Lord to give him the full details, but, as I say, the general principle of compliance applies.
Just to finish the point I was making in reference to the noble Lord’s point about black box systems, where a system is inherently opaque, forces must have compensating controls such as rigorous testing, performance monitoring and strong human review, or not use that system.
Given these assurances—and I am grateful to the noble Lord for saying that he was encouraged, and we will wait to hear from his colleague as to whether she is encouraged by these responses—I hope the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
I am very interested in this area and supportive of the right use of AI in policing, because it can be enormously helpful to the police in terms of resources. I remember when I was at the Cabinet Office, they were doing a trial where they were using AI instead of officers to look through CCTV of abuse and child abuse, and that was saving a lot of resource and a lot of difficulty for police officers. The Minister did not mention what kind of use the police were making of AI. Does he have any information on that, or can I be referred elsewhere?
Lord Katz (Lab)
A range of use is made by police forces at individual force level. Each force makes operationally independent decisions as to what tools they test or deploy. Sometimes it is around administrative tasks that we see across lots of public services and sometimes it is specifically around operational issues and investigation. It is probably best that I do not go into too much detail, but I can certainly go back and talk to officials to see what we might be able to follow up on in writing with the noble Baroness, if there is more detail we can provide.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. Yesterday, I looked at the public ATRS repository that is meant to record what AI tools police forces are deploying. It contained only two entries for police AI tools, even though we know that many are already being used, including systems such as live facial recognition, which is not listed at all. A great deal of AI development takes place within individual police forces, rather than through national programmes, and there are several reasons why these tools may not be appearing in the central record. Some forces believe that putting information on their own website is sufficient to meet transparency requirements. Others may avoid reporting tools by categorising them simply as standard software rather than as algorithms or AI systems. There may also be worries about publishing full information which could make it easier for defence lawyers to challenge decisions in court.
I think, therefore, that both the Government and we are clear—as well as the Official Opposition—that there absolutely is a problem that needs to be addressed, because it is not being addressed at the moment. AI is moving at such a rapid pace that this is not something that can be kicked into the long grass; it really needs to be addressed now. I therefore look forward to seeing the proposals that the Government are going to come forward with—I will not mention the war or the White Paper—but, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Doocey
“National plan on police data intelligence systems(1) Within 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must publish and lay before Parliament a national plan to modernise police data and intelligence systems in England and Wales.(2) The plan must include steps to be taken to further the aims of—(a) replacing any antiquated police technology;(b) closing capability gaps identified in the National Audit on Group-Based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse;(c) enabling real-time secure information exchange between police forces and partner agencies;(d) supporting improved—(i) risk identification,(ii) early intervention, and(iii) co-ordinated action,to protect children.(3) The national plan must set out clear milestones of how to achieve the aims set out in subsection (2) within five years of the plan being published.(4) Every 12 months after publication of the plan under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must lay a further report before Parliament outlining the progress to date in achieving the aims set out in subsection (2), until those aims have been completed.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment aims to take forward part of Recommendation 7 of Baroness Casey’s National Audit on Group-Based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, relating to updating police information systems.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 432 seeks to press the Government on their plans to address long-standing problems of fragmented police and criminal justice data systems. I must tell noble Lords that I was working on this very subject when I was a member of the Metropolitan Police Authority, which I left more than 16 years ago, and the system has neither changed nor got any better. The recent national audit on group-based child sexual exploitation produced by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, described policing’s data intelligence infrastructure as antiquated and identified systemic failures that continue to put children at serious risk. The audit also highlighted the wider paucity of technology underpinning policing.
These concerns echo what has been said for many years, and when I served on the Metropolitan Police Authority, the same warnings had already been voiced about creaking systems that did not keep pace with the demands placed on them. Yet despite endless reviews, there is still no fully integrated digital system linking the police with the rest of the criminal justice system.
Fragmented, outdated IT undermines public protection more broadly. Officers’ time is wasted on manual workarounds; investigative opportunities are missed; prosecutions are delayed, and known risks are not always identified, let alone shared. As digital evidence proliferates and crime becomes more cross-border and complex, the lack of seamless data sharing between forces and agencies becomes even more damaging.
Concerns about poor IT integration between the police and the Crown Prosecution Service were being formally raised as far back as the late 1990s. A major joint inspection published in July 2025 reiterated that the CPS case management system was never designed to interface properly with the 43 different police IT systems, contributing to delays, low charge rates and victim frustration. In other words, the same structural problems persist nearly three decades on.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I support much of what the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, said about the problems we face. This links in well with my amendments, which will be taken next week: Amendment 436 on enforcement data and Amendment 437 on police paperwork.
The fact of the matter is that a lot of officer time is wasted. There is too much paper and too much copy and paste, and, as the noble Baroness said, opportunities are missed. I know this because my son works in the Met and often complains when he comes to see me about the poor IT integration, particularly between the police, the CPS and the courts, where cases are being progressed.
I am sure that the Minister is well aware of all this and that steps are being taken to improve things, and I know, having worked in government on IT systems-related work, that it is very difficult. However, there is an enormous advantage to be gained from making progress in this area and spending police time on chasing and catching criminals, not on so much bureaucracy.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
My Lords, I want to make a very brief contribution—cheekily, because I have not taken any role in this Bill. My noble friend’s amendment, what she said in support of it and the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, are highly pertinent to the debate on the Government’s proposal to restrict jury trials. On the Tube in, I read an account of the report from the Institute for Government, which has looked at the Government’s proposals and concluded that the time savings from judge-only trials would be marginal at best, amounting to less than 2% of Crown Court time. It suggests, pertinently, that the Government
“should instead focus on how to drive up productivity across the criminal courts, investing in the workforce and technology required for the courts to operate more efficiently”.
As others who know the situation much better than I do have said, it sounds dire. One is used to all these problems of legacy systems—lack of interoperability and so on. I remember all that being debated at EU level. It is difficult and probably capital-intensive work—at least, initially—but instead of promoting these headline-grabbing gestures about abolishing jury trials, the Government need to fix the terrible lack of efficiency in the criminal justice system. I am not sure that the civil justice system is any better. Having, unfortunately, had a modest involvement in a case in the county court, I found that it was impossible to phone any staff. You might be lucky to get a response to an email after a week.
Making the system work efficiently, with all bits interacting with each other, would do a great deal more to increase productivity and save the time of all those people who are running around. One hears accounts from people who work in the criminal courts of reports not being available, files being lost and staff being absent, let alone the decrepit state of court buildings. All this investment needs to go in before the Government resort to gesture politics and things such as abolishing jury trials.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 432 was so well introduced by my noble friend Lady Doocey. This lack of appropriate technology and how it is handicapping our police services is something that she feels very strongly about. I was delighted to hear what the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and my noble friend Lady Ludford had to say, because this lack of the appropriate technology extends beyond the police services into the wider criminal justice system. This proposed new clause would address the desperate state of police data infrastructure by requiring the Secretary of State to publish a national plan to modernise police data and intelligence systems within 12 months.
As mentioned in the explanatory statement, this is not an abstract bureaucratic request. It is a direct response to, among other things, recommendation 7 of the National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey. The audit painted a damning picture of the current landscape: intelligence systems that do not talk to one another, vital information trapped in silos and officers unable to join the dots to protect vulnerable children. It is unacceptable that, in 2025, we still rely on fragmented, obsolete IT systems to fight sophisticated networked criminality. This amendment seeks to mandate a coherent national strategy to ensure that antiquated police technology is replaced, that intelligence regarding predatory behaviour is shared effectively across police borders in real time and that we finally close the capability gaps that allow perpetrators of group-based child sexual exploitation to slip through the net.
Amendment 432 would ensure that, when the police hold vital intelligence, they have the systems to use it effectively. We cannot claim to be serious about tackling child exploitation if we do not fix the digital infrastructure that underpins our investigations.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for bringing forward this amendment, which seeks to require the Government to publish a national plan to modernise police data and intelligence systems in England and Wales. At its heart, this amendment speaks to a very practical and pressing concern: that our policing infrastructure must stay up to date with modern crime, particularly the most harmful and insidious forms of abuse.
Outdated and fragmented information systems can frustrate effective policing. That point was raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, in the National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, which noted that some police forces are still operating antiquated legacy systems that inhibit real-time data sharing and hinder co-ordinated action across forces and with partner agencies.
Group-based child sexual exploitation is a complex crime. Our response must therefore be equally networked and technologically capable. Recommendation 7 from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, made it clear that improving data systems is essential—I emphasise that word—to ensuring children’s safety and enabling earlier intervention and more efficient information exchange. I look forward to the Minister’s outline of the steps the Government have already taken to address this issue.
This amendment seeks to take that recommendation forward by requiring a national plan with clear steps and milestones to modernise police data and intelligence systems. We strongly support the idea of having clear milestones not just for police forces and agencies but for the public and Parliament. Transparent targets allow for progress to be measured and debated, and provide operational leaders with something concrete and tangible to work towards.
We also welcome the requirement for annual progress reports to be laid before Parliament until the plan’s objectives are achieved. That level of ongoing scrutiny is important if we truly want to drive systemic improvement rather than to allow good intentions to gather dust. I therefore echo the helpful contributions of my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford; we really must do better.
I look forward to the Minister’s response to this amendment. I would be grateful if he would outline how the Government intend to address the problems identified in the national audit and how they will respond to the constructive challenge that this amendment presents.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for explaining the rationale behind her amendment, which would require that a comprehensive national plan to improve police data and intelligence systems is set out within 12 months of the Bill receiving Royal Assent.
While I am sympathetic to the intent of this amendment—I think probably everyone in the Committee is—I stress that Parliament already has a role in holding the Home Office to account on policing systems. The Public Accounts Committee has oversight of the Law Enforcement Data Service and has required the Home Office to provide detailed information on its development. The Commons Home Affairs Committee also regularly scrutinises Home Office digital transformation and policing technology, and it is open to the Justice and Home Affairs Committee of your Lordships’ House to do likewise.
Additionally, His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services publishes State of Policing: The Annual Assessment of Policing in England and Wales. This report is laid before Parliament, ensuring that Parliament remains informed about the performance, challenges and progress of police forces across England and Wales. This provides information on police efficiency, effectiveness and progress on reforms, including those relating to IT and crime data integrity.
Work to improve access to policing data is already under way. For example, last June the Home Office conducted a preliminary market engagement to better understand what solutions the market could offer policing to improve data integration. We are currently evaluating those responses against the existing policing landscape to determine the best way forward. We also awarded a contract to deliver a police technology strategy and road map.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
Before the Minister sits down, I am obviously delighted to hear about the White Paper. We are really looking forward to it being published. He helpfully mentioned a contract that has been let to look at this whole area—a police technology strategy and road map for intelligence and the technical use of it. I wondered who that contract had been let to and what the timeframe was for delivering conclusions. The other point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, was the question of having enough capital for the IT. Being a businesswoman, I know very well how expensive that can be. If the Minister could say a little bit more about that, that might help us before Report.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I do not have details of the contract in front of me. I am, of course, aware that there could be commercially confidential issues at play which might prevent the level of disclosure that she wants, but, in the spirit of trying to be helpful, I will certainly go away, take it back and write to the noble Baroness if I can.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I am very sorry. I am recalling the passage of the Procurement Act, where we discussed at some considerable length what contract could and could not be kept from the public. The detail can be confidential, but the fact of the contract and who it is let to should surely be part of the public domain—it should be on websites.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I will certainly defer to the noble Baroness’s knowledge of the Procurement Bill because I think it went through the House before I was in the House. I am happy to share what detail that we can under the details of that Act. I hope that that satisfies the noble Baroness.
I will also go away and look at the issue of capital funding. I am afraid I do not have the figures in front of me, but of course it is important that we fund all these systems adequately. We would contend that, unfortunately, for the past 14 years some of the investment in policing that we would have liked to see has been lacking, and we have been very clear about our wider approach as a Government to investing, particularly in neighbourhood policing but in policing at all levels. We want to improve on recent experience.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
I thank the Minister for his response, but I am, frankly, gobsmacked at his suggestion that my amendment was not needed because the Home Office had a role in deciding what IT the police had and making sure that they had what they needed. For more than two decades, report after report has documented the same weaknesses: fragmented systems, wasted effort, and vital intelligence lost between agencies. People who did not understand would find it almost impossible to believe that vital intelligence can be lost between agencies, but it has been happening for years and years. We cannot keep treating this as a series of isolated IT upgrades that are needed when what is needed is a national strategy, with clear responsibility and sustained investment. There is no way past that; that is what is needed and it is what must be provided. This amendment does not prescribe the solution. It simply asks for leadership and for a timetable to deliver what everyone thinks is now essential.
The Minister mentioned talking to different people and finding out what was needed. All you have to do is talk to 43 chief constables and they will tell you exactly what is needed, for free. We do not have to go out to thousands of people and run various inquiries, taking days and months trying to work out what is needed. Everyone knows what is needed: the money, the will and the leadership. But, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Smith of Llanfaes
Policing: devolution to Wales(1) Schedule 7A of the Government of Wales Act 2006 is amended as follows.(2) In section B5 (crime, public order and policing)—(a) omit “and policing”, and(b) omit line 41 “policing”.(3) The Secretary of State may by regulations make further provision under this section.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause seeks to devolve policing to Wales, by removing it from the list of reserved matters in the Government of Wales Act 2006.
Baroness Smith of Llanfaes (PC)
My Lords, Amendments 433 and 434 are in my name. I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, and the noble Baroness, Lady Humphreys, for adding their names to both amendments, and the noble Lord, Lord Hain, for supporting Amendment 434. I look forward to hearing contributions from across the Committee on how we can ensure that policing and youth justice in Wales genuinely meet the needs of the people of Wales.
I will take the amendments in turn, beginning with policing. Amendment 433 would remove policing from the list of reserved matters in the Government of Wales Act, thereby devolving responsibility for policing to Wales. My case rests on two central arguments. The first is the current shake-up in police governance across England and Wales and what that means for Wales, and the second is the reality of how policing in Wales is already funded.
First, on governance, His Majesty’s Government’s proposal to abolish police and crime commissioners in England and Wales makes the amendment particularly timely. In England, PCC functions are expected to transfer to mayoral authorities. Wales, however, has no equivalent governance structures. That leaves a serious constitutional gap, with no clarity as to where those powers will ultimately sit. This moment therefore presents a clear choice: either Wales is left in a governance limbo or policing is devolved to the Senedd, allowing Wales to take responsibility for its own public safety. It cannot be right that devolved English regions, such as Greater Manchester, can exercise greater control over policing than the democratically elected legislature of Wales.
Secondly, on funding, what strengthens this argument considerably is the financial reality. My understanding is that in 2024-25 only around 43% of policing expenditure in Wales came from the UK Government. The remainder came from within Wales itself, with approximately 44% funded directly through council tax; in other words, the people of Wales are already paying for the majority of their policing.
It therefore follows that policing policy and priorities should better reflect Welsh needs and Welsh circumstances. The Welsh Government have, for example, used their health budget to support police officers working directly within the education system, engaging with young people on substance misuse, healthy relationships and cybercrime. This preventive work not only supports public health objectives but helps build trust between communities and the police.
The geography and demographics of Wales are markedly different from those in much of England. We have fewer large urban centres and many rural communities, where access to services is already challenging. Centralisation, often driven by cost-saving decisions made at a distance, has had a particularly damaging impact in Wales. Court closures provide a clear example—increasing travel times, costs and complexity for victims, witnesses, offenders and professionals alike. Within this context, policing must strike a careful balance, recognising Cardiff’s role as a capital city, while also addressing the unique challenges faced by rural communities, where service delivery is often more expensive and more fragile.
Wales is also a bilingual nation, yet the College of Policing, which trains officers for England and Wales, is not required to comply with the Welsh Language Act. Welsh-medium training for police embedded in Welsh communities should not depend on good will. It should be embedded as a core requirement. That too points towards the need for devolved control.
I turn to Amendment 434, which would remove youth justice from the list of reserved matters and devolve it to Wales. Youth justice is already, in practice, quasi-devolved. The services that young people most frequently interact with—education, health, social services—are all devolved. In Wales, the vast majority of young people who come into contact with the youth justice system are low-level offenders and many are dealt with out of court through youth bureaus. These bureaus run by Welsh local authorities take a public health and restorative justice approach. The Welsh Government’s child-centred framework, Children First, Offenders Second, has been widely recognised. Sometimes described as the “dragonisation of justice”, it reflects Welsh values and Welsh priorities.
Once again, funding tells an important story here. In 2022-23, around 64% of youth justice funding in Wales came from devolved sources. While more recent data is not publicly available, there is little reason to believe that this position has materially changed. That same year, the proportion of funding provided by the Ministry of Justice to Wales was lower than for any English region. For example, the Youth Justice Board core grant made up 44% of total funding in the north-east of England and 40% in the north-west. In Wales it accounted for just 24%. Once again, Wales is largely funding a system it does not control.
On the wider constitutional point, Scotland and Northern Ireland both have full responsibility for their justice systems and Wales remains the outlier. This is not an argument for devolution for its own sake; it is an argument for fairness, coherence and effectiveness. Many of the most powerful levers for reducing crime—health, housing, education and social care—have been devolved to the Senedd for over 26 years. Retaining justice powers here at Westminster fragments responsibility and weakens accountability. When systems fail, it is often unclear who is responsible, and communities pay that price. Welsh Labour’s 2021 manifesto committed to pursuing the case for devolution of policing and justice, as set out by the Thomas commission. We have had report after report, commission after commission. This is not a moment for further exploration, it is a moment for action.
Let Wales take responsibility for policing and youth justice. The people of Wales are already paying for these systems. They deserve the ability to shape them in line with their needs and values. The time is now. I look forward to the Minister’s response and hope that His Majesty’s Government will give serious consideration to these amendments as the Bill progresses through the House. I beg to move.
Lord Hain (Lab)
My Lords, I have not added my name to Amendment 433, but I have to Amendment 434. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for having tabled it.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of the amendments, to which I have put my name. As the noble Lord, Lord Hain, has made such an eloquent speech in relation to youth justice, I will concentrate on the police because the arguments are identical. The reason I say they are identical is that the three commissions that have looked at this issue—commissions made up not of politicians interested in hanging on to power but of individuals who have experience and expertise in the systems—have all recommended the devolution of youth justice and the devolution of the police. The first was Sir Paul Silk, the distinguished clerk; then I chaired a Commission on Justice in Wales, which reported in October 2019; and then there was the report of Dr Rowan Williams and Professor Laura McAllister. All recommended the same thing.
In view of the pressing need for a debate to occur at 4 pm—it may be a minute or two early—I refer to paragraphs of the report that we wrote. The police are dealt with at paragraphs 4.77 to 4.151, and youth justice is dealt with at paragraphs 4.181 to 4.195. I give those paragraph numbers in the hope that someone in the Home Office might read them. One of the problems of the report that the commission I chaired submitted is that no one has ever answered it. I assume it has never been answered because it is unanswerable. It is therefore important, in the light of the forthcoming paper on the police, that this point is grappled with.
The two fundamental arguments have been outlined by both the noble Lord, Lord Hain, and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith. First, if you devolve everything else, you have to devolve police and justice. They are integral to the proper management of a system. Secondly, there is the democratic argument that if Wales is paying the greater part of what it costs, there should be accountability—certainly greater accountability than that enjoyed by the Mayors of Manchester and London. At the moment, the accountability is the other way around.
Where this is so important is that the view used to be expressed that the people of Wales really were not up to governing themselves. That was the 19th-century and early 20th-century view and, thank goodness, is gone. But now one asks: what is the argument against devolution? It is very difficult to see what it is. It will be a testing point as to what will happen on the publication of this White Paper.
The Government are abolishing police and crime commissioners. I express no view as to whether that is a good thing or a bad thing, but it forces the Government to grapple with what happens in Wales. Are they going to set up some elaborate structure to avoid devolution, or are they going to face up to devolution? We shall know the answer to this in the forthcoming White Paper. I hope that the Home Office officials, when they have read the paragraphs to which I have referred, will see that there is one unanswerable response to this question: devolution. On the other hand, if they set up some elaborate structure, no longer will it be said, “Well, the Welsh aren’t quite up to running their own police force”. It might be said, “There are other reasons why politicians don’t like giving up power in London. They want to hang on”. One has already seen reflected in remarks made in and across Wales that it is about time that these important powers were transferred to Wales to make the Government coherent, rather than hanging on to them and to power for what I hope I have wrongly understood—or been told—are purely party-political reasons. I hope that is not the case, but the proof will be in the pudding of the police White Paper.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, we on the Liberal Democrat Benches are grateful to the noble Lady Baroness, Smith of Llanfaes, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, for tabling Amendments 433 and 434, and to the noble Lord, Lord Hain, for adding his name to Amendment 434. These amendments relate to the devolution of policing and youth justice to Wales.
My noble friend Lady Humphreys has signed both amendments as they agree with Lib Dem policy and our ambitions for Wales, but, unfortunately, she cannot be in her place today. Our manifesto for the general election in 2024 promised to:
“Deliver a fair deal for the people of Wales by … Devolving powers over youth justice, probation services, prisons and policing to allow Wales to create an effective, liberal, community-based approach to policing and tackling crime”.
To the disappointment of many in Wales, the issue of devolving justice to Wales was absent from Labour’s general election manifesto, despite Keir Starmer committing a year before, in 2023, to introducing a take back control Bill to devolve new powers to communities from Westminster. This commitment appears to apply to England only, and gradually, over the months since the election of the Labour Government, their lack of ambition for Wales has become more apparent.
After the State Opening of Parliament in 2024, there was no new mention of new powers for Wales in the King’s Speech. In July 2025, the noble Lord, Lord Timpson, said that the UK Government could row back on its promises on the devolution of probation and youth justice, despite the Welsh Government beginning the groundwork to prepare for what they believed to be a realistic project.
Noble Lords have raised queries about the consequences of the decision taken by the Government in November last year to abolish police and crime commissioners—a decision that those of us on these Benches applauded. At the time, noble Lords from Wales were concerned about the lack of clarity on the Government’s plans for the transference of the PCCs’ functions to Wales. The assumption was that the functions would transfer to mayors in England and to the Senedd in Wales. However, far from providing clarity, the answers they received amounted to pure obfuscation. Now we learn, in what could be described as a slap in the face to the Senedd, that the functions of the PCCs are to be transferred to a new board, placing the Welsh Parliament on the same level as a non-mayoral authority in England.
On these Benches we understand the difficulties so ably clarified by the noble and learned Lord in his contribution to the Sentencing Bill of devolving just one part of a system. But where has English Labour’s ambition for Wales disappeared to? For all the platitudes about mutual respect and co-operative working, the disrespect is beginning to show, sadly. Where is the recognition that Wales has been ready for the devolution of the justice system for the last 25 years at least, and where is the road map for our two nations to achieve that together?
Lord Sentamu (CB)
My Lords, I do not come from Wales. I am speaking because I have sympathy, and I have friends there. I remember somebody asking me, “Are you evangelical or Anglo-Catholic?” I said, “Catholic, yes; Anglo, no”. Wales may sometimes feel it is singing that song.
The devolution of justice and policing to Wales are two sides of one coin, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said. To those who tabled Amendments 433 and 434—the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and the noble Lord, Lord Hain—I simply ask one question: if policing and youth justice, this one coin with two sides, are devolved to Scotland, why not Wales?
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, we oppose Amendments 433 and 434, which seek to devolve policing and youth justice to Wales. Let me be clear: I make no observations on the principle of devolution for its own sake, but these amendments would make profound constitutional and operational changes. They are presented without convincing evidence that devolution of policing or youth justice would improve outcomes for victims, communities or young people themselves.
Policing and youth justice are not isolated administrative functions—
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
May I ask the noble Lord whether his staff have read the report that contains all the evidence? To say that this is put forward without evidence is not correct.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
I cannot answer that from the Dispatch Box, I am afraid; nor do I have many staff.
Policing and youth justice are not isolated administrative functions. They sit at the heart of a single, integrated criminal justice system spanning England and Wales. Police forces operate across borders daily; so too with the criminal justice system. Intelligence sharing, counterterrorism, and serious organised crime and public order policing all rely on consistent legal frameworks, operational standards and accountability structures. Fragmenting those arrangements would introduce complexity, duplication and risk at precisely the moment when policing faces unprecedented pressures.
Policing in Wales is already delivered locally, is locally accountable and is responsible to Welsh communities. Police and crime commissioners in Wales set priorities based on local need. Chief constables in Wales are not directed from Whitehall on day-to-day policing. What is proposed is not so much localism but the creation of a new layer of political control over policing.
The amendments ask your Lordships’ House to place policing and youth justice under the control of the Welsh Government. This has been run by Labour continuously since devolution began. It is therefore legitimate to ask what that Government’s track record tells us about their capacity to take on these serious responsibilities. In area after area of devolved public policy, Labour-run Wales has failed to deliver. Educational outcomes in Wales have fallen behind those in the rest of the United Kingdom on many international measures. Health waiting times are persistently worse than in England. Major infrastructure projects have been delayed or mismanaged. Those are not ideological assertions; they are documented outcomes of more than two decades of one-party dominance and failure.
When systems fail in devolved areas, the response of the Welsh Government has often been to blame Westminster rather than to reflect on their own actions or inactions. If policing and youth justice were devolved, who would be blamed if and when crime rose, youth reoffending increased or serious failures occurred? Experience suggests that accountability would become more opaque, not clearer and more robust. Constitutional change should be driven by clear evidence of benefit, not by political symbolism. It has not yet been demonstrated how these proposals would reduce crime, improve public confidence or deliver better outcomes for young offenders; nor has it been shown that fragmentation would be avoided and how cross-border crime would be tackled more effectively, or failures remedied. For these reasons, we cannot support the amendments.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and my noble friend Lord Hain for tabling these amendments. I speak as Home Office Minister but also as a resident of Wales, a Member of Parliament for Wales for 28 years, a Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Wales who helped bring in devolution, and a Welsh Whip who took it through the House of Commons, so I am a supporter of devolution and know my way around this patch. However, I say to the noble Baroness that the Government cannot support in full the direction of travel that she has proposed.
I recognise again the great contribution that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, has made on this issue and in his reports, but the view of the Government remains that devolving police and youth justice would require extensive institutional change and carry major operational and financial implications. Devolving policing in particular would undermine the UK Government’s ability to deliver crime prevention and the safer streets mission in Wales.
The noble Baroness raised finance. The position she mentioned in Wales is no different from that across the border in Cheshire. Taxpayers there have a burden of funding carried forward, with UK central support. That is a common issue. The noble Baroness does not have too long to wait, as the police settlement for England and Wales will be issued by the Home Office very shortly. I expect that—
Baroness Brinton (LD)
The noble Lord commented about it not being the right time for Wales, but does this mean that the Labour Government are changing their view about police devolution in Scotland? It works perfectly well.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
There are significant differences between the positions in Scotland and Wales. Scotland has its own legal system, prison system and policing system; it has had that for some time. In Wales, we have a very integrated England and Wales court system and a cross-border, east-west relationship. For example, the regional organised crime centre that services the area of north Wales where I live is a cross-border co-operation on a cross-border issue.
We have looked at the noble and learned Lord’s points and reports and, from my perspective, attempting to separate elements of the offender management system from the wider criminal justice system would in practice be extremely complicated. It would lose some of the economies of scale that we have in the current arrangements, and it would put a jagged edge on an entirely new and complex interface. I know that the noble and learned Lord has looked at those issues, but that is the view of the UK Government. The UK Government recognise the importance of Welsh partnership structures such as the Policing Partnership Board for Wales and the Police Liaison Unit, but ultimately the Government have no plans to devolve policing in Wales at this moment.
Noble Lords mentioned the decision announced on 13 November last year to abolish police and crime commissioners. We have put in that plan, and it will require legislation at some point to give effect to those proposals. There will be further discussion in the forthcoming White Paper on them, but we have committed to work with the Welsh Government and other stakeholders to ensure that new arrangements provide strong and effective police governance for Wales, while recognising the unique nature of those Welsh arrangements.
Having said that, on the Labour Government’s commitment that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, mentioned, we are working with the Welsh Government to undertake a programme of work on the Labour Government’s 2024 manifesto commitments around youth justice, which goes to the heart of one of the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness. In light of the manifesto commitment, we are trying to ensure that the youth justice system delivers effectively for the people of Wales. We are undertaking a programme of work to meet that aspect of the manifesto commitment, which meets in part the objectives of the noble Lords who spoke to these amendments.
I am conscious of time, and I am sorry that this is a speedy debate pending the debate that is due any moment now. We can return to this on Report, as the noble Baroness may do, but the view of the Government to date is as I have outlined.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
First, I do not want the Minister to answer this now, but I would be very grateful if he would look again at the funding for the police in Wales. Unless I am mistaken, Manchester and London do not have a Government who make a grant to policing as the Welsh Government do. Secondly, the argument has been put forward, but the arguments that we have put contrary to all this have never been answered—and I hope they will be answered in the police White Paper. If the argument is a good argument, it stands or falls by its strength. The Government in London have never had the courage—and those who seek political advantage have stood behind that lack of courage in failing to answer independent views that have been expressed.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The Government will answer those questions, and they can make a very robust case for why devolution of policing should not happen. As I have said, we are exploring the issue of devolution of youth justice with the Welsh Senedd and the Welsh Government, and in the forthcoming police White Paper we will look at what the governance systems should be in consultation with the Welsh Senedd, police and crime commissioners and the police chiefs in Wales. That is a further debate. The noble Baroness has opportunities on Report to table amendments to get a fuller debate, and there will have to be legislation capacity at some point around the objectives set in the announcement on 13 November and in the forthcoming White Paper, which is coming very shortly. In the light of all that, and given the time that we have now, which is far too short to debate this in full—and I would like to do that at some point with the noble Baroness—I ask her to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Smith of Llanfaes (PC)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response, although I admit that I am quite disappointed with the position expressed by the Government. I certainly do not agree that it is too complicated to devolve policing to Wales when apparently it is not too complicated to abolish PCCs and create a brand-new structure—so I do not accept that argument. But today we have a debate to come after this one, so I shall withdraw the amendment. However, I do not think that we have resolved the argument over how the policing will be governed after the abolition of PCCs. I hope that the police reform White Paper includes detailed proposals in relation to that issue.
The Minister mentioned some positive steps on youth justice, and it would be good to have further discussions on the details between Committee and Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Crime and Policing Bill
Tuesday 27th January 2026
(3 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-XIII(b) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Thirteenth Marshalled List) - (27 Jan 2026)
Lord Hogan-Howe
“Police covenant: mandatory reporting on suicide and attempted suicide(1) The Secretary of State must ensure the collection and publication of data on suicide and attempted suicide among police officers and police staff for the purposes of supporting mental health and wellbeing under the police covenant (see section 1 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022).(2) Each police force in England and Wales must collect and submit annually to the Secretary of State—(a) the number of confirmed suicides by serving police officers and police staff;(b) the number of attempted suicides by serving police officers and police staff;(c) contextual information, where reasonably available, including duty status, length of service, role, rank, known occupational stressors, and access to mental health support. (3) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed, and annually thereafter, lay a report before Parliament (to be known as the “Police Covenant Mental Health Report”) which must include, but is not limited to—(a) national and force-level data trends,(b) analysis of occupational contributory factors,(c) assessment of the adequacy, usage and evidence-based outcomes of mental health and suicide prevention provisions under the police covenant,(d) recommendations to address identified risks, and(e) a statement from the Chief Medical Officer for England.(4) The report under subsection (3) must—(a) be published and disseminated to all police personnel;(b) include commentary from the College of Policing on compliance, data quality and best practice at force level;(c) include contributions from staff representative bodies and trade unions.(5) Anonymised data, disaggregated by force area, must be published, subject to data protection and safeguarding.(6) Each Chief Constable must, at the end of every calendar year, provide a statement to the Secretary of State certifying that the requirements under this section have been met by their police force.(7) Where a Chief Constable fails to provide a certification under subsection (6) without reasonable excuse, the Secretary of State must notify HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services.(8) The Inspectorate must have regard to a notification under subsection (7) in the course of its inspection of that police force under the police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy (PEEL) programme.(9) The Secretary of State must establish an independent advisory board, to be known as the “Police Suicide Prevention and Mental Health Advisory Board”.(10) The Board must consist of persons with expertise in clinical care, occupational health, staff representation and academic research.(11) The functions of the Board are to—(a) advise the Secretary of State on guidance relating to suicide prevention and mental health in the police workforce,(b) set standards for the collection and reporting of relevant data, and(c) review and make recommendations on force-level responses to risks identified through data and inspections.(12) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about the operation of the Police Suicide Prevention and Mental Health Advisory Board, including provision about—(a) the Board’s procedures,(b) its terms of reference, and(c) its reporting duties.(13) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about—(a) data collection standards,(b) statutory guidance,(c) audit mechanisms, and(d) such further oversight as may be considered necessary.(14) In this section, “police officer” and “police staff” have the same meanings as in section 1 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022.”
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I rise to support and move the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, to which I have added my name. I also support the other two amendments in this group. The reason for the amendments is that the Police Federation of England and Wales is concerned because it believes—but is not sure—that there is an increased rate of suicide among police officers, and it has a similar concern around police staff. For those noble Lords who do not know, about two-thirds of police work is done by police officers and about a third by employees who are police staff.
The Police Federation was concerned because it intuitively thought that the numbers were rising, so it sent out FoI requests to each of the 43 forces—in fact, there are also three non-Home Office forces. Unfortunately, it got only 34 replies, which has not helped it in determining whether there is a real problem. It could be worried for no cause, but at the moment it is struggling to establish the facts. The difficulty is that it cannot get hold of the data. I am really concerned about this, because it seems to me that it should not be that difficult.
I suspect that, even if the numbers of suicides are increasing, there are probably not going to be hundreds, even among a workforce of a quarter of a million. It is probably a relatively small number—probably tens rather than hundreds. Even for the biggest organisations, you would think that they would be able to find this data. For the smallest forces, surely they can remember the individuals. Some of the smaller forces we heard about in the police reforms announced yesterday have about 1,000 people, so there are not going to be so many that small forces could not remember whom this shocking thing had happened to. Police officers and police staff are generally relatively young people. They do not tend to die when they are in service, and when they die through suicide, it is a terrible shock for everybody involved.
There would be complications in gathering the data. As the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, proposes, it would be helpful to get the data not only about those who have committed suicide but also about those who have attempted it. Establishing whether a death is a suicide or not relies on a coroner; that is the only absolute way in which we can say that there has definitely been a suicide. Sometimes, to be fair, coroners are sympathetic. They realise that this can feel to the family like a judgment, and often they will find any way that they can, in law, to find an alternative, so getting hold of the data can be difficult.
Of course, who can say what an attempted suicide is? There is no absolute proof of that. I suspect that the occupational health units in each of the 43 forces have some data. Because that is medical data, however, they cannot always share it with the employer. If it is relevant just to that person but is not relevant to their employment; it is a confidential issue and, if the individual wants it kept secret, then that is entirely up to them, and the occupational health units might not be able to share it.
It is vital to get this data for a couple of reasons. One is to establish patterns, if there are patterns; for example, does it affect certain roles? We know already that it is an awful job for certain officers and staff who view, for example, child abuse images as part of their general work. To have to sustain that work over months and years, even with all the welfare support that they get, might make it an area that we would be worried about if we saw that there was an increase in the number of suicides; likewise, among firearms officers or dog handlers, male or female—the role does not really matter. We just need to understand what it is, obviously, to try to prevent it.
What worries me about not being able to get hold of this data—it ought to be possible to get at least some of it—is what it says about the relationship with the chief officers, the Police Federation and the unions. There is a statutory requirement for the chiefs to meet personally with the head of the federation every quarter, and to meet with the unions. I am sure my colleagues will also explain that. Beyond that formal requirement, we also meet them informally, usually about once a month. Chiefs should be meeting their federation reps at times such as bravery awards, and there are various other internal mechanisms.
If they are concerned, it is hard to imagine that they have not mentioned it. If they have mentioned it, why have they not got a response? Why has it ended up with FoI requests, three-quarters of which have been badly answered? In fact, some of those who did not reply were the biggest forces of all. Sometimes people take it that 30-odd out of 40-odd forces is three-quarters; it is three-quarters of the forces, but some of the forces are very big and some are very small, so we do not have any representative data.
My final point is for the Home Office. There are, broadly, two amendments here. One is very detailed from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, about not only how the data is gathered but what is done with it afterwards. My amendment just says that the Home Office might want to collect this data. I wonder whether the Home Office has asked for it and also been refused; perhaps the Home Office could be interested as well.
It is important for two reasons. First, when people are committing suicide in their employment, it matters that we establish whether it is their employment that is causing it, or there is something else that the employer has absolutely nothing to do with. The employer might have been able to help had they had some sensitivity to the problems that their staff are facing. Secondly, policing is about care. Those who serve must look after each other. My test is always that at 3 am, when everybody else has gone home, you cannot call the police if you have a problem, so you must rely on your colleagues.
It is vital for any employer to care for their staff because they want better performance, and to make sure that their staff can do what they are paying them a salary for. But in policing and the emergency services in particular, you must rely on each other and look after each other. If that is not done properly, or if there is anything we could do to help a person, but they then take their own life and we could have noticed, it is probably the worst example, and, surely, we would all want to do something about that. It matters for many reasons and that is why I support the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, and have tabled my own. I beg to move Amendment 435.
Lord Bach (Lab)
My Lords, I have put my name to Amendment 435 and, of course, I support Amendment 438A from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, in this group. I remind the Committee that I served as the elected Police and Crime Commissioner for Leicestershire and Rutland for five years between 2016 and 2021. I welcome this initiative by the Police Federation of England and Wales. I am proud to say that its present chair, Tiff Lynch, is a Leicestershire police officer, whom I can call a friend.
As Police and Crime Commissioner, I was responsible for the well-being—this is true of all Police and Crime Commissioners but perhaps not widely known—of only one person: the chief constable. However, as any Police and Crime Commissioner would be, I was concerned in a broader sense with the well-being of all those who worked for Leicestershire Police, whether officers or staff. During my time, one senior officer took his own life in obviously tragic circumstances and, since I left office, there has been another suicide, this time of a very recently retired senior officer.
I am afraid to say that over the last 30 years there have been four senior officer suicides in that force. I do not have any information concerning police staff, but I remember clearly, and will not easily forget, the deep and lasting distress caused to all at police headquarters and in the community beyond by the death of the officer who took his own life in my time.
I must confess to not knowing at the time that all police forces were not compelled by law to pass on information about suicide or attempted suicide. I imagine I presumed that they were compelled to do so. It is surely obvious—it certainly is to me—that there should be mandatory reporting. I cannot for the life of me understand why that has not been the position until now. That is why I support these amendments and urge the Minister, with his great knowledge of policing matters, to express the Government’s acceptance of the principle behind these amendments.
It almost goes without saying that police staff who perform such a vital and necessary role can be subject to enormous pressures that we sometimes do not even know about and are rightly included in the mandatory reporting. This is a reform that should not be delayed. The Bill is a useful vehicle for bringing in what should have been there a long time ago.
Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington (CB)
My Lords, I, too, support this amendment, following on from what both noble Lords have said. Policing is a difficult, dangerous and stressful task. I have for many years referred to police officers as the men and women who are the dustbin collectors of society. They will go where other people do not want to go. I take my information source beyond those whom the noble Lords have mentioned. My son did 32 years in the police service. He has just retired as a senior detective, running one of the most difficult parts of the Metropolitan Police, and he now has a very senior role in government. Over the last two to three years, he and his friends have reported how people are either thinking about committing suicide or have attempted suicide, and in his command over about 18 months two committed suicide.
Whether and how you deal with a suicide is a difficult question. It is sensitive information. People shy away from it, understandably, but there is no doubt that we have a suicide problem in policing. My 30 years’ experience of Northern Ireland was in taking people into the most difficult situation in policing that has ever been undertaken—more of that later, no doubt, at the public inquiry, with what has been disclosed recently. Out of 28 people, all hand-picked, who went into Northern Ireland on the so-called Stevens 1, four of them never came back to policing. Two of them were thinking of committing suicide and I referred them to the force medical officer. Those people never reached the statistics.
Like my noble friend Lord Hogan-Howe, I was an inspector of constabulary for nearly two years, inspecting many forces across the country, from the largest to the smallest. One of the most important roles of the inspectorate in that case—we have discussed this—was that we went and looked at the sickness rates of a force. If we found that the sickness rates were very high, performance and morale were low. We would dig deeper, but it was difficult to find out where suicide played a role or if it played a role at all. We have a problem here and I say to the Minister, who is always supportive, that this may well be a nudge in the right direction.
Some of us, as old men do, have dinner parties or meet up for a glass now and again, and the information that I am getting from my old colleagues and current colleagues, who I have to keep in contact with because of the activities that we are now about to be involved in in relation to Northern Ireland, is that there is a problem. I can understand why some chiefs would shy away from that. We have a police commissioner here who did a superb job—not many of them do or did, but he did—and if you listen to what my noble friend Lord Hogan-Howe has to say and to my information, we need to do something.
Maybe this amendment is too long and complex for it to stand the test of examination, but there is an amendment further on, submitted by my noble friend Lord Hogan-Howe, which is short, sharp and to the point. It holds the kernel of what we are dealing with. I support the amendments, including the final amendment, whichever way my noble friend Lord Hogan-Howe wants to go. Let us have a look at it. What is there to hide behind these figures? Why has this survey come back with very little information in it? Speaking as a chief constable, a commissioner and an HMI, I think that that is not good enough. I do not believe that the Home Office should be treated in such a way.
Lord Sentamu (CB)
I, too, support the shortest of all the amendments. My noble friend Lord Hogan-Howe’s Amendment 438A gets to what needs to happen without a lot of description. I have always felt that brevity is the best answer to a problem, because you know what is being asked for. I want to congratulate him on putting in this amendment. Every organisation will face this question of suicide and, if there is a way of collecting the data and working out why, that is necessary. I believe that the duty of candour is not simply about the way the police treat citizens; it is also about the way the organisation treats the police service. There must be a duty of candour from the chief officer and, of course, the Home Office has a part to play. I support this wonderful short amendment, because that is what needs to happen. With a much longer amendment, I am afraid that what is simple will be lost in quite a lot of detail, which is not what we want.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, from these Benches there is strong support for Amendments 435 and 438A, which would finally shine a light on one of the most sensitive and least discussed aspects of police welfare: suicide and attempted suicide among officers and staff. This is not about apportioning blame; it is about creating conditions in which people can seek help early and leaders cannot look away. Nearly two years ago I sought this very information and was assured that work was happening to collate it. Yet no figures have emerged, leaving families, colleagues and policymakers in the dark, still awaiting clarity and transparency. These amendments would ensure that bereaved families do not feel that their loss has been silently absorbed and they would confront the lingering stigma around mental ill health in policing.
Policing demands a particular duty of care that transcends the ordinary employer-employee relationship, as the state requires officers to face repeated trauma that is unparalleled in any other walk of life. We are now operating in what many describe as a crisis policing model, where officers spend most of their time dealing with the darkest parts of human experience with far fewer opportunities to balance that with visible neighbourhood-based work. In the past, time spent on community policing would lift them out of the dark place. Today, that release valve is much weaker. Much of the informal support that once existed has disappeared. Officers used to have shared spaces where they could decompress together at the end of a shift, but those communal areas have largely gone. From staff sifting through distressing online material every day to front-line officers facing the increasing likelihood of physical assault, the psychological strain is relentless. This feeds a siege mentality in a service that still struggles to recognise emotion and is not naturally open.
Policing remains an environment where taking paternity leave can invite mockery and where the burden can fall especially heavily on women and minority officers amid unreported discrimination. In too many forces, officers still fear that admitting vulnerability will derail their career progression. If Parliament seeks people to shoulder that burden on our behalf, it must insist on collecting basic information. Tracking suicides and attempted suicides would pinpoint hotspots and high-risk groups, enabling proactive measures such as resilience training, peer support and routine psychological screening. I urge the Minister to take these amendments back to the Home Office and consider bringing forward concrete proposals on Report.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Bailey of Paddington and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for bringing this matter to the attention of the Committee. The noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington, and I know all too well the stresses and strains of policing. It is vital that more is done to support our officers. I approach these amendments from the fact that it is impossible to address what we do not measure and, at this moment, policing has almost no reliable national mechanism for measuring accurately the total number of police suicides.
Data from the Police Federation of England and Wales shows that more than 100 police officers and staff have died by suicide between 2022 and 2025, with at least 70 officer deaths and over 200 attempted suicides in that period. Those figures are likely undercounts because there is no statutory requirement for forces to record such events. The federation has also revealed troubling trends in how these incidents are linked with organisational stresses—notably, that 47 of 70 suicides and 173 of 236 attempted suicides that it has identified between 2022 and 2025 involved officers under investigation for misconduct or criminal allegations. That is not simply a statistic; it is a human tragedy that echoes through families, colleagues and communities.
As has been said, police forces are not required to record suicide or attempted suicide, meaning that the true scale of the problem is hidden from view and national suicide statistics do not treat policing as a risk occupation, as they should. Without a statutory duty to record and report, we are asking police leaders to act in good faith alone, with widely inconsistent results. Two of the largest police forces in England and Wales reportedly could not provide their own figures when the federation asked. The amendments would end that inconsistency by placing responsibility for data collection and publication on a statutory footing.
The amendments are not a step taken in isolation from policing leadership. The National Police Chiefs’ Council and the College of Policing are already committed to suicide prevention across the service. They have jointly endorsed a national consensus statement on working together to prevent suicide in the police service in England and Wales, acknowledging the importance of reducing stigma and improving well-being. The College of Policing also leads on national suicide prevention guidance and professional practice, emphasising the duty of forces to recognise inherent risk factors associated with police work and to promote supportive interventions. However, guidance and consensus alone cannot ensure consistent national reporting or create the accountability that comes from an annual report, laid before Parliament, which analyses trends, contributory factors and the effectiveness of support mechanisms under the police covenant.
Requiring chief constables to certify compliance and linking non-compliance to inspection through HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services will ensure that this is not simply a bureaucratic exercise but a real driver for change. However, without consistent mandatory data, these efforts lack the firm foundation needed to evaluate progress and target interventions where they are most needed. We on these Benches fully support the amendments.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for highlighting the amendments that he has put before the Committee today and to the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, although he is not in his place, who tabled two of the amendments.
The importance of collecting accurate and consistent data for police officer and staff suicide is certainly relevant. I note particularly that the noble Lords, Lord Stevens and Lord Hogan-Howe, and my noble friend Lord Bach have a significant senior level of experience in these areas. I am grateful also for the comments of the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, and I recognise and note the strong support from the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, from the Opposition Benches for the proposals in the amendments.
Every life lost to suicide is a tremendous tragedy and, when that person is part of our police workforce, that loss is even deeper because those officers, as has been said, walk towards danger and see things that everyday citizens do not see. It is only fair that we support them with the same care and commitment that they show to us.
It may help the Committee to know that last year I met the Police Federation chair, Tiff Lynch, when she raised these matters with me. I have to say that this is an issue. We must do our utmost to protect and support police officers and this Government agree that understanding the scale and nature of the problem is essential. As the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said, it is important that we understand whether any levels of suicide are linked specifically to a policing role or linked to factors outside of policing that policing may or may not exacerbate, as well as what measures can be taken, as in any walk of life, to help to support and encourage individuals who have mental health challenges or experiences that drive them to suicide. That is why we as a Government are actively considering the best options for achieving that, both in legislation and via non-legislative routes, so that we can deliver meaningful and sustainable improvements without creating unnecessary burdens.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
I thank the Minister for such a constructive response and of course I thank everyone for their support. The noble Lord, Lord Bach, made a point that I had not made in my speech but that I want to amplify: in collecting the data, we should consider people for at least 12 months after retirement. He mentioned one particular case, but we can all perhaps imagine others and, if there is a link, that would be interesting to look at.
I hope we do not have to end up with legislation, because, in a way, that would be an admission of failure. There are far better ways of achieving it without that, or the bureaucracy that the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, mentioned. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, for his usual powerful support for this and for saying it is common sense that this needs sorting out—there was no challenge on that from the Minister. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for their wholehearted support.
A couple of important things have through in the debate. First, the noble Lord, Lord Davies, mentioned the potential link to misconduct processes. If that is an issue, we need to understand why. We had an amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, on a previous Committee day about potential deadlines or timelines for how long these things take; that cannot be unconnected. Whatever it is, we need to understand what it is about.
There is a second very important HR issue: are we recruiting people who understand the nature of the job they are about to embark on? Are we sharing the nature of the challenges? Are we supporting them at the beginning if they have things that they are not sure about? It is important, for the reasons we have all talked about, to make sure that this happens. I am really reassured about the round table. It would be really helpful if, by Report, we had a definite route forward, because I can see there are various routes.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
Can I raise one point with the noble Lord? It seems to me—certainly from reflecting on my own police service—that one of the issues regarding suicide simply was the fact that police managers were unable to identify the issues when they arose. I wonder whether he, as a former commissioner and part of the inspectorate, has a view on that.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
The noble Lord, Lord Davies, makes a really good point: are we training our managers and supervisors to recognise the signs? For good reasons, occupational health units keep all this data together privately. The noble Lord, Lord Stevens, mentioned a referral to the medical officer to see whether there was a problem; I wonder how many referrals are coming back the other way to let the manager know that this person might have an issue, not necessary to talk about suicide but to say there is a stress issue and they may need some support. Has it become a one-way valve that protects their privacy but reduces their safety? There are many facets to it that I hope the round table might address. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment and thank the Government for their response.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe
“Police enforcement data(1) Police forces in England and Wales must publish annual data on the enforcement of the following offences—(a) shoplifting,(b) offences involving a blade,(c) phone theft,(d) fare dodging on public transport, and(e) offences involving bicycles and e-scooters.(2) In this section, “enforcement” means the investigation and collection of evidence in preparation for a prosecution.”
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, in moving my Amendment 436, I will also speak to my Amendment 437. I thank my noble friend Lord Jackson for his support on the crucial issue of police force publication of enforcement data and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for supporting my proposed review of police paperwork or its online equivalent.
As I explained at Second Reading, I have discovered in my long career in business and in government that enforcement of the law is as important as the rules and regulations themselves. This is as true for neighbourhood policing as it is for serious crime, and far too little is being done. I also believe in the power of comparative statistics as a driver of performance and success. As I agreed with the noble Lord, Lord Timpson, during the Sentencing Bill debate, good leadership and management —the manager of a store or the prison governor—is the best predictor of success. I believe the same will be the case in the police, although I would be interested to hear from the Minister at what level that is true in the police structure.
However, it is not possible to identify and promote the best without comparative data. Hence, my amendment takes five areas of public concern, which we have already debated and which the Great British public care about: shoplifting, offences involving a blade, phone theft, fare dodging on public transport, and offences involving bicycles and e-scooters. It would require police forces individually to publish annual data—so not a great burden—on the investigation and collection of evidence in preparation for a prosecution. It needs to be accessible, so the public and parliamentarians can see it and hold police forces to account. They will also be able to see how others are doing and learn from their success.
The amendment would, I suspect, help to reveal the scale of wasted effort. Many cases of burglary, shoplifting and theft are not pursued, despite good evidence from the victim, because of the bureaucracy and even indifference of the system, and the poor IT integration between the CPS and the courts, which we have discussed on other occasions. It would help to focus on the right things, away from prosecutions for tweets and back to the Peelite principle that the police need to be part of the community they serve. The sunlight of publicity would help to drive necessary change. I say to the Minister that data helps people to do the right thing and to take timely and sensible action. I would be interested to know from the Minister how much of the data proposed in my amendment is already collected and how accurate it is, so that we can assess how difficult the change would be.
Amendment 437 seeks to tackle the huge bureaucracy that the police services have become, with energetic police women and men weighed down by requirements. The effect is to drain resource from the front line and our pavements. Indeed, the Bill will just add to such requirements, rather than the reverse. Unfortunately, we cannot solve the problem today, which is why I propose a review of police paperwork, which needs to be led by an outsider with a passion for cutting red tape and looking to experience elsewhere, such as lean thinking in business, which we found very useful in the supermarket sphere—another huge employer of well-trained and decent people. The review could also look at the IT and AI systems linking the police to the courts, the CPS and other enforcement bodies. I believe there is huge scope to reduce and simplify paperwork and its online equivalent.
The Minister may know that there is already a Police Federation campaign known, curiously, as #SimplifyDG6. It aims to tackle the bureaucracy around disclosure, which sees both uniformed and detective officers tied up for hours. Police officers are required to redact files that go to the CPS in order for it to decide whether there is sufficient evidence to charge an offender. The federation believes that a data bubble, allowing unredacted information to be exchanged between the police and the CPS before a charging decision, would free up thousands of policing hours every year. Redactions could then be completed by the police if a person is to be charged. I know from my business experience that taking a proper look at such processes can yield huge productivity savings.
I hope the Minister will look at the proposals in our amendment seriously and not just refer me to the police reform package announced yesterday. The Wild West of street crime is here today but, as the Government have made clear, their reforms will take years to bring in. They will also increase and not decrease paperwork.
There are bad apples in the police, like everywhere. However, the idea of regularly requiring a licence to practice for every police constable is not necessary and will reduce efficiency, cost a fortune and lead to a mushrooming of accreditation and training paperwork, or its online filing, linked to the proposed well-being and development checks and career pathways. Licensed professions are generally for areas where there are specific and clear academic requirements, such as medical doctors or accountants. I do not believe it makes sense and could undermine one of the great advantages of the police—I speak from the experience of having a son in the Met—that it attracts intelligent and brave people to the dangerous task described so well by the noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington, who, sadly, is no longer in his place.
These policemen do not necessarily have, need or want the paperwork credentials of other important professions. We need common sense, not credentialism. That is the way ahead. On the face of it, this approach feels mistaken, although I recognise that there will be extensive consultation on the changes in the White Paper. But this is all the more reason for our proposed review of paperwork and bureaucracy. I beg to move.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure, as ever, to support my noble friend in her Amendments 436 and 437. She is an expert in intellectual property, but she might want to copyright the term “Wild West of street crime”, as we have got used to it.
Amendment 436 goes to the heart of a police accountability. That is the wider issue here. It seeks to put on a statutory footing the imperative to provide timely data in respect of enforcement, openness and transparency. It is not necessarily about interfering in the operational effectiveness or decision-making of the police, but it is about openness, transparency and restoring the faith and trust that taxpayers should have in their local police. Unfortunately, the noble Lord, Lord Bach, is not in his place. I am sure he discharged his duties commendably in Leicestershire, but, frankly, the police and crime commissioner model has not worked. I speak as someone who used my maiden speech in the other place in June 2005 to call for elected police commissioners. I am afraid that it has been a damp squib. The relationship between senior police officers and the commissioners, to whom they should have had accountability, has not worked out in the way it should have done. I applaud the Government for the decision to discontinue that.
We see egregious examples of apparent two-tier policing. Robert Peel is probably turning in his grave now when he looks at the antics of the chief constable of the West Midlands, who colluded with Islamist thugs and their representative, the Member of Parliament for Birmingham Perry Barr, in preventing Jewish fans from attending a game in our second city. He also lied twice to a parliamentary committee, seemingly with impunity. He has now left the service with a large taxpayer-funded pension.
The question is: do the police actually care what elected politicians and Ministers think? I am not sure that is the case. There have been lots of cases of alleged two-tier policing. More recently, one has to look only at the comparison between the policing of the Palestinian hate marchers in our capital from October 2023 and, for instance, the banning of a Walk with Jesus rally in east London or the heavy-handed policing of farmers protesting at the Government’s tax policies at the end of last year. This is not a political issue. It is an issue of the undermining of policing by consent and that is bad news for all of us.
Data is needed for the justice system, particularly the police force, both to work effectively and so that they can be scrutinised by lawmakers and the public. Public perception of our police matters. We want our police to be perceived positively by the public based on evidence that they are doing their jobs well. Public perception of the police is currently low, and crime rates appear to be high. Data on enforcement would both be a motivation for effective policing and help them to be held accountable—and, more importantly, give an accurate public image.
We currently have a crisis on our hands in respect of law enforcement in England and Wales. Knife crime in England and Wales rose by 78% between 2013 and 2023; even when the population growth was factored in, this was still a 68.3% rise. In 2024, 31.5% of all robberies committed in London’s Met police area involved stealing mobile phones—this increased from 21.6% in 2021. Noble Lords will know that the Committee considered my amendment on the theft of mobile phones, ably introduced my noble friend, earlier this month. In-person theft offences—which, according to Policy Exchange, is where an item is stolen from a person but, unlike a robbery, no force is used or threatened—the percentage of cases is even higher and represents between 68.5% and 72.6% of offences during the last four years. London has faced a dramatic surge in theft from the person offences: a 170% increase in the three years up to 2024. Also, there were nearly 95,000 shoplifting offences in the year to June 2025, a 38% increase on the previous year.
This amendment is about enforcement data. The police are not always effective in dealing with these crimes. In the year to March 2025, the Met solved 5% of burglaries and robberies reported to it. It solved less than 1.5% of reported bike thefts and less than 8% of shoplifting offences. In 2024, only 0.6% of theft from the person offences were solved. This declined from just 1.1% in 2021. Public perception of the police is becoming worse. In 2022, 50% of Londoners thought that their local police were doing a good job; in 2025, that had dropped to 45%.
Police forces across England and Wales should publish data annually on the enforcement of offences so that the public and lawmakers know how successfully crimes are being policed. The public also deserve to know this information. If the rate of crime is increasing, so then should the rate of enforcement. We must support the Peelite principle of policing by consent. We need to collect, collate and analyse data to restore public confidence. That is why we need to support my noble friend’s amendment, as I have today. I hope the Minister will give consideration to what is essentially a cross-party amendment.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I totally support Amendment 436 on the collection of enforcement data; the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, have explained well why I do. But I am rising to speak to Amendment 437 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, calling for a review of police paperwork. I will just explain why. I have put my name on a number of amendments that require more data collection, which might sound contradictory. But we need more granular and accurate data, while ensuring that data is streamlined and necessary, rather than collected just for the sake of it. In that sense, there is no contradiction.
The review of paperwork is necessary to identify and cut out all the endless and needless form-filling that police officers are forced to do. Whenever you talk to rank and file police officers, one of the most voluble frustrations that they voice is the ever-growing regime of paperwork and bureaucracy. They complain that they did not sign up to become pen-pushers and this is hardly what they envisaged when they joined the force.
More seriously, we have just heard a very moving debate on the mental health challenges faced by some police officers. I do not want to be glib, but when you talk to police officers, they will often say that they are tearing their hair out and completely demoralised because of the amount of bureaucracy that they face—so it is worth bearing that in mind.
The impressive multiplication of the number of forms the police have to fill out could be interpreted as indicative of the scientification or the professionalisation of police work, as the bureaucratic regime’s apologists would have us believe. I think the duplication of information, which is often banal, indicates a stifling bureaucratisation of policing and a trend that is reiterated by officers as impeding their ability to respond to crime or engage in proactive crime solving.
I want to use an example from some years ago. I was a victim of a very nasty, unpleasant mugging. I reported it to the police, as one does, and they were hyperactive in their response. I got a very nice letter reassuring me that they were there for me as a victim. got a form to fill in, asking whether I had had the right kind of support as a victim. I even had a follow-up phone call to find out why I had not filled out my form and to make sure I was okay. The problem was that at no point did anyone visit me in the sense of attempting to apprehend the person who had committed the mugging. That never came up. It was all about my feelings about being a victim of crime, rather than solving the crime. Imagine how much paperwork went into that. I was bemused, but infuriated as well.
We would like this review to ask how paperwork has proliferated. Certain people argue that the process-driven approach to policing is created by risk aversion—the police covering their own backs, potentially. It might be that it is an obsession with communication. There is certainly a lot of press releasing done, tweets put out and so on. The main thing is that we have to get to the bottom of what is creating it. I think—there will be a discussion on this on a later group—that a lot of the work generated does not have anything to do with core policing. When I talk to police officers I know, they say they are engaged in a wide range of activity related to equality, diversity and inclusion initiatives, which are also bureaucratic in terms of the kind of things that they have to do. We heard about non-crime hate incidents on a previous group. How many hours are spent investigating those? There is also a great deal of paperwork being generated by that, and hopefully we have seen the back of them.
Perhaps this amendment is kicking at an open door. I am hoping for a positive response from the Minister because the Home Secretary, Shabana Mahmood, has made similar points. It seems that cutting red tape is a part of what the Home Office is trying to do, so I am delighted about that.
I have a couple of reservations. I am slightly worried that the solution for cutting red tape that has been put forward is a greater use of AI. I am all for sensible use of technology, but I note that West Midlands Police recently took a shortcut and cut back on a lot of hours of paperwork that would have been wasted in a proper investigation in relation to the Maccabi Tel Aviv football game with Aston Villa. The problem with that shortcut and paper-saving exercise was that as a consequence it came up with a non-existent football match to justify the banning of the Israeli fans, as we know. Recent research by businesses has shown that for every 10 hours apparently saved by the use of AI, four hours are used checking errors and fact-checking AI output. They have had to bring in extra staff to do that particular type of work.
Finally, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Neville- Rolfe, on her reservations about the licensing of police officers. I am afraid that fills me with horror. Credentialism is notorious for being more bureaucratisation. If you want any evidence, just look at the university sector and what is happening on that in certain sectors.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 437 calls for a review of the volume of paperwork that police officers must complete in the course of their duties. This is one of the most persistent frustrations voiced by front-line officers. Despite the introduction of a new digital case file system, the use of automatic redaction tools and simplified disclosure guidance, the core problem remains: a combination of the pre-charge full file requirement and an onerous disclosure regime. We share the noble Baroness’s concerns, but we do not believe a review is the answer. The evidence is already on the table, as are the solutions.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for tabling her two amendments. I begin with Amendment 436, co-signed by my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough. I strongly support my noble friend’s efforts to ensure that release statistics are as rigorous and useful as possible. These releases are pivotal to both the police and the public—the police so that they are aware of the types of crimes they are likely to encounter, and the public so that they can judge the performance of police forces for themselves.
As it stands, there is not a standard, reliable measurement of crime rates and statistics. The current accredited metric used by the Office for National Statistics is the Crime Survey for England and Wales, which is helpful in giving an indication of certain crime rates but cannot be described as a foolproof operational tool. It uses an interviewer-administered face-to-face survey, which immediately makes the recounting of crime a choice on behalf of the victim, who may, for whatever reason, decide not to disclose it. It reports only crimes committed against over-16s and excludes crimes against the general public, the state, tourists and residents of institutions.
I understand that this is done so that the survey is unaffected by police reporting or recording changes, but it also creates a crime reporting system deeply affected by human discretion that can similarly not serve as a trustworthy basis. The least we can do is ask that the police are required to record data on the enforcement of offences simultaneously to the Crime Survey for England and Wales releases. It would provide a metric to judge police performance, as it would demonstrate the estimated number of crimes committed compared with those investigated by police forces.
This leads me to my noble friend’s second amendment, also signed by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. Investigations into committed crimes must lead to prosecutions, or else there is little point in maintaining a justice system. Between 2020 and 2024, more than 30,000 prosecutions collapsed. A large proportion of these came from the mishandling or loss of evidence by police. The storage and retention of evidence is an area in desperate need of modernising. It has been described as overwhelming by serving officers and has too often resulted in injustice for victims. The first step in solving this issue is a thorough review of the system as it currently exists before setting out a blueprint of reform. The amendment in question would provide for this, so I wholly support it and I hope the Minister does too. I look forward to his reply.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, for her continued interest in improving transparency and accountability in policing. She will know that I am outcome-focused myself, and that I try to ensure that we get outcomes. I note the support from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and the noble Lords, Lord Jackson of Peterborough and Lord Davies of Gower, for Amendment 436.
The Government have taken significant steps to improve the visibility of police performance. I draw noble Baroness’s attention to the newly established police performance framework. That framework, supported by the Home Office’s police performance unit, provides a robust mechanism for monitoring enforcement activities across all 43 current police forces in England and Wales. This includes the priority offences that the noble Baroness mentioned, such as shoplifting, knife crime and theft.
The noble Baroness mentioned the White Paper; I will respond by trailing some of the announcements that were made in the White Paper yesterday. A key one was that the Home Office will this year introduce an initial sector-facing police performance dashboard that will enable chief constables and local policing bodies to analyse the transparent, high quality and operationally significant data that all three Back-Bench speakers sought. This will empower forces to deliver improvements through strengthening their understanding of where they are performing well and where they can learn from practice in other forces to improve. The framework has been designed to be flexible, and there will be a midpoint review in middle of 2027-28 to allow for the inclusion of any new priorities that might be brought forward. The Government believe that this is an appropriate mechanism for considering additional offence categories, rather than—with due respect to the noble Baroness— mandating them in primary legislation.
I took to heart the point from the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that requiring police forces to publish enforcement data on a fixed list of offences might add burdens and administrative duplication, particularly when many of these offences are already captured through a range of other mechanisms, and contradict the later amendments to reduce police bureaucracy. That is an important factor to bear in mind when we consider this proposal.
Furthermore, the police and the CPS are required to comply with the Director of Public Prosecutions guidance on charging, which applies to all offences where a criminal charge may be instituted. This guidance ensures that investigations meet evidential and public interest tests before prosecution. Compliance for that is monitored through an internal assessment framework between the police and the CPS that is crime agnostic and used only for management purposes. A statutory duty to publish enforcement data for selected offences might duplicate those arrangements and divert resources from front-line policing.
In summary on Amendment 436, yes, we need to improve, but we have put in place some mechanisms. We will monitor those mechanisms and, I hope, return to them in due course, without the legislative requirement proposed by the noble Baroness.
The noble Baroness’s Amendment 437 goes to the heart of the core issue of productive use of police time. I again note the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for this amendment. The 2023 Police Activity Survey, provided by the Home Office, gave us significant insights into how police time is used. We are planning to repeat that survey this year, and I hope it will again help us to understand a bit more about the policing landscape.
The 2023 productivity review, sponsored by the College of Policing’s Centre for Police Productivity, prioritised the rollout of productivity-enhancing capabilities, such as the use of AI and robotic process automation, to reduce the time spent on administration. I know that there are concerns about AI, and I have heard them raised today in Committee. However, when properly used, AI can reduce bureaucracy. In Autumn 2024, we launched the Police Efficiency and Collaboration Programme to explore how we can improve productivity and efficiency savings.
Yesterday, the Government published the policing White Paper, From Local to National: A New Model for Policing—I have a copy to hand for ease of reference. In that White Paper is a comprehensive package of reforms that address the issues in the noble Baroness’s amendment. I refer her to paragraph 91, which says:
“Another area of extensive paperwork in policing comes from the requirements of the criminal justice system. In the months ahead we will work with the Ministry of Justice and the Crown Prosecution Service (alongside the Attorney General’s Office) to examine changes that could reduce the burden on policing. As part of this work, we will look at a number of areas including the disclosure regime and redaction, the use of out of court resolutions, charging and joint police-prosecution performance metrics. We will do this alongside consideration of any new or emerging evidence, such as the implications of the Independent Review of Disclosure and Sir Brian Leveson’s recommendations for criminal court reform”.
We therefore recognise that that is an important issue.
I also refer the noble Baroness to paragraph 293, which says:
“It is expected that in its first year Police.AI will focus on some of the biggest administrative burdens facing policing – including disclosure, analysis of CCTV footage, production of case files, crime recording and classification and translating and transcribing documents. This will free up 6 million policing hours each year”.
The Government are therefore focused on those issues, so I am not convinced that we need a legislative solution to deal with them. With this having been put in the White Paper—it is a brand-new document, and Members will want to have a chance to reflect upon it—the direction of travel is self-evidently there. I hope that the noble Baroness will understand that the core issues on which she is calling for a review are addressed in the document that I have just referred to the Committee.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
I am old enough to remember the last time that we looked at regional police forces. That was under the Minister’s erstwhile colleague, the right honourable Charles Clarke, I think, in 2008-09. There is some merit in the argument for amalgamating large forces. However, will the Minister confirm that AI is also important in supporting hyper-local community policing? A burglary takes place in the Met area every 11 minutes, and, tragically, a rape takes place every 54 minutes. There are big discrepancies between, say, Bexley, Richmond, Kingston and central London. Will the Minister ensure that Ministers are cognisant of the need to use AI to reinforce community policing, as well as the mergers of police forces at a very large level?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord for that. I refer him to the first line of paragraph 281 of the policing White Paper, which says:
“In policing, getting the right information into the right hands at the right time can mean the difference between life and death”.
That is absolutely right, as is the point that the noble Lord made. AI, particularly how it develops over the next few years, will be critical in distilling information that can be used by police to investigate, capture and understand crime performance in any area. We have some significant expertise in the Home Office that is looking at those issues, and the direction of travel has been set in the White Paper.
In addition to the forces of good using AI, criminals are themselves looking at how they can use AI to better defraud people, so we need to be ahead of the game on that as well. In the White Paper, we are looking at AI in respect of both challenges. We are looking at how it is used by bad actors, and at how we can reduce, collect and analyse information and dissect trends in a much speedier way and take out physical paperwork. The noble Lord makes a very valid point about how that can be used at a local level, as well as on a national trend basis.
The points that the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, is making are very valid. When I was last doing the job of Police Minister in 2009-10, which was a long time ago, we had a review at the Police Federation’s urging. We have tried to reduce paperwork, because it is critical. Police officers should use technology to amass information on how we can prevent crime, bring prosecutions through the CPS and understand trends in local areas, as the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, has said. That is the direction of travel in the White Paper. With those assurances, I hope that the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
I think this has been a constructive discussion with a good tone. I thank the Minister for his comments, including on the new dashboard and the plan to review that again in 2027-28, and other mechanisms such as the policy activity review and things that have been proposed in the White Paper. I will look at all that before deciding how we come back to this important subject on Report.
I would warn against relying too much on AI. I am a huge fan of using AI to improve justice systems. But it is also important to look at the underlying processes themselves before turning them into AI or tech processes. You need to use the lean thinking that I mentioned, which I have experience of from the private sector, because that helps you to do things much better.
Having said that, I am very, very grateful for the wide support for this area; I thank in particular my noble friend Lord Jackson for reminding us of some of the numbers, especially in London. We heard about the collapse of cases and other difficulties which we need to tackle together. We heard about the importance of improving public perception of police activity. Good, streamlined, clear data could help drive a better perception of what the police are doing and what they are trying to do, and so improve public confidence.
On paperwork, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, is right to question some of the things that the police are required to do and to record, and I feel that a review, going slightly beyond what is in the White Paper, could actually help us with that. That would help our very energetic Home Secretary to do the right things to try to reduce bureaucracy, which I know is the Government’s intention.
Although we agreed on several things, as the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and I tend to do, including the need for the data bubble between the police and the CPS, I think a review might help to make things happen. When I was a Minister, I used to resist reviews, again and again. But occasionally I had to agree to them and I actually found, where I managed to stay as Minister for a reasonable period, that they were incredibly useful in driving the department to be more effective and proactive. The truth is that we need the right sort of data, and we need to reduce paperwork to release resources for front-line policing. Luckily, in this debate, we have all got the same objective. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Cash
“Recording of biological sex in police data(1) Every police force in England and Wales must, in respect of any individual who is arrested, charged with an offence, or issued with a caution or penalty notice, record the biological sex of that individual.(2) For the purposes of this Act, “biological sex” means—(a) the male or female sex recorded at birth, or(b) where a Gender Recognition Certificate has been issued under the Gender Recognition Act 2004, the sex recorded on that certificate.(3) Where official documents presented at the point of arrest do not reflect the biological sex as defined in subsection (2), the discrepancy must be noted separately. (4) The Secretary of State must issue guidance to ensure consistency of recording and to prevent reliance on administrative records altered on the basis of self-identification alone.”
Baroness Cash (Con)
My Lords, I rise to move Amendment 438B, the wording of which is intended to be replaced by Amendment 438EF. I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, for supporting this amendment. I am also grateful to the Minister for reminding us about the general direction of travel taken by the Government in this area: the views expressed by the Home Secretary and others over the last six months about improving data collection and, again, in the White Paper, the objective to make data collection more consistent nationally. All of that is extremely welcome.
Sex is a foundational principle in crime. By that I mean the sex of an individual is a primary determinant of both offending patterns and victimisation risks. So, it is a crucial piece of information in terms of the overall justice system at every point. For example, 98% of recorded rape offenders are male, and roughly nine in 10 suspects in serious violent offences are male, and those proportions have remained significantly consistent over time. This information underpins offender profiling, multi-agency public protection arrangements, domestic abuse risk models, custody practice and the Government’s own crime strategies, as we have just been hearing. If sex were not a material variable, none of those systems would function as they do.
Despite this, at the moment there is no consistent national standard for what sex means in police recording systems. In some forces it means biological sex, in others it may reflect self-declared gender. In others, the two are conflated or left ambiguous. In some systems, records can be altered without clear audit. The same offender committing the same offence can therefore be recorded differently depending on the force or the system. That produces incoherent national datasets, undermines comparability between forces and also degrades—talking about AI and information collection—trend analysis.
This is a massive problem, because police data is the entry point for the entire criminal justice system. It feeds directly into that risk assessment, offender management, safeguarding decisions, prison allocation, probation supervision and national crime statistics. If the data is unstable at the point of entry, everything downstream is compromised. It is not just my view; this concern has been reinforced by repeated warnings from His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services and the Office for National Statistics, which have consistently found that police-recorded crime data is highly sensitive to inconsistent recording practices.
Where the system is already struggling with data quality, it is incredibly important that the core variables are clear, standardised and grounded in the facts. It is not a hypothetical situation and we know that Scotland has already tested the alternative and made the necessary changes. For several years, Police Scotland, like forces in England and Wales, was recording sex in the basis—at times—of self-declared gender, including for suspects in sexual offences. The result was that biological males charged with rape could be recorded as female, rendering national statistics unreliable and damaging overall public confidence in the system. After sustained scrutiny, it announced in October 2025 that biological sex would be recorded for crime and policing purposes, with any transgender status recorded separately where relevant. Operational reality forced that correction, which has been welcomed by the public.
The independent experts have also supported that measure. The Government-commissioned review led by Alice Sullivan found that public bodies, including justice agencies, have allowed sex to be redefined or replaced, which degrades the data quality. The conclusion is very clear in her review. In all areas, including crime, sex should mean biological sex, and, where gender identity is recorded, it should be recorded separately, not substituted. Murray Blackburn Mackenzie’s analysis showed that, once sex recording drifts from biological reality, crime statistics become unreliable, contested and incapable of supporting sound policy or public trust. When one thinks about the very small numbers of women in the numbers I have just related in respect of violent offences, for example, one can see that wrong data could massively skew this.
The same issue arises in offender risk. Official Ministry of Justice analysis shows that men who identify as women have offending profiles aligned with the male offender population; trans women and men have the same offending profile, including for violent and sexual offences. To be absolutely clear, I am not suggesting that trans women are in any way more inclined than the average man to commit offences, but in population profiles, the same rate of offences is perpetuated within that population—male pattern violence does not change through identity declaration. When men are recorded as female in police data, male violence is understated, female offending is overstated and risk analysis is distorted. This really matters for repeat offender analysis, escalation risk and, most importantly, safeguarding.
We have already seen the consequences of ignoring biological sex in custodial settings. In England, we have had assaults occurring through the placement of men in the female prison estate. The Government responded to this by tightening allocation rules, explicitly re-anchoring decisions in biological sex and risk assessment. That policy recognises the basic truth that biological sex is a material safeguarding factor in criminal justice. That is a well-established principle among criminologists. Police data is the upstream source for those decisions.
This matters massively for the Government’s violence against women and girls strategy. That strategy relies on police-recorded crime data to measure prevalent trends and progress. It rests on two empirical facts. Women and girls are disproportionately the victims of certain crimes—I hope there is no one in this House who would dispute that—and those crimes are overwhelmingly perpetrated by men. If police data cannot reliably identify male offenders because sex has been replaced by gender identity then progress cannot be measured and accountability collapses.
There is nothing in this amendment that would alter how the police should interact with transgender people or that would prevent gender identity being recorded separately where operationally relevant. It does not seek to change how individuals are treated. It simply seeks to ensure that biological sex is not lost or overwritten, because all the evidence shows that it matters. A criminal justice system that cannot accurately record the sex of offenders simply cannot accurately analyse male violence or protect women effectively. That is why I beg to move this amendment.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I have enthusiastically added my name to Amendment 438B, now replaced by Amendment 438EF, on the recording of biological sex in police data to prevent reliance in administrative records on self-identification and so on. The noble Baroness, Lady Cash, has laid out the arguments with great clarity and precision, and I appreciate that. In the past, I have tabled similar amendments to previous Bills. Unfortunately, my attempts were far less elegantly argued than hers, but they were rebuffed, as though I was motivated by some ideological attempt at undermining inclusion policies. Nothing could be further from the truth. The truth is that I want ideology out of data and data collection.
I think there is a slightly different atmosphere now, and I hope that we can have this discussion. Since then, the Supreme Court’s clarity on equality law in the distinct category of biological sex in relation to single-sex provision gives us an important marker. We have had the Sullivan review, commissioned by the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology under Rishi Sunak’s Government. Its themes were broadly welcomed, I think, by the present Government, which are to identify obstacles to accurate data collection and research on sex and gender in public bodies and in the research system and to set out good practice.
I state at this point that we owe huge thanks to Professor Alice Sullivan for her 226-page review. It was a real work of public service. It found that the recording of sex and gender across the justice system and police forces is highly inconsistent and in a muddle, and therefore is not reliable. This matters, because anything that erases biological sex or confuses biological sex in official data in relation to crime is problematic. Many of the policies in the Bill, if they are to be effective, rely on evidence, and that evidence must therefore be based on reliable data.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, I just looked about my person at my identification documents and found my House of Lords pass, which at least at this point does not record my birth sex. I suppose “Baroness” might arguably do the trick—or not, I do not know. I suspect it would not be enough for the supporters of these two amendments. I also looked in my handbag, and my two bank cards do not record anything approximating my biological sex.
In an earlier group, I heard noble Lords opposite speak very compellingly about what the police are up against and how they are tearing their hair out because of the bureaucracy. Last week, I agreed with the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, in particular and other noble Lords opposite when they spoke to an amendment to ensure that, were there to be digital ID, the police could not demand that information on request in the street. A number of noble Lords made very strong and passionate speeches on that issue.
I wonder about the workability and the wider consequences of the amendment, were it to be added to primary legislation. It is very broad in scope, dealing with anybody who is subject to arrest or a charge or caution for any offence. It would place a firm obligation on the police to record the person’s birth sex and any discrepancy between that and what the person identifies as or what is on any documents that they present. How on earth is this to work without, I suspect, far more intrusive searching than is necessary for every offence, from a minor public order protest offence to shoplifting to insider trading? In each scenario, the police would be required to make a determination of the person’s biological sex, requiring a fairly intrusive examination and challenging and questioning. That would be quite a traumatic and degrading experience for anyone and might be disproportionate to the offence being investigated.
I agree that crime can be highly gendered; we know that because all we have learned about violence against women and girls, but I fail to see that this kind of determination is necessary at the point of arrest for insider dealing or even for a protest offence. And, if we are talking about headaches for the police, I can imagine in a large protest every arrestee being briefed by their comrades and colleagues deliberately to identify in a mischievous way just to give the police a headache.
I ask noble Lords to think again about the contradictions in the positions that they are taking on this very long Bill. Workability, proportionality and whether this kind of intrusion into the lives of not just people who have changed sex or are transexual but of anybody who is subject to arrest and charge, particularly a woman with short hair, for example. I am reading stories about women who have had mastectomies for breast cancer being challenged in gym changing rooms because of the way they look.
I ask noble Lords to think about the wider consequences and the proportionality of what they propose.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way. All of us who care about the safety, security, integrity and autonomy of women are also concerned about, for instance, a so-called trans-inclusive strip search policy which allows, for instance, a 6 foot 4 inch man who self-identifies as a woman to search a very vulnerable young woman at a police station. That is an issue of great concern, and were we to adopt this amendment, it might be ameliorated.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord for his intervention, but that is a separate issue—it is about who is allocated to which duty at the police station, and it is perfectly reasonable for the police themselves to organise who conducts a strip search and who conducts a strip search on whom. That is not what the first or second version of the amendment is about; it is about an obligation on the police to make a determination of the biological sex of anybody they are arresting, charging or cautioning. It comes from noble Lords who, as I understand it, oppose compulsory digital ID that could conceivably require some determination at the point of registration. I applauded those compelling speeches last week from noble Lords about that being too much of an intrusion on the citizen who is innocent until proved guilty at the point of encounter with the police. How are the police going to do this?
Baroness Cash (Con)
I have never spoken in this Chamber on digital ID; I want to make that clear for the record, because the noble Baroness used the plural in talking about all those present. I also want to come back on her very emotional intervention, for which I am grateful as she clearly feels very passionately about this. Most of us have more confidence in the police than she may be demonstrating, because a lot of this is common sense, as the public at large understand. Some 50% of the population are women and girls, and they deserve to be protected. The number of people we are referring to is very small, but among that number are some really bad actors. This is a foundational principle of our criminal justice system, so how does she square the emotional circle in saying that this is not possible without infringing rights?
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
As a woman, I have often been called emotional in debate, but that is the nature of the patriarchy. I did not mean to be emotional; I am just trying to ask about the practicality of this proposed obligation on the police to be the determiners of the biological sex of a person they arrest, not for sex offences but for any offence. I heard in some of the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, for example on the importance of knowing as much about a prisoner as possible, an argument for making a clear determination in a prison setting, because one needs to determine who should be imprisoned with whom. I understand that. I can certainly envisage this being highly proportionate and relevant for arrest and investigation for sex offences, but that is not the breadth of this proposal. This is for any arrest, charge, caution or suspect, which would be overbroad and a complete administrative and practical nightmare for police officers.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
Can the noble Baroness clarify a couple of things? First, does she recognise any problems at all about the data as it is presently collected—in different forms by different police forces, and then used as national crime data as though it is reliable and consistent? Does she have any qualms? I am sure the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, would be happy to work with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, as great legal minds working together, emotionally or non-emotionally, on better wording. I can understand that, but the import of this is the data.
Secondly, the noble Baroness rightly points out that many of us are committed to campaigning against violence against women and girls. How can we reliably know how many women and girls are victims of such violence or who the perpetrators of that violence are? We cannot just assert it unless we have reliable statistical data. That is the point of the Sullivan review, which I hope she would show some respect towards even if she is not quite clear that she supports this amendment.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
To be clear, a perpetrator is someone who is convicted, not anyone who is arrested. As I tried to suggest in response to the comments about incarceration, it is much easier to justify greater intrusion at the point of conviction, particularly if someone is going to prison. I do not think this is about drafting; it is about the practical policy the amendments are proposing. How on earth is it viable to put this obligation to be the determiner and decision-maker over somebody’s biological sex? Is it reasonable to put that on every constable? I look forward to hearing from the noble Lord on the Opposition Front Bench, because he served as a police officer for many years and with some distinction. He may know better than I whether this will be welcome for police officers in their everyday duties, for every arrest and every offence.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
My Lords, I have attached my name to this amendment. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, who has been courageously raising these issues of gender identity and sex, over many years and before it was fashionable, through the prism of wishing to protect the safety and security of women. I applaud her for that. I also thank my noble friend Lady Cash, who speaks with great professional expertise and experience.
Notwithstanding the passionate case put by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, it is surely the case that policy, particularly when we are dealing with sensitive issues such as crime data and violence against women and girls, which is rightly a government priority, should be formulated and delivered on the basis of robust, peer-reviewed, empirical evidence. Who can logically argue against that? That is what the amendment is principally about.
We have heard about the Sullivan standard. The context in which we are working in putting forward this amendment is that sex is a protected characteristic and the Equality Act 2010 has been clarified by the Supreme Court. It is extremely disappointing that the Equalities Minister, Bridget Phillipson, continues to obfuscate and delay proper timely guidance being issued by a number of bodies in respect of, for instance, access to single-sex spaces. The Supreme Court stated plainly that under the Equality Act, “sex” refers to the material reality of being female or male. That determines how single-sex spaces function in a mixed-sex society, from women’s changing rooms to prison, and justifies excluding men where doing so is necessary and proportionate. That remains the case, which is why this amendment is very important. It is in that context that it would hopefully be incorporated into the legislation.
As we know, the Sullivan review was commissioned in February 2024 with the aims of identifying obstacles to accurate data collection and research on sex and gender identity in public bodies and the research system, and setting out good practice guidance for how to collect data on sex and gender identity. Sullivan recommended that:
“Data on sex should be collected by default in all research and data collection commissioned by government and quasi-governmental organisations … The default target of any sex question should be sex (in other words, biological sex, natal sex, sex at birth). Questions which combine sex with gender identity, including gender identity as recognised by a Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC) have a mixed target”.
She also recommended that:
“The Home Secretary should issue a mandatory Annual Data Requirement (ADR) requiring the 43 territorial police forces of England and Wales and the British Transport Police (BTP) to record data on sex in all relevant administrative systems. Relatedly, police forces should cease the practice of allowing changes to be made to individual sex markers on the Police National Computer (PNC)”.
This is about public trust. That is why my noble friend is quite right to refer to the situation of Police Scotland, which in November 2025 moved officially to record the biological sex of all suspects. The chief constable stated that it will ensure that
“by recording accurately biological sex, our crime data is accurate”.
The Scottish experience proves that it is possible to maintain a respect-based approach in person, using preferred pronouns in custody, while ensuring that the official record reflects the material facts needed for “statistical rigour”. The deputy chief constable of Police Scotland, Alan Speirs, confirmed that recent legal rulings provide the necessary clarity that “sex” in law refers to biology. This gives police the mandate to record it as such without infringing on the Human Rights Act or the Equality Act.
If police forces do the wrong thing on this, it can result in calamitous situations. I declare my interest as a member, at least for the next month, of the British Transport Police Authority. The British Transport Police, without any proper guidance from the National Police Chiefs’ Council or Ministers, decided unilaterally in autumn 2024 to launch a transitioning and non-binary search guidance policy, which meant that even individuals without a GRC were permitted to search anyone, including a woman, provided that the person doing the searching, for instance, said that they were a woman—even though they were a biological man.
That advice was quickly rescinded. I argued, as a member of the authority, that it was a disastrous mistake. It cost many thousands of tax pounds in legal fees that the force has had to pay as a result. The organisation Sex Matters launched a possible judicial review against that decision. It took the focus away from policing, front-line activities and operational efforts in order to engage in virtue signalling on the basis of the preferences of the chief constable and the senior officers at the British Transport Police. It did not do anything about the 11% clear-up rate for offences of violence against women and girls that, unfortunately, remains prevalent on the transport network in this country.
I cannot understand how any noble Lord, on the basis of tackling crime and the objective of having the data available to allocate resources properly, can realistically argue against the amendment because it has the background of the Sullivan review and Ministers’ acceptance of the Supreme Court ruling in 2025. On that basis, the Ministers should look benignly on the amendment, because it is not onerous and draconian; it is realistic, fact-based and based on empirical research. Therefore, it should be adopted because, if nothing else, it would greatly improve the efficacy of this largely important Bill, which we on this side support. It would mean that police officers could properly address the issues with the facts behind them, rather than the ideological absolutism that unfortunately marked much of the debate and the hostility to collecting data in the criminal justice system on the basis of gender identity rather than sex. It is a good amendment, and I hope that the Ministers will be able to support it.
Baroness Donaghy (Lab)
My Lords, I am not a great legal mind, I am afraid; I am not even a legal mind. Many people would argue that I am not a great mind either, so I have questions rather than a dictatorial philosophy.
The contrast between the original amendment and the one before us is quite revealing. “Biological” was taken out of the title, yet the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, said she thought that biological sex was a material fact, so why was it taken out of the heading?
There was a very interesting reference to the gender recognition certificates, which I took a little bit of comfort from. Then, in the amendment before us, that reference was deleted. My second question is: is the reference to “official documents” being “proffered” regarded as the substitute? I would be very grateful for that clarification.
Perhaps the noble Lord on the Front Bench could answer this in his summing up: what assurances can we have that anyone accused is not forced out, even if the particular allegation is not related to sex and sexuality? How can we avoid people having to come out against their will?
I am still not sure why this issue is regarded as so vital. I am sorry, but there seems to be a lack of proportionality about this whole debate in the massive challenges that our police forces have today. Is it really that vital? I am not terribly convinced about that. I have questions more than anything, but I feel there is some disproportionality on this whole subject.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
The noble Lord was not here at the start of the debate.
Baroness Donaghy (Lab)
The noble Lord was not here at the start of the debate.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I am grateful for all the contributions to this, as usual, heated debate about recording data. I will focus mainly on data in my response from these Benches.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, for starting by quoting some data sources, but neither she nor the amendment acknowledges the existing police guidance about capturing demographic data and annual data requirement 153, all the work already being done by the National Police Chiefs’ Council to review these policies following the April 2025 Supreme Court judgment, and its desire to develop a national standard for recording protected characteristics. In November last year, an equality impact assessment for the Law Enforcement Data Service noted:
“There is no legal obligation on any person with a GRC to inform the police that they have changed their name or gender”.
It is vital that data collection by public bodies has a clearly defined purpose and scope, and that staff have the right training and guidance to deliver services that support and accommodate all service users.
In addition, the Home Office produces the annual data requirement, which sets out requests and requirements for data that police forces should collect and report to the Home Office. Some are mandatory, some are voluntary. Requirement 153, which I referred to earlier, is voluntary and details how forces should capture demographic data
“in a consistent way by aligning it to ONS census 2021”.
This sets out that data about sex
“should be recorded in line with information on … birth certificate or gender recognition certificate”.
At the moment, it is not clear how widely this has been adopted.
Since 1974, the police national computer has been the main database of criminal records and is used by front-line officers from all police forces in the UK to understand who they are interacting with. In 2016, the Home Office established the national law enforcement data programme to replace the PNC and PND with the Law Enforcement Data Service or LEDS—sorry, another acronym. That will replace the existing PNC capability across all police forces this coming March.
The equality impact assessment for LEDS was published in November 2025 and considered how the programme would impact on those with the protected characteristic of gender reassignment. The EIA states:
“There is no legal obligation on any person with a GRC to inform the police that they have changed their name or gender. Where a person does wish this to be acknowledged then LEDS user can add an Information Marker”.
The EIA notes that the NPCC is undertaking a policy review following the April 2025 Supreme Court judgment, which
“aims to strike a balance that is both lawful and respectful of all individuals involved”—
that is a quote from the judgment—and that
“LEDS is being built to configure new policies as they take effect”.
The EIA also notes that a working group on national protected characteristics data recording standards was established by the Diversity, Equality and Inclusion Coordination Committee and the NPCC diversity, equality and inclusion lead. It is important to note, as has been mentioned by others, that the Supreme Court judgment in the case of For Women Scotland v the Scottish Ministers considered the definition of “woman” only for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010.
In addition to that, I have found an FoI dated May 2025 and the ONS response on a question about the collection of data. It gives a somewhat detailed response to about 10 different questions on how many people who have undertaken gender reassignment have been convicted of certain offences or groups of offences. Under the category of collection of data for gender identity, which is different from the sex registered at birth category, it says:
“We have to be robust enough to provide reliable estimates”.
It cannot provide reliable estimates. Why? Because the numbers are so low. As I am sure the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, knows, as she has been quoting data quite a bit, if you cannot rely on the data because it is low compared with the millions of women across the country, it becomes a problem to be able to include it. Why? Because the data will not show, or, if it is pulled out separately, individuals will become identifiable to the public. That is the fundamental problem.
So, I hope the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment. The National Police Chiefs’ Council is already undertaking work to review policies in light of the Supreme Court judgment. The Supreme Court judgment was limited in considering the meaning of “sex” for the purposes of the Equality Act, not for wider legislation or policy. Frankly, it is unclear how this amendment would be practically workable; front-line police forces would be asked to challenge information provided about an individual’s sex. It is also unclear how the amendment would be consistent with data protection legislation, the Gender Recognition Act, and, indeed, Article 8 rights to a private life.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)
My Lords, I rise very briefly to speak.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
The noble Lord has the right to speak in Committee, of course. Conventionally, we tend not to hear from Back-Benchers after the Front Benches have started winding, but of course he has the right.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Katz. I will make three very brief points. The first is that the Supreme Court judgment had a logic behind it, and it is very difficult to see how that logic does not roll out across a whole bunch of issues such as this one. So this amendment relates very strongly to that Supreme Court judgment.
The second point is that the three noble Baronesses talking against the amendment were trying to say, “Well, what point would it have?” Yet the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, stated that there had been reports that the amount of crime, including violent crime, committed by females had increased, and that this had caused some kind of minor moral panic in society. Now, we know that women—biological women—have far lower rates of offending than men, whether non-violent or violent. Our understanding of the role of women in society is very much driven by that understanding of the civilising impact of womanhood on society. It is fundamental to our ideas of how society works.
If we are persuaded by false data that the role of women is changing—that women are becoming more violent, that women are becoming more criminal—our view of society will be very different. That would be unfortunate, if it is false.
Finally, the objections made by the noble Baronesses to this amendment, other than those of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, did not fundamentally dispute the premises but merely argued about the practicability—indeed, as did some of the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. If we are to talk about practicability, first, we have the evidence that Scotland has already implemented this, so arguments against practicability fall away.
The point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti —that you are putting an onus on a policeman to respond to somebody claiming a particular sex or gender, when in fact that may not be correct—was given the lie by her own statement that there are lots of people who are happy to come to a police station and confuse things by deliberately giving the wrong information. Basically, she is saying that, when a policeman is confronted by a six-foot bloke who says that he is a woman, it is difficult to confront that person. This is set against the very correct concern she had about a woman with short hair or whatever who looks a bit man-like, as many do, being challenged on saying that she is a woman.
If they can sort that out in Scotland, they can sort that out in the UK. But, in the meantime, which would you prefer: that data is falsified and moral panics emerge, or that police have a slightly bigger onus to try to ascertain the true biological sex of an individual?
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have spoken, and I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Cash both for bringing forward this amendment and for the clarity with which she set out the problem that it seeks to address. I speak in support of the amendment. It is fundamental to our safety and justice system that police data is accurate and fit for purpose.
I am grateful for the warm words that the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, spoke about me. I hope that I will not disappoint her too much when I say that sex is not an incidental characteristic in policing or criminal justice: it is a foundational variable. Patterns of offending, particularly in relation to serious violence, sexual offences, domestic abuse and repeat high-harm crime are profoundly sex-disaggregated.
I would say to the noble Baroness, Lady Donaghy, that police forces depend on this data to analyse trends, assess risk, deploy safeguarding interventions and evaluate whether strategies, including those endorsed by your Lordships’ House, are actually working. If police records cannot reliably distinguish males from females, risk assessment collapses, trend analysis becomes unreliable and the very legislation that we pass to make the public safer is frustrated.
We have already seen what happens when biological sex is replaced with self-declared gender identity. As has already been mentioned, in Scotland, Police Scotland permitted suspects’ sex to be recorded on the basis of self-identification, including in serious sexual offences. The consequences were predictable and serious: incoherent statistics, loss of public confidence and an inability to analyse male violence accurately. After sustained scrutiny, Police Scotland reversed that policy in October 2025 and confirmed that biological sex would be recorded, with transgender status noted separately where relevant. That reversal was driven by operational reality, not ideology, and it offers a clear lesson for England and Wales.
Independent expert evidence reinforces this point. The Government-commissioned review led by Professor Alice Sullivan was unequivocal: sex should mean biological sex and, where gender identity is relevant, it should be recorded separately, not substituted. Similar conclusions have been reached by independent analysis examining the consequences of degraded data across public bodies. Once sex data is compromised, statistics become contested, safeguarding weakens and public trust is eroded.
There are also real-world safeguarding implications. Ministry of Justice analysis shows that trans-identified male offenders exhibit offending patterns aligned with the male population, including for violent and sexual crimes. Recording such individuals as female underestimates male violence, artificially inflates female offending and distorts risk analysis.
We have already seen the downstream consequences in the prison estate, where serious safeguarding failures led the Government to tighten allocation rules. Biological sex is a material risk factor; police data is upstream of all this and, if it is wrong at the point of arrest or charge, the entire system is compromised.
There is a theme running through many of our debates today: good policing is inextricably linked to good data. The Government have acknowledged this. Biological sex is just one of the data variables that must be recorded for accurate policing, so I wholeheartedly support my noble friend’s amendment and I hope the Minister will, too.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, for her Amendment 438B and the subsequent Amendment 438EF, which seek to mandate the collection of sex data on perpetrators of crime. I thank everybody who spoke with some force and passion on a debate that certainly was not dry and simply about data. We heard the views of my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, and the opposition Front Benches.
Before I go any further, as referred to by a number of noble Lords, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, we are absolutely resolute in our goal, expressed in the violence against women and girls strategy published before Christmas, to halve violence against women and girls over the decade. We recognise that it takes a whole-government, indeed a whole-society, approach, but we are resolute in doing that and the issues that we are discussing in this group are germane to that effort.
However, there are already powers available to the Home Secretary to obtain data from police forces. The question is whether these are adequate. Section 44 of the Police Act 1996 gives the Home Secretary powers to obtain relevant data from chief constables. This power, which noble Lords have mentioned in the debate on this group, is exercised through an annual data requirement which sets out what data should be recorded and provided to the Home Office. Such data is routinely published as official statistics to provide a window on the work of government and the police service.
The content of the annual data requirement is reviewed annually and, where new requirements are made out, it allows collections to be added or existing ones amended. However, we accept that these powers fall short of what is required. Not to presage the next group too heavily, the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, will be aware that, in December last year the Home Secretary announced that we will legislate to mandate the recording of suspects’ ethnicity data. This will happen at the earliest opportunity as part of our wider legislative proposals on police reform, which we announced in the White Paper on police reform published yesterday.
As announced in that White Paper, we are introducing key proposals to address the fragmentation of data across police forces and recording formats. In that White Paper, which I commend to your Lordships, we say that we will work with the police to introduce a number of measures around data—for instance, developing new technology to integrate data nationally; mandating national standards on data to create consistency in recording data across police forces and improve the quality of datasets; introducing a single national decision-maker with authority over key national datasets; and removing unnecessary barriers to data sharing across police forces and agencies. This will provide the necessary statutory powers to ensure the delivery of recommendation 4 of the National Audit on Group-Based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, and will improve the integrity of the data that the police use, collect and analyse.
Furthermore, I agree that consistent and accurate data on sex needs to be recorded, and we are carefully considering the implications of the Supreme Court ruling that clarified the definition of sex in the Equality Act.
In replying directly to my noble friend Lady Donaghy’s question about thinking about it from the individual’s perspective, and what they may or may not want to happen in terms of their gender identification, it is still fair to say that the data collected will be anonymised and treated as per current GDPR and other data protection terms. This is about collecting data for wider analysis rather than thinking about what might happen to that individual from the way that that data is collected.
I hope I have reassured the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, of the work going on in this area. In light of this and our commitment in the White Paper to bring forward legislation in the context of our wider reforms to policing, I ask that she withdraws her amendment.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
May I just clarify one question? Could the noble Lord explain the Government’s attitude to the Sullivan review? When are they going to act on it? It is very comprehensive and I understood that the Government, particularly the Home Secretary, were perfectly positive about it but, like too many reviews, it sits there, with all that hard work, data collected and intellectual energy, and is not acted upon. If it had been, these amendments would not be necessary. Maybe the noble Lord could give us a timeline to clarify that.
Lord Katz (Lab)
As the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said, there was certainly a lot of work done. I believe that it was commissioned by the previous Government, so it overlaps from the previous Administration into ours. I am not sure that I can provide a concrete timeline from the Dispatch Box, so I would be happy to write to the noble Baroness with those details.
Baroness Cash (Con)
My Lords, I am sincerely grateful to everyone who has spoken and to the winding speakers today. It is such an important question, and it is such a pleasure to have a debate like this and to engage with former colleagues and noble Peers to discuss an often emotional or passionate issue.
The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and I have known each other for such a long time, but not everyone knows that. I believe that I may have referred to the noble Baroness with a pronoun during my speech, and I am very sorry if I did that; it was a lapse from knowing each other and I want to put that on the record. I am very grateful to her for speaking with her typical compassion and empathy for everyone—a testament to her time as the head of Liberty, and the principles that she has lived by ever since.
I say the same to the noble Baroness, Lady Donaghy, and I am very grateful to her for engaging in this debate and being present. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for citing the data, and noble Peers who supported the amendments. I am very grateful to everyone.
The noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, referenced Scotland. I would like to end on that thought. There is, of course, a direction of travel by the Government, which we welcome and support, but in his response the noble Lord, Lord Katz, did not address what data is going to be collected in relation to sex. I know we are coming on to ethnicity next. I say to the Minister that this is an opportunity to grapple with this issue and to do something by accepting this amendment, which would really support the violence against women and girls strategy. The noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, also made some very sensible points about the common-sense approach of the police, and we have confidence in them to be able to act in a sensible way. For the record, there is no suggestion in this amendment that anyone would be embarrassed or outed. It is about the police recording the data, not publishing the data. We know that data, when the statistics are processed off it, is anonymised.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I am very grateful for that last point. The point I raised was that the data is so small that if only two people had committed a certain offence in a year, they would be identifiable. That was the point the ONS made in its response to somebody else’s FoI request—I do not know whose—because of that identification and then breaching of data for the individual concerned.
Baroness Cash (Con)
That has not concerned His Majesty’s inspectorate, the Ministry of Justice or, indeed, Professor Sullivan. In fact, they make the opposite point, which is that the small numbers of trans-identifying individuals—
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Wilson of Sedgefield) (Lab)
Is the noble Baroness prepared to push this to a vote or withdraw? We have had the debate. There is no need to rehash the argument that we have already had.
Baroness Cash (Con)
With enormous apologies, I was responding to the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I would like to return to this subject on Report. Subject to that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Cash
“Recording of ethnicity in police data(1) Every police force in England and Wales must, in respect of any individual who is arrested, charged with an offence, or issued with a caution or penalty notice, record the ethnicity of that individual in accordance with subsections (2) and (3).(2) The officer must record the police-observed ethnicity of the individual using the 18-category classification employed in the most recent Census for England and Wales.(3) Where the individual voluntarily states an ethnicity, the officer must also record the self-declared ethnicity, noting any difference from the police-observed ethnicity. (4) For the purposes of criminal-justice statistics, analysis, and publication under section 95 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991, the police-observed ethnicity shall be treated as the primary record.(5) The Secretary of State must issue statutory guidance to ensure consistent recording and the uniform use of the Census ethnicity categories across all police forces.”
Baroness Cash (Con)
My Lords, I am sorry—it is me again.
I very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Katz, for the White Paper, which I have skim-read—I will admit that I have not read it closely—and I welcome again its contents and direction of travel on this. I tabled this amendment because the White Paper does not go so far as making a statutory requirement around the reporting of data. It is my position that this is an opportunity for the Government to do that and, with one simple amendment, to make this requirement and enforce this consistency across all the reporting of the amendments.
This is not a new proposal. It is the 18-category standard proposal of ethnicity, which is a framework used in the UK census, first introduced nationally in 2001 and expanded in 2011 and 2021. That includes five broad ethnic groups: white mix, multiple Asian, Asian British, black African and Caribbean, black British and other, each with broad subcategories. The College of Policing, the Home Office and His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services all recommend that self-defined ethnicity, not officer-led definitions or visual categories, be used in operational and statistical recording. In policing that is known as SDE, or the self-defined ethnicity standard.
Crucially, there is no statutory obligation to use this system, no uniformity across police forces and no enforcement if it is bypassed. That is the gap that this amendment seeks to close. The current reality is a patchwork of practices. Police officers are instructed to ask for self-defined ethnicity at various stages, but compliance with that is highly variable. In many cases they substitute visual shorthand, which is crude, unreliable and not comparable with either the census or the official data. Even where self-defined ethnicity is collected, the categories used are not always aligned with the full 18-category standard set.
We have a patchwork at the moment, with forces using different ways of defining ethnicity and not uniformly communicating or building a database. The result has been quantifiable gaps in current reporting. Victims’ ethnicity is often missing, undermining the understanding of harm. In 2023, His Majesty’s Inspectorate found that in 61% of all cases where a victim was identified, ethnicity was not recorded at all. That is not a technicality; it is a collapse of visibility over who is being harmed and how.
Similarly, stop and search data is increasingly incomplete. Home Office statistics show that in stop and search records, self-defined ethnicity is missing in 20% of cases. That is one in five encounters without proper identification, and that source is the Office for Statistics Regulation. Prevent referrals are particularly shocking and show chronic underrecording. Between 2015 and 2023, police failed to record the ethnicity of more than 33,000 Prevent referrals. I cannot imagine an area of policing and national security where the ethnicity of an individual referred might be more important.
Operational consequences for victims, offenders and public oversight also manifest from these absences. Victims go unseen if ethnicity is unrecorded; they cannot have services tailored to them, and violent crime prevention cannot be prioritised. We do not understand whether different communities are underreporting crime or, indeed, overreporting. In homicide—murder—data for the year ending March 2022, only 671 victims had their ethnicity recorded; the rest were either missing or excluded—that is from the Home Office’s own data reports. Without the full self-defined ethnicity data at each stage of police contact, we cannot fulfil our obligations under the Equality Act.
The 18-category of self-defined ethnicity is the gold standard. It has been highly commended by multiple public bodies. When the police rely on visual codes or simplified lists of their own, they often misclassify individuals. They lose comparability with the census or with NHS and education data, so there is no cross- reporting across our own public bodies. They also create a very dangerous vacuum where speculation and grievance thrive—we have seen that in media reporting of issues in the last few years, where tensions in communities build and demands are made for greater transparency.
The vacuum has happened in child sexual exploitation cases. In the Casey review in June 2025, the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, reported that ethnicity data was missing in two-thirds of the cases. Public debate has become polarised about grooming gangs since, with both denial and exaggeration filling the vacuum where the facts and data should have been. In Prevent referrals, where ethnicity was unrecorded in the 33,000 cases I have just mentioned, communities have accused the state of Islamophobic bias; others say that Prevent is too soft. Again, there is no data to resolve the dispute or even have an informed debate on.
In high-profile arrests, where ethnicity is omitted—the Home Secretary herself has spoken about this—social media becomes saturated with speculation, particularly from extremist or far-right actors, and forces the police into reactive disclosures. The former Met officer, Dal Babu, has said that
“there will be an expectation for police to release information on every single occasion”
because there is such intense speculation from the far-right on social media. These vacuums of information and of data are really dangerous.
My appeal to the Government is that a statutory duty to record full self-defined ethnicity at every point of contact solves these problems and gives us standardised, comparable data to analyse and act upon. The costs would be minimal but the status quo is very expensive. If we do nothing and we do not require this accurate reporting, we have operational blind spots, cross- system breakdowns, reputational damage to the police, and litigation risk. It is also extremely difficult retrospectively to rebuild community engagement or to repair crises when the damage has been done and trust has collapsed.
Police leadership supports better recording. In September 2023, Steve Hartshorn, chair of the Police Federation, said that senior officers must be held accountable for failing to record victims’ ethnicity. It is not just a data issue; it is about accountability and fairness. In August 2025 the new College of Policing guidance supported the proactive release of ethnicity and nationality data where it strengthens trust and clarifies public understanding. In December 2025 senior police officials, including Gareth Edwards of the NPCC’s vulnerability knowledge and practice programme, spoke on this. I could go on. Noble Lords will already be familiar with some of them from past reporting on this very issue of transparency and trust.
It begins with visibility, a consistent system, and a mandatory requirement to record the data. I know that the Government’s sentiments and intentions are already in this direction of travel, and this is an opportunity to make it happen. I beg to move.
Crime and Policing Bill
Tuesday 27th January 2026
(3 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-XIII(b) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Thirteenth Marshalled List) - (27 Jan 2026)
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 438C in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, on the recording of ethnicity in police data. I do not profess to have the noble Baroness’s expertise in this area in terms of her work at the Equality and Human Rights Commission or as a distinguished lawyer, but her aspiration to have clear, consistent and transparent data is increasingly important for politics and with the public, which is why I wanted to speak.
Following on from the Casey review, the then Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, announced that collecting ethnicity and nationality data in child sexual abuse and exploitation cases would become a mandatory requirement. This recommendation to collect targeted information was made after the review had found that there was a paucity of data nationally concerning the ethnicity of perpetrators who were part of the rape grooming gangs. The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, had found that, as we have already heard, only three local policing areas, Greater Manchester, West Yorkshire and South Yorkshire, had such data.
The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, concluded that while this was sufficient evidence to show that there were “disproportionate numbers” of men from Asian and specifically Pakistani heritage among the suspects, as well as those convicted, that conclusion had been avoided for too long. She criticised official “obfuscation” that misled the public.
Yvette Cooper concluded:
“While much more robust national data is needed, we cannot and must not shy away from these findings”.
I think that sums up a very positive development. It recognises that we need to collect more data on ethnicity if we are not to get ourselves into a political scandal, which the grooming gangs question was, and not to obscure the detail. Local residents, members of the public and, of course, victims felt very frustrated that these things were not allowed to come out.
With much more acceptance of the positive role of acknowledging ethnicity and data in the wind, we should look at expanding that. This much more open approach now needs to be applied to crime statistics more generally. In fact, in this new atmosphere, the issue has also affected policing. In the wake of the Southport murders of those three little girls, the police slowness in releasing the details of the suspected perpetrator, Axel Rudakubana, when he was arrested, caused immense political tensions, as we know. The almost wilfully misleading description of the suspect as a 17 year-old from Lancashire who was originally from Cardiff led to a sort of pseudo form of misinformation, creating an information vacuum that led to false rumours. Misinformation started online that the killer was a Muslim asylum seeker, which was completely incorrect.
Accurate data and accurate descriptions play a valuable role. The Met Police chief, Sir Mark Rowley, declared that it was right to release the ethnicity of suspects, pointing out the importance of being
“more transparent in terms of the data”
that the police release. This amendment is trying to make sure that the data collected is accurate. It is not just a debate about it being released.
The Southport incidents led to guidance being developed by the National Police Chiefs’ Council and the College of Policing, recognising public concerns, to ensure that police processes are fit for purpose in an age of rapid information spread. But I do not think that this response should just be about combating misinformation—that should not be the main driver. In order for us to have accurate information, the main driver should be that the public have a right to know and understand offender and victim profiles accurately. The police, very specifically, need to understand the data to aid in the prevention and detection of crimes. It is arguable whether decisions to release information should be left up to police forces—that is not what we are concerned with here—but data collection certainly needs to be mandated, and a failure to act on this can lead to tensions.
I want to counter one thing. In some of this debate, campaigners have tried to suggest that such data collection may overly encourage focusing on racial backgrounds, fuelling right-wing conspiracy theories or pandering to racism. I do not think that is fair. Not a week goes by without the public asking questions about incidents because they are concerned for the safety of their communities. Sometimes that involves ethnicity. The noble Baroness, Lady Cash, made it clear that this is much broader than the issues that I have raised. This is also about the ethnicity of victims and ensuring that people from different ethnic backgrounds are not discriminated against or unfairly treated by the police. We have to be much more open and not shy away from or be frightened by this kind of data—it is essential for good policing and for reassuring the public that we are not trying to hide behind not revealing or not collecting ethnicity data for political or ideological ends, as we did with the grooming gangs.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said, this amendment focuses on the recording of ethnicity in police data—not the sensitive, balanced issue of when to publish. I rather agree with what I understood her remarks to be about that: it is probably best left in operational police hands, because there are sensitivities about it. The recording of ethnicity has been a controversial subject in different jurisdictions over the years. Parts of continental Europe—Germany, for example, for obvious historical reasons—take a very different view to recording ethnic data. But I think there is value in having some recording of ethnicity in police data, not least as a means of attempting to grapple with race discrimination, for example, in stop and search.
My question is about subsection (2) of the new clause proposed by Amendment 438C. Again, it is this issue of police observation rather than self-identification. The amendment focuses on the 18 categories in the census. We are all familiar with that census and often fill out questionnaires that look at those 18 subcategories. That is one thing when you are self-identifying—it is very easy for me, for example, to use the census categories, because I know my story and I know my history. But I challenge even noble Lords and noble friends in this Committee, without the benefit of Wikipedia or smartphones, or stuff written about me and my history, to determine which of those 18 categories I would best fit into.
I worry about how this would work if an officer must record the police-observed ethnicity of the individual using the 18-category classification employed in the most recent census for England and Wales, including determining whether somebody is British Asian, British Pakistani, mixed race, et cetera—
Baroness Cash (Con)
As we are in Committee, I welcome the noble Baroness’s comments on this. The 18-category classification is the gold standard of identification. In practice, a police officer may have a conversation with a suspect. Reality needs to be injected with a bit of common sense. If an individual does not know how to self-identify, a conversation helping them to locate their particular geography or identity may be facilitated with the common sense of the officer concerned. If there is an alternative, I welcome it, because I hear that the noble Baroness is in agreement on the principle and the general direction. What therefore would be a good system?
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Cash. At the police level—at the level of arrest—it has to be some version of self-identification. The police need to ask—and, if necessary, have the conversation—but it cannot be that the police observe, decide and adjudicate. That is not viable. The noble Baroness may disagree with me, but if this is going to happen in relation to race and ethnicity it will probably have to be self-identification. As I say, anything else at the level of arrest or charge is not practical.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I declare my interest that my son is a senior lecturer at Swansea University, specialising in online radicalisation. He advises a number of Governments and parliaments, including our own, and other public bodies, including on Prevent.
In the previous group, we noted that the police are in the middle of changing the databases that they use for recording data and moving to the new law enforcement data service. The details are due to be published very shortly, we hope, in March this year. It is important that proper data is collected on ethnicity. I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, quoting the review of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, because those points are extremely important.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Cash for tabling this important amendment, allowing for a debate on this matter. The link between ethnicity and crime has, for far too long, been a taboo subject, but the fact is that it always has been and remains to be a significant factor in explaining certain trends.
When ethnicity is ignored and underreported, observers are reduced to relying on conjecture based upon unverified connections. It does an injustice to the victims of crimes that go either unresolved or underreported because their causal factors are refused to be acknowledged. When the facts are obscured, it opens the door for accusations from both sides in bad faith. People are derided as racist, and uninvolved communities are implicated. The result, again, is that the focus is directed away from the victims.
Grooming gangs have been the case study most often referenced when discussing this topic, and I apologise for repeating the same argument, but we do so because they offer the best example of the consequences of ignoring this link. For decades, tens of thousands of white working-class girls were systematically groomed, trafficked and raped by gangs of predominantly Pakistani men. This is a fact that has only recently been accepted by mainstream politicians and media, despite years of campaigning and research conducted outside of Westminster.
We should not have arrived at this point where, after more than 30 years, Westminster is only just waking up to the scale of the tragedy. We should not have had to wait for the review from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, which was commissioned only after the Government faced significant pressure, both in Parliament and online, for politicians to act on an overtly racialised crime. I understand that the failings surrounding the inability to bring these gangs to justice have been many, but a consistent factor is authorities overlooking the crimes for fear of being racist. In turn, the police have done nothing to allay their fears by providing accurate ethnicity figures.
The words of Denis MacShane, the former MP for Rochdale, a grooming hotspot, aptly demonstrate this. By his own words in 2014, he avoided the industrial-scale rape of working-class girls in his constituency out of fear of “rocking the multicultural boat” and offending his own sensibilities as a
“true Guardian reader and liberal Leftie”.
Bad men need nothing more to compass their ends than that good men should look on and do nothing. Good men, in the narrow sense that they were not the ones committing evil crimes, were permitted to adopt Denis MacShane’s acquiescent attitude for decades, because there was no official empirical pushback for campaigners to draw from. If ethnicity data had been collected and released, the fact that these crimes were disproportionately committed by the Pakistani community —as we know from the fragmented picture that we now possess—would have been transformed from a racist trope derided as an inconvenience into a proven fact to be used by police forces for action.
We must learn from our failings. It is not enough simply to commission a review into grooming gangs and hope that acknowledging past crimes will put a stop to future crimes being committed. Crimes are still happening, and they are still happening along ethnic lines. Mandating the recording of ethnicity is a necessity for any Government claiming to want to reduce violence against women and girls.
Past the recommendation from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, and past grooming gangs, there is a great practical reason to introduce a requirement to record ethnicity. Crime trends differ from community to community, and identifying exactly what these are will help the police direct resources more effectively. This data—and I hope that many noble Lords opposite will support me here—would even reduce officers’ unconscious biases, as decisions would be based upon empirical evidence and not assumptions drawn from shaky data.
The administrative burden that would come with this change would be negligible. It is an extra tick in the box in an arrest report. The benefits, as explained, are numerous. If we are serious about organising a victim-orientated system that is empirically based, this amendment is absolutely necessary. I hope that the Minister will agree, and I very much look forward to hearing from him.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, for her amendment, which seeks to mandate the collection of ethnicity data in respect of the perpetrators of crime. I also thank all those who contributed to this debate: my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and, for the Opposition, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower.
I will not repeat the point that I made in the last group—admittedly, this is a bit further away than I thought we were going to be—but I stress that the content of the annual data requirement on police is reviewed annually. We have also announced plans in the police White Paper, which we have already discussed in a previous group, to bring forward legislation, when parliamentary time allows, on mandating the collection of suspect ethnicity data.
There has been a lot of discussion and debate on this amendment around the recent National Audit on Group-Based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey. For the avoidance of any doubt, I want to be absolutely clear that these abhorrent crimes must be pursued wherever they are found, without cultural or political sensitivities getting in the way.
I will just pause to correct the record. While I am not at all defending his comments, I believe that I am right in saying that Denis MacShane used to be MP for Rotherham rather than Rochdale—I am referring to what the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, said—which is obviously where one of the gangs that the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, looked into operated. I just want to put that out there. However, as I said, that does not undermine the abhorrence of these crimes; they must be pursued, irrespective of any cultural or political sensitivities getting in the way.
The previous Home Secretary wrote to all chief constables to make it clear that we expect that ethnicity data will be collected from all suspects in child sexual abuse and criminal exploitation cases. As previously set out by the Home Secretary, we will be legislating to mandate the collection of ethnicity data in such cases. To be very clear, I quote directly from the police White Paper, which was published yesterday:
“we will work with policing to create a framework for mandating clear national data standards in a timely way, to improve how data is collected, recorded and used across England and Wales, and make sure these standards are applied across all forces and the systems they use. This will further support existing legal and ethical frameworks, ensuring data is managed responsibly and proportionately, and maintaining public confidence”.
The noble Baroness, Lady Cash, referred to the importance of self-defined ethnicity, and this is how the ONS recommends that ethnicity be recorded in line with the census, which does ultimately provide the benchmark versus which all public service data should be collected. In light of this and our commitment to bring forward legislation in the context of our wider reforms to policing, I ask that the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Cash (Con)
My Lords, the mandatory recording of ethnicity data was a recommendation of the Macpherson inquiry—it was that long ago—and it just has not happened; it has not been put on a statutory footing. So, due to the variability in collection of data up and down the country we have already heard about today and the many other sociological, criminological difficulties that we now have with assessing the data trends, I wanted to bring forward this amendment and invite the Government to use this moment, with the Crime and Policing Bill going through, to set this on a statutory footing. I do not feel particularly attached to what categories we use, provided they are not the old five high-level groups, which are very cursory and do not provide the granularity of detail needed.
I am grateful to those who have spoken in support, including the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox of Buckley and Lady Chakrabarti. I am grateful also for the winding speeches. But I would really welcome further conversation, because given the Government’s direction of travel and the comments of the noble Baronesses, I feel there is common ground.
The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, referenced ICE. We must not let that happen in our country. People often say we are just a bit behind the curve of the US, and that is not what we want to happen. But we have an opportunity to take steps that prevent the lack of transparency and dictatorial authoritarian behaviours that we have seen recently in the US. In my view, this is an opportunity and I believe the Government are sincere about driving towards this. Putting it on a statutory footing would emphasise that and give the public the reassurance that they seek. On that note, I beg to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower
“Exception of the police from the public sector equality dutyIn Schedule 18 (public sector equality duty: exceptions) of the Equality Act 2010, after paragraph 3 insert—“The police
3A (1) Section 149 does not apply to any police force when exercising policing or law enforcement functions.(2) For the purposes of this paragraph, “police force” includes—(a) a police force maintained by a local policing body,(b) the British Transport Police,(c) the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, and(d) the Ministry of Defence Police.””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would exempt the police from the public sector equality duty under the Equality Act 2010, so as to ensure they are solely committed to effectively carrying out their policing functions.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 438D, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel, seeks to exempt the police from the public sector equality duty under Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 when they are exercising core policing and law enforcement functions. The public sector equality duty requires public authorities, in the exercise of their functions, to
“have due regard to the need to … eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation … advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it … foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it”.
The purpose of the amendment is simple, and it comes from what should be a fundamental truism: the police should focus unambiguously on preventing crime, protecting the public and upholding the law.
Police forces already operate within one of the most extensive frameworks of legal accountability in public life. Their powers are constrained by statutes such as the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, regulations, ethics codes, common law and detailed operational safeguards. Despite this, operational decisions of police officers are being second-guessed not through the lens of legality or effectiveness but through compliance with equality impact assessments, diversity metrics and institutional diversity, equality, and inclusion priorities that were never designed for split-second operational judgments.
There is a practical application here. The police are often hampered in their ability to stop and search people because of their duties under the Equality Act. For example, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act Code A, which governs the operation of police powers to stop and search, states that
“when police officers are carrying out their functions, they also have a duty to have due regard to the need to eliminate unlawful discrimination, harassment and victimisation, to advance equality of opportunity between people who share a relevant protected characteristic and people who do not share it, and to take steps to foster good relations between those persons”.
I think it would be quite widely accepted by the public that it is not the police’s role to advance equality of opportunity. They are not activists.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, Amendment 438D would
“exempt the police from the public sector equality duty under the Equality Act 2010, so as to ensure they are solely committed to effectively carrying out their policing functions”.
When I read that I wished that we could apply this exemption across the board. I wish that more public bodies would commit themselves to effectively carrying out their functions and not get distracted by the public sector equality duty. The police, I am afraid, have become far too embroiled in politicised equality initiatives—the EDI-ing of the police, as it has become known.
Briefly, I want to raise why this amendment is worth thinking about and why it is quite important. There is currently legal action being taken against the UK Civil Service over aspects of EDI practices, and specifically noted is official participation in Pride events. The argument is that taxpayer-funded Civil Service involvement in, for example, LGBTQ+ Pride marches, including civil servants marching in branded Civil Service Pride t-shirts, using rainbow lanyards at work and so on, is in breach of provisions in the Civil Service Code about being objective and impartial. This relates to the police as this recent legal action follows a successful legal challenge against Northumbria Police in 2025, where the High Court ruled that uniformed police officers marching in Pride marches breached police impartiality.
For the public, the idea of a politicised police force fuels the argument that the police may be unfair or discriminatory in who they target for, for example, non-crime hate incidents. Though we have seen the back of those, they were the blight of many a person’s life and destroyed many citizens’ lives. We need reassurance that the public sector equality duty has not been used to distract the police or to politicise policing. All the evidence would imply that it has been, and that is something that the Government should be concerned about.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of my noble friend on the Front Bench. When Section 149 of the Equality Act came into effect, it was seen largely as benign. It very reasonably imposed an obligation on public sector organisations to treat people with fairness and equality and to ensure that there was equality of opportunity within the organisation and in the interface that those bodies had with the wider public, whether it was local government, the NHS or other bodies. However, it has unfortunately been the subject of Parkinson’s law, where the work expands to fill the category. Therefore, instead of focus on the managerial targets, action plans and strategy documents which would deliver demonstrable improvement in policing performance across a wide number of areas and criminal activity, there has often, regrettably, been an overfocus on the public sector equality duty.
As someone with a background as a human resources manager and practitioner, I believe that every decent leadership in every organisation should have a set of policies which deliver fairness and equality within the organisation. It should not be incumbent upon the Government to compel organisations to do something that they should already be doing. Many leading organisations in the public and private sector do so anyway because treating people with fairness and decency and giving them opportunity delivers better performance.
I apologise to the Committee for mentioning again my experience on the British Transport Police Authority. At the end of October 2023, I was invited to attend a workshop on diversity, equality and inclusion. That cost the taxpayer £29,000 for, essentially, two days of a workshop, some handouts and some supplementary material which contained contested theories around critical race theory, white privilege and microaggressions. I declined to attend the first day; the second day was much more productive because it was focused on the senior management objectives of the British Transport Police. This expansion of the public sector equality duty has been inimical to the main objectives of policing, which are to tackle crime and protect the safety and security of our citizens—on the railways, in the case of the BTP, and in the wider country.
There is a special case to be made that policing is different because it has the responsibility, as a corporate entity within the Peel principles, to police by consent and to treat people equally irrespective of their age, race, religion or ethnicity. There is an issue of undermining the trust and faith people have in the police if we concentrate too much on a duty which is quite divisive, contentious and controversial.
For those reasons, I support my noble friend’s amendment and look forward to the Minister’s answer. I hope that he will at least engage with the argument. He is shaking his head—I do not know why, because we have not yet concluded the debate. He should know better than to dismiss any noble Lord before the conclusion of a debate. For the reasons I have enunciated, I hope that the Minister will at least engage with the debate in a thoughtful way, which is what we normally expect from him.
Baroness Thornton (Lab)
My Lords, the public sector equality duty exists so that our public services in the UK, which are funded by all of us, obey the laws on equalities. It is there because that is not what used to happen—and sometimes it still does not happen. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, that all he had to do was watch the recent television programme about the goings-on—the racism and misogyny—in one of our local police stations to know that we need these things on our statute book. As a veteran of the Equality Act 2010, I am very proud that we have them there. I hope my noble friend the Minister will give his usual defence of, “It’s Labour that always triumphs and always puts forward equalities, because that is actually important for our society”.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, for outlining the core, essential use of the public sector equality duty. I note that the Government’s website says:
“The Public Sector Equality Duty … requires public authorities to have due regard … when exercising their functions, like making decisions … It is intended to help decision-makers, including Government ministers, to comply with the duty”.
It does not talk about Pride marches or the detail of training.
Section 149 of the Equality Act says:
“A public authority must … eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is prohibited by or under this Act”.
I do not think the police could argue with anything there. It must also
“advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it”.
That speaks to the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, about some of the very poor, racist behaviour we have seen from a few individuals. It must also
“foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it … A person who is not a public authority but who exercises public functions must, in the exercise of those functions, have due regard to the matters mentioned in subsection (1)”.
I have quoted that very short section because the descriptions by some previous speakers in this short debate have made it sound like something completely different. I would be very worried if the police no longer had to follow the public sector equality duty as set out in the Equality Act. We can all argue about whether we do or do not like going on training days, or about a certain amount of money being well spent or not, but we really want to see discrimination eliminated, and that is particularly important in the police.
The noble Baroness, Lady Cash, said on the last group that we all need common sense and practicality. The PSED is the tool that does that, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for outlining the detail. He is right that the police should follow the law; the point is that the PSED and the impact assessments also fit within that. Getting rid of the PSED would mean that unlawful discrimination might well be missed, and that would be dreadful. He also said that it is not down to the police to deliver equality. I think the Equality Act differs on that and, given the work the police do, we would be pretty horrified if they suddenly said they did not have to deliver equality.
One of the ways that racism can be eliminated from the police is by ensuring compliance with the PSED. It is not the PSED itself at fault, but what is going on inside police authorities. That is why, for the third group today, we are talking about the importance of the White Paper on policing that has just been published, which will change the culture and ensure that that stops. We on these Benches believe that the PSED is a vital tool for the police to deliver that.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
My Lords, the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Thornton, cannot both be right. The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, is making the case that the public sector equality duty is a tool to tackle racism. Yet, as the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, made clear, the appalling, racist events at Charing Cross took place a year ago, 14 years after the PSED came into being. Surely it has not worked and a cultural change has to happen from within the organisation, as well as complementary legislation being imposed. On this occasion, it does not seem to have worked in that part of the Metropolitan Police.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I am very grateful to the noble Lord for mentioning that. That is exactly why I mentioned the Metropolitan Police’s London Race Action Plan earlier on—because it has not worked. But that action plan is underpinned by the PSED and the responsibilities without the police. Get rid of that and it might never happen.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
Does the noble Baroness acknowledge the problems of mission creep? The original aims may well have been worthy but, on training days, for example, my concern is that the content of those training days can breach impartiality rules. In fact—I will not go through it now—there have been well-documented instances of, for example, the fight against racism being turned into the campaign for Black Lives Matter, which are two very different things. Is there any concern at all about any politicisation or dangers?
One of the things we discussed in the Employments Rights Bill was that, attendant to this particular duty, there has been a huge increase in HR. It is the fastest-growing industry in the UK, sadly. Largely, that has been to try to interpret this equality duty, and it has led to a wide range of activities that may never have been envisaged by the Equality Act originally.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for mentioning those things. I am not quite sure what the questions are, but I can say quite clearly that I do not see a direct line between the public sector equality duty and Black Lives Matter. What I have seen with Black Lives Matter is black people being treated very poorly and some being killed because it was not working properly. The fact that it was not working properly was not because it existed; it was not working properly because the police were not avoiding and fighting discrimination.
On the point about the increase in HR, those of us who are perhaps behind on our fire safety assessments might be concerned about that. Each organisation must assess what it needs to do for all its members of staff. I keep saying to the Minister, “Please don’t just train specialist staff in things like violence against women and girls; it has to be throughout”. Why does it have to be throughout? Because of the equality issues and all the points that were raised by noble Lords who have spoken and, indeed, the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, earlier on, about women being much more likely to be victims of serious crime. That is why we need it: because it is absolutely underpinning everything the police do.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I am grateful for the opportunity to support the public sector equality duty in legislation and to say to the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Jackson of Peterborough, that there are times when you know before anybody has even spoken that you are not going to agree with the premise of the argument. This is one of those occasions. I am not going to agree with the premise of the argument, but I will not repeat what the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has said. I will only in part repeat part what she said by referring to what Section 149, the public sector equality duty, is.
It says:
“A public authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to … eliminate discrimination”—
or should the police not be looking at making sure that they eliminate discrimination in their dealings? On harassment, should the police not be ensuring that they are not involved in harassment in their dealings? On victimisation, should the police not be involved in ensuring that they do not victimise in their dealings? It goes on to refer to
“any other conduct that is prohibited by or under this Act”.
It says in this Section, which the noble Lord wishes to remove from legislation, that the police or any public authority should
“foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it”.
Section 149(5) says:
“Having due regard to the need to foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it involves having due regard, in particular, to the need to … tackle prejudice, and … promote understanding”.
Does the noble Lord think that the police should not have a role in tackling prejudice and promoting understanding? That is what he is saying by seeking to remove this piece of legislation. The section goes on to say:
“The relevant protected characteristics are—age; disability; gender reassignment; pregnancy and maternity; race; religion or belief; sex; sexual orientation”.
Does the noble Lord believe—he obviously does, since he has tabled the amendment—that those protected characteristics should not be ones that the police seek to take into account when dealing with these matters?
The noble Lord has put a perfectly fair argument, but it does not take my listening to it in detail to know, as I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, that it is not on my core values list or my core approach to how we deal with policing, and it is not how the public sector equality duty is designed. It is designed to embed day-to-day work in all our public authorities. As the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, said, that leads to better outcomes for individuals and for communities. For policing, the duty is vital to maintain public trust and legitimacy. I say to the noble Lords, Lord Jackson of Peterson and Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that the Peelite principles mean that the police police with the consent of the community. If they did not take into account the duty not to discriminate, victimise or harass then I am sorry, but that is not a police service that would secure the support of the community in its policing.
Compliance with this duty is not a bureaucratic exercise. It is a practical tool, but one with a moral under- pinning, for better decision-making and accountability. Removing the duty would risk undermining confidence in policing, particularly among those communities that are in the protected characteristic list in Section 149 of the Equality Act.
There are times when we can have a debate, have an argument and, potentially, listen to areas where we will have some movement from either the Opposition or the Government. This is not one of those times. I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw the amendment now but, if he brings it back on Report, I will take great pleasure in asking every Member of this House to vote it down.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
I will allow the Minister to dismount from his high horse on this. The fact of the matter, as he knows very well, is that between the election of the Labour Government in 1997 and 2010, when the Equality Act came in, there was still a concern, based on a moral underpinning by the then Labour Government, to improve equality in the workplace and elsewhere. My party brought forward, for instance, the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, which tackled discrimination. The Minister’s party, very rightly, brought forward the Race Relations Act 1976. It is not a moral imperative solely for the Labour Party and this particular Government. There is, however, an argument to be made about bureaucracy and whether the focus is too much on EDI, which prevents senior management and officers at the operational level concentrating on keeping people safe and tackling crime. That is the point that we are making, not that we on this side do not care about people being treated fairly and equally in the workplace and elsewhere.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
From my high position on my horse, I say to the noble Lord that we will take a different view on that. From the position of a very high horse, I think that the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Davies, would be damaging to community relations, to community cohesion, and to the police’s ability to police effectively. It would give carte blanche to the type of events that have happened in certain police stations in London in the last few weeks. It would also, dare I say it, remove the floor from the policing principle that we do not tolerate those things.
The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, says that certain things have not happened; he mentioned, in response to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, that some standards have not been raised in the time of the Equality Act. I remind him that there will be somebody speeding today, and somebody stealing from a shop today. There might even be a murder today. It does not mean that people would not break the law because we did not have that legislation.
The key point is that, with the Equality Act, we are trying to set a public duty that public authorities act with fairness irrespective of the protected characteristics listed in that Act. I think the police would want to—never mind should—be held to that level of account. That is why I have come to the judgment that I cannot support the proposals from the noble Lord, Lord Davies. That is a fair political disagreement between us. I have not done that in a way that says anything bad about the noble Lord’s motives. It is simply that, for me, there is a difference. There is blue/red water between us on this. I am happy to say that I hope he withdraws the amendment today; however, if he does not, we are willing to make those arguments on Report. I hope that, with the support of the Liberal Democrats and others, my noble friends and I would stand up for what we think is right about the Equality Act 2010.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
Would the noble Lord comment on the High Court judgment that said that police impartiality was, in fact, compromised in the example I gave relating to Northumbria Police? That situation directly speaks to this. Will he also reflect or comment on whether he feels that fairness and anti-discrimination has been guaranteed to all by the public sector equality duty when we consider the events and protests that happened around the Sarah Everard case and the, frankly, inexplicable one-sided policing, in many instances, at demonstrations around Palestine, at the expense of Jewish people and Jewish citizens of this country? The argument that the public sector equality duty is a bureaucratic exercise that box-ticks your way to suggesting that everything is fine in the world, whereas some of us are rather more concerned that the status quo is not adequate or good enough in the fight against racism, for women’s rights or, indeed, for equality.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
If the noble Baroness looks at aspects of the Bill before us today and earlier in Committee, and at what we said in the policing White Paper yesterday, she will know that the Government do not accept that standards do not need to be raised. We want raised standards, better vetting of police officers, better performance and speedy dismissal if police officers have done wrong. We want to improve those standards. However, the Equality Act is about basic principles underpinning how public services interact with people in our community. In the policing sense, I argue, as I did a moment ago, that those Equality Act provisions underpin what the police want to do, which is to police with the consent of the community. I cannot agree with her; that is an honest disagreement between us. I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate; it has been short but stimulating. In particular, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, for their support.
When considering this matter, there is a question that I would like all noble Lords to keep in mind: what do we want the police to prioritise? Surely the answer is public safety, crime prevention, and the fair and firm enforcement of the law. As I have said, and as the legal framework makes clear, policing is already tightly regulated. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act, codes of practice, judicial review, the Independent Office for Police Conduct and the courts all ensure that police powers are exercised lawfully and proportionately. None of those protections would be removed by this amendment. The entire purpose of the amendment is to remove a layer of bureaucratic obligation that is ill suited to operational policing and increasingly counterproductive. It would allow officers to make decisions based on intelligence, behaviour and risk, rather than the fear of breaching abstract equality issues—but perhaps I am guilty of looking at this from an operational perspective.
If we want the police to be active on our streets rather than passive observers and to intervene early rather than apologise later, and if we want public confidence rebuilt through effectiveness rather than process then we must give them the clarity and confidence to do their job. We must recognise that effective policing is itself a public good and that the most equal outcome of all is a society in which the law is enforced without fear or favour. With that, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Goodman of Wycombe
“Report: non-violent extremismWithin three months of the day on which this Act is passed, each police force in England and Wales must publish a report setting out any strategies they have to reduce crime associated with non-violent extremism.”
Lord Goodman of Wycombe (Con)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 438E, I will speak also to Amendments 438EA—which the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, has been kind enough to support—and 438F, 454A and 454B about non-violent extremism.
Right at the start, the term “non-violent extremism” requires a bit of definition. Noble Lords may ask whether the social practices of, say, the Christian Exclusive Brethren are extreme? Could the same be said of a Hasidic Jewish sect, an anarchist commune or a Quietist Salafi group in Islam? My view is that, while these groups and others can be problematic for cohesion and integration, they are not so in relation to the extremism that my amendments seek to address, for none of them is intrinsically connected to harassment, public order offences, acts of terrorism and other such breaches of the rule of law.
There are many extremist movements and ideologies that are; the three most prominent are the far left, the far right and, for want of a better term, the Islamists. All three aim to
“negate or destroy the fundamental rights and freedoms of others … undermine, overturn or replace the UK’s system of liberal parliamentary democracy and democratic rights; or … intentionally create a permissive environment for others to achieve”
these aims. I quote from the last Government’s definition of extremism. I am told that it is also this Government’s and would be grateful if the Minister could confirm whether this is so when he replies to the debate.
Of these three forms of extremism—far-left, far-right and Islamist—the last has preoccupied public policy most since the London Tube bombings of 7 July 2005. Some 71% of terrorist incidents in Britain since that date have been executed by Islamists and 75% of the case load of Contest—the Government’s counterterror strategy—is concerned with Islamist threats. Only last October came the first murder since medieval times of Jews in England simply for being Jews, in the terror attack on Heaton Park synagogue in Manchester.
The question that has haunted public policy since 7/7, including crime and policing policy, is whether it should seek to address acts of lawbreaking alone or also the ideologies that help to drive them. To use the classic figure of speech, should policy seek simply to shoot the crocodiles or also to drain the swamp? The thrust of policy under Governments of all three main parties—as evidenced by Contest, which a Labour Government created; by the Munich speech of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Chipping Norton in 2011, during the coalition years; or by Sir William Shawcross’s Prevent review three years ago—has been to seek to drain the swamp, but progress has been fitful. There has never been an overarching policy that seeks to counter Islamist and other extremism in our institutions and civil society—such as in charities and out-of-school settings, through to the NHS, universities and schools.
There is also the matter of sermons and talks in mosques—this is extremely topical, I am afraid—that incite hatred and violence. The X account habibi regularly draws attention to these, and I will send the Minister a file drawn on it after this debate. But he will already have available to him details of how many preachers in mosques have been prosecuted for such offences since, say, 7 October 2023. I would be grateful if he would share these with the Committee when he replies or, if he does not have the figures available, write to me.
My amendments could not possibly cover all this ground, nor do they fall into the trap of assuming that all extremism is terror related; nor that all extremism, whether terror-related or not, is Islamist; nor that Islam, an ancient and venerable faith, is to be conflated with Islamism, a modern and politicised ideology. Indeed, only one of my five amendments is religion-specific and it is not Islam-specific.
However, my amendments do seek to cover the ground I have been describing, and I am grateful for the emerging work of two all-party groups. The first is the All-Party Group for Defending Democracy, chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Walney. The second is the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Counter Extremism, chaired by Damien Egan, MP for Bristol North East, whose visit to a local school was recently cancelled. He is the vice-chair of Labour Friends of Israel. It later emerged that the diversity and inclusion leader of the academy trust, of which the school is a part, had supported the Hamas terrorists of 7 October as “heroes”.
The all-party group has produced a report, Time to Act, which points out, first, that the last Government, in effect, scrapped their own counterextremism strategy in 2021. Secondly, this Government’s post general election “rapid analytical sprint” review of extremism has never, to the best of my knowledge, been published, although the think tank Policy Exchange obtained a draft. Thirdly, it is unclear whether the Commission for Countering Extremism, set up by the last Government, will continue. The commissioner, Robin Simcox, has not been replaced. The Minister, asked by me recently whether he would be, has now very kindly and promptly replied to say:
“We are reviewing the roles and remits of various bodies to ensure our resources are best placed to meet current challenges”—
which, if I may say so, does not cast a great deal more light on the matter.
I turn to the amendments themselves. My Amendment 454A would require the publication of the rapid analytical sprint. If the Minister will not accept the amendment, will he please tell the House when the sprint will be published?
My Amendment 454B would require the appointment of a Commissioner for Countering Extremism to replace Mr Simcox. Again, if the Minister will not accept the amendment, can he tell the House what his plans are for the commission, or, if he cannot do that yet, when he will?
My Amendment 438E would require each police force to publish its strategy for reducing non-violent extremism. Again, if the Minister will not accept the amendment, will he tell the Committee what plans the Government have for police forces in this regard and on what timetable?
Finally, my Amendment 438EA comes in the wake of the horrifying developments in Birmingham referred to earlier today by my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough, in which the West Midlands Police bowed to an extremist mob over a football game, conjured up evidence that does not exist to justify its decision, and then, in the words of Nick Timothy MP, “lied and lied again” about its actions, including to Parliament. Three of the eight mosques that the West Midlands Police consulted over its decision had hosted preachers who promoted antisemitic conspiracy theories or called for the death of Jews.
I expect police forces to liaise with mosques and with other religious institutions. It is important to point out that groups and organisations other than mosques were involved in lobbying the West Midlands Police over the game in question. But the public surely has a right to know which police forces meet with which mosques and other religious institutions of other faiths, and then to draw their own conclusions. My Amendment 438EA would require them to do so.
These are probing amendments, but we cannot have a void where policy should be when the future of our liberal democracy is at stake. I look forward to the Minister’s response. I beg to move.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, has explained, this group is largely about a concentration on efforts to combat non-violent extremism, about transparency and about efforts by the Government and police forces to counteract such extremism. He also calls for the appointment of a Commissioner for Countering Extremism.
The noble Lord particularly—and, I would suggest, rightly—recognises and is concerned with the importance of developing and fostering dialogue between police forces and religious communities, as well as a much wider understanding of the real concern and fear of religious communities in the face of extremism, not amounting to terrorism, that has become so much worse in recent years and particularly since 7 October.
This group gives us the opportunity to invite the Government to bring greater clarity and focus to their efforts in this area and to make it clear what it is that they plan. When Yvette Cooper, then the Home Secretary, directed the establishment of the rapid analytical sprint on extremism, she said that it was intended
“to map and monitor extremist trends, to understand the evidence about what works to disrupt and divert people away from extremist views, and to identify any gaps in existing policy which need to be addressed to crack down on those pushing harmful and hateful beliefs and violence”.
It is certainly right that the speech by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, was directed to those ends—considering hateful and harmful beliefs and violence not necessarily amounting to extremism. The rapid analytical sprint was intended to be directed widely and, since then, publicity has been given to the concentration also on misogyny, racism, antisemitism and general community hostilities. It was commissioned last August, so perhaps the use of the word “rapid”, if we do not know when it is going to be produced, is not completely apposite.
The group is also concerned with the concept of youth diversion orders. We will debate youth diversion orders on a later group, but they are directed by the terms of Clause 167, as it is drafted, to terrorism and terrorism-related offences. It is certainly right that Clause 167(2)(b) talks about
“the purpose of protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism or other serious harm”,
but serious harm is defined in, and our attention is directed to, Clause 168, which talks about harm from
“conduct that … involves serious violence against a person … endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person engaging in the conduct, or … creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or … the threat of such conduct”.
Serious harm in that context is, effectively, the threat of violence. As I understood the speech and the amendments, as a whole, by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, they are also directed to the points that Yvette Cooper mentioned when the rapid analytical sprint was established. They go much wider and concern non-violent extremism, which is what this group is about. He talked about confronting ideologies and draining the swamp.
We would be grateful if the Minister, when he responds, clarifies what the Government’s target is in tackling non-violent extremism. How far is the government strategy for both government and police action aimed at producing an overarching strategy to tackle non-violent extremism as well as terrorism? We appreciate that it is perhaps more difficult in conceptual terms to develop such a strategy aimed at non-violence than it is to develop a strategy aimed at terrorism, which, while appalling, is relatively straightforward to define. The concept of non-violent extremism is altogether more difficult, and at the moment we are left in the dark about what the Government propose.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Goodman of Wycombe, in this interesting group of amendments in his name, draws our attention to non-violent extremism and raises hugely important issues. I am not entirely happy with that broad definition of non-violent extremism, but the noble Lord has given us plenty to mull over in his interesting, thought-provoking and hard-hitting speech.
I am worried about the kind of ideologies that we face at present; I just think that the reluctance to confront those ideologies is more likely to be a failure of moral leadership rather than law, so I am trying to work my way around that. I am also concerned about the policing of a range of views dubbed extremist. We have to be careful, because that can be used to close down legitimate speech and to demonise dissident views as being too extremist and too beyond the pale to engage with.
Lord Harries of Pentregarth (CB)
Why could not or should not the disturbing examples that the noble Baroness has cited already have been prosecuted under current legislation on hate law?
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
That might well be true, but it indicates that there might be a problem of the police not necessarily being impartial, because they are so busy forming community relationships with mosques that they are not necessarily listening to the kind of things that are going on in mosques or whatever other institutions. I agree with the noble and right reverend Lord, but this is the point I am making: Hizb ut-Tahrir are on the streets of London shouting about Muslim armies and jihad, while the Metropolitan Police, no doubt getting some theological Islamic advice from their religious advisers, put up a post saying that jihad has a number of meanings and should not be seen in just one way and talking about personal struggle and so on.
I want to finish with the example of what good community relations are and where we might be. Amid the Southport murder-related riots, that horrible period of disruption and violence on the streets, an extraordinary film was posted on TikTok of a police officer telling counter-protesters to stash the weapons in the mosque so that they would not have to arrest anyone. The liaison officer, wearing a blue police vest, was addressing a group of men gathered outside the Darul Falah mosque in Hanley, near Stoke-on-Trent, and was appearing to give the group of young men a weapons amnesty. He spoke to the crowd, saying:
“If there are any weapons or anything like that, then what I would do is discard them at the mosque”.
The reason why I am saying that is that I just think we should not be naive. That is the most important thing. When we talk about the police liaising with religious organisations, in a period of identity politics and in a period such as the one that we are living through in 2026, we should at least pause and not assume it is all going well. I therefore welcome the attempt at saying, “Let’s know who they are talking to”. That is the important reason why I support this amendment.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, the Minister and indeed the Home Office might be forgiven for wondering why Amendment 438EA was necessary. One might have taken it for granted that, on the whole, if any important event was happening, those likely to be involved in it in the community would be consulted. However, I fear the Home Office needs to think again. We have heard already about Birmingham, where one of the largest police forces in the country speaks exclusively to the mosques. When the Maccabi fans were considering whether they would come to Birmingham, the police did not talk to the churches but, rather more importantly, they did not talk to the synagogues. If one stops to think about it, it is quite extraordinary. All that I have read and heard in this House, as well as reading in the newspapers, leads one to suppose that those considering whether those Jewish fans should be allowed to come were looking exclusively from the Muslim point of view.
The Home Office should therefore consider carefully, perhaps with the College of Policing, whether, when it comes to significant and possibly controversial events—or very controversial, as the Maccabi one was likely to be—it should tell police forces that they must find what all the local people who might be interested think about it, and take some advice. I am horrified by what happened. I entirely understand why the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, should have tabled the amendment, and the Government need to consider it with extreme care.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
My Lords, as one of the vice-chairs of the APPG on Counter Extremism, I support the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, in these amendments. He has already referenced the Time to Act publication, which was published late last year and deals with a number of statistics that are quite startling and deserve to go on the record today. It was found that one in five voters— 21%, actually—
“say that political violence in the UK is acceptable in some conditions, and 18% would consider participating in violent protests as the state of Britain declines”.
That is a very concerning thing to read. We know that there has been a nearly 600% rise in antisemitic incidents in the UK following 7 October 2023. We also know that anti-Muslim hate has doubled over this last decade. Those are statistics that cannot be ignored. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, outlined why she finds some difficulty with these amendments, but there is recognition in the report that extremism
“is one of the primary domestic security and societal threats facing the UK”.
When the noble Baroness was detailing some examples of extremism, the noble and right reverend Lord asked why people were not prosecuted. I would argue—and I know that the noble and right reverend Lord will recognise that I have an amendment later in the day—that the glorification of terrorism needs to be much more clearly defined in law. We will come to that later in the amendments. Defeating terrorism is not just about dealing with it from a military point of view but about dealing with the narrative around those terrorist organisations—“draining the swamp”, as the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, would put it. We are allowing glorification to continue on the streets of our country and then not recognising that extremism will grow as a result. I hope that when we come to debate that issue, there will be a good airing of the issues around the glorification of terrorism.
The first thing we need to do in this area is to recognise that there is a problem, and then to define the problem and move on to understand it and deal with it. I very much welcome these amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I share the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, and indeed by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, but I am very doubtful that further legislation is required. There is, as previous speakers have said, a very worrying degree of antisemitic extremist speech, particularly, I am sorry to say, in the Muslim community and not just in speeches in mosques. Opposition to the policies of the Israeli Government—opposition shared by many Jews—cannot begin to justify such speech.
The sort of people who murdered Jews in Heaton Park synagogue come from a community. They have been to school in this country. They are members of mosques. The real question is how the whole community, not only the Muslim community, is going to address this problem. I know, and the Minister will no doubt confirm, that the Government do a great deal to ensure that civic values and the lessons to be learned from the Holocaust are taught in schools, but I fear that much more needs to be done and there really is a responsibility on the leaders of the Muslim community to take further steps to ensure that those lessons are understood.
It is, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said, particularly poignant that this issue is raised on Holocaust Memorial Day, and sad that these matters need to be readdressed. It is a problem in our society; it needs to be dealt with, but, as I say, I am very doubtful that legislation is the answer.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Goodman of Wycombe for his recent group of amendments. Extremism in its worst form of course becomes terrorism. This is often, if not always, the product of idle inaction or, at worst, encouragement from surrounding communities and influencers. The propounding of extremist views, even if not necessarily violent, has slowly seated itself in public discourse and is gaining influence in local communities throughout the country. It is clearly something that needs to be addressed, so I welcome the chance to hear from the Government.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Goodman of Wycombe, for his amendments, which have generated some interesting discussion and points. I will try to respond to those in some detail.
It is accepted across the Committee that counterextremism is a deeply challenging and complex area, and that the Government have a duty to protect their citizens from the harm of extremism, violence and hatred. The approach we are trying to take to counterterrorism is something that the Home Secretary, the Security Minister and I take extremely seriously. It is not appropriate that any citizen should be made fearful for their safety or should be excluded from public or political life on the basis of hateful prejudice. There is already legislation on the statute book to deal with these matters. Our society also rightly rejects those who preach, promote or espouse hatred, and as such everyone has both a right and a responsibility to challenge extremist narratives. I hope there is agreement on what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said. The Government will continue to uphold and promote those values across the board.
I will look at the amendments in detail, starting with Amendment 438E, which, in the noble Lord’s words, seeks to require every police force to publish a report on strategies to tackle non-violent extremism within three months of this Act passing. I understand the intention behind the amendment and the need to tackle non-violent extremism. However—I think this again echoes a point the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, made—police forces already work within national frameworks and report through existing channels and imposing a statutory deadline would risk diverting resources from front-line activity and might lead to incomplete or inconsistent reporting. The measure potentially duplicates existing accountability mechanisms and could, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said, add bureaucracy rather than improving security outcomes.
Amendment 438EA seeks to impose an annual reporting duty on the 43 forces to report meetings with religious leaders and faith communities. I say to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and to others who mentioned it—the noble Baroness, Lady Fox and Lady Foster, have talked around these issues—that the impact of what happened in Birmingham resulted in the chief constable of the West Midlands losing his post and it will result in an examination of the practices around that.
However, if we take the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, at face value, I am not convinced that such a requirement would improve policing outcomes or community safety. Publishing who met who, when and how, could potentially deter some of the candid dialogue that is sometimes needed behind the scenes to ensure that community cohesion is taken into account. I also do not wish to expose sensitive protective security or safeguarding interactions with places of worship. There may even be some faith communities that do not wish to be seen in their community to be engaging with the police. It is possible, but I want to still encourage the police and those faith community leaders to have meetings. If that engagement is catalogued and publicised, it could undermine some of the problem-solving partnerships that I know the noble Lord wishes to foster.
Amendment 438F proposes including non-violent extremism in scope of the youth diversion order, which we will come on to in due course in Clause 167. That clause reflects the intended scope of that order, which seeks to implement a recommendation of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. That was a very specific recommendation to introduce a new diversionary civil order to better manage terrorist risk from young people. Including non-violent extremism in the scope of that potential order would go beyond the original design and intent that was suggested to the Government.
During policy development, officials have engaged with operational partners and the independent reviewer themselves. In essence, the youth diversion order is not a counterextremism tool for young people who hold divisive, extremist or hateful views but do not pose a risk. That is the key. It would not be proportionate to impose a counterterrorism risk-management tool on a young person who was simply assessed as holding extremist views. There are ways in which we can deal with that. There is the Prevent mechanism generally. There is a range of educational mechanisms that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred to for ensuring that we tackle these long-term issues in a much more productive way. I say to the noble Lord that the youth diversion order would not be the specific tool for the type of activity that he seeks to discuss today with his amendment.
In addition, I say to the Committee that there is no statutory definition of or consensus on what would include extremism. This would represent a level of interference with and intrusion on the rights of young people that is not yet even available in adult cases. In practice, the amendment would increase the scope of the order and would overlap with the remit of Prevent, which is designed to deal with individuals who are moving into extremist views but have not yet reached the terrorist threshold.
The Home Office is undertaking extensive counter- extremism work in collaboration with local government departments and the Commission for Countering Extremism. On the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, I know from my devolved responsibilities in the department that we are discussing those issues with the devolved Administrations.
Turing to Amendment 454A, I agree that transparency is important. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, has pushed for this transparency and has supported the amendment. I say this in the hope of being helpful to the Committee but, if documents such as the rapid analytical sprint on counterextremism were put into public domain, it could, for example, undermine policy development. It might impact upon the integrity of how policy is developed, because we would know that such documents were going to be put into the public domain. It would prevent disclosures, which would undermine the policymaking process, and less robust, well-considered or effective policies may well result.
However, through a range of mechanisms—this is the important point for the noble Lord and his amendment —the Home Office is accountable to Parliament for its counterterrorism policies and the rapid analytical sprint. Members here can debate, as we are now; they can table Questions, as they do; they can table Written Questions, as they do; I can appear before Select Committees, as I did at the European Affairs Committee with the noble Lord, Lord Ricketts, only last week; I can be answerable for Statements; and I can be answerable in debates. Home Office Ministers can appear in private before the Intelligence and Security Committee, where a private discussion between Members of this House, Members of the Commons and Government Ministers on the conclusions can be done in a way that does not compromise security information. It is absolutely right we are held to account for that. Equally, is it absolutely right that, on some occasions, it is done behind a shielded door, where privacy can help with better policy development. Further, we have just submitted written evidence to the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee’s ongoing inquiry into combatting new forms of extremism. My colleague Dan Jarvis, the Security Minister, gave oral evidence to that committee only last week.
There are definitely ways in which we are held accountable to Parliament. However, even if we accepted Amendment 454A and published all those documents, what goes into those documents means that there is a further wall behind them, and so we would not be able to put in them the things that we wanted to.
Amendment 454B, also from the noble Lord, seeks to mandate that, within three months of Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must appoint a dedicated counter- extremism commissioner. I was grateful to the noble Lord for his question the other week. That aspect of policy is not my direct responsibility in the Home Office; I answer for it here, but it is not my direct responsibility, so I was not aware at that time of the status of the Commissioner for Countering Extremism. I thought my letter had helped clarify the matter, but apparently it has not.
To clarify, the previous commissioner, Robin Simcox, left in July last year. As I said in my letter to the noble Lord on 9 January:
“We are currently reviewing the roles and remits of various bodies to ensure our resources are best placed to meet current challenges”.
That means that we are looking at a number of arm’s-length bodies, for which I have overall responsibility, to see whether we need them, whether we can rationalise them and whether we can make cost savings in them. The Commissioner for Countering Extremism is subject to that review. The Home Office has been asked by the Cabinet Office to do that as part of a Cabinet Office-led arm’s length bodies review. We are looking at the roles and remits of various bodies. I do not think that I have spent a single year of my now 30 years in either House without somebody asking why we are not reducing the number of quangos that are operational in departments. That is what the Cabinet Office is trying to do; we are looking at the arm’s-length bodies that we have. That is a general demand, and not to say that I know what the outcome of that review is going to be.
If Amendment 454B, from the noble Lord, Lord Goodman of Wycombe, was passed, it would mean that we would have to appoint a dedicated counterextremism commissioner. We may well do that, or we may not, but these issues are under review. I welcome the work that Robin Simcox has done. I cannot accept this amendment, given that we are still working through the outcome of the review.
I have tried to answer each of the amendments in turn. I am sorry that, in answering them, I cannot accept any of them. However, I hope that I have given legitimate answers as to why we are where we are. I hope that the noble Lord can reflect on those and, in due course, withdraw his amendment.
Lord Goodman of Wycombe (Con)
My Lords, this has been an appropriately sombre debate given the scale and sweep of the challenges described. I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Foster and Lady Fox, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, as well as the two speakers from the Front Benches and the Minister for replying to the debate. As I say, it has been necessarily sombre.
The Minister, very helpfully, for a number of technical reasons, explained why he wants to reject all of the amendments that I have put forward. But the sum of what he said—in dealing with the amendments in his usual charming and emollient manner—is that he did not confirm that there is a definition of counterextremism, and so has not confirmed that the Government have maintained the last Government’s position. He has not confirmed whether or not the commissioner will or will not be appointed. As for the analytical sprint, I could not really follow the logic of his argument, which is that it is impossible for some reason to publish it because it would cause difficulties in doing so. The last person the Minister reminds me of is any of the Beatles, but I feel his policy is taking us on a bit of a magical mystery tour. We do not know where the policy on non-violent extremism is going and we do not really know when we will know.
The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, caught the mood of the moment, which is a certain impatience. A vacuum in government policy simply is not good enough. Although I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that these matters are not best addressed by amendments and legislation—there was a certain element of probing in the amendments I have put forward—I do not think these matters have been entirely cleared up by the magical mystery tour that the Minister has taken us on and I reserve the right to come back to them on Report. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Doocey
“Injury in service award for policeWithin six months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must lay a report before Parliament on the merits of creating a commemorative emblem for police officers injured in the line of duty.” Member's explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to report to Parliament on the merits of creating a new award in the form of a commemorative emblem for police officers who have been injured in the line of duty.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 438EB is inspired by the 999 Injured and Forgotten campaign, led by Tom Curry, a detective forced to retire after suffering a life-changing injury on duty, weeks before reaching 22 years of service. In 2023, Tom launched a petition calling for a new medal for police injured on duty and discharged from the service, and it has since expanded to include all public servants.
Every day, emergency responders put their lives on the line to protect the public. Tragically, within policing alone, more than 16,000 officers have suffered catastrophic injuries in the course of their service and have had to give up their careers as a result. Yet there is currently no formal means of recognising their sacrifice. Like Tom, many injured officers miss out on long service and good conduct medals, which now require 20 years of sustained service. Gallantry awards elude most assault victims, who are typically ambushed from behind, depriving them of the opportunity to show valour.
The Elizabeth Emblem was created in 2024 to rightly honour public servants killed in the line of duty. On these Benches, we believe it is wrong that those whose lives have been changed irrevocably through injury are overlooked. This is a modest amendment. It simply asks the Government to consider the merits of such an award and to lay a report on it before Parliament. Although the Bill’s scope does not allow me to include all those we believe should be eligible, this would be an important step towards formal recognition of injured survivors and to honour the brave work of our emergency services. I beg to move.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for this amendment and the case she put forward. It is absolutely axiomatic that we must honour and recognise those brave police officers who put their safety at risk to protect the public. During my police service, I saw many acts whereby officers placed themselves in the most dangerous of situations with little recognition. If I had time, I would be keen to relate some of those instances to noble Lords; some of them, of course, had consequences. There is certainly some merit in the proposal. I look forward to hearing from the Minister what the Home Office might suggest on this.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I wholeheartedly agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that we owe our emergency service workers a massive debt of thanks for the work they do to keep us safe and for always answering the call when we need help. When dedicated public servants suffer serious injuries in the course of their duties, it is incumbent on us, as a state and as a society, to wrap our arms around them, so to speak, and ensure that they are given all the support they need.
I am sure we all agree that the list of public servants who risk and suffer injuries during the course of their duties is not limited to police officers; this was reflected in the noble Baroness’s comments. Other emergency services, such as our brave firefighters, ambulance workers and other emergency service workers, also face great risk of injury on duty. Any consideration will have to include them alongside police staff—I think the whole Chamber would agree on that—though I note that the text of the amendment refers to police officers alone. I hope the noble Baroness takes that in the spirit in which it is intended.
Noble Lords will be aware that the police are already eligible for a number of medals, including for long or exemplary service, for specific celebrations such as a Coronation or jubilee, and for gallantry. Individuals who suffer injury as a result of their efforts to prevent loss of life can and have been successfully put forward for formal gallantry awards. This includes Sergeant Timothy Ansell of Greater Manchester Police, who was injured coming to the aid of a colleague and received a King’s Commendation for Bravery in October.
Although I recognise that the threshold for these awards is high, and rightly so, there are many incidents which can and should be put forward but which currently fall below the radar. The Home Office has been driving work to increase the number of gallantry nominations for the police, and I encourage any noble Lords who have cases to put forward to do so via the Cabinet Office website.
Work to identify whether a medal is the best method of recognising emergency service workers who are injured as a result of their duties and whether it is viable is ongoing. However, I point out that in this country, all medals are a gift from the Government on behalf of the monarch. They are instituted by royal warrant and sit firmly under royal prerogative powers. It would therefore be inappropriate to legislate for such a medal, potentially cutting across the powers that rightly rest with His Majesty the King. On the understanding that this is a matter that is actively under consideration, I hope the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for his support. I also pay tribute to Tom Morrison MP, who previously highlighted this campaign in the other place. Those people who put themselves on the line for us in the course of duty really ought to be honoured. I take the Minister’s point that it is not in the gift of the Government to do this and that we should not legislate, but I hope that whoever has the power will be persuaded to do something like this. It does not have to be a medal, but it needs to recognise that people who put themselves on the line need to be appropriately rewarded—I do not mean monetarily; I mean a proper reward. With that in mind, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Kidron
“Police protocols when investigating the death of a child(1) The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 is amended as follows.(2) After section 27 (common law rules as to criminal investigations), insert—“Inclusion of guidance on collecting digital data when investigating the death of a child(1) Within six months the day on which the Crime and Policing Act 2026 is passed, the code of practice under section 23 must include protocols that a person of a prescribed authority must adhere to when investigating the death of a child.(2) These protocols must include the treatment of potential online harm as a primary line of enquiry.(3) In order to treat a potential online harm as a primary line of enquiry, a person of a prescribed authority, must—(a) seize and forensically examine digital devices as soon as is reasonably possible;(b) take all reasonable steps to capture early digital evidence and account data, taking into account that online services delete user data after a short period of inactivity;(c) document a child’s activity on all known online services, including recommended content, interactions with other users, content viewed, content uploaded, and any relevant metadata.(4) Where an investigation gives evidence that a service regulated by the Online Safety Act 2023 may have breached that Act, Ofcom must be notified and supplied with the evidence.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would update statutory guidance issued to police to include guidance on effective evidence-collecting during an investigation into the death of a child.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Barran and Lady Morgan, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for their support.
It is heartbreaking to be here again. I first raised this issue over four years ago after witnessing Senior Coroner Walker’s difficulties in obtaining data from US tech firms during his investigation into the death of Molly Russell. Senior Coroner Walker, Ian Russell—Molly’s father—and the family’s lawyers fought for years to secure data that revealed the role played by Pinterest and Meta, and this evidence was central to the coroner’s finding that both services,
“contributed to her death in a more than minimal way”.
Data is crucial. The original amendments were also recommended in the pre-legislative Joint Committee report on the draft Online Safety Bill. We debated them at length during the Bill’s proceedings. We got agreement to put them into the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill, which fell when the election was called. We tried to push them through in the wash-up and finally, after years of campaigning by bereaved families, they were included in the Data (Use and Access) Act last year.
I say all this because I want the Minister, when she replies, to weigh up her words carefully, knowing that the bereaved families, who have worked so hard to pass these provisions for so many years—some of whom are in the Gallery today—are still waiting. Yesterday, I met several bereaved families, including Mia Janin’s father, Mariano, who held a photograph of his daughter as he described a recent meeting with the Secretary of State, Liz Kendall. He said, “I thought it was a good meeting until I realised it was the same meeting we had with Peter Kyle a year ago—except this year we needed a bigger room because there are more bereaved parents, more dead children”.
I also heard yesterday of a newly bereaved parent who tried to get the police to access her daughter’s data, only to be told by Gloucestershire Constabulary’s occupational health department to talk to Ellen Roome: “She knows more about the law than the entire Gloucestershire police force”. I spoke to Ellen, who is with us in the Gallery, and she told me that the police downloaded her son Jools’s data in 2022 but are only now beginning to examine it.
We have a law, but it is not working, and I want to set out three reasons why. First, although coroners can ask Ofcom to issue a data preservation notice that requires online services to retain data in advance of issuing a Schedule 5 notice, they are not routinely doing so. Although Section 101 enables Ofcom to use its information-gathering powers when it receives a Schedule 5 notice from a coroner, it is not routinely doing that either.
I have eight separate letters from the Government saying who has been written to and outlining what guidance has been sent to whom, but still bereaved parents come to my door. For some, the loss of their child is still raw and they are blindly trying to work out the system; others are heartbroken that the opportunity to preserve data is long gone because they found out about the law too late. Sometimes, the coroner does not know that the measure exists or does not understand that data disappears and wants to wait for the police investigation before even considering such a request. All these different reasons undermine the fundamental purpose of the law.
To be absolutely clear, I have no criticism of the coroners. They are not experts in digital systems and cannot reasonably be expected to know that even a brief engagement, such as hovering over a link or pausing on a piece of content, can influence how an algorithm responds. Nor are they expected to know that platforms routinely infer and group children into behavioural cohorts relating, for example, to low mood, late-night use, social isolation or identity exploration. Nor are they supposed to know that seemingly fleeting online interactions can leave persistent data traces. The measure was specifically designed for Ofcom to take that burden from the coroners, but that has not happened.
Baroness Barran (Con)
My Lords, it is with a mixture of sadness and pleasure that I rise to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and have added my name to the amendments in this group. Much of the Bill impacts in small ways on the lives of many citizens in this country. These amendments, which I hope very much the Government will accept, would have a huge impact on the lives of a small group of families whose children have died and who are seeking to understand what led to their deaths. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, said, it is a club that no members wish to be part of.
Like the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, I pay particular tribute to Ellen Roome, mother of Jools, who died inexplicably aged 14. Ellen Roome has found herself at the front of a national call for change in relation to children’s access to social media in general and to these specific issues, which have impacted her family and other families so cruelly. My noble friend Lady Morgan of Cotes, who cannot be with us today, told me how moved she was when we met Ellen recently. I can only agree.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, set out, these amendments would achieve three things. First, they would explicitly bring the attention of the investigating officer to the digital and online aspects of a child’s life. The code of practice for officers feels like it was written in another age; maybe 2020, which I think was the year of latest version, was another age. Again, as we have heard, we owe thanks to Stuart and Amanda Stephens, who have highlighted this gap following the murder of their son Olly.
There is not a single reference in the code to digital evidence, just one reference to the fact that physical evidence can be captured digitally. Given how much of a child’s life is now lived online, it is vital that this is investigated properly and at the earliest opportunity. Our Amendment 438ED would bring this early investigative focus and would give the police the opportunity to alert Ofcom if they believe that a platform is not complying with the Online Safety Act.
The second thing that these amendments would achieve is that vital digital evidence would be systematically requested by coroners in the case of the death of a child aged between five and 17. The draft template would ensure that all relevant information is provided in a completely consistent manner, as well as giving the option to include any other relevant information for a particular case.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, said, currently, despite recent improvements in legislation, too much is left to the discretion of coroners, many of whom may be unaware of the new powers that they hold in relation to both coroner information notices and data preservation notices. Without this information, recently bereaved families are expected to request information themselves from a platform, through the horribly titled “deceased user duties”.
I looked at the help section of the Facebook website. Imagine being a recently bereaved family, just logging in; this is what they read:
“In rare cases, we consider requests for additional account information or content. You’ll be required to provide proof that you’re an authorised representative (e.g. family member) and a court order. Please bear in mind that sending a request or filing the required documentation doesn’t guarantee that we’ll be able to provide you with the content of the deceased person’s account. In addition, we’ll memorialise the deceased person’s account once we receive your request. If you’d like to send us a request, please contact us”.
I will leave your Lordships to judge the tone of that.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, these Benches support Amendments 474, 475, 438ED and 438EE, which all stand in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and to which I am pleased and privileged to have added my name alongside the noble Baronesses, Lady Morgan of Cotes and Lady Barran. I pay tribute to the relentless campaigning on behalf of bereaved families by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and to her utterly moving and convincing introduction today. I also pay tribute to all those bereaved families who have fought for these provisions.
I associate myself with everything the noble Baroness said about the implementation of and the intent behind the Online Safety Act, which has not achieved what we all set out for it to do. Together, these amendments address a singular, tragic failure in our current justice system: the loss of vital digital evidence following the death of a child. There has been powerful testimony regarding what is called the suspension gap. That occurs when a coroner investigating the death of a child feels unable to issue a data preservation notice because a police investigation is technically active, yet the police might not have prioritised the securing of digital evidence. During this period of hesitation, data held by social media companies is deleted and the opportunity to understand the child’s final interactions is lost for ever.
Currently, many coroners remain unaware that they can request data preservation notices in the early stages of an investigation. We have heard heartbreaking reports from bereaved parents that coroners feel unable to act while police investigations are active. Because inquests are routinely suspended during these investigations, the data is often deleted due to account inactivity or routine system operations before the coroner can issue an information notice.
The Molly Rose Foundation and the 5Rights Foundation have been clear. Automatic preservation is essential, because data is the key to joining the dots in these tragic cases. We cannot allow another child’s digital history and the truth about their death to vanish because of bureaucratic delay. As Ofcom has recently clarified, service providers are not required to retain data they do not already hold. They simply need to notify the regulator if information is missing. During recent consultations, major providers such as Meta and Microsoft did not object to preserving data from further back, provided it was still within their systems.
Too often, police seize a physical device but fail to notify Ofcom of potential breaches of the Online Safety Act. These amendments work in tandem. Amendments 474 and 475 would freeze the evidence automatically and provide the legal mechanism to preserve data. Amendments 438ED and 438EE would ensure that the police and coroners are fully aware of their responsibilities and protocols to collect that evidence. Together, they would ensure that potential online harm is treated with the same priority as a physical weapon in every investigation into a child’s death.
These amendments are about ensuring that our coroners system is fit for a digital age. They provide the speed and technical certainty required to support bereaved families in their pursuit of justice. We cannot continue to allow a lack of process to obscure the truth about why a child has died. We cannot allow the deletion of evidence to become the enemy of justice. I urge the Minister, as have the noble Baronesses, to accept these amendments as a necessary modernisation of our investigatory framework.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, if I needed persuading—and I am not sure I did—the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and her supporters have certainly persuaded me that there is a serious problem here. As legislators who spend hours in this Chamber, we all know that law without enforcement is a dead letter in a sealed book, and not what anyone wants to be spending their lives on. If, as it seems, there are gaps of responsibility and agency between coroners, the police, Ofcom and, dare I say it, the great big untouchable tech imperium that monetises our data and effectively monetises our lives, those gaps need to be dealt with.
Just as I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, not just for her commitment but for her expertise on online harms, I will say that my noble friend the Minister is probably one of the most expert and experienced criminal lawyers in your Lordships’ House. If these precise amendments are too broad and too onerous for catching children who, for example, were too young to have a device, I am sure that my noble friend the Minister will be able to address that. Between these noble Baronesses and other noble Lords of good faith, something can be done.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group and I am glad that my noble friends Lady Barran and Lady Morgan of Cotes have signed them on behalf of these Benches. I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and, of course, to all the bereaved parents and family members who are campaigning still to tighten and enforce the law in this important area, based on their terrible experiences.
We know that there are some gaps in the law. The noble Baroness’s amendments address, first, implementation and making sure that coroners are aware of the powers that the Online Safety Act has given them. Very sensibly, her amendments are about spreading knowledge and awareness so that, on behalf of the families of young people who have lost their lives in these terrible ways, coroners can find out the truth and hold that to account. In some ways, that is the easier problem to solve. Of course, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, said, the coroners are not technical experts: there is always a generational gap. The apps and the social media that are second nature to the young people using them can be mystifying to the parents, the coroners and the police who have to look into them in the most terrible circumstances. We need to make sure that everybody is aware of how the apps work and how the Online Safety Act works too.
The noble Baroness pointed out a trickier problem, which is the extraterritorial effect, particularly with relation to the law in the United States of America. She is right that the previous Government spoke to the previous US Administration about things such as the Stored Communications Act, which the noble Lord, Lord Allan of Hallam, raised in our debates on the Bill. It was a problem that we were aware of and, as the noble Baroness noted, there has been a change of government on both sides of the Atlantic.
Perhaps when the Minister responds, or perhaps later in writing, she will say a bit more about the changing dynamics and the discussions that are being had with the present US Administration. It is clearly having an effect on these cases; the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, mentioned the inquest into the sad death of Leo Barber, when the Schedule 5 notice was unable to be brought into effect. I would be keen to hear from the Minister, either today or later, about the more recent discussions that His Majesty’s Government have had with the US Administration on this important aspect.
Baroness Benjamin (LD)
My Lords, I fully support these amendments and congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, on her fight to highlight these issues over many years and on her opening remarks. I also pay respect to the bereaved parents who have been campaigning tirelessly and look to us to achieve change.
It is common sense for coroners and law enforcement agencies to have access to the social media accounts of deceased children who are believed to have died as a result of social media activity. If it was your child or grandchild, would you not want that? This action needs to take place automatically before accounts are deleted. Accounts should be preserved, and it should be a criminal offence to delete or edit them before they are reviewed by investigators. Like so many grieving parents across the country, I strongly believe that social media companies should not be allowed to withhold or destroy often crucial evidence that could be vital to investigations and lead to criminal convictions.
After hearing on “BBC Breakfast” news this morning some of the heartbreaking stories from bereaved parents who are campaigning on this issue and urging the Government to take more robust action, I was convinced that tragic cases such as these clearly highlight the need for social media companies to be compelled to protect our children and safeguard them from harm. This is yet another plea before more harm is done because, right at this very moment, there is a child viewing harmful content that could lead to tragedy, so I hope the Government are listening—and is Ofcom listening? I want them to listen to these bereaved parents and take further action. I urge the Government to accept these much-needed amendments and act now.
Baroness Shawcross-Wolfson (Con)
My Lords, I cannot match the eloquence of some of the previous speakers, but I want to add my support for this group of amendments. We have heard the policy arguments for these proposals and, as a policymaker, I think they are overwhelming, but I add my support as a parent as well as a legislator.
Those of us with children and teenagers know full well how much of a child’s life nowadays is conducted on a screen behind a password. Friendships, pressures and influences are impossible to get at without access to that digital record. I pay tribute to the bereaved parents who have campaigned with such courage and dignity; they have turned unimaginable grief into a determination to protect others, and the whole House will honour what they are doing today.
I very much hope that the Government accept these amendments and, if not, I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, will be true to her word and continue to bring them back on Report.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for tabling these amendments and I thank her and many others in the Committee who have given cogent and compelling arguments for their inclusion in the Bill.
It does indeed feel like the dial is starting to shift with regard to the protection of our children from online harms. I am very pleased, for instance, that your Lordships’ House supported my noble friend Lord Nash’s amendment last week in voting to ban under-16s from social media. The amendments before us today are in many ways an extension of that argument—that social media is not appropriate for children, it is causing irreparable harm and, in the most severe cases, as we have heard today, is leading to death. As the father of teenage children who, like so many other children, face a world of online temptation, pressure and influence, these issues are very personal. There is a lot to be said for creating further duties when there is the death of a child.
As has been said, the issue was in live consideration in the previous Government’s legislation, which included a clause that created a data preservation process. I am aware that the text of Amendment 474 is different, but the fundamental issue is the same: at their heart, these amendments contain the simple objective to ensure that coroners can access the social media data or the wider online activity of a deceased child where the death is suspected to be linked to that activity. In that scenario, it is plainly sensible to ensure that that data is not destroyed, so that coroners can access it for the purposes of investigations.
I have nothing further to add, given what has already been said. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s reply.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, I am sure that your Lordships will all agree that we have a great deal for which to be grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and her work in relation to the online space and its regulation when it comes to our most vulnerable citizens. It is so obvious that all child deaths are harrowing and deeply distressing for bereaved families that to say so seems almost trite. However that may be, I start my remarks by acknowledging this to make the point that the Government have this both front and centre. Anything I say this afternoon should be seen in that context.
I pay tribute to every brave family who fought to understand the circumstances that led to the death of their own child. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for telling me that some of the families are in the Gallery; I have not had an opportunity to meet them yet, but I extend the invitation to do so now. I also understand that for most, if not all, of them, this is not just about the circumstances of their own child’s death but about trying to ensure that this does not happen to other families.
We know that the data preservation provisions in Section 101 of the Online Safety Act continue to be a focus, both for bereaved families and parliamentarians who do not think that the process is quick enough to stop services deleting relevant data as part of their normal business practices. We agree that it is a proper and urgent objective to make sure that Ofcom has the powers to require, retain and provide information.
Section 101 was originally introduced following the campaign and amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, during the Bill’s passage through Parliament. In order to support both coroners and services, in September, both the Chief Coroner and Ofcom published guidance on this new provision. Ofcom consulted on the draft guidance in parallel and published its finalised guidance in December 2025. The Chief Coroner’s guidance encourages coroners to consider requesting a data preservation notice early in the investigation if the relevance of social media or another in-scope service cannot be ruled out. This should safeguard against automatic deletion of the data by service providers due to routine processes.
The Government brought forward the commencement of data preservation notices, which came into force on 30 September 2025. Since then, Ofcom has issued at least 12 data preservation notices. On 15 December 2025, the guidance for Ofcom was updated in relation to information-gathering powers, including new guidance on data preservation notices themselves. The Government are therefore working closely with Ofcom and the Office of the Chief Coroner to understand how effectively these are working in practice, but we have heard the concerns about the speed and efficiency of this process.
Against this background, I begin with Amendments 438ED and 438EE. The police themselves accept that there should be better guidance for the application of powers to preserve and access digital evidence in investigations of child deaths in order to ensure consistency across forces. Forgive me, I have a bad cough.
Lord Katz (Lab)
The Home Office and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology are already working with the police and the National Police Chiefs’ Council to create guidance to raise awareness of and promote the consistent use of powers available to the police to preserve and access data following the suspicious death of a child. Officials in the Home Office have been supporting this work where appropriate. That said, we can see why the noble Baroness’s idea of updating statutory guidance is attractive.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I can start again; I am very grateful to my noble friend for taking over. I say now that I would welcome a conversation with the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, as she and I discussed when we met briefly the other day. The Government do have concerns that being too prescriptive in legislation may create more problems than it solves because the legislation would need to be amended every time there were changes in technology or in operational practices. Your Lordships will be well aware, given our many late nights spent scrutinising primary legislation, of which tonight may be another, how clunky, cumbersome and time-consuming it can be to keep amending primary legislation.
For this reason, it is the Government’s view that our shared objective can be achieved using non-statutory guidance. Police forces are well used to applying and following guidance in a range of areas, from missing people to information sharing. Having said that, I make the point that I would welcome a conversation with the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, to see whether we can find a way through this by working together to do so.
I turn to Amendments 474 and 475. Again, this is an issue that the Government take very seriously. I reassure your Lordships that we are carefully considering the issues that these amendments raise and are grateful for the continued engagement of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the bereaved families. Taken together, these amendments would require coroners to notify Ofcom within five days of a child’s death, triggering a standard form to request data preservation.
Once again, we can see the appeal of such a requirement. The problem is that it would apply to all cases of deaths in the over-fives, regardless of whether social media may be relevant to their death. So, for example, where a child died as a result of a road traffic collision or of cancer, it is unlikely in most cases that social media retention would be of use to the police or the coroner. Therefore, while the Government are sympathetic to the aims of these amendments, it is our view that we need carefully to consider any possible unintended consequences.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
On that point, does the Minister have the number of children over five who die in other ways, just so the Committee can understand how much of a burden that might be?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I cannot give the noble Baroness the answer now, but I can write to her with that data.
Our view is that we need carefully to consider any possible unintended consequences; the need not to place a disproportionate burden on those investigating; and how such a provision might be drafted so as not to capture deaths which are outwith the scope of the amendment.
To conclude, we are not saying no. What I am saying is that I understand the noble Baroness’s concern that the existing statutory provision for the preservation of a deceased child’s social media data should operate as effectively as possible and we will consider carefully what further steps could be taken. As I have just mentioned, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and I spoke briefly and agreed to meet, and I am happy to extend that to include Ministers from both the Home Office and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology.
I look forward to updating the House on Report on this important topic. I cannot update the Committee in relation to the issues with the United States now, but I will write to the noble Baroness in relation to that. In the meantime, I hope she will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
I start by accepting all the various offers to meet the Minister and thank her for her tone in her response and for expanding it to the other departments as necessary. Before I withdraw the amendment, however, I want to make a couple of things very clear.
First, this sits in the broader issue of failure to have the Online Safety Act implemented properly. It sits in the broader issue of why children are dying at all. Moreover—I think I have to say this both on my own behalf and on behalf of the bereaved parents—I am very grateful for everybody’s gratitude, but we do not want gratitude; we want action. I am sorry, but on the actual points—six months, the same letter about the guidance that never comes—I do not accept that there cannot be a way of exempting sick children, and I would like to know how many children died in car crashes because someone was on the phone.
I do not think it is an excuse, and I really feel at this point that officials and Ministers are way too comfortable with unintended consequences. How about the House starts with dealing with the intended consequences of its legislation that are not being properly implemented? With that, and the promise to come back on Report, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(b) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offence within paragraph (a),(c) an offence under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (England and Wales and Northern Ireland: encouraging or assisting crime) in relation to an offence within paragraph (a),(d) an offence under the law of Scotland of inciting the commission of an offence within paragraph (a), or(e) aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an offence within paragraph (a).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is a drafting change (aligning the approach taken in relation to inchoate offences with that taken in paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 11).
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, Amendments 439 and 446 in my name are technical in nature and provide changes to the provisions concerning the youth diversion orders.
Government Amendment 439 relates to the definition of ancillary offences in Clause 167(3). Clause 167(1) provides that a court may make a youth diversion order if satisfied, among other things, that the respondent has committed a terrorism offence. The definition of “terrorism offence” includes ancillary offences such as aiding or abetting the commission of an offence. This technical amendment ensures that the definition of an ancillary offence operates as it should—I know that the noble Lord will appreciate this—in the context of the Scottish legal system and also aligns the drafting of the legislation with that in Schedule 11 to the Bill for consistency.
Government Amendment 446 relates to Clause 182(2). This disapplies the six-month time limit for a complaint to a magistrates’ court in England and Wales so that an application for a youth diversion order may be made at a later date where necessary. The amendment similarly disapplies the six-month time limit in Northern Ireland. I know that the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth, also has two amendments in this group. I will respond to those after hearing his representations. I beg to move government Amendment 439.
Lord Harries of Pentregarth (CB)
My Lords, I will speak to the two amendments in my name, Amendments 440 and 445. Amendment 440 would require the respondent to receive citizenship education in British values, and Amendment 445 sets out what those values are. The noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, has also added his name to these amendments. He very much regrets that he is unable to speak this evening due to a commitment chairing a police commission that he is not able to change.
I will make two preliminary points to avoid misunderstandings. First, these amendments are not about personal values or lifestyles. They are about the fundamental political values on which our whole society is founded. Secondly, these values are not a kind of innovation in our law; they already have to be taught in our schools.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I declare my interest again. My son is an academic who specialises in online radicalisation and Prevent, and advises Governments, Parliaments and public bodies, including our own Parliament and Government.
From these Benches we share the Government’s concern about the rising number of young people investigated for terrorism offences, and we welcome, in principle, earlier intervention and diversion away from the criminal courts. However, we also share many of the misgivings already expressed, particularly about using a low balance of probabilities civil threshold to impose what are, in effect, terrorism-labelled controls on children.
As drafted, the bar for imposing a youth diversion order is worryingly low for a measure that can place wide-ranging restrictions on children as young as 10, a breach of which may result in custody despite no criminal conviction. Can the Minister explain why the court need only find an order “necessary”, rather than applying the more familiar “necessary and proportionate” test for such intrusive measures?
The scope of these orders is also troubling. A YDO may be made if the court finds it more likely than not that a child has committed a terrorism-related offence, behaved in a way likely to facilitate one, or—as clarified by government Amendment 439—attempted, encouraged, aided, abetted, counselled or procured a listed terrorism offence. On top of that, I question the inclusion of “serious harm”, given that the justification for the serious nature of these orders is terrorism prevention, which needlessly risks widening the type of behaviour captured.
I am grateful for the briefing provided by Justice, whose work highlights that orders of this kind would fall more harshly on young people than they would on adults, especially those with intellectual disabilities or who are neurodivergent. There is also a real risk of disproportionate use against minority communities, particularly Muslim children, given existing disproportionality in terrorism policing. Action for Race Equality reports that, between 2021 and 2024, 31% of under-21s arrested for terrorism-related offences were Asian, despite making up only 9% of the population.
Justice and other organisations argue that, if youth diversion orders proceed, the Bill must be significantly strengthened, and we support that direction of travel from these Benches. They call for piloting before full commencement; a requirement for police to give reasons if they depart from youth offending team advice, with those views placed before the court; proper risk assessments before an order is imposed, as with respect orders; and for statutory guidance from the Secretary of State to be mandatory, not optional.
Amendment 445 would require those receiving youth diversion orders to be given citizenship education in British values. From these Benches, we recognise the good intent. It seeks to equip young people with a positive understanding of civic life, reinforcing shared values through education. That is a worthy aim which merits some consideration, particularly for those at risk of radicalisation.
We do have questions, however, around implementation and resourcing, and whether this might dilute the order’s core diversionary purpose. In short, we do not oppose early diversion in principle but require stronger safeguards in practice. In the case of the measures in the Bill, this chiefly means a higher and more appropriate test, tighter scope and better protection for vulnerable children.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I apologise that I missed the moment. I thought somebody else was going to speak, so I will be quick. In the last couple of weeks, the United Arab Emirates has curbed state funding for its citizens seeking to enrol at UK universities over concerns that they will be radicalised by Islamists. That is an extraordinary piece of information and it also indicates that we do have a real problem. I commend the Government for trying to find new ways of dealing with young people who are being radicalised: I understand that that is a real problem.
I was slightly worried that, in the same week, we heard about a regional game being used by some councils for Prevent, which identified one of the signs of pre-terrorism or extremism as those who support cultural nationalism, which seems to me to be muddling up again the terms of what is an extremist, what is not, and so on. I do not know that it is entirely clear.
I happen to share the reservations that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, raised on civil liberties and these youth diversion orders. As I have previously said, I am always concerned that where we lack moral courage in taking on radicalisation in public, procedures, process and legislation are used as a substitute for that. In that context I commend the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth, on at least trying, as he has many times, to raise the issue of teaching British values. Ironically, it has become quite controversial to say that we should shout British values from the rooftops. We are not encouraged to do so. That itself can be seen as exclusionary, not inclusive enough and so on. The noble and right reverend Lord has explained in detail why he wants that. I am not necessarily a fan of all the things in that list or the whole notion of citizenship education, but I think it is the right approach.
However, I note with some irony that some of the British values in that list include the importance of freedom of thought and conscience, freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly and association. This is in a Bill that could curtail many of those very things, and those of us who try to raise them have been dismissed and told, “Those things are not a threat. Don’t worry about it. We need to do this”. I also think it is interesting that in that list we have “regular elections”. I agree; I would not be cancelling them myself. In relation to the rule of law, jury trials are a key part of British values and democracy, ensuring that we have democratic representation for ordinary people and that justice is done in the criminal justice system. We know that they are in jeopardy.
I want us to push British values more. That would be far more important and effective than youth diversion orders. If we are to have youth diversion orders, let us have some British values in there—and if we are going to mention British values, let us stick to them ourselves, rather than just having them as a list that we can nod through.
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)
My Lords, I want to come in on the remarks of the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth, and his support of Amendment 445. I have a great deal of sympathy, and I have spoken in other debates that he has had about these matters in the past. I am completely convinced that he is right in his exhortation to us as a country to define some fundamental values to which we should all subscribe.
My only reservation about this amendment is about listing values prior to a national conversation and resolution and some premeditative thought about what a list of British values should contain, being very clear that we are not rubbing up against other parts of legislation covered elsewhere. I can see the attractiveness of this kind of list in general, but it would worry me a great deal.
The example I give is proposed new subsection (2)(e), “respect for the environment”. I see what the attempted definition of the environment is, but I respectfully say that that would apply to any country and is not necessarily British in terms of its value, as is the case with several of the other items on the list. I advocate bringing it back on Report with more generalised language rather than being so specific, or perhaps leaving this for another piece of legislation that is more directly concerned with it.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I fully endorse the comments made by my noble friend Lady Brinton, and I want to raise a couple of other issues. I am particularly disappointed to see no reference in Part 14 to safeguarding, risk assessments or multi-agency consultation beyond youth offending teams. This fails to heed the lessons of the Southport inquiry, which highlighted serious failures in information sharing, in part because the perpetrator was under 18, alongside failures to conduct forensic risk or mental health assessments. Without mandatory input from local organisations such as schools, social services and mental health teams, there is a real risk that youth diversion orders will repeat Southport’s tragic oversights.
On Amendment 445, which would require those subject to a youth diversion order to receive citizenship education in British values, we understand and have no problem with the intent. Helping young people develop a positive sense of civic life and shared values is a worthwhile aim. But we believe that if such education is to be offered, it should sit within mainstream or voluntary youth provision as support, not as a condition of a terrorism-labelled civic order. Linking values education to a coercive measure risks blurring the line between welfare and enforcement and could undermine both the legitimacy of the order and the educational goal itself. While we support early diversion, we need stronger safeguards to protect both the wider public and vulnerable children.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for the explanation given of the Government’s amendments.
We recognise the principle that underpins Amendments 440 and 445 tabled by the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries. Youth diversion orders are intended not simply to punish but to steer young people away from future offending and towards constructive participation in society. The idea that citizen education might play a role in that process is an interesting one. However, we feel that a number of practical and conceptual questions arise from those amendments.
First is the issue of delivery. Citizenship education of the kind envisaged here would require properly trained providers, appropriate materials, sufficient time, et cetera, to have any meaningful impact, and we should be cautious about placing new statutory requirements on the Secretary of State without a clear sense of how they would work on the ground or whether they would be consistently available across different areas.
Secondly, the amendment sets out a detailed definition of British values—or, as the amendment would have it, “values of British citizenship”—built around five specified pillars further defined within the amendment. The noble and right reverend Lord mentioned the Prevent strategy of 2011, which set out four basic values, as a matter of government policy rather than in legislation. I think we all recognise the importance of democracy, the rule of law, freedom and equal respect, but it is fair to ask whether we should enshrine those in legislation and, further, whether this is the right place to attempt such a definition, particularly in the context of youth diversion. Plainly, there may be disagreements about what might be included, as we have heard, how these concepts should be framed and whether a fixed statutory list risks being either too narrow or too prescriptive.
More broadly, we should also consider whether youth diversion orders are the most appropriate vehicle for this kind of civic education or whether those objectives are better pursued through schools, families or community-based interventions that can engage young people in a more sustained and holistic way. But I thank the noble and right reverend Lord for the arguments he made, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s reflections on the amendments.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, with his Amendments 440 and 445 has commenced a wider debate on the provisions of youth diversion orders. Through the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, we have had a wider discussion about the purpose of these orders, a point also mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey.
The requirements that the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, has tried to seek for the Committee to add would require, as part of the youth diversion order, the Secretary of State to design a package of citizenship education that can be imposed on a mandatory basis. I recognise that there is a positive intention in that, and I do not mean to argue against that positive intention, but I point the Committee to Clause 169(1)(a) and (b). There is no exhaustive list of requirements and restrictions that can be imposed through the youth diversion order. Clause 169(1)(b) says a youth diversion order may
“require the respondent to do anything described in the order”.
So the order can include a range of measures. Although later on there is a list of potential activities under Clause 169(3), it is also intended that the order is flexible so that the court can impose any requirement or restriction that is considered necessary for mitigating a risk of terrorism or serious harm. There is no restriction on imposing any type of educational requirements on a respondent, provided that they are necessary and proportionate for mitigating the risk.
I come back to the purpose of the order, which is to look at individuals who are not yet at a significantly high threshold to look at how, with police and youth justice services, we can offer interventions on a voluntary basis rather than potentially also as a mandatory requirement. I understand the intention of the amendments, but, again, I take what the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, has mentioned: there is no definition of the element that the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, is trying to bring into play.
I argue that a youth diversion order seeks to reduce terrorist risk and actively diverts respondents away from further contact with the criminal justice system but is not as specific or restrictive as the noble and right reverend Lord seeks in his amendment. Police and youth justice services may seek to provide supportive interventions on a voluntary basis, and that could include education. It may well include some wider education about the importance of Britishness or personal development programmes. However, as I have said, supportive interventions may also be imposed on a mandatory basis if the court agrees that is necessary for the purposes of protecting the public. That could be, for example, mandating to attend appointments such as those offered through Prevent, including ideological or practical mentoring. The point that I come back to with the noble and right reverend Lord’s amendments is that they would add a level of prescription that I would not wish to see in relation to the potential court’s activity.
A number of noble Lords asked whether the Government intend to pilot youth diversion orders. The answer is no, not at this moment. If the Bill receives Royal Assent, we will look at having it as an order that is available to the courts and would have the sole purpose, under Clause 169, of prohibiting the respondent from doing anything described in the order or requiring them to do anything described in the order. That could include the very points that the noble and right reverend Lord has brought forward, but I do not wish to restrict the process by being too prescriptive in Clause 169.
With those comments, I beg to move the amendment standing in my name. I ask the noble and right reverend Lord to reflect on the points that I have made and, I hope, not move his amendment.
“(aa) require the respondent to receive citizenship education relating to British values (see section (Further content: citizenship education)).”
Lord Harries of Pentregarth (CB)
My Lords, if I am allowed to respond, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Falkner of Margravine and Lady Fox, and the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, for their qualified support. I point out that there is no need for a national consultation about our fundamental British values because they are already there. They were brought into effect by the Conservative Government under the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Chipping Norton. My point is that the formulation is not adequate. I understand what the Minister says about not wanting to be too prescriptive, but I hope the Government will take much more seriously the whole question of fundamental British values and see whether there can be greater awareness and support for it in a whole range of legislation.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Viscount Colville of Culross) (CB)
A word of warning to the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries: if at this stage a noble Lord starts making a speech, we normally have to call the voices on it. But we will keep going.
Amendments 441 to 444
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(da) the inspection of any online account accessed by means of a device;”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with my other amendments to this clause, provide that a youth diversion order may include conditions relating to the inspection of an online account accessed by means of an electronic communication device the use of which is restricted under the order.
“(5A) The “inspection” of a device, or an online account accessed by means of a device, includes—(a) accessing the device or the online account, (b) examining information held on the device or accessed by means of the online account, and(c) extracting such information.”Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 169, page 207, line 19.
““online account” means an account by means of which information held on a service provided by means of the internet is made accessible;”Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 169, page 207, line 19.
“(11) The reference in this section to “extracting” information includes reproducing it in any form.”Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 169, page 207, line 19.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(2) The following do not apply to a complaint under this Chapter—(a) section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (time limit for complaints etc);(b) Article 78(1) of the Magistrates’ Courts (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/1675 (N.I. 26)) (time limit for complaints).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment disapplies the time limit for applications to a magistrates’ court in Northern Ireland (as well as in England and Wales).
Viscount Hailsham
“Support for terrorism: intention(1) The Terrorism Act 2000 is amended as follows.(2) In section 12 (support) after subsection (4), insert—“(4A) A person is not guilty of an offence under this section unless the conduct alleged was done by that person with the intent of encouraging, inciting, facilitating or enabling another to commit an act of terrorism.”.(3) In section 13 (uniform and publication of images), after subsection (1B), insert—“(1C) A person is not guilty of an offence under this section unless the conduct alleged was done by that person with the intent of encouraging, inciting, facilitating or enabling another to commit an act of terrorism.”.”
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, I shall also speak to Amendment 448. In respect of Amendment 447, I am glad to have the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, who I am happy to say is in her place.
The purpose of these two amendments is to ensure that individuals can be prosecuted under Section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000 for the offence of supporting an act of terrorism only if the acts alleged are, in substance, acts that support terrorism in the sense that ordinary citizens support that concept. Amendment 447 would make explicit the intent required—namely, that the act alleged was done with the intent of encouraging, inciting, facilitating or enabling another to commit an act of terrorism. Amendment 448 would provide for a defence when no such intent existed. The amendments are quite clearly in the alternative. I prefer Amendment 447 but I would understand if noble Lords preferred Amendment 448.
What I suggest is profoundly unsatisfactory and unjust is the present law. Consider the demonstrations that we see in the streets and squares of London, with hundreds of citizens holding placards that read, “I support Palestine Action”. Consider that these individuals are often elderly and retired folk, mostly self-evidently respectable and usually without much knowledge of the secret workings of Palestine Action. Now, they may be self-indulgent, and some indeed may accuse them of being naive, but are they really guilty of supporting terrorism in the sense that most of us understand that concept?
I suggest that these people are using a form of shorthand to demonstrate their opposition to the policies of Israel in Gaza and the West Bank. If they stood outside the Israeli embassy and shouted, “Down with Netanyahu”, or words to that effect, they would be doing no more than they are entitled to do, and I do not think the use of the shorthand, “I support Palestine Action”, however ill-advised the use of that phrase may be, makes them guilty of an act of terrorism.
There are at least three serious objections to the law as it is now framed. First, it is a serious restriction on free speech. I do not refer to the European convention, although that may be engaged in this instance; I refer rather to the long-established rights of citizens to demonstrate and express their views. That is a right to be restricted in only the most compelling of cases.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
I am really thrilled to be supporting the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, because obviously he is so sure of everything he says that I must be doing the right thing. I will deal with Amendments 447 and 448 slightly differently, because they are different. I support Amendment 447 because it directly responds to how the law is currently interpreted by the courts. The Supreme Court has made it clear that someone can be convicted without any requirement to show that they intended to support terrorism. The offence is about the suspicion of others, not the intention of the person charged.
That might explain the law as it stands, but it also exposes the problem. Under this interpretation, people are criminalised not for what they mean to do but for how their actions might be perceived or might be used symbolically by other people. The court accepted that this interferes with freedom of expression but concluded that the interference was justified because Parliament chose to prioritise disruption and prevention. This amendment asks Parliament to look again at that choice. Criminal law normally punishes intentional recklessness. Here, however, we are dealing with offences that can be triggered by clothing, images or symbols, with no need to show encouragement, promotion or support in any real sense. That is a very wide net, and one that risks catching protest, journalism, art, research or sheer provocation.
The Supreme Court has told us plainly that if this is to change it must be done by Parliament. That is exactly what this amendment does. It ensures terrorism laws target people who genuinely seek to assist terrorism, not those whose conduct just creates an appearance or a reaction. I obviously feel very sensitive about this, being a serial protester.
On Amendment 448, the Terrorism Act gives the state some of its strongest powers, and rightly so, but with powers that strong, we should be very careful about who gets caught up in them. Amendment 448 follows directly from the same Supreme Court judgment and addresses its practical consequences. The court accepted that Section 13 interferes with freedom of expression but held that the interference was justified because the law was clear and because Parliament had chosen that. It is all our fault. That leaves people prosecuted under these provisions with very little room to explain themselves. If you carry or display something and it falls within the scope of the offence, your purpose largely does not matter.
This amendment introduces a basic safeguard—a defence for those who can show that they did not mean to encourage, incite or enable terrorism. The Supreme Court emphasised foreseeability that people should be able to control their conduct if the law is clear, but foreseeability alone is not the same as fairness. A system that criminalises without regard to intent places an enormous burden on lawful expression and legitimate activity. By putting a defence on the face of the statute, Parliament would make it clear that these offences were aimed at genuine support for terrorism, not incidental, critical or contextual engagement with proscribed organisations.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
My Lords, Amendment 450 seeks to amend the current Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006. I declare that I am an officeholder in the APPG on Counter Extremism, a member of the APPG on Terrorism and Security and, probably most importantly, a victim of terrorism.
For 20 years this year we have had a criminal offence of glorification of terrorism, but under the current Section 1 there is a very high bar to meet, as the person making the statement of glorification has to intend that a person hearing the statement would be encouraged to emulate the terrorism being glorified. The glorification of terrorists or their organisations is certainly not confined to my part of the United Kingdom but rather is a threat to the security of the nation as a whole. Recently, on the streets of some of our major cities, we have seen proscribed organisations such as Hamas and Hezbollah lauded and that has had and will continue to have its consequences, particularly around radicalisation of our young people.
As someone who has lived with and through terrorism, I am always alert to anything which would encourage it and bring back those dark days of intimidation, murder and mayhem. Unfortunately, over the years since the cessation of IRA violence, there has been a strategy from Sinn Féin to lionise and put terrorists and their actions on a pedestal. There are many examples of Sinn Féin politicians, many of them senior figures, attending commemorations and celebrations for the lives of those who sought to murder their neighbours. In the interest of time, I will not bring any examples of that, because I have done so in the past in this Chamber, but suffice to say that apart from the pain which it causes to their innocent victims, it also seeks to normalise terrorism as a legitimate way to bring about political change.
The retraumatisation of victims is unforgivable and needs to be called out on every occasion, but public acts of commemoration also send a very clear message to young republicans that what these young men—and they were usually young men, and in some cases 16-year-olds, sent out to murder—did was in some way honourable. It glamourises what they did. To young impressionable people who have little knowledge of the life experience of the brutality of the IRA, it makes them sound like heroes, which they patently were not.
The often chanted, “Ooh ah up the Ra”, is a symptom of the continuing glorification of dead terrorists. It is, to some, a cultural chant, but nothing could be further from the truth. If we allow people, including those in positions of authority, to glorify terrorism in the way which, for example, the current First Minister of Northern Ireland does, then it normalises and sanitises terrorism and, in a cyclical way, will lead to young people being radicalised again. Witness those young people on our streets supporting the actions of Hamas, for instance. Many of them know little about the Middle East but think it is very hip and trendy to support Hamas because they hate Israel.
A little knowledge is a dangerous thing. If all you know about the IRA is that it took on the Brits and the First Minister says they were a great bunch of lads, then you can be forgiven for thinking that “Ooh ah up the Ra” is a grand wee chant. Those young people know little of the devastation, murder, intimidation and barbarity of the IRA because it is not something that is talked about by their First Minister.
As regards the current provisions, there have been no prosecutions under this section, to my knowledge, in Northern Ireland. When I asked the Minister a Written Question on this issue concerning England and Wales, he indicated on 2 December that there had been 52 prosecutions in England and Wales since 2011.
In 2023 the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, looked at this part of the legislation and decided that Section 1 did not need updating. With respect to the KC, I would argue that it needs change so that glorification of terrorism—in other words, glorifying the acts of a current proscribed terrorist organisation—in and of itself should be a criminal offence.
Mr Hall looked at this legislation in 2023, before the onslaught of support on our streets for Hamas; perhaps in this context he may need to look at this issue again. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, in his current review of public order and hate crime legislation, could also look at this issue.
In the meantime, I submit that change is needed for the following reasons. First, defeating terrorism is about not just militarily defeating the organisation but not allowing the narrative of those terrorists to be justified. Unfortunately, with the continued glorification of the IRA by senior politicians and others, there is a deliberate attempt to rewrite what happened in Northern Ireland. It was an unjustified, bloody, murderous terrorist campaign—nothing more and nothing less—and those of us who grew up with threats and the attempted murder of members of our family will not allow that to happen. We need society as a whole to recognise it as well. I urge noble Lords not to utter the phrase, “Yes, but it’s Northern Ireland and that’s all very difficult”. It is really not difficult. Whether you were a loyalist terrorist or a republican terrorist, you were a terrorist: someone who went out with the sole purpose of murder. Of course, the same is true of other shades of terrorists today.
Secondly, as I have already pointed out, there have been no prosecutions in Northern Ireland under the current Section 1. Why is that the case? Policing across the UK should be without fear or favour and certainly should not allow political bias or fear to enter decision-making. Unfortunately, there have recently been examples of political decision-making by police chiefs in the West Midlands and Northern Ireland.
Last week, two former chief constables of the PSNI gave evidence to the Northern Ireland Select Committee in the other place. Sir Hugh Orde and Sir George Hamilton were chief constables who took independent operational decisions. Despite policing in a very political environment, they made, as far I and many others are concerned, decisions based on policing considerations alone. They were not always popular with all the politicians, but that should never be the primary focus of a chief constable.
The two chiefs recounted instances when they had taken policing decisions and rejected attempted political interference. For Sir George, that was around the murder of Kevin McGuigan in 2015 and for Sir Hugh it was the Northern Bank robbery in 2004. On both occasions the political classes in London—and, disgracefully, Dublin—were interfering in the policing of Northern Ireland. They were trying to pressurise the two chief constables into not calling out the involvement of the IRA. They both resisted. I am very glad they did. It did not make politics in Northern Ireland any easier at that time—I remember it very well—but it was the truth. How sad then that their successor Simon Byrne decided to give in to political pressure when it was applied to him.
Unfortunately, some police chiefs do not feel strongly enough about implementing laws that may be seen as picking a side. I regret to say that some police chiefs, and indeed prosecutors, instead of applying the law without fear or favour, may be too timid and not want to rock the boat in taking a prosecution that may fail or may upset politicians or “communities”. The question is: how do you test whether all the elements of an offence are present if you are not willing to take it before the court? This amendment deals with those issues, I hope, as it removes the emulation part from the offence, and therefore makes it easier to prosecute.
Thirdly, I indicated at the start of my speech that I am an officeholder in the APPG on Counter Extremism. If we do not amend the law as this amendment seeks to do, I fear that the continued glorifying of terrorism will radicalise and lead more of our young people into terrorism. At present, there is a lack of legislation to capture extremism, but if we allow the glorification of terrorism to continue unabated, it will continue to grow, along with all the problems that it causes in our society.
Fourthly—and finally, noble Lords will be glad to hear—what sort of society do we want to live in? Do we want to allow the continued glorification of terrorism and all the inherent problems that will bring, or do we want to send a signal from Parliament that terrorism is, was and always will be wrong?
We need to stop the harmful normalisation of terrorism. I hope this amendment goes some way in doing that. Terrorism wants to put a wedge between those from different backgrounds. It wants to bring fear to ordinary citizens. In all its forms, it must be defeated. I hope that there will be support around the Committee for this amendment.
Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)
My Lords, I r support Amendment 450 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Foster. Like the noble Baroness, and many others in this Chamber, the legacy of terrorism is not merely an abstract term for me. It is not a sentence on a piece of paper. It is a real legacy that still affects people to this very day. It is remembered in empty chairs at the dinner table, in empty pews at church, physical and psychological scars, and in communities still working hard to build trust after decades of fear. In that context, the glorification of terrorism is not simply offensive but harmful. It reopens wounds, undermines reconciliation, and sends a message that the suffering of victims is somehow secondary to a warped narrative of heroism or resistance.
The noble Baroness’s amendment addresses a serious gap in our legal system. At present, the offence of encouraging terrorism includes the glorification of terrorist acts only where it can be shown that such glorification encourages others to emulate that conduct; in other words, the prosecution must demonstrate not only that terrorism was praised but that the praise was likely to inspire imitation. Of course, I fully support that extent of the existing legislation, but the threshold should be raised further to account for the rampant glorification of terrorism.
We know that radicalisation and normalisation do not operate only through direct instructions. People are rarely told in explicit terms to copy an attack. Instead, extremist messaging often works by celebrating past acts, portraying perpetrators as martyrs or heroes, and presenting violence as justified or necessary. That justification that there was no other way than terrorist acts came from the lips of the First Minister, Michelle O’Neill.
Over time, that steady diet of praise and romanticisation of violence can shift perceptions, especially among the young, making the step towards active support for violence feel less extreme and simply a culmination of calculated indoctrination. In Northern Ireland, we have witnessed at first hand how cultural and political narratives can remake paramilitary violence into something that is lauded and, disgustingly, admired.
References to paramilitaries appear in murals, slogans, music, and online spaces, endlessly. Everywhere we look across Belfast, in our schools and universities, in shops and on street corners, there are daunting inscriptions of acclaim about the IRA. We even have an entire political party that is yet to find it within itself to admit that IRA terrorism was wrong.
This amendment is so important because we have to think of the future and our younger generation, who now chant “Up the Ra” carelessly, believing it to be an act of rebellion and resistance. They look to their political leaders, who tolerate this: indeed, they encourage and applaud it. Let us pause for a moment and think about that. They may not be glorifying terrorism with a view to directly inciting others, but they are normalising it so radically that it would make it acceptable for someone to engage in terrorism, believing it to be morally right after years of repeated misinformation and miseducation. Yet for victims and their families, these are reminders of the bombings, shootings and intimidation, not symbols of pride.
This is a very personal and touching amendment because, like the noble Baroness, I and my loved ones were victims of terrorism too. For a moment, I take you to two young people, a young girl of 21 and her brother of 16. That day she was engaged to be married. She went to get her engagement ring and, of course, she was excited to show her engagement ring to her aunt and to her loved ones: this was wonderful. The future was her oyster and the future was wonderful. They left to show the engagement ring. Some family members joined them in the car. As they went down the road, they were stopped because they were told by another person that there was a car over the hedge. They went to help and noticed the car had its nose into the field, but there was no one in the car. Somebody said, “Just watch, there could be a bomb”, and as they walked from that scene, the car blew up. Those two young people, aged 16 and 21, were blown to bits.
How do I know? I was the one who was sent to the morgue to identify them. That girl was a beauty queen but, as I said before, there was nothing beautiful that day in what I saw. The 16 year-old lad did not even get on to the slab. His few bits were lying on the floor and I was not allowed to look. But then they did pull it back to show just a few bones. That was all that was left of the lad, a boy of only 16. This is reality. Their mother died of a broken heart shortly after that. I understand why. But who really cares? Who really cares except those who carry the burden, day after day.
Then they hear “Up the Ra” as a chant by young people, encouraged by their political leaders, who think that it is acceptable and normal. That is why we have broken hearts. So when I say to noble Lords that this amendment is necessary for the safeguarding of our younger people and the safety of our future, and to prevent the further glorification of terrorism, know that I say it with the full emotion of remembering everything that terrorism took from my life and the many people who would be here today if it were not for it.
Even when there is no expressive call to take up arms from individuals who glorify, the effect can still be to sanitise a campaign that caused immense suffering to all of us. If a statement stops short of urging others to replicate violence, it may fall outside the offence. That creates a loophole where the celebration of terrorism can circulate freely, so long as it is carefully worded. This amendment would remove the requirement to prove the encouragement of emulation and recognises a simple truth: glorification itself can be dangerous.
The same principle applies to contemporary terrorist organisations across the world. Groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis are associated with serious violence against civilians and are proscribed under UK law, yet we continue to see instances where their actions or symbols are publicly praised or celebrated without an explicit call for others to follow their example.
This amendment would not criminalise discussion, analysis or criticism of past events. It would not prevent historians, journalists or communities examining the causes and the consequences of conflict. This distinction is between explaining or debating terrorism and praising it. Leaving this loophole in place risks sending the wrong signal that, so long as no one says, “Do it again”, the public celebration of terrorist violence is acceptable. It is for that reason that I support this amendment.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
My Lords, it is always an honour to follow both the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, and the noble Lord, Lord McCrea. Their personal experiences—my family has not been directly affected—are a salutary reminder to this Committee that the choices that we make on this issue are not academic debating society-type issues. They are choices that have very real implications in the real world.
With the amendments in this group, we face a fork in the road. While two of the amendments may be very well intended, I say with respect to those who tabled them that they would take us down a dangerous and wrong road. The third amendment, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, and others, would strengthen our opposition to terrorism.
Terrorists and terrorist organisations, whether they are. in a Northern Ireland context, republican or loyalist, or in other contexts Islamists, far-right extremists or a whole range of other bodies, do not just appear. It is right that we do not judge terrorism on the basis of its ideology, but on the basis of its actions. That has been the position that this House and others have taken when deciding on proscription for terrorist organisations. They do not appear simply out of the ether. No one becomes convinced of a particular issue and, that night, picks up a gun or a bomb and goes out and carries out a terrorist act; it is a long process. It is a situation in which people get converted to a position of extreme ideology and extreme action out of that. It is a position in which the message is that the particular terrorist actions that are being carried out are normalised. They are presented as the only alternative way to sort out a problem. A lot of that is based on the surrounding language.
The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, introducing this group, said that he did not see a distinction between somebody saying, “I oppose the Netanyahu Government” and “I support Palestine Action”. With respect, I think there is a deep distinction. One is expressing a political opinion and the other is supporting a proscribed organisation. In a Northern Ireland context, it is the distinction between someone saying, very legitimately, “I am an advocate for a united Ireland” and somebody saying “I support the IRA”. There is a clear-cut distinction and we should draw that distinction.
If Amendments 447 and 448 were to be agreed, we would create an absurd situation. We could have platforms where people get up and urge people to support ISIS, Hamas, the Real IRA or other organisations. None of those things are supporting an individual act of terrorism, but they are clearly drawing people in. They are, if you like, the gateway drug into terrorism. As such, we would create a very dangerous situation where we facilitate in particular young people from different backgrounds becoming radicalised and bit by bit being drawn into that terrorist world.
It is critical for the past, the present and the future that Amendment 450 is put forward. On the issue of the past, we know, and we have heard from the last two speakers, of the real impact on and the real hurt for victims of terrorism, from whatever source they come. When someone gets up and eulogises the terrorists of the past, they create great hurt for those families, whether in the situation indicated by the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, or, for instance, if someone on a platform was to praise Hamas on 7 October, or refer to those who were involved in the attacks in 9/11 or Bondi Beach as some sort of martyrs for the cause. All those things are deeply hurtful to the families and the victims.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, Amendments 447, 448 and 450 could not be more different, but they seem to show two sides of the same coin.
Dealing first with Amendment 450, I entirely agree with what the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, has said. It is absolutely appalling that people should glorify terrorism in any way. We listened to some painful stories of what had happened during the Troubles. However, this is not a Northern Ireland issue. Having listened to three people from Northern Ireland, as an English woman who was formerly married to a man from County Down, now deceased, it is important to point out that this happens in the rest of the United Kingdom.
There are people in this country who support ISIS; there are people who support Hamas, and there are other groups that are not so well known that may well be supported. Whether it be the appalling acts of the IRA or the equally appalling acts of Hamas—whether the genocide is or is not does not seem relevant at the moment—there should be no glorification. I hope that the Government will listen to this, because, although it is promoted largely by those from Northern Ireland, as I have said already, it is equally applicable to the rather parts of the United Kingdom.
Looking at the other side of the coin, I respectfully disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Weir. The sort of people who are going out on the streets, particularly in London, to support Palestine Action, could not be more removed from the terrorists and the people glorifying terrorism. A lot of very decent, naive—as the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, called them—and, in many ways, foolish people are going out because they do not like what happens in Gaza. We get a great deal of coverage, rightly, about what is happening there. That creates a situation in which decent and very often elderly people are going along and behaving very stupidly, but they absolutely are not terrorists.
I wonder whether the Government were all that wise to proscribe Palestine Action as a terrorist organisation. It is an abhorrent organisation, but I really do not think it is within the ambit of terrorism as we normally understand it—but we are stuck with it because it is now the law. However, that does not mean that everybody who is foolish, naive and stupid enough to go out on the streets, very often in bad weather, to yell out rather stupid slogans are themselves terrorists. I am not sure that it brings any praise on the country, and particularly the Government, to have huge numbers of these people arrested. What on earth is going to happen to them? We look rather foolish with this, and I hope that the Government might look with considerable sympathy particularly at Amendment 447, which is the one that I would support.
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)
My Lords, I have listened to the noble and learned Baroness’s very fair presentation of the two sides of that argument. However, we cannot know, because we have no evidence, what the deeper, inner views may be of those people she referred to, who are leaving an event or a protest, or whatever. It is perfectly plausible that they may attend a demonstration but that their views are more extreme than those exhibited at the demonstration. I would therefore be a little bit cautious about not accepting that glorification is the door-opening to the more sinister motives that people can have. We know, from the extent of antisemitism that we have seen in our streets and from what is preached in mosques or liked on social media, that there is a fairly sinister trend in the glorification of terrorism.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
I am very sorry, but I have not entirely understood whether the noble Baroness is disagreeing with me on Amendment 450 or Amendment 447.
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)
I think possibly a bit of both, but Amendment 447 is the one that I would disagree with her on more.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
I find it extraordinary that glorification of terrorism can be supported in any way; it just seems abhorrent. In relation to Amendment 447, I am not entirely objecting to the police arresting people, because they may well arrest people when they are not sure, but if there be a great many people whom the police would recognise as not likely to be supporting terrorism as such, I hope that those people would be released pretty quickly from the police station.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, as always, the rational logic of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has been very helpful in untangling this issue. She has summed up some of my concerns and things that I am not sure about.
The noble Baroness, Lady Foster, has brilliantly articulated her worries about the glorification of terrorism and how it normalises terrorism into everyday life. I think that is valid. She notes that this is based on little knowledge, and little knowledge can be very dangerous. Whatever one thinks about Northern Ireland —and I assure noble Lords that at this end we do not all agree—it was a bloody conflict, and it is not to be treated lightly. Those who simply reduce it to slogans in the way that was described do not know what they are talking about.
In support of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, my concern is that when we get proscription legislation wrong, we also rob the notion of terrorism of its power to shock, of its content, and the danger is that we relativise it and trivialise it. I think a huge amount of damage has been done by putting Palestine Action into the same category as Hamas or ISIS. Even though Palestine Action, as has been described, is an obnoxious or objectionable organisation and should be held to account under the law when it uses criminal damage, I do not think it is a terrorist organisation. Putting those self-indulgent OAP protesters or students into the same camp as Hizb ut-Tahrir calling for jihad or those hate preachers I quoted earlier, for example, seems misplaced. It turns what I consider to be numpty protesters into some sort of heroes in their own mind, and it has captured the imagination.
If you go to universities, you now find that people think that anyone who supports Palestine Action is a free speech warrior who we should all get up and support. They do not understand why I, as a free-speecher, am not supporting it. The problem is that they now all think that terrorism is sitting on a road and saying, “I support Palestine Action”. If only terrorism were sitting on a road and shouting, “I support Palestine Action” or wearing a badge. That is not the content of terrorism, and there is a lack of knowledge about what terrorism is. If people think those people are terrorists, we sell young generations short by them not understanding what we are up against and what the problems are. Proscribing organisations, which is a very important weapon to use in a particular way, is one thing; treating those who simply are vocal in their support of that organisation, as has happened with Palestine Action, can just mean that we conflate slogans and words with terrorist actions or violent actions and empty them of any horror.
The difficulty is that I am torn. When I hear Bob Vylan, Kneecap or those student groups shouting “Internationalise the intifada” or strutting their stuff and cosplaying their support for barbarism, it is sickening and I want something to be done. Listening to the moving speech by the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, you can see that that is what you might want to tackle. It is just that I do not think proscribing Palestine Action did that, and we are now paying the cost for having inappropriately used proscription of an organisation to devalue what we mean by terrorism.
If we no longer have young people in this country who have lived experience of terrorism—sadly, young Iranians do, for example, so let us not concentrate entirely on ourselves—they think going on a demo outside a prison fighting for the hunger strikers inside is as bad as it gets. They do not get it, but I do not think we have helped them get it either, which is why I am nervous about saying that glorification of terrorism in that context should be against the law, because we have to be very careful about what we are making illegal.
Lord Goodman of Wycombe (Con)
My Lords, I wish to speak briefly in support of the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, which I signed. I do so, paradoxically, as someone who has written in the Daily Telegraph, of all places, against the proscription of Palestine Action. My argument was that there is a difference—this is to address the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner—between the intent of the protesters and the nature of the organisation.
There must be some common-sense way of differentiating between a violent organisation such as Palestine Action and Hamas, Hezbollah, ISIS, al-Qaeda and so on. In fact, a way has been proposed, because the noble Lord, Lord Walney, produced a whole report for the last Government suggesting that organisations such as Palestine Action be subject to certain sorts of orders that would separate them out. But that raises the question: what about Hamas, Hezbollah, ISIS, the IRA and so on?
Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)
My Lords, I want to contribute briefly, because we have had some powerful speeches and important contributions. Wherever you stand on the issue of Palestine Action and the arguments around that, one thing that we are all agreed on, as we have heard in this debate, is that the glorification of terrorism is wrong and should be outlawed, because it retraumatises victims and legitimises violence in the eyes of young people today.
The noble Baroness, Lady Foster, has done a great service in raising this issue and tabling this amendment. It is particularly focused on Northern Ireland, although, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said, it is absolutely an issue across the United Kingdom. The thing that concerns me, as the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, referenced, is the inconsistency in approach by the prosecuting authorities and by the police in Northern Ireland and across the United Kingdom in relation to this whole area. Whatever law we may pass or whatever amendment we may put in place to strengthen the prohibition on the glorification of terrorism, what effect does it actually have in reality when it comes to the victims seeing people who are carrying out these acts of glorification and speaking in terms of glorification? Will we actually see a difference in prosecutions and effective action against those who perpetrate these crimes?
When I speak to victims, they of course remember the events that have particularly affected them—we have heard the very powerful speeches by my noble friend Lord McCrea and the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, and all of us in this House from Northern Ireland have either personally experienced acts of terrorism against them or know people who have. The victims want that remembered. They want justice, of course, but they also want not to be forgotten. They want a consistency when it comes to those who glorify these terrible atrocities and acts of violence. They want action to be taken as appropriate, and when they see things being said and done, and nothing happens as a result of it, they lose faith in government, in politics and in democratic processes, and that is why people turn to other means that they think will get something done about such action.
It is very important that we have proper and appropriate laws in place against the glorification of violence or terrorism right across the United Kingdom. What I would ask for is consistency on the part of the prosecuting authorities and the police to take this matter more seriously than they do and have a common approach throughout the United Kingdom.
Lord Bew (CB)
My Lords, I want briefly to express my sympathy in support of the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Foster. The Minister will recall that, some months ago in Grand Committee, we discussed the noble Baroness’s amendment on this question of the glorification of terrorism. I absolutely respect the concerns raised by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and others about ambiguity, which clearly exists in some of these contexts, but for the issues that the noble Baroness talked about, there is no ambiguity—“Ooh ah, up the Ra” means only one thing. There is no ambiguity either in Kneecap—the word itself refers to glorification of a sadistic paramilitary act. When I spoke that day, many Members in the Room had not heard of Kneecap. Since then, Kneecap has become much bigger. I understand completely the difficulty the Minister has now in concluding, but I wish to convey to him this problem. Since we spoke that day, the glorification of terrorism has not abated or weakened; it has actually increased. Entire communities are getting locked into this, and that is a problem that faces this House.
Lord Elliott of Ballinamallard (UUP)
My Lords, briefly, I know this might sound as though it is a Northern Ireland debate, but it is not. I respect and accept the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, saying that this is an issue in England and Wales and more broadly. But we have experience of it—maybe more experience than others, or we may think we have. I stand here having served in the home service security forces in Northern Ireland for 18 years. Colleagues were murdered and friends were murdered. I carried their coffins. What is more, I have seen the devastation of some of those families in the aftermath, when some people lauded those terrorist acts. We see the rewriting of history and the glorification of terrorism—they taunt the families.
To prove that it is a much wider issue than Northern Ireland, back in 2014, two people were jailed for the glorification of the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby. So I accept that it is a much wider issue than Northern Ireland, but I want all noble Lords to understand the experience that the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, and others have of the Northern Ireland situation and what we have seen.
I had a friend murdered back in 1985. That evening, going past their house, people were stopping and jeering and applauding that murder. Is that not the glorification of terrorism? I do not care whether it is the glorification of a terrorist, terrorists or terrorism—to me, it is all the same. If you are glorifying terrorism, that is wrong and should not be allowed. That is the rewriting of history. Even now, we have the taunting of young people because their grandparents, uncles or other family members were murdered. That is wrong and it cannot be allowed to continue. That is why I support Amendment 450.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of Amendments 447 and 448. I also support the spirit of Amendment 450, with one reservation, which I will explain, and which maybe the Minister would have taken in any case.
As far as Amendments 447 and 448 are concerned, I have spoken in several debates about the scope of the Terrorism Act 2000 and the way it works, in particular because of the breadth of the offence under Section 12 of support for a terrorist organisation and the offence under Section 13 of wearing an article or uniform, and the publication of images, as arousing suspicion of support for a proscribed organisation. I spoke, from the point of view of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, about the unnecessarily broad scope of those sections as they stand, and in support of our amendment seeking a statement about the right of peaceable protest in this Bill.
My immediate concern arises, as it arose then, out of the arrest of some 2,700 people at peaceable protests against the proscription of Palestine Action. I take the point entirely that the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, made, that we cannot dig into the minds of those protesters and work out what their motivation was and then create some kind of thought crime that covers their position. What we can do is consider what the right of peaceable protest is and what price we pay for it. It is quite clear that this is not about the rights or wrongs of the proscription of Palestine Action. In supporting these amendments, I am solely concerned, as was the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, with the right to protest and the consequences of the way that the Terrorist Act 2000 works, branding peaceable protests as an offence against that Act, and branding as terrorists protesters who have done nothing more than carry banners or publicly express the view that the proscription is wrong.
I quite agree with the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that there is a massive distinction between the exercise of that right, however foolish those protesters, or some of them, may be and however much we may disagree with them, and branding them as terrorists and comparing them with those who are actually carrying out terrorism, which is, I suggest, not justified. It is not, of course, confined to protests in connection with Palestine Action, but the point that the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, made was also that the consequences for those who have been arrested, be they elderly retired people or students on the threshold of their career, are, in his words, wholly disproportionate. Those are words with which I entirely agree.
Some of those arrested have been charged. The charging process is nowhere near complete, and, as I understand it, the charging will go ahead so long as the proscription lives—the proscription is, of course, the subject of challenge. But if those arrests proceed inexorably to conviction then those people convicted will be branded as terrorists. As for the sickening nature of the slogans they may shout, “Globalise the intifada” to me can mean only one thing, and that is killing Jews for being Jews, and I speak as a Jew, and the phrase, “From the river to the sea”, is wholly unpleasant and has only one meaning. But for students to sit down and listen to and then repeat those slogans at a peaceable protest does not mean that they support acts of terrorism. It means, as the noble Lord said, that they are opposing, and opposing with force, some of the actions of the Israeli Government and of Israeli soldiers in Gaza, which have been, as the British Government and most western Governments have said, absolutely appalling themselves. It does not mean that they are terrorists. The noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, is right, as I said, that we cannot go into their minds to see what their motivation is, but we have to tailor the criminal law to actions, combined with a mental state.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
Would it help the noble Lord if I were to indicate that if and when I bring this amendment back on Report I intend to make it clearer that it is in respect of current proscribed organisations—in other words, terrorist organisations now? I accept the noble Lords’s point about historical context—it is an important point on which I have reflected during the debate—but if the amendment is brought back on Report, we could narrow the ground in terms of glorifying the acts of current proscribed organisations.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
I am extremely grateful to the noble Baroness for her intervention. That would, or could, remove my concern about the amendment about the glorification of past terrorist acts that may subsequently be seen as justified. I will certainly look at any modified amendment that the noble Baroness brings forward. Because I so strongly support everything that she and others have said in support of the spirit of Amendment 450, I would wish to support an amendment that dealt with those possibilities.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, this has been a vigorous and wide-ranging debate, dealing with very difficult questions. I thank my noble friend Lord Hailsham for his amendments. Regretfully and unfortunately, I have to disappoint him by stating that I cannot support them because I believe they would significantly weaken the effectiveness of our counterterrorism legislative framework at a time when the threat we face is persistent and evolving. In the words of my noble friend Lord Goodman, there is a darkening context.
The amendments would insert an intent requirement, where Parliament has deliberately chosen not to do so. Sections 12 and 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000 created offences that were crafted to disrupt terrorism at an early stage to prevent radicalisation and normalisation, and to give practical assistance long before violence is carried out. That preventive purpose would be undermined if the prosecution were required, in every case, to prove a specific intent to encourage or to enable a terrorist act.
It is also important to be clear that the current law already contains safeguards, especially in the court process. Prosecutorial discretion, a public interest test and judicial oversight all ensure that these offences are not applied casually or indiscriminately. I entirely accept the point from the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, that these must be applied consistently. The suggestion that individuals are routinely prosecuted and tried without regard to context or fairness is not borne out.
On a different note, I support Amendment 450 from the noble Baroness, Lady Foster. The glorification of terrorism, in all cases, is abhorrent. We have seen such glorification, from certain quarters, of the IRA and Hamas, which serves only to normalise such atrocities. I simply cannot add to the power of the contribution made by the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, and indeed by other noble Lords who spoke in favour of her amendment, which I simply cannot add more to, except to say that I support it and I look forward to hearing the Government’s response.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, beginning with the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb.
Proscription is one of the most powerful counterterrorism tools that we have. The UK’s proscription regime was established through the Terrorism Act 2000, which noble Lords are aware of, and there is a statutory process for it. Under that Act, the Home Secretary may proscribe an organisation if she believes it is concerned with terrorism. An organisation may be concerned with terrorism if it commits or participates in acts of terrorism, prepares for terrorism, promotes or encourages terrorism, or is otherwise concerned in terrorism. Decisions to proscribe an organisation are not taken on a whim; they are taken on advice from the security services and significant intervention from Home Office officials to examine the case. They are not taken lightly. They are ideologically neutral. They judge an organisation on its actions and the actions it is willing to deploy in pursuit of its cause.
I say neutrally that Palestine Action was deemed to be over the threshold of the 2000 Act and, on advice to the Home Secretary, to be an organisation concerned with terrorism. Once an organisation is proscribed—this House and the House of Commons overwhelmingly supported that proscription—it is an offence to be a member of it, to invite support for it, to make supportive statements, to encourage others to join or support it, to arrange or address meetings to support it in furthering its activities, and to display, carry or wear articles in a way that would arouse suspicion that one is a member or supporter of it.
Amendments 447 and 448 from the noble Viscount would apply to the offences concerning support and the display of articles under Sections 12 and 13. For the same reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, has given, these amendments would ultimately limit these important offences in such a way that they would become largely unusable in practice. I do not believe that that is his intention, but that would be the practical outcome. In relation to the offence of inviting support, it is already established that the offence requires a knowing, deliberate invitation to support. The changes proposed in the amendment would mean an additional burden for the prosecution to overcome.
I have heard comments, including from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that belief in or support for Palestine Action should not cross that threshold. Amendment 447 would import a further mental element, requiring intention. That goes to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, that it is at odds with the requirement to prove beyond reasonable doubt that a person intended to encourage, incite, facilitate or otherwise an act of terrorism. To provide a defence similar to the effect for the prosecution to disprove would again undermine the core element of the offence.
Section 13 is currently a strict liability offence, meaning that there is no requirement to evidence the intent behind the conduct, again as the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, mentioned. It is important that we say to the Committee that free speech is important. The right to criticise the State of Israel and to support Palestine is important. It is also quite right that, if people wish to say that they do not wish to see Palestine Action proscribed, that is also within the legal framework. It is a matter for the police, who are operationally independent, the Crown Prosecution Service and the courts to decide whether a crime has been committed. In particular, the CPS will want to consider, in charging an individual as opposed to arresting them, whether the prosecution is in line with the Code for Crown Prosecutors, which is a vital safeguard that prevents prosecutions from going ahead which are not in the public interest.
I have previously defended in this House the proscription of Palestine Action. The decision was not taken lightly. The police and the CPS have independent action, but I suggest that the noble Viscount’s amendment would, for the reasons mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, undermine the purpose of that. I say to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Lord, Lord Goodman of Wycombe, that those actions have been taken for a purpose. The threshold has been crossed and I suspect that, for those concerned with Palestine Action, more information will come to light as potential future prosecutions continue, which I think will show why those decisions were taken. We have a court case ongoing at the moment. I put that to one side, but that is my defence in relation to the noble Viscount’s proposals.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, this has been a very interesting debate, not least because I seem to have had the effect of uniting the two Front Benches in a common position so far as my two amendments are concerned. There is a huge difference between the glorification of terrorism, which is deeply offensive, and those who demonstrate their hostility to the policies of Israel by holding up a placard. I do not believe they are the same. In time, we must come to restrict the application of Section 12 of the Terrorism Act. That said, we have discussed it sufficiently for this evening, and I hope I will be forgiven if I withdraw Amendment 447.
Crime and Policing Bill
Tuesday 27th January 2026
(3 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-XIII(b) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Thirteenth Marshalled List) - (27 Jan 2026)
Viscount Hailsham
“Proscription process: parliamentary involvement(1) Section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (proscription) is amended as follows.(2) After subsection (3), insert—“(3A) Subject to subsection (3B) the Secretary of State may not make an order under subsection (3) unless prior to making such an order, the Secretary of State has placed before the Intelligence and Security Committee (the ISC) or any committee which by statute may have replaced the ISC (the replacement committee), a statement of the reasons for making the order and the ISC or the replacement committee has published a report regarding that order.(3B) Subsection (3A) does not apply if the Secretary of State is of the opinion that by reason of urgency the requirements of subsection (3A) cannot reasonably be complied with and the Secretary of State has made a statement to Parliament to that effect.(3C) If subsection (3B) applies, the Secretary of State must within seven days of the making of the order, place before the ISC or the replacement committee, a statement of the reasons for making the order and within a reasonable period thereafter, the ISC or the replacement committee must make a report to Parliament.”.”
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 449, I will speak briefly to Amendment 454. I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for her support for Amendment 449. I have a nasty feeling that I may be uniting my noble friend Lord Cameron and the Minister in opposition to my amendments; I will forgive them on this occasion. I am also extremely grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for his support on the previous group—I rather hope I might get some support from him on this occasion.
The purpose of Amendment 449 is to ensure that Parliament has as much information as possible before a decision to proscribe is made. I accept, of course, that it is not possible for Ministers to disclose in general debate all the information which they may have received in private and which, in their opinion, justifies proscription. I worked in the Home Office and the Foreign Office for around seven years, so I am under no illusions. Of course, the Minister, who has a similar track record, will be under no illusions either.
Having regard to the serious consequences of proscription, we need to do all that we reasonably can to ensure that, when a proscription order is made, Parliament is as well informed as it can be and that the justification for the order is well based. Otherwise, we are wholly reliant on the judgment of officials and Ministers. Without being unduly personal, on matters of such importance, I do not wish to be exclusively reliant on the judgments of Boris Johnson, Suella Braverman or Liz Truss—however informed and considered some may suppose them to have been.
Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee could provide a way forward. Amendment 449 would create a precondition to the Secretary of State’s ability to make a proscription order. Proposed new subsection (3A) would require that, if circumstances allow, before the Secretary of State makes an order, the Secretary of State must place before the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament
“a statement of the reasons for making the order”
and, in such circumstances, a report of that committee must be published before the order is made. I accept that there may be circumstances in which the urgency of the matter demands more immediate action. Proposed new subsections (3B) and (3C) address that eventuality. In effect, the procedure would be the same as that provided for in proposed new subsection (3A), but it would be retrospective.
In either event, the Intelligence and Security Committee will be able to examine the stated reasons in much greater detail than the House could do in public session. A degree of scrutiny and interrogation should be possible. The report of the ISC could be very important, reassuring Parliament as to the propriety of the order if that is the opinion of the ISC, or alerting Parliament if the ISC is not supportive of the order. I do not pretend that this would be a complete safeguard. However, it would certainly be an improvement. On that basis, I commend Amendment 449 to the Committee.
On Amendment 454, I think I can anticipate the arguments that will be advanced by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. She and I agree on an awful lot, and I know I shall support her on this matter.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, I declare an interest as a member of your Lordships’ Delegated Powers Committee. Of course, I speak for myself only but very much with those concerns in mind.
As noble Lords have heard from my friend who is also noble—but I cannot call him a noble friend—the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, I will speak to his Amendment 449, which I support, and my Amendment 454. I am grateful for his support and, on the latter amendment, for that of my noble friend Lord Hain, who is very sensibly not in his place at this hour. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame.
In contrast with the previous group—I am sad that there are not more participants from the previous group here—these are modest process amendments that are capable of uniting everyone who spoke for and against the various amendments in that group. Both these amendments are about increasing parliamentary involvement in and scrutiny of exceptional executive power—in particular, the power to proscribe an organisation as a terrorist organisation under Section 3 of the Terrorism Act.
To be clear—this may surprise some Members of the Committee—I believe that such powers are capable of being proportionate. In a democracy, no one should be allowed to organise a private army, in particular one that targets humans, and a democracy is proportionately able to respond by proscribing a terrorist organisation. It is none the less an awesome and exceptional power for the Executive to say that people will be prosecuted not just for their terrorist actions but for fairly broad and loose associations with people who may or may not be guilty of terrorist offences.
Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I have added my name to both amendments in this group for the reasons that have been so eloquently set out by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti.
The first point is that proscription is a very significant power for the Executive. The consequences are severe. Conduct that was hitherto perfectly lawful becomes not only unlawful but criminal. For that reason, we need to have proper checks and balances. The second reason, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, is that these amendments are actually quite modest. They do not try to limit or amend the scope of the criminal offences, which was the case with some of the amendments perhaps in the previous group; all they try to do is increase parliamentary scrutiny. To me, the case for doing so seems unanswerable.
The third point is that, as we know, there has been an intense debate on the proscription of Palestine Action, and views on that may differ. But my opinion is that, whichever view one takes, one should be able to support both these amendments—particularly in light of the very interesting exchange in the previous group between the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, where the idea that seemed to emerge was that there might be some way forward on tightening “glorification” by reference to proscribed organisations.
But if the reference point is proscribed organisations, we must be absolutely certain that we are getting proscription right, and we must be able to interrogate fully any proscription that the Government decide. For that reason, I think there is simply no answer to Amendment 454. We need to have one order per organisation that the Government intend to proscribe. It is no answer to say that this would place an undue burden. Civil servants will obviously have to spend considerable time putting together the evidence for proscription and, as part of that, requiring them to prepare two different orders is not asking for too much. Nor is it an answer to say that this would be an increased burden for Parliament.
When we vote on or scrutinise a proscription, we take a decision of great importance, for the reasons I have mentioned before. We should not be put again in a position, as was the case a few months ago, where we have to decide on the proscription of very different organisations—where, on the one hand, you have organisations for which the case for proscription is probably uncontroversial, and on the other hand you have examples of organisations for which there is objectively an argument to be had as to whether proscription is a good idea or not. For these reasons, I give my full support to both these amendments.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, I too support both amendments. I support Amendment 449 because proscription is a huge power. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, used the word “awesome”, and it is indeed an awesome power: it can turn ordinary behaviour into crime. Parliament should not be asked to rubber-stamp those decisions without proper scrutiny. Proscription can criminalise membership, association and even everyday activity, yet at present these decisions are made almost entirely within the Executive, with very limited parliamentary oversight, and that concentration of power carries risks. It leaves decisions open to mistakes or overreach and of course it can also undermine public confidence in counterterrorism law.
Parliament and the public need assurance that proscription is based on sound reasoning, reviewed independently and grounded in evidence. One thing we did not really have when we were asked to proscribe Palestine Action was evidence. Since then, we have had hints of various kinds, telling us that we will see when the evidence comes out and we will understand why that proscription was justified. But so far, I would argue, it has not been justified. Independent scrutiny is particularly important when the intelligence underpinning a proscription is classified and supposedly cannot be shared widely. Where decisions are urgent or complex, having a committee report afterwards helps Parliament and the public understand the reasoning and reinforces the legitimacy of the action taken.
I would have also supported this going further to address the recommendation of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson KC—the noble Lord, Lord Anderson—that proscriptions should be time-limited and expire after a set period, such as two years, unless Parliament is asked to proscribe yet again. As we know, once proscription has happened, in effect it lasts forever. Decisions this serious should not be made in private and left to drift. Parliament deserves a proper look at the evidence, so I hope that the Minister is going to bring us the evidence, as he keeps hinting in various speeches.
Amendment 454 is an excellent amendment, I have to say, because, when we proscribed Palestine Action, it was bracketed with two groups. I cannot even remember their names. They were right-wing, fascist organisations, and we had absolutely no choice about that. Had we dealt with each of those individually, we could have made a much better decision, I would argue. It seems that we just have to trust the Government—and who trusts the Government any more? Certainly not me, and many of the general public agree with me. Asking us to trust the Government is not the way it should be. It really should have better oversight.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
My Lords, I shall say a few words in support of Amendment 449 from the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and Amendment 454 from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. I do so on the grounds, really, that—
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
Apologies, I did not mean to put the noble Baroness off, I was just trying to recall whether she was here for the start of the group.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
I came in just as the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, got up.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
I was simply going to say that I agree with the reasons given by noble Lords, but in particular I want to stress the importance of having checks and balances in the constitution. We need, particularly where our constitution is unwritten, to pay particular attention to the ability of Parliament to scrutinise the Executive. It is so simple for the Executive to bring in proscription, but it must be equally simple for Parliament to be able to scrutinise it and afford a proper check.
It is really for that reason that I support these amendments, at a time when constitutional liberty is under threat, on both sides of the Atlantic, from executive power, whatever the Government in power. We heard earlier this evening from a US Supreme Court judge who spoke of this happening under recent Presidents, going back some time, and it has happened under Governments of all complexions here. Therefore, I commend these important amendments because of the centrality of the separation of powers.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, used the phrase “getting proscription right”. He is absolutely right. I support both amendments. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, was correct in saying that we have to have in respect of Amendment 449 more independent parliamentary scrutiny, and that goes for Amendment 454 as well. The noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, was right to say that we are looking for checks and balances. These amendments are concerned with democracy, with Parliament having a say and the opportunity to consider government proposals.
Amendment 449, which was economically and persuasively moved by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, is plainly sensible. Involving the ISC and for the Government to give reasons to the ISC before proscribing an organisation would increase the confidence of Parliament—all sides of both Houses—in the Government’s decision. As everyone has said, proscribing is a serious and important decision on a matter of great significance for the rights of the individual, the rights of groups and the public at large. I suggest that it would not just increase the confidence of Parliament to have ISC involvement; it would also increase the confidence of the public in these decisions.
The ISC is, of course, independent, parliamentary—it involves Members of both Houses—and cross-party. That seems to me, and I suggest is, an important reason in favour of ISC being involved. It is entirely consonant with the Minister’s assurance on the last group that the Government act on the advice of the security services in making decisions on proscription. That is as it should be—we would expect them to act on advice—but to involve the confidential parliamentary committee in that process can only improve the procedure.
I refer to another point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. We should always be aware of the dangers of an overmighty Executive not being as reasonable with their opponents and with others as we are used to expect. Things may change. Looking across the water at the United States, as the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, did, shows us that respect for democratic independence and procedures is fairly shallow and has to be protected. We should not be complacent about the possible dangers, and I suggest that this is a way of showing that lack of complacency. For the reasons of an added layer of democracy and added independence, the involvement of the ISC would add to our national security and not detract from it.
I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, when she said that there could be no reasonable opposition to Amendment 454. The idea that orders should be able to relate not to a single organisation but to multiple organisations is simply absurd. Palestine Action was proscribed alongside two other organisations. One was the Maniacs Murder Cult, a “white supremacist, neo-Nazi organisation”—I am using the Government’s description. It had claimed a number of violent attacks globally; it supplied, and supplies, instructional materials explaining to followers, mostly online, how to conduct terrorist attacks.
The other organisation was Russian Imperial Movement, another white supremacist organisation, described by the Government as “ethno-nationalist”, with the aim of creating a new Russian imperial state. That may sound eccentric, but it runs a paramilitary organisation called Partizan, which increases its adherents’ capacity for terrorist attacks. Indeed, two Swedish nationals attended Partizan in 2016 before committing a series of bombings in Gothenburg, Sweden, with devastating results.
The idea that Parliament—this House and, more importantly, the other place—should be given no choice but to approve or to deny proscription of all is, frankly, an insult to Parliament. MPs and Peers were given no choice but to approve or deny proscription of all. I know that MPs on the Liberal Democrat Benches were deeply offended by that denial of choice. It is illogical, undemocratic and unfair. It demeans Parliament not to allow individual MPs to exercise a fair choice over whether to proscribe a particular organisation. These decisions need to be taken individually and on their own merits, having regard to the arguments for and against proscription of each organisation concerned as it arises. The procedure for that would be simple, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, explained. It should not be a job lot put before Parliament as an executive decision, with no choice given to Parliament except the choice to endorse the job lot or not.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, this has been a short but very interesting debate. Amendments 449 and 454 concern the important and sensitive process by which organisations are proscribed under the 2000 Act.
Amendment 449 in the name of my noble friend Lord Hailsham raises a legitimate question about parliamentary involvement and scrutiny in the proscription process. As we have heard, the ISC has deep expertise, access to classified material and a well-established role in scrutinising national security matters. There is therefore an understandable attraction in ensuring that it has sight of and can report on the reasons for a proposed proscription before an order is made, except in cases of genuine urgency.
It may be, though, that the ISC would be receiving the same advice on issues of proscription from the same organisations, be they the police or the security services, as the Government, so there might be an issue of duplication. It is also important to recognise that proscription decisions often need to be taken swiftly in response to fast-moving threats. The Executive have to retain the operational flexibility to act decisively to protect public safety. I accept that the amendment recognises this through its “urgency” exception, but we need to consider very carefully where the balance should lie between enhanced parliamentary scrutiny and the need for speed and discretion in matters of national security. I genuinely look forward to hearing the Minister’s view on whether the existing framework already strikes the right balance. If there is scope for a greater formal role for the ISC, that cannot impede operational effectiveness.
Amendment 454, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, addresses another important aspect of the proscription regime. As we have heard, it would require each proscription order to relate to a single organisation only. It seeks to strengthen parliamentary scrutiny and accountability. I can understand the argument presented, as usual, so eloquently by the noble Baroness, but I also recognise that these are ultimately matters for the Executive and not the legislature. I await with anticipation the views of the Minister on both amendments.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, for tabling Amendment 449 and my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti for tabling Amendment 454. I will try to answer the points raised on both those amendments.
The amendment from the noble Viscount would require engagement with the Intelligence and Security Committee in advance of proscription orders being made. As somebody who served on the Intelligence and Security Committee for five years, I know that it is a trustworthy vehicle which does not leak, and which deals with security service issues from both Houses in a responsible manner. In the light of that, the noble Viscount will be aware that my right honourable friend the Security Minister, following the Palestine Action discussion we had, has written to the Intelligence and Security Committee and expressed his intention to write to the committee ahead of future proscription orders being laid in Parliament and, if the committee wishes it, to give a privileged briefing on the reasons why the proscription is being laid so that the committee can, in confidence, have that detailed information before it. I think that meets the objectives of the noble Viscount’s amendment.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
I am grateful to the Minister. That is indeed a good step forward but it falls slightly short, in that I do not think he is telling your Lordships’ Committee that the committee will be making a report to Parliament.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The time gap between informing and debate would be for the Security Minister to determine. In most cases, I would expect—without wanting to put a burden on my noble friend Lord Beamish as the chair of the committee—that the chair would probably want to contribute to that debate and would be able to inform the House if they felt there were issues they wished to draw to the attention of the House. Although my noble friend Lord Beamish is the chair who sits in this House, there will be a senior Member from the House of Commons who would also be able to answer to the Commons on any issue. So the noble Viscount is right, but the spirit of his amendment is met—though obviously that is for him to make a judgment on.
Amendment 454 had support across the Committee from the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Verdirame, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti asked for proscription orders to include one single organisation at a time. Historically, proscription orders have come in groups on many occasions. At the beginning of 2001, some 20 groups were proscribed in one order that took effect under the first statutory instrument made under that order. Four more organisations were proscribed on 1 November 2002, 15 were prescribed on 14 October 2005, and so on. In the interests of parliamentary time and the speed and flexibility needed to put those orders down, that was the case then and it was the case when we tabled the order with three organisations in June and July last year in this House and, at the same time, in the House of Commons. Security issues sometimes require a speedy response, and those issues were dealt with in that way for that reason.
I will give my noble friend one more reason, which she may want to reflect on. There is a threshold for proscription under the 2000 Act. Whether noble Lords like it or not, the decision of the Government was that the three organisations bundled together in the debate in July of last year had all met that threshold. I was available, as was the Security Minister in the House of Commons, to answer questions about each and all those organisations. The advice from the security services and officials, and ministerial examination and judgment of that advice, was that all those organisations crossed the threshold. Individuals might have wanted to vote against each one individually, but if they had, they would have been voting against exactly the same principle in each case—that the organisation had crossed the threshold.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister as always for his patience, fortitude and engagement but, with respect, the historical precedent does not answer the constitutional question: would it not be better for Parliament to have an up-and-down vote? Given that Parliament has already decided that it has a role in approving these proscriptions, would it not be a more meaningful approval if it was one organisation per order? Multiple orders can be drafted and signed on the same day. I say this having worked as a Home Office lawyer, including on terrorism matters.
Finally, I say to my noble friend, who I respect so much: this is not about him and it is not about the current Home Secretary. This is about the future and about the checks and balances that noble Lords opposite spoke about so passionately.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to my noble friend. I just say to her that the fact that there were three organisations bundled together in July last year did not stop a significant number of Members of Parliament, nor a significant number of Peers, voting against the order. They may have voted against it because they did not like Palestine Action, but I put to my noble friend again that Palestine Action had crossed exactly the same threshold as the two other organisations in that order. The judgment is not a judgment about Palestine Action. It is a judgment about the intents of Palestine Action, in line with the intents of the other two organisations in that order, which the noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred to, and which gave an explanation of their actions.
I was accountable at this Dispatch Box to say that those three organisations had crossed the threshold. Here was an order that we put together for speed and efficiency—accept my logic or do not. Both Houses accepted the logic. Some people voted against, maybe because of Palestine Action, but in voting against Palestine Action the logic was that they were voting against exactly the same tests that had been put against the other two organisations. That is the point. I give way.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
I ask the Minister to consider two points. First, the procedure that he has described involves an executive decision that the organisations had crossed the threshold and an executive decision that they ought to be proscribed. That is not a parliamentary decision; far from it. If you are going to give Members of Parliament a meaningful vote, they have to have an opportunity to express a view on each of those proscriptions. That is the first question.
The second question is rather simpler. We have a parliamentary service of unparalleled quality. It would not be beyond the wit of that service, or generally, to devise a system of degrouping whereby, if either one or a number of MPs or Peers wanted the orders to be drawn up separately, they could be drawn up separately. If everybody was content that a bundle of 24, 15 or three orders could be dealt with together, they could be dealt with together. That would involve minimal consultation and a slight procedural adjustment, but it would involve the importation of fairness and good sense into a procedure.
Certainly, those people I know who voted against the proscription of the three had nothing against the proscription of the other two but were concerned that they were being told they had to vote against all three if they wished to argue against the proscription of the Palestine Action group. I ask the Minister to accept that that is unfair and a denial of parliamentary democracy.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I give way also to the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame.
Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)
Maybe the Minister can take all the questions in one go. The threshold may be the same, but there are three separate decisions and each decision is based on different evidence. We are dealing analytically with three distinct decisions, and that is the reason why there should be three different orders.
I suspect that the historical examples to which the Minister referred—I am not certain; perhaps he can explain—were cases in which all the various organisations were in the same context, whether it was organisations related to Afghanistan, ISIS or al-Qaeda. What we had in the case of Palestine Action was the lumping together of very different organisations: a British extreme movement and two white supremacist Russian movements. They have nothing to do with each other, and the evidence is different. Does the Minister accept that, in those circumstances in particular, where we are dealing with very different decisions based on different evidence, there should be an order per organisation?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Verdirame, have made fair and reasonable points. We group them for speed and efficiency, and historically they have been grouped because we want to clear a number of proscription orders at the same time. However, I put this point on the table for the Committee: if, in the light of the advice of the security services of officials, ministerial interrogation of that and, now, the added locus of the Intelligence and Security Committee having sight of and being able to be briefed on those orders, we brought three orders into one order, the threshold remains the same, and that threshold will have been crossed by those organisations. It might be that its members have a sympathy for the Palestinian cause rather than the Russian nationalist cause, but the threshold decided by ministerial jurisdiction, on advice from officials and the security services, is the same: they have crossed the threshold of the 2000 Act for a terrorist organisation. Making them separate orders would still mean that Members of both Houses would have to vote and say, “We do not accept that they have crossed the threshold”. That is a different decision.
I am conscious of time. Those points have been made. I hope I have put the Government’s case with the response I made to the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and with my “take it or leave it” explanation of the points on disambiguation of the orders. Members can reflect on it. In the meantime, I ask the noble Viscount to withdraw his amendment.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, I am conscious that the Committee wants to make progress, so I will be brief. I hope the Minister realises that we are not revolutionaries here; we are all parliamentarians. He refers to the threshold, but the truth is that Parliament never knows the detailed reasons. It is because we do not know the detailed reasons that we want to involve the ISC to a greater extent than the Minister has suggested. I would like to push him to say that there will be a report whenever possible, more than just a statement from the chairman.
As to the noble Baroness’s amendment, it is difficult to see any disadvantage to what she suggests. All in or all out is not a good way forward. The Minister talks about efficiency and speed, in his charming way. However, the truth is that we could lay three orders in one day, each with a separate object; that would be a proper way forward. That said, with your Lordships’ permission, I withdraw Amendment 449.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“Prevention and investigation measures: online information(1) Paragraph 7 of Schedule 1 to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (terrorism prevention and investigation measures: electronic communication devices) is amended as follows.(2) In sub-paragraph (4), after paragraph (e) insert—“(ea) the inspection of any online account accessed by means of a device;”. (3) After sub-paragraph (4) insert—“(4A) The “inspection” of a device, or an online account accessed by means of a device, includes—(a) accessing the device or the online account,(b) examining information held on the device or accessed by means of the online account, and(c) extracting such information.”.(4) After sub-paragraph (6) insert—“(7) An “online account” means an account by means of which information held on a service provided by means of the internet is made accessible.(8) The reference in this paragraph to “extracting” information includes reproducing it in any form.”.(5) Paragraph 8 of Schedule 7 to the National Security Act 2023 (prevention and investigation measures: electronic communication devices) is amended as follows.(6) In sub-paragraph (4), after paragraph (e) insert—“(ea) the inspection of any online account accessed by means of a device;”.(7) After sub-paragraph (4) insert—“(4A) The “inspection” of a device, or an online account accessed by means of a device, includes—(a) accessing the device or the online account,(b) examining information held on the device or accessed by means of the online account, and(c) extracting such information.”.(8) After sub-paragraph (6)—“(7) An “online account” means an account by means of which information held on a service provided by means of the internet is made accessible.(8) The reference in this paragraph to “extracting” information includes reproducing it in any form.”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment provides that a measure imposed under Schedule 1 to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 or Schedule 7 to National Security Act 2023 may include conditions relating to the inspection of an online account accessed by means of an electronic communication device the use of which is restricted under the measure.
“Threshold for offences to be considered as terrorism-related: review(1) Within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must establish a review into what the effect would be of raising the threshold of offences which can be considered as terrorism-related offences under the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021.(2) The review specified in subsection (1) must report within nine months of its establishment.(3) Within one month of the day on which the report is published, it must be laid before Parliament, and the relevant Minister must table a motion for debate in each House on the report’s conclusions.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the government to review how raising the threshold for classifying offences as terrorism-related (under the 2021 Act) has impacted sentencing. The review must be completed within a set timeframe, reported to Parliament, and debated in both Houses.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I have considered this amendment while preparing for today’s debate. It calls for a review, within a timeframe, of how raising the threshold for classifying offences of terrorism related under the 2021 Act has impacted sentencing. Considering that a review is under way by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, it seems to be a waste of time to call for a review that is plainly within his terms of reference and will be within a timeframe after this Act has passed into law, so I do not propose to proceed with this amendment. I have spoken to the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones and Lady Doocey, about this, who share the amendment with me, and they are content to go along with me. I do not know whether the procedure is now that I simply do not move the amendment or that I withdraw it.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Finlay of Llandaff) (CB)
I think the amendment has been proposed with the wording on the Marshalled List and the noble Lord has spoken to it, but he may now wish to withdraw it.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe
“Submarine Telegraph Act 1885: amendmentIn section 3(2)(a) of the Submarine Telegraph Act 1885 (punishment for violation of Article 2 of Convention), omit from “penal” to the second “imprisonment” and insert “imprisonment for a term not exceeding 15 years and to a fine at level 5 on the standard scale”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to increase the punishment for sabotaging an undersea cable to a 15-year prison sentence, in addition to an unlimited fine, in the light of their status as critical national infrastructure.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 454C seeks to increase the punishment for sabotaging an undersea cable to a 15-year prison sentence and an unlimited fine. This constitutes critical national infrastructure and we need a stronger deterrent, I believe—as do one or two others from the Back Benches who have probably been caught out by the loss of the previous amendment.
Interestingly, one of Rishi Sunak’s early successes was a pamphlet on the subject for Policy Exchange, which he wrote with Admiral James Stavridis of the US Navy, a former NATO Supreme Allied Commander. Written in 2017, it helped to propel him into office and to his extraordinarily rapid advancement. As he said:
“While few realise it, our ability to transmit confidential information, to conduct financial transactions and to communicate internationally all depend upon a global network of physical cables lying under the sea”.
The admiral said that
“we have allowed this vital infrastructure of undersea cables to grow increasingly vulnerable”.
A severe attack by a hostile actor
“is potentially catastrophic, but even relatively limited sabotage has the potential to cause significant economic disruption and damage military communications”.
Fast forward to last year, when I took a renewed interest in the subject with the release of a report by the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy. It found, as the Minister concerned said in reply to a question I asked last year, that:
“The UK has plenty of cable routes and good repair processes for business-as-usual breakages”.
However, it also found “particular vulnerabilities” around the UK’s outlying islands, military cables and the financial sector, with a small set of “high-value targets”. Onshore infrastructure was also a concern, with links to data centres creating worrying levels of concentration. All this infrastructure could also be targeted in a crisis.
It noted that there were various laws around telecommunications, notably the Submarine Telegraph Act 1885. These have low penalties—£100 for damaging a cable by culpable negligence—with only modest increases possible via secondary legislation. The report concluded that updated and
“tougher criminal liability provisions might also help”.
In response to the report in December, the Government argued that the National Security Act 2023 could be used, with a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, but only if the activity was carried out by a foreign state or at the direction of a foreign state. Where this was not possible, it would be necessary to rely on the 1885 Act.
That Act is plainly inadequate for today’s dangerous situation. As the time is late, I would like to cut to the chase and hope that the Minister might look positively at my simple amendment in these dangerous times. I beg to move.
Lord Cromwell (CB)
My Lords, I will be very brief, and I apologise for arriving a little late to the scene. The intermediate amendment before this one seemed to disappear suddenly and caught me sprinting down the corridors, so I crave your Lordships’ indulgence. I will cut most of what I was going to say, mainly because it has been so well introduced by the noble Baroness.
This is an important amendment, and I support it. These are two-way supply chains of information, and they are as important to us—perhaps more so—as any other supply chain for our national security, our economy and the basic functioning of our society. Those who wish us harm are aware of this, are experimenting with ways of disrupting and damaging these cables and are finding ways to attack even the deepest of them. The Commons debate on the report to which the noble Baroness referred pointed out that deliberate damage can be denied or made to look accidental, and that undersea cables governance falls between eight departments, seven agencies and numerous private sector actors. The need for co-ordinated updating of the legislation is clear. The Government response basically agreed with this.
To conclude, these are perilous times of escalating insecurity, and they highlight how vital yet vulnerable these cables clearly are. Wider legislation may be required in due course—although goodness knows when—but in the meantime, we should act now as legislators in this Bill to update, clarify, and deter interference with, and attack on, this vital infrastructure. I thank your Lordships again for your tolerance.
Earl Russell (LD)
My Lords, I rise briefly to support this amendment. It offers a small change to an historic Act of Parliament, but it relates to the very lifeblood of modern society: the data on which we all depend. The UK is a crucial junction box, with 64 submarine cables; 75% of transatlantic capacity goes through just two cables, landing in Cornwall.
Clearly, this Act was designed for a very different time, and the penalties are not a deterrent and have not been fully updated, despite the Act having been updated in other ways. We have no hesitation in recognising the seriousness of undersea cable sabotage, as has been spoken to already. These incidents are increasing in the grey zone conflicts, and they can have serious consequences for our everyday ways of life.
The deterrents are not in place; this Act needs to be updated. This amendment addresses a real problem. The maximum term for wilfully damaging undersea cables would be up to 15 years, coupled with “to a fine at level 5”. That would send a stronger signal. It would align more clearly with legislation that is in place to govern other critical infrastructure—national infrastructure—including undersea energy and other critical things that we depend on.
We see this amendment as serving two purposes. The first is as a sensible tidying-up measure—an interim step, I guess—to remove an obvious anachronism from a still-operating statute. Secondly, it would serve notice that we await the more comprehensive regime that is also clearly required. We see this as an interim measure and an encouragement to the Government to bring forward a more comprehensive framework to deal with this problem.
I have more of my speech but, considering the time, I will leave it at that. We feel that this is just and proportionate. There are some issues about extraterritoriality and scope, but I will leave those for another time. Generally, the Government should accept this and view it as a stepping stone towards clarifying this area of law and making sure that we have the proper penalties and security for our vital infrastructure.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for tabling this amendment and all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I also express my thanks for the diligent work of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. Its report into the vulnerabilities of our undersea cables is a brilliant piece of work and makes for sobering reading.
As the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, said, these are perilous times and there never has been a more important time to consider the measure proposed, given that cables are the invisible backbone of much of our economy, security and everyday life. As we have heard, they carry the vast majority of international data traffic, underpin financial transactions, connect critical services and link the UK to our international partners.
The committee’s report underlined that while the UK has plenty of cable routes and good repair processes for what it phrased as “business-as-usual breakages”, there are distinct vulnerabilities particularly where multiple cables cluster, or connect to key landing stations, and in the links servicing our outlying islands. I represented the Highlands and Islands region in the Scottish Parliament for eight years or so, and that last point is very real to me on a personal level because these are not abstract concerns. They are very real. Damage to a cable connecting the Shetland Islands in 2022 disrupted mobile, landline and payment services for days.
As we have heard, despite these vulnerabilities, the legal framework has not kept pace with the security environment. The principal instrument remains the Submarine Telegraph Act 1885. The deterrent effect of criminal sanctions matters. As the committee observed, the UK cannot simply assume that hostile actors would refrain from targeting these cables in a future crisis, and the Government have to be prepared for the reality that hostile states or proxy actors may exploit these vulnerabilities deliberately.
In conclusion, I add that increasing penalties is certainly not the only measure the Government should be taking. The threats we face are far more wide ranging than simple criminality. There is a need for a whole of government approach to protecting critical infrastructure such as submarine telecommunications—that would involve the MoD, DBT, DESNZ and the Home Office. But this amendment is a start, and I hope that the Minister will listen and take action.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, this Government take the security of our subsea cables extremely seriously. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, for raising this issue. It is crucially important and right that it is debated and achieves the attention it deserves.
As the noble Baroness said, the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy recently conducted a public inquiry into the security of the UK’s subsea cables, and it shone a spotlight on this issue. Following that inquiry, in November 2025 the Government formally committed to increasing penalties for those who damage subsea cables where the activity cannot be linked to a hostile state. As the noble Baroness rightly says, where it can be linked to a hostile state, a life sentence is available through the National Security Act.
I hope that the noble Baroness, for whom I have a great deal of respect, will understand why the Government are not able to support her amendment today. I am sure she will readily agree that penalties are not the only issue here. It is essential that any strengthening of the law is done carefully and not piecemeal, with full consideration for our fishing and wider maritime sectors. Any potential changes would need to be proportionate and workable for those sectors, and that requires proper consultation.
One further aspect about the non-criminal elements of this that may reassure your Lordships’ Committee is that cable breaks happen regularly in UK waters, given the busy nature of our shallow seas. But the UK’s international connectivity is highly resilient, and we have a well-developed system of civil litigation that ensures that cable owners are reimbursed when a break occurs. I hope that, for all these reasons, the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, it is late, but I am grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, the noble Earl, Lord Russell, and my noble friend the opposition spokesman Lord Cameron of Lochiel, with his compelling Scottish perspective.
Given the vulnerabilities that have been identified, and identified successively, most recently by the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy’s report—which nobody is disagreeing with—it is important that something is done. The Minister rightly refers to the possibility of civil litigation. However, for something of this seriousness, given the scale of the threat that we now have in the waters around our country, that is not good enough.
I will reflect, but I hope the Government will take this away and perhaps come forward with their own amendment. That would obviously be ideal. Perhaps we can have some further discussions about how we solve this problem sooner rather than later. I note the point that the Minister made about fisheries and so on, but that feels like an excuse. I have been a Security Minister and, normally, when you have a big security issue, you try to take steps to mend matters as quickly as you can, as has been done with previous legislation. For today, I will beg leave to withdraw the amendment, but I might come back to this on Report.
Crime and Policing Bill
Monday 2nd February 2026
(3 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-XIV(Rev) Revised fourteenth marshalled list for Committee - (30 Jan 2026)
Baroness Meyer
Baroness Meyer (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 455 in my name seeks to preserve legal protection for unborn babies who could survive outside the womb. Clause 191 would fully decriminalise abortions by stating that a woman would commit no offence in relation to her own pregnancy. In doing so, it would disapply not only Sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 but the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929. This is a serious change. Much of the attention has focused on the 1861 Act, with less attention given to the removal of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, which protects viable unborn babies. When the 1929 Act was passed, viability was understood to be around 28 weeks. Today, it is generally around 24 weeks, but medical advances mean that some babies can survive from around 22 weeks. Our abortion law recognises viability, and this is precisely why there is a time limit.
Clause 191 would remove protections where the death of a viable baby was caused by the mother, meaning that even a full-term baby could be aborted by the mother with no legal consequences. A baby’s protection would then depend not on whether it could survive independently but on who ended its life. This cannot be right. Under the current law, a woman at 32 weeks’ pregnancy—when a baby is fully formed—who contacts an abortion service may receive support, counselling or discuss adoption, but an abortion cannot be performed. Under Clause 191, however, she could obtain pills and end her own pregnancy without breaking the law. The consequence is clear: no prosecution at any stage, for any reason, even when a baby is capable of being born alive. That would overturn the careful balance Parliament has maintained for decades.
My amendment is deliberately modest. It allows the disapplication of Sections 58 and 59 of the 1861 Act but retains the 1929 Act so that the deliberate destruction of a viable unborn child remains an offence. This is not about reopening the wider abortion debate; it is about ensuring that viable babies do not lose their legal protection rights.
There are also practical concerns. Abortion pills are easily obtained and sometimes used dangerously late in pregnancy. Removing all criminal liability removes an important safeguard and may leave coercion and abuse undiscovered. Judges already exercise compassion in the very small number of cases that come before the courts. Clause 191 goes far beyond that by removing accountability altogether. The current law strikes a balance: abortion is permitted up to 24 weeks, and beyond that, only in exceptional circumstances. Removing all limits is to cross a line. Close to birth, the difference between a foetus and a newborn may be a matter of hours, yet one would be fully protected in law, while the other could lawfully be destroyed. We do not allow infanticides of newborn babies, so why should the law treat a full-term unborn baby differently?
This proposal was not in the manifesto and has had no public consultation. Such a profound change deserves scrutiny. Public support for abortion up to full term is very limited, while support for protection after viability is strong.
I do not oppose abortion in all circumstances, but diluting the already limited protection for viable unborn babies is just a step too far. Without limits backed by meaningful legal deterrent, women may come under pressure to terminate pregnancy late in their terms, sometimes against their own wishes or consent. Clause 191 may also facilitate disability-selective abortion and sex-selective abortion, placing unborn girls at particular risk. For that reason, I support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Eaton, to prevent sex-selective abortions, which already exist in this country.
The noble Baroness, Lady Monckton, has tabled an amendment to remove Clause 191 altogether, and I hope it will command wide support. My amendment sits alongside it and ensures that this Committee focuses clearly on what Clause 191 really does and on the rights of viable babies. If we cannot protect children at the very beginning of life, when they are at their most vulnerable, what credibility do we have when we claim to put children first? I therefore urge the Committee to reject the clause. I beg to move.
Baroness Monckton of Dallington Forest (Con)
My Lords, I oppose Clause 191 standing part of the Bill.
Our role as parliamentarians, especially in this House, is to ensure that laws that make it on to the statute book are safe. Good laws require careful thought and prior consideration regarding any unintended consequences. Clause 191 fails to meet these criteria and should not become law. It was hastily added to an unrelated Bill and concerns a proposal that was neither a government manifesto commitment, nor called for by the public, nor subject to even rudimentary scrutiny.
Let me be clear: the law change proposed by Clause 191 does not relate primarily to one’s views on abortion, on which there will be a range of perspectives in this House. The abortion debate is often presented as pitting the rights of a woman against the rights of an unborn child at varying stages of development. It is not accidental that the legal limit for abortion is 24 weeks. That marks roughly the stage at which the baby is fully viable when born. This clause not only fails even to consider that person but would endanger the mother.
Laws exist for a variety of reasons. Sometimes, they exist to deter us from doing things that would cause significant harm to ourselves or others, out of motives that may be devious or simply desperate. The current law prohibiting women from performing their own abortions after 24 weeks is one such law. The existing legal deterrent protects women. For example, if a partner seeks to pressure a woman into an abortion beyond the 24-week limit, a limit which I note is already double that common in most European countries, a woman can currently point to the criminal law as a reason for not doing so. Removing this would make it much harder for vulnerable women to resist such pressure and would be particularly troubling given the dangers of unsupervised self-induced abortions later in pregnancy.
There is a supreme irony that those who claim to support legal abortion on the basis that the alternative would be unsafe—illegal abortions—are now proposing that women can perform such illegal abortions, outside the terms of the Abortion Act, in an unsafe environment. This law change would, in effect, reintroduce back-street abortion, as women would not be able to have terminations in a clinic beyond the 24-week limit but could do so at home, on their own, without the prospect of any subsequent investigation, using pills not designed for use outside of a clinical context beyond 10 weeks. The potential consequences are terrifying.
Baroness Thornton (Lab)
Does the noble Baroness accept that none of these things has happened in Northern Ireland? We changed the law and decriminalised abortion in Northern Ireland several years ago and literally none of the things that she is mentioning has happened there—nor in any of the other 50 countries where abortion is being decriminalised.
Baroness in Waiting/Government Whip (Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent) (Lab)
If the noble Baroness will bear with me, we cannot have an intervention on an intervention. She must allow the response.
Baroness Monckton of Dallington Forest (Con)
I thank the noble Baroness for her intervention.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
I thank the noble Baroness for giving way. Is she aware that, despite the extreme abortion regime that was imposed on Northern Ireland by the other place, there is no telemedicine in Northern Ireland? That is one thing we do not have.
Baroness Monckton of Dallington Forest (Con)
I received a letter from a former paediatric practitioner who is deeply concerned about this proposed legislation. She points out that when babies are legally aborted for medical reasons at over 22 weeks’ gestation, they are first euthanised by lethal injection into the heart. This is recommended by the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists to prevent larger sentient babies from being delivered injured but still alive. She asks what will happen if Clause 191 becomes law, this form of foeticide is not performed, abortion medication is taken and the baby is born alive.
Contrary to claims of supporters of Clause 191, women are not facing lengthy prison sentences for illegal abortions. The most high-profile case in recent years, of a woman who was 32 to 34 weeks pregnant but admitted misleading the British Pregnancy Advisory Service by telling it she was seven weeks pregnant, resulted initially in a short prison sentence that was quickly suspended on appeal. Sarah Catt was convicted in 2012 for a 39-week abortion, having been described by the chief inspector who led the investigation as “cold and calculating”. The judge in the case on appeal, Mrs Justice Rafferty, said:
“Mrs Catt caused the death of a foetus at term … She planned what she did with some care. She ensured that when she delivered the infant, it was in private. Somewhere there is a body”.
Under Clause 191, it would not even be permissible for the police to have investigated such a case. When Tonia Antoniazzi, the proposer of this clause, was interviewed by the House magazine and asked about this case, she said:
“If you can be cold and callous, you need to be helped and you need to be taken out of the criminal system”.
That opens an extraordinary vista.
A tiny proportion of the hundreds of thousands of abortions a year have resulted in women facing prosecution. The solution to these cases is not to decriminalise abortion to term for women in relation to their own pregnancies but rather to restore in-person consultations before women are able to obtain abortion pills, to enable a reliable gestational age check to take place. It is for this reason that I support Amendment 460, tabled in the name of my noble friend Lady Stroud.
Maya Ellis, one of the Clause 191 supporters in the other place, said that a woman should
“not be criminalised for anything to do with or within her body”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/6/25; col. 322.]
This is the case for absolute decriminalisation of abortion in any circumstances, and that is the true intention of the proposers of this clause, but it means that up to full term the viable unborn child would have the moral status of property, just as a slave did in the American Deep South in the 18th century. No one could be criminally liable for the destruction of their own human property. I do not consider this progressive.
We are told that Clause 191 is a moderate change to the law that would not affect the 24-week time limit. However, given that most abortions now take place outside a clinical setting and without an in-person consultation, the 24-week time limit would become redundant. Women could simply tell an abortion provider that they are below the legal limit and, in all likelihood, they would be sent the pills by post.
It is for this reason that a legal deterrent underpinning the 24-week limit is more important in the current context. Clause 191 is not moderate; it is radical. Its effect is to decriminalise abortions of babies up to birth if a woman seeks to induce a termination late in pregnancy by obtaining easily acquired pills.
The Bill is an important and lengthy piece of legislation that we have been debating in Committee over two and a half months. It was not designed, and is not an appropriate forum, to bring further widening of already highly permissive abortion laws. It is astonishing that the Committee is being asked to consider such a far-reaching law with so little prior scrutiny.
Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)
My Lords, my Amendment 456 has the support of the noble Baronesses, Lady Wolf and Lady Falkner, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. I am especially grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Wolf, who unfortunately cannot be here due to a prior commitment overseas.
This is a simple amendment: it would reinstate the offences that Clause 191 would otherwise decriminalise for women acting in relation to their pregnancies. The amendment also provides that criminal proceedings against any woman acting in relation to her pregnancy could not be instituted without the consent of the Attorney-General. Under the current law, a woman may avoid criminal liability if defences such as duress apply. The effect of Clause 191 would be that, regardless of circumstances, it would never be a criminal offence for a pregnant woman to do any act with the intention of procuring her own miscarriage at any stage of the pregnancy. It would, however, remain an offence for any other person to administer drugs or use instruments to cause an abortion. If Clause 191 is adopted, we would end up with a law that simultaneously denies criminal responsibility to the principal—again, regardless of individual intent or circumstances—while maintaining it for others.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, for the very useful meeting that she arranged before Christmas for some of us and the proponents of Clause 191, in particular Ms Antoniazzi MP. As the proponents explained to us, what has prompted Clause 191 is a rise in completely unmeritorious investigations against women. Some of these cases are genuinely appalling. For example, we know of the case of a woman who went into spontaneous premature labour, called for help and instead of being met by medical support was met by the police. While she was still trying to resuscitate her prematurely born baby, even before the paramedics arrived, the police were in the house searching the bins. She was separated from her critically ill baby and investigated for a year for abortion offences, despite medical tests confirming she had not taken any medication.
There are other cases where women have been forced to take abortion pills by an abusive or violent partner, and they were put under criminal investigation while the partner was not. These investigations seldom result in prosecutions and the very few prosecutions hardly ever result in a conviction.
Under our amendment, the consent of the Attorney-General would be required to institute criminal proceedings, not to open an investigation, but there are reasons to believe that this procedural requirement would have a restraining impact on the investigation phase too. The Attorney-General cannot give consent retrospectively. The CPS’s guidance for offences that require AG consent makes it very clear that prosecutors should seek consent before charge.
The current policy for these offences also requires the involvement of senior officials. Before a case is submitted to the Attorney General’s Office for consent, a deputy chief crown prosecutor or deputy head of a central casework division must check that the case has been prepared to an appropriate standard. Following on from that, a lawyer at the Attorney General’s Office will review the application before placing it before the Attorney-General. That lawyer may seek further information or clarification from the relevant prosecutor and their line manager. It is also necessary to ensure that the Attorney-General is allowed sufficient time to consider the case, so that he can make his own assessment.
Finally, for all these offences, the role of the Attorney-General does not end with the consent to prosecution. The Attorney-General will have to maintain an interest in the progress of the case and be kept up to date.
The amendment cannot rule out the risk of an inappropriate or unmeritorious investigation. That risk cannot be ruled out for any offence on our statute book. The amendment seeks to balance competing legal and moral principles, while taking into account the reality of the situation.
The requirement for Attorney-General consent should discourage the police from investigating cases that will not pass muster not only with the CPS at a senior level but with the Attorney-General. The requirement would also offer an opportunity for a tightening of the policy in respect of these offences so that the risk of unmeritorious investigations and prosecutions is further reduced. The amendment does not specify a requirement for the Attorney-General to introduce guidance on the circumstances in which consent would be given, but it is to be expected that such guidance will be published and could make it clear that the bar is, indeed, high.
This is a probing amendment. There are other amendments in this group that I am interested in and inclined to support to mitigate what seems a rather radical approach in Clause 191. It would be of assistance in this debate if the Government could help us understand a bit more about what is really happening with these investigations.
To conclude, I have three brief questions for the Minister. First, what is the latest available data on these investigations, and do the data confirm an increase in criminal investigations against women since 2020? Secondly, how do the Government explain this rise in investigations? Finally, other than Clause 191—which, of course, was not part of the Bill originally—what policy steps have the Government been considering to remedy this problem?
Baroness Thornton (Lab)
My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 461J. I thank my noble friend Lady Goudie, the noble Lord, Lord Patel, and the noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer, for supporting it.
The amendment seeks to add a new clause after Clause 191 that would pardon women who have had a conviction or caution for an offence abolished by Clause 191. Because of the existing 1861 legislation, abortion is classified as a violent crime. The record means that these women will permanently have to declare it as part of a DBS check, thus continuing the damage caused by this offence. It would ensure the removal of women’s details from police systems.
Like Amendment 459C, Amendment 461J seeks to right a wrong and an injustice. Of course, it is not the first time your Lordships have sought to do this, when something which has been unlawful and unjust is abolished. I am referring to the changes of the law on homosexuality and what followed.
The amendments in this very large group that seek to amend or get rid of this clause—passed as it was by a vote of 137 to 379 on a free vote in the Commons—will form the debate this afternoon. For example, Amendment 455, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, seems to profoundly misunderstand what it means, because if abortion remains criminalised after 24 weeks of gestation then, under the current law, only women who have an abortion after 24 weeks of gestation are targeted by the police, even when, in most cases, they have had a spontaneous miscarriage or a stillbirth. That amendment would make no difference to the current cruel situation, but the noble Baroness actually says she wants to get rid of the whole clause anyway.
Amendments 456 and 456A, introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, would, essentially, reverse the change agreed in the Commons and mean that abortion would remain criminalised. But I am aware that some noble Lords who are very concerned about this clause also support reproductive rights for women. We have already had many meetings about this, with the royal colleges and others. I ask that, between now and the next stage, those of us who take the view that reproductive rights are important but have concerns should continue those discussions.
Unlike what the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton, said in her speech on the clause standing part, this clause was not plucked out of thin air in the Commons. It is the product of years and years of trying to mitigate the criminalisation of women under cruel and awful circumstances. There have been entreaties to the DPP, discussions with the policing bodies and discussions with our legal systems, and every single one of them—I could bore the Committee by giving dates and facts—has taken the view that Parliament has to take a view on this matter. This is not something that can be mitigated by changing guidelines or rules. Indeed, Parliament took a view on this and decriminalised abortion in Northern Ireland a few years ago. As I said, this had no detrimental effect.
This clause seeks to ensure that women in England and Wales are no longer subject to year-long investigations and criminal charges—the kind of situation that the noble Lord just explained. Since 2020, around 100 women have faced police investigations. Six have gone to court; one has been sent to prison. The clause will not change the wider abortion law, or the existing time limits of the 1967 Act. It is supported by 50 organisations, including the medical royal colleges, violence against women and girls groups, every group that represents abortion providers in the UK and other women’s organisations. We should discuss our concerns about the clause and whether it does the job we want it to do, but there is support for it. Fifty countries in the world have not criminalised abortion. Why on earth should we in England and Wales?
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, I speak to Amendment 456C, but I support Amendment 456, which was spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame. The purpose of tabling Amendment 456C is to see if a compromise can be achieved between those who favour Clause 191 in its present form and those who are strongly opposed to it.
Late-term abortions are, of course, already lawful if they fall within the permissive provisions of Section 1(1)(b) to (d) of the Abortion Act 1967. Those paragraphs, of course, permit late-term abortions if there is a serious risk to the health of the mother or a serious risk of abnormalities in the unborn child. But Clause 191 goes very much wider than that. It would permit a mother, without any restriction in law, to abort a child right up to the moment of birth. I find it very difficult to make an ethical or moral distinction between killing a child immediately after birth and killing a child immediately before birth. One has been born, the other has not, but I cannot discern any difference in principle.
Lord Patel (CB)
My Lords, can the noble Viscount please assist me? I understand all the legal reasoning that he has put forward. I am not a lawyer, so I cannot challenge any of it. But I ask for his assistance on what actually happens in reality. In reality, lots of mothers lose their baby as a stillbirth. It happens at all periods of pregnancy. A lot of those losses are unexplained, and every health professional has a real concern when it happens, but for decades we have not been able to find reasons for unexplained stillbirths. If a mother, after 36 weeks of pregnancy, has unexpectedly lost her baby and she delivers a stillbirth, under this amendment, if I have interpreted it correctly, if she is reported to have interfered with that pregnancy—even if she did not—she would be made to prove that she was mentally unstable or financially handicapped. In the circumstance that she was neither of those things but had lost her baby naturally and inexplicably, how would the noble Viscount’s amendment work?
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, I agree that all investigations in this matter should be conducted with great sensitivity. I take the noble Lord’s points, but at the end of the day you have to establish a principle. May I complete my point before the noble Lord intervenes further? If there is powerful evidence that the mother has wilfully terminated the birth of a child immediately up to the moment of birth, it is right that Parliament should set out a process whereby she has to be investigated. If she falls within the defence, she will have a defence. I admit that that would not prevent an investigation, but at the end of the day you have to determine where you stand on whether or not this House is really going to guard human life.
Baroness Thornton (Lab)
How will we know? The noble Viscount needs to tell us how you would know that it was not the loss of a baby through natural circumstances? Who will decide?
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
It would be part of the process of investigation. In that context, I sympathise very much with the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, which would provide a further filter. There should be a prosecution only in cases where there has been a clear breach of the law. These are very sensitive matters and need to be conducted sensibly. But we have to stand on principle here.
Lord Winston (Lab)
My Lords, I have the greatest respect for the noble Viscount, but I fear there is a difference between speaking in theory and practical reality. I want to point out that I have certainly killed at least one baby at term myself; possibly two.
There is a condition called ectopic pregnancy. Very occasionally, pregnancies grow outside the womb or motor outside the womb during the course of the pregnancy. They are left outside the uterus, where they leave a huge hole in the abdomen, placing the bleeding mother at grave risk when the placenta is removed. In this situation, without any alternative, I did what I thought was a caesarean section in both cases to find that once I had opened the abdomen, the uterus was not in fact pregnant, but I was faced with a baby outside the uterus with a placenta. One baby was clearly very abnormal, with various limb abnormalities; the other baby looked completely normal. Both babies were delivered and—thank goodness, with the help of my colleagues—we were able to save both mothers’ lives. As the noble Lord, Lord Patel, will agree, the bleeding is a very frightening situation in the operating theatre.
If I may, I will tell the Committee the story of someone who was a patient of mine for about seven or eight years. Laura had a very rare condition—there are many rare genetic conditions—in her case, Lesch-Nyhan syndrome. This is a curious disease which tends to affect only boys but can occasionally affect any foetus. Laura had a series of pregnancies. About four of them ended in miscarriage. She desperately wanted a baby. Eventually, she conceived successfully, although she was often infertile, and finally had a baby. She gave birth to a baby rather prematurely, about four weeks before term, who had Lesch-Nyhan syndrome.
Peter was seriously abnormal. He had all sorts of neurological problems. He was unable to eat properly. He was unable to move properly. As a teenager, he had to be strapped in his wheelchair to prevent him mutilating himself. That did not stop him mutilating himself and eventually he started to bite off his lips and his tongue, so he had to have his teeth extracted, and that was not sufficient. He could not be moved around in his wheelchair, because if he was upstairs he would want to tilt himself downstairs. Peter continued to live a very long time; I do not know exactly when he died, but I think he was about 18.
We could do nothing about this lady, but we realised she had this genetic defect. For a long time, we tried to work out the mechanics of it. We eventually sourced the DNA. It was a particular mutation which occurs in very few families in this country. Mutations such as this occur in different ways in different pregnancies, not infrequently; in this case, her mutation was very difficult to deal with. After eight years of trying, she attempted to have more pregnancies because she desperately wanted to have a baby who was free of disease. The risk to her, of course, would be having another baby who might be handicapped and that, of course, would be an immense hardship for that family. That is often one of the big problems for people who try to terminate or deal with these sorts of conditions. Anyway, she had about a dozen pregnancies and eventually we put back into her uterus an embryo which we thought was normal—there was a great deal of resistance in Parliament at the time to this kind of procedure—but she had a live baby, who fortunately was well and was a boy.
That is another example, but it is also fair to say that there are many situations where you have obstetric abnormalities; for example, a baby born with very severe skeletal abnormalities. That could sometimes be unknown. A woman may not report to have her baby for whatever reason during pregnancy until screening is too late and she has not had ultrasound or any other care. That happens in poor families generally. It is inevitable in any society, however good your medical practice might be.
Sometimes, when close to term, a woman is suddenly found to have an abnormal pregnancy in her uterus, which would prevent labour being successful. A caesarean section would probably result in a dead baby but, alternatively, sometimes these babies have been what we call morcellated: you actually try to disintegrate them because it is the only way you can save the mother’s life, if she is critically ill at that stage.
This is a very serious issue and unless one fully understands that these things are possible, one has to recognise that you cannot—
Baroness O’Loan (CB)
I have the greatest respect for the noble Lord. I wonder whether he will give way; I thank him. The situations which he describes are all provided for in the Abortion Act.
Lord Winston (Lab)
I thank the noble Baroness very much for her point, because I appreciate that she is giving me a brief rest during a very emotional speech in my case. I apologise for it being an emotional speech, but when you have dealt with such patients frequently for many years, you forget exactly how serious this can be.
I have seen many women requesting terminations at all stages of their pregnancies, even very early and sometimes after in vitro fertilisation to get them pregnant. That is an extraordinary issue and you would not expect it to happen, but actually it happens throughout pregnancy. The women have such serious problems which may not show up as the kind of psychological problem that has been described.
I do not believe that any woman goes through a termination of pregnancy lightly. She certainly does not want to damage herself and do her own abortion. That is an extremely rare situation. The risk here is that we are trying to make law which is just impractical, in the real sense of the word, when we have such a range of syndromes and a population in which we cannot in fact diagnose pregnancy all the time, and never will be able to in people, for example, who are very poor or otherwise live in very serious circumstances and are damaged.
Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)
My Lords, the debate that we have just been having illustrates perfectly why the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, is so apt. His amendment would insert a requirement for the Attorney-General’s consent before criminal proceedings could be instituted in these cases, and that consent would require the Attorney-General to examine all the circumstances of the difficult cases we have been discussing in detail.
I have a few brief comments. As we have heard, Clause 191 arose from an amendment to the Bill in the other place but, astonishingly, it received less than two hours’ debate, as I understand it. It was approved without evidence sessions, yet it would be a major change to abortion law. Given that polling apparently reveals that a mere 1% of the public support abortion up to birth, and having regard to the scant debate in the other place, I am hesitant about making such a radical change to abortion law. The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, is the perfect solution. It is a compromise: a balanced amendment which maintains the existing criminal offence but recognises that there may be more finely balanced cases—
Baroness Thornton (Lab)
This is not about abortion up to birth, because the Abortion Act 1967 still stands. It is really important that noble Lords try to be accurate in how they describe this. I am not disputing anything the noble Lord says, except that it is not the case that this is about abortion up to birth. This is about the 1967 Act staying in place and about not criminalising women, is it not?
Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)
That does not detract from the fact that Amendment 456 would create a robust filter, through which prosecutions would have to go before instituting criminal proceedings. That would need the consent of the Attorney-General and without that consent—
Lord Patel (CB)
Can we just clarify what we are talking about? I am tempted to say that those putting forward these amendments are living in a world of fiction, but I am not so rude as to suggest that. I am not suggesting even that they are misguided. I think all these amendments and their proponents are doing this with a total conviction that wrong will be done if this provision gets through, so let us just address what wrong will be done.
The wrong that will be done is that a woman may try to abort or kill her baby at a late gestation or an early gestation. The criminality would be the same because she is doing so outside the 1967 Act. That will be the case, but that is not what the problem is. The problem is that hundreds of innocent women are wrongly accused of a criminal act and sent for police investigation. One person was sent to jail, and 10 of the other 100 that the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, mentioned had further investigations carried out and were then taken to court.
The Whip is trying to accelerate me, but we cannot accelerate unless I can address the issues raised.
Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)
I apologise, but can I remind Members that interventions are short and sweet? But because this is Committee, people can participate in the debate at their chosen point.
Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)
My Lords, to conclude, I do not have long comments on this. The Attorney-General would be there in such cases to examine whether something illegal and wrong has occurred, and he could withhold his consent for a prosecution if he considered that that was not the case. He would look at the particular circumstances. He or she would act quasi-judicially and independently of government.
Amendment 456 strikes a perfect balance and should give reassurance to women who have good cause to have a late termination, while preserving the criminal offence for those cases where a late abortion cannot be justified. It therefore meets Clause 191 half way, and I urge fellow Peers to support it.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
Can I clarify something in relation to the amendment? Very often the women we are talking about are not prosecuted and do not end up in court. The problem is that the process is the punishment—as we know from other instances.
How does the noble Lord deal with the fact that the majority of the women we are talking about—it is still a small group—are having police raids when they have maybe just had a baby? There was a 19 year-old who gave birth, who did not even know she was pregnant, and there was a police raid. Her family were completely disrupted. She was completely distraught and traumatised, and that process went on for six years before she was cleared. This amendment would not solve that, would it?
Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)
I cannot speak to that sort of case, and I entirely agree that it sounds terrible. But the police are there to investigate; that is their job. They have to do it according to rules and codes of practice and, if the system works properly, that sort of case should not arise. At least in this amendment there would be a filter before any criminal prosecution could be instituted.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 460, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud—who very much regrets that she is unable to be here today—to which I am pleased to be a signatory. I acknowledge the support of the noble Lord, Lord Frost, who unfortunately cannot be here this afternoon, and of course the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick, who will speak later.
Amendment 460 would reintroduce mandatory in-person consultations with a medical professional before abortion pills can be prescribed. It is a common-sense amendment that would protect women and ensure good practice. Amendment 460 would also offer a more satisfactory solution to the supposed problem that we are told lies behind Clause 191—the small number of prosecutions in recent years of women who have induced their own abortions beyond the statutory time limit. These prosecutions have taken place because abortion providers have been able to send abortion pills to women by post without reliably assessing their gestational age. This includes those who claimed to be under the legal limit of 24 weeks but who, in reality, were not.
Indeed, the two most high-profile cases highlighted by supporters of Clause 191 would not have been able to take place if gestational age had been properly assessed in a face-to-face consultation. Carla Foster was found guilty of an illegal abortion at 32 to 34 weeks’ gestation after admitting to deliberately misleading the UK’s largest abortion provider, BPAS, about her gestational age, telling it she was seven weeks pregnant.
Nicola Packer was charged with an illegal abortion after the UK’s second-largest abortion provider, Marie Stopes, sent her pills even though she was over the legal limit. She was acquitted after telling the court that she was unaware of how far through her pregnancy she was. It is remarkable that one of our leading abortion providers should respond to its own mistakes—sending pills to women beyond the legal limit through a scheme for which it lobbied and from which it benefits—by trying to push for even more radical laws that minimise accountability.
The solution to such cases is not to decriminalise self-administered abortions up to birth, as Clause 191 proposes, which endangers women and renders the 24-week time limit largely toothless. Such a course would be irresponsible and widely out of step with public opinion. Polling has found that only 16% of the public support the removal of offences that make it illegal for women to induce their own abortions after the legal time limit, with a clear majority supporting the current legal deterrent. For that reason, I support the stand part notice opposing Clause 191 from the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton.
The obvious better solution to all this is to restore in-person appointments before women can obtain abortion pills. Such appointments were the norm before the Covid pandemic but, in response to campaigning from the same groups behind Clause 191, the pills by post scheme was introduced when the pandemic began. Although many had significant misgivings—based on concerns that later proved prescient—about how this was rushed through without due process, and suspected that it was a thinly disguised ruse to bring in such a scheme permanently, one could perhaps at least understand the logic during a pandemic.
However, it was never the intention that pills by post abortions would be permanent, and in February 2022 the Government announced that the scheme would end after 70% of respondents to a public consultation called for its immediate end. However, amid late-night machinations in this House—not too dissimilar from the way in which Clause 191 was added to the Bill in the other place—an amendment was tacked on to the Health and Care Bill at the 11th hour, making the scheme permanent for England and Wales.
Shortly afterwards, stories started emerging of exactly the kind of incidents that many of us were so concerned about, demonstrating how pills by post endangers women and weakens the safeguards in our abortion laws. Amendment 460 offers the Committee a chance to undo a critical aspect of this law change. Under the amendment, women would still be able to take pills at home, should they wish, but not without the safeguard of a prior face-to-face consultation with a medical professional.
There are three principal reasons why restoring this safeguard—or, should I say, returning to former best practice—is essential. First, it would enable reliable gestational age checks before at-home abortions can take place. This is the primary reason why recent court cases have happened. An accurate gestational age check ought to be the bare minimum that we expect of abortion providers, which receive, on average, a reported £580 of taxpayers’ money per abortion—an increase of 42% in the five years since the pills by post scheme came in—even though their costs have been slashed by the removal of in-person appointments. In-person gestational age checks would not only prevent women wilfully misleading providers about their gestation but protect women who may mistakenly believe that they are in the early stages of pregnancy but who are actually further along.
Secondly, reinstating the in-person appointments would protect women from the significant health risks that accompany taking abortion pills beyond the legal limit. Reliable gestational age checks protect women, since at-home abortions are permitted only up to 10 weeks’ gestation because of the increased dangers to women of taking pills beyond the early weeks of pregnancy.
Indeed, the introduction of pills by post has led to a significant spike in medical complications. The Express newspaper reported a study based on FOI requests to NHS trusts that suggests that more than 10,000 women—that is one in 17 women who took pills—had to receive hospital treatment following the use of abortion pills in England between April 2020 and September 2021, which was after the pills by post scheme was introduced.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, this is an exceptionally difficult issue because of the conflicting interests, which cannot, in my view, be balanced.
The first is that under existing law, many women who have recently suffered miscarriages are subject to distressing and intrusive investigations when they have not acted unlawfully. However sensitive the investigation carried out by the police, it will inevitably be intrusive and distressing to the woman concerned. That is the first interest. On the other hand, we have to recognise that there will be women who terminate their pregnancies at a late stage for impermissible reasons, such as was mentioned by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. We have to recognise that, if Clause 191 is enacted, there may well be more such cases. These are two conflicting interests, and I am very doubtful that either of the proposed compromises is a solution to this problem—that is, the identification by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, of further defences, or the proposal of the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, of a requirement for the consent of the Attorney-General.
The reason why neither of these compromises works is that they will not prevent the investigations of women who have recently suffered the loss of their child. No view can be taken on whether the defences identified by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, apply or whether it is right and proper for the Attorney-General to give his consent to a prosecution, unless the facts and circumstances of the case are known; so the investigation has to take place, and it will inevitably be distressing to the woman concerned.
Therefore, it seems to me that we simply have to make a policy choice here, and it is a choice between two evils: the evil of the investigation of many, many women in very distressing and sensitive circumstances when they have acted perfectly lawfully, or the evil of allowing the women who have acted improperly not to be prosecuted. We will each have our own view on which is the greater evil.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
There is a further consideration that the noble Lord should perhaps address, and that is the value that Parliament should place on human life.
Lord Pannick (CB)
Of course Parliament should place a value on human life, but it should also, should it not, place a value on the interests of the unfortunate women who have, in the most distressing of circumstances, lost the child they are carrying. Therefore, to talk about the value of human life does not answer the profound dilemma which Parliament faces in addressing Clause 191. There are two evils here and the question is how we best address the problem.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
My Lords, is the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, suggesting that where sensitive matters are investigated, we should change the law? Let me refer to the case of a coroner investigating a death at home. I can cite an example only last Saturday of a friend of mine who died at home of natural causes, but his wife and family had an investigation and understood it was par for the course. They were very upset at the death of their father and their husband; none the less, the law is required to investigate suspicious deaths even in the most sensitive circumstances.
Lord Pannick (CB)
I take the noble Baroness’s point, and I very much sympathise with those who have been bereaved and who face such an investigation. However, there is a profound difference in what we are considering here, which is an investigation of a woman who has just lost the child she is carrying and who is being investigated with a view to the real possibility of a criminal prosecution of her. We have to recognise that a woman in those circumstances is particularly vulnerable and sensitive. We have to weigh that interest against what I accept is the real concern that there will be women who have acted improperly and unlawfully who will get away with their criminality.
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)
I wonder if what the noble Lord describes, with which I have a great deal of sympathy—I say this as a signatory to Amendment 456—would be ameliorated in terms of the distress of the investigation if the Attorney-General were to adopt guidance, and that guidance set out strict criteria that would at least remove or ameliorate the risk of the distress these investigations can cause. The Attorney-General can define very narrowly the circumstances in which the police would be entitled to do that, can he not?
Lord Pannick (CB)
He can, but as I have already said, the difficulty is that, however sympathetic the guidance, the circumstances of the woman concerned have to be investigated in order to identify whether her case falls within those criteria. Therefore, the damage he has done to the woman who has recently lost the child is caused, however sensitive the investigation and whatever the criteria. That is the problem.
Baroness Berridge (Con)
The noble Lord says that there is a profound difference. However, there are circumstances—maybe others are aware—where parents lose a very young child in the home to sudden infant death syndrome. In certain of those circumstances, the police have to come through the door. There is no profound difference there: unfortunately, we need to investigate sensitive things, and that is not a reason to not change the law.
Lord Pannick (CB)
I entirely understand and accept that the police will investigate many alleged possible offences in highly sensitive circumstances, but the issue that arises for Parliament, and your Lordships’ House in particular today, is whether we should adopt special criteria where the sensitivity and the distress relate to a woman who has recently lost the child that she is carrying. It is very difficult, in my view—I am obviously not an expert on this; women in the Committee will have a stronger view than I do—but I can understand the real, particular and damaging concern that arises where a woman who has carried her child for however many months loses that child and is then the subject of a criminal investigation. It is difficult to imagine anything that is more distressing to the woman concerned in those circumstances. The Committee therefore has to take a view on this. My current view—
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
The noble Lord makes a very reasonable case, but is it not really an issue of proportionality and balance? He talks about the level of distress but did not really answer the points made by my noble friends Lady Lawlor and Lady Berridge. The fact is that this has affected approximately 100 women in terms of criminal investigations, as against 1.5 million abortions since 2020. That is an important point to make in terms of informing the argument that he is making.
Lord Pannick (CB)
The Committee will take its own view on whether I have answered the questions that have been put to me. I do not think that a reference to 1.5 million abortions really takes the argument any further forward.
I recognise the difficulties of this, and each Member of the Committee will have their own view, but my current view is that the nature of the investigations, the distress that they cause and the unlikelihood that they would lead to a prosecution is the paramount consideration. I therefore see great force in Clause 191.
Baroness Hazarika (Lab)
My Lords, I want to speak to Amendment 459C, to which my name is attached. I very much support Clause 191, which I believe would modernise our society, but Amendment 459C would halt ongoing criminal investigations and prosecutions for repealed abortion offences, no matter when committed. This would tighten up Clause 191 on technical grounds. It would stop ongoing criminal investigations and prosecutions for repealed offences, no matter when they were committed; currently, Clause 191 applies only to actions after the Bill becomes law.
We are aware of multiple women who have been reported to the police by medical professionals in the months since the House of Commons voted in support of Clause 191. There was a clear signal from that vote—it passed by 397 votes to 137 votes—that Members of Parliament wanted women to stop being targeted. Existing guidance obtained from FoI requests indicates that Parliament cannot rely on police and prosecutors to make the decision to discontinue ongoing cases without a clear legislative process. This amendment would provide clarity for everyone.
I also want to lend my support to Amendment 461J, which my noble friend spoke about. This is about pardoning women with criminal records for abortion offences, in line with the Turing pardon. It also chimes with the scandal of young women who were the victims of the Pakistani grooming gangs, many of whom ended up with criminal records, which I am sure we will all agree was unforgivable.
Many of us in this House have spoken up bravely and passionately about the grooming gang scandal and talked about the plight of those young women and girls, and how vulnerable and alone they were. Well, let me tell you: many of the women who seek an abortion outside the law are often the same girls, and young women who face very similar circumstances. They are desperate. They have often been groomed, abused, violently attacked and raped, and they find themselves in very isolated situations. They do not have a loving partner or a lovely, warm family, and they do not trust the state at this point.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
I have great respect for the noble Baroness, and I was delighted to see her come to the House. However, I think it would be in keeping to withdraw a comment that could be misinterpreted as ageist and genderist.
Baroness Hazarika (Lab)
I hear the noble Baroness’s point, but I think this is really important. The outside world will look at some of the comments that have been made in this Chamber and will look at the age profile of those making them. That is okay; it is the truth. I am just looking around at who we are. We have many wonderful people with great wisdom and expertise, but we are currently talking about a group of women who are not adequately represented in this House. That is the point I was trying to make.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
Would the noble Baroness agree that we are all part of the same human race? Here in this House, we must legislate on behalf of everybody, not as if we were gender-blind about who we are as legislators but in the interests of society at large. I know the noble Baroness would agree that we must always consider the most vulnerable, and this debate is partly about who is the most vulnerable in this matter.
Baroness Hazarika (Lab)
I absolutely agree that we must think about who is the most vulnerable, but the point is that we have heard a lot of language about the rights of the unborn child. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, however, what about the rights of the living woman—often a younger woman—who has found herself in the most distressing of circumstances? As I said, she may have been raped, or part of a terrible domestic violence situation where she does not feel like she has much support, and she feels very alone. I really think this is an important point: so few women take joy from having an abortion, particularly a late-term abortion. I do not think women do it lightly, with a skip in their step, to try to go on a holiday or anything like that. It is a very visceral, emotional, physical experience. We have heard from eminent members of the medical profession about the physical toll that it takes on a woman’s body.
We must understand how vulnerable a lot of these women are. We heard an example earlier from a colleague about a woman who went into premature labour at home. Seven police officers searched her bins before the paramedics arrived. She was not allowed home for a week because her house was considered a crime scene, and she was not allowed contact with her partner. Her forensic samples eventually showed no trace of abortion drugs, but she remained under police investigation for a year. She was allowed only limited supervision with her baby, who had survived the birth despite the very traumatic circumstances.
There is another case study that I want to raise, because the human stories are very important here. Laura was at university, and she was the mother of a toddler when she pled guilty to ending her pregnancy using illegal drugs. She was also in a very abusive relationship and her partner told her not to go to a doctor under any circumstances, so she was very much left to her own devices. She ended up being sentenced to two years in prison. The abusive partner was never investigated. Let that sink in: an abused mother of a toddler is sent to jail while her abusive partner gets off scot free. This is not Kabul, by the way; this is here in the United Kingdom.
I do not know about you, but I want my rather overstretched police services to be investigating crimes such as domestic violence or other serious crimes, instead of rifling through the bins of a traumatised woman who has just given birth. I would like our rather overcrowded prisons to be housing serious offenders, not abused women who have small children. I feel that it is simply morally wrong, an utter waste of police and criminal justice time, and a waste of taxpayers’ money to go after these kinds of distressed and vulnerable women. They need psychological and medical help, not a costly investigation. I think most of us in this House are coming to a consensus that the police have been wasting their time on things such as non-crime hate incidents, so surely common sense would dictate that going after these women is misguided. The police should be catching criminals.
There has been a lot of heated debate around the question “what is a woman?” I know what a woman is, and I believe in her right to choose what is best for her reproductive health. I believe in protecting women when they need help the most, not hounding them like a criminal. That might be okay in some repressive regimes far away, but I know we are better than that.
The Lord Bishop of Lincoln
My Lords, I am one of those old men. I am also a single man, so I have no children of my own, but I am regularly in contact with very young families through baptism. Only last Thursday, I was in hospital in an acute cardiac unit for babies, anointing a two week-old baby who had just had open-heart surgery. So I know quite a lot about babies through a very long ministry. I also offer my thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Winston, for a television series that he oversaw about seeing a pregnancy from conception to delivery some years ago. That series reinforced my conviction about the sanctity of life.
The fact that we are here today in this Chamber means that we must recognise that we are on precious ground. Of course we are here to support women who have been abused and coerced. I think that the amendment proposing that we should require the Attorney-General to intervene would be rather too late if there had been a year-long investigation of a woman in between. I have been investigating this with the Lincolnshire constabulary: we need to look at how police procedure can be changed and invested in, enabling us to move away from treating these women as criminals to treating them as witnesses and victims, so that the police activity is primarily engaged in going after coercers and bad actors. I therefore agree with the noble Baroness in how that should proceed.
At the same time, noble Lords will not be surprised to hear me say that I entirely endorse the Church of England’s principle position in opposing the abortion of late-term foetuses who are viable, unless otherwise affected by the Abortion Act. I would like to see a different way of interpreting the law, which is differently enforced, which does not decriminalise or take away investigation, precisely for the protection of women and the preservation of unborn life.
To do that, we need to look urgently at how we allow investigations to take place and how we seek to support a woman, often a woman going through acute distress and bereavement. I quite understand the point about unexplained deaths, and we need to make sure that women are protected. But I signed a letter with 200 other clergy, back when Clause 191 first came out, expressing our dismay at the way in which this decriminalisation could so easily lead inadvertently, even if it is only a small number of babies, to the termination of the lives of viable children into the future. That, I am afraid, I could never support.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
I am just wondering if the Committee would allow me to speak at my extreme age. I have put my name to the amendment of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and I do not propose to repeat anything he has said. But there are two aspects I will speak about, particularly those raised by the noble Lords, Lord Patel and Lord Pannick.
First, in what they are both saying, we are looking at women who are not guilty of any offence. We are being asked to pass a law to protect offenders for the sake of people who are not offenders. Speaking as a former lawyer, I find that an extraordinary proposal. I absolutely understand what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is saying, about the difficulty of balancing. But he is talking about the innocent. We are being asked to pass a law that would actually protect the guilty for the sake of the innocent. It is the first time anyone has pointed this out, and I find it rather extraordinary. We are being asked to look at women who have suffered a stillbirth or an abortion not at their request but because it has happened at a very late stage, who are now being investigated by the police. I gather the whole thing has gathered momentum after pills were being sent by post. Prior to that, the police did not investigate a lot of cases, but because of the pills being sent by post, the police are now investigating to a greater extent.
Particularly in relation to those who are suffering domestic abuse—this relates to the amendment the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and I have put forward—it looks to me as though we are being asked to change the law because the police are taking a year to investigate, treating women extremely badly in the process. But surely, we should be looking at the guidance to the police. I am very relieved to hear the right reverend Prelate is going to get Lincolnshire Police to have a look at this. We should find out why the police are not looking at potential abusers or investigating the partner as well as the woman. We are being told again and again that the partners are not being investigated but the woman is being investigated. It is taking a year or longer—in some appalling cases, six years. But that is the failure of the police. We know they are overstretched, but it is an appalling failure, particularly if they do not investigate.
Baroness Bousted (Lab)
Would the noble and learned Baroness, with her outstanding history in the law, recognise that women and men are not treated equally in the criminal justice system, nor in police investigations; that it is the case that women, when they are convicted of an offence, are often sent to prison for offences for which men are not sent to prison; that women are sent to prison for longer than men for the same offences; that there are many women in prison for things that men would not be put in prison for; and that exactly the same is the case in investigations? We have to ask the question: why did it take six years, why are the police not—
Baroness Bousted (Lab)
We have to ask the question of why there are these inequities. Other noble Lords have made longer interventions; I do not know why I am being barracked in this way.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
My Lords, I would be grateful for clarification—
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
Order—that was an intervention.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
I have not quite finished.
I understand exactly what the noble Baroness is saying. I was not a criminal judge; I do not think I ever sent a woman to prison, so I am not qualified to speak on those issues. All I am really asking the Committee to reflect on is that we are principally being asked to change the law to support those who are not guilty of offences, and because the police are not behaving as they should.
Baroness Thornton (Lab)
I have two questions for the noble and learned Baroness. Why does the noble and learned Baroness think 50 countries have found this not to be a problem? Abortion is decriminalised in virtually every country that has had abortion legislation since the 1967 Act. So, I am wondering why the noble and learned Baroness thinks that is a problem. My second question is: why does the noble and learned Baroness think that adding further complications, which the amendment of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, would, would make this any better?
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
You cannot have two interventions.
I do not know the answer to the first question. I have not looked at what goes on in other jurisdictions; I do not know how well it works or whether it works. Secondly, it seems to me that there should be a lot of changes to the way this is all dealt with. If the police investigated the man as well as the woman, one would hope they would not pursue their investigations.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, it is Committee. Everyone can have a turn, as long as they stick to the speaking limits, so perhaps we could just take it around the Committee.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
I would just be grateful, and I will be brief, to get a clarification—
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)
Before the Government Whip sits down, could he please remind the Committee that interventions have to be brief and cannot go on into speeches? Can he also remind the Committee that those who have put their names to these amendments should be heard prior to those who have not?
Lord Katz (Lab)
First, there are no points of order in our self-regulating House. Secondly, the noble Baroness makes the point about interventions very ably. Thirdly, as I said, there is time for everyone in Committee to both move their amendments and speak to other amendments, so I suggest we just take it in a reasonable order. I will leave it to the Committee to decide who speaks next.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
My Lords, I will be brief—I would just be grateful for a clarification. I strongly believe in women’s rights, including reproductive rights, and I do not want women in distress subjected to criminal investigation, if at all avoidable. But I am struggling to understand why Clause 191 is considered not to amend the Abortion Act, as the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, among others, asserts. I noted that the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, said it would be “toothless” if Clause 191 is agreed.
If I have understood it properly, people other than the pregnant woman concerned would still be committing a criminal offence if they gave any kind of assistance. That is why it is considered that the Abortion Act 1967 is not in fact amended. The noble Baroness, Lady Hazarika, referred to repealed abortion offences, so we seem to be relying on the fact that only the woman herself would be regarded as decriminalised. I am not generally happy about decriminalisation, such as in relation to drugs. I prefer dotting the “i”s and crossing the “t”s and having legalisation—or not.
Have I understood that correctly? Maybe it is only when we come to the Minister that I will get full clarification as to whether or not we are amending the Abortion Act 1967, which I broadly support, even though it is a compromise. I have never supported the simple but simplistic “a woman’s right to choose”, because there are other considerations. I support the Abortion Act as a compromise on a difficult subject, as I think many people do, but I seek clarification that the Abortion Act is not being amended and that we would simply decriminalise the woman concerned while supposedly leaving the rest of the Abortion Act as it is.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
What our amendment does is disapply the Abortion Act so far as the mother and late-term abortions are concerned.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
Then I am not terribly attracted by the amendment of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. I am rather more attracted by that of the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, although I have heard the criticisms of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about that.
Lord Pannick (CB)
Can I assist the noble Baroness? Clause 191 is perfectly clear in that no offence is committed by a woman acting in relation to her own pregnancy. It simply does not affect the criminal offences that are committed by any person, whether a doctor or otherwise, who assists a woman. There are precedents for that distinction in the Suicide Act 1961. The act of suicide is lawful, but it is unlawful to assist.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
I do grasp that point, although I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for assisting me. In a broader sense, can it be relied on that Clause 191 would not have a wash effect over the Abortion Act 1967, which has been subjected to various attempts at amendment but has largely held the course since 1967? I understand all the very good reasons for it, but how we can be sure that this decriminalisation of the woman concerned would not ultimately lead to an amendment of the Abortion Act 1967.
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)
My Lords, as my noble friend Lord Verdirame has explained, my noble friend Lady Wolf cannot be here today, so I will pick up some of her points in this intervention as she is not here to make them herself. If we want to change the law, many say that Clause 191 will improve the situation for women’s bodily autonomy. I am all for that, but only after a considered debate, which we had in the past when we amended the Abortion Act 1967 to bring it into conformity with changing medical science and social attitudes. It is not as though we are stuck in aspic. This Bill is not the place to do so, as the breadth of amendments that this clause has attracted demonstrates.
I will concentrate mainly on the Covid-era regulations which permitted the obtaining of pills by post at any point of gestation, whereas previously, later stages required face-to-face consultation between the pregnant woman and doctors under the Abortion Act. This may have been necessary during lockdown, and it is a failure on the part of the then Government not to have contemplated a review after lockdown ended. As things stand, Clause 191 will facilitate changes where decriminalisation of late-stage and full-term abortions may well create additional dangers to women’s health, as pointed out at Second Reading by numerous noble Lords. It will also open the door to coerce women to seek late-term abortions against their own wishes. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, is not in her seat, but I think that is the point that she was trying to get to in her intervention.
If there is no sanction in law, what reason can one give a controlling partner who insists that it is perfectly permissible in law? Decriminalisation suggests that there is nothing to prevent the woman from aborting late-term through the convenience of pills by post, virtually no questions asked. So you have the perverse effect that, alongside the certainty of greater autonomy for women, we may well see the risk of coercive control and deception. I am sure that is not what the movers of this amendment in the other place sought.
My noble friend Lady Wolf made the point that while home-based abortions have become common, they normally use two drugs in the form of pills: mifepristone, which blocks progesterone, needed in pregnancy, but does not kill the foetus; and misoprostol, which basically causes cramping, bleeding and the emptying of the uterus. If taken early in pregnancy, the result is the same as an early miscarriage, in effect, and in England and Wales it is allowable for abortions up to 10 weeks of gestation.
The pills are advertised as simple to use and as creating early miscarriages with bleeding and perhaps some bits of tissue. So the descriptions are reassuring and encouraging. However, the reality may be very different and life-threatening to the woman, who, whatever her reasons for wishing to terminate the pregnancy, may not appreciate the complications. Pills by post do not require further safeguards than those put into place by the 1967 Act other than a phone or virtual call, which is the least satisfactory method of ascertaining stress, emotional distress or, indeed, coercive pressure.
I want to share with the Committee some examples of emotional pressure. Noble Lords may be aware of the case of Stuart Worby in December 2024. I am grateful to the prosecuting counsel, Edmund Vickers KC of Red Lion Chambers, for giving me some background information to this case. I should add, before I say anything further, that the victim is subject to lifelong anonymity.
In December 2024 the judge summed up the details of the case. A central aspect was that the victim married the defendant after the commencement of the pregnancy. He wished to terminate the pregnancy, but she wished to keep her baby, with or without him. He set about securing the termination without her knowledge and used a female friend to obtain abortive drugs from an online private clinic. The judge pointed out that he must have known that this was dangerous for his wife, as he knew she was many weeks past the time limit to use the drugs safely.
When Mr Worby received the drugs, he first added mifepristone to food and drink. The next day he told the victim that he wanted to try something sexually new in bed, which involved blindfolding her and tying her up. The real purpose was to insert the second type of medication, misoprostol, into her vagina. Shortly after he had done that, she became unwell, and the next day she suffered a miscarriage, losing the baby that she so badly yearned for. The judge’s remarks explained that the offence of administering poison to bring about a miscarriage was made more serious by Mr Worby’s prolonged research and planning over many weeks, by his involving others, by bringing about a miscarriage, and by the devastating effect it had on his then wife’s dream of having a child.
This sorry tale attempts to demonstrate that it is not only, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, the woman who may wish to terminate her pregnancy or the unborn child. There is a further factor here: the partner, the husband or other members of the family who may seek coercion.
Lord Pannick (CB)
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way. That is a shocking story, but nothing in Clause 191 would affect the criminal liability of the man who behaved in such a disgraceful manner.
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)
I find that very interesting. I am sure it will be a welcome debate among lawyers. I will look into that and take it into consideration when I come back with a renewed amendment on Report.
Lord Pannick (CB)
I am sorry, but this is simply not a controversial issue. Clause 191 says that
“no offence is committed by a woman acting in relation to her own pregnancy”.
It simply does not affect the criminal liability of anyone else.
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)
My Lords, we are coming back to the terminally ill debate that we had on Friday. Women may well be—although not in this particular case—coerced by partners to take pills when they would not otherwise have wished to do so. Perhaps noble Lords who have tabled amendments to do with face-to-face consultations have that in their minds, as a face-to-face consultation would require deeper insights on the part of medical professionals—pills by post do not.
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)
I would like to proceed a little further and then I will give way to the noble Baroness.
If we wish to change abortion law, we are perfectly entitled to do so as a society, but this clause raises significant questions that I hope the Minister will be able to answer, even though—I accept this—the Government said on Second Reading that they remain neutral on the clause and that they anticipated a free vote. As the clause seeks to repeal Sections 58 and 59 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, can the Minister explain how charges could be brought in a case such as Mr Worby’s and others? This was a poisoning and an attempt to procure a miscarriage without the woman’s consent—and it happened without repealing those offences.
As the Government have not carried out a consultation on this proposed change, how will providers of pills by post be regulated further to ensure that late-term pregnancies still carry protections under the Abortion Act and other criminal law? Will the Government commit to carrying out an overall review of the extent of the problem with police investigations of these women and to opening discussions with the relevant authorities to ascertain how better to focus police interventions? That is the objective of our Amendment 456.
On all sides of the Committee, we recognise the distress caused to women by unfounded police intrusiveness. There must be other measures that could address how that can be done with care. Upholding the rights of women in terms of their bodily autonomy, as well as society’s obligations to provide the appropriate medical care for them at this vulnerable point of pregnancy, exists on the one hand. On the other, we have obligations to the rights of the unborn child.
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)
I will say one more sentence before I sit down, and I will be happy for both noble Baronesses to intervene then.
We have obligations to the rights of the unborn child, as that is what very late-term abortions are about in terms of viability. These things engage our ethics and responsibilities in law. I suggest that the Minister seeks to engage with those of us tabling amendments to guide us on how we in this Committee can do both responsibly.
Baroness Thornton (Lab)
If you are being coerced into ending a pregnancy outside the law, and if you report that to the police, you yourself will be investigated for a criminal offence. That would be the case even though it is clear—as we know from that court case—that the man is the person who has coerced you into doing that. Can the noble Baroness say how this can be right? If a woman goes to the police in those circumstances—why would she?—she would be investigated for a criminal offence. That is what the law says now.
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)
In the Worby case, the woman discovered what had happened to her, went to the police and was not investigated.
Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)
My Lords, please excuse my enthusiasm but the Committee can see that, every time I blinked, somebody else jumped in.
I will speak in support of my Amendment 461B, which is focused on protecting underage girls. Before I do that, I will pose a few questions to the Minister on the back of the debate we have had today. First, an assertion has been made that this is happening all over the place and that many women are being prosecuted. Can the Minister give us access to the figures that she is working on to answer that question?
Secondly, is there any proof that the police are targeting women? That assertion has been made a number of times.
Also, what work are the Government doing to improve the nature of police investigations? The right reverend Prelate made that point very well. Surely, any woman in this situation should be treated as a victim until there is some very strong evidence that she is anything but a victim. What are we doing to help the police perform their duties better?
I will respond to the noble Baroness, Lady Hazarika. The notion that you can represent only people that you are of is one that we should fight very hard. I come from a very poor community and have spent my life representing people who have no relation to the way I look, where I come from and who I am. That is something we should fight very hard. I am a man and a father of two. When we talk about pregnant people, there is at least some idea that a man is 50% of how that situation arose, so I think I have some stake in the debate.
Finally, there is no debate on this side about what a woman is. If somebody is pregnant, in my world they are most certainly a woman. I cannot envisage any situation where somebody other than a woman would be pregnant. I am happy to take direction from the noble Baroness if she has such things.
My Amendment 461B is focused particularly on protecting young girls. To address this gap, my amendment would introduce a mandatory safeguarding investigation whenever an abortion is performed on a girl under the age of 16. This measure is in the best interest of vulnerable women and does not impede lawful medical care. It would simply ensure that when a child undergoes an abortion, relevant authorities are alerted and must promptly investigate the circumstances. Specifically, the investigation would seek to determine whether the pregnancy resulted from a criminal offence, such as rape or sexual offences under the Sexual Offences Act; whether the girl was subjected to coercion, exploitation or abuse; and whether any person involved, such as the abuser, may be liable for prosecution under existing laws.
One thing I know from my many decades of community work and dealing with vulnerable people in vulnerable situations is that an investigation-free zone is ripe for abuse. If you are an abuser, what you need is privacy. Clause 191 would provide privacy for many abusers, and that needs to be looked at very seriously.
The idea that there is a surge of young women who are being investigated needs to be taken into account, because this clause stands or falls on the idea that there are a lot of young women who are under a lot of pressure because of the things that are being suggested.
Clause 191 will bring about the most radical change to abortion laws in a generation, and it was done on the back of very little scrutiny and debate in the other place. I believe it falls to us in this Chamber to give it our full, undivided attention.
The other question I pose to the Minister is: what level of support is there for this publicly? We have heard that many of the professional bodies support the Bill, but do the public support it? Are they in the same place? Have they been consulted on what this would mean? I do not mean, “Do they support abortion?”; I mean, “Do they support the effect that this Bill would have?”
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
I thank the noble Lord for giving way because I can save the Minister here. A study in 2023 by the National Centre for Social Research found that the majority of people did not want to see women criminalised in the kind of circumstances that we are talking about.
Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)
I thank the noble Baroness, but, of course, the wrong question was asked. Let us be very clear, I personally do not want to see anybody criminalised, and I doubt that people want to see women who have gone through a very distressing situation be criminalised. But they would probably want to see a law, as identified by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, across the way, that dealt with the balance much better. Currently, that was the wrong question to answer.
I tabled the amendment because I am very worried about the real-world consequences for young women in vulnerable situations where, when they are being coerced, their abusers would know that no investigation is even possible. No matter where you stand on the question of abortion, surely noble Lords can see that the most vulnerable young women should be protected by us in law.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hazarika, talked about women who had suffered from rape gangs. They are exactly the kind of women I think would have benefited from some kind of investigation. As it stands, Clause 191 will prevent that happening.
Baroness O’Loan (CB)
My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 461 and in support of the Clause 191 stand part notice from the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton. I have put my name to that stand part notice, too.
As other noble Lords have observed, Clause 191 was passed in the other place following a very brief and truncated debate, entirely incommensurate with the gravity of its impact. In moving the amendment, the Member for Gower noted that it was about ensuring only that
“vulnerable women … have the right help and support”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/6/25; col. 306.]
I am sure that we all support the provision of appropriate and timely support for a woman considering an abortion. However, it drastically understates the effect of Clause 191, regardless of the intent of its mover.
We must confront the radical legal reality that this clause removes all deterrence against a woman performing her own abortion up to the very moment of birth. How does that ensure that women have the right help and support? The clause will decriminalise actions by a woman at any stage of her pregnancy, including actions which are criminal at present under the Offences against the Person Act and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act.
In 1929, they knew that a child who has been in the womb for 28 weeks was capable of being born alive. Now, we know of children who are born alive at 22 weeks and live. In 2020 and 2021, 261 babies were born alive at 22 and 23 weeks, before the abortion limit, who survived to be discharged from hospital. Why is abortion so distressing? As the noble Baroness, Lady Hazarika, said, it is because, by 23 weeks, the unborn baby has all its organs, muscles, limbs, bones and sex organs, it may hear, and it makes facial expressions, responds to loud noises, is getting into a pattern of sleeping and waking, practices breathing and it definitely feels pain. After that, they just keep growing.
Proponents of Clause 191 have been at pain to say that the Abortion Act is not changed and that the time limits remain the same, but that is not the reality of the clause. Clause 191 may not repeal the Abortion Act but it renders its protections largely symbolic in practice. At present, the Act operates as a tightly drawn exception to criminal offences that otherwise prohibit ending a pregnancy. Its force comes from the fact that abortion outside its conditions is unlawful. Once associated consequences are removed, the framework ceases to be a deterrent or a boundary for conduct and becomes, in effect, merely a regulatory code for providers, albeit with criminal consequences for clinicians who are left untouched for now. It is a profound shift. Time limits, certification requirements and clinical safeguards would no longer operate as meaningful legal limits on a woman’s actions.
Clause 191 is not an outworking of modernised enforcement; it is a hollowing out of the underlying settlement, which nullifies the protective structure built into the 1967 Act, particularly its recognition that abortion law is not a matter of personal autonomy but one of safety, safeguarding and the status of the viable unborn child. Both lives matter. The issue is not whether the Abortion Act still exists on the statute book; it is whether it still performs the function that Parliament intended. Clause 191 leaves the text intact while removing the mechanism that makes its limits real. I strongly urge noble Lords to support the removal of Clause 191 from the Bill.
Baroness O’Loan (CB)
I wish to finish my sentence.
The woman may be unable to deliver it. It may get stuck in the birth canal. If it survives the attempt to terminate its life, it may be born alive, as babies still are. What then? What of the mother? When one gives birth, one is monitored by doctors to ensure no crises occur, if possible. Those crises can include haemorrhage, damage to the womb and bladder, and, in the worst cases, death.
If the Bill is passed and a mother chooses to terminate her baby other than as provided for in the Abortion Act, she will not be prosecuted. She may have been coerced into it, as we have heard at length, for a variety of reasons, but, despite being decriminalised, she may die or face life-changing injuries.
Baroness Hazarika (Lab)
The noble Baroness paints a very vivid picture of how traumatic it is for a woman to go through this once late-term. I am sure all of us would agree that nobody would do this lightly. Does that not reinforce why it is so important that the woman should not be in a position where she thought she could be investigated by the police at this point and why she should go and seek medical advice, safe in the knowledge that she was not potentially going to end up in prison?
Baroness O’Loan (CB)
There are situations in which the woman in that case, under the Abortion Act, can seek help. I would expect that she would, but there are situations in which she may not. I simply ask the Government how they expect it to happen. Doctors administer these drugs. Doctors look after us in childbirth. We do not do it ourselves.
I move to Amendment 461. A considerable danger associated with Clause 191 is the activities of abusers and exploiters. The shield, which would be reimposed if telemedicine were stopped, is a requirement for all women considering abortion. It is not possible on the telephone to ensure a woman’s privacy and that she is not being coerced, or to verify that the person seeking the medication is the person who will actually take it, particularly in cases involving domestic abuse, child abuse and trafficking. It is important that the medication is not taken by a woman whose pregnancy exceeds 10 weeks. The NHS reported in July 2025 that, since 2020, 54,000 women have been admitted to hospital in England for complications from birth pills. Last year alone, there were 12,000.
In removing the criminal status of abortion, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, says, we perversely incentivise abusers to pressure vulnerable women into dangerous, isolated and self-administered late-term abortions. My Amendment 461 is a safeguard against that, which I hope noble Lords will be minded to support. It would create a provision analogous to that found in Section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961—a special offence of encouraging or assisting an abortion which is unlawful under the terms of the Abortion Act.
The amendment would not chill medical advice or online information. It requires intent, which is a distinct threshold. Ordinary clinical counselling or neutral provision of information would not meet the test. The amendment does not engage with or change what is lawful under the Abortion Act. It concerns only unlawful terminations and intentional encouragement or assistance. If an abortion is lawful, the offence does not arise. Perhaps most importantly, its desired effect is safeguarding vulnerable women.
Under the current wording of Clause 191, there is a risk, if self-administering an abortion is no longer a crime, that the woman can be pressurised. By legislating expressly where safeguarding is paramount and creating a clear specific offence, we would send a strong protective signal for women. My amendment would require the Secretary of State to consult and to talk to clinicians, et cetera. It is a measured, reasonable and necessary response. I urge noble Lords to support it.
Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Lab)
My Lords, I rise with a certain level of trepidation and fear to convey a contribution during this debate, as I am not a mother. I have never enjoyed motherhood; therefore, I do not have the experiences of many women right across this Chamber. But I rise to support Amendment 460, to which I am pleased to be a signatory and to which the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, has already spoken, and the clause stand part notice on Clause 191 from the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton.
I support Amendment 460 because the health risks of obtaining abortion pills without adequate prior in-person checks are now well documented. I feel that if they are to be available—if that is the way you support—you need an ultrasound and a full investigation.
I simply add one further example to those which have already been cited. The Irish Medical Journal published an article in March 2024 explaining how a woman in Ireland nearly died from an ectopic pregnancy after taking abortion pills. The article reported that the case
“could have been prevented by an ultrasound”.
If women once again had mandatory in-person scans, it would protect them, allowing ectopic pregnancies and other possible health risks to be picked up more reliably.
However, as has been noted, the woman is not our only consideration. I agree that there is a need to protect the woman but also the unborn child. By allowing Clause 191 to stand, we would remove the legal safeguards that exist to protect an unborn baby after the point of viability, when a baby could survive outside the womb. I contend that this is a radical and unpopular proposal. Indeed, this is an issue that should unite those of us who are pro-life and those of us who are pro-choice. In an article for the Times entitled “I’ve always been pro-choice but this is too far”, the well-known pro-choice commentator Janice Turner wrote
“I find it discomforting that a woman could abort a full-term baby and face no sanctions”.
She is not alone. Polling in 2024 found that only 1% of women support abortion up to birth, while just 16% of the public support removing a legal deterrent after the 24-week limit. In fact, 70% of women would like to see a reduction in our abortion time limits, not permitting women to induce their own abortions up to birth, as would de facto become the case under Clause 191.
As a Northern Irish Peer, I echo the earlier comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, regarding Northern Ireland. I was concerned to hear suggestions in the other place, during the truncated Report debate on this clause, that there are considerations about whether to introduce pills by post in Northern Ireland. I am deeply worried about this possibility. If supporters of Clause 191 really wish to bring England and Wales into line with Northern Ireland, as they claim, I make a simple suggestion that they ought to support Amendment 460 and reintroduce the in-person appointments that we rightly continue to have in Northern Ireland.
I finish by quoting the Times leading article, published two days after Clause 191 passed in the other place:
“Even the most ardent advocate of a woman’s right to choose must see that this change risks a host of unintended consequences. While women considering ultra-late termination must”—
I support them in this—“be regarded” and supported
“with the greatest understanding and sympathy”,
as well as with compassion and humanity,
“the possibility of a viable child being killed shortly before its birth is not a prospect to be treated lightly”.
I know there are different views on that issue right across the Chamber, but I hold my view, and I respect the views of others who take a different viewpoint. There has been no great public clamour, I believe, for this change. I very much hope that Clause 191 will not remain part of the Bill, and I also support Amendment 460 to which I am a signatory.
Baroness Eaton (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 459 and in support of other amendments that have been tabled in this group, in particular the clause stand part notice in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton, and Amendment 460 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud.
Clause 191, were it to become law, would open a Pandora’s box of unintended consequences. Although these consequences may be unintended, they are not unforeseen. After all, many of us warned about exactly what would happen if the pills by post scheme was introduced. Indeed, the only reason we are having this debate is because, tragically, those warnings proved to be accurate, and the supporters of pills by post now wish to decriminalise late-term, self-induced abortions as a result of and, dare I say, to conceal the results of this reckless scheme for which they lobbied.
Those consequences were foreseeable, and if Clause 191 makes it on to the statute book we can foresee what its consequences would be too. Although women ending the lives of their unborn children after the 24-week limit may be spared prosecution under the clause, I fear they will not be spared the grave resulting dangers to their physical health and the lasting trauma that would accompany such abortions. It is for this reason, and many of the others that have already been set out, that I wholeheartedly support Clause 191 not standing part of the Bill, and Amendment 460, which would reinstate in-person consultations with a medical professional before abortion pills can be obtained, should be approved.
Baroness Bousted (Lab)
My Lords, I ask the noble Baroness how criminalisation of the mother would provide any protection against abortions on sex-selective grounds. That is the argument she is making, it appears to me. How would criminalisation stop this?
Baroness Eaton (Con)
The criminalisation is known by both the partner and the mother, and it gives the woman a reason to say that this is a dangerous process that easily could lead to one or both of them being accused of an illegal act.
Baroness Eaton (Con)
The noble Baroness has had one intervention, and only one is allowed.
Lord Katz (Lab)
To be clear, the noble Baroness can take as many or as few interventions as she wishes.
Baroness Eaton (Con)
Well, that is not the information that was given earlier, but there we are. I think I have answered the question.
Baroness Eaton (Con)
No, I have already had one, and I am happy with it, thank you.
This is not scaremongering. We need only to look at other countries to foresee what the consequences of decriminalisation would be. Sex-selective abortion has been a significant problem in Canada since abortion was decriminalised. An article in the Canadian Medical Association Journal has outlined that:
“Easy access to abortion and advances in prenatal sex determination have combined to make Canada a haven for parents who would terminate female fetuses in favour of having sons”.
Evidence of sex-selective abortions has also been found in Victoria, Australia, since decriminalisation—so much so that one doctor was investigated by the medical board of Victoria for failing to refer a woman for a sex-selective abortion. Australian broadcaster SBS reported that there are higher numbers of boys than girls being born in some ethnic communities in Australia since decriminalisation.
If we go down the path proposed by Clause 191, we could expect the same to happen here, risking profound social and demographic problems. Estimates suggest there are more than 140 million missing women and girls across the globe, in most part resulting from sex-selective abortion and postnatal sex-selection infanticide.
Sex-selective abortion in China, arising in part because of the country’s one-child policy, created enormous demographic challenge in the country, with media reports describing how millions of men have struggled find a wife in the country.
Lord Winston (Lab)
Does the noble Baroness accept that sex selection has to be done under the auspices of the regulatory authority, the HFEA, and that it is illegal in this country and has remained illegal? It would be very difficult for clinics to use that technology without the support of the HFEA.
Baroness Eaton (Con)
I remind the noble Lord that there is already an issue in this country: BPAS suggests online that it is not illegal to have sex-selective abortions, so there is some dispute about that information.
Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer (LD)
My Lords, I have my name to Amendment 461—
Baroness Eaton (Con)
I have not finished. That was an intervention. Sorry; I have nearly finished.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I ask the noble Baroness to conclude her remarks: it is well over her 10 minutes.
Baroness Eaton (Con)
Yes, sorry, it is. I will just read the last paragraph. It is the interventions that have taken time.
Some of these examples may sound fanciful or seem extreme, but the worst consequences of a policy rarely announce themselves plainly at first sight; otherwise, we would always pass perfect laws, and we do not. We would be foolish not to learn from evidence in other jurisdictions. I contend that it would be far wiser to reject Clause 191 altogether. Doing so would protect women—both baby girls in the womb and the mothers who carry them.
Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer (LD)
My Lords, I added my name to Amendment 461J, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, spoke so eloquently. It addresses the pardoning of women who have already been criminalised. When Clause 191 becomes law, I look forward to this amendment being part of it because, as your Lordships all know, having a criminal record precludes you from some jobs and from getting visas to some countries. It is a very serious thing, and this small amendment is well worth while.
The overwhelming support from the professional bodies must weigh heavily on your Lordships, even those who are doubtful about Clause 191. I am grateful to those in the Committee who have experience in this field. It struck me that if the Royal College of Nursing, the Royal College of Midwives, the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, and the Royal College of General Practitioners are all behind, who are we to raise many of these issues? That is not to say we should not debate the important points. However, where those involved in delivering healthcare for women are so overwhelmingly supportive, this seems to me to be the right course.
The noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, asked about surveys. Well, I have one from YouGov that cites 70% of the public as saying that women should not face criminal prosecutions for having abortions outside the set rules.
The noble Baroness, Lady Monckton, made the comment: what is the role of this House? Well, the role of this House, which I am glad to say it is undertaking very well this evening, is, as we know, not to overturn the will of the Commons, where the vote was 379 to 137.
There are many amendments in this first group that seem innocuous. We debated some of them a while ago—for example, the requirement to keep statistics—in the Bill by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan. But they are not innocuous; they are really just a back door into undermining the very idea of Clause 191.
My last point is about an issue addressed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Lincoln. I have understood that decriminalisation does not encourage more, or later, abortion. In the countries that have practised it, such as Canada and New Zealand, it has not been the case that it has encouraged more or later abortion. Other noble Lords have eloquently made the point that abortion is not something that you, as a woman, just choose lightly. I have not had an abortion myself; I have had only a miscarriage, and I happily have two children besides, but that was enough to tell me that you would not lightly go and choose this. Getting rid of Clause 191 is an essential part of moving us into the 21st century and away from the very Victorian attitude that has prevailed until now.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
My Lords, before I discuss the substance of the amendments in this group, including my Amendment 461F, I want to make a brief observation. In my experience, both in the other place and as a Member of your Lordships’ House for a little over three years, the issues we are considering today in this group of amendments and the two that follow have become increasingly difficult to discuss openly. By that, I mean that we seldom consider the merits of the arguments put forward in good faith and instead fall back on principled objections. I regret that abortion has become such a binary and closed-off debate in this country. One’s views on the subject are put into a box: compassionate or unfeeling; morally progressive or morally regressive; forward-looking or Victorian. I am sure that noble Lords will agree that this serves nobody well, whether in this place in facilitating constructive and reasoned debate, and thereby serving the watching public well or, perhaps more importantly, in promoting the safety and well-being of women and unborn children.
There are, I would hope, things that we can agree on. Statistics released by the Department of Health and Social Care on 15 January show the highest number of abortions ever recorded in England and Wales, with 278,740 taking place in 2023—a 10% increase on the previous year. When added to figures from Scotland and Northern Ireland, this amounts to nearly 300,000 abortions across the UK in 2023. Nearly one in three of all pregnancies ended in abortion in 2023.
Baroness Hazarika (Lab)
I think we can all agree on the fact that there are a certain number of people in this Committee who have never been pregnant and never had to go through this. That does not mean that everybody else does not get to have an opinion on it, but there will be a lot of young women looking at this debate because the consequences of this debate will be very profound. That was the point I was making.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
I have never committed murder or been a hangman, but I can take a view on capital punishment from a moral view. To disaggregate people and their right or obligation to comment on the debate is not helpful. I caveat that by saying I have an awful lot of respect for how eloquently the noble Baroness put her case.
As I said at Second Reading, this will harm women, increase the number of late-term abortions and dehumanise children in the womb in a way I find chilling. But that has not been reflected on in the way that this has come to form part of the Bill.
During the debate on Report in the other place, which lasted a little over two hours in total, three new clauses were debated: proposed new Clause 1, which is now Clause 191; proposed new Clause 20, which proposed an even more extreme form of decriminalisation than that which we are considering today; and proposed new Clause 106, which I am delighted to see tabled again as Amendment 460 in the name of my noble friend Lady Stroud, which, needless to say, I strongly support.
In fact, saying that there were two hours of debate on such a significant proposal is perhaps overly generous. Sandwiched between the remarks of the three Members moving the proposed new clauses and the responses of the Front Benches, just 46 minutes were given over to speeches from Back-Bench MPs. The point is that there has been a scandalous lack of consideration of this change in our law and its impact.
I accept that some aspects of abortion law are an issue of conscience, but that is not a “get out of jail free” card for failure to undertake any form of due diligence, particularly on proposals that many of us regard as potentially dangerous. There is no impact assessment, there has been no pre-legislative scrutiny and there has been no consultation of any kind. I hope that the Minister, in responding to this group, addresses those issues.
I strongly support the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton, in her proposal to remove Clause 191 from the Bill and will do so again on Report. However, the danger of Clause 191 is compounded by the continuation of the pandemic hangover policy of pills by post, which provides for easy access to abortion pills without sufficient checks. I am afraid I simply cannot understand the view that holds that Clause 191 is pro-women. In combination with the ongoing availability of pills by post, it instead seems to me to offer the worst of both worlds. It opens the gates for overly expeditious access to less-than-safe care.
As the Member for Reigate in the other place has said:
“Being pro-choice should not mean supporting fewer checks and worse care for women seeking an abortion. Indeed, this is an issue where both sides of the abortion debate ought to eschew tribalism and unite in support of common-sense measures that safeguard women”.
I hope that we can rise above tribalism on this issue and find some common ground.
There are amendments in this group which I strongly support, including Amendments 455 and 459, but I will move on to my own Amendment 461F. While I would pick out other excellent amendments from this group, in the interests of time I will speak to my amendment particularly. My amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish guidance on the investigation of offences relating to abortion and infanticide within 12 months of the commencement of Clause 191. The amendment is concerned with providing clarity and clear protocols to distinguish between what would be a decriminalised self-induced abortion and a criminal act of infanticide or child destruction.
My amendment is also designed to reassure proponents of Clause 191, including some who advise concern about possible intimidation or distress caused to a woman who may have experienced a miscarriage or stillbirth. I recognise those concerns. Women facing miscarriage, stillbirth or medical crisis deserve care, dignity and compassion and nothing in my amendment would change that. However, I point to the other way around and suggest that the absence of clear guidance is what can produce overreach and inconsistency. When professionals are left uncertain about the law and about thresholds, practice understandably becomes variable. Some cases may be mishandled—
Baroness Thornton (Lab)
I am puzzled by something that the noble Lord has said and perhaps he would like to clarify. I am not quite sure how jailing women is pro-women.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
If the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, will forgive me, I did not quite hear the last part of her question.
Baroness Thornton (Lab)
The noble Lord has talked about being pro-women and I would like him to explain to the Committee why jailing women is pro-women.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
The simple point is that if Clause 191 is incorporated into the Bill, we will have a situation where many more women are under threat of coercion and many more women will face complications. Even the incomplete and substandard figures produced by the Department of Health on abortion in 2023 show that, at over 20 weeks’ gestation, 60.3% of women per 100,000 experienced complications arising from abortion in all clinical settings. That phenomenon will continue and will get worse. I hope that that is sufficient for the noble Baroness.
My amendment is directed towards striking an appropriate balance by providing legal certainty that would prevent overzealous investigation, weighed against the need to protect children. By defining clear thresholds for investigation, we protect vulnerable women while maintaining a shield for infants born alive. Clause 191 fundamentally changes our legal landscape and it is appropriate and reasonable to require updated public consultative guidance so that police and prosecutors understand what remains investigable, what standards apply and how to act lawfully and consistently.
In conclusion, if Parliament insists on decriminalising the woman’s role in procuring her own abortion, it has a profound moral duty to ensure that the law can still protect the infant the moment it leaves the womb. Amendment 461F is a measured attempt to ensure this and arguably the bare minimum in terms of responsible lawmaking. I urge noble Lords to support my amendment and others in this group, which seek to protect women and the most vulnerable lives among us. I urge Ministers to consider my Amendment 461F carefully as the Bill moves to Report.
Baroness Gerada (CB)
My Lords, until recently I was head of the Royal College of GPs. Our college is fully in favour of decriminalisation of abortion. As Professor Hawthorne said:
“No woman should face prosecution under antiquated laws that were created before women were even allowed to vote. This change in the law is a vital piece of protection for the reproductive and health rights of women”.
I would like to pick up a few issues. I have been fortunate enough to work in the NHS, in a legal state in terms of abortion, which has been absolutely fabulous, because I have seen many young women and girls and older women coming and needing terminations of pregnancy and I have guided them through it. I want to talk about a few things—for a start, telemedicine and “medicines by post” and the assumption that this is somehow a bad thing. I would like to turn it all round and say that this is a patient-centric initiative. Imagine having to travel far and to have to go past your abusive husband or abusive partner to say where you have been all day. This is humane and patient-centric and about 50% of women choose this option.
It does not mean that they do not get a proper assessment. Many people are assuming yet again that it is a sort of tick box. It is an hour-long consultation with pre- and post-termination counselling and at any point the woman can be seen face to face. I have also been hearing an assumption that it is an unsafe procedure. I think that I heard—I may have misheard—that one in 17 women end up having complications from having had a medical termination. That is not the figures from the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists. It says that, under 10 weeks, one in 1,000 women have heavy bleeds and at, over 20 weeks, four in 1,000 do. Those women are in hospital. Clearly it is very different. It is nothing like one in 17. You also have to compare that—we have the comparator—with women who miscarry at home without having an abortion, who probably end up in hospital, as I did twice as a young woman when I had miscarriages. I also want to pick up the issue that somehow telemedicine is a process without any legal requirements. Of course it has legal requirements. It is currently, and will continue to be, regulated under the abortion law. What we are doing is decriminalising it.
I then want to talk about foeticide or foetal sex selection. Foetal sex can be determined as early as 10 weeks and many women choose, for one reason or another, to know the sex of their child. Both my daughters-in-law—I was going say my sons but, of course, for the purpose of this, boys cannot become pregnant—chose to determine the sex of their child, just as many people do. It is perfectly legal to determine the sex of your child—at the 20-week scan, anyway, you can choose to determine the sex. Women can then choose to have a legal termination if they so wish, though I am struck by the noble Lord, Lord Winston, saying that there are legal implications. This is conflating the issue of decriminalisation and sex selection. I personally am against sex selection, but it is not part of this argument about decriminalisation.
I would also just like to address the under-16s and compulsory safeguarding assessments under what I assume would be a multi-agency assessment, including the police and social workers. As the law stands, women under 16 can obtain an abortion and obtain sexual health advice and contraception without safeguarding implications—clearly noble Lords all know about Gillick competence and Fraser guidelines. This would be a retrograde step. These young girls would not come to see us. They would probably end up like one patient who I saw very late in pregnancy. She presented with a rash on her abdomen, which is the rash with stretch marks; she was 32-weeks pregnant. She was so terrified—and this was before the law changed—of admitting that she had had unprotected sex and had not had her period. Compulsory safeguarding is a retrograde step and has nothing to do with this decriminalisation, which I fully support.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I mainly want to defend Clause 191 remaining in the Bill, but with some reservations. Before that, I want to acknowledge public interest in this issue and a popular worry that it is all about legalising abortion up to birth. That is what is being discussed. Worse than that, people believe that somehow this legal change was rushed through the other place almost by the back door. Legalising abortion up to birth is not what is contained in Clause 191, but I have sympathy with the public’s confusion over that and criticism about how the clause was added to the Bill in the other place.
The noble Lord, Lord Carter, spoke about some of this and everybody else has now mentioned just how little time was spent discussing this in the other place. More important, most people did not know it was coming. Most members of the public were not expecting such a big change in the law. Wherever you stand on this, abortion might be a settled entitlement for women—most people accept that abortion exists in society—but it is still a morally charged, difficult discussion. For some, conscience is involved. There are contestations, certainly about when life begins.
We cannot deny it: if anything talks to going beyond 24 weeks—and, as we have heard today, even 24 weeks is contentious or becoming so; it should not be, but it is—the public are perfectly right to be a bit furious and feel that somehow the democratically accountable system has been snubbed. I say that because this debate needs more discussion and depth. I am glad to hear that we are getting some of it here, but we certainly did not get it when the clause was brought into the Bill in the House of Commons. That has led to a big backlash, which, as it happens, is not necessarily the best atmosphere in which to conduct a rational, reasoned debate.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
I want to speak to the three amendments which I have tabled in this group. I urge noble Lords to show the normal courtesies that we extend when a Peer is speaking to an amendment that he or she has tabled.
I will start with my Amendments 456B, 461H and 461K. Amendment 456B is the third amendment in this group. As matters stand, the law allows for abortions only under certain clearly defined conditions after 24 weeks. Amendment 456B aims to ensure that women follow these conditions after 24 weeks. I suppose it is the most important of my three amendments, which is why I am speaking to it first, bearing in mind the problems and consequences to which other noble Lords have already pointed.
Clause 191 leaves abortion over 24 weeks as unlawful, but in practice it also leaves open the possibility for a woman to have such an abortion without consequences. My Amendment 456B would help to ensure that present-day legislation is observed by stipulating that criminal culpability is removed from the woman only if the abortion takes place before 24 weeks. As the law stands at present, there is a big difference between before and after 24 weeks. The law is clear that before 24 weeks there is a procedure and regulations to be complied with, and it is a relatively straightforward procedure. In practice, abortions before 24 weeks are allowed to go ahead once the paperwork has been done. By contrast, after 24 weeks abortions are allowed to go ahead only under a defined, limited process and subject to stringent conditions, such as that the mother’s life would be endangered or that the child would be born with serious defects.
These matters have been raised as if they do not exist. These stipulations have been raised in the Chamber as if they were not already part of the law. When a woman procures an abortion outside the legal procedure before 24 weeks, she almost certainly would have had the abortion lawfully. The fault is one of failing to go through the proper procedures. However, for abortions performed outside the law after 24 weeks, the position is completely different. These are abortions which may not have been permitted under the law had the woman sought permission. To put it bluntly, in these cases, the woman kills her own baby when she has not been legally permitted to do so and might have been denied the permission. Remember that, in cases post 24 weeks, the babies concerned may well be viable.
The new clause removes criminal culpability from women for abortions at any time. It is hard to see how a reasonable distinction can be made between a baby who is ready to be born and one who has just been. I was very impressed by the speeches of my noble friend Lord Hailsham and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, on these points.
I will conclude on this one, which will be the longest. It has been pointed out that the next stage in these matters is to decriminalise infanticide. What do we think of a society which kills babies a day before being born—indeed, as they are ready to exit the womb? Although the act remains a crime, the law excuses the main perpetrator. This would leave us with an act that remains a crime but the law excusing the main perpetrator of any blame. Is this the sort of society we want to create?
I move on to my Amendments 461K and 461H.
Baroness Coffey (Con)
While the noble Baroness finds her notes, I will say that I think Amendment 461K is a really interesting one. How are the Government going to make sure that providers of a variety of abortions actually operate within the law and make those checks? This is something I will be discussing regarding my amendment shortly as the debate continues.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, but I will go on to Amendment 461H on in-person consultations. We have already heard from the proposers of Amendment 460, which would require that this consultation be in person. My amendment would require this, but it would also add that the gestational age of the baby should be ascertained by a medical scan or other equivalent means. Usually this means an ultrasound scan, which can be given at seven weeks onwards. First-trimester scans are generally safe, non-invasive and commonly used to confirm pregnancy, identify the due date of the baby and—
Lord Patel (CB)
May I just, for information, correct that? First-trimester ultrasound scans are carried out with a vaginal probe, so they are invasive.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
I thank the Lord for that. But I think one of the American learned societies of obstetricians, gynaecologists and other kinds of medicine that indicates—as do other sites—that there is technology that is successful from seven weeks on, and certainly from nine or 10 weeks. There are differences. These differences are the subject of debate among medical professionals. I can see the noble Lord shaking his head.
Lord Winston (Lab)
I thank the noble Baroness for giving way. Just as a matter of information, I must tell the noble Baroness that in a clinic I have run for over 40 years which does ultrasound on every patient with a high degree of expertise, these measurements are not that accurate; they really are not. There is a real risk that you get the wrong stage of the foetus completely—at least a month out, if not more.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
I thank the noble Lord, and I respect his expertise, but I think there is a debate about how successful scans are and from what stage. We can debate that on another occasion, but there is evidence that scans can be used successfully. I will not take any more interventions, because my time is running out and I have one more amendment to go through after this.
There is evidence that first-trimester scans are generally safe, non-invasive and commonly used to confirm pregnancy, identifying due date et cetera. At the moment, the requirement is that the medical practitioner believes in good faith that the pregnancy will not exceed 10 weeks when the medicine or the first dose of a course is administered. I contend that the condition stretches the idea of belief and good faith unreasonably widely, so the medical practitioner simply accepts what they are told, perhaps by the pregnant woman who may be speaking in perfectly good faith—we have seen tragic cases of this—but is mistaken, or else that it is only after the gestational age of the baby has been reliably ascertained that the medical practitioner is in a position to believe in good faith that the pregnancy meets the conditions stated. My amendment would not change the Act.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
I will certainly bring my remarks to a conclusion. I will just briefly introduce my last amendment to Clause 191 if I may because of those interventions and, I have to confess, my loss of notes. Amendment 461K, my last amendment, proposes to—
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
I will make an intervention in general about this rather lengthy debate. I draw your Lordships’ attention to paragraph 4.46 on page 63 of the Companion, entitled “Reading of Speeches”. I will read it out very clearly so that everybody can understand what it says:
“The House has resolved that the reading of speeches is ‘alien to the custom of this House, and injurious to the traditional conduct of its debates.’ It is acknowledged, however, that on some occasions, for example ministerial statements”—
or statements from Front Bench speakers—
“it is necessary to read from a prepared text. In practice, some speakers may wish to have ‘extended notes’ from which to speak, but it is not in the interests of good debate that they should follow them closely”.
I also point out that the advisory time limits are made to include interventions. If there are interventions, that does not mean that you go over time. The reason that ministerial statements at the end of a debate are given 20 minutes is that that allows for interventions.
Lord Farmer (Con)
In response to the noble Lord, Lord Russell, the Companion says that we should not read speeches, but there is an argument that that is classist and sexist. Many women are not used to speaking ad lib—
Lord Farmer (Con)
Well, they are not. Many of us have not been parliamentarians for long, and we have not been at the right schools that have debating societies. If we want to say something important for the good of the common—
Lord Katz (Lab)
Order. We need to return to the debate. I suggest that the noble Baroness concludes her remarks imminently so that we can carry on with the debate.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
My Lords, my Amendment 461K agrees that the people who support this clause say that they are not trying to legalise abortions that would otherwise be illegal. If that were to happen, it would be extremely important to ensure that proper mechanisms exist for prosecuting the party culpable—that is to say, the abortion provider—so that they are not above the law or beyond the reach of the law. We should not forget that, for the most part, it is non-medical clinics that provide around 80% of abortions, with taxpayers funding the bill. Like all service providers—
Lord Katz (Lab)
The noble Baroness has had a lot of the Committee’s indulgence. We will take that as her finishing.
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)
My Lords, I think the noble Baroness was in danger of no longer wishing to be heard. That is where the Committee was moving. When the Whips tell us to conclude, we really should conclude.
Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)
My Lords, some of us have been sitting through this debate right from the very beginning. Others have come in late and then made certain speeches. I notice that the noble Lord had to read what he had to say as well. Therefore, I will just say to him very gently, and as graciously as I can, that this is a very vital issue. There are those of us who believe that it is important to say what we have to say carefully and clearly, and we are therefore seeking to put a point on the record.
People are watching this. I must be honest, having sat here for so long, one can be very confused in our debates. On Friday, we were debating allowing and encouraging sick and elderly people to end their lives as quickly as possible, but now we are debating something that does not allow healthy babies to even live their lives, so people outside are confused about where we stand. Therefore, there is a matter that we need to deal with on this issue.
I say this as a father; my wife and I have five children, and we lost one child. I therefore resent anyone saying that I do not know what this is. As a father of five children who has brought them up through all those years, I certainly know, even to this day, what it is to bring up children. Women who are pregnant, whether it is an intended pregnancy or not, deserve compassion, support and honesty from us in this place as we debate these matters—as do children who are capable of being born alive. My concern is that Clause 191 unsettles a delicate legal balance—one that many of us already feel is too casual—on the rights of the unborn child, without the security that such a change demands.
In the other place, two hours and 15 minutes were found for a Backbench Business Committee debate to consider government support for the fishing industry. Debate on the forthcoming business lasted one hour and 17 minutes. These are important matters. I do not cite those figures to denigrate either the topics that were debated or the business managers in the other place. I am pointing out that I find it remarkable that the entire debate on this issue in the other House, which concerned not only Clause 191 but the more extreme decriminalisation proposal—as well as a sensible, reasoned amendment to reinstate in-person consultation before prescribing abortion pills—lasted just two hours.
In fact, it is even worse: some 46 minutes were available for speeches from the Back Benches. That is how long the other place took to come to a conclusion on decriminalisation concerning this issue. This is not responsible lawmaking on a matter that carries profound consequences for the status of the unborn and the safety of women. That is why I strongly support the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton, in opposing Clause 191, and associate myself entirely with those who have spoken on that issue in support of her.
This is not simply a matter of differing worldviews or perspectives on the subject of abortion. Legal opinion, including that of Stephen Rose KC, confirms that Clause 191 would permit a woman to perform her own abortion at home for any reason, right up to the moment of birth, with no legal deterrent. We have heard another legal opinion, but, as we know, lawyers make their money by disagreeing with one another.
I am clear that science tells us that life begins at conception, but I also accept that this is not currently reflected in our law. However, whether one agrees or disagrees with the law as it stands, it is at least clear. In removing women from the existing criminal framework, as Clause 191 does, we upend our current settlement. As the gestation of a pregnancy advances, the state’s interest increases. This is not arbitrary: it recognises the view that with increasing viability must come increasing protection for the unborn. This is an explicit recognition not only that are two lives involved in any pregnancy but that they both require protection.
This is also a matter of safety. On complications, a government review published in November 2023 found that medical abortions after 20 weeks, even in clinical settings, have a complication rate more than 160 times higher than that of abortions under 10 weeks. The Government’s own commentary on the publication of abortion statistics for England and Wales in 2023 acknowledges that data on complications does not present a true picture. It says that,
“where … medication is administered at home, complications may be less likely to be recorded”.
Without an in-person check, women can obtain pills, perhaps mistakenly or through pressure, far beyond the 10-week limit for pills-by-post abortions. As it is, this seems a recipe for a disaster, but, with the deterrent effect of the current law removed by Clause 191, I fail to see how this problem will not be exacerbated and how more women will not be placed in precisely these higher-risk situations.
This is why Amendment 460 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, ably supported and spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, matters. By restoring in-person consultation before pills are prescribed, the amendment simply returns us to a best practice model with regard to women’s safety and the protection for viable unborn babies. It provides a crucial opportunity to assess gestation accurately, to screen for potential harm and to identify coercion or abuse. This is not a restrictive or regressive measure but a pro-safety one which, according to the poll of 2,103 adults by Whitestone Insight shortly before Clause 191 passed in the Commons, is supported by two-thirds of women, with only 4% in favour of the status quo.
Baroness Maclean of Redditch (Con)
My Lords, I am speaking late in the debate and others have made many points. I just want to speak to the amendments in my name in this group and say a few brief words about the stand part notice from the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton, to which I am a signatory. I also support the amendments in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Bailey and Lord Jackson, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Stroud, Lady Eaton and Lady Lawlor.
I consider myself very fortunate to have never had an abortion, and I wonder how many of us in your Lordships’ House have actually had one. I want to make it clear that I do not oppose abortion altogether. No woman would choose an abortion lightly, and I fully recognise the points that have been raised about the distress of police investigations for women at that time in their lives. But we owe it to ourselves and to the women affected to be honest about the reality of what we are discussing.
In 2022, 260 abortions in England and Wales took place at or beyond 24 weeks’ gestation. These abortions must be performed in NHS hospitals. The woman is awake—she goes through actual labour, including painful contractions; she will deliver a fully formed infant via a vaginal delivery. We may wonder whether every woman going through this is fortunate enough to be in a bereavement suite with specialist care, or will she be in the next room to someone delivering a healthy baby? At 24 weeks, a baby is 12 inches long, weighing about 1.5 pounds, with a fully formed face. The NHS website tells us that at 32 weeks, an unborn baby is perfectly formed and just needs to put on weight. Once delivered, we wonder what happens to the infant. They are classified as clinical waste to be incinerated; at earlier gestations, women are advised that they can take the remains home, bury them in the garden, flush them down the toilet or place them in household rubbish.
There is no extensive research on the long-term emotional impact on women of late-term abortions, but natural human empathy tells us that this must carry significant emotional impact and distress. My heart goes out to those who are in this position because of foetal abnormalities, but I ask your Lordships whether extending this experience to any point in pregnancy, including up to full term, is truly in the interests of women and girls, many of whom are victims of reproductive coercion, domestic abuse, child rape, trafficking or modern slavery, when we have so little understanding of the long-term effects.
In fact, there is complete silence around late-term abortions. It is a taboo subject associated with complex feelings. There is hardly any information about what it actually involves or how it will impact women and their bodies. Removing any legal deterrent, as this clause does, means that we put more women in a world of scary and unsafe unknowns, and we leave our public services to pick up the pieces without any plan. These are almost certainly not women with significant resources, resilient mental health or strong support systems. We are leaving the most vulnerable at greater risk of exploitation.
I come at this, respectfully, from a totally different perspective from that of the noble Baroness, Lady Hazarika, and others, because we know that abuse often takes the form of reproductive coercion, as the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, explained in the case of Stuart Worby, and we know that this is a pattern for grooming gang victims as well. I fully accept that this is not the design or intent of the policy, but it very much is the unintended consequence. How many of us can genuinely say that we always pass perfect laws without unintended consequences? It is not the case. This situation could happen via the pills by post scheme, or by coercion or other reasons.
Those who support this clause present it as a feminist fight for women’s rights, and accuse those of us on the other side of the debate of ignoring the suffering of women. They tell us this radical law change is necessary because dozens of women are facing life in prison under a Victorian law. But almost every part of this claim is questionable. The law in question, the Offences against the Person Act 1861, may be old, but it is still the basis of our laws today against GBH and manslaughter, and nobody would suggest that they are obsolete. The idea that women are facing life in prison is also fanciful. The one high-profile conviction in recent years under the Offences against the Person Act resulted in a short prison sentence that was suspended on appeal. As for the numbers, the groups who are campaigning for this tell us that six women have been prosecuted over the past three years. Given that there are now almost 300,000 abortions a year, it is hard to see why this justifies such a significant change. Of course, it is regrettable if there are women who have been wrongly investigated, but that is a police matter. We do not disapply other laws simply because people are sometimes wrongly investigated. It is critical that we make the distinction between babies who would and would not be viable outside the womb; that is why we have the 24-week limit.
The Member in another place who tabled Clause 191, Tonia Antoniazzi, is on record as saying in an interview that she was comfortable with women being able to abort at 37 weeks without committing an offence. Are people really comfortable with passing a law that means a woman could abort at full term for any reason without committing an offence, as would be the effect of this clause?
Many have spoken about the dangers of telemedicine, so I will not expand on that, but we discussed that in the assisted dying debate. Under that Bill, two doctors would at least have to make sure that the person applying for an assisted death was actually terminally ill by examining relevant records. But the pills by post scheme permits women to obtain abortion pills with no reliable way of ascertaining whether they are under the limit before which it is legal and safe to take pills or even pregnant at all.
I turn briefly to my Amendments 459B and 461G. While I sincerely hope that this Committee will support the stand part notice from the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton, in case it does not, I have tabled Amendment 459B to introduce a sunset clause requiring the Secretary of State to renew the legislation after each of the first three years. The related Amendment 502A is to make the regulations in proposed new subsection (3) subject to the affirmative procedure. In so doing, it encourages awareness and scrutiny of the provision and provides an opportunity to reverse the effects of Clause 191, should the consequences be as I fear.
I have also tabled Amendment 461G, which would require an annual report concerning abortion drugs that have been obtained illegally, maybe online, which I worry will become more likely under Clause 191. Of course, this need not relate solely to women considering an abortion themselves—it might relate to third parties or traffickers who obtain pills illegally to coerce an abortion or cover up abuse. It establishes ongoing transparency and oversight concerning what I fear will increasingly become a matter of public health and a safeguarding concern.
I should mention that I was unable to table any amendments to require the Government to collect numbers of pills by post that are issued or to require that this is captured on women’s medical records because those issues are not in the scope of the Bill. I would be grateful, therefore, if the Minister would look at those issues because I think they are very important.
There is a genuine worry that with the numbers of abortions rising and young women turning to that option more frequently, the future consequences for their reproductive health are simply unknown. We have many noble Lords in this House who practise medicine, yet we could see women coming to them and not disclosing that they have taken pills by post in the past. The cases that have led to the clamour for decriminalisation up to birth have resulted from pills by post and the inability to ensure that safeguards are maintained. Taking these pills outside the 10-week gestational limit is a dangerous course of action. The Department for Health and Social Care consultation found that the risks of this would include an ongoing viable pregnancy, reduced efficacy of abortions and death. I hope the House will consider my amendments as additional safeguards for women and girls, and I commend them to the House.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I am afraid it is clear that there are still a number of Back-Benchers who wish to speak on these amendments as well as the Front-Benchers, so I now propose to adjourn the debate on Amendment 455, move to dinner break business and then resume the debate on the Bill. I advise your Lordships’ House that notice has been taken of those who are here for the debate on Amendment 455, so when we resume, we will be able to continue the debate in an orderly fashion.
Crime and Policing Bill
Monday 2nd February 2026
(3 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-XIV(Rev) Revised fourteenth marshalled list for Committee - (30 Jan 2026)
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
My Lords, the Committee may be pleased to know that I plan to be comparatively brief.
Before the dinner break, the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean, asked how many people in your Lordships’ House have had abortions. Of course I cannot answer that question, but it is worth putting on the record the fact that one in three British women will have an abortion during their reproductive life. That is the reality for very many women in the UK today. They will need this reproductive healthcare.
I will not go over what has been said before, but I want to respond to some of the things that have already been said that need a response, and I will raise a point that has not been raised but which is important for contextualising our debate. It relates to a comment made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, about why we have seen an increase in investigations into what are often entirely natural miscarriages and late-term apparent or possible abortions. We have not discussed how the global political context has changed. There is an extremely well-funded global campaign around the world that is seeking to reduce women’s reproductive rights. For context on that, I went to the website of the Organization of American Historians and read an article by the historian Jennifer L Holland. She notes that,
“the antiabortion movement, in its many iterations, has radically transformed Americans’ ideas about women’s bodies, reproduction, feminist politics, and of course, fetal life. In the two centuries the movement has existed, its constituencies, tactics, and tools have all changed. But what has remained is the effect this movement has had on women’s lives”.
She adds that the movement
“transformed ideas as it also restricted the … ability of American women to access reproductive healthcare”.
The article goes on to note that, until around the 1840s, having an abortion in America was an unexceptional and “largely stigma-free” practice. That was because it had inherited the law from the UK that regarded anything before quickening as not being an issue; that is usually regarded as four to six months of gestation.
There is a reason why the law that we keep referring back to is from the 1860s. That was when we started to see a global movement, particularly an American-driven movement, which is now here in the UK, through very well-funded organisations and with millions of pounds coming from the US, through the huge power of social media, having an impact on whether people will think about these issues—whether they are a medical practitioner, police officer, et cetera. When we look at why we have seen an increase, we really have to consider the framework in which this debate is being conducted.
A long time ago now, the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, who is not in his place, said that
“all investigations in this matter should be conducted with great sensitivity”.
What has become clear from our debate is just how invasive and damaging investigations are. I will not go through the cases that have been rehearsed here today. There have been GCSE students who have had their phones taken away and their lives totally disrupted—it is absolute chaos. That is the reality. I do not think it is possible to do this sensitively.
I will briefly address the amendments that seek to attack—and we have heard a concerted attack on it today—telemedicine. I link the remarks of the noble Baronesses, Lady Gerada and Lady Fox, who both, in very different tones, perhaps, made it very clear that this has been an extremely successful delivery of healthcare. This is a safe and convenient way that has seen the average gestation at treatment for abortion fall substantially, with more than half of all abortions now taking place before seven weeks’ gestation.
If we were to stop telemedicine, as quite a number of noble Lords have called for, there would be a drastic increase in waiting times, women would have to travel long distances for care—even at the earliest gestations—and many women would be driven to buying pills online through legal, quasi-legal or simply illegal sources because of the lack of availability of that provision.
This brings me to respond to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, who spoke about the number of abortions occurring in the UK. I hope the noble Lord and, indeed, the entire Committee would agree that that figure is a reflection of the inadequacy of contraceptive provision in the UK. I hope we can all agree that we want better contraceptive provision and therefore that would be a way to reduce the number of abortions.
I note that a study from BPAS found that nearly half of women found it difficult to access contraception because of long wait times, difficulty in securing appointments, and financial hurdles when they went to secure their preferred method of abortion.
I have two more brief points—
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
I hear what the noble Baroness is saying. Is she aware that the World Health Organization defines a safe abortion as
“meaning that they are carried out using a method recommended by WHO, appropriate to the gestational age, and by someone with the necessary skills”,
and that recommendation 30 in its safe abortion guide states that medical abortion at 12 weeks or greater should be managed only by doctors in a healthcare setting—in other words, a self-managed medical abortion from 12 weeks’ gestation is deemed to be “unsafe” by the WHO?
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
The noble Lord has very powerfully made the case for ensuring that we are able to make that provision as early as possible.
I particularly want to address one amendment that we have only really heard the presenter address. Amendment 461B from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, would subject any female accessing legal abortion under the age of 16 to a mandatory investigation by police and child protection agencies. It is worth stressing that since 1985 it has been the law in England and Wales that under-16s can access contraception, abortion and sexual health care confidentially.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, first, I ought to say how I approach this debate. I had not intended to speak. The issue—passionate though people feel about it on both sides of the argument—is one that I hope I have always approached with an open mind. Abortion is a terrible thing in contemplation for anybody concerned, but it is a practical necessity for some. That is something that I have always felt strongly about.
One of the things that we could have been confused about in hearing the debate today is that the police are investigating every stillbirth and every miscarriage, which is not the case. If the death takes place or the child’s life is lost in a medical setting, usually the police are never involved. The time when the police become involved is either when there is a medical referral because there is a concern by medics or, alternatively, when there is an emergency at home or somewhere else.
I mention this because we have to be realistic, whatever the decisions made about Clause 191, about how the police respond. There are some ways the police response could be improved, but we have to give some understanding to the officers who deal with these emergencies, say, in a home or at a place of work. It could be a public toilet, or it could be that something is discovered in the middle of a field. At the beginning, the officers do not know whether they are dealing with a baby, a late-term foetus or a child who might have taken a breath or not; they have a very confused situation, and they cannot just walk away from it.
My first point is that there has to be some sensitivity. At a far earlier stage in the debate, I think the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, raised sudden death syndrome for babies. The police have got far better at dealing with that sort of situation, because 30 years ago we did not know that sudden death syndrome happened. Now we do, so it is dealt with in a different way from how it was 20 or 30 years ago.
The bottom line is that there is a requirement to freeze the scene in terms of evidence, because it is no good two or three weeks after the event when a judge, a coroner or someone turns around and says, “Well, you must have seen this at the scene and gained the evidence”, and they say, “Well, actually we did not seize it; we did not freeze it”. There is a difference between starting an investigation and freezing the scene and making sure you have as much evidence as is available, without too much intrusion, at that first point.
It is really important to be clear about this. If we set off and say that Clause 191 will come into effect and there will certainly not be a criminal investigation into the mother, that does not stop the need to collect evidence right at the beginning, when no one is sure. I think we have to be a little realistic about this.
On improving the police investigation process, there are two things that would be really helpful. Number one is that a senior detective with some experience attends the scene as soon as possible—I would say within an hour—to see what they are dealing with, so that if there is evidence to be seized, it is done sensitively and the family are protected as much as possible. Probably as importantly, unless there is an immediate need to start an investigation—for example, we could imagine that there might be injury to a child or a foetus that is not possible to explain by what appears to have happened to it medically, for example a knife or something else—you need to consider that set of circumstances. But generally, within a period of time—let us say 48 hours—the police must seek medical advice about how this child or foetus died and what, if anything, should happen thereafter. That starts to create a process that we could all objectively rely on.
My second point is that there has been a little confusion about the fact that, if the woman is coerced, Clause 191 does not mean that the coercer is innocent. It has nothing to do with that at all. It is only about the mother, if it is decided that that should go ahead.
I would like to make two final points. I just want to sit here and learn, but one thing I have not heard addressed in the debate—the problem, it seems to me—is that there are some women who, at 24 weeks and onward, need help. Whether the state says they can have an abortion or not, they might take that decision. Where do they go? We all agree that a back street abortionist is not a good idea. They cannot go to a medical professional, who would then be complicit in providing the abortion, perhaps, that they cannot legally have. If they end up with these online tablets designed for those under 10 weeks, that is not a good outcome. But I am not sure that what the state says—what we say—will help them in that terrible dilemma, because the need that they feel to have that abortion beyond 24 weeks has not gone away. If we abandon them to that decision alone, I do not think we help anyone. I would like to understand this myself, regardless of the decision about Clause 191: how do women in this position get some help?
With an open mind, there were three points that I do not think we have yet clarified. One thing that I was really interested to hear was that the pills designed for under 10 weeks are available online for people beyond that, and it seems as though that is not a good idea. They are designed for people under 10 weeks because that is when they work best. At 24 weeks and beyond they sound like an awful option—but what if they are your only option? How are we going to deal with control of those pills? I do not understand, from Clause 191 or the existing law, what we intend to do about that.
The second point, from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, was that there is this fundamental dilemma: the woman has not committed a criminal offence, but the people who enable her to do this act do commit an offence. I am not a lawyer, but that sounds like a contradiction. I think there has to be some explanation of how that gets remedied.
On the final point that was raised, I am not sure about the answers. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, did not think it relevant, but the point about sex determination as a reason for abortion seems to me a real risk. I do not know whether Clause 191 makes it more or less likely to happen, but it is a risk and nobody should allow that. It happens now, potentially, but if Clause 191 makes it more likely, what is the mitigation of that risk? I have not heard it. That needs to be addressed if Clauses 191 is to remain.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
My Lords, for the benefit of the absent noble Lord, Lord Russell, I will attempt to speak in a paperless fashion, which means that if I engage in verbal streams of consciousness I hope that the Committee will forgive me. There is a range of amendments in this group, many of which I support, a number of which I have sympathy with and a few that I oppose. That is perhaps natural, given the fact that a number of amendments in this group pull in completely opposite directions.
Of the amendments that I support, I draw particular attention to Amendment 460, which would require that before an abortion could take place there is at least a clinical appointment, that guidance is given and that it is done through that route. Noble Lords have come up with a range of solutions to what we all appreciate is a sensitive situation and have tried to square the circle. The evidence from prosecutions that have taken place, and where there have been convictions, is that in almost every case there has been an absence of clinical support and someone has, in effect, gone on a form of solo run. Albeit that it may well have been in very difficult circumstances and taken with a heavy heart, nevertheless that is the route down which they have gone.
In the limited time available, I will concentrate on supporting the Clause 191 stand part notice from the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton, because, with respect to those who drafted Clause 191, it is somewhat disingenuous, radical in its implications and dangerous, particularly for women. Let me explain why.
Mention has been made that it does not legally change the time limits. In a strict legal sense, that is true, but it does turn those time limits into a façade. If you have a situation in which an act that remains illegal can be carried out but the person who carries it out is immune and protected from prosecution in all circumstances—in blanket circumstances—you have a law that is utterly ineffective. It is the equivalent of saying that we will retain speed limits on motorways but anyone found driving on a motorway beyond that speed limit will not be prosecuted. It is somewhat disingenuous. A more honest approach would have been an amendment that simply said, “We want to move the time limit to the point of birth”. That is, in effect, what Clause 191 does, but the changes that it makes are disguised as the mirage that has been put in front of us.
This is a radical change. Within this Committee and society as a whole, there is a wide spectrum of views on the issue of abortion. Some, and I am one, would take a much more restrictive approach towards abortion and feel that with our current laws the balance is wrong. Others take a much more liberal or permissive view. The settled compromise between those positions is to say that, at present, the determining line between what is legal and what is not is whether a child can be born and viable at the point of birth. The point has been made that that line has shifted from 28 weeks to 24 weeks. There is a good argument that it should come down a little bit more. But Clause 191 will, in effect, shift the ground in some cases to a situation in which that abortion can take place up until the day of birth. That is a radical step that is out of sync with public feeling.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I support the mitigating amendments from a number of noble Lords, but I particularly support the proposition from the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton, that Clause 191 should not stand part of the Bill. I do so for a number of reasons; some are to do with principle and some to do with parliamentary procedure. Listening just now to the noble Lord, Lord Weir, and before that to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, I think that there are plenty of reasons why this deserves the kind of detailed examination that we have been giving it on the Floor of your Lordships’ House today, whatever our personal views may be.
Abortion is not just a medical procedure. It is not just about choice; it ends the life of a nascent human being. As the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, said early in our debate, it is about the sanctity of human life. That is one of the key questions that we must always wrestle with when we come to this issue.
Since 1967, when Parliament permitted what were supposed to be terminations carried out in rare and exceptional cases, there have been more than 11 million abortions in the United Kingdom. That is one life taken across the UK every two minutes. Since 1990, we have permitted eugenic abortions on the ground of disability right up to birth. That includes things such as cleft palate or club foot; 90% of all babies with Down syndrome are now aborted in the United Kingdom, according to NHS figures.
Laws have profound consequences. We are not a debating society but we do send signals. Laws, to some extent, are like semaphore: they send a signal to society. They have profound consequences—social, personal, economic and demographic—and not just for the unborn child. Clearly, from what noble Lords have said this afternoon, there are consequences for the women and everybody else who is involved. The amendments in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Maclean, Lady Meyer, Lady Lawlor, Lady Coffey, Lady Stroud, Lady Foster and Lady Eaton, and my noble friend Lady O’Loan, make it clear that this has profound consequences for women. We should take that into account as well.
Some noble Lords have touched on the question of law and whether international norms require us to do this. I remind the Committee that there is no such recognised right as the right to abortion in the European Convention on Human Rights. Decisions from the European Court of Human Rights have confirmed that the convention does not guarantee a right to have an abortion, nor does it guarantee a right to perform abortions. The court has also been clear that Article 8, which guarantees the right to private and family life, does not confer a right to abortion. The court has ruled that domestic laws that prohibit abortion do not violate Article 8. In contrast, human rights laws grant protection to the unborn. The preamble to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which the United Kingdom is a signatory, states that the child
“needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth”.
We need to ask ourselves, when we talk about conforming with what other jurisdictions do, how well we conform to those norms as well.
Things have changed as a result of the Health and Care Act 2022. I took part in the proceedings on that legislation. On the fourth day, an amendment was brought forward to make permanent the Covid arrangements permitting at-home abortions. Let me remind the Committee of the words of the then Health Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, who told the House, when announcing the end of the policy in February 2022,
“that it was always intended to be a temporary measure”.—[Official Report, 10/2/22; col. 1820.]
Too often, though, temporary measures become permanent and new arguments are brought forward to justify them.
One of the key arguments put forward in support of Clause 191 today is the alleged rise in the prosecution of women in recent years. If there has been a rise, that is intrinsically linked to abortion pills by post. I was particularly struck that Jonathan Lord, now of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists and a former medical director of Marie Stopes, acknowledged that for the 160 years prior to 2022,
“only three women have ever been on trial”.
Between 1 January 2012 and 31 July 2022, data from the Metropolitan Police shows that of 42 arrests under Sections 58 and 59 of the Offences against the Persons Act and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act, 34 of those arrested were men, and that of the seven who were ultimately charged, none of them were women. Prosecutions of women, I am glad to say, remain very rare indeed.
I know that there is agreement across the Committee, because we have all said it during the debate today, that any investigation of a woman following a pregnancy loss is a matter that requires deep compassion and sensitivity. Like others who have spoken in the debate, those of us who are fathers may have experienced the loss of a child as a result of miscarriage. We know what that means for men, as well as for women—what it means for everyone. It is the loss of a new child. Either life begins at conception or it does not. If it does, then the sanctity of human life that the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, described earlier surely must be a consideration.
I acknowledge that there may be circumstances in which accessing care and support may be less straightforward, but that does not justify the removal of in-person clinical safeguards altogether, particularly where there are well-documented risks around gestational error, coercion and missed complications. A compassionate and appropriate response would surely be to address access problems through properly funded, local, in-person services and targeted support for vulnerable women who may be coerced or even trafficked, rather than relying on a remote model that prioritises speed and convenience over safety.
There are radical alternatives to the defeat. As many have said in this debate, wherever we come from on the substantive issue, abortion itself is not something that is good or desirable; we must do all we can to try to find alternatives to it. Instead of asking a Select Committee to examine the sorts of arguments we have heard, instead of pre-legislative scrutiny, instead of examining the dangers to women or the inevitable increase in the number of terminations, instead of looking for alternatives which promote the well-being of both mother and child, instead of—as one noble Lord rightly referred to earlier—an impact assessment or any of the normal requirements in promoting legislation, this new clause was added simply as a Back-Bench amendment at a late stage of a Bill which is not primarily about abortion, and it was given a cursory 46 minutes of Back-Bench debate in the House of Commons. That would not have happened in my day in the House of Commons. This is no way to make law. The Government would be well advised to withdraw this clause, pending further consideration of the practical issues that it raises.
The uncomfortable truth which all of us must wrestle with, irrespective of our in-principle views on abortion, is that with Clause 191 on the statute book, if a woman intentionally induces an abortion at a very late stage and the baby dies in utero or during the process and is not born alive, there would be no criminal offence available in respect of her actions, regardless of gestation.
Abortion pills are powerful drugs. They can involve significant bleeding, pain and complications, and they can be tragically misused. The purpose of an in-person consultation is not delay or obstruction but to provide a vital clinical and safeguarding checkpoint. I urge noble Lords, even if they cannot support the substantive objections that I have made to Clause 191 in supporting the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton, to at least support Amendment 460, spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud. I hope that, when we return to this question on Report, there may have been some movement in that direction.
Baroness Coffey (Con)
My Lords, I tabled Amendment 461A, which would amend the Abortion Act. It is worth briefly stepping back. I completely understand why people have very different views on whether this is right or wrong or similar, or whether this is a healthcare treatment, but we have a law in place that puts restrictions on when abortions can happen.
It might perhaps feel that those restrictions are really just lip service. I say that because, in 2013 and 2016, the number of abortions was about 185,000 in England and Wales. It is now 278,000. A particular change started to happen in the statistics back in 2019, as, for the first time, people were allowed to take the second abortion pill at home. The first pill had to be taken in some kind of clinical setting, and then people could take the second pill at home. We saw a jump at that point, to about 207,000. I think I am right that 36% of abortions were taken at that point—that is about 75,000—where we saw the second pill be taken at home. We are now in a situation where, with the significant increase—a 50% uplift from a decade ago—72% of abortions are undertaken by both pills being taken at home. That is about 200,000 abortions in the year 2023, so there has been a significant change.
For what it is worth, I think that that is quite a sad figure. I appreciate that there will be people in this Committee who do not care what the number is—it is a woman’s right to choose. I do not agree with, or even respect, that point of view, but I understand it.
As has already been eloquently pointed out, we are now in a situation where Parliament still agrees that a crime may have been committed, but that, through Clause 191, the person carrying the foetus cannot be held responsible in any way. Therefore, the point of my amendment is to suggest that, instead of relying on good faith from the providers, we move to beyond reasonable doubt. I think that there is an element of my noble friend’s Amendment 461K, which proposes a new clause to make sure that the services provided are done in a lawful way.
Lord Patel (CB)
Can the noble Baroness help me by clarifying what her amendment would mean? Currently, a provider, or anybody who counsels a woman seeking abortion, will take in good faith what the woman might say to them about her gestation. But the noble Baroness’s amendment would move that to “beyond reasonable doubt”, which is at the level of a criminal court and not a social justice or civil court. That would mean that, in every case, the health professional who counsels the woman would have to provide evidence that they believed her beyond reasonable doubt. That would mean that there would have to be evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
Baroness Coffey (Con)
My Lords, one reason why I have chosen that phrase particularly at this stage—I might reconsider it for Report—is we are talking about a crime. If this happens beyond the terms which the law sets, it is a crime. This is about the change that happened, moving from taking the second pill at home to then just having both pills wherever. The case to which the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, referred earlier was one in which another lady got the pills and gave them to the chap. They were then applied unlawfully, obviously, and the other lady was also convicted—admittedly, it was a suspended sentence. But there was accountability.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
Is it not the problem that in criminal cases where the reasonable doubt test applies, you often have external evidence, such as witnesses or documents? What my noble friend is talking about here is really an oral conversation, and the only material available to the service provider will be what the prospective mother has to say. It is very difficult on that basis to come to a conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt.
Baroness Coffey (Con)
That is why I am not convinced that the situation that we have is satisfactory to uphold the law.
The other reason why noble Lords are concerned about Clause 191 is that Tonia Antoniazzi, who put this measure forward, has said publicly that she is very comfortable with abortions happening at 37 weeks—she has no problem with it at all. But I appreciate that that is not what everybody is in favour of.
I ask the noble Lord, Lord Patel, to forgive me: I want to speak to a few other amendments, and I am conscious of the time.
The other thing that I am keen to mention is in relation to Amendment 459 in the name of my noble friend Lady Eaton. It is specific to Clause 191. The issue was debated in the Commons in 2014, and the House said then that it was informed that it was completely unlawful. Of course, in the situation we have, you cannot use sex as a reason for an abortion; that would be unlawful. But one way in which this often get used is that someone might say that it would cause huge harm or distress if they were to have a boy or a girl contrary to the wishes of their family. It can be used as an alternative reason to access the various grounds in that regard.
Obviously, we are covering a lot of issues in this one group, which might be a reminder to people that it they could be spread over a few more groups. But we need to tread carefully. I am conscious that the Commons passed this by a huge majority, but I felt that it was just very blanket—almost like they wanted to decriminalise abortion entirely. That was how it came across. Nevertheless, it is our role to consider whether this is where we want to head, or do we actually want to find a better way of upholding the law than we have today, without the unnecessary affliction that some expectant mothers may fear?
Baroness Berridge (Con)
I shall speak very briefly to Amendments 456 and 460. I have been saddened by the lack of appreciation of the protective role that the criminal law brings, and I appreciated the comments of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. But it is important to consider some of the cases that have resulted in convictions and have not been controversial.
Sarah Catt, as reported by the BBC on 17 September 2012, aborted her baby at 39 weeks. She was prosecuted and sentenced for eight years; the body was never found—she disposed of it. The authorities realised because she had been for certain hospital appointments and no birth was registered; they went and investigated, and she said that she had had a legitimate abortion. It turned out that, when they searched her computer, because it was 2012, she had got pills from Mumbai and took those pills, and her husband knew nothing of what was happening. It is important to note that she was sentenced for eight years, and that is important particularly in relation to the amendments that seek to retrospectively pardon people. How will those connected to that lady, grandparents and potentially her husband, feel if that was no longer an offence because it was not controversial at the time? That is what we are dealing with here, that it would no longer be a crime at 39 weeks.
Having listened through many hours of debate now, I am unsure about the clarity and process of the law here. We have seen much suggestion that the pills by post are causing more investigations and heard about the nature of those investigations, but we need more detail and more evidence to legislate properly. Many noble Lords have tried to predict, “Women’s behaviour will do this” or “Women’s behaviour will do that” or “Things on the street”, as the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, said, “will be different”. But we do not know that because we have not had that really important pre-legislative process.
We have also had evidence that there is, in fact, sex-selective abortion going on, and we have had no equality impact assessment. I think that is a big flaw if we legislate on this. However, we do know from evidence in New Zealand that there could be an increase in late-term abortions, and we know that there have been more emergency calls as a result of more complications when the pills are taken after the 10-week window.
One point that has not been covered is that, obviously, the ambulance crew are often the first people through the door, so I would be grateful if the Minister could actually give some clarity and restate what the law is for those emergency providers faced with that situation. Concepts like birth, born alive and the first breath are not that easy to apply in this scenario. If you look at the Medical Law Review, there is a very interesting article by Elizabeth Romanis, in the winter 2020 edition, looking at advances in medical technology which mean that you can now operate on a foetus and there is a potential for having artificial wombs so this legal personality at the first breath might not be so easy to apply. Do the ambulance crew need to use all of their professional skills to ensure that that baby is born alive or not?
Also, the Nursing and Midwifery Order 2001, in Article 45, is very strict, unless it is a matter urgency or necessity, to ensure that people who are not medically qualified do not intervene in the birth of a baby; it is actually a criminal offence to do that. So I think we need to know from the Minister the boundary there as well, if there might be people with the woman as she is taking the pills in a late-stage abortion.
Finally, many noble Lords have said that this only had 46 minutes of Back-Bench time in the other place. I have pondered whether there is an opposite to the word “filibuster”, because I think it applies to this particular situation. It is a sadness now, I think, when one looks at Parliament’s granting of conscience issues to MPs and Peers, that somehow we have ended up in the position where these issues have lacked the pre-legislative scrutiny and consultation that are vital to ensure that we pass good laws. I do not think this one is fit, at the moment, without the involvement of the public in consultation, a White Paper, et cetera.
Baroness Spielman (Con)
My Lords, the debates today are of tremendous importance and, I think, of comparable difficulty to the painful debate about assisted dying, though that other Bill has rather overshadowed this clause. However, I think, in effect, that what we are talking about here does have some of the characteristics of a Trojan horse. It is a bit like a Private Member’s Bill hidden inside a government Bill. We have got just one day to consider the clause and to try to put some sensible restrictions and safeguards on what is clearly a risky proposal. I think the comments of many noble Lords have shown this.
I spent seven years responsible for Ofsted’s inspections of social services for children, and I saw a lot of the very worst of what parents, both male and female, will do to their children. On the Bill on that subject, debates have often been dominated by justified concerns for children’s welfare and safety, yet this clause goes the other way in explicitly legitimising the ultimate harm of killing a viable child if it is done by the mother, even where there is clear dishonesty or other wrongdoing by the mother and no mitigating circumstances whatever. I am not sure that that is a position that the majority of the public will ever see as progressive, inevitable or the way that the country should go.
It is, as various people have pointed out, a de facto removal of the term limit on abortion. With telemedicine coupled with self-declaration, what we have is something that is, I believe, really quite significantly unsafe. We simply do not have either the data or the monitoring systems to have the level of confidence that we should. By the way, I think we know that self-declaration and trust is not working as well as had been hoped in quite a number of Covid-era programmes where decisions are made remotely off the back of self-declaration. Some of the country’s woes come down to needing to find the political courage to say so and deal with that.
Baroness Sugg (Con)
My Lords, we have all received briefings on this clause, telling us that, unamended, it would allow abortion up to birth. I will address that in two ways. First, Clause 191 does not fully decriminalise abortion or alter the legal time limits. The legal framework remains for medical staff, which the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, set out very clearly. It has the advantage of stopping women facing investigation after miscarriage or a stillbirth, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, set out, but it would also ensure that the very small number of women who have ended their own pregnancies outside the law receive healthcare, mental health support and referral to appropriate support services rather than facing year-long police investigations. That is what Clause 191 sets out to do.
Secondly, I understand that some are concerned that this change in the law may increase later-term abortions. Clearly, later-term abortions have higher rates of complications than abortions at earlier gestation, but that still remains relatively low. We can, however, look at evidence from other jurisdictions. Although the noble Lord, Lord Weir, is right to point out that there are lots of different gestation limits across Europe, bringing women into the decriminalisation zone would bring us in line with 50 other jurisdictions, including France, New Zealand, Australia and the whole of the United States, where no women can be prosecuted for having her own abortion.
Evidence from these other jurisdictions shows that abortion law does not affect the likelihood of later-term abortions, and decriminalising abortion does not cause or correlate with any increase in third-trimester abortions. That is confirmed by the WHO and robust global evidence from countries including Canada, New Zealand and Northern Ireland, as the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, pointed out.
Looking at those in a little more detail—I am aware that it is late—in Canada, abortion was completely decriminalised in 1988. It is regulated as a health service with no criminal law or gestational limits, which goes much further that Clause 191 does. Over decades, data shows a stable pattern of early abortion and no increase in later abortion, despite that complete decriminalisation. In Northern Ireland, where abortion was decriminalised in 2019, almost nine in 10 abortions happened before 10 weeks, and there have been no reported cases of women ending their pregnancy at late gestations outside of medical frameworks.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
I appreciate the point the noble Baroness is making, but would she accept that the telemedicine is illegal in Northern Ireland? Pills by post is not an option, so the only route that any woman in Northern Ireland can use is the clinical route and within the timeframe. It is pretty obvious why there have not been any prosecutions; it is because there has not been a situation arising out of that.
Baroness Sugg (Con)
It is not the prosecutions that I am referring to, it is the cases themselves. I absolutely acknowledge that telemedicine is not available through medical services in Northern Ireland, but the pills are available illegally online and people are purchasing them. However, because women are decriminalised, they are never prosecuted for taking them.
The proportion of abortion procedures carried out before nine weeks’ gestation has increased in most countries with more liberal abortion laws. As explained by the noble Baroness, Lady Gerada, that is why this change is so strongly supported by the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, the Royal College of Nursing, the Royal College of Midwives, the Royal College of General Practitioners, and the Royal College of Psychiatrists, and many other health experts. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, that the meeting with these experts was really helpful. Perhaps we could do another one of those before Report so that noble Lords who have further medical questions can ask them.
Amendments 455, 456, 456B, 456C and 461F would retain the criminalisation of women in relation to abortion law, and women would still face arrest, investigation and prosecution under the law. I very much appreciate the efforts to find some compromise in Amendments 456 and 456C, and it is important to discuss whether this is possible. However, the harm that Clause 191 seeks to address would remain if those amendments were to be included in the Bill, as investigations would still be ongoing and we would still see women being pulled into the criminal justice system, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, set out.
I will briefly touch on vulnerable women. It is important to consider how this clause and the amendments would impact those women, who could be in a situation of abuse or coercion. Noble Lords have rightly raised concerns around this. Importantly, non-consensual abortion would remain a crime under Clause 191, including in the terrible case that the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, referred to.
Experts in this area have been really clear that the clause will be beneficial to women in this situation. The threat of criminal sanctioning can dissuade women from seeking help or even telling anybody what has happened to them. That is why it is supported by so many violence against women and girls groups, including the End Violence Against Women Coalition, Refuge, Rape Crisis, Karma Nirvana and many more. These groups came and did a very helpful briefing to noble Lords; perhaps we could replicate that again before Report. I understand noble Lords’ concern around coercion, but we should listen carefully to the experts in this area.
I will address telemedicine and Amendment 460, which would repeal its provision. Like other noble Lords, I was here for the legislation on its introduction, and I will present what has happened since. A large national cohort study undertaken in England and Wales published in the International Journal of Gynaecology & Obstetrics found that telemedical abortion is
“safe, effective and improves care”,
and is preferred by women. Full telemedicine is now essential for abortion provision and is being used by over 100,000 women every year in England and Wales. It has meant that once a woman decides she wants an abortion, she is able to access it more quickly and, therefore, more safely. Since the introduction of telemedicine, as the noble Baroness said, we have seen the average gestation at treatment for abortion falling substantially, with more than half of all abortions now taking place before seven weeks’ gestation. As we know, it is much safer to have an abortion as early as possible.
Telemedicine also provides a safe and confidential way for women in abusive and controlling relationships to receive abortion care. Safeguarding is an essential part of abortion care provision. Any patient that causes professional concern is provided with a full safeguarding assessment, and pre- and post-abortion support and counselling is available to all patients. Abortion providers are regulated by the Care Quality Commission, NHS England commissioners and the Department of Health and Social Care, which all have regulatory oversight.
I will address the medical complications point, which a number of noble Lords have raised. There have been 54,000 complications to medical abortion over the past five years, but that covers all gestations for all forms of medical abortion—in clinic, at home, telemedical or in person, scan or no scan, and at any gestation. Those complications are not reflective of pre 10-week medical abortion and are not exclusive to telemedical abortion care. No information has been included before 2021, when telemedicine was launched, so there is no analysis to see what has happened since then.
This also looks at the basic numbers of complications rather than rate, so it is an incomplete picture. As noble Lords have mentioned, over 1 million abortions have taken place in that five-year period. The number of abortions has gone up, which means the number of medical abortions has gone up. Therefore, sadly, the number of complications has gone up. But rather than looking just at the total figures, when you look at the rates shown by the latest abortion statistics and the hospital episode statistics, the rate of complications for medical abortion has fallen by 25% since telemedicine was introduced. That is why telemedicine is supported so strongly by medical professionals. Put simply, it is better care for women.
Telemedicine is a choice for clinically eligible women, not a requirement. A woman can always choose—
Baroness O’Loan (CB)
The noble Baroness talks about the number of complications being reduced in telemedical abortions, but the NHS statistics have shown a rise in the number of complications following the use of telemedical abortions, such that 12,000 people presented to hospital last year. Is the noble Baroness also aware that there is no collection of any statistics in Northern Ireland other than statistics delivered in accordance with the law? There are statistics on medical abortions and on surgical abortions, and that is it. There are no other statistics. I do not see where she is getting the evidence to support what she is saying in reference to abortion being decriminalised in Northern Ireland.
Baroness Sugg (Con)
On the noble Baroness’s first point, as I said, I acknowledge that the number of complications has gone up, but we have actually seen that the rate has gone down, because the number of abortions has increased. Even though that number has gone up, the actual rate has dropped by 25%. I am very happy to share the figures.
On the Northern Ireland statistics, that comes from the Northern Ireland medical association that provides the abortions. I completely agree that the more statistics and information we can have on this the better, so we are able to make fully informed decisions. Again, I am very happy to share that with the noble Baroness.
Baroness O’Loan (CB)
The statistics in Northern Ireland are collected from the health trusts that deliver the abortions; they are not collected from anyone else.
Baroness Sugg (Con)
Yes, from the people who provide the abortions. As I say, I am very happy to share that information with the noble Baroness.
Telemedicine is a choice—
Baroness Berridge (Con)
I am aware of the time, but can the noble Baroness, in the information she provides, please comment on the November 2023 government review, which says that the complication rate is higher when you are over 20 weeks’ gestation?
Baroness Sugg (Con)
I am specifically referring to telemedicine here, which is provided under 10 weeks. That is what I am talking about when I refer to complication rates. I have absolutely already acknowledged that later medical abortions have a higher rate of complications. That is why telemedicine is a good thing, because it brings the abortions earlier. As we heard, over half now are under seven weeks’ gestation.
I am running out of time, so I will stop there on telemedicine, but maintaining the option of telemedicine up to 10 weeks’ gestation for women who want it is safe, effective and helps ensure that women who have made the decision to have an abortion can access it as early as possible.
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)
The noble Baroness has invoked foreign jurisdictions a lot, but is she aware that a lot of them, as the noble Lord, Lord Weir, explained, have lower term limits whereby an abortion might be legal? She mentioned the United States, where she said there was no prosecution for abortion at all. Is she aware of how many states in the United States simply do not allow abortion? It is hardly surprising that there are no prosecutions if you do not allow abortion at all.
Baroness Sugg (Con)
I hear what the noble Baroness is saying. I was talking about the decriminalisation of women. Those are the jurisdictions which never prosecute a woman for ending her own pregnancy. I acknowledge, as I did previously, that gestational limits differ and whether medical professionals are included in decriminalisation varies, but in over 50 states, including all the United States, even those with the strictest abortion law, no woman is ever prosecuted for ending her pregnancy. That is important to acknowledge when people say that this is a huge change which is going to impact behaviour. Our law dates from 1967 and lots of people who made abortion legal after that never criminalise women.
Baroness Barker (LD)
My Lords, I start by thanking the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, for setting out the context behind this debate, which takes place against a backdrop in this country of large-scale funding by anti-abortion groups across the piece and almost daily articles in our newspapers about anti-abortion. That is one of the reasons why we have seen an increase in women being arrested. Noble Lords were very careful in the statistics they selected. Some chose to talk about 2018-22. It is undeniable that in the last three or four years there has been a huge increase in the number of women being investigated.
There are three groups of people in your Lordships’ House. There are those who are fundamentally opposed to abortion, and we have heard from many of them today speaking to many of the amendments. There are those who, like me in speaking to my Amendment 459C, support a woman’s right to make informed choices and who, for the last 10 years, have followed this debate about decriminalisation. To those who say that this was brought in as a measure by the back door, suddenly sprung on the House of Commons, that is wrong. For 10 years we have been discussing decriminalisation. Dame Diana Johnson brought Bills before another place. We have had a great deal of discussion about it at different stages. Then there is a third group: the people who have doubts. The speeches of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, typified some of them. They are the people who I want to talk to today, because they have some concern that this is not right.
In my preparation for today’s debate, which I have been thinking about for several weeks, I thought about a parallel and I went to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, went to, so I am sorry he is not in his place. I went to the fact that in 1961—a very good year in my opinion—this House debated the decriminalisation of suicide. I went, with the assistance of the Library, to look through the Hansard reports of that debate and the parallels are striking. At the point when it came into Parliament, what was the first criticism? That this had been sprung on us and was too big an issue to be brought in in this way. Yet there had been 10 years of debate prior to that by people who thought this was not the right way to deal with this issue. People in the Church had great debates about it. I suggest noble Lords read those Hansard reports, because the debates both here and in the House of Commons are profound. They are succinct, which is perhaps something we should relearn, because it is quite clear that there is no correlation between length of debate and quality of debate. These were people who were profoundly concerned about a moral issue and about what signal Parliament would be giving out were it to take this very grave step.
I will quote just one speech that took place not in the House of Lords but in the House of Commons. At Third Reading, the Conservative Minister Charles Fletcher-Cooke said:
“Because we have taken the view, as Parliament and the Government have taken, that the treatment of people who attempt to commit suicide should no longer be through the criminal courts, it in no way lessens, nor should it lessen, the respect for the sanctity of human life which we all share. It must not be thought that because we are changing the method of treatment for those unfortunate people we seek to depreciate the gravity of the action of anyone who tries to commit suicide”.
I suggest that there is a very strong and clear parallel with our debate. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, there are two evils here, and we have to decide between them.
Charles Fletcher-Cooke went on:
“One of the consequences of removing from the ambit of the criminal law this hitherto crime of attempted suicide is that it may be feared that some people may not be reached through the Mental Health Act; that there will be some who will not submit themselves to voluntary treatment, and cannot be persuaded by then medical advisers or members of their family to receive treatment. It may be apprehended that some gap in the welfare of the country may follow from that”.
He then said:
“We would all agree that it would be quite wrong either to keep the present criminal structure or to impose a new one purely for what we believe to be a very small minority. But we shall watch the situation and the Government will keep an open mind. We will see whether that small number increases and if a proposal not involving the odour of criminality is put forward to meet the situation, we shall certainly look at it again”.—[Official Report, Commons, 28/7/61; cols. 822-23.]
Two noble Lords talked about deterrence. Behind our deliberations today has been a fear that, if we cease to treat these women under the criminal justice system, we are somehow saying that what they do is less grave. I do not agree with that. I hope that, if I had taken part in that debate in 1961, I would have understood the point that they were making then, which is the same as the one we are making now: if somebody is so desperate that they would do this, they will not be in the right place if they end up in the criminal justice system. This is a medical issue.
In all the speeches we have heard today from noble Lords trying to chip away at telemedicine, the one thing that they have not dealt with is the point made to us by the people who see these desperate women: if we do anything to stop them being in contact with the medical profession, we put them in danger, and we will never get them out. In listening to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, I wondered whether police officers find themselves in other situations where someone has done something illegal that might have had a profound effect on their health. Is the first thing that comes into the police officer’s mind that the person should go to the criminal justice system, rather than making sure that they are medically safe? That is what we are doing throughout this debate: we are treating these women as being exceptional.
We should do what we have been doing for the past 10 years. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, is right that Clause 191 could be far more radical than it is. It is not radical; it is a very small adjustment to say that, if women are that desperate, they deserve medical treatment. All the amendments that have been debated today are just barriers in the way of that happening. I hope that people in this House, just as has been done at the other end, will realise that we are back to the same dilemma we had in 1961 and that we should do the right thing by desperate people.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, this has been a full, difficult and passionate debate, and I thank all noble Lords who have taken part. I know that issues of conscience such as this arouse very strong feelings, but I am pleased that we have managed to keep the debate respectful, as we always do in your Lordships’ House.
At the outset, I recognise that there are two aspects to this debate that we must firmly and definitively distinguish. The first is a matter of substance and the second is a matter of procedure. More specifically, the first is about the merits of the substance of Clause 191 and the second is about the process by which it became part of a government Bill.
On the first matter, that is an issue of conscience, and on this the Opposition do not and will not take an official position. I acknowledge that there is a multitude of views across the Committee, and indeed within my own party. That diversity of opinion is to be expected and welcome, but this is and always has been a matter of personal conscience.
However, the second matter is very different. Regardless of one’s views on the rights or wrongs of decriminalisation, the process by which Clause 191 was inserted into the Bill was, on any view, insufficient and, as a matter of procedure, deficient. The amendment was proposed on Report in the other place by Tonia Antoniazzi MP. It was not discussed in the Public Bill Committee or a Select Committee. As others have said this evening, it received 46 minutes of Back-Bench debate. Many Members in the other place were limited to less than five minutes of speaking time. On such an issue of profound social change, in no way can that be described as a full and proper debate—compare that to the vigorous debate we have had today.
Because this was an amendment to legislation brought in on Report and not part of the Bill as introduced or as amended in Committee, and because it was not government policy, this proposal has not undergone any of the usual stages of policy formation. As your Lordships will well know, where a major change to the law is proposed, the Government would normally publish a White Paper or Green Paper, commission an expert panel or review, gather evidence, conduct a public consultation, and publish an impact assessment and relevant supporting documents. The policy proposal would then be published as part of the Bill. It would be subject to detailed scrutiny in a Public Bill Committee, where witnesses would be invited to give evidence. None of these steps has been taken. Whatever one’s views on the merits of Clause 191, that is not a recipe for good law.
Let us just pause and reflect on the wide variety of issues that have arisen today—the amendments themselves cover a lot of ground. We have discussed issues of police procedure and investigation, a panoply of medical issues, and issues around potential coercion, telemedicine, prosecution policy and the vulnerability of women. There is a multitude of difficult and intricate issues to cover.
It is interesting that, when Parliament considered the Abortion Bill in 1967, the abolition of the death penalty and, more recently, the legalisation of gay marriage, all were introduced as separate Bills that underwent the full process of parliamentary scrutiny. Indeed, your Lordships Committee is currently considering another piece of social legislation, the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill. Despite being a Private Member’s Bill, that Bill has been subject to a rather more robust process and more significant scrutiny than this clause before us today. Of course, that is absolutely right; these are matters that, if we get them wrong, could have severe and perverse consequences. Again, whether or not noble Lords support Clause 191, the Committee is being asked to pass judgment on a provision to alter fundamentally the legal status of abortion, for right or wrong, without the possession of all the necessary evidence.
Indeed, during the debate on the clause in the other place, when discussing wider abortion law reforms, Tonia Antoniazzi, who as we know proposed Clause 191, said:
“More comprehensive reform of abortion law is needed, but the right way to do that is through a future Bill, with considerable collaboration between providers, medical bodies and parliamentarians working together to secure the changes that are needed. That is what a change of this magnitude would require”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/6/25; col. 305.]
I agree that these are changes of magnitude. A separate and distinct Bill would be a better way forward. Comprehensive reforms of legislation on social matters should have considerable collaboration between all relevant stakeholders. That has not happened with Clause 191. It is fair to say that, whatever one’s views on the moral element of the change, Clause 191 is so far-reaching, consequential and of such magnitude that it is questionable whether it is appropriate for it to be bolted on to the side of a crime and policing Bill.
Finally, I turn to the approach of the Government to Clause 191. Ultimately, this is now a clause in a government Bill. The Government may or may not have wanted it in the Bill, but, regardless of their neutrality, this clause is now in their Bill. If the Bill passes with Clause 191 remaining, it will be the Government’s job to implement it. It will unequivocally be government legislation.
Baroness Thornton (Lab)
Does the noble Lord believe that the 379 MPs who voted for this were duped into it in some way?
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
I do not think I suggested that for a moment—I do not accept that at all. I am pointing to the fact that this is a government Bill. It may not be the Government’s place to take a view on issues of conscience such as this, but it is their role and duty to ensure the coherence of the statute book and general good governance, and, of course, to implement the law of the land. I therefore have a couple of questions for the Minister. Are the Government satisfied with the process by which Clause 191 has been included in their Bill, and, if not, do they have any concerns whatever about that process? Further, the Government now face a binary choice: either they want the clause to remain in the Bill or they do not. It is not enough, with the greatest respect, for the Government to sit on the fence. I ask the Minister to answer that question as well.
In conclusion, on behalf of the Official Opposition, we take no view on the substantive issues of conscience here, but we have concerns about the process. This reform should have been subject to the usual consultations. It is a hugely complex, controversial, intricate area of policy-making, which deserves the fullest legislative process possible, and it has not had the usual procedures and rigorous scrutiny from start to finish of the legislative process. That is a matter of very great regret.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, the Government recognise that there are strongly held views across your Lordships’ Committee on this very sensitive issue. The noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, is of course correct that the Government maintain a neutral stance on abortion in England and Wales. We remain of the view that it is for Parliament to decide whether it is in favour of this or not. That is not sitting on the fence—that is actually deferring to the will of Parliament. It is for Parliament to decide the circumstances under which abortion should take place, allowing your Lordships to vote according to conscience. The Government will not stand in the way of change, if that is what Parliament decides.
The noble Lords, Lord Bailey and Lord Jackson of Peterborough, and the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, asked what the Government intend to do in certain situations. I remind your Lordships that this was not a government amendment, and therefore it is a matter for your Lordships. If this is the will of Parliament, the Government will ensure that the law is enacted.
That said, the Government must of course comment on the practical effects, workability and coherence with the statute book of any proposed legislative amendments. On 17 June last year, the Minister for Victims and Violence Against Women and Girls set out in the other place observations on what is now Clause 191. As this is already a matter of public record, I hope that your Lordships will forgive me for not repeating what she said, save that I have been asked the specific question by the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Falkner, about the effect of Clause 191 on the Abortion Act in how it deals with offences. The legal position is that the Abortion Act is unaffected by Clause 191. What Clause 191 does is to disapply the offences created by Sections 58 and 59 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, but only for a woman who acts in relation to her own pregnancy. The offences still apply to third parties. I reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, that any man behaving in the way she described would still be potentially committing an offence.
In order to avoid repeating myself later in this debate, I reiterate that the Government’s neutral position means that I will not be commenting beyond matters of workability and practical effect. As a shorthand, I am going to refer to conduct that could come within Sections 58 and 59 of the Offences against the Person Act and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act as abortion offences. I do not intend to address all amendments. There are some, such as Amendment 455 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, where we do not consider there to be significant workability concerns, particular operational implications or unintended consequences that your Lordships may wish to consider: it is a simple policy decision to be made. If I do not refer to any particular amendment, your Lordships may safely assume that that is because the Government regard it as a policy decision for your Lordships’ House without any operational or other matters to be considered. Finally, because this is a large group of amendments, I have tried to shorten my remarks to only the parts that I regard as being essential to bring to your Lordships’ attention. If anything is unclear, I encourage any of your Lordships to write to me so that I can provide a fuller explanation.
I begin with Amendment 456 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame. It may be helpful for your Lordships to be aware of the usual circumstances in which certain offences require that the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions, more usually, or that of the Attorney-General, more rarely, is required before criminal proceedings can be instituted. Generally, the concern to the DPP will be appropriate where either it is very likely that a defendant will reasonably contend that a prosecution for the offence would violate their convention rights or where there is a high risk that the right to bring a private prosecution might be abused and, if so, the institution of proceedings would cause the defendant irreparable harm. In general, prohibiting private prosecutions and ensuring that only the Crown Prosecution Service can prosecute is the check and balance used to mitigate these risks. If an offence involves national security or has an international element, the consent of the Attorney-General may be more appropriate. In response to the question asked by the noble Lords, Lord Verdirame and Lord Bailey, as to the statistics being relied on, it is not clear to me whether the data requested is collected, but I will make inquiries and write to the noble Lord.
I turn to Amendment 459 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Eaton. I can reassure the noble Baroness that the Government are clear that the law is also clear: sex is not itself a lawful ground for termination of pregnancy under the Abortion Act 1967. I can also reassure the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, on the same point. Accordingly, any third party, including registered medical practitioners, who terminates a pregnancy on the basis of the sex of the foetus alone would also be liable to prosecution under the relevant offences relating to abortion.
Turning to Amendments 459B and 502A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean, it is worth noting that, as currently drafted, the deadline for the Secretary of State to lay the draft regulations and the deadline for Parliament to approve those regulations is the same in this amendment. Practically, then, the effect might be that, if the Secretary of State lays the regulations on the final day permitted, Parliament would not then have sufficient time to approve them before the deadline. As a result, Clause 191 would automatically cease to have effect, even though the Minister had complied with the requirement to lay the regulations. It is unclear from the amendment as drafted whether that is the noble Baroness’s intention or whether she intends to give sufficient time for both these processes to take place.
Amendment 460 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, and spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, who is no longer in her place, would mean that women would no longer be able to have a consultation over the phone or by other electronic means before being able to self-administer medicine for early medical abortion at home, as is current practice. Instead, women would be required to attend an in-person consultation first before being able to take pills at home. The Committee may wish to note that the overall effect of this new clause would be to limit access to home use of early medical abortion pills because of lack of resources for abortion providers to hold in-person consultations. It could also reduce women’s access to early medical abortion due to travel distances, if they live in remote areas, or if they have difficulties attending a clinic for different reasons—for example, vulnerable women, women from more deprived backgrounds or women subject to coercion. The Government wish your Lordships to be aware that, given that the majority of abortions take place via this method, this new clause is likely to have a significant operational impact on access to abortions. That said, this is, of course, a matter of policy for Parliament.
Amendment 461H in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, is similar to Amendment 460 in that it seeks to introduce a requirement for an in-person consultation before medication to terminate a pregnancy may be lawfully prescribed. In addition, Amendment 461H would also require a scan, or what is described as a “clinically equivalent” alternative, to be conducted for all women to determine gestation before being able to take pills at home, whereas the current process is that an ultrasound scan is provided only in certain conditions where there is any uncertainty about gestation or where there is clinical need.
As drafted, it is unclear what is meant by “other clinically equivalent means” when determining the pregnancy’s gestation. Your Lordships may also wish to consider the likelihood that Amendment 461H would also result in additional costs being incurred because of either additional machines having to be bought and staff trained to provide an ultrasound for every woman seeking an early medical abortion, or the alternative, which would be to remove scanning capacity from the provision for other needs. Operationally, the requirement to have a face-to-face appointment and scan may also introduce additional waiting times for abortion care. This would have a particularly negative impact on those awaiting early medical abortion, but it might also have an impact on abortions at a later stage because of loss of system capacity. This could have the effect—unintended, we presume—of more abortions taking place later on. As with Amendment 460, the overall effect of this new clause would be to limit access to home use of early medical abortion pills because of resource issues in relation to the requirement in every case to hold in-person consultations and offer scans.
Amendment 461A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, seeks to apply the criminal standard of proof to medical assessments and decision-making. Your Lordships may wish to note that the operational effect of this additional burden of proof is that it is likely that women would no longer have a consultation over the telephone or by other electronic means before being prescribed medicine for early medical abortion at home, as is the current practice. Instead, women would need to attend an in-person consultation and have an ultrasound. So, for similar reasons to those I have already given in relation to Amendments 460 and 461H, Amendment 461A is likely to limit access to home use of early medical abortion pills and thus result in more abortions being undertaken at later gestation.
Amendment 461, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, seeks to create a new offence of intentionally encouraging or assisting a termination that is contrary to the Abortion Act 1967. We understand the noble Baroness’s amendment to be intended to work in the following way: a person would be guilty of committing such an offence whether or not a successful termination occurs and the amendment would also require the Secretary of State to issue guidance on the offence following consultation with appropriate stakeholders.
Clause 191 provides that a pregnant woman cannot commit an abortion offence in relation to her own pregnancy, meaning such terminations would no longer be considered unlawful under the Abortion Act 1967. As a result, Amendment 461 would apply only where a third party encourages or assists someone other than the pregnant woman. Your Lordships should be aware that this is already captured by existing encouraging or assisting offences under the Serious Crime Act 2015. Therefore, Amendment 461 would create an overlapping offence. Additionally, your Lordships may wish to note that, in any event, third parties can also still be prosecuted at the moment under primary offences such as Sections 58 or 59 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 or the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929.
I turn now to Amendment 461B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington. Safeguarding is an essential aspect of abortion care and all abortion providers are already required to have effective arrangements in place to safeguard children and vulnerable adults in compliance with the department’s required standard operating procedures for the approval of independent sector places for termination of pregnancy in England. Your Lordships may wish to consider that the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health has published national safeguarding guidance for under-18s accessing early medical abortion services, which seeks to ensure that all abortion providers have robust safeguarding in place. We expect all providers to have due regard to this safeguarding guidance.
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)
I will be very brief because I am conscious of the time. The other purposes for which this drug is prescribed do not require any face-to-face examination—am I correct in understanding that is what the noble Baroness is saying?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I am saying that this amendment as drafted would criminalise those who receive that drug by post if they are using it for some purpose other than abortion. It may also be helpful for your Lordships to be aware that this amendment as drafted would make it an offence for a business such as a pharmacy or an abortion clinic to receive these drugs by post.
On Amendment 461G, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean, your Lordships may wish to note that not all the information required under this amendment may be readily available. For example, it may not exist, it might require additional collection, or it may be held across different systems. It is unclear how there could be an accurate estimate of those who have illegally acquired abortifacients or the data that this estimate would be based on. Producing this annual report would therefore require the Ministry of Justice and other public bodies to take on additional responsibilities with associated costs.
On Amendment 461F in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, the Government remain neutral on changing the criminal law related to abortion, but it is important to note that Clause 191 does not decriminalise other offences such as manslaughter, murder or infanticide. These offences will continue to be investigated and prosecuted by the Crown Prosecution Service where the legal test is met. In addition, the police and the Crown Prosecution Service are operationally independent of government, and it would therefore not be appropriate for a Secretary of State to issue guidance. Similarly, the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council are also responsible for guidance on investigations for policing.
Finally, I turn to Amendment 461J, tabled by my noble friend Lady Thornton. It is important to note that a pardon does not quash a conviction or a caution; what it does is remove the legal consequences that would otherwise attach to it. As with any pardon or expungement scheme, consideration would need to be given to how such a scheme would operate in practice; for example, how those individuals would be identified. There is no single centrally held record of all cases that may fall within scope of this amendment, so it has implications for how and when the duty to direct deletion would be triggered.
In addition, given the breadth of the amendment, which extends to any record of an arrest or investigation, the scale of the records potentially in scope is uncertain. Also, because the amendment is not time-limited, it would thus apply to dead women as well. Taken together, these factors may mean that implementing such a duty as drafted would carry substantial operational and resource implications for policing, His Majesty’s Courts & Tribunals Service and those responsible for maintaining national databases. The scale of the work required cannot be reliably estimated at this stage but it could be considerable.
Baroness Meyer (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken today. I particularly welcome and support the speeches of the noble Baronesses, Lady Monckton, Lady O’Loan and Lady Foster of Aghadrumsee, the noble Lord, Lord Alton, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Lincoln, and so many others who spoke so eloquently and passionately.
It has been a very useful debate, which also highlighted how little scrutiny Clause 191 has received and how significant its potential effects could be—legally, socially and morally. At times, the debate revealed that we were speaking at cross-purposes: balancing the rights of women and the rights or non-rights of viable babies; balancing the rights of vulnerable women versus those who abort for personal or blunt, selfish reasons. We have all heard of women who aborted their child because they were afraid that a pregnancy would ruin their figure.
The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, hit the nail on the head. If I may paraphrase badly, it went something like this: Clause 191 risks decriminalising abortions undertaken for personal reasons while failing to guarantee the protection of women who have been a victim of abuse or coercion. This is an issue of such importance that I feel it merits much further consideration and, as the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, highlighted, ultimately it should not be part of the Bill.
I personally remain concerned that Clause 191 could have tragic unintended consequences both for women and for babies able to survive outside the womb. I do not see this as a right to abort, but rather how we as legislators can better protect the vulnerable—vulnerable women and the unborn child. This is why I continue to support the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton, in proposing that this clause should not stand part of the Bill. But, for now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
“(2) The Secretary of State must, no later than 12 months after the day on which this section comes into force, and at least once every 12 months thereafter, conduct a review of its operation and impact.(3) The review under subsection (2) must, in particular, consider—(a) the incidence of medical complications for women acting in relation to their own pregnancy under the terms of this section, including incidence of maternal death;(b) the impact on the health and safety of women undergoing abortions;(c) the prevalence of self-induced abortions outside a clinical setting beyond 24 weeks’ gestation;(d) any reported cases of coercion or abuse related to abortions;(e) the application of criminal law to third parties involved in abortions;(f) any other topics the Secretary of State may consider appropriate.(4) Following the completion of a review under subsection (2), the Secretary of State must lay a report of the findings before Parliament.(5) The Secretary of State may by regulations repeal this section if he or she considers that a report under subsection (4) reveals it is having a detrimental effect.”
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
My Lords, I know the hour is late, and it might be as well to record for posterity that a number of us were prevailed upon to regroup our degrouped amendments to keep the number of groups at three instead of four. The quid pro quo, as far as I understood from the usual channels, was that we would be allowed a decent amount of time to transact the business. The noble Baroness the Government Whip looks at me innocently—with an innocent visage—but the reason that the hour is late is that, obviously, we have had tributes to the former Lord Speaker, dinner break business and a UQ. I am sorry that your Lordships’ Committee is having to sit later than I would otherwise have liked.
I will not labour again the points I made at Second Reading about Clause 191, but I believe it will exacerbate the dangers inherently present in the pills by post regime. Suffice it to say that the new clause will make it easier to get abortion pills, it will make it easier for abusive partners to coerce women into having an abortion and it will lead to more abortions, including more late-term abortions, thereby putting more women at risk of dangerous complications. My Amendment 457 would introduce a statutory review of Clause 191 to provide a mechanism that is, in my opinion, the bare minimum gesture of seriousness this Parliament ought to make when undertaking such a profound change to the criminal law relating to the protection of human life.
Amendment 457 has three core elements. First, within 12 months of the clause coming into force, the Secretary of State must conduct a review of its operation and impact, followed by annual reviews thereafter. Secondly, there is a requirement that the reviews examine maternal complications, including maternal deaths, the health and safety of women having abortions, late self-induced abortion, connected coercion or abuse and the application of the criminal law to third parties involved in abortions. Thirdly, there is a power for the Secretary of State to repeal Clause 191 if the review shows it to be causing harm. The areas specified for review are not arbitrary but the categories where risk concentrates. They are the precise pressure points where this legislation is most likely to go wrong.
Let me outline a couple of these areas. It is vital we look at maternal complications. There is a serious discrepancy in the Department of Health’s reporting on this. The DHSC’s latest figures published just last month claim a complication rate of just 0.3 per 1,000 early medical abortions, equating to 71 abortions out of 236,000 in total. That sounds very good. It allows the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, the Minister, to repeatedly claim that abortion pills are safe. That is incredibly misleading. The official DHSC figures do not include complications reported after being discharged from a clinic. In other words, they do not include cases where a woman has taken one or more abortion pills at home, then has to go to hospital with infections, haemorrhaging or what is euphemistically called retained products of conception.
Those kinds of early medical abortions make up 82% of all abortions for residents of England and Wales in 2023. When you take into account hospital episode statistics publicly available for the NHS, you find that an estimated 12,000 women were admitted to hospital in 2023 with complications after taking abortion pills. There is a world of difference between 71 and 12,000, but the Government consistently refuse to report on the real picture. I have asked a number of Written Parliamentary Questions about upgrading the HSA4 form but to no avail. The Minister confirmed to me in writing in November:
“The Department has no plans to publish a separate annual report on abortion complications”.
I fear that, with Clause 191, the disparity between the official statistics and what is happening on the ground will only get worse. Modes of abortion provision have changed rapidly. Home-use pills, telemedical arrangements and so on all raise new questions. If Clause 191 increases the risk that women undertake dangerous procedures without clinical oversight or at later gestations, we must know.
Then there is coercion and abuse. Coercive partners, traffickers and other abusers sometimes pressure women into ending pregnancies. We must know whether decriminalisation for the woman inadvertently empowers abusers. Amendment 457 would require that to be examined.
That brings me to the third feature of this amendment: the power to repeal Clause 191 if the evidence demonstrates harm. Without this mechanism, the review would be merely an academic exercise. The repeal mechanism is a safety valve; it would not mandate repeal but make it possible where the evidence demands it. This is entirely normal, especially in sensitive areas of law. We have sunset clauses, review clauses and renewal clauses, all designed to ensure that legislation remains under scrutiny.
Baroness Thornton (Lab)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, has been around this circuit before, I think on a Private Member’s Bill proposed by one of his noble friends, about collecting the statistics. It shows that he does not actually seem to have checked what statistics are already collected before deciding that these things need to be done. I thought that it might be useful for the Committee to know that the annual abortion statistics already include the ethnicity of the woman and medical complications as part of the treatment. The noble Lord will also be aware that it is incredibly rare that the sex of the foetus is known, because the vast majority of abortions are carried out or happen before 10 or 12 weeks—so that is simply not known or collectable.
Complications from abortion care are extremely rare and are already reported. Abortion care providers are regulated and scrutinised through long-established accountability mechanisms, including published safe- guarding reports and Care Quality Commission inspections. These are on the public record; I am not sure why the noble Lord has decided that these things are not. Doctors are already legally required to provide information about abortions to the Chief Medical Officer, including gestation complications and grounds for an abortion.
The noble Lord is bringing forward amendments that would cause a huge amount of bureaucracy and might risk leaving medical professionals permanently unsure of the status of abortion law. I am sure that we would wish to avoid that happening. I shall be very interested to hear from my noble friend the Minister what the Government have to say about the implications of all these amendments.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
My Lords, I support the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson. We live in what a lot of us would describe as a post-truth world, in which facts are often passed off as opinions or, worse, that terrible phrase “fake news”. Sometimes opinions are passed off as being completely truthful facts, and sometimes we have misinformation going around the globe that comes not simply from conspiracy theorists on the internet but, sadly, sometimes from world leaders.
Given that context, it is important that when this House resolves on any legislation, looking into the future, that it should be on the basis of evidence, truth and facts. That is particularly true when it comes to abortion. It is an issue, irrespective of your views on it, which is deeply sensitive, and on which raw emotions are often provoked. To some extent we saw that earlier when, at times, the atmosphere of the Committee got a little bit tense. People have genuinely conflicting views on this, so the more we can try to base this on evidence, the better.
That is particularly true for the proposed changes that are being made in Clause 191, for two main reasons. First, although there has been some mention that this has been in the ether for a number of years, the specifics of this legislation came about by way of a Back-Bench amendment to a different piece of legislation, with a limited amount of debate on it. It was not part of a government programme or manifesto commitment. Any Back-Bench Member is perfectly entitled to bring forward an amendment; that is the normal procedure. The downside of that is that there has not been a direct level of consultation on this specific proposal.
Secondly, despite what has been said, there are some concerns about the quality of the data that we have on a range of issues. I listened carefully to what the noble Baroness said, and it seemed that she was putting forward two somewhat contradictory positions. You can either make the argument that all this data is already there and already gathered, and therefore these amendments are unnecessary, or, alternatively, you can make the argument that this would involve so much gathering of data that it would be a bureaucratic nightmare. You can argue either of those propositions, but the two are somewhat mutually exclusive in that regard. It strikes me that when we take decisions on this, it is important to get the data.
It has been highlighted—I think it was mentioned in a Private Member’s Bill that the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, proposed—that there are sometimes concerns over the quality of the data. Perhaps not unsurprisingly—it is not unique to this particular debate—we have heard different people on different sides of this argument quote sometimes contradictory data as to where we are.
It strikes me that there are one or two solutions to these problems, neither of which is mutually exclusive. The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, in the next group of amendments, proposes, apart from anything else, that we pause things until there is a proper consultation period. These amendments then look towards the idea of producing data and a report, and gathering evidence so that there can be a review of the procedures and how things work out. They highlight the range of issues that formed a number of the concerns in the previous debate. These are issues around the level of coercion, the medical complications that arise as a result of changes, whether it leads to a driver on sex selection, and, as mentioned, the incidence of late abortion, which then leads to a live birth. This range of issues highlights a lot of the concerns that were raised in the last group.
I appreciate that we have had this debate today, and that the proponents of Clause 191 will say that the concerns that have been raised—although I am sure they will accept they are genuine—are, in their view, misplaced or perhaps exaggerated, and that we have nothing to fear from Clause 191. Various incidents of what has happened in other parts of the world have been quoted. It is important, therefore, that we test that out. These amendments would gather that data and allow us to assess that. If we are dealing with false fears then, for the proponents of Clause 191, this will strengthen their argument in a year or two years’ time, whenever these things are reviewed. If the fears are genuine and are realised, however, then it is important, as the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, says, that if we gather evidence, it is not some sort of desktop exercise where we simply look at figures. If we gather evidence then it should be on the basis of having the opportunity, if it shows that there are increased dangers, for instance, to women or concerns over any other categories, to take a level of corrective action. That seems a very sensible course of action. I do not think there is anything that anybody should have to fear in these amendments, so I commend them to the Committee.
Baroness Barker (LD)
My Lords, I listened to the noble Lord, Lord Weir of Ballyholme, and what he said sounds eminently sensible, but the problem is this: the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, has set out the level of detail that is already gathered. The noble Lord, among other Members of your Lordships’ House, have gone on all day about telemedicine and coercion, yet when the royal colleges set up the evaluation of telemedicine, when it came in during Covid, they took particular care to examine issues such as that. They came up with data that showed that telemedicine was safe. Actually, it not only discovered women who were being coerced; it discovered women who were being trafficked. Yet Members of your Lordships’ House still trot out the same argument time and again. I listened to the noble Lord, Lord Weir of Ballyholme, and the arguments of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, and I am afraid I rather think that it does not matter what data we collect: they will make the same arguments over and again.
My noble friend Lady Brinton cannot be here this evening, but she particularly wanted to say this: the detail of these amendments is designed to confuse and delay the safe and effective legal rules of abortion. They would also take abortion out of the clinical sphere, trying to exceptionalise it and create an environment so hostile that it would deter women and, equally important, clinicians and medical staff, as the rules become more and more complex; and it would also be at the whim of the Secretary of State to amend details or to report at various times. It is a worrying idea to use secondary legislation to make everything more complex, because it gives Ministers the powers to change things and causes confusion and distress.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
I have listened to what has been said. Initially, I was not quite clear whether it was an intervention or not, but I appreciate that it is actually a speech. I think comparisons with America are somewhat facile, because if we were gathering data, it would be on an NHS-wide basis in that regard. The idea of anybody, as you would have in the United States—where an individual county will take a particular view—imposing different decisions or requiring different things is not something that could happen in this country. By all means, criticise the amendments and try to take them apart, but let us not make false comparisons based upon the very different federal system they have in the United States compared with what happens here.
Baroness Barker (LD)
I do not think that it is a false comparison. What we are saying is that, instead of having a system that is democratically decided openly and in Parliament, we will leave it to regulation and officials. I think that is wrong.
The other thing that my noble friend Lady Brinton wanted to say relates to proposed new subsection (3) in Amendment 457. Imagine a woman who is, in the words of the amendment,
“acting in relation to their own pregnancy”,
having to identify and report medical complications. What does that mean? I do not think that that is intended to make it any easier for a woman in need to access the care she needs. I think it is intended to frustrate and, therefore, I hope that these amendments will not be passed.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
My Lords, before the noble Baroness sits down, I fail to understand the logic of both the noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton and Lady Barker, in setting their face against collecting more data. The fact is, we are not certain. We are still not certain as to the veracity and accuracy of any of this data. To give an example, the Royal College of Gynaecologists has issued “Making Abortion Safe” guidelines to providers for the safe use of medical abortion after 20 to 22 weeks. These guidelines recommend the use of feticide to avoid the foetus being born with signs of life, which can cause distress for women and their care providers. In the same guidelines, the RCOG states that there will be a
“need for further intervention to complete the procedure”
in 13% of cases. That is more than twice the highest rate reported by the—
Baroness in Waiting/Government Whip (Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent) (Lab)
Order. My Lords, I am ever so sorry, but an intervention, according to the Companion, should be short, brief and specific to the point. So, if the noble Lord could actually make his point, I would be grateful.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
Standing Order 29 does not apply, and I am entitled to speak more than once in—
Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)
Absolutely, but this is an intervention.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
I have not finished yet. Standing Order 29 does not apply in respect of the ability for a Member individually—
Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)
My Lords, the hour is late, and I appreciate that this has been a very difficult debate. What I am saying is that the rules on an intervention are clear. The noble Lord is absolutely right that he can speak repeatedly, but he said
“Before the noble Baroness sits down”,
so we believed this to be an intervention.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
The Government Chief Whip is very flexible when it comes to that side of the Chamber segueing between speeches and interventions, and she does not intervene. It is only on this side that she intervenes, to throw off this side. The points she has made are not in line with what the Standing Orders and the Companion say, which is that a mover of an amendment and others are entitled to speak more than once.
Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)
The noble Lord has just promoted me, and I thank him for that. However, we have a very good Government Chief Whip, who I am privileged to serve under. The noble Lord will appreciate that, through my whipping, I have been trying to manage this in such a way that everybody has been able to be heard. Regardless of position, I do not think anyone here knows my personal views. On the current topic, it is the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, that is still on the annunciator, and the noble Lord indicated that he wanted clarification on a point before the noble Baroness sat down. That is what I was saying. We all believed it to be an intervention. If it is not, we can move on and revert back to the noble Lord for his second speech.
Baroness Barker (LD)
My Lords, I think my case has been made. These are a set of amendments which are designed to be unworkable. They are wrecking amendments, and I hope that we will not pass them.
Baroness Coffey (Con)
The thing about Amendment 461C, bearing in mind what the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, has said, is that quite a lot of this data is collected. Clearly, it was late this year, and there would be no point in doing a JR on the basis of that.
I understand that not every abortion happens at the point at which the sex of the foetus is known, but that data would be worth collecting, given the concerns that exist about gender or sex-selective abortion. It might be worth the ONS adding the question to the questionnaire or HSA4 form in the future.
Last year, the collection rate on ethnicity was 92%, but it would be useful to understand what further work the ONS might be doing to try to get that up to 100%.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank all those who have spoken in this debate, and my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough for tabling these amendments. I have already set out at length the view of the official Opposition on what we see as the procedural issues with Clause 191 in my response to the previous group. I will not repeat myself, but simply refer your Lordships to my previous comments.
My noble friend’s amendments relate to the provision of information and statistics relating to abortions and complications arising from abortions. As has been highlighted by my noble friend Lord Moylan in his Private Member’s Bill on this topic, there is an issue with the collection of data for complications from abortions. To conclude, I hope the Minister will be able to set out what action the Government are taking to improve the collection of data for such complications.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, the amendments in this group all relate to reporting requirements and monitoring abortion services. It is important to say again that the Government are neutral on this. My remarks are limited to workability, operational concerns or possible unintended consequences. I am not going to speak to all the amendments, only those where there are particular issues that should be brought to the attention of the Committee.
Amendment 457, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, as currently drafted means that parts of the information that would be required are broad and the exact meaning is not always clear, raising practical workability issues. Not all the information required may be readily available, and producing an annual report would require the Department of Health and Social Care to take on additional reporting responsibilities, with associated costs.
Amendment 458, also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, seeks to require the Secretary of State to produce an annual report detailing complications from abortions procured contrary to the Abortion Act. Determining whether specific cases fall within the report’s remit would require investigations to determine whether they could be considered to be contrary to the Abortion Act. This could necessitate involvement from medical professionals or other public bodies to review individual circumstances.
Further, as I have just said in relation to Amendment 457, as currently drafted parts of the information required are broad and the exact meaning is unclear, raising questions about practical workability. Not all the information required may be readily available; for example, it may not exist, it may require additional collection or it may be held across different systems, including the abortion notification system held by DHSC and patient records within the NHS.
Your Lordships may also wish to note that producing this annual report would require additional responsibilities with significant associated costs to the Department of Health and Social Care and other public bodies.
Amendment 461C would require the Secretary of State to publish an annual report disclosing data collected as required under Section 2 of the Abortion Act. I can confirm what has been said by my noble friend Lady Thornton: the Department of Health and Social Care’s abortion notification system already collects data on the self-reported ethnicity of the woman, when known, and complications that occur up until the time of discharge for all abortions. This data is published in the annual abortion statistics publication for England and Wales. However, as my noble friend Lady Thornton also commented, the abortion notification system does not currently collect information on the sex of the foetus, as most abortions are performed at an early gestation when the sex of the foetus will not usually be known.
On two further matters, the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, is correct: there has been a delay in the publication of the abortion statistics, but not for policy reasons. These are operational issues, which include moving to a new data processing system. We will announce dates for the publication of the 2024 data in due course.
Finally, on the question of sex ratios at birth, raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, the Department of Health and Social Care remains committed to publishing these statistics, and the publication dates for sex ratios at birth in the United Kingdom from 2018-22 and 2019-23 will be announced in due course.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions to the debate, including the noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton and Lady Barker, in particular, my noble friend Lord Cameron and the Government Whip, who is always very strict in the House, perhaps for the right reason.
It has been a good, lively debate. If I may press the Minister, and if she would perhaps be so good as to write to me on this, I have never had a satisfactory answer on the point I made earlier, about the use of the HSA4 form and why complications arising from terminations when a woman has left the clinical setting are not collected. It may not be hundreds of thousands, but it is a significant cost in terms of health outcomes and trauma for that woman, and cost for the NHS and private providers. We still need to know why that is not captured, because it does not provide the whole picture.
Nevertheless, with the proviso that we will return to this issue of data collection and empirical data that informs policy decisions, I seek the leave of the Committee to withdraw my amendment.
“(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the gestational age of the pregnancy exceeds 39 weeks.(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), the gestational age of a pregnancy is to be calculated from the first day of the woman’s last menstrual period.”
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
My Lords, I promise I did not allocate the amendments in these groups, so I am sorry if noble Lords have had enough of me. In fact, I have had enough of me today—but we are on the home stretch.
It will be obvious that Amendment 459A is a probing amendment, but it raises a very important point. It makes absolutely clear just what Clause 191 is going to permit. I believe it is beyond the bounds of what any responsible legislature should accept. As we all know, at 39 weeks’ gestation, a pregnancy has reached full term. At this stage, one is no longer speaking of premature viability, uncertain outcomes or developmental limitations; one is speaking, as clinicians will confirm, of a baby about to be delivered. Do we really believe that the criminal law should be entirely silent about the responsibility of the mother at that point? Should Parliament not insist upon a basic threshold of protection for the viable child who is quite literally on the threshold of birth?
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Viscount Stansgate) (Lab)
The noble Lord is moving his amendment.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
I am taking an intervention. I was more than happy to take an intervention from the newly minted noble Lord, Lord Doyle, but on the basis that wiser and better heads have prevailed, I will continue my words briefly.
The current criminal framework provides an important safeguard for women, particularly those under 16 and those who are vulnerable or at risk of coercion in what is already a highly permissive system. During the debate in the other place, the sponsor of the amendment, the honourable Member for Gower, claimed that legislative changes were needed “to protect the women”, but removing the legal deterrent to late-term abortions will only increase harm to women. It will mean a return to the days of backstreet abortions. A desperate woman will know she can end her pregnancy after 24 weeks without facing any police investigation for it, but she will be unable to obtain the abortion legally and so she will be driven towards illegal and unsafe providers.
A report in advance of the provisions coming into force might highlight all this and give us all a chance to think again, if indeed we are willing to think. There is a fanaticism around support for abortion that makes many people unwilling to consider the evidence. For example, some of the academic literature provides insight into the often-overlooked psychological impact of abortion, which was mentioned earlier. One study of 1.2 million pregnancies in Quebec hospitals followed women over a 17-year period. The results revealed that women who had an abortion were much more likely to be hospitalised for mental health conditions, such as depression and anxiety, as well as for substance abuse and suicidal ideation. This risk was higher among women who were under 25 at the time of their abortion and among those with a history of mental health difficulties. Another study found that, for many women, having an abortion is associated with lasting negative emotions such as feelings of guilt, regret, shame and self-unforgiveness. These feelings were strongest among women who reported being coerced.
I am constantly amazed at how little many feminists have to say about coerced abortion. The introduction of telemedicine abortion has undoubtedly made it much more difficult for coercion to be detected. A 2022 survey commissioned by BBC Radio 4 found that 15% of women have experienced pressure to have an abortion. This points to a significant cohort of women who are not exercising choice but are being manipulated into terminating the life of their unborn baby. I give way to the noble Baroness.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Viscount Stansgate) (Lab)
If it helps the Committee, I note that an intervention cannot be made when someone is moving an amendment. The noble Lord is moving his amendment.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
I am very grateful for that guidance, and I apologise for starting to accept what I am sure would have been a sparkling intervention from the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle.
There are huge gaps in our understanding, particularly in relation to complications, but I will not repeat the points I made on my previous amendments. Suffice to say, there is a pressing need for a more comprehensive and robust system of data collection. My noble friend Lord Moylan’s Bill, which is currently awaiting Report, seeks to address this deficiency by ensuring that complications are more accurately reported. It would be remiss to proceed with Clause 191 without first seeking to understand the consequences for the recording and monitoring of abortion outside a clinical setting, particularly when we know that the present framework fails to capture the true scale of complications.
Finally, it is deeply regrettable that we are being asked to approve the most far-reaching change to abortion law since 1967 without the public having first been consulted. A change of such moral, legal and societal consequence warrants proper consultation, yet the public have been afforded no such opportunity.
Whichever side of the debate one may be on, we can surely agree that this is a matter that should not be pursued without proper consultation and consideration on its likely impact. I therefore urge noble Lords to support my amendment. I beg to move.
Baroness Coffey (Con)
My Lords, I support my noble friend’s Amendment 562, particularly his proposed new subsection (13)(e). I did not hear from the Minister earlier about what they are going to do once Clause 191 goes ahead—assuming it does; we will decide on Report whether or not that will happen. I do not think that the Minister will answer that today.
Amendment 562 would require the Government to give some proper consideration to how this is going to work in practice before it is enacted. For that reason, it is a sensible way to get a bit of breathing space to open up what we are walking into and, for those where potential crimes are committed, given that one person in the arrangement has been decriminalised, what is going to happen to the people who have facilitated what could be a crime. That is why I support Amendment 562 at this stage.
Baroness Thornton (Lab)
As we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, basically, this suite of amendments drives a coach and horses through abortion rights as a whole, as well as, of course, completely opposing the clause that is under discussion. For example, virtually zero abortions occur at 39 weeks’ gestation. Taking abortion pills at that stage of gestation would simply induce labour. To accept the amendment would mean continuing criminal offences for abortion for vulnerable women. The same applies to the other suite. There would be delays and reversals, and vulnerable women would continue to face life-changing and traumatic investigations.
Amendment 563 is a wrecking amendment linked to all the other amendments to delay the implementation of the change in law. So while the noble Lord might say that he is—
Baroness Coffey (Con)
Forgive me for interrupting the noble Baroness, it is just that the annunciator has still had my name for the last minute, when indeed it is the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton. It has just changed now.
Baroness Thornton (Lab)
I do not mind. At this stage, they are probably a bit tired too, changing the annunciator.
The noble Lord might say that he is not opposed to abortion but, frankly, these amendments suggest that he probably is.
Lord Doyle (Lab)
My Lords, I should make the point that I jumped to my feet to make earlier—on the comment that the noble Lord made about how long this issue had been debated in the other place for.
The noble Lord was a Member of the other place previously. I have not had that privilege, but we should show colleagues there a little bit more respect, in that the amount of time that they spent debating this issue should not be seen as an indication of whether or not they actually supported it. I am not sure whether the noble Lord is suggesting, if they had debated it for 46 hours or 46 days that, somehow, the 379 MPs who voted for the clause would not have done so or that they were not aware of what they were voting for in the first place.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
As the noble Lord has specifically challenged me on that issue, the point that was raised in earlier groups was that for government Bills there is an impact assessment, an equality impact assessment and pre-legislative scrutiny. There is significant public consultation resulting from the Cabinet Office, as the noble Lord knows very well, and there are guidelines as to public consultation. None of that happened on this occasion. Therefore, let us pay due regard to the deliberations, scrutiny and oversight of the Commons if there is a proper due process in the way that a Bill evolves and is debated, tested and challenged.
That has not been the case on this occasion, and it is very similar to the pills by post situation. The original wording of the pills by post amendment in the Commons was disorderly and had to be rewritten by special advisers in the Department of Health before it was introduced in the House of Lords. That was tacked on to a Health and Care Bill in the same way that this has been tacked on to a mainstream Crime and Policing Bill. So, with all due respect to the noble Lord, I do not think that his analysis stands up to scrutiny.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
My Lords, I will just very briefly intervene, as I was going to intervene until I was corrected. I have learned something—it is always good to learn new things in your Lordships’ House. The noble Lord cited a number of statistics suggesting that abortion was something that did emotional damage to women or that they regretted afterwards.
I will just cite one landmark study, published in Social Science & Medicine in 2020—this is in the context of America, where there is a huge amount of pressure and social discussion around abortion—which said that five years after having had an abortion more than 95% of women said it was exactly the right decision for them. That is a very different figure from those the noble Lord was citing. It is important to put that on the record for anyone who might be reading the debate and thinking about this.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough for tabling these amendments. Again, I refer to comments that I made in the earlier group about procedure, during which I noted the absence of an impact assessment and consultation. My noble friend’s amendments attempt to insert those processes later on in the legislative stages, and reflect in some way what I said on that earlier group. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, your Lordships have heard me say now on at least two occasions that the Government are neutral, and therefore my only observations are about workability and operational issues.
I can respond to the amendments in this group in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, very briefly. It is unclear whether Amendment 563 is intended as an alternative to Amendment 562. If it is not, they would create two parallel commencement powers for Clause 191, each imposing slightly different and conflicting obligations on the Secretary of State.
In any event, your Lordships may wish to consider that not all the information required to produce the report as described in the amendment may be readily available within the timeframe, and some of the areas to be considered—for example, standards of clinical oversight—are broad. Although the amendment does not specify the consequences of failing to meet the specified deadlines for consultation or reporting, its effect would be that missing these deadlines would prevent Clause 191 coming into force.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
My Lords, that is a very brief response from the Minister. I do not think the two amendments that I put to the Committee at this late hour are mutually exclusive—they are complementary. One is about a public consultation exercise and one is about a report to be prepared by the Government using secondary legislation. I accept that there would be an element of discretion for the Government. Obviously, this would be primary legislation in the Bill, but it would be largely facilitated—as the Minister knows, being a very eminent lawyer—by secondary legislation.
I finish very briefly with one thought. To a certain extent, the situation with this clause, and how the Government have handled it, is if not quite novel then constitutionally unusual, because the Minister is not in a position to answer detailed questions. She has undertaken to write and we take her at her word.
The clause is a cuckoo in the nest, really. The Government are, in effect, saying that they do not support it and they do not oppose it but it is in the Bill. I do not always praise the leader of my own party, but I will on this occasion. She had the courage of her convictions to whip in the other place against the whole Bill, even though it is largely a very good Bill, because of the inclusion of Clause 191. The Government should resolve this constitutional novelty and the odd situation arising from the fact that they did not have the moral courage to push back against the Member for Gower, which they should have done, and say that Clause 191 is too extreme and does not have a place. The Government should have said that this clause should be put it in a Private Member’s Bill, or that the Member should lobby Government Ministers to bring it forward as government legislation. But they did not do that; they put it in the Bill. They are therefore going to need to give better answers by the time it gets to Report.
For all that, I appreciate the Minister’s efforts to answer some questions and to undertake to write. On that basis, looking forward to further discussions on Report, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
“Providing assistance under assisted dying legislation in Crown Dependencies: criminal liabilityIn the Suicide Act 1961, after section 2A (acts capable of encouraging or assisting suicide) insert—“2AA Assistance provided in Crown Dependencies(1) In sections 2(1) and 2A(1), a reference to an act that is capable of encouraging or assisting suicide or attempted suicide does not include—(a) participating in acts that facilitate the provision of a medically assisted death in Scotland or the Crown Dependencies (the “jurisdictions”) under or in connection with legislation in those jurisdictions (“relevant legislation”),(b) performing any other function under that relevant legislation in accordance with that relevant legislation, or(c) assisting a person seeking to end their own life in accordance with that relevant legislation to access that relevant legislation.(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 2 to prove that they—(a) reasonably believed they were acting in accordance with relevant legislation in those jurisdictions, and(b) took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence.””
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)
My Lords, I am not moving this amendment, but I feel I owe it to the House to explain why I took my name off it when it had been drafted. I was contacted by the Chief Minister of the Isle of Man, who felt that it was premature: they had not been consulted, their Bill has not received Royal Assent, and they felt that a considerable number of parliamentary colleagues would be greatly concerned if this was to pass as an amendment without formal consultation. I feel I should simply place that on the record, but I do not wish to move this amendment, so I realise that this is slightly irregular.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 192, page 223, line 27.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes provision that is no longer needed because of the general data protection override in section 183A of the Data Protection Act 2018, which was inserted by section 106(2) of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 and came into force on 20 August 2025.
Crime and Policing Bill
Thursday 5th February 2026
(3 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-XV Fifteenth marshalled list for Committee - (3 Feb 2026)
Lord Clement-Jones
“(4A) Before the appropriate national authority makes regulations under subsection (1) for the purpose of implementing a new international agreement, or significantly altering an existing agreement, the authority must conduct and publish a comprehensive Privacy Impact Assessment.(4B) The Privacy Impact Assessment required under subsection (4A) must analyse and report on—(a) the necessity and proportionality of the information sharing arrangements,(b) the mechanism by which individual rights, including those under Article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998, will be safeguarded,(c) the risks of non-compliance with the data protection legislation or of unintended consequences arising from the sharing of personal data, and(d) the nature and volume of personal data intended to be shared or accessed under the agreement.(4C) The appropriate national authority must lay before Parliament, no later than 12 months after the first regulations are made under this section, and annually thereafter, a report on the operation of regulations made under this section.(4D) The annual report required under subsection (4C) must include, in particular—(a) an assessment of the overall volume and categories of information shared under the regulations,(b) a detailed analysis of the impact of the regulations on the privacy and data protection rights of individuals, and(c) a summary of any internal reviews, audits, or legal challenges relating to information sharing under the agreements implemented by the regulations.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment requires a privacy impact assessment to be carried out before regulations are made under this section.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 464 I will speak to Amendments 467, 468 and 503, in my name. These amendments collectively address the governance of Clauses 192 to 194, which grant the Secretary of State broad powers to make regulations giving effect to international law enforcement information-sharing agreements. Following the recent passage of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025, we are now operating in a new legal landscape, where the statutory threshold for protecting data transferred overseas has been lowered. These amendments are not just desirable; they are essential safety mechanisms to fill that gap.
Amendment 464 would be a safeguard of, so to speak, look before you leap. It stipulates that, before regulations are made under Clause 192 to implement a new international agreement, the authority must publish a comprehensive privacy impact assessment. The necessity of this assessment has intensified following the enactment of the Data (Use and Access) Act. The UK’s new test for onward transfers of data has lowered the bar. It no longer requires foreign protections to be essentially equivalent to ours, but merely not materially lower. This creates a dangerous new risk profile. The European Data Protection Board has explicitly noted that this new test omits key safeguards against foreign government access and removes redress mechanisms for individuals. If the general statutory floor has been lowered, Amendment 464 becomes the essential safety net. We must assess these specific risks via a privacy impact assessment before we open the digital borders, to ensure that we are not exposing UK citizens to jurisdictions where they have no legal remedy.
This brings me to Amendment 467, which addresses the nature of the data being shared. Where regulations authorise the transfer of highly sensitive personal data, such as biometrics, genetics or political opinions, this amendment would require enhanced protective measures. All this highlights the illusion of data protection when transferring data to high-risk jurisdictions that lack the rule of law. We know that in authoritarian states domestic intelligence laws will always override the standard contractual clauses usually relied on for data transfers. Because the Data (Use and Access) Act has removed the requirement for foreign safeguards to be essentially equivalent, we cannot rely on the general law to protect highly sensitive biometric or health data. My amendment would restore the requirement that transfers of such sensitive data must be demonstrated to be strictly necessary and proportionate. We cannot allow efficiency of data sharing to deny the reality that, in some jurisdictions, once data arrives, the state will have unrestricted access. Transparency must follow these powers.
Amendment 468 would mandate the production of an annual report on international law enforcement information sharing. This is vital because we are entering a period of divergence. The European Commission, at the urging of the European Data Protection Board, will be monitoring the practical implementation of the UK’s revised data transfer regime. If the EU will be monitoring how our data laws operate, surely Parliament should be doing the same. We need an annual report to track whether these law enforcement transfers are inadvertently exposing UK citizens to jurisdictions where they have no effective legal redress. Without this feedback loop, Parliament is legislating in the dark.
Finally, Amendment 503 would ensure that regulations made under Clause 192 are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. Given that the primary legislation governing data transfers has been loosened, it is constitutionally inappropriate for these specific law enforcement agreements to slip through via the negative procedure. Amendment 503 would ensure that these regulations, which may involve the transfer of our citizens’ most sensitive biometric data to foreign powers, must be actively debated and approved by both Houses of Parliament.
We support international co-operation in fighting crime, but it must not come at the cost of lowering our standards. These amendments would restore the safeguards that recent legislation have eroded. I beg to move.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, we thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his amendments and the importance that he has obviously placed on the right to privacy of the general public.
I support the principle behind Amendment 464. Sharing information often carries a risk with it, particularly when it is for the purposes of law enforcement, and especially when this is done internationally. Law enforcement data contains information that is far more personal to the individual or case in question than the norm. Any data of this sort must be handled with the highest discretion. Ensuring that the sharing of this data respects the right to privacy carries no unintended consequences and, most importantly, is necessary and should be the benchmark from which regulations are made.
If this amendment is accepted, I do not see the additional need for Amendment 468. At the very least, the privacy impact assessment under Amendment 464 should form the basis of any annual report that Amendment 468 would mandate. Less is more when it comes to admin and reports, so I am hesitant to support a new report that is not necessarily needed.
I think Amendment 467 is sensible. In general, internationally shared data should not include information prejudicial to any individual, let alone domestic citizens. This particularly extends to the sharing of biometric data for the purpose of unique identification or genetic identification.
These categories of data are obviously vital for the purposes of law enforcement, but law enforcement extra territorially risks placing this data in the wrong hands. This and similar data should therefore be particularly protected, which is the aim of the noble Lord’s amendment. I hope that the Minister can outline what the Government intend to do to ensure that the international sharing of personal data is undertaken in the most discreet and protected manner.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to kick off what I very much hope will be the last day in Committee—not to jinx it. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for setting out the case for these amendments, which relate to the provisions in Clauses 192 to 194.
International law enforcement information-sharing agreements are a vital tool that provide law enforcement officers with access to new intelligence to fight crime, increase public protection and reduce the threat of societal harm posed by international criminality. To clarify, these measures provide the appropriate national authority with the power to make regulations to implement both new and existing legally binding international law enforcement information-sharing agreements. Such regulations may, for example, make provision for the technical and, where appropriate, operational detail to facilitate the information sharing provided for in a particular agreement.
The UK is recognised globally for having one of the most robust data protection regimes, anchored in the Data Protection Act and UK GDPR, which ensure that privacy is protected even in the most complex areas of law enforcement and international co-operation. This Government are committed to maintaining these high standards and ways of working to ensure that data protection and privacy are not compromised as we strengthen cross-border security. UK law already requires data controllers to conduct a data protection impact assessment for any activity that is likely to result in a high risk to individuals’ rights and freedoms. Public bodies and law enforcement authorities are bound by the Human Rights Act, the European Convention on Human Rights and the Equality Act, and they must duly assess activities accordingly.
Existing data protection principles and statutory requirements, particularly data protection impact assessments, already cover the concerns raised by the noble Lord’s amendments, making new duties duplicative and unnecessary. As is required under Article 36(4) of the UK GDPR, regulations made under this power as they relate to the processing of personal data will require consultation with the Information Commissioner’s Office.
The international law enforcement information-sharing agreements preceding the making of regulations under Clause 192 are subject to the usual treaty ratification procedures, including the provisions regarding parliamentary scrutiny provided for in Part 2 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. Any such agreement will be laid before Parliament with an Explanatory Memorandum, which would include the background to why the Government are entering into the agreement, its implementation and a note of any existing domestic legislation and human rights considerations. Additionally, an overseas security and justice assistance assessment will be required. Introducing additional scrutiny requirements would risk duplication and provide no additional substantive information to Parliament beyond what is currently available.
We must also consider the operational sensitivity of such processing. Law enforcement data sharing involves sensitive systems and procedures. Publication of such assessments may inadvertently expose vulnerabilities or methods that criminals or adversarial parties may seek to exploit.
Ministers regularly update Parliament on international law enforcement co-operation, including data sharing. I have a long list of examples before me—I will not detain your Lordships with too many of them. The Cabinet Office issued the Government’s response to the EAC report Unfinished Business: Resetting the UK-EU Relationship on 23 January this year and published it shortly thereafter. A couple of days before, on 21 January, my noble friend Lord Hanson appeared before the EAC to discuss the UK-EU reset, which focused on the LEJC, migration and the border partnership. You do not have to go far back for another example: on September 8, the Foreign Affairs Committee questioned the Cabinet Office and FCDO Ministers on post-summit implementation, co-ordination and future UK-EU co-operation frameworks. That is just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to parliamentary oversight of these matters.
Law enforcement authorities and government departments work closely together to assess international law enforcement capabilities and their effectiveness. Such assessments, by their very nature, are operationally sensitive and would not be suitable for publication. Specifically singling out international law enforcement data sharing also risks presenting a skewed picture of wider domestic operational activity, given that law enforcement outcomes are often the result of multiple capabilities and instruments being used. Owing to the breadth of law enforcement authorities that may be engaged in such information-sharing activity, and the likely multiple data systems, sourcing and collating operational data that would be suitable for inclusion in a published annual report would create significant demand and risk diverting resource from other critical law enforcement priorities.
We must also consider the implications for the international parties to such agreements, who may have concerns about the publication of such data and assessment, particularly where it may relate to operationally sensitive matters. That, in turn, may affect and limit the negotiability of future agreements. Such reports could potentially expose operational practices that it may not be appropriate to place in the public domain. We must be mindful that agreements will vary in scope with international partners; to publish detail on the volumes of data exchanged may inadvertently cause concern from international partners on differing operating scopes.
Finally, as to whether regulations made under Clause 192 should be subject to the draft affirmative procedure, I simply point the noble Lord to the report on the Bill by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which made no such recommendation. We are usually held to the high standards of that committee and admonished when it finds us wanting. In this case, we were not found wanting, which I think is a very good tick that I pray in aid.
I understand the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, about these clauses, but I hope that I have reassured him that data protection remains at the heart of our approach. With that in mind, I ask him to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his detailed reply. It was very cheerful, which I find quite extraordinary in the circumstances. It is almost as though he has been reading Voltaire’s Candide: everything is for the best in all possible worlds. I will read carefully what he said, but there was an extraordinary amount of complacency built into his response about the nature of sharing data across borders—specifically that the existing regime is sufficient to safeguard these transfers and that my amendments would introduce unnecessary friction into law enforcement co-operation. That is because the rules of the game have changed since the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025.
The Information Commissioner can operate only within the legislation provided, which is no safeguard in those circumstances. I have the highest regard for the Information Commissioner and his office, but they have to operate within the bounds of the law, which have changed since the Act was passed. I mentioned the European Data Protection Board and so on. The Minister has performed some kind of parliamentary jujitsu by seeming to say that sensitive data, which I cited as being one of the reasons why I tabled my amendments, makes it far too difficult to do what I am proposing. I admire his speechwriting but I must say that I do not think that is an answer.
I will withdraw my amendment, but I believe that the Act that we spent so long debating has changed the rules of the game and that these amendments are necessary to ensure that international co-operation does not become a backdoor for the erosion of privacy. I will come back to this but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 192, page 223, line 27.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 192, page 223, line 27.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, my late friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness had originally laid this proposal that Clause 195 should not stand part. I had signed it to support him because of my interests in human rights. His untimely death last week means that I am now leading on something that he, as an excellent lawyer, really understood and cared about. We shall in this debate, when we get into the detail, miss his incisive legal mind, combined with a passion for fairness and the rule of law. We miss him so much already. I am not a lawyer, but I will do what I can. I thank the Defence Extradition Lawyers Forum, or DELF, for its help and advice in the last few days, as well as its excellent technical briefing, from which I shall quote.
The core of asking that Clause 195 not stand part is straightforward. It would remove the right for a retrial following a conviction in absentia where the person convicted is deemed to have been present, even if there has been no contact between that person and their court-approved lawyer. As ever, there is more in the detail. Clause 195 proposes to amend Sections 20 and 85 of the Extradition Act, governing extradition following convictions in absentia. Following a stakeholder symposium convened in January, DELF identified material inaccuracies in the Government’s stated justification for the clause. Unfortunately, there are consequences as a result of these inaccuracies that will have serious implications for individuals facing extradition in future.
In the Government’s justification for Clause 195, they said that the proposed amendments
“ensure compatibility between UK domestic legislation and the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement”.
Article 601(1)(i) of the TCA, which governs convictions in absentia, already aligns with Section 20 of the Extradition Act 2003. Those safeguards, grounded in fundamental rights, reflect the carefully calibrated EU extradition framework, strengthened in 2009 to enhance protections for convictions in absentia. It sought to promote legal certainty and mutual recognition while respecting differing national legal systems. The problem is that Clause 195 risks making UK legislation inconsistent with the TCA in two material respects, thereby undermining the reforms advanced by the UK in 2008-09.
First, Article 601(1)(i)(iii) of the TCA permits refusal of extradition where a person did not deliberately absent themselves for a trial in absentia unless they have a right
“to a retrial or appeal … which allows the merits of the case … to be re-examined”.
That standard is reflected in Section 20 of the Extradition Act, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, but Clause 195 would dilute this safeguard by reducing it to a mere “right to apply” for a retrial, thus weakening protections previously secured across Europe.
Secondly, Article 601(1)(i)(ii) of the TCA deems a person present at the trial only where they have
“given a mandate to a lawyer … to defend him or her at the trial, and was indeed defended by that lawyer at the trial”.
However, new subsection (7A) in Clause 195 will weaken this protection, treating a person as present solely by virtue of their legal representation, even where there has been no contact or instruction between lawyer and client.
There is further concern over the Government’s inaccurate statement that the
“interpretation … changed as a result of … Bertino and Merticariu”.
The Supreme Court did not create new law by distinguishing between a right to retrial and a mere right to apply for one. Rather, it affirmed the settled meaning of “entitled”, endorsing established authority, which made it clear that entitlement does not mean “perhaps” or “in certain circumstances”. In doing so, the court in that case overturned the conflicting decision in BP v Romania 2015, which had erroneously treated a discretionary right to apply for a retrial as sufficient, having misapplied case law on procedural requirements that do not undermine a genuine entitlement.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for tabling this clause stand part notice. I would like to add my reservations about this clause.
First, I am concerned that this clause has not received sufficient scrutiny and consideration by Parliament. It was added on Report in the other place on 17 June last year. The Minister moving the new clause dedicated only 255 words to explain its effect and it was not mentioned by a single other Member. It has not received adequate attention. For that reason, I am pleased that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has tabled this amendment to allow us to press the Government on the measures they are proposing.
The second point is the potential impact this clause could have on the right to a fair trial for British citizens. Under Section 20 of the Extradition Act 2003, where a person has been convicted in another country, the judge at the extradition hearing must first decide whether the person has been convicted in their absence and then decide whether the person deliberately absented themselves from the trial. If the judge is satisfied that the person was convicted in absentia and did not deliberately absent themselves from the trial, the judge must determine whether the person would be entitled to a retrial or to a review that amounts to a retrial in the territory to which the person would be extradited. If the judge does not believe that the person would be entitled to a retrial if extradited, the judge must discharge the prospect of extradition.
The Supreme Court in the recent cases of Bertino and Merticariu distinguished between the right to a retrial and the right to apply for a retrial. The court has held that a person’s entitlement to a retrial does not simply mean the person “might” be entitled to a retrial but that they “must” be entitled. This means that a conditional entitlement to a retrial that is dependent upon the finding of the court in the requesting country is insufficient for extradition to proceed. This places a decision on whether a fair trial can be had firmly in the hands of British judges. That is surely right. It is plainly preferable for the determination of the ability for a retrial to take place to be undertaken by a British judge, as opposed to merely relying on the decision of a foreign court.
However, in Clause 195, the Government are seeking to overturn this ruling, thereby removing a key safeguard against unfair extradition. If this clause is brought into force, the judge in Britain would have to order a person’s extradition on the simple assertion by the requesting country that the person could be permitted to stand trial in person, regardless of whether that is actually true or not.
Let us imagine a person who was tried in absentia and was not aware of their conviction in another country. If they were extradited and not permitted a retrial, they would not have been able to stand up in court and defend themselves against the charges they had been accused of. That is surely a recipe for serious injustice. In short, I am concerned that this clause will lead to more British citizens being extradited on the whim of a foreign judge and not afforded the right to a fair trial. For this reason, I very much support the proposition from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, that the clause should not stand part.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
My Lords, I begin by saying how sorry I am that it is the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, moving her proposition and not Lord Wallace of Tankerness, who we will greatly miss. As we all know, he was a staunch advocate for the people of Orkney and Shetland. I served nine years with him in Parliament, as we crossed over during that time, and found him to be an exemplary public servant as Deputy First Minister for Scotland and as a Member of Parliament. I had less contact with him in your Lordships’ House and I am genuinely sorry that I cannot have contact with him today. I pass my condolences to his family. I am also grateful to the noble Baroness Lady Brinton for taking up the cudgels on this specialist subject and doing it in a way that is professional. I promise that I will try to answer the questions and follow up on the points she has raised.
I am also grateful to the noble Baroness for reminding me of the constituency case of Paul Wright in Mold, which I dealt with in a former life as Paul Wright’s Member of Parliament, following the extradition case with Greece. I will have to google it to refresh all the details in my memory, but it was an important constituency case for me to take up as a Member of Parliament at that time. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, feels that this did not receive sufficient scrutiny, but I take his point, and I hope I can answer his points today.
Clause 195 standing part of the Bill means that, under the Extradition Act 2003, the UK may extradite individuals either to face trial or serve a sentence. Where a conviction occurred in absentia and the UK court finds the person did not deliberately absent themselves, the judge must determine whether they will be entitled to a retrial in the requesting state. This clause will amend Sections 20 and 85 of the 2003 Act to restore the original policy intention that the individual must have a right to apply for a retrial, not a guaranteed retrial, for extradition to proceed. The amendment is required, as the noble Baroness mentioned, following the Supreme Court’s judgment in Merticariu v Romania, which interpreted the current drafting of the 2003 Act as requiring a guaranteed retrial—something some states cannot offer. Without this fix, certain legitimate extradition requests could be blocked, undermining justice for victims.
I know the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, mentioned this, but the amendment itself does not change any existing safeguards or processes governing extradition. The full suite of safeguards in the 2003 Act, including judicial oversight and human rights protections, remains unchanged. This includes the UK court’s powers to consider and determine whether someone deliberately absented themselves. I hope that gives her some reassurance.
The small government Amendment 537 makes minor drafting changes. It simply provides that Clause 195 will be commenced by regulations, as opposed to automatically coming into force on Royal Assent, as was originally planned.
I have heard what the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, has said and I have heard the complex case that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has mentioned. The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, asked whether she could have a meeting with appropriate supporters to discuss this and I would be happy to do so. For the purposes of confirming that, I would be grateful if she could email me the details of who she wishes to attend that meeting. It is entirely up to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, but I would be happy if the noble Lord, Lord Davies, wishes to attend—or I could offer him a separate meeting if he wants to have further discussions or representations. If that can be discussed outside Committee, I would be happy to do that.
In the meantime, I hope the reassurances I have given are sufficient for the moment. I would be happy if the noble Baroness would withdraw her opposition to the clause standing part, pending any discussion, which I will ensure takes place if possible—subject to our diaries—before Report, as appropriate. If not, we can still have the discussion, so that we can at least reflect on the points that have been made today.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for speaking in support of the clause not standing part, particularly for speaking about the very short time that it had for debate in the Commons, which obviously did not have the chance to go through some of the detail that DELF has provided for us in this Committee.
I also thank the Minister. He is, as ever, courteous and thoughtful. I am not sure we have closed the gap between where I believe that there are problems and where he and his officials think that this is all resolved. Therefore, I am very grateful for the offer of a meeting. I would be delighted if the noble Lord, Lord Davies, wanted to join us. I will indeed email him names, but in the meantime I withdraw my opposition to the clause standing part.
Baroness Chakrabarti
“Age of criminal responsibilityIn section 50 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, for “ten” substitute “14”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would raise the age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales from ten to 14 years so that no child under that age could be tried for or convicted of a criminal offence.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, Amendment 469 is in my name and the names of the noble and learned Baronesses, Lady Butler-Sloss and Lady Hale of Richmond, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester.
I ask Members of the Committee to think back to when they were 10—if that is not too difficult. Perhaps they were studying the Victorians in primary school. If so, they might have been astonished to learn that children of any age, even younger than 10, could be prosecuted in the 19th century. But there was an important nuance; even in the Victorian Juvenile Offenders Act 1847 and its spiritual successors, the Children Act 1908 and the Children and Young Persons Acts 1933 and 1963, there was a presumption of doli incapax—that children below 14 are inherently incapable of forming criminal intentions. This had to be rebutted beyond reasonable doubt by any individual prosecution. This is the very thing that will have spared many of us from criminalisation at tender ages for our misdemeanours in formative years. Of course, most of us also have the safeguards of loving, diligent parenting and/or class privilege.
When we foregrounded this debate in an Oral Question just over two weeks ago, my noble friend Lord Watts, who is not currently in his place, in his own inimitable style, suggested that my concern about our low age of criminal responsibility was somehow a middle-class preoccupation. I agree that class is relevant to this question, but, with respect to my noble friend, his analysis is rather upside down. It is not children on the playing fields of our famous public schools who are likely to be referred to the police for the fisticuffs, minor thefts and criminal damage that is almost inevitable in early years; it is instead the poorest and most vulnerable, such as children in care, who are also preyed upon by groomers and exploiters, and even blackmailed with the threat of being reported to the police by their abusers.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, I put my name to this amendment and I agree with everything that the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has said. This is the third time that I have tried to raise the age of criminal responsibility in this House. I tried first in the Blair Government and lost. I tried the second time in the coalition Government and lost. On each occasion, I asked for a modest increase, to 12. I would be content with 12, but I would naturally prefer 14. It is very sad, but I just wonder whether every Government, of whichever political persuasion, are so afraid of the press and the press headlines that they are not prepared to change the law. Some years ago, the four children’s commissioners of the United Kingdom wrote a joint report in which they said that the United Kingdom is the most punitive country in the whole of Europe. That has not changed.
I tried two relevant cases: the first was on the anonymity of the Bulger killers, aged 10; the second was Mary Bell, aged 10. I do not know whether noble Lords know that the two Bulger killers, aged 10, had found a pornographic video hidden under the bed of the father of one of them, and they watched it. It was a story of how to kill a small child after painting the child blue. Those two little boys went out and did exactly what the film had shown. That seems to me to be highly relevant to considerations. It was an appalling crime; there is no doubt about that, but one does really need to think—as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has reminded us—about the maturity of the brain, which is not properly completed by the age of 10, and is only still partly completed by the age of 14. There is substantial evidence that one Government after another absolutely refuse to recognise.
Ten is very young. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, let us think back to when we were 10—I find that particularly difficult at my age. One bears in mind one’s children or one’s grandchildren, how they behaved and the extent to which they really understood, not perhaps between right and wrong—I would hope they did—but the consequences of what they have done or might do. That seems to be something that is gained later in life than the age of 10.
One point that noble Lords might be concerned about is what would happen to a 10 year-old if they committed a really serious offence, particularly murder, with which I have been twice concerned. The fact is that Section 45 of the Children Act 1989 would send such a child who was a danger to him or herself or to others to secure accommodation. I am a patron of an admirable secure accommodation unit in Exeter. Every child in that unit has at least two carers, and some who are particularly troublesome have three. They are properly educated and looked after in a way that would of course happen to a child convicted of an offence; they would be sent nowadays to secure accommodation.
Mary Bell, however, was sent to prison. The very humane Member of this House, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, arranged that the Bulger killers should not go on to an adult prison; they in fact left at the age of 18. Noble Lords might be interested to know the reason why I gave anonymity to those two young men. I received evidence from the police, sitting as a judge, that there were vigilantes out there determined not just to injure them, but to kill them. There was substantial evidence that there were groups of vigilantes in various parts of the country. That was why I gave them anonymity. I ask the Minister to reflect on what the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and I have said: 10 is very young.
Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)
My Lords, I support this amendment. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has brought me to this point after watching the deliberations on this. I was someone who, through multiple decades of youth work in particular and community work, was reluctant to do this, but I feel that it is the right thing to do. I just note a few things that would need to happen to make this effective and safe for the wider public.
I have dealt with many gang-involved young men, in particular. There are groups of young men whose sole job is to recruit for those gangs. Sometimes, with our criminal age of 10 being so low, it has made a number of children safer because it has kept them away. If you raise that age, it means that those recruitment people can go around saying, “You’re okay. You can’t be prosecuted, you can’t go to court and you can’t get in trouble”. If we are going to make this change, it needs to be sounded very clearly that there is still a route for you to get in trouble—that it is very important.
The more important piece, I would argue, is to look at how the Metropolitan Police now approach all young children; it views them as a victim first and it is very reluctant to move them into being a criminal without some very serious evidence—that approach needs to be embedded somewhere alongside this change. However, I make the point that there are a number of 10 year-olds—there are not millions of them out there, but there are enough in some of our poorest communities—who are sophisticated enough to be a real danger.
If we are going to make this change, we should make sure that, alongside it, we still have a way to affect the behaviour of those young children, in particular around bullying. If we remove supervision from them—often, supervision from the police is the only thing that carries enough weight in their own mind—they become a serious source of bullying and can cajole other children into breaking the law.
While I will support the amendment, I have been moved to this position only very recently, because it has had to fight against multiple years of experience of dealing with some young children who are very criminally involved, deliberately so. I still see the noble Baroness’ point, but I make a plea to the Minister to make sure that measures are put in place to keep the community safe and to identify young people early, not labelling them as criminals but dealing with their ability to bully and cajole other young people.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
My Lords, I shall speak on Amendment 469, and I have listened with great care to the persuasive argument presented by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti and by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, whom I think I can also refer to as a noble friend. I have also been briefed by Justice, a body that I have the highest respect for; indeed, I have been a member of Justice—I think I joined in 1964—for up to 60 years.
I accept the widespread view in other countries that the age for findings of criminality should be 14 years, which is the proposition in Amendment 469. I accept also that Scotland has recently raised the age of criminality from eight years to 12 years. We should also take into account the alarming increase in crime committed by young children going down to the age of nine years, and even lower. I read, for example, from Home Office statistics, which record that 9,544 offences were committed by children aged nine or younger in 2024. That is a rise of 30% on the 7,370 under-10 crimes recorded in 2019, before the pandemic, and an 18% rise on the total for 2022 of 8,064. They range, alarmingly, over crimes concerning rape, arson, stalking, attacking police, making death threats and drug and racially motivated offences—that is for nine year-olds. In Cheshire recently, police faced an attempted murder suspect who was too young to go before the courts. I take full account of all that.
However, I have a sense of unease in raising the age of criminality from 10 to 14 years. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, raised the case relating to two year-old James Bulger, of February 1993. I need not go into the full facts, but it suffices to say that in a shopping centre in Bootle in Merseyside, a little boy, two year-old James Bulger, was separated from his mother and was met by two other boys, 10 year-olds Jon Venables and Robert Thompson. They proceeded to take him away, eventually to a railway line, where they committed the most horrendous murder of that little boy. Following that, they were tried and convicted in November 1993 and in June 2001 were released from prison on licence. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has dealt with their anonymity following their release.
The record is that—and I think this is very relevant—Robert Thompson is not known to have been a reoffender, but not so with Jon Venables. He has had multiple convictions, including for child pornography. He is currently in prison and recently, in 2023, bail was refused because he still posed a danger and a risk to the public. As I said, I have expressed my unease about this.
The only further comment I make on the horrendous case relating to poor two year-old James Bulger is that it is not the only recorded crime of horrendous behaviour by young persons. I recall reading in the newspaper of the recent murder of a pensioner, and I am fairly sure that it was underage children who were responsible for that. I also recall reading in the newspapers of the murder of a homosexual in a public park. Again, if I recall correctly, underage children were involved, including a young girl.
Juvenile crime, I suggest, should be kept on the record. It was highly relevant in the case of Jon Venables that it should be kept on the record. Perhaps we could make an exception for the very serious crime that I have outlined to your Lordships. But one way or another, that record of criminality should remain with the juvenile.
Lord Sentamu (CB)
My Lords, I am not going to repeat the wonderful presentation by the noble Lord, Lord Hacking. There is a sentiment in me which wants to go a long way with some of the things we have said. I listened quite intently to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the arguments were what I call suitable for a seminar, in that you can look at all sides of them. I am persuaded that some children may need greater care and support. It is quite possible that those who exhibit criminality could be helped and end up in a different place. Certainly, listening to the wonderful presentation by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the cases that she has tried, I do not think anyone could say a 10 year-old can commit a crime—that would be very strange. If they have committed a crime, they have committed a crime, and in questions of criminality it is not simply a matter of the law, because, say, you are, like me, an older man at nearly 77. In all of us, there is a propensity to be saintly and holy, but also a darkness which you have to deal with.
I am not uneasy about children having a criminal record if they have committed a crime; I am uneasy about the way they are then treated. We heard from the noble and learned Baroness about making sure that their identity is not put out in the public domain, because there will be vigilantes who want to terrible things to young children. On the fact that a judge took a decision on their being taken to another prison, there are appropriate ways of punishing people without feeling that all punishment must be the same because the nature of the crimes is like those of other criminals. I would have a thought that, with a child such as Thompson or Venables, and considering what they did to young James Bulger, you need to find appropriate ways of dealing with their safekeeping and providing help, but not in the same way as you would treat a John Sentamu. For instance, if I commit a terrible crime, although I am 77, I should be answerable to the rest of the population. The way we handle children often leaves a lot to be desired.
I was a chaplain in a remand centre, and some of those young people had committed horrendous crimes. When you looked back, nearly 99% of their habits had been learned from adults; it was not that they were dreaming of doing these terrible things. It was a borstal for the young, so I take on the arguments made. On the arguments about children that the noble Baroness gave us, I do not think it is a question of age. I do not know how their brains work, although that might help in terms of sentencing, but for me it is not a question of age.
During the Stephen Lawrence inquiry, we went to Wales, and we—and William Macpherson, who was the chair of the inquiry—were shocked that children as young as six were committing some of the most horrendous racist incidents. By the way, we call it the Stephen Lawrence inquiry but the rest of the population do not say that. They keep on calling it the Macpherson inquiry. It is not that; its title is the Stephen Lawrence inquiry. Again, you looked at the parents and they were not responsible. It was a group enterprise. Kids in school were learning the language and there was not enough information to help them understand that behaving like that is not going to help them.
We as a nation should take the view that all children belong to us, and it is our responsibility to make sure we create an environment in which they are going to be helped. Locking them up and throwing away the key cannot be acceptable where children are concerned, no matter what crimes they may have committed. We should examine, in the streets where we live, how well we have helped and supported children.
I ask the Minister, as we have matters that need to be taken seriously, to consider whether it is best to do this through this Bill, or whether it would be better to arrange a seminar to examine the issue before Report, and find out what would be best for our children, instead of applying the unhelpful label “criminal” or deciding that a threshold of 14 or 12 will do it, because kids as young as seven can do some terrible things. We should put our hand on our hearts and say that maybe, as a society, we need to do much better.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
My Lords, I rise briefly to support the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss.
It is important to recognise the very important point made by the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, in relation to the problems of gangs in London, but I do not believe that that should be the reason why we should not make a change.
There are three things one can say very quickly. First, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has dealt at length with the enormous improvement in understanding the development of the mind and the enormous scientific advances that have been made. Across the criminal justice system, we generally are very bad at adapting to science.
Secondly, it is right to pay tribute to the Youth Justice Service across England and Wales. It has improved, and we now deal with youth crime and young people in a much more humane and civilised manner than we did 20 years ago. The number in places like Feltham has fallen enormously, and thank goodness it has. I do not know how many of your Lordships have been there, but it is a terrible place, and you do not want to send people there, particularly young people.
Thirdly, this was an issue I looked at when chairing the Commission on Justice in Wales. I must tell the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, that he is not to worry: I am not making a devolution point now, but I will come back to that at Report. However, I will say that the commission that examined this issue was firmly of the view that the age of criminal responsibility should be raised to 12, having heard a lot of evidence. It seems to me that this is something we cannot kick into the long grass again. We must recognise change, and we should make it now.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
The noble and learned Lord may recall from his days at the Bar that the juvenile courts were very sensitive to their role; that the judge and the counsel did not wear wigs; that the young offender was not kept in the dock, but was placed alongside his lawyers, and so forth. So we have, stretching back a long way, been very sensitive when trying juveniles.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, as a former trustee of UNICEF, I rise to support Amendment 469, so clearly presented by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and signed and spoken to by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. Internationally, the minimum age of criminal responsibility is recognised as 12, and UNICEF has always been clear that it should be 14. I heard what the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, said, and understand his concerns about the very large number of young people and children being groomed and pulled into criminal gangs. He is right to say that we need more concerted support in terms of police, education and youth work intervention, but it is not the children’s—younger children’s—fault that they have ended up there. The noble Lord, Lord Hacking, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, recognised that heinous crimes needed to be marked in a certain way, but both also commented on the fact that we needed to understand that these were children. I am really grateful for the comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd.
Your Lordships’ House has been discussing this for many, many years and as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said, she was campaigning on this long before she came into Your Lordships’ House. Now is the time; we need change. We need to do that because there is so much evidence now.
In 2011, Nicholas Mackintosh, who chaired the Royal Society study on brain development, told the BBC then that there was
“incontrovertible evidence that the brain continues to develop throughout adolescence”,
and that some regions of the brain, responsible for decision-making and impulse control, do not mature fully
“until at least the age of 20”.
That Royal Society report cited the
“concern of some neuroscientists that the … age of criminal responsibility in the UK is set too low”.
We are still discussing it today.
UNICEF’s view is that 14 should be the minimum age, using scientific research as a base, but it is very specific that no country should have the age below 12. This places England, Wales and Northern Ireland in breach of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which is bad enough, but the real problem is a court system that assumes that children have capacity to make decisions when all the research shows that that is not reliable. It is wrong for a Government to assert that any interference with a child’s human rights can be justified.
UNICEF says in its excellent guidance note on youth offending published in 2022, that children under the minimum age of criminal responsibility,
“should not be considered (alleged) child offenders but, first and foremost, children in need of special protection”.
It says that offending behaviour by such children
“is often the result of poverty, family violence and/or homelessness … their involvement in offending behaviour is an indicator of potential vulnerability that has to be addressed by the social welfare system. Special protection measures for children … should address the root causes of their behaviour and support their parents/caregivers. The measures should be tailored to the child’s needs and circumstances and based on a comprehensive and interdisciplinary assessment of the child’s familial, educational and social circumstances”.
That matches the advice of the medical specialists too. Frankly, it is time that the Government stepped up and took the brave decision that we need to recognise that we are out of kilter with the rest of Europe and, frankly, most of the world.
Prosecuting children and holding them in young offender institutions does not give them the time and space to learn how to live their lives differently. We have heard from both the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, about how the arrangements work for children in specialist secure accommodation. We can still use those systems but without giving children the label of being a criminal when, clearly, they are not capable of making the right decisions.
I am really grateful to my noble friend Lord Dholakia, who has been campaigning on this particular issue for decades before he came into your Lordships’ House in 1997. His Private Member’s Bill in 2017 resulted in a wide public discussion. It is a shame that, nine years on, we have not progressed further. Let us do so now.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this has been a genuinely interesting debate. The amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, would raise the age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales from 10 to 14. For the reasons I will set out below, I am unable to support it.
First, the purpose of the age of criminal responsibility has not been designed to criminalise children unnecessarily. Rather, it is to ensure that the state can intervene early and proportionately when a child’s behaviour causes serious harm. As the noble Baroness, Baroness Levitt, the Minister, stated in this House, setting the age at 10 allows the justice system to step in at a point where intervention can prevent further offending and protect both the child and the wider public, and, crucially, children are not treated as adults. They are dealt with through youth courts under a distinct sentencing framework with rehabilitation as the central aim.
The evidence shows that the system already uses this power sparingly. We are told that, in 2024, only 13% of all children sentenced were aged between 10 and 14, and that proportion has been falling year on year. Of the 1,687 sentences imposed on children in that age group, just 23 resulted in custody. Those figures matter. They demonstrate that the age of criminal responsibility being set at 10 does not mean routine criminalisation of children. It means retaining a backstop for the most serious and persistent cases while diversion remains the norm.
Raising the age to 14 would create a dangerous gap. It would mean that children aged 10 to 13 who commit grave offences—including serious violence, sexual offences or sustained harassment—could not be held criminally responsible. This would limit the state’s ability to manage risk, protect victims and, in some cases, protect the child. There are rare but tragic cases—
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
I am very grateful to the noble Lord. Section 44 of the Children Act deals with children who are a danger to themselves and to others. The only difference in the criminal court is that it comes through the family proceedings court, but in fact the local authority would have to deal with it and the child would be put into secure accommodation. I wonder whether the noble Lord could take that on board.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
I am grateful to the noble and learned Baroness for that. I do not dispute that fact; I quite accept it.
There are rare but tragic cases, such as the murder of James Bulger, where a criminal justice response is unavoidable and undoubtedly in the public interest.
I respectfully suggest that international comparisons cited in this debate are far from straightforward and can sometimes serve to confuse matters. In fact, certain countries are now moving in the opposite direction. Sweden, for example, is proposing to lower its age in response to gang exploitation of children who know that they cannot be prosecuted. That underlines a key point. If the threshold is set too high, it can incentivise adults to use children as instruments of crime.
It is also worth noting that, although Scotland recently raised the age of criminal responsibility, Scotland’s experience should not justify this amendment. Even after deciding the age of criminal responsibility should be raised from eight years old, Scotland raised the threshold to 12 and not to 14. The Scottish Government also retained extensive non-criminal powers to respond to serious harmful behaviour. This amendment would go significantly further without clear evidence that such a leap would improve outcomes for children or public safety.
It is worth noting that a number of Commonwealth countries retain the doctrine that a child is considered incapable of wrongdoing, which was abolished in England and Wales by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. In many of those jurisdictions, the standard age of responsibility is similar to ours. Australia, for example, has a standard age of criminal responsibility of 10 years old, but a rebuttable presumption exists up to the age of 14. However, I should also stress that, simply because other countries may have higher ages than England and Wales, that is not, in and of itself, a justification to alter ours. We must ensure that the age of responsibility here is suitable for our needs—
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
Before the noble Lord leaves the question of international comparisons, can he confirm that in Sweden the proposal is to lower the age of criminal responsibility from 15 to 13, rather than leaving that unsaid?
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
I cannot confirm that, but I will certainly have a look at it.
The question is not whether children should be protected but whether removing the ability to intervene criminally until 14 years old would make children, victims or communities safer. I do not believe that it would. The current system already prioritises proportionality and rehabilitation, while retaining the capacity to act when it is absolutely necessary. For those reasons, I cannot support this amendment.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti has a long and honourable record of raising issues on behalf of some of the most vulnerable in society. She and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, make a formidable team when moving this amendment. I am very grateful to them for ensuring that this important issue remains at the forefront of every Government’s mind, including this one.
It was about a fortnight ago that your Lordships’ House debated this issue in response to my noble friend’s Oral Question. I said at the time, and repeat today, that the age of criminal responsibility is a complex and sensitive issue. I want to take this opportunity to set out in a bit more detail than the Oral Questions format allows why the Government believe that we should keep the age of criminal responsibility at 10 years old.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I am grateful to all noble Lords who participated in what I felt was a very thoughtful debate. Though it is invidious to do so, I would like to single out two contributions in particular.
The first is the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington. It is quite a big thing to come to Committee and say, “I have listened. I still have concerns, but I have changed my mind in the face of an argument from the opposite side of the aisle”. I pay tribute to him for that, remembering that it was his party, not mine, that took us into the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in the first place. I am very grateful to him. He does great credit to his party and this House.
I must thank the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, for a lifetime of public service and of considerable distinction at the Bar, on the Bench and in your Lordships’ House. It was she who gave the answer to the legitimate concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, about what would fill the gap in relation to dangerous and bad behaviour by young children if they were not to be criminalised: they would be dealt with in the family court and would be supervised and treated with a welfare approach, rather than a criminal justice one.
I thank everyone. I am obviously disappointed to some extent with my noble friend the Minister’s response, but I hope that the door is not slammed closed. I understand that a Back-Bench amendment is not necessarily the way to deal with something of this complexity and magnitude. However, I note, for example, that the Bar Council of England and Wales is currently conducting a commission into the age of criminal responsibility. I hope that, if the Government do not engage with it, they will at least watch those developments very carefully. This amendment was tabled on the basis of an age of 14; I may consider returning on Report with the proposition of age 12. For now, at least, and with thanks, I beg leave to withdraw.
Baroness Chakrabarti
“Safeguards against abuses by Covert Human Intelligence Sources(1) Section 27 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 is amended as follows.(2) For subsection (1) substitute—“(1) This Part applies to criminal conduct—(a) under an authorisation under this Part, and(b) where the conduct is in accordance with the authorisation.”.(3) For subsection (2) substitute—“(2) This part also applies to civil liability in relation to any conduct which—(a) is incidental to any conduct within subsection (1), and(b) is not itself conduct an authorisation or warrant for which is capable of being granted under a relevant enactment and might reasonably have been expected to have been sought in the case in question. (2A) If a person acts in accordance with a criminal conduct authorisation under section 29B (covert human intelligence sources: criminal conduct authorisations), the nature of that authorisation and compliance with it shall be considered and deemed relevant to—(a) any decision as to whether prosecution for a criminal offence by that person is in the public interest,(b) any potential defences to such charges of criminal conduct, and(c) any potential civil liability on the part of that person, and the quantum of any damages.(2B) The protections in subsection (2A) only apply where the conduct is not carried out for the primary purpose of—(a) encouraging or assisting, pursuant to sections 44 to 49 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (incohate offences), the commission of an offence by, or(b) otherwise seeking to discredit,the person, people or group subject to the authorised surveillance operation.”.”Member's explanatory statement
These amendments replace provisions of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 as amended by the Covert Human Intelligence Sources Act 2021 granting complete advanced criminal and civil immunity for authorised operatives and agents, with a public interest defence as long as they did not act as agents provocateurs.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, I am trying the patience of the Committee, but Amendment 470 is in my name.
In a week when our entire politics is reeling from the betrayal, treachery and most likely serious criminality of a now disgraced Peer, I hope we might all empathise with victims of abuses of power by covert human intelligence sources—CHIS—or police or other agency spies. Notwithstanding the ongoing public inquiry into the decades-old spy cops scandal, the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021 granted prior and absolute criminal and civil immunity to officers and agents of a whole host of public bodies if acting under a new scheme of pre-authorisation to commit crime. By this one Act, the centuries-old principle of equality before the law was breached.
Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer (LD)
My Lords, I was very pleased to add my name to this amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. To me, it is the most important amendment to the Bill, and she laid out fully why it is so needed. As she said, this will be about trust in the police, and without this sort of regulation, that trust will be lacking—especially given the spy cops inquiry, which I have been following. That inquiry led me to want to put my name to this amendment, particularly because it has been going on for 10 years, involving three judges, and we should now have the lessons from it. If it had wound up, we would have had the lessons from that inquiry, and this amendment fills a bit of the gap from not having them.
The problem with that inquiry is that quite a lot of it is held in secret and a lot of the transcripts are heavily redacted, so it is very difficult for a Member of your Lordships’ House to follow, as I have tried to, what the lessons will be. For those reasons, we should support this amendment, even if it is just a stopgap until that inquiry eventually reports. That could be years from now, so I am pleased to support the amendment.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, I support Amendment 470, which I, too, have signed. I agree with every word that we heard from the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Miller. This references a deep vein of misogyny that existed then in the Met police—and I suspect it still exists, in spite of all the promises to the contrary. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, is so calm; it always astonishes me how calm she stays when I know she feels exactly the way I feel about this, which is absolutely furious. I know that when I stand up I am absolutely furious about quite a lot of things, but this plumbs the depths of my fury.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
Thank you, everybody. I tried to be a core participant in the spy cops inquiry—I think it was the first one—but the judge ruled that it did not apply to me because I had been spied on by the regular police, not the spy cops, so I could not be part of it. I was very disappointed about that.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
My Lords, I oppose this amendment. I have to concede that, as usual, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, made a beguilingly attractive case for the amendment, but in essence this would be a legislative overreach. This activity is not being undertaken with impunity. We have checks and balances, although I accept they can be improved. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, that children are used because of county lines, where children are used to move weapons and drugs.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
I will give way a little later as I want to develop my point, if the noble Baroness will be so kind as to allow me.
I think there are two sides to every story. When I was first a candidate and then Member of Parliament for Peterborough, I remember the sight every week of animal rights activists at Huntingdon Life Sciences. I do not support the activities of rogue police officers, as enunciated in what the noble Baroness said about spy cops, but we must not conflate separate phenomena: a full public inquiry—albeit in camera, which I do not agree with, as there should be openness and transparency—and specific criminal cases. One can also make the case that those police officers and others who were doxed by animal rights activists have suffered a huge degree of harassment and violent intimidation since the allegations arose, without having the opportunity to clear their names in a court of law. I give way to the noble Baroness.
Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer (LD)
I would like the noble Lord to give way to my noble friend.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I am grateful. The noble Lord referred earlier to children and county lines. The problem with this case is that relationships were formed under lies by police officers and children were born of those relationships, whose fathers then disappeared. It is nothing to do with the criminalised activity of children. Will he please reconsider his comments with that relevance?
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
The noble Baroness makes a very fair point. I was referring to the issue of county lines and why children may be used. I deprecate the unacceptable activity to which she refers; none of us would support the fathering of children in a pretended relationship, so she makes a very fair point.
I was talking about Huntingdon Life Sciences and animal rights activists. That violence escalated to a significant level over a number of years, which culminated in the violent attack on and near-death experience of the then chief executive of Huntingdon Life Sciences. It was a very unpleasant period. Therefore, there was a reasonable case to be made that the Metropolitan Police, Cambridgeshire Constabulary and others needed to embed officers and intelligence assets within the animal rights movement to alleviate the risk of further serious criminal activity. That was an animal rights issue, but it could easily not have been.
The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, concedes very fairly that she does not want to circumscribe cases where you have to do long-term surveillance of, say, a terrorist plot which might be carried out were it not for police activity and long-term embedding of people. That is separate to cases where there has not been an operational rationale for preventing criminal activity, so I accept that there is a difference.
That is why this amendment is rather heavy-handed. No doubt the Minister will refer to the commissioner, who will look at whether these activities are timely and appropriate, but words matter. Incidentally, when the noble Baroness mentioned the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021, I think she made an unusual inference that it was to facilitate criminal activity. I may have been mistaken in hearing that and she may want to intervene.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, is completely right; that is the purpose of that Act. The Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act is all about authorising CHISs to commit offences, because we understand that that is sometimes necessary to keep your cover.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
That is true as far as that goes. However, in the wider context, the principal objective of that legislation is not to enable people to commit crimes but to prevent people being subject to endless civil and criminal litigation that may arise from their duties as representatives of public bodies, be they the security services, the police et cetera. So I think that the noble Baroness is being slightly unfair to the Ministers at the time who put through that legislation. What she outlined was clearly a corollary of passing that legislation, but it was not the principal reason, as I am sure she will concede.
The reason I wanted to speak is to interrogate the details of this amendment. Looking at paragraph (2B)(b) of the proposed new clause, I wonder what is meant by
“otherwise seeking to discredit, the person, people or group subject to the authorised surveillance operation”.
That seems a very wide-ranging paragraph and a recipe for much litigation in the future. Should it eventually be found on the face of the enacted Crime and Policing Bill, the way that it will be interpreted will give rise to a situation where the police, the security services and others are much more reluctant to enter into long-term surveillance of the kind I discussed earlier in seeking to thwart a terrorist plot, because of that quite wide-ranging and open paragraph.
Generally speaking, the noble Baroness has made a very fine point and I agree with much of what she said, but I genuinely do not understand the point of that paragraph. If it is a way of describing an agent provocateur, I understand that—and, because she is a prominent lawyer, she will no doubt tell me where that is found in other pieces of legislation. However, currently, that paragraph could be misinterpreted, and it will circumscribe the capacity of the security services and the police to do their job and protect individuals. For those reasons, while I am not necessarily against the amendment, I would like further clarification if possible.
Baroness O'Loan (CB)
My Lords, I have long had a responsibility for the investigation of matters involving CHISs and I fully accept that many people who agree to become CHISs do so in the public interest, because, without their activities, the intelligence that they are able to collect would be unavailable. I also accept that undercover activity of this kind has long been a feature of criminal investigation.
Nevertheless, while the CHIS Act, which was passed in 2021, provided a very necessary statutory framework for the operation of CHISs, because that was previously absent, it does not contain sufficient safeguards against abuse, particularly where such acts risk falling beyond the scope of the authorisation of the CCA, particularly where they are well concealed by those committing such crimes and not reporting back properly.
Regrettably, like many others, I have seen repeated abuses of authorisations of CHISs. I have also seen CHISs acting way beyond the scope of their authorisations, sometimes with the knowledge of those who manage them, to the extent that they value the CHIS more than dealing with unauthorised and perhaps criminal conduct by the CHIS.
When the CHIS is not an undercover officer—and, of course, not all CHISs are undercover state employees—there is less control and potentially a higher risk. Unlike in the experience of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, we in Northern Ireland have been able to expose unlawful activities of CHISs to bring them to account. So it can be done.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
My Lords, I add briefly to this debate. When the matter came before your Lordships’ House with the passage of the CHIS Bill towards the end of 2020 and beginning of 2021, whether to move from the use of CHISs and their conduct being looked at ex post facto to it being looked at in advance was hotly debated. It is a difficult subject to debate in an open Chamber. We all accept that CHISs are necessary, but it is impossible to go into the details of those cases here. Further, it is important to concentrate not on what happened prior to 2020, although such cases are illustrative of the abuses that can occur; we are concerned with what has happened since 2021 and how well the Act is working.
As things stand at present, I cannot really add much to what the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, has said. My experience of this area of CHISs is that we have learned an enormous amount from Northern Ireland. We ignore at our peril what the judiciary and those who have experience of Northern Ireland tell us. That peril is that we need to be absolutely clear that the system we have of authorising when CHISs engage in criminal activity is subject to rigorous scrutiny. What disturbs me, and why I support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, is that the key to the new system was prompt, effective and detailed scrutiny, reported to the best extent possible, of the way in which the system is operating.
On what the noble Baroness has said, I have looked at these reports myself. They are necessarily vague—they have to be, because you cannot put the information into the public domain—but they are delayed. I hope that the Minister will look very seriously at this and maybe meet some of us so that we can see the reality. Is this system working? If it is not working, we must revert either to the old system or to what is proposed in this amendment. It is key to public confidence in the police that we do not have a repeat of what happened in the matters that are the subject of the inquiry that has been spoken about—though this amendment has absolutely nothing to do with that—that the CHISs operate properly, and that anything that goes wrong is properly dealt with. We cannot have another scandal on the scale of that which has been investigated for the past 10 or 12 years—I have lost count of time.
This is, therefore, a matter where the amendment put forward by the noble Baroness really should be investigated. I hope that the Minister will look very seriously at it. I had long discussions during the passage of the Bill in 2020 to try to ensure that we had a good system. At present, on what is available, there is no real democratic accountability and no independent scrutiny of it. We must have that, if public confidence in the police is not to suffer the kind of problems that it suffered, into which the inquiry is going on, in relation to pre-2020 events.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
My Lords, I am so glad that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, have participated in this debate. Like myself, they attended the recent meeting chaired by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. It was very nice to hear from the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, the admiration for the courage of the witnesses who came to speak to us at that meeting.
In any form of covert human intelligence, there has to be deception. It is the only way that the officer of the state, whoever he or she may be, can penetrate through to get the confidence of the criminals who they are there to investigate. But there should be, as my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti says in her amendment, some restraint in what they get up to.
When the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, got up, he started by saying that he opposed this amendment, but it was pleasing that, by the end of his speech, he was quite neutral. That was very reassuring.
My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti referred to the 2011 case of R v Barkshire, which concerned an undercover police officer infiltrating a group of climate change activists. The police officer, who I will not name, indulged in a sexual relationship, for about seven years, with one of the ladies involved. It also involved the birth of a child. This police officer, according to my brief, had as many as 10 other sexual relationships during the course of his activity as an undercover officer. When it came to the court, it was said that he went “much further” than the authorisation given to him, and that he played
“a significant role in assisting, advising and supporting … the very activity for which these appellants were prosecuted”.
That is why my noble friend—I hope she notes that I am giving her full support in this amendment—is absolutely right to suggest that there should be restraint. I accept entirely the restraint which is contained in Amendment 470.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I thank JUSTICE and the group Police Spies Out of Lives, particularly the women who were on the receiving end of the treatment by the CHISs. I declare an interest as a director of the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust, which has given grants to Police Spies Out of Lives for well over a decade, in the run-up to the beginning of the inquiry.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, talked about how long it has taken to get the abuses taken seriously, and it really has. The inquiry itself took many years to be established, and there was damage to those women’s lives in the aftermath every time they went to people in the establishment to ask them to please take their concerns seriously. There was stunning silence.
The trust had a chance to meet and hear from these extraordinary women, who were seeking justice for many decades. Without their determination there would be no inquiry, no TV documentaries and no newspaper articles. I salute them all for their refusal to be cowed and their strength of character, even in the face of repeated setbacks from the establishment, including the extremely slow inquiry—which is not expected to conclude before 2030, and quite possibly later—at an enormous cost to the public purse and, above all, to these victims of the police spies.
The glacial speed of the public inquiry into undercover policing is on a par with the long delays of other historic scandals including infected blood, Post Office Horizon and the Independent Inquiry into Child Sex Abuse. As young girls and women who were taken advantage of in the 1970s head towards getting their pensions, it is vital to ensure that there are no further delays.
As we heard from the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and my noble friend Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer, Amendment 470 would replace provisions in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, as amended by the CHIS Act 2021, which grants complete advanced criminal and civil immunity for authorised operatives and agents with public interest offences, as long as they did not act as agents provocateurs.
The noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, helpfully made clear her experience in Northern Ireland and the shortcomings of the CHIS legislation. The contribution from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, also confirmed that we must continue to learn lessons from the new system. Amendment 470 would correct the law to ensure that, in future, those using CHISs must have a high standard of regulation and accountability. We, as a country, need more oversight of CHISs’ criminal activity and the mechanism to ensure that officers and their superiors meet these high standards and make decisions in light of the law.
From these Benches, we welcome Amendment 470 and the safeguard that it offers to the victims. I say this to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, but the officers too, because it would give them a framework and responsibility to think about any actions, whether they need permission for them and, if so, whether they should really be thinking about doing it at all, which is long overdue.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, it might not surprise the Committee to hear that I do not support this amendment and I am sure I will find myself making the same arguments as the Minister when he responds.
In 2021, Parliament passed the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act, which was introduced to this House by my noble and learned friend, Lord Stewart of Dirleton. Its effect was to create a legislative framework through which covert intelligence officers can be authorised to participate in conduct which would normally be criminal. The criminal conduct authorisation might be granted under Section 29B of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, as inserted by the 2021 Act, only if it is proportionate and necessary, in the interests of national security, prevention of crime and disorder, or in the interests of our economic well-being. Subsection (6) of that section also requires the person authorising the criminal conduct to ensure—and this is important—that all alternative avenues that do not make use of criminality have been exhausted. Subsection (7) states that the decision to grant an authorisation is required to comply with the Human Rights Act 1998. Finally, there is an explicit goal for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.
Therefore, there already exists a number of safeguards to prevent covert intelligence officers overstepping the bounds of their authorisation and to ensure that the authorisation itself is tightly drawn and strictly necessary. When a criminal conduct authorisation is granted, the officer to whom it relates is permitted to engage in the specified criminal conduct and cannot be prosecuted for that conduct. It is perfectly well understood and accepted that covert agents do, on occasion, have to engage in such criminal conduct in the course of their operations. It is absolutely right that the law protects them when this is the case.
It is also worth noting that the 2021 Act did not create new powers for the police and intelligence services; it simply placed on a statutory footing the mechanism by which they can be authorised to engage in criminal behaviour. This is surely preferable to having the whole system working on the side and in the dark.
The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, proposes in her Amendment 470 to remove the criminal and civil immunity provided to officers when they commit a criminal offence in pursuance of an authorisation to do so. She proposes replacing it with a defence to criminal or civil charges. However, she has also included an exception to that possible defence—when an officer encourages, assists or attempts to discredit the person who is under surveillance. I find this a startling exception. If a covert officer is given a criminal conduct authorisation and that authorisation, taking into account all the available safeguards, includes permission to commit an inchoate offence, I cannot see why that officer should not be able to do so. Certainly, the officer should not be held criminally or civilly liable.
I am sure the Minister will have further points to add, but we on these Benches cannot support this amendment.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
Is the noble Lord saying that he supports officers or their assets acting as agents provocateurs, inciting crime rather than investigating it?
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
I am not saying that at all. We all recognise that things have gone wrong, but what I say generally is that this type of policing—indeed, quite a number of aspects of policing—is about testing the law. Certainly, this is the case with the involvement of CHISs.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
The noble Lord mentioned all the safeguards, but why does he think the safeguards failed not once, but multiple times, and over quite a number of years?
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
I cannot answer for all the cases that have gone wrong; indeed, I cannot answer for any cases that have gone wrong—it is not my place to do that. I can say, however, that it very much depends on good leadership and good supervision, and all of that comes down to good training. It has always been my view that training is at the core of all of this.
Baroness O'Loan (CB)
Does the noble Lord accept that statutory blanket immunity from civil or criminal action acts as a barrier for people who are affected by such unlawful activities? It is a significant concern because of the impact that barrier has on those who might need to bring such action, and who might have difficulty getting funding or access to the necessary support. Then, there is an ongoing huge impact on trust in the police.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
Trust in the police in this area is essential. I am not sure I quite get the gist of what the noble Baroness is asking, but I am very happy to discuss it outside the Chamber later, if that would help.
Baroness O'Loan (CB)
It was about statutory blanket immunity—the extent of the immunity.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
Again, I would have to have a look at that before I give an answer. I am very happy to discuss it with the noble Baroness.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
Can the noble Lord comment on the case of R v Barkshire, and does he endorse the behaviour of the counter-intelligence officer in that case?
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
I am not entirely sure that I know all the facts of that case, so I am probably not qualified to answer that question. I spent my job putting people behind bars, not defending them. I am not a lawyer; I would not like to take that any further, frankly.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti for her amendment. The discussion today has taken me back to my time in Northern Ireland, when I had to see the product of covert intelligence. As Counter-Terrorism Minister in 2009, I had to see the product of that intelligence, so I understand the value of that. I also understand that the amendment seeks to amend the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 by removing the legal protections for covert human intelligence sources who have been tasked by the police and a limited number of other public authority agencies, such as the intelligence services, with engaging in specific, tightly defined, pre-approved criminal conduct. Furthermore, the amendment seeks to remove protections for CHISs engaged in such authorised criminal conduct where it engages the offences of encouraging or assisting an offender under the Serious Crime Act, or seeks to discredit those who are subject to a particular investigation. I understand the motive behind what my noble friend has brought forward.
I begin by addressing the undercover police inquiry, raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, my noble friend Lord Hacking and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, from the Liberal Democrat Front Bench. I took office in July 2024, and the undercover policing inquiry had operated for nine years at that stage. It is clear that the historical allegations under consideration by the inquiry are absolutely appalling. Such behaviour should rightly be condemned. The inquiry is ongoing, and we await the findings and any recommendations, but let me assure all those who have spoken that I am now responsible in the Home Office for managing inquiries, and I wish to see recommendations as soon as possible, for the very reasons noble Lords and Baronesses have mentioned today.
The current landscape around undercover operatives is much changed, and since 2013 enhanced safeguards have been put in place, but the Government want to see the lessons of that inquiry and consider them as soon as possible.
Noble Lords may recall the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021, which has been referred to today, and the revised CHIS code of practice of 2022, mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, which were subject to debate and approval both here and in the House of Commons. This scrutiny includes consideration of similar amendments proposed by my noble friend at the time.
I say to noble Lords generally, including my noble friend Lord Hacking, that CHIS play a crucial part in preventing, detecting and safeguarding the public from many serious crimes, including terrorism, drugs and firearms offences, and child sexual exploitation and abuse. Those who do it do so at such personal risk to themselves. I noted and welcome the support from the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Jackson—I will take the support where I can get it. It needs to be properly authorised and specifically defined criminality by the state, and they do so knowing that they will not be penalised for carrying out that activity, particularly by those engaged in criminal or terrorist activity, who may otherwise pursue legal action against them.
It is important that we place on record that CHIS authorisations and criminal conduct authorisations under Part II of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 can be validly given only where the proposed conduct is necessary, proportionate and compliant with the Human Rights Act. Valid authorisations make activity carried out in relation to them “lawful for all purposes”, providing protection from criminal and civil liability. However—I know my noble friend knows this—should a court find that the authorisation does not satisfy these necessary requirements, or should the conduct go beyond what is permitted by the authorisation, it will not be rendered lawful.
Given the significance of these powers, it is important to note that there are independent and effective avenues of oversight and redress, and that these exist—I know that colleagues who have spoken know this, but it is worth putting on the record again—via the Investigatory Powers Tribunal for anyone who believes they have been subject to improper activity by a public authority using covert investigatory powers.
Baroness O’Loan (CB)
I wonder whether the Minister is aware that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner has commented on the unsatisfactory nature of the recording of CCAs in a number of cases most recently, which appears to indicate a deterioration in that area.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am always interested in what Sir Brian Leveson, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, says. From my perspective he provides robust oversight, which includes comments that he has made, and he and his inspectors pay particular attention to that criminal conduct authorisation. He produces annual reports—I know that they are time-lagged, for reasons that are self-evident with any annual report. In his annual report in 2024, he identified
“good levels of compliance for the authorisation and management”
of police undercover operatives and noted that the quality and content of police undercover operative criminal conduct authorisations was found to be of a “good standard”. I will always look and listen to what he says because we have a responsibility to ensure that these matters are dealt with for the product of that CHIS to help protect the public at large.
I assure my noble friend and in this context the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, that the CHIS cannot be authorised to entrap people—which is one of the objectives of her amendment. Any such entrapment would be in conflict with Article 6 of the ECHR—as my noble friend knows, we are committed to maintaining our obligations under the ECHR—which protects the right to a fair trial. Furthermore, I point my noble friend to the publicly available Undercover Policing: Authorised Professional Practice, which states in clear terms that an undercover operative
“must not act as an agent provocateur”.
I hope that satisfies my noble friend on that point.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
I will ask a similar question to the one I asked the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. If these safeguards are so wonderful and if it is all in good order, why was this allowed to happen? The evidence of the spy cops from the early days of that inquiry was that the people overseeing the CHIS knew what was happening regarding their relationships with the women. They knew and they let it happen. That does not sound like good order.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
With due respect, the noble Baroness is raising historical issues; there have been improvements in performance management and control over time. As I said, those historical issues are appalling but are currently under investigation within the remit of the John Mitting inquiry into undercover policing. I want to see the recommendations of that inquiry as soon as possible so that we can see where there are further issues. I see that the noble Baroness wants to jump in again, which is fine. Leaping up is part of the parliamentary tennis that we play, and it is important that she has the opportunity to do so.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
It also keeps us fit. All through the inquiry, the police have blocked information from being given out. They have constantly tried to stop the truth becoming open. I can understand the Minister saying that he is waiting for the inquiry to report, but it could take another decade. In the meantime, we still have those concerns about the police. The women’s concerns were brushed away. There might have been various pathways for them to complain, but they were brushed away. Why does the Minister think it is any better today?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The noble Baroness tempts me to go into areas of the inquiry, which I will not do. The inquiry is looking at historical abuses, which we have recognised and which are appalling. In the meantime, there have been legislation and improvements by policing in the management of covert operations. I am giving the noble Baroness that assurance now that we believe there are improvements in that management but things that need to be looked at in relation to the previous operation.
The legislation that the noble Baroness is seeking to amend has also put in place a range of measures as a whole. I say to my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti that I have made clear that CHISs cannot be authorised to entrap. This amendment would impose broad and unintended constraints on intelligence gathering by CHISs where criminal conduct is a factor—for example, by preventing CHISs going along with offences that they do not instigate. I have seen the product of that type of activity by CHISs. It is extremely valuable for crime prevention and for bringing people who are committing criminal or terrorist acts to the courts.
My noble friend’s amendment would also rule out the possibility of discrediting the subject of an investigation—for example, a terrorist organisation—in cases where it is equally important to do so. My noble friend has fulfilled her duty. She is challenging the Government on these matters. Self-evidently, we are in a better place than we were many years ago. I await with interest the recommendations of the John Mitting inquiry on undercover policing and whether there are further issues for us to examine.
I want to touch on two other points. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, sort of asked for a meeting. I am always open to meeting with Peers. In my tenure in this job, I have tried to meet with anybody who has asked. But in this case, given that there is an inquiry ongoing, it would be inappropriate for me to meet with him to discuss those matters now.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
I was talking not about the inquiry but about the level of supervision and what is happening in the reports under this Act. I entirely agree with the Minister that what happened in the inquiry has nothing to do with this regime. The inquiry is relevant only because it shows the horrendous consequences of not supervising the use of CHISs. All I was concerned to understand better was why there are problems with the reports being so slow and what problems are being encountered. You cannot put this into the public domain, but it would reassure, from the point of view of democratic accountability, if we saw what the problems were and whether there were other means—such as strengthening the code of conduct—to put it right. The peril here is the discrediting of the police five years down the line. That is what I am concerned to avoid.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I hear what the noble and learned Lord says. Those are operational matters for the police, in my view, but we can make some judgments on that. I will reflect on what he has said and what he has requested, but my initial gut reaction—and I would like to trust my gut, on several occasions—is that it would not be appropriate to do that. I will reflect on what he said. I am trying to complete my remarks, but I see that the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, wishes to speak, and I will always give way to him.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
I thank the Minister for his generosity. I find myself in complete agreement with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. I found his remarks, like those of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, and others, very helpful. I think I understand that he specifically ruled out our considering inquiries, but the suggestion that I—as someone who, as the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, described, was hostile and is now more agnostic—would make to the Minister is that if he could look at secondary legislation, such as regulations, in terms of the timeliness of reports for the commissioner to bring forward, that would strengthen the scrutiny and oversight of the process. I fully agree with the process, but what seems to have come out as a consensus in the debate today is that people think the scrutiny process is clunky and not timely, so everyone loses in terms of reputation. If the Minister can perhaps give an undertaking that he will at least look at the issue prior to Report, that would be helpful.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
Given what has been said, I will reflect on the comments that have been made. It is important that Sir Brian Leveson has his independence and oversight. I shall look at my gut feelings on this, but I will consider it, take advice and see where we are outside the debate today. In relation to my noble friend’s amendment, I still hope that, given what has been said today—a valuable discussion has been had—she will withdraw it.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
Again, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in what I think was an important and thoughtful debate. There is quite a lot of common ground, actually. There is common ground that we must have covert human intelligence sources. They must play a role in investigating the most serious crimes, in particular. There is further common ground that part of keeping someone’s cover in, for example, a criminal gang or a terrorist cell, must inevitably sometimes include participating in criminal activity; otherwise, those around them will spot that they do not belong. Again, that is common ground. There is also common ground that it was right to put activities that were previously completely in the shadows on a statutory footing, as happened in 2021.
The difference between some Members of the Committee and others is about whether, when someone is authorised to commit criminal offences in such a role, that authorisation should bring advance total immunity for all purposes, civil and criminal, or whether instead the authorisation should equip them with a public interest defence. That is the difference between us. It is a question of principle but also of practice as to where the balance should be struck, and which system—the one currently on the statute book or something like the one I propose—would give a better balance of safeguards for the brave and genuine public servants who do this work without abusing the trust, but also for the rights of citizens to be protected from abuse. That is the difference between us. Which mechanism provides the most proportionate approach? I do not think there is a gulf, but this is something to keep under review and keep discussing.
As I said earlier, in the report from which the Minister read selectively, Sir Brian Leveson talks about reporting being good, but even he concedes, in the same report, a lack of “specificity” on occasion, only a “general descriptor”, a “number of errors” and so on. So there are some issues that warrant serious and ongoing scrutiny.
My noble friend the Minister may regret telling the Committee that he now has special responsibility for inquiries in the Home Office—his kindness may be a liability—but I suspect that we will want to keep pressing him, not least on the progress of the inquiry on the past but, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, said, on the way the system is operating today. The report suggests that the system today is not operating in the way that we would ideally like. With that, for the moment at least, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Alton of Liverpool
“Universal jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and ancillary conduct (England and Wales)(1) The International Criminal Court Act 2001 is amended as follows.(2) In section 51(1)—(a) after “person”, insert “, whatever his or her nationality,”;(b) after “war crime”, insert “in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.”.(3) Omit section 51(2).(4) In section 52(1)—(a) after “person”, insert “, whatever his or her nationality,”;(b) after “conduct”, insert “in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.”.(5) Omit section 52(4).”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause gives effect to the JCHR’s recommendation to amend the ICC Act 2001 to provide for the exercise of universal jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and ancillary conduct. This would allow for the authorities in England and Wales to prosecute persons suspected of these crimes without any requirement for a connection to the UK.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, in moving all-party Amendments 472 and 473, I thank the co-sponsors and other supporters, who include the noble Baronesses, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws and Lady Hodgson of Abinger, my noble friends Lord Anderson of Ipswich and Lord Carlile of Berriew, and the noble Lords, Lord Wigley and Lord Clement-Jones.
These amendments have been recommended to the House in two separate reports of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which I have the honour to chair. One of those arose from the legislative scrutiny of this Bill; the other was its report on how to deal with the atrocity crimes of Daesh against the Yazidis and other minorities. The recommendations and amendments of the JCHR were unanimous and enjoyed all-party support. They also enjoyed the strong support of the International Development Committee of the House of Commons and its chair Sarah Champion MP, and organisations such as Redress.
The Minister and others will have seen a letter from the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute, signed by more than 30 of some of the most illustrious and distinguished practitioners in the field. These amendments are a response to what the JCHR saw as a justice gap. They are also compatible with practice in other jurisdictions and are limited in scope. They make a very small but indicative and incremental change by removing the requirement of UK citizenship and UK residence from Sections 51 and 58 of the International Criminal Court Act 2001. I will try to summarise the key arguments in favour of the amendments for the Committee, then tackle some of the misconceptions.
Under international law, the UK is already legally obliged to prosecute suspects of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes who are present on its territory regardless of nationality or residence. A failure to do so puts the UK at risk of becoming a safe haven for alleged perpetrators of international crimes. The rule of law is weakened when alleged perpetrators of genocide or crimes against humanity and war crimes can be here in the UK without facing justice, so this is about closing that justice gap.
These amendments give substance to the long-standing case for reform repeatedly raised since 2009 and are not directed at any particular country, individual or context. There is no concealed political agenda, and safeguards are included to ensure the continuation of prosecutorial oversight by the Crown Prosecution Service and the Attorney-General of decisions about whether to prosecute. They also make a reality of the often-repeated desire for the United Kingdom to reinforce and renew its claim to leadership in promoting the rule of law. We will be doing so by ending impunity for the gravest international crimes and by empowering British courts to act where alleged perpetrators of international crimes are present in the United Kingdom.
It is a mirage to cite the role of the International Criminal Court, as it cannot single-handedly provide accountability for international crimes, even before considering the use of vetoes by those who would not wish such crimes to be referred to that court. Capable national courts must share the burden, as the German courts have done, in successfully prosecuting the crime of genocide. Other comparable democracies already prosecute suspects present on their territory, and that option should be open to us too.
Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)
My Lords, I support the noble Lord. This legislation presents a unique opportunity to close long-outstanding accountability gaps in the UK’s universal jurisdiction laws and ensure that the perpetrators of the world’s most serious crimes can be brought to justice on British soil, which is not always possible under current law.
Many organisations support these amendments, which, to be clear, amend the International Criminal Court Act. That Act confined universal jurisdiction relating to crimes under the Rome statute to those who had residency in or nationality of this country, so it is very limited. The United States law followed ours and limited certain crimes that would be covered by universal jurisdiction to nationality and residence. It has now amended its law to make sure that anybody coming through the United States who is suspected of serious, grievous crimes that would fall under this universal jurisdiction framework could be arrested. That is also the case in large parts of Europe.
Noble Lords will be asking what this business of universal jurisdiction is. UK courts can prosecute certain international crimes under the principle of universal jurisdiction because it is a legal framework that allows states to pursue justice for the most serious offences committed abroad, even when the case has no direct connection to their citizens or territory. Noble Lords can imagine what those crimes are. They include genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and torture. Universal jurisdiction reflects the global consensus that such crimes are so grave that they demand accountability wherever they occur.
At present, as I have said, the UK’s ability to prosecute grave international crimes under universal jurisdiction is limited. It is quite contradictory, but under the International Criminal Court Act, prosecutions can be brought for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity only where the suspect is a UK national or resident. As a result, individuals accused of serious international crimes can enter this country without facing justice—and, let me tell you, they do.
I hear this from reliable witnesses who have fled persecution. They know those who have come here, seeking independent schools for their children or university places—usually for their sons, it has to be said—and to shop at Harrods or vacation in London with all its amenities. They often come in civilian attire, not wearing the Iranian revolutionary guard or Russian general uniforms that they wear back at home. They come for all manner of purposes. They come and go, and we cannot act. When I was the master of an Oxford college, there was a scandal because the son of a revolutionary guard torturer found a place at an Oxford college, his father having accompanied him. This is happening in a subterranean way, and action could be taken.
Lord Wigley (PC)
My Lords, I support Amendments 472 and 473. We have already heard how these amendments could help victims and survivors to seek justice for some of the worst atrocities. We heard from the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and a moment ago from the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, of cases of genocide and crimes against humanity. The noble Lord, Lord Alton, also emphasised the reason why we need to care about justice and accountability for such atrocities. Many may wonder why we, in these islands, are best suited to investigate such crimes. How is it that alleged perpetrators enter the UK? Surely this should be regarded as a matter of national security.
However, my main purpose in speaking today is to bring the debate closer to home. In August 2024, Wales and the UK lost a remarkable man, described by his friends and families as a gentle giant—Ryan Evans. He was from Wrexham, not far from where I live. Ryan was then working as a safety adviser for Reuters in Ukraine. As it happens, Elinor and I took in a family of refugees from eastern Ukraine.
Ryan was in the east of Ukraine, with a news crew from Reuters news agency, when the hotel in which they were staying was hit by a missile. Ryan was killed and nine other people were injured in the attack. So, why was Ryan killed? He worked for Reuters, covering the atrocities committed by Russia in Ukraine. Russia does not want the world to know the scope and nature of those atrocities. Because of that, journalists and media outlets are specifically targeted. A recent report by Truth Hounds and Reporters Without Borders commented that, the case of Ryan Evans,
“stands not only as a testament to the dangers media professionals face but also as a call for accountability and reinforced protections for all members of journalistic teams”.
The killing of Ryan Evans is part of a wider pattern of similar atrocities and war crimes and crimes against humanity. As things stand, and without these important amendments, the family of Ryan have very limited avenues for justice and accountability within the UK. That is because the alleged perpetrators are not British citizens or, indeed, British residents. As such, when we talk about universal jurisdiction, we are talking not only about faraway cases in distant countries. British citizens may well be among victims or survivors, and we cannot continue denying them and their families an avenue for justice here in the UK.
I draw the attention of noble Lords to the words of the family of Ryan Evans—namely, David and Geraldine Evans—who came to Parliament last year and made this plea in support of strengthening the laws. These are words that deserve to be brought to the attention of the House:
“It’s been sixteen months since we had the terrible news of our son Ryan’s death. For those who have lost a loved one suddenly, they will know that you’re in shock for months—even longer; and, as time unfolds, the questions that initially came into your mind come back stronger. In Ryan’s Case questions like - “Was the single missile strike on his hotel deliberately planned? Was he killed instantly, or did he suffer? What is our Government doing to bring the people responsible for killing him to justice?”
They go on to say,
“Some questions we have the answers to, yes, Russia did target our son’s hotel in Kramatorsk deliberately. He died helping to seek the truth, by working with independent journalists, an unarmed non combatant. Russia’s propaganda machine tried to justify the attack and his death with ridiculous statements, as they do in their horrifying attacks on civilians, including non Ukrainian citizens. We seek justice for our son’s murder”.
Their plea concludes with the words:
“We, his family, have a life sentence of grief, which will never go away. The impact on us, his parents, his siblings, his children and wider family and friends is incalculable and life-changing. We look to our government to change the law to work to bring the people responsible for such war crimes and deaths, to justice. As long as one of our family members is alive, we will seek justice and work with our government for help. Ryan would want that; he was a man of integrity, honour and courage, as the following quote reminds us, In the words of Lois McMaster Bujold: ‘The dead cannot cry out for justice; it is a duty of the living to do so for them’”.
We need to do better for the families of victims and survivors, including the family of Ryan Evans. We need to make sure that the law in the UK enables them to seek truth, justice and accountability.
In December 2024, Reuters reported that Ukraine’s security service had named a Russian general it suspects of ordering a missile strike on the hotel and, in Reuters’ words,
“with the motive of deliberately killing employees of”
Reuters. The security service of Ukraine has named a deputy chief of Russia’s general staff as the person who approved the strike that killed Ryan Evans and wounded two of the agency’s journalists. Truth Hounds and Reporters Without Borders have identified two senior leaders in the army units that took the decision to strike the hotel. I understand that these names are known to the British Government.
At this stage, in view of the fact that we are considering the death of a British citizen, I would expect the authorities in the UK, at a minimum, to start investigations into the alleged perpetrators. The options to bring them to account in the UK are clearly limited, but I believe that Amendments 472 and 473 could help ensure that the alleged perpetrators are investigated for war crimes. I ask for the support of noble colleagues in memory of Ryan, for his family and indeed for justice.
Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (CB)
My Lords, I want to strongly support these amendments, and I shall be relatively brief. The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, was kind enough to inform the Committee that in her presence I described the present situation as illogical. In fact, I think I spoke a good deal more strongly than that, and she has been kind enough not to repeat the totality of my remarks.
This is a reform which has been proposed and urged upon successive Governments for years. I found the speech from the noble Lord, Lord Alton, utterly persuasive and completely unanswerable. I take issue with him on only one point, which is when he expressed a little bit of surprise that the CPS would be supporting him. When I was the head of the CPS, I strongly supported this reform. Indeed, shortly after I stepped down from that position, I wrote a column in the Times asking this question: what is it about prosecuting war criminals in this context that the Government do not like? I never received a reply to that question which I understood, and the question is still live.
Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I also offer my support but express some concerns that I believe could be addressed. I do not think I need to say very much as to the reasons I support the amendments, because the speakers before me have all done such a stellar job.
The one point that I would perhaps clarify is that a number of these offences under international law impose on the UK an obligation to prosecute or extradite. The problem that we have is that, in many cases, we cannot extradite. We cannot extradite in some cases because there is no jurisdiction that can, in practice, begin a criminal prosecution. But sometimes we cannot extradite because the jurisdictions to which we would extradite are jurisdictions where the suspect would face the death penalty or torture. In those cases, the individuals would, in effect, find a safe haven here because of our generous human rights protection, to which I think we should all remain committed. So we may end up with individuals who cannot be deported or extradited and whom we cannot prosecute unless we have some reform of universal jurisdiction. That is the need for this change, which would also bring us into line with international obligations.
My concerns are the following. First, we need to remember that universal jurisdiction is the last resort. In a lot of these cases, it is true that the country where the offence was committed, or of which the alleged offender is a national, will not be able to prosecute. However, ideally, the prosecutions should take place in a jurisdiction that has a closer connection with either the offence or the offender. Where that is not possible, we need to look at other options. Another option is prosecution before an international court and tribunal. As we know, under the ICC statute, the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court is always complementary to national jurisdictions. Only in the third instance, and as a last resort, should we look at prosecution under universal jurisdiction. It is only when everything else fails, which unfortunately might happen quite often, that prosecution under universal jurisdiction should be contemplated.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
I ask the noble Lord to continue the discussions with those of us proposing this amendment today, but our amendment is not as ambitious as he suggests. I wish it were, but actually it is much more limited. On some of the points he raised about the kinds of people who could be brought for prosecution to the United Kingdom under universal jurisdiction more widely, yes, that could happen in a country like Germany, but it would not happen under this amendment. This is about people coming here and being able to do so with impunity rather than immunity, simply because we do not have any powers to arrest them or take them to court.
Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)
I appreciate that it is about only those who are within the jurisdiction, but a lot of officials come within the jurisdiction at different points in time and for different reasons. There was another case a few years ago in which I was also instructed, concerning the visit of the Egyptian head of intelligence to the United Kingdom. On that occasion, there was an attempt to arrest him, which failed, and his immunity was upheld. That is the sort of scenario where we need clarity.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
I am very glad that my noble friend has raised that point, because it is very relevant. If, for instance, the Foreign Office were to say to the Attorney-General, “We are bringing someone here to have discussions about how to secure peace in Sudan”, but they might have been involved with the RSF or the Sudanese Army in some of the atrocities there, there would be no requirement to prosecute them, because in those circumstances the Attorney-General simply would not allow the prosecution to proceed.
Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)
It is not quite like that, because the Foreign Office would have to issue special permission for the person who came within the jurisdiction, and now that we have clarified the law, that would give that individual immunity. As for the Attorney-General’s decision not to consent, there is a risk that that could be subject to judicial review, and there have already been attempts in that space. But I agree that that is a very important procedural requirement, and it is already in the Act.
Lord Sentamu (CB)
My Lords, I support Amendments 472 and 473. On the arguments and all the difficulties and intricacies, the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, cannot be doubted, given his involvement and the things he has done. In the end, however, I am a simple person. I know that there are complications and it is difficult, but if these amendments are accepted, it would allow the possibility of exploring all those intricacies and complications.
The really annoying thing for most of us is when people whom we know have committed terrible atrocities—when the evidence is incontrovertible—can leave the places they have devastated and come here to do their shopping and have holidays. This country, and particularly this present Government, say that everything is going to be best under the rule of law. Lord Bingham, in his book The Rule of Law, said some wonderful things—that the rule of law is the nearest thing we have to a universal origin. In other words, there are no areas the rule of law does not cover. I say that because there is a possibility of enshrining what Lord Bingham was talking about.
Globalisation has given we citizens of the world the possibility of living in a global village. It is no longer about living on this little island—we all belong to this huge global village, and whoever touches any citizen in our global village touches us. It is not just the people who live in Ukraine or somewhere else: they touch them, and they are touching us.
We are therefore partly involved in all this. The United Kingdom must not become a haven, as the noble Lord said, for those who committed such atrocities and are escaping justice and the places where they were done. We must not be a place that gives the impression that the door is open and they can come here. They do their shopping, and some even bring their children to send them to university or other places of learning; I have known this. They think that they are getting away with it. To me, that is what must not happen.
Margaret and I came to this country in 1974, and it was another nearly six years before Idi Amin’s Government fell. We were terrified to have any contact with the Ugandan embassy, because the people he had sent before his Government fell had committed terrible atrocities. Margaret and I knew these characters and they got away with it. In his regime, nearly 900,000 people were murdered, including the chief justice, the chancellor of the university, the head of the civil service—I could go on and on. These dictators and people like that seem to have a very long arm that prevents anybody getting near them.
For me, these amendments are opening a door for further conversation. The proposers of the two amendments were wise in saying that this, if it is to happen, should be laid at the door of the Attorney-General. The Attorney-General, who has a lot of advisers and very able people, will look at it and make a decision on whether prosecution happens. They are not simply opening it out to every court, to everybody, to think they can have a go. It is so limited. If we do not do this, as a country that really upholds the rule of law, and if we do not have this universal jurisdiction as an armoury in place, we will simply have people coming here when they have committed terrible atrocities, and they will look as though they are untouchable.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
My Lords, all the speakers have made a powerful case in support of these two amendments, not least of course the noble Lord, Lord Alton, who moved the lead amendment. I apologise to him for missing the first few minutes. I was caught out because I had not remembered that Amendment 471 had already been debated. I have had the advantage of reading that part of the JCHR report, both on the account of—
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I apologise, but the noble Baroness has just said that she was not in her place at the start of the group. Really, she should not be speaking to the group if she was not in her place. That is the usual convention and courtesy of the House and is set out in the Companion as well.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, Amendments 472 and 473 from the noble Lord, Lord Alton, add a series of small but vital issues that would ensure that the UK can play its part in holding to account perpetrators of the most serious international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Above all, these amendments would give victims and their families the opportunity to achieve the justice that they deserve. I thank the British Institute of Human Rights, Genocide Response and Redress for their very helpful briefing.
The noble Lord, Lord Alton, and the signatories to his amendments have set out in detail the legal reasons why the current laws in relation to these international crimes need to have certain loopholes closed ,and other noble Lords have spoken to them as well.
As chair of human rights at Liberal International, I attend the annual Geneva summit on human rights. Last February, I met people who had fled from Sudan, Iran, Cuba, Russia and Tibet, and Uyghurs from China, who had been on the receiving end of the most appalling crimes, from genocide to crimes against humanity, including torture and war crimes. All of them look to countries such as the United Kingdom to uphold the standards of universal jurisdiction. Sadly, as outlined by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, we do not do that fully and, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, put it, we need to share the burden.
By not being prepared to empower our courts to act where alleged perpetrators of international crimes are present in the UK, we let people down. Without the changes proposed in Amendments 472 and 473, the British courts lack jurisdiction over alleged perpetrators of international crimes—including leaders of the Iranian regime who may travel to the UK for medical treatment, despite there being credible allegations of their involvement in international crimes against humanity, and the alleged perpetrators of genocide in Darfur—because the alleged conduct falls under the Rome statute crimes but does not trigger universal jurisdiction under UK law.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I fully understand the noble intentions behind Amendments 472 and 473, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool. The crimes he speaks of are among the most abhorrent and the work he has done is admirable. He is to be warmly congratulated. However, for reasons I will set out, the Opposition cannot support the amendments.
We must first recognise that the British justice system has, first and foremost, a responsibility to uphold the rule of law and punish criminality in Britain. Similarly, the British Government have, first and foremost, a responsibility to protect the security of Britain, and this must be our principal concern. The British Government are not a global Government; we cannot police the world, and we must be very open and honest about that.
It is also a more than unfortunate fact that there are a number of Daesh fighters and other terrorists who have been returned to Britain but have not successfully been prosecuted for the crimes the noble Lord, Lord Alton, refers to. Daesh committed widespread war crimes, genocide against Yazidis and numerous crimes against humanity. To pick up on the noble Lord’s point, if we have people in Britain who committed these heinous crimes but have not yet been prosecuted, I am not sure we should be adding even more by bringing prosecutions against people with no connection to the United Kingdom. Let us prosecute those who have been involved in genocide and war crimes who are in the UK first, before we start trying to prosecute others.
It is also very important that we do not simply welcome people with terrorist connections back into our country. We on these Benches are firmly supportive of the Home Secretary robustly using her powers to exclude people from the United Kingdom who pose a threat to the British people and, where necessary, to strip particularly dangerous people of their British citizenship.
Finally, there is also a question of where prosecutions should best take place. There is a compelling argument for prosecutions and investigations to take place closer to where the crimes were committed, which should allow for a better evidence-gathering process. Ultimately, we must be careful not to subordinate the safety and security of the British public for the purposes of advancing international law. For these reasons, we cannot support the amendments.
Lord Garnier (Con)
Can my noble friend comment on the remarks of the noble Lords, Lord Verdirame and Lord Macdonald of River Glaven? Did he find nothing in what they had to say the least bit attractive?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, my old home city, for the way in which he has approached these amendments. I thank him for the work of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which he chairs, and through him I pass on my thanks to my old colleague Sarah Champion, the MP for Rotherham, for the work she has done on this issue. As he knows, we had an opportunity to debate the committee’s report in Grand Committee. I was fortunate that my noble friend Lord Katz took the debate on that occasion and was able to set out the Government’s response, which the noble Lord, Lord Alton, will realise has not really changed in the intervening months since that debate. However, I am grateful to him, my noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, the noble Lords, Lord Wigley and Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, for their supportive comments, and I will come on to comments from other noble Lords in due course. I know the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, is not in her place at the moment, and missed the start of the debate so was therefore not able to speak in this debate—although she tried—but if she reads Hansard tomorrow, she can make any points she was going to raise in a letter to me and we will consider those prior to Report, which I hope is a fair compromise.
Before I go on to the main bulk of the arguments, I refer to the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, and his comments on the death of Mr Ryan Evans, of Wrexham, which is close to both him and me. It is obviously a deeply sad incident and his death in Ukraine in 2024 followed a Russian strike, as the noble Lord outlined. The UK Government continue to support efforts to ensure accountability for the crimes that are committed in Ukraine. This includes supporting the independent investigation of the International Criminal Court into the situation in Ukraine, as well as providing assistance to Ukrainian domestic investigations and prosecutions of international crimes. Although I cannot give him much succour today in relation to that particular issue, I hope he will pass on the Government’s condolences to Ryan’s parents. We are obviously happy to have further representations on that matter should he wish to make them in due course.
The points made by my noble friend Lord Katz in the previous debate—and those with which I shall respond to the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool—relate to the fact that the UK applies its universal jurisdiction only to a very few specific international crimes. Our approach to universal jurisdiction is designed to ensure that those suspected of, or accused of, crimes are investigated, charged and tried fairly and impartially at every stage, with access to all available evidence. This is in accordance with local constitutional and legal frameworks. It remains the case—and I know this will disappoint those noble Lords who have spoken in support today—that we do not believe that it is necessary at this time to extend the scope of the UK’s policy on universal jurisdiction to include genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. It is the long-standing view of successive Governments in general that where there is no apparent link between the UK and an international crime—and this goes to the point the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, made—we support the principle that such crimes are best investigated and prosecuted where they are perpetrated. That also goes to some of the points mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, because the advantages of securing evidence and the witnesses required for a fair investigation and a successful prosecution are part of a credible judicial process.
It should be noted that the UK already has jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity where they are alleged to have been committed by UK nationals or residents. In some cases where the UK does not have jurisdiction, such as in Ukraine—I have just mentioned the situation in relation to Mr Ryan Evans, as alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley—we are trying to ensure that we build domestic capabilities, and we support the work of the Office of the Prosecutor General to ensure that allegations of war crimes are fully investigated by independent, effective and robust legal mechanisms.
To go back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, the most serious international crimes not covered by the UK’s universal jurisdiction policy are generally already subject to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, which, again, I would argue today, is better placed to prosecute such offences where they are not being dealt with by the relevant domestic authorities. The UK is a strong supporter of the ICC and its mission to end impunity. I know that we will do what we can to ensure that the crimes that have been mentioned today are dealt with by that international court, but I have to say that the debate that we had in the Moses Room, led by my noble friend Lord Katz, and the response I have given to the amendments today are the Government’s position. I accept and respect the points that have been put to the Committee today, but given the considerations that I have mentioned, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Alton, to withdraw his amendment. In saying that, I suspect we will return to these matters on Report. The Government will always reflect on what has been said in Committee, but I hope in due course the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)
I apologise for interrupting, but I just wanted to make sure that I am not misunderstood. The ICC is there where it has jurisdiction, but the problem that we have is that, in some of these countries, there is no ICC jurisdiction yet. Syria is not a party to the ICC; Ukraine has become a party to the ICC but only as of 1 January 2025. Any offence in Ukraine predating that would be an issue in terms of ICC jurisdiction. That is where the gap in universal jurisdiction policy is quite relevant. I just wanted to clarify my position, which was not to say that we do not need it.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I accept that, and I thought I understood the noble Lord’s position clearly, but I am grateful for his clarification. It still adds to the general point that I have made today, and I go back to the original, overarching point that the UK applies universal jurisdiction to only a very few specific international crimes. Our approach—through long-standing support of successive Governments—is that, where there is no apparent link between the UK and an international crime, we support the principle that such crimes are best investigated and prosecuted close to where they are perpetrated. That may not be a position that satisfies the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, or his supporters today, but it is one which I hope I have clarified. I note also—which I did not mention earlier—the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for the general approach of the noble Lord, Lord Alton. With that, I ask him to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I thank everybody who has participated in this important debate. I was particularly grateful, of course, to the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, with her immense experience and as a colleague on the Joint Committee on Human Rights—we are beginning to miss her already, only one week after she rotated off the committee. This was a unanimous recommendation, not just in one but in two reports. We took evidence. This was not just about our inability to intervene in faraway places. We took evidence about British nationals who had been in north-east Syria and in northern Iraq and who had committed what even the Foreign and Commonwealth office has now decided was a genocide—it is willing now to use that word, which is very unusual on the part of the FCDO.
So we have the evidence. We know that 400 of the British fighters who went there came back, and not a single one has been prosecuted for the crime of genocide. Too often, there has been rank impunity. We also know that they have connections with other people who are not British citizens and who regularly travel to the United Kingdom. What this limited amendment seeks to do is not bring all those people before the British courts; it is about taking people who come into the UK with those kinds of links and bringing them to justice if the Attorney-General believes that there is a case to answer.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, for reinforcing the argument, and I thank my noble friend Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, the noble Lords, Lord Verdirame and Lord Wigley, and my noble and right reverend friend Lord Sentamu. I wish we could have heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, but I suspect there will be an opportunity on Report, and I hope that omission will be put right. Nevertheless, I was grateful to hear what the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, said about being willing to hear what she has to say but on a one-to-one basis. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and of course the Minister himself.
Lord Cromwell
“Report: economic crime fighting fund(1) The Secretary of State must undertake an assessment of the viability, and potential merits, of establishing an economic crime fighting fund based on the principle of reinvesting a proportion of receipts resulting from economic crime enforcement into a pooled fund for the purposes of providing multi-year resourcing for tackling economic crime.(2) The assessment specified in subsection (1) must also examine the impact of budget exchange rules on the functioning of the asset recovery incentivisation scheme. (3) In carrying out the assessment, the Secretary of State must consult such persons as they consider appropriate.(4) The Secretary of State must publish and lay before Parliament a report on the outcome of the assessment by the end of the period of 12 months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.”
Lord Cromwell (CB)
My Lords, today we have discussed at length some very important issues that are also pretty bleak. It has been lightened for me only by hearing the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, referred to as neutral, which is not an epithet that I would normally attach to him. I am sorry that he is not in his place. I hope that my operational amendment will conclude with a more positive and optimistic outcome.
I thank the Minister and his officials for meeting me to discuss this amendment, along with Labour MP Phil Brickell who, with the support of the APPG on anti-corruption, championed this amendment in the Commons. I am also grateful to that APPG for the excellent policy note it provided to the Minister following our meeting. I thank the Minister also for his helpful subsequent letter of 9 December. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for their kind support and for adding their names to the amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, wanted to be here but has been called away. He did, however, give me a statement, from which I will quote briefly when it is apposite.
The purpose of the amendment is to include in the Bill a requirement to undertake a viability study of the establishment of an economic crime fighting fund. I am mindful that this is Committee so I will mention only the following three summary points about the amendment. First, there are two statistics to illustrate the scale of the problem. Economic crime overall currently costs the UK £350 billion a year. That is equal to 17.5% of GDP, but we spend less than 0.05% of GDP tackling it. Also, of the £100 billion in illicit financial flows alone each year, law enforcement recovers only some 0.2%.
Secondly, crime-fighting agencies are currently trapped in a cycle of underfunding. The 2024 Civil Service survey found that only a third of National Crime Agency staff thought they had the necessary tools for their job, the lowest percentage of all 107 public bodies surveyed. This lack of funding limits vital recruitment, damages effectiveness and crushes morale. Meanwhile, despite fraud accounting for 43% of all reported crime last year, fraud prosecutions were down 50% on the 10-year median level.
Thirdly—this is where the fund comes in—despite the underfunding in the face of the almost overwhelming level of economic crime, the agencies still manage to generate an average of £566 million per year in fines and recovered assets. However, most of that £566 million recovered per year is not reinvested in fighting economic crime. Instead, most of it goes to the Treasury and the Home Office. Redirecting even a fraction of these funds to the key agencies fighting economic crime would be transformational.
This amendment would simply require a very timely viability assessment of enabling these agencies to break out of the current negative funding cycle, to fight more economic crime and to gain long-term sustainable funding for their vital work. Please note that the taxpayer would pay nothing. The funding would be paid for by the confiscated proceeds of crime—rather poetic justice.
I clarify the following points, which arose in discussion of the amendment after Second Reading. First, the fund would be wholly separate from victim compensation and would not alter the status quo in that area. There are also many cases where economic crime cannot be linked to specific victims—for example, where a criminal is laundering money from a drug-dealing gang.
Secondly, this is not a new or unique idea. All 13 supervisors for the accountancy sector retain penalties imposed for anti-money laundering breaches. The Ministry of Justice is permitted to retain part of the value of fines and fixed penalties collected, amounting to nearly £360 million in the financial year 2024-25. The FCA is allowed to retain a proportion of fines. This amounted to £71.6 million in the same period. These are just some UK examples. There are numerous other precedents of fines being reinvested, in the UK and internationally.
Thirdly, the current system is opaque and subject to the dreaded annularity rules, meaning that any money which the agencies retain must be spent by the year’s end or it is taken away. This encourages some truly bizarre behaviours to use up the money in time. One example we discussed with the Minister in our meeting was a sponsored yacht race.
There is also a specifically British wrinkle here. Police forces, as Crown servants rather than civil servants, are subject to different accounting rules. Thus the Met can keep some of the seized cash and spend it over multiple years, allowing it to plan and use it strategically. I quote the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe:
“The police force has been able to take a share of the criminal assets they seize, should a court so decide. Everyone accepts that the amount seized is a small fraction of the criminal assets out there. The police’s share of money is pooled in the Treasury and then returned to the forces—albeit that this process often takes 1-2 years. Nevertheless, this allows the police to invest in discovering and seizing further criminal assets”.
However, unfortunately, the National Crime Agency, the Serious Fraud Office, HMRC and the Crown Prosecution Service cannot do this. They are, as mentioned, captured by Treasury rules that require central government bodies each year to return what they have not spent. This confused and chronic underfunding cannot continue.
While I welcome the Government’s anti-corruption strategy and their interest in improving the economic crime levy and the ARIS systems, recent discussions with HMT and other officials suggest that they are not going to do anything substantive to move forward, claiming there is a lack of data from law enforcement agencies on the return on investments from the use of these funds. I therefore suggest to the Minister that consultation on the viability of the fund that the amendment proposes would be the right opportunity to speed up the frankly glacial progress made so far on data collection in the Home Office.
Finally, I remind the Minister and the Committee of two things. First, the amendment would not require the fund to be established, but simply that its viability be examined. Secondly, there was and is wide cross-party support for the amendment in the Commons. Details of this support have been provided already to the Minister. I therefore ask him the following question. If, as he may indicate in response, he or the Government consider that such a viability study could be undertaken without legislation, will he commit from the Dispatch Box today to implement such a study and tell the House when it can be expected to start and to report?
I give the last word to the former director of the National Economic Crime Centre, Adrian Searle:
“Substantive and sustained funding … is crucial. The resource currently deployed is not commensurate with the scale of the problem … Doing the necessary analysis appears to be a no brainer”.
I look forward to any comments from others and hope for a positive response from the Minister. I beg to move.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, I do not normally get involved with money issues because they are too messy and convoluted. The last time I recommended any sort of money being given to the police was when I was on the Metropolitan Police Authority. It was going to scrap the wildlife crime unit, and I argued strongly that we should keep it. It was not about naughty squirrels; it was about people committing crimes against wildlife. I felt it was an incredibly important unit, but that is by the by.
This is a growing crime. I can remember discussing it 20 years ago and people saying, “We need more money to fund the work and we need better systems”, and all that sort of thing, so it is surprising that we need this now after so long. It addresses a persistent weakness in our response to economic crime—the lack of stable long-term funding. Economic crime undermines public trust and causes real harm to individuals and communities, yet the agencies tasked with tackling it are often operating on short-term budgets, dependent on annual settlements and unable to plan effectively. This amendment asks the Government to undertake a serious assessment of whether a proportion of the proceeds recovered from economic crime could be reinvested into a fund to strengthen enforcement. That strikes me as an incredibly sensible approach; it would also stop the Treasury from grabbing the money and using it in even worse ways.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, economic crime is not a marginal issue. It is a national crisis affecting millions of people every year but, generally speaking, it goes under the radar most of the time. These are not victimless offences: they destroy life savings, devastate small businesses and undermine trust in our economy and democracy. When economic crime goes unchecked, it is not the powerful who suffer but ordinary people.
The amendment is modest and pragmatic. It would not establish a new fund; it simply asks for a viability study. I know the Minister is never keen even on turning a semicolon into a comma but, in this instance, it is not asking an awful lot of the Government—the Minister must stop stabbing his heart—just to agree to look at a viability study. It is really not a big deal. There are already clear precedents for this approach, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, just said; the FCA, the Ministry of Justice and parts of the police are already able to retain fines in different ways. If the Government are really serious about the UK’s reputation as a global financial centre, they must match rhetoric with resources. Can I persuade the Minister, for once, to move and just say yes?
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, for moving this amendment. Economic crime is one of the most pervasive threats to public trust and business confidence in the UK. In the year ending March 2024, fraud accounted for around a third of all crime recorded by police. Industry estimates suggest that economic crime costs the UK economy tens of billions of pounds per year, according to police statistics. These staggering statistics underscore the need for effective enforcement and resourcing.
In this context, the need to seek more sustainable and predictable resourcing for economic crime enforcement is understandable. The proposal to assess the viability of an economic crime fighting fund based on reinvesting a proportion of receipts from enforcement reflects a desire to tackle this persistent and widespread issue. I recognise that there may be merits to an approach that allows specialist technology and expertise to be built and retained over multiple years.
The amendment also calls for an examination of the impact of budget exchange rules on the functioning of the asset recovery incentivisation scheme. There have been reports that recovered assets sometimes cannot easily be redeployed by front-line investigators and that incentives can be blunted by accounting constraints. If funds that are recovered through enforcement cannot, in practice, be retained or redeployed effectively by those doing the work, it is sensible to ask whether the current framework is optimally aligned with the policy objective of strengthening economic crime capability. However, I recognise that any move towards hypothecation of enforcement receipts raises potential governance issues, and there is also the question of how such a fund would sit alongside existing funding streams and the Government’s wider strategy in this area.
I therefore look forward to the Minister’s response to this amendment. I would be grateful if he could outline what steps the Government are currently taking to fight economic crime and whether they believe that any further action is required.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, not just for his amendment today but for his patience in sitting through the Committee debates prior to introducing his amendment this evening. I am also grateful for the meeting we had with him and Phil Brickell, MP for Bolton West, in October and the meeting we had on 18 November.
It is important that Amendment 482 is considered. It would require the Government to consult on the viability of a ring-fenced economic crime fighting fund, and the intention of the amendment is to examine whether such a fund could provide multi-year resourcing for tackling economic crime. I am grateful for the comments from the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, in support of the amendment. The amendment recognises the significant harm that economic crime causes—reflected in the contributions made—to individuals, businesses, the economy and wider society.
The Government remain committed to tackling economic crime. That is evidenced not just by words in this Chamber but by our continued investment through the asset recovery incentivisation scheme and the economic crime levy, which has allocated £125 million to tackling economic crime in recent months. These schemes are delivering state-of-the-art technology to provide law enforcement agencies with the tools they need to stay ahead of criminals. It also includes an important factor, which is the recruitment of 475 new officers across the threat leadership, intelligence, investigative and prosecution capacity. We are putting people on the ground to deal with this issue as part of the, we hope, tangible benefits that we can get in the fight against economic crime. As a Government, we want to continue to work with our partners to ensure that we are most effectively investing the funding available.
I understand and accept—and did so in the face-to-face discussions we had with the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, and the Member of Parliament Phil Brickell—that the call for sustaining funding is an important one that needs to be investigated. I want to confirm to the noble Lord what I hope is of help to him: the Government are committed to exploring the funding landscape with the aim of strengthening economic crime enforcement. This is witnessed by the statements we have made in the recently published economic anti-corruption strategy, which was published last December —particularly paragraph 42, on page 23, which I quote for the noble Lord:
“In the context of Spending Review 2025”,
we will
“explore the funding landscape with the aim of strengthening economic crime enforcement”
as a joint Treasury and Home Office priority commitment in that anti-corruption strategy.
This strategy is fixed and there was a timescale for it when published. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, will accept our intentions in identifying the issues that he has raised and not just doing what we have done to date, which is to ensure that we have put resources in already. I hope that that review commitment in the strategy from December is of help to the noble Lord regarding the objectives of his amendments here today.
With that commitment, I would be grateful if he would at least welcome it and hold us to account on it and, in doing so, withdraw his amendment today.
Lord Cromwell (CB)
First of all, I can certainly promise to hold the Minister accountable for it, so I hope that pleases him. I thank the speakers—the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones and Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies—who have kindly commented on this amendment. I thank the Minister in particular for engaging with me before and for his comments tonight. I am still not quite sure what I am looking at. I think he used the phrase “exploring the funding landscape” a couple of times. When does that exploration reach its destination and come up with a report?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
We have the strategy, which was published in December. It is a fixed-term strategy, which includes the commitment to examine the points that the noble Lord has mentioned. My time is quite stretched at the moment but, if the noble Lord would find it helpful, I am very happy for him to meet officials dealing with that aspect particularly. We can potentially explore from there whether his input is helpful in stretching that strategy and making some positive outcomes from it.
Lord Cromwell (CB)
I thank the Minister for that answer. I was described in a previous debate as a legislative terrier, so I can assure him that I would like very much to meet his officials and, if necessary, nip their heels, because I am after a date when we are going to find the result of this viability study. Let us leave it at that. I am very grateful for his positive response. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
“Rural crime prevention strategy(1) On the day after the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must establish a rural crime prevention task force to develop proposals for tackling rural crime.(2) The task force must be given a remit that includes, but is not confined to, examining—(a) the particular types of crime that occur in rural areas, including but not limited to—(i) quad bike theft;(ii) equipment theft;(iii) animal rustling;(iv) fly tipping;(v) worrying of livestock by dogs;(vi) hare coursing;(vii) poaching,(b) crime rates in rural communities across England and Wales,(c) the current levels of police resources and funding in rural communities,(d) whether specific training in how to respond to rural crime call-outs should be undertaken by police control room operators,(e) the operational case, and the funding implications, of appointing rural crime specialists in Police Forces across England and Wales which serve areas that include a significant rural population, and(f) whether a National Rural Crime Coordinator should be established.(3) The task force established under subsection (1) must submit a rural crime prevention strategy to the Secretary of State within six months of its appointment. (4) The Secretary of State must, within a month of receiving the report made by the task force, lay the report and a written response to the task force’s recommendations before both Houses of Parliament.(5) The Secretary of State must, within a month of laying their response to the task force’s report, ensure that an amendable motion on the subject of the rural crime task force’s recommendations is laid, and moved, before both Houses of Parliament.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to establish a task force to produce a strategy for tackling rural crime, makes provision for specific aspects of the task force’s remit, and requires the Secretary of State to bring forward a substantive motion before both Houses of Parliament on the task force’s recommendations.
Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer (LD)
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, for adding his name to our amendment and especially for spotting the rather attractive typo in an earlier Marshalled List whereby “animal rustling” had become “animal hustling”. The only animal hustling I am aware of is when my small dog hustles me out of bed in the morning.
I have tabled this amendment to probe the Government’s thinking about rural crime prevention. I appreciate that a recent rural crime strategy from the National Police Chiefs’ Council covered the years 2025 to 2028. It is very helpful to have that document and to see the priorities there. However, I do not believe it replaces a government-wide prevention strategy. Many issues would benefit from the Government having a complementary strategy, for example from the Department for Education and Defra, both of which have a huge role to play in educating the public with regard to the countryside and its wildlife on questions such as when lighting a fire in the countryside becomes a crime—something that is increasingly serious with climate change. What is criminal behaviour when you are in your boat and you spot a dolphin? I will not weary the Committee with too many examples.
Society as a whole and the Government need to take a role in ensuring that our rural areas do not become crime hotspots. Organised crime, sadly, sees rural areas as a soft touch. A big example of this was recently highlighted by your Lordships’ House’s Environment and Climate Change Committee: fly-tipping on an industrial scale. It has become almost a full-time job for my noble friend Lady Sheehan to go around the country looking at these huge fly-tips. She has done a terrific job, raising awareness of the scale of the problem and eliciting some response for the Environment Agency and the Government. It is a question of public awareness, because it is important to report very early on where something is going to become a fly-tip. It illustrates how rural crime has become big criminal business, as has wildlife crime.
In hare coursing, for example, there is big money to be made through the bets placed. That is disastrous for farmers, driving straight through their fences and hedges. It is hard to stand in the way when you are alone and facing a gang. It is also hard to police in remote rural areas. I hope the Government are paying attention to that sort of crime. They should be praised for pledging to introduce a closed season for hares, which is an excellent thing to do, but it will be a shame if hares continue to suffer from hare coursing. Peregrine falcon chicks—not something you would normally associate with commanding high prices and being the subject of organised crime—have become such a luxury item in the Middle East that there is now a need to police peregrine falcons’ nests. Eel poaching—not one or two eels for supper but glass eels, which are the babies, all illegally fished—is a trade worth £53 million at the last annual count and is wiping out the eel.
Lord Cromwell (CB)
My Lords, I have added my name to this amendment, which I thoroughly support, despite it committing the legislative sin of having a list in it. It references animal hustling, which is probably already a criminal offence in a different area of the law, so I will leave that alone. The question surely posed by the amendment is: why is a rural-specific strategy needed? Not only does rural crime have specific characteristics, too often it happens out of sight and perhaps out of mind of the often metropolitan policymaker.
This concerns three related themes, the first of which is isolation. Rural homes and businesses are often isolated, making them vulnerable to crime, including violent and destructive crime, while the motorway network provides a rapid and anonymous escape route. A more recent phenomenon is the use, from the highway, of drones to scope out machinery or products for later theft —something we will return to with Amendment 486A. The police generally do their best to engage with the local community—I pay tribute to Leicestershire’s Neighbourhood Link scheme, which is local to me—but, on an area basis, police resources are spread very thinly.
The second theme is waste dumping, which has been touched on. There has at last started to be some press coverage of the large-scale and often toxic waste dumped by the lorryload at illegal waste dumps in the countryside, of which a growing number are now being recognised. Anywhere that a vehicle can pull over out of sight for just a few moments, there is constant fly-tipping of discarded furniture, building materials, tyres and unwanted household goods—to say nothing of the endless food wrappers, beer cans, bottles and seemingly ubiquitous Red Bull cans, which now form a continuous linear rubbish dump along the base of almost every rural hedgerow in my area. There is also the widespread dumping and then setting alight of stolen cars. Imagine the effect in a field of wheat when that happens.
I would also like the Committee to note that, in responding to a series of Written Questions from me, Defra—the “ra” does stand for “rural affairs”—has confirmed that it has no current obligation to address these matters beyond the immediate edge of national highways. Criminals know this, of course, and exploit it by driving up rural tracks or into fields to tip their waste.
The third theme is wider rural crime. I recently spoke to a farming family who, against everything they believe in, kill all the hares on their land every year. Why? Because, if they do not, violent gangs in four-wheel drive vehicles come and deliberately crash through their hedgerows, career across their crops and kill the hares on their land with dogs. Such “coursing”, as it is called, in some cases involves international criminal syndicates betting large sums on the outcome.
I could go on: churches are stripped of their roofs, there are armed gangs of violent poachers, raids and threats at village shops and post offices and widespread vandalism and theft. In short, rural areas are under siege from people who, with either criminal intent or anti-social indifference, are turning what we like to portray as a green and pleasant land into a rubbish-strewn hinterland whose population increasingly fear for their safety, livelihoods and property. That is why we need this amendment: to recognise that rural areas have specific characteristics, specific types of crime and an overall lack of focus, despite the best efforts of an overstretched police force.
Finally, I will refer briefly to the Minister’s answers to questions on the Statement on the police reform White Paper on Tuesday evening. He was asked a question on how rural policing would be covered. His reply was that the Government were looking at reviewing the funding formula and that the overall organisational model would include responsible, non-elected persons. I do not wish to express a view on the reforms, but I respectfully point out that he did not say anything about how rural areas would be affected by the reform.
Secondly, in response to a question on waste crime, the Minister said that organised crime was behind it—he was correct, of course—and that regional and national agencies would be looking “over time” at how to deal with serious organised crime. I suggest to him that a dedicated, rural-focused strategy is needed to prevent and tackle such crime, not just the Environment Agency, which largely deals with post-facto matters.
There needs to be a specific strategy to develop and enforce appropriate countermeasures to what is not a passing rural crime wave but a rising flood. I commend the amendment for highlighting this and I hope that the Minister and the Government will get behind it.
Lord Forbes of Newcastle (Lab)
My Lords, I seek to make a brief contribution to the discussion on this amendment. Noble Lords might ask themselves why somebody whose political experience was predominantly in a metropolitan area would seek to speak on rural issues, but I grew up in Weardale, in County Durham, and my mother still lives in the dale. From growing up there and from contemporary experiences, I know that the issue of rural crime is felt very keenly by communities in rural areas and can damage the fabric of those communities in a way that makes them feel further under threat.
To the list of examples of crime given by the noble Baroness who spoke just a few moments ago I can add the stealing of oil from fuel tanks, the stealing of logs from log stores, and drink-driving, which we know is more prevalent in rural areas than it is in urban areas. That is why I particularly welcome the Government’s commitment to reviewing and reducing the drink-driving limits for the whole country.
In the context of this amendment, we need to reflect on why some of these issues occur in rural areas and what the root causes of the lack of response may be. Many rural communities have a greater sense of trust and of community spirit, but that can have a downside, in that it can make people more susceptible to fraud and more liable to be scammed, particularly online. Alongside the amendments under consideration, I welcome the measures to introduce stronger investigatory powers and a stronger national approach to such crimes. Although crime can affect people anywhere, for those living in rural or isolated areas without support around it can be quite devastating.
There is a challenge around the whole-scale withdrawal of police stations and a police presence from many of our rural communities. That has resulted in one particular case that I am aware of, because it affected my mother. She was subject to the theft of some logs from land that she owns. The police response in that area was, “We suggest you go out and buy some cameras from Amazon to see if you can record this”. I do not think that that is sufficient, appropriate or suitable in the circumstances. It implies that a small-scale crime such as that is of no grand consequence, but to somebody like my mother, it has a very real consequence, because it has affected her fuel supply over the winter period.
There is an issue about the particular nature of crimes that are more prevalent in rural areas. As we come to Report, I hope we can look more fully at ways in which the Government can work alongside police and crime commissioners, while they are still in existence, and whatever their successor bodies are, to ensure that rural areas do not feel second best when it comes to crime prevention and community safety.
Earl Russell (LD)
My Lords, I will speak in support of the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Miller, to which I have added my name. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, for his support, and those who have spoken already.
The amendment addresses an issue that has for too long been treated as peripheral: the growing crisis of rural crime. For those who live and work in our countryside, there is the reality of financial loss, fear, and a deep sense of vulnerability and isolation. After rising to around £52.8 million in 2023, the estimated cost of rural crime stood at around £44 million in 2024. Despite some improvements, the resources devoted to addressing this remain inadequate. Freedom of information requests from my party submitted last April uncovered the shocking fact that only 0.4% of the police workforce across England and Wales is dedicated to rural crime teams. In Norfolk, for example, there are just two dedicated full-time officers, and some forces have no rural crime forces at all.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer, the noble Earl, Lord Russell, and the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, for tabling their amendment. As a rural-dweller myself, I agree and recognise many, if not all, of the offences that have been identified. Our rural communities are incredibly important. On this side of the Committee, the Opposition have made it an absolute priority to support them in this difficult time. That support extends past simply fiscal policy following recent tax policies to all issues that affect them, including crime. It is promising that, last year, rural crime fell by over 16%, but there is still work to be done. Those offences still cost rural communities over £44 million a year—a fact that underlined our pledge to set up local taskforces to tackle rural crime.
Our objectives are not different from those of the noble Baroness; we simply differ on delivery. A top-down, centralised approach is never normally the most effective way to tackle local disconnected issues, and rural crime is a prime example of this. It is far less the operation of the highly organised criminal gangs we see in our cities, and more often the actions of an isolated few who sense an opportunity to steal or exploit the countryside and act on it.
Localised problems require localised solutions. Police forces are budgeted based on local needs, and are therefore the most alert to the specific issues facing their communities. It should be them organising taskforces to tackle rural crime, as they have the knowledge and ability to act and adjust to the changing crime picture in their area. While we agree with the noble Baroness’s intentions and entirely support them, we would much rather see funding directed to local forces and delegate responsibility to them and their taskforces to tackle the rural crime that we all want to see curbed. I hope the Minister agrees.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer, for raising these issues, and to the noble Lords who have spoken in support of her. As someone who represented a rural constituency in the House of Commons for 28 years, I can say that things such as sheep worrying, isolation and local policing were meat-and-drink on a daily basis. In fact, the north Wales rural crime unit was the model for a lot of the work that has been done on rural crime at a national level. I therefore appreciate and understand the problems that are faced by rural communities. I say to the noble Baroness and others that the Government remain committed to tackling those crimes that particularly impact our rural communities.
Noble Lords have spoken today about some of the government measures being brought forward, but I want to address them as a whole. As part of our safer streets mission, we are introducing important measures to protect rural communities that look at clamping down on anti-social behaviour, strengthening neighbourhood policing and preventing the very farm theft that the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, spoke of, as well as the issue of fly-tipping, which has been mentioned by noble Lords today. I would also add shop theft to that. That is an important issue because, particularly in rural areas where there is perhaps only one shop, an organised crime gang, or regular shop theft, can impact small independent businesses very strongly. We are trying to deal strongly with those issues. Rural communities across England and Wales are already better protected from the rising threat of organised gangs, and we have new strategies to tackle crimes plaguing countryside areas.
I was struck by my noble friend Lord Forbes of Newcastle, who focused not just on the rural crime issues that I know he is aware of but raised important issues around fraud and the isolation that fraud can bring. I advise him that, in a three-year fraud strategy that we intend to publish in relatively short order, the Government intend to look very strongly at those issues and at what we can do in that space.
Developing a robust response to a rural crime is extremely important. I know that noble Lords have mentioned it, but the objective of the amendment is, as the explanatory statement says,
“to establish a task force to produce a strategy for tackling rural crime”.
I say to the mover of the amendment that, in November 2025, the Home Office, Defra and the National Police Chiefs’ Council published the Rural and Wildlife Crime Strategy, which, in essence, does what the amendment asks for, and which will bring together the points that the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, asked for, with ministerial oversight. The strategy is a vital step in the mission to provide safer streets everywhere.
There is also a Defra-led rural task force that was set up last year—that sounds like a long way away, but it was just over a month ago—with the aim of gathering evidence through a series of meetings and workshops to look at the specific challenges faced in rural areas. The evidence gleaned from the workshops is being examined, and it will be used to outline the Government’s strategic ambition for rural communities.
Some of the points that noble Lords have mentioned today, such as tackling equipment theft, are a huge concern. I understand that. We intend to implement the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023, which will introduce forensic marking and registration on a database of all new terrain vehicles and quad bikes. I am also pleased to say that we recently announced removable GPS systems. Those are demands that I had just over a year ago when I went to the rural crime conference chaired by the police and crime commissioners for Norfolk and Cheshire. We have acted on that.
Clause 128, which has already been considered, contains a valuable tool for the police that will help them tackle stolen equipment. It will ensure that, where it has not been reasonably practical to obtain a warrant from the court, the police can enter and search premises that have been electronically tagged by GPS or other means and where items are present that are reasonably believed to have been stolen. That is a very strong signal for organised criminals that we are going to track and monitor them and have a non-warranted entrance to their property if they have stolen equipment—and we will hold them to account for it.
I was pleased to be able to announce last year at the police and crime commissioners’ conference a long-term commitment of £800,000 for the National Rural Crime Unit and the National Wildlife Crime Unit. We have committed to replicating this year’s funding next year, in 2026-27; in what are tight and difficult financial times, we have still managed to commit that funding to help to support the National Police Chiefs’ Council in achieving the aims of that strategy.
To go to some of the specific issues that the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, mentioned, such as hare coursing, the establishment of that unit and work that it has done, and through that unit Operation Galileo, has seen a 40% reduction in hare coursing—again, that was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, as a specific problem that has existed and causes great difficulties in rural areas.
We have also looked not just at the excellent work of the National Rural Crime Unit but, overall, at how we can tackle rural crime in an organised way. Again, I recognise that there are challenges. The Government separately, through the Statement that we made only a couple of days ago in this House, are looking at reorganising and shrinking the number of police forces, and we are going to have a commission to look at that, with a review, in the next few months to come to some conclusions. We are trying to centralise some national activity on serious organised crime, which is very much behind a lot of that rural crime. That landscape will need to be looked at.
The noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, referred to what I said on Tuesday night. We are looking at how we review the funding formula—that is important. Again, I cannot give specific answers on that today, but I would say to the noble Baroness who moved the amendment and noble Lords who have spoken to it, including the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, that significant work is being done on this. We have a strategy and a task force; we have co-operation with Defra and specific measures being brought in that have been called for for a long time on equipment theft and wildlife crime, as well as on the funding of the unit. We have looked at a range of other measures that we will bring forward to tackle organised crimes in rural areas. With the neighbourhood policing guarantee, we are looking at every neighbourhood police force having named, contactable officers dealing with local issues. We are putting 13,000 of those neighbourhood police officers in place over the next three to four-year period, which will mean that we have 3,000 extra neighbourhood police officers by March this year and 13,000 by the end of this Parliament. That is focusing people from the back room to local police forces.
Again, there is a big mix in this, and I know that noble Lords will appreciate that it is a significant challenge at the moment, but I hope that that work is helpful and that the direction of travel suggested by the amendments is one that noble Lords can understand we are trying to achieve. With that, I hope that the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer (LD)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. There was a theme running through the debate of the difficulty faced by those in rural areas of isolation. The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, mentioned that I was seeking a top-down solution—not at all; I think that I am probably in your Lordships’ House because of looking for localised solutions. But that does not replace having an overall government strategy.
I am very pleased to hear from the Minister that they are committed to the funding for that unit; that is very helpful. I asked specifically about heritage crime, besides wildlife crime, so, between now and Report, perhaps the Minister could help me and provide a little more on how the Home Office is co-ordinating with the DCMS. Might he be able to write to me on that and also answer my question as to why wildlife crime is not notifiable? With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Earl Russell
“Offence of failing to meet pollution performance commitment levels (1) A water or water and sewerage company (“C”) commits an offence where C has—(a) failed to meet its pollution performance commitment level for three consecutive years, or(b) experienced an increase in serious pollution levels for three consecutive years. (2) For the purposes of this section—(a) “water or water and sewerage company” means companies which are responsible for the provision of water, or water and sewerage, services and which are regulated by Ofwat and the Environment Agency,(b) “pollution performance commitment level” means the level of performance on pollution that the company has committed to deliver, and which is reported against by Ofwat in its annual water company performance report, and(c) “total pollution incidents per 10,000km2” and “serious pollution incidents” mean the relevant figures under those headings reported by the Environment Agency in its annual environmental performance report.(3) If guilty of an offence under this section, C is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to a fine;(b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause creates an offence of failing to meet pollution performance commitment levels.
Earl Russell (LD)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 484 on behalf of my noble friend Lady Bakewell, who is unable to be here, I shall also speak to Amendment 485 in this group on pollution. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for her support for both. The amendments address the critical, environmental and public trust issue of the persistent and systematic failure of water companies to stem the flow of pollution into our rivers, lakes and coastal waters. The amendments are designed to work in tandem as a linked pair of provisions specifically targeting persistent and sustained underperformance. They are not designed to punish one-off incidents. They are a measured response to prolonged and sustained regulatory failures that, in the public’s eye, have become a matter of criminal neglect.
Amendment 484 would insert a new clause into the regulatory framework, creating a clear corporate criminal offence for a water or sewage company. That offence would be triggered when a company already regulated by Ofwat or the Environment Agency either fails to meet its pollution performance commitment level for three consecutive years or experiences an increase in serious pollution levels for three consecutive years. The pollution performance commitment level used is the exact target that companies commit to under the existing regulatory framework, which Ofwat reports on annually. The data regarding serious pollution incidents is similarly drawn directly from the Environment Agency’s annual environmental performance data.
A three-year threshold is a deliberate and calibrated response. We recognise that water companies can face individual problems from climate change, weather events, rapid population growth and other unforeseen circumstances. However, when failures persist year after year, are reported in black and white in regulatory reports but nothing is done, that is a different matter. By setting this three-year window, we would offer companies ample opportunity to correct their course. If they failed to do so, as a result of this amendment it could result in the matters being criminal.
Amendment 485 would build directly upon this foundation by creating personal criminal liability for senior managers. Liability would arise where a corporate offence under Amendment 484 was committed and the individual had failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent it. We have adopted a functional or a robust definition of senior manager, mirroring successful legal models in health and safety and economic crime already in legislation. It would apply to anyone who plays a significant role in making decisions about how the company’s relevant activities are managed or organised. This ensures that no one could evade their responsibility through misleading job titles or a corporate web of complex structures.
Critically, this amendment includes built-in protections to ensure fairness. The core requirement is to “take all reasonable steps”. A manager who could demonstrate that they have done this would have a clear path to acquittal. This structure would pierce the corporate veil without being reckless. Decisions regarding budgets and infrastructure carry personal weight for those who operate at the top.
Although there has been change, there is a lot that still needs to be done. Bill payers are facing a 26% increase in their bills and, in 2025 alone, supply interruptions across England and Wales rose by 8%. Even more concerning is the 60% increase in serious category 1 and category 2 incidents, which climbed to 75 in 2024. I recognise that we have had the Water (Special Measures) Act, the Cunliffe review and the recent White Paper and that there is more legislation to come. We welcome a lot of the measures, particularly those in the White Paper. Regulators have also imposed record fines, some as high as £90 million, but we must confront the reality that we may have reached the limits of a solely fines-based model.
When penalties are too modest, they just become the cost of doing business; when they are too punitive, they risk bringing down the very water companies that we are trying to sanction. Despite these fines, executives continue to draw substantial bonuses. Shareholders continue to receive massive dividends, while the environment bears the scars. The public is being asked to fund a staggering £104 billion in the promised AMP8 investment, and much of it is publicly underwritten through government schemes. We must have a statutory mechanism that ensures that this money delivers verifiable environmental gains rather than just being siphoned into higher gearing and profits.
Some critics may argue that these amendments will deter talent and overburden regulators. I disagree. These provisions are carefully calibrated to protect those who work in this industry, and they could do exactly the opposite. They could attract into the industry those people we need who are motivated to make change. Having that protection of the “reasonable steps” defence could help to attract the very talent we need. These measures are in line with requirements of the Environment Act that the polluter must pay. For too long this has not happened, and individual poor performance has been allowed to pass unchallenged.
These amendments provide the precise tools needed to bridge the gap between reporting failure and enforced change. Persistent pollution is not a technical glitch or an oversight; it is a substantial betrayal of public trust and an environmental duty. These issues need more thought than I have seen to date from the Government, despite the legislation coming forward.
The new water regulator, when established, must have the necessary tools to hold individual companies and individual corporate members within them to account personally for any serious and persistent failings; otherwise, it will not succeed, just as other regulators have not. I hope that the Government will view these amendments as a timely enhancement to their own thinking and plans for further reform. I beg to move.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
I love these amendments and wish I had tabled them myself. They are excellent. Water companies dumping sewage into rivers has been illegal for years: it is just this and the previous Government’s refusal to act that has let it continue without serious consequences.
The legislation allows Ministers to set a bar of what is acceptable behaviour and, so far, every politician in charge has refused to say what is and is not a major failure. The result of this political cowardice is that water companies continue to make a profit out of polluting our waterways and beaches, and the people in charge continue to collect their big pay cheques and bonuses.
Regulators such as Ofwat have been in bed with the water industry bosses, and the Environment Agency has lost staff and legitimacy. Labour are wedded to private ownership of water and refuse to consider public ownership, even though it would be the most popular legislation they could enact this Parliament. I keep making suggestions about how Labour can get some voters back, but it is not listening.
These companies are fleecing bill payers with the excuse that they need to carry out the investment they have failed to do for decades. They have taken the public’s money and given it directly to shareholders. They have run up debts to pay even higher dividends and the bill payers are now paying for those debts. What is going to stop them doing this all again?
These amendments take a direct route to stopping pollution by making this personal to the people at the top. If they do not spend the money to invest and reduce pollution, then that is a crime. They are taking the public’s money and failing to improve. My own preference would be to put them on long-term community service cleaning up the sewage from our beaches, waterways and riverbanks. I would probably put them in special uniforms so that everybody passing by would know exactly who they are. I would also put a complete ban on dividend and bonus payments.
I am happy—she says, through gritted teeth—to support this more moderate suggestion, as being something the Minister might accept. I would not give them three years to turn it around either, but setting some sort of firm deadline would be preferable to the inaction of this, and the last, Government.
Finally, the best way of stopping the crime of water companies dumping sewage in our rivers is to take them into public ownership. Reduce bills by reducing the money wasted on debt repayments and replace the current set of overpaid bosses with people who can do the job and care about our environment.
Lord Deben (Con)
My Lords, I declare a historic connection with the water industry in the sense that I was the chairman of a water-only company more than 10 years ago, but it means I know a bit about the water industry and perhaps that is helpful after the last intervention, because the truth of the matter is that this is not just a problem of the water companies.
First, it is the problem of those people who controlled the water companies. The way in which it was operated was a great mistake. There were two regulators and the Environment Agency was almost always overturned by Ofwat. Ofwat was leaned on by successive Governments to keep down the price of water. So I start by saying that we must have a system in which we are paying for the big changes that we know about—and, because I have been around for such a long time, I remember why privatisation took place. It was not anything to do with Mrs Thatcher wanting to privatise. It was because, when it had been public ownership, both municipal and national, there had never been investment. It is all right for the noble Baroness to say that that is what we want; if you look at the history, it is about the worst history of public investment that we ever had. We had Surfers Against Sewage and the filthiest water: the worst water in northern Europe. When we signed up to the water directive, as we did when were sensibly in the European Union, it was quite clear that we did not meet the standards. The Daily Telegraph used to say, “Oh well, of course our water is better than anywhere else because they drink bottled water in France”. The truth was that our water did not meet the standards of the whole of Europe.
The privatisation took place to get private money into the water industry, to make the changes that were necessary—and, for a bit, it worked. I was the Minister responsible after that had been done and it was murder to try to deal with it. As these companies brought new technology and the rest into it, they had to charge more and therefore we had all the arguments about keeping the water price down. Unfortunately, we have to recognise that water is not cheap and it is going to be more and more expensive. For example, Essex & Suffolk Water—which is about 200 to 300 yards outside Anglia, where I am affected, so I do not have a direct connection—has announced that it cannot provide new water for any new or extended industry until 2036. That is the effect of climate change and of not having the water we need.
We have to be frank about our problem: we are going to have to spend a lot more money on water, make it much more efficient, use new technology and do that through the privatised system that we have. There is no point in arguing about it; it is not going to be nationalised. The Government have made that quite clear and nobody else is going to nationalise it. So let us see how we can make this work. That is why I have come to be semi-supportive of this amendment: the reality is that we have not been able properly to regulate water and we need to do so. Directors of companies in these areas need to be personally responsible when, for a period, they have clearly not done the job which they are supposed to do.
The noble Baroness wanted us not to have three years. Frankly, you have got to have a period in which you can see whether this a persistent problem or a one-off. We are going to have lots of one-off problems. I know it bores the Committee for me constantly to talk about climate change, but the point about climate change is that it is really climate disruption. It means that we have very significant changes in weather which we cannot predict in advance and therefore we can have real problems, with so much water that we cannot deal with it or not enough water so we cannot provide for people. That does not mean to say that the people of Tunbridge Wells do not have a very considerable complaint about the fact that, yet again, they have not been able to have the water that they ought to have.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
It is very brave of the noble Lord to say categorically that this Government will not put the water companies into public hands, because they are famous for their U-turns, so who knows what is going to happen next week? Secondly, all these bonuses and huge payouts surely show a level of incompetence. They had the money to do the investment and they gave it instead to shareholders.
Lord Deben (Con)
I am sorry, the second part of the noble Baroness’s comments are ones she makes about everybody who is in the private sector. That is what she thinks about the private sector and I do not agree with her. The Polanski mechanisms of this world are devastating politically and economically and, really, I am not going to answer that because I just think it is not true and is nonsense.
However, the first part is actually quite important. The reason the Government do not want to nationalise the water companies is that it would cost a great deal of money that we ought to use for other things—and it does not necessarily end up with a better system. I am a historian: I always like to look at what happened before. When it was in the public sector and was run by municipalities, we did not spend the money. That was the problem. And we still would not do so, because there is always something better to spend the money on immediately. We are politicians; you do it for what the next moment is. The trouble with investment in water is that it is crucial, but it is long term.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
First, I do not want to get into a spat with the noble Lord but could he not mention people by name in this Chamber? That is quite rude. Secondly, I am an archaeologist and I know exactly how these things start. The fact is, it may be that public ownership did not help but private ownership has made it much worse—and it is not true that I condemn all private businesses.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Wilson of Sedgefield) (Lab)
We are straying away from the amendment and strolling into a bigger debate. If we can get back to the amendment, that will be fantastic.
Lord Deben (Con)
On the personal attack, Mr Polanski is the leader of a party. If he cannot be referred to in this House, I wonder what on earth we are coming to.
Lord Cromwell (CB)
I will follow the strictures just put on us to stay with the amendment. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Deben, as he still came back for another bite, that as someone who sat on the Industry and Regulators Committee that looked into the water industry in detail, I know that the Victorian system reached its capacity in 1960, and public and private ownership both failed in different ways for the simple reason that he gave: short-termism. That is the problem we face: the multiple billions that have to be spent over a long period, and no Government looking to get re-elected for the next five years will ever spend it.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, for tabling this amendment and the noble Earl, Lord Russell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for putting their names to it and contributing today.
Although we understand the noble Baroness’s intention, we do not believe that this amendment is the right approach to ensuring that our water companies act ethically and serve the customer. Neither do we believe that increasing offences for companies or for individuals is the right approach to decreasing water pollution. They are already subject to the powers of Ofwat and the Environment Agency; additional measures will just drive up legal costs and encourage hostile behaviour.
The Water (Special Measures) Act of last year placed a new duty on companies to publish an annual pollution incident reduction plan, and we should wait and see what the outcome of that policy is before we attempt to legislate further. It is undoubtedly an important issue, but we simply do not believe that this is the best way to go about it. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, for tabling the amendment, the noble Earl, Lord Russell, for moving it, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for putting her name to it and speaking to it. I enjoy—well, “enjoy”—sparring on issues of water ownership and water companies. Usually it is in Oral Questions rather than in the middle of the Crime and Policing Bill but, hey ho, you take your chances wherever you can. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Deben, for bringing his sense of history and active participation over a number of decades, if I may say so, on the issue of water ownership and stewardship. I found myself agreeing—which may not be too strange—in no small part with many of his comments.
Before I get into the meat of my remarks, I want to be clear: as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said, the Government are not going to nationalise the water industry. It would cost around £100 billion.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I am very happy to direct the noble Baroness towards Defra’s costings on this. You have to take account of all sorts of factors, including debt that you inherit as well as the equity stake of the companies that they are currently valued at. It is a very simplistic economics that leads you down the primrose path of the valuations that some people like to think it would cost. That is not the case.
I also gently point out to the noble Earl, Lord Russell, that the £104 billion that comes up in PR24 to which he referred is an investment commitment from the water companies. We are building new aqueducts now and we have not built them for decades, and that is one of the main reasons why we have continual problems of lots of rain but not enough water supply, to which the noble Lord, Lord Deben, referred. Anyway, I will take off my Defra Whip hat and put on my Home Office Whip hat, and I will speak to the amendment.
Performance commitment levels, including for pollution, are set for Ofwat in the price review process. Where companies fail to meet these commitment levels, they must return money to customers through reduced bills in the next financial year. Companies are therefore already penalised for failing to meet their performance targets. In addition, this Government have already introduced the toughest sentencing powers in history against law-breaking water executives. Provisions in the Water (Special Measures) Act 2025, to which the noble Earl, Lord Russell, referred, extend the sentencing powers of the courts to include imprisonment in all cases where the regulator’s investigations have been obstructed by individuals and enable obstruction cases to be heard in the Crown Court. As a company cannot go to prison, the provisions ensure that directors and officers are held to account. The threat of imprisonment will act as a powerful deterrent as water companies invest in upgrading broken water infrastructure and clean up our rivers, lakes and seas for good.
The 2025 Act also allows the Government to expand and strengthen the current range of financial penalties available to the Environment Agency in a bid to clamp down on more water company offences. The Government have consulted on the scope for these new penalties and their value. The changes will make it much easier and quicker for the Environment Agency to hold water companies to account. Through the 2025 Act, the Government have also given Ofwat the power to ban executive performance bonuses where companies fail to meet certain standards. Since this was introduced in June last year, six companies out of nine—Anglian Water, Southern Water, Thames Water, United Utilities, Wessex Water and Yorkshire Water—have triggered the bonus ban rule, and more than £4 million of potential bonuses have been blocked. This is the legislation working in action.
The Government announced, in response to the Cunliffe review, that they will establish a single powerful regulator for the entire water sector, with the teeth to enforce the standards that the public rightly demand. We have also accepted the recommendation from Cunliffe to end the era of water companies marking their own homework through operator self-monitoring. We will introduce open monitoring to increase transparency and restore public trust. We have set out our wider vision for the future of the water sector in a White Paper published on 20 January. This marks the most fundamental reset to our water system in a generation. When parliamentary time allows in a new Session, we will introduce a water Bill creating the laws that we need to fundamentally change the system.
The noble Lord, Lord Deben, asked whether the Government are committed to this. The Water (Special Measures) Act last year, our response to the Cunliffe review, the water White Paper and our commitment to legislate are a down payment on our commitment to do right by the industry, the environment, the consumer and those who wish to invest in our water system. I hope that the measures I have set out demonstrate that the Government and regulators are taking firm action to hold water companies and their executives to account for poor performance. For these reasons, in the knowledge that we will bring forward further legislation in due course, I hope that the noble Earl will withdraw the amendment.
Earl Russell (LD)
My Lords, I thank everybody who has spoken. That was a more interesting group of amendments than I expected it to be. I apologise—at the start I should have declared my interest as a board member and director of the Water Retail Company.
This has been an interesting debate. My amendment was not really about the ownership or privatisation of water—my party has a middle way on that—but about ensuring that the Government have the tools to change the behaviour and direction of water company executives. I take the Minister’s point about the £140 billion, but a lot of that is underwritten. We need that to be invested to get the change. I recognise the issues of climate change and the problems that we face, but this amendment is carefully crafted and is about adding this extra tool to the toolbox.
Fundamentally, my worry is that when we create the new regulator, which I welcome, it needs to be set up to succeed and to deliver—when, frankly, no other regulator has to date delivered in this space. My worry is that fines alone may not be enough to change corporate behaviour. I do not want to come back in another five or 10 years, when the climate has moved on and the problems we face are worse, and see that more money has gone in but the systems have not changed. However, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment, and I thank all those who have spoken.
Lord Garnier
“Joint enterprise(1) The Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 is amended as follows.(2) In section 8 (abettors in misdemeanors), after “shall” insert “, by making a significant contribution to its commission,”.”
Lord Garnier (Con)
My Lords, my Amendment 486, co-signed by the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede and Lord Berkeley of Knighton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, is a probing amendment designed to enable the Committee to consider the criminal law on joint enterprise and the Government to tell us how and when they intend to reform this troubling aspect of our law. The noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, regrets that he cannot be here this afternoon. He had wanted to refer to the law of Scotland, which I will not—simply because it would be a mistake for me to venture into that dangerous water. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, after having listened to what I have to say and endured my speech, might regret that he could be here, but I am very grateful to him for being here.
The instigator of this amendment is Kim Johnson, Member of Parliament. She presented a Private Member’s Bill to this effect in the other place in February 2024, and initiated a debate on joint enterprise through her Amendment 13 to this Bill on Report in the other place in June 2025. Amendment 486 is framed in the same terms, and its supporters come from across your Lordships’ House. Legal academics and practitioners outside Parliament have argued for it as well.
Section 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, if changed by my amendment, would provide that “Whosoever shall”—and here I add the amending words—
“by making a significant contribution to its commission”,
and would continue,
“aid, abet, counsel, or procure the commission of any indictable offence, whether the same be an offence at common law or by virtue of any Act passed or to be passed, shall be liable to be tried, indicted, and punished as a principal offender”.
I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, will address the corresponding need to amend the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 later this evening.
The last Government rejected this proposal because they said it would be too difficult for the prosecution to prove a significant contribution. I disagree. This amendment may not provide the best or only answer, but the intention is to bring to Parliament’s and the Government’s urgent attention the need for clarity, and therefore justice, in an aspect of our criminal law that has, over the years, led to confusion and injustice, as our courts have wrestled with how to deal with defendants who agree to commit one crime but who go on separately or together to commit another one. Over the years, that has led to a version of the law of joint enterprise that has allowed several people to be convicted of a crime, usually murder or manslaughter, even if only one person committed the fatal act. In some cases, there have been demonstrably unjust convictions.
Let me mention a few recent developments. The first is the combined Supreme Court and Privy Council decision in two appeals, Jogee and Ruddock, from England and Jamaica respectively, heard in 2016. If I may, I will refer to those two appeals as Jogee. The question of law relating to the liability of a secondary party was whether the common law took a wrong turning in two cases, one called Chan Wing-Siu, in 1985, and the other the Crown v Powell and English, in 1999.
The Jogee appeals concerned a subset of the law of secondary liability for a crime relating to the person who did not himself forge the document, fire the gun or stab the victim—the person who did so is the principal—but who is said to have encouraged or assisted the principal to do so. There is no question that persons who are indeed together responsible for a crime are all guilty of it, whether as principals or secondary parties. Sometimes it is not possible to determine exactly whose hand performed the vital act, but this does not matter, so long as it is proved that each defendant either did it himself or intentionally assisted or encouraged it.
Jogee did not affect that rule. In Jogee, the court was considering a narrower subpart concerning secondary parties who had engaged with one or more others in a criminal venture to commit crime A but, in doing so, the principal had committed a second crime, crime B. In many of the reported cases, crime B is murder committed in the course of some other criminal venture, but this aspect of the law is not confined to cases of homicide or even to cases of violence. The question in Jogee is the mental element that the law requires of the secondary party. This narrower area of secondary responsibility has sometimes been labelled joint enterprise. To speak of a joint enterprise is simply to say that two or more people were engaged in a crime together. That, however, does not identify what mental element must be shown in the secondary party. The narrower area of secondary responsibility in question, where crime B is committed during the course of crime A, has been in the past more precisely called parasitic accessory liability—a phrase that I have to accept does not exactly trip off the tongue.
The two cases of Chan Wing-Siu and Powell held that, in the kind of situation described, the mental element required of the secondary party is simply that he foresaw the possibility that the principal might commit crime B. If the secondary party did foresee this, the case is treated as continued participation in crime A—not simply as evidence that he intended to assist crime B but as automatic authorisation of it. So the secondary party was guilty under this rule, even if he did not intend to assist crime B at all. This set a lower test for the secondary party than for the principal, who will be guilty of crime B only if he has the necessary mental element for that crime, which is usually intent. That was in contrast to the usual rule for secondary parties, which is that the mental element is an intention to assist or encourage the principal to commit the crime.
Jogee held that Chan Wing-Siu and the Crown v Powell had taken a wrong turning in their reasoning. The decisions departed from the well-established rule that the mental element required of a secondary party is an intention to assist or encourage the principal to commit the crime. They also advanced arguments based on the need that co-adventurers in crimes that result in death should not escape conviction without considering whether the secondary parties would generally be guilty of manslaughter in any event. The Supreme Court decided that the law must be set back to the correct footing that stood before Chan Wing-Siu.
The mental element for secondary liability is the intention to assist or encourage the crime. Sometimes the encouragement or assistance is given to a specific crime and sometimes to a range of crimes, one of which is committed. Either will suffice. Sometimes the encouragement or assistance involves an agreement between the parties, but, in other cases, it takes the form of more or less spontaneous joining in a criminal enterprise. Again, either will suffice.
Intention to assist is not the same as desiring the crime to be committed. On the contrary, the intention to assist may sometimes be conditional, in the sense that the secondary party hopes that the further crime will not be necessary. If he nevertheless gives his intentional assistance on the basis that it may be committed if the necessity for it arises, he will be guilty. In many cases, the intention to assist will be coterminous with the intention that crime B be committed, but there may be some where it exists without that latter intention.
In most cases, it will remain relevant to inquire whether the principal and secondary party shared a common criminal purpose, for often this will demonstrate the secondary party’s intention to assist. This will be a matter of fact for the jury after careful direction from the judge. The error, Jogee says, was to treat foresight of crime B as automatic authorisation of it, whereas the correct rule is that foresight is simply evidence—albeit sometimes strong evidence—of intent to assist or encourage. It is a question for the jury, in every case, whether the intention to assist or encourage is shown. The correct rule, therefore, is that foresight is simply evidence—albeit sometimes strong evidence, as I say—of intent to assist or encourage, which is the proper mental element for establishing secondary liability.
The story does not end there, I am sorry to say—for those noble Lords who are still with me. For those convicted post Jogee, there is now a concern in the minds of some academics and practitioners that the Court of Appeal has subsequently lowered the conduct element and removed causation once again to widen liability through another error of law.
This criticism follows two cases in the Court of Appeal in 2021 and 2023, one called Rowe and the other called Hussain, where it was held—if I have this right—that, save for procuring a crime, conduct is enough, causation is not necessary and contribution is implicit and need not be measurable. The consequence is that the statutory language of “aid, abet, counsel or procure” is lost, and liability through complicity does not require proof that the accused person made a significant contribution to the crime in which he is alleged to have been complicit. Without a significant contribution, an alleged accomplice is not meaningfully involved in the principal’s crime.
Professor Matthew Dyson in his paper “The Contribution of Complicity”, published in the Journal of Criminal Law in 2022, suggests that judges should direct juries on contribution. This would retain the necessary derivative nature of complicity. Dr Felicity Gerry KC, who appeared for one of the defendants in Hussain, argues that the result of Dyson’s research
“is a much safer legal framework to ensure only those who make a significant contribution to the crime are at risk of conviction. The current approach fails to make it clear that there must be some nexus between the alleged acts of assistance and encouragement and the principal’s commission of the crime. Dr Beatrice Krebs has explained that without further guidance on the level of contribution made by the accessory’s action towards the principal’s commission of the offence, the jury has no tool to distinguish between an accessory who was merely present and one who by their presence has assisted or encouraged. Put simply—the decision in Hussain leaves a real risk of convicting people who make no significant contribution to the crime. The fundamental problem both Dyson and Krebs identify is the Court of Appeal focus on the accessory’s conduct rather than proof of the contribution to the principal’s commission of the offence”.
Dyson’s proposed test of a significant contribution, which I import into Amendment 486, is a measure that could have tightened the conduct element in complicity, just as Jogee envisaged greater care in fault.
Dyson argued that Jogee passed over the important issue of what contribution an accomplice needs to make to a principal’s crime. He submitted that
“English law is too willing to assume that such a contribution has occurred and has little detailed law to test for it”
and that a more rigorous approach is needed. He suggested a two-part approach:
“to be liable for assisting or encouraging a crime, the accomplice must make a substantial contribution to the principal’s commission of it; to be liable for procuring the principal’s crime, the accomplice must bring the crime about”.
Whether the accomplice’s assistance or encouragement had made the necessary substantial contribution would be a question for the jury. This approach, he argues, would be consistent with what was said in Jogee about overwhelming supervening acts. Where such an issue arose, a jury would first have to decide what level of contribution the assistance or encouragement of the accomplice had made and would then have to decide whether that had persisted to the point when the principal committed the offence.
The Court of Appeal rejected that proposition in Hussain, so, in addition to all those wrongly convicted before Jogee, there is a growing cohort of prisoners whose contribution to a crime has never meaningfully been measured. With no minimum threshold for the conduct element and, in murder, the consequence of lengthy tariffs on life sentences, this latest approach to joint enterprise contributes to overcriminalisation and overincarceration. Prison overcrowding and perceived injustice are, I suggest, a toxic mix. Absent a further case before the Supreme Court, we look to the Law Commission and the Government to find a way through.
In December 2024, the Law Commission announced a review of homicide and the sentencing framework for murder. It will, among other things, examine the law on joint enterprise following the Supreme Court ruling in Jogee. I suggest that the published timetable for the review is too long: opened in August 2025, with two separately focused consultation papers to be published in 2026 and 2027, it will not report until 2028. Would it not be possible to conclude the proposed review with two separate, if linked, reports—first, much earlier, on the offences, and, secondly, on defences and sentencing—rather than waiting until 2028 to publish one final report? Depending on what is in the legislative programme for 2028-30 and bearing in mind the delays caused by a general election and changing political priorities, it could be well over two years before anything is done.
I know from my own experience in government and opposition in Parliament since 1992 that Governments are reluctant to do anything that looks like being weak on crime, especially violent crime, but getting the law on joint enterprise understood and settled in statute is not a sign of weakness but evidence of the search for justice. I beg to move.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, for introducing this matter so fully. He started by saying that this was a troubling aspect of the law. I want to talk about how troubling it is and to reflect on the academic research which underpins many of the comments he made. I was a youth magistrate for many years, and my experience is underpinned by the academic research which I will refer to.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, if ever there was a day to consider whether we should just assume guilt by association, then today’s political context provides us with a reminder that it is complicated. I have added my name to Amendment 486 on reform of joint enterprise, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. Having listened to the elegant and legally erudite contribution from the noble and learned Lord, followed by such a well-informed contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, I am rather nervous that I am going to let the side down somewhat, but let me take a different approach.
Reading through the first-hand accounts in In Their Own Words produced by the Joint Enterprise Not Guilty by Association grass-roots campaign group that the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, referred to, really brings home that this tool of criminal justice is destroying too many young lives by incarcerating them for crimes which they made no significant contribution to. Sending people to prison for life and labelling them as murderers when they have not killed anyone, or were in many instances effectively bystanders, is something Parliament must address. Why? We have a responsibility to make sure the law is fit for purpose and applied properly and as originally intended. I think joint enterprise fails on all those counts.
I think we can all understand what the intention of joint enterprise is and was. Sometimes those who do not actually wield the knife do seem equally culpable—the armed robber involved in the heist that has gone wrong is the example always used. It could be deemed that he is as guilty as his accomplice who shot the cashier because he significantly contributed to the crime by, for example, carrying or supplying the gun or threatening the cashier. We can all acknowledge that in the brutal murder of Stephen Lawrence a group was closely involved in the killing.
Interestingly, if you look back to the ancient history of the law, which was explained by the noble Lord, Lord Finkelstein, in a Times article a couple of years ago, it also brings home that things can be complicated but people can be equally guilty. It began, apparently, with duelling aristocrats in the 18th century. The courts hit on the idea of reducing the number of duels by making seconds and surgeons liable for murder alongside the principals, so once more we can blame the hereditaries for everything that has gone wrong since—that was a joke.
It is important to stress that this is not about getting the guilty off the hook because behind each of these joint enterprise cases, the victims of crime, the families of those brutally killed, must not be forgotten, but justice for them is ill-served by overcriminalisation or overpunishment of the wrong culprits.
I want to use a couple of examples. Faisal Fiaz found out about the murder that he “committed” at the same time as everyone else because he saw it on social media. He did not know beforehand that there had been a murder because he was waiting in the back of a car as two of his colleagues in the drugs gang he was involved in went round the corner intending to steal cannabis from a local dealer. I want to stress that Faisal was no angel—he was involved in the drugs trade; he was a teenager in a gang—but he did not know that his gang accomplices were carrying a knife or that they had gone on to stab the dealer to death. The stabber fled the country to Pakistan and is still at large, whereas Faisal was jailed for life, with a minimum of 23 years, without any compelling evidence of intent or knowledge of the crime about to happen or even that it had happened. His presence in the vicinity and guilt by association was deemed enough to suggest to the CPS that he contributed to the murder in such a way that he is in prison for life. He was punished as harshly as he would have been had he wielded the knife, but I do not think that was the original intention, which was for the heist gone wrong or a duel.
That seems to be the crucial weakness in the current law of joint enterprise: the courts seem indifferent to the precise contribution to the crime of the accused, and this breaks the link between any action and accountability for that action. In this context, of course evidential standards are watered down and can even be dispensed with.
I was struck listening to Joseph Appiah, who was part of a group that clashed with rival schoolboys when he was 15. He was 200 yards away from the fatal stabbing of a 16 year-old. He did not stab the victim, nor did he see the stabbing, and he assumed that that would all be taken into account. He said:
“I didn’t see it, I didn’t know what happened and I can account for where I was, I could prove it. I always thought, well, you know, I didn’t do it, so when all the evidence comes out, eventually they will see the light, but that’s not how it went”.
Despite no DNA or evidence that he was directly involved or that he saw the act or knew that a knife was involved, he was found as culpable as the teenager who did in fact commit a stabbing.
Understandably, people conclude that the law of joint enterprises is so loosely interpreted by the criminal justice system because it makes it easier to secure convictions. It removes the faff of investigation, evidence gathering, proof beyond reasonable doubt and so on. In other words, it fuels cynicism in criminal justice. There are also side injustices created by the courts wielding joint enterprise as a blunt instrument. Fear of being convicted that way means that defence barristers have been known to persuade innocent clients to plead guilty to lesser charges such as GBH to avoid a trial of joint enterprise.
All these problems are well known, as we have heard. Back in 2016, the Supreme Court ruled that the law around joint enterprise had taken a wrong turn and been used wrongly for three decades. The court thought that it was rightly restoring the proper law of targeting those who intended to commit or assist in a serious crime. But, as we are all too aware, Supreme Court clarifications are not always used to rectify wrong readings of the law—the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies has revealed that, in the three years leading up to the ruling in 2016, 522 individuals were charged, but in the three years afterwards, 547 were.
As others have noted, reform of joint enterprise has gone as far as it is possible for it to go in the courts, and it now needs a change in the law. I give credit to Kim Johnson MP, who has used her voice in the other place to draw attention to this and inspire us all. Her attempts have failed so far, but the Government should now grab this chance, here in Committee, to right this wrong.
I have some qualms with one part of this debate, however, which is the implication that this is an actively racist law, or, to quote Jimmy McGovern, that its purpose is allegedly
“to keep scum off the streets, that’s how I think the police see it. That’s how they see all these young people – as scum”.
I loved Jimmy McGovern’s powerful 2014 drama “Common”, but I do not think that that is what is going on here. Joint enterprise has been used by many in good faith to try to tackle the scourge and blight of gang violence.
Yes, young Black people are 16 times more likely to be prosecuted for joint enterprise—there were also lots of young people, with 14% between the ages of 14 and 17 and 40% between 18 and 24, and 93% of defendants were male—but let us be honest: there is a real problem of young Black men stabbing each other. I live in Wood Green in Haringey, and it is real and it is not racist to note it. It is something we have to take into account.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
We need them to understand that the criminal justice system is not targeting them personally for crime but is fair and proportionate. That is what we should do.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I support Amendment 486 and thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, for his excellent introduction to it, which was very clear to follow.
Over the decades, thousands of people have been wrongly jailed for life in appalling miscarriages of justice because of the use of joint enterprise to charge those present with the commission of a serious crime. Sometimes that might be someone who was present and thought they were going to be involved in a low-level crime, whereas they had no involvement at all in the actual violence or murder committed by another but were still charged under joint enterprise as if they had also committed the act of violence or murder. That is very similar to the example that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, gave us.
Even worse, there are those who have been jailed for murder simply because they were present at the act of murder, although they had not been members of the gang involved. Over the last 15 years, this House has seen various amendments and had debates and questions trying to correct and clarify when charges should or should not be used for those who did not commit serious acts of violence. As has already been mentioned, a decade ago the Supreme Court recognised that joint enterprise had been used repeatedly and incorrectly in many cases, but nothing has really changed since then. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for quoting the figures for the three years before and after 2016, because that judgment has not changed the numbers either.
The key questions addressed by the Supreme Court, including what qualifies as assistance and encouragement, remain obfuscatory. It is still not clear whether presence at a serious crime is in itself enough. I will not repeat the data that the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and others have mentioned in the briefing we got from Joint Enterprise Not Guilty by Association. I differ slightly from the view of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. It is quite notable that over 50% of those prosecuted are not just young Black men and women, but there is also substantial overrepresentation of disabled and neurodivergent people, as well as many under 25. I might understand the last, but not the others on their own.
The proposal of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, would completely change the approach to considering who has been involved in serious crime. The amendment would ensure that, rather than guessing the individual's state of mind, associations and foresight of what might occur, the CPS must look at actual material actions, making that the baseline objective threshold for prosecution. I hope that the Minister is finally prepared to change the injustice in the use of joint enterprise and start a new era based on facts, not suppositions.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I fully support this amendment. I agree effectively with every word that has fallen from the lips of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and my noble friend Lady Brinton, and almost every word uttered by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. I hope that the Government will listen and give careful consideration to this amendment.
The law of joint enterprise has long been unsatisfactory. It was substantially improved by the decision of the Supreme Court in the Jogee case, as explained by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. The present state of the law in the light of Jogee is that an offence is committed by an accessory only if the defendant charged as an accessory intended to assist the principal in the commission of the offence. Even so, the law is still unsatisfactory and unclear, as extensively supported by the academic evidence cited by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and it sorely needs reform.
The phrase “significant contribution” to the commission of the offence used in the amendment is apt. It would overcome the difficulties mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, with the Court of Appeal’s position on the related accessory offences of procurement. The phrase has been proposed by the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies and widely by academics. It was the phrase used in Kim Johnson’s Private Member’s Bill, which was supported by, among others, Sir Bob Neill, who was then chair of the Justice Select Committee, and therefore one presumes by the committee itself.
While the expression may in some ways seem vague, it sets exactly the type of test that juries can and do recognise and regularly apply, rather similarly to the test for dishonesty used in relation to Theft Act offences. The amendment would make an offence of being an accessory much more comprehensible and justifiable than the present test. The present test, I suggest, focuses disproportionately on the mental element of accessory liability, whereas the amendment would focus on the actual contribution of the accessory to the commission of the offence.
There is considerable cause for concern that joint enterprise law in its operation is discriminatory. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, mentioned the research showing that Black people are 16 times more likely to be prosecuted on the basis of joint enterprise than white people. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, mentioned the same research. What neither mentioned is that that staggering figure—I suggest that it is staggering—was based on the CPS’s own figures for 2023.
I accept that there may be cultural issues, as mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, but they have to be judged against the caution that was mentioned by my noble friend Lady Brinton. There is also serious evidence of unjustified, unwarranted group prosecution. There is significant concern about evidence of racial bias and the risk of guilt by association in consequence. The point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox—that it sometimes may seem easier to prosecute for joint enterprise than by establishing individual guilt—is, or may be, justified. Concerns about guilt by association and gang involvement are entirely legitimate. I think they are shared by the public, and they are evidenced by the clear examples we have heard today. They evidence a lack of principle in prosecution and in the application of the law.
In evidence to the Leveson review, Keir Monteith KC and Professor Eithne Quinn from the University of Manchester argued that joint enterprise was overused. They went so far as to say that it contributed, as inevitably statistically it does, to the growth of the backlogs. They cited the trial of seven Black teenagers in 2022 who were accused of murder, where the prosecution accepted that they could not be sure who stabbed the victim, but asserted that all of those who went to the park where the killing occurred
“shared responsibility, at the very least contributing to the force of numbers”.
That was an inaccurate or, at the very least, incomplete statement of the law in the light of Jogee. Six of the seven defendants were acquitted, but the fact that they were tried and went through the period that they did prior to trial highlights the confused state of the law, which makes the essential ingredients of the offence difficult for jurors and sometimes even prosecutors to understand.
We should also take into account, particularly given the delays in bringing trials to court, the serious risk of charges based on joint enterprise leading to defendants who are ultimately acquitted being held on remand, as one of the seven defendants in the case I mentioned was for no less than 14 months.
Finally, I have a technical point that was mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, to whom I had mentioned it. While I support the amendment completely, it needs to be reworded or supplemented to cover summary offences. That is because, as a result of the amendment of Section 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 by the Criminal Law Act 1977, the accessory offence under the 1861 Act applies only to indictable offences—offences that are either indictable only or triable either way. A parallel amendment to Section 44(1) of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 is required to cover summary offences. There is no justification for distinguishing between them. With that rather academic point, I hope that the Government will act on this.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier for bringing forward this amendment and for the care and intellectual rigour with which he has set out the case for revisiting the law on joint enterprise. He has laid out a clear case for why this area of criminal law generates much concern, not least because of the length of sentences involved and the understandable anxiety about culpability and clarity in attributing criminal responsibility.
My noble and learned friend has, rightly, reminded the Committee of the complex and often unsettled journey that this area of law has taken, from the missteps identified by the Supreme Court in Jogee through to more recent Court of Appeal decisions, which some commentators argue have again widened liability in ways that risk injustice. His concerns about overcriminalisation and the potential for convictions where an individual’s role is marginal are serious points that deserve careful reflection. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s thoughts on them.
That said, while I welcome this debate and acknowledge the force of many of the arguments advanced, I am not persuaded that this amendment provides the right statutory solution at this stage. The introduction of a requirement that an accessory must have made a “significant contribution” to the commission of an offence raises difficult questions of definition and application. What amounts to “significant” is not self-evident. If left undefined, it would inevitably fall to the courts to develop meaning over time through case law, creating precisely the uncertainty and inconsistency that this amendment seeks to address. Alternatively, attempting to define “significant contribution” exhaustively in statute risks rigidity and unintended consequences across a wide range of factual scenarios. Tied to this, there is currently a wealth of case law that can be applied by the courts when considering joint enterprise. This case law would be made redundant in many scenarios if the law were to be changed by this amendment, which would surely not be desirable.
I believe that my noble and learned friend acknowledges that this amendment may not be the only way, or even the best way, but rather uses it as a probing amendment to draw attention to the problem. There is clearly an ongoing need to ensure that the law of secondary liability remains anchored to principles of intention, causation and moral culpability and that juries are properly directed to distinguish between meaningful participation and mere presence.
However, given the Law Commission’s ongoing review of homicide and sentencing, which includes consideration of joint enterprise in light of Jogee, I am cautious about pre-empting that work with a statutory change that may generate further ambiguity. Reform in this area must be evidence based and coherent. While I welcome the discussion sparked by this amendment and commend my noble and learned friend for his persistence in pursuing clarity and justice, I cannot lend the amendment my support today. However, I hope the Government will reflect carefully on the concerns raised and indicate how they intend to ensure that the law on joint enterprise is both fair and clearly understood.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, Amendment 486 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, raises an issue that has long troubled the criminal justice system. I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord for giving me sight of his speech in advance.
The criminal liability of secondary parties is an important but sometimes controversial concept in the law, and the Government acknowledge the anxiety over the consequences for those prosecuted and convicted as a result of the application of the rule. On the one hand, there are very real and understandable concerns. First, we recognise the anxiety that this has a disproportionate effect on young people and on those from certain ethnic groups. Secondly, it is a matter of serious concern that the law is widely misunderstood. For example, I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, in relation to her powerful speech, but in fact she said several things that were not quite right. For example, we have no law of collective responsibility, and mere presence without more is never enough to convict. Even lawyers and judges sometimes struggle with the application of this concept, as any of your Lordships who attempted to follow the limpid explanation of the law in this area from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, may well understand.
On the other hand, and seriously, it must be remembered that the reason why the rule exists is to ensure that it is possible to prosecute those who take part in group crimes—often, but not always, crimes of violence. Please remember that if your son or daughter was attacked by a large group, one of whom may have held the weapon, but others of whom were assisting and encouraging, you would want the entire group to face justice—more so if, because it was not possible to distinguish which of the many feet was kicking the victim, you could not prosecute any of them because you could not show which foot in fact delivered the fatal blow among the others which contributed to it. This is what, among other things, the doctrine of joint enterprise is there to cover.
I appreciate that the noble and learned Lord’s amendment is intended to probe the Government’s position. While the intention behind the amendment is understandable, as drafted, we believe that there are flaws in it which mean that it is not acceptable and would cause more difficulties than it solved for the courts which have to apply it. The issues about which the Government have concerns include the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, about what would count as “significant”. For example, is purchasing the weapon or acting as a lookout significant? What about shouting encouragement or driving the getaway car? You could not just leave this to a jury to decide, because then there would be a real risk of unacceptable disparities in decisions made on the same facts. In one part of the country, acting as a lookout could mean you were guilty of murder, but in another part, on the same facts, you would be acquitted. You could even get those results in courtrooms next door to each other in the same building. Such uncertainty would make prosecutions in group violence cases pretty much impossible, as well as leading to verdicts which would not command public confidence.
There are further issues, one of which has been identified by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, in relation to the magistrates’ court, but the amendment does not apply to the full range of offences because it does not address how it interacts with other forms of secondary liability, such as encouraging or assisting a crime under the Serious Crime Act 2007. The noble and learned Lord’s summary of the development of the law pre and post the landmark case of Jogee in 2016 illustrates, I venture to say, the great complexity of this area, but I reassure your Lordships that the Government are listening.
Mention has been made of the few important pieces of work that are going on in this area. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, has said, the Law Commission’s review of homicide offences and sentencing for murder is considering the implications of the current law on joint enterprise. I note the noble and learned Lord’s concerns about the length of time, but I should make it clear that the Law Commission is an independent body—in a sense, that is part of the point of it—which decides how to run its projects. It is not looking at joint enterprise on its own but at how joint enterprise is related to homicide offences and sentencing. One of the things it is considering is whether we should adopt a first and second degree murder to reflect the different roles played in sentencing, if not necessarily in conviction for a particular offence. As the noble and learned Lord will know, there is a significant interaction between the categorisation of homicide offences, the impact of partial defences and mandatory sentencing requirements, which makes separating out of these aspects of the report more complex.
Secondly, the Law Commission’s review of criminal appeals is examining if or how historic convictions are considered, which is a key area of concern for many people. Thirdly, the CPS has been consulting on its policies on gang-related prosecutions. This includes the controversial use of drill and rap music as evidence. It is also improving data collection on joint enterprise cases. As a number of your Lordships have referred to, last September, the CPS published its first annual data report on joint enterprise homicide and attempted homicide cases. The Government also recognise the important work of the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Miscarriages of Justice and the Westminster Commission, in which the noble and learned Lord is involved. I need not remind him that it is in the process of taking evidence and considering reform of joint enterprise, and we look forward to its report.
So, while the Government recognise the concerns about joint enterprise, and work is under way to address these issues, we cannot support this amendment today for the reasons I have given, and I invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
Can I just ask the Minister to reconsider, or at least explain, her argument that it is significant in this regard that different juries might come to different conclusions on the same or similar facts in different parts of the country, on one day or another? Is not her experience as a judge that that is an everyday event? Does she not consider that that is one reason why juries do not give reasons and are not asked for their reasons for any given decision that they make? Because it is a fact of life that we all accept.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
Not giving reasons is of course one of the criticisms that is sometimes made of jury trials. In the Government’s view, the wider and broader concept in the current law of an act of assistance or encouragement, combined with the intention to assist or encourage, gives a broad enough scope to allow juries to look at the conditions in every different case—whereas, when you are saying a “significant contribution”, it would be a matter of value judgment for particular juries as to whether they thought that a lookout was a significant contribution or not. For that reason, we think it would introduce significant uncertainty and significant risk of disparity in verdicts.
Lord Garnier (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. It has been, for me, an interesting and educational 55 minutes and I hope that the Government will have found it so as well. Although the Law Commission is of course an independent body, I dare say it might be sent a copy of this evening’s debate, which might encourage it to accelerate the way in which it is looking at this admittedly difficult and complicated question. I do not think that any of us who have spoken this evening thinks it is an easy question.
I thank the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox and Lady Brinton, and my noble friend on the Front Bench Lord Davies of Gower for their thoughtful and useful—I do not say “useful” in a demeaning way; I genuinely mean it—contributions to this debate, because it is, as I have said, difficult. The Minister was the first to accept that. She and I—and perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and others—will have summed up to juries and directed juries on the question of joint enterprise in one case or another. I dare say, at Snaresbrook Crown Court, there were probably quite a lot of difficult cases that had to be dealt with. However, I do not accept the Minister’s suggestion that juries would find it difficult, or that it would create other sorts of difficulties, to work out what “significant contribution” means.
Juries can work out, following proper direction from the judge, how to deal with actions taken in self-defence. You could get a different set of facts which would allow the defence to run, whereas, in other cases, it would not. Significant contribution is not a difficult concept, and it is not one that 12 members of a jury, when properly directed by the judge and having heard arguments from the lawyers for the respective parties, the prosecution and the defence, could not grapple with. They could. One has to think not just about “significant contribution”: let us work out what “no contribution” means. What does “insignificant contribution” mean? It strikes me that by simply posing those questions, one should not be frightened of the “significant contribution” question.
As I say, I understand the public policy, I understand the politics and I understand that my Government in the past, and now this Government, are worried about being seen to be weak on crime. For goodness’ sake, we have heard that record played year in, year out. But I hope that this evening’s short discussion will encourage others outside Parliament to keep pressing their arguments, both in court and academically. I hope that those who have taken part in this debate will continue to press for reform in this area. And I hope that the Law Commission, if it is listening, will accelerate its process.
It is now nearly 7.15 pm on a Thursday and it is almost a capital offence to talk in Committee stage on a Thursday at this hour. So I will bring my remarks to a conclusion by finally repeating my thanks to all those who have taken part. I beg the leave of the Committee to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Cromwell
“Use of drone technology: offence(1) A person commits an offence if they use drone technology to—(a) conduct reconnaissance of land or buildings with the intent of committing a further crime, or(b) carry items including controlled drugs, stolen goods, illegal weapons, harmful substances, or other items intended for illegal use in respect of people, property or good order. (2) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (1) is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale;(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine (or both).”
Lord Cromwell (CB)
My Lords, I have just been informed by the noble Lord, Lord Garnier, that I am about to commit almost a criminal offence by speaking at all. “We few, we happy few”. I will be as quick as I can. I start by thanking the Ministers, the noble Lords, Lord Hanson and Lord Hendy, for their kind assistance in considering this amendment, and the former’s very helpful letter to me of 29 January.
Drone technology has transformed many aspects of life and it would be foolish to suppose that it would not be used by criminals as part of their activities across the world. The technology continues to evolve, to become autonomous and t be coupled with AI. Legislation, almost by definition, cannot keep pace with such evolving technologies. While noble Lords will be relieved to know that I am not going to tilt at AI windmills tonight, I put down this amendment to highlight the abuse of drones for criminal purposes just for reconnaissance and for illegal deliveries. I have been on the receiving end of the former, finding drones buzzing around business premises to scope out what machinery or products are stored there which criminals can later return to steal. I understand that drones are similarly used along railways, for example, to look for copper wiring to steal.
The Minister’s letter of 29 January argues that the necessary law is, on paper, largely there, and that the real challenge lies in practical enforcement. His letter explains that, while technically it may be possible to show that someone is, under the Theft Act 1968, committing the offence of “going equipped for stealing”, reconnaissance as such is nevertheless not a criminal offence, essentially because it is very hard to prove intent. I entirely accept this, and also the Minister’s point that it would not be practical or proportionate to create no-fly zones over every possible target of theft.
However, I worry about people who feel unprotected when drones are routinely flown over domestic, commercial or public property in a way that is plainly intrusive and potentially preparatory to crime. It seems that nothing can be done. They and the police must stand off and wait until an act of criminality under existing laws is committed. I suspect that we may, in that case, see people start to take the law into their own hands.
As regards the use of drones as a means of delivery, their use to get drugs and other items into prisons is already well known, but there is a growing and wider use of drones as a delivery service for illegal items elsewhere. I was recently told about a delivery drone seen regularly flying back and forth between a drug dealer’s hilltop house and the settlement below.
The Minister’s letter encouragingly points out that new regulations now require drones to be equipped with what is called direct remote identification, which works like a digital number-plate that can be detected, apparently by anybody with a smartphone, who can then report this to the police.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, as the Home Secretary observed in the recent White Paper, policing has not always kept pace with a rapidly changing world. Airspace has indeed become a new frontier for both opportunistic and organised crime. Drones are now being used by burglars and organised gangs as near-silent scouts, identifying empty homes, weak locks or high-value items through windows. The law can, of course, address the burglary that follows, but it struggles to capture the preceding act of reconnaissance. This is particularly relevant to rural crime, where drones are acting as the advance guard for the theft and export of GPS equipment.
In our prisons, drones are described by residents as “almost routine”, delivering drugs, phones and weapons straight into exercise yards. Ministry of Justice data shows more than 1,700 drone incidents in a single year. That fuels violence and instability across the estate. However, as the Justice Committee pointed out last October, the problem is not only the drones but the conditions that allow them in: broken windows, unmaintained netting and faulty CCTV. Creating a new offence may have value, but it cannot by itself remedy years of underinvestment in the prison system.
I want to raise two further concerns. The first is an operational one. With core capital grants under severe strain, how can we realistically expect overstretched forces to invest in drone detection and countersurveillance technology? Secondly, until national integration plans are fully delivered, data on drone incursions will remain largely trapped in 43 police silos, leaving us blind to the wider intelligence picture.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, for tabling his amendment. We entirely understand the intention behind it and support its aim.
In government, we gave police forces the power to intercept or seize drones suspected of being used to break the law, and those that attempt to smuggle drugs or weapons into prisons. Before the 2024 election, we announced our intention to implement no-fly zones around prisons, extending the current provisions over airports. We therefore entirely support the aim of prohibiting drone use for criminal ends. Using drone technology as a reconnaissance tool for a crime is self-evidently wrong and that should be reflected in the law.
Similarly, using drones to carry drugs, stolen goods, weapons, harmful substances or anything similar must be tackled by the police. For the police to do so, they must be given the means. Nowhere is this more evident than in prisons, where drugs and weapons are being transported in by drones in order to run lucrative illegal businesses. Reports suggest that some offenders are deliberately breaking probation terms in order to sell drugs in jail, where they can make more money. Anything that enables this must be stamped out. If drones are indeed a means of transport for many of these drugs, we should target those who operate the drones and play a part in criminal enterprises. I hope that the Minister recognises this problem and will agree with me that the amendment is entirely correct in its aims.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, for setting out the case for his amendment. In tabling the amendment, he wrote to my noble friend Lord Hanson of Flint and to my noble friend Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill at the Department for Transport on the issue.
I think across the Committee we share the same concerns. I stress that the Government take the issue of the use of drones to facilitate illegal activity extremely seriously. However, my noble friend Lord Hanson of Flint set out in his letter to the noble Lord that the challenges of responding to these are not gaps in our criminal law so much as limitations on the practical enforcement tools available and in regulation to improve the visibility and compliance of drones. We are working to address these issues by supporting the development of counter-drone technologies and operational approaches, and ensuring regulations are in place that enable the legitimate use of drones while assisting operational responders in identifying illegitimate users.
Amendment 486A seeks to criminalise the use of drones for criminal reconnaissance and the carrying of illicit substances. The act of criminal reconnaissance is not in itself currently an offence, as proving intent, prior to an act being committed or without substantive additional evidence, would be extremely difficult for prosecutors. Criminal reconnaissance using a drone encounters the same issue. It would be impractical and disproportionate to arrest anyone for taking photos of a property or site, or for piloting a drone. In both instances, the act of reconnaissance would not be practically distinguishable from legitimate everyday actions, making the proposed offence effectively unenforceable. Where intent could be proven, it is likely that such acts could be prosecuted under existing legislation—for example, the offence of going equipped for stealing in Section 25 of the Theft Act 1968.
The carrying of illicit materials, whether it is in and out of prisons or elsewhere at large, is already an offence, regardless of a drone’s involvement. There is already a comprehensive regime of offences relating to the possession and supply of drugs, weapons and other illicit materials. I do not think that the amendment would address any gaps in the criminal law.
The Government have already made changes to the unmanned aircraft regulations to require drones to be equipped, as the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, set out, with direct remote identification, which will improve visibility and accountability of compliant drones. This system will allow drones to broadcast identification and location information in-flight and will help identify drone operators who may be acting suspiciously or breaking the law.
I share the sentiment of the noble Lord and the Committee in seeking to curtail the use of drones for criminal purposes. However, for the reasons I have outlined, I ask that he withdraw his amendment and let me sit down—as I have a cough.
Lord Cromwell (CB)
My Lords, I thank everyone who has taken part; I am not going to namecheck—you all know who you are.
It would be an act of cruelty to encourage the Minister, with his cough, to say anything further. I was tempted to ask him to go into a lot more detail, but I do not think that is a good idea.
I suspect we may need to come back to this issue as drone technology continues to advance. I cannot resist mentioning that, more locally, the large giraffe fence that is erected in front of this building will be absolutely no defence against a drone attack—so let us hope it does not come. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Katz
“(za) sections 40 and 41;(zb) section (Child criminal exploitation prevention orders: Scotland and Northern Ireland)(1) and Schedule (CCE prevention orders: Scotland);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment gives the Scottish Ministers power to make regulations containing provision consequential on the specified provisions.
“(aa) section (Pornographic images of strangulation or suffocation: Scotland);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment gives the Scottish Ministers power to make regulations containing provision consequential on the specified new clause (inserted after clause 84).
“(aa) sections (Child sexual abuse image-generators: Scotland) and (Possession of advice or guidance about child sexual abuse or CSA images: Scotland);” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment gives the Scottish Ministers power to make regulations containing provision consequential on the specified new clauses (inserted after clauses 63 and 64).
“(za) section (Duty to report remote sale of knives etc in bulk: Northern Ireland);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment gives the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland power to make regulations containing amendments consequential on my new clause, (Duty to report remote sale of knives etc in bulk: Northern Ireland), inserted after clause 36.
“(za) sections 40 and 41;(zb) section (Child criminal exploitation prevention orders: Scotland and Northern Ireland)(2) and Schedule (CCE prevention orders: Northern Ireland);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment gives the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland power to make regulations containing provision consequential on the specified provisions.
“(aa) section (Pornographic images of strangulation or suffocation: England and Wales and Northern Ireland);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment gives the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland power to make regulations containing provision consequential on the specified new clause (inserted after clause 84).
“(aa) section (Child sexual abuse image-generators: Northern Ireland);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment gives the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland power to make regulations containing provision consequential on the specified new clause (inserted after clause 63).
“(ca) section (Child abduction: Northern Ireland);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment gives the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland power to make regulations containing provision consequential on the specified new clause (inserted after clause 104).
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the new power of the Secretary of State to amend the list of prevention orders in clause 51 (inserted by my amendment to clause 51, page 68, line 30) is subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for regulations made by the Secretary of State under the specified new clauses (inserted after clause 84) to be subject to the affirmative procedure.
“(c) regulations under paragraph 10(4) of Schedule (CCE prevention orders: Scotland).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the new power of the Scottish Ministers to amend the list of prevention orders in paragraph 10 of the new Schedule about CCE prevention orders in Scotland (inserted after Schedule 5) is subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.
“(c) regulations under paragraph 10(6) of Schedule (CCE prevention orders: Northern Ireland).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the new power of the Department of Justice to amend the list of prevention orders in paragraph 10 of the new Schedule about CCE prevention orders in Northern Ireland (inserted after Schedule 5) is subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adjusts provision about regulations made by the Welsh Ministers to take account of Part 2A of the Legislation (Wales) Act 2019 (which is inserted by the Legislation (Procedure, Publication and Repeals) (Wales) Act 2025).
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, these are minor and technical amendments to the process by which Welsh Ministers will make regulations under powers conferred by the Bill. Recent legislation passed by the Senedd created “Welsh Statutory Instruments”, which are subject to three kinds of procedure in the Senedd that are similar to the affirmative and negative procedures followed in this place. These two amendments simply update the Bill’s provisions to reflect this new process, ensuring that the regulation-making power conferred on the Welsh Ministers by Clause 192 reflects the provisions of the Legislation (Wales) Act 2019 as recently amended. I beg to move.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this is a short and uncontroversial amendment. The 15 days in Committee we have had on the Bill have been a very long but important process, and I thank all the noble Lords on the Front Bench opposite for the many hours dedicated to the Bill so far. The amendment makes an amendment to the regulation-making powers of Welsh Ministers in consequence of the Legislation (Procedure, Publication and Repeals) (Wales) Act 2025, and for that reason I have no objection.
“(8) Regulations made by the Welsh Ministers under section 192 are subject to the Senedd annulment procedure (see section 37E of the Legislation (Wales) Act 2019 (anaw 4)).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adjusts provision about regulations made by the Welsh Ministers to take account of Part 2A of the Legislation (Wales) Act 2019 (which is inserted by the Legislation (Procedure, Publication and Repeals) (Wales) Act 2025).
““regulations” means regulations under any provision of this Act except section 201.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendments to clause 201, page 232, lines 25 and 35.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes section 40(5), which should extend to England and Wales only, from a list of provisions having UK extent.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for Schedule 7 (which lists the offences to which clause 65 applies) to have UK extent.
“(ja) section (Pornographic images of strangulation or suffocation: England and Wales and Northern Ireland) (5);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the amendment to the Online Safety Act 2023 in the specified new clause (inserted after clause 84) extends to the whole of the UK.
“(ja) sections (Obscenity etc offences: technology testing defence) and (Technology testing defence: meaning of “relevant offence”);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for the specified new clauses (inserted after clause 84) to have UK extent.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that clause 36(1), which inserts new section 141D of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, extends to England and Wales and Scotland. At present it extends only to England and Wales.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the subsections of the specified new clause (inserted after clause 84) that amend the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 extend to England and Wales and Northern Ireland.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for the specified provisions of my new clause (Duty to report remote sale of knives etc in bulk: Northern Ireland), inserted after clause 36, to extend to Northern Ireland only.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the subsection introducing the new Schedule about CCE prevention orders for Northern Ireland (inserted after Schedule 5) extends to Northern Ireland only.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the specified new clause (inserted after clause 105) extends to Northern Ireland only.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the specified new clause (inserted after clause 104) extends to Northern Ireland only.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the new subsection inserted by my amendment to clause 94, page 121, line 17 extends to Northern Ireland only.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for the specified new clauses to extend to Northern Ireland.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the new Schedule about CCE prevention orders for Northern Ireland (inserted after Schedule 5) extends to Northern Ireland only.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the subsection introducing the new Schedule about CCE prevention orders for Scotland (inserted after Schedule 5) extends to Scotland only.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the specified new clause (inserted after clause 84) extends to Scotland only.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the new Schedule about CCE prevention orders for Scotland (inserted after Schedule 5) extends to Scotland only.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment gives clause 28(2) the same extent as the provisions it amends, with the effect of allowing trial on indictment in Scotland for an offence under section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
“(ba) section 36(2);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for clause 36(2) to have the same extent as the provision it amends. It is related to my second amendment to clause 200, page 230, line 29, which provides for new section 141D to extend to Scotland as well as England and Wales.
“(ba) section (Duty to report remote sale of knives etc in bulk: Northern Ireland)(4);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for the specified provision to have the same extent as the provision it amends.
“(ca) section (Child sexual abuse image-generators: Scotland);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for the specified new clause (inserted after clause 63) to have the same extent as the provisions it amends.
“(ca) section (Child sexual abuse image-generators: Northern Ireland);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for the specified new clause (inserted after clause 63) to have the same extent as the provisions it amends.
“(da) section (Possession of advice or guidance about child sexual abuse or CSA images: Scotland)”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for the specified new clause (inserted after clause 64) to have the same extent as the provisions it amends.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes clause 195 (extradition) from the list of provisions that come into force on Royal Assent. The effect is that it will be commenced by regulations under clause 201(1).
“(ba) sections (Obscenity etc offences: technology testing defence) and (Technology testing defence: meaning of “relevant offence”);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for the specified new clauses (inserted after clause 84) to come into force 2 months after Royal Assent.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 94, page 121, line 17.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for the Scottish Ministers to make commencement regulations rather than commencement orders.
“(za) section (Duty to report remote sale of knives etc in bulk: Northern Ireland)(1) to (3), and section (Duty to report remote sale of knives etc in bulk: Northern Ireland)(4) so far as extending to Northern Ireland;” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for my new clause (Duty to report remote sale of knives etc in bulk: Northern Ireland), inserted after clause 36, to be commenced by order made by the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland.
“(za) section (Child sexual abuse image-generators: Northern Ireland) so far as extending to Northern Ireland;”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment gives the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland power to commence the specified new clause (inserted after clause 63) for Northern Ireland.
“(za) section (Child criminal exploitation prevention orders: Scotland and Northern Ireland)(2) and Schedule (CCE prevention orders: Northern Ireland);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment gives the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland power to commence the new provisions about child criminal exploitation prevention orders for Northern Ireland.
“(aa) section 94(3);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment gives the Department for Justice in Northern Ireland power to commence the provision inserted by my amendment to clause 94, page 121, line 17.
“(aa) sections (Stalking protection orders: Northern Ireland) and (Guidance about disclosure of information by police: Northern Ireland);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland to commence the specified new clauses.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment gives the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland power to commence the subsections of the specified new clause (inserted after clause 84) that amend the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, in so far as they extend to Northern Ireland.
“(ba) section (Child abduction: Northern Ireland);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment gives the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland power to commence the specified new clause (inserted after clause 104).
“(8A) Section (Safeguarding vulnerable groups: regulated activity (Northern Ireland)) comes into force on such day as the Department of Health in Northern Ireland may by order appoint.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment gives the Department of Health in Northern Ireland power to commence the specified new Clause (inserted after clause 105).
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment gives the Scottish Ministers power to commence the specified new clauses (inserted after clauses 63 and 64) for Scotland.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment gives the Scottish Ministers to commence the subsection introducing the new Schedule about CCE prevention orders for Scotland (inserted after Schedule 5).
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment gives the Scottish Ministers power to commence the specified new clause (inserted after clause 84).
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment gives the Scottish Ministers power to commence the new Schedule about CCE prevention orders (inserted after Schedule 5).
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for the Scottish Ministers to make commencement regulations rather than commencement orders.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendments to clause 201, page 232, lines 25 and 35.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 201, page 232, line 33, inserting a new subsection after subsection (8).
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendments to clause 201, page 232, lines 25 and 35.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 201, page 232, line 33, inserting a new subsection after subsection (8).
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 201, page 232, line 25.
Crime and Policing Bill
Wednesday 25th February 2026
(2 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 167-I(a) Amendments for Report (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (25 Feb 2026)
16:51 - Division on Amendment 1 - Ayes: 86 / Noes: 178 - Amendment 1 disagreed.
17:03 - Division on Amendment 7 - Ayes: 205 / Noes: 188 - Amendment 7 agreed.
18:37 - Division on Amendment 13 - Ayes: 213 / Noes: 150 - Amendment 13 agreed.
19:03 - Division on Amendment 18 - Ayes: 59 / Noes: 152 - Amendment 18 disagreed.
19:27 - Division on Amendment 27 - Ayes: 172 / Noes: 148 - Amendment 27 agreed.
Baroness Doocey
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment amends the test for imposing a respect order to require the court to be satisfied that it is necessary and proportionate to make the order for the purpose of preventing the respondent from engaging in anti-social behaviour.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I apologise to the House; I was not ready, but it is worth waiting for. This amendment would change the legal test for imposing a respect order, requiring the court to consider this step “necessary and proportionate”, and not merely “just and convenient”, in preventing a person engaging in anti-social behaviour. This small, targeted change would ensure that the test is more proportionately aligned with the potentially serious consequences of these quasi-criminal orders, since a breach can result in up to two years’ imprisonment. It would also better reflect the Government’s stated intention that these orders should be used to tackle the most persistent cases of anti-social behaviour.
As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, noted in Committee, these cases would be adequately covered by a “necessary and proportionate” framework. The Minister says that judges must already take necessity and proportionality into account under the Human Rights Act. If that is so, I struggle to see why that very safeguard cannot be placed transparently in the Bill. This is a critical point, given the well-documented failures of previous anti-social behaviour powers. The evidence shows that, in practice, vague legal tests not only lead to inconsistent decisions: they sometimes deter the courts from using orders.
A more rigorous test would also address concerns about systemic bias. Existing anti-social behaviour powers continue to fall more heavily on minority-ethnic and other disadvantaged groups. Without stronger safeguards, this will almost inevitably be repeated by respect orders. Tightening the test is a modest way to reduce that risk, and will provide greater clarity for all concerned—judges, counsel and victims—as well as those made subject to these orders. It also better aligns the order with the risk assessment duty already outlined in new Section J1 inserted by Clause 1.
In Committee a number of Peers expressed concern about judicial overreach, particularly with tools so sweeping that they can order somebody to do anything described. But the current broad and vague test will do nothing to solve this. In fact, it will make matters worse. The quasi-criminal nature of these orders will invite legal challenge, causing delay in already backlogged courts, potentially clogging the system with marginal cases while doing little for victims of persistent and ongoing anti-social behaviour. A clear necessity and proportionality requirement would sharpen the law, focus efforts on the worst cases and help ensure that respect orders become the tool of choice for serious or repeat anti-social behaviour, rather than just another broad but inconsistently used power added to an already confusing landscape.
I have one final point. In Committee we welcomed the Home Office’s plan to pilot these orders, only to be told that the Government had decided that this was no longer necessary. On that occasion, the Minister informed me that things change. However, since then things appear to have changed again: the latest policy paper says that respect orders will now be piloted before being rolled out nationally. That is obviously very welcome, but I hope that today the Minister can reassure the House that—in this matter, at least—there will be no further changes. One change I strongly advocate is that outlined in Amendment 1. If it sharpens the law, improves enforcement and offers greater protection against injustice for the price of a modest drafting alteration, why resist it? I beg to move.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I agree with everything said by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. As I understand the Government’s position, they accept that it would not be appropriate to impose such an order unless it is necessary and proportionate, and indeed that is the test applied by the European Convention on Human Rights, so the only question is whether the language of the Bill, and the Act that it will become, should reflect the true test. It seems to me, as it seems to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, highly appropriate that what is in the legislation should set out the true test. This has to be applied not just by judges but by police officers, local authorities, communities and everyone who is responsible for considering and enforcing this legislation. Let us put the true and proper test on the face of the Bill.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, there is a lot in this group. The Government are undoubtedly sincere in wanting to use the Bill to further tackle anti-social behaviour, and such moves to take on this blight on communities will certainly be popular. However, we have to pause a moment and say that there is already a plethora of tools on the statute book designed to tackle anti-social behaviour, and yet it does not seem to be improving. This is the group in which we need to ask why. Perhaps anti-social behaviour orders and injunctions in all their various guises, from community penalty notices to public spaces protection orders, are just not fit for purpose.
I fear that, instead of tackling this, the Government are taking an easy and performative route and affording the state even more of the same—with more draconian powers—under a different label, that of respect orders. They are doing all this with little clarity or evidence of efficacy. That is what the amendments in this group are designed to tackle. By and large, I support them all.
I tabled Amendment 6, which calls for an independent —I stress the word “independent”—review of existing powers under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, which should be published prior to the commencement of Sections 1 and 2 of the Act. As legislators, we have an obligation to take responsibility for assessing the impact of, and the evidence about, laws that we made in the past before we duplicate their weaknesses. We need to understand the pros and cons.
This review would look at solving the evidence gap. It is extraordinary that there is significant variation in data captured across relative authorities. Because ASBIs are locally administered in a patchwork of varied use, there is a worrying variation in the types and quality of data collected, the location of that data and the ability of that data to be extrapolated and shared internally or with relevant agencies where appropriate. This is surely a slap across the face of evidence-based policy-making, because without data it is not possible to adequately assess the effectiveness of behaviour orders and to fully understand any trends arising out of their imposition, enforcement or breach, including disproportionate impacts.
That is why Amendment 24 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, who is not in her place, which would require the Home Office to publish quarterly data, is so important, as well as Amendment 12 from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, which calls for an annual report. Both amendments positively try to tackle the limits of the availability of the evidence base, without which I do not know how we can make informed policy decisions.
At present, all the critiques of present behaviour orders are invaluably brought to us from sporadic academic research, FoI-based research led by the likes of Josie Appleton and her team at the Campaign for Freedom in Everyday Life, and the excellent campaign group Justice. They want their work to be made redundant by the Government; they want the Government and officialdom to do their work instead. If the Home Office does not understand its own legislative tools because it does not have the data, the misery of anti-social behaviour will remain untouched while the statute book grows.
I hope the Minister will listen to the front-line workers who have to implement and use these orders and who, reasonably, bemoan the lack of proper consultation with those who understand the ASBI regime in real life. I note the government amendment on consultation, which is welcome.
The majority of practitioners who Justice consulted believe that the new respect orders are unnecessary and replicate flawed laws already available. Only 6% conclude that they will improve outcomes for victims; 82% of respondents to the practitioners survey have called for the review of the existing 2014 Act and of existing powers prior to respect orders being introduced. There was unanimous agreement that the Government should address problems inherent in existing injunctions and orders before creating more, and that failure to properly consult has meant that opportunities to resolve problems with the way orders operate in practice, not on paper, and to increase their effectiveness have been missed. Surely the Minister will want and feel the need to understand why research shows that a significant proportion of CPNs and PSPOs are, for example, being overused for trivial activities, such as feeding the birds, honking horns, gathering in groups or idling in your car, or imposed in inappropriate circumstances against, too often, the homeless and the mentally ill, where the behaviour complained of falls far below the threshold of antisocial behaviour that the public are concerned about and that the 2014 Act was envisaged to tackle.
All that we are asking in these amendments is for the Minister to look at what has gone wrong so that we can improve it. Surely the Government are worried about the vastly varied use of existing orders, which creates a postcode lottery for victims and means that British citizens do not know what is allowed from one town to another. Conduct that is totally lawful in Lincoln might be subject to state sanction in Leeds. Surely such a differential variation in the volume of orders imposed, the type of orders imposed, the conditions imposed, and so on, undermines the rule of law that I know this Government strongly support. It makes enforcement dependent on the victim’s location, rather than circumstances, or on the perpetrator’s location, rather than precisely how they are behaving badly. This makes a mockery of the notion of all of us being equal under the law. A review would look at these problems and recommend practical solutions.
Amendments 1 and 3, especially, are important in relation to ensuring that respect orders are used only when necessary and in a proportionate way. We have already heard about that. I think this is very helpful, particularly in creating a right to appeal. I am worried that the statutory test and the language used for imposing these new respect orders are so broad that, rather than capturing behaviour that is serious and persistent in nature, they will criminalise more trivial behaviour. That these orders can be imposed on individuals without their knowledge and, most egregiously, for an indefinite duration—for example, until further notice—is why we need this appeals process. How is it fair or proportionate that an individual who has never been found guilty of an offence is required to comply with serious restrictions on their liberty and personal life indefinitely, yet someone convicted of an offence by the criminal justice system is at liberty and free of prohibitions once they reach the end of their defined term of sentence, or even sometimes before that these days? This is reminiscent of that stain on our justice system, the abolished and abominable IPP indefinite sentence, which caused such a scandal. Why would the Government now create these new, oppressive orders that flout the important principle that if individual lives are subject to state interference, they need to know how long the interference will last and when it will end?
Finally, I have added my name to Amendment 7, an excellent contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, on fixed-term penalty notices, based on the work of the Campaign for Freedom in Everyday Life. This, I hope, will ring true with any Labour Government, because ensuring that private companies dishing out on-the-spot fines for antisocial behaviour, and doing so to profit financially, is surely something that offends the Government’s values. There are concerns that antisocial behaviour orders have been corrupted for income generation and commercial purposes. With fines increasing so much under this Bill, surely that tendency will be turbocharged. I think it is something that the Government will want to tackle, because all the orders in Clause 4 being issued at such a low benchmark are likely to result in fines going up. I am worried that this will encourage councils to become trigger-happy with orders and so on.
I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, will remember, as I do, the scandal of Kingdom Security in north Wales in, I think, 2019, when councils including Conwy, Denbighshire, Flintshire, Gwynedd and Anglesey outsourced the collection of their on-the-spot fines to a private security group, Kingdom, which illustrated that the behaviour of the enforcers could well be seen as being far more anti-social than any of the behaviour of local residents for which they were supposed to be fining them. A grass-roots campaign attracted 8,000-plus members to its Facebook page and led to numerous protests all over north Wales, with the security group’s wardens accused of threatening, bullying and even stalking north Walians, following dog walkers and smokers at a distance just so they could catch them out and fine them. They expressly targeted the elderly and women and children; the tissue of one 95 year-old lady blew from her wheelchair to the ground, and she was fined.
Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)
My Lords, I shall speak to the amendment tabled in my name. As noble Lords know, I am terrible with the billion rules that we have in this place, so bear with me. This amendment would make a small change that would make a big difference to many residents around the country.
I shall try not to rehearse the arguments that I have made before, but we now need to reflect the reality of the housing situation in this country. With the Government’s mission to build 1.5 million homes, this reality will only become bigger—that many of our housing providers in the social sector are for-profit companies. It is a matter of fairness to make sure that the vulnerable residents that they are responsible for have the same access to the law that any resident would have, regardless of the legal structure of their landlord. To make that happen, I have proposed small changes to remove the particular words “non-profit private”. That would make a massive difference to these companies’ ability to keep people safe.
The law is at its best when it is clear and coherent. Good law should be comprehensive and unambiguous. If Parliament intends these powers to apply to housing providers, as I say, it should apply to all of them. This amendment would not alter the policy intent of the Bill but strengthen it, reinforcing the simple principle that tenants’ safety and accountability must be the same, regardless of where you live in the country. I recommend the amendment to the Government and ask for this tiny change to make sure that we can deliver safety for all our residents countrywide.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I shall speak to the amendments in my noble friend Lady Doocey’s name and mine, which seek to ensure that the Government’s new anti-social behaviour powers are grounded in evidence, proportionality and democratic accountability, as well as to other amendments in this group.
On these Benches, we do not dismiss the misery that persistent anti-social behaviour causes, but we remain deeply unconvinced that layering yet another complex civil order on to an already confused ASB framework is the right approach. As Justice has highlighted, respect orders risk duplicating existing powers, come with limited evidence of effectiveness and lack basic procedural safeguards. They rely on a weak civil standard of proof, yet they impose severe restrictions and carry a potential two-year prison sentence upon breach.
First, in Committee, we warned that the threshold of “just and convenient” is far too low for an order that can deprive a person of their liberty and exclude them from their home. I very much welcome what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, had to say in his observations on the European Convention on Human Rights. The Minister in Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, defended that language as “familiar” to the civil courts. However, he offered a chink of light, agreeing to examine the arguments for the wording in Amendment 1, “necessary and proportionate”, to ensure strict alignment with the Human Rights Act. I very much hope that his reflections have led him to accept this higher and safer threshold today, ensuring that these orders are not used merely for administrative expediency. We need an answer to the pilot or not-pilot question raised by my noble friend.
Secondly, I return to the issue of democratic accountability. Our Amendment 2 requires that the terms of respect orders and PSPOs must be subject to a full council vote. In his follow-up letter to me, following Committee, the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, rejected this, claiming that it would introduce delays and unnecessary bureaucracy. But democratic scrutiny of civil liberties is not an administrative delay; it is a constitutional necessity. The Government’s resistance to this directly contradicts the Local Government Association’s own statutory guidance, which recommends as best practice that final approval of a PSPO be undertaken at cabinet or full council level, to ensure openness and accountability.
Currently, research by the Campaign for Freedom in Everyday Life, formerly the Manifesto Club, shows that nearly half of all PSPOs are signed off by a single, often unelected, council officer, without any democratic vote. This lack of scrutiny has led to absurd and stigmatising orders banning innocuous activities. If full council approval is already recommended as best practice by the LGA, standardising it in legislation would not be an arduous delay; it would simply force all councils to meet the standard of transparency that the Government’s own guidance expects.
As regards Amendment 3, as I highlighted in Committee and in correspondence with the Minister, there is currently no formal means to directly appeal a PSPO FPN. Citizens feel pressured into paying unjust fines to avoid financial ruin. The Government’s move to increase the maximum fixed penalty notice for PSPO and CPN breaches to £500 is highly dangerous without statutory safeguards. In Committee, the Minister suggested that, if individuals feel a fine is unreasonable, they can simply make representations to the issuing agency. This is totally inadequate; there should be a formal right of appeal.
I turn to Amendment 7 in my name, which concerns fixed penalty notices for public space protection orders and community protection notices. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for her support in this respect and for her very extensive unpicking of these ASB powers. Under Clause 4, the Government are pushing ahead with a 400% increase to the maximum FPN for these breaches, raising it from £100 to a punitive £500. Without statutory safeguards, this will simply supercharge a system that is already widely abused. This new clause addresses the deeply concerning practice of fining for profit. It stipulates that neither an authorised person nor their employer may retain any financial benefit from the fixed penalty notices that they issue.
The Campaign for Freedom in Everyday Life’s Corruption of Punishment report exposes the grim reality of the modern enforcement market. Environmental and ASB enforcement is increasingly seen as a business. Local authorities are entering into contracts with private companies, boasting of “zero financial risk” while sharing the “surplus revenue” generated by fines. Guidance and formal representations are entirely inadequate when faced with the modern enforcement market. As the Campaign for Everyday Freedom’s research also highlights, 66 councils currently employ private companies to issue FPNs, and the standard model is that these companies retain a percentage of the income, often up to 100% until costs are recovered. This creates a direct perverse financial incentive to issue as many tickets as possible for innocuous actions.
As I have pointed out to the Minister, Defra has already issued strict guidance stating that private firms enforcing littering should not receive greater revenue from increasing the volume of penalties. It is entirely illogical not to apply the same statutory prohibition to anti-social behaviour enforcement. We must ban fining for profit in the Bill. It is a time to a put a statutory end to the revenue collection system masquerading as justice.
Finally, in Amendment 12, we have proposed an annual report on the use of these ASB powers, for all the reasons I have stated that were so well expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. I entirely understand that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, is trying to achieve something very similar in her amendment. We are all aiming for much greater transparency in the use of these ASB powers, and I very much hope that the Government will go for at least one of the proposals.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, it will come as no surprise to the Minister that these Benches maintain our opposition to the Government’s respect orders. We have heard, in Committee and today, many concerns about the new regime. Our concerns are slightly different from some of those expressed by other noble Lords, in that we oppose them because we view them as simply unnecessary.
In Committee, my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower asked the Minister what the true difference would be between respect orders and the current anti-social behaviour injunctions. The response confirmed that, in the Government’s view, the only difference is that breaching a respect order will be a criminal offence, whereas breaching an injunction is not a specified criminal offence. That may seem tougher on the surface, but, in reality, it will not make any difference. A person who breaches an ASB injunction can be prosecuted for contempt of court, as they have defied an order of the court; in addition, the power of arrest can be attached to the injunction under Section 4 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. Where that is the case, a police officer may arrest a person without warrant for breaching the terms of their injunction under Section 9(1) of that Act. Furthermore, an arrest warrant may be made by the court if the person who applied for the injunction believes the person has breached that injunction.
For all those reasons, therefore, a number of avenues exist for enforcement of these injunctions. But, even if the Government believe that creating a specific criminal offence is necessary, why not simply amend the ASB injunction regime to create that offence? Why introduce an entirely new regime? Having said all that, we are where we are. In Committee, the Minister responded to my noble friend’s criticism by stating that it was a manifesto commitment. I do accept this, and that is why I suspect they will pass today unhindered.
I turn briefly to some of the other amendments in this group. I have a rather specific concern about the requirement in Amendment 2, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that a respect order may be applied for only if the local authority has agreed to do so at a meeting of the full council. Subsection (8A) in his amendment states:
“A relevant authority may not make an application for a respect order … unless the relevant local authority has complied with the requirements … in subsection (8B).
However, the definition of relevant authority in new Section B1 includes
“the chief officer of police for a police area … the chief constable of the British Transport Police”,
and a number of other authorities, such as Transport for London. What this means is that, should the police wish to apply for a respect order, they must first seek the approval of the local council. I do wonder whether this might create an overly burdensome and time-consuming requirement.
Amendment 7 from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, is, however, something I do have sympathy for. In 2024, a record 14.4 million parking fines were issued, representing a 13% increase from the previous year. There are widespread concerns about unclear parking signage, faulty machines and companies using quotas to increase the number of fines they collect. Parking firms and, indeed, councils using fines based on spurious violations simply to make money is surely not right. Where a person has violated the rules, of course the use of penalty charge notices is justified, but we should not allow them to unfairly issue fines to those who do not deserve it.
Finally, and having been somewhat critical of respect orders, I say to the Minister that I welcome his Amendment 4. As much as I may think that respect orders are unnecessary, if we are to have them, it is welcome that the Secretary of State will be required to consult on the guidance they issue.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
It is good to be back, is it not? It feels like we have been away for ages and now here we are again, back for another session of interesting amendments to the Crime and Policing Bill. I am grateful to all noble Lords for tabling them.
As the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, recognised, respect orders are a Labour manifesto commitment. They are made for securing action on anti-social behaviour in our town centres across this country. We secured a mandate to implement them. I welcome the amendments and we will discuss them, but this is a core element of Labour government policy.
Lord Pannick (CB)
Would the Minister accept that it is very difficult ever to think of circumstances in which it would be appropriate for a court to impose a respect order, with all the implications that has for an individual, unless the court is satisfied that it is necessary and proportionate?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The noble Lord has made his point. I am trying to give the defence from the Government’s perspective. That is our view. He has made a reasonable point, but that is our view and I hope he accepts our comments on those issues in good faith.
On Amendment 2, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, will understand when I say that I agree with the points that he made. Amendment 2, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, is rather bureaucratic, in that the council must carry out a full public consultation prior to any application to the court for a respect order to be made.
I was leader of a council for some years. We had six or seven meetings per year. Does the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, really expect, in the event of this legislation becoming law, that the council would consider respect orders and agree them on a six or eight week basis, six times per year, before the police could go? I am with the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, on this one. Some areas undertake this as a matter of course as part of local practice, but there is no requirement for a public consultation prior to a public spaces protection order being implemented. It is certainly my and the Government’s view that such requirements would add an inappropriate and disproportionate barrier to respect order applications and delay important relief for ASB victims. I hope that, on reflection, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will agree with His Majesty’s Opposition and me. He may not, but I put that point to him for his consideration.
Amendment 3, again tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would add a provision for a respondent to appeal the making or variation of a respect order. I hope I can assure noble Lords that there are express provisions in the Bill that provide for an application to be made to vary or discharge a respect order. The ordinary rules of appeal will apply to decisions to grant a respect order or a refusal to vary or discharge an order. To be absolutely clear on this issue, decisions to grant or vary respect orders, as well as decisions not to grant or vary one, will be appealable through the usual avenues under Civil Procedure Rules. I hope that assists.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, for his Amendment 5. I know that he wished to speak to that in Committee. He seeks to add for-profit registered social housing providers to the list of relevant agencies that can apply for a respect order. I recognise the importance of relevant agencies having the tools to tackle anti-social behaviour, but we should exercise caution before extending these powers without more consideration. I say that in the spirit of friendship and co-operation with the noble Lord. The Home Secretary has a power to amend the list of relevant authorities that can apply for a respect order. If it is considered appropriate to add a for-profit registered social housing provider to the list then we can do that via secondary legislation after the Bill has achieved Royal Assent, but I would like to give more consideration to this point. This is not a “no”; it could be added later with more consideration. I hope that will at least help him in the discussions that he has had today.
Amendment 6 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, would require the Home Secretary, within six months of the Bill becoming law, to commission an independent review of the existing powers under the 2014 Act prior to introducing respect orders, housing injunctions or youth injunctions as a whole. Again, I go back to what I said to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel. It is a manifesto commitment that we fought the election on to improve anti-social behaviour responses, and one such response that we specifically put in the manifesto at the general election was respect orders. So, the idea that we wish to—
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
I rise just to clarify and to help the Minister. I would not want in any way to stop the Government implementing their manifesto promises. The aim of the review was not to stop respect orders; it was to suggest that the anti-social behaviour on the statute book was reviewed before respect orders were brought in, because the Government cannot learn what has gone wrong with the previous anti-social behaviour orders if they never review them. The review aimed to help the Government make sure their manifesto promise on respect orders was effective rather than just a piece of paper.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am always grateful for the noble Baroness’s help on these matters. It is as rare as hen’s teeth normally, but I am always grateful. I still say to her that the implementation of respect orders is crucial to ensuring that we tackle anti-social behaviour effectively. I put it to her gently, as I know she is keen on reducing bureaucracy and the cost of government et cetera, that this would be a very costly, unnecessary review of all ASB powers, when we already know that we agree with those powers, and it would cause unacceptable delays to the rollout of the orders promised in our manifesto.
We are already 19 months into our Labour Government term and people are impatient for change. One of the changes we want to make is in tackling anti-social behaviour. So, I say to the noble Baroness that the respect order, housing injunction and youth injunction are not novel; rather, they replace and improve upon an existing order, the civil injunction order, which has been in place since 2015. We are committed to ensuring that the powers to address anti-social behaviour remain effective, and we will routinely engage with practitioners across the board. Given those comments, I hope that the noble Baroness will reflect on her amendment.
Amendment 7 seeks to provide that any accredited or authorised person working on behalf of a local authority may not profit financially from the issuing of fixed penalty notices for breaches of public spaces protection orders and community protection orders. I point out to those noble Lords who tabled the amendment that the Bill makes it clear that the fixed penalty notices that can already be issued for breaches of these orders are still in place, and that we have increased only the upper limit of the fine. It is expected that the figure issued will be based on the individual circumstances and severity of the case.
As of now, local agencies are expected to ensure that fixed penalty notices are issued only in circumstances where it is considered proper and appropriate. I recognise that there are some concerns. The noble Baroness referenced her home area of north Wales, where an excessive and unreasonable number of fixed penalty notices have been issued. I fully accept that point, but I put it to her again that contracting enforcement to third parties is a common arrangement. Councils will not do it all themselves in-house; they do some of it contractually.
There is statutory guidance, which all relevant agencies have a legal duty to have regard to, which underscores the importance of applying the new fixed penalty notice limits in a proportionate and balanced way. I emphasise to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, who has cosigned this amendment, the importance of the proportionate use of the new thresholds, and that local authorities and agents acting on their behalf should not be issuing fixed penalty notices to generate profit. We will be consulting on the revised guidance, and I will undertake to share a copy of that guidance with the noble Lord and any other noble Lords, including the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, should she so wish, before any action is taken to implement any proposals passed by Parliament. That statutory guidance will be implemented, and I hope we can examine it in due course.
I turn now to Amendment 12 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and Amendment 24, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, who was not able to speak to it today. Amendment 12 would require the Secretary of State to publish and lay before Parliament an annual report on the operation of respect orders. Amendment 24 would require the publishing of quarterly data. I recognise that information held by central government on anti-social behaviour is, in some areas, limited. I want to see that improved, because that helps the Government understand the causes of anti-social behaviour.
Clause 7 provides for the provision of information about anti-social behaviour to the Secretary of State. Subsections (1) to (7) list the range of matters on which the Secretary of State may wish to collect information. The extent to which data will be reported and published will be confirmed after consultation with relevant agencies.
The Home Office publishes data on the use of stop and search powers, including the number of stop and searches conducted, arrests following a search, and demographic data. It includes information broken down by community safety partnerships as well as by police force areas.
Lord Sentamu (CB)
I am sorry to interrupt the Minister. Nobody doubts or questions that addressing anti-social behaviour is a manifesto commitment; that is taken as read. However, if it is a manifesto commitment, it must be put in words that clearly describe what the Government are trying to say. I find it quite baffling that in their first amendment, the Government prefer the words, “just and convenient”. What is convenient in there? Why are the Government dressing it up? I would have thought that the normal language of “necessary and proportionate” is much easier to understand. Why are the Government rejecting words that will help deal with anti-social behaviour, and instead fishing for other words that make no sense? Can the Minister try to make sense of it for me? I was given an explanation, but I was not persuaded, and I am sure I am not the only one. The words that we know in the Human Rights Act—necessary and proportionate —would ease the fear that the police will go on a spree and do a number of things because they judge it to be “just and convenient”.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
As ever, I am genuinely sorry that I have not been able to persuade the noble and right reverend Lord of the Government’s case. We have taken the view that “just and convenient” mirrors the civil injunction regime of the 2014 Act, passed by a Conservative and Liberal Democrat Government. They are not words from a Labour Minister but from an Act passed in 2014 that we are mirroring in the Government’s manifesto commitment to introduce respect orders. I am sorry that I cannot convince the noble and right reverend Lord of that, and that I have not persuaded him accordingly. We may—although I do not know—very shortly have an opportunity to see whether anybody else is persuaded.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
I am afraid that I remain unpersuaded. The Minister keeps mentioning the manifesto commitment, but the manifesto makes no mention of the liability threshold for a respect order, so it is surely perfectly legitimate to question the basis on which the respect order the Government are introducing is based.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The basis on which the respect order is introduced, and the phraseology used, is the phraseology his and His Majesty’s Opposition’s Government put in place for previous orders. I am not changing the wording of anything that, presumably, at some point in 2014 he and other Liberal Democrat Peers walked through a Lobby to vote for.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The noble Lord has got me there. Let me rephrase my challenge. The noble Lord did not support it, but the coalition Government he supported passed the 2014 Act. I like to be accurate in my barbs at noble Lords, and I hope that accuracy persuades him that, even if he did not vote for it, some of his noble friends in the coalition Government of the time did—a coalition that our side of the House did not look too favourably upon. I accept his personal position, but if there is division of opinion in this House and we test it, I shall move Amendment 4. I hope that other noble Lords will not press their amendments, but if I have not convinced them, they will put them to the test in the House.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, as a final throw, I wonder whether the Minister remembers how the Labour Benches voted in respect of those orders at the time.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
It was 12 years ago. Although I was a Member of the House of Commons at the time, I would probably have done whatever my noble friend the then Chief Whip asked me to do.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken, and I am very grateful for all the support that I got. I am disappointed, but not at all surprised, by the Minister’s response because, in my experience, the Minister is good at listening but not particularly good at hearing. I think we have done everything we can to put the case, both in Committee and tonight on Report, so I do not really see any point in examining the arguments any further. I would therefore like to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(2A) Before issuing or revising guidance under this section, the Secretary of State must consult such persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.(2B) Subsection (2A) does not apply to revisions that the Secretary of State considers are not substantial.(2C) The requirement in subsection (2A) to consult before issuing guidance may be satisfied by consultation carried out wholly or partly before this section comes into force.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment adds a consultation requirement to section M1, inserted into the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 by clause 1 of the Bill.
Lord Clement-Jones
“(5) For the purposes of this section, any authorised person or company issuing fixed penalty notices under the provisions listed in subsection (6) must not receive, directly or indirectly, any financial benefit that is contingent upon—(a) the issuing of a fixed penalty notice, or(b) the number or value of fixed penalty notices issued.(6) The provisions are—(a) section 52, and(b) section 68,of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (fixed penalty notices).(7) For the purposes of subsection (5), a financial benefit includes, but is not limited to—(a) any commission, bonus, incentive payment, or performance-related remuneration;(b) any benefit provided under a contract, arrangement, or understanding that links remuneration to enforcement outcomes;(c) any financial profit accrued by an employer;(d) any non-monetary benefit prescribed by regulations. (8) Any employer or person found to be in breach of subsection (5) may have their arrangements, accreditation or authorisation revoked by the chief officer of police or relevant local authority.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure that any accredited or authorised person, and their employer, may not profit financially from the issuing of fixed penalty notices.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I am afraid that it is no cigar again for the Minister on this amendment. On his promise of consultation on statutory guidance and so on on the question of fining for profit, I really do not think that is going to cut the mustard. On these Benches, we want to put a marker down that fining for profit, using contractors to enforce these powers, must end. We want to test the opinion of the House, so I beg to move.
Lord Russell of Liverpool
“(1A) Section 104 (review of response to complaints about anti-social behaviour) is amended as follows.(1B) In subsection (2)(b), after “published” insert “in their entirety”.(1C) After subsection (2) insert—“(2A) The relevant bodies in each local government area have a duty to promote awareness of the case review and review procedures.(2B) The relevant bodies in each local government area have a duty to publish the provision for victims dissatisfied with how the local bodies have dealt with or carried out the case review as per Schedule 4, Part 1, paragraph 3 (dissatisfaction with ASB case reviews).”(1D) In subsection (3)(b), after “area” insert “, and(c) specify the threshold for the case review including any timeframes and additional requirements which apply to that threshold.”(1E) In subsection (4)(b), omit “(or, if a different number is specified in the review procedures, at least that number of)”.(1F) In subsection (5)—(a) for “may” substitute “must”;(b) omit “any of”;(c) for “adequacy of the response to that behaviour” substitute “vulnerability of the victim(s)”.(1G) In subsection (6), after “decision” insert “, and, where the threshold is not met, they must—(a) provide that information in writing, and(b) with reference to review procedures specify the reason(s) for their determination that the threshold is not met.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, and another in the name of Lord Russell of Liverpool, seeks to establish a statutory threshold for convening an Anti-Social Behaviour Case Review, that considers the victim’s vulnerability and removes discretion for authorities to apply additional caveats.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 8, 9 and 10 in my name, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, who is outside the Chamber at the moment—I think she is talking to the other Minister—has kindly added her name. I thank the Minister and his officials for the meetings that we have had since Committee to discuss these issues.
The three amendments could be called the Newlove and Waxman amendments, because, in effect, they articulate the views and concerns of the late lamented Baroness Newlove and her successor as Victims’ Commissioner, Claire Waxman, about the issues that people on the ground experience in dealing with anti-social behaviour, most particularly the experience of victims.
Amendments 8 and 9 seek to improve the accessibility of the ASB case review by removing local discretion over thresholds and the definition of a qualifying complaint, which currently are creating unnecessary barriers for victims. The anti-social behaviour case review was established as a mechanism that allows victims to trigger a multi-agency resolution-focused review of their case, as in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, which set out a threshold for when a case review could be activated; it said three—or a different number, as set out under local review procedures —or more qualifying complaints within a six-month period.
However, the existing framework gives local organisations enormous discretion in setting local procedures, including defining the number of ASB complaints required and what constitutes a qualifying complaint. Consequently, authorities are able to add their own caveats, which creates yet another postcode lottery for victims. It creates inconsistencies in access to support and it delays intervention in situations where harm is escalating. For example, some authorities refuse to initiate a case review while an investigation is ongoing.
Similarly, the 2025 Local Government Association survey found that 62% of respondents applied additional local caveats, such as, as I mentioned, not allowing applications while an investigation is ongoing; requiring applications to be submitted within one month of the last reported incident; refusing a case review if one has already been conducted for behaviour of a similar nature; or rejecting complaints deemed to be “frivolous”, whatever the local authority’s definition of frivolous happens to be. This range of caveats presents a serious barrier to victims being able to seek timely relief.
Conditions such as prohibiting applications during ongoing investigations, imposing narrow time limits for reporting or refusing repeat applications, even where the behaviour is continuing, place the burden on the victim rather than on the system designed to protect them. Investigations can take months, during which victims may experience continued harm without any mechanism available to them to trigger a multi-agency response. As I mentioned, “frivolous” introduces subjective judgments that risk undermining victims’ credibility and, in particular, undermining confidence in the process. Collectively, this results in inconsistent access and contributes to the postcode lottery.
The Government’s response to these amendments in Committee referenced their newly launched ASB statutory guidance. While the Home Office’s updated guidance encourages a threshold of three complaints in six months, it is not legally binding and does not prevent authorities introducing additional conditions. Therefore, without legislative change, inconsistency and local caveats will continue. These amendments are designed to close these loopholes and establish firm national standards that the system currently unfortunately lacks.
Amendment 10 seeks to support the identification of gaps and barriers that victims face in the ASB case review process by ensuring what is surely a no-brainer: the consistent collection and publication of data. In this sort of situation, data really is king. One is flying slightly blind if one tries to make judgments about what is and is not going on if the data which one is relying upon to make those judgments are themselves seriously flawed and, as we have seen, open to individual interpretation to a significant degree across multiple local authorities.
In Committee, in response to the amendment that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and I put forward on anti-social behaviour, the Government said they wished to see how the new ASB guidance beds in before considering further legislation. This was the position also on the proposals to require independent chairs for case reviews and to ensure that victims are able to attend, or at least have their views represented.
We accept that the guidance needs time to take effect. Guidance is one thing, but if you do not have any meaningful way to monitor whether that guidance is being applied consistently, how it is being applied and what effect it is having then it is quite difficult to judge whether the guidance is doing what you want it to do.
Currently, data collection on the ASB case review is sparse, inconsistent and fragmented. There is a patchwork of information and no adequate national oversight. The original legislative framework for the case review requires local bodies to publish the number of case reviews they conduct and refuse each year. However, this information is somewhat meaningless if we do not know the reasons why an application for review was refused. In particular, as we have heard before, local bodies can set their own parameters for qualifying incidents and set caveats on the thresholds.
I recognise that the Government have introduced Clause 7 on the provision of information to the Secretary of State, whereby authorities may be required to provide
“reports of anti-social behaviour made to the authority … responses of the authority to anti-social behaviour, and … ASB case reviews carried out by the relevant authority”.
However, this merely outlines the types of information that the Secretary of State could require from local bodies, which, in the view of the Victims’ Commissioner, does not go far enough. Without proper data, it is not possible to assess whether the guidance is working in practice.
In responding to this group, we would be enormously grateful if the Minister could tell us whether the Government will commit to ensuring that the relevant authorities are required by regulations to collect and provide to the Secretary of State the data points as in Amendment 10. Specifically, this would mean information in relation to: first, where local bodies determine the threshold for the case review was not met, by reference to the local review procedures, and the reasons why they made that determination; secondly, the number of case reviews carried out that were chaired by an independent person; thirdly, the number of reviews where the victim or their representative was given the opportunity to attend; and, finally, the number of reviews carried out where the victim or their representative attended the review in person.
I hope that we will have a positive response from the Government. I know that the Minister is sympathetic to this. I know that everything cannot be done simultaneously, but the case for more consistency, as required in the first two amendments, and for providing meaningful, useful data to judge whether the new guidance is working is important enough that I hope the Government will give this some serious attention. I beg to move.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I signed the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Russell. He spoke eloquently to the detail and, indeed, during the debate that we had in Committee on them. I want just to summarise the key reasons.
We understand why the Government want to see their guidance bed in, but we are already picking up concerns about some of the detail. The point of these three amendments is to set very clear ground rules for each of the stages, partly to make the data reliable but also partly to give absolute clarity about what happens at each stage of the review.
The first amendment is about the threshold for the case review, the second is about the nature of the ASB and whether that is a qualifying complaint, and the final one concerns collection and review of the data. The first two are important because we have already heard that local authorities respond very differently. Finally, as the noble Lord said, data is vital. If certain characteristics about each case review are published, having that collection of data would be extremely helpful. Then, by reviewing the data by authority and elsewhere, it would become very easy to see how the case reviews are happening nationally.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for his work on these amendments, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for her contribution to the debates on anti-social behaviour reviews, both today and in Committee. It is an important issue that touches on how our system responds to persistent harm affecting families and communities. We on these Benches are very sympathetic to these amendments.
In Committee, noble Lords rightly underlined that anti-social behaviour is rarely about a single, isolated incident, but often results in repeated conduct that causes cumulative distress and disruption. The ASB case review—previously known as the community trigger—plays a very important role as a safety net. It is designed to bring agencies together to ensure a joined-up response where local action alone has not resolved the problem. Its predominant purpose is to give victims an early opportunity to have their situation collectively reviewed when they have reported multiple qualifying incidents over time.
The amendments in this group seek to strengthen that mechanism by bringing into statute some elements that are currently left to local discretion. A statutory threshold for convening a case review—removing caveats that frustrate victims—would provide clarity and consistency across the country, ensuring that victims do not face a postcode lottery when accessing this right. In Committee, my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott echoed this point, noting that a statutory threshold would streamline the process and prevent agencies imposing additional barriers that can deter applications. That would depend, of course, on where exactly the threshold was set.
These amendments also include measures targeted at transparency. They would require authorities to publish the reasons why they determine that a threshold has not been met, and to publish data on independent chairing and on victim attendance. That increased transparency would build confidence in the process and assist in identifying patterns of variation between areas. However, as was raised in Committee, it is important to balance those laudable aims with the need to avoid imposing disproportionate bureaucracy on bodies that are, perhaps, already under pressure. The Government explained that updated statutory guidance has been published, as we have heard, to strengthen awareness of the case review mechanism and to help agencies guide victims through the process. We should therefore reflect on whether mandating every procedural step in statute will, in practice, make the process smoother or potentially risk diverting resources from handling the underlying behaviour. None the less, this group of amendments is rooted in a shared desire to ensure that victims of persistent anti-social behaviour are heard, supported and treated fairly. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for his amendments, and for the opportunity to meet and discuss them in person. I am also acutely aware that he developed and examined the amendments with the late Baroness Newlove, to whom I again pay tribute, and with Claire Waxman, the current Victims’ Commissioner, and indeed with the National Police Chiefs’ Council. We have had, I hope, a fruitful discussion, during which I have given the Government’s view both in Committee and in our head-to-head meetings.
The noble Lord’s Amendments 8 and 9 aim to limit the relevant bodies’ discretion to set criteria to underpin an application for a case review. Amendment 8 would also require the relevant bodies to provide more transparency as to their reasoning, but also to promote awareness of the case review and publish the provision in place for situations when the victim is dissatisfied about how the case has been handled. I am aware that the noble Lord knows this, but it is worth putting on record: an individual may currently apply for a case review after making three qualifying complaints. We updated the statutory guidance in September last year, and it already dictates that the relevant bodies involved in these reviews may, where appropriate, set different thresholds from those described, provided that they do not make it more difficult for the victim to make a successful application. The Government maintain that the ability to set different local thresholds is important to allow flexibility in handling each case, particularly where agencies may want to add caveats to make the threshold for a review lower in cases of high harm or those involving vulnerable adults.
It is also important that noble Lords examine the provision in Clause 6, which gives powers to police and crime commissioners to set up a route for victims to request a further review when they are dissatisfied with the outcome of their case review, including when the relevant bodies determine that the threshold was not met for the initial case review. That adds a further safeguard to the case review process to ensure better victim outcomes.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
I thank the Minister for his response, which was much as anticipated—so no surprises. I think we all understand the underlying issues and some of the bad things that victims are currently experiencing.
These three amendments come from a period during which the Victims’ Commissioner office has been scrutinising in detail the new guidance delivered last September. They were brought forward in the direct light of and in response to that new guidance. That is not to say that the new guidance is not welcome, but the experience of the Victims’ Commissioner and her office is that to understand whether the guidance is working as intended requires a level of data that is deeper and more detailed than is currently outlined in what the Government intend to get and what is covered in Clause 7. The concern is that while the guidance is very welcome, we will be unable to understand how effectively it is working to the level of detail that will be helpful to the Victims’ Commissioner, to victims and, thirdly, to the Government themselves.
After the Bill is enacted, it is certain that there will be meetings in the diary with the Victims’ Commissioner and her team, and they will be scrutinising the effects of the new guidance and the degree to which, from their observations, it is being implemented. I ask that the Government are open to having a constructive, interactive dialogue if the data raises more questions than it answers—which is, I think, what the Victims’ Commissioner anticipates may be the case—and that, if need be, they listen and adjust if the data is not telling us what we need.
I again thank the Minister and her team. I forgot to mention Andy Prophet, the ASB lead for the National Police Chiefs’ Council, who has been extremely helpful and supportive. His successor, Cath Akehurst, who I think takes over next week, is also very actively involved in this. We are trying to work with the police, the Victims’ Commissioner, the ASB charities and the Local Government Association to come up with solutions that work for victims and are enactable and enforceable in law and guidance. In that spirit, I withdraw the amendment.
“(6A) The requirement in subsection (6) may be satisfied by consultation carried out wholly or partly before this section comes into force.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment to section 105A of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (inserted by clause 7 of the Bill) allows pre-commencement consultation to satisfy the requirement on the Secretary of State to consult on regulations about information about anti-social behaviour.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, the Government’s amendments in this group all relate to certain of the delegated powers in the Bill. In the main, they respond to recommendations made by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and the Constitution Committee in their reports on the Bill. I am very grateful to both committees for their scrutiny of this legislation. Your Lordships’ House will be pleased to hear that I will not repeat all the arguments made by the Government. Instead, I point noble Lords to the responses to each of the committees’ reports, which are available on their respective web pages. However, let me briefly explain the various government amendments that address the committees’ concerns.
First, Amendments 15 and 25 to Clauses 9 and 24 provide that the guidance on fly-tipping enforcement and the new civil penalty regime, in respect of a failure to remove illegal online content relating to knives and offensive weapons, are subject to the negative procedure. I stress to noble Lords that the Government’s general position remains that it is not necessary or appropriate for the generality of statutory guidance to be subject to any parliamentary procedure. However, there are limited exceptions to that general rule, and we agree that the guidance provided for in Clauses 9 and 24 should be two such exceptions, as per the DPRRC’s recommendation that in both cases the guidance should be subject to the negative procedure.
Secondly, Amendment 382 to Clause 154 provides for driver information regulations to be subject to the affirmative procedure, in line with a recommendation by the Constitution Committee.
Thirdly, the amendments to Clauses 85, 129 and 134 narrow the scope of the regulation-making powers provided for in those clauses.
Fourthly, Amendments 415, 416 and 417 to Clause 196 ensure that all iterations of the guidance in respect of youth diversion orders are laid before Parliament, including in cases in which revisions are insubstantial.
Finally, Amendments 11 and 381 do not stem from a committee recommendation. Rather, they simply provide that pre-commencement consultation on the regulations relating to the provision of information about anti-social behaviour and the code of practice about access to driver licence information satisfies the requirement to consult under this clause. I beg to move.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, we have come to the first of two groups containing a large number of government amendments. I find myself having to express my strong frustration and disappointment with the number of government amendments that have been brought to this Bill on Report. As we broke up for recess, the Government tabled 243 amendments to the Bill. Then, on Monday, two days before the first day of Report, they tabled a further 73 amendments. This completely flies in the face of the accepted norms and conventions whereby the Government are supposed to table amendments a week before.
Most concerning is the introduction of entirely new amendments that have not previously been discussed, most notably the Government’s amendment relating to aggravation of offences. We will spend much time debating that amendment later, but suffice it to say that it is a very wide-ranging and incredibly worrying matter—never mind the fact that the amendment has not been debated in Committee in this House, nor in the other place, and as such will not receive the proper scrutiny it deserves.
Having said that, I do welcome some of the changes the Government are making. Amendments 15, 16, 17, 25, 26 and 267 all enhance the ability of Parliament to scrutinise some of the regulation-making powers granted to the Home Secretary. Requiring the draft guidance to be laid before Parliament for a period of 40 days is welcome and, we hope, will ensure that Parliament can diligently hold the Government to account. On Amendments 362 and 363, I am naturally cautious about the Government granting themselves more powers via secondary legislation, which in this case permits them to specify different articles that may be considered as “SIM farms”. My concern is slightly allayed by Amendments 364 and 365, which do place limitations on the Secretary of State’s power, but it would be useful to know what types of devices the Government envisage being brought into the scope of Clause 129.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful, to an extent, for the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. The vast majority of the Government amendments that have been laid before your Lordships’ House are either in response to issues raised through discussion in Committee, or subsequent to that discussion, or, as I said in my opening remarks, in response to the issues raised by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and the Constitution Committee. It is also important to say—and we will come to this in a large group coming up shortly—that they are large in number but they are all, in a sense, because of the nature of the legislation, making the same changes around devolution to many parts of the Bill. This is how the issues were understood and discussed. It followed discussion in Committee on that group, when the Opposition Front Bench presented their rationale for opposing this. We decided not to move the Government amendments that were tabled in Committee at that time.
This is an iterative process. I think it fair to point out that the point of Committee is for the Government to hear concerns and to be able to respond to them. I think there will be many areas where we will table Government amendments throughout Report stage of the Bill, not least the ones we are discussing in this group right now. I am grateful for the words of welcome for these Government amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. Concerns were raised by both committees about our approach to statutory guidance and secondary legislation, so we have responded to them.
The Government’s new clause on aggravated offences, which the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, referred to, as well as delivering on a manifesto commitment, responds directly to the debate on the issue in the other place. It was touched on in your Lordships’ House at Second Reading and in Committee, where we reiterated the Government’s intention to bring forward an amendment on Report. Moreover, the issues raised in the Government’s new clauses do cross over to those raised in what are now Clauses 122 to 124, which were thoroughly debated in Committee. I would be happy, in addition to this, to carry on the conversation, if the noble Lord is happy to do so, by writing to him on the specifics he raised concerning Clause 129. But, given that explanation, I reiterate my moving of Government Amendment 11.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Beith) (LD)
I call the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, to move Amendment 13. I must advise that if it is not moved, I cannot call Amendment 14.
Clause 9: Guidance on fly-tipping enforcement in England
Amendment 13
Lord Davies of Gower
“(1A) The guidance issued about the enforcement of offences under section 33 must ensure that, where a person is convicted of a relevant offence, they are liable for the costs incurred through loss or damage resulting from the offence.(1B) The guidance must also ensure that it requires the waste regulation authority to engage with the local police force to take all reasonable measures to ensure that the landowner, or community, responsible for the land upon which the relevant offence occurs, is not liable for the costs incurred resulting from the offence.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would ensure the Secretary of State’s guidance on fly-tipping makes the person responsible for fly-tipping, rather than the landowner or community, liable for the costs of cleaning up.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, the amendment in my name relates to fly-tipping and measures that can and should be taken to combat it. Fly-tipping is a serious and growing blight on society. In 2023-24 local authorities in England had to contend with approximately 1.15 million fly-tipping and litter incidents, an increase of 6% on the previous year. It is even worse in rural areas. Rural fly-tipping has increased by 9% over the past year, with one farmer saying that relentless fly-tipping happens almost every week. Last week it was reported that an elderly Hertfordshire farmer was facing a £40,000 clean-up bill after almost 200 tonnes of waste was fly-tipped on his land.
There is a significant disparity between the offences and the enforcement, which sends the signal to offenders that they are unlikely to face any consequences of their actions. Amendment 13 would seek to address this inequity. The Government propose to issue guidance relating to fly-tipping. Our amendment would ensure that guidance makes it clear that where a person is convicted of fly-tipping, they, not the victims, are liable for the costs incurred as a result of their offence. It would further require engagement between waste authorities and the police to ensure that the landowner or community upon whose land the dumping occurred is not left footing the bill.
Amendment 19, also in my name, proposes that a person convicted of fly-tipping should receive three penalty points on their driving licence for their offence. It seems self-evident to say that much fly-tipping is vehicle-enabled. Vans and cars are used to transport waste far from the original site and dump it illegally. For many offenders, particularly those operating for attractive profit margins, a fine alone may be viewed as a calculated business risk, and a price worth paying. The prospect of licence endorsement, however, introduces a personal and escalating consequence.
Amendment 20, which has been signed by my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough, would add fly-tipping to the list of offences for which vehicles may be seized under Section 59 of the Police Reform Act 2002. If a vehicle is reasonably believed to have been used in connection with fly-tipping, the police should have the powers to act decisively. Removing the instrument of the crime is one of the most effective deterrents available, and this amendment would disrupt organised dumping activity and reinforce the seriousness with which we should treat environmental crime. I hope the Minister is listening, and I have to say to the House that if he will not accept my amendments in this group, or give assurances as to the Government’s intent, I may well seek to divide the House.
Amendment 14 (to Amendment 13)
Viscount Goschen
“(1C) The guidance must specify that reasonable measures under subsection (1B) include requiring the waste collection authority to collect all waste resulting from the offence.”
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, I do not think it inappropriate that, although Amendment 14 was not moved, it should be spoken to.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
For the administrative ease of the House, I have not moved Amendment 14, but I do have another amendment in this group, Amendment 21, which I do intend to talk to, if that is in order.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
I do not want to intrude unnecessarily, but I did have a brief word to say about Amendments 14 and 21, both of which I welcome very much. This arises from a particular problem I had in my own area. We had a very efficiently run waste disposal area, which was closed—and the consequence was that we had a lot of fly-tipping. The advantage of Amendments 14 and 21 is that they would impose on the waste disposal authority certain obligations: obligations to pay and obligations to clear away the mess. The advantage of that is that it may make the waste disposal authorities much less willing to close sites. If the sites remain open, the prospect is that fly-tipping will not be as great. I was going to support Amendments 14 and 21, because what they would do is valuable, in the sense that it would encourage waste disposal authorities to keep sites open, and not to close them.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful for the support of my noble friend.
This is an important issue. I have campaigned for many years around fly-tipping and the importance of having a stronger regulatory settlement, so I very much support my noble friend’s amendments in this group. It is a very large-scale problem: the noble Lord, Lord Katz, I believe, referred at an earlier stage to an estimate of some 1.15 million fly-tipping events reported to local authorities. That is a huge number, and I expect that that thoroughly underreports the true scale of the problem.
The noble Lord, Lord Katz, was kind enough to write to me in response to a question I raised on 17 November in Committee, when I inquired as to the number of cost recovery orders that had been successfully made by the courts. It appears that the Government do not hold that information. I looked at the manifesto, about which we have heard an awful lot in this Parliament, and indeed today, and there was a commitment to make the fly-tippers pay for the clear-up, yet the Government do not hold the statistics. I am slightly puzzled as to how the Government are going to make progress on that without holding the relevant information. The noble Lord, in his letter to me, did say that 1,378 fines had been made in respect of fly-tipping. That is a tiny number: it is 1 in 1,000, or 0.1%. It is quite clear —the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock, in response to a question about the Kidlington outrage, agreed—that the current regulatory position is not working. This is a particular issue in the countryside, where there is a heavy burden on farmers, as we have heard. Here, I declare an interest of sorts, as the owner of a farm.
I have Amendment 21 in this group. Its effect is simple: it would place a duty on local waste authorities to remove waste and then to attempt to pursue cost recovery from the culprits. It builds, really, on Amendment 13, in my noble friend’s name, which seeks to amend the guidance. Both have a similar intent. In my view, it is simply unfair that the victim of the crime should be responsible for clearing it up. There are many factors that drive this crime, but at least two are within the direct control of public authorities as a whole—namely, the pricing of the landfill tax and, as my noble friend referred to, the accessibility of waste disposal facilities, and the Environment Agency and police enforcement effort.
My noble friend referred to the incident reported of a farmer who recently had 200 tonnes of rubbish dumped on his land. This is a perfect illustration of the problem that landowners, and indeed community trusts and others—for example, sports grounds and football clubs and so forth—can face. This individual faced a bill for some £40,000. Now, I understand that the council and the police had failed to identify the culprits and had failed to protect him after repeated previous incidents. Indeed, he alleges that he had also been the victim of intimidation. Why should he face financial ruin for the failures of public authorities to protect him from the actions of a criminal gang?
I would argue that it is simply not realistic, nor is it fair, to expect landowners to take on the role of detective to identify offenders and then to pursue them for the recovery of costs. They do not know how to make the various agencies involved work more effectively, they are vulnerable to intimidation and they do not have the resources.
The time has now come for the responsibility for protection, clear-up, investigation and prosecution to sit with the appropriate and relevant public agencies. To my mind, the arguments for doing this are clear, as it would create a complete system where public sector agencies control landfill pricing, access to legitimate waste disposal sites, identification and prosecution of culprits, and recovery of costs. This would incentivise the Environment Agency, the police and local waste authorities to be much more proactive in pursuing the culprits, facilitating their prosecution and recovering their costs. It would allow for faster removal, which is a very important factor. With waste lying around on farmland, private land or any open ground, one thing follows another, and more suddenly turns up. It would also give much fairer treatment to landowners.
It is clear that the current system is not working. On the one hand, we have had a member of the public being fined for pouring the dregs of her cup of coffee down the drain, but, on the other hand, no one seems to have noticed or done anything to stop at least 300 heavy goods vehicles dumping upwards of 10,000 tonnes of rubbish illegally in Kidlington. How can that possibly have happened? How can we have confidence in the system? If it cannot catch 300 trucks, what chance does the poor landowner have in this type of situation? This is a failure of the whole government system in the broadest sense of the term—central agencies and local—to protect victims. They now need to take responsibility.
I support my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower’s other amendments, all of which are designed to strengthen the regulatory settlement to tackle fly-tipping. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)
My Lords, I strongly support the intention and spirit of Amendment 13. Fly-tipping shows a shocking disregard for other people, the local community, society and the environment. It is not right that the cost of removing the consequences of it fall on the victims, as has been said, at huge expense.
My point is a technical one about the way that this amendment is drafted. I do not think that imposing this liability in guidance is the right way to go about it. Guidance is not normally legally binding. Those to whom it is addressed have to have regard to it, simply—even if it is laid before Parliament with a stronger procedure, as I think the Government are proposing. In my view, the right way to do it is by an amendment to Section 33(8) and (9) of the Environmental Protection Act, where the penalties for the offence are set out. That would be the correct place to put it. That is the approach taken in Amendment 19, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. While I strongly support the amendment, and would vote for it in any Division, I think the way it is drafted is not quite right.
Lord Cromwell (CB)
My Lords, I declare an interest as a director of a farming company that is regularly the victim of fly-tipping of various scales.
I agree absolutely with every word that the noble Viscount shared with us a little while ago. I would add that the waste, often toxic waste, piled up on land is getting into the watercourses. This is a serious issue. Very often, landowners, even if they have the wherewithal to finance its removal, which many of them do not, do not have the technical expertise to deal with toxic waste. I spoke about this in Committee, so I am not going to go on in great detail, but it is a huge problem and every day it is getting worse.
The current legislation, which I have probed through Written Questions, is absolutely clear that the local authorities have no responsibility currently to do anything to assist, either through punitive legislation, assisting in the clean-up or by financially supporting those who are trying to do the clean-up. There is no support at all. We cannot allow this to continue. These amendments are a good start in the right direction.
To illustrate that, I will share one experience that I had. On a farm track, a large amount of building materials and other unpleasant items was tipped out of a truck. The perpetrators were so confident of not being caught or punished that they even threw on the pile the parking ticket that they had got earlier that day with the registration number. I called the police, who, to their credit, came out; we looked at it together, and afterwards I spent the weekend clearing it up. I showed the parking ticket to the policeman, who said, “Yes, that’s all very helpful, but I am not going to tell you whose vehicle it is in case you do something. I can assure you that, if we were to contact the people whose vehicle this is, they will simply say, ‘A lot of people drive that truck; it wasn’t me. I don’t know who it was; all sorts of people drive it’, and nothing will happen”. No further action was taken. That is one tiny example of the sort of things that people in rural areas face with waste, which is mainly generated in cities and simply taken out into the countryside and dumped with complete impunity.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group, particularly Amendment 20, to which I have attached my name. It is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, and the exemplary speech made by my noble friend Lord Goschen.
I have a more positive story that I read in the Times—I think noble Lords will also have read it—about a very public-spirited parish councillor in the Cotswolds, I think in Gloucestershire, who picked up a McDonald’s paper bag that contained a receipt, again, for a purchase of a McDonald’s meal. This very public-spirited and diligent parish councillor went to McDonald’s, which was able to use its CCTV coverage to identify the car and the driver. To their credit, Gloucestershire Police fined that gentleman £500. The slight downside for the public-spirited parish councillor was that that gentleman was one of his village neighbours, so conversations at the pub were probably quite awkward from thence on.
But seriously, I am delighted that there is a debate on this issue. Litter picking and fly-tipping used to be quite a niche issue. It is now considered a much more serious issue, as it should be, and I am pleased that my own Front Bench and Government Ministers are taking it seriously. As alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, in 2022-23, clearing up serious instances of fly-tipping cost local authorities £50 million. That does not sound like a lot of money, but it is £50 million not spent on other services. As the noble Lord quite rightly said, fly-tipping often involves hazardous materials, such as asbestos, tyres and chemical waste that contaminate not just water but air and farmland generally.
Lord Cromwell (CB)
I am very grateful for the kind things that the noble Lord is saying. To clarify, local authorities will clear up fly-tipping that is on the verge of the highway. Although it is not anywhere in law, if it is beyond 10 metres from there, it is your problem and they will not clear it up.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
The noble Lord is absolutely right and that point was very strongly made in trenchant remarks by my noble friend about the issue in Kidlington. He is right that fly-tipping disproportionately affects farmland and farmers have, as he knows, very little legal recourse. It also affects deprived urban areas. I believe that, in bringing forward action in primary and secondary legislation, we need to stigmatise those who would despoil the land.
I am a regular cyclist, and it is quite dispiriting and depressing to cycle around the rural parts of the city of Peterborough and south Lincolnshire and see the exponential growth in piles of fly-tipped material on farmland and at the fringe of roads and waterways—the River Welland and the River Nene being two rivers in our area. It is very depressing, but it is a growing phenomenon, and it relates to the issue raised by my noble friend Lord Hailsham with regard to the availability or otherwise of municipal facilities for the disposal of often significant amounts of building material.
The other thing, of course, is that this is very much linked, increasingly, to organised crime. Criminal gangs operate illegal waste operations, undercutting legitimate licensed waste contractors. Tough sanctions, particularly those that target the proceeds of such activity and can confiscate vehicles and even imprison ringleaders, are something that we should seriously think about and that have been pursued in other jurisdictions.
To finish, I will very briefly—I know this is Report, but now we have the opportunity to talk about these issues—acquaint your Lordships’ House with the fly-tipping action plan that Keep Britain Tidy brought forward and published at the end of last year. Its recommendations for tackling waste crime are to shut down rogue operators by introducing tamper-proof licensing; to have taxi-style licence plates and a central searchable register; to strengthen enforcement, with tougher sentencing, which of course these amendments would facilitate; to support councils with intelligence-sharing platforms and stronger representation in the joint unit for waste crime; and, finally, to make it easier for the public, with a national awareness campaign and mandatory retailer take-back schemes for bulky items such as sofas and fridges. They all seem to be sensible proposals that would not necessarily cost the taxpayer a huge amount of money.
This is a very serious issue. These amendments are proportionate and sensible and would not be overly burdensome financially on the taxpayer. On that basis, I strongly support them and I hope the Minister will perhaps address some of the specific issues I have raised in his response.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, broadly, I support these amendments. I would have thought the Government would welcome all of them, because they seem quite common sense. They are quite tactical at times, and I would just say that two strategic things need to be considered. One is the charging regime for businesses attending recycling sites. If the charges are set too high, it encourages people to find alternative arrangements. We might condemn it, but it is a bit like smuggling tobacco—when we set the tax wrong, the smuggling of tobacco from France increases exponentially. Getting that balance right is not easy, but if you look at where you can get rid of a fridge and what charge you will make if you are a business, that really is the context in which these offences have been committed. I am not trying to provide a defence for the people involved; it just seems to me that that is one of the things causing it.
The second thing is that it is a business, so they are doing it for money. I know that there are later amendments about it being an organised crime, but obviously you have to go after the assets ruthlessly, so that when you get them you go after their home or the business. That really starts to make an impact when they realise that their life will not continue in the way that it has. I am not sure we collectively—I include the police and the Environment Agency—have had that determination.
On the amendments, for me, Amendments 13 and 21 are vital. It seems bizarre that the person who suffered once would suffer twice when they have to pay to remove the problem, unless of course they are being paid to store it or have not taken reasonable steps to make sure it does not continue, such as calling the police, the Environment Agency or anybody else to try to help make sure that it does not happen again. Fundamentally, it cannot be right if a victim is asked to pay to remove a problem they did not arrange. It seems to me that at the moment it is being treated as a civil wrong when in fact we all agree that it is a criminal wrong. This shift of culture is vital.
The best people to try to help clear the problem—forget about whose fault it is—are the local authorities. They are the ones with the equipment, the people who are skilled, and, frankly, the recycling places and the tips to get rid of it now. The consequences are that we are seeing around the country health hazards growing: sometimes toxic waste; sometimes just rat infestations. We are seeing these things growing very near to where people are living with children or anybody. That cannot be right. Something has to be done, in the sense that somebody has to act quickly to remove the pile of stuff and make sure, so far as possible, that it does not return.
The other two amendments that I support are Amendments 14 and 20, which are two sides of a similar coin. They propose giving points on licences to offenders or taking their vehicles. We have seen that they have been effective measures. It does not necessarily stop people driving, but it restricts their mobility for a while. They can still drive, but the police have now got an opportunity to lock them up because they are driving while disqualified, so it is starting to inhibit their mobility. The second thing is, obviously, to take the vehicles. A large vehicle can be worth £20,000, £50,000 or £100,000. This starts to make a difference in their business model and that, it seems to me, is vital. Of course, the side benefit is that, where vehicles are seized because they have no insurance, no tax or no test, the police can do one of two things: they can either crush them and sell the scrap and get back any tax that remains on the vehicle, or they can sell the vehicle itself, so, actually, the money that is taken from the offender is then applied straightaway to law enforcement.
The Government might want to consider whether money taken in this respect is applied either through the Environment Agency or through other bodies to make sure that it enhances their ability to reduce the amount of organised crime involved in this horrible thing that is causing such misery around the country. Therefore, if a vote is called, I will certainly support Amendment 13, but I also support the other amendments because I think they are things that could work.
Lord Elliott of Ballinamallard (UUP)
My Lords, I will speak very briefly in support of these amendments. In particular, as a landowner and someone who has had fly-tipping on their property, I can say that it is extremely dangerous, even with small amounts of fly-tipping, whereby you have the fridges and the small amounts of wood or timber, particularly where you have livestock and machinery and where you have children. It brings disease and all sorts of trouble. So, there is that small level of fly-tipping, but then we also have the larger waste crimes, which are carried out by criminal gangs.
I know that, in Northern Ireland, we had a huge site at Mobuoy, outside of Londonderry. Two criminals have been prosecuted and jailed: one got 21 months and one got one year. Between them, however, their criminal gangs and their businesses are believed to have benefited to in the region of £33 million from that dumping and that waste disposal on to individual people’s land. It is absolutely criminal and we need to do more to clamp down on this, otherwise it is going to expand. Obviously, in Northern Ireland we suffer as well from cross-border fly-tipping and people coming across the border to tip their rubbish in Northern Ireland. But in general, it is something that really needs to be clamped down on, simply because there are not enough convictions and there are not enough people being caught.
Earl Russell (LD)
My Lords, I rise to respond from our Bench to this group of amendments. Fly-tipping is anything from the illegal disposal of rubbish from the back of a car boot to the more serious organised dumping of rubbish. There is no doubt that it is a growing problem that is out of control and harming our communities, damaging our environment and having a disproportionate impact on our rural communities. All too often, it is farmers and innocent landowners who end up paying the cost for other people’s criminality; the criminals all too often go undetected and unpunished.
The Government’s own statistics show that around 20% of all our waste generated ends up being illegally managed. Government figures released just this morning show that, for the year 2024-25, local authorities in England dealt with 1.26 million incidents—an increase of 9% from the 1.15 million incidents reported in 2023-24. This highlights the absolute scale of the problem, which is relentless and is only growing worse. While profits can range up to £2,500 per lorry load, this is low risk and high reward.
We have a lot of sympathy and general support for the amendments, but we do not feel that any of them, in and of themselves, offer the appropriate solutions. Amendment 13 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron, seeks to ensure that the state’s guidance on fly-tipping makes the person who is responsible, rather than a landowner or the community, liable for the cost of clearing up the mess. We entirely understand and share the concerns that this amendment seeks to address, but this is not a workable answer. The blight of fly-tipping and illegal waste dumping causes immense frustration for communities —especially innocent landowners who find themselves facing significant costs through no fault of their own. It is wholly right that those responsible for such environmental harm bear the financial burden for their actions. We fundamentally support the “polluter pays” principle.
Lord Cromwell (CB)
The argument could be summarised as letting perfect be the enemy of good. I am trying to suggest that seizing vehicles, making the polluter pay, if you can catch them, and putting points on their licence are steps towards solving the problem. They are not the silver bullet—there is not one. This will need a range of measures, including the issues around waste tips.
This would also give an incentive to the victims to actually collect evidence, sometimes at great personal risk. If you know that you can provide evidence and that there is a route for the police to prosecute these people and recover costs, it is an incentive to do something about it. At the moment, in rural areas, there is simply a belief that nothing is going to happen, so you might as well clear it up yourself or just leave it there. With these large waste dumps, you have no choice but to leave it there. I ask the noble Earl to consider that these are small steps that should be encouraged.
Earl Russell (LD)
To be clear, I do not disagree with the noble Lord—they are small steps and welcome. I am not against them as small steps; they will help. There is a bigger, broader problem out there that also needs tackling.
Lord Cromwell (CB)
Does that mean that the noble Earl will support the amendment in the Lobby?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, for setting out the case for these amendments. I am also grateful for the comments made in support from the noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Elliott, among others. I will refer to other colleagues in a moment.
I think that we can all agree that fly-tipping blights communities, adds to the burdens on local authorities and there is a need to take action on this. I welcome the fact that my colleague, Mary Creagh MP, in the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, as referenced by a number of noble Lords, has this very day issued a press release urging councils to crush more fly-tipping vehicles. She also issued new guidance for local authorities to crackdown on waste crime and ensured that we have our first overview for councils, offering clear instructions on the identifying, seizing and disposing of vehicles and strengthening deterrents. She also gave guidance for maximising public awareness and ensuring that the Environment Agency has new technology and boosted funding to put more waste crime officers on the ground. By happy coincidence, that happened this very morning, ahead of our debate here today. The statutory guidance in Clause 9 will help in that regard.
I will now comment on the amendments before the House, starting with Amendment 13. I note the technical issue mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere. I would have referred to it had he not done so. I endorse that. I also note the comments of the noble Earl, Lord Russell, on the issue in Amendment 13.
I recognise the financial burden that clearing fly-tipped waste places on landowners. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that, currently, where there is sufficient evidence, as per the point made by the noble Earl, fly-tippers can be prosecuted. On conviction, a cost order can be made by the court so that a landowner’s costs can be recovered from the perpetrator. If sufficient evidence is not available for a successful prosecution—this is, again, a point mentioned by the noble Earl, Lord Russell—there will not be sufficient evidence to force a fly-tipper to take responsibility for the clean-up either. If there is a prosecution, the clean-up can, in effect, be added to the sentence. It is therefore unclear how Amendment 13, by addressing this in statutory guidance, would help, when a criminal prosecution is already the best route for the desired outcome.
I note that Amendment 21, which was moved in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, and had the support of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, seeks in effect to place a duty on waste authorities to clear up waste left by fly-tippers. Again, I fully understand and share the sentiment behind the amendment. It is legitimate to ask why a farmer, landowner or occupier of any land should be liable for clean-up costs. As I have said to the House, where there is a conviction, the courts currently have the necessary powers to make the offender meet the clean-up costs. We encourage local authorities to investigate all incidents of fly-tipping, and the guidance today is clear evidence of the Government’s willingness—
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
Would the Minister be good enough to focus on this argument? If a burden were placed on the waste disposal authority, either by being liable to clear up the mess or by having to pay for it, it would be much less willing to close waste sites, and if waste sites are kept open then fly-tipping is likely to diminish.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The noble Viscount tempts me down the path of the direct responsibility of local councils, but that goes slightly wider than the amendments before us today. My point is that if there is already a conviction of someone for fly-tipping then the courts have the power to make the offender meet the clean-up costs. We encourage local authorities, as again by today’s guidance, to investigate all incidents of fly-tipping, including those on private land.
We also want to make good the enforcement powers, as I described. Defra is talking to a number of groups, such as the National Farmers’ Union and the National Fly-Tipping Prevention Group, to promote and disseminate good practice. However, the problem I come to again is that, where there is no prosecution and conviction, the long-established position currently is that local authorities are responsible for cleaning up fly-tipping on public land, while the landowner is responsible where the offence is committed on private land. I accept that that is unfair, it is a challenge and it is a cost to local taxpayers and landowners alike, but it would be a fundamental shift of responsibility for cleaning up waste on private land to hard-pressed local authorities, from the position where the local individual landowner themselves currently provides that.
Again, I want to put on the record that the Environment Agency does not have a responsibility to clear illegal waste sites, but it does so where—to go back to what the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, said—there is a potential risk of fire, there is a risk of impact on the watercourse or there are other environmental factors. I come back to what the noble Earl, Lord Russell, said: prevention, better enforcement, and the provisions in this Bill and other actions the Government are taking forward, are the way forward on these issues.
Amendment 19 sought to ensure that penalty points would be added to the driving licence of an offender for fly-tipping. Again, I hope I can help the noble Lord by saying that the Government are currently considering the benefits of adding penalty points to driving licences for fly-tipping offences. I noted the questions from the noble Earl, Lord Russell, on that, but there is still potentially a benefit in this area. However, I cannot accept the amendment at the moment, not least because any amendment would have to be considered under the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, which deals with driving licence enforcements, as opposed to the Environmental Protection Act 1990. However, the Government are looking carefully and quickly at the issue of penalty points and, although I cannot accept the amendment today, we will have to look at how we can put that principle into practice in due course.
Amendment 20, in the name of the noble Lord Davies, which was spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, and the noble Earl, Lord Russell, would add the offence of fly-tipping to the list of offences for which vehicles may be seized. I understand the sentiment behind the amendment but, as I have said, local authorities already have the power to seize vehicles linked to waste crime under the Environmental Protection Act 1990, and vehicles can be kept, sold or disposed of by local authorities.
I will refer to today’s press notice, which is available on GOV.UK. It says that the new guidance published today
“will provide the first comprehensive overview for councils, offering clear instructions on identifying, seizing, and disposing of vehicles involved in fly-tipping, as well as advice on taking cases to court and securing convictions against vehicle owners”.
I think that best practice is intended to provide, not replace, statutory documentation. It is therefore an important matter to my colleagues in Defra to ensure that we bring forward that statutory guidance on fly-tipping to examine the case for penalty points and how we deal with those matters in due course.
Lord Cromwell (CB)
Before the Minister sits down, may I ask him a question? I am sure that Defra issuing guidance on best practice for fly-tipping will strike fear, terror and a sense of repentance into fly-tippers. That slightly cheeky comment aside, if he will forgive me, I believe that the Environment Agency going on to land where there has been toxic fly-tipping will simply mean advising the landowner that if they do not deal with it, they will face a penalty themselves. I think that is going to be the case much more commonly than the agency coming on and clearing it up for them.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
On the first instance, the noble Lord commented on the proposals announced today. This Government are advising on a range of issues, through Defra today, about how we take action on fly-tipping. It is all very easy to be cynical about that and say that it will not work or stop the criminals. Any action that any legislation takes will not stop determined criminals, but it is important that the Government try to ensure that we deal with this effectively. Irrespective of the debate we are having, coincidentally, Defra has taken issue with that today and is trying to strengthen the response. I would rather welcome that than take shots at it. I say that in a friendly way to the noble Lord, but it is an important issue that we need to act on and the approach we are trying to take is important.
The noble Lord mentioned the waste management issues and difficulties in Kidlington. Again, I say to him that, in that instance, a criminal investigation ongoing and a total of four arrests have been made to date. As I said in response to the debate earlier, if those arrests end up with a criminal conviction against an individual proved in court, then that individual can have a cost element put against them to ensure that the costs of that clean-up are put to the individual or organisation concerned. That is an important mechanism which, again, the amendments are trying to examine, but that mechanism is there now.
Let us judge what happens in Kidlington and whether the investigation leads not just to further arrests but to convictions. That will be a matter for responsibilities which are not mine, but it is important to say that there is a mechanism to do that. Given the current debate around Kidlington, the figures we have produced today show that there were 1.26 million incidents of fly-tipping last year, which is quite simply unacceptable. Those figures and the Kidlington incident have focused the Government’s mind on this, and we are trying to respond responsibly. I hope noble Lords will accept the offer I have tried to give on penalty points, look at what I have said, and not press the amendment on the basis of the correspondence and the discussions we have had today.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate; I hope they will not be offended if I do not name them personally. However, I want to single out the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, for his example of what amounts to, as he said, rural crime. I was somewhat disappointed in the Liberal Democrat response. In particular, I thought that the noble Earl, Lord Russell, was somewhat contradictory in his response to Amendment 13.
I thank the Minister for what he said. I am not entirely sure that a press notice will address this situation, nor am I convinced that the long-winded process of convicting somebody and then pursuing them for costs is satisfactory as it stands. I do not need to reiterate the appalling impact that fly-tipping has on communities, in particular rural communities up and down the country. The only measure in the Bill related to fly-tipping is the Secretary of State’s guidance to be issued under Clause 9. That is not good enough. The British people are tired of seeing verges, lay-bys, farmland and residential streets turned into dumping grounds. If we are truly serious about tackling fly-tipping, we must ensure that enforcement is credible and that the costs of criminality fall where they belong: on the perpetrator. If the Government are unwilling to take the necessary action to tackle this scourge, I am afraid I have to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(3A) A draft of any guidance or revised guidance proposed to be issued under this section must be laid before each House of Parliament.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires draft guidance to be laid before Parliament.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 9, page 17, line 32.
“(5) The Secretary of State must not issue guidance or revised guidance under this section until after the end of the period of 40 days beginning with the day on which the draft was laid before each House of Parliament, or if it was laid on different days, with the later day.(5A) If, within that period, either House of Parliament resolves that the guidance or revised guidance should not be issued, the Secretary of State must not issue it.(5B) In calculating any period of 40 days for the purposes of subsection (5), no account is to be taken of any time during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which both Houses are adjourned for more than four days.(5C) The Secretary of State must publish any guidance issued or revised under this section.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for the negative resolution procedure to apply to guidance under this section laid before Parliament.
Earl Russell
“Waste crime: NCA priorityIn section 3 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 (Strategic Priorities), after subsection (1) insert—“(1A) When determining the strategic priorities of the NCA under subsection (1) the Secretary of State must determine that serious and organised waste crime is a strategic priority for the NCA, or any successor body, and ensure that it is included as a strategic priority for the agency when it issues its annual reports.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would require the Secretary of State, when setting strategic priorities for the National Crime Agency under section 3 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013, to include serious and organised waste crime as one of those priorities.
Earl Russell (LD)
My Lords, in opening this group on waste crime, I thank my noble friend Lady Doocey for her support. Serious and organised waste crime is now a multi-billion-pound scourge on our economy, countryside, environment and communities. It is out of control, and it is only getting worse. Figures released this very morning show an 11% rise in large-scale fly-tipping: some 52,000 tipper lorry load incidents in 2024-25, up from 47,000 incidents in 2023-24. Defra estimates that this alone will cost local authorities £19.3 million. From Hoad’s Wood to Kidlington to Wigan, serious organised criminal networks are leaving a trail of environmental and economic damage across our country. The Government’s own data suggests that up to a fifth of all waste may be passing through criminal hands.
The national cost in lost revenue, redemption and enforcement runs between £1 billion and £4 billion each year. One site alone, Hoad’s Wood, cost £15 million to clear. That single clear-up equalled the Environment Agency’s entire annual waste crime budget, draining funds intended for flood defences from the Environment Agency.
New illegal sites continue to emerge almost daily. Since the Environment and Climate Change Committee, of which I am a member, published its report last October, more large-scale waste dumps have been discovered than the agency itself had previously known existed. That should worry and alarm this House in equal measure.
Our systems are broken, and broken systems are creating broken outcomes. The fear of uncovering the true scale, or of bearing the financial consequences, has allowed the crisis to fester and to grow, to the organised criminals’ advantage. My amendment responds by proposing to make serious organised waste crime a statutory priority for the National Crime Agency. It would require the Secretary of State, when setting the National Crime Agency’s priorities under Section 3 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013, to include the threat and to ensure that it features in the National Crime Agency’s annual reporting.
That simple amendment would move waste crime from operational consideration to unequivocal accountability. I came across the issue through Hoad’s Wood, an ancient woodland and SSSI, where a vast illegal dump was allowed to accumulate, prompting a ministerial direction and a clear-up. That episode revealed a much wider criminal enterprise: sophisticated networks, often linked to drugs, firearms, and modern slavery, exploiting waste crime because it offers high-profit and low-risk reward.
Our enforcement architecture is simply not fit for purpose. Intelligence still vanishes in what has been described as a Bermuda triangle between various agencies. Local councils face clean-up bills that they cannot meet; communities endure polluted landscapes, falling property values and long-term health risks. Most sites are never cleared; prosecutions are rare, and often overly lenient when handed out; and proceeds of crime are seldom, if ever, recovered.
The Environment Agency, as a regulator, cannot fight these criminal cartels alone. Its dual role, licensing legitimate operators while tackling organised gangs, leaves it underresourced and overstretched. A mere handful of staff in the Joint Unit for Waste Crime cannot match adversaries with the capacity to purchase land, create fake companies and launder millions of pounds through waste crime.
Elevating waste crime to the National Crime Agency’s strategic priorities would change all of that in an instant. It would bring forensic accounting, integrated threat assessments, and co-ordinated operations linking the National Crime Agency, the Joint Unit for Waste Crime, the Environment Agency, HMRC, the police, and Border Force agencies. We have seen this model work against trafficking and cyber crime, with combined intelligence, freezing assets, and dismantling networks.
That would also strengthen parliamentary oversight. Ministers would be accountable for performance and resourcing, as they are for the National Crime Agency priorities. Waste crime would no longer be seen as an environmental issue on the margins but recognised as part of our national security infrastructure. The Government’s forthcoming White Paper and the new national police service provide a perfect and timely opportunity to rewrite this fight against the waste criminals to make it fit for the 21st-century threats we face.
Waste crime fits that description: national, organised, profitable and currently evading fragmented local resources. By hardwiring it into the National Crime Agency priorities now, through the Crime and Policing Bill, we can ensure that it receives the strategic response it demands.
Serious organised waste crime demands a serious organised response. This amendment is precise, proportionate and necessary. It would ensure that, when national priorities are set, serious and organised waste crime cannot be ignored. I urge Ministers to seize this opportunity for systematic reform. I beg to move.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, serious and organised waste crime—fly-tipping on an industrial scale—is poisoning our soil and waterways and, at least until fairly recently, was a largely hidden scandal costing billions of pounds in environmental and clean-up costs. Desecration of the land is not a local nuisance; it is now a significant part of the organised crime playbook, along with drugs and trafficking. The scale of this problem means that the Government need to show leadership now and act without delay. The new guidance that the Government propose in this Bill is welcome, but it falls dangerously short of what is needed. Reminding councils of the powers that they already have is simply not good enough. Minds need to be focused; communities up and down the country are crying out for real enforcement. I urge the House to support Amendment 18.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, we support the principle underlying this amendment. Serious and organised waste crime both is an environmental nuisance and has real consequences for communities and the taxpayer. As we heard from the noble Earl, Lord Russell, the Government’s own estimates say that around 20% of waste in England may be illegally managed at some stage in the supply chain, and that over a third of waste crime is linked to organised crime groups. These figures underline that waste crime is not simply limited to opportunistic fly-tipping; in many cases it is co-ordinated criminal activity driven by profit. It is therefore entirely understandable that noble Lords wish to see it recognised as a national strategic priority.
However, we have some reservations about placing such a requirement in statute. Under Section 3 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013, the Secretary of State already determines the NCA’s strategic priorities following consultation. At present there is no fixed statutory list of priorities, and to single out one specific crime type in primary legislation would be unusual. The question, therefore, is not whether waste crime is serious but whether this is the right legislative mechanism. I look forward to hearing from the Minister how the Government intend to ensure that serious and organised waste crime receives a sustained and meaningful focus.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I too have concerns about this amendment. Nobody could dispute that waste crime is a very serious problem that needs to be addressed. But as I understand it, the NCA’s strategic priorities at the moment—whether they are required by the Secretary of State or otherwise—focus on degrading the highest-harm organised crime groups, with a particular emphasis on tackling drugs, online fraud and organised immigration crime. There may be others. The NCA surely cannot treat all serious matters as a priority. The whole point of a priority is that it focuses on the most serious criminal offences that our society faces. I am not persuaded that identifying this very real problem as a strategic priority is going to assist.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Russell, for his amendment. As he explained, it would allow the Secretary of State to include serious and organised waste crime as a strategic priority for the National Crime Agency. We have all agreed that waste crime blights local communities, that it damages the environment and that serious organised crime—which is on the rise—is a factor in that. The Environment Agency is now regularly alerted to new illegal waste sites.
As evidence for the noble Earl that the Government take this matter seriously, the Environment Agency’s additional waste crime enforcement budget for 2025-26 has been increased by more than 50% to £15.6 million, a £5.6 million increase on the previous year. That is because we recognise that there is a potential area of concern here. It has allowed the Environment Agency to increase its front-line criminal enforcement resource by 43 full-time staff in the Joint Unit for Waste Crime and area environmental crime teams, as well as bringing additional staff for enforcement duties under our major waste reforms.
The Environment Agency works closely, as the noble Earl mentioned, with the National Crime Agency and the Joint Unit on Waste Crime. There are multi-agency prevention and disruption tactics taking place, as well as investigatory activities to impact successfully on criminals. Between the organisations, they have developed enhanced intelligence-sharing and an enhanced approach to targeting organised criminal gangs. We are looking, with other law enforcement bodies, at recommending and introducing new technical capabilities to look at how we can, through an agreed strategy, target waste crime.
Therefore, there is a role for the National Crime Agency but, as the noble Lords, Lord Cameron of Lochiel and Lord Pannick, alluded to, the National Crime Agency is not the lead agency for tackling waste crime. That is the Environment Agency. Under the Crime and Courts Act 2013, the strategic priorities for the National Crime Agency need to reflect changing threat levels in respect of different crime types. I am pleased to see the noble Baroness, Lady May of Maidenhead, here, who would have been lead Minister on the 2013 Act that established the National Crime Agency. I served as a shadow Minister at the time, when dealing with that Bill. Section 3 of that Act is deliberately silent on types of organised crime because it does not want to fetter the National Crime Agency—the very point the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made in relation to the Home Secretary’s discretion to skew the National Crime Agency’s priorities. Therefore, to insert a crime type, however well-meaning or needed, would be to undermine the principles of Section 3 of the 2013 Act.
In short, the Government fully agree with the sentiment underpinning the amendment. We take waste crime extremely seriously; the increase in the budget is evidence of that, as is the co-operation between the NCA and the Environment Agency. I hope that with those comments, the noble Earl will agree that his approach of tying the National Crime Agency to specific targets would not be as helpful as he had hoped and that he can withdraw his amendment.
Earl Russell (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response and thank everyone else who has spoken in this debate. This might be an unusual move but the truth is that waste crime is out of control. It is interlinked and intertwined with all these other serious forms of crime. Under the 2013 Act, it may be under the Home Secretary’s priority to deem waste crime as coming under the National Crime Agency. If the Minister had said to me that the Home Secretary will do that, I would absolutely have withdrawn the amendment. The truth is that that is not the case. The problem continues to grow and is out of control.
I very much welcome everything that is being done in this space. I recognise the work that the Environment Agency is doing. I am thankful to its staff who are working to clear up Kidlington and other sites. I also welcome the extra budget and new technology. I know the Government announced just last week that drones will be used, but frankly, they should have been used all along. If waste crime were dealt with as a serious organised crime issue, these matters would be intertwined and done already. I therefore have no choice but to test the opinion of the House on this matter because waste crime is a serious issue. It is not being addressed and is not part of the responsibility of the National Crime Agency.
Lord Davies of Gower
“Points on driving licence for fly tippingIn section 33(8) of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 (unauthorised disposal of waste: offence), at the end insert—“and in either case is also liable to the endorsement of their driving record with 3 penalty points.””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to add penalty points to the driving licence of a person convicted of a fly-tipping offence.
“Seizure of vehicles in connection with a fly-tipping offenceIn section 59 of the Police Reform Act 2002 (vehicles used in manner causing alarm, distress or annoyance), after subsection (1)(b) insert—“(c) is being used or has been used in connection with an offence under section 33 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 (prohibition on unauthorised or harmful deposit, treatment or disposal of waste),”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment adds the offence of fly tipping to the list of offences for which vehicles may be seized.
Viscount Goschen
“Fly tipping: English waste collection authority dutyWhen an offence of fly-tipping has been committed, the local waste authority must collect all waste resulting from the offence committed and then seek to recover the costs from the offender.”
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(3) A draft of any guidance proposed to be issued under this section must be laid before each House of Parliament. (4) The Secretary of State must not issue guidance under this section until after the end of the period of 40 days beginning with the day on which the draft was laid before each House of Parliament, or if it was laid on different days, with the later day. (4A) If, within that period, either House of Parliament resolves that the guidance should not be issued, the Secretary of State must not issue it.(4B) In calculating any period of 40 days for the purposes of subsection (4), no account is to be taken of any time during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which both Houses are adjourned for more than four days.(4C) The Secretary of State must publish any guidance issued under this section.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment provides for guidance under clause 24 to be laid before Parliament before being issued and to be subject to the negative resolution procedure.
“(6) The Secretary of State may revise any guidance issued under this section.(7) Subject to subsection (8), subsections (3) to (5) have effect in relation to any revised guidance.(8) Subsections (3) to (4B) do not apply to revised guidance if the Secretary of State considers that the revisions are not substantial.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment at clause 24, page 27, line 8.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment increases the maximum sentence for the new offence of possession of an offensive weapon with intent to use unlawful violence.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 27 in my name and in the name of my noble friend, Lord Davies of Gower, would increase the maximum sentence for the new offence of possession of an offensive weapon with intent to use it to commit unlawful violence from four to 10 years. The Bill rightly introduces this new offence to bridge a gap in existing law. At present, the maximum custodial sentence for offences such as carrying a bladed article or offensive weapon in public is up to four years on indictment, whether or not the person has intent. The new offence, as currently drafted, reflects a more serious scenario: possession with the intention to cause harm. However, this new offence carries the same maximum penalty as the existing offence, meaning that the additional element of meaning to commit damage or harm is not reflected in the prescribed punishment.
In Committee, many noble Lords highlighted this very real concern. I observed that the offence as drafted differentiates between simple possession and intentional violence. I posed a simple question to the Government: why is the maximum sentence the same for both? If the law is to distinguish between those who might cause harm and those who intend to do so, that distinction should be mirrored in sentencing as a matter of logic. Similarly, my noble friend Lord Blencathra emphasised that possession of an offensive weapon with intent to use it to commit violence or to cause fear is a profoundly serious act. He noted that:
“Such intent demonstrates a premeditated willingness to inflict harm, intimidate or destroy property”.—[Official Report, 17/11/25; col. 655.]
When these concerns were raised in Committee, the Government expressed opposition on the grounds of proportionality in raising the maximum sentence. The Minister said that four years aligns with maximum penalties for existing weapons-related offences, and that the offence sits logically between simple possession and actual use or threat. Yet this rationale effectively treats two objectively different states of mind and conduct as of equivalent seriousness in law: possessing without harmful intent, and possessing with the intent to unleash unlawful violence.
This amendment does not advocate arbitrary maximums or mandatory sentences. In fact, we have met the Minister half way in a spirit of compromise and lowered our original proposed threshold of 14 years to 10 years. I also respectfully remind your Lordships’ House that we are advocating a 10-year ceiling, not a default outcome; it is a maximum sentence only. Sentencing of course remains a matter of discretion for a court in an individual specific case. A higher maximum sentence would not mandate a longer sentence in every case. Amendment 27 would simply give the courts the discretion to impose sentences that more appropriately reflect the gravity of offences involving violent intent. This would enhance judges’ ability to differentiate between levels of culpability and send a clearer signal that society treats premeditated threats of violence more seriously than mere unlawful possession. If the Minister will not accept this amendment, I am minded to divide the House. I beg to move.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
I rise to express the support of these Benches for Amendment 27, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, which seeks to increase the maximum sentence for the new offence of possessing a weapon with intent. We entirely support the creation of this new offence, which rightly bridges the gap between the simple possession of a knife in public and actually using it to threaten or harm someone. Creating a separate category for those who carry weapons with violent intent is the right approach, to target the most dangerous individuals in our society. However, as my noble friend Lady Doocey made clear in Committee, if we are to treat carrying an offensive weapon with violent intent as a distinctly more serious crime than simple possession, that distinction must logically be reflected in the punishment.
As the Bill is drafted, the new law carries the exact same maximum four-year sentence as the blanket offence of carrying a bladed article. This fails to give the courts the means to sufficiently differentiate between those who might pose a threat and those who actively intend to inflict damage or harm. As the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, stated, this is not merely a theoretical sentencing debate. We agree with the stark assessment made by Jonathan Hall KC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, in his review following the horrific Southport attack. He made it clear that four years in prison is simply insufficient when there is clear evidence of an intention to cause mass fatalities. He recommended substantially tougher maximum penalties for possessing a weapon with intent to use unlawful violence, using the Southport attack as a case study. In his March 2025 independent review on the classification of extreme violence used in the Southport attack, Mr Hall argues that where someone arms themselves with a weapon intending serious violence, this is properly comparable to terrorism-style preparatory conduct, and that the maximum sentence should be very significantly higher than existing norms for simple possession offences.
In short, post Southport, Mr Hall has been arguing that possession with intent to use a weapon in serious violence should carry far higher maximum penalties than the traditional four-year ceiling, and that a new preparation for mass killing offence, up to life, is needed to close the pre-attack gap. By raising the maximum penalty to 14 years, this amendment would provide a ceiling, not a mandatory minimum—and we would, of course, expect the Sentencing Council to issue clear guidance around how to categorise levels of seriousness, to guard against general sentence inflation. Nevertheless, the court must have the full weight of the law behind it in those, hopefully rare, cases where a lengthy sentence is deemed absolutely necessary for public protection. We cannot treat violent premeditated intent as a mere secondary factor. The punishment must be reflective of the severity of the crime, so we welcome this amendment to give the judiciary the vital tool that they need.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, for tabling the amendment, and to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, for moving it. I do believe that sentences should be proportionate to the offence. That is why the maximum sentence for the new offence of possession of a bladed article or offensive weapon with intent to use unlawful violence has been set at four years’ imprisonment. That, I have to say to the House, is in line with penalties for other weapons offences.
Such offences currently carry a maximum penalty of four years, including other more serious offences, such as threatening with an offensive weapon and repeat possession of offensive weapons. It is also worth noting that even though the maximum penalty is four years, the courts—judges in court after trial—are currently not giving sentences anywhere close to the upper range on the sentencing scale, which seems to indicate that judges view the maximum penalty of four years as adequate. A maximum penalty of 10 years for the possession with intent offence would therefore, in my view, be out of line with other possession offences and potentially disproportionate, given where we are.
This is not meant to be a tennis-ball political point, but I say to the noble Lord that the new offence was included in the previous Conservative Administration’s Criminal Justice Bill, and the then Policing Minister, who is now the shadow Home Secretary, spoke eloquently in Committee on that Bill in support of the four-year maximum penalty. So there has been a change; that might be legitimate and right, but the Member for Croydon South, Chris Philp, spoke in favour of the four-year penalty that the Government are seeking only a couple of years ago. That is an interesting fact, but not one that I am intending to use aggressively; I simply want to put it on the record.
The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation has given a recommendation, which the Government have accepted, in his review into the Southport attacks: that the penalty for new possession offences at Clause 27 be kept at four years if the Government consider introducing a new offence of planning a mass-casualty attack. Let me reassure noble Lords that we are considering how best to close the gap identified. However, I do not believe that there is a case for increasing the maximum penalty for the offence in Clause 27 as proposed by the amendment.
I hope the noble Lord will agree with what the Conservative shadow Home Secretary said when he was the Policing Minister and will withdraw the amendment.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. I am especially grateful for the support from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and his citation of Mr Hall on the tragic events in Southport.
I have no doubt that all noble Lords understand the seriousness of knife crime and weapon-related violence. As I have previously stated, we support this new offence. However, my amendment acknowledges that there is a meaningful moral and legal difference between someone who unlawfully carries a weapon and someone who carries it with the intent to cause harm. If the maximum sentence remains the same as that for simple possession, the differentiation risks being more symbolic than substantive. A person who arms himself with the purpose of inflicting violence presents a far greater and more immediate threat than someone who does not. Our sentencing framework should reflect that reality. It is a sincere shame that the Government will not accept this amendment. We stand by it, and for the reasons I have outlined I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Crime and Policing Bill
Wednesday 25th February 2026
(2 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 167-I(a) Amendments for Report (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (25 Feb 2026)
20:46 - Division on Amendment 179 - Ayes: 43 / Noes: 131 - Amendment 179 disagreed.
Lord Hanson of Flint
(i) obtained from the buyer a copy of an identity document issued to the buyer in a physical form and a photograph of the buyer, or(ii) took such steps to verify the buyer’s age as may be prescribed in regulations made by the Secretary of State,”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment adds a requirement to section 141B of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 for a passport or driving licence used as proof of age on a remote sale of a knife to be a physical version, and allows the Secretary of State to make regulations prescribing an alternative process for age verification (such as digital ID).
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
My Lords, the amendments in this group in my name are substantially the same as those that I tabled in Committee. As the House may recall, I withdrew those amendments following concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, but today I am reintroducing them for the House’s consideration. The amendments relate to the provisions in Clauses 31 to 35, which introduce stricter two-step age verification checks for the sale and delivery of knives and crossbows bought online.
For the House’s convenience I will recap: Clauses 31 and 32, on knives, and Clauses 33 and 34, on crossbows, will require at the point of sale, or point of sale or hire, for crossbows, specific checks to include photographic identity plus a current photograph; and, at the point of delivery, photographic identity checks; and they will create a new offence of delivering a package containing a knife or crossbow to someone other than the buyer—if the buyer is an individual, as opposed to, for example, a company—so that knives and crossbows cannot be left on doorsteps or with neighbours.
These amendments clarify that the passport or driving licence required as proof of age for a remote sale of a knife, or for a remote sale or hire of a crossbow, must be a physical version. We are also again adding provisions that will allow the Secretary of State to make regulations, subject to—I hope this helps the House—the affirmative procedure, prescribing an alternative process for age verification, such as digital ID. These amendments are required to ensure that a digital ID can be used as evidence of identity wherever the physical ID is accepted.
In Committee the noble Lord, Lord Davies, raised concerns that the use of digital ID would be mandatory. However, I assure him that this is not a blanket requirement mandating the use of digital ID to purchase knives or crossbows; it is simply making provision for alternative forms of ID, digital or otherwise, to be used. This is to ensure that the legislation keeps pace with future potential developments in digital ID. I know that the Benches opposite have concerns about the Government’s plans for digital ID, but we have been clear that under those plans it will not be mandatory to have a digital ID. I hope that that helps the noble Lord. These provisions are about giving people a choice in how they verify their identity. It will continue to be possible for the purchaser to present a physical passport or driving licence, where they have one, as an alternative to a specified digital ID.
Furthermore, with the permission and support of the authorities in Scotland and Northern Ireland, these amendments also extend these clauses to Scotland and Northern Ireland.
We are amending the legislation to ensure that all contractors in the delivery chain are responsible for age and ID verification on delivery of bladed products and crossbows to residential premises. This is to account for situations where the delivery company engaged by the seller to deliver the bladed product sub-contracts the delivery to other companies. We believe that it is essential that all companies in the chain are responsible for ensuring that age and identity are verified before the package is handed over to the buyer; otherwise, regulations made under the Bill would be meaningless.
I hope that, having reflected on the debate in Committee, and given the changes and the clarification I have given, the noble Lord, Lord Davies, will be content with these government amendments. There are other amendments in the group. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will, if he so wishes, move Amendment 177. I will respond to the noble Lord once I have heard his speech. For the moment, I beg to move.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I am not sure whether I am in order. I am looking at the noble Lord, Lord Katz, who is nodding, which is good news. I thank him; it is much appreciated. There is nothing worse than writing a speech and being unable to deliver it.
I welcome the government amendments in this group, brought forward by the Minister, concerning the remote sale and delivery of knives and bladed articles. As I noted in Committee, we on these Benches fully support the intent behind the Government’s measures in this area. We must strengthen accountability for businesses and sellers in tackling online knife sales. We welcome the robust two-step age-verification checks being implemented. It is entirely right that we ensure a consistent UK-wide approach by extending these provisions, including those relating to crossbows, to Scotland and Northern Ireland. It is vital that the law across the home nations is exactly on the same footing, so that criminals cannot exploit cross-border differences to acquire lethal weapons.
I also welcome the amendments that clarify the rules around identity documents. The requirement for a physical identity document to be shown upon the delivery of a bladed product provides a necessary safeguard. Furthermore, we acknowledge the provisions allowing the Secretary of State to prescribe alternative age-verification steps such as digital ID.
As I made clear to the Minister previously, there is no Bench more strongly against compulsory digital ID than the Liberal Democrats’, so we remain highly supportive of the assurance that analogue physical forms of identity will continue to be accepted alongside any new digital alternatives. Embedded among these amendments, however, is our Amendment 177, referred to by the Minister, on the remote sale of knives. This amendment requires that regulations mandate the reporting of bulk knife sales to the police
“in real time, or as soon as is reasonably practicable”.
In Committee, the Minister stated that he was sympathetic to the overall aim of this amendment but argued that the current duty in Clause 36 was sufficient and that exact timeframes would be handled later in regulations, following consultation. Sympathy does not intervene in a crime. We have seen cases where young people effectively act as arms traders, buying huge numbers of illegal weapons online for community distribution. If the police are to effectively track and intercept these bulk purchases, they need that intelligence immediately, not days or weeks later when the weapons are already on the streets. Amendment 177 would ensure that operational effectiveness is guaranteed in the Bill, turning bureaucratic compliance into actionable, life-saving intelligence.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, in Committee, I asked the Government to withdraw their amendments that permitted them to require by regulations the use of digital ID for age verification for the online sale of knives and crossbows. My concern was that permitting this would be the first legislative step towards mandating digital IDs. Since then, of course, the Government have conceded that digital IDs will not be made mandatory and, while I still harbour some reservations, I am now content for the amendments to be made to the Bill.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful for the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. If I may, I will address the points from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and thank him for returning to the issue of fixed-penalty notices with his Amendment 177.
We are clear that, in order for the reports on bulk sales of knives or other bladed articles to be a useful tool for the police to prevent knife crime, they must be sent to the police in a timely manner. I say to the noble Lord that we are working with the police on the details of a reporting system, and I want to reassure him that the points he has raised both in Committee and in his amendment, and during the debate today, will be taken into account when drafting the regulations. I do not believe there is any difference of substance between us on that; it is just that we are of the view that the timeliness of reports is best left to regulations, rather than primary legislation. We will be bringing those regulations forward, and I hope he will be able to support, comment upon and discuss them at that time. I hope the noble Lord will be content not to move his amendment.
Before I finish on this it is worthwhile, both in the context of this debate and the previous group, to place on record that while overall knife crime was previously climbing, since the start of this Parliament knife homicides have fallen by 27% and knife-enabled offences have recorded an 8% decrease. The latest admissions data for NHS hospitals in England and Wales also shows a 10% fall in admissions for knife assaults. Now, I am not complacent and will not stop pressing on this, but those results demonstrate progress. Given the measures in this Bill, and the measures we may have on digital and non-digital ID two-step verification, I hope we will further reduce those figures in the coming months. In the meantime, having moved my Amendment 28, I will beg to move the other amendments and hope that the noble Lord will be content not to move his.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 31, page 36, line 23.
“(10A) A statutory instrument containing (whether alone or with other provision) regulations under subsection (4)(a)(ii) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for regulations prescribing the steps that may be taken to verify a buyer’s age to be subject to the affirmative procedure.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 31, page 37, line 6.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“Remote sale or letting of knives etc: Scotland(1) Section 141C of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (remote sales and lettings of knives) is amended as follows.(2) For subsection (5) substitute—“(5) Condition A is that, before the sale or letting on hire—(a) the accused either—(i) obtained from the recipient a copy of an identity document issued to the recipient in a physical form and a photograph of the recipient, or(ii) took such steps to verify the recipient’s age as may be prescribed in regulations made by the Scottish Ministers, and(b) on the basis of that copy and photograph or those steps, a reasonable person would have been satisfied that the recipient was aged 18 or over.(5A) For the purposes of subsection (5) an “identity document” means—(a) a United Kingdom passport (within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971);(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom or by or on behalf of an international organisation;(c) a licence to drive a motor vehicle—(i) granted under Part 3 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 or Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1)), or(ii) issued in the form of a photocard by a member State;(d) any other document specified in regulations made by the Scottish Ministers.”(3) In subsection (6)(b) for “a person aged 18 or over” substitute “the recipient”.(4) In subsection (7) for “a person aged 18 or over” substitute “the recipient”.(5) In subsection (9) omit “or a person acting on behalf of the recipient” in both places it occurs.(6) After subsection (10) insert—“(11) Regulations made by the Scottish Ministers under subsection (5)(a)(ii) are subject to the affirmative procedure.(12) Regulations made by the Scottish Ministers under subsection (5A)(d) are subject to the negative procedure.(13) For the meaning of “affirmative procedure” and “negative procedure” see Part 2 of the Interpretation and Legislative Reform (Scotland) Act 2010 (asp 10).”(7) In section 141A(4B) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (sale of knives to persons under 18: Scotland) for paragraphs (a) to (b) substitute—“(a) a United Kingdom passport (within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971);(aa) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom or by or on behalf of an international organisation; (b) a licence to drive a motor vehicle—(i) granted under Part 3 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 or Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1)), or(ii) issued in the form of a photocard by a member State;”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause makes provision for Scotland equivalent to that made for England and Wales by clause 31 (as amended by my amendments to that clause).
“Remote sale of knives etc: Northern Ireland(1) Article 54A of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (S.I. 1996/3160 (N.I. 24)) (remote sale of knives) is amended as follows.(2) For paragraph (4) substitute—“(4) Condition A is that, before the sale—(a) the seller either—(i) obtained from the buyer a copy of an identity document issued to the buyer in a physical form and a photograph of the buyer, or(ii) took such steps to verify the buyer’s age as may be prescribed in an order made by the Department of Justice, and(b) on the basis of that copy and photograph or those steps, a reasonable person would have been satisfied that the buyer was aged 18 or over.(4A) For the purposes of paragraph (4) an “identity document” means—(a) a United Kingdom passport (within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971);(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom or by or on behalf of an international organisation;(c) a licence to drive a motor vehicle granted under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1)) or Part 3 of the Road Traffic Act 1988;(d) any other document specified in an order made by the Department of Justice.”(3) In paragraph (5)(b), for “a person aged 18 or over” substitute “the buyer”.(4) In paragraph (6), for “a person aged 18 or over” substitute “the buyer”.(5) In paragraph (8), omit “or a person acting on behalf of the buyer”, in both places it occurs.(6) In Article 57 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (S.I. 1996/3160 (N.I. 24)) (rules and orders)—(a) in paragraph (1) after “54(3)(c)” insert “, 54A(4A)(d)”;(b) in paragraph (2) after “Article” insert “54A(4)(a)(ii) or”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause makes provision for Northern Ireland equivalent to that made for England and Wales by clause 31 (as amended by my amendments to that clause).
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(1A) In section 38 (delivery of bladed products to residential premises)—(a) omit subsection (4);(b) in subsection (8)—(i) in paragraph (b) omit “Scotland or”;(ii) after paragraph (b) insert—“(c) on summary conviction in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or to both;(d) on conviction on indictment in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months, to a fine or to both.”(1B) In section 39 (delivery of bladed products to persons under 18)—(a) in subsection (1), for paragraphs (c) to (e) substitute—“(c) before the sale, the seller entered into an arrangement with a person (“the contractor”) by which the contractor agreed—(i) to deliver bladed products for the seller, or(ii) to arrange the delivery of bladed products for the seller,(d) the contractor was aware when they entered into the arrangement with the seller that it covered delivering, or arranging the delivery of, bladed products, and(e) pursuant to that arrangement, the bladed product is finally delivered to residential premises by the contractor or a person acting on the contractor’s behalf.”;(b) omit subsections (2) and (3);(c) for subsection (6) substitute—“(6) The contractor commits an offence if, when the bladed product is finally delivered to residential premises by the contractor or a person acting on the contractor’s behalf, it is not delivered into the hands of a person who—(a) is aged 18 or over, and(b) if the buyer is an individual, is the buyer.(6A) A person acting on the contractor’s behalf commits an offence if—(a) the bladed product is finally delivered to residential premises by that person or another person acting on the contractor’s behalf, and(b) it is not delivered into the hands of a person who—(i) is aged 18 or over, and(ii) if the buyer is an individual, is the buyer.(6B) For the purposes of this section, a person acts on the contractor’s behalf if the person acts in relation to the bladed product pursuant to a relevant arrangement with—(a) the contractor, or(b) a person who acts on the contractor’s behalf.(6C) A “relevant arrangement” is an arrangement entered into before the sale of the bladed product by which the person agreed to finally deliver, or to arrange for the final delivery of, bladed products (whether or not the person was aware that the arrangement covered bladed products).”;(d) in subsection (7)—(i) for “subsection (6)” substitute “this section”;(ii) in paragraph (b) omit “Scotland or”;(iii) after paragraph (b) insert—“(c) on summary conviction in Scotland, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum;(d) on conviction on indictment in Scotland, to a fine.”.” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with other of my amendments to clause 32, extend the provision made by that clause to Scotland and Northern Ireland and make related drafting changes. It also ensures that all contractors in the delivery chain are responsible for age and ID verification on delivery of bladed products to residential premises.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 32, page 37, line 11.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 32, page 37, line 11.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 32, page 37, line 11.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 32, page 37, line 11.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 32, page 37, line 11.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 32, page 37, line 11.
“(3A) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 39(6) or (6A) to show that the delivery conditions were met.(3B) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 39(6) or (6A) who did not finally deliver the bladed product to show that the person took all reasonable precautions, and exercised all due diligence, to avoid commission of the offence.(3C) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 39(6A) to show that the person did not know, and a reasonable person would not have known, that what was delivered was a bladed product.”Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 32, page 37, line 11.
“(a) the person finally delivering the bladed product—(i) was shown by the person (“P”) into whose hands it was finally delivered an identity document issued to P in a physical form, or(ii) took such steps to verify P’s age and identity as may be prescribed in regulations made by the appropriate national authority, and”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that an identity document shown to a person delivering a bladed product must be a physical document. It also allows regulations to be made prescribing an alternative process for identity verification (such as digital ID).
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 32, page 37, lines 31 to 33.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with my second amendment to clause 32, page 38, line 10, provide for EU driving licences to count as an identity document in Scotland.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 32, page 37, line 11.
“(5A) In subsection (5)(c) “relevant driving licence” means—(a) in relation to England and Wales and Northern Ireland, a licence to drive a motor vehicle granted under Part 3 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 or Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1));(b) in relation to Scotland, a licence to drive a motor vehicle—(i) granted under Part 3 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 or Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1)), or(ii) issued in the form of a photocard by a member State.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with my amendment to clause 32, page 38, line 6, provide for EU driving licences to count as an identity document in Scotland.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes provisions that are no longer needed because the matters are dealt with in the new section 40E inserted by my amendment to clause 32, page 43, line 14 and the new section 42A inserted by my amendment to clause 32, page 45, line 19.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes provisions that are superseded by my new amendments to section 39 of the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 (see my amendment to clause 32, page 37, line 11).
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 32, page 37, line 11.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 32, page 37, line 11.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 32, page 37, line 11.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes a drafting change for consistency.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes a provision that is no longer needed because the matter is dealt with in the new section 42A inserted by my amendment to clause 32, page 45, line 19.
“(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to a fine; (b) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale;(c) on summary conviction in Scotland, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum;(d) on conviction on indictment in Scotland, to a fine.”Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 32, page 37, line 11.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes provisions that are no longer needed because the matters are dealt with in the new section 40E inserted by my amendment to clause 32, page 43, line 14 and the new section 42A inserted by my amendment to clause 32, page 45, line 19.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with other amendments to this inserted section, ensures that all contractors in the delivery chain are responsible for marking packages containing bladed products that are to be delivered to collection points as needing age and ID verification.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 32, page 37, line 11.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with other amendments to this inserted section, ensures that all contractors in the delivery chain are responsible for marking packages containing bladed products that are to be delivered to collection points as needing age and ID verification.
(ii) to arrange the delivery of bladed products for the seller,”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with other amendments to this inserted section, ensures that all contractors in the delivery chain are responsible for marking packages containing bladed products that are to be delivered to collection points as needing age and ID verification.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with other amendments to this inserted section, ensures that all contractors in the delivery chain are responsible for marking packages containing bladed products that are to be delivered to collection points as needing age and ID verification.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with other amendments to this inserted section, ensures that all contractors in the delivery chain are responsible for marking packages containing bladed products that are to be delivered to collection points as needing age and ID verification.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with other amendments to this inserted section, ensures that all contractors in the delivery chain are responsible for marking packages containing bladed products that are to be delivered to collection points as needing age and ID verification.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with other amendments to this inserted section, ensures that all contractors in the delivery chain are responsible for marking packages containing bladed products that are to be delivered to collection points as needing age and ID verification.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 32, page 37, line 11.
“(2A) A person who acts on the contractor’s behalf commits an offence if they, or another person acting on the contractor’s behalf, deliver the bladed product to a collection point.(2B) For the purposes of this section, a person acts on the contractor’s behalf if the person acts in relation to the bladed product pursuant to a relevant arrangement with—(a) the contractor, or(b) a person who acts on the contractor’s behalf.(2C) A “relevant arrangement” is an arrangement entered into before the sale of the bladed product by which the person agreed to deliver, or to arrange for the delivery of, bladed products (whether or not the person was aware that the arrangement covered bladed products).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with other amendments to this inserted section, ensures that all contractors in the delivery chain are responsible for marking packages containing bladed products that are to be delivered to collection points as needing age and ID verification.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with other amendments to this inserted section, ensures that all contractors in the delivery chain are responsible for marking packages containing bladed products that are to be delivered to collection points as needing age and ID verification.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes a provision that is no longer needed because the matter is dealt with in the new section 42A inserted by my amendment to clause 32, page 45, line 19.
“(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to a fine;(b) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale;(c) on summary conviction in Scotland, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum;(d) on conviction on indictment in Scotland, to a fine.”Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 32, page 37, line 11.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes provisions that are no longer needed because the matters are dealt with in the new section 40E inserted by my amendment to clause 32, page 43, line 14 and the new section 42A inserted by my amendment to clause 32, page 45, line 19.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 32, page 37, line 11.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 32, page 37, line 11.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is a drafting change.
(a) gives the bladed product to a person collecting it, but(b) does not give it”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that section 40D(4) applies where a bladed product is given to the person collecting it by a person acting on behalf of the operator.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes a drafting change.
“(a) the individual giving the bladed product to the person (“P”) collecting it—(i) was shown by P an identity document issued to P in a physical form, or(ii) took such steps to verify P’s age and identity as may be prescribed in regulations made by the appropriate national authority, and”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that an identity document shown to a person handing over a bladed product must be a physical document. It also allows regulations to be made prescribing an alternative process for identity verification (such as digital ID).
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 32, page 42, line 34.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes a provision that is no longer needed because the matter is dealt with in the new section 42A inserted by my amendment to clause 32, page 45, line 19.
“(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to a fine;(b) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale;(c) on summary conviction in Scotland, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum;(d) on conviction on indictment in Scotland, to a fine.”Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 32, page 37, line 11.
“40E Further defences to offences under sections 38 to 40DThe appropriate national authority may by regulations provide for other defences for a person charged with an offence under any of sections 38 to 40D.” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes provisions that are no longer needed because the matters are dealt with in the new section 40E inserted by this amendment and the new section 42A inserted by my amendment to clause 32, page 45, line 19.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 32, page 37, line 11.
“(d) in subsection (3), for “40” substitute “40D”;(e) in subsection (4) for “40” substitute “40D”.”Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 32, page 37, line 11.
“(a) in subsection (1) for paragraphs (c) to (e) substitute—“(c) before the sale, the seller entered into an arrangement with a person (“the contractor”) by which the contractor agreed—(i) to deliver bladed articles for the seller, or(ii) to arrange the delivery of bladed articles for the seller,(d) the contractor was aware when they entered into the arrangement with the seller that it covered delivering, or arranging the delivery of, bladed articles, and(e) pursuant to that arrangement, the bladed article is finally delivered by the contractor or a person acting on the contractor’s behalf.”;(b) omit subsections (2) and (3);(c) for subsections (4) to (9) substitute—“(4) The contractor commits an offence if, when the bladed article is finally delivered by the contractor or a person acting on the contractor’s behalf, it is not delivered into the hands of a person who—(a) is aged 18 or over, and(b) if the buyer is an individual, is the buyer.(4A) A person acting on the contractor’s behalf commits an offence if—(a) the bladed article is finally delivered by that person or another person acting on the contractor’s behalf, and(b) it is not delivered into the hands of a person who—(i) is aged 18 or over, and(ii) if the buyer is an individual, is the buyer.(4B) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (4) or (4A) to show that the delivery conditions were met.(4C) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (4) or (4A) who did not finally deliver the bladed article to show that the person took all reasonable precautions, and exercised all due diligence, to avoid commission of the offence.(4D) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (4A) to show that the person did not know, and a reasonable person would not have known, that what was delivered was a bladed article.(4E) For the purposes of this section a person acts on the contractor’s behalf if the person acts in relation to the bladed article pursuant to a relevant arrangement with—(a) the contractor, or(b) a person who acts on the contractor’s behalf. (4F) A “relevant arrangement” is an arrangement entered into before the sale of the bladed article by which the person agreed to finally deliver, or to arrange for the final delivery of, bladed articles (whether or not the person was aware that the arrangement covered bladed articles).(4G) In this section the “delivery conditions” has the meaning given by section 40(4).”;(d) in subsection (10)—(i) for “subsection (4)” substitute “this section”;(ii) in paragraph (b) omit “Scotland or”;(iii) after paragraph (b) insert—“(c) on summary conviction in Scotland, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum;(d) on conviction on indictment in Scotland, to a fine.””Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 32, page 37, line 11.
“(9A) After section 42 insert—“42A Interpretation of sections 38 to 42(1) This section applies for the interpretation of sections 38 to 42.(2) A person (“A”) is not in the presence of another person (“B”) at any time if—(a) where A is an individual, A or a person acting on behalf of A is not in the presence of B at that time;(b) where A is not an individual, a person acting on behalf of A is not in the presence of B at that time.(3) A person other than an individual—(a) is within the United Kingdom at any time, if the person carries on a business of selling articles of any kind from premises in any part of the United Kingdom at that time;(b) is outside the United Kingdom at any time, if the person does not carry on a business of selling articles of any kind from premises in any part of the United Kingdom at that time.(4) The “appropriate national authority” is—(a) in relation to England and Wales, the Secretary of State;(b) in relation to Scotland, the Scottish Ministers;(c) in relation to Northern Ireland, the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland.(5) A person charged with an offence is to be taken to have shown a matter if—(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.”.”Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 32, page 37, line 11.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 32, page 37, line 11.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 32, page 37, line 11.
“(c) in subsection (3)—(i) omit “, 40(10)(c)”;(ii) after “is” insert “, and regulations made by the Scottish Ministers under section 40(5)(d) are,”; (d) in subsection (4) for “40(13)” substitute “40(4)(a)(ii), 40D(8)(a)(ii), 40E”;(e) in subsection (6) after “Act” insert “, except for regulations under section 40(5)(d),”;(f) after subsection (6) insert—“(6A) Regulations made by the Department of Justice under section 40(5)(d) are subject to negative resolution within the meaning given by section 41(6) of the Interpretation Act (Northern Ireland) 1954.””Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 32, page 37, line 11.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(2A) After section 1 insert—“1ZA Defence to offence under section 1: England and WalesExcept where section 1B applies, it is a defence for a person charged in England and Wales with an offence under section 1 to show that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence.”.(2B) In section 1A (defences: Scotland)—(a) in subsection (1)—(i) for “It” substitute “Except where section 1B applies, it”;(ii) after “charged” insert “in Scotland”;(b) in subsection (3) for paragraphs (a) to (b) substitute—“(a) a United Kingdom passport (within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971),(aa) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom or by or on behalf of an international organisation,(b) a licence to drive a motor vehicle—(i) granted under Part 3 of the Road Traffic 1988 or Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1)), or(ii) issued in the form of a photocard by a member State, or”;(c) for the heading substitute “Defence to offence under section 1: Scotland”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with my other amendments to clauses 33 to 35, extend to Scotland the amendments made by those clauses to the Crossbows Act 1987, and make related changes.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
(i) obtained from B a copy of an identity document issued to B in a physical form and a photograph of B, or(ii) took such steps to verify B’s age as may be prescribed in regulations made by the relevant national authority,”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires a passport or driving licence used as proof of age on a remote sale or letting of a crossbow to be a physical document, and allows the Secretary of State or Scottish Ministers to make regulations prescribing an alternative process for age verification (such as digital ID).
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 33, page 46, line 9.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with my second amendment to clause 33, page 46, line 25, provides for EU driving licences to count as an identity document in Scotland (for consistency with the existing provision in section 1A(3) of the Crossbows Act 1987).
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
“(5A) In subsection (5)(c) a “relevant driving licence” means—(a) in relation to England and Wales, a licence to drive a motor vehicle granted under Part 3 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 or Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1));(b) in relation to Scotland, a licence to drive a motor vehicle—(i) granted under Part 3 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 or under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1)), or(ii) issued in the form of a photocard by a member State.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with my amendment to clause 33, page 46, line 21, provides for EU driving licences to count as an identity document in Scotland (for consistency with the existing provision in section 1A(3) of the Crossbows Act 1987).
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
“(b) on summary conviction in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);(c) on conviction on indictment in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine (or both).”Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
(i) was shown by the person “(P)” into whose hands it was finally delivered an identity document issued to P in a physical form, or(ii) took such steps to verify P’s age and identity as may be prescribed in regulations made by the relevant national authority,”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires a passport or driving licence used as proof of age on delivery of a crossbow to be a physical document, and allows the Secretary of State or Scottish Ministers to make regulations prescribing an alternative process for age verification (such as digital ID).
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 34, page 48, line 12.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
Member’s explanatory statement
This is a drafting change.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
(ii) to arrange the delivery of crossbows or parts of crossbows for A,” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, along with other amendments to inserted section 1E, ensure that offences relating to the delivery of crossbows to residential premises can be committed by all contractors in the delivery chain.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, along with other amendments to inserted section 1E, ensure that offences relating to the delivery of crossbows to residential premises can be committed by all contractors in the delivery chain.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that inserted section 1E(1)(e) applies to deliveries by a person acting on C’s behalf.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes provision that is no longer needed because the point is now dealt with in section 1J(2A) (general interpretation) as inserted by my amendment to clause 35, page 54, line 29.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that inserted section 1E(3) applies to deliveries by a person acting on C’s behalf.
(a) the crossbow or part of a crossbow is finally delivered to residential premises by that person or another person acting on C’s behalf, and(b) it is not delivered.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, along with other amendments to inserted section 1E, ensure that offences relating to the delivery of crossbows to residential premises can be committed by all contractors in the delivery chain.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, along with other amendments to inserted section 1E, ensure that offences relating to the delivery of crossbows to residential premises can be committed by all contractors in the delivery chain.
“(5A) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) or (4) who did not finally deliver the crossbow or part of a crossbow to residential premises to show that the person took all reasonable precautions, and exercised all due diligence, to avoid commission of the offence.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, along with other amendments to inserted section 1E, ensure that offences relating to the delivery of crossbows to residential premises can be committed by all contractors in the delivery chain.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, along with other amendments to inserted section 1E, ensure that offences relating to the delivery of crossbows to residential premises can be committed by all contractors in the delivery chain.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, along with other amendments to inserted section 1E, ensure that offences relating to the delivery of crossbows to residential premises can be committed by all contractors in the delivery chain.
“(6A) For the purposes of this section a person acts on C’s behalf if the person acts in relation to the crossbow or part of a crossbow pursuant to a relevant arrangement with—(a) C, or(b) a person who acts on C’s behalf.(6B) A “relevant arrangement” is an arrangement entered into before the sale or letting on hire of the crossbow or part of a crossbow by which the person agreed to finally deliver, or to arrange for the final delivery of, crossbows or parts of crossbows (whether or not the person was aware that the arrangement covered crossbows or parts of crossbows).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, along with other amendments to inserted section 1E, ensure that offences relating to the delivery of crossbows to residential premises can be committed by all contractors in the delivery chain.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
“(b) on summary conviction in Scotland, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum;(c) on conviction on indictment in Scotland, to a fine.”Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
“(b) on summary conviction in Scotland, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum;(c) on conviction on indictment in Scotland, to a fine.” Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
Member’s explanatory statement
This is a drafting change.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
(ii) to arrange the delivery of crossbows or parts of crossbows for A,”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, along with other amendments to inserted section 1G, ensure that offences relating to the delivery of crossbows to collection points can be committed by all contractors in the delivery chain.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, along with other amendments to inserted section 1G, ensure that offences relating to the delivery of crossbows to collection points can be committed by all contractors in the delivery chain.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that inserted section 1G(2) applies to deliveries made by a person acting on C’s behalf.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
“(2A) A person acting on C’s behalf commits an offence if, pursuant to the arrangement, that person or another person acting on C’s behalf delivers the crossbow or part of a crossbow to a collection point.(2B) For the purposes of this section, a person acts on C’s behalf if the person acts in relation to the crossbow or part of a crossbow pursuant to a relevant arrangement with—(a) C, or(b) a person who acts on C’s behalf.(2C) A “relevant arrangement” is an arrangement entered into before the sale or letting on hire of the crossbow or part of a crossbow by which the person agreed to deliver, or to arrange for the delivery of, crossbows or parts of crossbows (whether or not the person was aware that the arrangement covered crossbows or parts of crossbows).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, along with other amendments to inserted section 1G, ensure that offences relating to the delivery of crossbows to collection points can be committed by all contractors in the delivery chain.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, along with other amendments to inserted section 1G, ensure that offences relating to the delivery of crossbows to collection points can be committed by all contractors in the delivery chain.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
“(b) on summary conviction in Scotland, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum;(c) on conviction on indictment in Scotland, to a fine.”Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is a drafting change.
(a) gives the crossbow or part of a crossbow to a person collecting it, but(b) does not give it”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that section 1H(4) applies where the crossbow or part of a crossbow is given to the person collecting it by a person acting on behalf of the operator.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes a drafting change.
(i) was shown by P an identity document issued to P in a physical form, or(ii) took such steps to verify P’s age and identity as may be prescribed in regulations made by the relevant national authority,”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires a passport or driving licence used as proof of age on collection of a crossbow to be a physical document, and allows the Secretary of State or Scottish Ministers to make regulations prescribing an alternative process for age verification (such as digital ID).
Member’s explanatory statement
The amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 34, page 52, line 36.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
“(b) on summary conviction in Scotland, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum;(c) on conviction on indictment in Scotland, to a fine.”Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
Member’s explanatory statement
This is a drafting change.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
(ii) to arrange the delivery of crossbows or parts of crossbows for A,”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, along with other amendments to inserted section 1I, ensure that offences relating to the delivery of crossbows to residential premises can be committed by all contractors in the delivery chain.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, along with other amendments to inserted section 1I, ensure that offences relating to the delivery of crossbows to residential premises can be committed by all contractors in the delivery chain.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that inserted section 1I(1)(e) applies where a person delivers the item on C’s behalf.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment leaves out provision that is no longer necessary because the point is now dealt with in section 1J(2A) (general interpretation) as inserted by my amendment to clause 35, page 54, line 29.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that inserted section 1I(3) applies where the item is delivered by a person acting on C’s behalf.
“(4) A person acting on C’s behalf commits an offence if— (a) the crossbow or part of a crossbow is finally delivered by that person or another person acting on C’s behalf, and(b) it is not delivered”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, along with other amendments to inserted section 1I, ensure that offences relating to the delivery of crossbows to residential premises can be committed by all contractors in the delivery chain.
Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
“(b) on summary conviction in Scotland, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum;(c) on conviction on indictment in Scotland, to a fine.”Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, along with other amendments to inserted section 1I, ensure that offences relating to the delivery of crossbows to residential premises can be committed by all contractors in the delivery chain.
“(6A) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) or (4) who did not finally deliver the crossbow or part of a crossbow to show that the person took all reasonable precautions, and exercised all due diligence, to avoid commission of the offence.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, along with other amendments to inserted section 1I, ensure that offences relating to the delivery of crossbows to residential premises can be committed by all contractors in the delivery chain.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, along with other amendments to inserted section 1I, ensure that offences relating to the delivery of crossbows to residential premises can be committed by all contractors in the delivery chain.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, along with other amendments to inserted section 1I, ensure that offences relating to the delivery of crossbows to residential premises can be committed by all contractors in the delivery chain.
“(8) For the purposes of this section a person acts on C’s behalf if the person acts in relation to the crossbow or part of a crossbow pursuant to a relevant arrangement with—(a) C, or(b) a person who acts on C’s behalf.(9) A “relevant arrangement” is an arrangement entered into before the sale or letting on hire of the crossbow or part of a crossbow by which the person agreed to finally deliver, or to arrange for the final delivery of, crossbows or parts of crossbows (whether or not the person was aware that the arrangement covered crossbows or parts of crossbows).” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, along with other amendments to inserted section 1I, ensure that offences relating to the delivery of crossbows to residential premises can be committed by all contractors in the delivery chain.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(1A) “Relevant national authority” means—(a) in relation to England and Wales, the Secretary of State;(b) in relation to Scotland, the Scottish Ministers.”Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
“(2A) A person other than an individual—(a) is within the United Kingdom at any time, if the person carries on a business of selling or letting on hire articles of any kind from premises in any part of the United Kingdom at that time;(b) is outside the United Kingdom at any time, if the person does not carry on a business of selling or letting on hire articles of any kind from premises in any part of the United Kingdom at that time.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment defines when a person is within or outside the United Kingdom for the purposes of the crossbow provisions.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for regulations made by the Secretary of State prescribing the steps that may be taken to verify a buyer’s age (as well as regulations under the provisions already specified in inserted section 6A(2)) to be subject to the affirmative procedure.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 35, page 55, line 6.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 35, page 55, line 6.
“(4) Regulations made by the Scottish Ministers under this Act, other than regulations under section 1B(5)(d), are subject to the affirmative procedure.(5) Regulations made by the Scottish Ministers under section 1B(5)(d) are subject to the negative procedure.(6) For the meaning of “affirmative procedure” and “negative procedure” see Part 2 of the Interpretation and Legislative Reform (Scotland) Act 2010 (asp 10).”Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
“(4) In section 66(2) of that Act (guidance by Scottish Ministers), after paragraph (a) insert—“(aa) any of sections 1 to 3 of the Crossbows Act 1987 as they have effect in relation to Scotland,”.”Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 33, page 45, line 32.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“Remote sale and letting of crossbows: Northern Ireland(1) The Crossbows (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 (S.I. 1988/794 (N.I. 5)) is amended as follows.(2) In Article 3 omit “, unless he believes him to be eighteen years of age or older and has reasonable ground for the belief”.(3) After Article 3 insert—“Defence to offence under Article 33A. Except where Article 3B applies, it is a defence for a person charged with an offence under Article 3 to show that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence.Defence to offence under Article 3: remote sales etc(1) This Article applies if—(a) a person (“A”) is charged with an offence under Article 3, and(b) A was not in the presence of the person (“B”) to whom the crossbow or part of a crossbow was sold or let on hire at the time of the sale or letting on hire.(2) It is a defence for A to show that the following conditions are met.(3) Condition 1 is that, before the sale or letting on hire—(a) A either—(i) obtained from B a copy of an identity document issued to B in a physical form and a photograph of B, or(ii) took such steps to verify B’s age as may be prescribed in regulations made by the Department of Justice, and(b) on the basis of that copy and photograph or those steps, a reasonable person would have been satisfied that B was aged 18 or over.(4) For the purposes of paragraph (3) an “identity document” means—(a) a United Kingdom passport (within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971);(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom or by or on behalf of an international organisation;(c) a licence to drive a motor vehicle granted under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1)) or Part 3 of the Road Traffic Act 1988;(d) any other document specified in regulations made by the Department of Justice.(5) Condition 2 is that when the package containing the crossbow or part of a crossbow was dispatched by A, it was clearly marked to indicate— (a) that it contained a crossbow or part of a crossbow, and(b) that, when finally delivered, it should only be delivered into the hands of B.(6) Condition 3 is that A took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to ensure that, when finally delivered, the package would be delivered into the hands of B.(7) Condition 4 is that A did not deliver the package, or arrange for its delivery, to a locker.(8) Where the crossbow or part of a crossbow was dispatched by A to a place from which it was to be collected by B, references in paragraphs (5) and (6) to its final delivery are to be read as its supply to B from that place.(9) In paragraph (7) “locker” means a lockable container to which the package is delivered with a view to its collection by B, or a person acting on behalf of B, in accordance with arrangements made between A and B.”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes provision about crossbows for Northern Ireland similar to that made by clause 33 for England and Wales.
“Delivery of crossbows: Northern IrelandIn the Crossbows (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 (S.I. 1988/794 (N.I. 5)), after Article 3B (inserted by section (Remote sale and letting of crossbows: Northern Ireland)) insert—“Offence of seller etc delivering crossbows or parts of crossbows to residential premises(1) This Article applies if—(a) a person (“A”) sells or lets on hire a crossbow or part of a crossbow to another person (“B”), and(b) A and B are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale.(2) A commits an offence if, for the purposes of supplying the crossbow or part of a crossbow to B, A—(a) delivers the crossbow or part of a crossbow to residential premises, or(b) arranges for its delivery to residential premises.(3) A commits an offence if, for the purposes of supplying the crossbow or part of a crossbow to B, A—(a) delivers the crossbow or part of a crossbow to a locker, or(b) arranges for its delivery to a locker.(4) In paragraph (3) “locker” means a lockable container to which the crossbow or part of a crossbow is delivered with a view to its collection by B, or a person acting on B’s behalf, in accordance with arrangements made between A and B.Defences to offences under Article 3C(1) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under Article 3C(2)(a) to show that the delivery conditions were met.(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under Article 3C(2)(b) to show that—(a) the arrangement required the person with whom it was made not to finally deliver the crossbow or part of a crossbow unless the delivery conditions were met, and(b) the person charged with the offence took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to ensure that the crossbow or part of a crossbow would not be finally delivered unless the delivery conditions were met. (3) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under Article 3C(3) to show that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence.(4) For the purposes of this Article the delivery conditions are that—(a) the person finally delivering the crossbow or part of a crossbow—(i) was shown by the person (“P”) into whose hands it was finally delivered an identity document issued to P in a physical form, or(ii) took such steps to verify P’s age and identity as may be prescribed in regulations made by the Department of Justice, and(b) on the basis of that document or those steps, a reasonable person would have been satisfied—(i) that P was aged 18 or over, and(ii) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of a crossbow was sold or let on hire was an individual, that P was that individual.(5) “Identity document” has the same meaning as in Article 3B(4).Offence of contractor delivering crossbows or parts of crossbows to residential premises on behalf of UK seller(1) This Article applies if—(a) a person (“A”) sells or lets on hire a crossbow or part of a crossbow to another person (“B”),(b) A and B are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale or letting on hire and A is within the United Kingdom at that time,(c) before the sale or letting on hire A entered into an arrangement with a person (“C”) by which C agreed—(i) to deliver crossbows or parts of crossbows for A, or(ii) to arrange for the delivery of crossbows or parts of crossbows for A,(d) C was aware when they entered into the arrangement that it covered delivering, or arranging the delivery of, crossbows or parts of crossbows, and(e) pursuant to that arrangement, the crossbow or part of a crossbow is finally delivered to residential premises by C or a person acting on C’s behalf.(2) C commits an offence if, when the crossbow or part of a crossbow is finally delivered to residential premises by C or a person acting on C’s behalf, it is not delivered into the hands of a person who—(a) is aged 18 or over, and(b) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual.(3) A person acting on C’s behalf commits an offence if—(a) the crossbow or part of a crossbow is finally delivered to residential premises by that person or another person acting on C’s behalf, and(b) it is not delivered into the hands of a person who—(i) is aged 18 or over, and(ii) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual.(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under paragraph (2) or (3) to show that the delivery conditions (within the meaning of Article 3D(4)) were met. (5) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under paragraph (2) or (3) who did not finally deliver the crossbow or part of a crossbow to residential premises to show that the person took all reasonable precautions, and exercised all due diligence, to avoid commission of the offence.(6) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under paragraph (3) to show that the person did not know, and a reasonable person would not have known, that what was delivered was a crossbow or part of a crossbow.(7) For the purposes of this Article a person acts on C’s behalf if the person acts in relation to the crossbow or part of a crossbow pursuant to a relevant arrangement with—(a) C, or(b) a person who acts on C’s behalf.(8) A “relevant arrangement” is an arrangement entered into before the sale or letting on hire of the crossbow or part of a crossbow by which the person agreed to finally deliver, or to arrange for the final delivery of, crossbows or parts of crossbows (whether or not the person was aware that the arrangement covered crossbows or parts of crossbows).Offence of UK seller delivering crossbows or parts of crossbows to collection point(1) This Article applies if—(a) a person (“A”) sells or lets on hire a crossbow or part of a crossbow to another person (“B”), and(b) A and B are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale or letting on hire and A is within the United Kingdom at that time.(2) A commits an offence if, for the purposes of supplying the crossbow or part of a crossbow to B, A—(a) delivers the crossbow or part of a crossbow to a collection point, or(b) arranges for the crossbow or part of a crossbow to be delivered to a collection point.(3) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under paragraph (2)(a) to show that—(a) when the package containing the crossbow or part of a crossbow was delivered to the collection point, it was clearly marked to indicate that it contained a crossbow or part of a crossbow and should only be given into the hands of a person who—(i) is aged 18 or over, and(ii) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of a crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual, and(b) the person charged with the offence took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to ensure that the package containing the crossbow or part of a crossbow would be given into the hands of such a person.(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under paragraph (2)(b) to show that—(a) when the package containing the crossbow or part of a crossbow was given to the person with whom the arrangement was made, it was clearly marked to indicate that it contained a crossbow or part of a crossbow and should only be given into the hands of a person who—(i) is aged 18 or over, and(ii) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of a crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual, and (b) the person charged with the offence took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to ensure that the package containing the crossbow or part of a crossbow would be given into the hands of such a person.(5) “Collection point” means a place—(a) from which the crossbow or part of a crossbow may be collected by the person to whom the crossbow or part of a crossbow was sold or let on hire or a person acting on that person’s behalf, and(b) where on collection the crossbow or part of a crossbow is given by an individual to the person to whom the crossbow or part of a crossbow was sold or let on hire, or a person acting on that person’s behalf.Offence of contractor delivering crossbows or parts of crossbows to collection point(1) This Article applies if—(a) a person (“A”) sells or lets on hire a crossbow or part of a crossbow to another person (“B”),(b) A and B are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale or letting on hire and A is within the United Kingdom at that time,(c) before the sale or letting on hire A entered into an arrangement with a person (“C”) by which C agreed—(i) to deliver crossbows or parts of crossbows for A, or(ii) to arrange the delivery of crossbows or parts of crossbows for A, and(d) C was aware when they entered into the arrangement that it covered delivering, or arranging the delivery of, crossbows or parts of crossbows.(2) C commits an offence if, pursuant to the arrangement, C or a person acting on C’s behalf delivers the crossbow or part of a crossbow to a collection point.(3) A person acting on C’s behalf commits an offence if, pursuant to the arrangement, that person or another person acting on C’s behalf delivers the crossbow or part of a crossbow to a collection point.(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this Article to show that—(a) when they delivered the package containing the crossbow or part of a crossbow to the collection point or a person acting on C’s behalf, the package was clearly marked to indicate that it contained a crossbow or part of a crossbow and should only be given into the hands of a person who—(i) is aged 18 or over, and(ii) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of a crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual, and(b) they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to ensure that the package containing the crossbow or part of a crossbow would be given into the hands of such a person.(5) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this Article to show that the person did not know, and a reasonable person would not have known, that the product was a crossbow or part of a crossbow.(6) For the purposes of this Article, a person acts on C’s behalf if the person acts in relation to the crossbow or part of a crossbow pursuant to a relevant arrangement with—(a) C, or(b) a person who acts on C’s behalf.(7) A “relevant arrangement” is an arrangement entered into before the sale or letting on hire of the crossbow or part of a crossbow by which the person agreed to deliver, or to arrange for the delivery of, crossbows or parts of crossbows (whether or not the person was aware that the arrangement covered crossbows or parts of crossbows). (8) “Collection point” has the meaning given in Article 3F.Offence of handing over crossbows or parts of crossbows at collection point(1) This Article applies if—(a) a person (“A”) sells or lets on hire a crossbow or part of a crossbow to another person (“B”),(b) A and B are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale or letting on hire and A is within the United Kingdom at that time,(c) the crossbow or part of a crossbow is delivered to a collection point, and(d) condition A or condition B is satisfied.(2) Condition A is that—(a) the delivery is pursuant to an arrangement entered into before the delivery by—(i) the person operating the collection point (“the operator”), and(ii) A or the person delivering the crossbow or part of a crossbow to the collection point, and(b) the operator was aware when they entered into the arrangement that it covered the delivery to the collection point of crossbows or parts of crossbows.(3) Condition B is that A is the operator.(4) The operator commits an offence if the operator (or a person acting on the operator’s behalf)—(a) gives the crossbow or part of a crossbow to a person collecting it, but(b) does not give it into the hands of an eligible person.(5) A person acting on the operator’s behalf commits an offence if they—(a) give the crossbow or part of a crossbow to a person collecting it, but(b) do not give it into the hands of an eligible person.(6) “Eligible person” means a person who—(a) is aged 18 or over, and(b) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of a crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual.(7) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under paragraph (4) or (5) to show that the collection conditions were met.(8) The collection conditions are that—(a) the individual giving the crossbow or part of a crossbow to the person (“P”) collecting it —(i) was shown by P an identity document issued to P in a physical form, or(ii) took such steps to verify P’s age and identity as may be prescribed in regulations made by the Department of Justice, and(b) on the basis of that document or those steps, a reasonable person would have been satisfied—(i) that P was aged 18 or over, and(ii) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of a crossbow was sold or let on hire was an individual, that P was that individual.(9) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under paragraph (4) or (5) to show that the person did not know, and a reasonable person would not have known, that the product was a crossbow or part of a crossbow.(10) In this Article—“collection point” has the meaning given in Article 3F;“identity document” has the meaning given in Article 3B(4). Offence of contractor delivering crossbows or parts of crossbows on behalf of non-UK seller(1) This Article applies if—(a) a person (“A”) sells or lets on hire a crossbow or part of a crossbow to another person (“B”),(b) A and B are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale or letting on hire and A is outside the United Kingdom at that time,(c) before the sale or letting on hire A entered into an arrangement with a person (“C”) by which C agreed—(i) to deliver crossbows or parts of crossbows for A, or(ii) to arrange the delivery of crossbows or parts of crossbows for A,(d) C was aware when they entered into the arrangement that it covered delivering, or arranging the delivery of, crossbows or parts of crossbows, and(e) the crossbow or part of a crossbow is finally delivered by C or a person acting on C’s behalf.(2) C commits an offence if, when the crossbow or part of a crossbow is finally delivered by C or a person acting on C’s behalf, it is not delivered into the hands of a person who—(a) is aged 18 or over, and(b) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual.(3) A person acting on C’s behalf commits an offence if —(a) the crossbow or part of a crossbow is finally delivered by that person or another person acting on C’s behalf, and(b) it is not delivered into the hands of a person who—(i) is aged 18 or over, and(ii) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual.(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under paragraph (2) or (3) to show that the delivery conditions (within the meaning of Article 3D(4)) were met.(5) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under paragraph (2) or (3) who did not finally deliver the crossbow or part of a crossbow to show that the person took all reasonable precautions, and exercised all due diligence, to avoid commission of the offence.(6) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under paragraph (3) to show that the person did not know, and a reasonable person would not have known, that what was delivered was a crossbow or part of a crossbow.(7) For the purposes of this Article a person acts on C’s behalf if the person acts in relation to the crossbow or part of a crossbow pursuant to a relevant arrangement with—(a) C, or(b) a person who acts on C’s behalf.(8) A “relevant arrangement” is an arrangement entered into before the sale or letting on hire of the crossbow or part of a crossbow by which the person agreed to finally deliver, or to arrange for the final delivery of, crossbows or parts of crossbows (whether or not the person was aware that the arrangement covered crossbows or parts of crossbows).””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes provision about crossbows for Northern Ireland similar to that made by clause 34 for England and Wales.
“Sale and delivery of crossbows: Northern Ireland: supplementary provision(1) After Article 3I of the Crossbows (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 (S.I. 1988/794 (N.I. 5)) (inserted by section (Delivery of crossbows: Northern Ireland)) insert—“Interpretation of Articles 3A to 3I(1) This Article applies for the interpretation of Articles 3A to 3I.(2) A person (“A”) is not in the presence of another person (“B”) at any time if—(a) where A is an individual, A or a person acting on behalf of A is not in the presence of B at that time;(b) where A is not an individual, a person acting on behalf of A is not in the presence of B at that time.(3) A person other than an individual—(a) is within the United Kingdom at any time if the person carries on a business of selling or letting on hire articles of any kind from premises in any part of the United Kingdom at that time;(b) is outside the United Kingdom at any time, if the person does not carry on a business of selling or letting on hire articles of any kind from premises in any part of the United Kingdom at that time.(4) “Residential premises” means premises used solely for residential purposes.(5) The circumstances where premises are not residential premises include, in particular, where a person carries on a business from the premises.(6) A person charged with an offence is to be taken to have shown a matter if—(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.Power to create other defences by regulations3K. The Department of Justice may by regulations provide for other defences for a person charged with an offence under any of Articles 3C, 3E, 3F, 3G or 3H.”.(2) In Article 8 of the Crossbows (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 (S.I. 1988/794 (N.I. 5)) (punishments)—(a) in paragraph (1) for “this Order” substitute “Article 3, 4 or 5”;(b) after paragraph (1) insert—“(1A) A person guilty of an offence under Article 3C is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale (or both).(1B) A person guilty of an offence under Article 3E, 3F, 3G, 3H or 3I is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.”(3) After Article 8 of the Crossbows (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 (S.I. 1988/794 (N.I. 5)) insert—“Regulations(1) Regulations made by the Department of Justice under Article 3B(4)(d) are subject to negative resolution.(2) Regulations under any other provision of this Order may not be made by the Department of Justice unless a draft of the regulations has been laid before and approved by a resolution of the Northern Ireland Assembly.”.(4) In section 66(3) of the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 (guidance on offences relating to offensive weapons etc), after paragraph (d) insert—“(da) any of Articles 3 to 3I of the Crossbows (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 (S.I. 1988/794 (N.I. 5)) (sale etc of crossbows),”.” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes provision about crossbows for Northern Ireland similar to that made by clause 35 for England and Wales.
Lord Katz
“Application of Firearms Acts to sound moderators etc(1) The Firearms Act 1968 is amended as follows.(2) After section 2 insert—“2A Possession of a sound moderator or flash suppressor(1) Subject to any exemption under this Act, it is an offence for a person to have in their possession a relevant accessory unless the person holds a firearm certificate or a shot gun certificate.(2) “Relevant accessory” means an accessory to a firearm to which section 1 applies which is designed or adapted to diminish the noise or flash caused by firing the firearm.”(3) In section 57 (interpretation)—(a) in subsection (1)—(i) omit paragraph (d);(ii) in the words after paragraph (d) omit “, and accessories to,”;(b) in subsection (4)—(i) after the definition of “registered” insert—““relevant accessory” has the meaning given in section 2A;”(ii) in the definition of “shot gun”, omit the words from “and any” to the end.(4) In Schedule 6 (prosecution and punishment of offences) after the entry for section 2(2) insert—
“Section 2A | Possession of relevant accessory without certificate under this Act | Summary | A fine of level 3 on the standard scale”. |
This amendment removes sound moderators and flash suppressors from the definitions of “firearm” and “shot gun” in the Firearms Act 1968 and creates an offence of possessing a sound moderator or flash suppressor without having a valid firearm or shotgun certificate, or without an exemption applying.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Brady of Altrincham, will recall that he tabled an amendment in Committee which sought to deregulate devices known as sound moderators and flash suppressors. These items are subject to control by virtue of the fact that they are included in the statutory definition of a firearm, set out in Section 57 of the Firearms Act 1968.
Lord Brady of Altrincham (Con)
My Lords, I rise very briefly to thank the Ministers on the other side of the House. I am very grateful that they have accepted what I think was an entirely common-sense case, which the Government had already accepted in a report that was previously published. I would just say that, in what I think is now my 29th year in Parliament in one House or the other, the number of occasions when Governments and Ministers accept entirely common-sense arguments from the other side of the House and respond is so small that I cannot think of many others, so I really am grateful. It will help the police and reduce the bureaucratic burden on them. It will reduce costs for a lot of people and does not pose any harm whatever, so thank you.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I warmly welcome the Government’s amendments in this group, which deliver on the commitments made by the Minister during our debate in Committee. As I noted at the time, townies such as myself were being educated during the passage of the Bill on what these items were. However, the logic of this measure was immediately clear when the noble Lord, Lord Brady of Altrincham, introduced his amendments, and we were very pleased to support them when he first championed the cause. We are delighted that the Government have accepted his amendments.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I too thank the Minister for bringing forward these amendments. These measures were rightly pressed for in Committee by my noble friend Lord Brady of Altrincham, so I am glad the Government have taken his points on board and are now implementing them. These amendments will remove an administrative burden currently placed on the police—something we all support—and will pose no threat to the public. They are wholly reasonable, and we support them.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, it is very rare to have both unanimity and common sense break out across the Chamber. I thank all noble Lords for their comments, including those among townies—I associate myself with the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, as a fellow townie. It was an education and I have learned an awful lot. I thank everyone for their support.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
I would say to the noble Lord before he sits down that unanimity and common sense do not always go together.
Lord Katz (Lab)
That is the point that I was struggling to make, which is put more eloquently by the noble Lord.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would ensure that low-value shoplifting is to remain as a summary only offence, so as to not introduce greater burdens for the Crown Court.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, as in Committee, these Benches oppose Clause 40 standing part of the Bill. I will briefly remind the House of the background. Clause 40 repeals Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, which was inserted into that Act in 2014. Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Court Act provides that, where a person is charged with a shoplifting offence but the value of the stolen goods is under £200, the offence is triable only summarily. Accordingly, low-value shoplifting cases will be heard only before a magistrates’ court and will not go before the Crown Court. That is the current position.
The Government now propose to do away with this and make low-value shoplifting triable either way. In its criticisms of the status quo before the general election in 2024, the Labour Party suggested that the status quo had created,
“effective immunity for some shoplifting”.
That was the wording in the Government’s manifesto.
As I have said previously, this is incorrect. There never has been effective immunity for any shoplifting offences. If making an offence a summary offence is akin to granting immunity, then it follows that we have given immunity to anyone who commits common assault, battery, theft of a car, drunk driving, dangerous cycling, being drunk and disorderly, and harassment, to name but a few offences. The truth is that there are hundreds of summary-only offences. Do the Government think that they create immunity and should become triable either way too?
There are two other matters that demonstrate further the contradictory and, indeed, damaging consequences of this clause. Essentially, the question hinges on the interaction between this clause and two other measures that this Government are pursuing with perplexing enthusiasm: their Sentencing Act and their proposed court reforms.
In the Sentencing Act, the Government have introduced a presumption of a suspended sentence where the sentence is less than 12 months. I know that the Government do not like these Benches making an ongoing critique of their sentencing reforms but, given their negative future impact, we shall continue to do so.
The average custodial sentence for shop theft is two months, meaning that, in future, it is likely that all shoplifters will be spared prison time. If you wanted to look for effective immunity, this is where you will find it. Permitting those charged with low-value shoplifting to seek a Crown Court trial may very well lead to a collapse in the prosecution of those offences, as the CPS will determine that prosecution is simply not worth it.
Coupled with the presumption of a suspended sentence order for all sentences under 12 months, there is a significant likelihood that, under this Government, the vast majority of shoplifters will avoid prison entirely. Furthermore, the Government’s court reforms will see more cases moved away from the Crown Courts, the curtailing of jury trials and an increase in the sentencing powers of magistrates’ courts.
The Government say that this is necessary to tackle the backlog. They have argued that offenders are trying to game the system by electing for Crown Court trials, knowing that they will take longer to go to trial and that the case may collapse. So, on the one hand, they are reducing the number of either-way offences because the Crown Courts are overwhelmed and yet, on the other hand, they are making low-value shoplifting triable either way. This makes no sense whatever.
If the Minister will not listen to my arguments, she might perhaps listen to those of her own colleague, Sarah Sackman, the Courts Minister, who is quoted in a Guardian article as asking:
“Do we think that someone who has stolen a bottle of whisky from a minimart should receive the right to trial by jury?”
I quite agree with Sarah Sackman. I do not think that a person who steals a bottle of whisky should go before the Crown Court, but that is exactly what could happen if Clause 40 becomes law.
For all these reasons and, essentially, because in our view the Government’s position here is completely contradictory, I beg to move.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, Clause 40 delivers on a manifesto commitment made by this Government. I am very happy to note that I and the noble Lords, Lord Cameron of Lochiel and Lord Davies of Gower, share the same overall objective: to reduce the backlog in the Crown Court by reserving jury trials for the most serious cases. I am delighted to hear that they agree with the Government, so I look forward to their support for our proposals to do exactly this when your Lordships’ House considers the Courts and Tribunals Bill, which was introduced in the other place earlier today.
The low-value shoplifting provision was always a curious beast and quite unlike other criminal offences because shoplifting was, and still is, charged as theft, which is always a “triable either way” offence. This meant that, although there was a presumption that if the goods were valued at less than £200 the case would remain in the magistrates’ court, a defendant who wanted a jury trial could still choose—or “elect”, to use the formal term—trial in the Crown Court. It is nonsense to say that this keeps it in the magistrates’ court, because Section 22A still allows defendants to elect trial in the Crown Court if they want to do so. The reality is that hardly any of them did; I will return to this shortly.
This was an administrative provision designed to reduce the burden on the Crown Court. In reality it had very little impact on that, but it did have a very undesirable effect that was entirely unintended. Although multiple factors have contributed to rising retail crime, one persistent issue is the perception in many quarters that low-value theft has no real consequences. Some regard it as having been, in effect, decriminalised. It does not matter whether that is in fact true; it is the perception that is damaging.
Section 22A created the perception that those committing theft of goods worth £200 or less will escape any punishment. Clause 40 rectifies that—and it really matters. Evidence from the Association of Convenience Stores shows that only 36% of retail crime is even reported. Many retailers choose not to do so because they think it is a waste of time; they believe that the police will not do anything. Once again, it does not really matter whether they are right about that; that is what they believe.
This underreporting masks the true scale of the problem and leaves businesses vulnerable. We must act decisively to support retailers facing this growing challenge and scourge of shoplifting. Clause 40 does exactly that. It closes a critical gap by sending a clear and unequivocal message: theft of any value is a serious criminal act and will be treated seriously.
I hope noble Lords will accept that probably no one is more concerned than I am—as one of the only people who has actually lived through what it has meant in practice, when I sat as a circuit judge—about remedying the position of the backlog in the Crown Court. As I have already said, jury trials for these cases are a very small proportion of the Crown Court’s workload. In the year ending in September 2025, almost 50,000 defendants were prosecuted for shoplifting goods valued at £200 or less, but only 1.3% of those cases were committed for jury trial in the Crown Court. The vast majority of them had been sent there by the magistrates, with only a very small proportion of defendants electing trial themselves.
Returning the situation to the previous law, where the offence is triable either way, therefore carries no greater risk to the Crown Court than already exists under the existing provision. But it sends a clear message to perpetrators and would-be perpetrators: this crime will not be tolerated and will be met with appropriate punishment. We are signalling to retailers that we take this crime seriously, that they are encouraged to report it and that the police will take it seriously.
The happy news for the noble Lords who tabled this amendment, and any others concerned about the backlog in the Crown Court, is that once we pass the Courts and Tribunals Bill, low-value shoplifters will no longer be able to game the system by choosing jury trial because in all cases the decision on venue will be made by the magistrates’ court, not by defendants. As I have already said, I look forward to the noble Lord’s support on this. In the meantime, given that this is a manifesto commitment, I make it absolutely clear that the Government are determined that it shall pass. I hope I have been able to persuade the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister, but I am afraid I am not quite persuaded. The Government have been attempting to appear tough in a so far unsuccessful attempt to demonstrate that they are cracking down on crime. Yet, as we know from the latest crime statistics, in the year ending September 2025 there were 519,381 recorded incidents of shoplifting, which is a 10% increase on the previous year. To make matters worse, they are now proposing measures that will not see a soul go to prison for shoplifting and, via Clause 40, will allow offenders to string out their trials through the Crown Court, all while they pursue the polar opposite outcome for other offences through their court reforms. If this is the policy of a Government who are serious about tackling shoplifting, they have a strange way of showing it. We are not prepared to allow shoplifters to go unpunished, and I therefore have no option but to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is made for the purposes of my amendment at line 19.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, on this occasion, I hope I can be accused of listening and hearing in order to assist the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. These amendments to the child criminal exploitation offence will, in cases involving children aged 13 or over, remove the requirement that a perpetrator did not reasonably believe the child was an adult. In bringing forward these amendments, I am directly responding to concerns raised in debates in the House, having listened in particular to the cogent arguments put forward in Committee by the noble Lords, Lord Hampton and Lord Russell of Liverpool, and my noble friend Lady Armstrong of Hill Top. Indeed, arguments were made in the House of Commons for the same.
We maintain that reasonable belief in age would not be a simple loophole for perpetrators and that it is a precedented and long-standing legal test. The CPS and courts are experienced in dealing with such an element. However, having reflected further, and acknowledging that there is a heightened risk of teenage Black males, who are overrepresented in the cohort of children vulnerable to child criminal exploitation, being wrongly perceived as older, we will not risk perpetrators being acquitted because of how society misperceives children as appearing older than they are in this context.
Adults who draw children into committing criminal activity should always be convicted of this offence, regardless of how old the perpetrator believed the children were. These amendments send a clear message that responsibility for involving children in crime, which is always bad and harmful, rests with the adult. I commend the amendments to the House.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for tabling these amendments. We wholly support the intention of Clause 41, which introduces the offence of child criminal exploitation, but I have several concerns regarding the amendments, which I hope he will be able to allay.
First, is the original crime being brought forward to highlight and punish exploitative behaviour? An adult will perhaps get a 12 year-old to shoplift or deal drugs because they are less conspicuous and have less chance of being caught. That type of coercion is what is being targeted here. I am not so sure that this is always the case when it comes to older teenagers. When the child is 16 or 17, it is often far more of a voluntary decision, based on a mutual understanding, to commit a crime. While there may be exploitation, the offender may not be enticing them towards crime because they are a child. That is a subtle but important difference in intention. Introducing strict liability up to 18 removes the discretion that courts often exist to provide.
That brings me to my second concern, which is that this may end up being used to absolve fully complicit young offenders of criminal responsibility. The Government have made it clear that they see 16 to 18 year-olds as adults, and the law already provides them with many legal rights that 15 year-olds do not have. The Government will soon give them the right to vote. Is the Minister really arguing that personal volition never plays a part in crimes committed by young people? Of course there will be cases of exploitation, but I am sure that your Lordships’ House will agree that there will also be cases where that is not the case. Introducing strict liability will open the door to others already implicated in the crimes committed by the teenager being rendered wholly liable for a crime that somebody else was a part of.
I understand the Government’s intentions with this updated measure. It involves a different principle from child sexual assault, but just as that crime includes a condition that factors in intent, so should this crime, on the part of those under-18. Obviously, there should be an arbitrary cut-off, as the original measure suggests, but we have a criminal age of responsibility of 10 and we are giving 16 year-olds the vote; to suggest that 16 to 17-year olds involved in a crime with an adult can always claim that they were exploited and coerced is not consistent. I hope that the Minister will be able to address these points.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. I was just checking with another Member of your Lordships’ House before I started my winding-up speech. My apologies for not attracting his attention.
We welcome the Government’s decision to address child criminal exploitation. The range of measures in the Bill are certainly a start and address the growing concern about children being exploited into criminality. I particularly welcome the Minister’s letter, dated a couple of weeks ago—about 15 February—explaining that the amendments laid address a highly specific concern about the requirement for the prosecution to prove that the perpetrator did not reasonably believe the child was aged 18 or over, if the child was aged 13 or over. We thank him for that.
However, from these Benches we urge the Government to go further in the longer term in ensuring that all children are safeguarded from exploitation. This needs to be recognised as a form of exploitation. Along with a number of organisations, we think that this should be done through a statutory definition in Parliament, partly because that will guide the services but also because it would make it very clear where the boundaries are on CCE.
Hand in hand with this is the whole issue of cuckooing, which we will come to in the next group. That is equally important. It is one of the newer, more virulent ways of coercively controlling children. We welcome the amendment, wish it had gone further, and look forward to discussions in the longer term about how that can be remedied.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to noble Lords and will try to respond briefly. I remind the House that we are responding to requests from noble Lords, and in addition from partners in children’s charities, law enforcement and Members of the House of Commons, to make a change to ensure that the child criminal exploitation offence works as intended to protect the children most at risk of being targeted.
As both the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, have said, boys aged between 15 and 17 and, very often, Black and other minority children are commonly overrepresented in those figures. They are the same children at risk of being wrongly perceived as being older, and therefore not protected. We have tried to ensure that we place the responsibility for any criminal activity firmly where it belongs in this case, which is with the adult who is effectively trying to groom, encourage, lead—however we wish to describe it—the child under the age of 18. For the purposes of this legislation, a child is dealt with as being under the age of 18.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies, raised again his concerns about voting at 16. That is an issue for debate, and it is a Labour manifesto commitment, but it is not an issue for debate today.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The noble Lord says it is a comparison. I accept that, but for the purposes of this legislation, we are saying that individuals aged 15 to 17, particularly, are vulnerable. This goes to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. Requiring the courts to consider what age the perpetrator reasonably believed the child to be by reference to their appearance or behaviour risks, in my view, reinforcing the injustices we have and risks somebody who has undertaken child criminal exploitation getting off because they believed that that person was older than they actually were.
That is a line we have drawn and an argument we have made, and it is in the legislation. I am not the Minister responsible for this, but I would still be happy to have a discussion with the noble Lord at some point about why votes at 16 is important. If he wants to do that, we will find an opportunity, I am sure, if it relates to a Home Office Bill at any time in the future.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(a) D engages in conduct towards or in respect of a child (C), and(b) D does so with the intention of—(i) causing C to commit an offence,(ii) causing C to do anything outside the relevant part of the United Kingdom which would constitute an offence if done in that part, or(iii) facilitating the causing of C, in future, to commit an offence or do anything outside the relevant part of the United Kingdom which would constitute an offence if done in that part.It is irrelevant whether or not D knows or suspects that C is a child.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment removes the requirement that the child is under 13 or the person does not reasonably believe them to be aged 18 or over, and spells out that the person’s state of mind in relation to whether the other person is a child is irrelevant.
Member's explanatory statement
This is consequential on my amendment to Clause 41 at line 19 of page 62.
Member's explanatory statement
This is consequential on my amendment to Clause 41 at line 19 of page 62.
Member's explanatory statement
This is consequential on my amendment to Clause 41 at line 19 of page 62.
Member's explanatory statement
This is consequential on my amendment to Clause 41 at line 19 of page 62.
Member's explanatory statement
This is consequential on my amendment to Clause 41 at line 19 of page 62.
Member's explanatory statement
This is consequential on my amendment to Clause 41 at line 19 of page 62.
Member's explanatory statement
This is consequential on my amendment to Clause 41 at line 19 of page 62.
Member's explanatory statement
This is consequential on my amendment to Clause 41 at line 19 of page 62.
Member's explanatory statement
This is consequential on my amendment to Clause 41 at line 19 of page 62.
Member's explanatory statement
This is consequential on my amendment to Clause 41 at line 19 of page 62.
Member's explanatory statement
This is consequential on my amendment to Clause 41 at line 19 of page 62.
Member's explanatory statement
This is consequential on my amendment to Clause 41 at line 19 of page 62.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“ScheduleSound moderators etc: exemptionsFirearms Act 1968
1 (1) The Firearms Act 1968 is amended as follows.(2) In section 7(1)—(a) the words from “a firearm” to the end become paragraph (a);(b) at the end insert—“(b) a relevant accessory.”(3) In section 8—(a) in subsection (1) for the words from “, have” to “ammunition” substitute—“(a) have in their possession, purchase or acquire, a firearm or ammunition, or(b) have a relevant accessory in their possession,”;(b) in subsection (1A)—(i) after “ammunition”, in the first place it occurs, insert “, or the possession of a relevant accessory,”;(ii) for “or ammunition”, in the second place it occurs, substitute “, ammunition or relevant accessory”;(iii) after “of, or” insert “firearm or ammunition is”.(4) In section 9(1) for “or ammunition” substitute “, ammunition or a relevant accessory”.(5) In section 11—(a) in subsection (1) for “or ammunition”—(i) in the first place it occurs, substitute “, ammunition or a relevant accessory”;(ii) in the second and third places it occurs, substitute “, ammunition or relevant accessory”;(b) in subsection (4)—(i) omit the “and” at the end of paragraph (a);(ii) at the end of paragraph (b) insert“and(c) a relevant accessory,”.(6) In section 11A at the end insert— “(7) Where a rifle is borrowed on any premises in reliance on subsection (1), the borrower may, without holding a certificate under this Act, borrow and have in their possession on those premises a relevant accessory for the period for which the rifle is borrowed.”(7) In section 12(1) after “firearm” insert “or relevant accessory”.(8) In section 13(1)—(a) in paragraph (a)—(i) for “or ammunition”, in the first place it occurs, substitute “, ammunition or a relevant accessory”;(ii) for “or ammunition therefor” substitute “, or ammunition or a relevant accessory therefor,”;(b) in paragraph (b)—(i) for“or ammunition”, in the first place it occurs, substitute“, or ammunition or a relevant accessory”;(ii) for“or ammunition”, in the second place it occurs, substitute“, or ammunition or relevant accessory”;(iii) omit the “and” at the end;(c) after paragraph (c) insert—“(d) having obtained a permit under paragraph (c), remove any relevant accessory from or to a ship, aircraft or aerodrome, to or from the place specified in the permit.”Firearms (Amendment) Act 1988
2 (1) The Firearms (Amendment) Act 1988 is amended as follows.(2) In section 15—(a) in subsection (1) for “and ammunition” substitute “, ammunition and a relevant accessory”;(b) in subsection (2) for“or ammunition”substitute“, ammunition or relevant accessories”.(3) In section 16A(1) for “and ammunition” substitute “, ammunition and a relevant accessory”.(4) In section 16B(1) for “and ammunition” substitute “, ammunition and a relevant accessory”.(5) In section 17 after subsection (1) insert—“(1ZA) The holder of a visitor’s firearm permit may, without holding a firearm certificate, have in their possession a relevant accessory.””(6) In section 25(4) (interpretation), for “or ammunition” substitute “, ammunition or relevant accessory”.(7) In paragraph 1 of the Schedule, in sub-paragraphs (2)(a), (3) and (4) for“and ammunition”substitute“, ammunition and relevant accessories”.”Member's explanatory statement
This new Schedule adds sound moderators and flash suppressors to exemptions from the requirement in the Firearms Act 1968 to hold a firearm or shot gun certificate.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, and others in the name of Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb, seeks to ensure children are not held criminally responsible for cuckooing or coerced internal concealment offences.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, like other noble Lords here this evening, I am quite keen to get home, especially as I will have to stay up all night tomorrow night reacting to the Gorton and Denton by-election, which is going to be very exciting. I hope the Minister expresses the same sort of support for these amendments—well, obviously he will not, but perhaps somebody else will—because I am concerned that Labour has promised something that these clauses will not actually deliver. Perhaps I can explain.
I want to thank the noble Lords, Lord Hampton and Lord Randall of Uxbridge, both of whom signed these amendments, although the former’s name is not on them. Amendment 195 and the related amendments seek to ensure that children are not held criminally responsible for the offences of cuckooing or coerced internal concealment where those acts arise from exploitation. These amendments come from joint work by the Children’s Society, Action for Children, ECPAT UK, Catch 22, the Alliance for Youth Justice, the NSPCC, Barnardo’s and other academics.
The Government’s decision to introduce the offence of CCE, alongside new offences addressing cuckooing and coerced internal concealment, demonstrates a genuine commitment to closing gaps, increasing justice and ensuring that those who exploit children are held to account. Taken together with the new preventive orders and the strengthened safeguarding orders elsewhere in the Bill, this represents real progress.
However, there is a troubling inconsistency at the heart of the legislation as drafted. Children being exploited by adults, whether forced to take over another person’s home or to facilitate internal concealment, could be criminalised. While the offence of child criminal exploitation applies only to adults, Clauses 58, 61 and 62 bring children under the age of 18 within the scope of the new offences of cuckooing and coerced internal concealment. That means children who are themselves being exploited by adults could, in law, be treated as perpetrators rather than victims. This directly contradicts the Government’s stated intention to address the imbalance of power exercised by adults who use children to commit crime. It also risks undermining the very purpose of the new offences by re-criminalising children through the backdoor.
We know from the National Crime Agency that child exploitation is a defining feature of cuckooing linked to county lines activity. Police forces report children as young as 14 being found in properties that have been taken over for criminal purposes. This clearly is a legal point, and I am not a lawyer; I very much hope the Government’s lawyers can look at this and see that I am right and perhaps tighten up the Bill as drafted. Children subjected to violence, grooming, intimidation and control cannot meaningfully refuse adults who demand their help. They cannot consent and they should not be punished for crimes that arise directly from their exploitation. This Bill really has the potential to mark a genuine shift in how we respond to child exploitation, and these amendments could help ensure that children are victims and not offenders, and that the law reflects that without any sort of ambiguity.
Amendment 198 concerns Clause 62 and the provision of statutory guidance for agencies responding to child criminal exploitation. Again, it comes from the same child action networks I mentioned before. As I have said, the creation of new offences and preventive orders in this Bill is welcome, but legislation on its own is a blunt instrument and its success will depend entirely on how it is implemented on the ground by the wide range of statutory agencies that come into contact with children at risk of exploitation. Child criminal exploitation is complex, hidden and constantly evolving. It cuts across policing, social work, education, health, youth justice, housing and safeguarding partnerships. We have to have a joined-up, consistent, well-informed response; otherwise, it is pointless putting any of this into the Bill. Support and guidance must extend to all public authorities with statutory responsibilities to safeguard and promote the welfare of children, because without comprehensive multi-agency guidance we will continue to see uneven responses, confusion over roles and responsibilities, and children falling through the cracks.
Elsewhere in the Bill, in Clause 99 in Part 6, the Secretary of State is rightly given powers to issue multiagency statutory guidance on the new stalking offence. That recognises that identifying victims, managing perpetrators and preventing harm requires co-ordinated action across multiple agencies. Child criminal exploitation is no less complex and, in many cases, far more so, and the same approach should apply here. Amendment 198 would ensure that statutory guidance is issued to all agencies operating under Section 16E of the Children Act 2004, reflecting their safeguarding activities and duties.
I realise it is very difficult for the Government to react to all the amendments that we put in. I am feeling a bit lonely on these Benches, actually—I do not know if everybody else has gone home already; I am quite jealous. My ambition is to ensure that the provisions in this Bill are supported by the clear, authoritative, multiagency guidance necessary to make them work in practice, and to make sure that we can see they are working in practice. I beg to move.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, has outlined the amendments and their importance in detail. I want to echo her last point about the need for proper guidance to set out exactly what the many agencies that should be involved need to do. The group of charities that have written to us propose that this should
“Provide clear advice on the complex and evolving nature of CCE”,
including cuckooing;
“Clarify the roles and responsibilities of all relevant partners”
and “Emphasise transitional safeguarding”, ensuring that young people do not suddenly get pulled out of somewhere and have absolutely no resource to face a new life. They add that it is important that this is not just the obvious agencies; it needs to include those concerned with slavery and trafficking and the police specialists working in child abduction, and it needs to extend to care orders, secure accommodation and deprivation of liberty orders.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for tabling these amendments, and I fully appreciate that they are concerned with the protection of children and young people. The amendments would restrict the new offences of cuckooing and coerced internal concealment so that they applied only to those aged 18 and over, and they would require the Secretary of State to issue statutory safeguarding guidance in connection with these provisions.
Let me say at the outset that we all recognise the deeply exploitative nature of cuckooing and forcing or coercing individuals, particularly vulnerable people, into internally concealing drugs or other items. The purpose of these new offences in the Bill is precisely to target that exploitation, and we on these Benches have a lot of sympathy for that principle. The clauses are designed to disrupt organised criminal activity that so often preys on the vulnerable.
However, we cannot support the amendments in this group. They would, in effect, create a blanket exemption for 16 and 17 year-olds from criminal liability for these offences. In this country, the age of criminal responsibility is 10. Parliament has long accepted that young people under 18 can, in appropriate circumstances, be held criminally responsible for serious criminal conduct. To carve out a specific exemption here would create inconsistency in law and risk signalling that certain forms of serious exploitation-related offending are less culpable when committed by older teenagers.
That is not to deny that many young people involved in such activities are themselves victims. The courts already have extensive powers to take age, maturity, coercion and vulnerability into account at charging and sentencing. Prosecutorial direction and the youth justice framework provide mechanisms to distinguish between a hardened exploiter and a child groomed into criminality; a blanket statutory exclusion would go too far.
As for the proposed requirement for additional statutory guidance, safeguarding responsibilities are already embedded in existing legislation. Public authorities with safeguarding duties are well aware of their obligations, and we should be cautious about layering further statutory guidance unnecessarily. We must ensure that exploiters are prosecuted, victims are protected and the law remains coherent. For those reasons, while I very much respect the intentions behind these amendments, I cannot support them.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for taking part in this debate. I start with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb—and I start by welcoming her genuine recognition of the progress that we are making through this legislation by introducing the new child criminal exploitation and cuckooing offences in this Bill. We are grateful for that. As she explained, her Amendments 195 to 197 seek to restrict those who commit the cuckooing and internal concealment offences to those aged 18 or over.
The Government fully recognise that children, particularly those exploited by county lines gangs, are often used to carry out cuckooing activity or to persuade others to internally conceal items such as drugs for a criminal purpose. The act of turning these children into exploiters themselves is particularly appalling and is why this Government’s work to target child criminal exploitation is so important. I think that everyone across your Lordships’ House recognises that. While I appreciate the spirit of these amendments and believe that it is absolutely right that children, when they have been exploited and groomed into criminality, should be protected as victims, this does not in itself override the age of criminal responsibility, where the law holds children over a certain age responsible for their actions. It is possible for a child to commit cuckooing or internal concealment without having been exploited to do so.
Let us be clear that decisions as to whether to charge someone should be taken on a case-by-case basis. As with all offences, the police exercise operational judgment when investigating and gathering evidence to establish the facts of a case, and the Crown Prosecution Service’s public interest test will of course apply. This includes consideration of the child’s culpability and whether they have been compelled, coerced or exploited to commit any potential crime of cuckooing or internal concealment. We will also issue statutory guidance to support implementation of the cuckooing and internal concealment offences, including on how the police should respond and identify exploitation when children are found in connection with cuckooing or internal concealment.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, posed the question why we are not creating a statutory defence for children against their prosecution for crimes, including cuckooing and internal concealment, committed as a result of effectively being a victim of child criminal exploitation. When a victim of proposed child criminal exploitation offences also meets the definition of a victim of modern slavery, they may retain access to the statutory defence contained in Section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. Many victims of CCE will continue to be able to access the Section 45 defence, as they do now. However, we consider that creating an additional stand-alone statutory defence for victims of child criminal exploitation beyond that which already exists in Section 45 of the 2015 Act for victims who are also victims of modern slavery and/or human trafficking could have unintended consequences, given the breadth of the proposed offence. The child criminal exploitation offence is to address the imbalance between children and those individuals who criminally exploit them.
I add that we are working with partners in the criminal justice system to improve awareness and understanding of the Section 45 defence, which will support the early identification of potential victims of modern slavery and prevent criminal proceedings being brought against victims. It is intended that guidance on the potential availability of the Section 45 defence under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 for victims of child criminal exploitation will be included in the statutory guidance that will accompany the new offence.
I turn to Amendment 198. We similarly sympathise with the intention behind the amendment to introduce statutory guidance for multi-agency partners. It is essential that agencies work together to safeguard and protect children and vulnerable adults from criminal exploitation. However, statutory safeguarding responsibilities are already set out in statutory guidance, principally in Working Together to Safeguard Children, which includes guidance on child criminal exploitation. To supplement this, we will issue non-statutory guidance for partner agencies on the child criminal exploitation offence and orders and on cuckooing and internal concealment to support them to identify these harms and recognise how their statutory responsibilities apply. Issuing separate statutory guidance with additional legal burdens for safeguarding partners on these specific crime types alone risks duplication and a siloed approach to protecting children and vulnerable adults—something that I am sure we would all wish to avoid happening.
More broadly, the Government are taking a range of actions to strengthen child protection through the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill, which will introduce new multi-agency child protection teams in every local authority in England. This will ensure stronger join-up between police, health, education and children’s social care when responding to harms such as child criminal exploitation.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, mentioned stalking offences, which are committed mainly against adults, so it is appropriate to have bespoke guidance. Here we are talking about safeguarding children where the DfE guidance will apply, so it is appropriate that we take this approach, given the range of agencies involved for children. I hope that, given those assurances, the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
Before the noble Lord sits down, I said in my contribution that I hoped that the agencies might extend beyond the usual ones, and the Minister certainly named the usual ones. Would it, for example, include working with the local gangmaster operations as well?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I will not speculate. I suspect that would be the case, but I had probably best undertake to write to the noble Baroness to confirm that detail.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
I thank the noble Lord for his answers. I recognise the points he made, and those made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, but quite honestly, when you have so many children’s organisations saying that the Government have got something wrong, the Government ought to listen. Although I am not going to push this to a vote, I feel like tackling the various Ministers in the corridor sometime and making sure they understand the depth of my care and passion about this. We all want to protect children, and the Government will be responsible if there are gaps. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Crime and Policing Bill
Monday 2nd March 2026
(2 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 167-II(c) Amendments for Report (Supplementary to the Second Marshalled List) - (2 Mar 2026)
16:12 - Division on Amendment 209 - Ayes: 121 / Noes: 145 - Amendment 209 disagreed.
17:43 - Division on Amendment 248B - Ayes: 71 / Noes: 177 - Amendment 248B disagreed.
17:56 - Division on Amendment 262 - Ayes: 61 / Noes: 178 - Amendment 262 disagreed.
20:19 - Division on Amendment 273 - Ayes: 202 / Noes: 155 - Amendment 273 agreed.
20:31 - Division on Amendment 274 - Ayes: 192 / Noes: 155 - Amendment 274 agreed.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(a) to make or adapt a thing for use for creating, or facilitating the creation of, CSA images;(b) to possess, supply or offer to supply a thing (a “CSA image-generator”) which is made or adapted for use for creating, or facilitating the creation of, CSA images.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes a drafting change to clarify the operation of the CSA image-generator offence.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
My Lords, the government amendments in this group are what I will term minor drafting changes designed to clarify the operation of the new offences in Clauses 65 to 67 and 69.
Amendments 199 to 208 and 210 to 229 make minor changes to ensure that the operation of the child sexual abuse image-generator offence at Clauses 65 to 67 is clear and consistent across the United Kingdom. Amendments 230 to 233 make drafting changes to clarify the language used in the “paedophile manual” offence at Clause 69.
These amendments do not modify the policy intention behind these offences; rather, they make necessary clarificatory changes to ensure that they operate effectively. I beg to move and hope that the House will agree.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I welcome the Government’s technical amendments. We spent some time in Committee debating the definition of a “thing” used to generate horrific CSA images. I am pleased that the Government have tabled Amendment 201 to clarify that a “thing” explicitly includes a service.
Modern AI is not just a program sitting on a hard drive but an ephemeral, cloud-based service. By adopting this broader language, we ensure that those who provide the underlying infrastructure for CSA image generation cannot evade responsibility through technical loopholes. These may appear to be technical drafting changes, but they provide the necessary teeth for the primary offences in Clauses 65 to 67.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, the government amendments in this group are largely consequential and minor drafting changes. They relate to the important topic of child sexual abuse image generators. I have little to say to this group other than that the topic which they address is one of serious and urgent concern.
The rapid emergence of generative AI has presented new and troubling challenges. The recent Grok AI scandal, in which an AI model generated harmful sexual content publicly, some of which involved children, highlighted the potential for mainstream tools to be misused in ways that normalise or distribute abusive material. That episode underlines why robust legal safeguards are essential as technology evolves.
The Government have continued to delay passing legislation regarding AI regulation, which was alluded to as far back as 2024. I thank the Minister for his assurances that the Government will continue to monitor developments in this area and work with industry to protect children from abuse and exploitation.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 65, page 81, line 16.
“(c) “thing” includes a program, information in electronic form and a service.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 65, page 81, line 16. It also clarifies that a service can be a CSA image-generator.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 65, page 81, line 16.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 65, page 81, line 16.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 65, page 81, line 16.
Member’s explanatory statement
This is a minor drafting change.
Member’s explanatory statement
This is a minor drafting change.
Member’s explanatory statement
This is a minor drafting change.
Member’s explanatory statement
This is a minor drafting change.
Baroness Kidron
“46D Child sexual abuse image-generation risk assessment(1) A provider of an online service, including but not limited to a generative AI large language model, must risk assess the likelihood of their service being used to create or facilitate the creation of a CSA image or images as defined by section 46A. (2) If a risk is identified in a CSA image-generation risk assessment—(a) where the provider is regulated by the Online Safety Act 2023, a provider must report the risk within two working days to OFCOM, and agree to steps to reduce, mitigate and manage the risks within 14 days;(b) where the provider is not regulated by the Online Safety Act 2023, a provider must notify the National Crime Agency within two working days and agree to steps to reduce, mitigate and manage the risks of the online service being used to create or facilitate the creation of CSA images within 14 days.(3) Where a provider regulated by the Online Safety Act 2023 fails to agree to or implement steps to reduce, mitigate and manage the risks with OFCOM (see subsection (2)(a)), they can be subjected to OFCOM’s enforcement powers as set out in Part 7, Chapter 6 (enforcement powers) of that Act.(4) Where a provider not regulated by the Online Safety Act 2023 fails to agree to or implement steps to reduce, mitigate and manage the risks with the National Crime Agency (see subsection (2)(b)), they commit an offence.(5) A provider that commits an offence under this section is liable to be issued with a penalty notice by the National Crime Agency.(6) In this section a “penalty notice” means a notice requiring its recipient to pay a penalty of an amount not exceeding whichever is the greater of—(a) £18 million, or(b) 10% of a provider’s qualifying worldwide revenue for the most recent complete accounting period.(7) A penalty notice may be reissued where a provider continues to commit an offence under this section.(8) In carrying out its duties set out in this section, the National Crime Agency may consult with OFCOM.”Member’s explanatory statement
The Bill includes amendments which prohibit the creation of Gen-AI models specifically designed to create CSA images, but it is still possible for general-purpose models to be used to create CSA images. The Government has committed to allow providers of other Gen-AI services to risk assess how their services could be used for this purpose. This amendment makes that a requirement.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, and the noble Lords, Lord Russell and Lord Clement-Jones, for adding their names. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, for trying to add her name. Such was the enthusiasm that there was no space.
As already discussed, the Government have brought in new Clauses 92 and 93 to allow companies and responsible third parties to risk-assess the creation of CSA by gen AI models. That is an important detail. If the company is red teaming, or the regulator needs to test, it must not be guilty of an offence for doing so. But this new measure is permission, not obligation—and permission is not enough.
Amendment 209 seeks to do three things: to make risk assessment mandatory; to require mitigation within 14 days; and to hold companies not covered by the Online Safety Act to the same standard via the National Crime Agency.
A report from UNICEF last month referenced an Interpol study across 11 countries which found that at least 1.2 million children have disclosed having their images manipulated into sexually explicit images in the past year. In some countries that is equivalent to one child in every classroom being subjected to this new form of child sexual abuse. The report recommended the introduction of guardrails for AI developers at the design stage. In a meeting earlier in your Lordships’ House, we were told repeatedly and reminded graphically that AI CSAM creates appetite in offenders and that what happens online does not stay online.
We have consulted, and Ofcom has consulted—Parliament has debated this for years—and now we are consulting again. I argue that there are three reasons for accepting the amendment right now.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I support my noble friend Lady Kidron—I was very happy to put my name to this. The noble Baroness and others in this Chamber were at a meeting that we had at lunchtime today with a variety of really knowledgeable experts in this area. Even for those of us who have been to these sorts of meetings in the last few years fairly regularly, the latest news is really deeply shocking. I cannot even begin to tell your Lordships how shocking it is.
Indeed, there was an expert from Finland there who is about to deliver a very comprehensive analysis of the status quo, which will be delivered to Ofcom and published shortly. She was unable to give any details; however, she did tell us—I must confess that I am not that shockable, but I did find this pretty shocking—that the earliest instance that this research has discovered of a child being abused sexually was a child who was seven hours old, if noble Lords can believe that. What is more, we were told that there are manuals available on the web and the dark web which tell perpetrators, if they wish to sexually abuse newly born infants, how to do so in such a way that it is not able to be medically identified.
It reminds one slightly of the recent, very brave, interview that Gisèle Pelicot gave, which some of your Lordships may have seen—if noble Lords have not, I recommend it—in which it appeared that the reason that Gisèle did not realise what was happening to her was that her husband had availed himself of sufficient medical knowledge to know that, when he drugged her, he also put muscle relaxants into the medication. The normal physical reaction of anyone’s body, particularly a female body, when it is being violated is to resist it and seize up; in the case where you had muscle relaxants administered, of course, that was not the case, so, when Gisèle woke up, she did not feel well, but she did not realise what had happened. There are manuals on the web telling perpetrators how to do that with newly born infants in order that it is not identified. This is the world we are living in.
I am reminded of an analogy that we often used to use when I was a management consultant, when we were trying to indicate to a business that things were getting slightly out of control and not going the way they wanted: the parable of the frog in the water, which is gently increasing in temperature until the point that it realises it is being boiled alive, by which time it is too late. If you look at the scale of the abuse that is happening and the way in which artificial intelligence is accelerating this exponentially, it is never too late, but I can only add to the words of my noble friend Lady Kidron: how much longer do we have to keep on beseeching the Government to listen?
I reminded the meeting of a meeting I had a few months ago with a Minister from another department and her team. The Minister was female and all the advisers were female. We asked them, “How many of you have children, and what age are they?” They told us, and we then described some of the things that are happening to children of that age. You could see a visible change in demeanour and body language. This is not something that is happening to other people, or happening remotely on the BBC news or online; it is happening to us and our children, and it becomes deeply personal. The reason why the noble Baroness and others of us feel so passionately about this is that it is happening all around us—to our children, grandchildren, nephews and nieces—and we appear to be blind to what is going on.
We are blind in the sense of finding solutions that will work and blind to even trying solutions that may not be perfect but at least indicate a level of intent to do something about it. The companies that are the aim of the noble Baroness’s amendment know what they are doing; they are aware of what they are allowing. They are probably doing some risk analysis, which is probably not very good reading, but they know exactly what they are doing. To try to limit the Government’s approach to only those engines that have clearly been designed primarily to produce child sexual abuse material is the tip of the iceberg. It is all the other ones that are doing the damage. Until and unless we face up to that, zero in on them in such a way that they have to pay attention, and make it seriously painful for them, we are not going to change anything.
I appeal to the House, should the noble Baroness decide to take this to a vote, to send a clear signal to the Government about what is going on. Those of us in this House who are involved in this are frequently approached by the Government’s own Back-Benchers from another place—many of whom have young children —who are deeply concerned about what is going on. They are desperate for their Government to show real leadership and, rather than having consultation after consultation, to take action. So I appeal to the Government to look at this very seriously and I appeal to the House, if the noble Baroness decides to divide, to go with her.
Baroness Benjamin (LD)
My Lords, I support Amendment 209, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I was at the meeting that the noble Lord, Lord Russell, so graphically described. I wish all noble Lords had been there too. If they had been, they too would support this amendment. It makes me weep to think of the harm and damage being done to babies—babies—and young children. It is shocking, and if we do not vote for this amendment, we should be ashamed of ourselves. It might not affect you personally, but you have to care about the millions of children out there who are having to face this abuse.
The growth in artificial intelligence tools is exposing children to new and enhanced harms. Perpetrators are using image generators to create hyper-realistic child sexual abuse material that can be used to abuse and extort children, including to financially blackmail young people. Devastatingly, Childline is hearing from more and more children who are experiencing this type of abuse. For example, a 16 year-old boy contacted the charity saying that a girl claiming to be his age made fake sexual images of him and threatened to share them with his friends unless he sent her £200. What is this world coming to, with children being blackmailed like this? Children are speaking about feeling incredibly scared, distressed and isolated in these situations. They are unsure about why it is happening or where to turn for help.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, this is a grim subject, like, I am afraid, many of those that we are going to discuss in our proceedings today. An overwhelming case has been made by those who have spoken, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I very much hope that the Front Benches—Government and Opposition—are listening to the views that have been expressed.
I shall offer one argument additional to those that the noble Baroness has set out. In addition to regulatory sanctions against the providers of these online services, and in addition to any possible criminal remedies that may arise, there is also the possibility of civil sanctions: claims for damages brought by groups of parents who have the misfortune to have had their children dealt with in this appalling way. Any such claim for damages would be immeasurably assisted were the providers of the online services to have a legal duty to risk-assess the likelihood of their services being used in this way.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)
My Lords, I was also at the meeting, which has been referred to, that was held this lunchtime and dealt with the troubling question of what seems to be an epidemic of growth in the exploitation of children on the internet. I must say that it revealed figures that I was not aware of, and I regard myself as relatively well briefed on this matter.
Further information came out today—particularly from the work, which has already been alluded to, by Members who were present at that meeting—that much of the of the material that is seen online also moves across into the real world. The use of these elements on the internet to groom children, to set up meetings with them and then to participate with them in illegal acts has been growing to a point where it is quite clearly an epidemic that must be dealt with. We are at the start of something extraordinarily unpleasant that needs to be looked at in the round, in a way that we have not yet done or been able to do.
Having been heavily involved in the Online Safety Act, I am conscious of the fact that we are dealing with legislation which has been overtaken by technology. The developments that have happened since we the Bill became an Act have meant that the tools we thought were being given to Ofcom and being used by the Government are very often no longer appropriate. They are probably not as far-reaching and certainly do not deal with the speed with which this technology is moving forward.
I have not been able to attend any meetings which Ministers may have had with my own side on this, but I gather that there is a Whip on against this amendment. I wonder whether the Minister could think hard about how he wants to play this issue out. It seems that one of the problems we have in dealing with legislation in this area is that we are never dealing with the right legislation. We want to amend the Online Safety Act but obviously, by moving an amendment to this Bill, which is from another department, we are not maximising the chances of having an output which will work. In addition, the way Ofcom is interpreting the Act seems to make it very difficult for it to reach out on new technologies, such as those described by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, in her excellent speech introducing the amendment.
In a moment of transition, when we are so keen to try to grasp things so that they do not get out of our control, there may be a case for further work to be done. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, mentioned that she was happy to try to look again at the wording of her amendment if it is not appropriate for the Government. I am conscious that the Government are also trying to move in other areas and that other departments are also issuing measures which may or may not bear directly on the issue. It seems that there is a very strong case—although I do not know how my noble friend will respond—for asking for this issue to be kept alive and brought back, perhaps at Third Reading, where a joint amendment might be brought between the noble Baroness and her supporters and the Government to try to make sure that we do what we can, even if it is not the complete picture, to take this another step down the road.
Baroness Bertin (Con)
I will make a very small intervention because people have spoken so eloquently before me. I support the amendment 100% and I am surprised that the Front Benches are not taking a different view. For crying out loud, I am not easily shocked but the briefing that we have all spoken about that we went to this afternoon shocked me. We are so behind the curve on this and we have to get ahead of it, so I support the amendment.
The Earl of Erroll (CB)
My Lords, I can see what the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, is saying about Third Reading, but it would be wiser to vote for this amendment now—if noble Lords have any conscience at all, they have to vote for it—and if it is slightly defective it can be amended at Third Reading. If we do not do it now, there is a huge risk of it not coming back.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, from these Benches, I strongly support Amendment 209, which was so convincingly spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I was very pleased to have signed it, alongside the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes.
This amendment is a vital safeguard against the “innovation first, safety later” culture of big tech. Although the Bill will rightly prohibit the creation of models specifically designed to generate CSA images, it remains silent on general-purpose models that can be easily manipulated or jailbroken to produce the same horrific results. As the unacceptable use of tools such as Grok—referred to by my noble friend Lady Benjamin in her powerful speech—has recently illustrated, we cannot leave the safety of our children to chance. We face a technological and moral emergency. The Internet Watch Foundation, represented at the meeting today which the noble Lord, Lord Russell, and my noble friend mentioned, has warned of a staggering 380% increase in confirmed cases of AI-generated child exploitation imagery. The noble Lord, Lord Russell, is right that the extent of this abuse is sickening beyond imagination.
The amendment would mandate a safety-by-design intervention, requiring providers to proactively risk-assess their services and report identified risks to Ofcom within 48 hours. In Committee, the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, pushed back against this proposal, arguing that it
“would place unmanageable and unnecessary operational burdens on … the National Crime Agency and Ofcom”.—[Official Report, 27/11/25; col. 1533.]
He further claimed that these measures risk creating “legal uncertainty” by “duplicating” the Online Safety Act. Both assertions need rebutting. First, protecting children from an industrial-scale explosion of AI-generated abuse is not an unnecessary burden; it is the primary duty of our law enforcement and regulatory bodies. Secondly, we cannot rely on the theoretical protections of an Online Safety Act designed for a world before generative AI. Ofcom itself has maintained what might be called a tactical ambiguity about how the Act applies to stand-alone AI chatbots and large language models.
Alongside the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, who we will support if she puts the amendment to a vote, we ask for an ex ante duty: providers must check whether their models can be used to generate CSAM before they are released to the public. Voluntary commitments and retrospective enforcement are simply not enough. The Government have already committed to this principle; it is time to put that commitment into statute. I urge the Minister to accept Amendment 209 and ensure that we move away from ex post measures that address harm only after a child has been victimised.
The current definitions of “search” and “user-to-user” services do not neatly or comprehensively capture these new generative technologies. We cannot allow a situation where tech developers release highly capable models to the public without first explicitly checking whether they can be used to generate CSAM. Voluntary commitments and retrospective civil enforcement are simply not enough. We need this explicit statutory duty in the Bill today and I urge the Minister to accept Amendment 209.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 209, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, would require providers of relevant online services to assess and address the risks that their platforms may be used for the creation, sharing or facilitation of child sexual abuse material, placing a strengthened duty on them to take preventive action. More than anyone in this Chamber, I fully recognise the intention behind strengthening preventive mechanisms and ensuring that providers properly assess and mitigate risks to children. Requiring companies to examine how their services may facilitate abuse is, in principle, entirely sensible. The scale and evolving nature of online exploitation means that proactive duties are essential.
However, I have some concerns about the proposed mechanism, on which I hope the Minister may also be able to provide some input. The amendment appears to rely on providers conducting their own risk assessments. That immediately raises several practical questions, such as what objective standard those assessments would be measured against, whether there would be statutory guidance setting out minimum criteria, and how consistency would be ensured across companies of vastly different sizes and capabilities. There also remains the crucial question of what enforcement mechanisms would apply if an assessment was superficial or inadequate. Without clear parameters and oversight, there is a danger that such a system could become uneven in practice.
I would welcome reassurance from the Minister as to how the Government intend to ensure that risk-based duties in this space are transparent and robust for the purposes of child protection. The question is not whether we act, but how. We all share the same objective of reducing the prevalence of child sexual abuse material and protecting children from exploitation. The challenge is ensuring that the mechanisms we legislate for are clear and enforceable in practice. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness Kidron, for tabling Amendment 209 and for her commitment to doing all we can to prevent online harms. I was struck strongly by the contributions from the noble Baronesses, Lady Benjamin and Lady Bertin, the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Russell of Liverpool, my noble friend Lord Stevenson of Balmacara and the noble Earl, Lord Erroll.
This is a really serious issue. The Government are committed to making sure that we have constructive engagement with the noble Baroness, as I have tried to do, including one formal and one informal meeting this very day, to ensure that we can make this work in the interests of what everybody in this House wants to do: to ensure, particularly given the rapid development of technology, that the public, and especially children, are safeguarded from harm. This Government are committed to tackling sexual exploitation and abuse and ensuring that new technologies are developed and deployed responsibly. I know that that matters; I know that it is important, and I know that this Government want to make sure that we deal with it.
A few weeks ago, the Grok AI chatbot was used to create and share vile, degrading and non-consensual intimate deepfakes. This House should ensure that no one lives in fear of having their image sexually manipulated by technology. From the Prime Minister to the DSIT Secretary, we said at the time that we will do something to stamp out this demeaning and illegal image production.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
If I was in the same meeting as the Minister, officials were unable to say that LLMs and generative models would be covered by that amendment. Indeed, they said that the policy of the Government was chatbots only. Chatbots are the subject of another amendment that I have tabled, which we will come to later. We have to be clear that the amendment in front of us remains only because I was told this afternoon that the new government amendment would not cover the same territory.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The government amendment has been tabled. I am asking the noble Baroness—whether she does this is self-evidently a matter for her—to withdraw her amendment and look at the amendment that we have tabled today on a cross-party basis and on behalf of DSIT and the Home Office, the department that I represent. That amendment will be debated around 18 March, and she can make comments on it at that stage. I am trying to meet the needs of the House and the Government to respond to what are complex and difficult challenges. All I will say is that, by bringing more AI services into the scope of the Online Safety Act, we will ensure that there is a clear and consistent regulatory framework that will allow us to hold companies to account.
In Clause 93, we have introduced the technology testing defence that will enable persons authorised by the Secretary of State to test technology for these harms. The defence will give providers reassurance to test the robustness of their models’ safeguards, identify weaknesses and design out harmful inputs. This, in turn, will reduce the risk of their models being criminally misused, particularly to abuse women and children. This further supports all AI companies in scope of the Online Safety Act with their risk-assessment obligations.
Given those measures—the noble Baroness will have to make a judgment on this—but the Government consider that Amendment 209 is therefore unnecessary as it cuts across the approach that I have outlined to date both in the Bill, in Clause 93 and the clauses I outlined earlier, and the proposed amendment that I shared with her as best I could prior to this debate. The House has a chance to look at that now that it is published. This cuts across that duty and imposes a broad statutory duty on online services, duplicating regulatory mechanisms, and it could create legal uncertainty. The noble Lord, Clement-Jones, challenged me on that, but that is the view of Ministers, officials and our legal departments. We are worried about the similar enforcement routes outside the Online Safety Act framework.
We take this seriously. The points that the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, made are extremely important. I was not able to attend the briefing earlier, but I know how much that has impacted Members who have spoken today. The National Crime Agency and police will play a key role in protecting children from UK child abuse. It is warned that the scale and complexity of online child sexual abuse are resulting in tens of millions of annual referrals of suspected online sexual abuse. Policing resources are best spent on protecting children and arresting offenders, so it is appropriate that Ofcom continues to play a critical regulatory role in preventing and tackling the AI generation of child sexual abuse material.
I have tried to persuade the noble Baroness but, if I have not succeeded, there will have to be a Division. I do not want there to be one because I think this House should speak with one voice on tackling this issue. The laudable objectives of the amendment are, we believe, better addressed through both the existing legislative framework and the targeted government amendment we have tabled today to expand the scope of the Online Safety Act to bring illegal content duties in line for chatbots. This will mean that providers need to mitigate potential risks to prevent children facing such abuse.
I hope I have convinced the noble Baroness. Again, I apologise to the House for the lateness of the tabling of the amendment. We are trying to work across government on this, and that amendment will be debated on 18 March. In light of that, I hope the noble Baroness feels able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
My Lords, as a point of information, I feel it would be useful to say that Clauses 64 and 65, to which the Minister refers, are in fact a narrowing of an original amendment, laid by me and other noble Lords, that the Government deliberately narrowed so that it deals only with electronic files that have been deliberately and exclusively created to create child sexual abuse. I very much welcome those clauses. However, if the Government had not narrowed that amendment, I would not be standing here today with this amendment.
I am grateful for the Minister’s time, and I am happy with the chatbot amendment as far as it goes—and inasmuch as I have seen it an hour before everyone else—but it does not deal with this issue. I rang the Minister this morning and asked for a meeting to say, “If you can tell me that this is covered by the chatbot amendment or that it’s already covered in another way, I will back down”. But I am afraid that nobody could tell me that, because it is not. That is just how it is.
I say to the noble Lord speaking for the Official Opposition, no, no, no. It is not okay to say, “We must work out how to do this”. This is an opportunity to work out how. We always do it this way. We pass an amendment; we get a power; and Ofcom and the Government do the guidance. I say to the whole House, and particularly to my friends on the Labour Benches who may be considering voting against this, have any of you seen child sexual abuse made out of your image? I have. It is not funny; it is serious and it is easily done. I think it is unacceptable to vote against an amendment that says only, “Risk assess”. It is not okay to put a product out in the world if you do not have any responsibility for the harm it causes. So, I do not expect to win, because the Government are whipping against and the Opposition are sitting on their hands, but I think it is important to say to the people who are in a vortex of this kind of abuse that at least some of us in this House have their backs.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
When the noble Baroness says that some of us in this House are concerned about this issue, I want to say to her that all of us in this House are concerned about this issue. The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and myself have many differences in this House, but we are at one in trying to improve the position of the regulations to tackle this issue. The amendment that I have tabled is a very important step forward on behalf of the Government, on a DSIT and Home Office basis, and I am grateful for the support of the noble Lord. I do not want to have a Division in this House. The Government and the Opposition may well win that vote, but I do not want that Division to happen; I want us to go forward in a constructive way, to look at the amendments that are tabled and to make a change that really benefits people.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
I say to the noble Lord that there is only one way to prevent a Division on this issue, which is either to stand at the Dispatch Box and say that it is covered, or that we will keep it alive until Third Reading so that we can make sure that it is covered. If I have insulted anyone by suggesting that only some of us are willing to walk through the Lobby to protect children from child sexual abuse, forgive me, but unless the Minister has something to say, then as a matter of principle I shall divide the House.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(a) to make or adapt a thing for use for creating, or facilitating the creation of, CSA images;(b) to possess, supply or offer to supply a thing (a “CSA image-generator”) which is made or adapted for use for creating, or facilitating the creation of, CSA images.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes a drafting change to the operation of the CSA image-generator offence in Northern Ireland.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 66, page 85, line 17.
“(c) “thing” includes a program, information in electronic form and a service.” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 66, page 85, line 17. It also clarifies that a service can be a CSA image-generator.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 66, page 85, line 17.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 66, page 85, line 17.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 66, page 85, line 17.
Member’s explanatory statement
This is a minor drafting change.
Member’s explanatory statement
This is a minor drafting change.
Member’s explanatory statement
This is a minor drafting change.
Member’s explanatory statement
This is a minor drafting change.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(a) to make or adapt a thing for use for creating, or facilitating the creation of, CSA images;(b) to possess, supply or offer to supply a thing (a “CSA image-generator”) which is made or adapted for use for creating, or facilitating the creation of, CSA images.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes a drafting change to clarify the operation of the CSA image-generator offence in Scotland.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 67, page 89, line 9.
“(c) “thing” includes a program, information in electronic form and a service.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 67, page 89, line 9. It also clarifies that a service can be a CSA image-generator.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 67, page 89, line 9.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 67, page 89, line 9.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 67, page 89, line 9.
Member’s explanatory statement
This is a minor drafting change.
Member’s explanatory statement
This is a minor drafting change.
Member’s explanatory statement
This is a minor drafting change.
Member’s explanatory statement
This is a minor drafting change.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This is a minor drafting change.
Member’s explanatory statement
This is a minor drafting change.
Member’s explanatory statement
This is a minor drafting change.
Member’s explanatory statement
This is a minor drafting change.
Baroness Levitt
“(ia) sections 8A to 8C (rape and other offences against children under 16);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my new clause (Sexual offences against children under 16), inserted after clause 73.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, I will speak to government Amendments 234, 235, 237, 249, 250, 448 and 467, which will give effect to recommendation 1 of the National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey. She recommended that the law should be changed so that an adult who engages in penetrative sexual activity with a child who is under 16 is charged with rape. I thank the noble Baroness for the audit. She worked closely with us as we developed these offences, and it was important to us to ensure that we met her objectives. I thank her for her strong support of the Government’s proposals.
We are taking a two-stage approach, starting with the amendments being debated today. These will create new offences covering rape and other penetrative sexual activity with a child who is under 16 by an adult. The important thing to note is that the prosecution does not have to prove that the child did not consent, so ostensible or purported consent or reasonable belief in consent is completely irrelevant. This eliminates any question of whether an under-16 seemed to have consented. All that matters is the age of the child. If the child is under 13, the defendant’s belief about their age is irrelevant. If the child is aged 13 to 15, an adult who believed that the child was aged 16 or over would not be guilty, but only if that belief was reasonably held. This mirrors the existing approach to sexual offences committed against children.
The maximum penalty for these offences will be life imprisonment, and these offences will sit alongside existing ones in relation to sexual activity with and towards children. The Crown Prosecution Service will therefore retain discretion to charge the full range of child sex offences where appropriate, though we expect that the use of other offences will be very limited. As with existing offences against children under 13, the CPS will prioritise the more serious charges. We are also tabling the necessary consequential amendments, such as ensuring that where the relevant criteria are met, offenders will be eligible for extended determinate sentences.
This brings me to the second stage. The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, was clear in her audit that the law in this area needs to be changed to ensure that children are treated as children. Alongside our new offences, we are committed to doing two things. We are going to carry out a public consultation to look at how to treat what are known as “close-in-age relationships” within the cohort of relevant child sexual offences. This responds to the noble Baroness’s recommendation that the Government should consider a close-in-age exemption to prevent the criminalisation of teenagers who are in relationships with each other.
We will also conduct a post-implementation review of the new offences to test the impact they are having. We know that there are some concerns about the element of reasonable belief in age, and this review will look closely at how that works in practice. I assure the House that the Government will continue to progress this work as a matter of priority to ensure that we get the law right in the long term. I beg to move.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, we believe that Amendment 235 delivers on the crucial recommendation from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, in her national audit. By creating these strict liability offences where consent is rightly irrelevant and the offence of reasonable belief in age cannot apply, these clauses send an important signal making it unambiguously clear that no adult can claim ignorance or excuse when preying on the young and vulnerable.
The audit explained how grooming gangs repeatedly evaded rape charges for penetrative sex with 13 to 15 year-olds. Cases were downgraded or dropped because victims were misperceived as having consented or been in love with abusers, despite children under 16 being legally incapable of consent. Perpetrators avoided accountability by claiming it was reasonable to believe their victims were older than 16, perhaps due to their demeanour or because they had fake ID. These clauses strip away both loopholes for good, and on these Benches we give them our full support.
The intent of Amendment 236 to elevate penetrative offences against young teens to rape is laudable, but, as we signalled in Committee, we have several concerns. Mandating rape charges for every act of intercourse with a child under 16 may sound resolute, but it introduces unnecessary evidential hurdles and extra elements that must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, which could result in guilty offenders walking free. Forcing every case into a life sentence framework risks deterring pleas from defendants and unnerving juries, driving up acquittals on technicalities. Amendment 236 also retains the “reasonable belief in age” defence, which—as the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, highlighted—offenders have exploited to evade justice. We believe the Government’s approach offers a surer path to protecting vulnerable children, and it has our support.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, we support the Government’s approach and indeed welcome it. In Committee, my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower and I tabled an amendment in the same form, in essence, as Amendment 236 in this group. The amendment would create a specific offence of rape of a child under 16 to close the loophole in the current law whereby an adult who has sexual intercourse with a child between 13 and 15 is not automatically charged with rape. That was one of the key recommendations from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey. In Committee, these Benches were critical of the fact that, although the Government had accepted the noble Baroness’s recommendation to do this, they had not brought forward a legislative proposal to change the law. With Amendment 235, they have done exactly that.
I am also pleased that they have gone slightly further and included within the scope assault by penetration and causing a child to engage in sexual activity. Overall, this is a welcome step and, in light of it, we will not press Amendment 236 to a Division.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I am very grateful for the acknowledgement by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, that, in essence, Amendment 236 covers the same ground as the government amendments. I commend the noble Lords for bringing forward their amendment and making sure that it is on everybody’s radar. As the noble Lord said, the Government’s amendments go further than Amendment 236 was intended to, in that it covers all penetrative activity, not just penile penetration, and it is accompanied by all the necessary consequential amendments, such as ensuring, when relevant criteria are met, that offenders are eligible for extended determinate sentences.
We are indebted to the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, for her work and bringing about this important change. It makes it absolutely clear that penetrative sexual activity between adults and children under 16 is fundamentally wrong, cannot be excused by any suggestions about consent and will be treated with the utmost seriousness.
Baroness Levitt
“Sexual offences against children under 16(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as follows.(2) After section 8 insert—“Rape and other offences against children under 16
8A Rape of a child under 16(1) A person aged 18 or over (A) commits an offence if—(a) A intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of another person (B) with A’s penis, and(b) either—(i) B is under 16 and A does not reasonably believe that B is 16 or over, or(ii) B is under 13.(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for life.8B Assault of a child under 16 by penetration(1) A person aged 18 or over (A) commits an offence if—(a) A intentionally penetrates the vagina or anus of another person (B) with a part of A’s body or anything else,(b) the penetration is sexual, and(c) either—(i) B is under 16 and A does not reasonably believe that B is 16 or over, or(ii) B is under 13. (2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for life.8C Causing or inciting a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration(1) A person aged 18 or over (A) commits an offence if—(a) A intentionally causes or incites another person (B) to engage in an activity within subsection (2),(b) the activity is sexual, and(c) either—(i) B is under 16 and A does not reasonably believe that B is 16 or over, or(ii) B is under 13.(2) An activity is within this subsection if it involves—(a) penetration of B’s anus or vagina,(b) penetration of B’s mouth with a person’s penis,(c) penetration of a person’s anus or vagina with a part of B’s body or by B with anything else, or(d) penetration of a person’s mouth with B’s penis.(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for life.”(3) In section 73(2) (exceptions to aiding, abetting and counselling) after paragraph (a) insert—“(aa) an offence under section 8A or 8B (offences against children under 16);”.(4) Schedule (Sexual offences against children under 16: consequential amendments) contains minor and consequential amendments.”Member's explanatory statement
This new Clause creates new offences of rape, assault by penetration, and causing or inciting a sexual activity involving penetration, in relation to children under 16.
Baroness Levitt
“(ca) an offence under any of sections 8A to 8C of that Act (rape and other offences against children under 16),”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my new clause (Sexual offences against children under 16), inserted after clause 73.
Lord Katz
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment amends subsection (6)(d) so that it does not include offences under sections 66E and 66F of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (as only adults can be victims of those offences).
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, the amendments in this group are all minor and technical in nature. Amendments 238 and 251 modify provisions in Clause 75 and Schedule 10, which provide for the new grooming aggravating factor and relate to the duty to report child sexual abuse respectively. In each case, the provisions refer to a run of offences at Sections 66 to 67A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. When the Bill was originally drafted, this run of offences all related to offences against children, which are relevant to the provisions in Clause 75 and Schedule 10. The Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 has since added two adult-related offences into the run of offences at Sections 66 to 67A of the 2003 Act, specifically at Sections 66E and 66F. These two amendments simply remove the new adult-focused offences from the list of relevant offences in Clause 75 and Schedule 10.
Amendment 388 to Schedule 18 adds to the list of amendments that are consequential on the confiscation order provisions in the Bill an amendment of a provision recently inserted by the Sentencing Act 2026 into the Sentencing Code. Finally, Amendments 447, 453 and 454 provide that the provisions on child sexual abuse image generators at Clause 65, costs protections at Clause 162 and anonymity for firearms officers at Clauses 168 to 171 all have UK-wide extent, as was the original drafting intention. I beg to move.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, very briefly, I thank the Minister for bringing forward these amendments. They seem to be entirely reasonable and we support their implementation.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for the Official Opposition’s support for these amendments.
Lord Nash
“Action to forestall the sexual exploitation of children by combating CSAM(1) Within 12 months of the passing of this Act the Secretary of State must, for the purpose of forestalling the sexual exploitation of children, make and bring into force regulations which require manufacturers, importers and distributors of relevant devices to satisfy the CSAM requirement specified in subsection (2).(2) The ‘CSAM requirement’ is that any relevant device supplied for use in the UK must have installed tamper-proof system software which is highly effective at preventing the recording, transmitting (by any means, including livestreaming) and viewing of CSAM using that device.(3) The duties of manufacturers, importers and distributors to comply with the CSAM requirement specified by regulations under subsection (1) must be subject to enforcement as if the CSAM requirement was a security requirement for the purposes of Part 1 of the Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Act 2022.(4) Regulations under subsection (1) must—(a) enable the Secretary of State, by further regulations, to expand the definition of ‘relevant devices’ to include other categories of device which may be used to record, transmit or view CSAM, and (b) protect the privacy of the users of relevant devices through making provision to ensure that software of the kind required by subsection (2) does not, and cannot be used to, collect, retain, copy or transmit any data outside of the relevant device on which it is operating, or determine by any means the identity of the user of the relevant device on which it is operating.(5) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (1) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.(6) For the purposes of this section—“CSAM” means images, video recordings or live videos involving child sexual abuse, including—(a) any indecent photograph or pseudo-photograph of a child within the meaning of the Protection of Children Act 1978, and(b) any prohibited image of a child, within the meaning of section 62 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, that is not an excluded image within the meaning of section 63 of that Act;“relevant devices” are smartphones or tablet computers which are either internet-connectable products or network-connectable products for the purposes of section 5 of the Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Act 2022;“manufacturer”, “importer”, “distributor” and “supply” is each as defined in the Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Act 2022.”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to take action to forestall the sexual exploitation of children by mandating the installation of software which prevents the creation, viewing and sharing of child sexual abuse material on smartphones, tablets, and subsequently other devices, which are supplied for use in the UK.
Lord Nash (Con)
My Lords, as this is the first time I have spoken on Report, I draw attention to my interests in the register, particularly the fact that I am—and have been for many years—an investor in many technology companies, mainly software companies.
I do not think I need to spend too much time telling noble Lords of the appalling worldwide industry of child sexual abuse, as I know many noble Lords are only too aware of it. There have been many powerful speeches about it already today and I went through it in quite a lot of detail in Committee, but I will mention a few facts. It is estimated that in the Philippines alone, one in every 100 children is coerced into this industry, often with their parents’ consent, for the gratification of paedophile customers across the world. It is estimated that around 70 million child sexual abuse images are floating around the internet, many of which are of very young children and some—quite a few, sadly—even of babies, as the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, mentioned earlier. Many depict incest.
Some of the victims in these images have been viewed tens of millions of times. Imagine what it is like as a young girl or an adult walking down the street and seeing a man—it would be a man—look at you and peer at you for a few seconds, and to wonder whether that man has seen you raped online. With the advent of AI, it is, as we now know, possible using just text to speech to generate increasingly appalling images.
Depending on whose statistics you look at, this country is the second or third-largest consumer of this dreadful stuff in the world. The National Crime Agency issued a report last month saying that it arrests 1,000 paedophiles a month in this country. There were tens of thousands of outstanding investigations, and it is estimated that there are well over half a million offenders in the UK alone. For some offenders, this online abuse is a gateway to real-life contact abuse, as the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, has mentioned already. There is no doubt that some of this is fuelled by addiction to pornography and the desire for even more extreme content.
Under existing legislation, material can be taken down only once it has been seen—often by children. With livestreaming of this abuse, which is a very large industry, the images are watched in the moment and often immediately taken down. The tech companies already have methods of taking down much of this non-livestreamed material, but most of them are not using these methods effectively. Technology is now available to block on device the viewing of child sexual abuse images, or the making or livestreaming of them.
My amendment would mandate that this technology be installed on smartphones and tablets supplied in the UK. Of course, it would be open to manufacturers to develop their own technology to do that if they did not want to purchase a third-party product. Everyone I have spoken to, from regulators to technology experts and the companies themselves, is completely confident that that can be done. The problem is not the technology; it is achieving very high accuracy levels, at 99%, and very low false positives, at under 1%.
Of course, the Government will also need to be satisfied that the technology works effectively. Several discussions about this have already taken place between the Home Office, DSIT, the Internet Watch Foundation and the technology company I introduced to them. The Government may also initially, at least because of the difficulty sometimes of telling a 16 or 17 year-old from an 18 year-old, want to bring it in effective for a lower age. Since at least half of children being abused are under 13, that would be a very good start. My amendment would require the regulations to be brought into force within 12 months, but the regulations could mandate a further period for implementation.
Noble Lords will have noted that in place of my original Amendment 239, I now have down Amendment 239A. The difference is the addition of proposed new Clause 4(b) to ensure user privacy, which is perfectly possible under the technology because it is on the device; the data is not stored and does not go into the cloud.
We have the opportunity under the Bill to effectively hamper this appalling activity—indeed, industry—thereby saving and protecting many children from harm. I believe we have a moral obligation to pass this into law.
Baroness Benjamin (LD)
My Lords, I have put my name to Amendment 239A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Nash, as I believe we need to protect our children, however and wherever we can, from child sexual abuse material being created and shared. Shockingly, over 70 million images—yes, 70 million—are being circulated around the world, far beyond these shores, via the scourge of the online world. There is sexual imagery involving children as young as seven to 11, being exploited and watched by an ever-growing audience. This is not only immoral but cruel, despicable and illegal. It makes me weep to think that children’s childhood is being snatched away from them as we speak.
Organisations such as the Internet Watch Foundation have helped to secure arrests of those for CSAM offences but, despite those arrests, the number of offenders continues to grow. Demand is not being diminished; it is being fed by sick-minded, perverted individuals. Heartbreakingly, where demand for new imagery grows, so does the abuse of real children to produce it.
Social media is central to how offenders operate. Some 40% of CSAM offenders attempted to contact a child after viewing material, with 70% doing so online, mostly through social media, gaming and messaging platforms, while 77% of offenders found CSAM on the open web, with 29% citing social media.
I have met young people who have remained victims of this vile practice years after they became adults. They describe the ongoing harm they suffer because the images of their abuse remain in circulation. They have had their abuse material viewed millions and millions of times. Research has confirmed that survivors with an online element to their abuse found significantly higher levels of long-lasting harm, including depression and anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, self-harm, substance abuse, social isolation and sexual dysfunction, compared with survivors whose abuse was never recorded or shared online.
The cruelty that these survivors must endure extends even further. Some are actively hunted in adult life by offenders seeking to see how they look today. Can your Lordships believe this? With AI, offenders are now generating new abuse imagery featuring adult survivors—in some cases producing material in which the survivor appears to be abusing their younger self. Does that not make you want to cry?
Imagine if it was your child or grandchild, and what it means to live that reality. Imagine a survivor, as the noble Lord, Lord Nash, described, walking down the street, catching the eye of a stranger and immediately, involuntarily, thinking, “Have you seen the image of me being abused?” Does that not make your heart bleed? This is the daily experience of people whose abuse is permanently accessible online.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I am grateful, as I am sure the whole House is, to the noble Lord, Lord Nash, for tabling this amendment. We are all familiar with regular updates on our smartphones that eat more and more of the memory and use up more and more of the battery. They happen systematically, usually for security reasons, very regularly and seamlessly. However, I was not aware, until the noble Lord tabled his amendment and we had some discussions and meetings around it, that the technology that we are talking about to intercede and stop our devices being able to access or use this sort of material already exists to some degree on our telephones. Who among us who has an iPhone, like me, knew that the software to prevent and screen child sexual abuse material already exists but can be activated only if you go into the parental controls and turn it on—at which point it then starts working? I had no idea that that was embedded in my phone.
The technology exists. The large manufacturers of these gadgets already have access to that technology. In some instances, they have already developed it to a very sophisticated level but, for all sorts of reasons, have chosen not to roll it out. One of the major arguments used against this sort of thing being rolled out is from the free speech brigade—one of whose protagonists I am glad to see is not in the Chamber today. They will always say that free speech trumps everything else. It is an unfortunate choice of verb, but that is the argument put forward.
But the reality is that the technology we are talking about works in such a way that in no way, shape or form does it prevent free speech. It does not in any way, shape or form intervene with those platforms which are encrypted. It operates separately to those platforms but works in such a way that, without revealing what is going on in those encrypted messages, it stops the sort of material that we are talking about actually getting involved in the first place. In my view, that is not exactly an interdiction of free speech.
For all these reasons, I ask the Government to look at this very carefully and closely. We are not dealing with some wonderful space age technology that has yet to be developed; we are talking about technology which already exists. There are individuals who have a huge amount of knowledge and experience in this area. It is probably a brilliant example of His Majesty’s Government pursuing one of their avowed aims, which is to work more closely with foreign jurisdictions together in this sort of area.
For all these reasons, I hope that the Government will give a positive response, and that we will not have, “Oh, it is very difficult”, or, even worse, that we will have a consultation. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)
My Lords, in speaking on issues related to online safety, I seem to spend most of my time apologising for the fact that the Act is not as up-to-date, efficient or effective as it should be, but here is another example of where technology has overtaken the good work that we did all those years ago to try to bring forward that legislation.
I learned about this at the same meeting that has been referred to already. At first sight, it looks as though it is an answer to a lot of problems that we have with the way in which younger people in particular interact with the internet. Those of us who were involved in pursuing what is now the Online Safety Act will be aware that we were largely looking at the user end of the material and cycle, looking at the apps and their interactions, that were being generated by those who were involved in servicing the internet. We did not look at technology in the hardware side at all and had no real thought about anything that we were dealing with in the then Bill affecting it. Yet this seems a very interesting and easy-to-adopt technology that would solve a lot of problems in relation to issues about the spread of material, which we would think should not be available where there are things like age bars or other means of providing gaps in the access to it.
There are always going to be problems with how we manage the changeover between childhood and adulthood, and we are aware that the technology is moving fast on that as well. It may well be that what is current today may be out of date by the time this Bill becomes law. But the Government should look very closely at the way in which this technology operates to prevent, at the equipment level, access to material which should not be seen by children particularly.
There will, as the noble Lord, Lord Russell, has said, be issues about free speech, and I do not think we should underestimate those. There are obviously ways in which this could be used against societal values; but for the particularity of how children are to be protected, making it impossible for them to access material, which they should by law not see, on the equipment they buy seems a very useful way forward, and I commend it to Ministers.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the wise words of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson. Let me say from the outset that, in principle, on these Benches we conditionally support Amendment 239A, which has been spoken to so powerfully by the noble Lord, Lord Nash.
The noble Lord very clearly set out the urgent issues involved, as did my noble friend Lady Benjamin and the noble Lord, Lord Russell, and all of us who were there in the same meeting which we have referred to before. We are at a technological and moral crisis point, as we have debated in a previous group regarding child sexual abuse material online. We face a children’s mental health catastrophe, and the ubiquity of child sexual abuse material is a central driver of that catastrophe.
The noble Lord, Lord Nash, has explained that his amendment would mandate that manufacturers and importers of smartphones and tablets ensure their devices satisfy a CSAM requirement to prevent the creation, viewing, and sharing of such material.
The question, however, clearly arises as to whether this would undermine encryption or privacy. We recognise that the noble Lord, Lord Nash, in his revised Amendment 239A, does indeed include a duty of privacy in his regulations. In my view, the thing to avoid is the chance that a technological fix of this kind could involve some degree of surveillance. I do agree with the noble Lord, Lord Russell, that, at first sight, the technology looks extremely promising, as the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, mentioned, but, before taking this further, we need to be absolutely sure about the robustness of this technology and its impact on privacy.
By requiring software to be preloaded at the system level, we would move away from the model of parental controls and platform responsibility, and we would place the duty on the manufacturers who profit from these devices. Quite apart from that, we do, of course, also need to ensure that the platforms take action.
The Minister may promise further consultation, but we do not need much more consultation to know that the status quo is failing; we need to find a solution now rather than playing an endless game of digital catch-up. As other others have urged, I hope that the Government will take a look at this proposal urgently, closely and seriously.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this group of amendments addresses one of the gravest and most distressing areas of criminality: the sexual exploitation of children and the creation and circulation of child sexual abuse material. There will be no disagreement among noble Lords about the objective behind these amendments. The scale of this crime is deeply alarming and becoming increasingly technologically sophisticated. The question before us is not whether we act but how.
I turn to the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Nash. Once again, I entirely understand and support the underlying aim. The goal of ensuring that devices supplied in the UK have highly effective, tamper-proof system software capable of preventing the transmission or viewing of CSAM is a commendable one. Preventing abuse at source is always preferable to prosecuting it after the harm has occurred.
I recognise that Amendment 239A includes express provisions intended to safeguard user privacy, requiring that any such software must operate in a way that does not collect, retain, copy or transmit data outside the device, nor determine the identity of the user. It also provides for affirmative parliamentary approval of the regulations.
However, it is still hard to overlook the practical challenges that may arise from this amendment. Determined offenders frequently exploit encrypted platforms and modify operating systems, often using overseas-hosted services. A requirement limited to devices supplied for use in the UK could be circumvented by overseas purchases or software alterations. Even with privacy safeguards written into the regulation-making power, this amendment may still raise complex issues relating to encryption, cyber security, technical feasibility and enforcement. Mandating tamper-proof software across all relevant devices would represent a significant expansion of the regulatory framework established under the Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Act 2022.
While I strongly support the objective of forestalling child sexual exploitation and disrupting the circulation of abuse material, I am not yet persuaded that this amendment provides a workable legislative solution. I look forward to hearing from the Minister how the Government are strengthening preventative technology and ensuring that industry plays a meaningful role in protecting children, while maintaining a framework that is technically feasible and legally robust.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Nash, for setting out his amendments. I know that he met last week with the Minister, my noble friend Lady Lloyd, and I hope that was a productive discussion. I was pleased to meet with him as well—I have lost track of the date, but it was some time in the last few months—when he graciously brought along representatives of companies that are developing the technology he talked about today. I found that meeting useful.
I acknowledge the noble Lord’s intention to protect children through this amendment, and I want to be clear, as I was on the previous amendment, that the Government share the ambition to protect children from nude imagery and prevent the spread of CSAM online. I hope that my response to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, showed that this is a matter the Government are taking seriously. That is why, in the violence against women and girls strategy, we have made it clear that we want to make it impossible for children in the UK to take, share or view nude images. We strongly agree that nudity detection on a device is an effective way in which this could be achieved.
Lord Nash (Con)
I am grateful to the Minister for his answer and to the other Members who have spoken today. I am satisfied that the Government are seized of this issue. I do not think it will be difficult to satisfy them and Members of this House and the other place that the technology works, the privacy issues can be sorted and we can deal with all their concerns. On the basis of the commitment the Minister has made today, I will not be testing the opinion of the House. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Grey-Thompson
Baroness Grey-Thompson (CB)
My Lords, I have a number of amendments in this group: Amendments 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248B, 263 and 265. I have also added my name to Amendments 257 and 264, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Polak, which I strongly support. Unfortunately, the noble Lord is not able to be in his place today, but I share his concerns about protecting children from harm. These two amendments seek to fill the gap caused by Clause 84, which was raised in Committee, and I believe they are proportionate. The current clause does not cover a multitude of ways in which reports of abuse can be concealed, and it allows many who intentionally conceal to slip through the net.
Clause 84 is triggered only when the person acting to conceal abuse does so by blocking or deterring someone under the new duty from making a report, so the two amendments seek to strengthen what is currently there. It is broader than the current clause, which we believe currently means that it would be a two-tier system. I am not sure how we can justify an offence that would criminalise a teacher but not a religious leader.
Many of the amendments in my name were taken from my Private Member’s Bill on this, but I took some time to consider what should be a priority, and those are Amendments 246 and 248B. For clarity, I will not be seeking to divide on any others in my name in the group, but I would be interested to hear the Minister’s views on Amendments 246 and 248B.
Like others, I have been working on this issue for a number of years. In 2015 the then Sports Minister, Tracey Crouch, asked me to author a report on duty of care in sport. Mandatory reporting was high on the list of issues that needed to be resolved, the other being positions of trust, where the loophole has now partially been closed.
Coaches and volunteers have very positive relationships with young people. These amendments are not to overburden them but to offer protection. Individuals may be worried about reporting so they need more guidance, and a framework of law will do that. No one wants to get it wrong, and we have to be mindful that there may be some malicious reporting.
As a young athlete in my early 20s, I witnessed inappropriate behaviour by a coach—nothing that I could quite put my finger on. You could argue that it was another time when less was known, but we are now seeing a number of historic cases. When I was a young athlete, there was no framework, policy or procedure to be able to raise it. I did not quite have the words to express what I saw, I did not have evidence, I did not witness abuse and there was no direct disclosure, but what I was trying to explain might have triggered greater awareness of this behaviour. I did not know what I now know. Years later, that coach was charged with historic offences in the 1970s and sentenced to seven and a half years in jail.
When the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse was announced, I expected much movement. In March 2020 the Office for National Statistics estimated that 3.1 million adults in England and Wales experienced sexual abuse before the age of 16. IICSA concluded that child sexual abuse was endemic and permeated all sections of society, and it estimated that more than one in six girls and one in 20 boys have been sexually abused in the UK every year. On average, it takes victims 26 years to disclose abuse.
The IICSA report is quoted in the equality impact assessment saying that current arrangements are confusing, unfocused and ineffective. The Local Government Association estimates that only one in three children who are sexually abused by an adult tell someone. According to the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, it is estimated that 85% of child sexual abuse goes undetected and unreported. Our system is failing the victims of child sexual abuse, and changes need to be made.
I do not believe that His Majesty’s Government’s proposals go far enough and may make the public think that the IICSA mandatory reporting recommendations are being acted on. I do not believe it will make enough of a difference. The key item in the equality impact assessment is table 1 in paragraph 31, on page 9. Given that the Children’s Commissioner for England estimated in 2015 that only one in eight cases of abuse comes to the attention of the authorities, an increase in reports of 0.3% would bring the proportion of unreported cases from 87.5% all the way down to 87.46%. An increase of 0.3% in the numbers of reports would bring the proportion of reported abuse up from 12.5% to 12.54%.
I will not attempt to pre-guess what the Minister might say, but I am imagining a response that it might stop adults wanting to work with children. That is why I looked at Amendment 246, which would make non-reporting a criminal offence. This was recommended by IICSA to provide for defences in situations where there is reasonable doubt concerning the grounds for suspicion. There are criminal sanctions in many countries—Australia, Croatia, Canada, France and most US states.
It has been a pleasure to work on this issue with the honourable Member for North West Cambridgeshire, Sam Carling MP, who wrote the brilliant Amendment 248B. He also has an adjournment debate tonight on this very topic, and I look forward to that. I thank him for venturing down to our end of the building to sit and listen to this debate. I think both of us would prefer a criminal offence, but I am trying to be pragmatic. The proposed new clause in Amendment 248B seeks to ensure that civil sanctions can be imposed for failure to comply with the duty to report suspected child sex offences. Sam Carling has met the NSPCC, the Lucy Faithfull Foundation and the Centre of Expertise on Child Sexual Abuse, which all want to see His Majesty’s Government criminalise the intentional concealment of abuse. He has also met a number of other organisations.
The NSPCC is deeply concerned that the professional sanctions proposed by the Government as the only consequence of non-compliance are not enough. While not wanting sanctions that would lead to a criminal record, it very much wants stronger civil sanctions, including potential fines. Based on these conversations, Sam’s amendment, which I have tabled, describes how civil sanctions would work based on Home Office fine-issuing powers in the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act.
The NSPCC said:
“The use of civil sanctions for failing to make a report under the mandatory duty is supported by the NSPCC. It is their belief that civil and professional sanctions strike the right balance between giving this duty the teeth it needs to ensure compliance, and also framing it as a tool meant to uplift and empower our child protection workforce and volunteers”.
The NSPCC feels strongly that the mandatory reporting duty should include reasonable suspicion as a trigger.
Further, two of the IICSA panel members, Sir Malcolm Evans and Ivor Frank, wrote to the Home Secretary on Friday urging her to change course on these issues. They are concerned that the only sanction proposed for the failure to report child sexual abuse under the duty in this Bill is a referral to the Disclosure and Barring Service. They said:
“This falls far below what was recommended. Many of the organisations which our report criticised for failing to safeguard children from abuse rely extensively on volunteers who are often not DBS checked or regulated … DBS referral is already a requirement for regulated activity providers when it comes to those believed to pose a risk to children, and it is a criminal offence to fail to do so. We are therefore calling on the Government to, at the very least, implement stronger civil sanctions for failure to comply with the duty”.
They reported no evidence of the “chilling effect” that would discourage people from wanting to work with children. It simply is not there. They go on to urge His Majesty’s Government to strengthen the duty in the Bill to better deliver on the promises they have repeatedly made to implement IICSA.
My final point is about Amendment 262, which is not in my name but in those of the noble Baronesses, Lady Walmsley and Lady Brinton. If they seek to divide the House, I would very strongly support their amendments as well. I beg to move.
Baroness Walmsley (LD)
My Lords, I apologise to the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, for missing the beginning of her speech on Amendment 240. However, I have checked with the clerk and I believe it is in order that I speak to my amendments in this group.
Since this is Report, I will not repeat the arguments I made on these and similar amendments in Committee. I will describe what each of my four amendments does and pray in aid not only the final report of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse but a letter, which I will quote from, that members of the board of IICSA wrote to the Home Secretary on Friday last. Having spent seven years hearing evidence about CSA and the reasons why it has been hidden, and having reported in 2022, they were very disappointed when this Bill was published, and even more disappointed when they heard the Minister’s rejection of the measures in these amendments in Committee.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I have signed my noble friend Lady Walmsley’s Amendments 246A, 248, 248A and 262 in this group. I will not repeat the points that she made in her important contribution, other than to say that it is very disappointing that this Government, and indeed the last Government, refused to implement the mandatory reporting recommendations from IICSA.
It is an unusual step for the board of an inquiry to write to the Home Secretary, as it did last Friday, to urge her to implement specific recommendations, but it did. My noble friend Lady Walmsley explained why this was important and why the Government’s worries are unfounded, given that the amendments from her and the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, echo the mandatory reporting rules in other countries, including Australia, where it works. I hope that the Minister will have a change of heart.
I heard some ministerial tutting when my noble friend Lady Walmsley was speaking, but she, the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, and the IICSA board all understand that these amendments cover proposals that are essential pillars to finding and stopping child sexual abuse. Without them, there is a real risk that what the Government are proposing will not work in practice.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, for bringing back her amendments, and I thank other noble Lords who have spoken to their amendments in this group. I recall that this topic prompted one of the more robust debates that we had in Committee, and I am grateful for the chance to touch on the key points again.
This group touches on the issue of child sexual exploitation. While the previous groups focused on creating specific offences for crimes against children, these amendments consider the failure to report sexual offences when they occur. As was our position in Committee, we are broadly supportive of the principles behind the noble Baroness’s amendments. I entirely understand her concern that criminal sanctions work as both an impetus for, and as a punishment for not, reporting child sexual abuse, and that the Bill, as currently drafted, does not underpin the duty with an offence.
Similarly, I see the logic in removing Clause 77(6), which removes the duty if the individual in question believes that another person will make a notification, and of Amendment 263, which would remove the “best interests” defence. I accept that this may be used as an excuse to turn a blind eye, which would render the new provision rather meaningless, but I also accept that there needs to be some leeway in reporting duties. Perhaps the Minister can touch on this when he speaks to Amendment 266.
Regrettably, I cannot accept the argument behind Amendments 240 and 242. While I accept that the duty of care lies with the local authority, it is the police forces that are tasked with intervening and arresting those committing child sexual offences. There are undoubtedly cases where it would be necessary to contact police forces first, and I do not think that restricting reporting to simply the local authority is wise.
I am grateful for my noble friend Lord Polak’s amendments, particularly those to Clause 84. Amendment 257 underscores the importance of clear and delineated settings in which these new provisions would be applicable. However, although this is important, I do not think it should be exhaustive. CSA takes place in all walks of life, unfortunately, and confining reporting it to categories risks removing the duty in other places.
My noble friend Lord Polak’s Amendment 264 goes past the current drafting of the Bill, which introduces an offence of preventing or deterring the reporting of child sexual abuse, and would create a new offence of intentionally concealing a child sexual offence. I support the intent behind my noble friend’s amendments and hope the Minister will be sympathetic.
I also support the intention of the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley. We should be guided by evidence, which the IICSA report provided, and that is why the last Conservative Government accepted its findings—a policy we still champion.
On the Minister’s Amendment 266, guidance is the correct and obvious next step. There are many nuances involved in this new provision, as we have heard throughout this debate, and accompanying it with thorough guidance would allow for requirements to be more clearly outlined. That being said, I hope the Minister will now confirm that the guidance will address the concerns raised today, particularly around exceptions to reporting requirements—that would benefit from further guidance from the Secretary of State.
Once again, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions and look forward to the Minister’s remarks.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to those who tabled amendments. The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, was absolutely right: there was ministerial tutting on this Front Bench when the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, said that the Government are looking at “How little can we do?” I refer the noble Baroness, for her interest, to the document we produced on 9 April 2025, which I have just looked up online. It has 87 paragraphs of cross-government action, in response to the Alexis Jay report, that the Government will take on this. I refer her to Clauses 77 to 86 of the Bill, which bring forward amendments. I do not wish to make a party-political point about the previous Government, but there is a point to register here: the Alexis Jay report was produced in October 2022, and this Government have not just brought these clauses before the House but, on 9 April 2025, produced an 87-point response to the legislation. So it is not about how little can we do but about how much we can do from a standing start on 4 July 2024.
Baroness Walmsley (LD)
My Lords, I am very sorry that the Minister has taken offence at my comments. I accept that this Government have brought forward legislation and taken a number of actions, but I am very much influenced by the disappointment of the IICSA board members. As my noble friend Lady Brinton said, it is very unusual that such people should write in the terms that they have to the Home Secretary. It is in those particular sections of their report they are very disappointed, and so am I. But I am sorry if the Minister was upset and offended by my comments; I never intend that.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful for the noble Baroness’s comments. I am not upset or offended; I just want to put the record straight. We are trying to deal with this issue, having been in office for just under 20 months. This Bill was produced some time ago, and we put in it a response that meets most of the IICSA recommendations to date. We produced a report on 9 April last year setting out the direction of travel. I am not upset personally; I just want to put this on the record. The noble Baroness cannot say that it is about how little we can do when we are trying to do as much as we possibly can.
On the letter which was mentioned, it was sent on Friday and has gone to the Home Office. I have not seen it myself yet. The noble Baroness may have a copy, and I am sure she will pass it to me in due course. I can see that the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, is itching to give me the letter, but I say to both noble Baronesses that we will respond to it in due course—the Home Secretary will assess its contents.
Lord Mann (Lab)
The Minister gave a commitment earlier, I believe, to read the letter from IICSA. I have not seen the letter, although, unlike anyone from the Home Office, I was one of the two MPs who attended the inquiry. In fact, I represented people for 30 days at the inquiry, so if there are recommendations from those who spent many hundreds of days with the experts on the detail of the inquiry, can I take it that the Minister and his team will read and give consideration to the implications in relation to these or any similar amendments to the legislation that might come from the logic, the conclusions and even the specificity of what IICSA is proposing?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
As I said to noble Lords who raised the issue, we will look at and respond to the letter from the IICSA members, but I have not seen it, I have not got it in front of me and I am not going to respond to it today, even if it is passed to me, because I have to have some collective discussion with colleagues about the points that are raised. I just say to my noble friend that what the Government have tried to do since 4 July 2025—again, I pray in aid the statement, if he has not looked at it, of 9 April 2025 —is to meet the objectives of IICSA as far as we can. We have met an awful lot of the objectives that have been set, and they are before the House in the legislation today.
Baroness Grey-Thompson (CB)
I apologise that the Minister has not seen the letter. If I had realised that he had not seen it, I would have made sure he did. I recognise that it is difficult for him to respond to a letter that he has not seen. Will the Minister make a commitment at the Dispatch Box that, if I do not move Amendment 248B, we will be able to have a discussion and I will be able to bring the amendment back at Third Reading, if we are not able to find a suitable route through?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I always try to be helpful, if I can. I do not want to have amendments at Third Reading, and therefore I cannot help the noble Baroness with that request. As I say, I have not seen the letter. It is in the ether of the Home Office system. It has arrived, so it will be acknowledged and responded to. But it was issued only on Friday, as the noble Baroness mentioned; to be fair to the Home Office, that is an issue that we will have to look at. Obviously, we will respond to that letter. I will make sure that both the noble Baronesses, Lady Walmsley and Lady Grey-Thompson, have the response, if appropriate, because they have raised it today. I will check with IICSA that it is happy for me to do so—that is important.
The further amendments in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Polak, and the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, and Amendment 248A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, also seek to supplement or remove the criminal offence of preventing a reporter carrying out their duty. Amendments 264 and 248A would provide for proposed thresholds that, again, I cannot accept. The proposed thresholds—when a person “suspects” abuse has taken place, even if that suspicion is poorly founded, the alleged offence never occurred or the relevant concealment actions had no actual effect—are far broader, and harder to justify or prosecute, than interference with a well-known statutory duty. The Government’s preferred model for this type of offence is narrowly targeted, purpose driven and clearly aligned.
On Amendment 265 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, on protection for reporters, the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 already provides a legal framework for protecting child abuse whistleblowers from dismissal, victimisation or other workplace detriments. Attempting to legislate against, for example, social shunning, reputational harm or informal exclusion would pose significant legal and practical problems.
This Government have progressed the recommendations on IICSA in a significant way since 4 July 2024 when we took office—the House may disagree; that is a matter for the House to take a view on. Beforehand, there was a significant gap of inactivity for a range of reasons that I will not talk about today. We have put potential measures in the Bill, and we have made, through a range of other measures to which I referred earlier, a significant amount of progress on these issues.
I accept that there may be issues that are still being pressed, but the progress that has been made is significant. Therefore, I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, to withdraw her amendment and I invite the House to support the government amendments I introduced earlier.
Baroness Grey-Thompson (CB)
My Lords, I thank everyone who has taken part in this short debate. I am glad that the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, was able to speak. She has worked extensively in this area for decades, and I have leant heavily on her expertise. The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, makes the strongest point on the unusual nature of a board writing to the Home Secretary. As I previously said, I am sorry that the Minister has not been able to see that. On page 1 of the letter, paragraph 2 says:
“we are deeply concerned that the mandatory reporting duty, as currently drafted in the Crime and Policing Bill, does not fully reflect our recommendation. In particular, there is: a lack of appropriate sanction for failure to report; an insufficient definition of who should be a mandated reporter; and a narrow trigger for the duty that does not include reasonable suspicion and recognised indicators of abuse”.
I go with the opinion of Sir Malcolm Evans and Ivor Frank and, as much as this Government have moved things on, they have not moved things on far enough. While I am happy not to press my Amendments 240 to 246, when it is called I will seek to divide the House on Amendment 248B.
Baroness Grey-Thompson
“Penalty for failure to uphold duty to report suspected child sex offences(1) The Secretary of State may give a person who acts contrary to section 77 (duty to report suspected child sex offences) a notice requiring them to pay a penalty of a specified amount not exceeding the prescribed maximum.(2) The Secretary of State must issue, and from time to time revise and re-issue, a code of practice specifying factors to be considered by them in determining the amount of a penalty imposed under this section, as well as factors which they will use to assess if the issuance of a penalty would be in the public interest.(3) A penalty notice must—(a) state why the Secretary of State thinks the person is liable to the penalty,(b) state the amount of the penalty,(c) specify a date, at least 28 days after the date specified in the notice as the date on which it is given, before which the penalty must be paid,(d) specify how the penalty must be paid,(e) explain how the person may make an appeal against the penalty, and(f) explain how the Secretary of State may enforce the penalty.(4) Any person in receipt of a penalty notice under this section may appeal to the county court on the ground that they are not liable to the imposition of a penalty because—(a) they are not required to comply with the duty to report child sex offences under section 77,(b) a relevant exemption from that section applies,(c) a report under the duty was made and therefore the penalty was issued in error, or(d) the amount of the penalty is too high.(5) The court may—(a) allow the appeal and cancel the penalty,(b) allow the appeal and reduce the penalty, or(c) dismiss the appeal.(6) An appeal shall be a re-hearing of the Secretary of State's decision to impose a penalty, and shall be determined having regard to— (a) the code of practice under this section that has effect at the time of the appeal, and(b) any other matters which the court thinks relevant (which may include matters of which the Secretary of State was unaware).(7) An appeal must be brought within 28 days of the date the notice was received by the person upon whom it was issued.(8) A penalty under this section is recoverable as if it were payable under an order of the county court. Where action is taken to recovery a penalty under this section, the penalty is to be treated for the purposes of section 98 of the Courts Act 2003 (register of judgments and orders etc) as if it were a judgment entered in the county court.(9) Money paid to the Secretary of State by way of penalty must be paid into the Consolidated Fund.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure that civil sanctions can be imposed for failure to comply with the duty to report suspected child sex offences.
Baroness Grey-Thompson (CB)
My Lords, I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Baroness Levitt
“ScheduleSexual offences against children under 16: consequential amendmentsFirearms Act 1968 (c.27)
1 (1) Paragraph 6 of Schedule 1 to the Firearms Act 1968 (offences to which section 17(2) applies) is amended as follows.(2) In paragraph (f), for “(3)(a) to (d)” substitute “(2)(a) to (d)”.(3) After paragraph (f) insert—“(fa) section 8A (rape of a child under 16);(fb) section 8B (assault of a child under 16 by penetration);(fc) section 8C (causing or inciting a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration), where the activity was caused;”.Internationally Protected Persons Act 1978 (c.17)
2 (1) Section 1(1A) of the Internationally Protected Persons Act 1978 (offences for purposes of section 1) is amended as follows.(2) In paragraph (e), for “(3)(a) to (d)” substitute “(2)(a) to (d)”.(3) After paragraph (e) insert—“(ea) an offence under section 8A or 8B of that Act;(eb) an offence under section 8C of that Act, where the activity involving penetration was caused;”.Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978 (c.26)
3 (1) Paragraph 9 of Schedule 1 to the Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978 is amended as follows.(2) In paragraph (d), for “(3)(a) to (d)” substitute “(2)(a) to (d)”.(3) After paragraph (d) insert—“(da) section 8A or 8B (rape of a child under 16; assault of a child under 16 by penetration);(db) section 8C (causing or inciting a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration), where the activity was caused;”.Criminal Justice Act 1982 (c. 48)
4 (1) Part 2 of Schedule 1 to the Criminal Justice Act 1982 (early release of prisoners: excluded offences) is amended as follows.(2) In the entry for section 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, for “(3)(a) to (d)” substitute “(2)(a) to (d)”.(3) After the entry for section 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 insert— “Section 8A (rape of a child under 16).Section 8B (assault of a child under 16 by penetration).Section 8C (causing or inciting a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration), where the activity was caused.”Children Act 1989 (c. 41)
5 In Schedule ZA1 to the Children Act 1989 (serious sexual offences for the purposes of section 10C), in paragraph 3 after paragraph (h) insert—“(ha) section 8A (rape of a child under 16);(hb) section 8B (assault of a child under 16 by penetration);(hc) section 8C (causing or inciting a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration);”.Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (c. 33)
6 (1) Section 25(2) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (offences to which bail restrictions apply) is amended as follows.(2) In paragraph (k), for “(3)(a) to (d)” substitute “(2)(a) to (d)”.(3) After paragraph (k) insert—“(ka) an offence under section 8A of that Act (rape of a child under 16);(kb) an offence under section 8B of that Act (assault of a child under 16 by penetration);(kc) an offence under section 8C of that Act (causing or inciting a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration), where the activity was caused;”.Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995 (c. 53)
7 In section 11(9) of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995 (definition of “rape”), for “or 5” substitute “, 5 or 8A”.Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 (c. 43)
8 In section 32ZAB(1) of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 (specified offences for purposes of section 32ZAA), after paragraph (f) insert—“(fa) an offence under section 8A of that Act (rape of a child under 16);”.Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44)
9 (1) The Criminal Justice Act 2003 is amended as follows.(2) In section 256AZBB(1) (specified offences for purposes of section 256AZBA), after paragraph (e) insert—“(ea) an offence under section 8A of that Act (rape of a child under 16);”.(3) In Schedule 4 (qualifying offences for purposes of section 62), after paragraph 16 insert—“Rape of a child under 16
16A An offence under section 8A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.Attempted rape of a child under 16
16B An offence under section 1 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 of attempting to commit an offence under section 8A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.Assault of a child under 16 by penetration
16C An offence under section 8B of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.Causing a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration
16D An offence under section 8C of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 where it is alleged that the activity was caused.” (4) In Schedule 5 (qualifying offences for purposes of Part 10) after paragraph 15 insert—“Rape of a child under 16
15A An offence under section 8A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.Attempted rape of a child under 16
15B An offence under section 1 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 of attempting to commit an offence under section 8A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.Assault of a child under 16 by penetration
15C An offence under section 8B of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.Causing a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration
15D An offence under section 8C of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 where it is alleged that the activity was caused.”(5) In Part 2 of Schedule 15 (specified sexual offences for purposes of sections 244ZA and 325) after paragraph 109 insert—“109A An offence under section 8A of that Act (rape of a child under 16).109B An offence under section 8B of that Act (assault of a child under 16 by penetration).109C An offence under section 8C of that Act (causing or inciting a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration).”(6) In paragraph 7 of Schedule 34A (child sex offences for purposes of section 327A), after paragraph (a) insert—“(aa) sections 8A to 8C of that Act (rape and other offences against children under 16);”.Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (c.12)
10 In section 116(8)(a) of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (offences constituting child sexual exploitation), after the entry for sections 5 to 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 insert—“sections 8A to 8C (rape and other offences against children under 16);”.Modern Slavery Act 2015 (c.30)
11 In paragraph 33 of Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (sexual offences to which defence in section 45 does not apply), after the entry for section 8 insert—“section 8A (rape of child under 16)section 8B (assault of child under 16 by penetration)section 8C (causing or inciting child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration)”.Sentencing Act 2020 (c. 17)
12 (1) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows.(2) In Part 1 of Schedule 14 (extended sentences: the earlier offence condition: offences), in the table in paragraph 9, after the entry for section 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 insert—
“(ga) Section 8A (rape of a child under 16) |
(gb) Section 8B (assault of a child under 16 by penetration) |
(gc) Section 8C (causing or inciting a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration)”. |
“(ga) section 8A (rape of a child under 16) | The date on which section 8A comes into force |
(gb) section 8B (assault of a child under 16 by penetration) | The date on which section 8B comes into force |
(gc) section 8C (causing or inciting a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration) | The date on which section 8C comes into force” |
“(fa) Section 8A (rape of a child under 16) |
(fb) Section 8B (assault of a child under 16 by penetration) |
(fc) Section 8C (causing or inciting a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration)”.” |
This new Schedule makes minor and consequential amendments in relation to my new clause (Sexual offences against children under 16) inserted after clause 73.
Baroness Levitt
“(ia) sections 8A to 8C (rape and other offences against children under 16);”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my new clause (Sexual offences against children under 16), inserted after clause 73.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment amends paragraph 2(d) so that it does not include offences under sections 66E and 66F of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (as only adults can be victims of those offences).
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment extends paragraph 7 of Schedule 10 to cover supervised activities.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment extends paragraph 8 of Schedule 10 to cover supervised activities.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment extends paragraph 14 of Schedule 10 to cover supervised activities.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment extends paragraph 17 of Schedule 10 to cover supervised activities.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment extends the definition of looking after a child on an individual basis, in paragraph 18 of Schedule 10, to cover supervised contact.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendments extending paragraphs of Schedule 10 to cover supervised activities.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendments extending paragraphs of Schedule 10 to cover supervised activities.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment defines “regular contact” for the purposes of Part 2 of Schedule 10.
Baroness Walmsley
“(6A) The sixth case is where P witnesses a child displaying sexualised, sexually harmful or other behaviour, physical signs of abuse or consequences of sexual abuse, such as pregnancy or a sexually transmitted disease, to an extent that would cause a reasonable person who engages in the same relevant activity as P to suspect that a child sex offence may have been committed. (6B) The seventh case is where P witnesses a person (A) behaving in the presence of a child in a way that would cause a reasonable person who engages in the same relevant activity as P to suspect that A may have committed a child sex offence.(6C) A failure to comply with the duty under section 72(1) is not an offence where the reason to suspect that a child sex offence may have been committed arises from subsection (6A) or subsection (6B).”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would implement part of recommendation 13 of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sex Abuse that there should be a duty to report where a person recognises the indicators of child sexual abuse. Failure to report in these instances would not attract a criminal sanction.
Baroness Walmsley (LD)
My Lords, in light of the unusual nature of the letter from two members of the board of IICSA to the Home Secretary, I intend to test the opinion of the House. I acknowledge that, when this Government came in, they said that they would agree to and try to implement all the recommendations of IICSA, and they have done a great deal, but I am afraid they have not done so on mandatory reporting. To show support for the amazing work done by the whole of the IICSA board, I would like to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“Guidance(1) The Secretary of State may issue guidance about the duty under section 77 to persons who engage in relevant activities.(2) Those persons must have regard to the guidance.(3) Before issuing guidance under this section, the Secretary of State must consult such persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.(4) The Secretary of State must publish any guidance issued under this section.(5) The Secretary of State may revise any guidance issued under this section.(6) Subsections (2) to (4) apply to revised guidance, except that subsection (3) does not apply if the Secretary of State considers that the revisions are not substantial.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause provides for the Secretary of State to issue guidance about the duty to report child sex abuse.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes the Secretary of State’s power to make regulations changing the persons to whom a notification under clause 77 is to be given.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes the Secretary of State’s power to make regulations adding further exceptions to the duty under clause 77.
“(c) Part 1 of Schedule 10 (child sex offences);(d) Part 2 of Schedule 10 (further relevant activities) so as to add or change an activity.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment limits the Secretary of State’s power to make regulations amending Part 2 of Schedule 10 so that it may only be used to add or change an activity (not remove one).
Baroness Levitt
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes a provision which requires the courts to dismiss certain actions in respect of personal injuries attributable to child sex abuse if there would be substantial prejudice to the defendant and it would not be equitable for the action to proceed.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, government Amendment 270 makes a change to Clause 87. In making this change, the Government are responding to the concerns raised by some of your Lordships in Committee.
Clause 87 itself is vital; it removes the current three-year limitation period for personal injury claims brought by victims and survivors of child sexual abuse in respect of the abuse committed against them and gives effect to a recommendation of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse. This is needed because many victims and survivors are not able to talk—or even think—about the abuse they suffered until many years afterwards, which is a direct consequence of the abuse itself.
Clause 87 inserts new Section 11ZB into the Limitation Act 1980 because it is that Act that makes provision for the dismissal of actions which are outside the time limit for personal injury claims. Under new Section 11ZB(2), if an action is brought outside the usual three-year limitation period, for it to be dismissed the defendant must satisfy the court that a fair hearing cannot take place. Under the current drafting of new Section 11ZB(3), the action may also be dismissed if the defendant demonstrates that allowing the action to proceed would cause them substantial prejudice.
We have listened carefully to the testimony of victims and survivors, and reflected on the amendments debated in Committee, all of which raised concerns about the substantial prejudice test. We decided that they were right. The retention of Section 11ZB(2) alone both implements the relevant IICSA recommendation and ensures that those accused of child sexual abuse maintain their right to a fair hearing. I am therefore pleased to say that Amendment 270 removes new Section 11ZB(3) from Clause 87.
Many have spoken about this, and I pay tribute to them all, but I make special mention of the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, and Mr Stephen Bernard, who brought this to our attention swiftly. Mr Bernard spoke to me most movingly about his own experiences, and I thank him for this; he has played a big part in ensuring that the Government reached this decision. I beg to move.
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)
My Lords, as I mentioned at Second Reading, I am very proud that with Clause 87 this Government abolished the time limitations in historical Church child sexual abuse cases. Survivors such as my friend Stephen Bernard, whom my noble friend the Minister referenced, were concerned that the clause, as originally drafted, added a new substantial prejudice, especially for historical cases. This created uncertainty, delays and an extra hurdle for survivors.
I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for listening to the concerns of survivors such as Stephen, and for tabling Amendment 270. With the removal of lines 31 to 39, the IICSA recommendation has now been adopted in full, thus ensuring better access to justice for the survivors of historical sexual abuse. I am very grateful to my noble friend.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I supported the amendment in Committee, and I echo the thanks given by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, to the Minister for listening. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies, who tabled the original amendment. This is a really important clarification, which will help victims and prevent injustices happening in the future.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I apologise for being a little late into the Chamber; things moved much more rapidly than I think any of us anticipated. I spoke about this issue at some length, I fear, at Second Reading, in setting out what I thought were the difficulties legally in this area. In Committee, I invited the Government to give their response to my various submissions, which were effectively that the law, as it existed, provided sufficient safeguards so that claimants could bring their claims much later than the three-year limitation period that applies to a personal injuries claim, provided that they satisfied the various criteria set out in Section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980.
I agree with the Minister that the clause as originally drafted ran the risk of generating further litigation—and I declare my interest in having been involved in a great deal of this kind of litigation over the years. I thought that would be a mistake. I am glad the substantial prejudice provision has been removed from the clause, because it gives some welcome clarity and should minimise the risk of there being further unnecessary litigation in which the precise meaning of the provisions is probed inevitably by one side or another.
This is not quite where I would have liked the law to be, because I think the law is satisfactory as it is. However, I think that I, or anybody else concerned in this area, would differ with the general aim, which is to make sure that those who, for very good reasons, have delayed bringing claims are sufficiently protected by the law and can invite the courts to take into account their delay. The risk that I was concerned about, which was adverted to in the well-known case of A v Hoare, was the real risk that it would be impossible for there to a be a fair trial in certain circumstances because of the lapse of time. Perhaps witnesses have disappeared, documents have gone missing, and then there are all the other factors that can make it impossible for a fair trial to take place.
Although this is not quite the result I would have preferred, I think I look forward to the Minister’s reassurance that the Government’s position will preserve those twin aims: to preserve a claimant’s right to bring claims, albeit late, if there is a good reason, but also to protect a defendant if, because of the lapse of time, it is impossible for there to be fair trial. I hope that she can reassure me that she thinks that this definition will preserve the observations made by the House of Lords in A v Hoare that there comes a time when it is simply too late to have a fair trial. A fair trial, of course, will concern a defendant who probably was not in any way responsible for the perpetration of any sexual abuse and, because of the operation of the doctrine of vicarious liability, was deemed to be responsible—such as a school or other institution—because I do not think anybody has any sympathy for the actual perpetrators, however late a claim may be brought.
It is my observation that it is not a wholly satisfactory situation, but I am grateful to the Government for at least removing some of the ambiguity that was in the original way that the clause was framed.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, this is a significant amendment which my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower, with the support of noble Lords from across your Lordships’ House, originally tabled as a probing amendment in Committee. The removal of new Section 11ZB(3) from the Bill is important. If it had remained in the Bill, it would have weakened the removal of limitation periods for civil claims arising from child sexual abuse, correctly introduced by the proceeding provision new Section 11ZA. By removing subsection (3), it is fair to say we send a clear message that the law recognises the particular trauma and complexity that so often characterises historic cases of child sexual abuse.
In Committee, we moved the amendment on the grounds that new Section 11ZB added uncertainty for survivors. Noble Lords from across the House raised concerns then, and have mentioned them today as well, that an additional hurdle could undermine the purpose of the reform and create ambiguity for claimants. I am therefore very pleased that the Minister has had a change of heart. I am tempted to explore further the reasons behind that, but for the time being, I thank her for the change of heart.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I thank all Members of your Lordships’ House who welcomed this government amendment. On the matters raised by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, sadly the courts are very used to dealing with non-recent cases of child sexual abuse and the issues of loss of evidence and loss of opportunity to present matters, and I am confident that the courts will be able to deal with that in a fair way. I am pleased to hear that there is overall support for the amendment. I thank again those who raised this with us in Committee, and I beg to move.
Baroness Levitt
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment creating a new offence of sharing semen-defaced images (see my amendment to Schedule 11, page 321, line 19).
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, it is an honour to be opening today’s debate on intimate image abuse. It gives me great pleasure to be able to say that, over the course of the passage of this Bill in your Lordships’ House, I have had a number of extremely helpful conversations on the subjects of pornography, child sexual abuse images, misogyny and a lot of other subjects which, while often distasteful, are important in the fight against violence against women and girls. We will cover some of those issues in this group and others in subsequent groups. I want to say, in relation to all of them, how grateful I am to those Members of your Lordships’ House who have taken the time to speak to me and work with me.
In the context of this group, I pay tribute to the noble Baronesses, Lady Owen, Lady Kidron, Lady Brinton and Lady Doocey, and the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Clement-Jones. A substantial part of my career as a lawyer has been spent in the fight against violence against women and children—not only girls—and I thought that I was pretty knowledgeable about it in the context of the criminal law, but I am more than happy to acknowledge that I have learned a great deal from those to whom I have spoken in the context of this Bill, and I pay particular tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Owen. On a number of occasions, I have changed my mind after speaking to them and I have no doubt that this is a better Bill as a result, and so I thank them.
As a result of what has been said in the debates and other conversations, the Government have tabled a collection of amendments that, taken together, create a package of further changes that strengthen the overall intimate image abuse regime already contained in the Bill. I hope that your Lordships will agree that they show that the Government are listening and acting.
I have already mentioned the noble Baroness, Lady Owen of Alderley Edge, but I also thank Professor Clare McGlynn; they have both worked hard to keep these issues at the top of the agenda. These amendments are also a tribute to the vital work of organisations such the Revenge Porn Helpline and Refuge and, of course, the victims and survivors themselves, who have taken the courageous and important step of reporting online abuse and raising awareness.
I have already said that I am proud of these amendments, but I am aware that, for some, they do not go far enough. I ask those who will speak to their amendments today to accept two things: that we are all on the same side about the harm that we are trying to prevent and that I am truly committed to trying to get this right. When I say that I cannot accede to something, there is a good reason for it, and I am not refusing to accept amendments for partisan reasons or simply out of stubbornness.
This landscape changes fast and usually not for the better, but there is a reason that we sometimes urge caution before creating new criminal offences and penalties. There can be real dangers in making piecemeal changes as soon as we are confronted by some new horrifying behaviour causing harm to so many victims. It is the responsibility of the Government to ensure that we do not legislate in haste and then come to regret it. If, in relation to some of these proposals, I ask that the Government are given time to gather more evidence and then consider the best way of going about preventing such behaviour, I ask your Lordships to accept that this comes from a good place—namely, wanting to make sure that any laws we pass capture the crimes we have in mind but do not have unanticipated consequences.
I turn to semen-defaced images. This is not a pleasant thing to discuss in polite society, but I need to make it clear what is meant by this, what the harm is and what we are doing in relation to it. What is meant by semen-defaced images are images of semen deposited on to another image, often a photograph and usually a photograph of a woman. It is disgraceful behaviour. It is designed to degrade and humiliate the woman in the picture, and we cannot tolerate this misogynistic behaviour in a civilised society. The noble Baroness, Lady Owen, persuaded me that we should make this a criminal offence and so we have done so. That is why the Government are bringing forward Amendments 271, 278, 279, 290 and 292 today. Together, they introduce a new offence of sharing a semen-defaced image of another person without consent.
This is the first step in stamping out this type of behaviour for good, but it is not the end. We are determined to tackle violence against women and girls in all its forms, and we want to ensure that the criminal law gets ahead of emerging harms. That is why we have announced in the VAWG strategy that we are launching a call for evidence better to understand online misogynistic, image-based abuse and the extent to which there are new harms and behaviour that may not be fully captured by existing criminal offences.
The issue of screenshotting was also raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen of Alderley Edge, at Second Reading and in Committee. Intimate images are personal and private. Consenting adults are of course free to share them and may do so in ways that are permanent or temporary. A person’s right to share their image temporarily in private must be respected, and if there is a violation of that right, it must be addressed. Government Amendments 281, 282, 283, 285, 286, 287, 288, 291, 293, 294 and 295, taken together, make it a criminal offence non-consensually to take a screenshot of, or copy in any way, an intimate image that the victim has shared only temporarily. This offence sits alongside, and mirrors wherever relevant, the other intimate image offences, and it sends a clear message to those who engage in this non-consensual behaviour that it is unacceptable and will be punished.
I briefly turn to the subject of takedown. I know that Amendment 275, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, will be debated later today in a separate group, but I will take a moment to mention the announcement made by the Prime Minister on 19 February. We will bring forward government Amendments at Third Reading in response to Amendment 275 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, to ensure that tech companies are legally required to have measures to take down reported non-consensual intimate image abuse within 48 hours to ensure that victims get rapid protection. It is important to refer to this now to demonstrate the Government’s action in this space as a whole. Where we have been able to, we have moved. I hope that your Lordships will bear that in mind as we progress through this debate.
I am also pleased to say that Amendments 296 and 456 designate new offences in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to criminalise creating and requesting purported deepfake, non-consensual intimate images as priority offences under the Online Safety Act. As many of your Lordships will know, this means that platforms will face the stronger duties that apply to the most serious illegal content. They will be required to assess specifically the risks of the service being used to facilitate this offence; to mitigate and manage the risk of the service being used to commit the offence; to take proactive steps to prevent users encountering such content; and to minimise the time that such content is present on their platform. There has been understandable public concern over the creation and dissemination of non-consensual sexual deepfakes on X, and the Government have been clear that no woman or child should live in fear of having their image sexually manipulated. These amendments help put that principle into practice.
Finally, Amendment 455 makes a small minor and technical change in respect of the taking and installing offences in the Bill, and I can provide further details if any of your Lordships would like them. I beg to move.
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 273, 274, 275, 276, 284 and 296A in my name and the names of the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Pannick, the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. In doing so, I declare an interest as I have received pro bono legal advice from Mishcon de Reya on image-based sexual abuse. I will also speak to government Amendments 278, 281 and 296. I want to place on record my support for Amendment 277 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey.
I thank the Minister for her determination to make progress on this issue. We have made huge strides since Committee, and I am very grateful. I also thank the survivors and campaigners who have fought for so long for these changes.
Amendment 273 seeks to ensure that in relation to abusers who are convicted of an intimate image abuse offence the court must,
“order the destruction of any content used to commit the offence on any device or data store containing”
it, and that prosecutors,
“lodge a deletion verification report within 28 days”.
While I acknowledge that the Government have updated the law to clarify that this content should be seen as being used to commit the offence under Section 153 of the Sentencing Act 2020, this does not offer victims any guarantee of the total destruction of the content used to commit the crime.
One survivor, Daria, whose convicted abuser was allowed to keep the content of her, said, “The weapons with which he caused life-shattering harm remain in his arsenal. Despite the severity of the crimes, as reflected in the sentences handed down by the Crown Court, I remain at his mercy with regard to whether he chooses to violate me again in the same way”. Daria is not alone in her experience. Shanti Das, a journalist who undertook research on this and published in February 2025, found that of the 98 image-based abuse offences prosecuted in magistrates’ courts in England and Wales in the preceding six months, only three resulted in deprivation orders. It is quite simply appalling. Survivors of this abuse deserve better. On this amendment, I will test the opinion of the House.
Amendments 274 and 276 mandate the Secretary of State to bring forward regulations to create a centralised statutory hash registry and mandate hash sharing. The Revenge Porn Helpline currently runs the voluntary register called StopNCII.org and has confirmed that it would be willing to run the centralised registry. The Revenge Porn Helpline does incredible work supporting victims of intimate image abuse and has a 90% success rate on the removal of content. However, 10% of the content is on non-compliant sites.
The amendment seeks to tackle non-compliance by allowing the Revenge Porn Helpline to co-ordinate with internet service providers to mandate the blocking of verified NCII content in cases of non-compliance, thus avoiding the long and bureaucratic process of obtaining business disruption measures under Ofcom that are of little comfort to victims whose image remains online. One victim, Jane, stated that,
“the platform’s slow and inconsistent enforcement left me feeling trapped in a relentless cycle, where the harm snowballed with every hour the abusive content stayed up. Constantly monitoring the internet, reporting the same material, and watching it reappear has taken a huge mental toll”.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 277, which would create a specific criminal offence of secretly filming someone without their consent for sexual gratification or in order to humiliate or distress them. In addition, it would make profiting from such footage a serious aggravating factor for sentencing, bringing clarity to a legal grey area and aligning the law with the reality of abuse in the digital age.
This amendment follows a BBC investigation which exposed the widespread practice of men covertly filming women on nights out and then monetising the footage on online platforms. The BBC identified over 65 channels across YouTube, TikTok, Facebook and Instagram posting this content. The material is being filmed in major cities worldwide, including London, and Manchester is a hotspot, with creators travelling from abroad specifically to capture surreptitious low-angle shots of fully closed women in dresses and skirts as they walk along the street. These are then uploaded as so-called “walking tours” or “nightlife content”. These posts have racked up more than 3 billion views in the last three years, with a single video generating up to £5,000 in revenue from ads and sponsorship.
Women and girls deserve to move freely in public without fearing that their bodies will be splashed across the internet without their consent. The problem is that existing voyeurism offences turn on narrow definitions of nudity and privacy. We welcome the Bill’s focus on non-consensual intimate image abuse and support the Government’s amendments and those tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Owen and Lady Bertin. However, these are confined to images of subjects in an intimate state. Fully clothed people generally fall outside this definition, even when filmed for sexual kicks.
Amendment 277 instead focuses on the degrading and predatory intent, which is where much of the harm lies. It centres on the victim’s humiliation and objectification, rather than on narrow definitions of body parts, clothing or location. It follows Law Commission advice to expand voyeurism legislation to non-private settings, based on intent. This amendment is carefully targeted at those with malign motivations.
In 2024, Greater Manchester Police made an arrest for this practice. However, no further action could be taken due to what the force described as “limitations in current legislation”. Harassment and stalking laws fail because they require a proven course of conduct. Abusers know that this behaviour is not currently captured by law and are exploiting this loophole. Without action, predators will continue to see this as a risk-free way of making easy money.
My honourable friend Wera Hobhouse MP has tabled a Private Member’s Bill on this issue. I echo her calls to compel platforms to remove such content. The Angiolini Inquiry recently warned that sexually motivated crimes against women in public are still not sufficiently prioritised. That is why I urge the Minister to give my amendment the serious consideration that it deserves. We need concrete action, not more rhetoric.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, this group covers a range of human conduct, from the objectionable to the disgusting. I thank the Minister for tabling a series of amendments which will benefit women and society at large. I particularly thank the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, for all the work that she has done, which has led us to this position, and for the amendments that she has tabled. I am sure that the whole House is very grateful to her.
I will speak specifically to Amendment 273, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, to which I have added my name. I understand that the noble Baroness may, if the Minister does not accept the amendment, wish to test the opinion of the House. This amendment simply seeks to impose a duty on a court to make a deprivation and deletion order where a person is convicted of an offence involving sharing or threatening to share intimate images without the consent of the victim.
The argument in favour of this amendment is very simple. It is necessary to give comfort to the victim who knows that the perpetrator has created or distributed the intimate images without consent. Unless there is a duty to destroy this content, the victim is inevitably going to remain extremely concerned that the content will remain in circulation and in existence.
That is the first argument. The second argument is that I can think of no justification whatever why the culprit should retain such intimate images when they have been convicted of being a wrongdoer in this respect. Those two points make this amendment unanswerable, and I strongly support it.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group—the government amendments, those in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, and the other amendment that was tabled. It was such an excellent speech, with such detail, that I do not want to go over the specifics, except to say that the noble Baroness is our leader and we will follow her through the Lobby.
I want to make one point, regarding the fantastic list of what is in the gap between what Ofcom can do and what Parliament can do. We should hesitate on that thought. Having looked a little this afternoon at the Government’s consultation, I see that there is almost nothing about what Ofcom cannot do, almost nothing about enforcement and, as I explained earlier, almost nothing about risk assessment. What happens beforehand, to prevent all this? What happens after it has all happened and we start to get enforcement? We cannot keep playing around in the middle. We have to go upstream, to the beginning, and we have to come to the end and get these things categorically dealt with in a way that interferes with business and makes it unacceptable to do it. With that, I will be supporting the noble Baroness.
Baroness Shawcross-Wolfson (Con)
My Lords, I pay tribute to my noble friend Lady Owen of Alderley Edge for the tenacity and expertise that she has brought to this issue. I acknowledge how far the Government have moved in response to her work and thank the Minister for her work and that of her department on this issue and willingness to listen. We now have a large number of government amendments to address concerns across take-down, screenshotting and semen issues. There has been huge progress. However, I support all my noble friend’s amendments and will speak very briefly to two of them.
Amendment 273 is, as we have heard, needed to ensure that those who perpetrate intimate image abuse are not allowed to keep the images. As it stands, it is extraordinary that perpetrators can leave court with intimate images of their victims still in their possession in some form. That cannot be allowed to continue. I hope that noble Lords from across the whole House will support my noble friend if we need a Division on this.
On the take-down service, I gently press the Government, as my noble friend has set out, on how their approach will deliver the protection for victims that her Amendments 274 and 276 would. The Prime Minister promised the public “one and done”, as we have heard: once an abusive image is identified, it should come down from all platforms permanently. That is the right promise. However, as my noble friend has set out, it is not clear that the Government’s proposal will deliver on that promise. Without a centralised comprehensive register, I do not see how it can be delivered. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response on this point.
The Government’s amendments reflect genuine and welcome progress on these issues. I very much hope that the Minister can take the final steps that are needed today.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, for her tenacity and the way in which she has consistently spoken up for the victims.
I will speak briefly to Amendments 273 and 274. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in his usual reassuringly expensive way, managed to pinpoint what this amendment is about. In effect, it would give courts an undertaking that they have a duty to see that the images that somebody has been convicted for taking and disseminating are destroyed. That seems unarguable. I hope that the Minister, with all her experience, can demonstrate why that should not be the case, because for almost everybody in the Chamber it seems to be a no-brainer.
In Amendment 274, we are revisiting some of the discussions that we had in Committee and on Report during the passage of the Online Safety Bill on the difficulty that victims have in being left to their own devices to deal with this, platform by platform, because each platform deals—or does not deal—with complaints in a different way. To have the indignity of having had something unmentionable done to you, which could happen on more than one platform, and then to have to individually pursue each platform and find that each platform has a different way of dealing with it and different hoops to go through, is piling injury upon insult.
We argued as well as we could during the passage of what became the Act that there should be much more thought given to the experience of victims as they try to confront what has happened to them and bring the organisations that have inflicted it on them, or enabled it, to book.
The way in which it has currently emerged from the Act and the way in which victims are still experiencing this huge variability and inconsistency is clearly an injustice, and I hope the Government will recognise that. Even if they are not ready and able to do something about it this evening, we would be most grateful for an undertaking that they will look at this very carefully and come back with something that the noble Baroness and the rest of us might find acceptable.
Lord Mann (Lab)
My Lords, I find it hard to comprehend any reason why anybody on the Labour Benches could possibly contemplate not voting for these amendments. On Amendment 273, if the argument is, “Oh, leave it with us”, that is not convincing. The Labour Party has some problems with young women voters and problems with women voters; it has problems with all voters actually at the moment. There has to be more than “Leave it with us” as a response.
I say to male Labour Party members—I am speaking to the Labour Party, but I want to emphasise the point —that I have no intention of going back to my daughters and granddaughters without this, or something equivalent or better, going through. If the Labour Party thinks that it can stop that, it is a moment of some crisis.
That is not necessarily what I am hearing from the Minister’s opening remarks, but I have no intention of doing anything that would stop this, in this form or a better one, becoming law. I think I once met the Minister in her former life, but I have not had the pleasure of meeting her since she has been a Minister here. I found it refreshing that she had already made a number of—“concessions” is the wrong word—discussed and thought-through changes, having been prepared to listen. I thought that was refreshing; we are not hearing or seeing enough of Ministers who are prepared to do that. It is a weakness in all Governments in recent times, so it is very refreshing.
I hope to hear how we are going to accept these changes, because there is not a case to answer, in relation to Amendment 273, that this should be stopped. I am looking forward to a continuity of the very welcome approach, which will make my remarks totally redundant by showing that there is a new spirit emerging in how we work to get the best possible legislation that we can all be proud of.
Lord Berkeley of Knighton (CB)
My Lords, I will add just one small point, and in doing so congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, who I regard as a friend. It is a great thing that these amendments are not gender specific, by which I mean that men have also been targeted in this way. I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm that what she intends would cover people of both sexes if they are the victims of this horrible exposure.
We all know how difficult it is to change something that has been said, or an image. Therefore, anything in the law that helps us to take down things that are offensive or, as the noble Lord said, disgusting, is welcome. These things very often just lodge in the mind; that is why it is so psychologically damaging to think, “Somebody has seen this and now it is so difficult to take it down”. So I completely support these amendments.
Baroness Bertin (Con)
My Lords, I also completely support these amendments, noble Lords will be unsurprised to hear. I have just a couple of points, because so many have been made very well already. I can feel the exhaustion of victims, still, in all this. The idea that you have to chase around all the different websites and service providers, and take it on trust, is just not acceptable: no way.
The Government have to be really careful when they make big announcements that get a lot of coverage like “One and done” or “A nudification tech ban is done”, which we will come on to later, because that leaves victims with a false sense of hope because, if we discover that that is not the case, that is just not good.
But obviously I want to thank the Minister for listening; that was a powerful point that was made before. I certainly will be backing these amendments.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I rise very briefly—I hope as briefly as other noble Lords—to, first, thank the Government for the movement that they have made in tabling their amendments. Secondly, I support my noble friend Lady Doocey with her Amendment 277, which would extend the aspect of voyeurism. Thirdly, and in particular, I support the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, nearly all of which I have co-signed, which address the devastating viral nature of non-consensual intimate image abuse, on which she has so effectively campaigned. Her amendments seek, I believe very effectively, to close the gaps that leave victims traumatised by the repeated uploading of their abuse.
In Committee, the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, resisted the call from the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, for a statutory NCII hash register, arguing that it would lead to duplication of work already being done voluntarily by organisations such as the Revenge Porn Helpline and tech platforms. But voluntary compliance is not a systemic solution. CSAM is tackled systematically because it is mandated. NCII victims deserve the exact same proactive statutory infrastructure to prevent cross-posting and reuploads.
The Minister also resisted the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, which sought strict deletion orders, claiming that existing deprivation orders were sufficient. Yet research shows that only a tiny fraction of intimate image prosecutions result in deprivation orders, leaving abusers with copies of the images in their cloud accounts. I thought the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, explained exactly why we need the new orders very clearly.
In Committee, the Minister dismissed the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, which sought to tackle the degrading practice of semen images, claiming that the drafting was too broad and might inadvertently criminalise a woman fully clothed at a hen night posing with a novelty item. I very much welcome the change of heart by the Minister, the Home Office and the MoJ in that respect.
We are talking about the targeted sick degradation of women’s images online and the law must adapt to protect women from this rapidly growing form of abuse. I believe that when a conviction is secured, the court must have the power to order the destruction of images and the disclosure of passwords. Without this, the victim lives in perpetual fear of reupload.
I believe that the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, has made a very strong case for her amendments, which make substantial improvements to the government proposals. I welcome the government proposals, but I believe they could go further.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to what has been an important and, at times, deeply sobering debate. I place on record my sincere thanks to my noble friend Lady Owen, who has been tireless in campaigning on these issues inside and outside this House. In Committee, noble Lords from across the House recognised not only the seriousness of the harm caused by non-consensual intimate images but the persistence and expertise she has brought to improving the law in this area. That work has already borne fruit in previous legislation, and it continues to shape the debate constructively here.
It is also pleasing to hear the Government agreeing with much of what my noble friend Lady Owen has said. The Prime Minister made absolutely no mention of her work when he announced the 48-hour takedown policy, and we all know that that success lies with her, so I am pleased the Minister has rectified that today. My noble friend has also highlighted an inconsistency in the Government’s position. If they are to enact the 48-hour takedown policy, they will need to establish a central hash register, given the gap between what Ofcom is able to do and what would be required to enact the Prime Minister’s announcement.
These proposals relating to hashing and the establishment of a statutory non-consensual intimate image register build on existing voluntary initiatives, including work undertaken by the Revenge Porn Helpline. In Committee, there was recognition across the House that hashing technology has already proven effective in tackling child sexual abuse material and that extending similar mechanisms to adult victims of intimate image abuse merits serious consideration. But, more than that, they are essential to enacting the Government’s own recently announced policy.
The proposal to require deprivation and deletion orders following conviction is, surely, the logical conclusion of the existence of the offence. If it is an offence for these images to be made and shared, then a court should require their deletion.
The amendments concerning screenshotting, copying of temporarily shared images, and the creation or distribution of degrading material are also rooted in the lived experience of many individuals, particularly young women and girls. Technology has outpaced the assumptions underpinning older offences. As my noble friend has argued, consent given for a time-limited viewing is not consent to permanent capture, nor should the law allow perpetrators to evade liability through technical loopholes.
Finally, on Amendment 277, we are supportive of the proposed expansion of the voyeurism offence to include where a person records non-consensual images of a person with the intent of obtaining sexual gratification. It is appalling that people can film others without their knowledge and consent and use those images for their own nefarious purposes.
I also thank the Government for their welcome engagement with my noble friend on these matters. It has been clear, both in Committee and since the Ministers met with my noble friend and other stakeholders, that there has been constructive cross-party dialogue. This is reflected in the numerous amendments they have tabled in this group to similar effect. That spirit of collaboration is to be commended. These issues, which concern dignity, privacy, exploitation, and protection from abuse, should never be partisan. I am therefore grateful for what has been achieved up to this point.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, the people-pleaser in me would love to be able to say, “Oh, go on then— I will accept them all and make everybody happy”, but I am afraid there are some good reasons why I cannot accept some of these amendments. I am going to try to respond to them all as briefly as possible, in the hope of explaining why the Government do not consider these amendments necessary in some cases, and do not consider it desirable for them to be done through the unwieldy mechanism of primary legislation in others.
I start with Amendment 273 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, on deletion orders. I say at the outset that the Government of course recognise the harm caused by those who retain copies of intimate images, and we want to ensure that the legal framework protects victims. We agree that it is a no-brainer about the principle, but, for reasons I will come to in a moment, it is not as simple to enact as it might seem.
The noble Baroness has correctly identified that there is a difference between depriving offenders of devices that have been used, and actually getting rid of—deleting—the images themselves. If there is an issue about insufficient judges making deprivation orders for devices, then we must tackle that. This amendment is not the solution to that. Indeed, if she is right that judges are proving to be reluctant, there is a risk that, even if this deletion order provision came into force, they might be reluctant to do that as well. That is not the way to tackle judges not making the orders.
We must make sure that what we do is workable. Verified deletion is highly complex in practice. There are a number of challenges concerning, for example, images stored in the cloud. The noble Baroness’s amendment is very short on the practical measures that would be needed to make it effective, such as how the verification is to be carried out, what the penalty would be for an offender who refuses to comply with an order to provide the password, or what happens during the appeal period. For example, in the Crown Court, defendants have 28 days following conviction to lodge grounds for appeal. These are all significant drafting issues that present problems with the amendment as tabled by the noble Baroness, so we need to give this further thought.
As I said to the noble Baroness in Committee and during our recent meetings, we are already amending deprivation orders so that they can be applied to seize intimate images and any devices containing those images, regardless of whether the device was used in the offence itself.
One of the issues which concerns us is that only a fraction of the victims of intimate images go through the criminal justice system. Many victims do not want to go anywhere near a criminal court, so we want to look at the available remedies in the civil courts in order to ensure that these, too, will offer meaningful redress for victims.
But anything we do needs to be comprehensive and in a package that works well together, ensuring removal of these images as quickly as possible. That is why I am pleased to announce today that we intend to review the available court order protection for victims of intimate image abuse across civil and criminal courts. The review is going to include routes for deletion to ensure that it is fit for purpose, that it identifies necessary improvements and that it has attached to it all the consequential provisions that are needed to make sure that it is actually effective.
This is not an attempt by the Government to kick the can down the road. We want to get it right, and we want it to have material value. We do not want to create something that does not work so judges do not use it. But we do not think a court order available in the criminal court addresses this problem as a whole, and that is why we need to take time to think more comprehensively about a tailored solution, working for victims and for criminal justice partners. The noble Baroness, Lady Owen, Professor McGlynn and I have discussed this, and I hope that the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment today in the light of that announcement.
Lord Pannick (CB)
I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way. The amendment, as she understands, imposes a duty on judges. Therefore, there is no question of a judge deciding not to use it. More substantially, I am very concerned about the delay that will result if the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, does not move her amendment. Surely, the proper way to deal with this is for the Government to accept the amendment, and, if they will not, for the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, to move it. If the Government wish, as they are perfectly entitled to, to add or to subtract, they can do so at Third Reading or, perhaps more realistically, in the other place. They will have plenty of time to do that; let us get on today and put this into law.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I will say two things in response to the noble Lord. The first is that the criminal courts tend not to be very keen on provisions that they regard as complex when they come at the end of a sentencing hearing. They tend to react by saying, “We’re going to leave this to be dealt with through some other mechanism because it’s too complicated. We can’t work out how to verify it”—the sorts of objections that occasionally are made in relation to, for example, very complicated compensation orders or confiscation orders. The second point is that there is, as I have already said, a real risk in piecemeal legislation that you bring in provisions for one court that then do not work in the read-across from the civil courts. On the civil courts, we cannot do that today.
We need to do this quickly, and we absolutely recognise this. After all, there is no point in saying that we take this stuff seriously and then saying that we are not going to do anything about getting rid of the images. It is illogical, apart from anything else, as well as perhaps not being very moral either. I ask the noble Baroness to accept the sincerity of what we say. That is as far as I can go today.
I turn now to Amendment 274, again in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Owen. I understand and agree with what she is trying to achieve. The only issue between us is whether this is the right way to do it. Ofcom has already consulted on additional safety measures for its illegal content codes of practice. These proposed measures explicitly include the use of perceptual hash-matching technology to detect and remove non-consensual intimate imagery, including deepfakes.
To be deemed compliant with their Online Safety Act duties by following the codes, services would need to deploy this technology automatically to identify and remove such content, providing victims with reassurance that their images are being removed swiftly. Given the urgent need to strengthen protection in this area, Ofcom announced on 19 February that it is accelerating timelines and will publish its final decision on these proposals on the use of hash matching in May, with measures expected to come into effect by the summer.
We consider that the work of Ofcom meets the aims of the noble Baroness’s amendment. The protection that she seeks will be delivered promptly and robustly through Ofcom’s forthcoming codes of practice. It is an area where unnecessarily imposing duties in statute, especially where work is already in progress, could have the adverse effect of restricting the flexibility of this work should it need to respond and change to the ever-changing online landscape in the future.
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
The Prime Minister launched his strategy for tackling non-compliance by saying that it would be a “one and done” system. Does the Minister acknowledge that the Ofcom system is not a “one and done” system? It is dependent on a series of factors, including whether all service providers choose to adopt third-party hashing. If they choose to operate their own hash database where they do not share the hashes, it is not a “one and done” system. I would really like to tidy up the confusion here between whether the Prime Minister is right or what is being said here is correct.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
The Prime Minister is right. The difference between us is what we understand by the system. The Government’s position is that the Ofcom system will achieve what the Prime Minister said he wanted to achieve. That is the difference between the noble Baroness and me. I am not sure that I can go any further than that this evening.
I turn now to Amendment 276, once again in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, on the NCII register. The Government recognise the vital work undertaken by the Revenge Porn Helpline, including operating a database of existing hashes of non-consensual intimate images that are shared with participating companies to detect and remove the images online. We recognise the benefits that a register of verified NCII content would provide, including the important role that it could play in supporting victims in the removal of the content.
This is one of those instances where the issue between us is whether it is necessary or desirable to put it on a statutory footing. The Government’s position is that it is not a necessity for its success and needs very careful consideration, especially to ensure that an NCII register aligns with the process taken by the Internet Watch Foundation’s register for child sexual abuse imagery, which operates successfully and has never been on a statutory footing, and to avoid any unintended consequences. For this reason, I confirm that the Government are committing to undertake a preliminary evaluation to determine the operational needs and impact of establishing a successful central register for non-consensual intimate image abuse.
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
I think it is important to clarify for the sake of the House that, with regard to the Internet Watch Foundation’s CSAM register, CSAM is illegal in and of itself. NCII—non-consensual intimate image—material is not illegal in and of itself. Therefore, a voluntary system will not work. It needs to be on a statutory footing.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I do not think anyone is suggesting that it should be voluntary. It is simply whether it should be established through primary legislation or regulation. I used the expression earlier about the unwieldiness of primary legislation. After all, one of the problems with legislating through primary legislation is that, if you get it wrong, you have to try to amend it or repeal it, whereas if you have regulations, particularly backed up by enforcement powers, it is a much nimbler way of going about things. That is the issue between us.
The evaluation will also assess critical considerations that are still outstanding, including the effect that such a registry has on intermediary liability and what is needed to establish robust verification procedures. The findings will be used to guide next steps to ensure that any options are sustainable and effective and work alongside existing regulation for platforms.
Turning again to semen-defaced images and Amendments 284 and 296A, also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, as I said when opening this group, the Government agree with her that semen imagery is disgusting behaviour. That is exactly why we have brought forward our own amendments to criminalise the sharing of a semen-defaced image without consent. The inclusion of
“semen … on any part of their body”,
as in the noble Baroness’s amendment, is unnecessary, because such images would already fall within the scope of the intimate image offences. To answer her question directly, I can confirm that the example she gave will, and should, already be covered by the existing legislation. The noble Baroness asked whether we can, in effect, require the CPS to amend its guidance to make it clearer. The CPS is, of course, an independent organisation—constitutionally, importantly so—but we can certainly look at asking the CPS whether it would be prepared to do so.
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)
My Lords, before my noble friend sits down, I am sure the whole House agrees with, in essence, what Amendment 273 says, but I also noted from my noble friend that it is much more complex than I had understood. I am sure that she is as frustrated as everyone else that these things take time, and I wonder whether she is able to give us any timeline. Sorry, I am an optimist, but this is an extremely important amendment. I will be supporting the Government, but it would be good to know if we are talking about months or whatever, because obviously we want to see this in statute as soon as possible.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I do not think I can quite express how unpopular I would be if I suddenly, on the hoof, came out with a time. All I can say is that we are committed to doing this quickly.
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
My Lords, before the Minister sits down, I emphasise that we have talked about drafting issues on Amendment 273. Obviously, I do not want to delay proceedings, but I remind the House that I first brought up forced deletion in September 2024, so the issue has been before the House now for about 17 months. It was in the Data (Use and Access) Bill in December 2024, when the Minister said, “There’s no problem here because it should be seen under Section 153 of the Sentencing Act 2020”. This is not working, and the only answer really is to deal with the matter tonight.
Baroness Levitt
“Purported intimate image generators(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as follows.(2) After section 66H insert— “66I Making or supplying purported intimate image generators(1) A person commits an offence if the person—(a) makes or adapts a thing, or(b) supplies or offers to supply a thing,for use as a generator of purported intimate images.(2) A “generator of purported intimate images” is a thing for creating, or facilitating the creation of, purported intimate images of a person.(3) A person makes, adapts, supplies, or offers to supply a thing for use as a generator of purported intimate images if a reasonable person (having regard to all the circumstances) would consider that they do so.(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that they took all reasonable steps to prevent the thing being used for creating, or facilitating the creation of, purported intimate images of a person without the person’s consent.(5) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years or a fine (or both).(6) Section 72(1) applies in relation to an act which, if done in England and Wales, would constitute an offence under this section as if references to a United Kingdom national included—(a) a body incorporated under the law of any part of the United Kingdom, or(b) an unincorporated association formed under the law of any part of the United Kingdom.(7) In this section—“purported intimate image” of a person, and references to creating a purported intimate image of a person, have the same meaning as in section 66E;“thing” includes a program, information in electronic form and a service.66J Section 66I: further defences(1) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 66I to prove that the person did the act which constituted the offence for the purposes of the prevention, detection or investigation of crime, or for the purposes of criminal proceedings, in any part of the world.(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 66I to prove that the person—(a) was a member of the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service or GCHQ (a “security body”), and(b) did the act which constituted the offence for the purposes of the exercise of any function of the security body.(3) “GCHQ” has the meaning given by section 3 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994.(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 66I to prove that the person—(a) was a member of OFCOM, was employed or engaged by OFCOM, or assisted OFCOM in the exercise of any of its online safety functions, and(b) did the act which constituted the offence for the purposes of OFCOM’s exercise of any of its online safety functions.(5) In subsection (4)—(a) “OFCOM” means the Office of Communications; (b) a reference to OFCOM’s “online safety functions” has the meaning given by section 235 of the Online Safety Act 2023.66K Section 66I: application to internet service providers(1) An internet service provider does not commit an offence under section 66I by—(a) providing access to a communication network, or(b) transmitting, in a communication network, information provided by a user, if the provider does not—(i) initiate the transmission,(ii) select the recipient of the transmission, or(iii) select or modify the information contained in the transmission.(2) The references in subsection (1) to providing access to, or transmitting information in, a communication network include storing the information transmitted so far as the storage—(a) is automatic, intermediate and transient,(b) is solely for the purpose of carrying out the transmission in the network, and(c) is for no longer than is reasonably necessary for the transmission.(3) An internet service provider does not commit an offence under section 66I by storing information provided by a user for transmission in a communication network if—(a) the storage of the information—(i) is automatic, intermediate and temporary, and(ii) is solely for the purpose of making more efficient the onward transmission of the information to other users at their request, and(b) the internet service provider—(i) does not modify the information,(ii) complies with any conditions attached to having access to the information, and(iii) on knowing of a matter within subsection (4), promptly removes the information or disables access to it.(4) The matters within this subsection are that—(a) the information at the initial source of the transmission has been removed from the network,(b) access to it has been disabled, or(c) a court or administrative authority has ordered the removal from the network of, or the disablement of access to, the information.(5) An internet service provider does not commit an offence under section 66I by storing information provided by a user who is not acting under the authority or control of the provider if—(a) when the information was provided the provider did not know that it was, or contained, a generator of purported intimate images, and(b) on knowing that the information was, or contained, a generator of purported intimate images, the provider promptly removed the information or disabled access to it.(6) In this section—“generator of purported intimate images” has the same meaning as in section 66I;“internet service provider” means a provider of—(a) a service that is made available by means of the internet, or(b) a service that provides access to the internet; “user”, in relation to an internet service provider, means a user of a service provided by the internet service provider.66L Liability for offence under section 66I committed by bodies(1) This section applies where an offence under section 66I is committed by a body.(2) If the offence is committed with the consent or connivance of—(a) a relevant person in relation to the body, or(b) a person purporting to act in the capacity of a relevant person in relation to the body,the person (as well as the body) commits the offence and is liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.(3) In this section—“body” means a body corporate, a partnership or an unincorporated association other than a partnership;“relevant person” , in relation to a body, means—(a) in the case of a body corporate other than one whose affairs are managed by its members, a director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body;(b) in the case of a limited liability partnership or other body corporate whose affairs are managed by its members, a member who exercises functions of management with respect to it;(c) in the case of a limited partnership, a general partner (within the meaning given by section 3 of the Limited Partnerships Act 1907);(d) in the case of any other partnership, a partner;(e) in the case of an unincorporated association other than a partnership, a person who exercises functions of management with respect to it.”(3) In section 79(5) (meaning of references to image of a person), for “and 66G” substitute “, 66G and 66I”.(4) In paragraph 1 of Schedule 2 (sexual offences for purposes of section 72), after paragraph (c) insert—“(ca) an offence under section 66I;”.(5) In Schedule 3 (sexual offences for purposes of Part 2), after paragraph 33B insert—“33C An offence under section 66I of this Act (purported intimate image generators), if the offender is sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.””Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause creates offences of making, adapting, supplying or offering to supply a generator of purported intimate images.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I am pleased to be opening this group with the introduction of government Amendments 272, 297, 449, 450 and 458. I once again thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, for the insightful recommendations in her pornography review. I also thank her for meeting me on a number of occasions over the last few months, and for the cordial and constructive tone of those meetings.
There is very little between the Government and the noble Baroness in our objectives. We recognise that her intention is to prevent the deeply unpleasant and damaging effect of what happens in both the online and offline worlds, including the effects upon our children. I hope and believe she also recognises that I am sincere when I say that we want to achieve the same thing. Where possible, the Government have tried to deliver on the issues that she has raised, and I thank her for the time she has taken to talk them through with us. I know that she has some concerns with regard to certain aspects of these amendments, to which I will respond later, but first I will speak to the government amendments.
I start with nudification apps. Together, Amendments 272 and 449 introduce a new offence that will ban the making, adapting, supplying or offer to supply of a tool or service for use as a generator of intimate images. The offence will give effect to our violence against women and girls strategy commitment to ban nudification tools. The offence will capture intimate image generators in all their unpleasant forms, including, but not limited to, apps, software, websites, AI models and bots. To be captured by the criminal offence, the tool must be made or supplied for the use of generating purported intimate images, irrespective of whether that is a primary purpose. The nudification tool ban will be the first of its kind in the world, and it will target the developers and suppliers who profit from the profound distress and victimisation of others. We will work with international partners and fora to tackle this issue.
The Government are committed to tackling the scourge of non-consensual sexual deepfakes and will continue to act to ensure that artificial intelligence cannot be misused to generate this abusive content. In addition to banning image generators, we have announced that we will table an amendment to the Bill to allow the Government to bring additional chatbots into the scope of the Online Safety Act and require them to protect their users from illegal content, including non-consensual intimate images. We will also work with international partners and fora to tackle this issue. Once the offence is in force, the Online Safety Act will impose requirements on social media and search services to have processes and systems in place to remove illegal content that supplies or offers to supply nudification tools, and this will significantly limit their accessibility to users in the UK.
I turn to another unpleasant topic: incest. It is with some pride that I bring forward Amendments 297, 450 and 458. Together, these amendments criminalise the possession or publication of pornographic images that portray sexual activity between family members, otherwise known unattractively as incest porn. In doing so, we give effect to one of the key recommendations of the Independent Review of Pornography by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. I know that she will soon speak to a cluster of her own amendments on this issue but, before she does, I place on record my sincere thanks to her for the vital role that she has played in bringing forward this important change.
We know there are concerns that the proliferation of incest-themed pornography can contribute to extremely harmful attitudes, particularly where it risks normalising child sexual abuse. The government amendment recognises those concerns. We are also pleased to announce that the new offence will be listed as a priority offence under the Online Safety Act, requiring platforms to take proactive and proportionate steps to stop this harmful material appearing online.
The offence as it stands will not capture pornography depicting relationships between step-relatives. This is a controversial topic, but such relationships are not illegal in real life. To be clear, though, any pornography involving real children, whether a step element is present or not, is already criminalised under the Protection of Children Act 1978. I beg to move.
Baroness Bertin (Con)
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 298, 297A to 297D, 281A, 300 and 300A in my name. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, in particular, who has worked on this issue for so many years, the noble Baronesses, Lady Kidron and Lady Kennedy, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for adding their names to this set of amendments.
One thing is clear from the past few weeks: the status quo that has allowed abuse, misogyny, paedophilia and the exploitation of women and girls to flourish cannot continue. The recent release of the Epstein files, which were porn-drenched, should be our moment of reckoning, a moment that forces us to confront uncomfortable truths about power, complicity and the systems that allow abuse to thrive in plain sight.
One of those systems is the modern online pornography industry. This House knows my steadfast commitment to bringing effective regulation to that sector, and I believe that this group of amendments will bring about this much-needed reset. It is a sector that has been driven to abusive extremes by powerful, profit-driven algorithms, too often monetising sexual violence and degradation. Categories such as “barely legal” may claim legality because performers are over 18, but the aesthetic is deliberate: youth, vulnerability and childhood. They are a fig leaf for the sexualisation of minors. Exploitation and trafficking are rife. Sexual abuse material remains far too easy to find on these sites, and many survivors tell us that what is filmed as content is in reality recorded abuse. This cannot continue.
Amendment 298, when tabled, had the intention of closing the gaping disparity between offline and online regulation. If content cannot be legally sold in a shop or on a DVD, it should not be freely available online. For decades, physical distribution has had classification, compliance and enforcement; online, self-regulation still dominates. This amendment sets out in clear terms the material that must not be distributed online. This is based on the BBFC’s guidelines and therefore mirrors what is illegal and prohibited offline, bringing parity across regimes. It also provides for an independent auditing body working alongside Ofcom—I would suggest the BBFC but I am not being specific on that—to carry out spot checks and audits of pornography so that content that would never meet the criteria for physical distribution is detected and removed, not simply noticed and ignored.
Baroness Hazarika (Lab)
My Lords, I want to be supportive of the Government, but I also urge them to listen really closely to what the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, has said today, particularly in light of the Jeffrey Epstein files, as she mentioned. Pornography pervaded the Epstein files. This is a scandal that has shocked us all. It has come to this House. It has affected the upper echelons of society. I just want to read a message that one of Jeffrey Epstein’s friends sent to him in the Epstein files. He said:
“Porn has taken over and the guys just want in the bedroom what they’ve seen in porn”.
This is a moment for the Government to be very brave. This is not a moment to be socially conservative. It is better for the Government to be right at the vanguard on this. We often ask the exam question: how can we prove that porn is affecting real life? That time is here and now; we have seen it through the Epstein files.
I want to leave your Lordships with this. On 20 January 2017, Jeffrey Epstein was Skype-messaging with a young girl still in school. He sent her instructions to watch Pornhub. He said:
“It will be very odd at first, but think of it like a school project … Don’t be shy, watch your reactions with no judgment”.
We are seeing pornography being used in real time to groom young women and young men, and I really hope that the Government will listen to the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin.
Baroness Benjamin (LD)
My Lords, I have put my name to support the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. Over the last eight years or more, every time that we have debated the harmful pornography issues that are in these amendments, I think, “Why is it taking so long for change?”, and I am an optimist. I never give up, so I keep on believing change is a-coming and good will prevail.
The murder of Sarah Everard and the recent revelations contained in the Epstein files, as we have just heard, expose graphically just how much online pornography has not only influenced violent sexual behaviour towards women and girls but caused massive long-term harm to the victims subjected to it. This is why these amendments are crucial to the well-being of women and girls, and men and boys, as well as very young children, to protect them from violence and harm—from having their minds distorted and, in many cases, having their childhood taken away from them.
For years now, Barnardo’s—I declare an interest as vice-president—and CEASE have called for online pornography to be regulated to the same standards as offline. Content involving strangulation, incest and adults dressed as children, as well as that involving trafficking and torture, is rightly illegal offline—yet these images and videos remain widely accessible online. This inconsistency is indefensible and must be stopped, so it is a relief that the Government are now moving on this issue to put a stop to it. Hallelujah! Thank goodness. This change has been worth waiting for. It is common sense. Why should children be exposed to harmful online material which is rightly illegal offline? The harm of violent online pornography is not abstract or without consequence. Men who watch violent online pornography are more likely to be violent towards women and girls, as well as sexually harming children, so the sooner action is taken to make the offline and online worlds compatible, the better for our children’s well-being and mental health.
I support all of the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, and have to congratulate her on her tenacity and her commitment to making a difference. I will speak on Amendment 300, because it seeks to ensure that platforms undertake age-consent checks for performers. This is a critical amendment in protecting women and girls. User-generated content dominates pornography platforms, yet this content is often uploaded with little or no verification. It is great that this amendment would ensure that every individual featured in all content is an adult and has given consent but, crucially, that women are given the right to withdraw their consent at any time and have the content removed.
I also support Amendment 281A, which seeks to ban nudification apps. The Government must be commended for their actions in making it an offence to create deepfake images, but there is an outstanding issue of so-called nudification apps, as we have heard. These AI power tools are being used to create non-consensual sexual images targeting women and girls, and even very young children. The Internet Watch Foundation reported a 380% increase in AI-generated child exploitation imagery, so we must stop every loophole to make sure that that is not possible. If we do not act now, technology will continue to outpace regulation, leaving victims unprotected.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
My Lords, briefly, I support the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. It has been a very grim afternoon, I have to say, repeatedly hearing some of the most horrendous things that can happen to women and children. I say to the Minister, for whom I have a great deal of respect and who spoke passionately—a word normally associated with me—that this is still too little, too late and too long across a number of these issues. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, is relatively new in the House, but we have been debating these things for eight years and I remember having this exact discussion during the Online Safety Bill. We have to just move on. We cannot keep on saying that it moves quickly and then allowing ourselves to move this slowly.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, made a really strong case that online porn affects real life. It is real-life violence and there is this unbelievably vast overlap with child sexual abuse. It is that mess that we have to see as one and, in that sense, the noble Baroness made the case for all of her amendments. I want to quickly mention government Amendment 272, which establishes an offence if a person makes or adapts, or
“supplies or offers to supply a thing, for use as a generator of … intimate images”.
What has happened to that amendment is exactly the same as what happened to the child sexual abuse amendment that has the same form. It deals with intentionality and says: “If you absolutely intend to do this, it will be illegal. But if it happens in general, on any old piece of software that somebody hasn’t bothered to train properly or put protections in, then you’re not caught”. I believe that is what the noble Baroness has in her broader amendment about software.
I really want to make the point that there seems to be a reluctance to catch general- purpose technology in these issues of child abuse, violence against women, intimate image abuse and pornography, and I hope that the Government are listening. We cannot avoid general-purpose technology if that is what is spreading, creating and making this situation available across communities. It is in that space that so many children first see porn. It is in that space that so many women are abused and that so much child sexual abuse is present.
I urge the Minister to think about the breadth and not just the intentionality, because in my view it does not really matter whether it is accidental on the part of the company. I finish by saying that I had the privilege of meeting Yoshua Bengio last week, who is absolutely central to the development of AI and neural networks, and so on. He said, and I paraphrase: show me the incentive and I will show you the design.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I rise very briefly, partly as a male of the species, since we are largely responsible for the situation we are describing. We are behind these business models, we are the sex that is making all the money out of it, and, in most cases, we are the abusers. It behoves us to acknowledge that and speak up about it.
I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. As a mother of young children, she has, on our behalf, subsumed herself for over two years in a world that most of us can barely imagine. That must have been an extraordinarily unpleasant and difficult experience. I pay tribute to her for doing it, because I am not sure many of us would have taken that on or lasted the course.
With that in mind, given the time and thought that she has given to this, the number of experts she has spoken to, the number of international parameters and comparators she has taken into account in looking at this, and the detailed way in which she has analysed the business models that underline this highly profitable business, it behoves all of us, and particularly the Government, to listen very carefully. The amendments that she has brought forth are not something that she dreamed up overnight; they are based on her detailed and painful knowledge of exactly how this business operates. She is identifying some gaps in the laudable approach the Government are taking to try to do something about this.
With my business experience hat on, I say that a major fault that businesses make is overpromising and underdelivering. His Majesty’s Government are in grave danger of doing exactly that in many of these areas to do with violence against women and girls. It is wonderful to have the headlines and to say, “We are taking this seriously and we are doing something about it”, but the devil is in the detail, and the detail is effective implementation. To effectively implement, you have to understand the business model, and, as people have said previously, you have to be prepared to disrupt it.
Baroness Shawcross-Wolfson (Con)
My Lords, more than 40 years ago, Parliament ensured that pornographic material that was deemed too degrading, too explicit or too dangerous could not be distributed. Parliament never changed its mind, but technology overtook the law, which is why we now have the absurd situation where content is illegal when viewed on a DVD but legal and freely available on the internet. That is why we desperately need Amendment 298 to deliver online/offline parity. I too pay tribute to my noble friend Lady Bertin, her team and all the other noble Lords in this House who have, as we have heard, campaigned tirelessly on this issue for many years.
Moving on to my noble friend’s other amendments, I support all of them, but I will speak briefly to three of them. I welcome the Government’s commitment to tackle incest pornography but, without including stepfamily relationships, this new amendment will have little to no impact on the actual content available. The videos will be the same; they will merely be retitled. My noble friend has already explained the popularity and violence of the “barely legal” teen pornography content. Other countries have already legislated to prevent this type of material proliferating. Amendment 300A would ensure that we did the same.
Finally, Amendment 300 is about preventing exploitation and abuse. The porn industry makes money from violence against girls and women. It is an industry that we know profits from human trafficking. This is not an industry that we can trust to do the right things. So I strongly support this amendment, and I very much hope that my noble friend will test the opinion of the House on this and all her other amendments if Ministers are not able to move further.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I associate myself with what my noble friend Lord Russell said about the remarkable contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. I also thank the Minister for all her efforts today to explain the Government’s position, and for the amendments that she has brought forward on behalf of the Government.
Amendment 298 is very important because it seeks to regulate online harmful content, and I very much support the principle. However, I will raise an important quibble. Amendment 298 defines what is meant by “harmful material” by reference to a number of very specific matters that I think we would all agree should not be online, such as material that
“promotes or encourages sexual activity that would be an offence under the Sexual Offences Act”,
or any sexual act that is
“non-consensual, or … appears to be non-consensual”
or
“threatens a person’s life … or is likely to result … in serious injury to a person”,
et cetera.
I have no difficulty with that: I entirely agree with it. However, I am concerned that, in subsection (2)(b) of the new clause proposed in Amendment 298, “harmful material” also includes that which
“would be an offence under … the Obscene Publications Act 1959 or the Obscene Publications Act 1964”.
I am concerned that that would be a very unwise way for us to regulate online content. The reason is that that Act is notoriously vague and uncertain. It depends on jury assessments of what would “deprave and corrupt” a person. It does not seem appropriate or necessary to include that element of harmful conduct when the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, lists, in perfectly sensible and acceptable ways, the specific types of content that ought not to be online and that should be prohibited.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, as with the last group, we on these Benches support the Government’s amendments, but we do not believe that they go far enough. Alongside the noble Lords, Lord Russell and Lord Pannick, I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, for her tireless work on the Independent Pornography Review and subsequently. We on these Benches fully support her amendments to ban step-incest pornography and content that mimics child sexual abuse, to implement age verification for those featured on porn sites and AI nudification apps and to establish vital parity between online and offline pornography regulation.
I will be extremely brief. Amendment 298 in particular would create parity between offline and online regulation. Offline content that would not be classified by the BBFC should not be legal online. The noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, rightly proposes a monitoring role for the BBFC to support Ofcom’s enforcement and I very much hope that the Government will concede on this. If the criticisms of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, are taken on board, the Government can easily alter that amendment at ping-pong.
I have also signed Amendment 281A. The Government’s nudification amendments are clearly too narrow. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, has described, by limiting scope to UK products, they ignore the global nature of this harm. We must go further to capture possession and use of any software designed to produce these non-consensual images. I very much hope that we will be able to avoid votes on the four amendments that the noble Baroness has put forward, and that the Government will take them on board.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, as we have heard, the many amendments in this group all concern the regulation of online pornography. It is notable that many of the amendments have been signed by noble Lords from parties across the political spectrum, showing a very firm desire in your Lordships’ House to regulate harmful online pornography. I again thank my noble friend Lady Bertin for the extensive work that she has carried out in this area and I echo what has been said by several noble Lords this evening in support of her long-standing commitment to this cause. I also thank other noble Lords who have not only spoken this evening but been involved in efforts elsewhere to make the online pornography space safer for children and adults.
I will focus briefly on some of my noble friends’ amendments. Amendment 281A, as we have heard, would create an offence for the possession of software that can produce nude images of another individual. These Benches are fully supportive of this amendment. It goes a significant way in ensuring that women and girls are protected.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, the Government of course sympathise with the intention behind all these amendments. They raise important but tricky issues. I am pleased that they have received such an extensive airing this evening, and I apologise in advance for the fact that this speech is a bit longer than some of the others, but some of these are complicated. I know that some of what I will say will not be what some of your Lordships may wish to hear. I remind the House that the Government have moved on some of the important issues raised, and I assure your Lordships that we have no intention of stopping here. But there are some areas that need further consideration and others where we have genuine operational concerns.
We are committed to continuing to work with the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. I and my fellow Ministers in the Home Office and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology have immensely valued her time and expertise in our meetings with her. It is because of this direct engagement that we have brought forward some of the amendments today. They are entirely to her credit, and I hope we can continue the discussions.
On nudification apps, we have sympathy with the underlying objective of Amendment 281A, but we do not believe that it is necessary for two reasons. First, the aim of Amendment 281A is already captured by the recently commenced Section 66E of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which bans individuals from using nudification tools to create intimate images without consent. Section 66B of the 2003 Act bans anyone from sharing such images once they have been created.
Secondly, nudification tools are commonly accessed online—for example, via a website, an AI model or a chatbot. A person using a tool will not necessarily possess or have downloaded the relevant software or model. That means that Amendment 281A would risk creating an unworkable discrepancy between very similar tools being accessed via different means. For example, it might capture a tool if it was downloaded as code by a user but not if it was accessed as a website. For this reason, we have focused the government amendment on banning the creation and the supply of such tools, rather than just the software. The Government are confident that the combined effect of the new offence in government Amendment 272, along with regulation via the Online Safety Act and existing criminal offences banning individuals from creating and sharing intimate images without consent, is an effective package in tackling this egregious harm in all its forms.
Baroness Bertin (Con)
I promise not to interrupt the Minister too much, but what about the point that it will not extend beyond UK apps?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
This is always the problem with criminal offences, which is why, on occasions, the Government have said that we want to urge caution before creating criminal offences when things that can be dealt with through regulation have a much wider reach. One drawback of criminal offences is that they typically apply only where prosecutors are able to establish UK jurisdiction. To provide some extraterritorial effect, we have ensured that Section 72 of the Sexual Offences Act applies to this offence, which will enable prosecutors to target overseas offending by UK nationals, bodies and associations. But the regulations—
Baroness Bertin (Con)
I accept that and, let us face it, this is the wrong Bill for this piece of legislation— I am prepared to accept that. I know that this is a criminal Bill, but surely the Government and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology have to accept—and make the point on the Floor of this House—that they will therefore re-open the Online Safety Act and bring regulation in to support the very good amendments that they are putting in at this point, or my Amendment 281A.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
These are exactly the conversations that we wish to carry on having, on how to best go about this to make sure that we achieve the aim that we are all trying to get to: getting rid of these horrible things. I would like to continue the conversation with the noble Baroness in due course.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, stressed that there was undue emphasis on intention and states of mind. Again, this is the problem with criminal offences: we do not create criminal offences where people who have done something accidentally end up being criminalised. That is why, on occasions, we say that regulation may be a better tool. The noble Baroness is looking outraged.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
No, I dare not tackle the noble Baroness on legal matters—what we do and do not do in the law—but, if you accidentally poison children’s food, you do not get a free pass. There are all sorts of places and spaces that have to—
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
We will continue this, but with the greatest of respect to the noble Baroness, the fact is that all criminal offences, pretty much, apart from those that are strict liability offences, which are pretty unpopular in the criminal law—[Interruption.] We will discuss this later, but take it from me that it is very rare to criminalise something that is done accidentally.
I turn now to incest. As I said earlier today, the Government have tabled a cluster of amendments that seek to go further than Amendment 299 by criminalising the possession and publication of pornography that depicts sexual activity between both adult and child family members. The reason for doing that is that it makes it more straightforward for law enforcement and regulators to tackle the harmful content, as pornography that portrays a family relationship will be criminalised and the prosecutor does not need to have to prove that the person concerned is under 18 or is a child. It can be very difficult to prove that the person is actually a child. We therefore consider government Amendment 297 to more robustly address the harm that the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, seeks to address.
I turn to the noble Baroness’s Amendments 297AA, 297B, 297C and 297D. Although I understand why she wishes to extend the Government’s amendment to a wider range of relationships, it is important that your Lordships understand that such an extension would criminalise sexual relationships that are lawful between adults in real life. With her Amendment 298, the noble Baroness has specifically sought to include that. It would go further than offline regulation, where some portrayals of step-relative relationships are classified, provided they are not in any way abusive in nature.
In addition, this change proposed by the noble Baroness’s amendment would significantly increase the complexity of the offence. For example, if the pornographic image depicted sex between step-siblings, operational partners would then also have to consider whether the persons live or have lived together, or whether one person is or has been regularly involved in caring for the other. It would be challenging for the police and the CPS to determine and ultimately prosecute. The intention behind the Government’s amendments is to make it as straightforward as possible to enforce and prosecute. That said, although I appreciate what the noble Baroness is trying to achieve, I urge her not to press her amendment.
Turning now to parity, I put on record that the Government accept the principle at the heart of Amendment 298 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. There is a clear and urgent need for greater parity between the treatment of harmful pornography online and offline. This Government, who have prioritised tackling all forms of violence against women and girls, will show the leadership necessary to deliver it. We have, with thanks to the noble Baroness, already taken steps in the Bill to criminalise some of the most egregious forms of content that are currently mainstream online. The strangulation pornography offence added in Committee and the further changes we are bringing forward today on incest pornography have been added because of the noble Baroness. These matters are now prohibited under offline regulation.
Acknowledging that the changing online world brings new challenges that must be tackled to address emerging harms, we will also be reviewing the criminal law relating to pornography to assess its effectiveness. We will ensure that our online regulatory framework keeps pace with these changes to the criminal law. Delivery of parity in regulatory treatment has already started. Once enforced, these offences will become priority offences under the Online Safety Act, requiring platforms to have proportionate systems and processes in place to prevent UK users encountering this content. This should stop this abhorrent content circulating unchecked on online platforms, where right now it is being recommended to unwitting users.
While these measures mark a significant step forward in protecting individuals online, we acknowledge that they do not address the totality of the complex question on parity. The current offline regime relies on checks on individual pieces of content, which can consider wider context and nuance in a way that does not easily translate to the scale and speed of online content. For this reason, we cannot accept the noble Baroness’s amendment, but because we completely agree with the need for greater parity, the Government are committing our joint pornography team, which was announced as part of the VAWG strategy, to produce a delivery plan within six months of Royal Assent.
Crucially, the delivery plan will set out how, not whether, the Government can most effectively close the gap. This will include consideration of how a new approach can address other potentially harmful content, such as pornography portraying step-incest relationships or adults role-playing as children. The delivery plan will thoroughly test which approach will be most effective by testing audit and reporting functions and considering how this can be done at scale to achieve the desired impact. The plan will also consider how and which regulatory frameworks can best address the issue, noting the interactions with the BBFC’s existing remit and that of Ofcom under the Online Safety Act, and how to ensure that there is effective enforcement in any future system. It will examine the case for tools, including fines and business disruption measures. We will keep up the pace. I can commit to including clear timelines for implementation in the plan, and we will keep them as short as possible, factoring in the possible need for legislation, subject to parliamentary timing. I know that my fellow Ministers will welcome the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, joining us as we conduct this work.
Baroness Bertin (Con)
I want to say thank you. The Minister has just made a very big announcement and I thank her, because she has acknowledged parity, and I hope that she will therefore be using regulation to make sure that we absolutely do create that level playing field. I just want to acknowledge that.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I turn to Amendment 300. While we accept the intended aim of this amendment, we cannot accept the proposed approach. The part of the amendment relating to the withdrawal of consent and its application to professional entertainment contracts has a number of practical implications. Where content is produced legally, as with the wider film industry, the rules and regulations governing its use are usually a commercial matter to be agreed between the performer and the production company, taking into account the intellectual property framework. I add that much of the content captured by this proposed offence is already illegal. The creation, distribution and possession of child sexual abuse material and sharing an intimate image without consent are already criminal offences.
The law is also crystal clear about the distribution of indecent images of children. Under the Protection of Children Act 1978, the UK has a strict prohibition on the taking, making, circulation and possession with a view to distribution of any indecent photograph or pseudo-photograph of a child under 18. That said, as I said earlier this evening, we accept that there is harmful material, including content that is non-consensual and displays child sexual abuse, that remains online, and that is not good enough. So, while we cannot support the amendment today, we are keen once again to work with the noble Baroness further to consider existing best practice in the area and, where there are gaps, how these can be filled. The outcome of the work on parity to which we have committed today will also influence consideration of how this amendment could be regulated.
Baroness Bertin (Con)
Law enforcement is already duty bound to investigate any material that may contain a child, so I do not believe that the amendment would suddenly create a whole load of legal activity that could stop the protection of children. I just do not accept that.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
The concern expressed by law enforcement is that it would divert resources from what they are doing at the moment. We will consider this issue as part of our rapid work on parity, and we will also consider the issue as part of our broader work on reviewing the criminal law. I do not underestimate the importance of all these matters. I hope your Lordships will forgive me for the length of time it has taken me to deal with them. My hope is that your Lordships will take the commitments that I have made and the government amendments that I have tabled as a sign of the Government’s genuine intention. Take it from me: we will go further, but we must get these issues right. In the meantime, with every respect, I ask the noble Baroness not to press her amendment.
“Duty to make deprivation and deletion orders (non-consensual intimate images)Where a person is convicted of an offence involving sharing or threatening to share intimate images without consent, as described by sections 66A and 66H of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (intimate images), the court must—(a) order the destruction of any content used to commit the offence on any device or data store containing such images;(b) order the defendant to disclose any password, key or authenticator necessary to access accounts or devices containing such images;(c) order verified deletion of such images from all locations, including cloud services;(d) direct the prosecutor to lodge a deletion verification report within 28 days.”
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
My Lords, we cannot allow victims to continue to suffer long after their abusers walk free. It is time we resolve this issue. I wish to test the opinion of the House.
“Hashing(1) No later than 12 months from the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must by regulations made by statutory instrument provide for the generation and lawful sharing of hashes of intimate images shared without consent in contravention of section 66B of the Sexual Offences Act 2023 (sharing or threatening to share intimate photograph or film), for the purpose of preventing re-upload , subject to safeguards.(2) The Secretary of State must make the regulations in cooperation with industry standard initiatives (such as StopNCII).”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment works in conjunction with others in the name of Baroness Owen regarding a mandatory removal period or de-indexing period of 48 hours for non-consensual intimate images and the establishment of a statutory Non-Consensual Intimate Image Register. This allows the Revenge Porn Helpline (who would be the preferred register holders) to share the verified hashes to internet infrastructure providers to ensure content is removed and blocked in cases where removal is not possible.
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
My Lords, every day this content remains online is another day women have to live in fear of it been viewed, downloaded or reshared. This is a vote to tackle non-compliant websites and allow victims to reclaim their lives. I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Crime and Policing Bill
Monday 2nd March 2026
(2 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 167-II(c) Amendments for Report (Supplementary to the Second Marshalled List) - (2 Mar 2026)
21:41 - Division on Amendment 281A - Ayes: 144 / Noes: 140 - Amendment 281A agreed.
21:56 - Division on Amendment 297AA (to Amendment 297) - Ayes: 144 / Noes: 143 - Amendment 297AA agreed.
22:08 - Division on Amendment 300 - Ayes: 143 / Noes: 140 - Amendment 300 agreed.
22:19 - Division on Amendment 300A - Ayes: 142 / Noes: 140 - Amendment 300A agreed.
“Content removal reporting and enforcement(1) Within 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must by regulations made by statutory instrument make provision for—(a) the way in which offences under section 66B of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sharing or threatening to share intimate photograph or film) can be reported to the relevant internet service as defined in section 228 of the Online Safety Act 2023 (internet service), and (b) the mechanism by which content created as a result of offences under that section must be removed by the relevant internet service.(2) The regulations must include—(a) a mandatory removal period or de-indexing period, as the case may be, for content that the reporting party reasonably believes to be in breach of section 66B of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 of 48 hours,(b) a requirement that the reporting process must be clear and accessible, and guidance on what constitutes clear and accessible reporting,(c) sanctions for malicious reporting,(d) sanctions for internet services for the failure to remove duplicates of offending material,(e) a review period after the initial 48 hours for assessing suspected offending content, and(f) a statement of which internet services are within scope of this section, produced after consultation with the Revenge Porn Helpline and other relevant stakeholders.”
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 275 is in my name and those of the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Pannick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I apologise to the House for the last-minute degrouping of this amendment. It is a vital amendment and I wanted to ensure that it could be brought back at Third Reading.
The amendment mandates the Secretary of State to create a mechanism whereby sites have to have clear and accessible reporting systems for content that a person believes breaches Section 66B of the Sexual Offences Act on the sharing of non-consensual intimate images. Vitally, it mandates internet services to remove or de-index this content within 48 hours. Critically, it includes sanctions for internet services to remove duplicates.
Last year I was contacted by Christina Trevanion, host of “Bargain Hunt”. Christina spoke to me about the ongoing trauma she faced trying to remove non-consensual, sexually explicit deepfakes of herself from the internet. She is one of many brave survivors of intimate image abuse who spoke out and inspired my 48-hour take-down amendment. She said, “It’s too late for me, but I do not want my daughters to grow up in a world where posting a photograph of themselves online puts them at risk”.
The amendment was based on the precedent set in the USA with the TAKE IT DOWN Act, itself inspired by the incredible advocacy of a young woman called Elliston and her mum, Anna. Anna described to me the unending trauma her daughter suffered knowing that, for the rest of her life, those pictures could be there. Anna’s biggest priority was getting those images taken down from the internet. For victims such as Christina and Elliston, every day that goes by is another day when they live in constant fear that their content will be viewed, downloaded or reshared in an ongoing cycle of revictimisation. I am delighted that the Government have agreed to work with me on this amendment. I think the Minister knows how passionate I am about this.
I am very pleased that the Government have committed to bring back their own amendment at Third Reading; we will get the exact details in a second. I am very keen to secure an undertaking that we can return to this issue at Third Reading. If for any reason the Government do not follow through and bring an amendment back in time for Third Reading, I reserve the right to bring back my Amendment 275, covering all the elements I have raised on this important issue. I am very grateful to the Minister for her collaboration and determination to work together on this. I know she is committed to getting it right. I ask her to confirm that the Government will provide an undertaking to bring back amendments at Third Reading to address the 48-hour take-down requirement for intimate images. I beg to move.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for her amendment, which would place a duty on the Secretary of State, within 12 months of the Act being passed, to make provisions for the way in which offences of sharing intimate images are reported and the mechanisms by which content is removed by the relevant internet service. I understand that the Government have given my noble friend an undertaking for Third Reading, and I am pleased that they have done so.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, I am pleased to put on record that this Government completely accept and agree with the intention that underlies this amendment. That is why, as I said earlier, the Government will introduce a legal duty for tech platforms to take down reported non-consensual intimate image abuse within 48 hours, to ensure that victims get rapid protection. This change, which will be brought forward at Third Reading, will create a strong, enforceable foundation for getting harmful material removed from online circulation, so that victims are no longer left chasing platforms for action. To support swift and effective action to remove this material by internet infrastructure providers, we will also explore any barriers to blocking and how this can be addressed. This will help ensure that rogue sites operating outside the scope of the Online Safety Act will be targeted. I appreciate the noble Baroness’s eagerness to see this change brought about quickly, but as the Government intend to bring forward amendments to this effect at Third Reading, I hope she will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
Can the Minister confirm to the House that not only will the Government be bringing forward amendments but if I am not satisfied with them, I may bring back my own?
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
May I just check that that is an undertaking? We have a nod. Thank you. I am very pleased that we will return to this issue at Third Reading, but for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“Register of intimate images shared without consent(1) No later than 12 months from the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must by regulations made by statutory instrument establish a statutory Non-Consensual Intimate Image Register for the purpose of preventing access to and dissemination of material shared online in contravention of section 66B of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sharing or threatening to share intimate photograph or film) (“NCII material”).(2) The Register must contain hashes of verified NCII material.(3) The Secretary of State must appoint a regulator for the Register to be responsible for oversight, enforcement, and coordination with internet service providers and online platforms.(4) Providers designated by the appointed regulator must use the Register to prevent the re-upload or distribution of NCII material.(5) The Secretary of State must issue guidance on governance, accuracy, proportionality, and privacy safeguards.(6) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”Member’s explanatory statement
For the purposes of this amendment, the Revenge Porn Helpline is the preferred body to manage the register. The service currently runs a voluntary hashing register and has indicated that they would be able to operate it. The register would be the authoritative source for platforms, search engines, and ISPs to block, delist and prevent access to NCII content.
Baroness Levitt
“1A After section 66A insert—“66AA Sharing semen-defaced image(1) A person (A) commits an offence if—(a) A intentionally shares a semen-defaced image of another person (B),(b) B does not consent to the sharing of the semen-defaced image, and(c) A does not reasonably believe that B consents.(2) A “semen-defaced image” of a person (B) is—(a) a photograph or film which—(i) shows, or appears to show, B, and(ii) has, or appears to have, semen on it or in its immediate vicinity, or(b) a photograph or film of a photograph or film within paragraph (a). (3) “Photograph” includes the negative as well as the positive version.(4) “Film” means a moving image.(5) References to a photograph or film also include—(a) an image, whether made or altered by computer graphics or in any other way, which appears to be a photograph or film,(b) a copy of a photograph, film or image within paragraph (a), and(c) data stored by any means which is capable of conversion into a photograph, film or image within paragraph (a).(6) A person “shares” a semen-defaced image if the person, by any means, gives or shows it to another person or makes it available to another person.(7) But a provider of an internet service by means of which a semen-defaced image is shared is not to be regarded as a person who shares it.(8) For the purposes of subsection (1)—(a) “consent” to the sharing of a semen-defaced image includes general consent covering the particular act of sharing as well as specific consent to the particular act of sharing, and(b) whether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all the circumstances including any steps A has taken to ascertain whether B consents.(9) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to prove that the person had a reasonable excuse for sharing the semen-defaced image.(10) A person (A) who shares a semen-defaced image of another person (B) does not commit an offence under subsection (1) if—(a) the semen-defaced image had, or A reasonably believes that it had, been previously publicly shared, and(b) B had, or A reasonably believes that A had, consented to the previous sharing.(11) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or a fine (or both).””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment creates a new offence of sharing a photograph or film of a person where the image has, or appears to have, semen on it or in its immediate vicinity, without the person’s consent.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment at Schedule 11, page 321, line 19.
Baroness Levitt
“66AD Creating a copy of intimate photograph or film shared temporarily(1) A person (A) commits an offence if—(a) another person (B)— (i) shares with A a photograph or film which shows, or appears to show, B in an intimate state, and(ii) does so in such a way that A can view the photograph or film for a limited time, but cannot send it to another person,(b) A intentionally creates a copy of the photograph or film that A can view at other times,(c) A knows that the photograph or film is shared with A by B,(d) B does not consent to the creation of the copy, and(e) A does not reasonably believe that B consents to the creation of the copy.(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a)(ii)—(a) the cases in which A can view the photograph or film for a limited time include the case where A can view it for as long as B allows A to do so;(b) sending the photograph or film to another person does not include showing it to another person.(3) References in this section to creating a copy of a photograph or a film include —(a) creating a copy of part of a photograph or film, or(b) creating a copy of a photograph or film with modifications,where the copy shows, or appears to show, B in the intimate state in which B is shown, or appears to be shown, in the photograph or film.(4) Subsection (1) is subject to section 66AE (exemptions).(5) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to prove that the person had a reasonable excuse for creating the copy.(6) Section 76 applies to an offence under this section.(7) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or a fine (or both).66AE Creating a copy of intimate photograph or film shared temporarily: exemptions(1) A person (A) does not commit an offence under section 66AD(1) in relation to a photograph or film shared with A if—(a) the photograph or film was, or A reasonably believes that it was, taken or recorded in a place to which the public or a section of the public had or were permitted to have access (whether on payment or otherwise),(b) the person the photograph or film shows, or appears to show, in an intimate state (B) had no reasonable expectation of privacy from such a photograph or film being taken or recorded, and(c) B was, or A reasonably believes that B was, in the intimate state voluntarily.(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b), whether a person had a reasonable expectation of privacy from a photograph or film being taken or recorded is to be determined by reference to the circumstances that A reasonably believes to have existed at the time the photograph or film was taken or recorded.(3) A person (A) does not commit an offence under section 66AD(1) in relation to a photograph or film shared with A if—(a) the photograph or film had, or A reasonably believes that the photograph or film had, been previously publicly shared, and(b) B had, or A reasonably believes that B had, consented to the previous sharing.” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment creates a new offence of creating a copy of a photograph or film showing, or appearing to show, a person in an intimate state, that has been shared with the person creating the copy only temporarily.
Baroness Bertin
“66AD Possession of software to create or amend a digitally produced sexually explicit photograph or film(1) A person (A) commits an offence if A intentionally possesses, obtains or stores software whose primary purpose is to create or alter a digitally produced photograph or film which shows another person (B) in an intimate state.(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to prove that the person had a reasonable excuse for possessing, obtaining or storing software whose primary purpose is to create or amend digital images of a person in an intimate state.(3) A person (A) commits an offence if A possesses, obtains or stores software with the intention to create or alter a digitally produced photograph or film which shows another person (B) in an intimate state.(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) to prove that the person had a reasonable excuse for intending to create or amend digital images of a person in an intimate state.(5) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or a fine (or both).(6) Where A is convicted of an offence under this section, the court may require A to delete—(a) the software used in the commission of an offence this section;(b) any copies of a photograph or film they have taken under this section, including physical copies and those held on any device, cloud-based programme, or digital or messaging platform they control.(7) A person can only commit an offence under this section if they are aged 18 or over.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would create offences to possess software which can produce nude images of another individual.
Baroness Bertin (Con)
I want to test the opinion of the House.
Baroness Levitt
“(2A) In subsection (3), at the end insert “, or as a person with whom it is shared”.” Member's explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that the provider of an internet service by means of which a photograph or film is shared is not regarded as a person with whom it is shared for the purposes of the offence in section 66AD of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (inserted by my amendment to Schedule 11, page 324, line 13).
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment applies the definition of photograph or film in section 66D(4B) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to the new sections inserted by my amendment to Schedule 11, page 324, line 13.
Baroness Levitt
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment applies the definition of consent in section 66D(10) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to the new sections inserted by my amendment to Schedule 11, page 324, line 13.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment applies the definition of consent in section 66D(10) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to the new sections inserted by my amendment to Schedule 11, page 324, line 13.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment applies the definition of consent in section 66D(10) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to the new sections inserted by my amendment to Schedule 11, page 324, line 13.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment applies the definition of consent in section 66D(10) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to the new sections inserted by my amendment to Schedule 11, page 324, line 13.
Baroness Levitt
“(za) section 66AA;”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment extends the time limit for prosecuting the offence in new section 66AA of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (inserted by my amendment to Schedule 11, page 321, line 19).
“(ba) section 66AD;” Member's explanatory statement
This amendment extends the time limit for prosecuting the offence in new section 66AD of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (inserted by my amendment to Schedule 11, page 324, line 13).
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment at Schedule 11, page 325, line 18.
“An offence under section 66AD(1) (creating copy of intimate photograph or film shared temporarily) | The defendant intentionally creating a copy of the photograph or film in question.” |
This amendment is consequential on new section 66AD(6) of the Sexual Offences Act inserted by my amendment to Schedule 11, page 324, line 13.
“Section 66AD | Copy of a photograph or film to which the offence relates” |
This amendment enables a deprivation order under section 177DA of the Armed Forces Act 2006 to be made in respect of a copy the creation of which is an offence under new section 66AD of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (inserted by my amendment to Schedule 11, page 324, line 13).
“Section 66AD | Copy of a photograph or film to which the offence relates” |
This amendment enables a deprivation order under section 154A of the Sentencing Code to be made in respect of a copy the creation of which is an offence under new section 66AD of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (inserted by my amendment to Schedule 11, page 324, line 13).
Baroness Levitt
“Online Safety Act 2023 (c. 50)
23 In Schedule 7 to the Online Safety Act 2023 (priority offences), in paragraph 28A (Sexual Offences Act 2003), at the end insert—“(c) section 66E (creating purported intimate image of adult);(d) section 66F (requesting the creation of purported intimate image of adult).””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment adds offences to Schedule 7 to the Online Safety Act 2023, requiring service providers to take action to identify and minimise users’ exposure to content created or requested in the commission of those offences and to mitigate the risk of services being used to commit those offences.
Baroness Levitt
“Pornographic images of sex between relatives(1) After section 67D of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (inserted by section 90 of this Act) insert—“67E Possession or publication of pornographic images of sex between relatives(1) It is an offence for a person (P) to be in possession of an image if—(a) the image is pornographic, within the meaning of section 63,(b) the image portrays, in an explicit and realistic way, a person (A) sexually penetrating—(i) the vagina or anus of another person (B) with a part of A’s body or anything else, or(ii) B’s mouth with A’s penis,(c) a reasonable person looking at the image would think that A and B were real, and(d) a reasonable person—(i) looking at the image, and(ii) taking into account any sound or information associated with the image,would think that A and B were related, or pretending to be related, in a way mentioned in subsection (2).(2) That is to say, A being related to B as parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, brother, sister, half-brother, half-sister, uncle, aunt, nephew or niece.(3) It is an offence for a person to publish an image of the kind mentioned in subsection (1).(4) Publishing an image includes giving or making it available to another person by any means.(5) For the purpose of subsection (1)(d)—(a) the reference to sound or information associated with the image is—(i) when subsection (1)(d) applies for the purpose of an offence under subsection (1), to sound, or information, associated with the image that is in P’s possession, and(ii) when subsection (1)(d) applies for the purpose of an offence under subsection (3), to sound, or information, associated with the image that the person in subsection (3) publishes with the image, and(b) A and B are not to be taken as pretending to be related if it is fanciful that they are actually related in the way pretended.(6) In subsection (2)—“(a) “parent” includes an adoptive parent;“(b) “child” includes an adopted person within the meaning of Chapter 4 of Part 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002;“(c) “uncle” means the brother of a person’s parent, and “aunt” has a corresponding meaning;“(d) “nephew” means the child of a person’s brother or sister, and “niece” has a corresponding meaning.(7) For the purpose of this section—“(a) “image” has the same meaning as in section 63;(b) penetration is a continuing act from entry to withdrawal;“(c) “vagina” includes vulva; (d) references to a part of the body include references to a part surgically constructed (in particular through gender reassignment surgery).(8) Subsections (1) and (3) do not apply to excluded images, within the meaning of section 64.(9) Nothing in—(a) section 47 of the Adoption Act 1976 (which disapplies the status provisions in section 39 of that Act for the purposes of this section in relation to adoptions before 30 December 2005), or(b) section 74 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (which disapplies the status provisions in section 67 of that Act for those purposes in relation to adoptions on or after that date),is to be read as preventing the application of section 39 of the Adoption Act 1976 or section 67 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 for the purposes of subsection (6)(a) or (b).(10) Proceedings for an offence under this section may not be instituted except by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.67F Defences to offence under section 67E(1) Where a person is charged with an offence under section 67E(1), it is a defence for the person to prove any of the matters mentioned in subsection (2).(2) The matters are—(a) that the person had a legitimate reason for being in possession of the image concerned;(b) that the person had not seen the image concerned and did not know, nor had any cause to suspect, it to be an image of the kind mentioned in section 67E(1);(c) that the person—(i) was sent the image concerned without any prior request having been made by or on behalf of the person, and(ii) did not keep it for an unreasonable time;(d) that—(i) the person directly participated in the act portrayed as person A or B mentioned in section 67E(1)(b),(ii) the act did not involve the infliction of any non-consensual harm on any person, and(iii) the person is not related to person B or A (as the case may be) in a way mentioned in section 67E(2).(3) Where a person is charged with an offence under section 67E(3), it is a defence for a person to prove any of the matters mentioned in subsection (4).(4) The matters are—(a) that the person had a legitimate reason for publishing the image concerned to the persons to whom they published it;(b) that the person had not seen the image concerned and did not know, nor had any cause to suspect, it to be an image of the kind mentioned in section 67E(1);(c) that—(i) the person directly participated in the act portrayed as person A or B mentioned in section 67E(1)(b),(ii) the act did not involve the infliction of any non-consensual harm on any person,(iii) the person is not related to person B or A (as the case may be) in a way mentioned in section 67E(2), and(iv) the person only published the image to person B or A (as the case may be).(5) In this section, “non-consensual harm” has the same meaning as in section 66. 67G Penalties for offences under section 67E(1) A person who commits an offence under section 67E(1) is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine (or both).(2) A person who commits an offence under section 67E(3) is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine (or both).”(2) In section 68 of that Act (special rules relating to providers of information society services), after “67A” (inserted by section 90 of this Act) insert “and 67E”.(3) In Schedule 14 to that Act (special rules relating to providers of information society services), in paragraphs 3(1), 4(2) and 5(1) after “67A” (inserted by section 90 of this Act) insert “or 67E”.(4) In section 47(1) of the Adoption Act 1976, for “or sections 64 and 65 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sex with an adult relative)” substitute “sections 64 and 65 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sex with an adult relative), or section 67E of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (possession or publication of pornographic images of sex between relatives)”.(5) In section 74(1) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002—(a) omit the “or” after paragraph (a);(b) after paragraph (b) insert “, or(c) section 67E of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (possession or publication of pornographic images of sex between relatives).”(6) In Schedule 34A to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (child sex offences for the purposes of section 327A), after paragraph 13ZA (inserted by section 90 of this Act) insert—“13ZB An offence under section 67E of that Act (possession or publication of pornographic images of sex between relatives).”(7) In Schedule 7 to the Online Safety Act 2023 (priority offences), in paragraph 29, after paragraph (b) (inserted by section 90 of this Act) insert “;(c) section 67E (possession or publication of pornographic images of sex between relatives)”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment makes it an offence to possess or publish pornographic images of sex between relatives (that is to say, incest).
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Finlay of Llandaff) (CB)
Amendment 297A, as an amendment to Amendment 297, is replaced by manuscript Amendment 297AA tabled today, which clarifies where it amends Amendment 297.
Baroness Bertin
Baroness Bertin (Con)
I intend to test the opinion of the House. It is not acceptable that step-incest is still currently available in pornography, and we should absolutely outlaw it. The Sexual Offences Act means that it is completely illegal in nearly all step-relations, and it should be outlawed, so I will divide the House. I beg to move.
Baroness Bertin
“Pornographic content: duty to verify age(1) A person commits an offence if they publish or allow or facilitate the publishing of pornographic content online where it has not been verified that—(a) every individual featuring in pornographic content on the platform has given their consent for the content in which they feature to be published or made available by the service,(b) every individual featuring in pornographic content on the platform has been verified as an adult, and that age verification was completed before the content was created and before it was published on the service, and(c) every individual featured in pornographic content on the platform, that had already been published on the service on the day on which this Act was passed, is an adult.(2) It is irrelevant under subsection (1)(a) whether the individual featured in pornographic material has previously given their consent to the relevant content being published if they have subsequently withdrawn that consent in writing, either directly or via an appointed legal representative, to—(a) the platform, or(b) the relevant regulator where a contact address was not provided by the platform to receive external communications.(3) If withdrawal of consent under subsection (2) has been communicated in writing to an address issued by the platform or to the relevant public body, the relevant material must be removed by the platform within 24 hours of the communication being sent.(4) An individual guilty of an offence under this section is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both); (b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine (or both).(5) A person who is a UK national commits an offence under this section regardless of where the offence takes place.(6) A person who is not a UK national commits an offence under this section if any part of the offence takes place in the United Kingdom.(7) The platform on which material that violates the provisions in this section is published can be fined up to £18 million or 10 per cent of their qualifying worldwide revenue, whichever is greater.(8) The Secretary of State must appoint one or more public bodies to monitor and enforce compliance by online platforms with this section, with the relevant public body—(a) granted powers to impose business disruption measures on non-compliant online platforms, including but not limited to service restriction (imposing requirements on one or more persons who provide an ancillary service, whether from within or outside the United Kingdom, in relation to a regulated service); and access restriction (imposing requirements on one or more persons who provide an access facility, whether from within or outside the United Kingdom, in relation to a regulated service);(b) required to act in accordance with regulations relating to monitoring and enforcement of this section issued by the Secretary of State, including but not limited to providing the Secretary of State with a plan for monitoring and enforcement of the provisions in this section within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, and publishing annual updates on enforcement activity relating to this section.(9) A relevant public body has a duty to act under subsection (8)(a) if it is satisfied an offence has taken place under this section even in the absence of a prosecution or if it is notified by an individual that consent has been withdrawn by that individual under subsection (2).(10) Internet services hosting pornographic content must make and keep a written record outlining their compliance with the provisions of this section, and such a record must be summarised in a publicly available statement alongside the publishing requirements in section 81(4) and (5) of the Online Safety Act 2023 (duties about regulated provider pornographic content).”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause makes it a requirement for pornography websites to verify the age and permission of everyone featured on their site, and enable withdrawal of consent at any time.
Baroness Bertin (Con)
Age and consent checks on porn companies are the very minimum standards that we should be putting on these organisations, which cannot be self-regulated and need to have this regulation put on them. It is the very basic thing that we should be asking of them. I intend to test the opinion of the House.
Baroness Bertin
“Amendment of Protection of Children Act 1978(1) The Protection of Children Act 1978 is amended as follow. (2) In section 1(1)(a) (indecent photographs of children) after “child” insert “or a person who appears to be or is implied to be a child”.(3) In section 7 (interpretation), after subsection (9) insert—“(10) When determining under section 1 whether an indecent photograph or pseudo-photograph is of a person who appears to be or is implied to be a child, reference may be had to—(a) how the image is or was described (whether the description is part of the image itself or otherwise);(b) any sounds accompanying the image;(c) where the image forms an integral part of a narrative constituted by a series of images—(i) any sounds accompanying the series of images,(ii) the context provided by that narrative;(d) the overall context in which the image appears, including but not limited to, the setting, the conduct and appearance of the depicted person or persons, and any other relevant factors.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes a series of amendments to the Protection of Children Act 1978 to extend the offence of making an indecent photograph of a child to cases where the child depicted is an adult.
Baroness Bertin (Con)
We must outlaw content that mimics child sexual abuse. I beg to move.
Baroness Levitt
“Sexual activity with an animal(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) to (5).(2) For section 69 (intercourse with an animal) substitute—“69 Sexual activity with an animal(1) A person commits an offence if—(a) the person intentionally touches an animal (whether living or dead),(b) the person knows that, or is reckless as to whether, that is what is touched, and(c) the touching is sexual.(2) For the purposes of this section, touching is sexual if a reasonable person would consider that—(a) because of its nature it may be sexual, and(b) because of its circumstances or the purpose of any person in relation to it (or both) it is sexual.(3) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years.” (3) In section 78 (meaning of “sexual”), after “66D” insert“, 69”.(4) In section 79 (Part 1: general interpretation) omit subsection (10).(5) In paragraphs 35 and 92 of Schedule 3 (sexual offences that make offender subject to notification requirements), for “intercourse” substitute “sexual activity”.(6) In the following provisions, for “intercourse” substitute “sexual activity”—(a) paragraph 151 of Schedule 15 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003;(b) paragraph 38(az) of Schedule 18 to the Sentencing Code.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment replaces the existing offence of intercourse with an animal with a wider offence of sexual activity with an animal.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, we have dealt with some unattractive topics already this evening, and we are about to embark on another one. Government Amendments 301, 302, 451 and 465 in my name deal with the unpalatable but very serious question of animal sexual abuse.
These amendments respond directly to concerns raised in both Houses. I am grateful to many noble Lords, particularly the noble Lords, Lord Black, Lord Blencathra and Lord Pannick, and Danny Chambers MP, all of whom argued persuasively that the current offence does not reflect the full range of abhorrent behaviour that we believe should be prohibited. I pay particular tribute to David Martin and Paula Boyden from the Links Group, who met me and provided the Government with further evidence.
Lord Black of Brentwood (Con)
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 390 in my name, to which my noble friend Lord Blencathra has added his own. He is an exceptional champion of animal welfare and it is an honour, as always, to have his support.
First, I shall speak to government Amendment 301. I am grateful to the Minister for her remarks. As she said, we had a good debate on this subject in Committee—also quite late at night, if I recall. The Government clearly listened carefully to the arguments and to the strength of feeling in the House and have acted on that. I am grateful to the Minister for meeting me—along with my colleagues from across the sector, especially, as she said, David Martin and Paula Boyden, to whom I pay tribute for their tireless work and insight—to discuss these issues in some depth, and to her officials who have worked on this. The noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock, has also been extremely supportive and helpful.
I welcome the Government’s amendment, which goes a long way to dealing with the issues I highlighted in Committee and supported. This is a really important step forward, both in terms of animal welfare and in recognising the link between animal sexual abuse—ASA—and domestic abuse and violence. There are one or two matters on which I would just like briefly to press the Minister.
First, it is disappointing that there are no powers of disqualification for individuals convicted of ASA or specific powers to deprive the offender of any animals they own at the time of their conviction. The best way to protect animals is to ensure that those inclined to commit such despicable crimes are banned from owning them or having access to them. The Minister may argue that this would follow on from a sexual harm prevention order but, as I understand it, such orders are available only if the court imposes a custodial sentence of two years or more, and the vast majority of these cases will not meet that threshold.
There may be other mechanisms through which a perpetrator could be deprived of the ownership of the animal they abused, but that will require the courts to remember to do this, and that cannot always be taken for granted. The best way to ensure that is to have something on the face of this legislation but, perhaps, if that is not possible, the Minister could kindly make clear the Government’s intentions in this area, for future reference.
Secondly, it is unfortunate that there is a discrepancy between the maximum sentence for physical animal abuse, which is five years, and for ASA, which will be set at two years. This could be said to convey the message that animal sexual abuse is less of a crime than physical animal abuse. I am absolutely sure that that is not what the Government intend, so again perhaps the Minister could just clarify the reasons for the discrepancy.
Thirdly, the amendment does not deal comprehensively with the issues around the possession and sharing of animal pornography, and here too there are no powers of disqualification or deprivation for imagery offences involving ASA.
These are technical points, but they are none the less very important and I would be very grateful if we could get the Minister’s views on the record. Ideally, there may be some way of sorting them out at Third Reading and the Minister and her officials would have my strong support in doing so. Having said all that, I am not going to make the perfect the enemy of the best. This amendment is real progress in dealing with this vile crime of animal sexual abuse and I am very grateful to the Government.
I turn to my Amendment 390, on a linked subject, which seeks to create notification requirements for people convicted of animal cruelty. It is analogous in many ways to the requirements relating to the sex offenders register. As we discussed in Committee, there is a real and frightening link between cruelty towards animals and violence towards a partner. As domestic abuse charities have consistently made clear, those who maim or kill animals often go on to become involved in incidents of domestic violence and, in the worst cases, murder.
One of the early warning signs of an abusive partner is the way they treat pets, which is why it is one of the questions on the DASH—domestic abuse, stalking and harassment—risk assessment routinely used by police across the UK to determine a victim’s risk of further harm. The evidence is as overwhelming and alarming as it is painful to read. Pets are often the first to be abused and harmed as perpetrators of domestic abuse seek to coerce, control or punish. Research undertaken by Refuge4Pets, which does wonderful work in this area in association with Dogs Trust, found that almost nine in 10 households which experienced domestic abuse said that their animals were also abused by the perpetrator. In 49% of cases, animals, appallingly and tragically, are killed by the abuser. A study by the Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and Northeastern University found that animal abusers are five times as likely also to harm humans. Unsurprisingly, 70% of people who have committed animal abuse also have criminal records for violence, property or drugs offences, or disorderly behaviour.
Beyond these statistics, horrific though they are on their own, is the very real human face of the victims, one of whom was a lady called Holly Bramley. Holly was murdered at the age of just 26 by her husband, Nicholas Metson, in 2023. The following year, Metson was convicted of her murder and sentenced to life in prison. Before she was so tragically robbed of her life, Holly was subjected to horrendous abuse by Metson, who had also been reported to the police for repeated extreme cruelty to her beloved pets. That was a red flag for the tragic events that followed, if only anyone had known about it.
Holly’s courageous mother, Annette Bramley, is now campaigning for a new nationwide protection register to identify those who have been found guilty of cruelty to animals in a bid to stop this sort of tragedy ever happening again. As Annette has said:
“Had there been a register with his name on there that we could have looked at, perhaps Holly might be here today”.
This campaign for what is dubbed Holly’s law is already backed by a petition with 50,000 signatures on it. The Member for South Holland and The Deepings in the other place, Sir John Hayes, has been a strong campaigner for action. I pay tribute to the tenacious work that he has been doing in gathering support from across the political spectrum for something to be done.
I know that the Government recognise the link between animal abuse, particularly of pets, and domestic violence. I therefore very much hope that, despite what the Minister has said, they will see the strength of this amendment, which would provide a vital resource for both individuals like Holly and their families, who may be in danger, and for law enforcement. It is a simple change that could help thousands of potential victims and ensure that no more families like Holly’s tragically have to suffer the same anguish because vital signs are missed.
I hear what the Minister has said, and I take her points on board. I hope that she might think again about this at some point. I am not going to take this any further forward this evening. If she is unable to do so as part of this Bill, maybe we could look at it again with regard to measures that come out of the Government’s animal welfare strategy in due course. I am very grateful to the Government for the action that has been taken.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, we should at least be grateful that we are dealing with this matter well after the dinner break. I support my noble friend’s amendment. I also support government Amendment 301. It is a big improvement on the current law, but I am very disappointed that it omits some of the essential features of the proposed new clause in the original Amendment 316 that my noble friend Lord Black of Brentwood had advocated for.
The Minister is a very talented lawyer, an excellent addition to this House and a nice person to boot. Her amendment is supported by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who is also incredibly able and almost as nice as the Minister. So I am being brave, or rather suicidal, when I say that these two lawyers have missed some of the crucial points in Amendment 301, as opposed to the proposed new clause in my noble friend’s original amendment. It seems that the government amendment is punishing people only for the perversion of the crime itself and not for the cruelty to the animal concerned.
Rather than continuing to say “the proposed new clause in the original amendment from my noble friend Lord Black of Brentwood”, I will simply refer to it as Amendment 316, which was its number in the Marshalled List in Committee. Amendment 316 would have not only criminalised sexual activity with animals but treated the conduct as an animal welfare matter. It would have given courts express powers to remove animals from offenders, direct their disposal, rehoming or destruction, and make disqualification orders tied to the Animal Welfare Act.
Government Amendment 301 criminalises sexual activity and touching but does not include those explicit welfare remedies or the statutory link to the Animal Welfare Act. Amendment 316 had a built-in mechanism for disqualification orders for owning, keeping, dealing in or transporting animals, and would have required those orders to be treated
“as if made under section 34 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006”.
Government Amendment 301 contains no parallel disqualification provisions, so an offender convicted under that amendment will not automatically be subject to the same statutory animal control prohibitions unless other legislation applies. Later in my remarks I shall come to the Animal Welfare Act and say why it is not adequate to deal with this problem.
Amendment 316 would have expressly allowed courts to make offenders subject to notification requirements and tied in amendments to the Sexual Offences Act and the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act for images. Government Amendment 301 changes the wording elsewhere, replacing “intercourse” with “sexual activity”, but the core text does not set out the same notification on image-related court powers.
Amendment 316 explicitly amended the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 to add images of sexual activity with animals and attach the same animal welfare disqualification remedies to convictions for those image offences. Amendment 301 does not include those parallel amendments.
We now come to the crux of the matter: the penalties. Amendment 316 carried higher maximum custodial sentences—up to five years on indictment—and therefore signals a higher statutory seriousness and sentencing range than Amendment 301, which is up to just two years on indictment. However, when we look at sexual activity with a corpse in government Amendment 302, we see that the maximum penalty will be raised to seven years, if I am right.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, this is another X-rated group of amendments. I added my name to government Amendment 301, on sexual activity with an animal, and I spoke on this subject in Committee. The prohibition of sex with animals has a long history—it was proscribed in Leviticus, chapter 18, verse 23—and it is high time that the statute book comprehensively addressed this subject. The predecessor section in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 fails to do that. I am pleased that the Minister, whom I thank, listened very carefully to the debate. She has listened to all those who made representations, and the Government have brought forward an amendment that—while it is no doubt less than perfect, for the reasons that the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra and Lord Black, indicated—is a very considerable step forward. I am grateful to the Government and support Amendment 301.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I welcome the Government’s amendment on sexual activity with an animal. The original amendment in Committee from the noble Lord, Lord Black, shone a fierce but necessary light on the grim intersection of animal abuse, child exploitation and online coercion, and it is because of that work that we are now debating a meaningful change to the law. What matters now is that the law recognises the overlap between animal sexual abuse, child sexual exploitation and wider patterns of coercive control, and that we respond with tools that are fit for purpose in 2026.
The Government’s amendment to Section 69 of the Sexual Offences Act replaces the narrow offence of “intercourse with an animal” with a broader offence of
“sexual activity with an animal”,
defined by intentional or sexual touching, whether the animal is living or dead. It also ensures that such conduct engages the notification regime in Schedule 3, so that those convicted can be managed as sexual offenders. That is a significant and very welcome step. However, there remain gaps that need to be addressed. The terminology widely used in policing and safeguarding is “animal sexual abuse” because it captures a spectrum of exploitative acts, including material that is filmed, traded online or used to groom children. These are not marginal cases; they go to the heart of how abusers terrorise children and partners, including by targeting family pets.
Amendment 390 from the noble Lord, Lord Black, would introduce notification and offender management requirements for a defined list of serious animal cruelty offences, placing those convicted on a register. That would apply to those who cause unnecessary suffering, arrange animal fights, possess extreme pornographic images of animals, damage protected animals or intentionally engage in sexual activity with an animal, as well as those who cause, coerce or permit another person, including a child, to do so, or who use an animal for sexual gratification. These are not technical tweaks. Notification and active offender management recognise the strong links between serious animal cruelty and the risk of harm both to animals and to people, especially children, who may be targeted with these horrific images or forced to participate in their creation.
A similar system to the sex offenders register would allow the police and probation service to monitor such offenders and retain the information needed to manage the risk they pose over time. I freely acknowledge the progress already made, but without the robust notification and management framework envisaged in Amendment 390 we will still be asking front-line agencies to deal with extremely dangerous offenders with one hand tied behind their back. The cost of getting this wrong is borne not only by animals but by the children and adults who are terrorised, coerced or groomed through this abuse. While I welcome the Government’s amendment as an important milestone, I urge the Minister to go further and to match the full ambition of the proposals of the noble Lord, Lord Black, on notification and offender management.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken to the amendments in this group and I echo the thanks of my noble friend Lord Black of Brentwood to the Minister for her remarks and for listening and acting on the concerns raised in Committee. I acknowledge the work of my noble friends Lord Black and Lord Blencathra, who are tireless champions of animal welfare and have worked effectively with the Government on the Bill.
We welcome the introduction of Amendment 301 and its consequential amendments, which build on the debate in Committee and update the offence of “intercourse with an animal” with a wider provision that covers all sexual activity, as we have heard. This area of law has long needed updating, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, and I am glad that the Government are doing it now. My noble friend Lord Black of Brentwood raised a couple of concerns that were worth highlighting. He said that to deprive an individual of animals that they own after they have been convicted is a logical next step. If the primary goal is to promote the welfare of animals, as I believe it is, it seems to me that the best way to achieve that would be to ensure that those who have been convicted are prevented from owning or having access to animals.
Similarly, he spoke about the discrepancy in sentences and that does not seem to make complete sense, as it stands. I look forward to hearing what the noble Baroness has to say in reply.
My noble friend also mentioned the possession and sharing of animal pornography. I am sure that there is not much appetite for further discussion of pornography today, but this is an important issue, and I would be grateful if the Minister could commit to considering measures to curbing animal pornography in the future.
Finally, these Benches wholly support the intention behind the amendment in the names of my noble friends. In the interest of brevity, I will not repeat the statistics or arguments raised by my noble friend Lord Black in his speech, but the evidence base is clear and irrefutable. It seems there is a causal link between animal abuse and domestic abuse and sexual violence. As he highlighted, pets are often used to coerce and control victims of domestic abuse. There seems to be institutional knowledge within relevant authorities that this is happening and yet we lack the safeguards to address it. My noble friend also mentioned the tragic case of Holly Bramley.
The cost/benefit of this measure is hard to argue against. The child sex offender register, a current practice that uses the same principle, costs just £1.92 million per year. I suggest that we would be in similar sums for this. I understand that the Minister may not be able to offer her support to this measure at this point, but I hope that it is something that the Government will return to in the future.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Black, Lord Blencathra, Lord Pannick and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for welcoming the Government amendments today and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for the flattering remarks that he made which were very welcome after a long day in your Lordships’ House. I am pleased to hear that the amendments have this support and, once again, I thank those who raised this with us in Committee.
This new offence is focused solely on strengthening the criminal offence relating to sexual abuse of animals, given the scope of this Bill. To establish this offence, the new offence that the Government are bringing today, the prosecution does not have to prove that the animal actually suffered, because this was sometimes an obstacle to prosecutions in the past. This was something that we were persuaded of during the meetings with the noble Lord and those who came with him. Where the conduct has caused the animal to suffer, the defendant can be charged with an offence under the Animal Welfare Act 2006, for which orders such as removing the animal from the offender’s ownership, rehoming or destroying the animal, or disqualifying the offender from keeping animals are available. It is not either or—they can both be charged at the same time. It is quite common with criminal behaviour.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
The Minister says that the accused could be charged. Charged and prosecuted by whom?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
Although the RSPCA conventionally prosecutes, there is nothing to stop the Crown Prosecution Service from prosecuting. If you had conduct that fell within both, you would not have two separate prosecutors bringing two separate sets of proceedings; it would be the Crown Prosecution Service for both. However, I understand the concerns. I am committing to continuing to engage with parliamentarians and key stakeholders on this issue. We will keep it under consideration.
As far as animal pornography is concerned—obviously a great worry to everybody—the offence of possession of extreme pornographic images under Section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 already criminalises possession of pornographic images depicting extreme acts, which includes intercourse or oral sex with an animal, whether living or dead. We do not believe that further legislation is necessary.
Turning to the question of sentence, the current offence of intercourse with an animal carries a maximum sentence of two years’ imprisonment, which we will retain for the new offence. We do not have evidence at the moment that this is insufficient to enable the courts to deal appropriately with offending of this nature, but we know that, when animal suffering occurs, there are higher penalties available under the animal cruelty legislation, which—as has already been said by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra—provides sentences of up to five years’ imprisonment. Once again, we will engage with parliamentarians and key stakeholders as to how the existing animal cruelty offences operate alongside the new offence. With that in mind, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Black, to withdraw—
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I am sorry for holding the House back this late at night. The Minister says that there is nothing to stop the CPS prosecuting for animal cruelty if it is prosecuting a case of sex with an animal and discovers cruelty. In that case, will she guarantee that the CPS will issue guidance to all its prosecutors that, where a prosecutor is prosecuting for animal sexual abuse and discovers animal cruelty, he or she will automatically prosecute it and not wait for the RPSCA to do it God knows when?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
The difficulty is that the Crown Prosecution Service, as a matter of constitutional convention, is independent of the Government and does not take well to being told what to do by them. However, we can raise this with it and ask whether it will look at it again. I beg to move.
Baroness Levitt
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment updates the wording of a reference to the offence of sexual activity with a corpse in paragraph 92 of Schedule 3 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
“Restriction on applying for gender recognition certificateAny offender who has been convicted of a sexual offence under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 may not obtain a gender recognition certificate.”
Baroness Maclean of Redditch (Con)
My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendment 307 in my name. I spoke to it in Committee and have brought it back because it is an important issue. The amendment would simply ban any convicted sex offender from obtaining a gender recognition certificate. I remind your Lordships that a gender recognition certificate would enable this individual to legally change their gender from male to female. That means they can live legally as a woman and access women’s and single-sex spaces.
When we debated this before, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, responded to my remarks and I thank him very much for his letter to me. I have tabled a number of Written Questions on this issue. I will make a couple of points about why this amendment is still needed and why I am not satisfied with the Government’s assurances.
In my discussions with the Government, they have rightly highlighted their tightening up of the requirements and safeguards to protect the public when people are changing their name. That may be the case with a gender recognition certificate. If somebody is changing their gender, they may wish to change their name—not necessarily, but it could happen. The Government are tightening up those requirements, putting in enhanced notification requirements, restricting changes to identity documents and bringing in closer requirements for police supervision. All those things are good, but it still requires the sex offender to notify the police of any changes to their personal information. It happens after the event; it is not a blanket ban. The onus is on the criminal to go to the police and say, “I have changed my name”. This is a convicted sex offender, so many would say that it stands to reason that there is a low level of trust in them anyway. To me, it is not a satisfactory answer.
The other objection the Government mentioned when I was bringing this forward and tabling Questions was that the scale of the problem is very small. That may be true, but the numbers are as follows. Almost 10,000 gender recognition certificates have been issued since 2004. Last year alone, 1,169 were granted. Nobody is saying that every single person who has been granted a gender recognition certificate is a sex offender or criminal—not at all—but the issue is that we do not know whether any of them are. There may be individuals within that population who are convicted sex offenders. I say that this is possible because, as the Government have confirmed, a criminal conviction is not disclosed in the process of applying for a gender recognition certificate. Apparently, the panel assesses risk and looks at a number of factors regarding that individual, but a criminal conviction is not part of that process.
I found that very strange, and various members of the public who have written to me have also found it rather strange. The argument that this is a small number of people is not adequate to reassure the public that we would not have somebody who has been convicted of a horrific crime—sex with a child, rape, paedophilia—go on to potentially obtain a gender recognition certificate. What possible reason could that individual have for changing their gender? There would be only one reason: they want to access more vulnerable people and commit horrendous crimes.
To me, it seems a matter of common sense that you could make the process of applying for this certificate something that has a step somebody must go through to say “I am not a convicted sex offender”, or the panel should require that evidence in its deliberations to ensure that somebody who has been convicted of rape or sexual offences of a serious nature should not be permitted to change their gender. The Government say that these issues are judged on case-by-case basis, but they do not keep the information that would really inform those decisions. The questions I have tabled to the Government show that applicants are not required to provide details of criminal convictions, and only 6% of those applications are refused for any reason. So it does look like a reasonably permissive process that people are able to get through quite easily.
If a person has successfully changed their gender and name, the onus is on them to go to the police. This is a system that is full of loopholes. It is not satisfactory to say “Well, it’s only a small number of individuals”, because even one person being able to do that is too many.
I will very briefly come back to the absolutely horrendous case I mentioned before. A perpetrator called Ryan Haley sexually abused a girl who was only 13 years old; she had to go to court and watch him on trial for sexual abuse, where he insisted that everyone call him Natalie Wolf and said he was celebrating his body and his choice. What about the body of the young girl who was abused under horrific circumstances? Why should he get to stand up and be treated as a woman when he committed disgraceful acts on a 13 year-old girl? That is the reason for my amendment, and I look forward to the Government’s response.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean, for outlining her reasons behind Amendment 307. However, I approach this from a somewhat different perspective. I do not sit behind the fact that there is a very low number of transgender people who are convicted of sex offences; I turn it around and look through the other end of the telescope. This is why I found the Government’s updated guidance called Crime and Policing Bill: Management of Offenders Factsheet extremely helpful.
First, the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean, referred to names. The factsheet very clearly says that sex offenders may not make name changes without the permission of the police; if they do not have permission, they are committing an offence. They also have to notify the police of any contact with children. In the past, that has meant that, whenever they spend 12 hours or more in a household where children are present, they have to notify the police of the address, the date on which they are going to stay and when residence began.
The changes will remove the time threshold and the responsibility not only on the offender but of those involved in monitoring the offender, whether it is the police or probation, meaning that any contact with children in the future will be monitored. Further, if they are away from a previously notified address, that is an offence, as the other items are under the Sexual Offences Act, if they do not notify authorities. The police will be watching for people who are on the sexual offences register to make sure that they comply, and I suspect they and probation would be very concerned if there were gaps in appearances and would chase them.
Is the Minister satisfied that the public would be safe from any sex offender on the register who is caught by the terms of this factsheet—which is a very good practical document for police, probation and others—whether they are transgender or not?
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I rise to speak very briefly. As was the case in Committee, we wholly support the intention behind my noble friend’s amendment. It would serve to prevent those who commit a sexual offence obtaining a gender recognition certificate and is a necessary step that would stop criminals retroactively exploiting gender recognition laws. Our view is that we should not put inmates at risk by placing other criminals of a different sex in prison with them, for instance. I have direct experience of this in Scotland, where a few years ago there was the celebrated case of Isla Bryson, who was a double rapist initially housed in the female prison estate having decided to transition while standing trial, and I would not want to see those mistakes repeated in the rest of the UK. I hope that the Minister can offer his support for this amendment and I look forward to hearing his reply.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean, for setting out Amendment 307. As she knows, we have discussed this in Committee, we have corresponded and I am grateful for her acknowledgement of that. Amendment 307 seeks to prevent anyone with a conviction for an offence under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 being eligible to obtain a gender recognition certificate.
As I said in Committee, individuals with sexual offence convictions are already subject to a comprehensive set of post-conviction measures, including the notification requirements, sexual harm prevention orders and oversight through multi-agency public protection arrangements. These ensure that offenders are monitored and managed according to the level of risk they present and not their gender. In answer to the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, obviously we believe that the measures in place are supportive and preventive and will manage offenders. We can never guarantee that offenders do not reoffend, but there is very close supervision and oversight through those multi-agency protection arrangements.
The noble Baroness, Lady Maclean, mentioned the number of gender recognition certificates issued and the potentially small number of people with a gender recognition certificate who commit an offence. Most of those who have one are living their lives legally, honestly and decently and will not come within the remit of this legislation. Given the strength of the post-conviction risk management systems that I have just mentioned, together with the very small number of gender recognition certificates issued each year, the Government do not consider a statutory prohibition of this kind to be necessary. To return to the point mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, the notification regime exists to support risk management, and we remain unconvinced that a blanket restriction on access to a gender recognition certificate will provide any meaningful additional protection.
Where a registered sex offender seeks to change their name following a change in gender—which goes to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, with the Scottish example that he gave—whether or not a gender recognition certificate is involved, in England and Wales, the measures as outlined in Clause 98 will apply.
I think that the measures in Clause 98—I know she has read them—are quite important. The notification requirements state:
“A relevant offender must notify a new name to the police … no less than 7 days before using it”.
The measures are there to ensure that reasonable, practical steps are taken. The clause provides the recognition that we are putting in place, which the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, mentioned: a registered offender must notify a new name to the police before a name change is put in place. In the small number of cases where somebody wishes to have a gender recognition certificate involved in a name change, Clause 98 covers the points clearly. It becomes clear that requiring offenders to notify the police of the acquisition of a gender recognition certificate will aid the police in the risk management of sex offenders. The Government can exercise existing regulation-making powers to introduce such a requirement.
Baroness Maclean of Redditch (Con)
I thank the Minister for his comments. Just to be very clear and direct, it would be one less individual for the MAPPA arrangements to worry about, because that individual would not have changed their gender. They would still be living in their previous gender and there would be a very straightforward process there. There would be no risk of loopholes and that person falling outside the MAPPA arrangements.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I again draw the noble Baroness’s attention to Clause 98, which says:
“A relevant offender must notify a new name to the police … no less than 7 days before using it”.
Again, criminal or not, if people wish to identify in the way in which they identify, I think they are entitled to be allowed to do so. I give way again.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I apologise for intervening at this time of night. Surely the key point is that, once someone has been convicted of a sex offence, being on the register, either indefinitely or for a particular period, is the trigger for the monitoring of that offender. Whether they have a gender recognition certificate or not is almost irrelevant. It is not irrelevant to the noble Baroness, and I absolutely accept that, but all the monitoring of that individual will happen regardless of whether they have a gender recognition certificate.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I said this in my opening remarks, but I will repeat myself to enforce what the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, said: the arrangements in place ensure that offenders are monitored and managed according to the level of risk they present, not according to their gender. That is the key point that I put to the noble Baroness. The gender issue is covered by Clause 98. The management of risk is covered whatever their gender happens to be at any time. People still have the right to change their gender and identify as they feel right, according to their own circumstances.
I say again to the noble Baroness that the vast majority of people who apply for a gender recognition certificate are not going to be sex offenders. They are going to be ordinary people walking round the streets and living in communities and never even thinking of being sex offenders. I do not wish to tarnish those individuals who have a full right to live their life as they choose, so I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Maclean of Redditch (Con)
I will not detain the House. I have heard what the Minister said and I am unsatisfied, but I will withdraw my amendment.
Lord Katz
“(b) in subsection (1), after “satisfied” insert “on the balance of probabilities”;(c) in subsection (2), after “satisfied” insert “on the balance of probabilities”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the standard of proof which applies when a court is deciding whether to make a stalking protection order, or whether to include a particular prohibition or requirement, is the civil standard.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, following consideration of amendments tabled by my noble friend Lady Royall and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, in Committee, the Government have brought forward amendments to the stalking provisions in Part 6.
Amendments 308 to 313, 314 and 315 explicitly provide for the civil standard of proof to apply when a court is deciding whether to make a stalking protection order, or whether to include a particular prohibition or requirement to an order in England, Wales or Northern Ireland. This includes when the courts are deciding whether to impose an additional prohibition or requirement on the variation or renewal of a stalking protection order. This will promote consistency and improve clarity in understanding of the standard of proof applicable in cases of stalking protection orders.
In addition, I am very happy to accept Amendment 316 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, which will convert the power conferred on the Secretary of State to issue guidance about stalking into a duty to do so. This will align the provision on guidance in the Stalking Protection Act 2019 with that in the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, promoting consistency in the legislative provisions which aim to tackle violence against women and girls.
My noble friend Lady Royall also has Amendment 313A in this group. I will respond to it once she and other noble Lords have contributed to the debate, but in the meantime, I beg to move.
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)
My Lords, before speaking to Amendment 313A, I thank my noble friend for bringing forward amendments in response to my amendment in Committee. These amendments clarify the evidential threshold for obtaining an SPO, bringing this in line with the domestic abuse protection orders, so ensuring swifter and less onerous access to these protective orders, and it will make a real difference to the protection and safety of victims.
I am grateful to the Minister and the Bill team for meeting me, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell, and to the Victims’ Commissioner and the Suzy Lamplugh Trust for their support.
Amendment 313A is very similar to the one I moved in Committee, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. It would introduce stalking protection notices—SPNs—to provide an immediate safeguard to prevent unwanted contact or communication from a perpetrator until a full SPO is granted, thus mirroring domestic abuse protection notices. In response to the debate on that amendment, my noble friend the Minister suggested that the amendment as drafted would be disproportionate, since it would criminalise the breach of a police-issued notice without court oversight. I have therefore updated the amendment so that a breach of an SPN would not be a criminal offence, ensuring that it reflects the framework for DAPOs.
Why is this amendment necessary? Because, as highlighted in the Suzy Lamplugh Trust super-complaint and its report on experiences of the CPS and the courts, the use of full and interim SPOs is currently inadequate, including lack of applications by the police and the time that it takes to obtain one, given that both the full and interim orders have to be granted by a court. Victims say that when police do apply for SPOs, the judiciary do not recognise the need for an SPO, particularly if other orders are already in place.
In response to the super-complaint, HMICFRS highlighted the arduous application process for the police and their frustrations over their inability to issue orders themselves. It called for the Government to use the DAPN framework as a template to legislate for a new stalking protection notice, which, like the DAPN, would not require an application to the court and could be issued by the police to offer protection in stalking cases.
The length of delays in cases varies from months to years. For victims of stalking, a delay in taking their case to trial means a continuation of the stalking behaviours, especially if no protective orders are put in place. The failure to put in place an interim or full SPO at the earliest opportunity puts victims at risk of further acts of stalking, which increases the potential psychological and physical harm that they are likely to suffer. Data on SPOs is also limited and outdated, making it hard to establish how many are refused by the courts.
It is both right and logical that SPNs should be enabled and put in place following a similar approach to DAPNs. They would offer immediate police-applied protection in stalking cases and set a timeframe for the courts to consider a full order. It cannot be right that, at the moment, a woman who is at risk of violence from a stalker has less protection than a woman at risk of violence at the hands of her domestic abuser, so steps must be taken to bring this into line.
The hour is late, but I will cite one case study from the Suzy Lamplugh Trust relating to delays in SPOs and the harm caused. This case opened in January 2025. The client was subjected to criminal damage, vexatious complaints to her employer and an online campaign aimed at discrediting her. The offender also moved house to be closer to the client. This has had a significant impact on her quality of life. The case has had four different OICs and different teams from the outset, which has caused considerable delay—to the detriment of the client. An SPO has been considered throughout the investigation, but there has been little progress or ownership of responsibility across the police force.
The advocate has pointed this out on numerous occasions. Several complaints have been made to the police and the local MP but, as far as the advocate knows, no response has been received. Legal services within the force had been contacted about an SPO in February 2025. Multiple witness statements had been obtained to support the application. The police stated that the SPO application was submitted in March 2025, but this turned out to be incorrect. The judge, in a separate non-molestation order request hearing, asked why after six months the force had not secured an SPO. At the time of writing, the SPO application was sitting with the force’s legal services awaiting a court date. Due to the time that has elapsed, the perpetrator has now been on bail for so long that it has required a magistrate’s application to secure a bail extension.
This and hundreds of similar cases demonstrate the need for swift action and the introduction of stalking protection notices. I beg to move.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, for setting out the details of her amendment, which I signed. I will not repeat any of the things that she said. I completely endorse them. I thank the Government for their amendments. Moving from the criminal level of proof to a civil standard of proof is important. We have been arguing for this for some time, so I am very grateful that the Government have taken this on board.
My Amendment 316 is another attempt to draw parallels between all the protections for victims of domestic abuse and those of stalking. It felt an odd decision that a Secretary of State might be able to report but not have to report on conditions. So I am very grateful that the Minister has signed my amendment. I look forward to seeing the statutory reports in due course.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, as a preliminary point, when we debated this part of the Bill in Committee, my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower made the point that the Government are not taking a strong enough line on sentencing for those convicted of stalking offences. That remains the case. I hope that Ministers will heed that warning. Violence against women and girls is unacceptable. We can all agree that and we must have a zero-tolerance approach. Strengthening stalking protection orders is just one step, but we need to take a tougher approach on sentencing and enforcement.
Amendment 313A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, is a reasonable proposal which Ministers should consider. It sets out the structure of the SPN procedure. The noble Baroness also spoke to existing flaws in the current SPO system. I have a couple of questions that I would be grateful if the Minister could consider. Do the Government feel that the existing stalking protection order system is dealing with orders sufficiently quickly? What steps are Ministers taking to speed up the process when issues arise?
Given the hour, I do not intend to detain the House further. We accept the government amendments in this group on the civil standard of proof, which respond to concerns raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall. They have the effect of clarifying the position on the standard of proof used when imposing SPOs. Clarity of the law and its application are essential parts of any just legal system and we welcome them.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I thank everyone who has taken part in this short but important debate. As my noble friend Lady Royall of Blaisdon set out, Amendment 313A would introduce a stalking protection notice, which could be imposed by an officer of at least the rank of superintendent. I am grateful to my noble friend for continuing to raise the operational issues impacting how well stalking protection orders work in practice and the differences between existing protective order frameworks for addressing violence against women and girls.
I am also grateful to my noble friend, together with the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for meeting with the Minister, my noble friend Lord Hanson of Flint, to discuss their amendment. I understand and sympathise with the intention of noble Lords to address this issue. In our violence against women and girls strategy, published in December, we committed to launch stalking protection order intensification sites into select police force areas. These will aim to drive up the use of stalking protection orders and provide opportunities to test innovative approaches to enforcing conditions and monitoring breaches which could be adopted nationwide.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I have just had a look to see whether I can find any data on the number of stalking protection orders issued to those under 18, and the answer is that they are not disaggregated. The Minister is drawing this great distinction about those aged between 10 and 17. We have just had a debate on another matter where we think there is a very small number involved. It would be useful to know if we could have some help from the Minister on the likelihood of numbers.
Lord Katz (Lab)
It may not entirely surprise the noble Baroness that I do not have that data or the awareness of what we can do with the data to hand, but I am certainly happy to undertake to write to her with as much detail as we can summon.
I hope that my noble friend will be content not to move her Amendment 313A and, with other noble Lords, will support the government amendments in this group.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the standard of proof which applies when a court is deciding whether to make a stalking protection order is the civil standard.
“(i) in paragraph (a), after “satisfied” insert “on the balance of probabilities”;Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the standard of proof which applies when a court is deciding whether to impose an additional prohibition or requirement on the variation or renewal of a stalking protection order is the civil standard.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the standard of proof which applies when a court is deciding whether to make a stalking protection order is the civil standard.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the standard of proof which applies when a court is deciding whether to include a particular prohibition or requirement in a stalking protection order is the civil standard.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the standard of proof which applies when a court is deciding whether to impose an additional prohibition or requirement on the variation or renewal of a stalking protection order is the civil standard.
“364I Stalking protection notices and streamlined process for stalking protection orders(1) A senior police officer of the rank of Superintendent or above may issue a stalking protection notice (“SPN”) where they have reasonable grounds to believe that—(a) the defendant has carried out behaviour associated with stalking as described in this Act,(b) the defendant is aged 18 or over, and(c) it is necessary to issue a notice to protect another person from the risk of stalking.(2) A stalking protection notice may—(a) prohibit the defendant from engaging in conduct which amounts to stalking, or from contacting or attempting to contact another person (“the protected person”) in a manner associated with stalking behaviour,(b) include a direction for a defendant to attend a magistrate’s court within 72 hours for an application for a Stalking Protection Order, and(c) remain in force until that hearing takes place.(3) A stalking protection notice must—(a) state the grounds on which it is made,(b) set out the terms of the notice, and(c) inform the Defendant of the date, time and location of the court hearing.”
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)
My Lords, I am very grateful for the response from my noble friend the Minister. I did not really understand the point about age, so I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and I look forward to reading Hansard and to receiving a letter likewise.
It is great to know that there is an internal review taking place, and of course we look forward to Richard Wright’s review. I note that the Government have said that they will respond to the review within four months, so we look forward to a response before the summer. With that, I am happy not to press my amendment.
“(ii) after “satisfied” insert “on the balance of probabilities”;(c) in subsection (3), after “satisfied” insert “on the balance of probabilities”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the standard of proof which applies when a court is deciding whether to make a stalking protection order, or whether to include a particular prohibition or requirement, is the civil standard.
“(aa) in subsection (3)(a), after “satisfied” insert “on the balance of probabilities”;”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the standard of proof which applies when a court is deciding whether to impose an additional prohibition or requirement on the variation or renewal of a stalking protection order is the civil standard.
Baroness Brinton
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would require the issuance of stalking guidance by the Secretary of State, mirroring the provisions for guidance within the Domestic Abuse Act 2021.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, for signing my amendment, and I am grateful that the Ministers said they would accept my amendment. On that basis, I beg to move.
Lord Addington
“Consultation on guidance for serious self-harm offences(1) The Secretary of State must issue guidance regarding the application of sections 115 and 116 (encouraging or assisting serious self-harm). (2) Before issuing or revising any guidance under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must consult extensively with the following persons and organisations—(a) representatives of self-harm support charities and organisations;(b) mental health professionals, including those providing trauma-informed care and support;(c) legal experts, including prosecutors and defence practitioners, regarding the application of the specific intent requirement;(d) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.(3) The guidance issued under this section must—(a) clearly differentiate between conduct falling within the criminal offence under section 102 (which requires specific intention to encourage or assist serious self-harm) and legitimate, supportive, or therapeutic activity;(b) include instruction for law enforcement and relevant agencies on identifying and engaging with vulnerable individuals in a trauma-informed manner.(4) The Secretary of State must lay before both Houses of Parliament a copy of any guidance issued or revised under this section.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to issue guidance on the serious self-harm sections of this Bill.
Lord Addington (LD)
My Lords, I join the Bill, at this late stage, very much as the understudy. I am afraid my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones could not be with us any longer, but the hour is late and I do not think anybody can accuse him of not putting in a shift. He gave me brief notes, and I will try to précis them further.
This is inspired by charities feeling that the advice they give out may be caught by the Bill. Of course, this will not be the intention of government, but the cock-up theory of history is one I have always found very appealing. If it can go wrong, it probably will, unless you put something in place.
I believe my noble friend was waiting for a letter from the noble Baroness the Minister; I am not policing his inbox so I do not know what has happened there, but if we can get some clarity from the Dispatch Box that steps will be made so that there is no confusion and this very important work can take place, then the noble Baroness, if she is replying to this, will be doing us all a favour in making sure that help can be given to people who desperately need it. I beg to move.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I had written “I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones”, which I crossed out, and then “the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey”, which I also crossed out. I will now say that I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Addington, for bringing forward this amendment and for the careful way in which he outlined the basis for it.
We support the intention behind Clauses 115 and 116. These are serious offences, designed to capture those who deliberately encourage or assist serious self-harm. Precisely because the subject matter is so grave and so bound up with vulnerability, it is essential that the law is applied with clarity and care.
The amendment’s focus on consultation and guidance is pragmatic and proportionate, because policy in this area must be rooted in the lived experience of mental health professionals and legal practitioners, so guidance that distinguishes criminal intent from legitimate activity will be vital to avoid unintended consequences. For those reasons, we lend our support to the principle behind this amendment and look forward to the Minister’s response.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I too had a speech that started off thanking the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I too crossed that out and wrote in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. I also now thank the noble Lord, Lord Addington, for moving this amendment.
I am, however, grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, who is not in his place now, for meeting me to discuss his amendment. I think I was able to persuade him and to reassure him that guidance on the application of Clauses 115 and 116 is not necessary. I also wrote to him—I know I cleared the letter, and it may even have been the day before yesterday; I think I have just received a message saying that it may not have been sent until this afternoon, but it has definitely gone. We have placed a copy in the House Library. The letter was written with the intention that it could be sent to the various charities so that they could see exactly what I was saying.
As the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and I discussed, the existing offence that these amendments seek to broaden, which is under Section 184 of the Online Safety Act, is already in active use by the CPS and law enforcement. We are not aware of any cases involving therapeutic support where prosecutors have struggled to determine whether a prosecution was appropriate. The CPS guidance is clear about the requirement of intention, which must be present to meet the threshold of the offence, and the CPS legal guidance will be updated to reflect the widened scope of the offence, which now covers conduct both online and in person.
The offence also contains two important safeguards. First, the defendant must intend to encourage or assist the serious self-harm. Secondly, their act must be capable of doing so. These safeguards ensure that vulnerable individuals and those providing mental health support are not also inadvertently captured.
I should make it clear that it is absolutely not the Government’s intention to target either vulnerable people or the therapeutic services that support them. The Government believe the offence as it operates now and as it will be expanded in the Bill is proportionate and targets only the most serious and culpable offending. I hope that the noble Lord is content with these reassurances and will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Addington (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for giving that assurance. Having it repeated again at the Dispatch Box makes it easier for people to feel secure about this. That, along with the letter, which I am sure is a work of great wisdom, will add to the fact that we will have a defence in place, just in case there are misunderstandings. With that, I am prepared to withdraw the amendment.
Crime and Policing Bill
Wednesday 4th March 2026
(2 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 167-III(b) Amendments for Report (Supplementary to the Third Marshalled List) - (4 Mar 2026)
17:11 - Division on Amendment 326 - Ayes: 41 / Noes: 181 - Amendment 326 disagreed.
Lord Lucas
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment introduces subsection (6A) inserted by another Lord Lucas amendment.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
My Lords, before we go through the listed amendments, I would be grateful if I could make a short intervention.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, has been called to move his amendment. The debate will proceed from there.
Lord Lucas (Con)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 318 I will speak to the other amendments in my name. Amendment 318 is a revised and strengthened version of a proposal that was kindly spoken to in Committee by my noble friend Lord Blencathra. It has been modified in light of comments made then, particularly from the Government Benches. It bears on disqualifying persons convicted of a serious cycling offence.
I suspect most of us, particularly those of us who spend any time in London, have experienced the enormous discomfort of being ridden past on the pavement at speed by a cyclist who has absolutely no interest in your comfort. If one has spent any time outside this Palace, one will also have noticed that the police have no interest in enforcing the law in these circumstances. It is up to us to do something to tighten the screws on cyclists like this. They make life for pedestrians extremely uncomfortable. The practice of continual and open law- breaking just brings the whole of the law into disrepute. It is really important that we tighten things up.
Amendment 319 would insert a new offence of riding or attempting to ride a cycle while disqualified. Such an offence requires accompanying sanctions. A licensing system seems to me entirely disproportionate; it would be a heavy weight of bureaucracy. I prefer the solution adopted by the Government in their approach to cycling offences in the Bill, which is to leave them to be enforced if circumstances allow—for instance, where somebody has been involved in a serious incident that the police have taken an interest in, or a member of the public makes a complaint that the police choose to follow up. That would sit easily with current policing practices. Continuing enforcement along these lines, though limited, would, if and when a prosecution or conviction was reported in the media, send a warning message to disqualified cyclists generally.
Turning turn to Amendment 321, the thrust of Clause 121 is to bring cycling offences pretty much into line with those applying to motor vehicles, but it leaves out disqualification. This is a missed opportunity to provide a substantial deterrent to offending. Proposed new subsection (9A), to be inserted by Amendment 321, prescribes that the period of obligatory disqualification for the two most serious offences of causing death or serious injury by dangerous cycling will not be less than five and two years, respectively. As for the other two offences of causing death or serious injury by careless or inconsiderate cycling, where the culpability is less, they will be subject to obligatory disqualification for not less than 12 months.
Proposed new subsection (9B) extends the definition of “disqualified” so that it can apply to cycles in a manner that is in conformity with the wording of the new cycling offences already created by the Bill. Amendments 323 to 325 add “obligatory” to the entries inserted by subsection (11) in Part I of Schedule 2; without them the amendment of Section 34 set out in Amendment 321 would be of no effect.
Amendment 333 would prescribe the penalties and mode of prosecution for the offence created by Amendment 319, and it inserts a new schedule containing minor and consequential amendments to the Road Traffic Offenders Act which is fine-tuned as it applies to persons disqualified for riding a cycle. Sections relating only to mechanically propelled vehicles are omitted.
As someone who frequently obstructs and remonstrates with pavement cyclists, I very much hope that my amendments will attract the support of the Government. I approve of the other amendments in this group and will listen to them with great interest. I beg to move.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I rise to speak to the amendments I propose. There are three sets affecting two themes. Amendment 343 is about the registration scheme for cyclists, and the two other groups—Amendments 326 to 328, and Amendments 330 to 332—are about creating a system to award points for offences committed by cyclists against their driving licence. They have the same theme, which is trying to get more accountability for cyclists when they hurt people or commit offences.
I do not intend to take as much time as I did in Committee, because I think the argument is fairly straightforward and the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, has made it. In 2015, 444 pedestrians were injured by cyclists; in 2024, that had increased to 603 and, of that number, those seriously injured had risen from 97 to 181. These numbers are based on police reporting, where the police attended. It is clear that these are minimum numbers. As a correspondent reminded me recently, it is not a legal requirement for the police to record an accident that occurs between a cyclist and a pedestrian, because it does not involve a motor vehicle. The numbers do not include incidents where the police did not attend a collision, where the pedestrian did not need medical treatment or attend their GP or a hospital— I think we have a serious gap in that information as well, because the data is not recorded well or collected at all—or where the police were not told.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
My Lords, I will speak in particular to Amendments 341 and 342 in my name but I support all the amendments in this group, which are on the same theme. Earlier today I met with the Motor Insurers’ Bureau, which takes this issue very seriously indeed and has made the point that privately owned e-scooters are illegal to use on public roads and spaces in the UK. They are classified as motor vehicles under the Road Traffic Act 1988 and therefore require insurance, registration and a driving licence, none of which is available for private e-scooters. That is why it is so important that we legislate for this area of the law.
The most recent figures show that fatalities and injuries caused by e-scooters and e-bikes increase year on year. Where there is no insurance for these vehicles, those of us with motor insurance all contribute to the Motor Insurers’ Bureau from which claims are made. While I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, for inserting two clauses from my Private Member’s Bill—it would be churlish of me not to acknowledge that; it shows that sometimes we Back-Bench legislators can achieve things—two outstanding clauses remain in my Bill.
A number of us have tried to insert insurance into the Bill to help this situation and have been told that it is not part of this Bill, so I am trying to do it in another Bill. In the context of that other Bill, the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill, I will just say in passing that there is a real issue here, because there is no definition of micromobility vehicles. It is incredibly important, for the purposes of motor insurance and of this Bill in creating criminal offences, that we are using the same definition in law. It is not acceptable to rely on one road traffic Act from 1988 for one definition and a later road traffic Act for another definition. When the Road Traffic Act 1988 came into effect, e-scooters did not exist. I am waiting to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, whether there is a definition that we can put forward in the context of that Bill.
The purpose of Amendments 341 and 342 is to fill the gap. At the moment, we do not know the extent to which e-scooters and e-bikes are being tampered with. It may be that a rented scooter could be perfectly law-abiding, but, although we have had endless pilot schemes, we have not had their results. Meanwhile, illegal e-scooters are being used for purposes for which they are not fit. That is why I urge the Government today to accept Amendment 341, which calls for a review to understand the way in which e-scooters are being potentially misused.
Equally, in Amendment 342, it is incredibly important that we have an annual report on cycling offences. I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who has done a great deal of work on this and managed to achieve a level of enforcement, by going out in the City of London—and I pay tribute to the work that the City of London Police do in this regard. There are other police forces doing work in other parts of the country, but I find it staggering that the Metropolitan Police do not have a target of impounding or chasing illegal users in this way.
I am going to come forward with a proposal in a different Bill, possibly my own Private Member’s Bill in the next parliamentary Session. The police may not have the ability to do this, but if an e-scooter or souped-up e-bike is parked, or berthed, and it is clearly illegal, traffic wardens should be trained to slap a fine on them or even confiscate them and take them away, to make sure that these illegal vehicles are taken off the road.
What worries me at the moment is that the Government do not know what they are dealing with. Separate departments are dealing with this issue—for example, the Department for Transport is encouraging people to use e-bikes and e-scooters to get to work, without considering that that has an impact as the level of casualties goes up. According to government data, in 2024 there were 1,339 casualties involving e-scooters; 32% of the injuries were serious and there were six fatalities. The statistics have got worse every year since recording began. We can clearly show that fatalities, injuries and casualties are increasing every year. It could happen to one of us, being knocked down on a pavement or crossing the road, as my noble friend Lord Lucas referred to.
It is unacceptable that the Motor Insurers’ Bureau is left to pick up the pieces when it comes to insurance. If someone has been incapacitated through such injury, a claim can run to millions of pounds to make sure that that individual has the required care for the rest of their life.
The time is right to grab this issue, take it very seriously and plug the two remaining gaps that I have identified with Amendments 341 and 342, along with the other amendments in this group.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I shall speak to my Amendment 344 on tackling the growing danger posed by food delivery couriers. There are moments in public policy when the evidence becomes so overwhelming, and so consistent across press reporting, academic research and lived experience, that Parliament has a duty to act. The dangers created by high-speed food delivery couriers, many riding illegally modified e-bikes, operating under intense delivery pressure, and too often treating pavements and pedestrian zones as racetracks, now fall squarely into that category.
The Department for Transport tells us that it will do a big consultation on this issue, lasting many months, if not years, but across the country the public can see what is happening. They see it on their high streets, in their neighbourhoods and, increasingly, in their hospitals. One of many published reports state that
“illegal or modified high speed e bikes + gig pay incentives = higher risk behaviours and more collisions, producing rising public complaints and a measurable clinical burden on hospitals”.
That is not rhetoric; it is the lived experience of communities across the whole United Kingdom.
The BBC’s reporting from Lincoln described the city centre as a Wild West, with delivery cyclists riding on pavements and through pedestrianised areas, leaving residents unsafe. Trauma surgeons have warned of a massive burden on orthopaedic services from e-bike injuries, with more severe fractures and complex operations becoming routine. Academic research from UCL confirms that gig economy riders—those working for the very companies that my amendment addresses—are more likely to speed, run red lights and use their phones while riding, and are more likely to be involved in collisions.
Lord Shinkwin (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 344A in my name, which neatly follows on from that of my noble friend Lord Blencathra. I begin by saying how grateful I am for the expressions of support from across your Lordships’ House when I introduced this amendment in Committee. I particularly appreciated the empathy from noble Lords, because it showed that the fear I have is real. It is a fear that is caused by dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling to people who perhaps have a mobility impairment like mine, or a visual or hearing impairment, or even to people who are not necessarily in the prime of life.
I also thank my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower, who said in Committee:
“Holding companies responsible, or at least requiring a public review of their practices, would help deter irresponsible riding and shift the burden back on to the companies that profit from high-speed delivery models. A review … would also allow us to examine the employment models used by these companies, the incentives placed on riders and the adequacy of training, supervision and enforcement mechanisms. It would provide a valuable evidence base for any future legislative change”.—[Official Report, 17/12/25; col. 747.]
I agree, and I am grateful for his support, as I am for that from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who in Committee made the important point:
“At the very least, this review might want to consider that an employer”—
or indeed contractor—
“could do more positive things than just employ sanctions. They could start to educate their cyclists and reward them for better behaviour”.—[Official Report, 17/12/25; col. 742.]
I also welcome the insightful comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, who said in Committee that
“the challenge is that most riders and scooters … are not employees of these companies, whose legal advice is that they do not want to go anywhere near that, because then they may be responsible for their cyclists’ or motorcyclists’ behaviour”.
Surely that is all the more reason for a review that includes contractors, as my amendment proposes. I thank the noble Baroness for acknowledging that the group of committee amendments in which my amendment was placed
“raise an important safety point”.—[Official Report, 17/12/25; col. 746.]
It is wonderful to know that our Lib Dem colleagues are so supportive of disabled people, and I look forward to hearing that they will follow through on their warm and very welcome words by supporting my amendment.
My third point is that, like the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, I am avowedly pro cycling. I believe that cycling is a good thing: I just happen to believe that responsible cycling is even better for pedestrians, for all road users and, most importantly, for cyclists themselves. Responsibility is the issue that lies at the heart of my amendment. What right-thinking person would disagree with the theory that every cyclist should cycle responsibly? Yet we know that there is a widening chasm between theory and practice. We know that, in practice right now, there is a culture of “anything goes”. As we heard earlier in the debate on this group, a culture of complete impunity is taking root, with the most frightening but inevitable consequences.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the dangerous, careless and inconsiderate behaviour of bicycle couriers, who career through red lights and along pavements, and the wrong way down one-way streets, with increasingly reckless abandon. It is the behaviour of what some noble Lords have described as “the worst perpetrators”—bicycle couriers—that my modest and reasonable amendment seeks to address.
The amendment would require the Home Secretary to institute a review
“assessing the effectiveness with which operators of bicycle courier services ensure”—
or, for legal clarification, take steps to ensure—
“that their employees and contractors conduct themselves on the roads in such a way as to avoid committing the offences in section 121”.
The review, which must be published within a year of Clause 121 coming into force, would recommend any changes to the law that it determines are necessary. The rationale for this amendment is similarly simple. It seeks to probe how the law can be changed to ensure that companies that contract the services of bicycle couriers bear some shared responsibility for the conduct of these cyclists on the road.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I rise to reiterate the concerns I expressed in Committee about the havoc being created by speeding cyclists, e-cyclists and e-scooters—a Wild West, as I have said before, particularly on London streets. I was nearly run over again this week in the Haymarket, and my next-door neighbour was told yesterday by a speeding cyclist, whom she upbraided outside her house and on our pavement, that he was an undercover policeman. More must be done, and I hope the Minister will give full consideration to all the amendments in this group, of which I am supportive.
I hope noble Lords will understand that I will keep my comments extremely brief. I say to the Minister that I welcome the new offences already in the Bill, which, as we have heard, reflect my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering’s previous Private Member’s Bill, but she is right, with her Amendments 341 and 342, to seek a review of electric scooter misuse and an annual report on cycling offences. My noble friend Lord Shinkwin has also proposed a review. We must keep up the pressure on the often-helpful noble Lord, Lord Hendy, and his Department for Transport so that we can deliver safer streets and safer pavements.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, we covered these matters pretty thoroughly during discussion of a number of amendments in Committee. As we are now on Report, I shall get quickly to the nub of the issue that I should like to discuss, which reflects a lot of what my noble friends Lord Blencathra and Lord Shinkwin have already said. I say at the outset that I am pro-bicycle and pro-cycling, but I am anti-law-breaking. We have a very serious situation at the moment.
I support this broad group of amendments. In particular, we have a problem with the use of illegally powerful e-bikes and those used by professional delivery companies. There are real benefits from e-bikes being used; it is much better for the environment, for all sorts of reasons, that e-bikes or bicycles are used rather than mopeds and two-stroke engines and so forth. It is a big step forward. The debate should not be characterised as anti-cycling—it is pro-cycling—but the technology has moved so fast that the general public perhaps do not always understand what is a legal or an illegal e-bike. The evidence appears to be that the police either do not spend too much time thinking about it or do not see the enforcement of the use of illegal e-bikes as a priority.
Every speech that we heard in Committee and have heard on Report was very supportive of that—very few views were expressed that did not make it feel as if there was a particular problem, apart perhaps from the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Katz, when he summarised the debate on 17 December, saying:
“We of course recognise the concerns about the behaviour of delivery riders, but it is harder to find firm evidence to suggest that their behaviour is so demonstrably worse than that of other groups that it is necessary to single them out for review”.—[Official Report, 17/12/25; col. 748.]
If we took a straw poll around the Chamber right now, I am not sure that he would find a huge amount of support. If he came out with me and the noble Lords, Lord Shinkwin, Lord Blencathra, Lord Lucas, and others one evening to have a look, we might be able to provide him with evidence in person pretty quickly.
The law is being ignored. If these were mopeds without number plates, I feel that the police would intervene quickly. The vehicles used have the performance of mopeds but are not regulated in the same way—they do not carry registration—and they are used to ride the wrong way up one-way streets, for example, in a way that I fell motorcycles are not. The general public see the law being flouted, and that is being normalised, which is a difficult and dangerous situation. These riders are agents or contractors of large delivery companies, which need to take responsibility for the fact that people operating under their flag or banner and doing their business for their commercial gain are routinely breaking the law; that is being ignored by delivery companies and not pursued with vigour by the police. When we had this discussion in Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Katz, was generally sympathetic but reluctant to take action.
A number of different approaches have been suggested by noble Lords, but the theme seems to be the same. Members of the House who have spoken are not saying that their particular solution is the be-all and end-all, but they recognise that there is a problem that needs to be addressed. The status quo is not working, so when the Minister comes to respond, the House would be very much in his debt if he were to give a clear indication of the degree to which he feels there is a significant problem. If he does not like the approaches being put forward in these amendments, he needs to be able to suggest what is going to change in order to give the House some comfort that the Government are actually taking this seriously.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I declare that I am a cyclist. I came in this morning and, as noble Lords can see, survived in one piece, miraculously. Secondly, I have to declare that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, saw me dismounting from my e-bike as I arrived, as he put it, prosaically, in front of our “prison gates” the other day. I actually dismounted when I was on the pavement, because I thought it was safer than doing it in the road, and he came towards me at considerable speed. I sometimes wonder if his own electric chariot is within the prescribed speed limit. One often thinks, “Is it a bird? Is it a plane?” and it is actually the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, going down one of our corridors at great speed.
I hate to interrupt this discussion because, from observation, your Lordships are most happy when discussing three particular issues: ourselves, which we enjoy enormously, and we go on at great length; potholes, which really gets your Lordships going; and dangerous cycling. At the root of this is behavioural psychology. The law is there. In repeated statements over the last 10 years, I have heard different Ministers—usually the junior ones, not the senior ones, because they get the short end of the stick—responding by saying, “Well, this is illegal; this is illegal; this is illegal”, which, of course, is a huge comfort to us all, particularly since it is clearly not actually being enforced.
I think back just a few days to the, I thought, rather good victory speech of the new Green MP, Hannah Spencer. She described the feelings of the people in the constituency that has elected her, and their experience of day-to-day life and how that made them feel, and there is an echo of that as one walks or cycles around London and sees open illegality happening everywhere we look. In large part, that is because we do not have a joined-up approach. I support the intent of all these amendments; however, we are never going to actually tackle this unless we have a joined-up approach.
I gently point out to the noble Lords who have put forward these amendments, of which there are a great many, that they might have had more power had they got together prior to Report, put their names together and tried to get some support from across the House to demonstrate the breadth and depth of feeling. When it comes to a joined-up approach, I am really saying that I hope the Government will acknowledge that there are ways of dealing with this, particularly if they look at international experience.
There are five elements, proven by international experience, to a joined-up approach to deal with the problems we are discussing. The first is clarity and adequate coverage of the rules. At the moment, we have a mixture of rules dating back many years in a variety of different laws, so it is not completely clear. The second is that detection and effective enforcement beats severity. Trying to put more rules and penalties in is not going to work if they are not enforced: it is the blind leading the blind. The third element is creating infrastructure in the right way. There is the phrase, “enforcement by design”. If you design roads, pavements, et cetera, cleverly—and some countries are rather better at that than us—you avoid a lot of this, because there is no need for it to happen; but it does require a joined-up approach.
The fourth element is operator and retailer controls. We have heard quite a lot about the operators, whether they are hire companies or food delivery companies. Again, that is not adequately covered by the hotchpotch of different laws we have. Indeed, in debate on a previous Bill, many of the Government’s own Back-Benchers, particularly those with a strong union background, were somewhat horrified to hear of the ways in which these delivery companies are able to avoid the law—by a designated driver, who is the employee or the contractor, actually asking somebody else who is not employed by the company or contracted to drive for them. If that driver is caught doing something bad, the company is not liable, because that individual is not connected to the company. That is done by most of these companies, which is clearly crazy.
Baroness Pidgeon (LD)
My Lords, this group of amendments is focusing on penalties and other measures for dangerous cycling on our streets. These Benches support a proportionate and evidence-based approach to updating the law, whereby any changes do not discourage people from cycling—considerately, of course—which we believe is an important mode of sustainable transport. The amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, once again try to disqualify cyclists for dangerous cycling. None of us likes seeing inconsiderate cycling on our streets, just as we do not like seeing dangerous or inconsiderate driving. However, we do not think these amendments are practical; they are not easily enforceable, so we will not be supporting them.
The amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, looking to add up to 12 points to a person’s driving licence for dangerous cycling, are an interesting proposal, given that many people who cycle also have a driving licence. However, fewer people are learning to drive, and this would not work for every cyclist. Whether this is proportionate and right is debatable. The issue remains, as we have heard throughout this debate, that traffic policing has been facing cuts across the country and it is not a prioritised area for policing; limited enforcement is also a challenge.
We do not support the other amendments from the noble Lord, Hogan-Howe, and the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, to set up a licensing scheme for cyclists and reports on cycling. We do not think they are necessary. The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and the new amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, try to tackle the many problems that have arisen with the rise in the number of delivery cyclists on our streets. We have been debating this here and on the devolution Bill. Most are picking up shopping from supermarkets or fast food and taking it to people’s homes. The amendments attempt to put some responsibility in law for the company the cyclist or driver may work for, but, as we have discussed, the challenge is that they may not actually be an employee.
We all acknowledge that there are real issues in this area with emerging micromobility modes and technology and their use. But the way forward is comprehensive legislation on e-bikes and e-scooters, addressing what is legally allowed on our streets, what safety standards we expect and the rules on their use. I therefore ask the Minister when the House might expect such legislation to address the many concerns we have heard expressed throughout the passage of this Bill. This is a real issue: we all see it day in, day out. I would like to understand how the Government plan to address it going forward, beyond this Bill. Specific legislation and a joined-up approach, as noted by the noble Lord, Lord Russell, are clearly needed, rather than amendments to the Bill today. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, we have spent many hours in your Lordships’ House debating the issue of dangerous cycling and the misuse of e-bikes. In Committee, I welcomed the Government’s measures to create offences to criminalise causing death by dangerous cycling, and it is right that offences relating to cycling are brought in line with those for driving. I am also aware that there are significant concerns about criminality arising from the use of e-bikes and that courier companies are not being held responsible for the actions of their riders. There is very evidently a problem here. It is for the Government to now come to Parliament with solutions to these issues. We do not need report after report, review after review and trial after trial. We need to need to know what the Government wish to do in this space, rather than simply what they do not want to do.
Fundamentally, there is a serious problem with enforcement. A large number of laws, rules and regulations already apply. E-bikes have legally prescribed specifications and cyclists are supposed to obey the rules of the road. The crux of this issue is enforcement—or the lack of it. Cyclists frequently flout the rules of the road with impunity and owners of e-bikes are illegally modifying them to go far faster than they were intended to. This presents real and very serious concerns for public safety. It is time for the Government to act and not prevaricate. I look forward to what the Minister has to say.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, so aptly put it, cycling is one of the issues that your Lordships’ House likes to debate at length. It is an important issue and I thank everyone who has taken part in this debate: the noble Lords, Lord Lucas, Lord Hogan-Howe, Lord Blencathra, Lord Shinkwin, Lord Russell of Liverpool and Lord Davies, the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Neville-Rolfe, Lady McIntosh and Lady Pidgeon. Some of them, though not all of them, were a very interesting supporting cast at a meeting in which I very much played junior partner to my noble friend Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill. I also thank them for that. There, we had a helpful discussion about some of the wider issues about the way that we frame some of the vehicles we have been talking about this afternoon.
We can all agree on the need for all cyclists, as with motorists, to obey the rules of the road so that our roads and pavements are safe for all users. As the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, put it, we can all say—at least, I hope we would—that we are pro-cycling but anti-lawbreaking. The issue is whether the proposals in these various amendments are workable, proportionate and do not have the unintended effect of deterring cycling and other forms of micromobility.
I will address the amendments in turn. Amendments 318 to 325 and Amendment 333, from the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, would allow for persons to be disqualified from cycling upon conviction of any of the offences in Clause 121. As we made clear in Committee, our fundamental concern is that such a disqualification could not be adequately enforced without some form of licensing for cyclists. Licensing for cyclists would be both costly and complex, and would mean the majority of law-abiding cyclists would face additional costs and barriers to cycling. It is a disproportionate response, given that these new offences are to deal with those rare cases in which cyclists have caused the death or serious injury of another road user.
I do not accept that the cycling disqualification would be an effective deterrent without effective enforcement. Moreover, it would place an unreasonable burden on the police or, alternatively, raise unreasonable expectations if your Lordship’s House were to give the courts the power to impose a disqualification without an accompanying effective enforcement mechanism. It may well be the case that the only way the police could identify whether such a disqualification was in force would be if the person was found to have breached it after being involved in a subsequent incident. This would entirely defeat the purpose of the disqualification and would not have prevented another incident. It would, in fact, likely be discovered only after another incident has occurred.
I turn to Amendments 326 to 332 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, starting with the amendments that would enable a person to receive up to 12 points on a driving licence upon conviction of any offences in Clause 121. Reaching 12 points on a driving licence would result in a person being disqualified from driving a motor vehicle. Section 163 of the Sentencing Act 2020 provides a general power for the criminal courts to impose a driving disqualification on an offender convicted of any offence. In addition, Section 14 of the Sentencing Act 2026 provides courts with the power to impose a driving prohibition requirement as part of a community sentence or suspended sentence. I hope these go some way to meeting the noble Lord’s objectives.
Amendment 343, again in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, would create a registration scheme for the purpose of enforcing the new offences in Clause 121. Although I accept that a registration scheme for cycles would make enforcement of offences easier, the absence of a registration system does not, of course, make enforcement impossible. As the noble Lord will know, the police would be expected to pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry open to them. As he said in his own contribution, there are some forces that are very effective at this, in particular the City of London Police, which he has direct experience of.
As with the example of licensing for cyclists that I referred to earlier, we cannot escape the likely significant cost and complexity of introducing a registration scheme for cyclists. Around 1.5 million new cycles are sold every year. No data is collected on this, but some estimates say that over 20 million cycles are in existence. It would therefore be a gargantuan task to introduce such a registration scheme, or indeed a licensing scheme. It would, for example, require all existing cycle owners, potentially including children, as well as those making new purchases to submit their information to some form of central database, and for some form of registration plate to be produced and affixed to each individual bike. Even if that were deemed proportionate, it is not realistic to suggest that detailed regulations could be delivered on this within six months of Royal Assent, as the noble Lord’s amendment proposes.
Amendment 341, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, would require the Secretary of State to undertake a review of the misuse of e-scooters, including their impact on safety and an assessment of the appropriateness of the legislation within 12 months of Royal Assent. At this point, as others have, I pay tribute to the work that the noble Baroness has done previously in this area. The safety of all road users is, of course, an utmost priority, and no one should feel unsafe on our streets. It is essential that new transport technology works for everyone. That is why we must crack down on those using e-scooters irresponsibly and in an anti-social way.
However, I do not believe that, after more than five years of running e-scooter trials, the Government should tackle that issue by undertaking yet a further review. I remind noble Lords that private e-scooters remain illegal to use on public roads, cycle lanes and pavements. Rental e-scooters can be used only as part of the Government’s national rental e-scooter trials. Last year, we announced an extension to the rental trials until May 2028, to ensure we have the best possible evidence base to inform any future legislation. We have collected some evidence, but it is still relatively new technology and there remain things we need to learn. We will use this additional time from extending the review to supplement our evidence and draw on further experience.
As I mentioned in Committee, the Department for Transport has already announced that the Government will pursue legislative reform for micromobility vehicles. As the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, said, we want to pursue a joined-up approach. We will pursue legislative reform for micromobility vehicles, which will include e-scooters, when parliamentary time allows. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, tempted me to go down a path of speculating what might be in a forthcoming King’s Speech, which is several rungs above my pay grade. I am afraid I cannot do that but, as I said, this is something we wish to pursue when parliamentary time allows.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
I am very grateful to the Minister for his reply. I find it a little concerning that he does not agree to a review but the Government have now extended their own review for another four years. We had a very useful meeting with him and the noble Lord, Lord Hendy. We are approaching Report on the English devolution Bill. When are we going to get a definition of micromobility vehicles?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I again thank the noble Baroness for the meeting, which I found useful. On the definition of micromobility, I will take that back and write to her on where it will come during the passage of the English devolution Bill, because I am not sufficiently across the details now. I will get back to her on that. I can confirm that, as was mentioned in the noble Baroness’s amendment, the Department for Transport will consult on any new regulations before they come into force, so that all interested parties will have a chance to shape any new regime on micromobility.
Amendment 342, also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, would require the Secretary of State to publish an annual report on the number of people charged with dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling, as provided for in Clause 121. I appreciate the noble Baroness’s concerns about the extent to which the police act on cycling offences—indeed, those concerns were expressed by many noble Lords today—but I reiterate that the offences in the Bill are the most serious in nature, including where a cyclist’s actions have resulted in the death or serious injury of a person. In such cases, we should expect the police to pursue them to the fullest extent possible.
I highlight to the noble Baroness that the Government already publish a range of statistics on criminal offences, notably the quarterly and annual reports on criminal justice system statistics, alongside annual statistics setting out information on those killed and seriously injured on our roads. That provides breakdowns by road user as well as some of the contributory factors such as speeding, the presence of drink or drugs, and non-seat-belt use. As this information is already available in the public domain, we are not persuaded on the merit of producing such a report for cycle offences.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
I am so sorry. I have just received from the Library the figures to which the Minister referred. There is not a separate category for e-scooters, which I find quite scary. There is a global category of “motorcyclists”. Does that embrace e-scooters or not?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I will have to go back to check the definitions. We spent some time in our meeting discussing these categories and definitions. As I understand it, that category does include e-scooters, but I want to go back to confirm that for the noble Baroness. As I said, these statistics are produced regularly. That does not mean that any future work on micromobility cannot allow for greater granularity in those statistics, if they are collected in a way that would permit that.
Finally, Amendment 344, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, would allow for food delivery companies to receive an unlimited fine should their riders be convicted of any offence under Clause 121 and where those companies do not have sufficient procedures to prevent those offences occurring. Amendment 344A would require the Secretary of State to review the effectiveness of any such procedures within one year of Clause 121 coming into force. Although I absolutely recognise the very real concerns that we heard both in Committee and today about the rogue behaviours of food delivery riders, we need hard, documented evidence to understand this in detail. I understand the straw poll point that the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, made, but, with the greatest respect, I am not sure how it would hold up in terms of statistical reliability.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, I am afraid that I really cannot let the Minister get away with that. I think that all Members who have spoken in today’s debate, and in previous debates, are absolutely unanimous about the degree to which there is a problem. I do not accept the Minister saying that the problem is that there is no data. He represents the Government. I have stood at the same Dispatch Box when I had some responsibilities for transport, so I know that it is the Government’s job to gather that data when there is obviously a problem. The Minister really cannot stand there and say that no action will be taken because there is no data showing a problem.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I think it will please the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, to hear that that is exactly not what I am about to do—I ask him to hold on a second.
As I was saying, we want to understand this in detail, including evidence on the extent to which the business practice of food delivery companies may influence the rogue behaviours of their riders—that is very much the case put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. To that end, the Department for Transport is commissioning research to look into that, which we expect to start at the end of this month. It will take about one year, and the DfT will publish its findings. This research will look at the impact of the business practices of food delivery companies on rogue behaviours and illegal bike use. In effect, it will be a non-statutory version of the review that the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, proposes in his amendment. I hope that that will satisfy his concerns—I will find out now.
Lord Shinkwin (Con)
I thank the Minister for that. Can he give an undertaking to the House that this non-statutory review will consult disabled people on their experiences? Can he write to me, and put a copy of the letter in the Library, saying which disability organisations will be consulted?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I will be very happy to write to the noble Lord and put a copy in the Library with further details of the research and how it is being commissioned by the DfT.
In addition, the DfT’s road safety strategy, which has been referred to already this afternoon and which was published on 7 January, makes a clear commitment to the Government piloting a national work-related road safety charter for businesses that require people to drive or ride for them, whether using cycles, e-cycles, motorcycles, cars, or light or heavy-goods vehicles. The charter will aim to promote good practice and improve compliance with current requirements. It will be developed in collaboration with businesses and industry and will be informed by existing schemes. The pilot, which is voluntary, will run for two years and will be monitored and fully evaluated.
Before I conclude, I want to pick up a point made particularly by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, in Committee and repeated this afternoon on issues around the employment status of some of these delivery drivers. The Government are absolutely clear that bogus self-employment is unacceptable. Employers should never seek to deny people their employment rights and avoid their own legal obligations by claiming that someone is self-employed when in reality they are not.
We understand that many delivery riders in the platform economy value the flexibility that that kind of employment status can bring, but new technologies and ways of working have made it more complex for businesses and workers to understand and apply the current employment-status framework. That is why the Government are committed to consulting on a simpler framework which allows to properly capture the breadth of different employment relationships in the UK and ensure that workers can continually benefit from flexible ways of working where they choose to do so without being exploited by unscrupulous employers. We understand that this employment space of delivery drivers is a particular issue, which is why this is very much an important issue to act on.
In conclusion, I am afraid that I cannot follow up the call of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for all-out vigilante action from pedestrians. I am not entirely sure that even he and his chariot—to use the phrase of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool—might expect me to. However, I want to take this opportunity to really acknowledge the frustration and fears of all noble Lords, and, indeed, many members of the public, about the abhorrent and dangerous behaviour of a minority—I stress that—of cyclists.
However, I come back to where I started. Any new legislation in this area must be proportionate and must be mindful of the potential adverse impact on law-abiding road users. I want to encourage micromobility to reduce congestion and promote healthy living— very much the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon. We need a clear evidence base, and, as I have indicated, we are undertaking research concerning the road behaviours of delivery riders. I just want to repeat what we were saying. We will pursue legislative reform for micromobility in the round, including on e-scooters, when parliamentary time allows. For now, therefore, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, to withdraw his Amendment 318 and other noble Lords not to move their amendments.
Lord Lucas (Con)
My Lords, that was disappointing reply, but it ended on a more encouraging note, and I am grateful for that. It is a simple thing. If a company sets terms for its riders that encourage, incentivise and reward law-breaking, we need to control that. My noble friend Lord Blencathra is quite right about that. He and I are going to have to continue our vigilante efforts to deal with the more ordinary personal misbehaviour of cyclists. There we are—that is something we have taken on—and, thanks to the Government, I shall have more time for it than I have had recently. For now, however, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Hogan-Howe
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I listened carefully to what the Minister said. The noble Lord, Lord Russell, is quite right that there is a need for a joined-up response, but I did not hear it. It is a fair challenge to the people who are opposing the Government to get their act together, but it is the job of the Government to deliver a strategy that might make a difference and I did not hear it. This has occurred quite a few times now. The noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, made the point about reduced traffic departments. She is quite right that it has nothing to do with this. The traffic departments of this country have never had much to do with cyclists. This is a problem of enforcement; it is not to do with the fact that traffic departments have reduced over time.
What am I asking for? I suppose I am asking for a protest vote. Every time I raise this issue, there is a rumble. People around me say afterwards, “I agree with you, we ought to do something”, but nobody can quite agree what. I am calling on the Members on the Government Benches and others to ignore their Whips. There will be a very marginal impact on their careers. I would never argue that my solution is the only one that will work, but the Government have a duty to do something. As we have all said, it is not just about older people like us complaining about cyclists. It is a general opinion among people whose views we represent.
I may lose, but courage is not measured by picking fights only that you are going to win. It is sometimes measured by picking those that you may subsequently discover that you do not have support on. With that in mind, I would like to divide the House on this amendment.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“Aggravated offences(1) The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 is amended as follows.(2) For section 28 substitute—“28 Meaning of “aggravated”(1) For the purposes of sections 29 to 32 an offence is aggravated if it is aggravated by—(a) racial hostility,(b) religious hostility,(c) hostility related to disability,(d) hostility related to sexual orientation, or(e) hostility related to transgender identity.(2) For the purposes of the following provisions an offence is aggravated if it is aggravated by hostility related to sex—(a) section 29,(b) section 30,(c) section 31(1)(a) and (c), and(d) section 32.(3) An offence is aggravated by hostility of one of the kinds mentioned in subsection (1) if—(a) at the time of committing the offence, or immediately before or after doing so, the offender demonstrates towards the victim of the offence hostility based on—(i) the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a racial group,(ii) the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a religious group,(iii) a disability (or presumed disability) of the victim,(iv) the sexual orientation (or presumed sexual orientation) of the victim, or (as the case may be) (v) the victim being (or being presumed to be) transgender, or(b) the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by—(i) hostility towards members of a racial group based on their membership of that group,(ii) hostility towards members of a religious group based on their membership of that group,(iii) hostility towards persons who have a disability or a particular disability,(iv) hostility towards persons who are of a particular sexual orientation, or (as the case may be)(v) hostility towards persons who are transgender.(4) An offence is aggravated by hostility related to sex if—(a) at the time of committing the offence, or immediately before or after doing so, the offender demonstrates towards the victim of the offence hostility based on the sex (or presumed sex) of the victim, or(b) the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards persons who are of a particular sex.(5) For the purposes of subsections (3) and (4), it is immaterial whether or not the offender’s hostility is also based, to any extent, on any other factor not mentioned in that subsection.(6) In this section—(a) references to a racial group are to a group of persons defined by reference to race, colour, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or national origins;(b) references to a religious group are to a group of persons defined by reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief;(c) “membership” in relation to a racial or religious group, includes association with members of that group;(d) “disability” means any physical or mental impairment;(e) references to being transgender include references to being transsexual, or undergoing, proposing to undergo or having undergone a process or part of a process of gender reassignment;(f) “presumed” means presumed by the offender.”(3) In the italic heading before section 28, for “Racially or religiously aggravated offences” substitute “Offences aggravated by racial or other hostility”.(4) In section 29 (aggravated assaults)—(a) in the heading for “Racially or religiously aggravated” substitute “Aggravated”;(b) in subsection (1) for “racially or religiously aggravated for the purposes of this section” substitute “aggravated (see section 28(1) and (2))”.(5) In section 30 (aggravated criminal damage)—(a) in the heading for “Racially or religiously aggravated” substitute “Aggravated”;(b) in subsection (1) for “racially or religiously aggravated for the purposes of this section” substitute “aggravated (see section 28(1) and (2))”;(c) in subsection (3) for “28(1)(a)” substitute “28(3)(a) and (4)(a)”.(6) In section 31 (aggravated public order offences)—(a) in the heading for “Racially or religiously aggravated” substitute “Aggravated”;(b) in subsection (1) for “racially or religiously aggravated for the purposes of this section” substitute “aggravated (see section 28(1) and (2))”;(c) in subsection (7) for “28(1)(a)” substitute “28(3)(a) and (4)(a)”. (7) In section 32 (aggravated harassment)—(a) in the heading for “Racially or religiously aggravated” substitute “Aggravated”;(b) in subsection (1) for “racially or religiously aggravated for the purposes of this section” substitute “aggravated (see section 28(1) and (2))”.(8) In section 66 of the Sentencing Code (hostility as aggravating factor in sentencing)—(a) in subsection (1), after “subsection (3)” insert “and subsection (3A)”;(b) after subsection (3) insert—“(3A) So far as it relates to hostility related to disability, sexual orientation and transgender identity, this section does not apply in relation to an offence under sections 29 to 32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 committed on or after the day on which section (Aggravated offences)(2) of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 comes into force.”(9) In the Armed Forces Act 2006, for sections 240 and 241 substitute—“240 Increase in sentence for offences aggravated by hostility(1) This section applies where a court or officer dealing with an offender for a service offence (other than an offence mentioned in subsection (7)) is considering the seriousness of the offence.(2) If the offence is aggravated by hostility of one of the kinds mentioned in subsection (3) the court or officer—(a) must treat that fact as an aggravating factor, and(b) must state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.(3) The kinds of hostility are—(a) racial hostility,(b) religious hostility,(c) hostility related to disability,(d) hostility related to sexual orientation, or(e) hostility related to transgender identity.(4) An offence is aggravated by hostility of one of the kinds mentioned in subsection (3) if—(a) at the time of committing the offence, or immediately before or after doing so, the offender demonstrates towards the victim of the offence hostility based on—(i) the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a racial group,(ii) the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a religious group,(iii) a disability (or presumed disability) of the victim,(iv) the sexual orientation (or presumed sexual orientation) of the victim, or (as the case may be)(v) the victim being (or being presumed to be) transgender, or(b) the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by—(i) hostility towards members of a racial group based on their membership of that group,(ii) hostility towards members of a religious group based on their membership of that group,(iii) hostility towards persons who have a disability or a particular disability,(iv) hostility towards persons who are of a particular sexual orientation, or (as the case may be)(v) hostility towards persons who are transgender.(5) It is immaterial whether or not the offender’s hostility is also based, to any extent, on any other factor not mentioned in subsection (4). (6) In this section—(a) references to a racial group are to a group of persons defined by reference to race, colour, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or national origins;(b) references to a religious group are to a group of persons defined by reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief;(c) “membership” in relation to a racial or religious group, includes association with members of that group;(d) “disability” means any physical or mental impairment;(e) references to being transgender include references to being transsexual, or undergoing, proposing to undergo or having undergone a process or part of a process of gender reassignment;(f) “presumed” means presumed by the offender.(7) This section does not apply in relation to an offence under section 42 as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales is an offence under any of sections 29 to 32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (offences aggravated by racial and other hostility).””Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause expands the grounds on which offences may be aggravated under sections 28 to 32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (racial and religious hostility) to include hostility related to disability, sexual orientation, transgender identity and (except for section 31(1)(b)) sex. It also makes consequential amendments.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
My Lords, I am very proud to introduce Amendment 334, as it delivers on a Labour government manifesto commitment by extending the existing statutory framework for aggravated offences under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.
As noble Lords will know, under the existing provision, specified offences are aggravated and subject to potentially greater maximum penalties where it is proved that the offender was motivated by hostility towards the protected characteristics of race and religion. The relevant offences for these purposes are criminal damage, harassment, stalking and certain public order offences, as well as several offences against the person, including actual and grievous bodily harm, strangulation, assault and malicious wounding.
Through Amendment 334, the Government are not creating new criminal offences; rather, we are extending a well-established legislative model to ensure that it properly captures the full range of hostility-based offending that we know is taking place in our communities. I just happen to believe that individuals who are trans or have a disability have a right and a promise to live life free from hostility in our society today. I pray in aid that, in the last year for which figures are available, March 2024 to March 2025, 4,120 hate crimes were registered by the police against transgender people and 10,649 hate crimes were registered against people with disabilities.
The amendment fulfils the Government’s commitment to level up the hate crime legislative framework by extending the regime of aggravated offences under the 1998 Act to cover criminal behaviours motivated by hostility towards sexual orientation, disability and transgender identity. We are also adding behaviours motivated by hostility based on sex or presumed sex.
As a corollary to Amendment 334, government Amendments 345, 347, 349 and 353 separately amend the new offences on abuse towards emergency workers to provide for aggravation where these offences are motivated by or demonstrate hostility to the same range of protected characteristics. This ensures, for the first time, parity of treatment across these protected characteristics and provides the police and prosecutors with a broader set of tools for recognising and responding to hate crime offences.
This measure has received a broad welcome from a range of charities and organisations involved with disability or with transgender issues. Stonewall has described the measure before the House tonight as
“a powerful message that LGBTQ+ people deserve equal access to justice”.
Galop, the LGBT and anti-abuse charity, has described the amendment as a “landmark moment” for equality. Real, the deaf and disabled people’s organisation, has said:
“It reflects long-standing calls for equal protection under the law for all victims of hate crime”.
The Spinal Injuries Association has said:
“It sends a clear message that violence and hostility directed at disabled people will no longer be overlooked and must be treated with the seriousness it deserves”.
I concur with all those comments, and I hope that the whole House will do too in due course.
Aggravated offences are well established in our criminal law. By extending the scope of the provisions in the Crime and Disorder Act, we will help to ensure that criminal justice agencies identify and record hostility against protected characteristics where they take place and that perpetrators are appropriately punished for their offending.
These are not abstract virtues. They translate into better case-building, clearer communication with victims and, ultimately, more robust outcomes in court. I hope that they will also prevent people being attacked, abused and harassed for issues to do with their identity as transgender people or people with disabilities. It is simply not acceptable in the 21st century for those types of offences to take place. That is why we consider that the aggravated offences framework remains the right tool for recognising and responding to hostility based offending.
Recognising hostility based on sex within the aggravated offences regime complements our mission to tackle violence against women and girls. It will enable the courts to recognise on the face of the offence the serious harm caused when a victim is targeted because of their sex or presumed sex. Making it clear in law that offences motivated by hostility towards a victim’s sex will be treated just as seriously as those motivated by hostility towards the range of other protected characteristics in the hate crime regime reinforces our determination as a Government to confront these harms.
To ensure coherence across the statute book, the aggravated version of the existing Section 4A offence under the Public Order Act 1986 will not extend to cases involving hostility based on sex or presumed sex. That is because the behaviour targeted by that offence—namely, causing intentional harassment, alarm or distress—is already more than adequately covered by the new aggravated offence introduced by the Protection from Sex based Harassment in Public Act 2023, which will come into force on 1 April. This approach prevents duplication while ensuring the law remains both targeted and effective.
I will listen to what noble Lords say in their amendments, but I put a clear message down that this is a matter of principle for this Labour Government and people across this House. I believe and know that it will have the support of many others in this House, for which I thank them in advance. It is not right that transgender people or people with disabilities are singled out for offences. They need the protection of the law and today is the day for this House, and for the House of Commons when it is considered there, to stand up and say what is right. I beg to move.
Amendment 334A (as an amendment to Amendment 334)
Lord Young of Acton
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
My Lords, I declare my interest as the director of the Free Speech Union. Between them, my three amendments address a single, straightforward question: should misgendering a trans person be treated as a criminal offence, still less an aggravated one? The answer is clearly no, and I hope the Minister will assure me that that is not the Government’s intention in moving their amendments to the Bill.
Let me begin with government Amendments 334 and 349. Amendment 334, as we have heard, extends the aggravated offences under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, currently limited to race and religion, to cover sexual orientation, transgender identity, disability and sex. Amendment 349 applies the same aggravators to the new offences relating to threatening or abusive behaviour towards emergency workers. My first two amendments would insert a clarification into both that evidence of misgendering alone would not be treated as adequate proof of any criminal offence nor of hostility on the basis of transgender identity.
Baroness Cash (Con)
My Lords, I support the amendments of my noble friend Lord Young of Acton and oppose the Government’s amendments in their entirety, on principle.
I did not expect to be beginning in the way I am about to begin, but I want to say this because the quality of debates around hate crime have become increasingly polarising. In my first year in this House, which has been a great privilege, I have grown to deeply admire the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, in particular for the way he has conducted the passage of this Bill and the many late nights and long hours he has put in. Indeed, I have grown slightly fond—if that is okay to say—of him and our exchanges in the corridors. Therefore, it is with some trepidation and fear that I get to my feet to say that I hope we can engage in a respectful debate. I do not agree that this is the right vehicle for the objectives but I do agree with the objectives.
The Minister used these words—I hope I have taken them down correctly; I think it is verbatim. He happens to believe that trans and disabled people “should be able to live without hostility”. I 100% agree with that, but I do not believe that this is the right vehicle. My noble friend Lord Young of Acton has already covered the existence, introduced in 2020, of the aggravating factors in sentencing which allow all those characteristics and categories to have increased sentencing as a result of hostility acted out on those people. I want to clarify that, because I do not believe there is a single person here, whether Peer or guest in the Gallery, who would disagree with anything that the Minister said. I hope we can have a debate on what the right vehicle is, which does not denigrate anything when it comes to what the principles should be.
Seeking to amend the Bill to add “aggravated factors”, alongside race and religion, introduced a quarter of a century ago, is a significant departure. It is an extension and expansion of the structure of our criminal law. The traditional structure is that conduct constitutes the offence: for example, he hit him and he meant to. The motive may aggravate the sentence; the law does not need to prove why. But once we subdivide offences by protected characteristic or identity, we depart from that principle. We know—because the Home Office itself says that only 7% of recorded hate crimes result in charging—that this becomes a complicated way of proceeding against this kind of conduct, particularly when we already have a vehicle for punishing it. The same conduct becomes a different offence depending on the identity of the victim and the alleged beliefs of the defendant. The motive for the crime moves from sentencing into the definition of the crime itself. It is, of course, more complex to establish, and harder to charge and then to prove. What better way to approach it than by the sentencing mechanism, where a judge has heard the evidence, and it has become quite clear and apparent during the course of the trial that this was an underlying motivation. He or she—I note, with deference, the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, sitting opposite—can then increase the sentence accordingly.
This is not something I have just come up with today. Many respected academics and lawyers have questioned the aggravated defence regime. Professor Richard Taylor has argued that racially or religiously aggravated offences created by the 1998 Act are conceptually confused and duplicate what could be, and is now, more adequately addressed through sentencing law. The Law Commission of England and Wales has recognised this structural tension. In fact, the Law Commission goes so far as to comment on sex not becoming a characteristic at all. There have also been a number of reports by Policy Exchange, and I declare my interest as a senior fellow. These reports warn against the steady multiplication of identity-based criminal categories, and emphasise that the criminal law should focus on the conduct, rather than proliferating protected characteristic variants of an offence.
Others, including Lord Sumption, have cautioned that we should not push the criminal law from punishing harmful conduct towards adjudicating belief and motive. We do not need any reminder of the risks, because we are currently dealing with the failure of the non-crime hate incident reporting regime. Why, at the very moment that Parliament is moving to curtail the recording of non-crime hate incidents—recognising the problems created when policing becomes entangled in the recording of perceived hostility—are the Government proposing to expand hostility-based criminal offences themselves? I noted that the Minister said that this was a manifesto pledge, but it makes me very uneasy that we are coming to it only on Report. It is such a significant structural change in the criminal law and an expansion of the regime that I would have appreciated the opportunity to speak to it at Second Reading and to challenge and scrutinise it in detail in Committee.
We need to have an honest and evidence-led debate. It is too easy to reflexively say that this is the kind thing and the right thing. It will not produce change or the results that we want it to. The aggravated offence model has been operating for more than a quarter of a century as a large-scale behavioural and sociological experiment in using identity-based categories to address prejudice. It is taboo to question it and to question whether it has worked, but we must. If it had reduced hostility or strengthened social cohesion then there might be a case for expansion, but it has not, and no evidence of that has been produced.
Hate-crime legislation is not a demonstrably effective enforcement tool. It is wholly wrong to divert resources in this way, in an already overstretched criminal justice system, where we are challenging the very existence of the jury trial without a solid evidential base for doing so. I oppose the amendment.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I support the Government’s amendments. As I understand them, they do not create any new criminal offences; they are concerned only with sentencing for criminal offences that are proved and on the statute book. It is elementary that the sentence the court imposes for any criminal offence must depend on the circumstances of that particular offence. I cannot see the objection to the court being told that one of the things it should take into account is whether the defendant, who has been convicted of a particular offence, has acted by reason of hostility based on the victim being, or being presumed to be, transgender.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
The court can already take all the aggravating factors into account, save for hostility to sex. If a crime is aggravated by one of three of the four aggravators that the Bill would introduce into the charging regime, the CPS can flag those as aggravating factors and they can be taken into account at the sentencing stage, so what material difference would the government amendments make?
Lord Pannick (CB)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, but he is running two inconsistent arguments. He is saying first that the law already allows this, and secondly that this amendment to make the position clear is fundamentally objectionable on grounds of principle. He cannot run both arguments, nor say that it is objectionable for one of the factors that the court should take into account to be whether the hostility is based on sex. Why should we exclude sex? Why does the law currently allow the victim’s membership, or presumed membership, of a racial or religious group to be a factor that the court can take into account, but not sex or transgender status? That makes no sense whatever when the Equality Act deals with all these protected characteristics.
I emphasise that whether it is right or appropriate for the judge to take these factors into account in the circumstances of a particular case, and to what extent, will depend on the discretion of the sentencing judge, which will inevitably depend on the circumstances of the crime. Therefore, to exclude entirely the factor of the victim being, or being presumed to be, transgender, as the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, seeks to do, seems arbitrary.
Of course, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, that we must be very careful indeed to ensure that people are not punished for the exercise of free speech, but the law protects that exercise. It protects it by reference to Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which the sentencing judge must take into account in all cases. I do not know the circumstances of the case that the noble Lord referred to, where there was an acquittal at the appeal stage, but I strongly suspect that Article 10 had something to do with it. I support the Government’s amendment.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I have serious reservations about the Government’s amendments on aggravated offences. I appreciate that this puts me at odds with the Minister, but I knew that long before today, because in Committee he made a passionate speech, as he has today, telling us how proud he would be to move these amendments and claiming that they show a Government prepared to protect LGBT and disabled people.
If this is such an important change in the law for the Government, and a principled flagship for progressive Labour that appeared in its manifesto, we have to ask why the Government waited until Report in the Lords—so late in the Bill’s passage—to table the amendments. They must have thought that they were principled and important before, so why are we seeing them only now? I am afraid that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, explained, this denies this House the constitutional right to properly scrutinise and mull over the complex details of the amendments—let alone the fact that that was denied to the elected Chamber.
In the limited space that we have here, I will start by raising some general concerns I have with aggravated offences. Some people might say that this is a Second Reading speech; if it is, it is because the Government did not bring the amendments forward until now, so I will say it anyway. In my view, the state’s job, via criminal justice, is to prosecute material, clearly defined offences. When the authorities attempt to either infer or impute motivation for a crime, seemingly to signal its particular gravity, that is a dangerous move towards punishing ideas, beliefs or attitudes. Some of those ideas, of course, might be bigoted or abhorrent, but they are none the less ideas and opinions. We need to be wary of inadvertently stepping towards thought-crime solutions just to signal our moral virtue, and I am worried about expanding that regime.
This has consequences. Offences such as these carry higher maximum penalties when offenders demonstrate hostility, and this can mean prison. But hostility can be interpreted broadly in the law as ill will, antagonism or prejudice. Let me be clear: violence, harassment, assault or whatever against a disabled person, a trans person, a woman or anyone should be punished appropriately—severely, if that is your take—and certainly uniformly, regardless of motive. But aggravated sentencing can lead to some perverse outcomes.
On hate crime aggravators, in Committee I used an example from the CPS report Our Recent Hate Crime Prosecutions. A man was put in jail for 20 weeks for
“assaulting his father, sister and a police officer, and using racist slurs against his sister’s partner”.
But the CPS notes that, without the racist slurs, he would have only received a community order. So for the assault he would have retained his freedom but, with the racist words, he got 20 weeks in jail. What is more problematic is that many of the offences we are talking about are not actually those kinds of aggressions but often speech that is promiscuously criminalised.
This sentencing anomaly really hits home when it comes to the much boasted-of addition of sex into the aggregation. “At last”, people will say; “misogyny taken seriously”. But, during the Sentencing Bill, the Government refused to accept a perfectly reasonable amendment exempting sexual assault offences and domestic violence offences from the early release scheme. Surely, a real, material commitment to women would be to have accepted that amendment, not increased sentences for offences deemed driven by hostility to women.
Instead, my view is that we should prosecute actual offences committed against any woman. When those offences involve, for example, sexual violence or domestic abuse, we should give appropriate sentences to perpetrators and then not let the offenders out early to free up prison places. That would help women far more than this amendment, the wording of which says that the aggravators must be announced in “open court” to declare an offence aggravated—if ever there were an indication of the performative nature of this, that is it.
One worry is that many of the offences to which “aggravated” will be attached will be the tangled plethora of hate speech crimes, already leading to the scandal of Britain’s declining free speech reputation internationally, with so many arrested for speech crimes, as we have heard about. So many of these offences are wholly subjective, because hostility can be defined by the victim. We have seen the recent weaponisation of speech against those who do not share the same views, the whole cancel culture and toxicity that has proliferated, and identity groups and those with protective characteristics pitched against each other in grievance complaints.
Although it was not in the criminal law, we saw a gross example of this when John Davidson, a man with Tourette’s and the subject of an award-winning sympathetic film, involuntarily ticked and shouted out the N-word. Subsequent commentary refused to accept that there was no intent to offend. Race and disability were put at odds, rather than empathetically understanding the issues, and that is one of the problems with playing the identity politics issue. Increasing aggravated offences will just add to this toxic mix, and that, combined with public order and communications arrests—if not prosecutions for speech crimes, as described by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton—will make this issue really difficult.
The issue of hostility to transgender identity is likely to stir up further tensions. I want to ask: what is transgender identity? At best, it is a subjective category. It is a self-defined description. That is not a criticism; it is just an observation. Transgender identity does not require a gender recognition certificate or surgery. By the way, the wording in the amendment is confusing here: it gives credence to the fact that surgery might be a key, but then it says “proposing to undergo” gender reassignment, which is a very odd phrase. That is why the amendments of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, are right to query and probe it, which is what we should be doing, even though it is so late in the day. How transgender people are defined will matter to how these amendments will be understood.
The clarification of the noble Lords from the Official Opposition, in Amendments 337, 350, 351 and 352, establishing what sex means in the Bill, is also helpful. Emphasising biological sex—sex at birth—is necessary to ensure that the cultural clash between gender identity and sex is not muddled up in this Bill or in these amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, in his Amendment 334A, also hopes to ensure that the proposed changes do not criminalise misgendering.
I just note that I hate the word “misgendering”. If a male identifies as a female, even if he has a certificate or has had surgery, he is still a man. Saying that is not misgendering; it is factually accurate. Asking me to call him a woman is compelled speech, asking me to repeat misinformation. But would that statement, which I am very nervous about making, be seen as evidence of hostility to someone based on their gender identity? Guess what: too often, those accused of, and punished for, so-called misgendering offences are women. Police criminalised Sex Matters’ Helen Joyce for some tweets referring to Freda Wallace by his former name Fred and using he/him pronouns, and the police recorded that as “criminal harassment” with “transgender aggravators”.
What about the young lesbian who says that she is not attracted to a male—a man who thinks that, by wearing stilettos and a dress, he is a woman and should be allowed into a lesbian-only group at a workplace—
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I do not wish to disturb the noble Baroness’s train of thought, but how we frame this debate is important. It is an aggravated offence if the individual has committed an offence that I outlined earlier, such as grievous or actual bodily harm, public order offences, harassment, stalking or criminal damage. It is not about the issues the noble Baroness is speaking to.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
To clarify, in the first example I gave, of Helen Joyce, it was called criminal harassment for the tweets and the aggravated factors. The police actually dropped it in the end, but they—not me but the police—called it criminal harassment with transgender aggravators. In the example I was giving, the lesbian in her work group was then labelled a bigot. In other words, it is the L in LGBT, not the T, that will often take the hit. I mentioned that because she was threatened by the person, who said they would go to the police, and then she was visited by somebody who said that the police would be involved. I am making this point because I am worried about it spiralling out of control. I would say that that is misogyny: demonising a biological woman for expressing her sexuality as same-sex attracted. I want to be sure that the amendments in this group navigate such clashes and do not avoid them.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I apologise but, a little unusually, this is a convenient time to break for dinner break business. It is mid group, but I assure noble Lords that we are taking a note of who is in the Chamber so that we can continue the group in an orderly fashion after the dinner break business. Before I hear some sedentary tutting, I note that this has been agreed through the usual channels.
Crime and Policing Bill
Wednesday 4th March 2026
(2 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 167-III(b) Amendments for Report (Supplementary to the Third Marshalled List) - (4 Mar 2026)
19:48 - Division on Amendment 334 - Ayes: 213 / Noes: 145 - Amendment 334 agreed.
21:07 - Division on Amendment 358 - Ayes: 52 / Noes: 146 - Amendment 358 disagreed.
22:02 - Division on Amendment 359 - Ayes: 129 / Noes: 132 - Amendment 359 disagreed.
Lord Rooker (Lab)
My Lords, I will contribute briefly on this group. In general, the amendment produced by my noble friend the Minister is to be applauded. It is massive and detailed—but this is one of the issues. We are on Report in the House of Lords. The House of Commons will never get the chance to discuss this. When the Lords amendments go back, the Commons will have an hour, or two hours at most, for the Bill, without any amendments, so there is a real issue about our procedures.
It is not the first time this has happened. It is a regular occurrence that when we get massive changes at the end of a Bill—
Baroness Thornton (Lab)
Is my noble friend aware that they actually had an extensive debate on this matter in the Commons?
Lord Rooker (Lab)
This amendment has just turned up here. It is for this House; it was not dealt with in the Commons. That is why we are debating it. It is a brand-new amendment. It is extensive—two or three pages.
I know I am a bit out of date, having been here so long since I left the other place, but the Commons will not have the chance to debate this amendment, simply because of the procedure for dealing with Lords amendments. So, while I agree in general with what my noble friend the Minister has brought forward, let us not kid ourselves. At the end of the day, the Commons has the last word on everything—but it does not have all the detailed words on everything. So, we have to be really careful in the way we scrutinise something that turns up here at the last minute and cannot be looked at again in the other place. If we start a Bill in this place, it is different, but we did not. We therefore have to be careful about what we are doing.
My other point is that, in general, I agree with the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Young. I am not in favour of discrimination against anybody on any grounds whatsoever, but he raised the point, as did the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that in general, the discrimination on misgendering is basically anti-women, because they will be the majority who might have the complaint. There is no question about that. Therefore, the issue should not be left nor criminalised. It may be that my noble friend the Minister has a perfectly straightforward answer. I certainly hope he has, because although I do not propose to vote for any of the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Young, he has raised a very fair point. Again, there will be no chance to discuss this in the Commons, so we need to have a bit more of the detail here in this House.
Lord Paddick (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I declare an interest as a paid adviser to the Metropolitan Police. My understanding is that the Government’s amendments simply create a legal level playing field, with deterrents currently available on the grounds of race and religion being extended to other protected characteristics. It is far more serious if you are targeted for attack because you are a member of a vulnerable group than if you are attacked at random, and the law should reflect that.
There has been debate today about free speech and non-crime hate incidents, but these provisions are about actual crimes targeted at vulnerable people. I completely agree with the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and those of the Minister.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for the way he introduced these amendments. As he said, this is a government manifesto commitment, and it was evident in the pride with which he moved this amendment. However, I agree with concern raised by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, and others—that it is regrettable that we are seeing the drafting of this provision at this late stage in this House. We have had long debates on the principle as the Bill has gone through, but in this particularly vexed area of the law, the devil really is in the detail, so it is regrettable that we are coming to it fairly late.
In his introduction, the Minister said with clear passion that he wants to level up the protections afforded to people under the law when it comes to hate crime. My concerns are slightly different from some that have been expressed so far in the paused debate: that this amendment as drafted in fact treats some groups of people differently from others and leaves a bit of levelling up still to do.
In part, that is because of the slightly uneasy settlement that we have because of the Equality Act 2010, which, as a Bill, went through Parliament in wash-up. I think it is ripe for a bit of post-legislative scrutiny; it is often prayed in aid in all directions without people fully understanding it. It used to be a bugbear of mine in government when people came to me with a submission talking about people with protected characteristics. I would say, “But that’s everybody”—anyone with an age, a race or a sex has protected characteristics. There is no such person as a person with no protected characteristics. But the way the Equality Act 2010 describes and applies them is not wholly equal, and when it comes to this area of the law, that causes some problems.
We all have a sexual orientation. Section 12 of the Equality Act defines that for us. We may choose different terms ourselves, but it tells us that we are attracted to “the opposite sex”, “the same sex” or members “of either sex”. Accordingly, that is reflected in the amendments that the Government have brought forward vis-à-vis hate crime and hostility on the basis of sexual orientation.
We all have a race or a religion. Again, the descriptions in proposed new subsection (6) talk about
“references to a racial group”,
which could apply to Black people, white people, Asian people, Welsh people—everybody is covered by that provision. In proposed new subsection (6)(b), the
“references to a religious group”
talk explicitly of a “lack of religious belief”. It does not matter whether you are an adherent to a certain religion, you are covered by that. The difficulty in this area comes when we start to apply it to disability or to people’s gender reassignment status, and that is where we start to see the problem in the descriptions in the government amendment. Proposed new subsection (3)(b) talks about
“hostility towards persons who have a disability or … hostility towards persons who are transgender”.
Does that mean that an offence committed against somebody on the basis that they are, for instance, deaf, could be treated as an aggravated offence, but that an offence committed against somebody on the basis that they were a hearing person could not be? I would be grateful if the Minister could explain whether that is the case and whether that is really what the Government are seeking to achieve here.
Similarly, when proposed new subsection 3(b)(v) specifies
“hostility towards persons who are transgender”,
and we have seen many horrible examples of crimes that are aggravated on that basis, does that mean that an offence committed against somebody on the basis that they are transgender, or presumed to be so, could be treated as aggravated, but an offence committed against somebody on the basis that they are cisgender—that they are not transgender—could not be? Again, it would be useful to have the clarification.
I am aware that both of those examples are less numerous and, arguably, far less likely to occur, but they are not implausible, and they should not be neglected by laws that we pass in the name of equality. I know this is a difficult area of the law when it comes to drafting—I think that lies behind some of the delay that the Government have had in bringing forward this amendment—but surely it would be possible to avoid these lacunae by stating, for instance, “a disability or lack of disability” or “a person who is transgender or who is not”. Surely that would allow this to be applied in other ways.
Lord Pannick (CB)
I am very grateful to the noble Lord. Can he give a practical example of when there has ever been a relevant criminal offence committed against a person because they are not deaf?
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
I cannot—not as a lawyer; I cannot refer to case law on this—but I would not rely on past example alone. If we are passing laws that seek to apply equality, we should seek to apply it on the basis of somebody’s disability status, whether they are disabled or not. It is not implausible—though I accept it is far less likely and far less numerous in past occurrence—for that to be the case. In some of the other areas in the heated debates that we see, it is not as implausible as many of us would like to assume. If it is possible to tighten this up in the drafting, I think it would do the job the Government are seeking to do in a complete way.
That would not prevent the Government fulfilling their manifesto commitment for delivering protections to trans people and disabled people; it would simply ensure that everybody was treated in this area of the law on the basis of protected characteristics in the same way. At the moment, there are greater protections for everybody of every conceivable sexual orientation and people of either sex, but there are not on each of the areas set out in the Equality Act. More pertinently, it would avoid fuelling what is already a very unhelpful public discourse about two-tier policing and laws, or some of the more charged debates that we have in the darker corners of the internet or from the more far-fetched foreign critics who have been mentioned previously.
On Amendment 336 from my noble friends Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, while it is understandable that they are probing this area, I do not think that their amendment is warranted. It probes the question of whether protections for transgender people should apply to people who are “proposing to undergo” a process of gender reassignment. In fact, Section 2 of the Gender Recognition Act 2004, which has been the law of the land for 22 years, requires somebody applying for a gender recognition certificate to undergo that process to have
“lived in the acquired gender throughout the period of two years”
preceding their application. Signalling an intention to propose to go through that process is an important part of the law as it stands, and therefore Amendment 336 is not needed.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, for raising the issue about someone who was not deaf. Unfortunately, he has forgotten that the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 set out exactly why people with disabilities were disadvantaged in society—and, frankly, still are. That is why some people—whether we are talking about someone who is deaf, someone who is in a wheelchair, someone without sight or someone with severe autism—need some support to have equality. That is not what these amendments seek to do. What these amendments seek to do is to say that someone who is disabled should now be included with other people as someone who can be targeted simply because of their disability. I want to give two brief illustrations to explain why it is important.
Two years ago, a man launched a racist tirade at passengers on a packed London train. He started shouting extreme racist abuse at a woman in her 70s, using language that I could not possibly repeat in your Lordships’ House. When passengers tried to intervene and support this elderly lady, they were then shouted at and attacked and became scared. Indeed, one person left the train. The police were able to use aggravated charges because the words he used to describe her were clearly racist. She was chosen because of the colour of her skin. It was not because she was just sitting there.
Contrast that with last autumn when comedian Rosie Jones was attacked on a train from Brighton to London Victoria. She was hit with a wine bottle—luckily, it was only plastic; she said that only a comedian could do that. She was hit only because of her cerebral palsy and probably, she thinks, because she is well known to be LGBT. At the moment, those people could not be considered for an aggravated sentence—and that is what these amendments seek to do. That is the point. Therefore, I have no problem whatever in saying that we should support these amendments.
I have reported in your Lordships’ House before that people have said to me on a train, when I have been commuting in the rush hour, “Why are you taking up space? People like you don’t work”. That is not an aggravated offence. But when someone tried to kick me on a platform because they felt I should not be there because I was in a wheelchair and in her way, that would have been an aggravated offence if they had caught her.
I am really struggling with all these debates going on at the moment. Yesterday, the leader of the Conservative Party made a big announcement about getting rid of equalities, and everyone is talking about identifiers. I do not have an identifier; I am disabled—and sometimes people take it out on me. I can live with most of it, but sometimes it goes beyond the right place. Frankly, members of our judicial system should be able to make up their minds about whether it is an aggravated offence. That is the subject of the amendments we are debating today.
Lord Shinkwin (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. That she spoke as powerfully as she did—and I hope to echo some of her words—draws attention to the fact that so few of us in this House have a severe disability and therefore look at these issues from first-hand experience.
I was not intending to speak on these amendments—Amendment 334 in particular—and I obviously let my Chief Whip know, but I have listened very carefully to the debate and, as I say, I come at this from a purely personal experience. The noble Baroness mentioned the Disability Discrimination Act, which, of course, your Lordships’ House passed about 30 years ago. It was so exciting, because it was meant to herald a new dawn of non-discrimination and equality. Thirty years later, discrimination on grounds of disability is rife—and I know that because I experience it several times a day, day in and day out. It may be low-level abuse—smirks, nudging as I go past, laughter—but the effect it has on a person’s self-esteem and morale, when they are having to cope with so many other challenges in life, cannot really be described. It has to be felt to be believed.
I simply say to the House that this is a new development. I referred to the Disability Discrimination Act coming in 30 years ago this year. I was on the National Disability Council, advising the Government on its implementation, so we were developing codes of practice 30 years ago, almost to the day. I would say that the law is inadequate and needs this amendment. It needs to be updated for this simple reason: the message needs to go out from your Lordships’ House that the sort of behaviour the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has described, and the case studies she has shared with the House, are completely unacceptable. I do not believe a single member of your Lordships’ House would disagree with that. They are completely unacceptable. This amendment sends that message. Notwithstanding my personal support for the wonderful work that the Free Speech Union and my noble friend Lord Young of Acton do, I support this amendment.
Baroness Hunt of Bethnal Green (CB)
My Lords, I want to acknowledge and thank the Minister for the introduction of this amendment. It is a vast improvement on the amendment laid in the other place. We discussed it at Second Reading and in Committee, and it is great to see it on Report.
However much we might like to reconsider the wording of the Gender Recognition Act, the way in which we consider hate crime, and the Equality Act, that is not what this amendment does. We can talk about the GRA, we can talk about hate crime and we can talk about the Equality Act, but that is not what this is about. This is about extending to disability and LGBT people and sex aggravated offences that already exist for race and religion and belief. That was a recommendation made by the Law Commission in 2021, which feels like a different country was indeed only five years ago.
What aggravated offences do that is different from increased sentencing is very specific. First, it leads to stronger sentences and a higher maximum penalty. However, in order to do that, hostility must be proven as part of the offence itself and not just considered at sentencing, so you need significantly stronger evidence than you currently do. For those who are concerned about the lacklustre way in which people are accused of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity, that will have to be put through a much more rigorous process to be tested before this kicks in. You also get a longer time to report because it is considered in the Crown Court, which gives victims more time to report and gives the police more time to investigate. Therefore, again, there is a much stronger need for substantive evidence before those cases can be considered and people can be found guilty. It is changing in the sentencing, but the nature in which that investigation takes place will be much more rigorous than the current provision that is made on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity. That increased sentencing was introduced circa 2020—forgive me, but I do not know exactly when—as an easier way of kind of levelling up the law, because this was too tricky to do then. This is now about just levelling up.
The world feels more hostile. This amendment demonstrates that the Government, and indeed this House, take that very seriously. It incentivises people to provide better evidence of crime. A tweet misgendering would, I think, not likely pass muster, but misgendering while you kick someone’s head in possibly might be an aggravating factor in sentencing, and that feels quite reasonable.
I would say that being counted matters—these crimes being counted matters. I said at Second Reading and in Committee that, when the hate crime law did not exist for people like me, I presumed that the crimes I was experiencing were an okay thing to experience. When Governments from both sides—I say that as a loving Cross-Bencher of all of you—have introduced legislation that protects me, that makes me feel more like I belong in this country. This amendment therefore signals that, as a member of the lesbian, gay, bi and trans community in this country, I am protected from hate crime and that will be taken seriously. I can report it and the police will do their job to find substantive evidence if it exists. If it does not exist, they should send me on my way. This does not give us an opportunity to unpick that, but I absolutely welcome this amendment.
Lord Herbert of South Downs (Con)
My Lords, I draw attention to my entry in the register of interests. I chair the College of Policing, but I am not speaking in that capacity, nor have I spoken to policing colleagues about this matter.
I want to make a couple of observations about the debate that we have had. It is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Hunt of Bethnal Green, whose comments I agreed with entirely. The issue that she was seeking to draw attention to was in response to the argument that we have heard that there is no need for the provisions that the Government have set out because the courts can apply a sentencing uplift already for crimes involving hostility to gay or disabled people. Yes, they can, but for the reasons the noble Baroness explained, we are talking about a separate architecture of aggravated offences, which are stand-alone criminal charges, and which are therefore investigated as such from the outset and recorded separately. That sends a much more potent signal about the seriousness of these crimes. These aggravated offences also extend the statutory time limit for cases to be submitted to the Crown Prosecution Service, which the regime of mere sentencing uplift does not. That potentially provides additional protection for victims.
I have a concern with the arguments that are being advanced about the Government’s proposal. If, for instance, the issue is that police time will be wasted by this change in the law and that it is the wrong use of resources, that is an argument for the existing aggravated offences to be swept away. The principled argument to take, and one that would be advanced by my noble friend Lord Moynihan, who is nodding vigorously, would be to say that if aggravated offences are wrong, a waste of time and do not matter—I think they matter a great deal for the reasons that the noble Baroness, Lady Hunt, set out—then we should sweep them away for offences in relation to religious hatred or racial hatred, because those also are protected characteristics under the Equality Act and this architecture is worthless because it corrodes free speech, and so on.
Make that argument if that is what you believe. However, the reverse argument was put by the Law Commission. Extending this protection for some offences to some groups but not others—to groups that are already recognised as being worthy of protection by the criminal law because of their vulnerability, because they are minority groups—creates a “significant disparity” and causes significant injustice and confusion. A Law Commission report, hundreds of pages long, examined these issues in depth and concluded that there should be an extension.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
That is the second or third time that the 2021 report of the Law Commission of England and Wales has been referred to in this debate. To clarify, that report clearly and strongly recommended not including sex as a protected, aggravated characteristic in the charging or sentencing regime. It set out some extremely good reasons for why sex should not be included from a clearly feminist point of view. By all means, cite the Law Commission’s recommendations to support the inclusion of the other three aggravators that the Government want to add to the charging regime, but it was explicitly not recommended that sex be added as an aggravator.
Lord Herbert of South Downs (Con)
But my argument was against the proposal that these offences in their entirety should be rejected by this House—that the Government’s proposal in its entirety should be rejected by this House. I was not engaging with my noble friend’s argument. I have some sympathy with his point, and in particular that merely misgendering someone should not become a criminal offence. It might be a thoroughly unpleasant thing to do but whether it should be an aggravated offence is worthy of discussion. My concern is that we may be getting ourselves into the position of opposing an amendment that makes an aggravated offence in relation to disabled people, as well as to LGBT people, and we reject that and yet we do not for the other offences.
There is also a danger of attempting to trivialise this matter and a confusion with the debate on non-crime hate incidents. We will come to that. I have taken the strong position that we need a much higher bar in relation to those incidents and that the whole regime needs sweeping away. We will come to that. However, we are not talking about that. We are talking about potentially very serious criminal offences. We are talking about GBH and criminal damage, and are saying that where those offences are motivated by hostility against a group, it does not make sense that the offence can be aggravated in relation to racial or religious hostility but not in relation to disabled people or to LGBT people.
That is the argument. We are not talking about whether people should be able to say disagreeable things on Twitter. This is not the moment for that debate. We are talking about serious offences and whether they should be aggravated, which would result in a more serious penalty and would send a signal to wider society.
There has been a quite concerning increase in hate crimes in relation to LGBT people, particularly transgender people. I have taken for some time a position, which finds me out of step with most of the groups in the LGBT lobby, that there is a very legitimate discussion to have about how women’s rights are affected by transgender rights and that there needs to be a recalibration of the law and the movement’s positions on this. I happen to take that position. However, I know that the way in which this debate is being conducted outside of this Chamber is resulting in an increase in hate against transgender people. That is deeply concerning. It is vilifying people because of ideological positions that are being taken. It is particularly wrong when people in positions of responsibility start using this debate for political purposes.
I have great concern about the climate in which this debate is being—
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I want to clarify or come back on a couple of things.
Lord Paddick (Non-Afl)
It is not allowed on Report. You are allowed to ask a question.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
I will ask a question then. I understand that the noble Lord says that this has been trivialised into just Twitter or non-crime hate incidents. However, hate crime law very often involves speech. Therefore, it is not just a question of GBH and so on. Also, one of the reasons why it has not been possible to make a principled objection to the whole shebang, which I am opposed to, is because of how the amendments have been laid out. It has been quite difficult to break them down in the way that is suggested. Would the noble Lord therefore accept that, for those of us who are worried, it should not have been handled in this way and that the way in which the amendment arrived here does not facilitate the best scrutiny that, as he has indicated, we should give?
Lord Herbert of South Downs (Con)
I am grateful for the noble Baroness’s intervention. This issue merits further and deeper discussion, which is a matter for the Government to address. Yes, of course, the whole principle of aggravated offences and hate crime is that it may involve an infringement upon free speech. The judgment that we must make is whether it is legitimate that it does because of the seriousness of the offences. As I have said, it is very important that we do not allow the criminal law and the police to intrude into the trivial.
The point that I was making is that there is a danger of giving the impression that this is only about disagreeable things that are said on Twitter. It is not. We are talking about offences at the more serious end of the spectrum as well: offences which, when committed against people simply because of their characteristics, because they happen to be members of a particular group, make them more serious. We should be sending that signal to society and protecting the victims. If we do not take that position, and if we think that the whole regime of aggravated offences is wrong, let us take an honest position and say that we will not have them for racial offences or religious offences either. That is not the position, as I understand it, of our Front Bench, which is why I cannot support noble Lords in opposing the Government’s amendment.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)
My Lords, those of your Lordships who were in Committee will recollect that, as my noble friend Lord Herbert suggested, I tabled an amendment seeking to remove all aggravating hate crimes.
One of the points that I thought that I made quite well was to show the utter incoherence of aggravators at the time. One law had a few protected characteristics, another had others, some had lots, some had a few. I thought that I had made a point there. It is as if the Minister has said, “Hold my beer; okay, if you feel that it is incoherent, we’ll just put all the protected characteristics into as many laws as we can and we will make it more rational”. I agree that that is the effect of this amendment. Like my noble friend, I am against all aggravator laws. I do not propose to make the earlier speech but I will rehearse very quickly some of the major points.
It is quite a difficult stance to make. The Minister was extremely eloquent in saying why he felt that this amendment should pass and received a huge amount of support from the Benches behind him. It is a difficult argument to make but I will explain why I think that this amendment is bad and why aggravation of hate crimes is poor.
I am going to make four points. First, they are clogging up the courts. All state resources are limited. Choices have to be made. If you put aggravation of a crime as an additional reason for prosecuting that crime, the police will be far more reluctant not to prosecute. You will not get the old-fashioned bobbying. We are not talking about trivial crimes. We are talking about serious crimes, and those can already be prosecuted.
In the old days, a policeman could say, “Come on, chaps, break it up. Don’t do that”. But if someone had said, “You Black bastard”, or whatever—I hate to even say that phrase—the police would find it very difficult not to prosecute. It increases the time of the courts. But in fact, there is a better way than criminalising this, which is just to let society work it out.
My noble friend said that transgender crime was on the increase. I have just looked it up on the AI, and apparently it is not. We know that hate crime against gays and lesbians has massively declined as society has come to accept that it is a perfectly natural thing and that it is something to just ignore or accept, but it is not something to criminalise.
My second point is that this—
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I am very grateful to the noble Lord. He keeps talking about hate crimes, but this is not about hate crimes. This is about offences already on the books in which a judiciary is asked to look at whether it has been aggravated because of the individual’s characteristics. It is not about hate crimes.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)
I thank the noble Baroness for her intervention. I was just about to get on to that in my second point, which is that the whole idea of an aggravated crime increasingly weaponises and politicises the concept of hate.
In the previous debate, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, made some very affecting comments. I was able to talk with her about the incident that she also mentioned this evening outside the Chamber. Over the years, my very long-standing and noble friend Lord Shinkwin has told me some very harrowing things that have happened to him. The disabled protected characteristic having an aggravated crime is possibly the most difficult of these to speak against.
But whatever that protected class is, it is exactly the point that the noble Baroness was making. This is an aggravator to a crime that exists. If the crime is committed, it does not matter why it was committed; it can still be prosecuted. If it cannot be prosecuted, you cannot prosecute the aggravated aspect of it either. Weaponising hate and making it into a thing ignores the fact that these are merely aggravator laws. They are not laws that in and of themselves create a crime; they merely aggravate an existing crime. That has received very little attention in the debate this evening.
Thirdly, it further creates and promotes the concept of society as identity groups. I have the view that we are all human beings and the way to have a coherent and well working society is for us all to work together, whereas with aggravated crimes, people with one or another protected characteristic are encouraged to say, “I’ve been discriminated against. They are the things against me. These people are hateful”, instead of saying, “Let’s all join together and just stop crime”.
I would like to lean on two actors who I very much respect and think of as very thoughtful people: Denzel Washington and Morgan Freeman. They have both been quoted on numerous occasions as saying, “How do you stop hate crime? How do you stop racial hatred? The answer is you stop talking about it”. If they believe that, and I happen to agree with them, what is it about what they say that noble Lords disagree with?
My final point is on this idea of looking into people’s minds. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, talked about a case where the difference between committing a bad crime and committing it because you dislike the gender or whatever it was of the individual was a wrap on the knuckles or going to jail for six weeks. How do you know exactly what was in that person’s mind? Was it just an off-the-cuff remark, or was it some deep hatred that deserved society’s censure? You do not know. Queen Elizabeth I said, “I do not want to look into men’s souls”. It has been a fundamental part of British jurisprudence since the 17th century—I do not know why the noble Baroness thinks that is funny; it is fundamental to the way we conduct our society.
Lord Pannick (CB)
I am very grateful to the noble Lord. Will he accept that there is no question of a court looking into someone’s soul? The aggravation has to be proved. It has to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and it is proved beyond a reasonable doubt by what the person has said, or what they have done, and the circumstances of the case. That is a matter for the judge.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)
The noble Lord evinces the certainty that comes from a lifetime in the courts. Those of us who sit outside those courts are maybe a little less certain of the courts’ ability to reach such a fine state of discernment.
I will wrap up; it is getting late.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)
At least I had this debate in Committee, my Lords, which the Government failed to do with this amendment, so I should have the right to reply to it. The amendment goes beyond what is valuable and on to what is political and dysfunctional. I urge the House not to support it.
Lord Cashman (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I will speak very briefly, because the one thing I agree on with the previous speaker is that it is late. I was not going to speak, but the amendment directly affects me. It affects the kind of country I want to remain living in. I have to say to your Lordships that I wake up most mornings wondering why our country has become so mean and why hate is so promoted and why hate crime is rising. I speak because I am a member of the LGBT community. I have had bricks through my window in the past. Sadly, if it were done now, it would be properly prosecuted.
A civilised society has nothing to fear from the way it protects minorities, particularly vulnerable, dehumanised and misrepresented minorities. Indeed, I would argue, looking at past legislation that has made my life better in so many ways, that the way we treat minorities is the litmus test of any decent, civilised country. Therefore, I urge your Lordships to get into the Content Lobby behind the Government and support this vital and necessary government amendment.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in the debate on this group. It is a very large group with a number of significant amendments.
As a preliminary, my Amendments 346 and 348, and government Amendment 347, are about an issue relating to emergency workers which we on these Benches have been highly critical of throughout proceedings on the Bill in relation to trying to leave out the clauses that create new criminal offences relating to abuse towards emergency workers. We have stated our opposition to those in Committee, and I do not seek to repeat those points today.
My main concern today is government Amendment 334 and its consequentials. The broad thrust of my argument is around, first, the lateness with which the amendment has appeared, and secondly, the overlap with the sentencing regime.
We are very disappointed that the Government have brought forward such a significant amendment at this late stage in the Bill’s proceedings. We have not had the ability to discuss it in Committee, and the Government are now asking us to accept an amendment for the first time which has not been adequately scrutinised. We have had several general debates about some of the issues raised, but tonight we have had a two-hour debate where lots of different points and arguments have been made, and we now have to decide not only whether the intent behind the amendment is sound but whether the Government’s drafting of it is workable. That is a tall order, given that this is our first—and if the Government have their way, our last—debate on the amendment. In my view, the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, is absolutely right.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful for the comments of noble Lords and noble Baronesses. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, for her kind comments at the beginning—if I blush, that is the reason why. I appreciate them.
I hope that this debate will be undertaken in a way that respects different views, but there is a significant difference of opinion between noble Lords who support this amendment and those who do not. That is fair, proper and right. This House and the House of Commons are places to debate those issues, and I will try to do so in as friendly and constructive a way as possible while sticking to my firm principles that the Government’s amendment is the right thing to do.
I am grateful for the support of my noble friend Lord Cashman; the noble Lords, Lord Shinkwin, Lord Herbert of South Downs, Lord Paddick and Lord Pannick; from the Liberal Democrat Front Bench, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton; and the noble Baroness, Lady Hunt of Bethnal Green. I think that that spread of opinion from the Cross Benches, the Liberal Democrat Benches, the Government Benches and, indeed, the Conservative Benches shows that this is a real issue that needs to be addressed.
I noted that the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, has argued again today. He did so in Committee. I accept his view as his view. He wanted, in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Herbert of South Downs, to row back on all aggravated factors in his amendment. He accepts that. I have no argument about his right to do so, but I do about my position on where I accept it. There is a real debate between us.
I say again to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, and other noble Lords who have raised this issue that this amendment is not about non-crime hate incidents or offensive tweets; it is about serious offences such as actual bodily harm, public order offences, harassment, stalking and criminal damage where a prison sentence would be given by a judge on conviction. If the judge, having heard the evidence of the prosecution and witnesses in that trial, believes that the harassment, stalking or actual bodily harm was generated not just by two people meeting in a pub and having a fight but by somebody turning up in that pub, having a fight and suffering actual bodily harm because the individual was a different colour, race, religion or sex—or because they dressed in a transgender way, because that is what they chose and that is the way they live their life—that is something that, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, put his finger on, a judge should take into account when giving a sentence of up to the maximum potential sentence under the law.
That is because the law will say that it was not just an argument or stalking offence or harassment because of a general factor; it will say that the principal direction of that harassment, stalking or grievous bodily harm was because of a transgender characteristic, disability characteristic, racial characteristic or misogyny. I draw a line in the sand on this and say that this House, the Government and Parliament should stand up for those people who face that kind of activity. That is a reasonable position to take.
The amendments strengthen support and protection for victims. No one will go down for a tweet or a non-crime hate incident under this; they will go down because they committed a serious offence, and they will get an aggravated sentence because they did it for a reason that this society should not tolerate.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
I am asking a question; is that allowed on Report? I want just to clarify: when the Minister says a tweet versus a serious offence such as a public order offence or harassment, will he accept that that can be a speech crime? I have never mentioned tweets. It is serious if you get sent to prison for a speech crime. That is why there is concern about speech.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
We are going to have a whole debate at some point in the next couple of weeks on non-crime hate incidents involving the type of issues that we are debating. I am putting the case for the Government. That is my view, it is what we are saying, and I have had support from people who have been political opponents in the past, people who I share political views with, opposition parties and Cross-Benchers. That is a reasonable coalition that has said that this is the right thing to do.
Genuine points have been raised about the tabling of this amendment at this late stage on Report. I say three things in response to that. First, this is a manifesto commitment. Secondly, the Law Commission report in 2022 developed this. It is a complex area of criminal law and has been a long time in gestation. Had we been able to draft an amendment that met the objectives we set then I would have tabled it in Committee, but we have drafted and tabled it now after a long period of gestation.
I also say to noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Rooker, that it was announced at Second Reading in the House of Commons that we would bring this amendment forward. In Committee in the House of Commons, an amendment was tabled from the Back Benches by Rachel Taylor, MP for North Warwickshire and Bedworth, to meet the Labour Government’s manifesto commitment. The House of Commons debated that amendment and the Government said they accepted it in principle but needed to look at it in the context of the Law Commission and its drafting. After a full debate in the Commons, we accepted the amendment and have brought it back.
At Second Reading in this House, I took great pride in saying that we would bring the amendment back. With all due respect to the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, he tabled an amendment in Committee that would sweep away every aspect of race and other protected characteristics. That is his view. In my argument against that view during the discussion we had in Committee, I said to him and to the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, that I would table an amendment on Report and that we would debate it. We have had two and a quarter hours on this debate so far today. We may have a Division on it, on which I hope to get support from other colleagues. But I say to all noble Lords that this is an important issue.
The amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, would, in essence, water down that proposal. The amendments in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Cameron of Lochiel and Lord Davies of Gower, would water down that proposal. The amendments seeking to strike out the offences in Clauses 122 and 124 of threatening emergency workers would mean that individuals could abuse emergency workers on a racial basis. That is simply not acceptable to me, the Labour Government, the Liberal Democrats, Members of the Conservative Back Benches and the Cross Benches. It might be a legitimate view, and I will not deride that view, but is not one I will ever share. I say to my noble friends: join me in that Lobby—
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti reminds me that I have been in this House for just under two years now and have voted only once in the Lobby on that side of the Chamber.
Tonight, I ask my noble friends and anybody else who wishes to join me to vote for this amendment, because it does what the noble Baroness, Lady Hunt of Bethnal Green, said: it says to people who have protected characteristics, “Society is on your side”, and if you are picked out because of that characteristic, we will make sure that the people who pick you out pay a penalty for that if the judge in that trial determines that, having had a guilty verdict, your motivation was one that attacked protected characteristics. If it is good enough for people who are Jewish, Muslim or Black, it should be good enough for trans, disabled and other people. That is why I take great pleasure in asking my noble friends to join me in this Lobby any moment now to vote for this amendment. I hope that all noble Lords who support the principle will do so.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
I thank the Minister for his response and, on the basis that I have understood him correctly that none of these amendments or the Government’s intention of commencing the new Clause 4B of the Public Order Act is intended to encourage the police to investigate misgendering on social media—I can see the Minister is nodding—I am happy to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Levitt
“Domestic abuse protection orders(1) The Domestic Abuse Act 2021 is amended as follows.(2) In section 35 (provision that may be made by orders), after subsection (5) insert—“(5A) A domestic abuse protection order may require P to participate in an assessment to determine whether P should be required to participate in a programme of activities.(5B) A domestic abuse protection order may provide that if, following an assessment required under subsection (5A), the person carrying out the assessment determines that P should participate in a programme of activities, then P is required to participate in that programme of activities.”.(3) In section 36 (further provision about requirements that may be imposed by orders), omit subsections (2) to (7).(4) In section 44 (variation and discharge of orders), after subsection (3) insert—“(3A) A magistrates’ court may of its own motion vary a domestic abuse protection order made by a magistrates’ court acting in the local justice area in which that court acts.(3B) The Crown Court may of its own motion vary a domestic abuse protection order made by the Crown Court.””Member's explanatory statement
This new clause adds participation in an assessment and programme of activities as examples of requirements that a domestic abuse protection order may include, and allows the criminal courts to vary domestic abuse protection orders of their own motion.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, Amendment 338 responds directly to what we have learnt from the domestic abuse protection order—DAPO—pilot, which is currently rolled out across Greater Manchester, Cleveland, North Wales and the London boroughs of Croydon, Bromley and Sutton.
We know that positive requirements such as behaviour change or substance misuse interventions are vital tools in tackling perpetrator behaviour, but the current legislation makes it extremely difficult for criminal courts to impose these requirements quickly, particularly in police-led cases where hearings must take place within 48 hours of a domestic abuse protection notice being issued. The changes we are bringing forward will remove those barriers and ensure that victims receive stronger, enforceable protection at the very first hearing.
The change will allow criminal courts to require a perpetrator to attend a suitability assessment as part of the original order, and if the assessment shows that a programme is appropriate, that requirement will apply automatically without the need for further hearings. These amendments are not needed in the civil and family courts as those jurisdictions already impose an assessment requirement as part of a DAPO. We are also removing the need to identify and name a programme provider up front for all courts—one of the key issues raised by operational partners in the piloting areas. Instead, we will set out the role of the responsible person in statutory guidance to ensure flexibility for local delivery.
Finally, we are also closing a gap in the legislation by giving criminal courts the power to vary a DAPO of their own motion, bringing them into line with the civil and family courts. Together, these changes will streamline the process of imposing a positive requirement condition in a DAPO, reduce unnecessary adjournments and ensure that victims of domestic abuse benefit from quicker, more consistent and more effective protection across all court jurisdictions. I beg to move.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the Minister and from these Benches we support the changes set out in her Amendment 338. My Amendment 361A says that if
“there is reasonable suspicion that a death by suicide has been preceded by a history of domestic abuse committed against the person by another person, the relevant police force must investigate that suicide as if it were a potential homicide”.
My honourable friend Marie Goldman MP has talked with a number of domestic abuse campaigners who have become increasingly concerned that police and CPS procedural policy should include this presumption, because sometimes it is missed. Pragna Patel from Project Resist launched a Suicide is Homicide campaign last year, and the group Advocacy After Fatal Domestic Abuse has been calling for this for many, many years. Frank Mullane, its chief executive, said to the Guardian that doing this would guard against evidence being destroyed or lost,
“for example where police have returned the victims’ phones and laptops”,
after an assumption of suicide has been made, thus losing key evidence that might be needed at a later date.
On Monday, the Scottish courts convicted a man of killing his wife after she took her own life. There was a history of domestic abuse right from when they first got together, which included his choking her. There was considerable evidence that he had continued to coerce and pressure her, which eventually forced her, very regrettably, to take her own life. This news from Scotland is good, and I am very grateful for the discussions with the Minister, but I hope she will look favourably on this and reassure your Lordships’ House that the Government will consider putting it into practice.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I want briefly to thank the Government for Amendment 338. I know the Domestic Abuse Commissioner and her team are extremely grateful that they have been listened to—this is something they have wanted for some time—so I would just like to say a big thank you for that. On Amendment 361A from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, I understand the reasons for it, and I hope the Minister will be able to give an encouraging response. As far as Amendment 409C is concerned, I cannot see the Government accepting that. The reasoning behind it is right, but I cannot see it being practical or effective.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the Government and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for their amendments in this group. I do, however, have some concerns about the Government’s Amendment 338. We on these Benches believe that domestic abuse protection orders are a very important civil tool; indeed, they were introduced under the previous Conservative Administration. However, they are not, and should never become, a substitute for proper criminal justice consequences. Amendment 338 will expand orders to include mandatory participation in assessments and activity programmes. With respect, I do not believe that the answer to domestic abuse lies in programme participation; it lies in firm sentencing and, where appropriate, immediate custody.
I raise these concerns in the wider context of the Government’s sentencing policy. During the passage of the Sentencing Bill, this House divided at Report on a Conservative amendment that sought to exempt domestic abuse offences from the new rebuttable presumption against short custodial sentences of 12 months or less. Noble Lords on these Benches, in particular my noble and learned friend Lord Keen, argued that domestic abusers should not benefit from an assumption in favour of suspension. When the issue was pressed to a vote, the Government resisted that exemption.
Noble Lords are therefore now faced with an uncomfortable contradiction. The Minister will no doubt say the Government are determined to be tough on violence against women and girls; yet, when given the opportunity to ensure that domestic abusers would not fall within an automatic presumption against immediate custody, they declined. Against that backdrop, it is difficult to accept that expanding programme requirements within civil protection orders represents a meaningful, tough stance against domestic abuse. Real deterrence requires certainty of punishment.
Turning briefly to Amendment 361A, I have sympathy with its intention. Where suicide may have followed a history of domestic abuse, investigation must be rigorous and sensitive. However, requiring all such cases to be investigated as if they were homicides raises practical and legal concerns. Police investigations must follow clear evidential thresholds, and homicide procedures carry significant procedural and resource implications. A rigid statutory instruction risks unintended consequences and may not in practice deliver better outcomes. It is for officers and detectives who arrive at the scene of a crime to determine, on the basis of the available evidence, how to investigate that death. Prescribing in law how to advance an investigation in specific circumstances is not an appropriate course of action.
In conclusion, I am not persuaded that expanding the scope of domestic abuse protection orders is a legislative solution to the problems women and girls face daily. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I genuinely thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Doocey, who is not in her place, for Amendment 361A. As I find is so often the case with the noble Baronesses, there is very little between us on the principles involved. The Government agree that it is vital that police officers understand the link between domestic abuse and suicide; the only issue is how it is most effectively to be achieved.
There are three reasons that the Government cannot support the noble Baroness’s amendment. The first is that this is about the effective enforcement of police standards and, in our view, primary legislation is not the right place for this to sit. The second is a concern that it would not work, because there are no consequences contained within the amendment for not doing what the amendment requires one to do. If police forces are not inclined to do it anyway then an amendment that does not have any consequences is unlikely to make a difference.
The third and real reason is that, as we say, we are already on it. I will explain why we say that. The Government are already taking steps to improve police responses to suicides, including for cases where victims have taken their own life following domestic abuse. First, last year, the College of Policing published new national guidance for officers which highlights the importance of considering any history of domestic abuse and applying “professional curiosity” at the scene of these deaths. Secondly, the Home Office is working with the police to monitor the implementation of this new guidance, and has since commissioned five deep dives with select police forces to examine how the police are responding to suicides and unexplained deaths that follow domestic abuse. Thirdly, the Tackling Violence Against Women and Girls Strategy, published in December 2025, sets out that the senior investigating officer training programme for police officers will, going forward, cover deaths that follow domestic abuse, including suicides.
Fourthly, the Government are continuing to build the evidence base on suicides that follow domestic abuse through funding research developed by the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s domestic homicide project in order to capture information on these deaths from all 43 police forces in England and Wales and identify how the response can be improved. Fifthly, the Home Office is working with the domestic homicide project to explore the possibility of expanding the project’s scope in future years to encompass all suicides that occur in the context of violence against women and girls. This will enable deeper analysis and a more comprehensive understanding of every suicide resulting from these forms of violence and abuse.
Lastly, in relation to the criminal law, the previous Lord Chancellor asked the Law Commission to undertake a review of homicide law, including the use of manslaughter offences where abuse may have driven someone to suicide. Its final report is scheduled for publication in 2028. I know that your Lordships have expressed concerns before about this particular review, but this is the Law Commission’s own time frame and it is a serious piece of work.
I completely understand and acknowledge the impact that these deaths have on families; it is absolutely devastating. Supporting them is central to the Government’s approach. That is why the Home Office funds the organisation Advocacy After Fatal Domestic Abuse to provide specialist support to families bereaved by suicide following domestic abuse. The Government are clear that the police must respond effectively and comprehensively to suicides following domestic abuse, and the programme of work that we are already undertaking will ensure that they have the knowledge and the tools with which to do so. In the light of the Government’s ongoing work, I hope that the noble Baroness will be content not to press her amendment.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell, for supporting government Amendment 338 today. With the greatest respect to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, we are not here to re-debate the Sentencing Act all over again. The point is that this is only one tool in the toolbox of domestic abuse protection orders, and many of the other tools are much more punitive in nature. We have to remember that some of these people will go on to have other relationships in the future, and we want them to stop doing this. We want to make sure that these things are effective. The use of DAPOs is being evaluated by an independent research organisation. With that in mind, this is an important change. I am grateful that it has been welcomed by your Lordships, and I commend the amendment to the House.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“Guidance about honour-based abuse(1) The Secretary of State may issue guidance about honour-based abuse to such public authorities as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.(2) Guidance under this section may include guidance about—(a) the prevention of honour-based abuse;(b) the identification of honour-based abuse;(c) the collection and sharing of information about honour-based abuse;(d) how public authorities should work together in relation to honour-based abuse.(3) Before issuing guidance under this section the Secretary of State must consult such persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.(4) A public authority to which guidance under this section is given must have regard to the guidance when exercising its public functions.(5) The Secretary of State must publish the guidance.(6) The Secretary of State may revise the guidance.(7) Subsections (3) to (6) apply to any revised guidance, except that subsection (3) does not apply if the Secretary of State considers that the revisions are not substantial.(8) In this section “public authority” means a person exercising public functions, other than a court or tribunal.” Member's explanatory statement
This amendment confers a power on the Secretary of State to issue guidance to public authorities about honour-based abuse.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, in Committee—and I am grateful for the comments made at the time—the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, and others urged the Government to grasp the opportunity afforded by this Bill to deliver on the Government’s commitment to introduce statutory guidance to assist front-line practitioners in tackling honour-based abuse by supporting a statutory definition of such abuse. I am pleased to say that we agree that this is not an opportunity to be missed. The Government have tabled Amendments 339 and 340 in response to comments in Committee to deliver on the Government’s commitment.
Amendment 339 introduces a power for the Secretary of State to issue multi-agency statutory guidance on honour-based abuse. This guidance will sit alongside the statutory definition, operationalising it by clearly setting out expectations on prevention, identification, information sharing and multi-agency working across policing, health, education, social care and other safeguarding partners. Public authorities will be required to have regard to this guidance, meaning that professionals must factor it in to how they carry out their existing duties and safeguarding responsibilities.
Baroness Sugg (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Government for tabling their Amendments 339 and 340, and thank all noble Lords who supported this call in Committee.
These amendments respond to a campaign from Karma Nirvana and 60 other specialist violence against women and girls organisations, along with survivors and their families, calling on the Government to introduce the statutory definition of honour-based abuse. That campaign was established in memory of Fawziyah Javed, whose case demonstrates the tragic consequences of failing to identify honour-based abuse. Despite multiple calls for help, including two police visits just days before her murder, the abuse she endured was never recognised as honour-based abuse. Crucially, professionals failed to identify the multi-perpetrator nature of the abuse, which involved not only her partner but members of his family. Sadly, Fawziyah’s case is not isolated. Again and again, inquiries and serious case reviews show that, when honour-based abuse is not recognised early, victims are left unprotected, escalation is missed, and all those involved in abuse are not held to account.
The hope is that this definition, supported by clear guidance, will enable front-line professionals to identify, understand and respond to honour-based abuse before tragedies occur, and, crucially, to recognise all perpetrators involved. While this progress in the Bill is welcome, the Government’s chosen approach does not explicitly recognise the specific multi-perpetrator nature of honour-based abuse—an omission with real safeguarding consequences. The current wording risks being read as referring to only one additional perpetrator. Honour-based abuse, however, commonly involves multiple family or community members acting collectively, often across households and generations. Failing to reflect this reality in the Bill risks embedding the very misunderstanding that the definition seeks to correct.
My Amendment 340A would address this by making a simple and proportionate change to subsection (2) of the Government’s amendment. It would clarify that honour-based abuse can involve a person or persons, ensuring that statutory language reflects operational reality. It would align the law with the lived experience of victims, the expertise of specialist services and existing safeguarding practice. It is a modest change with major consequences for victim safety.
I am grateful for the engagement of Ministers and officials on this issue. I anticipate that the Minister may argue in response that this amendment is unnecessary because Section 6 of the Interpretation Act 1978 provides that
“words in the singular include the plural”—
I acknowledge that. However, this principle does not translate effectively in safeguarding practice. I appreciate that this issue will be made explicit in the guidance, and I am grateful for the Minister’s reassurances on that point, but we are concerned that legislation may be read literally, and that the harm of relying on “person” is therefore not theoretical. Focusing on a single actor risks professionals misunderstanding the collective nature of the threat and failing to safeguard against a wider group. That is precisely the gap that has led to missed risks and preventable deaths.
I very much hope that the Minister can accept my amendment or perhaps commit to coming back at Third Reading with the Government’s own version. If he cannot, please can he explain two things? First, what is the legal risk or harm of including the words “or persons”? The safeguarding risks of not including them are clear and substantial. Secondly, why have other areas of the criminal law, such as legislation on harassment, organised crime, gangs, affray and riot, been able to use explicit plural language, yet this Bill has not? In each of those contexts, Parliament has recognised the need for clarity where multiple actors are inherent to the offence. Honour-based abuse is no different; indeed, it is a textbook example of collective harm.
In closing, I am very grateful to the Government for taking this significant step forward. I pay tribute to the many survivors of honour-based abuse, and to the families of those who have been killed. Despite unimaginable trauma, they have fought for this definition so that others may be protected. They are following this debate closely, and their message is clear: honour-based abuse is collective abuse; if the law does not say this plainly, professionals may not act on it. I very much hope that the Minister recognises the strength of feeling, the weight of evidence and the safeguarding imperative, and accepts this small but vital amendment that will materially improve professional understanding and, most importantly, save lives.
Lord Pannick (CB)
I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, that it is not merely that, under the Interpretation Act, “person” includes “persons” unless the context requires otherwise—which I do not think it does here. I hope that the Minister will make it clear that the object of his amendment is indeed to cover cases where there is more than one person. If the Minister can say that that is the Government’s objective, the courts will have regard to that if there is any ambiguity at all, which I do not think there is.
Lord Lucas (Con)
My Lords, I congratulate the Government on bringing forward these amendments. However, reading Amendment 340 as it is written, in the context of our treatment of Lord Mandelson in this House, I cannot see how we are not guilty of honour-based abuse. We are a community that considers that a person has dishonoured us; we have subjected them to economic abuse and greatly restricted their access to money and income. How does it not apply? How would it not apply to a part of a community deciding to ostracise people who have been involved with a grooming gang? There is nothing in this definition that exempts “abuse” directed at people who have done serious wrong.
Baroness Verma (Con)
My Lords, I completely support my noble friend. I have worked in this area for over three decades and know the communities well. Sadly, unless it is very clear that those community members will be punished in the same way as the perpetrator—in many cases, there are many perpetrators —this will not be effective. Clarity needs to be put into legislation, so I wholeheartedly support my noble friend.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, this has echoes of previous legislation that has passed through your Lordships’ House. In the three or four years before the Domestic Abuse Act became law, if you had asked people to define domestic abuse, I think you would have had a range of interpretations, many of which would be somewhat wide of the mark compared with what is in the Act and is now generally understood by courts and police forces across the country.
We had a similar journey to go through when we talked about the appalling incidents of non-fatal strangulation, which, again, was a very strange term for many people to hear at the beginning. It takes a while for people to understand the concept and for there to be clarity on what it does and does not mean. For those who have been involved directly with honour-based abuse, including the extraordinary work that Karma Nirvana has done, and those who have been in this field for years, it is completely clear what honour-based abuse is. However, for many people who have not had direct exposure to that, including the people who may be asked to help, intervene and make judgments in these cases, it would be extraordinarily helpful for the definition to be as clear to a non-legal layman, who is trying to help and give support, as it would be to an experienced legal brain.
Lord Polak (Con)
My Lords, first, I want tribute to my noble friend Lady Sugg, who has brilliantly led this campaign. I also pay tribute to Payzee Mahmod, who I was fortunate to hear give evidence in the House on Monday on the whole issue of honour-based abuse. I would never dream of taking issue with my friend, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, on any legal matter at all, but he talked about the issue of ambiguity and the courts deciding. Why not just get it sorted out now, so that there is no ambiguity? That is why I support my noble friend Lady Sugg in getting the words in now. From what I heard on Monday, it is clear that this would accurately reflect the multi-perpetrator dynamics of the issue. It would provide clarity to professionals and strengthen the safeguarding responses, and it would deliver on the Government’s commitment to a robust definition. Getting it right now would stop any ambiguity, so I hope that the Minister will listen carefully to the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I commend the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, for leading on this, and for the excellent and clear speech that she just gave, as well as in the previous debate, which I read about in Hansard.
First, this is an example of a difficult area that people have steered clear of for many years, because they were frightened that, if they talked about it, they would be accused of racism. Secondly, it is not therefore understood, because it has not had public exposure in broader society. The fact that the Government have accepted these amendments will help raise the debate in a way that is not seen as in any way suspicious.
Whether it is clans, family structures or whatever, the multi-perpetrator point is well made, very important and not understood. My only reservation—I do not even know whether I have it—is that I have been very involved in, and concerned about, joint enterprise law, where not one perpetrator but a group of perpetrators was found guilty. That has led to a huge number of miscarriages of justice—there was recently a debate in the House on it. The danger of everyone in the vicinity being drawn in, and guilt by association in any way, makes me nervous. We must ensure that we are not criminalising people who are part of the family and maybe looked away, but who are not necessarily perpetrators. It would be very helpful if that could be cleared up. In general, however, the clearer that we in this House can explain the law, rather than waiting for the court to interpret us—that point was well made—the better.
Secondly, for those involved in the earlier debate on misogyny, women and so on, which was rather fractious, I regard this as heroic work in fighting crime against women and misogyny. Anyone involved in tabling these amendments and persuading the Government to adopt them deserves to be highly commended, because this is what lawmaking should be, rather than signalling one’s disapproval.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, as the Minister said in his introduction, as a result of the earlier amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, the Government have now brought forward much-needed statutory guidance, together with a clear statutory definition of this pervasive yet often overlooked form of abuse. Both are vital tools for front-line professionals. Without them, warning signs go unseen, cases slip through the cracks and victims remain dangerously exposed.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for bringing forward these amendments. I thank my noble friend Lady Sugg for her determined and tireless work on honour-based abuse. I know that the Government had intended to bring forward a statutory definition at some point, but it is purely down to her efforts during the passage of this Bill that we are discussing it today, and she fully deserves the commendation she has received this evening.
I will not repeat the points of my noble friend’s speech but simply reiterate that we plainly welcome the introduction of a statutory definition. I hope it will help in getting justice for the most vulnerable members of our society. I also offer my support to her amendment, which aims to provide legal clarity and remove ambiguity about the nature of honour-based abuse. It can take a wide array of forms, but a common trend among them is that it is often committed by families and community groups. My noble friend is, I think, simply seeking clarity on the Government’s new provisions so as to provide explicit confirmation of the position.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, for her Amendment 340A, which has had the support of the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Verma, the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and to some extent the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. I understand where she is coming from and I will try to explain where we are and how we can interpret her point.
On the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, and Lord Mandelson, formerly of this Chamber, I do not think that now is the appropriate time for me to comment on that—first because a number of potential legal cases are going on, and secondly because I do not conflate anything that will or will not face Lord Mandelson with the horrors that people have faced with honour-based abuse. The noble Lord has made his point, but I will not respond to it today.
Lord Lucas (Con)
I merely chose it as an example that we would all be aware of. It seems to me that the clause as drafted catches a lot of people who should not be caught by it. I will write to the noble Lord, if he will allow that.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am always happy to have letters—or, potentially, one of those newfangled things, an email—from Members of this House. If the noble Lord wishes to send something through, I shall happily examine it with my colleagues.
The contributions in relation to the amendment proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, rightly emphasise the need for clarity and to ensure a proper definition that covers situations where multiple people are involved in perpetrating abuse. I completely agree that the definition must reflect both the survivor experience and capture multiple perpetrator contexts. However, I put the caveat to her that we have to be careful that what appears a straightforward change to the wording does not create drafting ambiguity in itself or add complexity that would hinder practitioners. As I stated in my opening comments, as drafted this amendment covers a situation where there is more than one perpetrator. I am happy to put on the record that the Government will also make that clear in the Explanatory Notes and the statutory guidance, to be published in due course, so that front-line practitioners understand without doubt that honour-based abuse can be carried out by multiple perpetrators. Again, I hope that that goes to the point made by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Russell of Liverpool.
I understand and recognise the noble Baroness’s point but, again, the Home Office wants fully to consider the impact of the amendment. However, I hope the statement I have given from the Dispatch Box—which, again, for ease of practice, is that front-line practitioners can understand without doubt that honour-based abuse can be carried out by multiple perpetrators—is clear. I hope that, with that commitment, these government amendments will ensure that we have a significant milestone in strengthening the Government’s response to honour-based abuse, but more importantly that the public authorities have the tools, guidance, understanding and clarity they need to ensure that we provide a better overall multi-agency, victim-centred response.
I thank the noble Baroness for her amendments. A number of noble Lords have referenced organisations outside Parliament that have campaigned long and hard. I pay tribute to them and share their objectives. I hope with those comments that the amendments that I have tabled can be moved—
Baroness Sugg (Con)
I am very grateful to the Minister for that response, and it is great to hear that the Home Office is considering how this might impact the legislation. However, I do not think I have heard exactly what harm this might do or why it is allowed in other legislation but not in this. I therefore wonder whether the noble Lord might consider bringing it back at Third Reading, if the Home Office is able to find a way to get the provision concerning multiple perpetrators into the Bill.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I always try to be as clear as I can from this Dispatch Box, when I can. I simply say to the noble Baroness that the Government would not want to table any amendments to the Bill at Third Reading. We want to try to ensure that the discussions we have had are complete and that Third Reading is a relatively straightforward procedure. So I cannot offer her that comfort, and I might as well tell her that now. But I am also saying, notwithstanding the points she has made, and in the light of the guidance we are going to produce, that I hope the interpretation I have given, which I think reflects the view of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is one she can accept. I shall move my amendments, but I also ask her in due course not to press hers.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“Meaning of “honour-based abuse”(1) For the purposes of section (Guidance about honour-based abuse) “honour-based abuse” occurs where—(a) a person (“A”) engages in abusive behaviour towards another person (“B”) who is a member of A’s family or is a relevant connection of A, and(b) A is motivated wholly or partly by A’s perception that B has behaved, is behaving or may behave in a way which—(i) shames or dishonours A, B, A’s family, B’s family or A’s community, and(ii) does not comply with the accepted norms of behaviour in A’s community.(2) The reference to A engaging in abusive behaviour towards B includes A causing another person to engage in abusive behaviour towards B.(3) A person’s behaviour may be behaviour “towards” B despite the fact that it consists of conduct directed at another person (for example, B’s child).(4) Behaviour is “abusive” if it consists of—(a) physical or sexual abuse,(b) violent or threatening behaviour,(c) controlling or coercive behaviour,(d) economic abuse (see subsection (5)),(e) spiritual abuse,(f) psychological or emotional abuse, or(g) other abuse,and it does not matter whether the behaviour consists of a single incident or a course of conduct.(5) “Economic abuse” means any behaviour that has a substantial adverse effect on B’s ability to—(a) acquire, use or maintain money or other property, or(b) obtain goods or services.(6) A person is a member of another person’s family if any of the following applies—(a) they are relatives,(b) they are, or have been, married to each other,(c) they are, or have been, civil partners of each other,(d) they have agreed to marry one another (whether or not the agreement has been terminated),(e) they have entered into a civil partnership agreement (whether or not the agreement has been terminated),(f) they are, or have been, in an intimate relationship with each other, or (g) they each have, or there has been a time when they each have had, a parental relationship in relation to the same child,(and references to a person’s family are to be read accordingly).(7) A person is a relevant connection of another person if they are friends or acquaintances who are known to each other in person.(8) For the purposes of subsection (6)(g) a person has a parental relationship in relation to a child if—(a) the person is a parent of the child, or(b) the person has parental responsibility for the child.(9) In this section—“child” means a person under the age of 18 years;“civil partnership agreement” has the meaning given by section 73 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004;“parental responsibility” has the same meaning as in the Children Act 1989 (see section 3 of that Act);“relative” has the meaning given by section 63(1) of the Family Law Act 1996.”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause defines “honour-based abuse” for the purposes of my new clause (Guidance about honour based abuse), inserted after clause 121.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 124, page 169, line 20.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 124, page 169, line 20.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(3) The conduct of a person (“D”) is hostile towards another person (“E”) if—(a) at the time of that conduct, or immediately before or after that time, D demonstrates towards E hostility based on—(i) E’s membership (or presumed membership) of a racial group,(ii) E’s membership (or presumed membership) of a religious group,(iii) a disability (or presumed disability) of E,(iv) the sexual orientation (or presumed sexual orientation) of E,(v) E being (or being presumed to be) transgender, or(vi) the sex (or presumed sex) of E, or(b) D’s conduct is motivated (wholly or partly) by—(i) hostility towards members of a racial group based on their membership of that group,(ii) hostility towards members of a religious group based on their membership of that group,(iii) hostility towards persons who have a disability or a particular disability,(iv) hostility towards persons who are of a particular sexual orientation,(v) hostility towards persons who are transgender, or(vi) hostility towards persons who are of a particular sex.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment expands the kinds of hostility relevant to an offence under clauses 122 and 123 to include hostility related to disability, sexual orientation, transgender identity and sex.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(5) In subsection (3)—(a) references to a racial group are to a group of persons defined by reference to race, colour, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or national origins;(b) references to a religious group are to a group of persons defined by reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief;(c) “membership”, in relation to a racial or religious group, includes association with members of that group;(d) “disability” means any physical or mental impairment;(e) references to being transgender include references to being transsexual, or undergoing, proposing to undergo or having undergone a process or part of a process of gender reassignment;(f) “presumed” means presumed by D.” Member's explanatory statement
This amendment defines terms used in my amendment to clause 124, page 169, line 20.
“Controlling or coercive behaviour by persons providing psychotherapy or counselling services(1) A person (“A”) commits an offence if—(a) A is a person providing or purporting to provide psychotherapy or counselling services to another person (“B”),(b) A repeatedly or continuously engages in behaviour towards B that is controlling or coercive,(c) the behaviour has a serious effect on B, and(d) A knows or ought to know that the behaviour will or may have a serious effect on B.(2) A’s behaviour has a “serious effect” on B if—(a) it causes B to fear, on at least two occasions, that violence will be used against B, or(b) it causes B psychological harm which has a substantial adverse effect on B’s usual day-to-day activities.(3) For the purposes of subsection (1)(d) A “ought to know” that which a reasonable person in possession of the same information would know.(4) In proceedings for an offence under this section it is a defence for A to show that—(a) in engaging in the behaviour in question, A believed that he or she was acting in B’s best interests, and(b) the behaviour was in all the circumstances reasonable.(5) A is to be taken to have shown the facts mentioned in subsection (4) if—(a) sufficient evidence of the facts is adduced to raise an issue with respect to them, and(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.(6) The defence in subsection (4) is not available to A in relation to behaviour that causes B to fear that violence will be used against B.(7) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or a fine, or both;(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or a fine, or both.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment creates an offence of controlling or coercive behaviour by providing psychotherapy or counselling services.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 358 is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Doocey. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, who co-signed an amendment in the same terms in Committee and spoke to it, is unfortunately unable to be here this evening but is fully behind the amendment, on which he has campaigned for many years. We bring this amendment back on Report because we regard it as very important that the predatory behaviour of quack psychotherapists and counsellors, at which this amendment is aimed, is criminalised as quickly as possible.
I stress that no one, at any stage since I and others started campaigning on this issue, has expressed the view that this abuse of clients by quack psychotherapists or counsellors is not wicked behaviour that ought to be outlawed by the criminal law. This amendment is aimed at those who claim to be psychotherapists or counsellors and effectively secure clients—I could say “ensnare clients”—and are then guilty of coercive or controlling behaviour towards them. These clients are usually young people—but not always, as I think the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, will point out. They are, however, invariably extremely troubled. Typically, but again not always, the psychotherapists or counsellors then suborn their clients into believing that their parents or other family members have been guilty of abusive behaviour towards them, which, they assert, explains their present emotional and psychological difficulties.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)
My Lords, I rise briefly to support this amendment, which would have been avoided if we had been able to have proper regulation of psychotherapy professionals. The problem is that the voluntary registration through the British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy, the UK Council for Psychotherapy or the National Counselling & Psychotherapy Society requires people to be appropriately trained and have ethical standards. But if there is a serious complaint against them and they are removed from there, they can still carry on seeing clients and practising in a completely unethical way. There is absolutely no recourse for people who are seriously harmed by whatever activities are undertaken.
There are times in people’s lives when they are particularly vulnerable. One of those is when they are bereaved. Some older people, when they are bereaved, may be in what you could call that pre-dementia phase of being particularly emotionally vulnerable. They may have people who recommend in good faith that they go to see somebody who has some counselling label up, but who then goes on to exploit them tremendously to create dependency, charge huge fees and make the person emotionally dependent on them, which results in coercive behaviour to carry on seeing this person and carry on handing over money. They may also, in the process, implant the idea that their family are being unsupportive and that the best thing they could do would be to cut off contact with their family.
I have seen this first hand, when a family, who were well-meaning and wanting to provide support, had the most awful acrimonious correspondence sent to them by the person who was being advised for their own good in their counselling to have no contact whatever with these family members, and the counselling service that this person was accessing drained many thousands of pounds from their personal account. The problem is that, at the moment, there is no recourse for the public. They can complain and try to take a legal process against the person, but they are very vulnerable people. This amendment would provide a route to having some control, if you like, over some of these quack practitioners who should not be out there, putting up nameplates and calling themselves counsellors.
It is worth remembering that, particularly in primary care, we have talking therapies that have very good outcomes, such as cognitive behavioural therapy, delivered by people who are properly trained, subject to ethical standards and have appropriate diplomas. They provide non-judgmental, confidential, professional assistance and guidance to help people find a solution to their problems. It has become popular in primary care and in the community, but the backlash against it is that an unsuspecting person and their friends may not realise, or have any way of knowing, that somebody who claims to be a counsellor is completely bogus.
In 2024, Alastair Campbell campaigned hard against this, and there was a very good article in the i newspaper about it—I do not think it is advertising for me to name the paper. I recall the discussions we had about trying to get the registration of professionals, so that those who are providing a valuable service can carry on doing so and are not tainted in the minds of the public by those who are completely bogus. This amendment seems to be essential to protect the public.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Marks, mentioned the reservations which I expressed in Committee. I have thought further about this matter since Committee. Indeed, the purpose of the gap between Committee and Report is precisely so that all noble Lords—not only noble Lords on the Cross Benches and Back Benches but Ministers—can reflect on what was said in Committee.
I have looked in particular at the provision which the noble Lord, Lord Marks, mentioned, Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, which creates an offence of:
“Controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship”.
It uses, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, rightly said, the same concepts that the amendment tabled by the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, seeks to implement in the law in the present context. It seems to me that there is a very close analogy between that existing criminal offence and the present context, which is not in the same intimate or family relationship but in the relationship between the psychotherapist or counsellor and the patient.
For my part, I cannot see why the mischief—and it is a mischief—which the amendment seeks to identify should not be a criminal offence. Why should it be that persons who carry out conduct that is defined in this provision should not be subject to the criminal law? Regulation is important, but it is not the answer. The mischief defined in Amendment 358 should be a criminal offence. I have changed my mind.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for bringing his amendment back on Report, and commend him for his continued championing of this issue. Regrettably, these Benches cannot endorse his amendment. We acknowledge that there is plainly a gap in the current law that is causing an issue within the counselling and psychotherapy sector, but are less sure that the amendment as drafted would best serve victims and help them get redress.
As has just been said, the amendment would introduce an offence modelled on Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, which itself introduced the offence of controlling and coercive behaviour by intimate relations or family members. Like the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I understand the parallel with this, but I believe that they are fundamentally different in nature, with counselling and psychotherapy being a relationship with a client and a provider in a different setting.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for setting out his amendment on the issue of controlling or coercive behaviour by psychotherapists and counsellors. I fully understand the comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, in support of it. I am pleased in some ways—and in other ways I am not—that the noble Lord has managed to persuade the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to back his cause. However, while I accept that there are concerns in this area, I am sort of with the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, on this one.
The amendment seeks to create an offence of controlling or coercive behaviour for psychotherapists and counsellors providing services to clients, mimicking a similar offence in the domestic abuse context. I understand the need for that, as explained by the noble Lord, and I fully recognise that those who seek psychotherapy and counselling services may be vulnerable. As the noble Lord knows, psychotherapists and counsellors are not statutorily regulated professions in the UK. However, there are other safeguards in place for the public to acquire such services with confidence.
As my noble friend Lord Hunt of King’s Heath said in Committee, this is a complex area where there is an overlap of roles and titles. It is difficult to differentiate between and reach agreement on defining what these specific roles are, be it psychotherapist, counsellor, therapist, well-being coach, talking therapist, mental health practitioner, lifestyle mentor, family coach or spiritual healer—the list could go on.
As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, touched on, regulation is not always the answer. Quack and unscrupulous practitioners can, as has been described today and during previous debates, easily refer to themselves as something slightly different to avoid any proposed new offence, and regulation does not define the scope of practice.
In Committee, I heard the request for the noble Lord and supporters of the amendment to meet the relevant Minister at the Department of Health. I was pleased to facilitate that discussion, which I know took place on Monday—though there still appears to be a gap between the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and my colleague Karin Smyth MP.
The amendment as it stands is intended to protect vulnerable people from rogue practitioners who call themselves psychotherapists or counsellors, but it does not include a legal definition of counselling or psychotherapy services. I respectfully submit that the amendment is not the right route to take, in the light of that issue.
As I and my honourable friend the Health Minister in the Commons have said, the Government are focused on managing the underlying risks. We are ready to work with sector partners to commission a formal assessment of the oversight of such therapies in order to understand current risks as well as the effectiveness of existing safeguards and whether they need to be strengthened to protect the public better. As I mentioned in Committee—I will repeat it again for the noble Lord—if the Government are satisfied that the conditions for the regulation of a profession are met then they can take action through secondary legislation under existing powers in the Health Act 1999 to make changes and to bring into effect criminal offences relating to a person’s registration with a professional regulator.
I openly and honestly say to the noble Lord that we cannot accept the amendment, but I hope that there is some comfort from both the meeting and the direction of travel that I have set out on behalf of my colleagues in the Department of Health and Social Care. I hope that the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I regret that I am not content to withdraw my amendment.
First, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for highlighting how the opinions of the public may be affected, and the fact that the reputations of psychotherapy and counselling services, which are of value and honestly provided, may be tainted by the dishonest quacks who have absolutely no right to be practising—as a matter not just of regulation but of plain, honest practice—because they are there to take money from innocent clients. My view is that the definition of
“providing or purporting to provide psychotherapy or counselling services”
is wide enough to catch those quacks.
Secondly, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for reconsidering the opinions he expressed in Committee. That is what the gap between Committee and Report is for—to give us all a chance to think—and I am grateful to him for his change of mind and his support for the amendment.
I simply did not understand the objections of the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel. I understood the Minister’s objections when he talked about regulation, but he does not seem to have taken on board my point—which is central to all this—that regulation for the purposes of a new criminal offence is simply a red herring. What is important here is creating a criminal offence to catch dishonest people who are quacks, who are taking advantage of vulnerable people by coercive and controlling behaviour, and who ought to be punished for doing so. Others also ought to be deterred from doing so.
With some regret in view of the hour, I do not wish to withdraw the amendment; I wish to test the opinion of the House.
“Assault of public-facing worker(1) A person who assaults a public-facing worker at work commits an offence under this section.(2) For the purposes of this section—“public-facing worker at work” means a person who is providing a service or facilitating a transaction to the public in a public building or space, on public transport, or in a commercial property which is accessible to the public to buy or receive such services;“worker” includes an unpaid employee.(3) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or to a fine (or both).(4) In subsection (3) “the maximum term for summary offences” means—(a) if the offence is committed before the time when section 281(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (alteration of penalties for certain summary offences: England and Wales) comes into force, six months;(b) if the offence is committed after that time, 51 weeks.(5) In section 40(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (power to join in indictment count for common assault etc) after paragraph (ac) insert—“(ad) an offence under section (Assault of a public-facing worker) of the Crime and Policing Act 2025 (assault of public-facing worker).””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would expand the provisions of Clauses 38 and 39 (assault of a retail worker) to include all public-facing workers.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)
My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 359 and will also speak to Amendment 361, both of which are in my name. I am hugely grateful to my co-signatories, the noble Lords, Lord Hendy and Lord Hogan-Howe, and my noble friend Lady Harding, and I thank them for their support. I am also grateful to the Minister for meeting me and his noble friend Lord Hendy. I am only sorry that at that meeting we were unable to persuade him of our case, and I hope I can do a better job tonight.
My amendments replicate Clauses 38 and 39, which introduce a new stand-alone offence of assault against retail workers, but simply expand that offence to include all public-facing workers. I am bringing these amendments forward because the Government’s decision to make the new stand-alone offence exclusively for retail workers is based on arbitrary factors that make little sense, risks making matters worse for employers and employees alike and does not help address the cause of increased violence and disorder in public places and spaces, which causes us all so much angst. In a moment I will explain briefly how my amendments help to address the latter, but let me start with what is wrong with the Government’s approach and how my amendments can help put it right.
As we all know, the crime of assault applies equally to anyone who is a victim of it. No one is not covered by existing law. But four years ago, we introduced an aggravated offence of assault against all public-facing workers via the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act because violence and threats of violence to workers across all industries—retail, transport, hospitality, finance and more—were rising at a worrying rate. Now this Government argue that they are introducing a new crime of assault against only retail workers because violent abuse in shops continues to rise and because those workers are charged with upholding retail laws such as those involving age verification.
Of course it is horrific that some retail workers experience violence at work. They do not deserve that, and we all want it to stop. That is why I support Clauses 38 and 39. But other public-facing workers are experiencing increasing violence too. Many of these workers are also responsible for upholding laws and are required to take action when a member of the public flouts them, which they increasingly do. The most obvious example is transport workers and the scourge of fare dodging, but bar staff also routinely need to seek age verification.
The Institute of Customer Service—I declare my interest as the vice-chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Customer Service—has been tracking abuse against all public-facing workers for almost six years. Its most recent survey data from 15,000 responses shows that 42% of customer-facing workers experienced abuse in the preceding six months.
The problem that the Government have highlighted as one they need to fix is not affecting retail workers exclusively. Indeed, some of the worst cases of violence in a public place are against utility workers doing essential work on streets. Yet the Government’s approach even excludes those who work in bank branches, post offices and other outlets on high streets or in retail parks. What makes matters worse is that those workers fear they will not be treated equally if they are a victim of crime because they will fall outside the definition of a retail worker.
We need good people in these front-line jobs who are doing great work to want to stay in these jobs. But the Government’s arbitrary dividing line means we are in danger of losing them. That is not just bad for those workers: it is bad for customers, and it is bad for business. Sick leave associated with abuse and violence experienced at work is estimated to cost the economy at least £1 billion every year.
I must say at this point that we must not lose sight that, thankfully, most public-facing workers are not at risk of assault. Indeed, it is really important to make clear that customers are not the enemy, and we must not create an environment where, even unintentionally, they are made to feel like they are. We do not need more signs telling us not to be rude or abusive, but we do need a new approach. Alongside a better response from the police when crimes do occur, if we are to prevent violence against workers and any criminal conduct in public places becoming normalised, we must work together to discourage low-level disorder and disrespect for shared services and public property when we see signs of it taking root on our high streets, public transport or anywhere else. But that requires leadership from the people in charge of those public spaces and places. Most often, they are not the workers who are the highest paid.
It is not easy to uphold the shared standards and social norms that keep public spaces safe and orderly for everyone’s benefit, which is why those who are out there at work every day upholding the law and doing their best to maintain the common bonds that underpin a strong society do not just deserve our thanks: they need our strong backing for the leadership they are expected to give—and we need them to give—if we are to tackle disorder, which blights our communities. That is what my amendments seek to provide.
Excluding some workers from the cover of this new stand-alone offence risks disincentivising those excluded at a time when we need them most. Business leaders, workers and the wider public support these amendments. I hope that the members of unions and the former leaders of unions who occupy the Benches opposite will also support them. I hope the Minister accepts them. If he does not, I will seek to divide the House. I beg to move.
Lord Hendy (Lab)
My Lords, I am pleased to support Amendments 359 and 361 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell of Beeston. On the basis of those amendments, I will not advance the amendment I proposed in Committee for a stand-alone offence for transport workers. My amendment sought to give transport workers equivalent protection to that to be extended to retail workers by the Government in Clauses 38 and 39, but the noble Baroness’s amendments cover transport workers, retail workers and, as she mentioned, many more categories of workers who face the public and are exposed to the risk of violent attack by individuals apparently aggrieved by a worker doing what he or she is paid to do.
In proposing these more widely drafted amendments, there is no intention to diminish the coverage the Government are already offering retail workers. If there is some perceived shortfall in the scope of our amendments compared with that of Clauses 38 and 39 for retail workers, I for one would be very happy if the Government instructed parliamentary counsel to close that gap in drafting.
I thank my noble friend the Minister for meeting with the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, and me to discuss the amendments, notwithstanding that, as she says, he was not persuaded by us. With respect, I am likewise not persuaded by my noble friend’s justification for restricting the scope of the offence under discussion to retail workers only. The commitment given in the Labour manifesto would be equally fulfilled by adoption of our amendments in place of Clauses 38 and 39. Retail workers would have, and must still have, their manifesto protection. In any event, though it may result in duplication, our amendments do not involve a request to remove Clauses 38 and 39. That is not their purpose.
As to the argument that the wider amendment is not necessary, I point out that even if that were legally correct, the adoption of Clauses 38 and 39 and the rejection of the wider amendment put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, sends a particular message both to the workers in question and the public, as she pointed out. She mentioned violence against various categories of public-facing workers, and I gave figures for violence against transport workers at an earlier stage of the debate. I will not repeat those, but the House should know that the situation is getting worse. For example, British Transport Police figures for the period April to November 2025 showed a 21% increase in incidents involving violence against staff compared to the previous year, which itself showed a similar increase on the year before that. The stabbings at Huntingdon in November 2025 bring the point home.
Baroness Harding of Winscombe (Con)
My Lords, given the hour, I shall be brief. I support my noble friend Lady Stowell in the two amendments that she has so ably introduced, and I have been delighted to add my name to both of them.
I have worked all my life in consumer services: for 20-odd years in retailing, but then in telecoms and in the National Health Service, and, today, in hospitality—in horse racing. I should declare my interest as the chair or senior steward of the Jockey Club, given that we have the Cheltenham Festival next week, where we will have thousands of people in front-line, consumer-facing service roles at the racecourse.
I have not engaged in the Bill until this stage, so I apologise for that, but I am speaking to and have put my name to these amendments because I am bemused by the Government’s failure to support public-facing workers in all these other industries. I grew up in retailing and I love retailing, but if you have ever sat in a GP surgery with a receptionist, as I have, and watched them do their job, you will know that it is no different from being at the customer service desk at Tesco, which I have also done, dealing with the ups and downs of everyday life with the customers, the consumers, the citizens you are serving. We should be protecting them and treating them in exactly the same way. As the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, has said, that is true for transport, finance, telecoms, energy and water. We should not exclude the hundreds of thousands, millions, of people who provide us with these essential services. We learned during Covid how important these essential front-line, customer service-facing roles are, and it breaks my heart, five years after the pandemic, to see a Government who say they support working people not supporting many front-line working people.
It is not just front-line working people who want us to protect them; their bosses do too. The CEOs of businesses in all the sectors I have just mentioned know that it is good business to protect them. Some 42% of front-line workers, according to the Institute of Customer Service, have experienced abuse in the last six months, as my noble friend Lady Stowell has said; 37% say they have considered leaving their role because of that hostility; and more than 25% have taken sick leave as a result. That costs productivity in our public services and it costs economic growth in our private sector. The chief executives of all these organisations know that, and they want us to make sure that we treat all those workers with the same respect that the Bill, at the moment, treats retail workers only, which is why I support these amendments.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I have added my name to this amendment because it is trying to achieve consistency in law. At the moment, the law protects a retail worker more, when in fact those who provide services are doing exactly the same thing. Broadly, they deal with the public and they are trying to get rules enforced. They are just trying to make sure that things work well.
My reading of the present advice on providing protection to retail workers is that they are protected if they provide goods, but not if they provide services. The consequence of that is that people who, for example, work in betting shops, theatres and cinemas do not receive the same protection that they would receive if they were providing that same retail worker service and also providing goods, and that seems inconsistent. Then there is the further group of workers that the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, referred to: people who work in transport, such as taxi drivers. All of them face people who are often affected by drink or drugs, for example, and have to challenge bad behaviour, but they do not receive this protection. That seems odd. I find it odd that the Government do not want to protect that group of workers in the same way. For reasons of consistency, and because the workers I have described—those who work in betting offices, for example, where you get some pretty bad behaviour at times—deserve that protection, they ought to be included.
My final point is that although the present legislation excludes wholesale workers—should I name the companies? Perhaps not—you only get access to some of these wholesale or, I would say, retail sites by joining a club; you do not pay any money. I think we all know the ones I am talking about, where you get access to better prices merely by joining the club. Apparently, that is not retail. I think it is pretty much like retail. They still get bad behaviour on these sites. For all those reasons, I think this amendment regarding public-facing workers is a good idea and I encourage the Government to support it for the sake of consistency for those who provide services to us.
Baroness O’Grady of Upper Holloway (Lab)
My Lords, I will be very brief, partly to remind all noble Lords that the shop workers’ union, USDAW, under Joanne Thomas, the current leader, Paddy Lillis before her and, indeed, John Hannett—the noble Lord, Lord Hannett—has campaigned for years for freedom from fear for a predominantly female workforce facing violence at work. As we have heard, that got a lot worse through Covid. At the time, USDAW was pressing for legislation; nobody listened. I have to commend the Government for listening to the campaign from the grass roots all the way up to the top of USDAW for that protection for workers in that industry.
Having said that, I have looked at the very latest figures from the Health and Safety Executive and from the Labour Force Survey, which show that public-facing workers across a number of industries, sectors and jobs disproportionately face violence at work. More than that, I have heard it from workers themselves. Bus workers, transport workers and hospitality workers have been spat at, assaulted and threatened. I also alight on transport workers, because they too perform a significant act of public service in the work they do. They often face real threats and real assaults because of the job that they do.
I share my noble friend Lord Hendy’s hope that, even if the Government cannot support this amendment, my noble friend the Minister could at least commit to talk to colleagues in the relevant departments to get us around the table to look at a real strategy for prevention of violence and enforcement of the laws we have. Many workers still feel unsafe going to work to earn a living and no worker should face that threat at work.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, we strongly support the creation of a specific offence of assaulting a retail worker. It sends an important signal to those working in shops at a time when shop theft has surged and the risks to staff have grown. But if this measure applies only to those who work in shops, we risk sending an unintended message to other front-line staff that they somehow count for less.
The Minister previously gave three reasons for rejecting the noble Baroness’s amendment in Committee. First, he said that the case is especially strong for shop workers because they enforce age-restricted sales and are on the front line of theft. We agree that shop workers are at particular risk—that is why we support these clauses—but many other public-facing workers also enforce rules, refuse service and challenge bad behaviour. They too attract anger and sometimes violence.
Secondly, the Minister said that a narrow definition of retail worker is needed for legal clarity, while suggesting that some hospitality workers might be covered by the definition of retail premises in Clause 38. In practice, that causes new uncertainty. It is hard to justify protection for a worker in a café inside a supermarket but not for one in a café next door to a supermarket.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Stowell of Beeston for moving Amendment 359. I know that she has been pursuing it with tenacity. This amendment and Amendment 361 relate to the Government’s proposal to create a specific, stand-alone offence of assaulting a retail worker at work. I want to be clear from the outset that it is already an offence to assault a retail worker, because it is an offence to assault any person, full stop. That is the law. I do not believe that criminal law should treat anyone differently based simply on whether they are a retail worker. I fully recognise that retail workers face an appalling level of abuse and violence in the course of their jobs, but to say that the creation of a new, specific criminal offence of assaulting a retail worker will stop assaults on retail workers is, frankly, for the birds.
What will stop these assaults, or at least reduce them, is the police stepping up enforcement, and the Government stopping the release of criminals and handing anyone convicted of these offences suspended sentences. However, the Government clearly believe that creating this new offence will reduce violence against retail workers. If we are to take their logic to its conclusion, why would we not extend the offence to cover all public-facing workers? Does the Minister believe that transport drivers, as mentioned by my noble friend Lady Stowell and endorsed by the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, are of lesser value than retail workers? If the Government believe that this new offence will work then why do they not believe it will work for other public-facing workers?
My noble friend’s amendment exposes the absurdity of the Government’s position. They argue that violence against retail workers is a significant problem that needs to be tackled, which is absolutely correct, but then propose a solution that they refuse to extend to other workers who also face significant levels of violence at work. There is simply no logic to the Government’s approach. Either they believe that creating a new offence for specific groups of people will reduce violence against them or they do not. They cannot argue both. I would prefer that we did not have any new offences that outlawed things that are already outlawed and that we did not legislate to criminalise actions towards specific groups of people but not others. That would be my preference, but if we are to do these things, then we must take them to their logical conclusion. For that reason, I support the amendments from my noble friend.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her amendment, and for the opportunity to discuss it with her and with the organisations she brought in for face-to-face discussions with us. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lord Hendy for his contribution and for our meeting.
I declare my membership of the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers, which I joined 47 years ago and which sponsored me as a Member of Parliament. I put that on the record. I must also say to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, that I understand that he would prefer to have no offence. I understand that because when, as a Member of Parliament in the House of Commons, I tabled amendments to put these types of offences down, the then Government rejected them. I therefore understand where he is coming from, because that is consistent with the position of previous Conservative Governments.
In this case, we have a Labour manifesto commitment endorsed by the electorate. My noble friend Lady O’Grady mentioned USDAW. I pay tribute to that union, which has collected evidence and, through three general secretaries, including my noble friend Lord Hannett of Everton, campaigned strongly for an offence against retail workers. The Labour Party listened to that in opposition and put in its manifesto—I cannot claim credit for this, because I was out of Parliament at the time—a commitment to legislate for that offence, which appears in the Bill before the House today.
I have heard the comments from the noble Lord, Hogan-Howe and the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, and others, and from the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, on the Liberal Democrat Front Bench, on why they think that the bespoke offence against assaulting a retail worker should be extended to all public-facing workers. Along with proposing a new broader offence of assault against public-facing workers, the noble Baroness has tabled an amendment that would place a duty on courts to make a criminal order in the event of a conviction.
I hate to disappoint the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, but I repeat the arguments that I put to her in Committee and elsewhere. Public-facing workers such as those mentioned by my noble friend, the noble Lady Baroness, Lady Harding, and others, are covered under existing legislation, such as the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, which includes a range of violent offences, such as actual bodily harm and grievous bodily harm. Further, the provisions of Section 156 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, which was introduced by the previous Conservative Government, makes it a statutory aggravating factor of assault against any public-facing worker. That offence means that if someone, having been charged with the serious offence of assault and having gone through a trial, is deemed to have committed assault against public-facing workers, the court has the power to add aggravating factors to that sentence. That covers every type of worker that has been mentioned by noble Lords today. The aggravating factor applies in cases of assault where an offence is committed against those public service workers performing a public duty or providing a service to the public. That is an important factor.
Noble Lords have asked why there is a specific offence against retail workers that is additional to the aggravating offence. That is a reasonable question to ask. In clauses that have been mentioned there is provision for additional prison sentence capacity, criminal restriction orders and an unlimited fine for this stand-alone offence. Retail workers are still covered by Section 156 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, so why have we put that extra power in place?
The reason for this—and why I declared an interest—is that USDAW has, to my knowledge, for 17 or 18 years campaigned regularly for this in the Freedom From Fear Campaign. It has done so under the three general secretaries that my noble friend Lady O’Grady mentioned, and it has done so for a purpose—one that the Government share. Retail workers are fundamentally on the front line of upholding the laws passed by both Houses of Parliament on a range of matters. It is a retail worker who stops illegal sales of cigarettes, it is a retail worker who stops illegal sales of alcohol, it is a retail worker who stops an illegal sale of a knife, it is a retail worker who stops an illegal sale of a solvent, and it is a retail worker who protects the community by upholding all the laws on those issues that we have passed in this House and in the House of Commons. That is why USDAW campaigned for the specific offence, and it is why the Labour Party in government has been pleased to support the creation of that offence by putting it in the Bill.
That goes even further to the appalling shop theft situation. I do not call it shoplifting—it is shop theft. There has been a continued rise in shop theft over many years, and it is the retail worker who is on the front line saying, “Put that back”, calling the police and taking action in the shop. The Co-op, Tesco, Sainsbury’s and a whole range of retail organisations have campaigned for this, alongside USDAW, over many years. It has been thought through and there is an evidence base. It is a manifesto commitment, and we are trying to introduce that extra offence. I do not wish to see a train operative or members of customer services, as the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, mentioned, attacked with a knife. This is covered by common assault legislation from 1861 and by the 2022 Act as an aggravating offence. But the Government have put forward a stand-alone offence for shop workers for the reasons I have outlined.
Does that potentially create an anomaly? Let us discuss that and reflect on that view. But the manifesto commitment is clear, and we are delivering on that manifesto commitment. This is an important issue, based on evidence and campaigning by a range of bodies—retail organisations and trade unions—and it has my support. Therefore, I cannot support the noble Baroness—I have told her that—or my noble friend.
That is not to say that the Government accept that attacks on those members of staff are a normal part of what they should face. We are committed to driving down assaults and to enforcing, with the courts, the legislation on the statute book. The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, asked what the Government are doing to reduce the attacks in the first place. This Government are rebuilding the police force—13,000 neighbourhood police officers—and have put in place, with this Bill, changes in shop theft legislation. This Government are focusing on retail crime in hotspots and on making sure that we drive it down. We will ensure that the police forces have retail crime as a major priority.
In the last 14 years before July 2024, police numbers fell, neighbourhood policing fell and the focus on the high street fell. It was not a Labour Government but a Conservative Government who did that. They refused the legislation on assaults on shop workers that I proposed in the House of Commons, they refused to take action on shop theft on high streets and they refused to stand up for the workforce. With due respect, I will not take lessons today from the Conservative Front Bench.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
May I check whether my assertion is accurate or whether I am wrong? Would someone enforcing an age limit in a betting office not be protected by the retail workers’ protection but someone enforcing an age restriction in an off-licence would be? It seems to me that the distinction is simply between providing a service and providing a good. If I am wrong in that, I withdraw my comment, but I am not sure that the Minister has said I am.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
We have clearly defined in the Bill what we believe a retail worker is. I accept that there are areas of interpretation for the courts, such as, for example—we have discussed this with colleagues outside the House—whether a post office is covered by the retail worker provision. Somebody might walk into a post office to buy Christmas cards or birthday cards and go to the post office counter—is that a retail worker? Those are areas where there may be some interpretation, but we have identified this as tightly as we can. It is a straightforward clause that defines a retail worker. I commend it, given that there has been a considerable amount of work by the Home Office in drafting the amendment, after a considerable amount of work by retail organisations and trade unions to develop the campaign.
I go back to my point that all attacks on all staff are unacceptable. Other areas are covered, but the reasons I mentioned on the specific provision of upholding legislation are why we have put in a specific offence against retail workers. That is why I commend those clauses to the House. I ask the noble Baroness—although I understand that she cannot do this—at least not to push her amendment to a vote.
Baroness O'Grady of Upper Holloway (Lab)
Before the Minister sits down, I think there was appetite among many of us to see the beginnings of a strategy for each sector that we know is facing rising violence. I know that that is not within the gift of the Minister, but a request to talk to Ministers and get people around the table in those sectors so that we can deal at a strategic level with the causes of violence, as well as big issues such as resources for enforcement, would go a long way to give comfort to people that this is the beginning of a conversation about how we deal with violence against working people.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
As I said to the House, I do not support, encourage or condone any violence against anybody under any circumstances. The public-facing workers are covered by two pieces of legislation; we are adding a specific offence for retail workers, for the reasons I have outlined. I have met personally with a range of bodies that the noble Baroness has brought before us. I understand that my noble friend Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill has met organisations and met and discussed issues with my noble friend Lord Hendy, who is here today, and will continue to do so. However, this campaign on the clauses in the Bill has been a long time in gestation—it has taken 15 and 16 years to get where we are today—and I want to get them over the line, so I cannot accept the amendments that the noble Baroness has introduced. I ask her to withdraw her amendment but if she puts it to the vote, I shall have to ask my noble friends to join me in voting against it.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)
My Lords, the hour is late. I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in support of my amendments—indeed, I do not think that any noble Lord apart from the Minister has spoken against them. I just say to him that nothing in my amendments dilutes or diminishes what he has brought forward in Clauses 38 and 39. His manifesto commitment is still being met; all the work that he pays tribute to USDAW for doing over many years all stands. Nothing of what he is so proud to have brought forward in the Bill will be changed by us voting for my amendments tonight. My amendments would address the illogical way, as we have heard in the debate tonight, in which the Government are determined to tackle a problem that expands way beyond retail workers. I am afraid that I am not going to withdraw my amendment—I would like to test the opinion of the House.
“Offences of causing harassment, alarm or distress: amendments(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended as follows.(2) In section 4A (intentional harassment, alarm or distress) omit “, alarm” in each place where it occurs (including the heading) and omit “, alarmed” in subsection.(3) In section 5 (harassment, alarm or distress) omit “, alarm” in each place where it occurs (including the heading).”
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
My Lords, I am returning to a theme I raised in Committee in moving my Amendment 360. Amendment 360 is straightforward: it would remove the word “alarm” from Sections 4, 8 and 5 of the Public Order Act 1986. In Handyside v the United Kingdom, the Strasbourg court reminded us that freedom of expression protects ideas that “offend, shock or disturb”. This concept was reinforced in the oft-quoted dictum of Lord Justice Sedley, which I will not repeat tonight, which I sometimes think should be turned into a poster campaign by the police and CPS.
In a democracy, robust debate—political, religious and philosophical—will sometimes unsettle people, it may even alarm them, but that should not be a matter for criminal law. Section 4A currently criminalises
“threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour”
that causes
“harassment, alarm or distress”
where there is deemed to have been an intention to cause harassment, alarm and distress. In Section 5, the test is “threatening or abusive words” that are deemed likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress.
Alarm is inherently subjective, often momentary, and is too easily confused with discomfort. It is an emotion. This is a dangerously low threshold for prosecuting people over words, especially in today’s political climate where so many people have been implicitly trained to respond to hearing challenging opinions by talking about how hurt their feelings are. I watched the video of Nick Timothy MP documenting Islamists outside the infamous Maccabi v Aston Villa match, and Islamists persuaded officers to move on Mr Timothy by complaining about him talking to them.
We saw a similar attempt more recently on the streets of Whitechapel, where a crowd of men tried to get police to arrest a Christian street preacher in what they regard as some kind of “ethnic enclave” where preaching the gospel is prohibited. Thankfully, in that case, we saw a marvellously brave and sensible female police officer face them all down and defend free speech.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, for bringing this amendment back, because I had some thoughts on this after the debate we had in Committee. Having read English at university, I went back to the definition of “alarm” and started to look at the definition used in the Public Order Act. There are components of causing alarm, particularly in the Public Order Act, which the noble Lord wants to amend. The levels at which charging happens use different definitions of alarm, which are quite interesting for these purposes.
The definition of alarm in this context is to create a state of apprehension, fear or panic in a person, often accompanied by a sense of immediate danger or worry that something unpleasant is going to happen to them. There is a key difference in usage. Section 4A of the Public Order Act details using “threatening, abusive or insulting” conduct with
“intent to cause … harassment, alarm or distress”,
and, on likelihood, using threatening or abusive conduct that is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress, without necessarily intending to.
The issue I take with the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, is that he says it is all just about how you are feeling, but the point is that the definitions at the different levels within the Public Order Act, at least semantically, seem to show that it is more than that, because you need to identify what has triggered that sense of alarm. It is a range, as we have discussed in previous debates. Because his amendment wants to remove “alarm” from intentional harassment, alarm or distress, it falls at the higher level that I have just described. I wonder whether he might reconsider it in that light, because when the 1986 Act went through it was clearly very well thought through.
Interestingly, the OED definition:
“To make (a person) feel suddenly frightened or in danger; to strike or fill with fear”,
says that more recently it has been seen in a slightly weakened use. However, the WordWeb online dictionary says:
“Experiencing a sudden sense of danger”.
In a lot of dictionaries I have looked up, there is the repeated use of it as not just how you feel but a panic response to danger, a heightened level. Therefore, certainly in my books, it should stay with harassment as well, because they are both more serious than just feeling a bit worried about something, which is what the noble Lord described.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful for my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough’s amendment, which would remove the word “alarm” from the relevant sections of the Public Order Act. I entirely support his aims. Alarm is not an emotion that should be policed, if emotions should be policed at all. The Act in question has been used for the unprecedented policing of speech that we have seen recently, for which Sections 4A and 5 have been largely responsible, and any measure that weakens the effect of this law is welcome. So, although I am sceptical that he will, I hope the Minister will accept this amendment.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am afraid I cannot accept the amendment, and I will explain why to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson. I am grateful to him for bringing it forward. We will therefore have another opportunity to look at the offences in the Public Order Act 1986 and to reflect on the balance we must continue to strike between free expression and ensuring public safety.
The Government remain firmly committed to protecting freedom of speech. The ability to voice strong and at times uncomfortable views is fundamental to democratic life. However, as I set out in Committee, the ability to intervene early is an important tool for police to protect both the public and those involved, a point that I hope the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Jackson, will accept. The definitions in the 1986 Act, passed by a previous Conservative Government, including the words “alarm” and “distress”, are there so that there can be early intervention and examination, and so that people who feel “alarm” and “distress” can have that support.
The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, has also referred to the review of public order and hate crime legislation led by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. Government has given it the task of examining the threshold definitions of public order legislation, which are needed to protect the public, while ensuring that we do exactly what I know the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, wants to do: ensure that we do not have undue interference in freedom of expression. The review is expected to conclude in the spring—it is a flexible definition, as we know, but it will be in the spring—and the Government will carefully consider its recommendations before determining whether legislative change is necessary.
I cannot commit to where we are on that because we have not seen the outcome of the review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald. Given the circumstances —and given that the Act is now 40 years old and has stood the test of time from Mrs Thatcher’s Government to those of John Major, Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, however many Conservative Prime Ministers held the office between 2010 and 2024, and my right honourable friend the current Prime Minister—it strikes me that it is a sound piece of legislation. It has stood the test of a number of Prime Ministers and Governments. With the review pending, I hope that we can examine and look at all those issues. With those comments, I hope the noble Lord is content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
It gives me inordinate pleasure—it warms the cockles of my heart—to listen to the Minister praising the legislation of the late Baroness Thatcher in her pomp. We do not often get that, but we should be grateful for small mercies.
We have had a short and interesting debate. I take in good faith the comments of both the Minister and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. Her contribution was very thoughtful in really drilling down into what the word “alarm” means. I think the debate we had in Committee was about the consistent nature of a criminal offence. That is harassment and distress: if someone harasses or threatens someone on a consistent basis. It is different from a momentary issue that might arise.
I say that because we have seen too many examples of where individual police officers, who may not have had appropriate training and education in interpreting these pieces of legislation from the 1980s, have, in my opinion, overreached. That has a very corrosive impact on the faith and trust that the public have in the police force. It leads them to believe that there is such a thing as two-tier policing, which is not good for any of us.
I take on faith what the Minister said. I look forward to what I think will be a very comprehensive and thorough piece of work by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. On that basis, we will no doubt return to this specific issue and piece of legislation. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(a) a device which is capable of using five or more SIM cards simultaneously or interchangeably, for a purpose mentioned in subsection (1A), or(b) an article specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.(1A) The purposes are—”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment allows the Secretary of State to specify different articles as SIM farms in regulations.
“, or
(b) an article specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment allows the Secretary of State to specify different articles as SIM cards in regulations.
“(4) Regulations under subsection (1) may specify only articles which the Secretary of State considers are capable of being used for a purpose mentioned in subsection (1A) in a way which is a similar to a device within subsection (1)(a).(4A) Regulations under subsection (2) may specify only articles which the Secretary of State considers have a similar function to removable physical subscriber identity modules.(4B) “Article” includes information in electronic form. (4C) Before making regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must consult such persons appearing to the Secretary of State to be likely to be affected by the regulations as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes the Secretary of State’s power to make regulations amending clause 129 and inserts a restriction on the kind of articles that may be specified by the new powers inserted by my amendments to clause 129, page 173 line 35 and page 174 line 1. It also requires the Secretary of State to consult before exercising those powers.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment restricts the kind of articles that the Secretary of State may specify under clause 132.
Lord Clement-Jones
“Digital identity theft(1) A person commits an offence of digital identity theft if—(a) the person obtains, or attempts to obtain, personal or sensitive information relating to an individual, including but not limited to passwords, identification numbers, credit card numbers, national insurance numbers, biometric data, or other unique digital identifiers, and(b) the person intends to use this personal or sensitive information to impersonate that individual, or to enable another person to impersonate that individual, with the purpose of carrying out any transaction, activity, or communication in their name without their consent or lawful authority.(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)—(a) “personal or sensitive information” refers to any data, whether digital, physical, or otherwise, that can be used to identify, authenticate, or impersonate an individual;(b) “obtains” includes acquiring, accessing, collecting, or otherwise coming into possession of such information.(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a fine, or both;(b) on conviction on indictment in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to a fine, or both.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment creates an offence of digital identity theft.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 366 also stands in the name of my noble friend Lady Doocey. I have been a persistent—or is it insistent?—advocate for a specific offence of digital identity theft for many years. There is currently no criminal offence of identity theft in England and Wales—none. A fraudster can harvest your biometric data, clone your digital identity and impersonate you across multiple platforms, and at the moment of those acts they have committed no specific crime. The law does not intervene until after the damage is done.
Baroness Coffey (Con)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has got to the nub of an issue that seems to fall between a rock and a hard place. One of the issues that we face in terms of the crime survey, which is now being used by the Government as the primary way of deciding police resources, is fraud. Without doubt, the increasing use of digital identity will be the source of more fraud if we are not careful.
The Government seem to be in a predicament about whether to press ahead with digital ID more generally. We saw the resignation of a Minister at the weekend over their dubious ways of trying to challenge the credentials of a journalist assessing the organisation Labour Together. The Government have reappointed a Minister to undertake this task of establishing a digital identity card, which I am led to believe there will be a consultation announcement on within the next week. I hope that the Government are listening to the noble Lord by getting ahead of the issues that could come about with the mass spreading of digital identity.
I am very grateful to Nationwide, which rang to alert me to a fraud that was happening. I had used my card when I was abroad representing Parliament at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and suddenly it was being used in a number of places to secure money. That is a reminder, as we move to this digital approach to money, with cash evaporating, that the last Government did a lot to try to protect cash and to make sure that it was still being used on a widespread basis, and I appreciate that. However, it would be useful to get a sense of what the Government are doing to tackle this very real threat of digital identity theft.
This is particularly pertinent because of the 10-year NHS plan—never mind the 10-year NHS cancer plan—regarding how much is being put into the hands of government. With artificial intelligence understandably being introduced to increase productivity and the deployment of public services, somebody’s identity is precious, and the validity and protection of digital identity can become an extraordinary challenge to somebody’s integrity.
The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, has set out a number of issues in a great deal of detail in Amendment 366, with the proposed new subsection (2)(b) defining what “obtains” would mean. I think it would be helpful to the Committee to understand what protections are in place or being planned by the Government not to mandate the use of initial identity but regarding what their desire is. Again, I understand the desire of the use for government, but what is good for government is also good for general commercial practice.
It would be helpful to get an understanding of why the Government are resisting the amendment—if the noble Lord tests the opinion of the House, I will vote with him in that Division—and a sense of where they believe they have sufficient protections in making this case. We have discussed identity, fake imagery and deepfakes quite a lot during the passage of this Bill. I seem to recall in the last general election that the now Prime Minister was, all of a sudden, in the middle of a deepfake situation, with comments attributed to him that were not made.
We can go further with how technology has advanced in that regard, but where would this go if we started using digital identity to register for elections? Where is this going when it is about accessing cash, frankly, from the Government? I know from running the DWP for three years that, unfortunately, people seem very determined to try to commit fraud to get money to which they are not entitled. But as we continue to try to use AI as a force for good, what are the Government doing to try to stop it being used as a force for bad?
I do not wish to labour the point, but the noble Lord has really hit on something. There is a gap. There is a desire by the Government to do this good, but I think the amendment would plug the gap very well. There are so many instances in this Bill and other Bills which are coming before the House where the Government want all sorts of powers just in case. This is not a “just in case”; this is a “waiting to happen”. It is happening now, so what are we doing to address it?
I go back to the fact that 40% of crime is due to fraud. Two-thirds of that is digital, online fraud. This is affecting not just people in this Chamber but people right across this country, and that is something that I hope the Government will consider carefully. If there was a vote, I would certainly support the amendment to make sure that the Government take note and actually get something done about this. I support the noble Lord’s amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for bringing back his amendment on Report. His Majesty’s loyal Opposition retain our support for his measures, and I thank him for continuing his campaign.
I understand that the Minister refrained from supporting the amendment in Committee for fear of unnecessary duplication of legislation. I gently urge him that this provides an opportunity for the opposite. It is common practice across Governments to use new legislation to amalgamate old pieces of legislation into a single draft. This seems the perfect time to do so with digital identity theft.
There is an array of Acts that creates a puzzle from which a digital identity theft offence appears, but it is somewhat distorted, if not fragmented. At least five Acts cover areas of digital identity theft; a wide purview is by no means a bad thing, but they were all designed for a different age. Just reading out the years of our primary Acts demonstrates this: 1968, 1990, 2006 and 2010. Even the Data Protection Act 2018, the most recent application, is for an era without AI.
It is not worth repeating the statistics that we have heard throughout the course of the Bill. A simple fact will suffice: 60% of all fraud cases are identity fraud, and the recent increase has been driven by the internet and artificial intelligence. The Government talk about being ahead of the curve on AI safety and online regulation. That is commendable, but to claim one thing and then refuse to act on it is not. I hope the Minister can at least acknowledge the scale of digital identity theft and its growing prevalence. If he cannot support it now, I hope that he will commit to look into it in the future.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for returning to this important matter. As I set out previously, although digital identity theft is not a stand-alone offence, the behaviour the noble Lord highlights is already captured by existing legislation. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, predicted some of the response that I would give; it has not changed hugely since Committee. This includes the misuse of personal sensitive identifiable information. The Fraud Act 2006 criminalises the use of another person’s identity with the intention to gain or to cause loss. Unauthorised access to personal data, including biometric information, is covered under the Computer Misuse Act 1990.
I fully recognise the concerns raised, which is why the Government are already taking clear action. The new Report Fraud service has replaced Action Fraud, giving victims improved reporting tools and providing police with stronger intelligence and better support pathways. A full review of police skills has been completed and its recommendations will be reflected in the upcoming fraud strategy, which the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will be pleased to know will be published imminently.
Baroness Coffey (Con)
I am actually very pro-digital ID, as long as it is not mandatory, but one of the things to improve take-up is the fear that people will have fraud committed against them. This amendment introduces an offence not necessarily to reduce the likelihood of that, but to provide potential weapons that can be used against criminal forces. That is why I am so keen on this amendment.
Lord Katz (Lab)
While I understand the point the noble Baroness is making, I do not want to presage the content of the fraud strategy, which will be upon us really quite soon, or indeed what is in the legislation that will introduce national digital ID. I absolutely take the point that some people want to encourage digital ID because it gives security of identity in a digital form for deployment in a number of different areas, whether claiming a benefit, voting or whatever use it may offer—I will stop there because my expertise on digital ID does not extend much further. All I will say is that, given the comments I have already made about the Fisher review and the forthcoming fraud strategy, which will address emerging fraud risks, including identity theft, I hope that the noble Lord is content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, and very much appreciate what she had to say. In particular, I thought the phrase “precious digital identity” was extremely important, as well as her reference to deepfakes. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for his support. As he rightly identified, I said 59% and he rounded it up to 60%. That is the figure for the percentage of identity fraud in our landscape.
The noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, said that the Government need to answer what they are planning to do. The Minister threw the kitchen sink at that question but did not really answer it. We have police training in AI and digital, but I am not sure what I am expected to understand when he starts off by saying there is perfectly adequate criminal law on this, but then tells me that they will look very carefully at this as part of the Fisher review. Which one is the answer that I should take from the Minister—that he is taking it seriously or that he is not?
We seem to keep getting the same answer. The Minister starts off by saying that there is enough criminal law to cover this—completely contradictory to the Fraud Act Select Committee—and on the other hand he says that the review will consider this very carefully. That is a series of mixed messages, quite apart from the fact that the police will prioritise their response to digital crime. How will they prioritise their response to digital crime without the tools they need—i.e. a proper criminal offence of digital identity theft?
There is some confusion on the part of the Government. I still think they have not taken this seriously, and our citizens will suffer as a result, particularly in the age of AI, which both the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies, were clear about.
If I wanted to talk to the Chief Whip or the government roster at this time of night, or if we were in prime time, I might push it to a vote. But I will not; I will withdraw the amendment.
Lord Clement-Jones
“Defences to charges under the Computer Misuse Act 1990(1) The Computer Misuse Act 1990 is amended as follows.(2) In section 1, after subsection (2) insert—“(2A) It is a defence to a charge under subsection (1) to prove that—(a) the person’s actions were necessary for the detection or prevention of crime, or(b) the person’s actions were justified as being in the public interest.”(3) In section 3, after subsection (5) insert—“(5A) It is a defence to a charge under subsection (1) to prove that—(a) the person’s actions were necessary for the detection or prevention of crime, or(b) the person’s actions were justified as being in the public interest.””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment creates defences to charges under the Computer Misuse Act 1990.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 367 is also in the name of my noble friend Lady Doocey, and there is rather better news on this amendment as a result of conversations with the Minister. I warmly welcome the significant movement the Government have made in this area. This is reflected both in the recent policy paper on introducing statutory defences into the Computer Misuse Act, which they have shared with me, and in the constructive meeting I recently held with the noble Lord, Lord Katz, for which I thank him.
The principle we have long championed, that a cyber security researcher’s intent and motivation should be a relevant factor in law, has finally been acknowledged. As the industry has told us for decades, the 1990 Act is a relic of a different era. It was drafted when only 0.5% of people used the internet. It is now being asked to govern a world of generative AI and industrialised cyber warfare. Its current blanket prohibition on unauthorised access makes no distinction between a malicious hacker and a white-hat security researcher. Under current law, our cyber defenders are forced to operate with one hand tied behind their backs, fearing prosecution for the very activities that keep our national infrastructure resilient. This is not just a legal anomaly; it is a direct threat to UK resilience.
However, while the policy paper is a major step forward, we must ensure that it results in robust statutory protection, not just a vague promise of prosecutorial discretion. Reliance on the good faith of prosecutors is not a long-term solution for an industry that requires absolute legal certainty. Our amendment would provide that framework—a defence where actions were necessary for the detection or prevention of crime or justified in the public interest.
I ask the Minister to address some of the following critical concerns arising from the Government’s own policy paper. Because of the time of night, I am going to abbreviate it to give him the headings and write to him subsequently. First, the accreditation bottleneck is a national security risk. The whole question of having to have chartered-level UK Cyber Security Council accreditation will create a bottleneck. The definition of “suitably qualified” suggests that only those with membership of professional bodies such as the UK Cyber Security Council will be valid, but will it recognise in due course that those with established industry experience, who may not hold formal academic credentials, will also qualify? The “no supervision” rule is operationally unworkable, and the scope of non-intrusive activity seems somewhat random.
The vulnerability duty creates a legal trap. The paper requires a researcher who discovers a vulnerability to make all reasonable efforts to report it to the system owner as soon as practicable, but the paper itself acknowledges the difficulty of identifying system owners.
The bug bounty market is under threat. The paper prohibits permitted persons from requesting or demanding payment for reporting a discovered vulnerability. The global bug bounty market, where organisations invite researchers to find and responsibly disclose flaws in exchange for payments, is worth hundreds of millions of pounds and is a cornerstone of modern cyber defence. The paper’s drafting risks chilling this entire ecosystem.
Then we have statutory versus non-statutory protections. The paper acknowledges that reliance on the good faith of prosecutors is not a solution. Can the Minister commit to placing these defences in the Bill during this Session? If not, what vehicle do the Government envisage? Could the upcoming Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill accommodate this reform? We need a clear answer on the legislative timetable.
The paper does not seem to cover the public sector—the National Cyber Security Centre itself—yet the proposed defence appears directed entirely at privately accredited individuals. That is a question that needs answering.
We cannot allow technological development to race ahead of democratic deliberation. Our cyber security professionals need the clarity of the law to protect the UK in 2026 and beyond. I very much hope that this is a moment of genuine policy momentum, so let us produce legislation that is workable, inclusive and legally certain. I am very hopeful that the Minister will continue the dialogue over this policy paper. I beg to move.
Baroness Coffey (Con)
My Lords, I started using a computer before 1990. I was one of those children who started using the BBC Micro—one of the best things the BBC ever produced. Indeed, I learned how to code—admittedly only in BASIC, but sufficient in the days when the internet had not even been created—to start working out how to use data in the computer system.
Unlike the previous amendment, I cannot say to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, nor indeed to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that I would support them if they were to call a Division on this amendment. I completely agree with proposed subsections 2A(a) and 5A(a) that
“the person’s actions were necessary for the detection or prevention of crime”
but not this latter bit that they have lumped into it, saying that
“the person’s actions were justified as being in the public interest”.
I am a great believer in the public interest, but I find that it is being used now to try to justify too many things, including not releasing information from government. In fact, it would be contrary to the public interest, for example, to release information on some of the Bills that we are debating, not just today but at other times during this Parliament.
Let us just try to get a sense of what is going on with the Computer Misuse Act. Why was it introduced? It was introduced to stop manipulation. At what point does manipulation using computers become justifiable in the public interest? For some, that might be a whistleblower caveat. From what the noble Lord set out, I am not quite sure why this is the defining element. I am conscious that the Government may want to automate even more, so what is the balance with what is there to prevent crimes and similar? I appreciate that we do not want bureaucracy and legislation to get in the way of generally trying to stop harm, but what is the impact of the other elements of the noble Lord’s amendments? They could actually deploy harm while still trying to justify it in the public interest.
I appreciate there is sometimes a resistance to old legislation, but old legislation is not necessarily stuck in its time. There are many other Acts that go back hundreds of years that are still perfectly valid because the principles are the same. I would be concerned if we walked into allowing this amendment to go through without testing the opinion of the House to try to assess precisely what actions the noble Lord is trying to allow by making a case for the defence that something be done in public interest. That is why I express my concerns tonight.
Lord Fuller (Con)
My Lords, I will speak against Amendment 367. I have the gravest concerns about it. I am not going to echo everything my noble friend Lady Coffey said, but it amounts to a hackers’ charter. I take security and IT security very seriously. I am responsible for IT security in my business. We are in a sensitive industry—we are involved in global trade—never more so than today, when ammonia and natural gas are under global pressure as part of a war. You have to take these things seriously.
When I joined your Lordships’ House two years ago, there was a briefing and I was pleased that I was one of a handful of Peers and MPs who had a password manager. Every password I have is at least 16 characters—they are random and not one is repeated. You have to take this stuff seriously—no pet names, not using your wife’s name or possibly a wedding anniversary. Using a VPN is important as well.
No matter what precautions you take, however, someone is always going to have a go. What this amendment does is give the malevolent hacker a free pass to get through: a ready defence. It is not just that. We need to recognise that technology is changing all the time. All the things I may do with passwords are not enough. Even using face, voice, biometrics and two-factor authentication, cloned SIM cards or using public wifi to intercept signals are important ways in which even the most diligent and careful person can have their data compromised. There are people who want to abuse your privacy or insult your business. We can simply create a crime, but we must take a huge number of steps to avoid jeopardy or giving them a “get out of jail free” card.
In my view, this amendment would mean that, if somebody finds something, they get off, but if they do not find anything then they are guilty. All those years ago when I was at school, we were taught about trial by ordeal. If you gripped a red hot iron bar and you got blisters, you were guilty; if a lady was put on the ducking stool and she drowned, she was probably innocent. This is the sort of perverse outcome that this amendment would provide.
Further, it denies how technology is changing in so far as AI is concerned. In our minds, we have a spotty teenager hacking away at their computer, perhaps late into the night while playing Fortnite on the other screen. What this amendment does is give an opportunity for AI, mechanisation, and the industrialisation and automation of structured hacks on a phishing expedition—a mass insult or mass trolling to try to scrape as much as they possibly can. The public interest is in the eye of the beholder, and because there is no pure definition that is challengeable, and so one would have to go to the law or ask international lawyers what amounts to a statement of the law, we are going to get in a muddle.
I cannot support Amendment 367, not just because I think it is naïve, in so far as it is thinking about the individual at home, but because it fails to understand the way that technology is changing so rapidly—the industrialisation, AI and so forth, and the volume attacks. We cannot give a perverse incentive that allows those people with malevolent intent to get off while individuals, business and the economy, at home and abroad, are under attack.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for bringing back this amendment on Report. As was our position in Committee, we recognise the need to update the Computer Misuse Act 1990 and bring it in line with the online reality in which we now live, 36 years after the Act.
I am grateful that, in Committee, the Minister acknowledged the need for the Government to examine the pro-innovation regulation of technologies review by the noble Lord, Lord Vallance, and come to their own conclusions. He was right then that it is entirely reasonable to expect cyber security to be updated with the growth in internet use and the corresponding growth in cyber attacks.
Little more needs to be said, other than that we support the intentions of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I hope that the Minister will be able to update the House on the changes to the Act that the Home Office has considered.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I am once again grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his amendment and for returning to this very important subject. I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, and the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, for contributing to this short but vital debate. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for taking the time last week to meet with myself and officials to discuss this issue.
Cyber security professionals play a crucial role in protecting the UK’s digital systems. I support the intention behind this amendment; we broadly agree on the benefits of introducing a statutory defence. That is why we have been developing a limited defence to the offence of unauthorised access to computer material, provided for in Section 1 of the Computer Misuse Act, that will allow trusted cyber security researchers to spot and report vulnerabilities in a responsible manner.
We have made significant progress in shaping a proposal, but some details, including ensuring adequate safeguards, still need refinement. To date, we have briefed over 100 industry and expert stakeholders, including both cyber security firms and system owners, to finalise the approach. Engagement to date has revealed strong support for reform, alongside clear calls to ensure that the defence is workable for a range of cyber security researchers. We will provide a further update once that work is complete.
The noble Lord, Lord Fuller, said that the principle of a limited statutory defence risks creating a hacker’s charter. I stress that we are working with the whole industry—including, of course, the system owners—to develop a nuanced approach that is future-proofed and allows for responsible work in this area.
I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that the Government intend to legislate for a statutory defence against Section 1 of the Computer Misuse Act once this work has been completed and when parliamentary time allows. We are not quite there yet, so this Bill is not the right vehicle, but we are committed to delivering a solution that is proportionate and practical for both researchers and law enforcement. Like his colleague on the Liberal Democrat Front Bench—the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon—did earlier, the noble Lord tempts me to somehow forecast what might be in a future King’s Speech. I cannot be that precise.
As a possible response, the noble Lord mooted the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill, which will be a carry-over Motion. I am not going to get into the detail of that tonight, but I am very keen that we stay in communication. The noble Lord has asked some complex questions. He is going to write to me, and I am very happy to respond in kind. In light of the progress we made at the meeting we had last week, and the progress we were making on developing a proposal that has acceptance across the industry and is future-proofed and nuanced—we are, of course, very keen to continue the dialogue—I hope the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
Baroness Coffey (Con)
The Minister just said that he will exchange correspondence with the noble Lord. Will he make sure that that is copied to everybody who is participating in this debate?
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
I thank the Minister for his response, and the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, and noble Lord, Lord Fuller, for their contributions. As the Minister says, this defence is at the behest of the cyber security industry. That is a very important point. This is not just a group of hackers who have decided that they need to cover their tracks; this has long been demanded by the cyber security industry. I very much hope that when the industry sees the policy paper produced by the Government, it will see that the movement towards a defence is constructive and particular and does not have the kind of loopholes that it fears.
I thank the Minister for his reassurances about future legislation. I am obviously in very good company with my noble friend in providing temptation for the Minister about the King’s Speech. We look forward to the future legislative opportunities that the Minister has described. In the meantime, I withdraw my amendment.
“Consumer cloud-based service provider access restrictions: lost or stolen devices(1) A provider of consumer cloud-based services referred to in subsection (7)(a) that are accessed from a device must, upon receiving verified notification from a relevant person that a device has been lost or stolen, take reasonable and timely steps aimed at preventing any person who is not the device owner from accessing the provider’s consumer cloud-based services from that device, in order to discourage, where possible, the resale of devices obtained unlawfully.(2) In subsection (1) “relevant person” means— (a) a consumer who is the device owner,(b) a person that is a legitimate seller of the device, or(c) a relevant authority.(3) The provider must, so far as it is technically possible for the provider to do so in accordance with the technical standards referred to in subsection (7)(a), block access to the provider’s consumer cloud-based services from the device identified in the relevant verified notification.(4) The provider must inform, as soon as practically possible, the National Crime Agency and the police service in the area in which the theft or loss of the device was first reported.(5) Providers must, subject to appropriate safeguards, establish a process for relevant persons to appeal or reverse a block on a device in cases of error, fraud, or device recovery.(6) A provider shall not be liable for any loss or damage suffered in consequence of any action taken under this section.(7) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for—(a) the technical standards required to enforce the steps outlined in subsections (1) and (3),(b) the categories of consumer cloud-based services in relation to which providers will be required to take the steps outlined in subsections (1) and (3),(c) the implementation timeline for providers, and(d) sanctions for non-compliance.(8) In this section—“consumer” has the meaning given by section 2(3) of the Consumer Rights Act 2015;“consumer cloud-based service” means a digital service which—(a) is a cloud computing service (as defined in the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018 (S.I. 2018/506)),(b) is supplied directly to consumers in the United Kingdom, and(c) is used by those consumers solely for personal use.“device” means a mobile telephone device with an IMEI number;“device owner” means—(a) a person that—(i) is a consumer in the United Kingdom,(ii) has purchased a device through a contract or transfer of ownership of the device, or(b) a legal person that can demonstrate legitimate ownership through supply chain documentation.“legitimate seller” means—(a) a manufacturer or trader of the device,(b) an online marketplace provider or legal person that sells the device, or(c) a trader operating on an online marketplace provided they can trace the origin of the device.“provider” means a person who enters into a contract directly with a consumer in the United Kingdom for the provision of consumer cloud-based services;“verified notification” means a written notification that a device has been lost or stolen, which includes all of the following information—(a) details of the relevant device that has been lost or stolen, including its IMEI number,(b) evidence demonstrating that the person who has submitted the notification is a relevant person, such as proof of purchase or supply chain documentation, and(c) any other information that the provider reasonably requires in order for it to comply with its obligations under this section.”
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
My Lords, occasionally there are measures brought before this House that will hugely benefit people, that will be positive and that people of all political persuasions can support in the sometimes fractious fulcrum of Parliament. This is such a measure, and I am disappointed that the likelihood is that the Government will set their face against this proposal.
I commend to the Minister the excellent letter sent by Commander James Conway of the Metropolitan Police on 11 July to Dame Chi Onwurah, the chair of the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee, as part of its investigation and inquiry into mobile phone theft and designing out mobile phone theft as far as is practicable. It is an excellent letter, and I will return to it at the end of my remarks.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Jackson. I was delighted to move the amendment in Committee in his absence and to attract so much cross-party support. We also had the support of the police, of the esteemed former Met Commissioner, the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who I am glad to see in his place, and, as we have heard, from Dame Chi Onwurah, a very distinguished Labour MP.
As it is so late, I rise to say only that I agree entirely with my noble friend. The sight of distressed people in the Apple store, some from abroad, having to buy new phones and trying to get back into their accounts, affected me profoundly. It made me determined to change the incentive structure, both for criminals and indeed for retailers, which actually benefit from emergency sales of mobile phones. Given the degree of concern expressed across the Committee, at a much more civilised time, and the changes that my noble friend Lord Jackson has made to the amendment to try to meet any concerns, I very much look forward to a positive response from the Minister and to getting after this ghastly criminal operation.
Lord Fuller (Con)
My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendment 368 in support of my noble friend Lord Jackson, because losing your phone is not just inconvenient. When your device is stolen, a crime has been committed, and operators have a responsibility to take a much more leading role in disincentivising the opportunities to steal, to make it a lot easier to reunite people with a phone that might have been lost and to discourage the black market in stolen goods.
It is a late hour, but I hope to tell a little uplifting story about my experiences today, because today I found a phone on the Tube as I got off at Westminster. It turns out that the gentleman sitting next to me, who had got off at Victoria on the way from Fulham, had left it behind. I am an honest chap. I had a look: it was a pink case with two phone numbers inside. I called them and there was no answer, but I texted them and, by and by, there was a response. To cut a long story short, the phone was reunited with the owner—perhaps, as I have the phone number now, I might send them the YouTube clip and possibly the Hansard as well. The phone was deposited at Westminster Tube with TfL staff, who were really good. They were actually really interested and keen to help this poor, unfortunate chap.
But what if someone had not been quite so honest? What if that phone number was not tucked inside the pink case? How would it have been secured and returned? I did not expect to talk to this group, but my experience today shows how important this amendment is. The man in the street should not rely just on the kindness of strangers. The phone companies should not make it harder to reunite; we should prevent the perverse incentives.
But there is another point. The phone is no longer just a phone. It is not just a device to doomscroll on late at night. It is not just a device to play “Candy Crush”. The phone is now a token—part of our security infrastructure and part of the devices that secure our economy. I do not believe that this has been fully understood. I got locked out of my parliamentary account the other day, and because I had left my phone behind, I could not do my work, neither my commercial work nor the work associated with this House. I do not think that the penny has quite dropped with the operators to recognise that they are now part of the security infrastructure of our economy. It is not just the inconvenience of losing a phone and queuing up, as my noble friend says, in the Apple store to replace it; this is part of the technological infrastructure of our nation. Technology has moved on, and the phone companies must do so too.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
I rise briefly to support this amendment. This country has been good at reducing fires. It has done it by designing things and places not to burn. We have never had the same determination about designing things not to be stolen. This is all about preventing crime by design. The secondary feature is that people do not tend to steal things that have no value. There are a lot of negatives, but fundamentally, if it has value, people will steal it. They do not steal it to deprive you of it but to sell it, often to fund their drug habit. This amendment is all about taking the value out of the stolen phone.
There is some success at the moment, in that some of these phones cannot be reactivated on UK systems, but as we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, they are getting activated abroad. It is hard to stop them going abroad; very small portable devices put in containers are hard to discover. Although it was mentioned that the Met and others are having good success with drones and chasing, I guarantee that one day somebody will get badly hurt—either one of the people being chased or one of the cops. Chasing is, inevitably, dangerous. This is about stopping the chase and stopping the crime.
The 70,000 crimes mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, will be a bare minimum. Many people do not bother reporting them. There is no need to report them for many people. Sometimes they lose them in embarrassing situations, and they certainly do not report it then. We are talking about a large amount of crime that can have something done to prevent it.
My final points are these. There is no incentive at the moment for the phone companies to stop this crime, because when you lose your phone or have it stolen, you buy another one from them. The £50 million-worth of phones that the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, mentioned means £50 million more for the providers of the phones. So why would they stop it? All they have is more business coming through the door. The business model is not helpful to preventing crime.
It is a common-sense measure. It is well thought out. The amendment looks like it will work, given its extent and comprehensiveness, and nobody has a better idea; or, if they have, I have not heard it. This does not cost the Government anything. It will possibly cost the manufacturers, but it will be marginal to the costs and profits they have already. It is a really good idea. It helps the police a bit, but it mainly helps the victims as it reduces their number. It means that you can walk down the street, come out of the Tube, take your phone out and not have somebody whip it out of your hand.
My final point is that it is not just about theft. Often people are injured when their phone is taken—it is violence as well as theft. Particularly with vulnerable victims, nobody knows where it will end. It can end up with a murder or a very serious crime. If we can do something about this, it will have an impact. It is achievable, and I recommend that the Government, if they do not accept the amendment, try to find a way to do it in the future.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I rise to support Amendment 368 from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, on which he has campaigned so strongly. It addresses a crime that has become a blight on our streets: the industrialised theft of mobile devices. We must remove the profit motive from street crime. If a phone is useless the moment it is stolen, the thefts will stop. California proved it and the technology exists; the only thing missing is the will to legislate. I urge the Minister to move beyond collaboration and accept the amendment.
Baroness Coffey (Con)
It is the Government who have kept their Back-Benchers here at this time of night and kept the debate going. I am allowed to speak, am I not? The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, sprang up before me. But for all the Back-Benchers complaining about people debating this important issue, it was the Government’s decision to keep the debate going to this point, and some of that is to prevent a Division on the matter.
I am trying to understand—a question that my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, put so eloquently—why the Government are not accepting this amendment. They have given every indication that they will not. I appreciate that losing a mobile phone may be inconvenient, but the number one issue is the impact on tourism in London. It is why Sadiq Khan has painted up and down Oxford Street the words, “Don’t stand here”—because you might be attacked for your phone. It is ridiculous that, in our capital, the Mayor of London is painting these signs. It is all over the Tube as well that you might get your phone pinched. Yet the Government, for some reason, do not seem prepared to get tough with the mobile phone companies and prevent, as a former Metropolitan Commissioner has pointed out, a pretty lucrative business model which could be addressed—not just the thefts but the physical incidents that are happening, principally, though not only, in our capital—by taking forward my noble friend’s amendment.
It worries me that there is a risk of getting tribal on this, when we do not need to. Does the Minister want to intervene? I think she just said something from a sedentary position. I see she does not want to intervene. Does somebody else want to intervene? Was that the noble Lord, Lord Forbes? Does he want to intervene, with his experience of Newcastle? No, he does not want to intervene.
This is affecting not only citizens but tourists, and that has a massive impact on the attraction of our capital. The Government should be taking this issue a lot more seriously than they seem to be and trying to stop a crime that is one of the principal causes, in crime survey statistics, of people being frightened to go out and about on the streets of our capital city.
I am somewhat disappointed that this debate is happening close to midnight. I am conscious that Government Back-Benchers do not want to be here, and I can see that the Opposition Back-Benchers do not want to be here, but I do, because I care about people in our communities.
I appreciate that my noble friend will not want to test the opinion of the House tonight, but we must find a way to tackle this issue for the sake of everybody. Parliament must listen to the concerns of people across this country, and those trying to visit this country, and tackle something that has become so pernicious that it is a genuine threat to the prosperity of the many businesses that rely on people coming to this country and going out to enjoy themselves.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
I thank my noble friend Lord Jackson for his amendment regarding cloud-based services and access restrictions for lost or stolen devices. As my noble friend said, a similar amendment to the one before us was presented in Committee, during which it was pleasing to see Cross-Bench support from noble Lords on this proposed solution to an increasing problem.
Mobile phone theft is now a high-volume and high-impact crime. It is particularly prevalent in urban areas, obviously, and can often cause distress to its victims, as well as financial loss. Rather than simply creating new offences or imposing more severe punishments, we must address the current incentives that sustain the criminal market for stolen mobile devices. As was our position in Committee, we must act to remove the profit motive that fuels this behaviour in the first instance.
Amendment 368 in the name of my noble friend Lord Jackson seeks to achieve that precise goal. By requiring providers to take reasonable and timely steps to block access to services once the device is verified as lost or stolen, stolen phones would no doubt be less valuable on the resale market. This would result in the substantial removal of the economic rewards that drive organised and individual phone theft. The blocking of access to cloud synchronisation and authentication services would plainly strip stolen devices of much of their value to criminals. Quite bluntly, this proposal has the potential, as we have heard from other noble Lords, to undermine the business model of those stealing phones.
The amendment would also build on important safeguards. It would require a verified notification, a mechanism for appeals or reversal in cases of error or fraud, and an obligation to notify both the National Crime Agency and local police forces, thereby strengthening intelligence. Of course we must recognise that any operational mandate of this kind must be technically feasible and proportionate—the Secretary of State must therefore set appropriate standards and timelines through regulation—but the principle behind my noble friend’s amendment is vital. If smartphones lose value as criminal commodities, the incentive to steal them will be reduced. We on these Benches give this amendment our fullest support, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
Once again, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, for tabling this amendment. I begin by saying to the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, in particular, but also to the noble Lords, Lord Fuller, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Jackson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, that this Government take mobile phone theft seriously. That is why we have measures in the Bill to take it seriously, and why my right honourable friend the Home Secretary convened a mobile phone summit for the first time last year. That is also why we encouraged the Met to undertake its conference next week on mobile phone theft.
That is also why, in figures I can give to the noble Baroness, over the past year—the first year of this Labour Government—mobile phone thefts in London have fallen by 10,000, a reduction of 12.3% from the previous Government’s performance. It is a real and important issue. We are trying to tackle it and are improving on the performance from the time when she was Deputy Prime Minister. I just leave that with her to have a think about that, even at this late hour.
Baroness Coffey (Con)
So will the Minister accept my noble friend’s amendment?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I will come on to that in a moment, if I may. I accept the principle of the work the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, is bringing forward, but I do not accept it in the context that the noble Baroness put it: that we are doing nothing. We are doing quite a lot. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, which is the important thing—
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The noble Baroness did, actually. She said that nothing was happening under this Government. Every Member on this side of the House heard her say that.
The hour is late so I will go to the nub of the issue, which is the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson. Law enforcement partners—the police and the Home Office—are taking robust action to drive down instances of mobile phone theft. We have delivered the most comprehensive, intelligence-led response to mobile phone theft, and Operation Reckoning, supported by the Home Office through the Metropolitan Police Service, is tracking down criminal gangs on this issue, going to the point the noble Baroness did not mention.
I agree that we need to take action to make sure the companies that design these devices provide services, play their part and do absolutely everything they can to ensure that a stolen mobile phone is not a valuable commodity and therefore not worth stealing, which was the very point the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, mentioned. Law enforcement partners—all of us in the law enforcement sector—are currently working in collaboration with technology companies and partners, including phone manufacturers, to look at the technical solutions, which, I must say to the noble Baroness, is something that the previous Government did not do. The Home Office is supporting this important work, and I thank everybody involved for their constructive engagement.
I say to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, in particular, that it is our preferred approach to allow this collaborative work between mobile phone manufacturers, mobile phone operators, law enforcement partners and the Home Office to continue, so that we find a positive solution to this problem, rather than accepting the amendment before us today and mandating a specific, untested solution through legislation. It does not mean that we will not do this—we want to try to do it—but we have to make sure that we do it in a way that works, is sustainable and is in partnership with the mobile phone authorities. The approach we are taking will reduce the risk of legislation not achieving the desired output.
I want to be clear to the noble Lord that we are working on that now. If it does not work, and if we find blockages and we do not make progress, we reserve the right to look at any and all options. At the moment I cannot accept his amendment, because it would mandate us to do something, but we are already trying to work on this to make sure that what we do works. We are doing that in partnership with all those authorities. At the same time, we are doing practical stuff by tracking down people and putting more police on the beat, including the 13,000 neighbourhood police officers that we are introducing over the next few years. We are also ensuring that we take action through the Bill on tracking mobile phones and giving police superintendents more action. That is a positive programme of action. However, I cannot accept the noble Lord’s amendment and I ask him to withdraw it. If he does not withdraw it, I will ask my noble friends to vote against it.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
I had hoped the tone of this debate was going to be a bit more productive, collaborative and consensual. I just wish that the noble Lord would sometimes bite his lip on this. Frankly, we had a consensus, but he had to go into partisan, party-political mode, attacking the previous Conservative Government.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am a fairly gentle soul, but if the noble Baroness provokes this Government by saying that they are taking no action, then this Government will fight back and explain what action they are taking.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
Let me talk in detail about something I remember.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
Yes, I will. I do not want the noble Baroness opposite heckling. She has not been here for most of the debate. If she does not want to take part in an erudite, interesting debate on this issue, she could probably go elsewhere.
This is an important issue about people. The reason I got involved in this is because—as you do—I got into a discussion with a taxi driver. The taxi driver told me about picking up an American tourist, who was in floods of tears because her dream trip to London had been utterly ruined by phone theft. She was bereft and distraught. I then began to look at the excellent work that the Science, Innovation and Technology Select Committee had done. The fact of the matter is that there is no substance to the Minister’s assertion that the technical solutions are misplaced, not in place or not ready—they are. A number of the tech companies, such as Samsung and Google, have confirmed to the Select Committee that they are in place and that there is a technical solution to it.
Baroness Coffey (Con)
My noble friend is making a valid point. The reason I made the point I did earlier is because I understand that the Back-Benchers are irritated at being here at this time of night debating such an important issue.
Baroness Coffey (Con)
Well, that seems to be the case. My concern is that we hear about collaboration, but here is a tool that the Government can readily deploy, with the backing of Parliament, in order to strengthen their hand, and not wait for more time. I am conscious that all sides of the House want this to end. However, I have to say that the attitude so far has been that it is inconvenient to discuss this important matter.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
I concur with the spirit of my noble friend’s observation.
I have given the Minister plaudits in the past for doing a very difficult job on marshalling the Bill through the House—his diligence, his hard work, his commitment to the Bill. We support many of the aspects of the Bill, and we believe his heart is basically in the right place. What frustrates us—he must understand this—is seeing that his own senior Back-Bencher, who chairs a Select Committee, is robustly critical of a senior politician such as the Home Secretary for her inaction, while bringing forward technical solutions in a non-partisan way with a multi-party Select Committee. I find it quite difficult to understand why the Government should not accept it, because, at the end of the day, the Government would get the credit from the people of this country for doing that.
However, I accept that the Minister feels constrained. I take him at his word that he will continue a proper, thorough dialogue with the tech companies, based on empirical data and facts, and talk to senior police officers—people who know about building out crime and designing out crime. I hope that a future Bill will be tabled and that the Government will feel confident enough to include a clause incorporating what we have discussed.
We are discussing this at 11.50 pm because some earlier amendments were debated at significantly greater length than we expected. I would have pressed this to a vote but, notwithstanding everything that has been said, I hope that the Minister will reconsider and talk to his colleagues. This is a very good proposal. It is not a Tory proposal or a Labour proposal, but a proposal that will help people. As my noble friend Lady Coffey said, it will do a lot for tourism and put us where we ought to be: as a pre-eminent technological superpower, doing something to change things for the better.
On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Crime and Policing Bill
Monday 9th March 2026
(2 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 167-IV(b) Amendment for Report (Supplementary to the Fourth Marshalled List) - (9 Mar 2026)
17:31 - Division on Amendment 369 - Ayes: 75 / Noes: 190 - Amendment 369 disagreed.
17:43 - Division on Amendment 369A - Ayes: 88 / Noes: 172 - Amendment 369A disagreed.
19:45 - Division on Amendment 371A - Ayes: 200 / Noes: 162 - Amendment 371A agreed.
“The right to protestBefore section 11 of the Public Order Act 1986 (advance notice of public processions), insert—“10A The right to protest(1) Everyone has the right to engage in peaceful protest, both alone and with others.(2) Public authorities have a duty to—(a) respect the right to protest,(b) protect the right to protest, and(c) facilitate the right to protest.(3) A public authority may only interfere with the right to protest, including by placing restrictions upon its exercise, when it is necessary and proportionate to do so to—(a) protect national security or public safety,(b) prevent disorder or crime, or(c) protect public health, or the rights and freedoms of others.(4) For the purposes of this section “public authority” has the same meaning as in section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (acts of public authorities).””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would introduce an express statutory right to protest, imposing both negative and positive obligations on public authorities while recognising that the right to protest may need to be limited to protect other legitimate public interests.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, in opening this group, I will speak principally to Amendment 369, which is in my name and the names of my noble friend Baroness Doocey, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox of Buckley and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. I will also speak to Amendments 369A, 372A, 372B, 372C and 373.
Amendment 369 brings to Report our amendment calling for a strong statement in domestic law of the right to protest. Nothing has been said in Committee or so far on Report that has even started to persuade these Benches that this Bill does not need within it a strong statement of a statutory right to protest, which would both supplement and complement rights of the citizen under the ECHR. Our Amendment 369 is co-signed by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and others, as I have said, and I accept entirely that the right to protest is, in part at least, enshrined in Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Article 10 is on “Freedom of expression” and Article 11 is on “Freedom of assembly and association”. As I mentioned in Committee, the convention rights are circumscribed because they
“may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals”,
or for the protection of the rights and freedom of others.
A significant feature of the rights under the convention is that the degree to which the European Court of Human Rights may interpret or enforce those rights is subject to what is known as the “margin of appreciation”, accorded to individual signatory countries to decide how they, as nation states, interpret and enforce those rights. It is only where countries stray beyond that margin of appreciation that the European Court of Human Rights will hold a signatory nation in breach.
What our amendment would do, that is new and not encompassed by the convention, is make it absolutely clear that in this jurisdiction, public authorities have a threefold duty in relation to protest: first, to respect, secondly, to protect, and, thirdly, to facilitate the right to protest. That duty is dynamic and positive. Our amendment is an important and clear statement of what every citizen would have a right to expect and insist upon from government, local and national. Government would have a duty to act, which is far stronger than a duty merely to refrain from interfering. Such a firm statement would be a more powerful protection than the convention rights, precisely because the margin of appreciation of which I spoke would be irrelevant.
I need remind the Government only that it is their own express view that how we determine and apply the limits of Article 8, on the right to respect for private and family life, is open to discussion, as is the proper area for domestic legislation which they propose to introduce, in order to limit the way that Article 8 might act within the margin of appreciation. That is their stated position in the context of immigration law. That is a position the Government are entitled to take under the European convention, in my view. But there is a risk that more extreme Governments might push the boundaries of what is acceptable in the context of other human rights, including the rights under Articles 10 and 11.
Members will no doubt remember that in Committee there was clear agreement around the House that, whether dealing with convention rights or rights under our amendment, we would have to strike a balance between the stated rights and the applications of the limitation—either under the convention, in the case of the ECHR rights, or under domestic legislation, if it were amended as we seek. But there is one specific area where that distinction may be important. The convention in both Articles 10 and 11 permits restrictions for the protection of morals, as was apparent from the passage I quoted. In a society as diverse as ours, with mixed secular and faith-based belief systems and philosophies, that is not an area in which we on these Benches would wish to see, let alone advocate for, a derogation from the convention rights or a restriction of our rights for the protection of morals. Our amendment would not permit a derogation or restriction on that ground alone.
We also discussed the possibility in Committee that future Governments might not be as enlightened as our present Government no doubt are. I fear we can see the possibility that a future Government, more extreme than this one, might wish to introduce restrictions on freedoms of speech or assembly. In Committee, the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, expressed optimism that this would not happen. He more or less said that if a Government were elected, they could do what they liked. I am not so sure. I say in answer to that point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hanson: let us make it more difficult to change the citizen’s rights for the worse, while we can.
There was also discussion in Committee as to whether there might not be differences between the convention rights and the rights under our amendment. The suggestion was made by some that this would give rise to satellite litigation. For my part, I do not believe that the convention rights would in any sense either clash with or limit the rights of people in this country under the clear rights that would be enshrined in domestic law pursuant to our amendment.
On a practical level, I acknowledged then, and acknowledge now, that policing protests can be an expensive exercise and that it is sometimes difficult for the police to draw a balance—which often has to be drawn in advance—between overpolicing and underpolicing protests. That makes it even more important to spell out in clear terms what the right to protest is, so that the police and local authorities may be accorded the necessary resources for them to carry out that duty to respect, protect and facilitate protest.
Lord Pannick (CB)
The noble Lord has already accepted that the right to protest has to be balanced against the rights of others. Surely the virtue of the cumulative disruption provision, Clause 140, is that it is totally unacceptable that the rights of others who wish to pray in their synagogue, who wish to get to their synagogue, who wish to get away from their synagogue, should be repeatedly disrupted in the same place every week. The cumulative nature of the disruption pushes the balance in favour of asking the protesters not to cease protesting but to do it somewhere else.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
The answer to that is that the cumulative nature of the disruption is not what causes the oppression to worshippers at synagogues or mosques or anywhere else. We have accepted, for the purpose of Report, restrictions on the right to protest near places of worship on condition that it is relevant and that we are talking about the place of worship and worshippers being disrupted. The fact that a legitimate protest is repeated is not a reason for restricting the protests. If the rights and freedoms of others are restricted, that in itself is, under our Amendment 369, a reason for restricting protest, because there is a right to protest. It is not helped by the fact that repeated protests are seen as more difficult. I see the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about repeated protests at synagogues and mosques, but they are covered by our condition on restriction at a place of worship. I beg to move.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 369A in my name, which we have just been discussing, and to Amendments 372A, 372B, 372C and 373, to all of which I have added my name. Regarding Amendment 369A, Clause 133 seeks to create a new offence of concealed identity at protests. If this clause were enacted as it stands, the police would be empowered to ban all face coverings at a protest with only some limited exceptions concerning the person’s health, religion or work. Many other categories of perfectly law-abiding citizens may have good reasons to conceal their identities at protests—for example, those protesting against a hostile foreign state who fear retribution for themselves or their families, those who might be criticising their own religious or cultural communities, or survivors of sexual violence or domestic abuse who need to stay below the radar for their own safety. None of those is covered by the limited exemptions in Clause 133.
To solve this problem, Amendment 369A would provide a defence of reasonable excuse for the offence of concealing identity at protests, thereby putting the burden on police officers to justify why they believed that wearing a face covering at a protest made the suspect arrestable. This amendment strikes a careful balance between allowing the police to prevent public disorder and protecting the many law-abiding citizens who have legitimate reasons for wanting to exercise their freedom of expression anonymously.
I have signed Amendments 372A, 372B and 372C in the name of my noble friend Lord Marks. Clause 139 seems to have been drafted to give reassurance to Jews, Muslims and other denominations that they can attend their place of worship without feeling intimidated by protests in the vicinity of their synagogue, mosque, church or whatever. That sounds to me like a laudable objective. What is not to like? The difficulty is a severe unintended consequence caused by the drafting. The sheer number of places of worship in a country as old, religiously diverse and densely populated as Britain that could inadvertently become no-protest zones is enormous. Here in Westminster, Parliament Square and Trafalgar Square are both in the vicinity of one or more churches, and yet they frequently host major demonstrations. They could become off limits. Few if any large spaces in central London or any other city would escape the risk posed by Clause 139 of being ruled too close to a place of worship for a demonstration to be allowed. The Government may well say that this is not the intention of Clause 139, but that is exactly what the clause as drafted permits a senior officer to do.
My Lords, Amendments 372A, 372B and 372C would solve the problem by making a ban on protests near a place of worship possible only when the protest is directed at or connected with a place of worship or persons likely to worship there. Demonstrations that are unconnected with a nearby place of worship or that are in its vicinity purely by coincidence would be unaffected by Clause 139—problem solved.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, before I speak to my amendments in this group, I would like to say that I learned to read a long time ago—more than 70 years ago, before I went to school. This alphabet soup of a Bill is quite confusing, partly because so many people disagree with it. The noble Lord, Lord Hanson, should perhaps be aware that it is moderately unusual to have this many amendments; perhaps it would help if he accepted one or two. Obviously, all of my amendments are incredibly reasonable, so I urge him to pick them up. My first amendment in this group would solve the problem outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, so I expect his strong support on that.
The noble Lord, Lord Marks, moved Amendment 369 on the right to protest. In Committee, we were all reassured that this was not necessary, because the right to peaceful protest is already protected under the Human Rights Act. We were correctly reminded that Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights protect the freedoms of expression and assembly, and that public authorities are already bound by those duties, but that reassurance is based on the assumption that those protections will remain intact. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, pointed out, we cannot be sure of that; we cannot speak for future Governments, who might cause our right to protest to deteriorate.
Over recent years, under this Government and the previous one, we have seen a steady erosion of our right to protest and an expansion of police powers to restrict those protests. Each time, we are told, “The powers are modest—you will hardly notice them”. Of course, that is not true, because the effect is cumulative, damaging and leads to much greater constraint on people who are campaigning and protesting. The balance is shifting and Parliament continues to widen state power without at the same time reaffirming the underlying right.
I have also cosigned Amendment 369A, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger. There are many legitimate reasons why people might want to cover their faces at protests. Some noble Lords on this side of the Chamber might benefit from wearing masks sometimes, just to hide their look of derision at other noble Lords who are speaking coherently, cogently and sensibly. People might fear losing their job if their political views were known. They might fear backlash from family or their local community. They might be worried about racial profiling, particularly given the increased use of facial recognition technology. They might be protesting against a foreign regime and be genuinely concerned about repercussions for loved ones overseas. It is not unreasonable to wear masks.
I turn now to my Amendment 372ZA. Clause 139 is very problematic. It gives the police significant new powers to restrict protests near places of worship. I am an atheist, but I absolutely protect the right of people to worship freely, as they want to, and without fear. At a time of rising antisemitism, Islamophobia and racism, that duty is paramount for us here in Parliament. All our diverse communities must be supported and defended, and every faith group must have the ability to worship freely. As drafted, Clause 139 risks undermining that balance between rights. If the Government are not prepared to remove it, it must at the very least be clarified and narrowed. My amendments are offered as a compromise and an attempt to introduce clarity where the drafting is currently vague and overly broad.
My amendments, which address the phrases “in the vicinity”, “within 50 metres” and “the purpose of intimidating”, seek to establish clarity on these broad definitions in Clause 139. The clause seeks to restrict the right to protest by giving the police new powers to ban or restrict protest “in the vicinity” of places of religious worship, based on the false premise that these powers are required to protect freedom of religion. “In the vicinity” is a vague definition that could mean 10 metres or 10 miles. At the very least, the clause must be amended to make it more specific and contained, with an eye towards protecting Article 11—the right to freedom of assembly. “In the vicinity” needs to be clarified in terms of a specific distance. Many cities and towns have a large concentration of places of worship. The clause as it stands could make it virtually impossible to protest, as other noble Lords have said, including taking protests to Parliament or other such places on which protesters might wish to focus in order to make their point to people in positions of influence—for example, in government.
The Green Party feels that 50 metres is a sensible compromise that would provide clarity for police on the threshold for imposing conditions on protests while protecting the Article 11 right. Amendment 372ZA would help the police because it is so specific that they could take a tape measure to protests to make sure that protesters were at the designated distance. It would also help protesters, because they would know whether they were legally allowed to protest at that point or not. I urge the Minister to think about this and to clarify what “in the vicinity” means. It is far too vague to bring in in legislation. Surely the Government must see that.
The phrase “may intimidate” again is terribly vague, and I do not understand why anybody would put that in a Bill. This is bad writing—which is why we have so many amendments labelled ZA, ZZ and BZ and so on Report. All our diverse communities have to be supported and defended, but Clause 139, as it stands, will not do that because it is too vague. There are existing powers to address racial and religious hatred and violence. Under the Public Order Act 1986, the police can impose conditions on protests that may compel people not to worship, disrupt the activities of an organisation or intimidate or harass people in the vicinity. My amendment tries to make things clearer. As always, I am just trying to help the Government get things right.
Lord Pannick (CB)
Before she sits down, I put to the noble Baroness that her amendments would not achieve the purpose that I understand the Government to have with Clause 139. If you confer the power in relation only to a protest that takes place within 50 metres then you are not going to achieve the purpose, which is to ensure that people are able to get to and away from their synagogue every Saturday. If there is a march of hundreds or thousands of people that impedes their access, 50 metres is not going to work. As I have already put to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, protest is a balance between the rights of protesters and the rights of other people. The noble Baroness is ignoring the rights of others.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
I will speak to you all later.
I think the noble Lord is wrong. You cannot have these vague terms. I would have thought the noble Lord would appreciate the fact that you need clarity in legislation. How can the police know what “in the vicinity” means? How can they possibly make good judgments? They already make terrible judgments based on some of the laws that we have already passed; they overstep the mark constantly because they cannot be clear about exactly what it means and what we think it means. I argue that 50 metres is a sensible limit.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 369, which would introduce an express statutory right to protest and impose negative and positive obligations on authorities that recognise the right to protest. We were told in Committee, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, has reminded us, and we have been told again that this will not be necessary. However, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, has rightly pointed out, this group of amendments indicates exactly why it is necessary. This whole chapter, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, has explained, would undermine the right to protest.
A constant concern that I have with this Bill is that it is just the latest iteration of adding new powers to a veritable arsenal of laws already on the statute books undermining and curtailing protests. The problem is that we keep making new laws that seemingly are then not enforced, or not consistently enforced, leading to a demand that something more should be done, and more and more. Each time, that normalises the chipping away of the right to protest as a democratic norm—not as an unqualified right but as a norm.
I am just back from Manchester where, last week, two masked and arm-banded pro-Ayatollah Khamenei supporters—apologists for the terror-backing Iranian regime—rode horses at Iranian dissidents in the middle of the day on the streets of Manchester. It was terrifying, intimidating and violent in many ways. What struck me was that the Greater Manchester Police officers who were asked why they did not intervene just shrugged and said, “What can we do?” I am not advocating that we have a new law specifically banning the riding of horses by pro-Islamists through the streets. I am suggesting that we need more decisive police action and use of the laws that we have when they are required. I worry about building up more and more laws.
That is one of the reasons why I share with other noble Lords real concerns about the vague phrasing of Clause 139. The absence of a clear definition of “vicinity”, as has been explained, would allow the police to create substantial no-protest zones around places of worship, while giving powers to ban demos that may have the effect of intimidating people so as to deter them from religious activities. That is a very permissive power. Interestingly, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, described what he considered Clause 139 to be. He talked about people being intimidated on Saturdays at synagogue. We all recognise that, but that is not what Clause 139 says. I would be more sympathetic if it was, but, in fact, it is a very general clause that might have unintended consequences.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I agree with much of the discussion about this important group, but I remember that this is Report. While I share particularly the concerns about cumulative disruption, because it is Report, not Committee, I will confine my remarks to one speech in this group, with no interventions, and focus on Amendments 369 and 369A as briefly and succinctly as I can.
I agree with the noble Lords, Lord Strasburger, Lord Pannick and Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, about Amendment 369A. These arguments were rehearsed with great precision in Committee. The example was given of an Iranian dissident protesting and being concerned about reprisals—and you could substitute other countries and their embassies for Iran, that was just the one that came up that day.
In the clause, the Government acknowledge that there should be some defences to the offence of wearing a mask on a protest—I have concerns about the offence itself because it presupposes that protest is a slightly dodgy thing to begin with, and I do not agree with that—and included health, religious observance and work as justifications for concealing identity, but fear of reprisals was not included. The reasonable excuse defence proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, and his colleagues is a proportionate one, given what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said earlier about balancing rights. I urge my colleagues in government to think seriously about the noble Lord’s amendment because the defences currently to the offence of concealing your identity at a protest do not include the fear of reprisals, whether you are a battered woman, someone who disagrees with their employer or, crucially, a dissident outside the embassy of your homeland. I urge my noble friends in government to think again about that.
Just briefly on Amendment 369—I am still at just over two minutes—and enshrining the right to protest as a free-standing clause, even though it is acknowledged by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, that we have Articles 10 and 11 of the convention incorporated into the Human Rights Act, I say in friendship and gently to him that I think this kind of duplication may be a mistake we would come to regret. He is quite right, of course, as are the Government on other matters to do with Article 8, that you can, and should, be more precise in your domestic legislation when attempting to safeguard rights and freedoms, but this is not that much more precise. In effect, this proposed new clause pretty much replicates Articles 10 and 11 of the convention but for the removal of morals. Frankly, I think that morals is a dead letter these days.
As a fellow human rights person—I have been working with the convention and with some Members of your Lordships’ House for over 30 years—I say that that kind of almost duplication is dangerous in legal terms. I urge the noble Lord not to press that one, just as I urge my colleagues in government to support him and others who have signed up to broaden the defence in Amendment 369A to the offence of wearing a face covering at a peaceful protest.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
Before the noble Baroness sits down, can I ask her gently to explain why she does not accept that the margin of appreciation permits the Government to do things outside what we would want to see? I know that she and I both are great advocates for the ECHR, and she knows that, but the problem is that the margin of appreciation can be taken advantage of to allow restrictions we would not want to see. The first and principal point I might make in relation to the duplication point is that having the right to protest enshrined in domestic statutory law does away with the possibility that the margin of appreciation should allow restrictions that this Parliament would not wish to see.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I was trying to be brief—this is Report—but, with the leave of the House, I will answer, again as briefly as I can. I know that not everyone agrees and not every jurist agrees, but as far I am concerned, the margin of appreciation was always intended to be an international concept for an international court. Once you get to Strasbourg, it is quite right that a margin of appreciation applies so that Strasbourg respects the legislation and the jurisdiction of domestic legislators and judges.
I do not see it as a domestic legal principle at all, so I do not see that it is for even the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom to be operating a margin of appreciation when it applies the Human Rights Act domestically. I do not see that as the problem that the noble Lord does. The way that you put meat on the bones of human rights protections is with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, with the detail of the public order statute book; hence I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, about having a proper defence to face concealment. That is the detailed meat on the bones, not drafting a right to protest that pretty much replicates Articles 10 and 11.
If the concern—and I would understand this—is that a future Government will come in and scrap the Human Rights Act and pull out of the ECHR, why then have colleagues piggy-backed on to Section 6 of the Human Rights Act in the way that they drafted the right to protest? That is a mistake. I do not want to give up on the Human Rights Act and the ECHR; I will defend them as long as I have breath in my body. That is the approach because it is a hostage to fortune to have free-standing replication of particular rights in particular statutes, when we have the precious protection of an overarching Human Rights Act that applies to the interpretation of all law.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)
My Lords, the right to protest is an interesting concept. We all agree, on all sides of the House, that there is a right to protest. But, as with most rights—the right to free speech or the right to assemble, for example—in English common law it is not part of our law but part of our common law. We have an absence of fundamental liberties; you are free to do things unless the law otherwise prevents them. So it would be slightly odd to have the right to protest, without any of these other rights, simply inserted into our law. How would it work?
The point about public order legislation is that it always has to balance various interests: the right to protest, along with the right of those affected by those protests—third parties—and of course the police, who have to enforce what is often very difficult and complex legislation. It has to respect those various rights. The European convention did not invent these rights, but they are reflected in its Articles 10 and 11, both of which are qualified rights, not absolute rights. As Strasbourg has made clear, it is perfectly acceptable for individual Governments to determine, by reference to the circumstances that obtain in their countries, what limits are reasonable to place on those rights. Strasbourg has said a number of times that it is not likely to interfere with those. So imposing on top of our public order legislation this right to protest would, I respectfully suggest, cause only confusion in our law, making it difficult for courts and the police.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
My Lords, this is indeed Report and I have a great deal of sympathy with the amendments that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, spoke to. I also take the point of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones: this is a large group, with a large number of amendments. But I will restrict my comments to Amendment 369A.
As the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox and Lady Chakrabarti, said, it is much simpler to apply the test of “reasonable excuse”, rather than the complicated language used in Clause 133(2), where there is a test of whether the wearing of the clothes of concealment had
“a purpose relating to the health of the person or others”.
That is just asking for a complicated interpretation, and the “reasonable excuse” test is, in my view, sounder.
I will make one comment relating to the entirety of Report on this Bill. I, and I am sure other Members of this House, have extreme concern that we are having to sit every night beyond 11 pm to midnight. I am glad to see a nod from the Liberal Democrat Benches. That places great strain, not only on Ministers—I hasten not to ask the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, how many midnights he has been sitting up in this House for. He would find it difficult to count on his fingers: there are only 10 fingers to count on, so I am afraid he does not have enough fingers to count the number of times. So it imposes a strain on him, and it also imposes a great strain on all of us who need or want to participate in this Bill throughout every debate. There is another problem: with the House sitting so late, some important amendments are not considered. This happened to me on Monday last week. I had a very important amendment down, together with others, which was not reached. Indeed, it was not even spoken to. This goes for the whole of Report.
I am blaming nobody: I am certainly not blaming Ministers or the Government Chief Whip, all of whom I greatly respect. But there is a problem, and I cannot help recalling that, on Wednesday last week, when again the House sat to midnight, I was sitting in a committee room in Portcullis House and the annunciator said that the House of Commons rose at 7 pm. There is a disproportionate burden being placed on this House and I protest about it.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, in my experience, the later the sitting, the more persuasive the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, gets—but that is just a personal view.
I shall make one general comment and then make my observations on Amendments 369 and 369A. The modest changes—and they are modest—introduced in the Bill by the Government to public order legislation do not justify some of the alarmist comments that we have heard today about the death of the right to protest in this country. Protest is alive and well, as we see constantly, and will continue to be alive and well—and there is nothing in this Bill or in the Government’s proposals that will stop the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and others protesting against matters they disapprove of—so let us keep this in perspective, please.
Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer (LD)
I thank the noble Lord for giving way, but perhaps I could give him a very small example of something that is completely relevant to what he says. On 5 March this year, the Metropolitan Police raided a Quaker meeting house and arrested a number of young, non-violent activists who were being trained in non-violent protest. How can that happen? They were not even protesting: they were just planning how to be non-violent at protests. The noble Lord must concede that that would have a chilling effect on people.
Lord Pannick (CB)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, who makes a forceful point, but my understanding is that that led to no charges. I certainly would not defend what the police did in those circumstances. Perhaps more relevantly, it has nothing whatever to do with the contents of the Bill or the proposals that the Government are putting forward in this proposed legislation.
Amendment 369 is an important amendment, from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and others, proposing that we should insert into the statute book a right to protest. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, that it would be most inappropriate. It cannot be right to introduce a statutory right to protest when we are not introducing into the statute book, and rightly so, any other provision in the European Convention on Human Rights, such as the right to freedom of speech or to religious freedom. The reason for that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, is that we already have the protection of the Human Rights Act, which is applied by our judges.
With respect, I do not accept the criticisms made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, when he focused on the European concept, in the European Court of Human Rights, of the “margin of discretion”. But that is an international concept, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said. There is something similar here—a discretionary area of judgment—but the European concept is an international concept that is not applied by the domestic courts. Then the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, “Well, we need to put a marker down in case future Parliaments interfere with the right to protest”. But nothing that we do today will prevent a future Parliament, should it wish to do so, legislating in a way we may think is inappropriate. That is a matter for the future Parliament, and a matter for debate at the time.
The third point the noble Lord, Lord Marks, made was that the convention allowed for a restriction for the protection of morals. He said that was surely inappropriate. Well, yes, but I cannot think of any case where protest has been limited because of a moral view imposed by the police or any other authority. I would not go quite as far as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who said—I wrote it down—that morals were a “dead letter” nowadays, which is perhaps a wider proposition than she intended to suggest. But Amendment 369 would be most unfortunate. It would cause confusion and achieve no sensible purpose, if I may respectfully say so.
I take a different view of Amendment 369A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, and I have signed it. It deals with Clause 133, which introduces this new offence of concealing your identity at a protest. No defence of reasonable excuse is included, despite the fact that the Joint Committee on Human Rights, in its fifth report of the Session, proposed that there should be such a defence. The absence of such a defence is very puzzling, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, because in Clause 133(2) there are defences
“relating to the health of the person … religious observance, or … a purpose relating to the person’s work”.
In Committee I gave an example of why a defence of reasonable excuse is required. The example—and it is a very topical example—was of a man or a woman who wishes to protest outside the Iranian embassy or at some other demonstration against the conduct of the Iranian regime. They may well have a very strong reason for concealing their identity, which is that they have relatives in Iran. Are we really to say that they are committing a criminal offence, despite the obvious need for them to conceal their identity in those circumstances?
With great respect to the Minister, I heard no convincing answer to that point in Committee. That is why I have joined the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, in suggesting that a defence of reasonable excuse should be added to this new criminal offence. If the noble Lord wishes to test the opinion of the House—and I hope he does, if the Minister cannot give any comfort on this—I will certainly support him.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I rise mainly to support the Government. It seems to me that they are broadly taking steps to stop intimidation of the public, not to stop intimidation of the Government, which is what those who support the right to protest seem to be suggesting. The amendments, on the whole, seem to try to restrict that right. For the reasons that many people have already said, I do not think it is necessary.
The job of the police is to ensure that peaceful protesters are able to protest and that they are not intimidated. It is not their job to maximise the impact of the protest, which is what the implications of facilitation seem to suggest. Other people’s rights have to be respected; in the heat of a protest it is very difficult for the police to get that right. It can be a little easier in preparation for the protest, if you are able to plan, but many of these decisions often have to be made during the protest. When there are thousands of people who are emotional and shouting, perhaps outside the Israeli embassy, it can have an intimidating effect on everybody. We have to think seriously about how the police are able to implement these amendments.
I accept that proportionality is a very important part of the ECHR—I would not argue against that—but it is quite hard for the cops to measure this on the ground. In Northern Ireland it became such an issue that we ended up with a Parades Commission, which took the issues away from the police. The way that legislation is going, I suspect it might be wiser to leave someone independent to make these decisions rather than the police. But while it is with the police, it has to be as simple as possible, not because the police are simple—I speak personally—but because it is not easy to get that balance right. This is an acute judgment, not one that is measured in a court.
I want to speak about two other issues. If Parliament decides that it wants face coverings, we have to think carefully about the reasonable excuse. I do not disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, but I suspect that everybody will have a reasonable excuse. Imagine, as a police officer, confronting somebody about wearing a mask and trying to determine whether they have a reasonable excuse, together with four or five other people in a crowd. It would be almost impossible. Do they have a cold? That is one of the defences in the Act already. I think it would be almost unenforceable. I am not saying that it is wrong to have a reasonable excuse, but it is difficult to determine it during a protest.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
Surely the police will go ahead with the arrest and then the courts will decide whether there was a reasonable excuse.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
By that time they will already be in a cell, facing the fact that they have been arrested. It is best to avoid that prospect and the dispute you might end up in with a crowd when having to make that decision. The police need as smooth a transition as possible when implementing legislation, so I would be really careful if we carried on with that.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
Can the noble Lord answer the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about Iranians protesting outside the Iranian embassy, scared for their relatives in Iran?
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
I avoided having that conversation, because it is a good point. I introduced my points by saying that if a decision is made to impose a ban on masks, a reasonable excuse may be difficult to enforce. I am not expressing an opinion on the noble Lord’s very good point about whether it would capture Iranians who might be in fear of their life from the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is a reasonable point and I am choosing not to express an opinion on it.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
Can I pick the noble Lord up on one point? It is very interesting to hear him say that the law should be simple, because I have heard that from currently serving senior officers. Can he see that our accumulating more and more bits of law makes things not simpler but more complicated for the police? I have been on protests where the police have definitely been quite confused about the legislation. He ought to be arguing with the Government that we should make things much simpler.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
I will finish here because this is Report, but 50 metres is too short, although I think vicinity works. I agree with the noble Baroness on clarity; I am not against that, but you have to leave the police some flexibility given the circumstances they face. I do not think vicinity is an unreasonable suggestion. We can make that work, but 50 metres will never work.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, we have started the fourth day on Report with a wide-ranging and interesting debate on the general landscape of public order law. The noble Lords, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and Lord Strasburger, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady Fox of Buckley, have argued that there are too many statutory limitations on protest in this country. I do not agree, and I suspect I will find myself in much agreement with the Minister on those amendments.
First, I will speak to my Amendments 377C and 377D. Amendment 377C would extend the notification period for public processions from six to 28 days. Currently, Section 11 of the Public Order Act 1986 requires any person organising a protest to notify the police of their proposal to hold it with six days’ notice. The purpose of this period is to ensure that the police can plan their resource requirements effectively. They need to examine the route, number of attendees and timing, gather intelligence on the groups and people involved and assess the likelihood of violence and disorder. If the procession is likely to be large or the cause highly contentious, or if those involved have a history of causing disorder, they may very well need to make contingencies and possibly bring in more officers.
The short period of six days causes significant problems for the police, the public and the organisers of the protest, and it may take the police a substantial amount of time to gather all the available evidence and set conditions so the organisers can often only be notified of those conditions the day before the protest is due to take place. This does not give them adequate time to ensure that they can comply with those conditions, nor does it allow the public and businesses adequate time to adapt.
Policy Exchange’s polling demonstrated that the medium level of notice that respondents believed protest organisers should have to give to the police is 28 days. In its survey, 51% said organisers should have to give at least three weeks’ notice while 45% said the period should be at least four weeks. The 28-day period is also incidentally the same notice period as exists in Northern Ireland, and while I appreciate the different historical and political context in Northern Ireland, it does not seem unreasonable to extend that to England and Wales—especially given the substantial time and effort that police must pour into planning for large-scale protests.
Amendment 377D concerns the criteria on which the police may prohibit a protest. Currently, Section 13 of the Public Order Act 1986 permits the police to prohibit protests if there is a likelihood that the protest will result in serious public disorder. However, that is the only criterion included in that section, meaning there is no ability for the police to prohibit a protest if there is a risk of serious disruption to the life of the community, nor does it allow the police to take into account their own resources and ability to maintain public safety when making their assessment. My amendment would extend the criteria for the prohibition of protest to include where the chief officer of police has a reasonable belief that the protest could result in “serious public disorder”, “serious damage to property”,
“serious disruption to the life of the community”
or that it would
“place undue demands on the police”.
Given the Government's commitment to reform of public order law, I would think they should be able to accept these two amendments. Before the Minister says they need to wait for the review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, into public order and hate speech to report, I gently remind him that the Government were perfectly happy to pre-empt that review and legislate to extend the legislation aggravators based on characteristics last week. If they were happy to do so for that provision, I do not see why they cannot accept mine. However, if the Minister finds himself unable to do so, I am minded to press them to a Division when called.
I will also briefly comment on the other amendments in this group. Amendment 369, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and others, would create a new statutory right to protest. While the attention behind this is understandable, it is difficult to see what legal gap it is intended to fill. As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has already explained, the right to protest is already protected through the common law and currently through Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights incorporated domestically through the Human Rights Act.
However, it is important to recognise that we do not derive our rights in Britain from international treaties or even from domestic statute. The right to protest was protected before Parliament passed the Human Rights Act in 1998 and before we joined the ECHR. It is a right derived from ancient English liberty and our common law inheritance, so placing it into the Crime and Policing Bill in 2026 will not change a thing. I dare say if we were to leave the ECHR and repeal the Human Rights Act, we would still have our ancient freedom to protest intact.
What is more, creating a new declaratory clause risks adding greater complexity without adding meaningful protection. Indeed, by restating rights that are already well established, we may inadvertently create new areas of legal uncertainty rather than clarity for the police, local authorities and the courts, and for those reasons I cannot support that amendment.
A similar concern arises with Amendment 369A, which would introduce a reasonable excuse defence relating to concealing identity at a protest. Clause 133(2) already contains these defences. They include when a person is wearing a face covering for health reasons, religious observance or a purpose relating to their work, and that is a perfectly reasonable and pragmatic list of exceptions.
Amendments 372A and 372AA seek to narrow the circumstances in which conditions may be imposed on protests in the vicinity of places of worship. In doing so, they replace the current test by which a protest may intimidate with a requirement to demonstrate a specific purpose to intimidate. That is a significantly higher threshold. The difficulty is obvious. In practice, intimidation often arises from the circumstances and impact of a protest rather than from an explicitly stated intention. Requiring the police to prove purpose before acting risks tying their hands precisely when communities may feel most vulnerable.
On Amendment 373, as I stated in Committee, we on these Benches are supportive of the introduction of police powers to take into consideration cumulative disruption when placing conditions on protests and assemblies. I do not therefore agree with removing Clause 140. After all, the previous Government tried to introduce this in 2023 and it was the Liberal Democrats and Labour who voted it down in this House at the time, so it is good to see the Labour Party finally has come round to the Conservatives’ way of thinking.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Marks, Lord Strasburger and Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for affording us this further opportunity to debate the right to protest and public order measures in the Bill. I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this important debate.
The Government fully recognise the importance of peaceful protest in a democratic society. However, Amendment 369, put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, would place in statute a right that is already clearly protected in domestic law—and it is not only me saying that, as we have heard from the formidable legal troika of the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Pannick, and my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. As they said, public authorities are bound by the Human Rights Act to uphold Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights which cover freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. These rights are qualified and may only be limited when restrictions are lawful, necessary and proportionate. Common law also provides strong recognition of peaceful protest. Introducing an additional statutory provision risks creating overlap and uncertainty, particularly for operational policing, without offering any meaningful new protections.
In their contributions, the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, talked about the risks of, shall we say, a more extreme Government and this paving the way for further restrictions on the right to protest. I can only agree with comments made by a number of noble Lords, particularly the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Faulks: I hope the occasion never arises, but that is democracy, and any incoming Government that have that kind of mandate would not find it hard to overturn not only provisions that the Government are making in this Bill but the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, proposes, should it make its way on to the statute book. I am therefore not sure that argument really washes.
The Government remain firmly committed to safeguarding the right to protest. That is one reason why we have asked the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, to review the current legislative framework. One of the matters being explored as part of the review is—to quote its terms of reference—whether the current legislation
“strikes a fair balance between freedom of expression and the right to protest with the need to prevent disorder and keep communities safe”.
The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, is expected to report later in the spring. I assure noble Lords that we will consider very carefully all his recommendations, including any proposing a strengthening of the right to protest.
Amendment 369A, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, would provide a reasonable excuse defence for concealing a person’s identity at a protest in a designated area and shift the burden of proof away from individuals within that designated area on to police. Instead of requiring a person to justify why they had a valid reason for wearing an item to conceal their identity, as set out in the specified defences, it would place the responsibility on the police to assess, during a live protest, whether the explanation provided was reasonable or not. As we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, that is not necessarily always an easy thing to do.
Clause 133 currently provides three statutory defences for concealing identity at a protest within a designated area: relating to the health of the person or others; religious observance; or for a purpose relating to that person’s work. The offence carries a reverse burden of proof, meaning it is for the individual to prove they concealed their identity for one of these reasons. I consider this a proportionate and carefully balanced offence.
It is important to highlight that any decision to designate an area and arrest a person concealing their identity must take into account Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, meaning that all decisions must be necessary and proportionate in relation to the right to peaceful protest. It is important to bear in mind that a locality will be designated only when it is thought that a protest activity is likely to involve or has involved criminality, so it is expedient to do so in order to prevent or limit the commission of offences.
Lord Pannick (CB)
So is the Minister saying to the protestor at the Iranian embassy that he or she has only two choices: not to protest, or to protest not wearing a face mask and thereby run the risk that their relatives in Iran may be killed or tortured?
Lord Katz (Lab)
In that example, I revert to what I said about the locality being designated only if the police suspect that criminality is likely to occur or has occurred on previous occasions. I put it to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that a largely peaceful protest outside an embassy and at an appropriate distance would not fall into that category of protest.
As I was going to say, clear operational guidance from the NPCC—
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
It might well be that that protester is just on a general demonstration. If you are an Iranian or Chinese dissident, you might be on a civil rights demonstration, arguing for the right to protest. That would equally be the target of the ire of your authoritarian, anti-protest, anti-civil liberty regime. Can the Minister explain how this cannot possibly chill their right to go on a protest? It is not just the transnational example—other examples were given. Some people will not go on protests because they will be frightened of the consequences.
Lord Katz (Lab)
On this having a chilling effect, the new offence will cover only people in the locality who are
“wearing or otherwise using an item that conceals their identity”.
As I said, the police will use this power only if they can say there is going to be criminality on a particular protest, such as a march. That is not a power they are going to be using lightly.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
I am sorry to keep pestering the Minister, but the difficulty is that there is absolutely no reason why the criminality has to be connected with the attitudes of those Iranians who are frightened. The criminality simply has to be connected with the protest as a whole. It may be entirely separate from the views, attitudes or desires of the Iranians who, in the example of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, are likely to be deterred from attending a protest.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I do not disagree with the noble Lord. What I am saying is that the police designation of a locality where this offence would apply would be made only in cases where they thought that criminality and an offence would occur. It is not related to the fact that, in this case, there are Iranians protesting. I reflect the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who, to paraphrase, said that the reasonable defences we list in the clause are common-sense and easily explicable.
Lord Pannick (CB)
May I test the patience of the Minister? I am very grateful to him. The defence he is offering—that this applies only if there is criminality—does not explain why Clause 133 recognises the defences of health, religious observance or a person’s work. If the Government recognise those defences, even though they are in the context of criminality, surely the clause should also cover the type of example I have given.
Lord Katz (Lab)
The noble Lord can never test my patience too far. I simply say that, in terms of the police’s operational use, there are three clear, easy-to-understand, easy-to-interpret defences one could use in this situation. Fear of dissident reprisal does not necessarily fit into that category so easily. Notwithstanding his inability to test my patience, I am going to make some progress, as we have more to discuss.
Under Amendments 372A, 372B and 372C in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, Clause 139 would apply only where a protest is directed at or connected with the place of worship, before conditions could be imposed. Additionally, Amendments 372ZA, 372AA, 372AB, 372BA, 372BB and 372D in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, would raise the threshold for police intervention by requiring proof that a protest has the explicit purpose of intimidating individuals accessing a place of worship and that it would, in fact, intimidate them. The amendments also propose limiting police powers to protests occurring
“within 50 metres from the outer perimeter”
of a place of worship.
As seen with recent demonstrations, protests can have an unintended impact on the lives of a community and those seeking to exercise their freedom of religion without intimidation or fear. I want to be clear that Clause 139 seeks to address a clear legislative gap arising from such protests. Police currently have powers to intervene where there is a serious disruption to the life of the community or intentional intimidation. However, we have already heard consistently from both the police and religious communities that these thresholds are too high to protect worshippers who feel too intimidated to attend their place of worship, even though the protesters do not intend to have such an effect. Requiring officers to demonstrate both the purpose and effect of intimidation would restrict their ability to act at an earlier stage, reducing operational flexibility.
Clause 139 responds directly to that problem. It does not ban protests; it simply gives the police the ability to impose proportionate conditions where a procession, assembly or one-person protest may create an intimidating atmosphere in the vicinity of a place of worship. This will protect the freedom to worship without undermining the fundamental right to protest. Both rights are essential, and the clause is carefully designed to balance them. As the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, herself said, the duty to protect minority communities and their right to go about their lives—whether it is their freedom of worship or any other aspect—is indeed paramount. The clause seeks to do that.
The noble Baroness’s proposal to introduce a rigid 50-metre boundary would further constrain the police, as we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. The noble Baroness calls the proposal in the Bill vague, but I put it to her that the rigidity of a 50-metre boundary goes too far. For example, let us consider the practical example of the proximity of St Margaret’s Church to both this House and Parliament Square. Having this rule in place, notwithstanding any particular provisions on protests in Parliament Square, would make that sort of protest impossible. To use one of the examples promoted by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, any protest outside churches or cathedrals would presumably also be limited in that way.
Activity occurring outside that distance may still create an environment that discourages worshippers from entry, yet the police would be unable to impose conditions unless the protest moved closer. This would undermine the clause’s purpose of enabling proportionate intervention where there is a risk of an intimidatory atmosphere near a place of worship. As noble Lord, Lord Pannick said, that includes the comings and goings—going to and from a place of worship, as well as actually being within the building.
I take this opportunity to thank the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, who, I am afraid, is not in his place, for meeting me and members of Jewish community organisations, including the Board of Deputies of British Jews, CST and the Jewish Leadership Council, to discuss the clause. As I reiterated at that meeting, I want to make it clear that the Government will write to police forces and local authorities following Royal Assent to remind them of their existing powers to protect community centres, schools and places of worship. This will ensure that all agencies are fully aware of the tools they already have to respond to intimidatory behaviour in these settings.
Amendment 373, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, seeks to remove the cumulative disruption clause from the Bill. I have been clear that the right to peaceful protest is a fundamental democratic right in this country. However, it should be balanced with the need for individuals and communities to feel safe in their own neighbourhoods. Over the past few years, we have seen the impact of protests on the lives of communities and, of course, the tragic antisemitic terror incident that took place at the Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation’s synagogue on 2 October, which led to the unfortunate murders of Adrian Daulby and Melvin Cravitz. Protests subsequently continued, which highlighted concerns around the protection of specific communities, including Jewish communities, which are affected by the cumulative impact of protests.
There are other examples where communities face serious disruption from protests taking place in the same area week after week. On this, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. On the streets of London over the past couple of years, we have seen protests almost weekly. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, is right that the cumulative impact has the effect of forcing home a particular message that those protesters want to make. However, that should not come at the price of other citizens not being allowed to enjoy their regular rights.
Baroness O'Grady of Upper Holloway (Lab)
I remind my noble friend that in Committee a number of us raised the statement that was issued by a whole range of civic society organisations, whose members often live in the communities in which they carry out protests. He will recall in particular that the TUC supported that civic society statement.
I speak as one of the perhaps few people in this House who has had responsibility for organising mass national demonstrations in central London. Can my noble friend reassure those organisations that this is not, as they fear, in effect, a quota on national demonstrations in London? Can he also give some guidance to the police on how they pick and choose between those different organisations if there is to be a quota?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I thank my noble friend for that and for all the work that she has done in organising those national protests, at least one or two of which I am sure that I have attended.
It is absolutely not a quota. It is simply to say that if you are regularly marching in areas side by side with other communities, that repeated activity should not impede their ability, for example, to come and go to a synagogue. It cannot be right, as I know is the case, that synagogues should have to alter their regular service times on a Saturday morning to allow for protests. There must be a way that police can accommodate the needs of the protesters and of those worshippers. I want to be clear: this is not about imposing a quota on protests. The provision does not allow police to ban a protest but places a duty on senior officers to consider cumulative disruption when deciding whether the serious disruption to the life of the community threshold in Sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 is met.
Amendment 377C, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, seeks to extend the notice period required for planned processions from six days to 28 days. As I explained in Committee, six days provides the police with adequate time to work with organisers who are planning protests to ensure that any conditions imposed are necessary and proportionate. The noble Lord’s Amendment 377D seeks to amend Section 13 of the Public Order Act 1986 to enable a chief officer of police to consider
“serious damage to property, or … serious disruption to the life of the community”
and the demands on police resources when determining whether to apply for an order prohibiting public processions.
Section 13 of the 1986 Act rightly sets out a high threshold for considering whether public processions should be prohibited. Widening the scope of this power, including to take account of police resources, would risk undermining the right to peaceful protest under Articles 10 and 11 and the legislation becoming incompatible with the ECHR. The noble compared this with the measure we discussed last week around aggravated offences. The latter was a clear manifesto commitment announced before the review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven.
I hope I have been able to reassure noble Lords who have spoken in this group. They have raised some very legitimate issues about whether existing public order legislation and the measures in Part 9 of the Bill strike the right balance between protecting the right to protest, protecting communities and preventing disorder. As I have said, there is an ongoing review examining just this issue, and I put it to the noble Lord that we should wait for the outcome of that review. Accordingly, this is not the occasion to press any of the amendments to a vote today. On that basis, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Marks, to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I will be very brief in explaining why I do not propose to withdraw my amendment. First, our amendment would introduce a dynamic right, with a duty on local authorities and public authorities to respect, protect and facilitate the right to protest. Secondly, of course the margin of appreciation is indeed an international concept, but this Government are planning to legislate on the application of Article 8, and they may be right to do so, but we need to have proper concern about future legislation within the context of the margin of appreciation.
Thirdly, I am not suggesting for a moment that we can entrench legislation. The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, is absolutely right to say that Parliament cannot bind its successors. However, we can, by legislation, make it unattractive to reverse a public duty to support the right to protest. Finally, nothing I have said undermines the balancing of rights between the right to protest and the rights and freedoms of others; but the right to protest is at the heart of our democracy. If the Conservatives are not going to support us on this, so be it: that is very disappointing, but I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Strasburger
“(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to show that they had a reasonable excuse for wearing or otherwise using the item at the material time.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would provide a defence of reasonable excuse to the offence of concealing identity at protests, thereby putting the burden of proof on police officers to justify why they believe that wearing a face covering at a protest made the suspect arrestable.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who contributed to this very thoughtful debate. I point out that Clause 133 already contains three reasonable excuses for the offence, but I do not understand why it contains those three and no others. For example, we have not had a convincing explanation from the Government on the example of the Iranian dissident. Amendment 369A covers all reasonable excuses: the three already in the Bill; the Iranian dissident, who keeps coming up; all the others mentioned in the debate; and any others that we have not thought of yet. I am not satisfied with the responses that I have heard from the Government and I wish to test the opinion of the House.
“(d) a war memorial which has been listed under the provisions of the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990 or scheduled under the provisions of the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act 1979.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment broadens the current definition of “specified memorials” to include any listed or scheduled war memorial, not just those which happen to be Grade I listed at present.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, as I explained in Committee, I support the aims that the Government are seeking to achieve through Clause 137, which creates a new offence of climbing on memorials. Although there is a long history of statues forming part of peaceful protest and standing in dialogue between past and present, there is something special about war memorials, which stand as sacred monuments to those who made the ultimate sacrifice for the freedoms that we now enjoy. It is therefore a particular affront when they are dishonoured or desecrated, especially for the proud comrades, families and descendants left behind by the heroes that they commemorate. So I am glad to see the Government taking action in this area, but I am rather perplexed about the way they are going about it.
The Government have correctly identified a problem of principle—that war memorials are specially cherished parts of our public realm and should not be climbed on in this way. However, in translating that principle into this legislation, they have severely and illogically curtailed it. Rather than applying the power to all war memorials, they say it must only be ones specified by the Home Secretary, and have named just 24 in the initial list included at Schedule 14 to the Bill.
Reading that list, I was pleased to see some very fine memorials indeed, including The Response, Sir William Goscombe John’s splendid memorial to the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, who raised 52 battalions throughout the Great War, more than any other regiment. It stands in the grounds of St Thomas’s church in the heart of Newcastle city centre, by the Haymarket and the civic centre. It was commissioned by a local ship owner and Conservative MP, Sir George Renwick, to commemorate the raising of four of those “pals” battalions and later dedicated in thanks for the safe return of Sir George and Lady Renwick’s five sons from the Great War. Not as many families were as fortunate as they.
Similar stories stand behind each of the two dozen memorials specified in Schedule 14, Part 1, but it is a curious list both for what it does and does not contain. While the Government’s list has an admirable geographic spread, it does not include some of our most well-known national memorials, such as the Battle of Britain Monument or the Royal Air Force Memorial, to give just two examples from very close to here on the Victoria Embankment. Their proximity to Parliament makes them, sadly, a focus for protest and vandalism far more frequently than some of the memorials currently specified in the Bill, but they are not included. In Committee, we found out why. Schedule 14 simply specifies those monuments that are presently listed grade 1 in heritage and planning terms.
Although the listing system is a vital tool for preserving those assets that we most value as a society, applying it in in this way is fraught with problems. First, the Government have restricted themselves to those memorials that are presently given the highest designation, at grade 1. This misses many thousands of memorials that stand proudly in every parish of the kingdom, sacred to the memory of those who laid down their lives in combat and whose memory surely deserves to be honoured just as much as those inscribed on the memorials set out in Schedule 14. The Government have started with a problem of principle but addressed it only in part.
Secondly, the listing system is predicated on specific criteria. As Section 1 of the planning Act 1990 puts it, listing is for
“buildings of special architectural or historic interest”.
This means that a memorial can be given a higher grading for its sculptural accomplishment than for the subject it celebrates. In Committee, I gave an example of this—the Bill will protect Sir George Frampton’s grade 1 listed statue of Edith Cavell at St Martin’s Place but not Arthur Walker’s grade 2 listed memorial to Florence Nightingale round the corner in Waterloo Place. Is one of those wartime nurses really deserving of greater protection than the other because they happen to have been sculpted by different hands?
Thirdly, I worry that this approach will have a chilling effect on the listing system itself. If designating a monument grade 1 is accompanied by new restrictions and criminal sanctions, will that not deter Ministers and their advisers at Historic England from recommending those higher levels of protection? A better approach, I submit, is to follow what I have proposed in my Amendment 370 and specify any war memorial that has been listed, whether at grade 1, grade 2* or grade 2, or any that has been designated as a scheduled monument. This would avoid the practical problems that I have just set out and answer the problem of principle, on which the Government and I agree much more squarely.
The Lord Bishop of Norwich
My Lords, I support Amendment 370 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay and Lord Blencathra. Across this nation, war memorials, often raised by public subscription of pennies here and tuppences there, stand to hold memories of those who gave their lives—sons and daughters, brothers and sisters, cousins and parents. They are carved in stone, metal, wood or marble. The Whipsnade Tree Cathedral in Bedfordshire is a living memorial planted by Edmond Blyth, a World War I veteran, to commemorate his friends who were lost. They are physical embodiments of sacrifice, courage and collective memory, often within the curtilage of parish churches, each name both precious to someone and precious in the sight of God—ordinary people called to do the most extraordinary things in very challenging times. When they are damaged, it is a hit in the stomach for the whole of that community. It damages how we build our life together.
In recent years we have seen a great increase in younger generations exploring those names, finding out more about those people and giving their lives texture, colour and story. I have been very moved by going to a number of different exhibitions in parish churches across the diocese of Norwich that have showcased those often very young lives that were snuffed out in their prime in the service of this nation, so it is deeply distressing when memorials are damaged. Sometimes they are stolen for scrap metal and melted down, and the hurt that causes is immense.
I hope that these important memorials across the length and breadth of this nation can continue to serve as places to pause, reflect and think again, “Not again”. They are permanent reminders of the horror, destruction and futility of war. I hope that the Minister will accept the eminently sensible Amendment 370 for all the reasons that were so ably outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson. If the Minister cannot support Amendment 370, I hope that the Government will support Amendments 372ZZA and 372ZZB.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, I think it is very odd that there should be a distinction made by the Government between a memorial to Florence Nightingale and a memorial to Edith Cavell. That is purely an example that the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, has given us. If that is so, what on earth is the point of the clause?
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Parkinson for tabling these amendments that seek to ensure that our memorials of national and historic importance are afforded the respect and protection they deserve under the new offence created in Clause 137. As was noted in Committee, the offence of climbing on specified memorials was introduced to address gaps revealed by recent protests around war memorials, such as the Royal Artillery Memorial and, indeed, around the statue of our great wartime leader Sir Winston Churchill just outside this place. It was first introduced as part of the previous Government’s Criminal Justice Bill, and it is welcome that this Government have taken up the mantle.
Under the current drafting, however, only grade 1 listed memorials are specified, together with the statue of Sir Winston Churchill, but the list does not capture other memorials of equal national significance. As my noble friend has argued so eloquently, using grade 1 listed memorials does not serve a real practical purpose. It is much more about administrative ease. Why does Sledmere get two specified memorials but the Women of World War II Memorial gets no such protection? Amendment 370 would broaden the definition of “specified memorial” to include any war memorial that has been listed or scheduled, not just those that happen to be grade 1 listed.
That approach aligns with the fact that the significance of a memorial is not solely a function of its listing grade but of the history it commemorates and its role in national remembrance. Expanding the scope in this way provides a more objective and inclusive basis for protection and avoids arbitrary outcomes based on historic listing decisions.
Amendment 372 complements Amendment 370 by adding two memorials of particular national importance: the monument to the women of the Second World War in Whitehall, which honours the immense contributions of millions of women during that conflict, and the Holocaust memorial garden in Hyde Park, which stands as a poignant reminder of the horrors of genocide. Including those memorials recognises the breadth of sacrifice in the diverse stories that make up our collective history. I hope the Government will concede to this. If they do and my noble friend is content, so will I be.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to everyone who spoke in this short but important debate, particularly to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Norwich, who spoke very movingly about the power of memorials in every community and the hurt that communities feel when they are damaged or disrespected. Amendments 370, 372ZZA and 372ZZB, put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, seek to expand the list of war and other memorials covered by the new offence of climbing on a memorial provided for in Clause 137. I am grateful to him for taking the time to meet with me and officials last week on this issue and for his thoughtful consideration of how best to achieve the Government’s aim, which I think is shared across the House.
As regards Amendment 370, I fully acknowledge that many of the listed and scheduled memorials covered in the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990 and the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act 1979 commemorate events and individuals of great national importance. The Bill intentionally sets out a clear and fixed list of memorials which provides certainty for the public, policing and the courts. By contrast, Amendment 370 would link the offence to memorials listed or scheduled under two separate heritage Acts. Those Acts encompass a far wider range of structures than the focused list in this measure and can change over time. Therefore, this would introduce an uncertainty about which memorials were captured at any given point, undermining the clarity and consistency that the measure is intended to achieve. For this reason, I cannot support the amendment.
The noble Lord, and perhaps the House, will be pleased to hear that I am much more disposed towards his Amendments 372ZZA and 372ZZB, which seek to add the monument to the women of World War II and the Holocaust memorial garden in Hyde Park to Schedule 14. Our aim is to ensure that memorials that have been deemed at threat in the course of a protest are covered by the offence. As the noble Lord has explained, these two memorials have been targeted in recent years. They are both culturally significant, and I agree with him that we need to protect them under this new offence. I am therefore happy to confirm that the Government support these two amendments.
The Holocaust memorial garden in Hyde Park is of course designed to be enjoyed as a garden and people are free to walk within it. I have given consideration to the practical issue of whether the police will be able to enforce this offence. The intention of the offence is to capture the action of climbing and I am confident it will not capture walking on an installation such as the Holocaust memorial garden. There are other memorials listed in Schedule 14 which have steps that may be sat on by members of the public, such as the Royal Artillery memorial in Hyde Park. I am content that, in enforcing this offence, police officers will use their discretion to consider whether an offence is committed.
As I have previously stated, the provision includes a power for the Home Secretary to add further memorials by secondary legislation. This might include the statue of Florence Nightingale in Waterloo Place, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. This Government will be able to add to the list of protected memorials should a site be identified that requires inclusion. I remain of the view, however, that not every memorial or every war memorial can be included. To do so would make the measure unenforceable due to the number of memorials and many, by their nature—for example, commemorative plaques—cannot be climbed on. That said, I accept we need a clear process for deciding whether to add further memorials to Schedule 14.
We will commit to setting out the process through which the Government will add to the specified list of memorials through secondary legislation. We will ensure a methodical and structured approach to consider which memorials have a significant public interest in being included. We will set out the process shortly after the Bill receives Royal Assent. As the Home Secretary has already indicated, this will include the national Holocaust memorial when it has finally been built. I hope that I have been able to persuade the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, and that the combination of the addition of the two memorials specified in his Amendments 372ZZA and 372ZZB and the process I have outlined for considering the case for adding further memorials will persuade him to withdraw Amendment 370.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for that response and I thank him again for the time that he and his officials gave me last week to discuss this in detail. I am grateful too to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Norwich, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower for their support. As the right reverend Prelate said, these memorials stand very often on hallowed ground, but they are cherished and sacred to people of all faiths and none and inspire new generations to learn about the sacrifices of the past.
I continue to think that the solution in Amendment 370 is the more logical one, but I am grateful to the Minister for what he has said in support of my other two Amendments 372ZZA and 372ZZB, which gives an indication that the Home Secretary is willing to use the powers in Clause 137 where needed to make sure that these protections can be afforded to statues that are targeted by protesters and criminals. I will not press my Amendment 370. I look forward to seeing the two additions to the list and the vigilance of the Home Office and police in the years to come to see where others may need to be added, alas, if necessary. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Katz
“Protests outside public office-holder’s home(1) A person (“P”) commits an offence if—(a) P (alone or with other persons) carries on a protest outside, or in the vicinity of, premises that are used by a public office-holder as a dwelling,(b) P carries on the protest for the purpose of representing to, or persuading, the public office-holder that they—(i) should or should not do something, or(ii) should or should not have done something, and(c) P carries on the protest because of, or in connection with, the public officer-holder being a public officer-holder.(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to premises that are an official residence.(3) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to show that they did not know the premises were used by the public office-holder as a dwelling.(4) A person is to be taken to have shown the matter referred to in subsection (3) if—(a) sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.(5) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable, on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale (or both).(6) In subsection (5) “the maximum term for summary offences” means—(a) if the offence is committed before the time when section 281(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 comes into force, six months;(b) if the offence is committed after that time, 51 weeks.(7) The following definitions apply for the purposes of this section.(8) “Public office-holder” means—(a) a Minister of the Crown (within the meaning of the Ministers of the Crown Act 1975);(b) any of the Welsh Ministers;(c) any of the Deputy Welsh Ministers (within the meaning of the Government of Wales Act 2006);(d) the Counsel General to the Welsh Government;(e) a member of the House of Lords;(f) a member of the House of Commons;(g) a member of Senedd Cymru;(h) a member of a local authority;(i) an elected mayor of a local authority within the meaning given by section 9H (elected mayors: England) or section 39(4) (elected mayors: Wales) of the Local Government Act 2000;(j) a mayor for the area of a combined authority established under section 103 of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009;(k) a mayor for the area of a combined county authority established under section 9(1) of the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023;(l) the Mayor of London or an elected member of the London Assembly;(m) a police and crime commissioner;(n) a candidate at an election for an office mentioned in any of paragraphs (f) to (m).(9) “Local authority” means—(a) in England—(i) a county council;(ii) a district council;(iii) a London borough council;(iv) a parish council;(v) the Common Council of the City of London;(vi) the Council of the Isles of Scilly;(b) in Wales—(i) a county council;(ii) a county borough council;(iii) a community council.(10) “Dwelling” has the meaning given by section 8 of the Public Order Act 1986.(11) “Official residence” means—(a) 10, 11 and 12 Downing Street, London;(b) Admiralty House, Whitehall, London;(c) 1 Carlton Gardens, London;(d) the Palace of Westminster, London;(e) Chequers, Missenden Road, Aylesbury, Buckinghamshire;(f) Dorneywood, Dorneywood Road, Burnham, Buckinghamshire;(g) Chevening House, Chevening, Sevenoaks, Kent.”.Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment creates a new offence relating to protests outside the homes of public office-holders.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, these amendments seek to achieve a similar aim to an earlier amendment tabled in Committee, which the Government withdrew following concerns raised by the Benches opposite. In bringing back these amendments, I hope the revised drafting directly addresses the concerns raised by noble Lords who felt that the initial offence was drawn too widely.
Amendment 371 explicitly requires a protest to be taking place outside a public officeholder’s home for it to be an offence, rather than the broader activity reflected in the Committee amendment. Importantly, a person must be carrying out the protest because of, or in connection with, the public officeholder’s role. Amendment 376 further amends Sections 42 and 42A of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, which confer powers to direct protests away from a person’s home, so as to remove the requirement that protest activity must be linked to a specific future action. As I said in Committee, this change ensures that harassing or intimidatory protests outside the homes of individuals are captured, regardless of whether they relate to past or future conduct.
I recognise the question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, about whether additional legislation is truly necessary to protect the homes of public officeholders. The Government’s view is that there is an unequivocal need. We are not just talking about providing a feeling of safety to elected representatives; we are talking about the safety of their families too. This principle is foundational to the resilience of the public officeholder and thus to democracy itself. Under the Defending Democracy policing protocol, drafted and agreed by the former Minister for Security and the then Prime Minister, the previous Government set out a clear expectation that any protest outside the homes of elected representatives should be treated as harassment. That intent of the previous Government is what this amendment now achieves.
The role of elected representatives is the backbone of our democracy. Yet the Minister for Security has heard first-hand from colleagues who have tempered what they say or even how they vote because of intimidating behaviour targeted at their homes and their families. We know too that some, particularly women or those from minority backgrounds, are choosing not to stand for office because of the abuse they fear they will face. That is not democracy thriving; that is democracy shrinking. This legislation will give public officeholders and their families an additional layer of protection. It will help ensure that they can carry out their duties without fearing what awaits them at their front door and it will allow their partners, their children and their loved ones to feel safe where safety should be most assured: in their home.
Let me be absolutely clear: protest is a fundamental democratic right, and this Government defend it vigorously. There are proper, powerful places for protest: outside constituency offices, outside Parliament, at town halls, at political events, at rallies. But the home is different. It is where family life happens, where our children sleep, where our partners work, where people retreat from public life. It must not become an area for intimidation or a no-go zone. I beg to move.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, for all the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Katz, protests outside officeholders’ homes are in a special category. These amendments are plainly directed at harassing or intimidatory behaviour towards public officeholders, and they affect the families as well, so we are happy to accept these two amendments.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, I wish to add how delighted I am that the Government have done that. It is rather overdue and will give some degree of satisfaction to at least some families of MPs in particular.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, in Committee I raised some strong objections to the amendment that the Government were proposing then. We were concerned that the proposals could inadvertently criminalise canvassing and leafleting an officeholder from a rival political party. We were also concerned about the proposed second aspect of the offence, which could criminalise making representations about a matter relating to the officeholder’s private capacity.
I still have reservations about the principle behind Amendment 371. I do not accept the Government’s argument that all protests outside a public officeholder’s dwelling constitute harassment. That is the stated view of the Government, but I think it is demonstrably false. If a protest outside a public officeholder’s home becomes actual harassment within the meaning of the law then that should be prosecuted as such, and if the protest breaches the peace or becomes highly disruptive then there are already laws to deal with that, but simply saying that any person who wishes to make representations to a politician about their actions or policies outside their house is harassment and therefore unlawful seems a disproportionate infringement of liberty.
Having said that, I am grateful to the Minister for taking our comments on board. The amendment that the Government have tabled on Report is much improved and far more tightly drafted, and I welcome that. Could the Minister confirm that the definition of a protest in the amendment will not include canvassing and leafleting or asking someone to sign a petition? I think we would all benefit from that being on the record. Given that the Government have listened to our concerns, while we are not completely content, we will not oppose this amendment.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I particularly thank the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, because I feel that at this Dispatch Box I do not always meet the high bar that she sets for defending the Government’s position, so it is always good to win her praise.
To pick up on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, the Government are committed to defending democracy. I therefore assure him that Amendment 371 does not restrict political campaigning. It is perfectly legitimate for campaigners during election time to door-knock and speak to their local public officeholders about different political opinion. Where this crosses the line is when these people choose to protest against the public officeholder at their home.
These government amendments are vital to protecting our democracy. As my honourable friend the Security Minister has made clear, harassment and intimidation must never be accepted as part of a public officeholder’s role. This cannot become the new normal, and the scale of the problem cannot be overstated. It is not simply MPs, either. The Local Government Association’s Debate Not Hate survey in 2025 found that seven in 10 councillors had experienced abuse or intimidation in the previous year. The Speaker’s Conference reported that an astonishing 96% of MPs who responded to their survey had suffered at least one form of abuse, intimidation or harassment. This demonstrates that it is a real problem. Harassment is not simply confined to online spaces; it is very active in the real world too. We must therefore put protections in place not only to keep public office holders safe but to ensure that they feel safe, and that their families are protected. With that, I beg to move.
Lord Walney
“Designation and restriction of Extreme Criminal Protest Groups(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations designate a group as an Extreme Criminal Protest Group (“ECPG”) where the Secretary of State reasonably believes that—(a) the group has as its purpose and practice the deliberate commission of one or more of the following offences—(i) an offence under section 1 of the Public Order Act 1986 (riot),(ii) an offence under section 2 of the Public Order Act 1986 (violent disorder),(iii) an offence under section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 (destroying or damaging property), or(iv) an offence under section 7 of the Public Order Act 2023 (interference with the use or operation of key national infrastructure),(b) such offences are carried out with the intention of influencing public policy, parliamentary debate, ministerial decision-making, or the exercise of democratic functions, and(c) the activities of the group create a risk of serious harm to public safety, democratic institutions, or the rights of others.(2) A designation under subsection (1) does not amount to proscription for the purposes of the Terrorism Act 2000.(3) The following are offences in relation to group designated as an ECPG under subsection (1)—(a) membership of a designated ECPG;(b) promotion of a designated ECPG, including public advocacy, recruitment, or dissemination of the group’s materials;(c) fundraising for a designated ECPG, including soliciting or providing funds or financial benefit;(d) organising, directing or coordinating activities of the group;(e) providing material support, training, funds or equipment to the group where the person knows or ought reasonably to know that the recipient is a designated ECPG.(4) A person does not commit an offence under subsection (3) solely by expressing an opinion or belief that is supportive of a designated ECPG, where that expression does not amount to encouragement or assistance of criminal conduct.(5) An offence under subsection (3) is punishable on conviction—(a) on indictment, by imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or a fine, or both;(b) on summary conviction, by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or a fine, or both.(6) Before making regulations under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a statement of reasons explaining why the designation is considered appropriate.(7) The statement under subsection (6) may exclude material the disclosure of which would, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, be contrary to the public interest, including on grounds of national security or the prevention or detection of crime.”
Lord Walney (Lab)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to lead off this grouping on counterextremism. My Amendment 371A, tabled with co-sponsors the noble Lords. Lord Pannick and Lord Hogan-Howe, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, would create a limited mechanism to give the Government the option to seek parliamentary approval to restrict the activities of an extreme criminal protest group that was dedicated to committing criminal damage for political purposes. It would do so without branding individuals or the group as terrorists, and it would expressly rule out criminalising mere expressions of support that did not encourage illegal conduct. If it were applied instead of terrorist proscription, it would avoid the controversy of people being arrested for holding up signs in the manner that has happened so recently with Palestine Action under the provisions of the Terrorism Act 2000.
Following concerns in Committee that the original amendment was too broad and risked unduly restricting freedom of speech and association, we have substantially narrowed its scope. The number of offences here has been narrowed to riot, violent disorder, criminal damage or attempts to interfere with key national infrastructure. There is no possibility of widening those criteria without further primary legislation. Subsection (3) has been clarified so that assisting a designated group would be an offence only where the individual was knowingly furthering the group’s aims. Expressions of support for a group that do not amount to encouragement or assistance of criminal activity are expressly not criminalised in this text.
Contrary to what I suspect the Minister may be about to say in response, this proposal is timely now, despite the Government’s ongoing appeal against the High Court judgment that ruled the terrorist proscription of Palestine Action to be disproportionate. In fact, the pending appeal makes it all the more timely. This amendment does not affect that appeal itself. It makes no comment on the wisdom or otherwise of the Government's assessment that Palestine Action had met the terrorism threshold after its five-year-long campaign of criminal damage and occasional use of violence.
If passed, however, this proposal would allow Ministers to seek parliamentary approval through a positive statutory instrument to restrict the activities of a future criminal group that held the purpose, which is the strategic intent, and the practice, which is the track record, of using criminal damage for political purposes like Palestine Action did. That is another way, in specifying purpose and practice, that the amendment has been tightened from the text debated in Committee. Thus, it would allow action in a future scenario to be taken much sooner before the group had met the terrorism threshold. The penalties applied for offences would be lower: up to three years’ imprisonment, rather than up to 14 years under the Terrorism Act. It would not criminalise expressions of support, as I have said, and it would avoid those convicted being saddled with an offence under the Terrorism Act for the rest of their lives.
If the Government’s appeal against the Palestine Action ruling is unsuccessful, this would provide an alternative to deter the group’s malign activities should those activities be resumed once proscription was lifted. That is just one of the reasons why the House should not take the advice, which I suspect the Minister is about to give, not to accept this amendment and wait instead for the outcome of the review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, and then inevitably push this issue down the road for the next crime or public order Bill perhaps years hence. We all look forward to hearing the noble Lord’s views, but the Government themselves are not waiting for his view when they want to take swift action in other areas, such as on the cumulative impact caused by protests.
I hope, by the way, that the Minister will also accept my Amendment 377A to extend the cumulative impact provisions that he has laid applying to Sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act to Section 13, thus giving the police the power to recommend that a march does not go ahead on a particular day if the cumulative impact is sufficiently severe.
To go back to Amendment 371A, there have of course been many reviews in this territory, including my own when I served as the Government’s independent adviser on political violence and disruption. That review made the recommendation on extreme criminal protest groups that is encapsulated in Amendment 371A when it was published in May 2024, nearly two years ago. This is an appropriate time to act. It is an appropriately limited measure that can make a significant difference while completely preserving the right to protest and freedom of expression and association.
Lord Davies of Gower
(a) Condition 2, or(b) Condition 3,has been met.(1A) Condition 1 is that the group has as its purpose and practice the deliberate commission of one or more of the following offences—(a) an offence under section 1 of the Public Order Act 1986 (riot),(b) an offence under section 2 of the Public Order Act 1986 (violent disorder),(b) an offence under section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 (destroying or damaging property), or(d) an offence under section 7 of the Public Order Act 2023 (interference with the use or operation of key national infrastructure).(1B) Condition 2 is that the offences mentioned in Condition 1 are carried out with the intention of influencing public policy, parliamentary debate, ministerial decision-making or the exercise of democratic functions.(1C) Condition 3 is that the activities of the group create a risk of serious harm to public safety, democratic institutions, or the rights of others.”
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Walney, for bringing forward Amendment 371A and all noble Lords who have added their name to it. I thank the Members of your Lordships’ House who, I hope, will be speaking to it. This amendment is eminently sensible. We have heard several examples already of groups which engage in criminal and intimidating behaviour to further their ideological ends, but which do not necessarily pass the terrorism threshold. There is no justification for their continued lawful existence, but to proscribe them as terrorists obfuscates the meaning of the category and incorporates inactive supporters within the definition. The pertinent example of this is Palestine Action. I will not speculate on whether the behaviour actually amounts to terrorism, but the actions of its supporters following its proscription highlight the necessity for action.
An organisation that damages defence infrastructure and attacks members of the public should cease to exist, but for the police to then have to spend precious time arresting hundreds of protesters with placards is clearly not ideal. It may seem morally dubious on behalf of those protesters, but I think we can all agree that they are a far cry from the archetypal terrorist supporters of, say, ISIS or the Taliban. Most importantly, it is a waste of police time to have to deal with sanctimonious protesters who otherwise peacefully support a general ideological cause. That is why we entirely support the noble Lord’s amendment. Our Amendment 371B introduces a minor change to the drafting that reflects our belief that the proscription of groups in this category should not be contingent on whether they fulfil the criteria of both subsections (1A) and (1B). Individually, the actions in both subsections should merit a protest group being proscribed and prohibited from taking further action.
If a listed crime is committed that creates a serious risk to the safety of the public, then the line is crossed from dissent to danger. I think noble Lords can agree that whether a group is for an ideological end or not, this should merit proscription. The very act of a group entering an arms factory with sledgehammers should preclude its existence, regardless of motive. That said, ideological motive is also a factor that should be considered in its own right: if a group shuns peaceful protest and becomes willing to commit criminal offences to further a political end, that should be grounds to ban it. Take, for example, BASH BACK, the activist group which has consistently engaged in criminal damage, vandalism and intimidation in the name of so-called transgender rights. To take one example—as I am sure my noble friend Lady Cash will highlight—it recently spray-painted the office building of the Equality and Human Rights Commission for simply declaring that biological sex is biological sex.
This vandalism is an offence under Section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 and should result in a group being proscribed. I am, however, wary that spray painting and other forms of vandalism may not be seen to create a risk of serious harm to public safety, and I am not confident that, with the right lawyers, the actions of these groups would result in them being proscribed, because of a technicality. Criminality alone introduces the possibility of restricting the practice of a protest group. Whether this is augmented by either a risk to public safety or by an intention to influence political decision-making should confirm that decision.
That being said, I reaffirm my support for the noble Lord’s original amendment. It is a pertinent time for this debate, and I believe that Amendment 371A finds the right balance between prohibiting criminal activity and permitting peaceful support. I hope all Members of your Lordships’ House can recognise the rationale for moving away from a rigid binary between terrorism and protest and acknowledge that it is a spectrum that will benefit from more nuance. His Majesty’s loyal Opposition will support this amendment, and I look forward to hearing the closing remarks of the Minister and of the noble Lord, Lord Walney.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 371A from the noble Lord, Lord Walney. As the noble Lord mentioned, the House will be very familiar with the problems that have arisen from the use of the power that the Secretary of State has to proscribe a terrorist group. The virtue of Amendment 371A is that it avoids any such description. It focuses on the severe mischief that we know certain groups are causing in our society.
Who could object to the Secretary of State having a power, by regulation, to designate a group as an extreme criminal protest group if there is a reasonable belief that its purpose and practice is the deliberate commission of the serious offences set out in this amendment: riot, violent disorder, destroying or damaging property, and interference with the use or operation of key national infrastructure? Surely the Secretary of State should have power to take action, particularly when, as the amendment requires, those offences are carried out with the intention of influencing public policy, parliamentary debate, ministerial decision-making or the exercise of democratic functions, and they create a risk of serious harm to public safety, democratic institutions or the rights of others.
We all support the right to protest, but there are limits, and these clearly are breached by deliberate conduct the purpose of which is to act in the way set out in the tightly drawn amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Walney. As he has pointed out, he has avoided in his drafting the real problem that has arisen in the Palestine Action case: that people are criminalised by reason of support for that body. That has caused problems. The Court of Appeal case is pending, but this amendment avoids those difficulties.
So I support this. I hope the Minister will not tell the House that this is not the time and that we should wait in particular for the report of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. I too have the highest regard for him, but we should bear in mind that, with this Bill, the Government have not waited for his report in a number of provisions relating to public order, particularly and rightly on cumulative disruption. So I say to the House: let us deal with this. This is a legislative opportunity; it is a pressing problem, and we should deal with it now.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, for the reasons given by the noble Lords, Lord Walney and Lord Pannick, I strongly support this amendment.
Lord Goodman of Wycombe (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 419. It is rare for an amendment to succeed before it has even been moved, but so it appears to be in the case of this amendment, which would compel the Government to publish a counterextremism strategy. In Committee, I tabled a similar amendment, to which the Minister gave what was, in essence, a holding reply. I then obtained a Question for Short Debate on the same subject, to which the Minister again gave a holding reply. But it is third time lucky, for today, on the very day of this debate, the Government have published a counterextremism strategy—or rather a cohesion strategy of which counterextremism is a part—which I believe is being announced in the other place as I speak. So the timing appears to show, if nothing else, the power of your Lordships’ House. In saying so, I make no complaint: for the Government to publish a strategy at all is at least a start. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, and the noble Lords, Lord Mendelsohn and Lord Walney, who co-signed this amendment, as well as the Liberal Democrat Front Bench, our own Front Bench and other noble Lords who spoke in Committee.
The strategy will be carefully studied during the weeks ahead, and it is worth reiterating at the start the point that only part of it concerns counterextremism. It appears to contain, as one might expect, the good, the not quite so good and the indifferent. The good, for example, includes further action to bar preachers from abroad who incite violence in mosques. The not so good includes, to give the same kind of example, no specific action that I can see against preachers in this country who incite violence in mosques—I draw the attention of those who doubt this happens to the evidence regularly published on X by the activist, habibi.
As for the indifferent, there is the proposed special representative for anti-Muslim hostility. Some wanted a fully-fledged definition of “Islamophobia” claiming a basis in racism. Others wanted no definition at all. What we have is a halfway house, and I suspect it will satisfy no one. On the one hand, initiatives with faith communities, such as Inter Faith Week, are welcome—assuming that the Government and others know whom they are engaging with, funding or giving platforms to—and, on the other, plans to crack down on hate crimes, in the strategy’s own words, are problematic. The distinction between inciting violence and defending free speech is difficult to draw, but it is vital.
But on balance I want to, in the words of the old song, accentuate the positive and eliminate the negative. It is welcome that the strategy confirms the last Government’s definition of “extremism”, which, though not perfect, identifies its core characteristic: ideologies that aim to
“undermine, overturn or replace the UK’s system of liberal parliamentary democracy and democratic rights”.
It is also welcome that the strategy recognises clearly and unequivocally that, although Islamist extremism is very far from being the only challenge of this kind, it is the predominant form, responsible for three-quarters of the workload of Contest and 94% of all terror-related deaths in the past 25 years. The challenges we must confront are terrorism at worst and balkanisation at best, with our United Kingdom divided up in living practice, if not constitutional fact, into ethnic and religious enclaves. The precedent of Northern Ireland during the Troubles is not encouraging, and I am sure that none of us want to see that.
So, if the strategy is to work, much will hinge on a single word: implementation. Can the Government see the best of it through? If the strategy is to be coherent—applied to out-of-school settings, schools, universities, the NHS, prisons, police, charities, civil society and government itself—three essentials are required. The first is clarity, authority, and strength at the centre. The way our governmental system works, for better or worse, is that, until or unless No. 10 wants something to happen, it will not happen, and even then it may not. The strategy proposes a new interministerial working group and regular reporting to the Prime Minister. This is an admirable aim, but I fear it will not cut the mustard. What is required, rather, is a Cabinet Minister—the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster or perhaps the Deputy Prime Minister—who is charged with responsibility for delivering the strategy and who speaks and acts with the Prime Minister’s authority. I regret, in passing, the apparent non-replacement of Robin Simcox as the Commissioner for Countering Extremism.
Secondly, the strategy needs to work not only at the centre of government but throughout the country, in civil society and local communities. The closer the state is to local communities, the easier it is, in pursuit of a quiet life, to engage with, fund and work with extremists. If noble Lords want an example, they need look no further than the horrifying recent developments in Birmingham, where the West Midlands Police bowed to an extremist mob over a football game, conjured up evidence that does not exist to justify its decision and then, in the words of Nick Timothy, “lied and lied again” about its actions, including to Parliament. Three of the eight mosques that the West Midlands Police consulted over its decision had hosted preachers who promoted conspiracy theories or called for the death of Jews. I am a localist by temperament, but I suspect that Westminster and Whitehall will need strong powers of intervention.
Lord Goldsmith (Lab)
My Lords, I put my name to Amendment 371A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Walney, and I will say a word about it, because it is a bit of an unusual event for me to do that. But I will take also this opportunity to say something about the amendment to that amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower.
I have, in essence, two reasons for supporting the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Walney. Obviously, he did it from a position of great knowledge and experience in these areas, and I therefore take what he says and proposes very seriously. The first reason is that he is suggesting that particular conduct should be illegal—and can it be doubted that it should be? The constituent elements of this would be serious crime being promoted deliberately for the purpose of persuading of a particular political point of view; activities that create a “risk of serious harm” to public safety, democratic institutions or the rights of others; and that it should be for Parliament, on the application of the Secretary of State, to determine whether a particular group satisfies those requirements. That makes it, in my view, right for it to be unlawful, without having to go through the difficulties—referred to already by noble Lords—of proscribing an organisation as terrorist. I am not expressing any view on that; I actually supported what the Government did, but it is now for the courts to make their determinations, and I do not want to say anything that might suggest otherwise.
This amendment, if it were the law, would make it very clear that, in a limited category of case, where these requirements are met, it would be undoubtedly illegal without having to have issues. There are safeguards there: Parliament has to be involved in that. Secondly, it is clear that it is not proscription as terrorism: that is stated clearly in the amendment. Thirdly, all these elements need to be satisfied. That is why I come back to Amendment 371B from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. I do not support that because it would have the effect of diluting the requirements by making it possible for this to be an offence, even though one of the conditions described in his amendment as conditions 2 and 3 was not met. So, for example, it would mean that, even though the activities do not create a risk of serious harm to public safety, democratic institutions or the rights of others, it would be an offence. That goes too far for me, which is why I would not support his Amendment 371A.
The other issue that will be raised—I am sure that it will be raised by my noble friend the Minister, whom I thank for seeing me, too, to discuss the amendment—is the timing. I, too, have great respect for the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven; he and I worked very closely together when we were in government, when he was the Director of Public Prosecutions, and I look forward very much to what he has to say. But I am troubled. It will take some time, and there will then have to be a decision by government as to whether it accepts the recommendations. There will then need to be legislative time—and one thing I remember very well from government is the issue of finding legislative time. We have a vehicle here. If this is the right thing to do, this is a moment when it can be done. That is why I regret to say to my noble friend that I support this amendment and I have added my name to it.
Baroness Deech (CB)
My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 419 in support of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, and the other signatories. It calls for a counterextremism strategy to be published annually. I am also in support of the gist of all the amendments in this group, which are trying to plug the gap in the law exposed by the unwillingness to follow through on the proscription of Palestine Action, in so far as its supporters may be labelled terrorists, but recognises that the activists are carrying out acts of terror, as the court said, that damage the public and our infrastructure.
The Government will no doubt say that they have a strategy, newly issued as Protecting What Matters. At a time of tension, starting long before the current war with Iran but exacerbated by it, the Government have to confront real threats, exemplified, inter alia, by the arrest of four men suspected of working for Iran and being involved in threats to the safety of our community. There have been more than a dozen Iranian-backed attempts at kidnap and murder of our citizens in the last few years, with no doubt more to come. We are talking about matters of life and death.
The Government’s report allegedly identifies Islamist extremism as responsible for most of the terror-related deaths in the past 25 years—and it is good to see the Government saying what is sometimes deemed unspeakable. The Government are also right to resist any attempt to introduce a blasphemy law into Britain. We recall the innocent Batley grammar school teacher still in hiding, simply because he was being a professional teacher. Fortunately, Hamit Coskun was acquitted after burning a Koran: a nasty act, but not one deserving of special punishment. We remain committed to freedom of speech, no matter how rude, and it is not to be silenced by others who find it offensive in their view.
However, I see some blurring of responsibility in the Government’s document, as I saw it reported, when it comes to tackling Islamism. What is the difference between that ideology and Islam in general? Is there not a sliding scale from, at the extreme end, wanting to cover the country with sharia law at the expense of secular law, and at the other going on to be more motivated by what one’s religion might demand, supposedly, than by the law of the land? Continuing on the blurring theme, if the Government’s strategy requires the appointment of an anti-Muslim hostility tsar, this is moving away from equal treatment and leaving the door ajar for unquestioned extremism. The definition of anti-Muslim hatred takes us into the realm of policing offence and dilutes the need to call out extremism and danger if perceived. If divisive content is to be regulated, who determines that, save the noise and outrage from those who feel they are being attacked, again risking muzzling dissent and free speech?
The government report, I fear, is inadequate in protecting the Jewish community. Jews do not count. We number precisely 0.4% of the population. But Jews, young and old, are under threat and confront hatred every day in the streets, in schools, in hospitals, in the arts and online. I welcome the Government’s decision to set up a commission to inquire into antisemitism in schools, but it is slow. Antisemitism today is disguised as anti-Zionism, as the late Lord Sachs pointed out. We see right through that. There is no hatred based on, say, China’s treatment of minorities, or Russia’s, or African states’ treatment of Christians. Jews are singled out. The policing of hate marches and vandalism in the name of politics must be strengthened, and it is not going too far to say that the Jewish community’s trust in the police and the BBC is faltering. The law must set out police powers in this respect, and vandalism, even in the name of politics, must be severely punished. To see the statue of Churchill defaced tells you all you need to know about countering extremism. How much worse it will be if ever there is a start on building a huge, brutal Holocaust memorial next to Parliament.
There is more complication to come. It is reported that the noble Lord, Lord Walney, who deserves the utmost admiration of this House in his standing up to terror and extremism and the defence of our values and freedom, is to issue a report, Undue Influence, which blows the Government’s document out of the water. The noble Lord allegedly reports that there are 30 or so charities linked to Iran that maintain influence here and plot attacks against dissidents and the Jewish community. Some of them are already under the too-slow investigation of the Charity Commission, though it is not its fault, which has called for greater powers. Most chillingly, the noble Lord suggests that there is a reluctance to call them out for fear of being labelled Islamophobic, a fear that might only become worse if the Government’s strategy of tackling what they see as Muslim hatred is put into place. That would muffle still further any attempt to expose what might be going on by way of extreme risk.
On the one hand, the noble Lord, Lord Walney, warns that fear of being labelled racist has stultified the tackling of Iran-linked organisations, while, on the other hand, the Government want the anti-Muslim hatred tsar to protect Muslims from hate and discrimination. The noble Lord calls for more assertive regulation, but the Government want a cohesion strategy that plays down the danger and reassures Muslim communities. The Government’s proposals, as I read them, would increase the fear of being labelled racist or Islamophobic. It would make regulators more cautious and be weaponised by hostile activists to deflect attention away from their plans. The Government’s tsar must be completely limited, if it comes about, to hate crime: regulation should disregard religion and focus on criminal behaviour. A line must be drawn between domestic problems and the influence of Iran and other hostile states. Criticism must not be silenced.
In considering its balancing act, the Government must weigh, on the one hand, the atrocities committed by Islamists in, inter alia, the Manchester Arena, London Bridge, Westminster Bridge, the Underground, the Lee Rigby murder, Glasgow Airport, Heaton Park—and there are other incidents—and the risk, on the other hand, of not allowing the identification of further such calamities for fear of Islamophobia. The Government need to draw up a new strategy that protects Muslims at home from discrimination but does not create an atmosphere that allows hostile organisations to cry Islamophobia when their activities are under scrutiny for fear of terrorism. It is a difficult task, which is why the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, and I and the other signatories of this amendment are asking the Government to accept this amendment and move forward.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 371A from the noble Lord, Lord Walney, because it addresses a difficult area—something that falls short of terrorism and which causes problems for legislators, policing and the courts. Terrorism is fairly well understood. It is the application or the threat of violence for a political purpose; it is easily stated. In this case, it seems to me that there are some indications that there might be a gap. It is not the first time we have been confronted by this problem. Before terrorism was defined—probably by the terrorism which started in Northern Ireland—in the 1930s, we saw that people were parading on the streets for political motives, so legislation had to be introduced on uniforms and various other things that indicated that people were trying to use violence or political aspirations to influence the Government.
It seems that the gap that has evolved is around Palestine Action. There are probably three indicators of a need for a solution to a gap that has developed. First, we have had a criminal case in which a police officer was hit by someone with a hammer, and the people who appeared to have been involved have been found not guilty. That case has been appealed, but that one issue has obviously caused some concern for everybody affected—the police, in part, but mainly the businesses being attacked by this group. The second case is a civil case, which is already—
Lord Pannick (CB)
May I just correct the noble Lord? In that case, what happened was that the jury could not agree and there is a retrial of those serious criminal allegations.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
That is quite right, and thank you for that correction, although, clearly, they were not found guilty.
Secondly, the civil case is about prohibition. The High Court has decided that it does not prefer the Government’s judgment that Palestine Action should be a proscribed group. I find that constitutionally quite odd. I understand that sometimes, the court will come to a different opinion on legislation, but it seems to me that the Government, faced with the best information possible, have concluded that it should be proscribed, and the court has decided that that is not proportionate. Whatever the outcome on appeal—which the noble Lord, Lord Walney, has alluded to and we will hear eventually—this needs to be resolved quickly because it is hard to understand.
Both cases might indicate that there were some doubts about the proscription of this group. Most of the time, terrorist groups are obvious. Terrorism is mass and indiscriminate violence that murders tens of people. We see it and it is very obvious. In this case I did wonder, but sometimes governments have information that the rest of us do not. One of the other signs, which has already been mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Walney, was that, when support began to be expressed for a proscribed group, people then said, “This is quite odd; why are we arresting them?” They did not have the same qualms about Irish terrorism or about ISIS when they were beheading citizens of this country. It indicates that, perhaps, there is something different about this group. The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Walney, has identified a reasonable solution to that gap. Conspiracy alone is not a sufficient answer. It is possible to charge someone with conspiracy to commit a violent act or conspiracy to riot, but you cannot prosecute people who might fund that conspiracy. This amendment would start to address the protest group and the way it is funded and supported.
My final point—quite narrowly defined in this sense—is that this is about the intent to cause serious harm to public safety or to affect public policy and democracy. Both are substantial bars to pass before somebody could be convicted of this offence. The Government ought seriously to consider filling the gap with this amendment, or, if they do not, with something very much like it.
Lord Polak (Con)
My Lords, I support Amendments 371A, 419 and 441B, to which I have added my name. It is clear that attacking a police officer with a sledgehammer or breaking into an RAF base and damaging two planes, causing £7 million-worth of damage, is not a peaceful protest. Amendment 371A rightly targets that grey area between ordinary protest groups and groups that cross the threshold to be proscribed under terrorism law. These are groups whose purpose and practice involves the deliberate commission of criminal damage, riot, violent disorder and interference with national infrastructure.
When groups are legislated against, often, splinter groups form and these groups are left to fester. Amendment 371A would give greater power to the Secretary of State to deal with extremism at its root, rather than waiting for it to grow and meet the terrorist threshold. By this point, it becomes too late and the harms, which are sometimes irreparable, may have already occurred. Responsible governance means intervening before that point is reached. For those reasons, I support this amendment. I also pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, for his tenacity and I support his amendment.
Often, our approach has been far too reactive, notwithstanding the announcement being made in the other place. As the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, said, the Jewish community in this country knows all too well how rhetoric and ideological radicalisation can create a climate of fear. Between 2024 and 2025, at least 10 and probably more terrorism cases against British Jews or UK-based Israeli interests were uncovered. These plots were foiled thanks to the extraordinary work of the counterterrorism police and the Community Security Trust.
We have created an environment where extremism is allowed to grow unchallenged. Are we just going to wait until there is another attack on a synagogue or a credible plot against a Jewish school? At that point, it is too late. The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, recognises that extremism rarely appears suddenly; it develops gradually through networks, narratives and campaigns that legitimise hostility. Left unchallenged, these dynamics can become embedded in communities and online spaces, creating an environment where more serious forms of criminality or even terrorism become more likely. Amendment 419 is about ensuring that our response to extremism is enduring, co-ordinated and strategic. Above all, it is about ensuring that the Government are equipped with the tools and the institutional framework necessary to address extremism before it escalates into violence.
Finally, Amendment 441B in this group, in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, and the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, seeks to ensure that organisations which promote or support criminal conduct or which attempt to subvert the constitutional integrity or democratic institutions of the United Kingdom are prohibited from receiving public funds. Such a safeguard is well overdue. It would ensure that taxpayers’ money cannot, whether deliberately or inadvertently, support organisations whose activities threaten public safety or the foundations of our democracy. Public funds should strengthen society, not subsidise those who seek to destabilise it.
It remains far too difficult to challenge organisations that continue to receive public support despite clear evidence that their leaders promote extremist ideologies, including those who openly aspire to replace democratic governments with a religious caliphate. This loophole allows public money to reach bodies fundamentally at odds with our democratic principles. This amendment would close that unacceptable gap. It would protect public funds from misuse and send an unequivocal message that any attempt to undermine the democratic institutions of the United Kingdom should not and will not be tolerated.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Walney, Lord Pannick and Lord Hogan-Howe, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, for listening in Committee. Reservations were raised, and it is refreshing and unusual to have an amendment brought back that tries to take into account some of the issues that were raised in good faith. The fact that the amendment has now been posed as not unduly undermining freedom of speech or association and does not criminalise expressions of support is very useful. That it is so much narrower in scope makes it much more something I support—not that everyone has been waiting for that point, but none the less.
More seriously, the pre-proscription point is really important. My dread is that what has happened with Palestine Action, without getting into the court case, has discredited what proscription is about and watered down what people think terrorism is. These much more granular attempts at making distinctions are so important.
However, we need to acknowledge the dangers in what we mean by “extremism” in relation to this whole group of amendments, especially today, when the Government’s pronouncements on anti-extremism are coming out. We should acknowledge that those who hold the pen on any legal definition of extremism acquire extraordinary powers to curtail free speech, criminalise people and so on. It makes this a difficult issue. In a democratic, pluralist society there is invariably a wide range of beliefs and opinions that can be dubbed extremist. That means we have some potholes to negotiate, as it can lead to partisan, subjective or political labelling of dissenting views that can be dubbed extremist.
I raise that because it is not straightforward. We might think that we all know what we mean by “extremist”. I have agreed with all the examples I have heard today—I have thought, “I don’t like them either—I’ll dub them extremist”. The problem is when it is used a bit more promiscuously. If the definition is “something that completely undermines democratic norms and values”, up until recently I would have thought that anyone attacking the democratic norm of the key legal protection traditionally afforded to due process, which has gone on for hundreds of years, was an extremist, but now we have a Government pushing to abolish jury trials and I am meant to accept it as straightforward.
Lord Goldsmith (Lab)
I thank the noble Baroness for recognising what has been done in this amendment, but it does not actually talk about extremism. It talks about “extreme criminal protest groups”. It may reassure her that the definition does not depend on the views being put forward being extremist but the actions and particular conduct—riot and so forth. I offer that to reassure her on the point she is making, which otherwise I am listening to very carefully.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
I thank the noble and learned Lord for that clarity. That is true for that amendment. I was going on to talk about why I am sympathetic to Amendment 419, which calls on the Government to publish a counterextremism strategy, while recognising that, when we do so, we must acknowledge that this is a difficult area. Amendment 371A has carefully avoided being about views and opinions, but not all the amendments in this group do. We have to be very careful when we talk about extremism.
On Amendment 419, one should congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Goodman of Wycombe, on his persistence, as has been said. I like the amendment because it calls for a review to be published annually. The announcement today that there is a strategy does not make this amendment irrelevant, because we need to carry on updating and looking carefully at what we mean by this. Laying that before Parliament seems important. On the pre-emption of the new social cohesion document, Protecting What Matters, it is certainly being posed as an anti-extremism strategy but is likely to get into all sorts of difficulties precisely because of this uncertainty about what we mean by extremism, beyond the controversy over the special representative on anti-Muslim hostility.
The noble Baroness, Lady Deech, has talked about the difficulties there. I am very anxious about it. I have been contacted since the announcement by people working on the grooming gangs who are worried that they would not be able to raise the issue with this definition—even though they are not quite sure what it is yet, so fair enough—as well as academics working on cousin marriage and so on. There has been some enthusiasm in certain quarters, saying that we should now name and shame all the media organisations dominated by anti-Muslim hatred. You can already see supporters of this new definition, such as it is, gearing up to start pointing fingers and they have started naming names. It is fair enough, but with this leaked document saying that national symbols such as the union flag can be a tool of hate used to intimidate and exclude, that it is an extremist symbol and so on, you can see why people would be anxious.
Baroness Verma (Con)
My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Goodman and the noble Lord, Lord Walney, but I would also like to see highlighted in any reports coming forward the increasing attacks on Hindu and Sikh communities. They are not being reported widely, but unfortunately they are on the increase, and we are having worrying discussions internally on how to deal with them.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
My Lords, I declare my interest as director of the Free Speech Union. I too share the reservations of the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, about the Government’s decision today to publish an official definition of anti-Muslim hostility and to appoint a tsar to ensure that it is observed. There are already adequate protections in the law for people of all faiths; I am thinking in particular of the proscription of the stirring up of religious hatred in the Public Order Act 1986 and the proscription of discrimination by employers on religious grounds of employees, applicants to jobs or service providers.
I am not persuaded that Muslims need particular protections over and above those that all faith groups are granted under the law. I am not convinced that in a city such as Leicester, for instance, publishing a definition of anti-Muslim hostility but not anti-Hindu hostility will allay rather than exacerbate community tensions. I hope there will be an opportunity for your Lordships’ House to opine on the entire action plan unveiled today when the House discusses the Statement in due course.
I do, however, support the amendment 371A from the noble Lord, Lord Walney. There are some extreme criminal protest groups who do not deserve the kind of free speech protections that other groups deserve, precisely because they use their free speech and right to protest to bully, intimidate and threaten those they seek to silence.
The Free Speech Union was itself the victim of an extreme criminal protest group that my noble friend referred to while speaking to this amendment and the supplementary amendment: Bash Back. It stole some data from the Free Speech Union’s website in a cyber attack, including the details of some small donors, some of whom had donated to some extremely sensitive crowdfunding campaigns in the expectation that they were doing so privately. That data, however, was stolen and published on Bash Back’s website. That was designed not only to silence those with whom it disagrees but to intimidate, bully and threaten an organisation that is simply defending the right to speak of those that Bash Back disagrees with.
Therefore, I think there are circumstances in which the Home Secretary should have the power to designate and proscribe certain extreme criminal protest groups. This more nuanced measure, particularly with the supplementary amendment, is a more attractive alternative to the present arrangement. In addition to defending a wide variety of people who have not broken the law, the Free Speech Union is currently engaged in defending a Palestine Action protester who was arrested and has been charged just for expressing support for Palestine Action by holding up a sign saying, “I support Palestine Action”. It is very difficult to defend the prosecution of people who merely express support for what I would think of as an extreme criminal protest group, not a terrorist group.
I therefore urge your Lordships to support the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Walney, as it creates a degree of nuance, and I believe that proscribing groups that deserve to be proscribed without also making it a criminal offence to express support for those groups is a welcome compromise.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, despite having some hesitation about it, we are broadly support of Amendment 371A from the noble Lord, Lord Walney. The concept of the new category of extreme criminal protest groups that are not proscribed has real merit and is plainly an attempt to plug an uncomfortable gap. We agree with the noble Lord, Lord Walney, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, that unlawfulness is at the heart of this amendment. The amendment states that the group must have
“as its purpose and practice the deliberate commission of”
one of a series of serious offences, and that
“such offences are carried out with the intention of influencing public policy, parliamentary debate, ministerial decision-making, or the exercise of democratic functions”,
and that,
“the activities … create a risk of serious harm to public safety, democratic institutions, or the rights of others”.
Those provisions make it clear that extreme criminal protest groups are well named. The provisions as a whole would also make it clear, however, that it is not appropriate for proscription of those groups whereby any support for the groups is made a criminal offence under the Terrorism Act.
If the amendment would avoid the prosecution of peaceful protesters for peaceable support of groups that could be branded terrorist under the Terrorist Act, we could support it unconditionally because there would then be a hierarchy of offences. At the top of the tree would be offences under the Terrorism Act, and then the treatment of groups which qualified as extreme criminal protest groups under the Walney amendment. But the Government have not committed and would not commit—and I do not suppose they will at this stage commit—to end prosecutions for peaceable protesters under the Terrorism Act. That may change after the Macdonald review, or it may change if the Government’s appeal against the High Court’s decision in relation to Palestine Action is unsuccessful. However, our position is that it would be helpful to have a middle course, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, pointed out in very sensible terms. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, articulated the same point very well, but in a different way.
The problem we see with the amendment is that it does not affect the Terrorism Act, and there would remain the potential for prosecution of peaceful protesters under that Act as the law stands. So we have decided, with some hesitation, that it is probably sensible to await the Macdonald review. I accept that I am making that point in the face of the argument made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that we should not be asking for any legislation along the lines of the Walney amendment to wait at all. Of course, there is the problem that not accepting this amendment would leave us with the limited choice of the Terrorism Act or nothing, and that is a very unfortunate position to be in.
We have some concerns about the drafting of the amendment, and they are not minimal. Under proposed subsection (3)(b),
“promotion of a designated ECPG, including public advocacy, recruitment, or dissemination of the group’s materials”
would be an offence. Would subsection (3)(b) cover handing out leaflets or carrying posters or flags in a peaceable way? In proposed subsection (3)(e),
“providing material support, training, funds or equipment to the group where the person knows or ought reasonably to know that the recipient is a designated ECPG”
suggests that the level of knowledge required is very low. What is material support? What would count as equipment? Would posters, flags or banners count as equipment? It would be considerably worrying if the answer to those questions was positive.
In sum, we are broadly supportive and believe that there should be a middle category, but we are concerned about the amendment as it stands. The Government should be seriously considering their position between now and Third Reading; they should listen to the very strong feeling in the House that something is needed in the way of a middle course that would prevent these prosecutions for peaceable protest and support under the Terrorism Act. They should then come back to the House at Third Reading with an amendment that could answer the criticisms and gain widespread support.
Finally, we have considerable sympathy with Amendment 419 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, which calls for the publication of a counterextremism strategy.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. Noble Lords have spoken of the effects that these groups can have when they go unchecked, and I think that the whole House has benefited from listening to these anecdotes. We cannot stand for a society in which violent, insurrectionary behaviour is normalised. Groups such as Palestine Action or Bash Back should not be allowed to exist given their past actions, and this amendment provides for that. That said, their supporters are not advocates of general terrorist activities and, while they support morally dubious causes, requiring their arrest for standing outside with a placard is a monumental waste of police time.
For similar reasons, I also support Amendment 419, tabled by my noble friend Lord Goodman. His is a very simple amendment, which merely asks the Government to publish a counterextremism strategy, given the ever-increasing extent of political extremism and its encouragement in some quarters. Amendment 371A strikes a balance. It adds nuance to a category of offences that desperately needs it, and we wholly support its intent. I hope that the Minister will agree. I am happy to withdraw my Amendment 371B and, should the noble Lord, Lord Walney, wish to divide the House, we will support him.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
A lot has been discussed this evening, and I will try to respond to the amendments as best I can. I welcome the fact that the noble Lord, Lord Walney, has moved his amendment. I had a chance to talk to him earlier online; he has arrived on time, and I am pleased he is here to move it. He has had support from across the House, including from the noble Lords, Lord Polak, Lord Pannick and, in part, Lord Davies, and my noble and learned friend Lord Goldsmith, and I thank him for his amendment. Other noble Lords and Baronesses have spoken in favour of the legislation, and I note the comments made by the noble Baronesses, Lady Deech and Lady Verma, and, in the context of this debate, the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. I will come to the separate amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman of Wycombe, in due course.
The nub of the argument is that Amendment 371A shows that there is an impact of sustained criminal activity, including serious incidents involving damage to property, intimidation and risks to public safety, and it should be dealt with as an interim measure between proscription and criminal damage legislation as a whole. I outlined to the noble Lord, Lord Walney, in a recent letter that the Public Order Act 1986 grants police powers to manage protests by imposing conditions, and looks at those it is necessary to place on protests, including location, route and date. I also pointed out to the noble Lords, Lord Walney and Lord Pannick, and my noble and learned friend Lord Goldsmith, whom I also met today, that the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, is currently undertaking an independent review of public order and hate crime legislation, which will cover whether existing legislation is effective and proportionate. I am pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, acknowledged that the review, which will report later in the spring, will discuss and give some potential framework to the existing legislation. Also, the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme, the action we have taken on Palestine Action under the 2000 Act, the work of Prevent and the protest legislation in the Bill are all measures that deal with similar issues to those the noble Lord, Lord Walney, has brought forward.
To come to the nub of the problem, which I hope noble Lords will accept, I understand that there are a range of views on the amendment, and I may find myself in a minority on this if it goes to a Division, which I hope it will not. When I look at the amendment itself, if there was such a tool as that proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Walney, below the threshold in the Terrorism Act 2000, it would not have stopped the Government proscribing Palestine Action under the 2000 Act. The assessment was made that Palestine Action passed the statutory test for proscription at that time. As noble Lords will be aware, although there is a Court of Appeal hearing on Palestine Action, the High Court agreed in its first consideration that Palestine Action had organised and undertaken actions amounting to terrorism. A case is pending that will be reviewed and the Government will have to respond to it in due course.
However, I would argue that, at present, we have the tools in existing public order and related legislation to tackle the type of criminality that the noble Lord, Lord Walney, mentioned. We are significantly upscaling our efforts on counterextremism as a whole. Groups that meet the Terrorism Act threshold, and individuals acting on their behalf or in support of them, will be dealt with under existing proscription powers. Where groups do not meet the threshold for proscription, we will continue to assess the activities of organisations against our legal frameworks and existing legislation. If there is evidence of purposeful actions that are potentially radicalising others into terrorism or violence, proportionate action will be taken. I have mentioned already things such as Prevent, the protest legislation and other measures. Again, the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, will review those matters in due course.
To answer the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and others, that the Government have brought forward legislation, we have commissioned the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, to undertake a review, but the amendments we have brought forward are in response to urgent matters that we felt we needed to tackle. I have tabled those in relation to protest legislation to ensure that we manage difficult challenges by putting forward legislation on, for example, protests, marches and giving the police powers. I suggest to the noble Lords, Lord Walney and Lord Pannick, that it is something we should take our time to consider. The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, is bringing forward his review shortly, in the spring. This amendment, whether in its original form or as amended by Amendment 371B put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, effectively seeks to create a parallel regime to that in the Terrorism Act, which the Government believe is not necessary and risks unjustified interference with rights to free speech and freedom of association. The Government must be able to protect our citizens from the harm of extremism, violence and hatred but, in doing so, we must strike the right balance between protecting freedom of speech and tackling those who promote violence and hatred in our communities.
Amendment 441B, also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Walney, concerns access to public funds for organisations promoting or supporting criminal conduct. Again, I say to him that the Government provide funding to a huge range of organisations through grant schemes administered by departments and arm’s-length bodies across government. Any grants of public funds are subject to Treasury guidance set out in Managing Public Money, which looks at risk, control and assurances that grant controllers are required to take into account. Is the legislative route required?
Today, and this goes to the heart of amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Goodman of Wycombe, we have published the social cohesion action plan. A number of comments have been made about the issues in the plan, including by the noble Baronesses, Lady Verma and Lady Deech, and the noble Lord, Lord Goodman of Wycombe. It was put on the website probably less than an hour ago and is many pages long. I simply ask that Members look at what is in it, its context and the things we are trying to challenge so that all communities, whatever their religion, can live their lives in freedom, and so that we have social cohesion in what is, and will remain, a multicultural society. The engagement principles will be updated so that public bodies do not confer legitimacy, funding or influence on extremist groups.
On Amendment 419, which would require the publication of a counterextremism strategy, the noble Lord said that he has raised it in Questions, in amendments in Committee and in Grand Committee in a special debate. We are looking at the issues he has raised; there will be further updates and reports on the matter, and I advise him to look at the social cohesion strategy—which, as I said, was produced within the past hour—in full.
Extremists often deliberately operate without meeting thresholds for criminal conduct and cannot be prosecuted for their actions. Despite this, this Government still have a responsibility to protect our citizens from the harm of extremism, violence and hatred. But in doing so, we still have to protect the balance between freedom of speech and tackling those who promote violence and hatred in our communities.
We have been very clear in our approach to counterterrorism and counterextremism. We have an overarching counterterrorism strategy, an approach that ensures counterextremism efforts are focused on the highest harm threats, in direct support of our core counterterrorism and wider security mission. The local social cohesion strategy, published by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government in the past hour following a Statement in the House of Commons—which I suspect will be repeated here shortly—is trying to marry those things together to provide social cohesion. I hope that answers the points from the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, on those issues.
Finally, with Prevent, Contest and the definitions of extremism we have examined, set out by the previous Government in 2024, we believe there are strong mechanisms to tackle extremism while ensuring we support all members of our society. The noble Baroness, Lady Deech, said that Jews do not count. I say to her, genuinely, that everybody in society counts; everybody has a right to protection; and everybody has a right to live their lives free from persecution, harassment, terrorist activity and extremism. I felt genuinely sorry when she said that phrase. We are trying to support all members of our community, particularly the Jewish community. If she looks at the measures in the Bill, she will see they have been driven by allowing people to express their religion and for them not to be harassed or put into a box by people on marches and protests on a regular basis. That is what we are trying to do.
I understand where the noble Lord, Lord Walney, is coming from, but I wish for him to withdraw and not to push his amendment. We have a framework in place to deal with criminal activity and those organisations that cross the terrorism threshold, and to ensure through the social cohesion strategy that all members of our community have the right to live a free life in the United Kingdom.
Lord Walney (CB)
My Lords, this has been an excellent and thoughtful debate, and I have been touched by the kind words and expressions of support from nearly all sides of the House. I have listened carefully to what the Minister has said, and I hope he knows how much I respect the work that he and the Government do, but on this occasion I am not convinced by his central assertion that the framework exists and is working.
The Minister raised the issue of Palestine Action, as so many have done across the Chamber today. It is indeed looming large over this discussion. Whether or not you take the view that the Government were right in proscribing Palestine Action, the fact that it took five years of this organisation committing criminal damage in a sustained and organised way before it was deemed to have met the terrorism threshold—which is now obviously being challenged, and I hope the Government win on appeal—shows that there is a gap. This gap is not filled by the public order measures which are used to place conditions on marches, which the Minister has cited in response as to why the framework is working. That is a different thing.
I am really pleased—and it is really unusual—to get such a broad expression from, reductively, the Conservatives to the Liberal Democrat Benches on a difficult issue like this. It shows that it is proportionate. I quote in conclusion the words of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, back at him. He has—reluctantly, I would think—come to the view that he will abstain, but he made the point himself that not supporting this amendment leaves on the table a choice between the status quo of doing nothing, or full terrorism proscription. I really respect his view that he would like to see encouragement of proscribed terrorist organisations taken off. That is a complex question, but if I had opened that up in this amendment, the whole thing would probably have been subsumed.
Therefore, it is right that we push this particular narrow change to the legislation. The Government and the Minister’s concerns can be tightened up after this, when the Bill goes into ping-pong. Then, we can deal with the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, in the shortest order after that. With that all having been said, I would like to test the opinion of the House on this matter.
“24A Monument to the Women of World War II, Whitehall, London.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adds the Monument to the Women of World War II to the list of war memorials in Part 1 of Schedule 14.
“27 Holocaust Memorial Garden, Hyde Park, London.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adds the Holocaust Memorial Garden to the list of memorials in Part 3 of Schedule 14.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, this seems to be a convenient time to break for dinner break business. We will therefore not return to the Bill before 8.38 pm.
Crime and Policing Bill
Monday 9th March 2026
(2 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 167-IV(b) Amendment for Report (Supplementary to the Fourth Marshalled List) - (9 Mar 2026)
21:57 - Division on Amendment 377 - Ayes: 82 / Noes: 151 - Amendment 377 disagreed.
22:08 - Division on Amendment 377C - Ayes: 76 / Noes: 185 - Amendment 377C disagreed.
22:20 - Division on Amendment 337D - Ayes: 68 / Noes: 183 - Amendment 337D disagreed.
23:03 - Division on Amendment 380 - Ayes: 40 / Noes: 123 - Amendment 380 disagreed.
Baroness Doocey
“(4) After section 14, insert—“14ZZA Imposition of conditions: live facial recognitionPrior to imposing conditions under either section 12 (imposing conditions on public processions) or 14 (imposing conditions on public assemblies), the senior officer of the police force in question must confirm that live facial recognition will not be in use, unless a new statutory code of practice for the use of live facial recognition surveillance in public spaces in England and Wales has previously been presented to, and approved by, both Houses of Parliament.””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that police cannot use live facial recognition technology when imposing conditions on public assemblies or processions under sections 12 or 14, unless a new, specific code of practice governing its use in public spaces has first been formally approved by both Houses of Parliament. It is intended to safeguard public privacy and civil liberties by requiring democratic oversight before this surveillance technology is deployed in such contexts.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 374 seeks to place statutory guardrails on the use of live facial recognition, echoing the recent calls from the Equality and Human Rights Commission. We recognise that this technology can assist the police in tackling serious crime, but it must be used responsibly. Its rapid spread into everyday policing before essential safeguards or parliamentary scrutiny are in place raises profound constitutional concerns, particularly in the policing of dissent. Amendment 374 addresses the most contentious use of this technology, at protests and public assemblies. It would prohibit live facial recognition when police impose conditions under the Public Order Act unless and until Parliament had approved a new statutory code of practice. These are moments when people exercise their fundamental rights to free expression and peaceful assembly; rights which depend on participants feeling safe from tracking or retrospective profiling.
This Bill already tightens protest offences and curbs anonymity; layering unregulated facial scanning on top of those restrictions risks further shrinking the space for lawful dissent. Many people will have perfectly legitimate reasons to think twice before attending a demonstration if they know their face may be scanned. Without clarity on how watch-lists used at protests are compiled, people have no way of knowing whether they are being flagged for genuine risk or for the views they hold. At a protest, the chilling effect is not just about being scanned; it is the fear of political profiling. If the Government cannot clearly define who is a legitimate target for facial recognition at a peaceful assembly, then such deployments are, by definition, arbitrary and cannot meet the legal test of necessity and proportionality.
Operationally, the emerging concerns around false positives and the significantly increased risk to those from minority-ethnic backgrounds are a real headache for policing large public gatherings. Deployment without a code of practice will likely result in dozens of wrongful stops to verify identities, with confrontations that divert officers from real security threats and de-escalating crowds. We have already seen how damaging these errors can be. Just in the last few weeks, an innocent south Asian man was arrested at his home in Southampton for a burglary 100 miles away in Milton Keynes. He was handcuffed and held for nearly 10 hours because he was wrongly matched to CCTV footage by a Home Office algorithm that its own research shows produces significantly higher false positives for black and Asian faces. Last month, a man was publicly ejected from his local supermarket after staff misinterpreted a facial recognition alert.
These are not minor glitches to be shrugged off. They are serious violations that erode public trust, particularly in communities already wary of state power. The Government’s consultation is welcome, but it is far too slow for the pace of change we see on our streets. Until Parliament has set clear rules, Amendment 374 is both necessary and proportionate. We must ensure that Parliament, not oblique algorithms, decides the limit of state power. I beg to move.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
My Lords, we are talking today about live facial recognition at protests and why the police must not be allowed to use it until Parliament has agreed a clear and democratic code of practice. At its heart, Amendment 374 is about power and trust. Live facial recognition is not just another camera on a street corner; it is a mass surveillance tool that can scan every face in a crowd, compare people in real time against a watch-list and permanently change what it feels like to stand in the public square. Once you normalise all that at protests, you change the character of protest itself.
If people think that simply turning up at a demonstration means that their face can be scanned, logged and potentially mismatched to a suspect list, some will decide that it is safer to stay at home. That is a direct, chilling effect on the right to protest, to assemble and to speak out against, or for, the Government. We should not let that happen by stealth through a patchwork of local decisions and internal guidance that most citizens will never see. That is what is happening at the moment.
The technology itself is far from neutral. We know that facial recognition systems can and do get things wrong. They perform differently across age groups and ethnicities. A false match in the context of a protest is not a minor inconvenience. It can mean being stopped, questioned, detained or stigmatised in front of your friends, your colleagues or your community, not because of something you did but because an algorithm made a guess. Allowing that at political protests without proper rules and oversight is an invitation to injustice.
It is not enough to say, “Trust the police. We have internal policies”. The question here is not whether any particular chief constable is well-intentioned; it is whether the state should be able to scan and track people at political gatherings without Parliament having debated, defined and limited that power. In a democracy, if the Government want tools that can alter the balance of power between citizen and state, they must come to Parliament, set out the case and accept constraints.
That is why a publicly debated statutory code of practice matters. It is where we answer basic questions that are currently left in the grey zone. In what circumstances, if any, is live facial recognition at a protest justified? Who sets the watch-lists and on what criteria? What happens to images of people who are not of interest? Are they actually deleted? If so, how quickly? Who can access them and for what purposes? What independent oversight exists when things go wrong? Until those questions are answered openly, the use of live facial recognition at protests rests on unpublished risk assessments and technical documents that ordinary citizens cannot challenge and that elected representatives cannot easily amend. That is the opposite of how intrusive powers should be operated in a liberal democracy.
We should also be honest about the precedent. If we accept live facial recognition at protests now, without a code, it will be used more often and for more purposes later. Once the infrastructure is there and the practice is normalised, it will be very hard to row back. The time to set limits is before the rollout, not after the abuses. Police should not have, without parliamentary approval, the ability to quietly turn every protest into a data-harvesting exercise, watching not just the few who pose a risk but the many who are simply exercising their rights.
The principle is simple: if live facial recognition is to be used at all in the context of political protest, it must be under a clear and democratically approved code of practice, debated in Parliament, tested against our human rights obligations and subject to real oversight and redress. Until that is in place, the police should not be allowed to deploy this technology at protests.
Lord Pannick (CB)
This is another context where there has to be a fair balance between competing interests. One can easily see that the use of live facial recognition is a vital policing tool. However, as has been explained, it has an adverse impact on privacy. What concerns me is that the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act require not merely that steps taken are necessary and proportionate, which the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, rightly referred to, but it is a requirement that any restrictions or provisions in such a context must be prescribed by law.
I am very concerned that having police authorities and police officers exercising a pure discretion, without any statutory guidance or code of practice, may well fail that legal test of prescribed by law, because of the uncertainty and the excess of discretion. Therefore, the Government would be well advised in this sensitive context to ensure that there is statutory guidance and a statutory code of practice. The Minister may be unable to accept this amendment, but I hope he will be able to tell the House that steps will be taken to provide clear guidance to police authorities as to the use of this technology.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 374, which I have signed, but also to Amendment 430, which I tabled.
The use of live facial recognition in our public spaces is an extraordinary expansion of state power that currently exists in a legal vacuum. We are not Luddites on these Benches; we recognise the utility of technology, but we must ensure that live facial recognition is a targeted tool used under the rule of law and not a blanket surveillance net that chills the right to move freely and anonymously in our streets. The use of live facial recognition technology in public spaces poses a profound challenge to our civil liberties that cannot be met purely by internal police guidance. We are witnessing a fundamental shift in the nature of British policing—a shift, if you like, from the line-fishing of traditional human observation to the deep ocean trawling of automated mass surveillance.
Amendments 374 and 430 collectively seek to provide the democratic and judicial safeguards currently missing from what the experts have called a regulatory lacuna or legislative void. Amendment 374 prohibits the use of LFR during public assemblies or processions, unless a specific code of practice has been approved by both Houses of Parliament, as my noble friends have explained. In a free society, individuals should not have to pay the price of handing over their sensitive biometric data just to engage in democratic protest. We must safeguard public privacy and civil liberties by requiring democratic oversight before this technology is deployed against those exercising their right to assembly. We cannot have policing by algorithm without democratic oversight.
The current lack of oversight creates a documented chilling effect. Research by the Ada Lovelace Institute indicates that nearly one-third of the public are uncomfortable with police use of LFR, and up to 38% of young Londoners, for instance, have stated they would stay away from protests or public events if they knew that this technology was being used. We cannot allow our public squares to become spaces where citizens are treated as walking barcodes or a nation of suspects.
Critically, Amendment 430 would establish that the use of LFR in public spaces must be limited to narrowly defined serious cases and require judicial approval. It would provide the fundamental safeguards our society requires. It would prohibit the use of LFR by any authority unless it was for the investigation of serious crimes and had received prior judicial authorisation specifying the scope and duration of its use. We must ensure that this technology is used as a targeted tool, not a blanket surveillance net.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
My Lords, I support these amendments because it is very important that live facial recognition should be subject to legal oversight and judicial oversight; there should be a law. We should see such amendments in the context of an overall parliamentary democracy which believes in lawful freedom of expression, whether it is in Parliament, the newspapers or public places. Live facial recognition without a proper legal framework could be used in an undemocratic fashion. Police, sadly, will find evidence very often for whomever they wish to convict. I know that is not necessarily the case, but if you are under pressure as a police officer to make your case stick, you will trawl whatever evidence you can to get it through to the stage of being investigated. I urge your Lordships to support these amendments because they will strengthen our democracy, and it is important that people should feel that they live in a free country, not in one subject to the sort of powers we see exercised in other countries, such as China.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this group of amendments returns us to an issue debated at some length in Committee: the use of live facial recognition technology in policing. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for tabling these amendments on this important topic.
As set out in Committee, we on these Benches cannot support proposals that would severely restrict or pre-empt the operational use of live facial recognition by law enforcement. Live facial recognition is an increasingly important tool in modern policing. Used lawfully and proportionately, it has already demonstrated its value in identifying serious offenders, locating wanted individuals and preventing violent crime before it occurs. It has been deployed particularly effectively in high-risk environments such as transport hubs and major public events, where rapid identification can make a decisive difference in protecting the public.
That does not mean that safeguards are unnecessary. There must always be a careful balance between the protection of civil liberties and the need to equip police with effective tools to tackle serious crime. The use of new technologies must be proportionate and subject to appropriate oversight, but the amendments before us would go significantly further than that. In different ways, they would either prohibit particular uses of the technology, place rigid statutory barriers in its way or create restrictions that would unnecessarily impede the ability of the police to deploy it where it may be most needed. Amendment 374 would prohibit the deployment of live facial recognition in the context of public assemblies or impose extensive prior authorisation requirements. It risks tying the hands of the police at precisely the moments when rapid and flexible operational decision-making may be required.
We must recognise the points raised in Committee that the Government are currently consulting on the future regulatory framework for live facial recognition. To attempt to settle these questions piecemeal through amendments to this Bill would risk creating an incomplete or inconsistent framework. While the concerns raised by noble Lords are legitimate and deserve careful consideration, we should not default to restricting a technology that has already shown its potential to disrupt serious criminality and protect the public. The challenge is not to prohibit its use but to ensure that it is deployed responsibly, lawfully and proportionately. For those reasons, we cannot support the amendments in this group. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for tabling these amendments and to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for supporting some of the arguments that I will make in response to them. The noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones, Lord Strasburger and Lord Pannick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, have all put their finger on their concerns around the use of this technology.
I will begin by providing a view of what live facial recognition does. It allows for real-time location of individuals of interest to the police. It scans the faces of those passing a camera in real time, comparing faces against a predetermined, specific watch-list of, potentially, wanted criminals, vulnerable missing persons or individuals posing risks to public safety. If no match is made—this goes to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, made—currently, the scanned face is deleted instantly. Every deployment and every specific bespoke watch-list for that deployment must have a defined policing objective, be supported by clear intelligence and ultimately be determined by humans.
Noble Lords will be aware that the use of facial recognition technology in all circumstances, including in live facial recognition, is already subject to safeguards, including those provided in the Human Rights Act and the Data Protection Act. I agree that there needs to be a framework, which is the nub of what I think all noble Lords have said in this debate.
The noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, will know that the Government had a 10-week consultation for that very purpose—to look at the issues of a legal framework where law enforcement use of biometrics, facial recognition and similar technologies could be used. The consultation ended on 12 February. I give the House an assurance that the Government intend to respond to it by the summer; we have more or less a 12-week deadline from the end of its closing, but it will be by the summer. The consultation is clear that the Government need to design a new framework and assess how the police use technologies such as facial recognition. It needs to ensure that there are safeguards, as noble Lords have mentioned, around the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, that we protect these rights and that facial recognition technology is demonstrably proportionate to the seriousness of the harm being addressed.
We are currently considering the consultation and, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, said, that should take its course. However, we intend to set out our proposals in due course, which will be subject to scrutiny by both Houses of Parliament. I hope noble Lords accept that it would not be appropriate to pre-empt the outcome of the consultation or the proposals that Government will bring forward, which we will ensure have new legal framework for the use of facial recognition technology by law enforcement agencies.
While I think that the points made by noble Lords have real merit, I hope that, with the comments I have made and the reassurances I have given, we will save the difficult debate about regulation, how it operates and what the proposals mean for a proper legal framework for another day, which will come very soon. I hope the noble Baroness will—
Lord Strasburger (LD)
Before the Minister sits down, could he give the House some indication of when the day will come when we have a debate on some meaningful proposals? Could he also tell the House whether those proposals will cover the use of this technology by the private sector—which is happening a lot already in retail—as well as the public sector?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
As I have tried to indicate to the noble Lord, we have had a consultation that finished on 12 February, and we intend to respond to it by the summer. Currently, what that response will be is to be formulated, so I will not give him chapter and verse on when and how. However, if legislation is required, we will look at that at the earliest opportunity, as we always do.
I cannot pre-empt the King’s Speech and I cannot give a timetable on that, but I will give a timetable when we respond to the consultation. We should remember that the Government initiated the consultation—we were not forced into it—to get to a position whereby the very issues that noble Lords have mentioned today are considered. With those comments, I hope the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister and all noble Lords who have spoken. I have no doubt at all that everything the Minister said, he actually believes. But it reminds me of when I was on the Metropolitan Police Authority for the first time and I went round all the police stations in London—I think there were 32 at the time, with 32 borough commanders. The first thing I noticed was that, at the time, if you took samples, they had to be stored in a fridge for X number of days at a particular temperature and then they had to be destroyed within another number of days. In almost 60% of the stations I visited, none of this had happened.
So I understand what the Minister is saying: that unnecessary facial recognition photographs will be destroyed instantly. But I would feel much happier if there was some process for ensuring that that is being done and a way of checking that. I am pleased to hear that there is going to be a debate on what guardrails are needed—because they are desperately needed—but, for now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“Return to unauthorised encampments: prohibited period(1) The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 is amended as follows.(2) In section 60C(3) (offence relating to residing on land without consent in or with a vehicle) for “12” substitute “three”.(3) In section 61 (power to remove trespassers on land)—(a) in subsection (4)(b) for “prohibited period” substitute “period of three months beginning with the day on which the direction was given”;(b) omit subsection (4ZA).(4) In section 62 (supplementary powers of seizure)—(a) in subsection (1)(b) for “prohibited period” substitute “period of three months beginning with the day on which the direction was given”;(b) omit subsection (1A).(5) In section 62B(2) (failure to comply with direction under section 62A: offences) for “twelve” substitute “three”.(6) In section 62C(2) (failure to comply with direction under section 62A: seizure) for “twelve” substitute “three”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause changes the period within which a person directed to leave an unauthorised encampment must not return from twelve months to three.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 375 in my name I pay tribute to my noble friend Lady Whitaker for the discussions we had both in Committee and outside it, which resulted in the amendment being brought forward today on Report.
Amendment 375 addresses the no-return period for individuals directed to leave an unauthorised encampment. This new clause restores the previous three-month period, replacing the 12-month prohibitions introduced by the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. The Government remain firmly committed to ensuring that communities feel safe, public spaces are protected and unauthorised encampments do not cause disproportionate disruption or distress. At the same time, we must ensure that enforcement powers are applied fairly and in a way that respects the rights of all individuals, including those in the Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities. I thank my noble friend Lady Whitaker for her campaigning on this issue, and for meeting with me and representatives from the all-party group for Gypsy, Roma and Traveller Communities earlier this year.
As she knows, and as I hope the House will be aware, in May 2024, the High Court found that setting and extending the no-return period to 12 months was incompatible with ECHR rights. This was because of the limited availability of authorised transit sites, meaning that individuals could be placed at risk of criminal sanction even when no lawful alternative was available. In light of this ruling, on their election in 2024 the new Government examined this, and it is right that we use this Bill to remedy that incompatibility.
Baroness Whitaker (Lab)
My Lords, I first declare an interest as president of Friends, Families and Travellers and the Advisory Council for the Education of Romany and other Travellers, and co-chair of the relevant APPG. It is in that connection that I applaud these amendments. They right an acknowledged wrong, a breach of the Human Rights Act, the remedy for which was fought for in the courts by a brave Romany Gypsy, Wendy Smith. They will give our few remaining nomadic families some limited means of continuing to live in the way the courts have agreed they are entitled to.
As my noble friend the Minister said in the meeting he called to discuss the amendment, for which I, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, who is not in his place, our colleagues in the NGOs, Wendy Smith’s barrister and the few thousand Travellers affected—and it is only a few thousand—are very grateful, it is “a stage in a journey”. That journey is the path to equal treatment and the end of the dwelling discrimination which comes from the lack of permitted sites. The actions to move farther along in the journey through greater provision of sites do not lie with his department, but my noble friend the Minister has helpfully said something more about the future. If he has any details on timing and more precise allocation of responsibility, we should welcome them. As I said, they are not inherently matters for his department, but I would like to hear the whole Government supporting this. I commend these amendments.
Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville (LD)
My Lords, I declare my interest as a member of the APPG for Gypsies, Travellers and Roma, and speak in support of Amendments 375, 466 and 468. I thank the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, for his introduction to this important group of amendments. As has been said, this is the start of a journey to reach equality of access to services for those currently living a nomadic life.
Several noble Lords across the Chamber made representations against the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act, brought in under the previous Government in 2022 and subsequently ruled to be a breach of the Human Rights Act. Those who objected listed the effect the new restrictions would have on family life, those with health issues and access to education, et cetera. In a society that purports to uphold the rationale of equality for all, it is unacceptable to discriminate against those who follow a different lifestyle from the majority of us.
I have long campaigned for legislation to require every local authority to provide permitted permanent sites for Gypsies and Travellers alongside permitted temporary stopping sites for those who travel as part of their culture and way of life. This has always been rejected by Governments of different political persuasions, and I welcome the Minister’s comments this evening on the provision of sites in the future.
I am now lucky enough to live in an area that has adequate, decent provision for those identified as Gypsy, Roma or Traveller. Several of those sites are within a short walk of my home. I am delighted that those people are able to be married in the church in which I also worship, and that they are able to grieve the passing of their loved ones in the same environment. Everyone should be able to access education for their children, alongside healthcare for their elderly, even if they are moving from area to area around the country. A stopping place or site which allows this to happen should be a right, and not left to a local landowner to permit for short periods.
This small group of amendments is not a magic wand to ensure that sites appear overnight, but it is a step in the right direction to help families raise their children in a relatively safe environment. I support the Minister’s amendments.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I welcome the opportunity for debate that the Government’s Amendment 375 has afforded us. This is obviously a highly contested issue but, before we start, I put on record the very specific nature of the issue we are debating. In 2024, the High Court declared that a specific section of the Conservative Party’s Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 was incompatible with Article 14, the prohibition of discrimination, and Article 8, the right to private life, of the European Convention on Human Rights. That section extended the prohibition on returning to land covered by requests to leave from three to 12 months. That is why the Government are now attempting to reverse that change. The judgment did not, as claimed in Committee, nullify that no-returns order.
I will make His Majesty’s Loyal Opposition’s position clear: although we accept that the law as it currently stands renders the continuation of the current offence of returning to or re-entering prohibited land untenable, we would ultimately rather that the human rights law that has caused this incompatibility be repealed and the offence upheld. It is not racial discrimination to uphold one of the fundamental governing systems of our society. As perhaps some noble Lords in the Chamber will want to hear, private property has been a continuous thread throughout our history that has galvanised peace and prosperity in our country. Remove the right to private property and you create a system that favours freeloaders and fraudsters.
In the judgment, the presiding judge spoke of a balanced structure between the property rights of landowners and occupiers and the interests of Travellers. The increase in a no-returns order from three to 12 months would supposedly disproportionately affect the balance in favour of landowners. I do not believe that the interests of trespassers should be equally balanced with those of landowners and occupiers, if at all. That does not pertain to the Gypsy Traveller community; it does not matter who the people are. Declaring that the right to private property should trump the subjective desires of an individual or group does not have a racial element. It is an entirely neutral law and fundamentally liberal, in that it affords the same freedoms to all.
It is true to the latter point that it is disheartening to see the party that was once the vehicle of Manchester liberalism now supporting such a partial and anarchic view of the world. Therefore, if the law posits that upholding the belief in private property and enacting its enforcement in law is considered wrong, the law should be repealed. If the law ascertains that private property undermines an abstract theory of human rights and that the latter should prevail, the law should be repealed. If the law favours the human rights of the infringer over the victim, the law should be repealed. If the law is able to overturn the decision of a sovereign, elected Parliament acting of its own volition, the law should almost certainly be repealed.
Therefore, although we welcome the Government’s attempt to find a compromise between our legal commitments, we are unfortunately of the opinion that they are amending the wrong Act entirely. They are still rather dogmatic in their commitment to this outdated doctrine, but they are simply kicking the can down the road and delaying the inevitable. Whether the courts allow a three-month no-return period is immaterial; there would still exist an extrajudicial doctrine that has the ultimate say over the United Kingdom’s Parliament. There will simply be an appeal to this amendment, and if that is unsuccessful, they will find themselves facing the ECHR in another challenge to another Act.
We are sympathetic to the Government’s attempt at a balancing act, but they are targeting the symptoms over the cause. That cause is the ECHR enshrined in the Human Rights Act. The ECHR has served its purpose, but the fact that it now favours rule-breakers over rule-takers shows that it does so no longer. The Government must recognise this truth, and I suspect that deep down they do. They should follow the advice of the Conservative Party and leave the ECHR. Perhaps the Minister will reply bearing good news.
Lord Pannick (CB)
Before the Minister replies, I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that the rule-breakers are not those who want to return within three months; they are the local authorities that have statutory obligations to provide proper sites for Travellers but are failing to do so.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
Let me clear up something straight away. There is not going to be a meeting of minds between me and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, on the abolition of the ECHR. I will leave it at that. There is no common ground between us. Yes, we are generally looking at some reforms, but there is no common ground on abolishing the lot, which is what the noble Lord seeks to achieve. There is blue/red/orange water between us on this; I will leave it at that.
On the question raised, I am grateful for the support of my noble friend Lady Whitaker and the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville. We have moved in light of the judgments that were made, and we have instated the three-month period in this legislation. That is the right thing to do in relation to the legislation. I think the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, accepted that, while having a wider target. At the moment, I will take his acceptance of that as support. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, for her support, and I am grateful for the constant chivvying of my noble friend Lady Whitaker on this issue.
In my opening remarks, in anticipation of what would be said, I said that the Government agree that planning appropriately for the housing and accommodation needs of our diverse communities is essential in supporting sustainable and inclusive growth. It is important, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, just reminded the House, that the responsibility to set pitch and plot targets for Traveller sites lies with local authorities, and absolutely right that they must identify specific deliverable sites sufficient for five years against targets. As I said in my opening remarks, a revised National Planning Policy Framework and the Planning Policy for Traveller Sites were published at the end of December 2024, following extensive consultation.
The Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government is currently consulting on a new national planning framework. That consultation runs until 10 March. The noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, and my noble friend Lady Whitaker mentioned the need to look at more sites. That is actively being looked at. Despite the wide reservations of the noble Lord, but with the support of the Liberal Democrat Benches and my colleague Lady Whitaker, I hope that my amendments can be accepted by the House tonight.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“Harassment of a person in their home(1) The Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 is amended as follows.(2) In section 42 (police directions stopping harassment etc of a person in their home), in subsection (1)(b)—(a) omit the “or” at the end of sub-paragraph (i);(b) after sub-paragraph (ii) insert—“(iii) that they should not have done something they were entitled or required to do; or(iv) that they should have done something they were not under any obligation to do;”.(3) In section 42A (offence of harassment etc of a person in their home), in subsection (1)(b)—(a) omit the “or” at the end of sub-paragraph (i);(b) after sub-paragraph (ii) insert—“(iii) that they should not have done something they were entitled or required to do; or(iv) that they should have done something they were not under any obligation to do;”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment expands sections 42 and 42A of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 (protests outside homes) to cover protests about something done in the past.
Lord Faulks
“Lawful or reasonable excuse defence for public order offences(1) This section applies to any offence that makes conduct unlawful unless there is an excuse for it and specifies either that the excuse must be a lawful excuse or that it must be a reasonable one.(2) A person has no excuse for the conduct if—(a) it is intended to intimidate, provoke, inconvenience or otherwise harm members of the public by interrupting or disrupting their freedom to carry on a lawful activity, or(b) it is designed to influence the government or public opinion by subjecting any person, or their property, to a risk, or increased risk, of loss or damage.(3) It is immaterial that there are or may be other excuses or reasons for the conduct or that its main purpose may be different.(4) In this section “conduct” includes any act or omission.(5) For the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, this section must be treated as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies when a person has a lawful or reasonable excuse to a public order offence.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)
My Lords, this group of amendments was due to be heard last Wednesday. We were sent away just before midnight but reassured that they would be heard first thing on Monday. Well, it is 9.30 pm; I suppose that is first thing.
Amendment 377 is an important amendment, supported by the noble Lords, Lord Godson, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Davies. It is about lawful or reasonable excuse for public order offences. It is not particularly easy for a legislature to say what could constitute a reasonable excuse. However, the law is currently in a mess. The culprit is the Ziegler case, in which the Supreme Court, by a majority, said that whatever Parliament might say, it was necessary for a court to decide for itself, using the vexed issue of proportionality as a separate assessment, it would seem. Paragraph 59 of the leading judgment describes the process of proportionality as a
“fact-specific inquiry which requires the evaluation of the circumstances in the individual case”.
There has been widespread criticism of the Ziegler case. The courts have been backing away from it—for example, the Colston statue case in the Court of Appeal and last week in two cases, R v ABJ and R v BDN. Policy Exchange, the think tank, has mounted a long-standing campaign against the incoherence that the Ziegler decision has generated. There is absolutely no reason, from Strasbourg’s point of view, why national Governments should not decide on the sensible and appropriate limits on the law in relation to protest. Many noble Lords will remember the 2023 legislation and the provisions concerning tunnelling, major obstruction to transport networks and interfering with key national infrastructure. I was always concerned that superimposing on all these very specific offences the defence of lawful or reasonable excuse without giving any definition was, in effect, simply asking courts, “Do you think that there was a reasonable excuse?” but not saying how they were to approach that issue. I tabled amendments, together with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, without success, to clarify the issue so that courts could know what questions they should ask of themselves other than whether they liked the protest.
During the debate on this provision in Committee, no noble Lord from any party seemed to agree with the Ziegler decision or seek to defend it. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, seemed to dislike the amendment on one particular ground—that it purported to oust the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. I understand his loyalty towards the European Court of Human Rights, but the amendment does not seek to do that. It seeks to confirm that, in our view—I think that it is pretty uncontroversial—this amendment complies with the European Convention on Human Rights. It respects a balance of the various rights, and the House will know only too well that Articles 10 and 11 are qualified rights. It is clearly important that the law in relation to protests should take into account not only the rights of protesters but those of all those parties whose lives could be completely upset by the exercise of those rights and, of course, the police, who have to interpret the law and administrate the law, so coherence is most important.
I then looked again at what the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, had to say in response to this group. I want to be fair to the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, who has been indefatigable in the course of this Bill, dealing with any number of amendments, and often with large groups. I do not blame him altogether for not seizing on the Ziegler point with any great detail, but I fear that his answer was simply not good enough. He merely said
“the Government are not persuaded that this amendment is needed. Public order offences have been developed to ensure that those reasonable excuse defences apply only when appropriate and respect the need to balance”,—[Official Report, Commons, 13/1/26; col. 1634.]
et cetera. It was a perfectly fair statement of what the aims of any Government are but not an answer to the inadequacy of the Ziegler case. Therefore, I ask the Minister directly—sorry, it is not going to be the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, replying, as he is getting a well-earned rest, but the noble Lord, Lord Katz—whether he says, on behalf of the Government, that the Ziegler decision was correct, or does he accept, like almost any other legal commentator, that the decision was unfortunately wrong, as other judges seem now to accept? If that is the case, the law is incoherent, and it must be changed.
I fear I must join my noble friend Lord Pannick and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, who is not currently in his place, in saying that it is simply not good enough to say that we must wait until the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, speaks on the subject—if he were to speak on the subject, because, of course, that may be some time in the future. Then there is the vexed question of legislative time.
We need to sort out the law in relation to protest. This amendment, whose drafting has not been criticised in any way, states what could or should constitute a reasonable excuse or lawful excuse. The time has come to clarify the law for everybody’s sake. I beg to move.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I have added my name to my noble friend Lord Faulks’ amendment and I support it. To repeat a point I made on an earlier amendment, the police generally need simplicity, not complexity. Generally, Ziegler created complexity in what, in that case, was the simplest of offences. It was all about wilful obstruction of the highway. That used to be fairly straightforward. It was on a highway; it got obstructed and it was done wilfully: that was the offence. That is all that had to be proved. Of course, it is used not only in cases of protest, but Ziegler said that, in the case of protesters blocking the highway, that simple test could not be applied; it had to consider further issues. In fact, what it said was that the person could be convicted of obstructing the highway only if the prosecution could persuade the court that a conviction would be a proportionate interference in his or her convention rights, which, in effect, shifted it for the police to prove proportionality when someone was blocking the highway.
My point is that, although we understand the intellectual background to that, it has left the law in such a confused position that the cops do not know whether to enforce it at the moment of the crime. That is never a good position to be in. There is a secondary issue, which is that senior officers often become involved in planning for marches that are to happen in the next week or two weeks. They probably have a little bit more time to consider these issues, but frankly, the police have always used discretion. People block the highway fairly regularly; we all do. If you stop in your car, if you are walking on the highway, you can block it, so they do not arrest everybody who blocks the highway. They do not arrest every protester who is walking on the highway and clearly is obstructing it. That is what marchers do; it happens all the time. Of course, it becomes a bit tricky when a group within the protest decides to sit down in the middle of Oxford Circus and want to stay there for some time. That, I think we might all accept, is unreasonable. The police will try to persuade them. At some point, they might want to intervene and say, “Actually, I think you need to move or, alternatively, you are going to get arrested. There is a consequence to what you are doing. That’s your right, but there will be a consequence”.
I am afraid this judgment has left the police really confused. This is about obstruction of the highway, but it applies to all the different aspects of public order law. I do not think that it is fair to ask the police to start balancing human rights on the street. Of course, there is the issue of reasonableness, which is where discretion comes in—they are not going to arrest everybody and should exercise their powers only if somebody refuses to move or repeatedly causes an aggravation to the simple offence—but the danger of this judgment is that the law is confused and the police are caught in the middle. This amendment is an opportunity to clarify it. I think that is reasonable and I support it.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, criticism of the Ziegler decision is well-founded and well-taken, but the law has moved on. For example, in the Supreme Court’s abortion services case, 2022 UKSC 32, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, speaking for a seven-judge Supreme Court, said at paragraph 42:
“The decision in Ziegler was widely understood as having established that every criminal conviction of protesters involved a restriction upon their Convention rights, and must be proved to be justified and proportionate on the basis of an assessment of the particular facts. As explained, that understanding was mistaken”.
The law has moved on.
As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, recognised, there have been a number of more recent cases in which the courts emphasised, in the context of protest, that it is sufficient that Parliament has laid down a particular offence. It is therefore not necessary for the prosecution to prove proportionality on the facts of the individual case. It may well be that more clarity is required in this area, but the House should proceed on the recognition that Ziegler, for all its faults, is not current law.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, for the elegant way that he introduced this amendment and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for explaining his perspective on it. In effect, it was a police perspective, given that the police find it difficult to apply the law as it was thought to be after Ziegler. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for explaining that the law has moved on since Ziegler.
I do not propose to get into the argument of precisely what the law is in the light of Ziegler as subsequently interpreted. I am concerned with the way that this amendment addresses the question of reasonable excuse. This is achieved by, in effect, spelling it out in proposed new subsection (2), which says:
“A person has no excuse for the conduct if … it is intended to intimidate, provoke, inconvenience or otherwise harm members of the public by interrupting or disrupting their freedom to carry on a lawful activity”.
That hides within it an open question about the meaning of intention in that context. It is for that reason that I do not support the amendment as drafted.
It may well be that a person recognises that conduct that is otherwise perfectly lawful, particularly in a context of peaceful protest, may inevitably carry the consequence of provoking or inconveniencing other members of the public by interrupting or disrupting their freedom to carry on a lawful activity. That comes back to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, made in the context of obstructing the highway. Any obstruction or interference with traffic or movement or getting to work, or any delay, could all be intended consequences of lawful protest. What worries me is that this amendment, as drafted, would acknowledge that intention and say that there could be no excuse. It is not then a question of weighing up any excuse in the light of what the courts may consider to be an excuse in any particular case; the question is what the intended consequence would be, and the intended consequence may appear to the people charged with the conduct to be entirely reasonable, though intended, and may objectively be entirely reasonable, though intended.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, the recent ruling of the Supreme Court in R v ABJ and R v BDN has thrown the law of public protest into even greater confusion. That case relates to two protesters prosecuted under Section 12(1A) of the Terrorism Act 2000 for expressing public support for Hamas, a proscribed organisation. The appellants claimed that their charges under the Act represented a disproportionate interference with their right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court unanimously dismissed this appeal and, in doing so, ruled that the Section 12(1A) offence in the Terrorism Act does not represent a disproportionate interference with the convention rights.
I raise this ruling because it highlights the confusion around protest law ever since the Supreme Court delivered a different ruling in the case of DPP v Ziegler in 2021. We have discussed the implications of the Ziegler ruling in this House on a number of occasions. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has again reminded us of the details in that case. There is a clear tension between the court’s ruling in Ziegler and its ruling last week.
The court has made it clear that the Ziegler logic does not apply to the Terrorism Act defence but has not yet rectified the damaging consequences of the Ziegler decision. The basis of the court’s reasoning in Ziegler was the lawful excuse defence in Section 137 of the Highways Act 1980. In Committee, my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and I tabled amendments to remove the reasonable excuse defences from a number of Acts that are used to prosecute highly disruptive protesters, including the Highways Act and the Public Order Act 2023, and from this Bill.
When I spoke to those amendments, the Minister said that,
“the reasonable excuse defence is necessary in these instances to ensure an appropriate balance between protecting the wider community and the right to protest”.—[Official Report, 13/1/26; col. 1633.]
It is clear that the balance has not been made. I have not tabled those amendments to remove the reasonable excuse defences again, apart from Amendment 377B, which would remove the reasonable excuse defence from Section 137 of the Highways Act. I can think of no possible excuse for anyone purposefully to block the highway unless they are authorised to do so, such as the police or officers of National Highways. Removing that defence would render the issue in Ziegler null and void since that defence was the issue under consideration by the court.
However, I accept that the problem has now grown. The Supreme Court’s decision in the Ziegler case means there is now judicial precedent, and defence lawyers up and down the country have been lining up to utilise that argument so their clients can get off scot free. That is why I will be supporting Amendment 377 from the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. While I would prefer to remove those defences entirely, it would be better that the clarity in the law provided by Amendment 377 was made. His amendment would apply more widely than mine and therefore, I am happy to admit, provides a more substantial solution to the problem.
I would like to pick up on something that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said in Committee:
“much of the criticism of Ziegler fails to recognise that the courts themselves have understood that Ziegler went too far, and that what Parliament has determined in relation to the law is the governing law”.—[Official Report, 13/1/26; col. 1623.]
I accept his interpretation that the courts by subsequent decisions have recognised the issue of Ziegler, but the decision in Ziegler still stands as case law. It has not yet been overturned. I think that serves as one of the strongest arguments for Parliament to pass Amendment 377 and rectify the error that the courts have themselves acknowledged.
If the European Convention on Human Rights prevents the application of the law as passed by Parliament or prevents the conviction of those who should be convicted, that demonstrates that we should leave the ECHR, but while we remain within the purview of the Strasbourg court and while the Human Rights Act remains on the statute book, the decision in Ziegler needs to be reversed. Therefore, if the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, wishes to divide the House on Amendment 377, he will have our full support.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who took part in this short but important debate, and I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Davies of Gower, for tabling these amendments which seek to narrow the existing lawful or reasonable excuse defences that may be used for public order offences.
It may be helpful to set out how a lawful excuse works in practice. A person is automatically treated as having a lawful excuse only under two specific circumstances. The first is if the defendant honestly believes that the person who is entitled to consent to the damage has given consent or would have consented if they knew of the circumstances—for example, an honest belief that the owner of a car in which a child was locked on a hot day consented, or would have consented, to the defendant smashing the window to get the child out. The second is if the defendant acts to protect their own or someone else’s property and they honestly believe both that the property needs immediate protection and that their actions are reasonable—for example, a person damages one person’s property while accessing the property of another to prevent a fire. It does not matter whether a person’s belief in those circumstances is reasonable or justified; it just needs to be honest.
Whatever the failings of, or, indeed, one’s views on, the Ziegler judgment, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said in his sagacious contribution, case law has moved on and the Supreme Court has made subsequent rulings which chart a clearer path. It is the case that the right to private property will always need to be balanced with other convention rights, such as the right to protest and freedom of expression. This will have to be judged on a case-by-case basis, but leading case law has set out the parameters, and the Court of Appeal did not say that the exercise of a person’s convention rights could never form the basis of lawful excuse for criminal damage.
While I acknowledge the concerns of noble Lords, I have a great deal of sympathy for the arguments advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. It is for the Crown Prosecution Service and the courts to decide what may constitute lawful or reasonable excuse in individual cases. Further, the current scope of the defence allows the CPS the necessary flexibility to consider the full circumstances of each case on its merits. The types of behaviour that noble Lords have suggested, such as intimidating or harming members of the public or the risk of damaging property, are unlikely to be considered a reasonable excuse. Therefore, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)
I am grateful to all those who took part in this debate. I think the issues have rather narrowed between those who have taken part in it. For the first time during the course of these debates on this issue, we had some drafting points from the noble Lord, Lord Marks. They have come late, but none the less I will deal with them.
The first point is that the noble Lord did not like my proposed provision that says that it is not an excuse if you intend
“to intimidate, provoke, inconvenience or otherwise harm members of the public by interrupting or disrupting their freedom to carry on a lawful activity”.
That does not seem to be a very reasonable excuse to me, so it seems a very sensible thing to put in the amendment.
Secondly, the noble Lord did not like subsection (3), where it says that it is immaterial that there may be other purposes. If the defendant does not have a good excuse, it is no good saying, “My overall excuse, because I happen to support Just Stop Oil, is a good one”. You cannot rely on that.
In his final point, the noble Lord stuck to his argument that this was an attempt to oust the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Act 1998. I repeat the point that it is not that. Whatever the future may hold, we are still part of the European Convention on Human Rights. But the convention requires the balancing of rights, including that they have to be treated as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This provision reflects all those factors in a perfectly appropriate balance. Therefore, it complies with the European Convention on Human Rights.
I come finally to this point. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, quite rightly said, pointing to a recent judgment of the President of the Supreme Court, that the courts are backing away from Ziegler. I am not surprised. It sits very uneasily with the jurisprudence in this area generally. The decision is almost moribund. But it is time to give it a decent burial. It is time to conclude that the law should be clear, that we can understand what it means and that the police can understand what it means, so that the whole business of putting forward spurious excuses will cease and we can have a proper and sensible law in relation to protest. I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Davies of Gower
“Extension of notice period for public processions(1) Section 11 of the Public Order Act 1986 (advance notice of public processions) is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (5) for “6” substitute “28”.(3) In subsection (6) for “6” substitute “28”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would extend the notice period that is required for public processions to take place from 6 to 28 days.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this amendment seeks to extend the notice period for public processions from six days to 28 days. The Government have resisted this; however, the police feel that it is difficult to operate under the current system and would prefer that it was 28 days as opposed to six. On that basis, I think we should be supporting the police, and I beg to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Davies of Gower
“Prohibition of protests(1) Section 13 of the Public Order Act 1986 (prohibiting public processions) is amended as follows.(2) For subsection (1) substitute—“(1) The chief officer of police may apply to the Secretary of State for an order to prohibit the holding of all public processions (or any class of public processions so specified) for a period of not more than 3 months in any district or part of a district if either of the following conditions are met.(1A) The first condition is that the chief officer of police reasonably believes that the powers under section 12 will not be sufficient to prevent a public procession in the district or part of the district from resulting in –(a) serious public disorder,(b) serious damage to property, or(c) serious disruption to the life of the community.(1B) The second condition is that the procession would place undue demands on the police.”(3) In subsection (2)—(a) omit “a council may with the consent of”;(b) after the first “Secretary of State” insert “may”.”
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this amendment relates to the prohibition of protests, where the chief officer may apply to the Secretary of State for an order to prohibit the holding of all public processions, and where he or she considers there may be serious public disorder, damage to property or, indeed, serious disruption to the life of a community. That is an eminently sensible amendment, and the Government have resisted this again. However, I feel that it would be a great tool in the box for police, so I look to divide the House on it.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(1) The Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 is amended as follows.Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 154, page 205, line 6.
“(5A) The requirement in subsection (5) may be satisfied by consultation carried out wholly or partly before this section comes into force.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the Secretary of State’s duty to consult before making regulations under section 71 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 (inserted by clause 154) may be satisfied by pre-commencement consultation.
Baroness Doocey
“(7A) Authorised persons listed in section 71A may not use the information referenced in subsection (1) for the purposes of biometric searches using facial recognition technology.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that the DVLA database cannot be used for searches using live facial recognition.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 380 erects a vital safeguard. It blocks Clause 154 from handing millions of drivers’ private photos to the police for facial recognition searches without full parliamentary scrutiny and explicit consent. It stops a road traffic database being quietly repurposed for mass biometric surveillance, while still allowing proportionate, tightly regulated data sharing for genuine policing needs.
In Committee, Peers from across the House voiced concerns echoing not just the Liberal Democrats but a wide range of civil society groups, among them Liberty, Big Brother Watch, Justice, StopWatch, Inquest and Privacy International. The Minister still tells us that this is merely a tidying-up exercise with no impact on facial recognition, but the evidence tells a very different story. It points to a plan to funnel photos of over 50 million innocent drivers into a vast facial recognition repository, dismantling vital privacy safeguards.
For anyone who thinks that sounds exaggerated, let me make three points. First, the previous Government explicitly justified an almost identical clause on the basis that it would enable facial recognition searches; they were candid about that intention. If this Government do not share that purpose, they should have no difficulty supporting my amendment.
Secondly, thanks to freedom of information requests, we now know that other civic databases, passports and immigration records are already acting as de facto facial recognition libraries, without public knowledge, consent or a clear parliamentary mandate.
Thirdly, there is a strategic facial match-up project—a joint Home Office and police scheme—to enable facial recognition searches across multiple databases, including non-policing ones. Its existence has yet to be confirmed in public Home Office policy documents, having surfaced only via government tender notices, media reports and oblique spending references. If this project does not exist, I invite the Minister to set the record straight.
Facial recognition turns an ordinary photograph into biometric data, a unique identifier like a fingerprint or DNA, which in law should be retained for criminal justice purposes only under very strict safeguards. The UK does not currently have population-wide biometric databases of innocent citizens. Creating a single, easily accessible policing platform for these civil images runs directly against the European Court of Human Rights’ warning that blanket retention of biometrics is a serious and disproportionate interference with privacy. Plugging the DVLA database into a facial recognition engine also risks creating a honeypot for hostile states and criminals, exposing the lifelong biometric signatures of almost every adult driver.
There are practical problems as well. Driving licence photos are updated only every 10 years, so the database already holds millions of outdated images. Using that kind of so-called “noisy data” for facial recognition inevitably increases the risk of false positives and wrongful stops. We know that this technology is far less precise than DNA and has already contributed to wrongful accusations, yet we are assured that its accuracy is improving. However, there is no timescale for this. The Government are, in effect, asking Parliament to sign a blank cheque for mass access to our biometric data. Amendment 380 simply asks this House not to hand them the pen. I beg to move.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I know a young man who has just got his driving licence. He is very excited and sees it as a rite of passage; he is now a grown-up. He has joined the club of drivers and he shows his driving licence with pride. I can assure noble Lords he has no idea that applying for a driving licence means that he is joining a vast biometric police database, a club of police surveillance, and his mugshot will be treated like one of those Most Wanted gallery of rogues images.
This is a corruption of public trust. The public apply for one thing, only for it to be subverted and used for something else. It seems to me to be duplicitous and behind the backs of the public. Currently, police forces can directly access and search DVLA data only in relation to road traffic offences and must phone the DVLA in relation to other offences. I note that the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, would not prevent police forces accessing DVLA data for law enforcement purposes, but it should not be the default position. It is important to create this safeguard to prevent such data being used to conduct, in effect, phishing exercises of facial recognition. Therefore, we need this amendment to be taken seriously and I will be interested in what the Minister has to say.
This is not some paranoid dystopian vision. In a recent submission to the Home Affairs Committee, the National Police Chiefs’ Council stated that police chiefs were indeed seeking access to the DVLA database for facial recognition. That would be a huge expansion of police surveillance powers, granting them access, as we have heard, to the biometric data of tens of millions of citizens. We cannot overestimate how important it is that we do not just nod this through but take seriously the risk to civil liberties. It is why the noble Baroness’s Amendment 380, which creates a safeguard, is so important: to protect the civil liberties and privacy of innocent driving licence holders.
I conclude with a quote from Big Brother Watch, which says that this represents
“a disproportionate expansion of police powers to track and identify citizens across time and locations for low-level policing needs”.
In a way, it is an abuse of the police to ask them to use these underhand methods, and it is therefore vital that there are safeguards in law to prevent this happening, particularly because it is happening behind the backs of ordinary people.
Lord Pannick (CB)
There is no question, as I understand Clause 154, of a blank cheque, and there is no question here of underhand methods. What the clause requires is that the Secretary of State produces regulations, and the regulations must specify the circumstances in which information may be made available under this section. I am assuming that in due course, the Government are going to bring forward regulations to implement this provision. Those regulations will have to be laid before Parliament, and there will be an opportunity, if any noble Lord wishes to do so, to debate those regulations. I suggest that that is the time to assess whether the regulations contain a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the public interest.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
My Lords, the DVLA driver database must not be turned into a ready-made line-up for facial recognition systems. This is about more than data protection; it is about the basic relationship between citizen and state. People did not hand over their photographs to the DVLA so that the Government could quietly repurpose them for mass identification; they did so under legal compulsion to get a driving licence.
Using those images to power facial recognition searches fundamentally changes the deal after the fact. It turns a compulsory single-purpose database into an all-purpose surveillance tool, without anyone ever having given meaningful consent. Once you allow the police to run facial recognition matches against the DVLA database, you create the possibility of identifying almost anyone, almost anywhere, from a single image. That goes far beyond investigating named suspects. It enables trawling through the entire driving population to find possible matches, with all the risk of false positives that facial recognition systems already carry. A bad match here is not an abstract error. It is a real person, wrongly flagged, questioned or even arrested, because a machine thought their face looked similar.
The DVLA database is also nearly universal for adults. That makes it uniquely tempting. If we normalise using it for facial recognition in one context, it will not stop there. Today, it might be justified for serious crime. Tomorrow, it could creep into protests, public events or routine inquiries. Once the precedent is set that every licence holder’s image is fair game for search, the barrier to expanding that use becomes paper-thin.
There is also a democratic principle at stake here. When the state wants new investigative powers that are this sweeping, it should come to Parliament and ask for them openly, with clear limits, safeguards and independent oversight. What must not happen is a quiet, technical integration between the facial recognition system and the DVLA database, introduced by secondary legislation and governed mainly by internal policies and obscure memoranda of understanding. This is legislation by the backdoor, not by debate.
If we allow the DVLA database to be searched with facial recognition, we are not just making investigations a little more efficient; we are rebuilding the basic infrastructure of our democracy so that the state can, in principle, put a name to almost any face. We are doing that using images people had no real choice about providing, and for a completely different purpose. So, the line we should draw is simple and firm: the DVLA driver database is for licensing drivers, not for powering facial recognition line-ups. If any Government want to change that, they must come back to Parliament with primary legislation, make their case in public and accept strict statutory constraints. Until then, we should say clearly that turning a compulsory licensing database into a de facto national ID gallery is a step too far for a free society. That is what Amendment 380 does and I commend it to the House.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I do not support the amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made the point that there will obviously be regulations, because people do have fears about accessing the DVLA database.
At the moment, the only database that facial comparisons are made against is that of suspects, which is a substantial database of people the police have arrested in the past. It would be a bizarre outcome if the technology existed to find a serial rapist and the only way we could find them was on the DVLA database, but we buried our head in the sand and said that we were not going to look. This is just the start of an investigation, not a conclusion. No one would get charged as a result of being identified by this process, but it may well start an investigation that might exclude or include them. To not take up the possibility that you could identify them, either through the DVLA or other databases, is the wrong way forward.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said that the fact that this access is to be authorised by regulations is a saving grace. We know full well that in this House, fatal Motions virtually never succeed. The Conservative Front Bench may take some comfort from the fact that there would be provision for regulations, but the reality is that once the enabling legislation is passed, regulations will be in the hands of the Government, and nobody can do anything about it.
This is an issue of consent. People who apply for driving licences do so and have done so for many years on the basis that their photographs and biometric data are provided for the limited purpose of applying for a driving licence—that goes for all the information they provide. It is not for the purpose of enabling a trawl for suspects. One can envisage a position where, in some circumstances, authorisation to use information in public hands, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, suggested, may be appropriate, but this is not the place for it to be provided for by regulations subsequent to and consequent upon this enabling clause.
It is a question of public trust. The information and photographs are provided by applicants for driving licences based on the trust that they will be used for that purpose and that purpose alone. To misuse that information to enable a trawl of photographs to see if they might be suspected of some offence, with nobody having any real control over that use, is an abuse of trust. For that reason, I support the amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I will address Amendment 380 in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Moulsecoomb, and the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Strasburger. I am grateful to them for raising an issue that deserves careful consideration. The amendment would prevent authorised persons using information held on the Driving and Vehicle Licensing Agency database for biometric searches using facial recognition technology. It is right to ensure that Parliament scrutinises these emerging powers thoroughly. Public trust in policing is vital, and it is only through open debate and clear safeguards that such trust can be maintained.
The DVLA database contains photographs and personal information provided by millions of law-abiding citizens for the specific purpose of licensing drivers, and it is therefore entirely understandable that noble Lords should question whether it is appropriate for that information to be used in other contexts, particularly the context of advanced biometric searches. The principle that personal data should not be repurposed without clear justification is one that many of us across the House share.
However, while the concerns behind this amendment are sincere and valid, I fear that it is unnecessary and ultimately misguided. It would risk undermining the ability of our police and law enforcement agencies to prevent and investigate serious crime. First, it is important to recognise the operational value that carefully regulated facial recognition tools can provide to modern policing. The technology, when used responsibly, can assist officers in identifying suspects in serious crime, locating dangerous offenders and protecting the public in situations where time is of the essence. It can be particularly valuable when investigating crimes involving unidentified individuals captured on CCTV or other images.
The police already rely on a range of databases and identification tools to perform these tasks. Photographs from custody suites, passport records and other lawful sources have long assisted the police in identifying suspects and victims alike. Facial recognition technology represents in many ways a technological evolution of that long-standing investigative practice. The amendment before us would place a blanket prohibition on the use of DVLA images for biometric searches involving facial recognition. Such prohibition risks creating an artificial and potentially harmful limitation on investigative capability. If a suspect’s image appears on CCTV and the only high-quality image available for comparison is contained within a DVLA database, the amendment would prevent police even conducting that comparison. We must ask ourselves whether that is a proportionate outcome.
Secondly, it is worth emphasising that the use of facial recognition technology by police forces in the United Kingdom is not taking place in a regulatory vacuum. The deployment of such technologies is already subject to a framework of legal safeguards, oversight and guidance. Police forces must operate within the boundaries of data protection law, including the principles established under the UK general data protection regulation and the Data Protection Act 2018. Their activities are subject to oversight by bodies such as the Information Commissioner’s Office and, where appropriate, the courts. Moreover, the use of live facial recognition by police has already been subject to significant judicial scrutiny. The courts have made it clear that deployments must be proportionate and transparent, and accompanied by appropriate safeguards. That jurisprudence has helped shape operational guidance and policing practice in this area.
Given that context, I question whether it is wise for Parliament to impose a sweeping statutory ban in relation to one database. Doing so risks pre-empting the careful regulatory balance that is already evolving through legislation, oversight and case law. That does not mean that the concerns raised by the amendment should be dismissed—far from it. The growth of biometric technologies demands a clear and robust legislative framework. Many Members across this House have rightly called for greater clarity about how facial recognition should be governed in the future. I feel the same. Questions of transparency, accountability, accuracy and bias must continue to be examined with great care.
However, those broader questions should be addressed through a comprehensive approach to biometric governance rather than through a single amendment targeting one database in isolation. If Parliament concludes that additional statutory safeguards are required for facial recognition technology then we should consider them holistically, ensuring that any rules are consistent, proportionate and grounded in operational reality. A piecemeal prohibition risks creating unintended consequences while failing to resolve the underlying policy debate.
For those reasons, while I commend the spirit in which the amendment has been brought forward, I regret that I cannot support it. Instead, I hope that the House will continue the broader necessary conversation about how facial recognition technologies should be regulated, ensuring that we protect civil liberties and the ability of our police to keep our communities safe.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, this has been a useful debate. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for tabling the amendment, and to the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for speaking in support of it. I am grateful for the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, which echo some of the points that I will make. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, pointed to one of the arguments that I will make: that access to the data will be subject to a statutory code of practice to ensure that its use is appropriate.
I remind noble Lords of the purpose of Clause 154: it is simply about bringing legislation up to date, which is what I said in Committee when we debated this matter. As a result of technical changes to the way police and law enforcement access driving licence data, it has become clear that we need to improve the DVLA data access regime by setting out clearly in statute—which is what Clause 154 does—which persons can access DVLA driving licence data. The legislation provides additional clarity on this issue.
The measure will enable us, through secondary legislation made under these new powers—this goes to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—to expand the purposes for which DVLA data may be accessed automatically to include policing or law enforcement purposes. This means that the police will have another tool to cut crime and keep the public safe, in line with the commitment by chief officers to pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry when investigating an offence. I emphasise that access to the data will be subject to a statutory code of practice to ensure that its use is appropriate.
We are clear that there will be strong safeguards around the use of DVLA data, which, as I have said, will be introduced via regulations made under the new provisions. We debated earlier government Amendment 382, which ensures that these regulations are subject to the affirmative procedure in both Houses, in line with a recommendation from the Constitution Committee.
We want to ensure that officers undergo training prior to being able to access information. The police are already legally required to consult with local communities. Extensive audits of who has accessed DVLA driving licence data are maintained. It is already standard practice that each time the DVLA driver database is accessed by a police officer, the details of what information is accessed and for what purpose is logged. This will continue to be the case once the revised measure is implemented.
On the issue of facial recognition technology, I want to make it clear to all noble Lords who have signed this amendment, including the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that police forces do not conduct biometric facial recognition searches against images contained on the DVLA database. Officers use the DVLA database for day-to-day policing matters. Anybody who has watched a police programme on a Monday night—when they get the opportunity in the recess to do so—will have at some point seen a police officer pull over a car and look at an individual who says, “I haven’t got my licence with me”, and tell them they are Jimmy Jones of X address. The police officer then wants to check that they are Jimmy Jones of X address, and so they access the DVLA database. Nine times out of 10, on the police shows that I watch on a Monday night during recess, it is a false name, and therefore there is police action accordingly. That is the purpose for which the police currently use the database.
As I said in our earlier debate on Amendment 374, the use of facial recognition technology in all circumstances is currently subject to safeguards, such as the Human Rights Act and the Data Protection Act. As I have said in previous discussions, any use of facial recognition technology will be subject to the outcome of the consultation that we finished on 10 February. That will be completed in about 12 weeks and, by the summer, we will have government proposals which the noble Baroness, along with both Houses of Parliament, can scrutinise, to achieve some view on whatever the Government propose following the outcome of that consultation.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, that, if the amendment were agreed by the Government tonight then the police officer who stopped somebody on the street—potentially a drunk driver, an unlicensed driver or a driver with no insurance—would not be able to access the DVLA database. That goes to the very points that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, made in his speech.
This is not about mass surveillance. It is about using the DVLA database in an appropriate way—logged, recorded and monitored by the police to ensure that we check that person A is actually the right person who can drive that vehicle at that particular time. It is not, with due respect to noble Lords, mass surveillance. It is proper use of police technology to ensure that the DVLA database helps catch bad actors in the act of doing bad things. I hope the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, there is no chance at all that I am going to withdraw the amendment, but I think the Minister knows that. We are not on the same page on this. How on earth can the Government justify taking information that people have given for one purpose and using it for something else? It is totally and utterly disgraceful. People have given their photographs to get a driving licence; it is wrong that they can now be repurposed to be checked by police. Just let me finish the sentence. There is nothing wrong with the Government, in their consultation, saying to people, “We want to repurpose the DVLA driving licence database because it would be really helpful to police. Would you be willing to agree to this?”, but they did not say that. They have just taken it.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
Does the noble Baroness think that a police officer, at 11 pm, on a street here in Westminster, should not access the DVLA database to check that the person is who they say they are? If she thinks that, she would really be blowing a hole in every Monday night television programme that I have ever watched.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
I suggest that the Minister has been watching too many of these television programmes. There is a complete lack of transparency. The Information Commissioner’s Office had to learn about the use of passport databases through media reports, rather than Home Office disclosure, even though this appears to have been happening since 2019. It is just so completely and utterly wrong. If people had given their information for it be used for those purposes, it would be fair enough and no problem at all, but they did not and the Government have taken it without permission. The whole situation is absolutely appalling.
There is the potential for 50 million drivers to be put on a permanent database and to be checked every single day. Of course, the police want it; I would want it if I were the police. It will make their lives so much easier. It will make it very easy for them to check everything they need to check, but that should not be the purpose of this.
Lord Pannick (CB)
The noble Baroness is very eloquently making her case on the basis of a lack of consent. I suggest to her that the police regularly use material that people have not given their consent for them to use—for example, their fingerprints and saliva.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
I do not accept that that is the same as 50 million innocent drivers being put on a database. However, I have given all the arguments and we have had this debate twice. The noble Lord is gesturing. I am sorry; what does that mean?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I was simply saying that, as the noble Baroness has already indicated that she is going to divide the House and given the hour, it would probably be quite useful just to go to that stage.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
I think that is very unfair, because my speeches are probably shorter than those of anybody in this House. The noble Lord should not pick on me because he does not like what I am saying. I do not like being bullied.
I do not believe that what the Government are doing is right and I would like to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(3A) The requirement in subsection (3) may be satisfied by consultation carried out wholly or partly before this section comes into force.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the Secretary of State’s duty to consult in preparing a code of practice under section 71B of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 (inserted by clause 154) may be satisfied by pre-commencement consultation.
“(3) In section 76 (subordinate legislation), after subsection (5) insert—“(5A) A statutory instrument containing regulations under section 71 may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for regulations made by the Secretary of State under section 71 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 (inserted by clause 154) to be subject to affirmative resolution procedure.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“Code of practice relating to non-criminal hate incidentsIn the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, omit—(a) sections 60 and 61 (code of practice about police processing of personal data relating to hate incidents), and(b) the italic heading before section 60.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment repeals sections 60 and 61 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022.
Lord Hanson of Flint
My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 383, which repeals the statutory code relating to non-crime hate incidents issued under Sections 60 and 61 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. Consideration of the review undertaken by the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council has shown that to be the appropriate policy to take forward. The interim findings of the review commissioned, in conjunction with the College of Policing, by the former Home Secretary were published in October. They were clear that the existing system no longer operates as intended and should be replaced with a clearer, more proportionate model.
Non-crime hate incidents were originally introduced following the landmark Stephen Lawrence inquiry. Their intent—to gather information to prevent crime, support investigations and safeguard the vulnerable—remains as relevant today as it did 30 years ago, and we remain committed to safeguarding against hostility and collecting information to support an effective policing response. However, the environment in which policing operates has evolved significantly since that inquiry and over time non-crime hate incidents have expanded beyond their original intention. The growth of social media in particular and online polarisation has drawn the police into disputes that fall outside their core duties. Police officers must be able to focus on catching criminals, cutting crime and ensuring public safety, and the present statutory code has not provided the clarity needed to support that focus. It must therefore be revoked.
The College of Policing—I am pleased to see its chair, the noble Lord, Lord Herbert, in his place—and the National Police Chiefs’ Council are clear that the current system is not fit for purpose. They intend to set out a more appropriate framework that ensures that recording is proportionate, clearer and firmly focused on the most serious incidents to ensure the police are not drawn into matters they should not be drawn into. It will do this by tightening the definition of an incident, raising the recording threshold, moving from recording all incidents that are a cause for concern to capturing only those that relate to core policing purposes. These reforms will be supported by robust guidance and training so that the incidents are handled appropriately. The new framework has been developed by police experts in consultation with community representatives. It will, I believe, strike the right balance between safeguarding vulnerable communities and protecting lawful freedom of expression by ensuring that recording is consistent and focused on genuine risk.
The amendment before the House today repeals the statutory framework to facilitate the introduction of a new framework. Commencement will be timed to ensure an orderly transition aligned with the introduction of the replacement framework. As I have indicated to the House previously, further detail will be set out following the publication of the college’s final report, which I expect in very short order in the coming weeks. The report is going to the National Police Chiefs’ Council for consideration next week and I expect it to be published by the College of Policing shortly afterwards.
Amendment 383 will end a system that policing experts agree no longer works. However, the original intention behind non-crime hate incidents to help prevent crime and safeguard the vulnerable remains important. Our commitment to tackling hate remains, as witnessed by the amendments we brought forward last week that were approved by this House, but the mechanism by which the police assess and record information will change, with a higher threshold for police involvement. We will continue to safeguard our communities but through a clearer, more proportionate framework that works. When that is brought forward, I will make sure that the results are published and that noble Lords, as well as Members of the House of Commons, can see the outcome of that final report once the National Police Chiefs’ Council has issued it for clearance. The amendment enables the changes that I have explained.
I will respond to Amendment 387B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Young, once I have heard noble Lords, but for now I beg to move the amendment.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
My Lords, I support Amendment 387B. I declare my interest as a director of the Free Speech Union.
I am grateful to the Minister for summarising the final report of the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council on non-crime hate incidents, for the courtesy he has shown me and the co-sponsors of this amendment in the run-up to this debate, and for arranging for me and others to be briefed by Sir Andy Marsh and his team at the College of Policing about the recommendations in the final report, which I will get to shortly.
As I made clear to the House in Committee, I have long-standing concerns that the investigation and recording of non-crime hate incidents has been a huge waste of police time and had a chilling effect on free speech. According to a report for Policy Exchange published in November 2024, police in England and Wales are spending an estimated 60,000 hours a year investigating and recording NCHIs—non-crimes. That is time that could be spent solving actual crimes. Based on FoI requests submitted by the Telegraph and others, the Free Speech Union estimates that over a quarter of a million NCHIs have been recorded since they were first introduced in 2014, and that is in England and Wales alone. That is an average of more than 65 a day.
Why so many? Because if a hate incident is reported to the police by a member of the public, they have little choice but to record it as an NCHI. All that is required is that the victim, or indeed any witness, believes that the incident in question was motivated by hostility towards one or more of the victim’s protected characteristics. No additional evidence is required. Examples include a man accused of whistling the theme tune to “Bob the Builder” whenever he saw his neighbour, a woman who said on social media she thought her cat was a Methodist, and two schoolgirls who told another girl in the school playground that she smelled like fish.
It is hard not to laugh, but for the people who have had NCHIs recorded against them it is no laughing matter. If you apply for a position or a voluntary role that requires you to carry out an enhanced Disclosure and Barring Service check, an NCHI can show up on your record. That is why I say that NCHIs have had a chilling effect on free speech. People are rightly concerned that, if they say something that another person takes offence at, it can permanently blot their copybook and may prevent them getting a job as a teacher or a carer, or volunteering at a charity like the Samaritans. There is also the broader concern that the amount of time the police are spending on investigating and recording non-crimes is undermining public confidence in the police.
That is why I welcome the recommendations that the Minister has shared with us. It sounds like we have finally seen the back of NCHIs—something that the Free Speech Union has been campaigning for for six years now. Assuming that the National Police Chiefs’ Council and the Secretary of State sign off on these proposals, the kind of incidents that were recorded as NCHIs in the past will in future be recorded, as I understand it, as anti-social behaviour incidents, and only those that meet the higher threshold—that is, that recording the incident is considered necessary for the prevention or detection of a crime or for another policing purpose, and it complies with the new recording guidance.
I am particularly encouraged by what we have heard about the new guidance. We have been assured that it will have due regard to the right to freedom of expression and in that way, we hope, protect the police from being dragged into bad-tempered arguments on social media as well as petty disputes between neighbours. In future, if someone calls a control room to complain about a supposedly offensive remark they have seen on Twitter or overheard across the garden fence, the call handler can say, “I’m sorry, but that’s not a policing matter”. That is all to the good, and I take this opportunity to congratulate the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council on producing such a sensible report. This is a welcome dose of common sense that I hope will go some way to restoring public confidence in the police.
Nevertheless, I do not intend not to press the amendment. Our amendment would not prevent the police recording incidents where doing so served a legitimate policing purpose, even in some circumstances logging those incidents on an intelligent management system. Noble Lords, including the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, raised concerns about that during the debate in Committee, and we have adapted our amendment accordingly.
To be clear, this amendment will not prevent the police recording incidents involving a hate element for intelligence-gathering purposes. However, I still have concerns that historic NCHIs could show up in enhanced DBS checks. That is why proposed subsection (5) in this amendment says that the police must not disclose historic NCHIs that would not meet the new higher recording thresholds. I think your Lordships would agree that data entries that would not be made under the new regime, but which are hanging around on police computers, must not be disclosed in enhanced DBS checks.
I have reluctantly come to accept that asking the police to comb through their databases and delete historic NCHIs that would not meet the new recording threshold would be too resource-intensive because of the sheer number that had been recorded, and that demand no longer appears in our amendment. Nevertheless, proposed subsection (5) says that any NCHIs that police come across that would not be recorded under the new regime must be deleted. I do not think that is a big ask, and it would enable people who believe NCHIs have been recorded against their names—trivial incidents that would not be recorded under the new criteria—to ask the police to delete them.
I welcome the assurance that the new recording guidance will have due regard to the right to freedom of expression, but, in the absence of putting any of these recommendations in statute, what guarantee do we have that the College of Policing, under new leadership, or a different Home Secretary, would not dispense with that requirement? Consequently, proposed subsection (4) in the amendment says:
“Guidance in relation to incident recording must have due regard to … freedom of expression”.
That brings me to a broader point. As I understand it, the Government’s plans for taking forward these recommendations—assuming they are signed off—is to include them in guidance, but not statute. The government amendment in this group will repeal the statutory basis for the current NCHI regime, thereby clearing the ground for a new regime to spring up in its place. But that new regime will be wholly reliant on guidance. I do not doubt the Minister will do what he has said he will do with the full support of my noble friend Lord Herbert, the chair of the College of Policing, Sir Andy Marsh the CEO and the chief constables on the national council. But what about their successors? What happens if a more authoritarian Government replace the current one?
The only way to future-proof these recommendations, to guarantee that this new, more sensible arrangement is not short-lived and that NCHIs do not spring back to life, Freddy Krueger-like, in a few years’ time, is to give the new regime some statutory underpinning. Proposed subsection (1) in this amendment drives a stake through the heart of NCHIs and makes sure they cannot be resurrected in the absence of primary legislation to the contrary. No Parliament can bind its successors. Indeed, if the Home Secretary wants to take up some, but not all, of the report’s recommendations, the Government could amend this amendment at Third Reading. In the meantime, I urge them to support these sensible suggestions and put them on a statutory footing.
In my view, too many of the rules governing how public authorities behave are found in guidance when they should properly be in statute. Indeed, the current NCHI regime, which I think we are all agreed is not fit for purpose, emerged from guidance issued by the College of Policing in 2014 and was not put on a statutory footing until 2022, by which time it was too late for Parliament to wrest control over it. A bureaucratic leviathan had been created in the form of ever more voluminous guidance. Let us not make the same mistake again. Something as important as what incidents reported to the police are investigated and recorded and, in some cases, disclosed in enhanced DBS checks is properly a matter for Parliament, which is why I urge your Lordships’ House to support this amendment.
Lord Fuller (Con)
My Lords, as the leader of the local authority, I had to address a public meeting in Wymondham in Norfolk at least 10 years ago, I cannot quite remember. It was about providing accommodation in the local plan for Gypsies and Travellers. I see here in the Chamber this evening at least four former council leaders, and I hope they will sympathise with the dilemma I faced. It is a thorny subject. Not many people have sympathy for Gypsy and Traveller families, but it is one of those hands you are dealt when you become a leader. The meeting was highly charged. I was in the lions’ den, but at least I was able to rely on a briefing from the council solicitor and monitoring officer as to what was the safe ground: the procedure about the local plan, the process about assessing needs, the duty to balance the needs of the settled and travelling communities and the obligations to follow the law. My job was to hold the ring.
I do not think I made any friends that evening, but I was the messenger for a law that not everybody appreciated. But, if the council did not follow the law, who else would? I got out alive and, in the circumstances, I think it probably went as well as it could have. The alternative was probably not to turn up, and that would not have been right at all. So imagine my surprise when I was called to a police interview a few days later to answer for a non-crime hate incident. I was supported by the council’s solicitor, who confirmed that, yes, I had accurately reported the process and the law at the meeting. Right was on my side. But that meant nothing. Perhaps someone in the audience that evening in Wymondham had hurty feelings. Perhaps they had an axe to grind against Gypsies and Travellers. Perhaps they were political opponents. Ironically, perhaps they were prejudiced against me.
Baroness Lawrence of Clarendon (Lab)
My Lords, I did not intend to speak. I spoke in Committee, and I listened to what the Minister put forward and what the noble Lord on the opposite Bench said about the recording of non-crime hate. It depends on how you see non-crime hate and on who is at the receiving end of it. For me, it led to the murder of my son. For individuals who think they have the right to walk around and talk about especially young black men in a certain way, what starts off as just verbal leads to violence. This is what I tried put across in Committee: people see the verbal as a playground, but it is not necessarily that. After the inquiry, when that was put into a recommendation, it was said that, if those who are on the receiving end—or people around them—perceive it to be something, that is what it is.
If you take that away and do not record it, how do you move forward, if it then moves from something verbal into violence and you have no way of tracking back to where it started from? Okay, so within the report here, it could be said in a way so it comes across to make sure that you do not lose that part of it, because some of it leads to violence and that is what happened to my son. Hence, I take offence when people say that it is just playground talk, because it does not necessarily mean that. So noble Lords should please consider what they are saying here and what implications it has outside, and our children.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
Perhaps I could briefly add something to what the noble Baroness has just said. Just to clarify, I think that the kinds of remarks that she is talking about that were made about her son would be recorded and would meet the new criteria under the anti-social behaviour incident regime, which, as I understand it, is going to replace the NCHI regime. They would remain on a police database in a way that could then be used to detect and prevent a crime: they would meet the new recording threshold. I have no objection to that kind of thing being recorded: I think that it would serve a useful policing purpose. So just to be clear, I am not in any way suggesting that those kinds of remarks should not be included in future—I think that they should be—but I want to exclude the more trivial things from being recorded and having the police waste so much time on them.
Baroness Lawrence of Clarendon (Lab)
But you would not know until it gets to that point: to violence. If you do not start off with where it starts from, you will never get to the end, whether that is from trivial chat or whatever you want to call it, or playground. Later on, if that same individual or whoever carries on, that leads to violence, and if you have no way of going back to check where that started from, how do you know to be able to prosecute that individual for what he said, going back further to where we are now? That is what we need to be very careful about.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, to follow on from the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence of Clarendon, one difficulty that we have had in relation to any discussion such as this is that the police are under an enormous amount of pressure because of the horrible things that happen—understatement of the year—to imagine that all speech can lead to violence. If they see that, obviously they will police all speech and treat everybody’s speech as potentially dangerous and damaging. Once that happens, we no longer live in a free, democratic society. That is quite straightforward.
One thing that I think is very difficult is that the horror of Stephen’s racist murder and the fact that the police did not intervene and there was so much scandal around it means that sometimes people feel very nervous, anxious or worried about saying anything in the name of fighting hate, in case they are somehow implicated in having prejudiced views. I would like to enthusiastically welcome the Government’s Amendment 383, abolishing the statutory basis for non-crime hate incidents, because, over the past few years, when some of us have raised problems with non-crime hate incidents, and with the police policing those incidents—as in attitudes and words—it has felt as though we were banging our heads against a brick wall. So it feels quite good to count this as something of a win, and even to be vindicated, because, to be honest, opposing non-crime hate incidents has meant facing some brickbats, both outside here, in my capacity as the director of the Academy of Ideas, and, to be honest, especially in here. There was a less than subtle inference that opposition to non-crime hate incidents, or indeed a whole range of hate legislation in fact, revealed some lurking bigotry or was proof that we were soft on hate.
Yet here we are, and that is proof of something else that is important: that it is always worth raising issues here and battling on, because sometimes Governments can change their minds and sometimes the College of Policing can change its mind—you can make people look at things again. I also welcome the outbreak of common sense and reasonableness from the College of Policing and the fact that there has been a genuine attempt to get on top of what obviously was not intended from the original non-crime hate incidents—it has got completely out of hand. Despite that, and despite the fact that I am delighted that the notions of freedom of expression and free speech have now been taken seriously by the different bodies, I still have some worries and would like some reassurance and clarification from the Minister.
I am worried about the risk of non-crime hate incidents simply being rebranded. The Government have suggested, as we have heard, that some incidents currently recorded as NCHIs will continue to be recorded as anti-social behaviour incidents. Despite what the noble Lord, Lord Young, explained in terms of the higher threshold, I want to check with the Minister whether the behaviour that will be recorded that way will still be based on the subjective premise of a victim perceiving hostility or prejudice towards protected characteristics.
As so much anti-social behaviour regulation, as we discussed earlier on Report, is prosecuted to a lower evidential standard yet treated as a criminal offence and can lead to criminal sanctions, could this lower threshold be used in such incidents? I am worried about repeating the same problems. Can the Minister also rule out that any such anti-social behaviour hate incidents will be added to the national crime database, disclosed in enhanced DBS checks or investigated in much the same way as NCHIs? I am not sure about that.
One reason why I support Amendment 387B in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, is that it will make it harder to set up an alternative recording system that is NCHIs in all but name. I am also worried about ambiguity and confusion if we leave all this to guidance, as has been mentioned. As I understand it, police forces are not prohibited from continuing to record NCHIs under the Government’s amendment for quite a while, and I am just not sure how this is going to happen.
The statutory basis for NCHIs under Sections 60 and 61 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act was simply a way for the Secretary of State to issue guidance. Will repealing the statutory basis alone not simply mean that the police will return to the pre-2023 position where they continue with NCHIs under their own guidance? Maybe I have misunderstood that. Even if that happening only temporarily until the Government worked out exactly what to do, I am concerned about this muddled period.
Amendment 387B would rule out this concerning prospect, offer the police some clarity and guarantee the outcome that we all desire. Clarity, or lack of it, has always been a bugbear in relation to non-crime hate incidents. It is why I am so anxious to hear how the Government’s plans will be communicated, and I hope there will be clarity. On the one hand, we have experience of how a lack of clarity led to the growth of NCHIs without any intention for that to happen. Even the current DPP, Stephen Parkinson, admitted to the Times Crime and Justice Commission that until recently he “had no idea” what an NCHI was, was puzzled by it, and had to look up what on earth the term meant. That was the current DPP, noting that even within the police service there has been some surprise at the level of non-crime hate incidents that were being investigated because they did not know what they were.
The last thing police forces need now is to be left in limbo in any way, while consultation, regulations or guidance is sorted out. We know from An Inspection into Activism and Impartiality in Policing published by His Majesty’s inspectorate in September 2024 that there has been inconsistency in the way forces have responded to NCHI guidance. What happens if some of the more EDI-enthusiastic forces carry on spending thousands of hours sifting through online posts, seeking out so-called hate and so on and investigating common everyday interactions as if they are crimes, which I know is not what the Government or the College of Policing intend?
Limbo in law is never good and any ambiguities can lead to the law being flouted. I will give just one comparison. As of October 2025, the start of the academic year, only one university had complied with the Supreme Court judgment clarifying biological sex in relation to the Equality Act. The rest claimed to be waiting for the EHRC code—waiting for guidance rather than complying with their legal obligations. I do not want the same thing to happen.
Lord Herbert of South Downs (Con)
My Lords, I draw attention to my entry in the register of interests showing that I am the chair of the College of Policing. We are broadly in agreement about the way forward. There is a large measure of agreement that the current system of non-crime hate incidents is no longer fit for purpose. As the Minister said, under the new proposals in the final report into this matter that the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council have produced, which goes to the police chiefs’ council next week for ratification, non-crime hate incidents will no longer be recorded. They will go.
I assure the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that this will not be a mere rebranding exercise. The threshold of an incident will be significantly increased. Common-sense professional judgment will guide decisions and only where there is a genuine risk of harm and a clear policing purpose will incidents continue to be recorded. The powerful intervention by the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence of Clarendon, reminds us of the importance of ensuring that, where there is a risk of harm, we must continue to record the incidents. That was the original reason why, as a result of the recommendation of the Macpherson review, this regime was put in place. However, for all the reasons we have discussed, it does not work properly and there is a better approach that will reduce police time.
So far, so good, and I can therefore agree with most of my noble friend Lord Young’s Amendment 387. The one problematic area is the requirement that all records must be deleted after three months. The policy on deletion is a matter for the Government, not for the College of Police or the National Police Chiefs’ Council, but the view of those bodies is that it would be disproportionately burdensome to go back and delete all the existing records.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
Just to be clear, one of the differences between the amendment as originally drafted and this new version is that the new version no longer asks the police to go through all their databases and delete all historic NCHIs. It just asks them to delete those they come across. So, if a person who thinks they have an NCHI recorded against them, like my noble friend, writes to the police, fires off an SAR and discovers they have an NCHI still recorded against their name—and it does not meet the new, higher recording threshold—the police will be obliged to delete it. The amendment does not ask the police to go through records. As my noble friend says, that would be too resource-intensive; all it asks is that, when they come across them, they delete them if they do not meet the new threshold.
Lord Herbert of South Downs (Con)
Okay; that is helpful. I thank my noble friend, and I am sure the Government will respond to that. But if part of the purpose of this is to ensure that it meets the concern my noble friend set out—that people may, to use his words, be prevented from getting a job because of the release of a non-crime hate incident in an enhanced DBS check—I should point out that the review has not been able to find a single example of a non-crime hate incident being disclosed in an extended DBS check and preventing someone from securing employment. We therefore think the risk of that is very low. The release is a matter for the chief constable’s discretion. Of course, the risk could be made even lower if the new, higher threshold were applied to any future decision, but again, that would be within the Government’s gift to agree. What is already a negligible risk could be made even more negligible, so that would address the concern.
The final question relates to whether non-crime hate incidents will spring back into life, to use my noble friend’s expression. My response is, not so long as I am involved with this, and I am sure I could say the same for the chief executive of the college, Sir Andy Marsh. The serious point, however, is that there clearly has been a change of mood, partly because of the way in which social media has influenced this whole matter. But such action is always within the gift of any future Government, as my noble friend conceded: no Government can bind themselves to changing practice and policy. What matters now is that we put in place a robust regime that works and ensure that the police are focused on the right things.
Therefore, I am very pleased we have this broad agreement about the way forward. I do not think my noble friend’s amendment is necessary, but it is for the Government to respond to that. We must be wary of tying up the police more on this, when we are trying to release their time. We must also be aware of the injunction of the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence: that serious incidents must continue to be recorded. We must remember why this regime was set up in the first place. Not every recorded non-crime hate incident has been trivial; they can indicate a building pattern of behaviour and that is what we have to guard against. But the new system will put in place higher thresholds to ensure that the trivial are weeded out, and that, I think, is what we all want.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
My Lords, given the hour I do not want to detain the House for much longer. In fact, I have deleted the first page of my speech accordingly, and I will address the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, in a moment.
First, this amendment insists that all future incident recording guidance must have due regard to freedom of expression—and that matters. In a liberal democracy, the test is not whether we protect only speech we agree with; it is whether we protect the space for robust, sometimes uncomfortable, debate on race, religion, sex, gender, politics and many other issues.
Police guidance should start from the principle that lawful speech is not a policing problem. Further, it deals with the past as well as the future. It should require that historic non-crime hate incident records which do not meet the proper recording threshold must not be disclosed on DBS checks and must be deleted when discovered. That is vital for natural justice. If we accept that this category has been misused and overused, we cannot leave people’s lives quietly marred by data that should never have been held in the first place. I particularly address these remarks to the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence.
This is not about turning a blind eye to genuine hate crime. On the contrary, by scrapping a vague, perception-based non-crime category, we free up police time and attention to focus on real offences: threats, harassment, violence and criminal damage. We will make the system clearer for victims and for officers. We will be sending a simple message that if you have been the victim of a crime, the law is there to protect you, and if you have merely heard something you strongly dislike, that is not in itself a matter for the police.
At the moment, too many people are unsure where that line lies. They fear that expressing a lawful view on a controversial subject might bring a knock at the door or a mark on their record. That chilling effect is corrosive. It drives honest disagreement underground and pushes some people out of the public square altogether. We should be defending the right to argue and criticise, and to challenge within the law, not encouraging people to outsource every disagreement to the police.
The amendment would preserve the ability of the police to record information where it is genuinely necessary for crime prevention and public safety. It would hardwire respect for freedom of expression into any future guidance. In doing so, it would strengthen civil liberties and good policing. It says that the police are there to deal with crime, not to catalogue lawful opinions. This is a distinction worth defending and I urge the House to support this amendment.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I have listened carefully to the contributions from the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Young, on their amendments, and to other speakers around your Lordships’ House. I want to return to the difficult and sensitive issues, raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, of where the boundaries are and protecting the vulnerable versus free speech. We have debated that in some detail, with examples in Committee, so I will not rehearse those. I have two questions for the Minister about the new arrangements.
We are losing from the guidance a useful paragraph that sets out exactly that the risk of significant harm may be greater if the individual who has experienced the incident is considered to be vulnerable, and then directs people to the College of Policing as to how the police do that. I mention this to the noble Lord, Lord Young, who said that everything under the regime that is about to disappear was entirely in the view of the individual who felt that that they were being done. That has not been the case. It has been assessed by the police, following the code of practice.
Can the Minister reassure your Lordships’ House that, in deleting Sections 60 and 61 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act, the police will not lose the balance that we have in the current code that sets out how to determine a vulnerable person from one of the categories covered in the Act, including race, religion, disability and LGBT, and the real risk that a crime may be committed in the future?
The noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, spoke very eloquently. What she did not say, and everyone has assumed, is that it was absolutely obvious from the start, when the verbal attacks started on Stephen and other young people in his area, that it would not have looked like something that should have been recorded. But there is something called a course of conduct, which is very common in harassment and stalking and a number of anti-social behaviours that start to build up, and the police bring in psychologists to look at that behaviour. One of the problems is that we cannot lose that progression. If things stop being recorded, I do not understand how you can do it. There are certainly rules about not using it in DBS checks, but if you lose that information, I really fear that the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, is right to have concerns. So, can I ask the Minister if the Government—
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
The disagreement is not about whether incidents should be recorded because they could form part of a course of conduct which ends in a serious crime. The argument is about where the recording threshold should be placed. Surely the noble Baroness will accept that, if it is so low that the police are recording 65 non-crime hate incidents every day in England and Wales alone, then the threshold is too low.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
The hour is late and I really do not want to get into a debate about that. The point is that the police are going to have to make whatever the new system is work. My worry is that there seems to be a line now that might exclude cases that are important because of the course of conduct which might become a criminal act.
I did not manage to get quite to the end of my speech. I therefore ask the Minister whether the Government are confident that such a course of conduct under a number of non-crime hate incidents would be visible to the police if the code of practice is repealed and the police stop recording them.
Lord Lebedev (CB)
My Lords, I will not take much of your time. First, I fully respect and acknowledge the arguments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, which I feel have been addressed very well from the other side of the House. I support Amendment 387B and endorse the arguments made by noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, in favour of this amendment.
Last July, I was able to raise the widespread concerns so many of us have about non-crime hate incidents—NCHIs—in a short debate in this House. I was encouraged by the widespread support across parties for a robust stance in defence of free speech. Many noble Lords outlined how pernicious NCHIs are. I was grateful to the Minister for his thoughtful engagement on the arguments.
Since that debate, there has been a welcome retreat from the use of NCHIs, with the Metropolitan Police Commissioner and others recognising the inappropriateness of using valuable police time to harass individuals for exercising their right to free speech. Like the noble Lord, Lord Young, I am pleased that police leaders and Ministers now recognise that recording the names of citizens on police databases for actions which are not crimes should be curtailed. That is customary good practice, but it is, in this case, not enough.
We need to ensure that there is appropriate statutory protection for free speech, and we need to ensure that past expressions of opinion, which may have been recorded under a previous regime, cannot be used to blight the future of citizens. Amendment 387B would not only wipe clean the slate but affirm the importance of free speech, the foundational freedom on which all others depend. I commend it to the House.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow so many excellent speeches from noble Lords across the House who recognise the problems that non-crime hate incidents have caused. I am very pleased to see that there is much agreement on this matter, and I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Herbert of South Downs, for his update, as it were. I am also particularly grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, for her very important intervention.
Like many of my noble friends and many noble Lords around the House, I fully support Amendment 387B tabled by my noble friend Lord Young of Acton and the noble Lords, Lord Strasburger and Lord Hogan-Howe. The amendment would bring about the abolition of the category of so-called non-crime hate incidents. If this were to become the law of the land, NCHIs would be permanently dead. Their recording and retention would end, and we could finally put this well-intentioned but ultimately damaging experiment to bed.
We have had many debates during the passage of the Bill about the various tenets of hate crime laws and aggravating factors based on hostility. Indeed, only last Wednesday, the Government were successful in expanding their enormous web of legislation even further, despite our best efforts to stop them. We have lost that battle for now, but I reiterate my opposition to those provisions. While related to the debate we had last Wednesday, the matter before us now is rather different. Non-crime hate incidents are not hate crimes; they are something quite different. They represent the recording by police of incidents that are not crimes at all.
The House will have heard the background to NCHIs from other noble Lords, so I will not repeat that, but their establishment in 2014 via guidance issued by the College of Policing was motivated by sincere intentions. They were supposed to assist police in identifying patterns of hostility in communities that might escalate into criminal behaviour, and that objective was understandable, but in practice, the policy has drifted far beyond that limited purpose. We now find ourselves in a position where individuals can have a police record created about them for conduct that is entirely lawful, simply because another person perceives it to have been motivated by hostility. That is a very serious matter indeed.
The threshold for the recording of these incidents is ridiculously low. A person needs only to be concerned by another’s conduct in order for them to report such conduct to the police for recording as an NCHI.
The matter has quite rightly received serious scrutiny in recent years, and I particularly want to reference the independent review conducted by the College of Policing and led by my noble friend Lord Herbert of South Downs into the use of non-crime hate incidents. The review acknowledged a number of very significant concerns, and it recognised that the recording of such incidents had in some cases created a chilling effect on free expression. It also identified problems with the threshold for recording and the potential for disproportionate interference in the lives of individuals who had committed no crime.
The review led to revised guidance from the College of Policing intended to raise the threshold for recording NCHIs and better protect freedom of expression. I welcome that effort. It was a step in the right direction.
The review also demonstrated something more fundamental—that the concept itself is deeply problematic. We have seen, over the years, a number of examples where the recording of non-crime hate incidents has been plainly vexatious, trivial or disproportionate. In one widely reported case, a former police officer found himself the subject of a non-crime hate incident after engaging in a debate on social media about gender identity. There are several examples that have been given in the debate, so I shall not provide further evidence. There have been cases where individuals have had police records created simply for sharing satirical material online, expressing controversial opinions or engaging in perfectly lawful political debate. We should pause and consider what this means in practice.
In some circumstances, such records may be disclosed during enhanced background checks conducted by the Disclosure and Barring Service. That means that an allegation about a non-criminal matter could potentially affect a person’s employment prospects, particularly in professions involving children or vulnerable adults. There have been documented cases where individuals have feared precisely that outcome.
I also recall the remarks of Ministers during our Committee debates, in which the Government acknowledged the importance of protecting free speech in this area, and the Home Office has repeatedly recognised the need to strike the right balance. Indeed, the Home Secretary herself has spoken publicly about the importance of ensuring that policing does not stray into the regulation of lawful expression. She has emphasised that police officers must focus on real crime and genuine threats to public safety. I agree with those sentiments, but I suggest that the time has come to move beyond incremental reform. The fundamental difficulty is that the concept of a non-crime hate incident places the police in the position of adjudicating perceived hostility in circumstances where no law has been broken. That is an uncomfortable and inappropriate role for the police service.
I put on record my thanks to the Minister for making the time to meet us and to the College of Policing for the briefing it gave on its plans for the future recording of such incidents. It was helpful of the Minister to set out some of that when we opened.
As my noble friend Lord Young of Acton said, the proposals by the college are certainly welcome. It has been clear that NCHIs will not exist any more and that any incident where hostility is a motivating factor will now be recorded as an ASB incident. Critically, these will not be disclosed in enhanced DBS checks. The college has also said that it will be providing updated guidance and training to clarify the higher standards of proof required for the recording of such incidents, and a new triaging method.
This is all welcome, but that does not mean that all is perfect. I still have some concerns and will briefly outline them. My first concern is that, if the abolition of NCHIs is not embedded in statute, there is the possibility of them being brought back to life in the future. All it would take is a change in Home Secretary, or a new Prime Minister, who could reintroduce them by the back door. If all we have is guidance, there is no legal safeguard to prevent them returning. I would feel much more comfortable knowing that they are gone for good and will never be resurrected from the dead.
Secondly, it must be explicitly acknowledged that any guidance produced by the College of Policing about the future recording of incidents will have freedom of expression at its heart. If this had been the case when the NCHI regime was created, we might not have seen as many unintended consequences. It is a fairly basic requirement, which is why I am pleased that my noble friend has included that in his amendment.
Thirdly, the issue of historic NCHI recordings needs to be addressed. Given that the Government have now agreed to abolish them, it does not seem right that thousands will still exist and may very well be disclosed in enhanced DBS checks. That is a matter of fairness. Individuals should not carry the burden of a police record relating to conduct that was never a crime in the first place. That has now been acknowledged as a mistake.
However, like my noble friend, I appreciate the point made by the College of Policing: that to require their deletion within a few months, as the original amendment sought, would be a highly labour-intensive process. If our purpose is to prevent the police wasting time and allow them to do their job, requiring them to sit down and trawl through every single file does not make sense. However, where NCHI recordings are discovered, they should be deleted and they most certainly should not be disclosed. It is sensible to have the guarantee in statute.
The college and the Government have made commendable progress and I reiterate that I am genuinely pleased at the direction of travel. However, we still need some guardrails. That is why we on these Benches believe that there must be a provision in legislation to ensure that NCHIs are gone, that they do not return and that the new regime is more transparent, reasonable and respectful of freedom of expression. For that reason, I very much support Amendment 378B and, if my noble friend does press it to a Division, we will follow him into the Content Lobby.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful for the discussion and, in winding up this debate, I put on record my thanks to Sir Andy Marsh of the College of Policing for the work he has done on this exercise of examining non-crime hate incidents. I remind the House that we are here today with the amendments I have tabled and with the outline that I have given from the College of Policing response, which the chair of the College of Policing has also endorsed. We are here today because the then Home Secretary, my right honourable friend Yvette Cooper, commissioned that review and asked for a report to be produced. That is why we are here today: we have taken action.
I listened with great interest to the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, talking about his experiences. That was not the responsibility of this Government. We are trying to change that regime. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, that we are trying to change that regime. I say to all noble Lords who spoke that we are trying to change that regime. However, I say to my noble friend Lady Lawrence of Clarendon that, in doing so, we want to ensure that we keep the essence of what that regime was established for: to identify precisely the issues that she mentioned in her very powerful contribution. The intent—to gather information, to prevent crime, to understand tensions, to look at potential areas where tensions could arise, to support investigations and to safeguard the vulnerable—remains as relevant today as it did 30 years ago.
I say to the noble Lords, Lord Lebedev, Lord Fuller, Lord Young of Acton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, who have spoken on this issue, that we understand the issue. However, I hope that we are making some movement to address the concerns, at the same time as keeping the essence of why those non-crime hate incidents needed to be recorded in the first place, and to have the revisions that the College of Policing have brought forward. Once they are endorsed, we will look at how we put those into practice in due course. I hope that will help both the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
I thank the Minister for giving way. I am struggling to understand what the rationale would be for disclosing in an enhanced DBS check an NCHI which, under the new recording thresholds, would not have been recorded. The Minister elided the issue by suggesting that the police—a chief constable—might think in future it would be sensible to disclose relevant information if someone is applying to work with children or vulnerable adults. But if the police would not have recorded that historic NCHI under the new higher recording threshold—because it would not be considered to have any police or intelligence value, or value in the detection or prevention of a crime—what justification could there be for disclosing it in an enhanced DBS check? If there is not one, what will it cost the Government to put it in statute that it cannot happen?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The noble Lord is asking for the deletion of historic records. That is the important point I am trying to make. If the chief officer determines that that non-conviction information should be disclosed—I go back to the 4,920 disclosures out of 4.1 million, including all matters for an enhanced DBS check—then it is important that we do not fetter the chief officer’s hands and apply a prohibition to disclose information which may be relevant to individuals. That may be a difference between us and, as the noble Lord, Lord David of Gower, said, we may well test that in a Division when the time comes.
The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, made the absolutely right point that we need to ensure that we do not repeal Sections 60 and 61 until a replacement framework is in place. We will try to do that. As I said at the start of the debate and in the comments I have just made, it is essential that police and others continue to have the ability to monitor hate and hostility to prevent crime and safeguard the vulnerable. That is also the assurance I give to my noble friend Lady Lawrence.
In summary, the Government’s amendment is designed to repeal the statutory guidance, restore focus and reduce administrative burdens. We have made those changes because of the type of incidents noble Lords referred to. Amendment 387B would risk creating precisely the opposite effect and, for those reasons, the Government cannot support it. I invite the noble Lord not to move his amendment when the time comes, but, in the meantime—tonight—I commend Amendment 383 because, having considered and reviewed the matter, it is the right thing to do. In establishing the new regime, we will make sure that we keep the essence of the important matters from the former regime.
Crime and Policing Bill
Wednesday 11th March 2026
(2 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 167-V(a) Amendments for Report (Supplementary to the Fifth Marshalled List) - (10 Mar 2026)
17:30 - Division on Amendment 387A - Ayes: 215 / Noes: 180 - Amendment 387A agreed.
17:44 - Division on Amendment 387B - Ayes: 227 / Noes: 221 - Amendment 387B agreed.
19:16 - Division on Amendment 391 - Ayes: 163 / Noes: 153 - Amendment 391 agreed.
“Police charges for escorting vehicles or trailers carrying a load of exceptional dimensions(1) Within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must, by regulations, establish a framework to regulate the fees charged to hauliers by police forces for escorting a vehicle or trailer carrying a load of exceptional dimensions. (2) The framework under subsection (1) must—(a) include criteria to specify when a police escort is required for vehicles or trailers carrying a load of exceptional dimensions, as opposed to a private self-escort, and(b) set out the fees police forces may charge for escorting vehicles or trailers carrying a load of exceptional dimensions.(3) Police forces may submit applications in writing to the Secretary of State to disapply the fees set by the regulatory framework in extenuating circumstances.(4) The Secretary of State must make a determination within ten days of receiving an application submitted under subsection (3).(5) In this section “vehicle or trailer carrying a load of exceptional dimensions” means a vehicle or trailer the use of which is authorised by an order made under section 44(1)(d) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (authorisation of use on roads of special vehicles not complying with regulations under section 41).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to require the Secretary of State to establish a regulatory framework to manage the fees charged to hauliers by police forces for escorting a vehicle or trailer carrying a load of exceptional dimensions.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, I fear I am a wholly inadequate substitute for my noble friend Lord Attlee, who has now retired from your Lordships’ House after 35 years of dedicated service. During that time, he raised many important issues relating to haulage, including in Committee on this Bill. While my noble friend was proud to be the only Member of either House of Parliament with an HGV licence, I should admit, with a little shame, that I do not have a driving licence at all. There is perhaps a lesson in that, now that we have passed a Bill to expel our hereditary colleagues, with all their varied areas of expertise, leaving behind former apparatchiks such as me.
I was very glad to support my noble friend’s amendment in Committee and to take up the cudgels now, alongside the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner of Worcester, because it is an issue which has a profound impact on many organisations across the cultural, tourism and heritage sectors, not least our heritage railways, as the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, set out very strongly in Committee. This weekend, he and I had the pleasure of being in Llandudno, in our capacities as president and chairman of the Heritage Railway Association, for the HRA annual awards. These celebrated the extraordinary achievements of charities, small businesses and volunteers of all ages, from every corner of the UK, in keeping this much-loved part of our national heritage thriving in the face of considerable challenges, such as rising costs, employment taxes and more.
I was especially pleased to see such strong representation there from the north-east of England as we celebrated those responsible for marking the 200th anniversary of the first passenger rail journey from Stockton to Darlington in such style, and I was delighted to see the Tanfield Railway, which charts its history back 100 years even further, to the age of horse-driven wagon-ways, become Railway of the Year. That means that a small corner of County Durham now boasts the Museum of the Year, in Beamish, and the Railway of the Year just a few minutes away.
However, one of the things which makes the work of brilliant organisations like these harder is the way that certain police forces manage the movement of abnormal loads on our road network. The movement of most heritage rolling stock between railways is undertaken by road on low loaders. These movements are vital for the galas at which historic locomotives and vintage carriages bring such joy to people of all generations—not to mention inward investment to towns, cities and rural communities—as well as for essential maintenance and repairs. These road movements are undertaken by specialist haulage contractors and sometimes have to be accompanied by a police escort vehicle. The cost of these police escorts is typically between £2,500 and £5,000 per trip, but they can be higher and, in some cases, even exceed the haulier’s charges, with some heritage railways reporting charges that they have seen in excess of £7,000. For many of our heritage railways, which are registered charities or small businesses operating on very tight margins, these costs can be entirely prohibitive.
Moreover, there is widespread inconsistency in the application of these charges, with some police forces charging and others not. Most determine whether a police escort is required based on the weight of the load, but some determine it on the length. In some cases, an escort is required only for a few miles through a particular police force area, with the rest of the journey going unescorted, but a full fee is still applied. To avoid these charges, some hauliers are now making large and unnecessary detours, which add mileage and costs, and increase the environmental impact. In Committee, my noble friend Lord Attlee and the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, explained that a particular culprit in this regard is West Midlands Police, which many hauliers have been trying to avoid because of the unhelpful attitudes that it has displayed, but of course that is not very easy given its central location in England.
Following the debates in Committee and the tireless efforts of my noble friend Lord Attlee, the Policing Minister Sarah Jones had a helpful exchange of correspondence with the acting chief constable of West Midlands, underlining the importance of adhering to the guidance issued by the National Police Chiefs’ Council on this matter. We are very grateful to the Minister for writing in the way that she did, and we all hope that her letter and the change of leadership at that force will bring some improvements. However, West Midlands is far from the only force causing dismay with an inconsistent approach or excessive charges. Heritage railways moving loads through Staffordshire, West Yorkshire, Derbyshire, Greater Manchester, South Yorkshire and parts of Scotland have all reported similar issues to those confronted in the West Midlands.
This is a problem that afflicts many businesses and organisations in every sector. I have heard from the Holiday and Residential Parks Association, which represents the owners and operators of approximately 3,000 holiday, touring and residential parks across the United Kingdom. Its members also have experienced excessive cost increases when transporting static caravans to and from holiday parks, as well as significant delays from an inconsistent application of embargoes by various police forces. Most troublingly, the Holiday and Residential Parks Association says that, despite the publication of revised guidance by the NPCC last summer, it and its members continue to see very little improvement in practice. Given the need for clarity and consistency, this is not a matter which should have rely on the whims of individual police forces or the good offices of the Policing Minister, whoever he or she happens to be at the time.
It is particularly damaging for rural and coastal areas where tourism is one of the major sources of employment. If the Government want to support economic growth across our country, here is a clear area in which they could act to help the growth creators. The Minister has been very helpful in discussing this matter with the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, and me. First, can he say what weight the guidance prepared by the National Police Chiefs’ Council carries? What penalties or remedies apply if an individual force do not adhere to it? Secondly, can the Minister set out some of the actions that the West Midlands Police has promised, following the exchange of correspondence between it and the Policing Minister? Thirdly, the noble Lord, Lord Katz, said in Committee that:
“Introducing a standardised regulatory framework … would also risk undermining the ability of forces to respond flexibly and proportionately to local needs”.—[Official Report, 15/1/26; col. 1953.]
Does he really think it fair that heritage railways or holiday parks in some parts of the country should be treated differently to others, and does he think it right to risk creating the sort of postcode lottery that we have already begun to see?
Amendment 384, which the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, and I are proud to bring forward on behalf of our noble friend Lord Attlee, and building on his work, does not ask Ministers to intervene in operational matters. It simply requires the Secretary of State to establish a regulatory framework to manage more clearly and consistently the fees that are charged to hauliers when escorting what may be dryly termed in the industry as “abnormal loads”, but which ordinary people across this country would think of as inspiring locomotives, much-loved holiday homes and more besides. I beg to move.
Lord Faulkner of Worcester (Lab)
My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 384, which is similar to the one tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and debated in Committee on 15 January. Police charges for abnormal loads are a cause he very much made his own, as the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, said, and I am sorry that his retirement from your Lordships’ House came just a couple of weeks too early for him to be here to move the amendment today.
Lord Addington (LD)
My Lords, I am an unworthy substitute for the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, but I am afraid it is one of those occasions when real life catches up with your Lordships’ House; it has stopped her being here today. She supports the amendment. When you start to think about it, it comes under the heading of a no-brainer: there should be a consistent approach. If you are taking on an economic activity to transport something across the country, you should have a rough idea about a consistent approach to transporting it. If you have not, there should be a very good reason. There does not seem to be one, other than it having been decided that they will be charged at this rate.
Heritage railways are a nice cause, but there are more widespread and universal economic impacts from this if you transport goods on our main transport system without incurring extra, sometimes prohibitive costs. It would be comparatively easy for the Government to at least bring them into line and give them some steer as to a realistic level of charge to be placed on them. At the very least, admin considerations around this can be cut down. I hope the Minister will be able to tell us that it is all in hand and that the Government have a timetable for making sure anybody involved in this knows what is happening, so that everybody can say “thank you very much” and move on to the next issue.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I too support the amendment. I suggest that if, as I hope, the Minister agrees that regulations are needed, they should not just deal with consistency but impose a substantive limit on the fees to be charged. It seems that in this context, as in many others, the maximum that should be charged is the cost incurred to police forces.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, although the movement of abnormal loads may seem like a niche and marginal activity, my noble friend Lord Attlee, who recently retired from your Lordships’ House, laid out a compelling argument in Committee for why that is not the case. The heavy haulage industry is a vital component of our national infrastructure and construction sectors, yet the framework governing when police escorts are required and how much may be charged for them is inconsistent.
It is wonderful that my noble friend Lord Parkinson has now taken up the mantle on this matter. He began his contribution by outlining his concerns about the use of heavy haulage by the heritage railway industry, an issue also raised by the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner of Worcester. The issues are wider than that. In Committee, Earl Attlee spoke with considerable authority on this matter and set out the difficulties that parts of the industry have experienced. In particular, he highlighted the sharp increase in charges in certain areas and the absence of any national framework governing those fees. In some cases, police forces have charged for a full shift of officers, even where the escort itself may take a very short period of time. Industry representatives have raised understandable concerns that such practices can result in costs that far exceed the cost of the haulage operation itself.
The overwhelming majority of police forces apply the relevant legislation in good faith and without difficulty. The problem appears to arise in only a minority of forces, where the absence of national guidance has led to practices that the industry considers disproportionate. The result is uncertainty for hauliers, increased costs for major infrastructure projects and, ultimately, inefficiency within a system that should be operating smoothly.
Therefore, the amendment seeks to ensure that there is a clear national framework. It sets out when police escorts are truly necessary, as opposed to private self-escorts, and would establish a transparent schedule of fees. It also sensibly seeks to allow police forces to apply to the Secretary of State for flexibility in genuinely exceptional circumstances. Put simply, the amendment balances the need for consistency with the operational realities that police forces face. For those reasons, I am grateful both for the tireless campaigning of Earl Attlee and to my noble friend Lord Parkinson for continuing to push the Government on this matter.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, I join all the speakers in the debate on this small but important issue in praising the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, who, after almost 34 years of service in this House, retired just a few days ago. It would be remiss of me not to join in paying tribute to him, his work and the tenacity with which he pursued this issue, including recruiting the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, and my noble friend Lord Faulkner of Worcester to take up the cudgels on his behalf. He was a true champion of the heavy haulage industry. As the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, said, it is important that we focus on this not just because of the impact on the Heritage Railway Association—as dear as it is to many hearts in your Lordships’ House—but because of the importance it has to our economy, including all the construction and infrastructure that we wish to provide.
Earl Attlee took great pride in being the only Member of your Lordships’ House to hold an HGV licence. I hope that, in his absence, he is pleased to know that that knowledge gap has been bridged in some part by my newly introduced noble friend Lord Roe of West Wickham. By virtue of being a firefighter, he holds—or at least held—an HGV licence for the purpose of driving fire engines. I think that Earl Attlee would have appreciated that.
Moving to the matters before us in the amendments, as noble Lords have explained, the amendment relates to setting criteria specifying when a police escort is required and charges levied by the police for escorting abnormal loads and would require the Secretary of State to establish a framework to regulate such fees. While I recognise that the aim of the amendment is to improve consistency and predictability for operators moving such loads, we do not believe that a new statutory framework is necessary.
Changes have already been made to support greater consistency. In May last year, the National Police Chiefs’ Council published new guidance outlining when police escorts should be provided for abnormal loads. This was developed in collaboration with policing, industry and national highways. The NPCC Abnormal Load Guidance 2025 is the national framework used by all UK police forces to determine whether an escort is required and, if so, whether that escort must be provided by the police or can be undertaken as a self-escort. Furthermore, a national framework setting out charges for escorting these loads already exists. Section 25 of the Police Act 1996 contains a power for the police to recharge the cost of policing in specific circumstances. Fee levels are set out in the guidance on special police services by the NPCC, and this is updated annually.
Introducing a standardised regulatory framework—as I said in Committee, and I will repeat it here—undermines the ability of forces to respond flexibly and proportionately to local needs. We cannot escape this fact. The operational demands placed on police forces by abnormal load movements can differ across the country and are influenced by a range of local factors, including geography, road infrastructure, traffic additions and the availability of police resources.
To be clear, the Government take this issue seriously. As we have heard, following a meeting with the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, my colleague, Policing Minister Jones, wrote to West Midlands Police to pass on her concerns. I am grateful for the commendation from the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, and my noble friend Lord Faulkner, of that correspondence. As a result, I understand that West Midlands Police is undertaking an independent, expert evaluation to assess the force’s compliance systems and processes against the NPCC guidance.
It is important to allow time for the recent guidance to have effect before considering further action. Furthermore, to ensure that it remains fit for purpose, the NPCC has committed to formally review its abnormal loads guidance 12 months after publication; that is, in May of this year—a couple of months’ time.
I understand noble Lords’ concerns around the adherence of police forces to this guidance. Therefore, I can confirm that the Government will write to the NPCC following Royal Assent of the Bill to remind forces of the need to follow the guidance I have mentioned.
The noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, and, in the same spirit, my noble friend Lord Faulkner asked what weight could be given to the guidance issued by the NPCC and what actions might be pursued by West Midlands Police as a consequence. As I have already said, West Midlands Police is undertaking a review. This is NPCC guidance, which it is itself reviewing to make sure that it remains current and responsive to issues that emerge over time.
There is always a balance between having inflexible statutory guidance, inflexible statutory regulation and guidance that is operated locally. We are currently on the side of the latter. Within that, this is national guidance. Police forces will pay great attention to that. They will pay even greater attention to the idea that, to quote my noble friend Lord Faulkner, the Policing Minister is “on the case” with this. With respect, I think that is an appropriate level of intervention. The Government are aware that it is an important issue. We will always keep our eyes on it and make sure that we can have a level of scrutiny to ensure that police forces behave respectfully toward hauliers while maintaining their local operational independence.
Lord Pannick (CB)
I am very grateful to the Minister. Will the letter that the Minister mentioned make the point that it is unacceptable in principle for police forces to seek to make a profit via the imposition of these fees?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I would need to go back and check on the correspondence for the noble Lord, but this is about making sure that this is covering costs, rather than anything else.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Addington and Lord Pannick, the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, in her absence, as well as to my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel, for their support on the amendment. I am grateful to the Minister for his reply, for the engagement that we had in recent days and for the meetings he had before that with my noble friend Lord Attlee. As the noble Lord, Lord Addington, said, this ought to be a no-brainer. We need consistency from police forces, and we have not seen that. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, rightly added that it is important that industry and all the sectors affected see that, where charges are applied, it is merely to cover legitimate costs and not a useful revenue stream for police forces, as many suspect it has become.
“Wearing a face covering while cycling(1) A constable may stop any person to whom subsection (2) applies.(2) This subsection applies to a person who wears a face covering while cycling or riding a scooter in such a way as to conceal their identity.(3) Where a constable has exercised the power under subsection (1), the constable may also require the person to remove the face covering.(4) A person who fails to stop when required to do so by a constable in the exercise of their powers under this section commits an offence.(5) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month or a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale (or both).”
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
My Lords, the amendment was tabled by my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe and I have attached my name to it. Before I move on to it, I want briefly to indicate my support for the excellent amendment in this group tabled by my noble friend Lady Buscombe, Amendment 387A, which would give regulatory authorities greater powers to tackle illegal activity that is afflicting many villages, towns and cities in our country and, in particular, is impacting the amenity and quality of life in residential and commercial areas. I very much hope that the House is predisposed to support that amendment.
Amendment 385 seeks to get around the problem of cyclists hiding themselves from the public by covering their faces when breaking the law. It would give police officers the power to stop individuals while wearing a face covering. Following an intervention from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, in Committee, my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe also provided that a constable may require the person to remove the face covering.
I think it is fair to say that many of us have been disappointed by the Government’s response so far to all the amendments on cycling, e-bikes and e-scooters, and to our efforts to use the Bill to destroy the business model that makes mobile phone thefts so profitable and attractive to criminals. I do not seek to relitigate our debate last week on mobile phone theft, but I hope that your Lordships’ House can understand the context in which I am moving the amendment in my noble friend’s name.
My noble friend Lord Davies of Gower said from our Front Bench in Committee:
“I task any Member of the Committee to watch footage of these phone thefts and deny that there is a problem with face coverings and bikes. Face coverings mean that they are not detected by CCTV, while electric bikes, often modified, mean that the victim has no chance of chasing and retrieving the stolen property”.—[Official Report, 20/1/26; col. 163.]
Our city streets now teem with men—they are usually men—on fast cycles, electric bikes and scooters, whose faces are, even in summer, hidden by balaclavas or ski masks. This feels hostile even if it is not, especially if it is accompanied by loud music or shouts of, “Get out of the way”. Often, the intentions of such concealment are malign; at best, they are hurrying to make fast-food deliveries and endangering people like me who are using the pavement for its proper purpose.
I must stress that we are not talking about this being a London-only issue. For example, newspaper reports show that, in Darlington, there were hundreds of complaints last year about youths on bikes wearing balaclavas and riding recklessly in groups around pedestrians, which is appalling—especially for the elderly or infirm. We need to put a stop to all of this. We need a new power, and we need it now, rather than waiting while the problem grows.
I should make it clear that I am not against cycling or the wearing of masks, scarves or helmets. This is not a prohibition. I merely want the police to have the powers they need to take action where they suspect that a crime is being committed. The powers in the Public Order Act to remove face coverings in designated areas or for local authorities to make public space protection orders—these were mentioned by the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Katz, in winding up—are inadequate. They may be useful for hotspots such as Oxford Circus— I strongly support such use—but they ignore the fact that cycle crime is widespread and undermining faith in both the police and the Government.
The Minister of State, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, later argued in our debate on Report on 4 March that mobile phone theft is coming down a bit: it is down by 12% under this Government. I concede that—it is good news—but it is still at an appalling level, making life miserable for tens of thousands of victims. I made the point that, in 2023, there were 4,985 cases of robbery and theft of a mobile phone in London alone, using a motorcycle or an e-bike, and that a face covering was worn in more than 1,000 of those incidents.
We have also heard that the Department for Transport is planning legislation on what it likes to call “micro-mobility”. However, as the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, suggested, such legislation could in practice take another two years; in fact, it could take longer to secure a legislative slot. My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe made the point that, when the Food Safety Act was passed, during which time she was a civil servant, it had been waiting for a slot for nearly 10 years; that was until Edwina Currie created a crisis and it became a political priority. In short, we cannot wait.
Moreover, this Bill is the right vehicle for this amendment on face coverings because it concerns the enforcement of criminal law by the police, rather than controls on cyclists, cycles and e-bikes per se. Countries such as Switzerland, France and Denmark are reported to have proscribed facial coverings in public spaces. I am not seeking to go that far.
To summarise, this amendment would allow a police officer—but not other enforcement officers, it should be noted—to stop a person cycling or riding a scooter who is wearing a face covering in such a way as to conceal their identity, and to require them to remove it. It would not ban such face coverings. The penalty would be a level-3 fine of up to £1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding one month.
My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe tackled this matter gently in Committee, hoping that the Minister would take the opportunity to bring forward a government amendment on Report. In the absence of a more positive response, I would normally have been minded to test the opinion of the House, but, in the interests of the expeditious transaction of House business, I will not do so. I beg to move.
Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)
My Lords, my Amendment 386 seeks to enable police officers, after a lawful stop, to ask a member of the public to exit the vehicle. I support the work of the Police Federation of England and Wales, and I have tabled this amendment for four obvious reasons.
First, the amendment seeks to close a clear operational gap. In a world of keyless and electric vehicles, removing the key no longer guarantees that the vehicle is disabled. Officers need a law to reflect this reality. Secondly, the amendment would create a modest and practical power, not a sweeping new stop power. It would apply only after a lawful stop has taken place and would allow officers to control the scene more safely. Thirdly, it is about the safety of officers, passengers and the wider public. Requiring occupants to exit a live vehicle can reduce the risk of sudden flight, injury, interference with evidence and escalation at the roadside. Fourthly, the amendment contains proper safeguards. The tests of reasonableness and proportionality are built in, and the Secretary of State may issue guidance linked to the PACE codes.
This is a sensible, limited and necessary amendment that I hope the House will support. We are now living in an era when many police officers and members of the public are being harmed, because people can simply drive away as police officers do not have the right to make the situation safe by asking them to step out of the car. I have been through the reasons why this is a proportionate and useful amendment that fills a gap that needs to be filled. I commend it to the House.
Baroness Buscombe (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 387A. Let me begin by explaining the reason and intent behind this simple amendment. On 20 January, further to an Urgent Question regarding business rates in the hospitality sector, I asked,
“are any of the many thousands of Turkish barbers, as they are so called, vape shops and nail bars—which are all cash only and which have infected our villages, towns and cities—paying any business rates? … We know that most of them are about money laundering, organised crime and county lines drugs”.
In his response, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, the noble Lord, Lord Livermore, stated:
“I agree with a great deal of what the noble Baroness says. HMRC has announced substantial measures to crack down on some of the businesses she mentioned, and I think she will have seen several of them closing in recent months. She is quite right that more needs to be done”. ”.—[Official Report, 20/1/26; col. 139.]
The Labour MP Joe Powell stated recently:
“The crackdown on dodgy shops across the country is something the public cares deeply about. Our high streets are being hollowed out by illegitimate businesses that often don’t pay the tax they owe, sell illicit goods and have links to serious organised crime. That has real consequences for those that play by the rules, and for communities fed up with seeing illegal activity in plain sight”.
In response to an Oral Question on 5 March in your Lordships’ House regarding growth in cash-only businesses, the Labour Peer, the noble Lord, Lord Watts —to whom I have given notice that I will be referencing him in this debate—stated that the businesses
“are not there for the customers’ benefit but, in some cases, for the business to avoid tax and other things”.
The noble Lord, Lord Livermore, in response, stated that
“the Government are very aware ... HMRC has recently engaged in increased enforcement activity around those exact points”. —[Official Report, 5/3/26; col. 1415.]
There is clearly cross-party support for the intention behind this amendment. In addition, I have been informed that the Chartered Trading Standards Institute very much supports this amendment, stating that it would be extremely helpful to the trading standards profession and other enforcement agencies. If ever there was a case for sharing intelligence across Whitehall and HMRC together with the Home Office, the National Crime Agency and trading standards, this is it.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 385, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, and Amendment 386 from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey. On Amendment 385, masks on cyclists are a difficult area. We all know that cyclists wear masks for reasons of keeping their mouth warm when it is cold. Not everybody who covers their face is a criminal. However, it is clear that some groups of criminals are wearing masks to avoid detection, which the amendment intends to address.
The point I raised in Committee is that, obviously, an officer already has the power to stop any vehicle, so they can stop any cycle without the cyclist having to wear a mask, or for any other reason. My only point is that, if you intend to give this power, there is not much point in having the power if you do not have the power to ask them to remove their mask. So there are difficulties with it, but that is where my support is.
The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, makes a good point. For as long as I was a police officer, when you stopped vehicles, you always asked them to take the ignition key out to make sure that you did not get run over and they did not run off. But now, if they do not have the key in, the car still goes. Just as importantly, you are always wary of what they are sitting on—a gun, knife or whatever else it might be—so getting them out of the car can be helpful. But I have to say that have been times when they were so big I kept them in the car. There are times when you use discretion.
All that said, I think it is a good amendment when we consider the changes in vehicle design, and it is worth the Government thinking seriously about it.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, I have real reservations about Amendment 385, which I am afraid I cannot support. I am glad that my noble friend is not thinking of testing the opinion of the House.
I speak as a cyclist and I fear, for the reason touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, that what is proposed in Amendment 385 is likely to damage relations between the police and innocent cyclists. The truth is that, when bicycling, we all wear a variety of things that are capable of disguising our identity. I did this morning. One always wears a helmet, very frequently one wears goggles or spectacles, either as sunglasses or to keep the rain out, and when it is cold one wears a ski mask or scarf around the bottom of one’s mouth. All these things are capable of concealing one’s identity. I saw several people doing this today when I was bicycling in from King’s Cross. This will damage relations between the police and innocent cyclists.
I ask, rhetorically, what kind of person is the police officer likely to stop? Most probably, I suspect, it will be a person from an ethnic minority, who may be young too. Anybody who has been in Parliament as long as I have knows the trouble that you have from stop and search. That is proportionate, because the carrying of weapons is a serious risk. I acknowledge that it is perfectly correct that cyclists on occasion conceal themselves in order to seize bags and mobiles—that is true—but the remedy is disproportionate.
Furthermore, the amendment gives rise to an interesting question of principle. If it is right to impose this restriction in respect of cyclists, what about motorcyclists? They come into exactly the same category and are perfectly capable of snatching a bag or mobile, and most of them now have visors over their helmets. So, what are you going to do about that?
My own view is that, yes, there is a problem, but this is a disproportionate remedy. It will impact on innocent cyclists, as I venture to describe myself, and it will damage relationships between the police and the cycling community. I was very glad to hear that my noble friend indicated he will not test the opinion of the House because, had he done so, I would have voted against him.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I hear the concerns of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, about Amendment 385. It would confer a power on a constable to stop a cyclist without any basis, reasonable or otherwise, to suspect that they are committing an offence or are about to commit an offence, when they may have, as the noble Viscount said, a perfectly good reason to be wearing a face mask. They may have influenza, which they do not wish to share with others, or they may be concerned to avoid diesel or petrol fumes on the road. Moreover, the amendment would confer an unrestricted power on the constable to require the person concerned to remove the face covering, with the sanction of a fine or imprisonment, without any requirement on the constable to consider whether that individual has a proper reason for wearing a face mask and without any defence of reasonable excuse. I too could not support such an amendment.
In Amendment 387A, the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, made a powerful case about the mischief which afflicts local communities. My only concern is whether her proposed new clause would do much, if anything, to address this real mischief. The remedy would still depend on enforcement action by local authorities or the police, and would still depend on evidence which is difficult to obtain. I appreciate that police forces are independent, but the Government need to do all they can to encourage them to take action to deal with these problems. If that requires further resources then they should have further resources, but it should be a priority for effective policing.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, I support my noble friend Lady Buscombe in the thrust of what she is seeking to achieve with her Amendment 387A. I do not think I heard my noble friend say that this would be a panacea or the answer to this complex situation, which clearly needs a multi-agency response. There seems to be a widespread agreement or understanding that there has recently been a substantial proliferation of essentially cash-only businesses on our high streets for nefarious purposes.
Many businesses may well be totally legitimate and carrying on as they have done for many years, but, as one example, in a town not very far away from where I live in the West Country, I recently counted 10 barbers or nail bars in a relatively short street. There are not enough nails or hair within that area, when, only a couple of years ago, approximately two would have sufficed. Either there has been a massive demand by the locals for these services or there are other motives. It seems clear that the police, trading standards and the Government know what is going on.
It is incumbent on the Minister, when he replies to the debate, to acknowledge the scale of what is happening and to give the House an indication of how a truly multi-agency and tough, robust approach will be taken to this issue to nip it in the bud. Where the public see acceptance of widespread law-breaking, there needs to be action for the law to continue to be respected.
Lord Berkeley of Knighton (CB)
My Lords, I have some sympathy with the noble Lord Jackson, especially around people stealing mobile phones. However, when I read proposed new subsection (2), about people covering their face to stop identification, I thought that the problem about that was the same as my noble friend Lord Pannick mentioned. I used to cycle a great deal and I always wore a scarf, partly because of fumes, as he said, but because I seemed to be ingesting a vast number of insects and found this really rather objectionable, whether I had had lunch or not. For that reason, I am rather worried about this amendment.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 385 is the face covering amendment, in which I note that motorcyclists strangely are not covered but scooter riders are. I am not sure I see the need for a new general stand-alone police power to require someone to stop, and I see real dangers in requiring someone to remove a face covering.
The police already have, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, referred to, a discretionary power under Section 163 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 to require any motorist or anybody propelling a mechanical vehicle or a cycle to stop—and a mechanical vehicle would include motor scooters and motorcycles. That power is very wide. It is generally considered to be directed to enable the police to conduct traffic checks. That is perceived as part of the compact between Governments and road users: if you use the roads, the corollary is that police officers can require you to stop as part of performing their function of regulating the traffic. An extra power to stop is entirely unnecessary.
The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, has rightly drawn attention to the specific case of mobile phone theft, reckless riding, riding on the pavements and so forth, but his amendment does not refer to the need for a reasonable suspicion that anyone required to remove a face covering is committing a crime. It seems to me that that was the point alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and ought to be an essential part of any new offence. As has been pointed out inventively, lots of people wear face coverings on cycles or scooters. The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, referred to the need to keep warm, and others referred to the need to avoid fumes.
In terms of wearing helmets which conceal identity, there is the safety aspect. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, considered the avoidance of germs, and the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley of Knighton, had additional and inventive reasons for wearing face coverings, including the avoidance of ingesting insects. However, the serious point is that there can be dangers and there can be fear caused by people nefariously covering their faces. If there is a reasonable suspicion of crime, then that may be a reason for taking action. Without that, this amendment is hopeless. For my part, I am not happy when delivery drivers call at people’s homes completely covered up, because you never know whether their purposes are honest or not. At least a home owner can refuse ingress, but I would not support a general power to prevent people from wearing face coverings or a power to stop that was specifically directed at that.
On Amendment 386, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, it may have surprised some of us that police officers do not have a power to ensure that keys are taken out of ignitions, and that this amendment was directed at keyless or driverless cars. I should have thought, along with the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, that it was sensible for police officers to ask people to get out of cars if they think that the cars that they have already stopped under Section 163 of the Road Traffic Act ought to be vacated in the interests of public safety and the avoidance of crime. I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, that sometimes it is sensible not to get them to get out of the car if they look particularly big or threatening; nevertheless, I see the reason for this amendment, but I would have thought it goes wider than driverless or keyless cars.
As to Amendment 387A from the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, I suspect that the whole House has a great deal of sympathy with her speech about organised criminal networks and driving unacceptable businesses from our streets, villages and towns—she even covered the quiet lanes in our villages—but her amendment, on which I share the view of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is not directed to anything that would necessarily achieve a great deal in respect of driving that kind of illegitimate or non-tax-paying business from our streets. The amendment is limited to extending the existing periods of closure notices and closure orders. For my part, before that amendment could be approved, I would want to see serious evidence that it would have some impact on these offences. I would also like to hear the Government’s view. At the moment, there is very little evidence as to why the existing periods for closure notices and closure orders are insufficient.
Baroness Buscombe (Con)
My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, and also addressing the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I am concerned that the noble Lords feel, “What’s the point?” That is one of the reasons we are where we are in this country, which is in a terrible place. What I am suggesting is a small amendment that would make it a bit more of a deterrent to these guys; to start making life more difficult for them; to extend these closure orders so that we are being a little more efficient about use of police time and our courts. We are hearing that we are going to lose our juries because of lack of court time. This is an example where, if we had longer periods of closure, it would allow our enforcement agencies to actually start doing something other than just the few attacks that Machinize has carried out so far. We need to find as many opportunities as possible within the criminal justice system to start taking this on. What message will it send to the public if we do not bother to do some of the easy bits to get this going?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I will just say that was quite a long intervention, particularly for Report stage.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I will answer very briefly, and perhaps on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, as well, because I suspect that what we are saying is roughly the same. I am entirely with the noble Baroness on the question of juries, and on the question of needing to do something to reduce the kind of crime, particularly by organised criminal gangs, happening in our villages, towns and streets. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about the need for more resources for policing. But the problem with the noble Baroness’s amendment is that there is no evidence that I can see, or that has been shown to us, that extending these periods would do anything significant to reduce crime.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friends Lady Neville-Rolfe, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, Lord Bailey of Paddington and Lady Buscombe for their amendments.
Amendment 385 in the name of my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe, spoken to by my noble friend Lord Jackson today, would, as we have heard, grant the police powers to stop a person riding a bike and wearing a face covering, and then require them to remove that. The context of this is the epidemic of phone theft. The United Kingdom now accounts for almost 40% of Europe’s phone thefts despite being only 10% of the market. In London, there is one mobile phone theft every seven and a half minutes. It is to that issue that my noble friend Lord Jackson is directing his amendment. He has pinpointed what I think we all accept is a very serious issue: the actions of intimidating masked cyclists stealing mobile phones. He set out ably the rationale for his amendment, although when doing so he indicated that he did not intend to test the opinion of the House.
Amendment 387A from my noble friend Lady Buscombe seeks to amend powers relating to closure notices and closure orders. As other noble Lords have recognised, the character of our high streets has changed dramatically over the past decade. Alongside the pressures of online retail and the economic challenges facing traditional business, we have seen the proliferation of premises that appear at best dubious and at worst directly connected to organised criminal activity. The scale of the problem should concern us all. We all know the types of shops at issue here; they appear almost overnight in our cities and towns’ prime retail locations, often with few customers but somehow able to sustain some of the highest rents in the country. Investigations by local authorities have uncovered counterfeit goods, illegal tobacco, unregulated vapes and sometimes sweets containing additives banned under UK food standards.
The amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Buscombe proposes to alter the powers contained in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 by extending the duration of closure notices from 48 hours to seven days, and the maximum period for closure orders from three months to 12 months. As my noble friend said so powerfully this afternoon, there are many institutions in support of this, notably the Chartered Trading Standards Institute, which has been calling out for greater powers to tackle rogue retailers.
The present legal framework provides tools to deal with such premises, but in practice the existing time limits are often insufficient. A closure notice lasting only 48 hours may simply delay the problem rather than solve it. Criminals can wait out short closure periods, reopen under an altered business name and transfer activities elsewhere before enforcement agencies have time to complete the necessary investigations. Similarly, a closure order lasting a maximum of three months may be inadequate where organised criminal networks are involved. By the time the order expires, the underlying criminal structure remains intact, ready to resume operations.
I fully recognise that the current periods were set out by the previous Conservative Government in 2014, but the passage of time—12 years since then—has demonstrated that more needs to be done to restore our high streets and communities, and to end the scourge of criminality blighting them both. Surely the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Buscombe is a step in the right direction and if she wishes to divide the House, she will have our full support.
As we have heard, my noble friend Lord Bailey of Paddington’s Amendment 386 addresses a practical and important issue. It has arisen from the evolution of modern vehicle technology and the difficulties police officers face on the front line. As he said, modern vehicles can remain powered even when drivers exit. The absence of a physical key means that officers cannot rely on the traditional safeguards that once existed. My noble friend’s amendment would provide officers with a clear statutory basis to direct drivers to exit the vehicle and remain outside while the stop is dealt with. It would also allow the Secretary of State to issue guidance or codes of practice to ensure that power is exercised consistently and appropriately.
For these reasons, I hope that the Minister gives careful consideration to that amendment and to all amendments in this group. I look forward to his response.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I am grateful to noble Lords for tabling these amendments. I will speak to each in turn.
The noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, moved Amendment 385 on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. I remind noble Lords about the Government’s winter of action that took place over the Christmas period, between the beginning of December and the end of January. That complemented a summer campaign that focused particularly on the issues that the noble Lord mentioned, namely anti-social behaviour and mobile phone theft. As the noble Lord mentioned in his introductory comments, the actions that we took over that 12-month period resulted in a 12% fall in mobile phone theft in London. That is still not good enough; it needs to fall further. It is a horrendous crime that is damaging to tourism and to the individual, but there has been a fall in the first year of this Government due to the hotspot action that we took. The winter and summer action campaigns took place in 650 town centres across the country, and were supported by additional resources from local police forces to deal with this issue. We know that we will see more analyst data in the coming months as to the impact of that action.
My point echoes some of the points made by the noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames. The Government’s road safety strategy was published on 7 January and sets out commitments to increase robust enforcement of road traffic laws to protect road users. It is under the auspices of the Department for Transport and indicates an important role for the police to play in taking action against the type of behaviour that the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, is concerned about.
As I stated in Committee, the police have a suite of powers under existent legislation to tackle street crime facilitated by bicycles and scooters and, as the noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and Lord Pannick, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, have mentioned, to address the use of face coverings intended to conceal identity. I encourage the police to make full use of those powers, especially in the crime hotspots that we have identified. Section 60AA of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, for example, permits the police to require individuals to remove face coverings in designated areas, so the police could designate a particular areas, such as a high street, where they believe crime is likely to take place. In those areas, the police have the powers under that legislation to remove face coverings.
There is a range of reasons for wearing a face covering that I am not going to pray in aid. Those were made very strongly by the noble Lords, Lord Berkeley and Lord Pannick, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. They focused on weather, ill health, fumes, and the added protein of insects going into the mouth of the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley of Knighton. These are all valid reasons. They are not ones I pray in aid strongly today, because the legislation is there.
This includes Section 163 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, which the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, referred to. It provides for anybody driving a motor vehicle or riding a bicycle to stop if directed to do so by a constable. Section 59 of the Police Reform Act 2002 permits police to seize motor vehicles that are being used in an anti-social manner. Furthermore, Section 165A of the Road Traffic Act 1988 permits police to seize motor vehicles. That includes, in this case, e-scooters being driven without an appropriate licence or insurance. I encourage the police to use those powers. Public space protection orders can also be used. Therefore, there are reasonable powers on the statute book that can be used to meet the objectives of the noble Lord’s amendment.
I turn to Amendment 386, from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington. I said in Committee that I have a lot of sympathy with this amendment, and it is supported by the Police Federation. I want to see police officers doing their vital job. As I mentioned, we recently published the road safety strategy. The consultation on that strategy includes proposed changes to penalties for motoring offences and specific proposals on the existing offence of failing to stop and report following a collision. It also seeks views on related measures around compliance when drivers are stopped by the police—a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. The Department for Transport is considering the results of that consultation and aims to respond when it closes on 11 May. I encourage noble Lords to refer this debate to that consultation.
I have great sympathy with the amendment. I want to ensure that police officers have the necessary tools to enforce our road traffic laws and make our roads safe, but I ask the noble Lord to wait for the outcome of the consultation. Following the consultation, there will be areas that we could potentially take forward at some point when legislative time allows.
I turn next to Amendment 387A, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe. I say straightaway that she raises an important point. Not all the businesses that she mentioned are criminal outlets, but there are a number of businesses that are potentially involved in criminality. The new high streets task force is looking at whether the current data sharing between agencies supporting enforcement teams is appropriate as we want to maximise our response.
In the summer, the Government will publish a new anti-money laundering and asset recovery strategy that will set out further ambitious measures to strengthen our fight against money laundering, including better sharing and exploitation of financial information. Further, the Home Office has a cross-government high streets illegality task force that is developing strategic long-term policy to respond to money laundering and associated illegality in UK high streets, including forms of economic crime that the noble Baroness mentioned, as well as tax evasion, illegal working, systematic vulnerabilities that criminals exploit, and issues to do with HMRC and trading standards.
In the summer of last year, I had the great honour of attending a raid in Birkenhead, in Merseyside. HMRC, the National Crime Agency, Merseyside Police and trading standards raided a premises that was allegedly—I use that word because I am not sure whether the matter has come to court yet—defrauding HMRC, selling illegal goods and purporting to be a legitimate business when it was not. That raid was perfectly reasonable, so action is currently being taken.
I say to the noble Baroness, and to the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, who supported a similar level of action, that the Government are trying to design a number of actions to drive out illegal businesses in a range of ways. As the noble Baroness said, they undercut legitimate businesses, reduce government tax revenue and illegally employ people. That is not good or acceptable, and we need to take action. The question is whether the noble Baroness’s amendment to increase the duration of closure notices from 48 hours to seven days, and closure orders from three months to 12 months, would assist in that process.
In Clause 3, we are, as the noble Baroness knows, increasing the duration of closure notices from 48 to 72 hours. That gives the police and others time to investigate initially. If her proposal was taken, does she think that having more empty premises on the high street or in a village for 12 or six months is good for the high street as a whole? I am not sure that it is. We do need to drive out illegality, and I accept that there is illegality going on, but I hope I have pointed out the challenges we have. The increase to 72 hours in the Bill will help address operational challenges and give agencies more time to progress an application for a closure order and to protect any victims and the community in the interim while a closure order is sought.
The closure power itself, as the noble Baroness will accept, is a very powerful tool and routinely used in a housing context to protect the most vulnerable. I argue that the extension to 72 hours in Clause 3 is sufficient to provide respite to victims and to the community from anti-social behaviour. Closure orders are intended to provide short-term relief, which is why we are increasing their duration only by a further 24 hours. I say to the noble Baroness that, while a closure notice cannot prohibit access to anyone who habitually lives on the premises, a closure order can. Closure orders are intended as temporary, targeted measures, not long-term sanctions, but I accept that there is a real issue that needs to be addressed and I hope it can be with the measures I have outlined. What the Government are doing now, on a cross-government basis with HMRC, the Home Office, the police, the National Crime Agency and trading standards locally, is trying to root out where that illegality takes place, and further action will be taken in due course.
I hope that, with those reassurances, despite the support of the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, the noble Baroness will not press her amendment. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, for his indication that he is not going to press his and I hope that the assurances I have given and the favourable view I have of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, will allow us to complete a proper consultation on that point and that he will not press his amendment, either.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this very interesting debate, and thank in particular my noble friend Lord Goschen and the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley of Knighton, with his interesting intervention in the debate. I reassure my noble friend Lord Hailsham that these are permissive, discretionary powers, not blanket ban powers, and they are targeted at a particular subset of criminals. There is clearly a quantum difference between people passing through a locale who are dressed to cycle on the public highway and those who are flooding the zone on e-bikes, dressed in black, with helmets and face coverings, with a rucksack, who may wish to rob a shop or assault someone by snatching their mobile telephone. With all due respect to my noble friend, I think his concern is misplaced, but I fully respect the arguments he made.
I also thank the Minister. We have had a lot of debate on this issue, and I am partially reassured by the measures that the Government have brought forward that are currently in train. I hope that we can return to this issue, not least the breaking of the mobile phone theft model that organised crime is engaged in. In the meantime, as I indicated, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Bailey of Paddington
“Direction to exit vehicle following a lawful stop(1) Where a constable in uniform, or a traffic officer, has required a vehicle to stop under section 163 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (power of police to stop vehicles), the constable may direct the driver and any passenger to— (a) exit the vehicle, and(b) remain outside the vehicle for so long as is reasonably necessary for the exercise of the constable’s functions.(2) A person commits an offence if, without reasonable excuse, that person fails to comply with a direction given under subsection (1).(3) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.(4) A constable may use reasonable force, where necessary and proportionate, to secure compliance with a direction given under subsection (1) for the purposes of officer safety, public safety, or prevention of escape or interference with evidence.(5) The Secretary of State may issue codes of practice or guidance relating to the exercise of powers under this section and such codes may be incorporated into Codes of Practice issued under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.(6) In this section “vehicle” has the same meaning as in section 185 of the Road Traffic Act 1988.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment closes an operational safety gap created by keyless and electric vehicles, where removing a key no longer disables a car. It provides a modest, post-stop direction power so officers can safely manage encounters outside a live vehicle. Safeguards are built in through reasonableness, proportionality and PACE-linked guidance.
Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)
I thank the Minister for his answer. I am partially sated by what he said about the consultation that is coming along, but we all know that consultations can take for ever, and we may not get the outcome that I am seeking. I want to make the point that we have already had officers in London and in Essex injured by people deciding to drive away. In most other jurisdictions across the western world, this law has been put in place because they have already had deaths. I think it is just a matter of time before an officer is seriously hurt if we do not address this issue. But, as I said, the Minister was very generous in his answer and has given a way forward. I accept that way forward, so I shall not move my amendment.
Baroness Buscombe
“Duration of closure notices and orders: extension(1) The Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 is amended as follows.(2) In section 77 (duration of closure notices)—(a) in subsection (2), for “48 hours” substitute “7 days”, and(b) in subsection (3), for “48 hours” substitute “7 days”.(3) In section 80(6) (power of court to make closure order), for “3” substitute “12”.(4) In section 82 (extension of closure orders)—(a) in subsection (7), for “3” substitute “12”, and(b) for subsection (8) substitute— “(8) The period of a closure order may be extended for another 12 months after the original extended 12 month period has elapsed, and there is no maximum duration of the closure order.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would extend the period in which the police and the magistrates’ courts may make closure notices and closure orders, to 7 days and 12 months respectively.
Baroness Buscombe (Con)
My Lords, I will be brief. I heard what the Minister said and I support everything that the Government are trying to do to attack the scourge on our society, and all our villages and towns. I am sorry to say that the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Pannick, seem rather defeatist. If this is not a panacea—which it is not—it is a nudge to keep us finding different ways to intimidate these people and say to them, “Stop doing this and destroying our villages, towns and cities”. I thank my noble friend Lord Goschen and my noble friend on the Front Bench for their support and I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Young of Acton
“Abolition of non-crime hate incidents (No.2)(1) Non-crime hate incidents (NCHIs) must not be recognised as a category of incident by any police authority in the United Kingdom.(2) No police authority or police officer may record, retain or otherwise process any personal data relating to a NCHI.(3) Subsection (2) does not mean a police authority or police officer cannot record, retain or otherwise process an incident that is relevant for the prevention or detection of a crime, or for another policing purpose, provided it complies with incident recording guidance issued by the College of Policing or the Secretary of State.(4) Guidance in relation to incident recording must have due regard to the right to freedom of expression.(5) Any historic records of NCHIs which do not meet the incident recording threshold as set out in guidance issued by the College of Policing or the Secretary of State, must —(a) not be disclosed in a Disclosure and Barring Service check;(b) be deleted upon discovery.(6) For the purposes of this section—“non-crime hate incident” means any incident or alleged incident which does not constitute a criminal offence, but is perceived, by any person, to have been motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility or prejudice towards a person or group on the grounds of race, religion, sexual orientation, disability, sex or transgender identity;“police authority” means a body specified in section 174(1);“police officer” means any person acting under the authority of a police authority.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would end the investigation and recording of non-crime hate incidents and ensure that any future incident recording guidance has due regard to the right to freedom of expression.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Strasburger, for co-sponsoring this amendment. I was disappointed to learn that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has apparently changed his mind. In Committee, he said:
“I support this amendment as a necessary check on the expansion of the surveillance state”.—[Official Report, 20/1/26; col. 177.]
I urge your Lordships to support this amendment because placing a statutory limit on what non-crimes the police can investigate you for and record against your name is in the interests not just of my noble friends on this side of the House, some of whom have had non-crime hate incidents recorded against them, but of noble Lords opposite and the Liberal Democrats. We must remember that the political wind can change. It is in your Lordships’ interests to place a statutory limit on what the police can investigate and record as non-crimes. It is in all our interests, and it really should be put on a statutory footing. For that reason, I intend to divide the House.
Baroness D'Souza
“Amendment to the Sentencing Act 2020 to introduce public interest compensation orders(1) The Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.(2) After section 133(b) (compensation orders), insert“, or(c) to make a payment to one or more relevant organisations for public interest or social purposes (“public interest compensation order”).(2) In this Chapter, “relevant organisation” means an organisation listed in Schedule 5A (relevant organisations for public interest compensation orders).”(3) After section 135 (making a compensation order), insert—“135A Public interest compensation orders(1) When convicting a person of a relevant offence, the court shall consider whether to issue a public interest compensation order, and what the terms of that order should be.(2) In this section “relevant offence” means an offence listed in Schedule 5B (relevant offences for public interest compensation orders).(3) The Secretary of State may by order amend the relevant offences listed in Schedule 5B.(4) In determining whether to make a public interest compensation order against an offender, the amount to be paid under such an order, or to which relevant organisations the payments should be made, the court must, in addition to the factor in section 135(3), have regard to—(a) the rights of victims of human rights violations (inside or outside the United Kingdom) to receive effective reparation and remedy,(b) the fact that individuals who are not proven to be direct victims of the offender’s offence may nevertheless be victims of human rights violations to which the offender’s offence is related,(c) the broader impact of the offender’s offence on victims of human rights violations in the United Kingdom or in other countries, (d) where there is a large number of victims of human rights violations to which the offender’s offence is related, the urgency of victims’ needs (which may vary depending on the harms that they have suffered),(e) where the relevant offence is an offence under regulations imposed under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, the purposes of the relevant regulations and any human rights violations arising in connection with conduct that these regulations seek to discourage, and(f) whether it would be appropriate to make another type of compensation order and, if so, whether the offender has sufficient means to pay both orders, as well as the need to prioritise compensation to direct victims of the offender’s offence.(5) If the court considers issuing a public interest compensation order, the court may (but is not required to) ask the Secretary of State to recommend the relevant organisations to which the funds subject to the order should be paid and if the court makes such a request—(a) the Secretary of State shall, within 90 days (the “relevant period”), recommend to the court in writing one or more organisations to which the funds subject to the order should be paid (the “recommendation”) and in doing so, the Secretary of State must have regard to the same factors as under subsection (4) above;(b) the court may issue a public interest compensation order after the earlier of—(i) the court having received a recommendation, and(ii) the relevant period having expired;(c) if a recommendation has been made within the relevant period, the court may take it into account in issuing a public interest compensation order but shall not be bound by it.(6) The court may direct that confiscated funds be paid to a relevant organisation subject to such conditions as it considers appropriate.(7) The Secretary of State may by order amend the organisations listed in Schedule 5A and the Secretary of State shall review the organisations listed in Schedule 5A at least annually.(8) If, under subsection (5) above, the Secretary of State recommends one or more organisations that are not listed in Schedule 5B, the organisations recommended by the Secretary of State shall be considered relevant organisations for the purposes of the public interest compensation order at issue.(9) For the purposes of this section, a court may issue a public interest compensation order regardless of whether there is a direct connection between the offender’s conduct and the harm suffered by the ultimate recipients or beneficiaries of the public interest compensation order.”(4) After Schedule 5 (Breach, revocation and amendment of reparation order), insert the following new Schedule—“Schedule 5ARelevant organisations for public interest compensation ordersThe following organisations—The Trust Fund for Victims, created by the Assembly of States Parties in accordance with article 79 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.The Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, established within the framework of the Council of Europe by Resolution CM/Res(2023)3, or any successor body or attached fund. The United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture, established by the United Nations General Assembly through resolution 36/151 of 16 December 1981.”(5) After Schedule 5A (Relevant organisations for public interest compensation orders), insert the following new Schedule—“Schedule 5BRelevant offences for public interest compensation ordersThe following offences to the extent that they are offences under the law of England and Wales—Offences arising under regulations imposed under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018.””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to amend the Sentencing Act 2020. It would allow the courts to award compensation orders not only to individuals but also for public interest or social purposes, thereby enabling the proceeds of confiscated criminal assets to be more readily used to compensate victims of offences under the UK’s sanctions legislation.
Baroness D'Souza (CB)
My Lords, in the absence of the noble Lord, Lord Banner, I shall move the amendment, although my defence of it will be less than perfect, given that I have only just seen it. However, I must first thank the Minister for having kindly organised a meeting between the noble Lord and officials at the Home Office in order to discuss the Bill. That was extremely useful and important.
I support the Bill and am trying to find quickly the reason why I support these amendments. They would enable the courts to award compensation to public interest companies instead of simply to victims. The current mechanism is that, in the case of sanctions in particular, the moneys recovered from sanctions, which can often be substantial, go straight to the Government. Admittedly, it is important that the Government have resources in order to strengthen enforcement mechanisms, but it seems to me somewhat unfair that the victims do not get a look in in terms of compensation when, after all, the sanctions have been devised in order to protect victims and, indeed, reward them. Although we recognise that compensation is not always monetary, it is important that there is official acknowledgement of the wrongs that have been done to them.
The fact that the courts cannot enable the money derived to go to public interest compensation is an anomaly that I think needs to be corrected. One of the reasons for that that the Minister gave in the meeting, which, as I mentioned, he kindly set up, is that it would be difficult to determine who was a victim and what sort of compensation was necessary or just, simply because the number of victims of aggression, particularly in the context of conflict, is huge, wide and difficult to determine. The Government are concerned that the right money goes to the right victims. That is acknowledged, and it is a very important point.
However, Redress, which has drafted many of the amendments on this aspect of the Bill, has pointed out that there already exist relevant organisations that can receive funds for victims, including the Trust Fund for Victims, which was created by the Assembly of States Parties, in accordance with Article 79 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. There is also the Register of Damage, for damage caused by the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, established within the framework of the Council of Europe by resolution or any successor body or attached fund. There is also the United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture, which was established by the United Nations General Assembly through its resolution of 16 December 1981. It is also worth pointing out the relative ease that Ministers and the Government would have in keeping a register of those organisations that receive compensation funds and monitoring them.
In essence, it seems just and fair that the victims of aggression, particularly in the area of conflict, and those it is eventually agreed should receive compensation, should in fact receive that money; it goes to the Government—the Treasury and other sources within government—in order, as I have said, to strengthen the enforcement mechanisms. I entirely agree with that, but I am not sure that all the money should go there; some of it should be set aside for the victims. Again, I stress that the reason for this is that, although sanctions are set up to retrieve funds meant for the victims, the fact is that the victims do not always get this money. I beg to move.
Baroness Goudie (Lab)
My Lords, I support the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, and the noble Lord, Lord Banner. I thank the Minister and his officials for all they have done on this clause. Might the Minister look at this again before Third Reading or at some other point to see whether it is possible to do what we have requested? I am grateful for all the meetings and the help we have had from everybody; let us hope that we can do something.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, we support in principle Amendments 387C and 387D, the first of which was moved by the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Banner.
These amendments address a moral and legal imperative, ensuring that assets confiscated from those who violate our laws, particularly our sanctions regime, are used to provide redress to the victims of those very same violations. My own amendment in Committee focused on a ministerial power to create a fund via regulations but Amendments 387C and 387D would place this power where I believe it properly belongs: with the judiciary. By amending the Sentencing Act 2020 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, these amendments would grant the Crown Court the discretion to award compensation for public interest or social purposes. This would ensure that, when a court deprives a defendant of the benefits of their crime, it can simultaneously direct those funds towards the restoration of the communities or individuals harmed.
As the organisation Redress has highlighted with great clarity, the UK is currently an outlier. Both the United States and the European Union have already established mechanisms to repurpose seized assets. In 2023, the US successfully transferred over $4 million seized from a Russian oligarch to support war veterans in Ukraine. Here in the UK, we have frozen assets on an unprecedented scale following the invasion of Ukraine, yet we operate in a regulatory lacuna where we can freeze and eventually confiscate but we cannot compensate effectively. Without these amendments, we are, in effect, telling the victims of state-sponsored aggression and human rights abuses that, although we will punish the perpetrator, we will do nothing for the survivor.
This is not about the convenience of the state; it is about clarity of justice. We must move away from a system that treats the proceeds of sanctions violations as a windfall for the Treasury and instead treat them as a resource for reparations. I urge the Minister to recognise that there is cross-party unanimity on this issue. Sympathy at the Dispatch Box in Committee was a start, but sympathy does not stop crime—and it certainly does not provide reparations.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, first, I thank my noble friend Lord Banner for tabling these amendments, which, as we have heard, raise questions around how the proceeds of crime may be used to benefit victims. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, for stepping into the breach today to speak to these amendments in my noble friend’s absence.
My noble friend Lord Banner has tenaciously pursued this matter for many months. The intention behind his amendments is clear: to ensure that, where criminal assets are confiscated, the courts have flexibility to direct those funds towards compensation for victims or towards wider public interest purposes linked to the harm caused. In Committee, I spoke sympathetically on these amendments. I shall not seek to repeat the points I made then but other noble Lords explored how these proposals would interact with the existing confiscation and forfeiture regimes under the Sentencing Act 2020 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. Those are complex frameworks, and any changes to them must be carefully considered, but these amendments make an important point about ensuring that justice is not only punitive but restorative. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I am especially grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, for moving this amendment on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Banner. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lady Goudie for speaking in support of the noble Baroness.
As the noble Baroness and my noble friend know, I arranged a meeting for the noble Lord, Lord Banner, to discuss these matters with Redress. Both attended, as did other Peers, including the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool. I set out then, as I did in Committee, the rationale for the Government’s position in relation to these amendments. I should say to my noble friend Lady Goudie that, although today I will restate the Government’s position, which is not to accept the amendments, we always keep these matters under review and will continue to do so.
The compensation of victims is an extremely serious issue and something that we take seriously. Last time out, in Committee, I laid out the UK’s various mechanisms for victim compensation; I will not repeat those now, in the interests of time. In his amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Banner, raises this issue in the context of Russia’s war with Ukraine. I appreciate the continued support of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for the approach that has been tabled today, but, if I may, I shall speak to this amendment in the context of where the noble Lord, Lord Banner, was, I think, coming from. I acknowledge the support for the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel.
The noble Lord, Lord Banner, has spoken to me on many occasions about the need for wider community compensation, rather than just for individuals, in the context of the war in Ukraine. I affirm this Government’s support for Ukraine. Indeed, the UK is already one of Ukraine’s largest supporters and donors, providing significant financial aid alongside working with international partners to support Ukraine as much as possible. The UK has already committed £21.8 billion, of which £13 billion is for military support, £5.3 billion is for non-military support and £3.5 billion is for UKEF cover; there is also an ongoing commitment to provide £3 billion annually either for as long as it takes or until 2030-31. We are also supporting, along with the G7, loans backing profits belonging to Russian sovereign assets in the EU, as well as the interest on those assets being put towards Ukrainian interests.
Therefore, there are a number of issues on which we are fully supportive and where we are using resources to meet the objectives of the noble Lord, Lord Banner. However, I say to him and to those who have spoken in favour of the amendment today that, given the limited number of cases to which these amendments would apply, they would create only a minimal impact on the people of Ukraine. I suggest that it would be better for us, in the initial stages, to focus our efforts on the larger international mechanisms for compensation, in line with our international partners, which provide far greater funds. I have pointed in particular not just to the UK’s direct taxation commitment but to the G7’s $50 billion ERA loan, which is backed by interest generated from Russian sovereign assets in the EU and the UK.
I understand the noble Baroness’s support on this issue. I particularly understand the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Banner, around this matter, as well as his desire to help and support our friends in Ukraine; I completely share that desire. However, following the rationale that I have laid out, I suggest that this would be best done through the current mechanisms of government, not through these amendments. I will keep all matters under review but I feel that these amendments would distract the UK—and, indeed, our partners—from the core principle of supporting Ukraine, particularly in this time of great need. I ask the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, to withdraw Amendment 387C.
Baroness D'Souza (CB)
My Lords, I thank the Minister as always for his response and for the support that the Government are providing, particularly in Ukraine after the Russian aggression. I still feel, however, that the definitions within the Bill of “victim” and “loss” are too narrow and indirect victims are clearly not eligible. We all know that there are many tragic indirect victims of war crimes. It is very likely that there will be more sanctions to come and that there will be further need for victim compensation. At present, there are 2,500 Russia-targeted sanctions. The Government still retain most of the proceeds of these.
Nevertheless, I hear what the Minister has said about keeping this under review. Given the fact that I do not think these amendments have been properly addressed by me—although they have by the Member opposite and by the Opposition Front Bench—I will not press them. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 387C.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“51A In section 161E(5) (making an income reduction order) (as inserted by section 3 of the Sentencing Act 2026), for paragraph (b) substitute—“(b) section 15A (where court sentences before confiscation proceedings).””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment adds, to the list of amendments that are consequential on the confiscation order provisions in the Bill, an amendment of a provision inserted by the Sentencing Act 2026 into the Sentencing Code.
Lord Katz
“Notification requirements for child cruelty offenders(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations require child cruelty offenders to notify specified matters to the police.(2) “Child cruelty offender” means a person who, in England and Wales—(a) is convicted of a child cruelty offence,(b) is found not guilty of a child cruelty offence by reason of insanity,(c) is found to be under a disability and to have done the act charged against the person in respect of a child cruelty offence, or(d) is cautioned in respect of a child cruelty offence after the person has admitted the offence,on or after the day on which the regulations come into force.(3) A “child cruelty offence” means an offence listed in Schedule (Notification requirements for child cruelty offenders: child cruelty offences).(4) The regulations may in particular make provision—(a) about the period for which a child cruelty offender is subject to notification requirements (which may be an indefinite period);(b) about the occasions on which, or intervals at which, a child cruelty offender is required to give notifications;(c) about the time limits for giving a notification;(d) about how notifications are to be given to the police (which may include provision for notifications to be given to persons authorised by the police in accordance with the regulations);(e) requiring a child cruelty offender to allow photographs and fingerprints to be taken for the purposes of verifying the offender’s identity; (f) requiring or authorising a person with parental responsibility for a child cruelty offender to give notifications, where the offender is under 18;(g) for specified notification requirements to apply to a child cruelty offender only if the offender has been given notice by a police officer, in accordance with the regulations, that those requirements apply;(h) for reviews of whether a child cruelty offender should remain subject to notification requirements, or to specified notification requirements;(i) for a child cruelty offender to cease to be subject to notification requirements, or to specified notification requirements, following a review.(5) If the regulations make provision for a child cruelty offender to be subject to notification requirements for an indefinite period, they must make provision under which the child cruelty offender may cease to be subject to the notification requirements following a review.(6) The matters which may be specified in the regulations as matters which must be notified include, in particular, any matter a relevant offender is required to notify to the police by or under Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (as it has effect in England and Wales).(7) Before making regulations under this section the Secretary of State must consult—(a) the National Police Chiefs’ Council, and(b) any other persons the Secretary of State considers appropriate.(8) In this section—“notification requirements” means requirements imposed by the regulations;“specified” means specified in the regulations.”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause gives the Secretary of State power to make regulations imposing notification requirements on persons who commit child cruelty offences.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I am pleased to move the government amendments in this group, which will establish the powers needed to introduce a clear and robust regime for managing those who have committed appalling child cruelty offences. Before turning to the detail, I pay tribute to the extraordinary dedication of campaigners, including Tony and Paula Hudgell. Their tireless advocacy, grounded in personal tragedy and driven by a determination to protect other children from harm, has been instrumental in bringing this issue to the forefront of public debate and legislative action. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and Helen Grant MP, for their constructive engagement in helping us to deliver this important step forward.
We continue scrutiny of this Bill at a pivotal moment for the management of dangerous offenders. The police system underpinning the sex offenders register is transitioning from the legacy ViSOR database to the new multi-agency public protection arrangements, which will deliver modern, integrated risk-management capabilities. At the same time, as part of the Government’s commitment to halve violence against women and girls over the next decade, we are examining how best to strengthen community-based offender management across the system. In that context, and in recognition of the complexity of this area, we have taken the decision to provide for the framework of a new scheme in the Bill, while setting out the operational detail in regulations subject to the affirmative procedure.
The Government’s amendments therefore create the power to establish a set of familiar tools for police to apply in managing such offenders: notification requirements; clear rules about what must be notified, when and how; and the powers necessary for the police and partner agencies to assess and respond to risk consistently and proportionately. Important safeguards and parameters are built into the structure of these powers to ensure that the scheme adheres strictly to the framework approved by Parliament. The qualifying offences and thresholds in the new schedule introduced by Amendment 395A ensure that the regime is squarely focused on serious harm to children arising from their own caregivers, including offences such as child cruelty, causing or allowing a child to die or suffer serious physical harm, and female genital mutilation. This is a coherent and tightly drawn list which will close the safeguarding gap identified by campaigners.
The regime provides for maximum penalties which are consistent with those faced by registered sex offenders and proportionate to the gravity of deliberately evading such monitoring. It ensures that any entry or search must be authorised by a justice of the peace and used solely for the purposes of risk assessment. Regulations establishing the scheme will be developed in consultation with the National Police Chiefs’ Council and will be subject to the draft affirmative procedure. We believe that this approach strikes the right balance between parliamentary oversight and the operational flexibility that is required to respond swiftly to the evolving landscape and potential changes to patterns of offending or evasion.
For these reasons, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, not to press his Amendment 389 and to join the House in supporting the Government’s approach. I beg to move.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, the government amendments are welcomed from these Benches. In their scope and depth, they ensure that offenders who have committed the heinous crime of child cruelty will now be required to notify, and will be monitored carefully to ensure that their access to children is supervised to protect children from such offenders. As we debated in Committee, these offences need to be brought into the safe scope of high-level offender management.
I echo the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Katz, about Tony Hudgell and his family. They are doughty campaigners who have shone a spotlight on an area that most of society has ignored over the years.
I read Amendment 389 with interest. I ask the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, and the Minister, whether proposed new subsection 6, identifying relevant offences, would be covered in government Amendment 388C.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, this is an important group of amendments, concerning the creation of a child cruelty register. I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to the development of this proposal over the course of the Bill’s passage through your Lordships’ House and the other place.
I remind all noble Lords that the reforms before us today, as we have heard, are the result of determined campaigning over a long period. I place on record the sincere thanks of the Opposition Benches to Helen Grant MP and her constituent, Paula Hudgell, whose tireless advocacy has brought this issue to national attention. I am incredibly pleased that Parliament has responded to this campaign and I welcome very much the Government’s decision to accept our proposals and bring forward their own amendments to establish a notification regime for child cruelty offenders. I put on record my sincere thanks to the Minister for his engagement on this matter.
As noble Lords will appreciate, there remain differences of view about the precise scope of the register and the offences that should fall within it. From these Benches we have consistently argued that the register should cover a broader range of offences to ensure that the system captures a full spectrum of conduct that poses a continuing risk to children. While the Government’s proposals do not go as far as we might have wished in that regard, they nevertheless represent real progress and a clear acknowledgement that the existing gap in the law must be closed.
We welcome the Government’s willingness to move in this direction and hope that, as the policy is implemented, there will remain scope to review and strengthen the regime where necessary. I have one question for the Minister. Because it is vital that the register is established as soon as possible, can he give from the Dispatch Box an indication of possible timelines for when that might happen?
Once again, I thank Paula Hudgell and Helen Grant MP, who have performed a tremendous service in bringing this issue to the attention of Parliament and the wider public. I hope that all noble Lords from across your Lordships’ House will join me in recognising their efforts. For the avoidance of doubt, I will not be moving Amendment 389 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful for the consensual approach taken by the Liberal Democrat and the Opposition Front Benches. I will answer the questions in the order that they were given.
The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, asked about the offences listed in proposed new subsection 6 to be inserted by the Opposition’s Amendment 389. The offences that are covered are listed in government Amendment 395A and largely overlap with those in the opposition amendment.
On the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, we will set up the register as soon as practicable when the new MAPPS system is up and running. I cannot commit to a more solid timeline than that, but I hope he will take the way that the Government have responded to the campaign and the amendments as a promissory note, shall I say, that we are taking this matter very seriously and will act with as much speed as we can practically muster. With that, I beg to move.
“Notification requirements for child cruelty offenders: enforcement(1) Regulations under section (Notification requirements for child cruelty offenders) may provide for a person to commit an offence if, without reasonable excuse, they—(a) fail to comply with a specified notification requirement, or(b) in purported compliance with a specified notification requirement, notify information that they know to be false.(2) The maximum penalty specified for an offence must not exceed (but may be less than)—(a) on summary conviction, imprisonment for a term of the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, imprisonment for a term of 5 years or a fine (or both).(3) Regulations under section (Notification requirements for child cruelty offenders) may confer on a constable power to enter and search relevant premises.(4) The regulations must provide for the power to be exercisable only—(a) under the authority of a warrant issued by a justice of the peace (which may authorise the use of reasonable force),(b) where it is necessary for a constable to enter and search the premises for the purpose of assessing the risks posed by a child cruelty offender who is subject to notification requirements, and(c) where a constable has sought, and been unable to obtain, entry to the premises for that purpose on at least two occasions.(5) Premises are “relevant premises” if there are reasonable grounds to believe (because of a notification given under the regulations or otherwise) that the child cruelty offender resides, or may regularly be found, at the premises.(6) In this section—“notification requirements” means requirements imposed by regulations under section (Notification requirements for child cruelty offenders);“specified” means specified in the regulations.”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause allows regulations under my previous new clause to create offences, and to confer powers of entry on constables.
“Notification requirements for child cruelty offenders: power to amend Schedule (Notification requirements for child cruelty offenders: child cruelty offences)(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend—(a) Schedule (Notification requirements for child cruelty offenders: child cruelty offences) (child cruelty offences);(b) section (Notification requirements for child cruelty offenders: interpretation) for the purposes of that Schedule.(2) Regulations under subsection (1) may add an offence to Schedule (Notification requirements for child cruelty offenders: child cruelty offences) only if—(a) the Secretary of State considers it appropriate to do so, having regard to the nature and seriousness of the harm that may be caused to persons under 18 by conduct constituting the offence, and(b) the offence is not listed in Schedule 3 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (offences to which Part 2 of that Act applies) (disregarding for this purpose any condition subject to which an offence is listed in that Schedule). (3) Where an offence is capable of being committed against a person aged 18 or over, an amendment adding it to Schedule (Notification requirements for child cruelty offenders: child cruelty offences) must include a condition that the victim was under 18.(4) An amendment of Schedule (Notification requirements for child cruelty offenders: child cruelty offences) or section (Notification requirements for child cruelty offenders: interpretation) within subsection (5) does not apply to convictions, findings and cautions before the amendment takes effect.(5) An amendment is within this subsection if it—(a) adds an offence,(b) removes a condition relating to an offence, or(c) changes a condition in such a way as to cause an offence committed by or against a person of a particular age in certain circumstances, or resulting in a particular disposal, to be within the Schedule when it would not otherwise be.(6) Before making regulations under this section the Secretary of State must consult—(a) the National Police Chiefs’ Council, and(b) any other persons the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause confers powers to amend the list of child cruelty offences in my new Schedule inserted before Schedule 21.
“Notification requirements for child cruelty offenders: interpretation(1) In section (Notification requirements for child cruelty offenders)(2), a reference to a conviction includes a reference to a finding of a magistrates’ court, where the court makes an order under section 37(3) of the Mental Health Act 1983, that the accused did the act charged.(2) The following provisions do not apply for the purposes of section (Notification requirements for child cruelty offenders)(2)—(a) section 82(2) of the Sentencing Code, and(b) section 187(1) of the Armed Forces Act 2006,(conviction with absolute or conditional discharge deemed not to be a conviction).(3) A reference in Schedule (Notification requirements for child cruelty offenders: child cruelty offences) to an offence (“offence A”) includes—(a) an attempt or conspiracy to commit offence A;(b) an offence under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (encouraging or assisting crime) in relation to which offence A is the offence (or one of the offences) which the person believed would be committed;(c) aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of offence A.(4) References in Schedule (Notification requirements for child cruelty offenders: child cruelty offences) to a person’s age are to the person’s age at the time of the offence.(5) References in Schedule (Notification requirements for child cruelty offenders: child cruelty offences) to imprisonment include—(a) a period of detention which a person is liable to serve under a detention and training order;(b) a sentence of detention in a young offender institution;(c) a sentence of detention under section 250 of the Sentencing Code or section 209 of the Armed Forces Act 2006; (d) a sentence of custody for life under section 272 of the Sentencing Code (including one passed as a result of section 210A of the Armed Forces Act 2006); (e) an extended sentence under section 254 of the Sentencing Code (including one passed as a result of section 221A of the Armed Forces Act 2006).”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause makes provision about the interpretation of my new clauses and new Schedule about notification requirements for child cruelty offenders.
Baroness Sater
“Review of the criminal records disclosure regime(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed, undertake a review of the operation of the criminal records disclosure regime in England and Wales.(2) The report must, in particular, consider—(a) the impact of criminal record disclosure and DBS checks on individuals’ access to education, training and employment,(b) the criteria and processes for filtering and disclosure on basic, standard and enhanced checks, and(c) whether legislative, procedural or regulatory changes may be necessary to ensure that the regime appropriately balances public protection with rehabilitation.(3) In preparing the report, the Secretary of State must consult relevant bodies, including employers, the Disclosure and Barring Service, criminal justice agencies and representative organisations for people with convictions.(4) A report of the review must be laid before both Houses of Parliament within 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to review and report to Parliament within 12 months on the operation of the criminal records disclosure regime, including the impact of DBS checks on access to education, training and employment and whether any legislative, procedural or regulatory changes are needed.
Baroness Sater (Con)
My Lords, the amendment would require the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament within 12 months of the Act coming into force a report reviewing the criminal records disclosure regime. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, who unfortunately cannot be here today, for supporting it.
The purpose of the amendment is straightforward: to ensure that a thorough review of the criminal records disclosure regime is undertaken within 12 months. We know that having a criminal record can have profound consequences for individuals’ ability to rehabilitate and move forward with their lives. It is therefore important that we understand whether the current regime is operating proportionately and whether changes might be required to ensure that it strikes the right balance between public protection and rehabilitation. Many noble Lords have in the past raised concerns about aspects of the criminal records disclosure regime. I believe that this is a timely moment to bring this amendment forward, so that we can look at this in the round.
Your Lordships will know that I have previously spoken in this House on, and put forward amendments where I have highlighted, the postcode lottery that can arise when an offence is committed before the age of 18 but the individual is not brought before a court until after their 18th birthday. In these circumstances, for example, a young person who might otherwise have received a youth disposal such as a referral order may instead be sentenced as an adult, simply because their case reaches court after they have turned 18. That difference can have significant long-term consequences, including for what later appears on a Disclosure and Barring Service check and therefore for access to employment, education and training, and indeed their rehabilitation prospects.
I thank the Minister—the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt —for engaging constructively with me on this matter. Her willingness to meet me shows that there is genuine openness within government to look at this anomaly more closely. The Justice Secretary has recently indicated that the Government are considering opportunities to simplify the criminal records regime, particularly in relation to childhood offences, with the aim of ensuring that the system is clear and proportionate and does not unduly harm future job prospects. That signals recognition that reform is needed.
If the amendment were to be accepted, it would be helpful for the review also to consider the anomaly and to begin to address the issues I have concerns about, which I believe are deeply unfair. In preparing the report, the Secretary of State would be asked to consult widely, including with employers, the Disclosure and Barring Service, criminal justice agencies and organisations representing people with convictions, to ensure that the review reflected the experience of those most affected. Accepting this modest amendment would be a good and constructive step forward: simply a request for a review that could help inform future policy.
Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)
My Lords, I very much support this amendment. In Committee, I tabled an amendment, which was debated—the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, was acting Minister at the time—and would have prevented a criminal record being kept for children who are prosecuted by private rail companies under Section 5 of the Regulation of Railways Act 1889 and criminal records being created as a result, because there seemed to be a practice in certain magistrates’ courts for prosecuting such children for what were inadvertent, youthful transgressions, which were wrong but certainly did not merit a criminal record which, as I understand it, could be searched by potential employers for between eight and 11 years. I would like a commitment that this review, if it takes place, will cover that sort of case. It is all part of that bigger picture of children having criminal records created against them.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I want to give enthusiastic support to this amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Sater. I think that a criminal record disclosure regime is very important—we all understand that we do not want the worst of the worst working with children and so on —but the impact on rehabilitation is quite serious.
On Monday evening, it was therefore a great relief when the Minister said to those of us who were worried that non-crime hate incidents might be stored on a criminal database that could be used to prevent future employment or volunteering opportunities that that was a misplaced concern—although having the word “hate” by your name on a police database might not be what one would want.
In this instance, we are talking about people who have criminal convictions, have been in prison or have been serving their time. In working with former prisoners, I have known former drug addicts and gang members who have been invaluable as volunteers or in working with young people or youth services, but many of them are simply kept out of being able to help because of the barring scheme. A group of ex-prisoners that I had some dealing with wanted to do some work with care homes—we desperately need people to work in care homes. They were fully rehabilitated but were basically going to be barred from doing so. That seemed to me to be unfair and counterproductive. There was also a teenage victim of a grooming gang—a victim—who was convicted for soliciting prostitution at the age of 16. She should get a pardon, of course, but the main thing is that she is barred even from going on her own child’s school trips. She desperately wants to help out in the school, but she cannot.
These things should be looked at quite straight- forwardly. It is tricky, because I am aware that we do not want threatening people to work with, for example, children, but we should not be risk averse. I commend the noble Baroness on the wording, which is an appropriate balance between public protection and rehabilitation. There is no point putting people in prison and telling them that they will be different people and be given a second chance if they rehabilitate but then denying them that second chance when they leave prison. They might as well just carry on being criminals. I think this amendment is, as they say, a no-brainer, and I hope the Government will accept it.
Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)
My Lords, I support Amendment 390A from the noble Baroness, Lady Sater. I just want to give a practical look at this. As many noble Lords know, I have been a youth and community worker for well over 35 years now, and one of my biggest projects was to run a job club. Many of the young men in particular in my job club were very disappointed when they could not get work. Invariably, they had had some brush with the law that meant prison time, had done the work on themselves to be productive members of society, and came out, but then the barring code, DBS and all kinds of things got in the way. What do you believe they returned to then? They returned to the only skill they had, which was criminal activity. Most of the most serious criminals I dealt with—the repeat criminals, the ones that you really needed to cross the road for—were so because, at that moment when we could have assessed them slightly differently, when their youthful transgressions could have been looked at in a different light, we did not, and they then became a really serious, long-term problem to us all.
When I spoke to a group of young men very recently, and I keep saying men because I have been doing work with gang-involved young men, one of them finished our conversation by saying to me, “You”—by that, he meant us—“are doing it to yourselves”. He said that if we continue to view him as a criminal, he will continue to behave as a criminal.
We are all certain of two things: we do not want people who have committed crimes of the worst kind to go unpunished and get away with them, and we want to protect public safety. But since these rules first came in, some time ago now, our protection awareness and the rules have greatly advanced. As a trustee of a charity that does youth work, my job was to look at people’s criminal records and help to assess whether we could help them to work safely with our young people. Usually, we could do that, and for those for whom we could not we had to ask them to leave.
The idea that the Government should have a review is long overdue. If you really want to rehabilitate people, you have to show them that there is some chance that they can re-enter society and make up for what they may have done incorrectly. We understand that it is a balance but, again, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, pointed out, the wording of the amendment contains that balance. I commend it to the House.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, from these Benches, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, for the meeting that she had with my noble friend Lord Marks and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. I gather that the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, had a different meeting. We entirely support the amendment and were very pleased that the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, talked about the principles of agreeing with the review. We think that is very important.
We absolutely agree with the principle, as set out by the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, that children should not be adversely affected by backlogs, which they have absolutely no control over at all. There is a broader principle: the age at which an offence or caution took place should absolutely be the age at which the offender is dealt with. With regard to the review, we believe that youth cautions and conditional cautions should not remain on the young person’s record once they have become an adult. We hope that that will be taken into account in the review as well.
I echo the comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, on the very careful wording by the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, in proposed new subsection (2)(c) about ensuring that
“the regime appropriately balances public protection with rehabilitation”.
That seems to be common sense. We endorse that and hope that the Government will use it as the basis for their review.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Sater for tabling this amendment on a hugely important issue. I can be relatively brief because she gave ample reasons for the amendment. When criminal records are disclosed, they should be done so regularly and proportionately across all cases. She gave many compelling reasons for the amendment and, as she said, it is modest. It does not ask much of the Secretary of State. I agree absolutely with my noble friend that this system would simply benefit from an updated review. For all those reasons, I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, for her amendment, which is supported by my noble friend Lord Ponsonby. Perhaps I should explain why I am responding to it instead of my noble friend Lady Levitt, who has had considerable engagement with the noble Baroness and other Members of the House on this matter. The amendment relates to the Disclosure and Barring Service, which is the responsibility of the Home Office, so I am responding to it. In principle, there are a number of areas where there is crossover between the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office. I noted the support from the noble Lords, Lord Carter of Haslemere and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox of Buckley and Lady Brinton, for the general principles of the amendment.
The criminal records disclosure regime is designed to strike a balance between supporting ex-offenders to put their past behind them and ensuring that we keep people safe. The regime plays a crucial role in helping employers to make informed recruitment decisions, particularly, as was mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, for roles in health, social care and education. It also aims to avoid the disclosure of old and trivial offending so that people can make fresh starts and get on with their lives. We all know that employment and a fresh start are critical to preventing reoffending. The significance of employment—along with housing, family support and optimism for the future —for reducing reoffending should never be underestimated.
We keep the regime regularly under review as a matter of course, so that it remains fit for purpose and responds to concerns as they arise. I recognise the value of stepping back and carrying out a more strategic assessment, which the amendment would do.
I know that noble Lords know this, but the Deputy Prime Minister, who is also the Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor, gave a commitment on 2 December, in response to the Sir Brian Leveson’s Independent Review of the Criminal Courts: Part I, that the Government will consider opportunities to simplify the criminal records regime to ensure that it is clear and proportionate, particularly—given the discussions we have had and reflecting what my noble friend Lady Levitt had said—in relation to childhood offences. My department—the Home Office—and the Ministry of Justice are working together to look at the next steps.
We intend to publish a consultation that is, in a sense, the review that the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, asks for, setting out proposals for specific reforms on disclosure of childhood criminal records. Currently, the plan is to have that consultation published by the end of the year. If we can do it earlier, we will. There is a lot of work to do but I want to get it done as quickly as possible and I know that my noble friend Lady Levitt will want to do the same. I can certainly give the assurance that we will have that consultation out by the end of the year, and that will, I think, provide the strategic review that the noble Baroness’s amendment seeks.
I believe that it is right to prioritise consideration of how the regime affects those who offend as children. On behalf of my noble friend Lady Levitt and the work that has been done on engagement to date, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, for the external pressure she has put on us on these matters but, in the light of those reassurances, I ask her to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Sater (Con)
I thank the Minister and am very grateful to all noble Lords who contributed: the noble Lord, Lord Carter, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and my noble friend Lord Bailey all spoke very positively and passionately about the amendment. I thank the Minister for his extremely positive response and look forward to hearing more about the consultation at the end of the year. Speed is of the essence and we would like to see it as soon as possible. We have heard, from me and others, about lots of anomalies in other situations involving criminal records that we think we should deal with, but I thank the Minister again and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower
“Misconduct investigations where officer acquitted(1) The Police Reform Act 2002 is amended as follows.(2) In section 13B –(a) in subsection (1), at end insert “but this is subject to the exception in section 13BA.”, and(b) in subsection (2), at the beginning, leave out “The” and insert “Unless the exception in section 13BA applies, the”.(3) After section 13B, insert—“13BA No re-investigation on acquittal for the same conduct(1) Where this section applies, the Director-General may not make a determination under section 13B(2) to re-investigate the complaint, recordable conduct matter or DSI matter.(2) This section applies where—(a) the Director-General, appropriate authority or relevant review body (as the case may be) has made a determination under paragraphs 23(2)(c), 24(2)(b) or 25(4G) of Schedule 3,(b) as a result of the determination mentioned in paragraph (a), the Director of Public Prosecutions has brought criminal proceedings against the relevant person, and(c) the relevant person has been acquitted in those criminal proceedings.(3) The exception in subsection (1) does not apply only if—(a) the relevant authority has come into possession of substantial new evidence relating to the conduct that was the subject of the investigation, and(b) the relevant authority is of the reasonable opinion that the new evidence would, if considered, be significantly likely to lead to a finding of misconduct or gross misconduct.(4) In this section—(a) “relevant person” means the person to whose conduct the investigation related; (b) “relevant authority” means the Director-General, appropriate authority, local policing body or relevant review body (as the case may be).”(4) After paragraph 24C of Schedule 3, insert—“Investigation where person acquitted in criminal proceedings
24D (1) This paragraph applies where—(a) an investigation of a complaint, conduct matter or DSI matter (“the index investigation”) has concluded and the final report has been submitted to the relevant authority,(b) the relevant authority has made a determination under paragraphs 23(2)(c), 24(2)(b) or 25(4F),(c) as a result of the determination mentioned in sub-paragraph (b), the Director of Public Prosecutions has brought criminal proceedings against the relevant person, and(d) the relevant person has been acquitted in those criminal proceedings.(2) In this paragraph—(a) “relevant person” means the person to whose conduct the index investigation related;(b) “relevant authority” means the Director-General, appropriate authority, local policing body or relevant review body (as the case may be).(3) Where this paragraph applies, the relevant authority may not initiate a new investigation, re-open an investigation or order a re-investigation against the relevant person in relation to the same complaint, conduct matter or DSI matter that was the subject of the index investigation.(4) Sub-paragraph (3) does not apply only if—(a) the relevant authority has come into possession of substantial new evidence relating to the conduct that was the subject of the index investigation, and(b) the relevant authority is of the reasonable opinion that the new evidence would, if considered, be significantly likely to lead to a finding of misconduct or gross misconduct.”(6) In paragraph 25 of that Schedule—(a) after sub-paragraph (4D) insert—“(4DA) The Director-General may not direct that the complaint be re-investigated under sub-paragraph (4C)(b) if paragraph 24D applies in relation to that investigation.”, and(b) after sub-paragraph (4E) insert—“(4EA) The local policing body may not make a recommendation to the appropriate authority that the complaint be re-investigated under sub-paragraph (4E)(a) if paragraph 24D applies in relation to the conduct to which the investigation related.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would prevent the Independent Office for Police Conduct from investigating an officer where that officer has already been investigated and acquitted in court for the same conduct matter.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 391 stands in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. In Committee, speaking to the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, I raised the case of the police officer, Martyn Blake, whose case served as the perfect example of the difficulties of serving as a police firearms officer.
The Independent Office for Police Conduct, as is the norm, investigated Martyn Blake following a police firearms operation in London that resulted in the fatal shooting of Chris Kaba, and he was subsequently charged with murder. The case proceeded through the full criminal justice process and the evidence was examined in open court before jury under the rigorous standards of criminal law. After hearing the evidence, the jury acquitted him.
For most people, an acquittal, after an initial investigation and then a full criminal trial, would represent the end of the matter, but in this case, despite the acquittal, the IOPC indicated that the circumstances of the case would still be examined further in the context of police misconduct proceedings. The IOPC then reopened those proceedings, constituting its second investigation and the third investigation overall.
Whatever one’s view of the original incident, the situation raises the question of how many times an officer should be required to defend themselves for the same conduct. We have had restrictions and double jeopardy since the 12th century, but this appears to be triple jeopardy. Police officers can be investigated by the IOPC, referred to the CPS, dragged through the courts, acquitted and then reinvestigated. My amendment would amend the Police Reform Act 2002 to ensure that where a police officer has been investigated for a complaint or a conduct or DSI matter, prosecuted in a criminal court and acquitted, the same conduct cannot simply be reinvestigated by the Independent Office for Police Conduct unless there is substantial new evidence. That last point is important.
The Criminal Justice Act 2003 reformed the law of double jeopardy by permitting retrial where there was new and compelling evidence. I completely understand that if new evidence comes to light, the IOPC may need to reopen an investigation. There is a safeguard in the amendment to ensure the fairness of the police complaints system. I do not dispute the importance of police accountability; public confidence in policing depends on robust oversight, and the Independent Office for Police Conduct plays a vital role in that framework, but accountability must also be balanced with basic principles of justice. When the criminal courts have examined a case and reached a verdict, there must be a strong presumption that the matter is settled.
I know only too well that police officers make difficult and sometimes life and death decisions in circumstances that are fast-moving, dangerous and highly uncertain. They do so in order to protect the public. When something goes wrong, it is entirely right that their actions are scrutinised carefully and independently, but it is equally important that the process is fair, proportionate and finite.
I hope that the Minister will realise the harrowing mental burdens placed on the police and accept the amendment. All I am asking is for him to meet me half way and bring something at Third Reading or perhaps commit to bringing forward a proposal along these lines in the upcoming Bill on police reform. If he does not accept my amendment today and cannot give me an assurance about police reform, I will seek to divide the House.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
In family cases of sexual or physical abuse, someone can be tried and acquitted but then dealt with in the family court on very much the same evidence. That is partly because there is a difference in the standard of proof, which, in a criminal case, is much greater than in civil and family proceedings. Having said that, I am entirely sympathetic to this amendment.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, I cannot support this amendment, for two reasons. First, it imposes a regime which is wholly different from the regulatory practices in every other regulatory authority. For the last 15 years, I have practised exclusively as a legal adviser to regulatory panels, including for doctors, nurses, midwives, healthcare practitioners and social workers. In each and every case, a practitioner, a registrant, who has been acquitted by a criminal court can be brought before the regulatory panel to face misconduct proceedings. That is because the standard of proof is different: the criminal acquittal means that they failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the regulatory panel is entitled to find, on the balance of probabilities, that misconduct has been made out.
That takes me to the second point. Not only is it contrary to all the practices that we as a Parliament have imposed on other regulatory authorities, which I have identified, it is contrary to the merits. It may very well be that an officer who has properly been acquitted is none the less, on the balance of probabilities—the test within the regulatory authority—guilty of misconduct. I believe that that option should remain. I am very close to the position of the noble and learned Baroness, who draws from her experiences in the family courts. My experience is in regulatory proceedings, and what is proposed in this amendment is profoundly different from what we have imposed on the regulatory authorities.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I have added my name to this amendment, which the noble Lord, Lord Davies, set out the case for very well. It is linked particularly to the Chris Kaba case.
I will try to address the points made by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. He made a fair point. There are times when, even if someone has been acquitted of a criminal offence—in this case, a charge of murder—disciplinary issues might be discovered which are not directly related to the death but a professional body may want to address, such as ammunition not being signed out properly or something else that was important but not relevant to a criminal charge. The concern in this case, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, explained, is that it appears from the press release, which is all we have to go on, that the IOPC basically laid its charge based on the criminal case—the charge of murder. That might seem very difficult to understand.
The amount of time this takes—I am sure that this can happen in medical cases—is substantial. In the Chris Kaba case, from event to criminal case took about three years. The officer will probably wait another two years. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, addressed the double jeopardy point—it is probably nearer to triple or more jeopardy. There are two or three bites of the cherry as far as the officer is concerned, although we must look at it beyond the officer’s understanding.
There is first an assessment of whether there is a criminal charge. Should that be negative, there is then a misconduct charge. Should both be negative, if there is a death involved, which we are particularly concerned about with respect to police firearms officers, a coroner’s court will be convened, after waiting for the two previous decisions. At the end there can be a verdict of unlawful killing, at which point the whole thing starts again. All this accounts for the very long processes. Why can these decisions not be considered in parallel rather than sequentially? I have still not really heard a proper explanation for that.
If the IOPC considered in the police case that there was gross misconduct or a conduct issue, why did it not lay a charge at the beginning? Why did it wait for the outcome of the criminal case, unless, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has suggested, more evidence had been discovered in the criminal case that might have made a difference? No one has said that.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
The noble Lord was suggesting, I think, that it is wrong to hold a subsequent disciplinary proceeding on precisely the same facts that gave rise to the acquittal. But in the regulatory proceedings of which I have been speaking, that is precisely the case. Very often a practitioner or registrant who has been acquitted before a criminal court then comes before a regulatory panel facing misconduct proceedings on precisely the same facts. My point is that the amendment is seeking to put in place a regime wholly different from that which operates in every other profession, and deprives people of the option of finding an officer guilty of misconduct when, on the balance of probabilities, the officer is guilty of misconduct.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
I am not going to try to argue the case; I am making my argument, and the noble Viscount is making his. The other regulatory bodies do not have something called the IOPC, a body that is charged with investigating this type of thing. That is fine, but it imposes a further burden and further process. Two groups are badly affected: the family of the person who has died and the officer in the case. Of course, I make the case for the officer, but both matter in that both are badly damaged. For me, this is a subset of the later discussion we will have about police firearms officers, but it is just one indication of some of the aggravation of their position, when, in every case, when charged, they have been found not guilty. In the Kaba case, following a three-year process, it took three hours for a criminal court to find that there was no case to answer and the officer was found not guilty.
It is very hard to understand why the IOPC, after all that time, having not charged in the first place at the time of the event, suddenly instigated the case at a later stage. For all those reasons that I have tried to identify, police firearms officers, who take incredible risks on our behalf, are an important group that we have to consider and, unless we find some comfort for them in law, the danger is they will turn around and stop doing it on our behalf. I think this is a help. I accept the fundamental point from the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, that it may be inconsistent, but I would argue that we are in a pretty inconsistent place now so far as the law and the process is set up.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, can I add a further point to the points made by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, with which I agree? The purpose of the criminal proceedings is distinct from the purpose of the disciplinary regulatory proceedings. The purpose of the criminal proceedings, of course, is to decide whether this individual should face a serious sanction of many years in prison for what is alleged. The purpose of the disciplinary proceedings is entirely different. It is to protect the public and decide whether a person who serves as a police officer is an appropriate person in all the circumstances to continue to do so.
It is uncomfortable, but it may well be the case that the director-general, on reviewing all the evidence, takes the view that this particular officer should not continue to be in the police force, should not continue to hold the responsibilities that he or she does, and should not continue to have the powers that he or she does. If this amendment is passed, we will be putting the director-general in an impossible position. It will mean that he or she has to take no action to seek to impose disciplinary proceedings on an officer against whom there may be very considerable evidence that they are simply unsuitable to remain in the police service.
That is very similar, I would suggest, to the situation the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, drew attention to, because the purpose of the family law proceedings is entirely different to the purpose of the criminal proceedings. The purpose of the family law proceedings is to decide whether the child needs to be protected and therefore those proceedings can quite properly continue in relation to the same allegations that were rejected by the criminal court.
The Lord Bishop of Manchester
My Lords, can I add my two-penn’orth to this? I declare my interest as the co-chair of the national police ethics committee, but I am speaking more as a serving Bishop. I have to hear disciplinary complaints against clergy. Sometimes those clergy have committed something which is being investigated first by the police. To answer the point from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, often the police tell us, “We don’t want you interfering until we have finished”. If the result of the criminal proceeding is that the person is convicted, I can then do quite a summary process in terms of applying a penalty or perhaps depriving that member of the clergy from serving in their parish, perhaps banning them from ministry for a time or for life. But all of that is very much on that balance of probabilities, on the civil standard. It is very different from the criminal standard.
There are many cases where the police investigation may not lead to a trial or may lead to a trial and acquittal but there are still major issues around the suitability of that person to be a minister of religion, such as their safeguarding ability. I need to be able to reassure my people in my diocese by following a proper disciplinary process on exactly the same facts as the criminal case was dealing with, but to that very different standard of proof.
Again, as chair of police ethics, I think the ability of the police to be respected by the public, for me, demands that there are occasions when somebody who has been acquitted at the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt should still then face the disciplinary matter at that civil standard of the balance of probabilities, so I could not support this current amendment.
Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 392 in my name is about fairness, discipline and humanity.
First, misconduct investigations that drift on for months and years are damaging to everyone involved—the officer, the family, the complainant and public confidence in the system. Secondly, where these cases run on endlessly, the consequences can be severe. Long investigations place huge strain on mental health and, in the worst cases, such prolonged uncertainty has been linked to suicide. That alone should make this House pause and ask whether the current system is working as it should. Thirdly, I want to stress that this amendment does not block proper investigation and does not touch criminal matters. It simply says that, after 12 months, there should be independent scrutiny by a legally qualified person so that cases can move on properly and an officer can either be brought back into service or removed from the service without delay. Finally, swift justice is a matter for all involved. It matters for the innocent officer who should not be left in limbo. It matters for the complainants who deserve prompt and credible outcomes. Justice delayed helps no one; this amendment would bring greater urgency, greater accountability and a greater sense of fairness to the police disciplinary system.
Morale in the police force, particularly in the Met, is very low and one of the things that officers continually point to is the length of investigations when an officer is accused of something. This is not to say whether the officer is innocent or not—that is a whole other affair—it is the length of the investigation. If you speak to any of your local bobbies, particularly if they are an officer, they are likely to tell you they are considering leaving. When you probe a bit deeper, this question of investigations always comes up. One of the major roles of this Government now has to be to improve police morale by doing the right thing and making the whole system fairer.
I come from the Black community, the community arguably most over and under policed simultaneously in this country. If we are to have a police force that can actually care for the people who have the most interaction with the police, we need to raise their morale. I commend this amendment to the House. It could be a very good step in the right direction to make these investigations fair and to raise police morale.
Baroness O'Loan (CB)
My Lords, Amendment 393A in my name seeks to codify the Supreme Court decision in W(80) which relates to police disciplinary proceedings involving the use of force. The amendment relates to the test used to determine whether an officer misconducted themselves when he or she used force in self-defence. The amendment would place in statute the current legal position that an officer must hold an honest belief that they or others faced an immediate danger and, crucially, that where that belief is mistaken, the mistake must also be an objectively reasonable one.
I have retabled this amendment to encourage further consideration by the Government of their decision to depart from this test following Sir Adrian Fulford’s rapid review. Under their proposal, an officer would be able to rely on an honestly held but mistaken belief, even if the mistake was unreasonable. This is a significant shift, and one intended to be made by statutory instrument and without public consultation.
Since this is Report, I will not repeat the arguments made in Committee; however, I continue to believe firmly that the current civil law test is the right one in the context of misconduct proceedings. Of course, as many have rightly emphasised, it is essential that officers required to make split-second decisions in life-threatening situations are treated fairly, but fairness to officers must be balanced with the equally important obligations of learning, improvement and accountability of officers. The current test already achieves that balance. On the previous references to delays in the misconduct proceedings arena, I would say that these matters should be addressed by review, rather than removing the possibility of misconduct proceedings.
It is important to be clear that this amendment does not concern the criminal law. It does not touch on criminal prosecutions, as was suggested during Committee. To answer the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, with respect, the reason that disciplinary proceedings await the outcome of criminal proceedings is that this is what the police ask. I chair the safeguarding service in the Roman Catholic Diocese of Westminster and in many cases the police will say to us, “Please stop: do nothing”, and the policy is that we stop and do nothing until the police say we can do something. That is an important reservation.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
May I address that simple point? To be clear, in these cases, the IOPC is the investigating body. It is in full possession of the information it has gained—interviews, evidence from the scene, et cetera—so it is in a good position to query criminal charge or, at that stage, query misconduct charge, but it waits until the end of the whole process to instigate the misconduct charge that it could have instigated at the beginning, indicating the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that it may be an employment issue. I find it confusing that it waits until the outcome of a criminal case, where it will have had no reasoned explanation for the jury’s decision—it would in a civil case, but not in a jury case, because no reason is offered. That is my point. It can be different in other professions, I understand, because they did not have the benefit of the investigators deciding what to put forward to the CPS.
Baroness O'Loan (CB)
As police ombudsman, I was faced with exactly this problem, and I knew that our criminal proceedings had to be dealt with first.
To continue, what we are talking about here is the standard to be applied in misconduct proceedings. These proceedings exist in large part not just to ensure accountability but to enable forces to reflect and learn. They also enable the police to demonstrate that they take seriously situations involving the use of force, even when that force has been held not to be criminal. Despite that, the use of force must be necessary and proportionate.
This has broader implications. A disciplinary system that cannot scrutinise unreasonable mistakes risks undermining public confidence in policing. Retaining the civil law test supports public confidence by ensuring that unreasonable errors of judgment are open to scrutiny. Removing that scrutiny would weaken the learning function of misconduct proceedings, pose risks to public safety and give the impression that unreasonable policing errors lie beyond the review of accountability. That would have an impact, inevitably, by diminishing trust in policing.
For these reasons, I would be very grateful if the Minister could indicate what steps the Government are willing to take to address the serious concerns raised about moving to the criminal standard for self-defence in misconduct proceedings, particularly in the absence of wider public consultation or engagement with the communities most affected by police use of force. I am grateful to Justice, Inquest, the National Black Police Association and StopWatch for their help and support in this amendment.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, these amendments all address the same question: how we protect the public from unlawful force while treating officers fairly when they carry out dangerous duties on our behalf. From these Benches, we start from two simple principles: there must be clear, consistent standards of accountability; and we must not drift into a two-tier justice system that treats police officers differently from everyone else.
On Amendment 391, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, we have particular concerns. It would, in effect, close off the possibility of independent scrutiny by the IOPC once a criminal court had acquitted an officer. That might sound attractive in the interests of family, but it risks confusing two distinct questions: whether conduct meets the high criminal threshold for conviction and whether it meets the professional standards we rightly expect from those who wield state power.
We are more sympathetic to Amendment 392 from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey. Misconduct cases that drift for years are bad for families seeking answers, for complainants whose evidence fades, for taxpayers funding prolonged suspensions and, not least, for officers left in limbo. The broad thrust of the amendment—that investigations need clear expectations and real grip—is one we support, while recognising that complex cases sometimes need longer and that rigid timelines can carry risks.
Amendment 393A, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, seeks to put beyond doubt the test that should apply in police disciplinary proceedings involving the use of force. We support the aim of aligning those proceedings with the approach of the Supreme Court in W80 as a modest but important safeguard for bereaved families and communities who need to see that internal standards reflect the law as articulated by the highest court. If the Government are now moving in that direction through secondary legislation, so much the better, but Parliament is entitled to a clear, on-the-record explanation of the test, not simply an assurance that it will be sorted out behind the scenes.
Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)
Before the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, sits down, I wish to say that this is not a rigid timeline for anything other than a review to look at the timeline. I accept that a complicated case may need to run, but even in a complicated case, somebody should say, “Okay, this is complicated—we need more time”. In many instances, 12 months would be the point where somebody said, “We need to wrap up and move on”.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for initiating his Amendment 391. I know that it is motivated by the desire to support police officers in the difficult role they perform. He and I share that motivation. I say to him, however, that the amendment as drafted would have the effect of curtailing existing powers that the Independent Office for Police Conduct can use to reinvestigate or reopen a case that it has previously closed. The amendment also seeks, more generally, to prevent the reopening of investigations into complaints against the police from the public, again if such complaints have resulted in criminal proceedings which have not resulted in a conviction.
I take very straightforwardly the points made by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who made the point that I was going to make: we know of no recent cases where the Independent Office for Police Conduct has reopened a closed case. However, it is in the public interest that cases of alleged police misconduct can, if need be, be reopened in the light of substantive new evidence or evidence that the original investigation was flawed. As has been said by the three noble Members who have spoken, not all criminal proceedings against serving police officers involve line-of-duty incidents. Some may involve serious corruption or sexual violence by police perpetrators, and there may be compelling public interest arguments for reopening such cases.
The powers of the Independent Office for Police Conduct to reinvestigate a case are already limited by existing law, which requires the IOPC to have compelling reasons to reopen a case. This is a legal threshold and is already a high bar. Disciplinary proceedings involve different evidential tests, as was mentioned by those who contributed, and the lower threshold for finding misconduct or gross misconduct is the balance of probabilities. They also serve a different purpose from a criminal trial. We rightly expect the highest standards from our police officers, so a blanket presumption that no police officer who has been acquitted in the criminal courts should face disciplinary proceedings would, in the Government’s view, be quite wrong—I think that reflects the points of view put by the noble Viscount, the noble Lord and the noble and learned Baroness. That is a compelling argument which I hope the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, will reflect on if he seeks to push the amendment, which I hope, in due course, he will not.
Amendment 392, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, seeks to improve the timeliness of police complaints and misconduct investigations by creating a new system of legal adjudicators with the power to overrule both chief constables and the Independent Office for Police Conduct by closing down investigations where they determine that there is no good or sufficient reason for any delay. As we have previously debated, unnecessary delays in these investigations are not in anyone’s best interests. I know the impact they will have on public confidence and on the welfare of the police officers involved. However, while it is right to strive for improvements in timeliness, this amendment risks adding another layer of bureaucracy, thereby adding cost and delay and not removing it.
The Government are committed to supporting chief constables to remove those who are not fit for purpose, but the amendment has the potential not only to overrule the responsibilities of chief constables and the Independent Office for Police Conduct, but to create some perverse outcomes. The Government’s recent police reform White Paper already confirms our commitment to an independent, end-to-end review of the police conduct system, which I know the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, would support. It will include looking at timeliness and how this can be improved. Again, further process will be brought back following the police White Paper proposals.
Amendment 393A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, would require that, where a police officer uses force based on an honestly held but mistaken belief, that belief can justify the use of force only if the mistake was objectively reasonable. In effect, as she knows, it seeks to codify the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of police officer W80, which found that the civil standard applied to this test. As the House will know, police officers carry out important and demanding roles. The Government are determined to ensure that both the public and the police are able to feel confident in the police accountability system. That is why we commissioned a review—again, the noble Baroness referred to this—from Timothy Godwin, a former senior police officer, and Sir Adrian Fulford. They carried out a rapid, independent review into police accountability.
The findings of that review were published in October 2025—again, the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, referred to this—and it recommended that the Government change the legal test for the use of force in police misconduct cases from the civil to the criminal law test. The Government, again, have accepted this recommendation and we are in the process of making the necessary changes via secondary legislation. Our intention is that these changes will come into force later this year, in the spring of 2026.
While I understand the noble Baroness’s concept, I cannot support it, because we have put in place the independent commissioners to examine the matter thoroughly and they heard evidence from a wide range of stakeholders. Their recommendation was clear: the current approach has created confusion, inconsistency and, I accept, a very bad effect on police morale, particularly among firearms officers. I hope the changes we are making will bring clarity to the system. I reassure the House that it will still be the case that any force used must be proportionate, reasonable and necessary. I hope that satisfies the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, after her comments—it may not—and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey.
Finally in this group, I will speak briefly to government Amendments 395 and 397. These are technical amendments to ensure that specialist police force barred and advisory lists are consistently applied across police forces. The provisions in Clauses 173 to 181 and Schedule 21 are part of a broader effort to raise standards and conduct within law enforcement. They also include the closure of a legislative loophole. These technical amendments have been tabled to ensure that we have alignment in the treatment of civilian employees within the police service.
I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I hope I have satisfied the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, and the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington. I hope not just that I have satisfied the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, but that on reflection he is able to listen to the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and therefore not push his amendment to a vote. But, as ever, that is entirely a matter for him.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. I am grateful to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for his valid points and for injecting his valuable experience into this debate. I say to my noble friend Lord Hailsham that it is wrong to draw a comparison between policing and the medical profession. Policing is uniquely different.
This has been a thoughtful discussion about how we maintain robust police accountability while ensuring fairness to the officers who serve the public. The case of Martyn Blake has brought this issue into the public consciousness. Whatever view one takes of the circumstances of that tragic incident, the fact remains that the case was heard in open court before a jury and the officer was acquitted, yet the prospect of further investigation has remained. For many officers watching that case unfold, the concern is not about accountability; it is about whether there is ever a point at which a matter can truly be regarded as concluded.
As my noble friend Lord Bailey of Paddington pointed out, there is much current discussion about police morale and those young-in-service officers leaving the police service. The proposal in my amendment is fair to officers. It is clear for the system and maintains the integrity of the oversight framework. It is highly unfortunate and extremely disappointing that the Minister has not been able to at least meet me half way and make the commitment that I sought. On that basis, I beg to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Bailey of Paddington
“Scrutiny of investigation timeliness(1) The Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2020 (S.I.2020/2) are amended as follows.(2) After Regulation 13 (timeliness of investigations), insert—“Scrutiny of investigation timeliness(1) A legally qualified person must be appointed to scrutinise any investigations of misconduct or gross misconduct which have not been completed within 12 months.(2) The legally qualified person must determine whether there is good and sufficient reason for the time already taken, and how much time is anticipated to be needed for completion of the investigation.(3) In determining whether there is good and sufficient reason, the legally qualified person may have regard to any relevant matter, and must have particular regard to—(a) whether the investigation has been efficient and effective;(b) whether there has been unnecessary or unreasonable delay, having regard to the complexity and seriousness of the case;(c) the impact upon the officer and others;(d) any anticipated further delay;(e) the public interest and effect on confidence in the police disciplinary system;(f) representations made on behalf of any person entitled to receive a copy of the information provided.(4) If the legally qualified person determines that there is good and sufficient reason to continue the investigation, then the legally qualified person must set a date for the conclusion of all proceedings.(5) Nothing in this provision shall have any effect in relation to any criminal investigation.”(3) The Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 (S.I.2020/4) are amended as follows.(4) After Regulation 19 (timeliness of investigation), insert—“Scrutiny of investigation timeliness(1) A legally qualified person must be appointed to scrutinise any investigations of misconduct or gross misconduct which have not been completed within 12 months.(2) The legally qualified person must determine whether there is good and sufficient reason for the time already taken, and how much time is anticipated to be needed for completion of the investigation. (3) In determining whether there is good and sufficient reason, the legally qualified person may have regard to any relevant matter, and must have particular regard to—(a) whether the investigation has been efficient and effective;(b) whether there has been unnecessary or unreasonable delay, having regard to the complexity and seriousness of the case;(c) the impact upon the officer and others;(d) any anticipated further delay;(e) the public interest and effect on confidence in the police disciplinary system;(f) representations made on behalf of any person entitled to receive a copy of the information provided.(4) If the legally qualified person determines that there is good and sufficient reason to continue the investigation, then the legally qualified person must set a date for the conclusion of all proceedings.(5) Nothing in this provision shall have any effect in relation to any criminal investigation.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment proposes a 12-month limit, unless extraordinary circumstances reviewed by a legally qualified person dictate otherwise, which would encourage forces and external bodies to complete misconduct and gross misconduct processes quicker, allowing officers to resume duties and limiting the negative impact on their health and wellbeing.
Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)
I thank the Minister for his answer. Before we voted, he said to me that he hoped I was satisfied. I will say that I am partially satisfied with his answer, and that is good enough; I will not test the opinion of the House. I would like to say, however, that he talked about the work that the Government are doing to look at how we can shorten these investigations; he mentioned that the Government were going to give this more consideration. I implore him to look at how we shorten these investigations. They are unnecessarily wrong and they are causing huge damage on both sides of the equation. I would like to support the Government in that work, and if I can be of any help, I hope they will let me know. However, I will not test the will of the House.
Crime and Policing Bill
Wednesday 11th March 2026
(2 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 167-V(a) Amendments for Report (Supplementary to the Fifth Marshalled List) - (10 Mar 2026)
21:30 - Division on Amendment 394 - Ayes: 44 / Noes: 153 - Amendment 394 disagreed.
Baroness Doocey
“Suspension of chief constables(1) The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 is amended as follows.(2) In section 38 (appointment, suspension and removal of chief constables), after subsection (2) insert—“(2A) Before suspending a chief constable under this section, the police and crime commissioner (or their successor) must—(a) be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the chief constable’s continued exercise of their functions would present a serious risk to the efficiency or effectiveness of the police force, or seriously undermine public confidence in the policing of the area, and(b) consult His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (or any relevant successor inspectorate) and have regard to its views.””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would require a police and crime commissioner (or their successor) before suspending a chief constable under section 38 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, to consult His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services and to be satisfied that suspension is necessary to avoid a serious risk to the efficiency or effectiveness of the force or to public confidence.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 393 seeks to protect the operational independence of chief constables by introducing vital safeguards at the point of suspension—the moment when they are most vulnerable to political pressure in practice.
In Committee, I tabled an amendment addressing a later stage of the formal dismissal process. However, after listening to police representatives, it has become clear that the real problem arises much earlier. The unilateral power of suspension currently exercised by police and crime commissioners, without any duty to seek independent input, is a significant driver of the leadership instability we see today, with nearly one in five forces losing their chief constable every year.
Under the current framework, the independent inspectorate must be consulted before a chief is formally removed, yet suspension often pre-empts this and can be triggered on relatively vague grounds, including simply that a chief constable’s continued presence may be detrimental to the efficiency or effectiveness of the force. In practice, this suspension loophole means the mere threat of suspension is often enough to force a chief to resign just to avoid a very public confrontation.
This leadership churn has real-world consequences. In Devon and Cornwall, the disruption of having three chief constables in 18 months led to service shortfalls and diminished morale. The Government’s own recent White Paper admits that the PCC model has often “not facilitated effective management” and acknowledges
“tensions in the one-to-one relationship”,
which ultimately harm communities.
My amendment proposes two modest but critical adjustments. First, it would require the PCC to be satisfied on reasonable grounds that continued service poses a serious risk to efficiency or to public confidence, replacing the current vague thresholds. Secondly, it would extend the duty to consult HMICFRS at this earlier stage, creating consistency between the decision to suspend and the decision to remove.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for her amendment. It is a measured proposal that would simply require a police and crime commissioner, before suspending a chief constable, to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for doing so and to consult His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services.
Chief constables occupy one of the most demanding leadership roles in public life. They are responsible for operational policing, for thousands of officers and staff, and for maintaining public confidence in the rule of law. Therefore, decisions to suspend them are of the utmost seriousness, not only for the individual concerned but for the stability and effectiveness of the force they lead.
Recent events remind us why clarity in these processes matters. The policing of the Maccabi Tel Aviv fixture generated significant public and political debate about policing decisions and leadership accountability. In that context, the actions and judgments of the then chief constable of West Midlands Police, Craig Guildford, have been the subject of rightful scrutiny and commentary. There is potential concern about the necessity for the amendment, but I look forward to what the Minister has to offer on it.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for her amendment. I say at the outset that she has a point: the process by which police and crime commissioners may suspend a chief constable should be looked at.
The noble Baroness has suggested that His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services should be involved in this process. As I discussed in Committee, the inspectorate already has such a role for the enforcement of resignations or retirements of chief constables under the Police Regulations 2003. I am pleased to tell the noble Baroness that the Government agree with the suggestion she has made; I do not wish to surprise the noble Baroness.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I hope she can recover from that shock. I ask her to look at paragraph 134 of the White Paper, From Local to National: A New Model for Policing, which we published on 26 January. It says:
“We will reform the process for the appointment, suspension and dismissal of Chief Constables to introduce greater fairness, transparency and balance into the process. This will include introducing a requirement for Mayors and Policing and Crime Boards to seek views from His Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary before taking any action to suspend the Chief Constable”.
I confirm that we intend to bring forward the necessary legislation as soon as parliamentary time allows. We want to do that as part of the wider police reform package, so that it is not a piecemeal approach. There will be a wider police reform follow-through on the White Paper as soon as parliamentary time allows. It is a very ambitious programme. I want to make sure that we do not just deal with it in isolation. That reassurance is on the record, and on that basis I hope the noble Baroness will not push her amendment.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, tells me that it is a victory. I thank the Minister for that confirmation, and I am very pleased that it is not just when some chief constables are going to be sacked; it is actually at the stage I asked for in my speech. That is the key point. If they can be suspended and that does not require consultation with anyone, the fact is that practically all of them have just taken the view that they do not want a big public outing, so they have just resigned anyway. That is what I am trying to stop. The Minister has said that he is going to do exactly what I have asked for. Can someone write that down? I am delighted, and I therefore withdraw my amendment.
Lord Pannick
“(3) The court may, on application by or on behalf of D and on notice to the media, make an order—(a) withholding from the public in proceedings before the court—(i) D’s name, (ii) D’s address,(iii) D’s date of birth,(b) giving a reporting direction (see section 170) in respect of D (if one does not already have effect), or(c) making an anonymity order (see section 171) in respect of D.(4) To make an order under subsection (3) the court must—(a) be satisfied that the order is necessary—(i) to protect against a real risk to the safety of D or another person arising from D being identified as the person alleged to have committed the offence, or(ii) to prevent real harm to the public interest, and(b) be satisfied that the order includes the least restrictive measures possible to address the conditions in (a)(i) or (ii) and is proportionate having regard to the principle of open justice.(4A) Where the court considers that giving notice under subsection (3) would defeat the purpose of the application, it may make a temporary order without notice, which must be reconsidered at the earliest opportunity after notice has been given to the media.”Member’s explanatory statement
The amendment would replace the presumption of anonymity for firearms officers in Clause 168 with a power for the Court to grant anonymity where it is necessary to protect against a real risk to the safety of the officer or another person arising from D being identified as the person alleged to have committed the offence, or to prevent real harm to the public interest, having regard to proportionality and the principle of open justice.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I hope the Minister will give me as satisfactory a response in relation to this group as the other Minister just gave to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey.
Amendments 393B to 393F in this group are in my name. They address Clauses 168 to 171, which will create a presumption of anonymity for an authorised firearms officer who is charged with an offence in relation to the use of a weapon in the exercise of his or her functions. That presumption will apply unless and until that defendant is convicted of the criminal offence.
I am very grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Black of Brentwood, and to the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, for adding their names to these amendments. Unfortunately, the noble Lord, Lord Black, and the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, cannot be here tonight. They send their apologies. We will all miss their contributions, as they made powerful speeches on this subject in Committee. I also record my gratitude to Emma Snell of Justice and to Sebastian Cuttill of the News Media Association for their very helpful briefings.
Amendment 393B would replace this presumption of anonymity in the Bill with a power for the court to grant anonymity where it considers it necessary to protect against a real risk to the safety of the firearms officer or another person, such as a member of the officer’s family, or to prevent harm to the public interest, having regard to proportionality and to the principle of open justice. That, in essence, is the common-law position that applies now.
I recognise the need for courts to have this power to grant anonymity in appropriate cases, but it would be a mistake to legislate for a statutory presumption. That is because the criminal courts have long proceeded, and rightly so, on the basis that open justice is a core principle of our legal system. It is a core principle because it is essential to maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice. Restrictions on reporting what goes on in our courts always need to be justified. In the context addressed by Clause 168, there are especially strong reasons for upholding open justice.
We are here typically concerned with the actions of a firearms officer acting on behalf of the state, whose use of a weapon has killed another human being. That event will have led the CPS to bring a criminal prosecution, which means that the CPS believes that two criteria are satisfied—first, that on the available evidence, the court is more likely than not to convict, and secondly, that it is in the public interest to proceed with the prosecution. Of course, the prosecution must prove its case, but in this context the interests of open justice are very important in the public interest. The public, not just the family and friends of the deceased, surely have a strong interest in knowing what is alleged against whom.
Open justice, I suggest, is of particular importance at this time, when public confidence in our police force is low—perhaps lower than ever before. A presumption that the press cannot fully report a murder trial will, I fear, inevitably cause further damage to public confidence.
I accept that there will be cases where open justice should give way to the need to protect the defendant and his or her family. The court must have power to provide protection by requiring anonymity, but that must be because of information that provides a reasoned basis for concern that such protection is required in the particular circumstances of the case.
I also emphasise that Clause 168 would confer special protection on firearms officers. The Government do not suggest that other police officers or prison officers whose conduct may lead to the serious injury or death of another person should enjoy this presumption of anonymity, and rightly so. To confer this unique protection on firearms officers is unnecessary because a discretion for the court suffices, and it is wrong in principle because this is a context where the interests of open justice are at their strongest.
In Committee my noble friend Lord Carter of Haslemere—I am very pleased that he is in his place—suggested that firearms officers might be deterred from taking up such posts if there is no presumption of anonymity. That seems to me, with great respect, a weak argument when no other police officer enjoys such a presumption, when Clause 168 does not guarantee anonymity, when our amendments would allow anonymity in appropriate cases and when a firearms officer is far more likely to be concerned about the risk of prosecution than about the question of anonymity.
Also in Committee, my other noble friend—I do not have very many—Lord Hogan-Howe, whom I am also very pleased to see in his place tonight, emphasised the difficult and important job done by firearms officers. I recognise that, and I agree with my noble friend. That should be carefully borne in mind when decisions are taken in the public interest on whether to prosecute. Once a prosecution is brought, no defendant should enjoy a special presumption of anonymity. My noble friend Lord Hogan-Howe also drew attention to the fact that there are not many of these cases. That is no doubt true, but I suggest that adds nothing to the debate on how such cases should be treated when a prosecution is brought.
In Committee the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, emphasised that firearms officers can face serious death threats and intimidation—very regrettable but no doubt true. So can other police officers, and if there is information suggesting such circumstances or a risk of such circumstances, our amendments would allow the judge to protect anonymity. That is the right way to ensure both protection and open justice.
The other amendments that I have tabled, Amendments 393C and 393D, would ensure that the criteria for courts imposing restrictions are the same after conviction and pending an appeal, and Amendments 393E and 393F would ensure that courts have flexible powers to vary or revoke reporting restrictions or anonymity orders in the light of any changes. I beg to move.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I shall speak to just two amendments, Amendments 393B and 394. Amendment 393B is the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has introduced about anonymity. Noble Lords will not be surprised to hear that I do not agree with him. However, I shared with him a few days ago that I have some sympathy with the general position. Police officers should be accountable and one of the main ways in which to be accountable is to be identifiable, which is why they wear numbers and now wear their names. That is important. I therefore hesitate before I argue for anonymity. I am not saying that it is a black-and-white question. However, on balance, I agree with the Government’s proposal, which is to provide anonymity for firearms officers. The assumption is changed from the present: it is that there will be anonymity unless the judge decides there will not be. That is the complete reverse of the situation today. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, prefers it as it is today, but would put it in statute rather than common law.
I am going to say more on Amendment 394 and the group of special people we rely on. It is important because, in the case we have heard about of Sergeant Blake and Chris Kaba, the man that he shot, there was clear information before the court that Mr Kaba was a member of an organised crime group. In fact, he was wanted for two firearms offences, so there was reasonable suspicion that he and others who were linked to him had firearms access. That will not always be the case. Despite that, the judge in the case decided to lift the anonymity that had been possible. I met Sergeant Blake a few months ago. The effect on his life and his family was significant. When someone has been named, it cannot be retracted, which is why it is so important to get it right at the beginning. That is why I prefer the Government’s position. It could be argued out but, once argued in, everybody is named and consequences flow from that. Sergeant Blake was incredibly understanding of what had happened. He was not overly critical of anyone at all. We as Parliament have to consider him as one example, but there have been others. So, I prefer the Government’s position and I think it is defensible.
Finally, I made a mistake when I was speaking about this in Committee. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, corrected me. He was quite right. I said that it was a small case. It was not about being a small issue but about a small number of people. That is the point I misapplied. I realise it is an important issue. It is also important that these officers get supported. This protection, which can be argued out, is more important than the general principle on this occasion. I take the point of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that other officers have come under threat who do not carry firearms. They can also apply for anonymity. However, if you are shooting someone dead, it raises the threat and the risk level and I prefer the Government’s calculation. So, I support the Government and not the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.
Amendment 394 is about trying to get a higher bar before officers are prosecuted. Not too many officers have been prosecuted over the years, and everyone who has been charged has been found not guilty. Some lawyers have said, “Therefore, the system works, why do you worry?” The trouble is that it sometimes takes three to five years for that outcome to arrive, during which time the officers and their families are under incredible pressure. So it matters who gets charged and we have to consider this special group of people. Out of the 145,000 police officers, probably about 3,500 can carry a firearm. They deploy to around 17,000 incidents a year. That was in 2025 in England and Wales. They actually discharged their weapon in between five and 10 operations. They hit fewer people and not everyone who was hit died. My broad point is that they are not a trigger-happy group. There is no evidence that they regularly go out and shoot people. When it happens, it is a serious issue, and of course there should be some accountability. But we rely on them as volunteers. They do not get paid more, and if they ever change their mind—which I think was the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Carter—we have no way to force them to do it. You cannot order an officer to carry a firearm in our present regime. We are not America, where it is a condition of service. So we rely on them an awful lot and we prey on their good will quite a lot, too.
I do not want to address the legal issue in terms of these officers, but I want to bring our attention to the policy involved. We all have to bear in mind that there are probably three broad groups of firearms operations. Something happens in front of an officer or they get deployed quickly; it is a planned operation, they are going to arrest somebody in their home; or it is a crime in progress. It all comes down to the same thing. In that second in which you have to make a decision, you remain a human being. You have to decide whether you are going to shoot or not. On the whole, the evidence shows that they get it right. Should they kill someone or hurt them seriously, the whole system, the whole panoply of the state, descends on them. “Why did you do that?” That is not the problem for me.
The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, raised the issue of other professions. I do not know how many surgeons there are in the Chamber, but when a surgeon makes a mistake and slashes an artery, the whole world does not descend and say, “Why did you do that?” But it does when a firearms officer shoots. I realise there is some distinction, but the outcome is the same. The firearms officer is going to come under severe scrutiny during that period. We have to consider that they remain a human being who did their best that day. They did not go to work to try to kill someone. They went to work to try to do the job that we had asked them to do on our behalf. In an unarmed society with an unarmed police force, I believe that they are a special group.
As I come towards the end of my speech, I should say that I have met most of the officers who, over the past few years, have been charged. One is called Anthony Long. He was under inquiry for 11 years before he was cleared by a Crown Court jury. Each officer I have met who has been in this position has shown great humility. They are the sort of people you would want to give a gun to. It is not about just whether they can shoot straight; it is about the judgment they apply at that time. You want sensible, mature people.
Despite the fact that all these people had been under inquiry for so long, they were incredibly understanding of why they were in that position. They understood that there had to be an inquiry, and they were very understanding of all the different processes. I think that this group of people deserves our honour as well as their own. At the moment, I am afraid, the system—not individuals—is treating them badly. Somebody has to speak up for them, which is why, for me, these amendments have so much power. I realise that there are big legal issues that must be considered—no one is immune to that—but my passion has been to try to support these people in what is, I think, a very difficult job. There is evidence that they are doing it properly; over the past 40 years, there has been no evidence of them doing it badly. There have been no convictions of an officer.
My final point is that it seems as though, on the route to getting into a court, everybody makes the judgment that this is a criminal charge. There is the investigation, which the police sometimes did; now, it is the IOPC. The CPS makes a decision, then it is put before a jury. To me, that is where some common sense gets applied. The benefit of a jury is that we have the judgment of our peers. When they apply their judgment, they conclude that this group of officers is generally doing things right. I wonder why the system cannot do more for firearms officers to encourage them to carry on doing this and taking these very difficult decisions on our behalf without having, in that second, to worry about the consequences over the next few years. We cannot sustain that, and I do not think that they should. That is my reason for arguing for these two amendments.
Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)
My Lords, Amendment 403 in this group is in my name.
The group that we are talking about raises the issue whether authorised firearms officers deserve any special protection if they are, or may be, prosecuted for their conduct or if they are convicted. Some would say that they are not so deserving, because it would not be giving equal treatment to all. Others, me included, believe that they most certainly need some additional protection, whether that is a presumption of anonymity, a higher threshold before a prosecution can be brought, a lesser penalty if they are convicted, or a combination of all three.
These are among the bravest people in society. They volunteer for the job so as to protect the public, even though it means exposing themselves to a high risk of death or injury. They are motivated by the highest ideals and deserve special consideration because of it. They are emphatically not in the same position as ordinary members of the public who injure or kill others with a firearm, so I support the statutory presumption of anonymity, which the Government commendably proposed. I also oppose Amendment 393B, which would impose conditions before there can be anonymity.
In fact, I do not think that there is a huge difference between the Government’s Clause 168 and the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—whatever number it is. In essence, we are talking about what the default position should be and whether that can be rebutted in the interests of justice, one or either way. The Government have come down in favour of a presumption of anonymity, which is where I come down as well, but I do not think that there is a huge gap.
For me, it goes without saying that the safety of firearms officers and their families is at real risk because of the extensive publicity that such cases attract. Parliament should, therefore, presume that to be the case. However, even anonymity does not avoid the intense stress that such officers, who have put their lives on the line for the rest of us, must endure while waiting for trial, which can, of course, take years, so I agree with the principle behind Amendment 394: that a higher threshold should be set before such a prosecution can take place. Whether this should be as high a threshold as requiring the case to be exceptional before there can be a prosecution is a matter for debate, but I agree that the factors set out in proposed new subsection (5), which would be inserted by Amendment 394—
“the exceptional demands and stresses to which authorised firearms officers are subjected to in the course of their duties, and … the exceptional difficulties of making time-sensitive judgments”—
should always be given particular weight.
Where a prosecution is brought, especially if there is no higher threshold for prosecution, my Amendment 403 is designed to mitigate the penalty imposed if certain conditions are met. I tabled this amendment in Committee. but the debate took place with just 10 Peers in the Chamber at 11.15 at night, so I have brought it back on Report. It is about whether police firearms officers who use excessive force on the spur of the moment in the honest but mistaken belief that the degree of force is reasonable, and who would otherwise be entitled to rely on self-defence, should be found guilty of murder or manslaughter.
Thirty years ago, in the Lee Clegg case, the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords recommended that, in these circumstances, law enforcement officers should not be treated the same as terrorists and other murderers if they use excessive force; and that they should be convicted of manslaughter, not murder. I find that a statement of the obvious. Quoting the Court of Appeal, Lord Lloyd of Berwick said:
“There is one obvious and striking difference between Private Clegg and other persons found guilty of murder. The great majority of persons found guilty of murder, whether they are terrorist or domestic murders, kill from an evil and wicked motive. But when Private Clegg set out on patrol on the night of 30 September 1990 he did so to assist in the maintenance of law and order and we have no doubt that as he commenced the patrol he had no intention of unlawfully killing or wounding anyone. However, he was suddenly faced with a car driving through an army checkpoint and, being armed with a high velocity rifle to enable him to combat the threat of terrorism, he decided to fire the … shot from his rifle in circumstances which cannot be justified … we consider that a law which would permit a conviction for manslaughter would reflect more clearly the nature of the offence which he had committed”.
However, Lord Lloyd ruled that it was inappropriate for the courts to change the law and that it was for Parliament to do so. Here we are, 30 years on, with that opportunity.
In rejecting my amendment in Committee, the noble Baroness the Minister said that it would
“create a two-tier justice system where police officers who kill or injure in the course of their duties are judged by a more lenient standard than applies to the rest of the population”.
But is treating police firearms officers differently from other murderers a two-tier justice system? Surely not. We are not treating like with like. Police firearms officers who go on duty, risking their lives to protect us all and, in the words of the Minister, are
“having to make life and death decisions in an instant”.—[Official Report, 20/1/26; col. 266.]
are emphatically in a different category from those who kill with an evil motive. The law should therefore treat them differently.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I thoroughly welcome these sensible and proportionate amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, which he more than ably explained. I was prompted to speak on Amendment 393B having just read the Government’s Protecting What Matters action plan. I have plenty to say on that, but your Lordships will be relieved that I am not going to do so now.
In the plan, the Government readily admit that trust in institutions is in decline and that social cohesion is fraying. I am concerned that, if Clauses 168 to 171 go through unamended, it could create a problem of further distrust in policing. Despite the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, saying that there is not a huge gap between the amendment and the Government in relation to presumed anonymity for armed police officers, the Government are proposing an unprecedented rejection of the principles around open justice and, more importantly for me, press freedom. I am concerned that the clauses will limit the ability of the press to report in any meaningful way on cases involving the use of lethal force by police officers.
Replacing the presumption of anonymity should not leave officers vulnerable or unsafe, but the amendment would allow the power to grant anonymity if there are specific risks to safety or if it is in the public interest, to prevent harm. This is a blunt instrument. It would set up a privacy regime that would shut the media out from scrutinising the state’s exercise of power with guns. I cannot see how the public will not see that as covering up when the media will be denied any meaningful opportunity even to contest such anonymity, let alone to report. That is the concern. I am sure that the Minister will explain.
It is interesting that the police have recently been asking for greater freedom to release more details in relation to some investigations. This is not in terms of armed police, but police forces have recognised that suppressing information can lead to misinformation. That can turn nasty if the public feel that there has been a cover-up.
That is a move to transparency to ensure public consent and build trust, which goes in the right direction. I am just worried, although it is not their intention, the clauses will be a step back from a duty to have candour and from the state being transparent when, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, pointed out, an armed officer representing the state takes another human being’s life. We should not just grant automatic anonymity in that way. We have to at least allow the media to ask questions and scrutinise.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)
My Lords, my name is on the series of amendments that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has spoken to, and I will make a few brief comments in support of them. Before I do, I shall make a few observations about Amendment 394. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, has not yet spoken to it, and he may be able to answer all the points I will make.
I start by saying that I share—with all noble Lords, I think—concern and admiration for the police generally, particularly for police officers who undertake willingly the task of bearing arms on our behalf in circumstances that may conceivably lead to serious harm to them and which call for difficult judgments to be made, often on very little information and in a split second. I entirely understand the concern.
I also wonder whether all these amendments are not significantly inspired by the Chris Kaba case and the officer, Martyn Blake. As to the decision not to grant him anonymity, it is very arguable that the judge came to the wrong decision. But, of course, we must bear in mind that hard cases make bad law and that there is a danger that, from one case, we then proceed to legislate in a way that overreacts and makes a change which is not really justified.
I will deal with Amendment 394, on presumption against prosecution. I am concerned about this. The idea of a presumption against prosecution does not find its way into the criminal law very often. I was able to find only one, the much-criticised Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Act 2021, where the then Conservative Government brought in a limit to the prosecution—a legal threshold in relation to overseas acts by serving forces rather than police officers. In certain exceptional circumstances there would be a presumption against there being a prosecution after five years. That was much criticised. What I struggle with in this amendment is that, before any prosecution is brought—the Minister will know this better than anyone, really, in your Lordships’ House—there has to be a consideration of whether there is sufficient evidence to prosecute, and, secondly, whether it is in the public interest to prosecute.
The factors referred to in this amendment, for example, in proposed new subsection (5)—
“In making a decision to which this section applies, a relevant prosecutor must give particular weight to the following matters … the exceptional demands and stresses to which authorised firearms officers are subjected to in the course of their duties, and … the exceptional difficulties of making time-sensitive judgments”—
are absolutely right, but I respectfully say that those are the very considerations that would be taken into account by the prosecution in the ordinary course of affairs when deciding whether there is sufficient evidence and deciding whether it is in the public interest to prosecute. This would put into the criminal law a presumption that does not have a satisfactory precedent and place officers in a particular position. I feel we must leave it to the prosecutors to take all these matters into account in deciding whether it is appropriate to prosecute.
I should perhaps declare an interest, in that I was a barrister who acted on behalf of the police in one of those few cases where an officer did, in fact, unfortunately, kill a suspected criminal. The case went all the way to the House of Lords. It is called Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police. Ashley’s relatives were represented by Sir Keir Starmer, as he was not then, whose junior was the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hermer, as he was not then. The argument involved very much the same issues that we have discussed this evening about objective and subjective mistakes. A very junior officer, as part of the armed response unit, thought he had seen a sudden movement. He opened fire and unfortunately killed Mr Ashley. He was prosecuted for murder and acquitted, because it was a mistake. Civil proceedings followed in due course. It was difficult, but he clearly made a mistake and the jury had no difficulty in acquitting him.
That brings me to the amendment suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Carter. I understand what has been said over the years in relation to those matters, but they are very much taken into consideration by juries in any event. Self-defence would include all those matters, or the urgency of the situation. Although I will listen carefully to what the noble Baroness has to say, I am not at the moment convinced that we need to change the law.
I said that I do not like presumptions in the context of the criminal law. I do not like presumptions much anyway, which brings me to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. What worries me about the presumption is: what rebuts that presumption? At the moment, the law provides that a judge decides in the particular circumstances whether it is appropriate to grant anonymity, and he or she will take into account all the factors, including the risk of danger to the officer if he or she is named, which is entirely proper. But this presumption would, I respectfully suggest, mean that the judge would be getting a very strong steer from Parliament that he should grant anonymity unless—and we do not really know what the “unless” is.
Granting anonymity runs contrary to the principle of open justice. Although one has considerable sympathy for any officer caught up in the situation, nobody is above the law, whether they are officers or not.
The press has a duty to report cases, particularly cases of this sort, where serious consequences have followed from the action of the state. We know that journalists are thinner on the ground than they once were and often have to cover different courts. I speak with some experience as the chairman of the press regulation body and knowing the pressures that journalists are under. They themselves often have to make representations to judges, in all sorts of circumstances, as to whether there should be an anonymity order or not. They might be faced with having to persuade a judge who has already been told that there is a presumption of anonymity. That is a hard burden to discharge for a journalist who may or may not have some legal representation. As a result, it seems to me almost inevitable that all officers will be granted anonymity.
If that is what Parliament thinks is appropriate, so be it, but let us not delude ourselves into thinking that presumption will mean anything other than automatic anonymity in these circumstances. I think this is a step that should not be taken. Although all these amendments concern a very real issue and concern, open justice and fairness to all seem to me to point to the result that the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, should be accepted and the other amendments rejected.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
Before the noble Lord sits down, could he just consider one thing? He made some very strong points. One thing that concerns the officers—although the noble Lord is quite right to identify that there have been relatively few criminal charges over the period—and the reason they are not persuaded by the CPS, or whoever is making the decision, taking into account only sufficiency of evidence and public interest, is that on every occasion the CPS has brought a criminal charge, the jury has disagreed with it. It leads you to wonder what led to that decision-making process, because all the points the noble Lord made about all that is considered do not survive the test of a jury when it arrives.
That is why there is this concern. I am with the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. Is this the perfect solution? I am not a lawyer and not in a position to judge whether it is the best solution, but it is why this question is raised so frequently—not because of the frequency of the cases but of how often they have been cleared in a very short time after all the careful consideration by very good lawyers who come to a completely different judgment from that offered by a jury.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)
The prosecuting authorities have decided in these cases, for whatever reason, that they think it appropriate to bring a prosecution, to bring the matter before a court where a jury determines what is right. We trust juries—I know that it is a contentious issue at the moment as to what extent we trust them and in what circumstances—but in cases of this sort juries will remain, whatever happens to the prospective reforms. It shows that juries are perfectly capable of taking into account all the pressures that face officers in the situation the noble Lord describes and they regularly do so.
I am content to leave it for the prosecution to decide whether there is a case. Of course, if, having heard the prosecution’s evidence, the judge decides that there is not a prima facie case, the case can stop at that stage. Then the matter comes before a jury, and the common sense of 12 citizens decides—almost inevitably, it seems, reflecting all the factors we have discussed—that in very rare circumstances would it be appropriate to convict an officer. Precisely as the noble Lord has said, these are rare circumstances; often, the officer has not discharged a gun in anger before—we are not talking about Los Angeles or New York—so I am content with the situation.
Lord Paddick (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I should declare an interest as a paid adviser to the Metropolitan Police, although I have not discussed this issue with the police.
I came this evening looking to support the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, but a couple of things that he said have caused me some concern. One is about the principle of open justice—yes, it is important to maintain public confidence, and it requires open examination of the evidence, but in police shooting cases, I am not sure that it is a requirement to identify the individual officer concerned. Exactly what happened during the incident has to be heard in open court and openly reported, but not necessarily the identity of the officer at that stage.
The noble Lord also tried to say that firearms officers did not have a unique role, but they do in the use of lethal force. They discharge their weapons on the understanding that it is highly likely that if they do, somebody will die. They aim at the largest body mass and therefore a fatality is the most likely outcome. That is something that no other police officer who is unarmed, or prison officer, as the noble Lord mentioned, would have to face. Therefore, the role of a firearms officer is unique for those reasons.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, I spoke on this subject in Committee; I did so with considerable wariness given the strength and distinguished nature of the lawyers who were stressing the importance of open justice. I listened to their speeches incredibly carefully and the House owes them a great deal for coming forward and making the position clear.
I worry about the situation of firearms officers. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made an incredibly important point. Firearms officers do not pick and choose which incidents they attend; they do not have the opportunity to take legal advice before they pull the trigger, and if they do pull the trigger, the likely outcome is death. That is very different from the situations that most police officers find themselves in.
The second point is that we owe them the presumption that we—the Government, their force, and society more generally—will support them in the work that they do, and if they find themselves in the circumstances that we are discussing this evening, their anonymity will be protected until such time as they are convicted, if that is what happens, because by the time their anonymity has been granted, it is too late. I believe that they need to have that certainty at the outset before they go on any missions, before they are deployed.
We ask firearms officers to go into harm’s way. They face intense physical danger from what they do. They are called only to the most serious incidents and stand the risk of being killed themselves. They face the risk of prosecution or perhaps disciplinary action for the shot they discharge, if indeed that is the outcome—which is, as we have heard, incredibly unlikely, but it does happen. We owe them the limited support of the presumption of anonymity, which could be waived if the situation demanded that. It is a big step indeed to go against the presumption of open justice and I fully recognise that—a very powerful argument has been put forward there.
There is one other point to consider that I do not think has been really explored this evening. The obvious conclusion if officers are worried that their names will be publicised should a legal action be brought is that they might hesitate in their duty. They might hesitate to pull that trigger and, in so doing, someone else, a member of the public, may be killed because there is doubt in the minds of those officers. That is something that we should consider very carefully as well.
I got to my feet with considerable temerity, as, apart from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, I am the only non-policeman or non-lawyer present in the discussion so far. None the less, there are some points to bear in mind, and I support the approach of the Government.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 394 and to the other amendments in this group. Britain has a very proud and distinctive model of policing by consent. The defining feature of that model is that the overwhelming majority of our police officers do not routinely carry firearms and when firearms are deployed it is because the threat is so grave that lethal force may be necessary to protect life.
That responsibility falls on a very small and highly trained group of officers, and I do not think it hyperbole to say that police firearms officers are some of the bravest, most dedicated officers in the country. According to the latest Home Office statistics, as of 31 March 2025, 6,367 police officers were authorised to carry firearms in England and Wales. That compared with 6,473 the year before, so it is clear that their number is shrinking. That is not something we can afford. It is why my amendment would introduce a presumption against the prosecution of armed police officers where they had discharged their firearm. It would do this by requiring a prosecutor when considering bringing charges against an armed officer to apply the principle that it should be exceptional to bring a prosecution against that officer. This raises the threshold for prosecutions to be instituted. The CPS would have to clear a higher bar to do so.
I want to cast aside some incorrect aspersions. I am not suggesting that armed police officers should be above the law—I want to be absolutely clear about that. The higher prosecution threshold that would be introduced by proposed new subsection (4) of my amendment would still permit prosecutors to bring charges against officers where there are exceptional circumstances. All it is saying is that there must be an acknowledgment of the unique nature of the circumstances that lead to an officer discharging their weapon. Proposed subsection (5) would require prosecutors to give particular weight to the unique demands and exceptional stresses to which firearms officers are subjected, as well as the incredible difficulties of making time-sensitive, split-second decisions.
I want to impress this on the House. It is impossible to understand the immense pressure facing you when you are tasked with the responsibility of carrying a police firearm. I know—I have done it. I carried a firearm for a number of years while employed on counterterrorist duties. Imagine the toll it takes on you as a person. To make it worse, you always have the thought in the back of your mind that, if you do have to use your weapon, you might be hounded for years by the press, by protestors and even by the police force you so dutifully served.
To face the possibility of being dragged before the courts simply for doing your job, with your name splashed over all the papers, is enough to deter anyone, but we cannot afford that to happen. All police firearms officers are volunteers. We need these dedicated officers. We rely on them to protect us in this very building—they are outside, right at this very moment, standing ready to prevent any possible attack.
That is why I cannot support the amendments in this group from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. As I said in Committee, I am firmly supportive of applying the Government’s approach of a presumption in favour of anonymity. The amendments from the noble Lord would not, in my view, substantially alter the status quo, whereby the decision to grant anonymity is at the court’s discretion.
We all say that we must support the police, but support is expressed not only in words; it must be reflected in the structures of law and justice. Those who protect the public in the gravest of circumstances deserve a system that recognises the unique demands placed upon them. Above all, we must ensure that we protect those who protect us. If the Minister cannot accept my amendment, or if I do not hear warm words, I may well seek to test the opinion of the House.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I apologise; I thought the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, was going to speak only to his amendment, but in fact he was summing up. I should have spoken first.
We have sympathy with the principles behind the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. They would replace the current presumption of anonymity with a more flexible, case-by-case judicial test, based on real risks to safety, the public interest and open justice. These are important safeguards and they align with our long-held position. From these Benches, we continue to support a carefully balanced presumption of anonymity for firearms officers who face criminal charges, one that can be rebutted when a court considers identification essential for justice or for maintaining public confidence. The amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, would make anonymity the exception, rather than the starting point. That risks undermining the reassurance that these vital specialists need.
In these thankfully rare cases, where hesitation can cost lives, we believe the balance should rest with a rebuttable presumption. It offers protection to officers acting in good faith, without compromising transparency or creating any sense of special treatment. Just as importantly, it protects their families. For me, this is a key issue. Police officers’ children should not have to face abuse at school or live in fear of vigilante threats or gang reprisals. Our approach suggests a middle way, avoiding a chilling effect on recruitment while maintaining public trust through strong judicial oversight.
We are less sympathetic to Amendment 394. While armed officers face exceptional pressures, the proposed presumption against prosecution would send a damaging message that they are being judged by more forgiving standards than other citizens. That is not a principle we believe that we should endorse.
Finally, we understand that the aim of Amendment 403, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carter, is to reassure firearms officers that the law recognises the realities of split-second decision-making, but we fear that it would, in practice, create a special homicide defence available only to that group. We would rather continue to trust judges and juries to apply the existing nuanced law, which already allows for context and proportionality, than to carve out a lesser liability for one profession.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, this group of amendments illustrates exactly how sensitive and difficult these cases are, does it not? In some of the amendments, noble Lords are saying that firearms officers should be held to a different standard than the rest of the population, but, in the others, it is being argued that even a small additional protection for them and their families is too great a differential in treatment.
Against that background, I start with Amendments 393B to 393F, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I met the noble Lord, together with the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Black, and the News Media Association, and I thank them all for the interesting and constructive conversation that we had. The Government have considered the noble Lord’s amendments with great care. We understand, and entirely support, the principle of open justice and freedom of the press, but what is in issue here is trying to find the appropriate balance.
I am really sorry to have to disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, whom I admire greatly, but the Government firmly believe that firearms officers face very real and specific risks from organised crime groups and violent offenders, and that this requires there should be a presumption that only their personal details should be withheld up until such time as they are convicted—and if they are acquitted, that their identity will remain protected.
In doing so, we recognise that firearms officers who are being prosecuted for discharging their firearm face a unique situation, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said. The threats they face before and after the trial are real and, unlike most defendants, if acquitted, they are simply unable to return to their old lives as innocent people. Firearms officers and their families have targets on their back, even if they are cleared of any wrongdoing.
This special set of circumstances requires a tailored response, and we believe that the Government’s proposals achieve the correct balance. Those who are opposed to establishing a presumption of anonymity until conviction have twin concerns: first, that there is insufficient evidence that this is necessary; and, secondly, that it represents the thin end of the wedge. I want to deal briefly with each argument in turn.
First, on the evidence that this is needed, there is no doubt that the threat faced by firearms officers is not theoretical. There are very real risks. As I set out in Committee, and will not repeat in detail, firearms officers can face serious death threats and other forms of intimidation, which also extend to their families. As evidence for the need, there is real concern that the revelation of the identity of police officers who are being prosecuted is having a negative effect on the recruitment and retention of these essential officers. I am not sure that these are exactly the same statistics that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has, but certainly those from the document on armed policing attrition and retention record that, since 2019, there has been a loss of 583 armed officers, or an 8.8% reduction. This is a very real concern.
What is important is that this measure does not force the courts to issue an anonymity order. It will not cause secret trials. Judges must still consider the interests of justice and they have an active duty to uphold open justice. Even if no party challenges the anonymity, they still must, in considering the interests of justice, assess whether a reporting direction is necessary and proportionate. Even when anonymity is granted, the proceedings will remain public and the evidence will be tested in open court.
I am afraid the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, is under a misapprehension about what this involves. The only restriction is removing the identity, so they will be referred to throughout all proceedings as Officer A. Everything else will be reported, and, in the event that they are convicted, anonymity will be rescinded and their identity will become known.
A further concern has been the ability of the media to challenge the making of such an order. The Government absolutely understand the point, and we offer the following reassurances. First, by virtue of Criminal Procedure Rule 6.2, courts must actively invite media representations whenever anonymity or reporting restrictions are under consideration, and the judge must create the opportunity for scrutiny.
Secondly, HMCTS has delivered a package of reforms to strengthen media access and support open justice in criminal courts. As part of this reform, every criminal court now has a new circulation list called the reporting restriction application notice list. This list includes contacts from the media distribution list who have specifically agreed to have their details shared with applicants for advance notice. They will be added as mandatory contacts to all reporting restriction application notice lists held by criminal courts to ensure service on their members. In addition, HMCTS has established a media engagement group to improve processes to better serve media professionals in criminal courts.
Thirdly, the law grants the media the right to appeal any decision to make a reporting direction or an anonymity order to the Court of Appeal. But here is one of the most important points: if a judge refuses to make an anonymity order, the prosecution and the defendant have no right of appeal. That is one of the reasons that the Government have decided that the starting point should be a presumption that anonymity is granted.
Would this be the thin end of the wedge? These are unique circumstances. The number of trials is tiny. In the past 10 years there have been two criminal trials for murder or manslaughter as a result of a fatal police shooting. By way of comparison, there have been 13 fatal police shootings since 2019-20. Clauses 168 to 171 have been carefully drafted to strike a lawful and proportionate balance between fundamental rights and the need to protect our firearms officers and their families.
I turn to Amendment 394, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and spoken to powerfully also by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. It is one of two amendments that take the opposite view to that advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.
While we acknowledge, once again, the importance of firearms officers and the debt that we owe them, the Government are unable to support this amendment, for these reasons. It would fundamentally alter the basis upon which prosecutorial decisions are taken by introducing a statutory presumption against prosecution for a particular group of citizens, who in this case happen to be police officers. Without doubt, this would create a two-tier approach to prosecutions in the criminal justice system. All public prosecutorial decisions, as we have heard frequently this evening, are made in accordance with the Code for Crown Prosecutors, which has statutory force. Its two-stage test has stood the test of time.
The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, suggests that the CPS is getting the decisions wrong because of the number of acquittals. With respect to the noble Lord, that rather misses the point. The CPS test is not to decide whether it prosecutes somebody who is guilty. If we knew they were guilty, we would not need the jury. The test is whether there is a realistic prospect of conviction. That is an exercise of judgment as to whether it is more likely than not that there will be a conviction. If so, and if the public interest stage is satisfied, the case is put before a jury, who decide whether or not they are actually guilty.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
I thank the Minister for giving way. I understand and accept the distinction that she makes. Over the past 20 or 30 years, the concern for the police officers involved is that, on every occasion that the decision has been made, it has been wrong so far as the jury is concerned. It has left the officers believing, sometimes, that the way that the CPS has discharged its problem—with a public outcry about the shooting—has been to test it in a court, rather than making its own decision for which it should be accountable. I understand the distinction that the Minister makes, therefore, but it is spooky that on every occasion the CPS has got it wrong so far as juries are concerned.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, again, that is a fundamental misunderstanding. If the CPS had got it wrong, the judge would have withdrawn it at half-time. It would never have got as far as a jury. The two things —one of them being the fact that the jury has acquitted—simply do not correlate.
The noble Lord’s amendment gives no indication as to how this proposed test would fit with the Code for Crown Prosecutors, save that we would then have a two-tier system, with one rule for the police and another for the citizens they police. It is hard to see how such a situation could command public confidence.
As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said, the unique position of firearms officers will be taken into consideration at both stages of the full code test. In cases involving fatal police shootings, the Crown Prosecution Service already considers whether the officer’s actions were necessary and reasonable in the circumstances, as the officer honestly believed them to be, recognising how difficult it can be to make fine decisions in the heat of the moment. It is the same law that applies to every citizen. Prosecutions in these cases are very rare, reflecting the high threshold already applied; an additional statutory presumption is neither necessary nor appropriate.
Lastly, I turn to Amendment 403 from the noble Lord, Lord Carter, which was, as ever, attractively advanced by him. The Government’s position remains as it was in Committee: there cannot be a separate criminal law for police officers in homicide cases. The current legal framework already offers robust protection for those who act under a genuine and honest belief, even if that belief later proves to be mistaken. In any event, the Law Commission is considering the offence of homicide, and the Government will consider its report carefully in due course.
I am grateful for the debate that we have had today. It is clear that there are strongly held views on both sides, but the Government believe that they have struck the right balance to protect our highly valued armed police officers while not standing in the way of the principles of open justice and a single-tier justice system. For that reason, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister and to all noble Lords who have spoken in what has been an interesting and important debate on a vital question. I am also grateful to the Minister and her officials, who have devoted considerable time to meeting me and others concerned about this matter, for taking our concerns so seriously. My noble friend Lord Carter of Haslemere made the point that there is much agreement on all sides, and there is. It is very important to emphasise that. We all agree that firearms officers do a vital job. They do it in the public interest, they do it in exceptionally difficult circumstances, and they have our thanks for their service.
Respectfully, I cannot agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies, on Amendment 394, for all the reasons given by my noble friend Lord Faulks. To say to the public that a particular category of defendant—firearms officers—should be prosecuted only if the circumstances are exceptional would send a terrible message to the public and damage public confidence in cases where someone has died by reason of the actions of an officer of state. Surely the standard principle should apply: the CPS asks itself whether a conviction is more likely than not and whether it is in the public interest for there to be a prosecution. As my noble friend Lord Faulks said, in assessing the public interest and whether a conviction is likely, the CPS of course takes into account all the circumstances; in particular, whether the officer is acting normally in the heat of the moment in exceptionally difficult circumstances.
I have a couple of points on my amendment in relation to anonymity. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made the powerful point that firearms officers are unique in that they are licensed to shoot, and that, in almost all cases where they exercise that power, the likely outcome is death. I say to the House that this special and unique role makes it all the more important that open justice fully applies, unless there is information before the court suggesting that anonymity is needed.
The noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, made the powerful point that these officers deserve certainty, because otherwise, when they go out to work and are faced with an immediate threat, or what they perceive to be an immediate threat, they might hesitate before shooting as they are worried about the consequences for them. This would be very much against the public interest. I say to the noble Viscount that, under Clause 168, the firearms officer does not have certainty. All that the Government are providing is a presumption, and, as the Minister rightly emphasised, the court will decide, even with a presumption, whether anonymity should apply.
However, whatever noble Lords may think of my judgment on this, I can count, and therefore I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower
“Presumption against prosecution for alleged conduct by authorised firearms officers(1) Where a relevant prosecutor makes a decision to which this section applies, the prosecutor must, in making the decision—(a) apply the principle set out in subsection (4), and(b) comply with subsection (5).(2) This section applies to a decision of a relevant prosecutor as to—(a) whether or not proceedings should be brought against a person (“D”) for a relevant offence, or(b) whether or not any proceedings against D for a relevant offence should be continued,in England and Wales.(3) In this section, an offence is a “relevant offence” if—(a) it is alleged to have been committed by D acting in the exercise of functions as an authorised firearms officer,(b) the conduct alleged to constitute the offence involved the use by D of a lethal barrelled weapon to discharge a conventional round, and(c) D was, at the time of the alleged offence, authorised by the relevant authority to use that weapon with that round.(4) The principle referred to in subsection (1) is that it is to be exceptional for a relevant prosecutor making a decision to which this section applies to determine that proceedings should be brought against D for the offence or, as the case may be, that the proceedings against the person for the offence should be continued.(5) In making a decision to which this section applies, a relevant prosecutor must give particular weight to the following matters—(a) the exceptional demands and stresses to which authorised firearms officers are subjected to in the course of their duties, and(b) the exceptional difficulties of making time-sensitive judgments as are required by the nature of D’s functions as an authorised firearms officer.(6) The following are “relevant prosecutors” for the purposes of this section—(a) the Director of Public Prosecutions,(b) a Crown Prosecutor, or(c) any person to whom the institution or taking over of proceedings for a relevant offence mentioned has been assigned under section 5(1) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 (conduct of prosecutions on behalf of the CPS).(7) In this section, “authorised firearms officer” means—(a) a member of a relevant police force who is authorised by the relevant chief officer to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round in the exercise of functions as a constable, (b) a National Crime Agency officer who is authorised by the Director General of the National Crime Agency to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round in the exercise of functions as a National Crime Agency officer,(c) a member of the Police Service of Scotland or the Police Service of Northern Ireland who—(i) is provided under section 98 of the Police Act 1996 (cross-border aid of one police force by another) for the assistance of a police force in England and Wales, and(ii) is authorised by the relevant authority to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round in the exercise of functions as a constable, or(d) a member of the armed forces who—(i) is deployed in support of a relevant police force or the National Crime Agency, and(ii) is authorised by the Secretary of State to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round for the purposes of that deployment.(8) In this section—“conventional round” means any shot, bullet or other missile other than one designed to be used without its use giving rise to a substantial risk of causing death or serious injury;“lethal barrelled weapon” has the meaning given by section 57(1B) of the Firearms Act 1968;“member of the armed forces” means a person who is subject to service law (see section 367 of the Armed Forces Act 2006);“relevant authority” means—(a) in relation to a member of a relevant police force, the relevant chief officer;(b) in relation to a National Crime Agency officer, the Director General of the National Crime Agency;(c) in relation to a member of the Police Service of Scotland, the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland;(d) in relation to a member of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland;(e) in relation to a member of the armed forces, the Secretary of State;“relevant chief officer” means—(a) in relation to a police force in England and Wales, the chief officer of police of that police force;(b) in relation to the British Transport Police Force, the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force;(c) in relation to the Ministry of Defence Police, the Chief Constable of the Ministry of Defence Police;(d) in relation to the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, the Chief Constable of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary;“relevant police force” means—(a) a police force in England and Wales,(b) the British Transport Police Force,(c) the Ministry of Defence Police, or(d) the Civil Nuclear Constabulary.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would apply a presumption against prosecution for armed police officers where they discharge their weapons, and requires prosecutors to consider the unique burdens placed on armed officers.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, my Amendment 394 seeks a presumption against prosecution for alleged conduct by authorised firearms officers. I really think that we owe it to firearms officers, who have an exceptional responsibility, to provide this presumption against prosecution. I have to say that I did not hear the warm words that I was looking for from the Government Front Bench, so I am afraid that I seek to divide the House on this.
Lord Hanson of Flint
““law enforcement employer” has the meaning given by section 174(1);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment applies the definition of “law enforcement employer” in clause 174 to all of clauses 173 to 178.
“ScheduleNotification requirements for child cruelty offenders: child cruelty offencesPart 1Child cruelty offencesOffences Against the Person Act 1861 (c.100)
1 An offence under section 27 of the Offences Against the Person 1861 (abandoning or exposing a child), if the offender— (a) was 18 or over, and(b) is sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (c.12)
2 An offence under section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (child cruelty) if the offender—(a) was 18 or over, or(b) is sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.Infanticide Act 1938 (c. 36)
3 An offence under section 1 of the Infanticide Act 1938 (infanticide).Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 (c. 31)
4 An offence under section 1 of the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 (female genital mutilation), if—(a) the victim was under 18, and(b) the offender—(i) was 18 or over, or(ii) is sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.5 An offence under section 2 of that Act (assisting a girl to mutilate her own genitalia), if—(a) the victim was under 18, and(b) the offender—(i) was 18 or over, or(ii) is sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.6 An offence under section 3 of that Act (assisting a non-UK person to mutilate overseas a girl’s genitalia), if—(a) the victim was under 18, and(b) the offender—(i) was 18 or over, or(ii) is sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (c. 28)
7 (1) An offence under section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 of causing or allowing a person’s death, if the victim was under 18.(2) An offence under that section of causing or allowing a person to suffer serious physical harm, if—(a) the victim was under 18, and(b) the offender—(i) was 18 or over, or(ii) is sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.Part 2Corresponding service offences8 (1) An offence under section 42 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales (within the meaning given by that section) is an offence listed in Part 1 of this Schedule.(2) Section 48 of that Act (attempts, conspiracy, encouragement and assistance and aiding and abetting outside England and Wales) applies for the purposes of this paragraph as if the reference in subsection (3)(b) to any of the following provisions of that Act were a reference to this paragraph.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Schedule lists offences which are child cruelty offences for the purposes of my first new clause inserted after clause 164.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes a requirement to add civilian employees to the Civil Nuclear Constabulary and British Transport Police advisory lists, where allegations are made against them after they resign or retire. This reflects the position for civilian employees of territorial police forces under section 88I of the Police Act 1996.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adjusts the meaning of “disciplinary proceedings” in relation to the Ministry of Defence Police.
Baroness Doocey
“Police training: independent review(1) Within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must establish an independent review of the quality of in-service police officer training within police forces in England and Wales.(2) The review must—(a) assess the consistency, effectiveness and outcomes of all training provided to police officers after completion of their initial entry-level training, including all—(i) in-service training,(ii) workforce development programmes,(iii) refresher courses, and(iv) specialist training;(b) consider the extent to which training equips officers with the necessary skills, knowledge and professional standards to reflect the demands of modern policing, including—(i) digital skills,(ii) investigative skills,(iii) trauma awareness and conflict management, and(iv) processes by which police officers are informed of, and trained in, changes to the law, and(c) make recommendations for improvement, where appropriate.(3) The review established under subsection (1) must complete its work within 12 months of its establishment.(4) Within three months of receiving the review, the Secretary of State must lay a statement before Parliament containing their response and proposals to take forward the recommendations in the review.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to establish an independent review on police training.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 398 I will speak also to the other amendment in my name, Amendment 399. Systemic flaws in our training infrastructure leave front-line officers underequipped and the public at risk. Training should be the bedrock of policing excellence, not a Cinderella function that is both underfunded and undervalued.
In Committee, the Minister asked the House to wait for solutions in the Government’s White Paper. That document has now arrived but, instead of solutions, it proposes to streamline training, and even scopes a reduction in essential public and personal safety training. In the real world of policing, “streamline” is too often code for cutting corners. At a time when one-third of our officers have less than five years’ service—the most inexperienced workforce in decades—reducing the frequency of safety and de-escalating training is a dangerous recipe for increased injuries and risk of misconduct.
The White Paper offers licences to practise and digital passports. These are bureaucratic distractions, not real reform. We risk burying officers under accreditation paperwork while they struggle to build chargeable cases for complex modern crimes such as cuckooing, stalking and online fraud.
Most concerning is the shift towards learning on the job within everyday operational work. For an inexperienced force, this too often means picking up bad habits from equally inexperienced colleagues. Furthermore, by absorbing the College of Policing into the new national police service, the Government are asking the police to mark their own homework. No organisation can objectively evaluate its own systemic failings. An independent statutory review should be non-negotiable. We cannot keep adding new duties into the statute book—respect orders, offensive weapons laws and the rest—without a concurrent independent assessment to check whether the training system, last audited nationally in 2012, can actually deliver them.
Amendment 399 addresses another critical gap by placing a statutory duty on every police force to provide regular, high-quality mental health training. Mental health calls now constitute 15% to 25% of all police demand, yet too many officers lack the specialist training to manage them safely. The amendment seeks to establish a national minimum standard aligned with “right care, right person”, requiring every officer to complete initial training within six months of assuming front-line duties, followed by refreshers every two years.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for bringing back her Amendment 398. We broadly supported the intention behind her amendment in Committee, and we echo that today. It is of course not acceptable that there has been no independent review of the quality of the more than £400 million spent annually on training for eight years, and the statistics on police officer experience and unsolved crimes bear witness to that fact.
I am grateful that, since our debate in Committee, the Government have brought forward a White Paper that covers many aspects of policing, including training. That is a welcome step, but perhaps the Minister could outline some more specifics on the form that this reform will take? I am conscious that the College of Policing is still working on precise proposals, but an update would be very much appreciated. It is a positive sign that the Government recognise this gap in our policing and seem to be acting on it. As such, while we support the noble Baroness’s intention, we believe that letting the Government carry out their work is a more practical next step.
As we noted in Committee, while we also support the noble Baroness’s intention in Amendment 399 to provide the best possible care to those with mental health problems, we cannot support this specific measure. The Government made it clear in the Mental Health Act last year that they want to reduce the role of police in mental health decisions. We broadly support that. It reflects the belief that health workers, not the police, are the right officials to deal with mental health issues. Any police training must not blur this clear distinction. That said, I understand that police officers are often the first responders to situations concerning mental health patients, so I acknowledge the complexity of the issue and would welcome the Minister underlining the Government’s position on this in his reply.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for these amendments, which bring us back to the important issue of police training.
Amendment 398 would require the Home Secretary to commission an independent review of police training. As your Lordships’ House will be aware, the College of Policing is responsible for setting national training standards, including the police curriculum and accreditations for specialist roles. Our police reform White Paper set out our commitment to develop a licence to practise for policing. It will seek to create a unified system that brings together mandatory training with consistent professional development and well-being support.
As we work with the sector, we will examine the existing training landscape and look to the findings of the police leadership commission, led by my noble friend Lord Blunkett and the noble Lord, Lord Herbert. We will also consider how this model can build on the accreditations and licensing already delivered by the College of Policing in specialist operational areas.
As has been noted, both this evening and in Committee, the College of Policing is also developing a national strategic training panel, which will provide further sector-led insight into existing training. We would not want to pre-empt the outcomes of this work or create a burden of extensive reviews for the sector when much activity is under way through police reform. We therefore do not believe it necessary for the Home Secretary to commission an independent review of police officer training and development, as proposed in Amendment 398. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment, as these issues have been examined comprehensively through existing work. I can assure her that it is a key element of our police reform agenda. Having published the White Paper, we will obviously progress that at the appropriate time and produce further reforms that may be necessary, which there will be further opportunities for your Lordships’ House and the other place to debate at length, whether through a legislative vehicle or not.
I am sorry that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, was rather dismissive of introducing the licence to practise. Officers deserve a clear and consistent structure to empower them to learn, train and develop as skilled professionals. Once implemented, a licence model will provide greater assurance that the police have the correct training and well-being support to do their jobs and that there are regular reviews to ensure that they meet national standards. We recognise that we will not be able to introduce a licensing model overnight, but we have set out the first steps for a licensing model, including mandatory leadership standards and a strong performance management framework.
Amendment 399 seeks to ensure that police officers have the training required to deal with people suffering through a mental health crisis. As I indicated, the setting of standards and the provision of mandatory and non-mandatory training material is a matter for the College of Policing. It provides core learning standards, which includes the initial training for officers under the Police Constable Entry Programme. This underpins initial learning levels around autism, learning disabilities, mental health, neurodiversity and other vulnerabilities. Through forces utilising this established training, officers are taught to assess vulnerability and amend their approaches as required to understand how best to communicate with those who are vulnerable for whatever reason, and to understand how to support people exhibiting these needs to comprehend these powers in law and continue to amass specialist knowledge to work with other relevant agencies to help individuals.
We consider it impractical to expect, or indeed require, police officers to become experts in the entire range of mental health and vulnerability conditions, including autism and learning disabilities. Instead, the College of Policing rightly seeks to equip them to make rational decisions in a wide range of circumstances, and to treat people fairly and with humanity at all times.
I have said this a number of times: all forces are operationally independent of government. To seek to impose requirements on mandatory training risks undermining that very principle. Furthermore, each force has unique situations—different pressures, priorities, demographics and needs. To mandate that a small rural force must undertake the same training as a large urban force will not give it the flexibility it needs to best serve its local communities. Furthermore, the College of Policing is best placed to draw on its expertise to determine the relevant standards and training that the police require.
The training already provided equips officers with the knowledge to recognise indicators of mental health and learning disabilities; to communicate with and support people exhibiting such indicators; to understand their police powers; and to develop specialist knowledge to work with other agencies to help individuals. As the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said, this is not about replacing real experts and mental health workers, in the NHS and other agencies, who are best placed to provide that specialist knowledge and expertise.
I hope that, on the basis of these comments and the work already under way, the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
I thank the Minister for his response. I do not think it matters who is responsible for training. What matters is that training is appropriate and that officers are trained.
I spent most of last year talking to chief constables in the whole of the UK. Their view was very different from what the Minister just said. Their view was that they do not get sufficient training, that training is piecemeal and that they have virtually no training in anything to do with mental health. I do not think they were just making that up; this was something that they genuinely believed. In fact, I am pretty certain about it.
Also, HMICFRS has reported time and again that training is inconsistent, the quality is weak, there are weak checks on force-run programmes, there is poor support for new officers and obvious risks in forces marking their own homework. These gaps demand independent scrutiny. That is not similar to what the Minister just said. Training is a vital ingredient for officers. We sit in this House and in the other place, and we make rules and regulations as to what should happen. But we do not make sure that the people on the ground facing these problems every day are equipped to deal with them. That is, frankly, a disgrace. The fact that there has been no independent check on police training since 2012 is almost beyond belief. However, it is late, so I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Doocey
“Duty to record algorithmic tools(1) Each police force in England and Wales must disclose its use of any algorithmic tool used in the exercise of its functions that may affect the rights, entitlements or obligations of individuals by completing entries in the Algorithmic Transparency Recording Standard (ATRS).(2) Under subsection (1) “algorithmic tool” means a product, application or device that supports or solves a specific problem using complex algorithms.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment places a duty on police forces to disclose any algorithmic tool used in the exercise of its functions.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 401 in my name. The amendment would place a clear legal duty on police forces to declare high-impact algorithmic tools using the Government’s algorithmic transparency recording standards, known as ATRS. It is currently just professional guidance, not a binding obligation, and compliance is dangerously patchy, with many live operational tools still undeclared publicly. Yesterday, a search of the public repository found only two entries for police AI tools, despite systems such as live facial recognition being in widespread use.
The Government’s White Paper promises a new registry through its police.ai initiative. However, without statutory backing, this risks becoming another underused voluntary scheme that takes years to implement while AI moves at a relentless pace. In Committee, the Minister claimed that the ATRS was too jargon-heavy and designed only for Whitehall. The ATRS contains dual tiers, a plain English narrative for citizens and technical details for experts. The real barrier is not jargon but commercial confidentiality clauses in procurement contracts. Without a statutory duty, forces cannot override these clauses, even where tools restrict rights and freedoms.
The Minister was also concerned about compromising operational effectiveness and scrutiny. The ATRS already builds in exemptions for national security and cases where disclosure would prejudice law enforcement. A statutory duty would codify these existing safeguards, not remove them. We are talking about tools of state coercion, predictive pre-crime models and risk-scoring 999 calls. The public are entitled to operational transparency to judge their fairness. Defendants cannot challenge what they cannot see.
My Amendment 401 responds to the national audit of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey. It mandates a national plan, with clear milestones to modernise police data systems for real-time intelligence sharing. The Government’s White Paper admits that 90% of crime now has a digital element and that policing has fallen behind. Fragmented IT creates a back door for security vulnerabilities and a forensic backlog of 20,000 devices. The Minister insists that existing programmes offer more agility than a statutory plan, but this piecemeal approach is exactly what has failed us for 30 years.
I welcome the NPCC’s recent announcement of a national data integration and exploitation service. However, this is still at the scoping stage, offering only guidance. It lacks binding timelines and parliamentary oversight, which the serious failings exposed in the audit of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, suggest are urgently needed and that Amendment 401 would deliver. The Home Secretary says that she wants to go big or go home on police reform. This is her chance: a clear pathway towards a national strategic overhaul. A basic transparency duty must be part of that foundation. The service with the most intrusive powers should not work to a lower transparency bar than Whitehall. I beg to move.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
My Lords, I was going to speak on Amendments 400 and 407 in this group, but my noble friend Lady Doocey made such an excellent contribution that I will skip my speech on Amendment 400. I want to say, though, that I am not quite sure what the point is of me speaking on any amendment at this stupid time of day and with no chance of a meaningful Division to test the opinion of the House. What we are doing here is not scrutiny; it is just going through the motions. Nevertheless, I will go ahead with my speech on Amendment 407, if only to put my views on the record.
Amendment 407 is in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, who is not here. As my name is also on the amendment, I may, I believe, speak to it on her behalf. Am I correct?
Lord Strasburger (LD)
Thank you. Amendment 407 asks us to make a practical decision about policing and tackling violence against women and girls. It is not—I repeat, not—about taking sides in a culture war. Recording biological sex in every case is about getting the basics right: honest crime figures, sound operational decisions and better protection for victims of violence. If we do not know clearly in our police data who is male and who is female, we cannot properly track male violence, spot patterns and target resources where they are most needed.
When police forces blur sex and gender identity, the data starts to go wrong. Hardly any perpetrators of sexual violence are women, so it takes only a small number of male offenders being recorded as women to make it look—wrongly—as if women are suddenly committing many more violent and sexual offences. That distorts our statistics, makes it harder to see the true scale of male violence against women, and risks bad safeguarding decisions.
If systems shift between recording sex, gender as perceived or self-identified gender, we lose track of the trends. We can no longer say with confidence whether male violence is rising or falling, or whether policy changes are working. When the public discover that “female” means one thing in one table and something different in another, trust in policing and government data inevitably suffers.
Professor Alice Sullivan is one of the UK’s leading experts in quantitative social science. She was appointed by the Government to independently review how public organisations can best collect data on sex and gender. Her review cuts through the confusion that currently exists. It says that, when the state needs sex data, it should ask a simple factual question about biological sex—“What is your sex: male or female?”—and that that must be kept separate from any voluntary questions about gender identity. It strongly recommends that all police forces record biological sex in all relevant systems.
Some people worry that this will force trans people to out themselves to the police. It should not and it does not have to. The police already record very sensitive information—religion, disability, sexuality—while respecting confidentiality, human rights and data protection law. The sex question is about biological reality for operational and statistical purposes. Held securely in background systems, it is not a licence to broadcast someone’s history or to deny their gender identity in day-to-day interactions. Where there is a need to understand gender identity, that can be done through a separate, clearly labelled voluntary question with strict safeguards.
The choice is stark. If we do not record biological sex, we accept distorted crime figures, poorer operational decisions, broken trend data and growing public mistrust. If we do record biological sex clearly and consistently, we give ourselves honest statistics, better safeguarding and a policing system that can see and therefore tackle the reality of male violence against women and girls.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 407, on the recording of sex in police data. It is a real shame that the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, is unable to be with us because she would have introduced it very elegantly.
A year ago, in March 2025, Professor Alice Sullivan’s Review of Data, Statistics and Research on Sex and Gender came out. It pointed out:
“It is well-established that sex is a major determinant of offending and victimisation”.
The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, may have been going through the motions but he went through them very well by explaining clearly why this amendment matters. As he pointed out, it is very difficult for the Government to claim to have a target-based campaign to reduce violence against women and girls if they do not have consistent, accurate data in relation to women and girls. Although Professor Sullivan’s review was broadly welcomed by the Government, its recommendations have not yet been acted on. This amendment attempts to nudge some action from the Government.
The issue of delayed guidance is a constant problem. The Women’s Rights Network recently contacted the National Police Chiefs’ Council, inquiring whether it intends to now record sex accurately and address what it said was the “ideological corruption of data”. The NPCC’s reply says that
“updates to the collection and recording of sex and gender reassignment questions are pending subject to the issue of national guidance by the Office for National Statistics/Government Statistical Service following the UK Supreme Court ruling earlier this year”.
That is one pending answer. Individual police forces responding to a variety of organisations’ queries about the continued use of a variety of approaches to collecting sex data—including self-ID, recording a rapist as female and so on—say that they are waiting for guidance from the ONS and the GSS. Is there anyone not waiting for guidance? It feels as though this is a waste of time that is unnecessarily adding to confusion.
In Committee, I went into detail about differing and contradictory data collection practices across police forces. I will not repeat that, but recording practices vary not just between but within criminal justice agencies and even relevant government departments. As there are 40 different databases at a national level relating to criminal justice, the data that is being collected as we speak is full of discrepancies. The Home Office’s annual data requirement on demographic data, for example, advises police forces to record sex subject to a gender recognition certificate. Other mandatory Home Office standards—on police use of force, for example—require officers to record perceived gender, with a choice of male, female or other. There are also the multi agency public protection arrangements, which focus on protecting the public from the most serious harm from sexual and violent offenders, including convicted terrorists. They too conflate sex and gender in their data collection.
However, the Murray Blackburn Mackenzie criminal justice blog discovered via a freedom of information request that MAPPA provides police officers across the UK with
“51 options to record the gender identity of high-risk offenders”.
How does it help to keep the public safe, or aid operational coherence, to know whether a terrorist or paedophile is pangender, genderqueer, agender, bi-gender or gender-fluid, just to name a few of the 51 options they could fill in? I am not trying to be glib; I am just urging the Government to bring clarity and consistency to the collection of data on sex in relation to victims and perpetrators, because otherwise I think it is unfair to claim that there is anything like an evidence-based policy when it comes to sex and, indeed, gender.
We have recently had some exchanges about the new aggravated offences in relation to transgender people, and there are people who are transgender who claim that hate speech and hate crime against them has gone up. I am not challenging whether or not that is true. But to collate the data to make a case for that, one has to make a distinction in the collection of data between somebody who is transgender and somebody who says “I am a woman” who is in fact a transgender person who identifies as a woman.
I think that, for all victims concerned, let alone for understanding the nature of offenders, we need to have accurate, consistent data across all criminal justice agencies and all police forces. I hope that the Minister will at least give us an assurance that the recommendations of Professor Sullivan’s fine and important review—which is full of detail and evidence, with practical conclusions, and which the Government have welcomed—will be acted on. If we can get that assurance tonight, that would be brilliant. If there is any government reluctance to accept Professor Sullivan’s review, it would be really helpful to understand why—what the hold-up is—and maybe the Minister could explain that too.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, given what the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, said about the lateness of the hour, which I think we are all aware of, I want to be very short on my concerns about Amendments 406 and 407. I am sorry not to see the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, in her place.
My concerns about both amendments are about practicality and the dignity of people. In a nutshell, this is what they have in common: the police are going to be the race police and the sex police in addition to being the police, and they require police officers to make a judgment even against the way that the suspect—or the victim—defines themselves at any stage in the criminal justice process. I think that is a mistake.
How is this going to work? A victim goes to the police because they have experienced an assault or another serious crime. Whatever community or person they are, they will go to the police, and, under both these amendments, the police officer is required to interrogate whether they are who they say they are on sex and race grounds. I think this is a real mistake, and it will not help the police in the difficult work they have to do and certainly will not help all our communities in these difficult times.
I think that is one minute and 58 seconds. I hope noble Lords understand my point.
Lord Pack (LD)
My Lords, I wish to speak on a slightly different topic: my Amendment 409FA. I have tabled it because we face a three-pronged crisis. First, there is the growing evidence of foreign interference from Governments and individuals seeking to subvert our democracy. The case of the former Reform UK leader in Wales, Nathan Gill, who pled guilty to eight charges of bribery, is perhaps the most prominent example, but it is by no means the only one—as shown, for example, by MI5’s recent alert to MPs, noble Lords and parliamentary staff after finding that Chinese intelligence officers were attempting to recruit people.
Secondly, there have been far too many other political scandals involving misbehaviour by politicians, such as those involving the then Lord Mandelson, although he is, sadly, by no means the only person from this House, or due to join this House, who has recently been in the headlines for all the wrong reasons.
Thirdly, trust in politics and politicians is at a worryingly low level. A headline from the 41st British Social Attitudes survey, for example, was:
“Trust and confidence in Britain’s system of government at record low”.
Given recent events, it is a reasonable fear that future BSA data will show new record lows being hit. We therefore need to up our game. It is welcome that the Government are taking some steps to do so. The plans in the Hillsborough Bill to modernise the law over misconduct in public office are particularly welcome.
Lord Lucas (Con)
My Lords, after that, I had better begin by confessing a misdemeanour. Many years ago, I added my terrier’s name to the census as a “rodent operative” and gave her age in dog years. That illustrates that it is important that when we are gathering data it is, by and large, reliable.
In fact, the principles of GDPR should surely lead us to say that we have no business collecting personal data from people if we are not going to use it. If we are collecting data that is so remarkably corrupt as some of the data that the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, talked about, it is useless. It tells us nothing about what is going on in society. It has no function—there is no valid use we can make of that data—so we should not be collecting it.
The first question for the police and the Government to ask themselves is whether they need the data. Do they actually need to record sex in all crimes and for all victims. If so, what will they use that data for? If they are going to use it, is it not important that it is accurate? They should choose, therefore, what data they record according to the use they are going to make of it. I therefore have a lot of sympathy with Amendments 406 and 407. I am, despite my past bad behaviour, in favour of accurate data.
I end by giving the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, a moment’s comfort. Once an amendment is on the Marshalled List, it is the property of the House—anybody can move it or address it.
The Earl of Effingham (Con)
My Lords, I wish to speak incredibly briefly, purely because the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, mentioned the noble Baroness, Lady Cash. She personally spoke to the noble Lords, Lord Hanson and Lord Katz, and she apologises. She was otherwise detained and sends her regrets.
Lord Paddick (Non-Afl)
My Lords, as I said earlier, I am a paid adviser to the Metropolitan Police. However, I have not discussed this subject with the police; these are my personal views.
With regard to Amendments 406 and 407, from my operational policing experience I know that the proportion of transgender men and women in the general population is very small. The proportion of offenders who are transgender is even smaller, and the number of transgender people who are convicted of violence is tiny. The number of criminal offences committed by transgender people is neither statistically nor operationally significant for the police.
On victim data, the most important operationally useful data for the police in relation to hate crime is how the victim identifies themselves. For other offences, it is what motivated the assailant—that is, what did the assailant perceive the victim to be? Did the assailant perceive the person to be female, in which case it is misogyny? Did they perceive the victim to be transgender, in which case it is transphobia? The birth sex of the victim is not that operationally significant for the police, nor is it likely to be statistically significant.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I have one sentence to add to the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. The Office for National Statistics, in response to an FoI, said on the collection of data in relation to the “gender identity different from sex registered at birth” category:
“We have to be robust enough to provide reliable estimates”,
but there is not enough data to be able to do that. Why? Because the data is so low that it is statistically insignificant. It is not corrupt and it is not many more to twist it for women. We need to be factually accurate when looking at this issue.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
I was not making the point it has been assumed I was making. This is about consistency, which is the point made by Professor Sullivan. Different police forces are collecting different data on gender identity or sex, sometimes conflating the two and sometimes using multiple variations on a theme. I then used the analogy of this happening across criminal justice. From the point of view of whatever evidence someone is trying to collect, as has just been pointed out, if we are going to collect data—and maybe we should not bother—will it be useful if it is different all over the country depending on the department?
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I am struggling to hear the question in the noble Baroness’s intervention. I repeat the point that the Office for National Statistics and the police data that is currently collected both say the numbers are so low they are insignificant and therefore unusable.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, this group of amendments raises two significant issues for modern policing: transparency in the use of algorithmic tools and the modernisation of police data and intelligence systems.
I turn first to Amendment 400, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. We on these Benches recognise the intention behind the proposal. As policing increasingly makes use of complex digital tools, such as data analytics and algorithms, it is entirely right that questions of transparency and public confidence are taken seriously. However, as discussed in Committee, we should be mindful that policing operates in a sensitive operational environment. Any transparency framework must strike the right balance between openness on the one hand and the need to protect investigative capability and operational effectiveness on the other.
Amendment 401, also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, addresses a different but equally important issue: the state of police data and intelligence systems. Few would dispute that technology within policing must keep pace with the demands of modern crime, and the challenge is not simply identifying the problem but determining the most effective mechanism to address it. Modernising policing technology is a complex and ongoing task that already involves national programmes, investment decisions and operational input from forces themselves.
For these reasons, while we recognise the important objectives behind these amendments, the question for noble Lords is whether the specific legislative approach proposed here is the most effective way of delivering them.
The amendments in the name of my noble friend Lady Cash seek to require the police to record the ethnicity and sex of a suspect. These are steps that these Benches wholly support. The importance of these measures can hardly be overstated. Recording ethnicity data has been recommended by experts of all professions, parties and associations. It is a requisite for enabling police to track and measure crime trends within certain communities and serves a secondary purpose of allaying or affirming arguments and claims about offending statistics, which currently are regrettably too often reduced to conjecture. Similarly, we support the recording of sex data as part of a larger drive to secure the rights of women by delineating sex from whatever gender identity an individual assigns themselves.
We are entirely supportive, therefore, of my noble friend Lady Cash’s amendments and are grateful to other noble Lords who have spoken in support of them tonight. I hope the Minister agrees that these are issues that should be above the political divide and that these amendments will improve operational efficiency. I look forward to his response.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this wide-ranging debate on a wide-ranging group of amendments.
I begin with Amendment 400, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. I fully agree—indeed, we have cross-party consensus here—with the importance of transparency in the use of algorithmic tools by the police and acknowledge the current lack of a complete or consistent national picture of police use of AI, as has been highlighted by the noble Baroness. However, the algorithmic transparency recording standard, or ATRS, was designed for central government and arm’s-length body use and is simply not the most effective or proportionate mechanism for delivering meaningful transparency in an operational policing context.
As we announced in the policing reform White Paper, the Government are taking forward a national registry of police AI deployments. The registry will be operated by the new national centre for AI and policing, which will be launched later this spring. This police-specific registry approach will address directly the concerns raised in Committee, and again this evening, about patchy disclosure, public confidence and accountability, while respecting operational independence.
The noble Lord, Lord Cameron, rightly noted the importance of having a flexible approach when it comes to operational policing. Locking policing into an inflexible statutory mechanism to disclose tools under the ATRS, even as an interim measure, would risk duplicative reporting, unclear disclosure expectations and putting additional administrative burdens on forces without improving public understanding or oversight.
The policing registry is an active programme of work designed specifically to close the transparency gap. It will adopt a tiered approach to transparency. All operational AI deployments will be recorded nationally, while a robust exemptions framework will protect genuinely sensitive capabilities from public disclosure, in a similar manner to how the Freedom of Information Act operates. This approach is designed to deliver clear narratives for the public, with named officers accountable for AI deployments in their force and strong compliance incentives. The Government fully expect police forces to utilise the registry and be transparent with the public about the algorithms they are using and the steps that have been taken to ensure they are being used responsibly. This is vital to building and maintaining public consent for the use of these powerful tools.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
I thank the Minister for his response and am pleased to hear that there is to be a new registry. I think the Minister said that it will be up and coming in a couple of months and that, critically, it will deal with the issues that I raised both in Committee and tonight on Report. With that in mind, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel
“Exception of the police from the public sector equality dutyIn schedule 18 (public sector equality duty: exceptions) of the Equality Act 2010, after paragraph 3 insert—“The Police
3A (1) Section 149 does not apply to any police force when exercising policing or law enforcement functions.(2) For the purposes of this paragraph, “police force” includes—(a) a police force maintained by a local policing body,(b) the British Transport Police,(c) the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, and(d) the Ministry of Defence Police.””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to exempt the police from the public sector equality duty under the Equality Act 2010, so as to ensure they are solely committed to effectively carrying out their policing functions.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 402, standing in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower, concerns the application of the public sector equality duty under Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010, specifically to policing and law enforcement functions. The amendment would ensure that police forces are left to focus on their core duties—to prevent crime and protect the public—without being constrained.
Every day, police officers must make difficult and sometimes instantaneous decisions in the most challenging circumstances, and their priority must always be public safety. This amendment provides a clear and limited exception from the public sector equality duty when, and only when, police forces are exercising their operational policing and law enforcement functions. Operational decision-making, which so often takes place in fast-moving situations, must be guided first and foremost by the need to prevent harm and uphold the law. Police powers are already limited by statute, such as the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, regulations, ethics codes, codes of practice, the IOPC and, of course, the courts, not to mention operational safeguards.
This amendment would ensure that clarity and focus are restored to the operational framework of the police. It would allow officers to concentrate on stopping crimes and protecting victims, without the risks that those decisions could later be questioned by a framework that was never designed with front-line policing in mind. I know that my noble friend Lord Davies and the Minister had a spirited debate in Committee on this topic. I must be entirely frank with your Lordships that I do not intend to test the opinion of the House on this matter. I would like to probe the Government, however, as to their rationale on retaining the current framework and its impact on policing. For those reasons, I beg to move.
Lord Paddick (Non-Afl)
My Lords, it is me again. I declare my interest as a paid adviser to the commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, particularly on issues of culture and leadership.
In the UK, we police by consent. That relies on public trust and confidence. Public trust and confidence, in turn, relies on the police treating every member of the public with dignity and respect, no matter their background or the community with which they identify. In addition, to ensure every police officer and member of police staff can be themselves and give of their best, the public sector equality duty is essential. Yesterday, the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Sir Mark Rowley, told the London Policing Board that he was committed to continuing the work of the UK’s largest police force on diversity, equality and inclusion. If noble Lords will not take my word for how important the public sector equality duty is to policing, maybe they will take Sir Mark’s.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, introduced Amendment 402, which proposes that the police should be exempt from the public sector equality duty under the Equality Act 2010, to ensure that they are
“solely committed to effectively carrying out their policing functions”.
I still have some difficulty in following the arguments for this amendment; I also raised this in Committee. I wonder whether the noble Lord seriously believes that applying the PSED takes away from the police carrying out their duties effectively. In speaking earlier to Amendment 400, my noble friend Lady Doocey mentioned the review by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, and the importance of standards, training and inspection: the perfect circle that ensures police forces are working effectively. The PSED is absolutely at the heart of that.
A number of high profile cases have absolutely strengthened the need for the PSED. Indeed, it has been failings in policing that shocked the country, and every report on those incidents has talked about appalling attitudes to vulnerable people. On Monday evening, the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence of Clarendon, spoke about the murder of her son Stephen, and how that racist murder might have been stopped if the police had done their job earlier, when the harassment was escalating. Following the murder of Stephen Lawrence, the Macpherson report of 1999 was a means of changing the culture in public institutions, not just the police, to ensure that they had due regard to race equality decisions. This was later extended to disability and gender issues.
It was clear in Macpherson’s report then that the police were “institutionally racist” and had a lack of curiosity, in the Lawrence case, about the anti-social behaviour of young white gangs and what they were doing to local Black young people. The whole design of the PSED was to ensure that the police could do their job properly, without fear or favour, and support vulnerable communities. There are many excellent, moral and dedicated police officers who fulfil this every working day. Sadly, it has not always been consistent.
When sisters Bibaa Henry and Nicole Smallman were murdered in a park in June 2020, the public were appalled by the behaviour of the police. Photographs of the dead girls were taken and shared by police officers: this was racism and misogyny. In that case, more work was needed to change the culture of the Met. When Sarah Everard was murdered in March 2021 by a serving police officer, the country was shocked. The background story about misogyny in the force was equally shocking, as was the fact that, at work, the dreadful behaviour of the murderer had been tolerated and not dealt with. I raise these cases because each of the reports on these incidents keeps returning to the culture that engenders racism and misogyny in certain places in the police.
I have absolutely no doubt, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, that there is an enormous amount of work going on to change that culture, and in many forces it is working well. But without the PSED there would be no priority to have due regard to race, gender and disability. There would be no yardstick for the police inspectorate to look at and address culture. There would be no clear duty to ensure that staff are trained. Worst of all, it would be all too easy to slip back into the old ways. I am sure that the Conservative Front Bench would not want that to happen. The PSED is an important tool in the armoury of the police to keep us all safe, including those who are both vulnerable and at high risk. Please do not support Amendment 402.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
We are here again. I do not expect the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, to understand why I am not going to change my position. There is a view that, for all the reasons that have been given, equality is extremely important for a public sector body. I did not disagree with a single word that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, or the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, said, and I stand here to say that the public sector equality duty is one that this Government fully support.
I know that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, is not going to press this amendment to a Division this evening. If he did, I would ask my noble friends to vote against it. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, the police are the public, and they have the confidence of the public. The Peelian principles, on which the police were established all those years ago, are about the police reflecting the public, understanding the public and taking the public into account. The public are made up of people who have disabilities, people who are gay, lesbian and trans, and women who face particular challenges. The public are people who have protected characteristics. We need to understand that.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. As my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower said in Committee, the question that your Lordships must ask yourselves is what we want the police to prioritise. These Benches have argued that the answer to that question is public safety, crime prevention, and the fair and firm enforcement of the law.
This amendment is aimed at removing a layer of bureaucratic obligation that, in our view, is simply not fit for purpose for operational policing. Effective policing is a public good. The way to ensure that the largest number of people are met with dignity and respect is to ensure that the law is enforced effectively. However, in the light of all contributions, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Kidron
“Police protocols when investigating the death of a child(1) The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 is amended as follows.(2) After section 27 (common law rules as to criminal investigations), insert—“27A Inclusion of guidance on collecting digital data when investigating the death of a child(1) Within six months of the day on which the Crime and Policing Act 2026 is passed, the code of practice under section 23 must include protocols that a person must adhere to when investigating the death of a child.(2) These protocols must include the treatment of potential online harm as a primary line of enquiry.(3) In order to treat a potential online harm as a primary line of enquiry, an investigating person must—(a) seize and forensically examine digital devices as soon as is reasonably possible;(b) take all reasonable steps to capture early digital evidence and account data, taking into account that online services delete user data after a short period of inactivity;(c) document a child’s activity on all known online services, including recommended content, interactions with other users, content viewed, content uploaded, and any relevant metadata.(4) Where an investigation gives evidence that a service regulated by the Online Safety Act 2023 may have breached the terms of that Act, OFCOM must be notified and supplied with the evidence.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to update statutory guidance issued to police to include guidance on effective evidence-collecting related to potential digital harm during an investigation into the death of a child. Currently, there is no statutory guidance for police to follow regarding investigating digital harm.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 404, 405, 431 and 432. In the light of the hour and the spirit of my conversations with the Minister, I will not go through my amendments in detail, nor the very long journey it has been to get here. In short, they concern earlier agreements that, in cases where a child has died, the coroner and the police should be equipped and informed to preserve data from online services.
I thank the Minister, and officials from both the Ministry of Justice and DSIT, for their engagement. Before I put on record some of my concerns, I acknowledge that, for the past few weeks at least, we have been trying to get to the same place on this. I am disappointed that we have not quite found a way to do so, and I hope that the Minister will find a way to reassure me and—possibly more importantly—the bereaved parents who have fought hard for these amendments.
Both my Amendment 404 and government Amendment 429A seek to make it automatic that, on being notified of the death of a child, a coroner issues a data preservation notice which means that a regulated service under the Online Safety Act would have to preserve the data of a child within five days. The Government have agreed to this in principle but wanted to exclude children who die in circumstances such as a road accident or in hospital as a result of illness, to which I have agreed. But, in their effort to exclude those children, they have, in proposed new subsection (1)(b) in their Amendment 429A, allowed the coroner to decide
“that no purpose would be served by OFCOM giving a notice”
under the Act
“because such information is of no relevance to a child’s death”.
That is too broad. Giving permission for a coroner to decide what constitutes “no purpose” is a bit like snakes and ladders: we are back to the problem that has plagued bereaved parents, where coroners underestimate the speed necessary to preserve data, or the scope and importance of information that might be preserved in this way. This is not a criticism of coroners. It is far beyond the experience of professionals, across all domains, to understand the range of online material available or its ethereal nature.
My second issue with the government amendment is that they have chosen to reduce the length of time that data is preserved—the preservation notice—from a year to six months. I discussed this with officials earlier today, and I understand that it is extendable, but both I and Ellen Roome, bereaved mother of Jools, feel that it is not long enough. Some 45% of inquests take longer than six months; 18% take more than a year. Reducing the time is deliberately creating a weakness in the system at a time when parents need support and must not be made anxious by watching the clock running down and worrying whether someone, somewhere in the system, will fail to extend the preservation order.
There is also an ongoing issue with conflicts between our laws and those in the US. I received a letter from Minister Narayan this week updating me about the conflict between Section 101 of the Online Safety Act and the US Stored Communications Act. The letter said:
“Interpretation of the SCA is not settled”,
there may be some variety between different US states, and
“discussions between DSIT, Ofcom and service providers are taking a place to find a path forward”.
This regime depends entirely on resolving this issue. We were promised from the Dispatch Box that this was a priority for DSIT nearly two years ago, when the previous Government were in power. It was not done then and it is still not resolved. The letter did not mention anything about discussions between Government Ministers and their counterparts in the US, upon which this finally depends. I hope that the Minister is not surprised at the level of frustration felt by bereaved parents at the lack of speed with which this issue has been pursued.
The Government have put out a press release and made assurances to bereaved parents, and now we are here at a time of night when no vote can reasonably take place. So I would like the Minister to offer to bring pack tighter wording at Third Reading. I believe it is necessary and what parents are expecting. Even if she is not able to make that commitment tonight, it is what should happen and I ask her to try to make it happen. It has been promised and I believe it must be delivered.
I do not intend to pursue my Amendment 405, but I simply ask the Minister to put on the record how the police will be better informed of this regime. I finish by paying tribute all the bereaved families who have campaigned for this change—Jools’ law—and the amendments that preceded it. We in this House are witness to your pain and your generosity in campaigning so that others do not suffer as you have.
I wish to remind the Government of what one father said the day before Committee: “I was happy with the meeting with Liz Kendall until I realised it was the exact same meeting I had with Peter Kyle the year before. Nothing had changed except the size of the room to accommodate the increased number of bereaved parents”. There is a crisis unfolding that the Government are not grasping. Sorting out this amendment is not enough, but it must be done. I beg to move.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I rise to speak on this vital group of amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, concerning the investigation of child deaths, to which I have been very pleased to add my name. We all absolutely acknowledge that the noble Baroness has been tireless in her campaign and her support for the bereaved parents, and she is no less eloquent or persuasive even at this time of night.
The chink of light provided by the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, in Committee and the movement represented by government Amendments 429A and 454A are very welcome. However, on these Benches, like the noble Baroness we question whether they are as comprehensive as the solutions proposed in her amendments. The government amendments are substantive concessions regarding the principle of automatic data preservation, but they fall short of the immediate statutory certainty and the proactive coronial and police duties sought by the noble Baroness to ensure a comprehensive investigation into digital harms. So, while I welcome in principle the Government’s agreement to make DPNs automatic, their current drafting often leans on secondary legislation and future consultations. These amendments place the duty firmly in the Bill, providing the immediate legal certainty that bereaved families deserve in 2026.
Perhaps the most critical missing piece in the Government’s current approach is addressed by Amendment 404, which requires the police to investigate digital harm as a primary line of inquiry as a matter of routine. We cannot treat the digital environment as secondary to the physical. If a child is found harmed in a public park, the police do not wait for a consultation to decide whether to check the CCTV, yet when a child dies in circumstances which may involve social media, digital forensics are often treated as an afterthought or a secondary consideration. So the noble Baroness’s additional amendments should not be controversial. They should be accepted, fast-tracked and robustly enforced, and I urge the Minister to take them on board today.
Baroness Barran (Con)
My Lords, I too will speak very briefly, given the hour. I was also pleased to add my name to Amendment 431. For the benefit of Hansard, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, referred to Amendment 404—but I think she was talking about Amendment 431. Anyway, I am going to try to talk about Amendment 431. I agree with everything the noble Baroness said in her opening remarks.
I too will focus on subsection (4)(i) of the new clause proposed by the Government’s Amendment 429A, which reduces the time for which data would be preserved, from 12 to six months. I have been given to understand that part of the reason for that is because of the ECHR and the need to respect the privacy of those concerned, but it leaves bereaved parents in an unsatisfactory situation, and I wondered why the Government did it this way round and why there could not be a mechanism for automatically deleting any data the minute the inquest was completed and the data was no longer needed, rather than putting pressure on coroners to have to extend, and apply for an extension of, the notices. I would be grateful if the Minister could consider that.
Baroness Shawcross-Wolfson (Con)
My Lords, I will not detain the House at this hour. I thank the Minister for the progress the Government have made on this since we spoke about it in Committee—it really is a step forward. However, like other noble Lords, I urge the Minister to just go a little bit further, and, if she could possibly address the issues raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, that would be fantastic. I hope she will have good news for us when she stands up.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I begin by placing on record my gratitude to all the noble Lords who have led the campaign on this important issue, none more so than the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, who has so ably championed this cause. I think it self-evident that we all acknowledge the harms that phones and social media are doing to our youth. I speak as a father of teenage children who are grappling with these very issues day to day.
This is most tragically brought to the fore when phones and social media lead to the death of children. Parents who face this unimaginable tragedy should be able to know what their child was accessing, and the evidence from these awful incidents should prove to the general public that steps have to be taken. I see no argument for why the police should not be required to collect evidence relating to potential digital harm, as indeed they are required to do for general causes of death. Similarly, if social media has in part led to the death of a child, the bare minimum that providers should do is to retain the data relating to the victim.
I too express gratitude to the Minister for considering the arguments raised in Committee and acting upon this. I understand that many in your Lordships’ House believe that Amendment 429A does not go far enough and that it does not place the desired duties on police forces. However, I welcome at least the start that this represents.
There is a tension, I fear, between what the Government are doing in your Lordships’ House—rightly, making concessions on the issue—and, at the same time, in the other place voting against further protections from online harms. The Minister’s amendment today places duties on providers. It is a short step from mandating data retention to enforcing age limits. This is not the time for that debate in its entirety, but it is worth putting it on the record. I reiterate my gratitude to all Members of your Lordships’ House who have campaigned on this important matter.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, the Government remain grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and to the bereaved families who have raised concerns about the effectiveness of the existing framework for the preservation of online material that may be relevant to understanding a child’s death. I reiterate what I said in Committee: the loss of any child is a profound tragedy, and the Government are clear that we must take every possible step to safeguard children online.
I pay tribute to all the campaigners on this issue. Of course, I would be delighted to see Ellen Roome. I had the opportunity to meet her briefly; she was introduced to me by the noble Baroness, Lady Shawcross-Wolfson, outside the Chamber. It would be good to organise something formally and to include the noble Baronesses, Lady Kidron and Lady Barran. I will do what I can to find out what is happening with the inquest. Obviously, I cannot commit my noble and learned friend the Attorney-General to anything, but I will do what I can to find out what is happening.
I promised in Committee that the Government would consider how that framework could be amended to ensure that data preservation is applied consistently and as quickly as possible. We have done that: we listened and we have acted. I am delighted today to bring forward government Amendments 429A, 454A and 467AB, which require speedy data preservation in every case involving the death of a child aged five or above. The only exceptions to that will be where the child’s online activity is clearly irrelevant to their death or an investigation is plainly not necessary.
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for her constructive engagement on the development of this provision. Our most recent meeting was this afternoon, where we did our best to move things forward; I will return to that in a moment. As I have emphasised to her, the Government’s firm intention is that a DPN request becomes the default and should be made in every case, unless the coroner is very clear from the outset that online data is not relevant to a child’s death. We will ensure that this expectation is clearly set out in the Explanatory Notes to the new provision. I will write to the Chief Coroner, asking her to consider issuing guidance for coroners on the application of the mandatory requirement and, crucially, the circumstances in which an exception may be appropriate.
The Government thought we had done enough and that we had done what was wanted of us, because we all agreed with the objectives. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has reservations, and I understand them. I hope that we can continue to discuss this, so that we can reach a position where everybody is happy that we are doing what we have set out to do.
On the time limit, this now mandatory policy will entail the preservation of a much greater volume of data, including that of third parties, than at present. As it preserves the data relating to the dead child, it will also sweep up those on the other end of the interaction—the third parties are the issue here. To ensure that it is proportionate, we are therefore reducing the initial retention period—not the overall retention period—to six months, which, in the majority of cases, should provide sufficient time for the coroner to decide whether the online evidence is relevant. It is not related to when the inquest takes place, because the coroners all start working on this long before the inquest actually opens. It is simply putting it in place so that they have time to make the decision. There is a provision to extend it. The coroner does not have to apply to extend it; it is much simpler than that—they simply have to decide to extend it. Therefore, more time can be secured by the coroner if it is not yet clear.
We will work with the Chief Coroner and operational partners to ensure that coroners are clear that a positive decision is needed at the six-month point on whether or not to extend a DPN. If there is any doubt, the default position should be to extend the DPN to ensure that the data is preserved until the inquest.
These amendments will make a minor change to the existing regulation-making power in Section 101 of the Online Safety Act, so that regulations setting out the kinds of services that will automatically receive a DPN can refer to ongoing research. That means they will remain current and will capture any new and emerging services that become popular with children.
Amendments 431 and 432, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, would, as we are all aware, basically give effect to the same issue as the government amendments, but they include preserving data where online activity is not relevant to a child’s death. The reason for the difference is that the government amendments carve this out to reduce delay and diverting resources away from relevant cases. For that reason, we cannot accept the noble Baroness’s Amendments 431 and 432, as they would require a disproportionate retention of third-party data, which would risk breaching Article 8.
Finally, on Amendment 404 and the consequential Amendment 405, also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, we agree that it is essential that the police both understand the powers available to them and can use those powers consistently to access all relevant information when investigating these cases, including digital material or content held on social media platforms. As the noble Baroness knows, the National Police Chiefs’ Council is developing guidance to improve awareness and to promote uniform use of these powers, and the Home Office is committed to working with the police on this issue.
I know how concerned your Lordships’ House is about the pace of change in some of these newer technologies. That is exactly why, for guidance to remain practical and effective, it must be able to evolve alongside the fast-changing technological developments and legal frameworks. That is why it is preferable not to set this guidance or its detail in primary legislation but instead to continue working with the police to ensure that this guidance is delivered soon and to a high standard.
For the reasons I have set out, I ask the noble Baroness not to press her amendments. I thank her again and thank all other noble Lords who have spoken for their collaboration and engagement on this important issue.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
I thank all noble Lords who have supported this, not just tonight but on previous occasions, and I thank the Minister. Earlier this afternoon, we were looking for the perfect words. When she stood up, she said “clearly irrelevant” to the death of a child, and that would have been the perfect phrase to have in the Bill. I say it on the record. Maybe she can come back with a surprise at Third Reading.
I very much appreciate the work of the department and where the Government have met us, and I accept the point about the police. I say for one final time that, unfortunately, we have been round this three times. If this does not work, we will be back again with fury. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Bailey of Paddington
“Police covenant: mandatory reporting on suicide and attempted suicide(1) The Secretary of State must ensure the collection and publication of data on suicide and attempted suicide among police officers and police staff for the purposes of supporting mental health and wellbeing under the police covenant (see section 1 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022).(2) Each police force in England and Wales must collect and submit annually to the Secretary of State—(a) the number of confirmed suicides by serving police officers and police staff;(b) the number of attempted suicides by serving police officers and police staff; (c) contextual information, where reasonably available, including duty status, length of service, role, rank, known occupational stressors, and access to mental health support.(3) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed, and annually thereafter, lay a report before Parliament (to be known as the “Police Covenant Mental Health Report”) which must include, but is not limited to—(a) national and force-level data trends,(b) analysis of occupational contributory factors,(c) assessment of the adequacy, usage and evidence-based outcomes of mental health and suicide prevention provisions under the police covenant,(d) recommendations to address identified risks, and(e) a statement from the Chief Medical Officer for England.(4) The report under subsection (3) must—(a) be published and disseminated to all police personnel;(b) include commentary from the College of Policing on compliance, data quality and best practice at force level;(c) include contributions from staff representative bodies and trade unions.(5) Anonymised data, disaggregated by force area, must be published, subject to data protection and safeguarding.(6) Each Chief Constable must, at the end of every calendar year, provide a statement to the Secretary of State certifying that the requirements under this section have been met by their police force.(7) Where a Chief Constable fails to provide a certification under subsection (6) without reasonable excuse, the Secretary of State must notify HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services.(8) The Inspectorate must have regard to a notification under subsection (7) in the course of its inspection of that police force under the police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy (PEEL) programme.(9) The Secretary of State must establish an independent advisory board, to be known as the “Police Suicide Prevention and Mental Health Advisory Board”.(10) The Board must consist of persons with expertise in clinical care, occupational health, staff representation and academic research.(11) The functions of the Board are to—(a) advise the Secretary of State on guidance relating to suicide prevention and mental health in the police workforce,(b) set standards for the collection and reporting of relevant data, and(c) review and make recommendations on force-level responses to risks identified through data and inspections.(12) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about the operation of the Police Suicide Prevention and Mental Health Advisory Board, including provision about—(a) the Board’s procedures,(b) its terms of reference, and(c) its reporting duties.(13) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about—(a) data collection standards,(b) statutory guidance,(c) audit mechanisms, and(d) such further oversight as may be considered necessary. (14) In this section, “police officer” and “police staff” have the same meanings as in section 1 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022.”
Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)
My Lords, before I go into detail on Amendment 408, I thank the Police Federation of England and Wales for its tireless work on this issue.
If we are serious about the police covenant then we must be serious about the well-being of those who serve. We cannot claim to support officers and staff while failing even to measure properly the most tragic outcomes of poor mental health. The amendment is rooted in a simple principle: what is measured is what is acted upon. At present, the collection of data on suicides and attempted suicides in policing is too inconsistent and too limited. Without clear national data, patterns are missed, warning signs are overlooked and opportunities to save lives are lost.
The amendment would require proper annual reporting to Parliament, force-by-force data and analysis of occupational stress points. This matters because policing places extraordinary pressures on people—trauma, long hours, operational strain and repeated exposure to distress. We need evidence-based data, not just warm words.
The amendment would strengthen accountability. Chief constables would have to certify compliance. HMICFRS would be alerted where forces fell short. An independent advisory board would help to drive best practice. This is not just about getting figures and gathering data; it is about making sure that those figures are acted upon.
Behind every statistic is a human being—an officer, a staff member, a family member or a team member left grieving and asking whether more could have been done. This amendment would help us understand the scale of the problem, improve prevention and honour the spirit of the police covenant by protecting those who protect us. I beg to move.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, both the amendments in this group highlight a serious issue in policing. Many officers and staff are under extreme strain and we are not systematically measuring the scale of the problem. We support the proposal of the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, for the mandatory recording and reporting of suicides and serious suicide attempts, a proposal backed by the Police Federation. Whether through his amendment or Amendment 409, it is important that we act now to bring this problem into clear view so that we can assess the risks and protect officers’ welfare, as we would with any other occupational hazard. It is therefore necessary to place a legal duty on forces and the Home Office to record these incidents and publish the figures so that appropriate support and interventions can be designed, and responsibility for preventable loss of life can be properly examined.
The police service rightly places emphasis on officer well-being, but these amendments would take a further step by increasing transparency so that we can understand what is happening to those who carry some of society’s heaviest psychological demands. Police officers are often the first to assist people in mental health crisis, but we must ensure that their own welfare is addressed. As my noble friend Lady Brinton observed in Committee, policing has often relied on signposting staff to external organisations rather than building internal support that is tailored to their needs.
First, however, we must remedy the lack of consistent data across forces. A unified system for collecting and publishing a mental health matrix would allow targeted evidence-based support that is timely and preventive. I hope that, in this instance, the Minister will recognise the importance of a clear duty to measure and report these outcomes as the basis for any serious strategy on officer well-being.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this group of amendments addresses the important issue of mental health and well-being for those serving in police forces. Amendment 408, in the name of my noble friend Lord Bailey, and Amendment 409, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, seek to improve the collection and publication of data relating to suicide and attempted suicide among police officers and police staff.
The intention behind them is clear. If we are serious about supporting the well-being of those who serve in policing, we must first ensure that we properly understand the scale and nature of the challenges that they face. Policing is a profession that places extraordinary demands on those who undertake it. Officers and staff routinely encounter traumatic incidents and cumulative stress that comes from protecting the public in difficult circumstances, and I can personally vouch for that. While the vast majority serve with resilience and dedication, it is clear that these pressures can have a profound effect on mental health.
In Committee, my noble friend Lord Bailey spoke movingly about the importance of ensuring that the police covenant is underpinned by robust evidence. Without reliable national data, it is difficult to identify patterns, understand risk factors or evaluate whether the support structures currently in place are working as intended. The same point was echoed by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who emphasised that better data is essential if we are to design effective prevention strategies.
There is already recognition across policing on the need to strengthen the evidence base in this area, and work is under way through national policing bodies to improve the collection of welfare data. However, the amendments before the House highlight the importance of ensuring that this work is transparent and capable of informing meaningful action. Ultimately, the police covenant reflects our collective commitment to those who protect the public. Ensuring that we understand and address the mental health risks faced by officers and staff is central to that commitment.
For those reasons, this group of amendments raises issues to which the Government should give careful consideration. I look forward to what the Minister has to say in response.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Bailey of Paddington and Lord Hogan-Howe, for tabling the amendments in this group. I am conscious of the fact that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies, supported the amendment’s general direction of travel.
First, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, that suicide and attempted suicide in the police workforce have devastating consequences. I and the Government recognise fully the need to address mental health and well-being in policing seriously and responsibly. As the noble Lord will know, the National Police Wellbeing Service already does vital work in tackling suicide risks to the police workforce, including work on prevention, postvention support for forces, a 24/7 mental health crisis line for anyone working in policing, and specialist trauma services.
I am grateful for the way in which the noble Lord has framed his amendment and brought it forward. However, I say to him respectfully that placing an additional statutory reporting duty in primary legislation is not, I feel, the right approach at this time. I say this for three broad reasons. First, much of the information sought by the amendments, particularly in relation to attempted suicide, is often clinical, confidential, medical data. In many cases, it cannot be lawfully or ethically shared with employers, so mandating this through primary legislation would be the wrong approach and would risk unintended consequences around confidentiality, trust and data integrity. In my view, that is a significant blockage in the amendment to date.
Secondly, I reassure the noble Lord that the absence of legislation does not mean the absence of action. This is a really important point. Police forces already collect data on deaths by suicide, and there is national co-ordination of that data. The challenge is not in getting forces to comply; it is in what we ask for from forces, how it is defined and, most importantly, how it is used to drive meaningful prevention. Again, I look forward to the future and looking at a revised national police service downstream, following the White Paper, where training, well-being and personnel functions are brought into the centre and where there is a smaller number of police forces on the ground. There will be a real focus on this, and I know it is important to do that.
Thirdly, I do not want to be locked into a rigid framework before necessary clinical, operational and ethical questions have been resolved. This is not simply a matter of reporting; it also requires high-quality support. In particular, as I think the noble Lord will accept, it demands a culture that understands that mental health challenges are there in police forces. Police officers see some horrendous things on the ground. They have really hard experiences and are very often traumatised. It is important that we embed in the culture of the police force how we respond to those issues. It is not simply about collecting statistics. I know that that is the noble Lord’s prime motivation but, ultimately, it should be about having an automatic, embedded culture that recognises the stresses and strains, helps identify them and puts in place measures to help people with their mental health.
That is why the Government are focusing their efforts on strengthening well-being support, trauma care and early intervention in the police White Paper, and also why my colleague, the Minister directly responsible for policing and crime, has engaged with police leaders, staff associations and experts to look at how we can improve the quality of the data and, more importantly, the quality of preventive action. As it happens, I had a useful discussion with the Police Federation at my party conference in Liverpool in October last year. We understand that there is a real issue to help support, but I do not believe that the amendments before the House on Report today would be the right solution at this stage.
With this recognition of the problem and a grateful Minister who says to the noble Lord, “Thank you for bringing this issue forward”, I hope that, on the basis of what I have said, the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)
I thank the Minister for his response and for the nature of his response. I truly believe that the Government are beginning to focus on this long-lasting issue. My slight pushback and challenge are around the embedding of a culture. The organisation is so big and so diverse in its approach to this problem. Many forces do not collect the figures and certainly could not provide them when asked by the Police Federation. We need to ask them officially because, as was said, we need to embed that culture. By asking for those figures, we build a mechanism that embeds that culture.
However, in view of the Minister’s very generous approach to this subject, and my belief that the Government truly are beginning to focus on this, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Smith of Llanfaes
Policing: devolution to Wales(1) Schedule 7A of the Government of Wales Act 2006 is amended as follows.(2) In section B5 (crime, public order and policing)—(a) omit “and policing”, and(b) omit line 41 “policing”.(3) The Secretary of State may by regulations make further provision under this section.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause seeks to devolve policing to Wales, by removing it from the list of reserved matters in the Government of Wales Act 2006.
Baroness Smith of Llanfaes (PC)
My Lords, my Amendments 409A and 409B concern the devolution of policing and youth justice to Wales. These are the same amendments that I tabled in Committee. I will keep my remarks brief, considering the late hour, but I hope that the Minister can provide further clarity, because the questions raised in Committee remain unanswered.
Not long after Committee, the police reform White Paper was published. There are some good things in it, particularly the focus on neighbourhood policing, but it does not address the unfairness of policing powers being withheld from Wales compared with the other devolved nations. At that time, the Minister stated that the White Paper’s proposals for Wales concern organisation rather than devolution and that devolving policing is not right for Wales at this time. However, I say respectfully that, if we are reorganising the whole system, this would seem to be precisely the moment to align responsibility with accountability through devolution.
The abolition of PCCs fundamentally reshapes the governance of policing. In England, functions will move to mayoral authorities, yet Wales has no equivalent structures. It is logical that the Welsh Government should be part of the answer, whatever that answer is, to the newly created gap. Yet we still do not know what model the Government envisage for Welsh police governance, whether devolution of policing even remains under consideration, despite consistent recommendations from independent commissions, or how Welsh financial contributions, already substantial, will be recognised. In 2024-25, only around 43% of policing expenditure in Wales came from the UK Government. The remainder came from Welsh government contributions and council tax. This remains a reserved matter in which the UK Government retain that decision-making power, yet Welsh citizens already fund most of their policing.
On youth justice, I welcome the Minister’s confirmation that work is under way on the manifesto commitment that they have themselves. As the noble Lord, Lord Hain, noted in Committee, Wales’s child-first approach has helped to drive
“a sharp and sustained decline in first-time entrants”.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/1/26; col. 466.]
over many years. He also highlighted that children in conflict with the law often have “overlapping needs” and that the “jagged edge” of the current settlement can impede the joined-up support that those children require.
Crucially, many of us have argued that youth justice is a contained, high-impact area where devolution would be feasible and important, demonstrating new intergovernmental respect and co-operation. The Minister has previously referred to a programme of work in relation to youth justice. Today, I would like to find out more on the progress of this: what its scope is, when conclusions will be reached and, if legislative change is anticipated, through which vehicle and on what timetable. Without this detail, Parliament cannot scrutinise the direction of travel. Scotland and Northern Ireland have full responsibility for policing and justice. Wales remains the outlier.
I am not asking the House to decide on these matters today; I am asking the Government to provide the clarity that Wales deserves. When will proposals on Welsh police governance be published, what is the timetable for decisions on youth justice devolution, and how will accountability be secured for systems largely funded in Wales but not yet controlled in Wales? I look forward to the Minister’s response at the end of the debate. I beg to move.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
When we had a debate in Committee, Wales was squeezed into the very short time we had on the Thursday afternoon before a debate had to start. It is no one’s fault but Wales is being squeezed again. It is now 11.30 pm and this is serious—it is no-one’s fault, and I am not blaming anyone; it is the way the cookie has crumbled. It seems to me that what we want is a proper debate. On the previous occasion, in inviting the noble Baroness to bring her amendments back, the Minister promised a fuller debate. At this hour of night, I do not really think that is sensible, but I will say two things.
First, as the parliamentary process seems to produce no proper forum for the discussion of these serious issues, and the Minister said he had very serious arguments to support the non-devolution of policing, will he agree to have a proper meeting about these things so that we can look at how policing has operated in Scotland and Northern Ireland to the benefit of those two nations, and how it could benefit Wales? Secondly, why is Wales treated as though justice were an island removed from Wales? Justice is not an island; it is an integral part of policy. Separating out areas of justice from the rest of internal affairs is almost, I think, unique across the world to Wales as a self-governing nation.
On the two particular matters, I do not want to add much about policing, but I want to say a word about youth justice. Since the debate in Committee, the Government have published A Modern Youth Justice System: Foundations Fit for The Future. If I may say so, with genuine respect—I put that in because, sometimes, it is said of lawyers that, when they say “with respect”, they mean without any respect at all, but I mean this with genuine respect—the foreword written by the Deputy Prime Minister, Lord Chancellor and Minister for Justice presents an irrefutable argument for the way in which youth justice must be properly aligned with other services.
What is fascinating about that paper, however, is that there is not a single word about what is to happen to youth justice in Wales. There are excellent arguments as to what is to happen in England. Had we had a debate at a sensible hour, I was going to weary your Lordships, I hope not unduly, by looking at the arguments so powerfully made by the Deputy Prime Minister. This is not the time to embark on that argument: I would weary noble Lords unduly at this hour of night. In the first debate on Report, however, the Minister rightly emphasised how important it was that the Government stuck to their manifesto commitments when emphasising why we had to have a respect order. In the face of a powerful argument that did not add anything to what we already said, he said that it was a manifesto commitment. I therefore hope he will be able to explain the manifesto commitment to look at youth justice and its devolution, and say what is to be done.
I found it very disappointing listening to the evidence of one of the Welsh Ministers, Mr Irranca-Davies, of the Senedd’s Legislation, Justice and Constitution Committee, when he was asked repeatedly about youth justice. He said that discussions were going on and they were working hard, but he could not say anything of any detail and hoped that they would be able to do something soon.
I very much hope for two things. First, I hope that the Minister and those who take a different view can have the opportunity for a robust argument, so that we can see what each side says. The report of the Silk commission, the report of the commission that I chaired, and the report of Rowan Williams and Laura McAllister’s commission all argued for the devolution of both these things, and no one has ever presented an argument as to why they are wrong. It seems to me that a robust discussion would be the best way forward.
I also hope that the Minister is able to explain tonight how the Government intend to honour the manifesto commitment and how the powerful logic of the Deputy Prime Minister’s arguments can be applied not merely to England—although I accept here, of course, that it is most important that they apply to England—but how they are to be applied to Wales.
Lord Jones of Penybont (Lab)
My Lords, the Minister will know that when I was First Minister of Wales, I strongly supported the devolution of policing, and my position has not changed. I fail to see why Wales alone, of the four nations of the UK, should not have the powers to shape policing and policing priorities.
I have heard arguments about crime being cross-border. Well, that is true of England and Scotland as well, and indeed of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland for that matter. Simple co-operation between police forces is a way of overcoming that. I saw that in 2013 when we had the NATO summit in Newport. Police officers from all over the UK had come to help police that event.
The Minister will, I am sure, be relieved to know that I am not looking for him to agree with me tonight. I know the view of the UK Government that, currently, policing should not be devolved in Wales. Nevertheless, we now have a lack of clarity as to the future, because with the abolition of the PCCs, the suggestions that have been made about how policing will be made accountable in the future are based on English political structures that do not exist in Wales. We do not yet know what will happen in Wales. That is important because there are, of course, arguments that we have to make to ensure that Wales is properly recognised. Wales has its own civil contingency forum, language, laws and ways of policing that must be reflected in the future. With that in mind, does the Minister agree that a way must be found to take this forward? Will he agree to meet me, and perhaps others, to see how we can deliver better policing that nevertheless reflects Wales’s national distinctiveness?
I turn very briefly to Amendment 409B, in which I have a personal interest. This was a recommendation that came from the Brown commission, of which I was a part. Naturally, I fully support the devolution of youth justice. I was delighted to see this included in the manifesto that the Government were elected on in 2024 and I look forward to its delivery.
Lord Murphy of Torfaen (Lab)
My Lords, when my noble friend was the First Minister, and slightly before that, when I was the Secretary of State, I was less of a campaigner for this issue than he was. But I recognise that times have changed over the last few years. I am told that devolution is a process rather than an event—something that I have witnessed myself over the last 20-odd years that I have been involved in Welsh politics at a ministerial level. But two or three things have occurred literally within the last year or so that mean we have to bend our minds to something that I was not all that keen on all those years ago.
First, as my noble friend said, the Labour Party manifesto indicated that youth justice and probation were now to be matters for the Welsh Government and the Welsh Senedd. Like my noble friend, I was a member of Gordon Brown’s commission, and that was something we all agreed on. I look forward to my noble friend the Minister’s response on those specific issues, which we must not forget.
On the issue of policing generally and its devolution, the view over a number of years was that it was quite hard to devolve policing without devolving criminal justice. The noble Baroness referred to Scotland and Northern Ireland. Scotland historically has had both over many centuries. Northern Ireland has not—it did and then it did not after the collapse of the first Stormont arrangement. Indeed, when I was Northern Ireland Secretary, I held responsibility for criminal justice and for policing until the Good Friday agreement made the difference by recommending that both those issues should eventually be devolved to Northern Ireland, which they have been, and very successfully too.
Two things have occurred over the last few weeks. First, my noble friend the Minister came to the Chamber and told us that police and crime commissioners were to be abolished. I do not think that that was in the manifesto, but I entirely concur with it. However, if we are to abolish police and crime commissioners, the responsibility for accountability has to lie with somebody. In England, there are mayors and the new organisations which will follow the devolution Bill, but in Wales there are no such institutions. There are no mayors and no local authorities which currently have a responsibility for policing. We have to find out what happens in Wales when that Bill goes through. That makes us think more about general police devolution.
Secondly, my right honourable friend the Home Secretary has now decided in the White Paper on policing that there will be far fewer police authorities and police boards in England. What happens then? Will the current four police forces in Wales be abolished? Will we have two or one for the whole of Wales? I do not know but obviously there will be a change if the White Paper affects Wales as much as England.
Those two issues mean that we have to bend our minds to what we do about policing in the months ahead. Those months ahead will inevitably be complicated by the fact that in 60 days’ time there will be an election in Wales, the outcome of which none of us knows but it will undoubtedly be something we have to deal with in a rather different way from how we have over the past 100 years.
Baroness Humphreys (LD)
My Lords, given the hour, my contribution to this debate will be a short one.
I first apologise for not having spoken to similar amendments on this subject in Committee because of illness. I express my gratitude to my noble friend Lady Brinton, who is no longer in her place, for taking my place on that occasion. My thanks go also to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, for bringing the amendments in this group back for debate on Report.
On these Benches we agree with both Amendment 409A on the devolution of policing and Amendment 409B on the devolution of youth justice. They are in line with both Welsh Liberal Democrat and our federal Liberal Democrat policies. Had this debate taken place at an earlier hour, we would have joined the noble Baroness in the voting Lobby.
I will speak very briefly on youth justice, which was seen as an early candidate for phased devolution. The Welsh Government have been able to influence youth justice policy through devolved areas such as education, health and social services, and have established a youth justice system that prioritises prevention, rehabilitation and the rights of children over punitive measures.
According to a Senedd research document published in January this year,
“The Welsh Government has said that it has agreed with the UK Government for officials in both governments to work together to ‘explore options’ where responsibilities in the youth justice system could be ‘realigned’”,
as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, referred to. What progress has been made there?
But despite that and other affirmative statements, the Senedd Equality and Social Justice Committee warned last year that
“the UK Government could row back its promises on the devolution of youth justice … in Wales”
Disappointingly, experience is showing us that this is what appears to be happening.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, for bringing forward Amendments 409A and 409B, which raise the question of devolving policing and youth justice to Wales. As discussed in Committee, these amendments engage an important constitutional issue about the structure of the devolution settlement. It was argued that devolving these responsibilities could allow them to sit alongside other public services already devolved to the Welsh Government, such as education and health.
However, as was also noted, these matters currently form part of a single legal jurisdiction covering England and Wales. Policing and youth justice operate within that shared framework which supports co-operation between forces and national capability across the system. Changes of the scale proposed here would represent a significant constitutional shift. A matter of such importance cannot properly be considered through two amendments to an ever-growing policing Bill. Indeed, I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd: he is absolutely right that this certainly requires more time. It would require a broader, more fundamental discussion about the future structure of the devolution settlement which, in respect of policing, we on this side, I am afraid, would resist. I look forward to the noble Lord’s remarks.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, for returning to the issue on Report. We find ourselves in a very strange situation today where the noble Baroness who moved the amendment resides in Wales, the shadow Minister was a former Member of Parliament in Wales and resides in Wales, and the Government Minister is a former Member of Parliament in Wales and resides in Wales. We are having a bit of a Welsh fest today where every Member who spoke also resides in Wales. I apologise to my noble friends for keeping them here on this Welsh discussion. I have to say to the noble Baroness that I regret it being this late in the evening. It is slightly out of my control because of the way in which the debates have fallen.
As has been seen in the debate, there are a number of different views and within Wales there are a number of different views on this matter. The Government are still of the view, and the position remains clear, that policing operates effectively within a single integrated England and Wales criminal justice system, and it is really important that we examine that.
As my noble friends Lord Murphy of Torfaen and Lord Jones of Penybont mentioned, there is a lot going on in the policing world at the moment, not just in Wales but in England. There will be legislation to abolish police and crime commissioners and an examination of the model for their replacement. As has been said, that model will include the mayoral model in England but also a local authority model. We have given a very strong commitment that the structures in Wales will be a matter for discussion in the review that is being undertaken, pending the legislation that will come before this House, when parliamentary time allows, to abolish police and crime commissioners.
A review of the number of police forces, currently 43, will be undertaken in the next few months and completed in the summer. There will be significant engagement with the Senedd, Welsh police forces, current police and crime commissioners, Welsh Members of Parliament and anyone else who wishes to have a view on what the format should be in relation to any revised structure in Wales. Self-evidently, there are a number of options: the existing four police forces; a smaller number of police forces; a single police force; and the different types of governance structure that could be put in place. That will be part of the discussion that is undertaken.
Lord Wigley (PC)
I am following what the Minister is saying with great interest because it responds to the numerous points that have been made about the reorganisation that is needed to make sure there is no vacuum. The point I would press is that we have an election for the Senedd coming up in May. Trying to get a coherent discussion, debate and conclusion at this point becomes extremely awkward. It would be good if it could be started immediately, before we find ourselves in the middle of an election, with the intention of bringing everybody on board very rapidly afterwards. The Minister will understand the challenges.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I fully do. The review that is being undertaken of force sizes throughout the whole of England and Wales will commence very shortly. The terms of reference, if they are not public already, will be very shortly. The input of the Senedd, the political parties, the current Administration and, potentially, an Opposition Administration in the Senedd is absolutely valid for that discussion. At the end of that period, we want to try to have an understanding of the preferred models through negotiation and discussion on issues such as force size and governance. That is really important because there has to be legislation at some point to abolish police and crime commissioners. In doing that, there will be opportunities to discuss force size and governance accordingly.
I would like to take up the suggestion of a meeting made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. I am very happy to meet any colleagues who have spoken today. It may be more appropriate that we do that either with the review team for force size and current structures or directly with the Police Minister, but I will reflect on that request and get back to the noble and learned Lord at a sensible hour to determine how we undertake that.
I understand the support from the noble Baroness, Lady Humphreys—another resident of Wales speaking, in effect, from the Front Bench, in this case on behalf of the Liberal Democrats. I have set down the principle: the Government do not believe that this reorganisation is about devolution. We have different views on that, but that is the principle of where we are. There are issues still to look at, such as force size and governance, that are for discussion to get the best deal for Wales and avoid, as the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, has said, causing any interregnum in service. I plan to meet some new police officers in Wales shortly, and I will be engaged as someone who has an interest in the matter for this House.
The system currently provides operational resilience, shared capability and strong cross-border co-operation. We do not believe that fragmenting it would improve outcomes for victims or communities. That is the Government’s position. There is an honest disagreement here, but there are still issues that need to be resolved.
On the issue of youth justice, which was mentioned in the debate, it is true that the Ministry of Justice is working constructively with the Welsh Government on delivery and oversight arrangements. The manifesto committed to considering the devolution of youth justice and that work is under way. Consideration does not equate to immediate legislative change, which is why I cannot accept it in the Bill today. No decision has been taken to devolve youth justice through this Bill, but that work is under way. It is a complex issue, and we want to get the best outcomes, but that is the position. I hope the noble Baroness can accept that in the context that I put to her today.
Baroness Smith of Llanfaes (PC)
In looking ahead to a future legislative vehicle for progressing the devolution of youth justice, does the Minister have a specific timeline in mind and what stage of the programme have the Government got to?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I cannot give the noble Baroness a timeline or a commentary on that discussion, but what I can say, as I have said already, is that work is under way. This Government were elected for a five-year Parliament and work is under way—that is what I can say today. She will undoubtedly test us again, as there will be opportunities for questions and debates, and there will be legislative scrutiny whenever any legislation is brought forward on the question of police and crime commissioners. However, today, with the principled position the Government have taken, I cannot accept the noble Baroness’s amendments on devolution or on youth justice. As I have said to her and other interested Members, a process is under way on the question of the structures and governance in Wales, which anybody can contribute to in the next few months. The work under way on the justice issue is being dealt with by my colleagues in the MoJ and by the Senedd.
Whatever happens in the election, there will be a Welsh Government of some form, though I do not know what that will be. We are discussing this with the Welsh Government now and we will discuss this with the Welsh Government afterwards. As the Minister responsible for devolution in the Home Office, I have regular meetings with counterpart Ministers in Wales on those issues, as do my policing colleagues. I hope that, with those reassurances at this late hour, the amendment can be withdrawn.
Baroness Smith of Llanfaes (PC)
I thank the Minister for his answers and all noble Lords for contributing to the debate. What is most important from what we have gathered this evening is to ensure that, whatever arrangement is decided going forward, it is decided not just in England for how it can benefit and work for police forces in England but that there is particular engagement in Wales.
The Minister mentioned engagement with the Senedd and police forces in Wales, but making sure that it is genuine engagement, and that they can design what the system looks like for the benefit of Wales and not have just another version of what will happen in England, is important. I think that all of us who took part in this debate would welcome further discussion to find out more about the next steps. I am sure we will have further discussions about this, but today I will withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe
“Police enforcement data(1) Police forces in England and Wales must publish annual data on the enforcement of the following offences—(a) shoplifting,(b) offences involving a blade,(c) phone theft,(d) fare dodging on public transport, and(e) offences involving bicycles and e-scooters.(2) In this section, “enforcement” means the investigation and collection of evidence in preparation for a prosecution.”
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, in moving my Amendment 409D, I will speak to the other amendments in my name. I thank my noble friend Lord Jackson for his support on the crucial issues of police force publication of enforcement data, reducing police paperwork and the reform of disclosure to that end. I have discovered in a long career in business and in government that enforcement of the law is as important as the rules and the regulations themselves, and this is particularly true for neighbourhood policing.
It is not possible to identify and promote the best without comparative data. Better data on enforcement, publicly available, would both be a motivator for effective policy and help to hold the police to account. My amendment therefore takes in five areas of public concern that the great British public care about: shoplifting offences, offences involving a blade, phone theft, fare dodging on public transport, and offences involving bicycles and e-scooters. The Minister mentioned in Committee that the Home Office will introduce a sector-facing police performance dashboard this year. It will help chief constables and local policing bodies to analyse the sort of data that we are seeking, and to drive improvements.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I will speak to this group of amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. With the finishing post in sight, I will be extremely brief.
These amendments correctly identify a crisis at the heart of our police service. There is a consensus that our police are currently drowning in a sea of unnecessary paperwork, and my noble friend Lady Doocey’s policy paper, Policing Fit for the Future, makes the case with devastating clarity. It records the testimony of chief constables, who warn that low morale and heavy workloads are being compounded by
“archaic IT systems—some over 50 years old”
that force highly trained officers to spend more time as data entry clerks than as crime fighters. The Government’s own White Paper, From Local to National: A New Model for Policing, acknowledges this failure. It rightly sets out a mission to “strip away the barriers” that prevent officers focusing on the public’s priorities. We on these Benches welcome the ambition to automate manual processes and deliver millions of hours back to the front line.
I am not going to go into detail on the amendments, but we cannot support them as drafted. They risk micromanaging the police through the statute book and could become relics of a different era within a few short years. However, I urge the Minister to take the spirit of these proposals to heart and ensure that they are reflected in the new national policing model.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for bringing forward this group of amendments. Together, they address a theme that will be familiar to many across the House: the need to ensure that police officers are able to focus their time on policing rather than bureaucracy.
Amendment 409D concerns the publication of enforcement data for a number of offences that have become a source of considerable public concern, including shoplifting, offences involving blades, phone theft and fare evasion. We lend our strong support to the amendment. Greater transparency around enforcement activity can only help to strengthen public confidence and provide a clearer picture of how policing resources are being deployed.
Amendment 409E addresses the volume of paperwork that officers are required to complete. In Committee, it was rightly observed that administrative burdens can too often draw officers away from the front line. A review of the scale of those requirements and how they might be simplified would therefore be a sensible and constructive step.
Finally, Amendment 409F raises the question of data sharing and the efficiency of the systems that underpin case preparation and charging decisions. As many noble Lords will know, delays and inefficiencies in the exchange of information between the police and the Crown Prosecution Service can slow down the progress of cases and place additional strain on already stretched resources.
There is a significant amount of work that goes into the redaction of police documents before they are sent to the CPS, often for the documents simply to be sent back because they are overredacted. Furthermore, many of the cases the police redact may not end up being prosecuted. It is clear that this is a significant waste of police time and money, and my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe is right: it would make more sense for the CPS to take charge of the redaction of documents that may enter the public domain, given that it would have a far smaller number of documents to trawl through.
Taken together, these amendments all speak to a wider objective: ensuring that the system surrounding policing work is as efficient as possible, allowing officers to focus on preventing crime, catching offenders and protecting the public. The police should be spending as much time on the front line as possible, rather than being encumbered by unnecessary paperwork. I hope that the Minister will give them careful consideration and, as always, I look forward to his response.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, we are nearly there. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, for returning to these issues, which were thoroughly debated in Committee, and the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Davies of Gower, for their contributions to this short but nevertheless important debate. I know that the noble Baroness takes a keen interest in improving how police handle data and utilise their resources effectively. We share that objective and appreciate her constructive contribution to that discussion.
On the noble Baroness’s Amendment 409D, as announced in our police reform White Paper, the Government will introduce a police performance dashboard this year, which will allow chief constables and local policing bodies to analyse transparent and operationally significant data. This will allow forces to understand where they are performing well and where they can improve. The Home Office and the Office for National Statistics already publish extensive data, of course, on police-recorded knife crime, shoplifting and theft, and the outcomes assigned to these crimes. The published outcome data provides detailed information on what happened after a crime was recorded by the police, such as where a result is a charge or summons, out-of-court disposal, et cetera. Essentially, it links crimes to their investigative and judicial results, giving insight into how offences progress through the criminal justice system. Additional data is available through police.uk, where members of the public can access monthly crime maps and stop and search statistics. Transport authorities such as Transport for London also publish enforcement data on fare evasion. This is to say that the dashboards are still in development but will build on what we already provide in the public domain.
I know from her contributions to the Bill that the noble Baroness has concerns about how police are enforcing the law particularly around offences involving cyclists and e-scooters. The Home Office has recently established the police performance framework, which provides a strong mechanism for monitoring enforcement activity across all police forces in England and Wales. This framework is flexible and is currently scheduled for review in 2027-28. Mandating which offences the police publish enforcement data on through a fixed list in statute, as her amendment envisions, does not offer the necessary flexibility, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, noted, as to how the performance framework operates. In addition, it risks duplicating the work already being undertaken that I have outlined.
Turning to Amendment 409E, the Government have already gained valuable insight into how police time is used, through the 2023 Police Activity Survey, to which the noble Baroness referred. Given the usefulness of the results, the Home Office ran the survey again this year, with fieldwork taking place just last week. We expect to have results in the next few months and will consider how to ensure that they can enable police productivity improvements. From this activity, we expect to gain a detailed profile of how police time is used, as well as insights into productive and non-productive uses of that time. We have sponsored the Centre for Police Productivity in the College of Policing and launched the police efficiency and collaboration programme in 2024 to improve productivity and efficiency across police forces.
Furthermore, our recently published White Paper presents an array of the most significant reforms to policing for nearly 200 years. It outlines our plans to modernise the entire workforce, establish a new performance system to drive improvements in forces, strip out duplication and inefficiency and deliver £354 million of efficiency savings through a police efficiency and collaboration programme. I know that the noble Baroness is keen on efficiency savings, so I hope she welcomes that announcement.
Finally, on Amendment 409F, we support the noble Baroness’s desire to free up officer time by removing administrative burdens such as unnecessary redaction and improve the efficiency of case file preparation and the charging process. A large part of the redaction burden is driven by current disclosure practice, so we have collaborated with criminal justice partners to pilot a more proportionate approach to disclosure. The pilot, running in the Crown Prosecution Service’s south-east region, aims to reduce the redaction burden by reducing the unnecessary sharing of unused material and refocus efforts on what meets the test for disclosure. This should make case preparation more efficient and enable more timely and effective charging decisions. We are also working with policing to support the adoption of AI-enabled redaction technology. The majority of forces now have AI-enabled text redaction tools, and we are supporting those forces to adopt audiovisual multimedia redaction technology in the most efficient way.
In conclusion, we support the aims of these amendments, but given the work in train, I hope I have been able to persuade the noble Baroness that they are not necessary at this stage. However, I will be very happy to meet her request to facilitate a meeting with the most appropriate Minister, so that we can take the discussion forward. In the meantime, I invite her to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
I thank the Minister for his courteous reply. The prospect of a meeting is most welcome: I will be able to clarify one or two outstanding points in relation to the material that he has kindly set out. I was glad to hear about the pilot on redaction in the south-east. I hope that, in due course, that will either solve this problem of redaction, which we and the Lib Dems agree is a big problem, or show that some sort of legislation needs to be brought forward. However, in view of the Minister’s response and the lateness of the hour, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Crime and Policing Bill
Wednesday 18th March 2026
(1 month, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 167-VI(a) Amendment for Report (Supplementary to the Corrected Sixth Marshalled List) - (17 Mar 2026)
16:12 - Division on Amendment 409G - Ayes: 225 / Noes: 189 - Amendment 409G agreed.
17:10 - Division on Amendment 418 - Ayes: 231 / Noes: 188 - Amendment 418 agreed.
18:25 - Division on Amendment 422C - Ayes: 220 / Noes: 191 - Amendment 422C agreed.
19:46 - Division on Amendment 422D - Ayes: 203 / Noes: 148 - Amendment 422D agreed.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, we are about to start the final day on Report of the Crime and Policing Bill. There are 13 groups of amendments to complete today, and multiple votes are expected. I will briefly remind the House of some key parts of the Companion that are particularly relevant to Report. This is intended to help us make progress and proceed to votes.
First—this is every Whip’s favourite line—the House has resolved that speeches should be shorter. Secondly, and importantly for today as we are on Report, the Companion states:
“Arguments fully deployed in Committee … should not be repeated at length on report”.
Thirdly, I remind your Lordships’ House that, while interventions are in accordance with the customs of the House, they should be brief questions for clarification; lengthy and frequent interventions should not be made.
Finally, some of the topics we will discuss today are emotive and very important to many noble Lords. As my noble friend the Chief Whip has frequently reminded the House, it is in the best traditions of the House that these debates are conducted with courtesy and respect.
Baroness Doocey
“(2A) In determining whether to make a youth diversion order in respect of the respondent, the court must be provided with evidence relating to—(a) the alternative interventions that have been considered or previously applied,(b) the reasons why such interventions were considered inappropriate, unsuitable, or unsuccessful, and(c) consultations undertaken by the police with relevant individuals, experts or agencies, which may include youth justice services.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment requires the court to be provided with evidence of any alternative interventions considered and any consultation undertaken with relevant individuals or agencies in respect of a child or young person subject to a youth diversion order application. This amendment strengthens the provision of multi-agency evidence to assist the court when undertaking the ‘necessary’ test and when making a youth diversion order.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, in moving this amendment, I will also speak to Amendment 417A.
Amendment 409G would ensure that, before a court imposes a youth diversion order, it has clear evidence of any alternative interventions that have been tried or considered, why they failed and what consultation took place with the child and the relevant agencies. The point of the amendment is to ensure that there is proper multi-agency input and that these new orders are used only when they are genuinely appropriate. It would also help the court to judge whether the order is proportionate and whether the necessity test has truly been met. The amendment is designed to make them more effective by clearly showing why other interventions have not worked. Early consultation will mean fewer orders being rejected, less wasted court time and conditions that are practical and linked to the services available locally.
Crucially, the amendment learns the lessons of the Southport case. There, a failure to share information meant that decision-makers were left without a full picture of the young person’s background. That led to an ineffective referral order in 2021, three years before the tragedy occurred. The amendment would help stop such failures from happening again. By requiring all relevant information to be brought together before a single decision-maker, it would ensure that multiple referrals and early warning signs are not missed. We know that proper multi-agency working, involving police, youth offending teams, social services and the voluntary sector, produces more reliable risk assessments and helps prevent serious harm. My amendment would embed that joined-up approach. It also encourages consultation beyond statutory agencies, extending it to parents and carers where appropriate. In the Southport case, the failure to consult the perpetrator’s parents was another missed opportunity. The amendment would help ensure that those closest to the child are properly involved from the start.
Amendment 417A addresses another crucial issue—data. The Independent Commission on UK Counter-Terrorism, Law Policy and Practice in its 2025 report made it clear that effective counter-radicalisation work depends on better data, especially when children and young people are concerned. The amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish annual data on the use and impact of youth diversion orders and related powers showing breach rates, the type of prohibitions and requirements imposed, and data about protected characteristics. Only with that transparency can we see whether these orders are truly helping to divert young people from custody or whether they are having unintended consequences for certain groups.
We already know that a strikingly high proportion of counterterrorism referrals involve autistic children—not because they are more likely to be radicalised, but because their intense interests can be misunderstood. These children are also especially vulnerable to grooming.
I place on record my thanks to Justice for its excellent briefings and invaluable work in shaping the amendment. I add my support to the related proposals tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones.
The tragic lessons of Southport show that interventions must be tailored carefully to the facts of each case. Amendment 409G would strengthen public protection by making sure that judicial decisions are based on the fullest possible understanding of a child’s circumstances. I beg to move.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, before I speak to my amendment and the others in this group, I just say that, as the Green Peers are not part of the usual channels, we were not able to give our views on the fact that this very important piece of legislation is being bullied through this House by the Government. It is absolutely outrageous that we do not have another day for Report. I hold both Members of the Front Bench accountable for this. It is not acceptable. This is no way to make good law, when we are going to be very tired in the later hours and possibly in the early hours.
However, on group 1, my Amendments 409H and 409J on youth diversion orders are supported by a wide range of organisations, including the Alliance for Youth Justice, the Centre for Justice Innovation, MLegal, the National Youth Advocacy Service, Sheffield Hallam University, INQUEST, the Children’s Rights Alliance for England, Just for Kids Law and the Runnymede Trust. That is quite a lot of very experienced organisations that support these amendments. Their collective expertise in youth justice, children’s rights and legal practice adds considerable weight to the concerns that underpin these proposals.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I am saddened by the attack from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, on the Ministers, because they have sat through hours of debate on the Bill and listened most patiently. I have not always agreed with them, but they have responded with the utmost courtesy. They should be thanked, rather than criticised, for their efforts.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their amendments in this group. We accept the Minister’s amendments, which seem entirely reasonable.
I appreciate the sentiments behind the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. However, we believe that they are somewhat misguided. Youth diversion orders, whatever one may think of them, will be implemented as a means of dealing with some of the most serious offences committed by people of the age of criminal responsibility. We should not be making concessions to people who have committed or intend to commit terrorism offences. We believe that engaging in these acts forfeits any right to the conditions of the noble Baroness’s Amendment 409H as a primary consideration.
Similarly, regarding Amendment 409J, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, I entirely understand and acknowledge the issue she is trying to grapple with. Our position, however, is simple: court proceedings should be carried out in the language of the land. That said, the Government do offer translation services, and I ask the Minister to set out measures that are already in place to ensure that offenders understand orders that are made by the courts.
Turning to the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, youth diversion orders must be underpinned by the principle of proportionality. Amendment 417A would ensure that they are being used in this expected manner. We particularly support the intention behind Amendment 409G—that youth diversion orders will be a serious step to take, and that ensuring that multi-agency evidence backs up the decision to issue an order is therefore incredibly important. Similarly, the sharing of data on terrorists and terrorism networks is becoming an increasingly urgent need. Any step that improves the efficiency of the sourcing and sharing of information between authorities is welcome, so we also support this amendment. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Jones, for their amendments on youth diversion orders. Amendment 409G, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, would require the courts to be provided with details of previous interventions, both considered and imposed, and set out consultation undertaken with other agencies. Amendment 409H in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, would amend Clause 185, which deals with measures which may be imposed by a youth diversion order. Amendment 409J, again in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, would require a youth diversion order to be issued to the respondents in simple terms to ensure that they understand what is being asked of them.
I understand the sentiment behind these amendments, but I hope I can explain why the Government cannot accept them. In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, we have had a lot of debate on this Bill and will undoubtedly continue to do so during ping-pong. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for his comments; we are doing our best. If noble Lords wish, we can have votes very speedily tonight—if people put their arguments succinctly and the Government respond succinctly, as I will try to do.
On the amendments to date, the Home Office is drafting statutory guidance which will, I hope, help with the points raised by the noble Baronesses. That will be by the negative procedure. It will be produced as soon as possible and will include further details on the circumstances for youth diversion orders. On Amendments 409G and 409H, the legislation already makes it clear that courts must consider the youth diversion order necessary for the purposes of protecting the public from the risk of terrorism or serious harm. Clause 185 clarifies that this test applies to each individual measure imposed by the order. As part of that, courts must also consider proportionality, which is key.
On the second part of Amendment 409H, and regarding the really important points the noble Baronesses have made, Clause 185 already ensures that there are safeguards for an individual’s work or educational commitments and avoids duplication with requirements imposed by other orders. There are similar safeguards in other civil orders. I will address the point made by the noble Lord on translation services later in the debate, or in writing. On Amendment 409J, I recognise the importance of ensuring that the respondent understands the detail of the order imposed upon them. That is vital, and is a consideration for youth offending teams already.
Amendment 417A would require the Secretary of State to publish an annual report on youth diversion orders. The provisions in this Bill already expand the statutory remit of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to include youth diversion orders. In practice, this will mean that youth diversion orders will be considered as part of the annual reports of the independent reviewer. I hope this helps the House. In addition, the Home Office does provide an annual report to Parliament on the use and oversight of disruptive counterterrorism powers. I give a commitment that I will review whether we should include reporting on youth diversion orders as part of this.
I am grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, for the government amendments. They are technical amendments to clarify the relevant court in Clause 186, which deals with notification requirements, and in Clause 193, which deals with applications to vary a youth diversion order.
Taken together, Amendments 413 and 414 update the route of appeal for both an applicant and a respondent of a youth diversion order. Current drafting includes a route for further appeal to the Court of Appeal in England and Wales. To align the appeal routes with other similar civil orders, this amendment removes the route to the Court of Appeal. This allows established appeal routes to be applied. The applicant or defendant will be able to appeal a youth diversion order made in a magistrates’ court to the High Court by way of case stated or to the Crown Court, with an onward appeal, allowed by way of case stated to the High Court. I hope that these technical amendments will help to clarify the purpose of the Government’s proposals.
I hope that with those assurances the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, will withdraw her amendment. If she wishes to press it, I advise my noble friends to vote against it.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I am disappointed with the Minister’s response because the current duty to consult requires the police to speak only to the youth offending team, not to social services, health, education and others who know the child. The whole point of my speech was to say that in order for these very powerful orders to be made, it is absolutely critical that everything is taken into account. That cannot happen if not all the agencies are consulted.
The lessons from Southport include years of escalating warnings that were missed. No one agency had the full picture, and I believe that without this amendment that will happen again. I am disappointed because the Bill is the quickest and simplest way to require proper multi-agency consultation as a basic safeguard before such orders are made, which is absolutely essential. I would like to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that the relevant court for determining the police area is the one to which the application for a youth diversion order was made.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies which court an application for variation should be made to.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies which court an application for variation should be made to.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes provision for an appeal to the Court of Appeal from a decision made by the Crown Court on an appeal under clause 194(1). The effect is that there will be an appeal by way of case stated to the High Court under section 28 of the Senior Courts Act 1981.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes provision which is superseded by my amendments to clauses 186 and 193.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes provision that is superseded by the new subsection inserted by my amendment to clause 196, page 245, line 34.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 196, page 245, line 29.
“(6A) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament—(a) any guidance or revisions issued under this section, and(b) in the case of revisions, a statement of whether the Secretary of State considers them to be substantial and, if not, of the reasons why.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to lay all revisions of guidance before Parliament, even where the revisions are not considered to be substantial.
“Glorification of terrorism: removal of emulation requirement(1) Section 1 (encouragement of terrorism) of the Terrorism Act 2006 is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (3), for paragraphs (a) and (b) substitute—“(a) relates to one or more organisations which are at the time of the statement proscribed as terrorist organisations, and glorifies the commission or preparation (whether in the past, in the future or generally) of such acts or offences; or(b) glorifies the commission or preparation (whether in the past, in the future or generally) of such acts or offences, and is a statement from which members of the public could reasonably be expected to infer that what is being glorified is being glorified as conduct that should be emulated by them in existing circumstances.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure that the present glorification of past terrorism, including both terrorism from proscribed organisations and the glorification of individual terrorists, is criminal, to reduce any harmful normalisation of terrorism.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 418 and to try to explain the rationale for the changes I have made since Committee. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Polak, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, for adding their names in support of the amendment. I declare that I am an officeholder in the APPG for counterextremism, a member of the APPG for terrorism and security, and a victim of terrorism.
For 20 years we have had a criminal offence of “glorification of terrorism”. However, the current Section 1 is a very high bar to meet for prosecution, as the person making the statement of glorification has to intend that a person hearing the statement would be encouraged to “emulate” the terrorism being glorified. After the debate in Committee, I sought to narrow the wording of my amendment to deal with current proscribed organisations. Noble Lords may remember that there was a concern, as the amendment was drafted for Committee, that it may capture some historic features that none of us would have seen as glorification of terrorism in today’s world. When I shared my change of amendment and sought to narrow the scope, however, the Minister pointed out in a letter to me that I might now be excluding glorification of those terrorists acting on their own behalf: those not advocating or acting on behalf of a proscribed organisation, such as the Manchester bomber. Obviously, I would not want that to be the case.
I have worked with the wonderfully patient staff in the Public Bill Office to try to deal with the issues raised by the Minister. I hope that what is before the House today captures my amendments, as put forward in Committee, but also deals with the issue of so-called “lone wolf” terrorists, or their supporters, calling for others to emulate their activities. I thank the Public Bill Office for all its assistance in dealing with these issues, and thank the Minister, also, for bringing the issue to my attention.
My reasons for pushing this amendment are fourfold. First, defeating terrorism is not just about militarily defeating the terrorists or the organisation, but about not allowing the narrative of those terrorists to be justified. Secondly, there have been no prosecutions in Northern Ireland under the current Section 1, and very few in England and Wales, despite the growing glorification of terrorism and terrorists. We need to enable the police and the prosecutors to deal with those who seek to glorify terrorists, and I hope that this amendment is helpful in that regard. Thirdly, as I indicated, I am an officeholder in the APPG on counterextremism. If we do not amend the law, as the amendment seeks to do, I fear the continued glorification of terrorism and the radicalisation of more of our young people, leading them into terrorism. At present, there is a lack of legislation to capture extremism, but, if we allow the glorification of terrorism to continue unabated, extremism will grow in our society, and we know all the problems that would bring.
In Time to Act, the recent APPG report on counterextremism, it was found that one in five voters said that political violence in the UK was acceptable in some conditions. We should all be shocked by that statistic, but unfortunately it comes from the normalisation of terrorism. In a further report, published this week by the Union of Jewish Students, we are given clear evidence of what happens when glorification of terrorism is allowed to happen unchecked. The report found that the glorification of terrorism is prevalent and unpunished. Our research has found that student groups have explicitly called for violence against Jews, even justifying the terrorist attack at Bondi beach in December 2025. Some 49% of those students spoken to have heard slogans or chants glorifying Hamas, Hezbollah or other proscribed groups on campus. Some 47% have witnessed justification of the 7 October attacks, rising to 77% among those who encounter Israel/Palestine protests regularly.
We must act. We have been given clear evidence of the impact of the glorification of terrorism, particularly on our young people. We must deal with it because, fourthly and finally, what sort of society do we want to live in? Do we want to allow the continued glorification of terrorism, and all the inherent problems that it will bring, or do we want to send a signal from Parliament that terrorism is, was and always will be wrong?
Just yesterday, I was shocked—I should not have been, because unfortunately it has become the norm—that, at a council-run St Patrick’s Day parade in Newry, parents were buying balaclavas and scarves with IRA slogans on them for their young children. The impact on our young people is huge, and that is what I am concerned about. People might say that I should not live in the past, and sometimes when I raise the issue of the glorification of terrorism the Minister will say that everything that happened in the past was terrible. But this is not about the past; this is about the future and our young people.
We need to stop the harmful normalisation of terrorism, and this amendment would go some way towards doing that. Terrorism is never justified. It causes mistrust between communities, takes away lives and causes devastation for so many people. I have listened to the concerns that were raised in Committee, and by the Minister, and I hope that the House will see fit to back my amendment. I beg to move.
Lord Polak (Con)
My Lords, I am pleased to support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, to which I have added my name. As I understand it, the purpose of the amendment is pretty straightforward: it seeks to remove the current requirement in Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 that, for a statement glorifying terrorism to be criminal, prosecutors must prove that the speaker intended to encourage others to emulate the act. In practice, this current requirement creates a significant evidential barrier.
Under the current law, it is not enough that someone praises terrorist violence, celebrates terrorist attacks or glorifies terrorist organisations; prosecutors must go further and demonstrate that the individual intended their words to encourage others to copy those acts. As a result, individuals can glorify terrorism while carefully avoiding an explicit call for imitation, and so remain technically within the law.
We know that extremist propagandists are acutely aware of these legal boundaries. They deliberately operate at the margins of the law. Rather than issuing explicit instructions, they rely on suggestion, admiration and narrative. They glorify past attacks, elevate perpetrators as heroes or martyrs, and celebrate organisations that Parliament has already determined must be proscribed because of the threat that they pose. Such messaging may not always contain an explicit instruction to copy the act, but it none the less plays a powerful role in the radicalisation process. It legitimises terrorism, fuels extremist ideology and contributes to an environment in which violent extremism becomes normalised.
In many cases, Parliament has already taken steps to proscribe certain organisations as terror groups. The decision reflects a clear judgment that those organisations pose such a grave threat that supporting them must be prohibited. It therefore follows that publicly praising or glorifying the acts of such organisations should also fall into the scope of criminal law, even where, as I said, the speaker avoids explicit calls for imitation. This amendment would simply align the legislation with that principle.
It is important to be clear on what the amendment would not do. It would not criminalise legitimate debate, historical discussion or academic analysis of terrorism, nor would it undermine the fundamental protections of freedom of expression that are central to our democratic society. Instead, it would target the deliberate glorification of terrorist organisations and their acts of violence, which extremist actors use to spread propaganda and to influence vulnerable audiences.
Extremist propaganda has evolved significantly since the original legislation was drafted. Today, radicalisation often occurs through narratives that glorify past attacks and portray terrorists as heroes, rather than through direct instructions to commit violence. If the law is to remain effective, it must reflect that reality. Removing the emulation requirement would close a loophole in the law, align our legislation with the realities of modern extremist propaganda and strengthen the ability of prosecutors to act against those who glorify terrorism while hiding behind technicalities. It would send an unequivocal message that the celebration of terrorist violence has no place in our society. This amendment represents a sensible, proportionate and necessary improvement to the existing legislation, and I hope that colleagues will support it.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
My Lords, I have sympathy, as I usually do, with the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, but I will make two short points.
First, by removing the emulation requirement, inserted very deliberately in 2006, this amendment would criminalise the utterance of unpleasant viewpoints without regard to whether they have an effect. It would become a police matter to say that the IRA did what it had to do in 1918 or that the Tamil Tigers, currently a proscribed group, fought bravely in defence of their homeland. It seems to me that this would restrict the scope of legitimate comment and be a departure from the principle that we normally criminalise behaviour only when it is liable to cause harm to others.
Secondly, I heard what the noble Baroness said about Hamas and the St Patrick’s Day parade, but I wonder whether the purpose of this amendment is not better served by Section 12(1A) of the Terrorism Act 2000, inserted as recently as 2019. This already makes it a crime to express
“an opinion or belief that is supportive of a proscribed organisation”,
being reckless as to whether that will encourage someone to support it. If police or prosecutors are being unduly cautious in this area—I heard what the noble Lord said about that—they might usefully be directed to that provision of the existing law.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
My Lords, I support the amendment in the names of my noble friend Lady Foster and others. It is right that we look to close the loophole. We need to look at how terrorists operate in the real world. The loophole that is there at present suggests that the current legislation’s wording is not quite fit for purpose.
I agree that the refinements made between Committee and Report are useful. First, I disagree that this would in any way restrict freedom of speech. Historic debate is to be valued, and I do not believe that this would in any way restrict that. The amendment focuses on the contemporary situation. Secondly, it is important that the position of the so-called lone wolf is covered—unfortunately, we have seen more instances of this: people who want to, in effect, wear the badge of a terrorist organisation but who may or may not be directly connected with that organisation. Whether it is in Manchester or in Sydney in recent days, we have seen the horrific situation of a radicalised individual or group of individuals perpetrating such attacks, and it is right that this is covered as well.
There are two principal reasons why I support this amendment and think it is necessary. The first, arguably the lesser of the two, is that it is dealing with the present. Unlike the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, and probably like most Members of this House, I have not been a victim of terrorism or had a family member who has been. All of us in that position can be thankful for that. Where we see people eulogising past terrorist actions for their own purposes—drawing people into their organisations or their way of thinking—it is deeply hurtful to the victims and relatives, whether that is in relation to terrorist atrocities that took place in Northern Ireland, the Manchester Arena bombing or the 7/7 attacks. The presentation of those who perpetrated these attacks as righteous martyrs, and people purveying the view that there was “no alternative”, is deeply hurtful to the living relatives of the victims. That reason alone is sufficient to make this change.
The bigger reason is looking to the future, and this is where we need to get real as regards terrorism. Terrorist organisations are not some closed cell or small group of people who simply never change and who wither on the vine as time passes. For any terrorist group to operate and continue its activities, it requires the influx of new blood, time and again.
One of the things that I find deeply disturbing is that a number of young people are naive and are drawn in; they are not simply handed a gun or a bomb on day one and told to go out and take it with them—they are drawn in bit by bit. The way in which terrorist organisations operate is to gradually indoctrinate those young people in a dangerous ideology and even more perverse methodology and gradually draw them in. In doing so, they get those people addicted to their methods—and past terrorism becomes, effectively, the gateway drug. Many young people, if we were to mention the 7/7 attacks, for example, would have no memory of them: they were before they were born, and they do not see the consequences and the hurt caused directly to those families or the evil done in society. It becomes a much easier sell for terrorist organisations to draw people in on that basis, and to present those who carried out those hideous attacks as being some form of martyr or indeed role model for the future.
To that extent, I do not care whether we are talking about Northern Ireland-based terrorism, whether it is the extremism of those who carry out violence on behalf of some Islamic extremist view, whether it is far-right terrorism or whether it is a terrorist group that is effectively a front organisation for some foreign power. The reality is that we judge terrorism not by its motivation but by its words and actions. There is a real danger of young people being radicalised and drawn in, with the presentation of the evils of the past as potential martyrs.
The argument will go that if, for example, we needed to create a united Ireland by violence 40 years ago and it was right then, surely it must be right now; that if white supremacism was right 30 years ago, it is right now; or that if having an Islamic caliphate across the world was right 20 years ago, it is right now. All those ideas are repugnant, but the logic is that if they are being used by terrorist organisations, using this level of loophole as the argument to draw young people in, we have a duty to protect society but also to protect our young people and prevent them being radicalised. That is why I think this is an absolutely necessary amendment that will help to protect society.
Lord Rogan (UUP)
My Lords, I also support this amendment. We have heard mention of the IRA. Those who lived in Northern Ireland through the Troubles know that Sinn Féin/IRA was the most hideous terrorist group—reduced to “Ra”. Last night, after celebrating St Patrick’s Day, five young people came on to the Tube dressed with tricolours and shouting “Up the Ra, up the Ra, up the Ra”, which only means support for the IRA. I do not think those young people fully realise the hurt and offence that gives to the victims of Sinn Féin/IRA. I fully support this amendment.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I have a lot of sympathy with trying to tackle ways of taking away the romantic attachment to terrorism as some kind of heroic endeavour, so I completely understand the reasons for this amendment. However, I cannot see how it would work in practice at present. I cannot see how it would deal with a Rangers-Celtic match, or with people singing “The Fields of Athenry” versus those singing “The Sash”, those shouting “Up the Ra” and those shouting “No surrender”. There are slogans on both sides, all of them associated with the previous struggle. I do not know what would happen to those children if, shockingly, as the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, explained, they have balaclavas bought for them—then are they or their parents in scope? How do we deal with that? Goodness knows what you do about Kneecap, the band. I am all for banning them because they are hopeless, but they play on the very imagery that we are discussing.
We have a real problem on university campuses. Far too often, young people are cosplaying as jihadists in the way they dress. I understand that this is not a direct call to arms, but these Hamas wannabes are in a way justifying the type of—what they would call—defensive violence of 7 October. The Ayatollah Khamenei apologists justify IRGC violence, and the expert propagandism fills a society with narratives that I think are very dangerous in terms of young people being radicalised. But I just do not think this amendment can work, because I think we need to be much more courageous in dismantling those narratives, in going on to university campuses and taking on those who put forward critical theory policies that justify treating Israel as a terrorist pariah state and somehow turning a blind eye to the cosplaying radical jihadists.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, my answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, is that this amendment is not going to solve all problems in this area, but it is going to make a significant contribution. She is concerned about hard cases, and she identifies some of the possible hard cases. My answer to that is that the CPS will prosecute only in a case where it believes there is a more than 50% chance of a conviction and it is in the public interest. Many of the examples that she gives are most unlikely to satisfy those criteria.
Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)
My Lords, if noble Lords in this House do not believe that the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, is giving the answer to a problem that is a reality within our society, then I hope that the Minister, if he is not accepting this, will tell us what the answer is. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, talked about going into the campuses and talking to these young people. You will never shame the likes of Gerry Adams, so just trying to talk them away is not going to solve the problem.
I am speaking for those in Northern Ireland who went through 30 years of terrorism. Every day you went out, your loved one went to the gate and watched you get into the car, believing it was the last time they would see you. Society cannot live under that. It should not be asked to live under that. Therefore, if the Minister says this is not the answer to the problem, I respectfully ask him to give us the answer and not close his eyes to reality. We have to deal with it, and we need to deal with it now.
Lord Elliott of Ballinamallard (UUP)
My Lords, I welcome the opportunity to make a few points in this debate. To be fair, there is legislation that covers the glorification of terrorism. The problem—I think the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, and others have tried to make this point—is that it is not strong enough and does not do what it is supposed to say on the tin. If we look back at the case of Fusilier Lee Rigby, two people were convicted and jailed for that. In 2021 there was a conviction for encouraging terrorism and collecting information after posting messages. In 2023 there was another conviction for sharing a video of National Action, a proscribed neo-Nazi group. In 2024 someone was jailed for encouraging terrorism.
I do not want people to think that there is no legislation; there is, but the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, is trying to improve it, particularly for those victims. We hear, in summary, that the law allows for the conviction of people who glorify terrorism. The vast majority of the UK population has not been convicted of any offence and prosecutions require specific evidence. I also picked out from a report that, in the year ending March 2023, 169 people were arrested for terrorism-related activity. Only 46 were charged with terrorism-related offences and we have no idea how many were actually convicted. What we are trying to do here is to make things better.
I ask noble Lords to put themselves in a situation; the examples I give are live examples. There is a group of young people playing in a junior band and a busload of adults pull up who are coming from a Gaelic football match and they start singing pro-terrorist songs and chanting “Up the Ra”. What does that do for those young people who are out playing and enjoying music? I give another example. A man during the Troubles, because he was a member of the Ulster Defence Regiment, was murdered. That evening, his three young children and his widow were in the house and groups of people drove past in cars, cheering at his murder. Those were his neighbours who were doing that—cheering at his murder and shouting “Up the Ra”. Tell me that that is not an offence. If it is not, it should be. Tell that man’s widow, who is still alive, and his children that that is not an offence. If it is not, it should be.
We need to tighten the glorification of terrorism legislation. I listened to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and I have to say that she gave some examples that are not akin to what we are talking about here. You cannot stop some of those chants and singing “The Fields of Athenry” or “The Sash” at a Rangers-Celtic match—and, by the way, that is not illegal, but there is a significant difference between singing that and going out to publicly antagonise people by shouting “Up the Ra”, “Up the UVF” or support for other terrorist organisations. So I support the amendment.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
Does the noble Lord agree that, as we saw recently, it is also the extent to which, if we normalise the sense of terrorism, it feeds into future terrorism? To give an example of this, when we saw the terrible shooting of John Caldwell—thankfully, despite horrendous injuries, the officer survived—and, a day or two later, the police arrived on an estate to arrest one of the suspects, there were a number of young people in that area who were cheering on not the arrest but the potential culprit. I suspect that they were doing that through a level of ignorance, but there is the seeping in of the idea that terrorism is acceptable to a new generation. That means that, while it is bad enough in terms of the memories of those who have gone through it, it is creating the fertile ground—
Lord Katz (Lab)
I remind the noble Lord that interventions are meant to be short and to ask a question; his has gone on for quite a while.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
I was just going to say: fertile ground for the future.
Lord Elliott of Ballinamallard (UUP)
Yes, I think it is very important that there should be no legalisation or normalisation of glorification of terrorism, or of terrorism in general. That is what we are trying to stop here—and what we must stop; otherwise, it will allow more radicalisation of young people throughout society. I am not talking just about Northern Ireland; we need to wake up and realise that it is happening here in GB as well.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I expressed some doubt in Committee about the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Foster. I recognised the strength of feeling around the House in favour of her position, forcefully expressed, then as now, by the noble Lord, Lord Weir, and others, in connection particularly with past events in Northern Ireland but relevant to terrorism in all its forms. The noble Baroness pointed particularly to antisemitic terrorism allegedly arising from events in the Middle East but in reality entirely unconnected with those events, as with the Bondi Beach attack, which she instanced.
I was, however, concerned in particular by the possibility that the amendment as originally drafted would penalise the glorification of acts of historical terrorism that are or might now be recognised as freedom fighting, despite the methods adopted to express them and fight for a cause or viewpoint. For example, the struggles of the ANC and Nelson Mandela might be categorised as terrorism by some, and those who celebrate their struggles and their outcomes, now widely understood and approved, might be caught by the provisions. So might the actions of partisans and resistance fighters, which, again, we now celebrate and applaud because they were struggling against dictatorships. However, the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, has recognised those concerns and redrafted her amendment so that her proposed new subsection (2)(a) requires that a statement
“relates to one or more organisations which are at the time of the statement proscribed as terrorist organisations”.
Section 1 of the 2006 Act criminalises statements that are
“likely to be understood … as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement … to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism”.
Under Section 1(3), such statements include any statement that
“glorifies the commission or preparation (whether in the past, in the future or generally) of such acts or offences”,
and there follows the emulation requirement that this amendment is designed to remove. It is only that requirement that the amendment is designed to remove, it is a narrow amendment in that sense, but that analysis suggests that perhaps the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, went too far in her speech opposing this amendment. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in his suggestion that that was the case.
Of course, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that it is only part of the picture, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, also said, and that changing the narrative among young people is the crucial challenge, but removing the emulation requirement may help. Proposed new subsection 2(b) in the amendment would pose two alternative routes to conviction. The first would remove the emulation requirement at paragraph (a) but applying the glorification offence only to statements relating to currently proscribed terrorist organisations. The second, at paragraph (b), which is an alternative, would replicate exactly the existing offence at Section 1(3)(a) and (b), the glorification with the emulation requirement. It could be a cause for concern—and I listened with care to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson—but because it replicates the existing offence that has been on the statute book since 2006, and the emulation requirement includes a reference to existing circumstances, that seems to me to be a safeguard.
We have concluded that the newly defined offence is carefully drawn; we accept the argument of the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, that the glorification offence, restricted to already proscribed terrorist organisations, does not need the emulation requirement; and we accept that that requirement is difficult to prove. Therefore, if the noble Baroness chooses to divide the House, we will support the amendment.
Lord Empey (UUP)
My Lords, I think it is important to look at this not just from an Irish point of view; we have to look at the big picture. It is clear that there are different pieces of legislation that govern this area, and reference has been made to other pieces of legislation. As the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, said, we are on Report and moving toward Third Reading, so there is an opportunity here. If the Government have particular difficulties with this, they have heard the mood of the House. I have no doubt that they can take that on board, and if there is something that they are not comfortable with in the drafting of this amendment, they can bring forward their own.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I shall be extremely brief. I thank the noble Baroness for her amendment. As I said in Committee, I firmly support her in seeking to amend the emulation requirement in the Terrorism Act 2006. We will of course have a more wide-ranging debate on terrorism in the next group, so I will reserve my wider comments for then.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, for returning to the issue of the glorification of terrorism, our exchange of letters and her movement and reflections on what we said in Committee. I note the support from the noble Lords, Lord Rogan, Lord Empey, Lord Weir, Lord Marks, from the Liberal Democrat Front Bench, Lord Polak, from the Conservative Back Benches, Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown, and Lord Elliott. I will come back to comments made by other noble Lords as I progress.
Let me say straight away that I have not been a victim of terrorism, but I know people who have been. I have met victims of terrorism not only in the context of Northern Ireland when I had the honour of serving there but in this job, from a range of backgrounds. I know that discussion of all these issues, including in this debate, causes great pain for those victims. However, I hope can explain why, even with the changes that have been made by the noble Baroness, I cannot accept the amendment in its current form.
Let me first express and reiterate the purpose of the encouragement offence. It was introduced after the 7/7 attacks and is designed to act as a precursor offence to reduce the risk of people being encouraged to carry out acts of terrorism. The offence applies equally to statements made online or offline. It also applies even where an individual is reckless about the impact of their statement—that goes some way to the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley.
Encouragement includes any statements that glorify acts of terrorism. To be clear, “acts of terrorism” in this context includes any action taken for the purposes of terrorism, whether or not it was taken by a proscribed organisation. Today, we have talked about the IRA—which, at one stage, was heavily proscribed—and about Palestine Action and other organisations in relation to the current conflicts and activities in Palestine and Israel. “Glorification” is defined in the 2006 Act—which was passed by a previous Government in which I served—as including any “praise or celebration”.
I recognise that Amendment 418 is a modified version of the noble Baroness’s proposal made in Committee. Specifically, the amendment would retain the historical safeguard that I pointed out to her and that is necessary to limit the offence, for the very reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, indicated today. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for having taken into account our concerns. However, the amendment would still disapply this to statements that indirectly encouraged acts of terrorism carried out by proscribed organisations.
The offence was carefully drafted at the time of its introduction to ensure that statements that are automatically captured by the offence have to meet both the requirement that the statement glorifies an act of terrorism and the historical safeguard. Amendment 418 attempts to split up these two requirements, when it was always intended that these requirements would work together. I remind the House that the encouragement offence has been recently reviewed by Jonathan Hall KC, the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, at the Government’s request and in light of the 7 October attacks, which a number of noble Lords referred to. In that review, he strongly advised against removing this historical safeguard.
In addition, the offence is very clear that statements that glorify acts of terrorism in such a way as to encourage others to carry out these acts would include acts of terrorism carried out by proscribed organisations. As a result, it is not necessary to spell this out any more clearly in legislation. As with the noble Baroness’s previous amendment tabled in Committee, it is also worth highlighting—this point was made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich—that there are other offences that may be relevant to her concern too. In particular, Section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000 makes it an offence to invite support for a proscribed organisation. The noble Lords, Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown and Lord Elliott, made points about prosecutions, which have very often been undertaken under that legislation. The offence in this Bill is designed to address the harm that comes from the legitimisation of terrorist organisations, which the noble Baroness has spoken about.
We may need to test the opinion of the House, but I know why the noble Baroness has brought the amendment forward. I know why noble Lords—particularly those with fresh memories of activities in Northern Ireland, including those who saw activities that still offend many people in Northern Ireland—support the amendment. I know why the noble Lord, Lord Polak, supports the amendment. However, I say to all of them that the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation has reviewed it and believes the offence is currently fit for purpose. There are many other mechanisms—including those that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, pointed to—that will lead to prosecutions for these issues. There is also a significant effort to ensure that the Government support activities to turn people away from terrorism—through the Prevent scheme, education and a range of other mechanisms—so that people are not politicised towards terrorism through activities undertaken.
With those reasons in mind, while I recognise the noble Baroness’s concerns and understand why she brought them forward, I hope that the reassurances I have given mean that she will not press the amendment to a Division. I await her response.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
I thank the Minister for the way in which he has communicated with me throughout on this issue of the glorification of terrorism. I also thank, as I said before, the Bill office for the way in which it has engaged with me.
I thank all noble Lords for their engagement on this issue. This has been a very good debate. On the other parts of the Terrorism Act that are there, I acknowledge what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, had to say on Section 12. The unfortunate thing is that we see very few prosecutions in relation to it. This is why, to take up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Empey, we cannot ignore what is going on around the glorification of terrorism in the widest possible terms in the United Kingdom. With that in mind, I would like to test the opinion of the House.
Baroness Chakrabarti
“Amendment of section 3 (proscription) of the Terrorism Act 2000In section 3(3)(a) of the Terrorism Act 2000, at end insert “, provided that only one organisation per order may be added”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would require that any order made under section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 relates to a single organisation. This would enhance the ability of both Houses of Parliament to scrutinise the proscription process by allowing the possibility of voting against some Secretary of State proscription decisions, without jeopardising others.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, more on terrorism, and proscription in particular. Amendment 420 is in my name, and I support Amendment 422B in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, which would beef up parliamentary involvement, and the role of the ISC in particular, in the proscription process. I oppose later amendments that seem to limit or completely remove the role of the courts in this area.
The Home Secretary’s power to proscribe a terrorist organisation under Section 3 of the 2000 Act is an awesome power. It is none the less necessary in a democratic society, because people should not be able to have private armies. We all understand that. None the less, getting these decisions right is incredibly important. In this debate, I will not relitigate any past or pending decisions. I am looking at it from the point of view of constitutional principle. The consequences of proscription are very serious, now and in the future, so getting these decisions right is very important.
My Amendment 420 is very modest, and I am grateful to all noble Lords across the House who supported it last time, and to colleagues in the other place of different political persuasions who spoke to me privately, expressing their support for this type of change. At the moment, a single proscription order may contain umpteen organisations, which means that when that order is put before each House, there will be a yes or no vote on an entire list, rather than an opportunity for Members of the other place or noble Lords to properly scrutinise and vote on each proscription decision. By contrast, the courts are able to review these decisions individually. I suggest that, as a matter of constitutional principle, both Houses should have a similar opportunity. That is what Amendment 420 would do.
Last time, my noble friend, amiable and courteous as always, as noble Lords know, was able to offer one argument against me, which was that we have always done it this way. I hope he forgives me, but I do not think that a good enough argument. There may be a further one to come, but that is not a good enough argument to limit the reasonable opportunity for both Houses of Parliament to vote on each individual proscription decision. There is no speed issue or emergency issue because even after my amendment, the Home Secretary could make multiple orders on the same day and sign them with the same pen; there would just be individual votes and debates, as required by Parliament. That is the argument. I beg to move.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, in the circumstances I shall confine my observations to Amendments 422A and 422B. Before I do so, I say that I strongly support the amendment just moved by the noble Baroness. Were she to divide the House on it, I would support it, but I gather that, perhaps because of the press of business, that is not her present intention.
The purpose of Amendment 422A is to ensure that individuals can be prosecuted under Sections 12 and 13 of the Terrorism Act for the offence of supporting an act of terrorism only if the alleged acts amount to supporting terrorism in the sense that the ordinary citizen would understand that concept. Amendment 422A makes explicit that the necessary intent that the prosecution must prove is that the alleged acts were done with the intent of encouraging, inciting, facilitating or enabling another to commit an act of terrorism. The amendment also restricts the possibility of a demonstrator being arrested under the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 of the Act. In general, an arrest must be authorised by a senior police officer of the rank of superintendent or above.
My suggestion to your Lordships is that the present situation is wholly unsatisfactory. It has been widely criticised, for example, by the judges in the Palestine Action case. In that case, judicial concern about statutory overreach contributed to the proscription of Palestine Action being held to be unlawful. It has also been the subject of much distinguished criticism—for example by Lord Sumption, a former member of the Supreme Court. I suggest that the position is profoundly unjust. If we consider, for example, the demonstrations that have been taking place in the streets of London, hundreds of people have been holding up placards that say, “I support Palestine Action”. Many of these characters are elderly and retired folk, rather like me; most self-evidently respectable, rather like me; and usually without knowledge of the secret workings of Palestine Action, rather like me. Now they may be self-indulgent—rather like me—and some accuse them of being naive, but are they really guilty of terrorism in the sense that most of us understand that concept? I suggest, surely not. What they are doing is using a form of shorthand to demonstrate their opposition to the policies of Israel in Gaza and the West Bank, and that they are entitled to do.
There are at least three serious objections to the present law. First, it is a serious restriction on free speech. I refer here not to the European convention, although it may be engaged, but to the long-standing tradition of English law. Secondly, to use the law in circumstances that offend the common sense of the ordinary citizen brings the whole body of criminal law into disrepute.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I shall speak to the two amendments in my name. Like many noble Lords, I was surprised by the decision of the High Court that the Home Secretary’s decision to proscribe Palestine Action was unlawful, in view of her detailed description of its terrorist activities in her House of Commons Statement on 23 June 2025.
In reading the High Court judgment, I was struck by the inconsistency of the arguments of the learned judges. At the beginning of the judgment, they set out the details of Palestine Action’s Underground Manual, which is standard textbook terrorist stuff: guidance to form small autonomous secret cells and to recruit only trusted participants. Then there is operational terrorist tradecraft: instructions to use secure email and VPNs, to conduct reconnaissance, and to pick targets based on complicity with the Israeli arms industry. It then has a section on targeting and tactics, with lists of defence firms, universities, financial firms and government buildings, and practical advice aimed at serious property damage to disrupt those targets.
The court then concludes that proscribing the organisation was “disproportionate” and that the Home Secretary did not follow her own policy, even though it said that
“the court must permit some latitude to the Home Secretary given that she has both political and practical responsibility to secure public safety”.
I submit that the Home Secretary must have the absolute right to proscribe an organisation based on the advice that she has received from our advisory bodies.
In coming to her decision, the Home Secretary sought copious advice on the terrorist nature of Palestine Action. As all noble Lords know, the Home Office and the FCDO do not proscribe organisations willy-nilly. We all complained about their failure to proscribe the IRGC. The Home Secretary had reports from a proscription review group, a cross-departmental group including counterterrorism policing, which encompasses specialist police officers from many police forces. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the CTP gave their reports.
The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre produced its assessment. JTAC comprises counterterrorism experts from United Kingdom intelligence agencies, police forces and government departments. Its report is very significant and was summarised as having concluded:
“Although most of its activity could not be classified as terrorism within the definition in Section 1 of the 2000 Act … Palestine Action had ‘commit[ted] or participate[d] in acts of terrorism to the extent of the attacks at Thales, Glasgow … at Instro Precision (a subsidiary of Elbit) in Kent … and at Elbit in Bristol … JTAC noted that those participating in the Bristol attack had ‘entered the [Elbit] warehouse, using weapons including sledgehammers, axes and whips’ and ‘during the attack two responding police officers and a security guard were assaulted and suffered injuries. One police officer had been assaulted with a sledgehammer and sustained a serious back injury’.
JTAC noted that Palestine Action had cleverly issued videos of the damage to property but not its violence against the responders.
We now come to the crucial question of proportionality. From reading the evidence, I am certain that the Home Secretary’s proscription of Palestine Action was lawful and proportionate, and a necessary response to an escalating campaign that threatened critical national infrastructure. The statutory test, the court admits, was satisfied. Section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 permits proscription where an organisation
“commits or participates in acts of terrorism … prepares for terrorism … promotes or encourages terrorism, or … is otherwise concerned in terrorism”.
The Home Secretary concluded that Palestine Action met that test and laid an order, which was approved by both Houses of Parliament.
Operational intelligence supported that decision. The JTAC assessment concluded that the group had conducted incidents resulting in serious property damage and that the Underground Manual provides
“practical advice and advocates for serious property damage”.
That assessment links the manual and the recorded actions to the statutory definition of property damage designed to influence government. The High Court judgment itself accepted that three of Palestine Action’s activities amounted to terrorist offences, which strengthens the factual basis for proscription.
The proscription was proportionate because of the severity and escalation of conduct. The pattern of over 300 direct actions with increasing frequency and severity, including attacks on defence suppliers and critical infrastructure, supports a conclusion that ordinary criminal law and targeted prosecutions were insufficient to address the systemic risk. It was proportionate because of the targeting of national security supply chains. Where actions against defence firms and related infrastructure create heightened national security risks, proscription is a legitimate, proportionate tool to protect those interests where the conduct is political and aimed at influence.
Proscription was also proportionate because policy and process safeguards were engaged. The Home Office relied on PRG and JTAC operational inputs and then laid the order before Parliament—steps that reflect the five policy safeguards that the Secretary of State must consider after concluding that it satisfies the terrorism test: the nature and scale of the organisation’s activities, the threat to the UK, its presence in UK, and the threat to British nationals overseas.
Of course proscription interferes with Article 10 and 11 rights to peaceful free association and expression, but it is narrowly aimed at an organisation which has been shown to promote or prepare acts meeting the statutory terrorism definition. Where evidence shows a real risk to infrastructure, violence and public safety, the interference with Article 10 and 11 rights is justified and necessary in a democratic society. Indeed, the court said:
“We do not consider that the proscription of Palestine Action is likely to result in any general impact on expressions of support for the Palestinian cause or even opposition to Elbit. This provides some support for a conclusion that the proscription was proportionate”.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the Home Secretary was in breach of convention rights because there might be some supporters of Palestine Action who are not advocating destruction and violence but general support for the organisation. However, if these people want to protest about Israel or Gaza or anything else, then they can do so, but not under the umbrella of an organisation advocating violence and damage and terrorism.
The court went on to say:
“Real weight must attach to the fact that Palestine Action has organised and undertaken actions amounting to terrorism as defined at section 1(1) of the 2000 Act. Those actions are small in number but they are still significant and it is also significant that these actions have happened in the United Kingdom … It is significant that Palestine Action has not suggested that its actions that have been assessed to comprise terrorism were either a mistake or an aberration”.
Indeed, Palestine Action has lauded those who took part in the actions.
The court said:
“It is, further, significant that the contents of the Underground Manual provide good evidence of Palestine Action’s continuing intention to promote the use of violence regardless of the risk that this will result in serious damage to property or serious violence against members of the public”.
Let me just repeat that last sentence. The court concluded that Palestine Action intends to continue with terrorist activities
“to promote the use of violence, regardless of the risk that this will result in serious damage to property or serious violence against members of the public”.
But then the court makes an extraordinary statement:
“Nevertheless, we are satisfied that the decision to proscribe Palestine Action was disproportionate. At its core, Palestine Action is an organisation that promotes its political cause through criminality and encouragement of criminality. A very small number of its actions have amounted to terrorist action within the definition at section 1(1) of the 2000 Act”.
So that is all right, then. The court has decided that three terrorist actions were not enough to justify the Home Secretary’s decision. How many does it want? Five actions, 10 actions, 15 terrorist actions, or to wait until persons—innocent people—are killed?
The Home Secretary has a duty to protect the public, not the court, and she should not be second-guessed in this way on the facts when there is clear evidence of terrorist activity. Even if it is only three serious incidents, there was the danger of escalation. The court said:
“When striking the balance between issues such as these, the court must permit some latitude to the Home Secretary given that she has both political and practical responsibility to secure public safety”.
I agree about the latitude and my Amendment 422 seeks to ensure that only the Secretary of State can make that judgment based on the advice of all the anti-terrorist organisations at her disposal, and at her own discretion. She is the one who answers to Parliament, to us, on the rightness and wrongness of her decision. My Amendment 422 seeks to ensure that supporters of any proscribed group who were arrested after that group was proscribed and before it was de-proscribed can be prosecuted for such an offence.
Of course, my amendments will be technically flawed, and my noble friend on the Front Bench will object on principle, with perhaps good reason, but I believe the concept is right. I hope that the Minister will bring forward an amendment at Third Reading to implement what I am advocating here. If he will not, will he tell the House what he proposes to do to reverse this perverse decision?
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I remind the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and the House, that the judgment in Palestine Action to which he objects is under appeal and the Court of Appeal, in due course, will pronounce on the wisdom or otherwise of the High Court decision and the legality of the Home Secretary’s decision. These criticisms, with some of which I certainly agree, are premature. What matters is not what the noble Lord thinks or what I think, but what the Court of Appeal says and, if necessary, what the Supreme Court says on such an important matter.
In any event, I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, who is a noted constitutionalist, that it is in principle wrong to seek to remove the power of the courts to assess the legality of judgments of the Home Secretary. Surely, it is a very valuable protection of the rule of law in this country that the courts pronounce on legality and Parliament does not remove the power of the courts to do so.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I have no objection to the court pronouncing on a point of law. However, on this occasion, it was not pronouncing on a point of law but making a judgment on the facts of the case and disagreeing with the Home Secretary on the facts.
Lord Pannick (CB)
I am not defending the Divisional Court’s judgment, but it would say that it was intervening on a point of law, because a point of law covers whether the Secretary of State was lawfully entitled to form the conclusion that she did in the circumstances. However, as I say, this is all highly premature.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
My Lords, I have prepared a full speech on three amendments in this group and the Government’s behaviour regarding the proscription of Palestine Action. I have signed Amendments 420, 422A and 422B, which, if agreed, would prevent the naked politicisation of terrorist legislation ever happening again. However, I recognise that noble Lords are anxious to get on with discussing other matters, and that we are facing a long journey into the small hours.
Furthermore, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, have ably covered much of what I would have said, so I will confine myself to pointing out that the Government’s decision to proscribe Palestine Action was wrong in principle and dangerous in effect. It stretched terrorism powers to crush a protest movement, not a terrorist organisation, with a chilling effect on our core democratic rights. It felt highly disproportionate when it was being debated in this House, and that was later confirmed by the High Court. No wonder the Government needed the crude political stunt of bundling Palestine Action together with two obviously terrorist groups to force it through Parliament.
These amendments matter because proscription decisions must be, and must be seen to be, grounded, proportionate and evidence-based. These amendments protect our security while honouring Parliament’s duty to scrutinise some of the gravest powers that we give to the Government. I suspect that the proposers of these amendments may judge that the House would prefer to move on to other matters, and so may not call Divisions on them. I hope that they do but, if not, I will have to satisfy myself with the hope that the derision heaped on the Government for the proscription of Palestine Action—and the embarrassment of watching 2,700 peaceful and mostly elderly protesters being arrested on terrorism charges—will be enough to deter this or any future Government from repeating this folly.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 420 and 422B, both of which I have supported. I go to a lot of events where the right to protest is debated, and people are quite shocked when I describe how this Government bundled three organisations together so that they could push through the proscription of Palestine Action. It does not look just or fair. They do not even have to be similar or connected, as these three were not. It was interesting to listen to the entertaining noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, running through the debate on whether to proscribe Palestine Action.
These amendments are about the process: about how it is done and whether it is done in a proper way. It is not proper scrutiny and it is not what this House is for when we have a blunt choice to accept or reject all three. That is not a sensible system. Proscription is a really serious step: it criminalises people for association, for support and even for what they say. Such decisions deserve to be looked at carefully, case by case, and not rushed through or passed in a job lot. If the Government are confident in their decisions about what is and is not a terrorist organisation—I assume they were confident about Palestine Action—they should have no problem with each one being judged on its own, not in a job lot.
The amendment from the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, comes down to something quite simple. These are very big decisions that can criminalise association, affect livelihoods and follow someone for years. If we are being asked to approve that, we should be properly informed—but we were not; we had to take the Minister’s word for it and we did not have the information. We are asked to nod things through without seeing the full picture. I do not think that is a very comfortable position for your Lordships’ House to be in.
Ensuring that Parliament has a clear and well-informed picture is the whole point of this. It also adds a bit more balance. At the moment, these decisions are taken by Ministers. It need not get in the way of a fair decision, or allowing things to move quickly. If there is urgency the Government can act, but they still have to come back and justify that decision properly afterwards. It is about making sure that when we take serious decisions, they are justified on the facts, not just on suppositions.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
My Lords, I add a few comments in support of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—but without repeating him—on the proposed ouster clause suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, in his Amendments 421 and 422DA. The schedule of proscribed organisations is often added to and rarely subtracted from. At present it has about 98 entries, if you include Northern Ireland as well as the rest of the world. That includes a number of nationalist movements from around the world that are, or have in the past been, committed to violence in pursuit of their aims.
Despite the recommendations of successive Independent Reviewers of Terrorism Legislation, the annual review of proscribed groups by the Home Office and the NIO was discontinued in 2014. As far as I know, that automatic annual review has not been reinstated. There is no requirement in law that proscription should have to be renewed every three or five years, or indeed at all. In my report on the Terrorism Acts in 2016, at paragraph 5.24, I recorded the Government’s admission, which I found breathtaking, that no fewer than 14 groups on the list no longer satisfied the statutory requirements for proscription. Even more breathtakingly, they did not try to stop me saying it. There were almost certainly other groups in respect of which the same thing could have been argued, yet most of those groups remain on the list.
One group, the al-Qaeda offshoot to which the current President of Syria belonged, was recently deproscribed on the initiative of the Home Secretary. But if an application to the Home Secretary is turned down, it then takes money and determination to challenge a proscription in POAC—the tribunal that exists for this purpose. A handful of applications have been made by organisations that have definitively rejected violence, and these have been successful. With great respect to the noble Lord and without reference to the Palestine Action case, I am not persuaded that there is any good reason to block this necessary avenue for recourse.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, I strongly support the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. It seems to me entirely sensible, for the reasons set out so well by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and I agree very much with what he said about the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, that Palestine Action should not be proscribed. It is not that I have any sympathy with it—it is a deplorable organisation that does a great deal of damage. If in fact the other laws required to deal with such appalling organisations are not sufficient, the Government should bring to this House, as well as the House of Commons, stronger laws to deal with them. But it is not, in my view, a terrorist organisation.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I will deal with this group as briefly as I can. I too support the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. The idea that you can bundle together organisations and then proscribe them as a group seems ridiculous. Parliament should be faced with one organisation at a time when it votes—that is a matter of common sense. MPs must be entitled to decide on the proscription of particular organisations individually, and the fact is that many Members of Parliament resented being asked to proscribe three organisations together.
Of the three organisations, the other two—Maniacs Murder Cult and the Russian Imperial Movement—were plainly terrorist organisations that ought to have been proscribed, and it was invidious for Members of Parliament to be told that it was an all-or-nothing decision. That amendment should plainly be accepted. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that, try as he loyally might, when the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, spoke to this in Committee he could say only that this has been done before and is the way we have generally done it. That is no answer to the argument so elegantly put by the noble Baroness.
Turning to the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, I will deal with Amendments 421 and 422DA together. Both contain what are commonly called ouster clauses; they have been spoken to by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, it is the right of the courts to pronounce on the legality of the actions of the Home Secretary. The amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, would, in effect, outlaw legal challenges to proscription, no matter how irrational, or what lawyers call ultra vires, or contrary to the evidence the proscription may be. An exception is suggested in the amendment: if a right to a fair trial would be totally nullified. As a test, I respectfully suggest that that is an entirely meaningless exception.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this is a very large and wide-ranging group of amendments, all relating to varying aspects of the law on terrorism and the proscription of terrorist groups. Given the amount that we need to get through today, I will be as brief as possible.
I have tabled Amendments 422C and 467AAA. The new clause proposed by Amendment 422C would require the Secretary of State to
“review whether any organisations related to the Iranian government should be proscribed under section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000”
within one month of Royal Assent. It would also require the Government to publish the results of that review and give reasons for the decision. Amendment 467AAA would simply ensure that the proposed new clause came into effect on the day that the Bill passed.
I acknowledge at the outset that this amendment is perhaps a round-about way of confronting a very simple but incredibly serious issue. I am, of course, concerned about the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps specifically. Unfortunately, I was advised that an amendment to primary legislation that inserted the name of an organisation into Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000 would be hybridising, so I have not done so.
I am in the fortunate position where I am almost certain that I know exactly what the Minister is going to say in response to this amendment: that the Government keep proscription under review at all times and, as such, my amendment is not necessary. But the fact is that the decision the Government have taken not to proscribe the IRGC is not satisfactory.
I am also sure that the Minister will try to attack me by saying that the previous Government did not proscribe the IRGC either. I am fully aware of that fact. But it is blatantly clear now to everyone that the situation is radically different from the situation even last year. We now have the Iranian regime erratically attacking most of the Middle East, blockading the Strait of Hormuz and allegedly plotting terrorist attacks in the United States. So I do not think it unreasonable for this to be the point at which we finally proscribe the IRGC. I know that there are a lot of people in this country who would support that.
On my noble friend Lord Blencathra’s amendments, I am sympathetic to what he is attempting to achieve. The ruling of the High Court in the case of R (on the application of Huda Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department found the proscription of Palestine Action to be unlawful on two of the four grounds before the court. One of those grounds was compatibility with the ECHR. The ruling on the second ground—that the Home Secretary was acting contrary to her own policy—was also contentious.
The court said at paragraph 74 of the judgment that the Home Secretary is required by the Home Office’s policy on proscription to balance the “benefits” and “costs” of proscription. Drawing the courts into what is in essence a political judgment such as this risks a very dangerous precedent, and my noble friend is therefore making an important point.
I also point out to those who might criticise my noble friend’s Amendment 421 that there are still protections against arbitrary proscriptions even if the role of the courts is curtailed. Both Houses of Parliament have to agree to an order under Section 3 of the Terrorism Act, and, under Section 4, an appeal can be made to the Home Secretary to deproscribe an organisation. If that appeal is rejected, an appeal can then be made to the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission, which—and this is important—per Section 5(3) of the Act must apply the same principles as the court would in a judicial review. Therefore, there are safeguards against arbitrary proscription and, as such, my noble friend Lord Blencathra is entirely correct to question the role of the courts here.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful for the amendments in this group—there are quite of lot of them—and the topics that have been raised.
To begin, I reiterate the critical importance of our counterterrorism framework, including proscription, in protecting the public; that is what this is about. I say in response to a number of comments by noble Lords that yes, we always keep the framework under review. As was mentioned in the debate, some organisations have been deproscribed as a result of government examination, and we are held to critical independent oversight, provided by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation.
Let me address each of the amendments in turn. My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti’s Amendment 420 aims to limit proscription orders to a single organisation per order, ensuring that each group is debated and voted on separately. That has had support today from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and others. I understand my noble friend’s intention. I just say again to them—and to the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger —that Palestine Action was proscribed, along with the other two organisations, according to exactly the same test under the Act that allows proscription to take place. The exact same test was applied to each of those organisations.
In July, those orders were put together in one vote for the purpose of the effective use of parliamentary time. We had a big debate in both the Commons and this Chamber, and there was no underhand purpose in doing that. As I said to the Committee at the time, multiple organisations have routinely been proscribed at the same time, according to the circumstances of the time. That is my “We’ve always done it this way” defence, but we have in fact always done things this way, under every political party in government to date.
There will be instances in future when it is again necessary for organisations to be packaged together for a proscription debate. I understand the purpose of the point made by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. I have discussed this matter with my colleagues who deal with these matters in the House of Commons. I want to reflect on it, but I ask my noble friend to allow us the time to do so, because I do not believe that such legislation should tie the hands of the Government in how they approach proscription. Let us reflect on these sensible points in order to allow a single debate and independent votes. I will leave it at that for the moment.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
I have one question for the Minister. The statutory test that is said to have been applied in the House of Commons is the statutory test of proscription. If Members differed on the result of the statutory test in respect of the three different organisations, they were not given any opportunity to distinguish between them. That is the position, is it not?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I accept that. As I have said, the “We’ve always done it this way” test has been put to me. I am saying to my noble friend that there are valid points that potentially need examination, but I do not believe that legislating to tie the Government’s hands on this issue is the way forward. I say to my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that there is a discussion to be had about how future proscriptions are brought forward, and we intend to reflect on those points.
Amendment 422DA in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, aims to prevent any challenges in court on these matters. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, summed up the Government’s objection, and I support what he said. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, re-emphasised those points, and I do not wish to add to what he said. As the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, might expect me to say, I cannot comment on an existing, live, legal examination of the Government’s reasons for that proscription. Irrespective of that, the amendment in the noble Lord’s name would remove all avenues of challenge, including those currently available under the Act. I do not believe that the Home Secretary should have unrivalled powers, even though, in this case, there is an ongoing court case, so I cannot accept the noble Lord’s amendment.
Amendment 422 aims to ensure that individuals can be arrested and convicted for active conduct before a group is deproscribed. Again, the position is clear: even after a group is deproscribed, individuals can be arrested and convicted for conduct that occurred while the group was proscribed. There is no automatic remedy for criminal convictions if an organisation is deproscribed.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their approach to such an important debate, in particular those who made a special effort to be succinct with the long night ahead. I remind noble Lords that my amendment on one organisation per order is not about Palestine Action; it is about procedure and constitutional safeguards for the future.
I am very grateful for the way in which my noble friend the Minister responded differently from the response in Committee. I am hugely encouraged by what he said. He has very graciously offered to go back to his colleagues in the Home Office and think again on this. I feel that I have to respond in kind by encouraging him to do just that, as he has so graciously offered. I so believe in the power of our argument on Amendment 420 that, when he has those discussions, I believe he will feel able to come back with a government amendment following Report. If he is not able to do so, having had those discussions, we will see what might be done at Third Reading.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I hope I was clear: I will not be bringing an amendment back at Third Reading, nor can I support the amendment that she brought forward today. I recognise the issue that she has raised and we will examine and discuss that with colleagues in relation to future proscription orders before any House of Parliament.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
There we go: I was too optimistic, perhaps. None the less, I believe that my noble friend sees the power of the argument or he would not have said what he has said. There are plenty of ways in which the Home Office might consider doing one organisation per order in the future. In any event, in light of the time, and given that I do not have the support of His Majesty’s loyal Opposition or of the Government—I am grateful to the Liberal Democrats for their support—I will not try the House’s patience with a vote that I cannot win this evening. I will keep nudging my noble friend the Minister and beg leave to withdraw.
Viscount Hailsham
“Support for terrorism: intention(1) The Terrorism Act 2000 is amended as follows.(2) In section 12 (support) after subsection (4), insert—“(4A) A person is not guilty of an offence under this section unless the conduct alleged was done by that person with the intent of encouraging, inciting, facilitating or enabling another to commit an act of terrorism.” (3) In section 13 (uniform and publication of images), after subsection (1B), insert—“(1C) A person is not guilty of an offence under this section unless the conduct alleged was done by that person with the intent of encouraging, inciting, facilitating or enabling another to commit an act of terrorism.”(4) Subject to subsection (5) a person may not be arrested in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed under sections 12 and 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, unless that arrest has been authorised by a police officer of the rank of superintendent or above.(5) When determining whether to authorise the arrest under subsection (4), that police officer must have regard to the provisions of sections 12(4A) and 13(1C) of that Act.(6) Subject to subsection (7), subsections (4) and (5) of this section shall not apply where an arrest has not been authorised by a police officer of the rank of superintendent or above, but a police officer, having regard to the urgency or gravity of the relevant circumstances, reasonably believes that it is necessary to arrest a person in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed under sections 12 and 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000.(7) When determining whether to make an arrest under subsection (6), that police officer must have regard to the provisions of sections 12(4A) and 13(1C) of that Act.”Member’s explanatory statement
The amendments are designed to ensure that arrests under sections 12 and 13 of the Terrorism Act are in general confined to cases where a person is reasonably suspected of encouraging, inciting, facilitating or enabling another to commit an act of terrorism.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
I am very grateful for the support of the Liberal Democrat Benches, but for a similar reason to that advanced by the noble Baroness, I am not going to trouble the House by seeking to divide.
Lord Davies of Gower
“Proscription status of Iran-related entities: review(1) The Secretary of State must, within one month of the date on which this Act is passed, review whether any organisations related to the Iranian government should be proscribed under section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (proscription).(2) The Secretary of State must publish the outcome of the review under subsection (1), and this must include the reasons for the Secretary of State’s decision.”
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Amendment 422C seeks a review of the proscription status of Iran-related entities within one month of the date on which the Act is passed. As I said previously and re-emphasise, it is clear to everyone that the situation now is radically different from the situation even last year, and on that basis I think we have a duty to protect people and I therefore seek the opinion of the House.
Baroness Kidron
“AI chatbots: content promoting terrorist and national security offences(1) It is an offence to create, supply, or otherwise make available an AI chatbot which produces content specified in subsection (2).(2) Content is covered by this section if it is content which--(a) produces language promoting, or tactics or target selection for, terrorist offences or real world violence,(b) threatens national security, or(c) encourages activity which threatens public safety.(3) It is an offence to create, supply, or otherwise make available an AI chatbot which has not been risk assessed for the possibility of producing content specified in subsection (2).(4) Where a provider of a chatbot identifies a risk of the chatbot producing content of the kind set out in subsection (2), it is an offence for a provider of a chatbot not to take steps to mitigate or manage those risks before making the chatbot publicly available.(5) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine (or both).(6) For the purposes of this Act an “AI chatbot” is a generative AI system, including a deep or large language model, able to generate text, images and other content based on the data on which it was trained, and which has been designed to respond to user commands in a way that mimics a human, or engage in conversations with a user that mimic human conversations.” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, drawing on conclusions in reports by the Centre for Countering Digital Hate, seeks to make it an offence to supply a chatbot which creates content or provides tactics that would result in terrorist offences or threats to national security, or supply a chatbot which has not properly been risk assessed. It is part of a set of amendments related to AI chatbot offences in Baroness Kidron’s name.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
My Lords, I will speak to all the amendments in this group in my name and those of the noble Lords, Lord Stevenson and Lord Clement-Jones, the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, and the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan.
I will first speak briefly to government Amendment 429B, which will give a power to the Secretary of State to bring forward regulations that could, in the future and at the discretion of the Secretary of State, ensure that chatbots are covered by the Online Safety Act. However, that very broad power is not matched by substance. The amendment does not define a chatbot or deal with the critical fact that, when a child is entrapped by a chatbot, there is nowhere to turn. Currently, the regulator has no duty to deal with individual complaints and the police do not recognise a chatbot as a person, meaning that there is no perpetrator to pursue.
The amendment also fails to address harms to children. In fact, it explicitly deals only with “illegal” harms. It does not deal with the coercive elements of control or the willingness of chatbots to plan many crimes, in addition to the crimes themselves. The government amendment also has nothing to say about enforcement. Taken together, it simply adds new duties to a system that is already understood to be lacking in speed and effective enforcement.
This lack of substance is compounded by a lack of clarity about scope. The amendment’s wording refers to an
“internet service that is capable (or part of which is capable) of generating AI-generated content”.
This is so broad that both Amendment 209, of two weeks ago, and Amendment 441A in this group would be entirely unnecessary. Yet, during our meetings on this issue, officials have been absolutely clear that although the scope is currently drafted as wide as possible, the intention is to get to a narrower definition as part of the process of creating secondary legislation. They could not guarantee that gen AI or search would be covered in any final measures. In short, it creates powers but offers no promise of protection.
I would rather have worked with the Government on this issue to make watertight provisions. Indeed, I have made that offer directly to the Secretary of State. We are in the foothills of a crisis. The government amendment offers too little clarity or certainty, so we are left with an amendment that is limitless in wording but uncertain in application and with a timeline that simply does not meet this moment.
On Thursday 5 March, Megan Garcia and her husband came to Parliament to talk about the loss of their son, Sewell. Members from both Houses were moved by the story of a much-loved and high-achieving child who was captured by a chatbot, coerced, bullied and, finally, encouraged to commit suicide. His death resulted in the chatbot, character.ai, becoming age-gated to users over 18, but there are many more chatbots to take its place that are not restricted in the same way. As this issue is getting more public notice, is in the newspapers daily and is talked about in the online world, sadly, my inbox is filling with cases that involve similar coercion, sexual content, dangerous medical advice and chatbots that support illegal activity.
On Friday last week, the Centre for Countering Digital Hate published a report that showed that eight out of 10 chatbots it tested were willing to help rehearse, offer tactical advice and identify potential sites for US shooters. Scenarios included a school shooting and a synagogue. Whether in the UK or elsewhere, the capability is the same and the risk is real. A chatbot that organises an attack, while wishing its user, “happy (and safe) shooting!”, is no less likely to help place a bomb, organise a knife attack or any other such violent act. This is not a description of a dystopian future; these chatbots are already on the market, widely used by both adults and children—ChatGPT, Gemini and Replika, among others.
Only on Monday, just two days ago, I was contacted by someone about Alexa+, which is widely anticipated to be launched very soon in the UK and is already available in the US. In the tranche of messages, there were messages about emotional dependence in very young children and stories of inappropriate content. One exchange on Reddit, from which I have redacted the name of the child, said:
“I plugged our Alexa in to ask it to help me with cooking a sweet potato”.
Then, her daughter asked it
“to tell her a silly story so it did”.
Then, her daughter
“asked it if she could tell it a story. It said yes … and then mid story interrupted her and asked her what she was wearing and if it could see her pants”.
I could not find a reliable statistic for how many households in the UK have Alexa, nor is it clear whether Alexa+ will be a choice for consumers or simply rolled out as an upgrade, but the statistics I found revealed that between a third and two-thirds of UK households have Alexa. In the material I was sent, it repeatedly alluded to the fact that the new service was active in their house or child’s bedroom without their knowledge or consent.
We have chatbots that coerce children into suicide, plan violent acts, build abusive relationships and have the capacity to be active in tens of millions of households. Taking a power, having another consultation and bringing forward regulation over which Parliament has no oversight is not action; it is kicking the problem down the road.
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 422D and 433 to 437. I fully support the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. Her arguments have been entirely backed up by the release only today of the report entitled Invisible No More: How AI Chatbots Are Reshaping Violence Against Women and Girls by Durham University and Swansea University. The research identifies the range of design choices and failures in safety mechanisms that enable, encourage, simulate and normalise violence against women and girls. The report found that fantasies of incest and rape were normalised, and one chatbot, Chub AI, suggested violent rape and domestic abuse as categories.
I reiterate the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, about the long and bureaucratic path to business disruption measures, meaning that harm continues to perpetuate as our system is not agile enough to tackle these rapidly evolving issues. I wish to pay tribute to Professor Clare McGlynn KC for her work co-authoring this ground-breaking report and emphasise the warning she made in today’s Times newspaper. She said:
“Chatbot violence against women represents a rapidly escalating threat. Without early intervention, these harms risk becoming entrenched and scaling quickly, mirroring what happened with deepfake and nudify apps, where early warnings were largely ignored. We must not make the same mistakes again”.
Professor McGlynn and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, once again demonstrate their ability to warn against these emerging harms, and I sincerely hope that noble Lords will back the noble Baroness should she wish to divide the House today.
Viscount Colville of Culross (CB)
My Lords, I support Amendment 422D and the consequential Amendments 434 to 437, to which I have added my name. In Amendment 429B the Government have gone far to respond to concerns over AI-generated harms, but this amendment, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has said, gives enormous powers to the Secretary of State to decide the shape of how AI-generated services are controlled in this country. The Minister knows there is concern across the House about exposing this central part of the new tech economy to what are effectively unfettered ministerial powers. Very few noble Lords want to support a skeleton amendment like this.
Government Amendment 429B gives the Secretary of State the right to amend, which is defined later as including the right to
“repeal and apply (with or without modifications)”.
This applies to all of Part 3 of the Online Safety Act illegal content duties in relation to AI services. Parliament will not even have an option to amend regulations on this issue. Proposed new subsection (1) in this amendment seems like a big deal to me, and the noble Lord should be very concerned. The intention seems to be that the basis of the existing regime in Part 3 will be used, but we do not know how the Secretary of State will decide to adapt that regime to fit the particularities of AI services that generate illegal content. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, pointed out, that goes a long way beyond AI services designed to mimic humans and human conversations, which is what chatbots are. If a subsequently elected Government are in thrall of the tech companies, how might they abuse this power?
During the passage of the Online Safety Act, noble Lords spent time and energy defining both a “search service” and a “user-to-user service”, and their responsibility for both designing out and mitigating illegal harms. It seems extraordinary not to have the details of the new services on the face of the legislation. The definition of “AI” in new subsection (17) is oddly uninformative. It simply says:
“‘AI’ is short for artificial intelligence”.
I think we all know that. That does not give us much of a clue about which technology it covers. By contrast, I draw your Lordships’ attention to Article 3(1) of the EU’s Artificial Intelligence Act, which sets out a carefully thought through definition of an AI system:
“‘AI system’ means a machine-based system that is designed to operate with varying levels of autonomy and that may exhibit adaptiveness after deployment, and that … infers, from the input it receives, how to generate outputs such as predictions … or decisions that can influence physical or virtual environments”.
The unclear nature of the AI definition in the amendment is compounded by new subsection (10), which allows for the definition of the provision to be changed and expanded. Once again, Parliament will not be able to amend any regulations derived from this power.
The biggest concern about the amendment is that, although it covers illegal content, it does not cover content that is harmful to children. As a result, I completely support my noble friend Lady Kidron’s Amendment 422D, and its consequential amendments, which would assuage many of my concerns about the scope and power given to Ministers at the expense of Parliament. I also urge noble Lords to vote against government Amendment 429B when it comes up later in the evening.
I also say to the Minister that regulating the wide definition of “AI” covered in Amendment 429B is important. It needs to be brought back as part of wider artificial intelligence legislation. I hope that he can reassure noble Lords that we will hear more about this in the King’s Speech.
Baroness Benjamin (LD)
My Lords, I support all the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I will speak to Amendment 433. Worryingly, children are increasingly turning to AI chatbots for all facets of their everyday lives. For many, gone are the days of independent, creative or critical thinking. While chatbots can help children to explore and better understand their world, there are far too many shocking cases of children receiving harmful information and becoming emotionally dependent on these platforms.
As it stands, AI chatbots risk becoming the latest example of an online product that has been rolled out without the right safety guardrails in place, and children are bearing the brunt. It is as if their well-being and mental health are not important. I can hear the AI developers thinking among themselves: “Who cares? It’s only children”. Well, we should care. Childline is hearing more and more from children who are being harmed on these platforms, with cases of false mental health diagnoses, information on how to restrict diets, and the formation of emotional relationships between children and chatbots. In increasingly concerning cases, children who have experienced abuse are told by chatbots that what they experienced was not abuse. These platforms cannot be allowed to give children harmful and misleading safeguarding advice that could prevent them speaking to trusted adults or organisations such as Childline.
The Government’s action to expand the scope of the Online Safety Act to cover illegal content created by chatbots is most welcome, and I thank them for it. However, they cannot stop there. The harmful content that chatbots can generate must be included too. This must cover the harmful content duties in the Online Safety Act, such as preventing the encouragement of self-harm or suicide, and all harms that are unique to AI chatbots. It means preventing chatbots misleading or manipulating children or mimicking human relationships.
The amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, would make it a criminal offence to develop or supply an AI chatbot that harmed children. It is as simple as that. Providers must be legally required to risk-assess their services and put effective safeguards in place. Morally, this is the right thing to do. I ask the Minister: if the Government decide that they do not wish to support this amendment, please can they set out today how they will deliver measures that comprehensively protect children from all the risks that these services pose? As I keep saying, and will say one more time, childhood lasts a lifetime. If we truly care, we need to ensure that children are protected from every single type of harm. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
The Lord Bishop of Oxford
My Lords, I also support the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and others, and thank them all most warmly. They seem to me appropriately comprehensive and detailed. I have been following the developments in chatbots for a year now: they are massive, they are rapid, they are driven by the pursuit of profit and shareholder value, and not by the welfare of individuals, whether adults or children. There is a tsunami of harm coming towards us, affecting not only the most vulnerable but the whole of our society. We urgently need this kind of regulation and risk assessment for chatbots.
The comprehensiveness and detail in these amendments are simply the application of the precautionary principle to the development of new technology. Technology should not be unleashed on the world if it has the capacity to break people, to do harm and to infringe on personal liberty and well-being. We do not allow harmful technological developments without adequate safety standards in any other area. It is unthinkable that a car would be released into the public if it was at risk of harming them. Similarly, you would not put people on an aeroplane if there were a significant risk of harm. You would not even buy a washing machine if it could bring harm in your kitchen. Yet chatbots are released on the world to be experienced, in private, by young children, with all the ensuing damage. It is vital that this strengthening is put in place, and that it is put in place urgently. I cannot imagine how the Minister could argue against this series of amendments and their urgency today.
We need to look at the example that we set to the rest of world, both as a Parliament and as a jurisdiction. A few weeks ago, I took part in seminars organised by a research institute in a university; they had the aim of educating civil servants and government officials in good and safe governance of AI across the continent of Africa. The world follows the example that is set in this jurisdiction and others. For the sake of our children and for the sake of the world, we need to resist and make safe the development of this technology. I support these amendments.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, for the reasons that have been so excellently given already and, in view of the time, I support all the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron.
Baroness Harding of Winscombe (Con)
My Lords, I will also try to be brief. I completely support everything that the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has said. I would like to draw out two arguments that have been made to me today as to why her amendments should not be supported and explain why they are wrong.
The first argument is that we should wait for an overarching AI Bill. We will be waiting for a very long time. Those of us who have worked in trying to regulate social media for the last 15 years know that we must not let the perfect be the enemy of the good. I wholeheartedly reject that argument.
The second argument that has been made to me today—and I find this astonishing—is that the risk assessment is overly burdensome. We are regularly told that generative AI is one of the world’s most transformational technologies. That means it is capable of enormous good and enormous harm. The risk assessment in Amendment 433 is simply asking that the makers of these chatbots identify and understand the risks of harm—that does not seem overly burdensome to me. Further, it asks that the risk assessment
“is kept up-to-date … takes … account … of the Online Safety Act … assesses the risks to equality of treatment of individuals … assesses the risks to … privacy … assesses the risks … from the choice of underlying models, data sets …and … is in an easily understandable written format”.
I really struggle to understand how that could be overly burdensome. In fact, I would argue the absolute opposite: it is the basic foundation of decent regulation, and we should be wholeheartedly supporting the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron.
Baroness Boycott (CB)
I will speak briefly to this group of amendments. I also support what the right reverend Prelate said about not letting loose a car or medicine, and food gets checked by the FSA. I think we could all be forgiven for thinking that maybe the Government care a lot more about the money that comes from Silicon Valley than about the citizens of this country.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)
My Lords, I speak from the Labour Benches and first congratulate the Minister on listening to the debates we had in Committee. I thank him very much for bringing forward an amendment which is as close as I have seen this Government move to try and patch up some of the problems we are facing but, as I am going to say later, I am afraid I do not think it goes far enough.
I have said in this House before, and I will say it again, that we have been outpaced by technology in this area—“chatbot” was not even a word, I think, at the time that we finally passed the Online Safety Act. The harm which has been described so graphically today in the speeches we have heard so far was unthinkable in those days. We have really opened up a torrent of problems which we did not know we were trying to solve at the time that Bill went through, even though we were proud of the Bill when it happened.
Today, we at least have the benefit of two good choices about how to take this forward. The Minister has brought forward an amendment that deals with the issue but, unfortunately, to my mind, it does not go in the right direction, and I want to explain a bit about why that is the case. The problem we are facing constantly with the Online Safety Act is that what is in the wording of the primary legislation is at variance with the way in which it is interpreted and implemented by the regulator. There are good reasons for that, which we do not need to go into today, but a gap has emerged between that which we in this House wanted to be happening now—out there with our children, with our families, with those who are using the internet for the benefit it all brings—and how the regulator is able to operate. It is too slow, lacking in ambition about where it is trying to go and I do not think it has all the powers it needs in the way that the Bill sets them out. Even if it did, I do not think the way it is structured allows it to move forward.
I say to my noble friend the Minister that it cannot be right to further complicate the situation by bringing forward powers to be held in the hand of the Secretary of State to try and remedy a structural fault elsewhere. That is why I think he should think very carefully indeed about the noble Baroness’s amendments, which set out—sometimes in painful detail, but certainly for real benefit—exactly what we will not tolerate in this online space. We should have done it in the Online Safety Bill. We did not, but it is not too late to catch up now. Simply taking powers, some of which are dangerously beyond what this House would normally agree, is not the way forward. I hope if the votes tonight go against him, he does not take it too badly but works with everybody here who cares so much about this to try and come forward with something that will begin to address the problems we face.
Baroness Cass (CB)
My Lords, I will be very brief. When it comes to assessing risk to children, a plastic bath duck has better risk assessment than AI chatbots. I fully support my noble friend’s amendments.
Lord Nash (Con)
My Lords, I support the amendments in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and others; I commend them on bringing them forward. Social media companies have captured our children’s attention, and now AI chatbots are coming for their affection—and worse. In legislating against harms caused by technology, we are always going to be playing catch-up, but we need to learn quickly to play catch-up much faster. These amendments offer us the opportunity to do that, and we should seize it.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, brevity is the order of the day but, like some of my noble friends, I would like to add my support to the amendments that have been laid before your Lordships’ House by my noble friend Lady Kidron.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights, which I have the privilege of chairing, is currently conducting an inquiry into AI and human rights. We have concluded our evidence taking, and I commend to your Lordships the evidence given by, in particular, Google, Meta and Microsoft. I also highlight some of the concerns that have been raised around child safety.
My noble friend Lady Kidron gave me, the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, and others the opportunity to meet the parents of Sewell Setzer. It was an extraordinary moment. He was a 14 year-old boy who took his own life because he had been befriended by a chatbot. I was struck by a report from Internet Matters that said that two-thirds of UK children aged between nine and 17 have used AI chatbots, with many engaging often. More than a third—35%—of them say that it is like talking to a friend; that figure rises to 50% among vulnerable children.
It is the obligation of your Lordships’ House to take this issue seriously. We should all be greatly indebted to my noble friend Lady Kidron for laying these amendments before us.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
My Lords, I oppose government Amendment 429B in this group. I declare my interest as the director of the Free Speech Union. Like my noble friends, I will try to be brief.
As several noble Lords have already pointed out, this amendment would grant the Secretary of State at the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology sweeping Henry VIII powers at a very late stage in our consideration of the Bill, thus giving this House far too little time to scrutinise them. Subsection (1) of proposed new Section 216A would grant the Secretary of State the power to
“by regulations amend any provision of this Act”—
the Online Safety Act—
“for or in connection with the purposes of minimising or mitigating the risks of harm to individuals in the United Kingdom presented by”
among other things, “illegal AI-generated content”.
That will presumably include content that breaches Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003, meaning that it is grossly offensive. This can include memes. In 2024, a man called Lee Dunn was sentenced to eight weeks in jail for reposting three “grossly offensive” memes on Facebook, having pleaded guilty to a Section 127 offence. How will Ofcom monitor whether AI chatbots are generating grossly offensive content?
Will the Secretary of State use the powers granted to her by this amendment to insist that spyware is installed on personal computers and mobile phones? Perhaps your Lordships consider that too remote a risk, but what about requiring technology companies to carry out client-side scanning of people interacting with AI chatbots on their devices—much like how Section 121(1) of the Online Safety Act grants Ofcom the power to require companies, including those that own private messaging apps such as WhatsApp, to scan content on people’s personal devices and report certain categories of illegal material to the National Crime Agency?
Do not forget that this amendment would allow the Secretary of State to amend “any provision” of the Online Safety Act in order to minimise or mitigate the risks of harm posed by illegal AI-generated content. I dwell on this to illustrate just how wide-ranging and open-ended are the powers that this amendment would grant to the Secretary of State—powers that could have far-reaching consequences for civil liberties and freedom of speech.
Another risk is the definitions part of the Amendment. Subsection (17) disapplies Section 59(14)(a) of the Online Safety Act when it comes to illegal AI-generated content. Section 59(14)(a) qualifies the scope of illegal content in Part 3 of the Act, and disapplying it gives the Secretary of State enormous scope to enlarge the definition of illegal content and impose proactive suppression duties on AI chatbots to make sure they comply with the new draconian censorship regime.
If the Government believe there are specific harms that users of AI chatbots are currently exposed to and should be protected from—and I certainly do not say that there are not—let them bring forward primary legislation so we can consider the remedies they propose and factor in the trade-offs, particularly when it comes to free speech.
Lord Polak (Con)
My Lords, I rise again to support the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, as I did the other day. It says on her Wikipedia page that she is
“an advocate for children’s rights in the digital world”.
She is right, and I hope that all Members across the House who have actually heard the debate will support her in the Lobby.
Lord Berkeley of Knighton (CB)
My Lords, many noble Lords who have spoken today also spoke quite vehemently about the dangers of the theft of copyright in AI. We were asking to shut the stable door before the horse bolted. Today we heard from the Government, and it is very welcome news that they are looking again at the theft of copyright and seeing if they can protect artists, musicians and writers still further. I say once again, let us move with my noble friend’s amendment before the horse bolts and let us shut the stable door now.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I will be brief. I entirely support the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, on all her amendments. What I would say to the Government about their own amendment is that I have just had what I suppose is the privilege—although it sometimes seemed quite lengthy—of being a member of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, and I can tell noble Lords that the quality of much secondary legislation is lamentable, varying by department. A lack of preparation, of any Explanatory Memorandum explaining anything relevant, and of any impact assessment whatsoever, is extremely frequent. In the last year, we have had several secondary instruments relating directly to the Online Safety Act, none of which has been particularly impressive, and some of which have been debated on the Floor of this House—my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones will be well aware of that. We have expressed our displeasure at the way in which this has been brought forward and explained.
All of us on the Cross Benches remember the late, lamented Lord Igor Judge. What he would think about a Government of this political hue bringing forward Henry VIII powers, to the power of 10, I cannot even imagine. If he is up there, he will be smiling wryly but he will not be impressed.
My only other point is rather strange. His Majesty’s occasionally loyal Opposition were extremely good at bringing in a variety of legislation which had a lot of Henry VIII powers. They have suddenly had a conversion on the road to Damascus, for which we should all be grateful. However, we need to think very carefully before we give the Government Henry VIII powers in an area as sensitive as this, and that is doing much harm as we speak.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I express from these Benches our very strong support for these comprehensive amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, which she has characteristically introduced so well and to which so many noble Lords have spoken so eloquently in support. I also want to express our concerns regarding the Government’s proposed alternative, Amendment 429B.
In this group, we confront digital harm that is not incidental but engineered by design. AI chatbots are no longer a futuristic curiosity but deeply embedded the lives of our children. They are designed not merely as tools but as confidantes, mentors, companions and, in some cases, explicit romantic partners. Their anthropomorphic features create dangerous emotional dependency. Without statutory safeguards, these bots can provide explicit information on how to self-harm. This is not a flaw but a design feature that drives engagement, and we cannot allow the generative power of AI to become a generator of despair.
We are not debating theoretical risks, as many noble Lords have said today. We are debating the forces that led to the tragic deaths of Sewell Setzer III, mentioned by a number of noble Lords, and Adam Raine, in the United States. Their families are pursuing legal action in the US on the basis that deceptively designed, inadequately safeguarded chatbots can be treated as defective products, and that developers should bear full legal liability when systems encourage, facilitate or fail to interrupt a user’s path to suicide.
I welcome the Government’s admission that a legal loophole exists in the UK. However, their proposed remedy, Amendment 429B, gives us a choice between the clarity of primary legislation through the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the convenience of the Executive. In contrast, the noble Baroness’s amendments provide clarity and embed safety duties in the Bill. Like my noble friend, I highlight Amendment 433, which deals with targeting the engineered features that keep children hooked. We know that bots guilt-trip users who try to end conversations. For a child, this is not a user interface quirk; it is emotional manipulation. These amendments would prohibit such coercive engagement techniques and, crucially, require bots to signpost users to help when asked about health, suicide or self-harm.
The primary legislation route offered by these amendments is the only fully viable and responsible path. If the noble Baroness wants to test the opinion of the House, we will support her in the Lobby. Should we be unable to secure her amendments, we would need to take a view on Amendment 429B. Four specific binding assurances would be required before we could consider supporting it; without them, it is nothing but a dangerous blank cheque. As changing these sections effectively rewrites the criminal threshold of the Online Safety Act, the Government must commit to the equivalent of the super-affirmative procedure for all significant policy choices, including amendments to core definitions or the expansion of duties beyond priority legal content. Standard procedures will not give this House the scrutiny needed.
Regarding mandatory supply chain transparency, we need a firm commitment that regulations will include a statutory mandate for providers to document and share their technical blueprints with Ofcom. Without this, the regulator cannot do its job. The Minister must confirm that the power will be used to tackle the issues raised by subsections (6) and (7) of Section 192 of the Online Safety Act, ensuring that chatbots cannot evade regulation simply because they lack a human mens rea. A bot does not intend harm, but it can be designed to cause it. The Minister must commit that any new regulations will explicitly disapply the requirement to prove human intent for AI-generated content. Regulations must define control across the entire AI supply chain so that accountability is not lost in a black box.
Finally, we would require a clear assurance that this power will not be used to alter the legal position of services that are not AI services. The scope of Amendment 429B must not drift beyond its stated purpose. If the Government are serious when they say that no platform gets a free pass, that must apply equally to generative AI models that, as we speak, are reshaping the childhoods of so many of our citizens. Safety by design must be the price of entry into the UK market, not an aspiration deferred to secondary legislation.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, both the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the Government are trying to solve the same problem, but with different solutions. I have to say that I find both solutions wanting. I feel that the position I see solidifying in the House is that we must accept either the Government’s amendment or the noble Baroness’s amendment, that something must be done and that this is binary, and I am not sure that I can accept that. I commend the aims of the noble Baroness’s campaign and I hope that we can find some common ground, but I have a number of questions about her amendments.
The approach that the noble Baroness has taken in her Amendments 422D and 433 is to create criminal offences for a person to create or even supply an AI chatbot that produces a selection of prohibited content. That would place criminal penalties on individuals who are involved in the creation of such a chatbot. The Online Safety Act applies civil penalties when companies violate the regulations: the companies are fined by Ofcom if they allow prohibited content to be published on their platform. These amendments would apply criminal sanctions punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment, but who is liable for these criminal penalties? Is it the software engineer who developed the chatbot? Is it the employee who presses the “publish” button that brings the AI online? Is it the senior management team who oversaw it, or the investors who commissioned it? Is it the CEO of the whole company? It is not clear to me, and it would be useful if the noble Baroness could clear that up.
The offence of supplying such a chatbot might also be problematic. If an AI chatbot app is listed on the App Store, and the AI could in some way be used by a person in the manner described, should Apple be criminally liable for that? Similarly, I have a few concerns about the risk assessment that the amendment would require AI providers to undertake. For example, proposed new subsection (5)(e) would require that a provider
“assesses the risks to equality of treatment of individuals”.
I question whether it is the Government’s role to mandate the target audience of a business product. It is worrying enough to believe that it is meritocratic to mandate quotas within organisations, but it is quite another stance to say that the very reason for a business’s existence, its output, should be directed by legislation.
As I have made clear, we do not oppose the noble Baroness’s objective of addressing the harms of AI with this amendment, but simply saying that there is a problem and that doing anything is better than doing nothing, irrespective of the problems with that something, is not a proper way to legislate. It is a recipe, I suggest, for bad law. However, I understand that the noble Baroness is trying to make the Government take action. It is up to the Government to come to Parliament with a sufficient solution. The Minister may try to say that the Government do have a sufficient solution in government Amendment 429B, but that would be wholly incorrect. I am quite shocked that the Minister has even considered bringing this amendment to the House, and I can only imagine what he might have said about it if he were standing where I am now.
Amendment 429B grants the Secretary of State sweeping Henry VIII powers to amend the entire Online Safety Act for the purpose of mitigating harms presented by AI-generated content. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, would be delighted to hear me say that this is an egregious attempt by an overreaching Government to exploit a serious issue to centralise power in the hands of the Secretary of State. It is almost unprecedented to grant a Minister the ability to amend an entire Act of Parliament. With this amendment, the Government are doing away with every bit of lip service they have paid to the importance of parliamentary scrutiny or their democratic mandate. The amendment would give not only this Government, who have made it clear that they are very happy running a centralised state with digital IDs, but every future Government the ability to amend online regulations and curtail the freedoms of providers. Indeed, a future Reform Government might go in the opposite direction and remove all regulations on AI. The noble Lord should reflect on that, too.
I ask the Minister to imagine that the glove was on the other hand: that he was standing at this Dispatch Box and I was the Minister proposing to give my Government these powers. There is no way that he would support such sweeping powers to amend an Act of Parliament by ministerial fiat. This is the Henry VIII power to end all Henry VIII powers. It cannot be allowed to make its way into the Bill and, when it is called, I will take pleasure in opposing it in the Lobbies.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I shall start by saying something that needs saying. The Government believe in protecting the public, especially children, from online content, which is why we have tabled the amendments on illegal online content today.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his words and his roll-call of that incredible list of speakers who supported the amendments. That was a wonderful list of people from all sides of the House, who did indeed have slightly varying reasons to support the amendment, but they were all positive. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and his Benches for their unequivocal support. I believe that the Opposition Benches are allowing a free vote this evening, and I really hope that they will use their free vote freely.
I will address a couple of details, just for the record. First, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that it is a binary, I am afraid, because either we have the Government’s amendment, which has no proper scope—it will be subject to all sorts of changes on the way—no oversight, no time limit and no scrutiny, or we have something that I have made very clear that I am willing to work with both sides of the House to perfect in the next few weeks.
Secondly, I say to the Minister that the Online Safety Act and the enforcement process we currently have has, so far, by civil penalty, put forward one fine of £55,000. That is where we are, and there is nothing in this government amendment or the consultation about online safety that deals with the problem of enforcement.
Finally, on the points that were made, we are talking about one person in one department having absolute power to change absolutely everything that eight years of debate in this House, two years of consultation, et cetera, have put forward. I am sorry but that is just inappropriate.
We have a new technology—it addicts, grooms, abuses and sometimes even kills. This is not in the future; it is right now. These amendments have the support of 45 expert organisations, which I believe have written to all noble Lords. I ask noble Lords, irrespective of their party affiliation, to support children, families, the vulnerable, women and, indeed, all of us, by sending a message to the Government to say, “If you can’t accept this, come back with something, for now, that is better described, narrow and to the point, that we can enforce”. On that basis, I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Crime and Policing Bill
Wednesday 18th March 2026
(1 month, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 167-VI(a) Amendment for Report (Supplementary to the Corrected Sixth Marshalled List) - (17 Mar 2026)
23:05 - Division on Amendment 424 - Ayes: 148 / Noes: 185 - Amendment 424 disagreed.
23:17 - Division on Amendment 425 - Ayes: 119 / Noes: 191 - Amendment 425 disagreed.
23:35 - Division on Amendment 426B - Ayes: 180 / Noes: 58 - Amendment 426B agreed.
23:47 - Division on Amendment 426C - Ayes: 70 / Noes: 166 - Amendment 426C disagreed.
23:58 - Division on Amendment 426D - Ayes: 68 / Noes: 163 - Amendment 426D disagreed.
(a) proceedings for an offence shall not be instituted against a woman acting in relation to her own pregnancy except by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions, who must exercise personally any function under this section of giving consent;(b) proceedings to which this section applies may not be commenced after twelve months from the date of the offence to which the proceedings relate.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to add the requirement of DPP consent for the institution of the criminal proceedings in Clause 208 against a woman acting in relation to her own pregnancy and reduces the limitation period for the offence.
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 422E and, additionally, do so on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, KC, who has a prior appointment in The Hague this week. He was the author of the probing amendment on this topic in Committee. At that stage, the Minister signalled some reservations about it and subsequently wrote to him with additional data, which has proved to be most helpful, so we thank her. The noble Baroness, Lady Wolf of Dulwich, has appended her name to this amendment and will speak to it, along with her other amendment.
Noble Lords will be aware that Clause 208, which was inserted into this Bill in the other place at a late stage, has attracted numerous amendments. Our intention with Amendment 422E is that, where opinions are a matter of individual conscience, we should attempt to offer the House a compromise between the Commons position—Clause 208—and Amendment 424, which seeks to leave out the clause entirely. I point out that Amendments 423, 423ZA and 423A would be pre-empted if this amendment was agreed on Division.
The amendment would do two things. First, it would require the personal consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions before any proceedings may be instituted against women acting in relation to their pregnancy. Secondly, it would provide that such proceedings must be commenced within 12 months of the alleged offence. The version we debated in Committee provided for the consent of the Attorney-General rather than the Director of Public Prosecutions. The Minister observed that offences where Attorney-General consent is required tend to be in the national security or international spheres, while DPP consent is required to address a wider range of concerns, including, as the Minister explained, where there is a risk that the institution of proceedings might violate convention rights or cause a defendant “irreparable harm”. There are some offences in areas other than national security or international matters where AG consent is required, as the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, argues—for example, contempt of court under the strict liability rule, pursuant to Section 7 of the Contempt of Court Act. Nevertheless, on balance, it seems proportionate and in keeping with existing practice to replace Attorney-General consent with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
Our amendment would, however, require that the DPP exercises the function of giving consent “personally”. That language is taken from the Bribery Act, where some offences impose a similar condition on the DPP. Without this additional requirement, we understand that the consent of the DPP to institute proceedings could be given by a Crown prosecutor by virtue of Section 1(7) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985. So requiring the DPP to exercise that function personally provides, in our view, a better guarantee against the risk of abuse, error or overzealousness.
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)
I do not think that we take interventions on Report, if I may refer to the Companion—but perhaps the Whip could assist us.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
I can clarify for your Lordships’ House that the noble Baroness is able to take interventions, or not, as she wishes.
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)
I would like to proceed and conclude my argument. I will be happy to listen to the noble Baroness once I have finished.
Because the police do not know when they find a lifeless body which of the situations they are confronted with, even with decriminalisation of abortion offences for the women acting in relation to her pregnancy, she may still be investigated. If it was a case of stillbirth, for example, for that woman the investigation will inevitably be a cause of stress. She might be worried that the evidence will not support her or she will not be believed. However, what else are the police supposed to do in these cases, other than try to establish the facts?
Therefore, it is not possible to remove women acting in relation to their pregnancy from any criminal process, even if you decriminalise abortion offences for them. What is possible is to introduce further guarantees, as we are attempting to do with this amendment, that would add an additional layer of personal assurance from the DPP that the facts in context of terminations are taken into account, and that after 12 months, in any event, proceedings will not be brought against the pregnant woman. It ensures that the decision to prosecute in relation to the woman is taken at the highest level—the DPP—and applies the certainty of a limitation period.
No solution in this area will ever be flawless, but when the evidence before us is so limited and the broader picture so uncertain, wholesale decriminalisation would be a disproportionate response to a problem which, in any event, needs careful and thoughtful steps for resolution. This amendment offers a more balanced and workable path to the problem that we all want to resolve satisfactorily. It provides meaningful safeguards for women, ensuring that any decision to prosecute is taken at the highest level, as well as the certainty of a limitation period, while not upending the balancing of principles and values underlying the Abortion Act 1967. I hope that both those who oppose criminalisation and those who are rightly troubled by the distressing cases we have discussed will see that this approach represents a principled and proportionate compromise, and will feel able to support it.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Morris of Bolton) (Con)
As the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner of Margravine, has already pointed out, if Amendment 422E is agreed to, I am unable to call Amendments 423, 423ZA or 423A by reason of pre-emption.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 423 which is in my name. The purpose of my amendment is to see if it is possible to effect a compromise between strongly held opinions. If a compromise is not possible, then subject to pre-emption, I could certainly support Amendments 422E, and I could also support Amendments 424 and 425. At Second Reading of this Bill and in Committee, I expressed my views on what was Clause 191 at that stage. I do not wish to in any way reiterate the detail of what I said. Suffice it to say that I am much closer to the position of the opponents of Clause 208 than to its supporters.
However, there are two general points I would like to make at this stage. First, it is very difficult to distinguish in principle between a child that is just born and a child that is about to be born. Secondly and consequently, to extinguish the life of a child that is about to be born can be justified only in the most compelling of circumstances. This is not just a matter of personal morality. It is a reflection of the value that society as a whole, and Parliament in particular, has put on human life. I hope that these two propositions will be accepted as true by your Lordships and will inform the debate we are to have.
In urging a compromise, I would ask the House first to consider the provisions of the Abortion Act 1967, because that Act permits, in certain circumstances, late-term abortion. Without going into too much detail, Section 1(1)(b), (c) and (d) of the 1967 Act permit a late-term abortion in the following circumstances: when it is necessary to prevent grave, permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the mother; when the pregnancy threatens the life of the woman; and when there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer from such serious abnormalities as would result in serious handicap. The point that I make is that the existing provisions in law meet many of the concerns that have been expressed in support of Clause 208.
However, I recognise that the proponents of Clause 208 do not regard the existing law as sufficient. It is therefore with that in mind that I have tabled Amendment 423 in the hope of addressing those concerns. Proposed new paragraph (a) in my amendment reflects the language of the Infanticide Act 1938. That statute was reviewed in 2006 by the Law Commission and its terms were confirmed. My amendment proposes that it would be a defence to a late-term abortion that
“the balance of the woman’s mind was … disturbed by reason of her pregnancy”.
The amendment provides that the burden is on the prosecution to prove the defence beyond reasonable doubt. In proposing that part of the amendment, I recognise that, in logic, if such a defence should be available in respect of the death of a child immediately after birth, it is very difficult to say that such a defence should not be available in respect of a child immediately before birth.
I turn to proposed new paragraph (b) of my amendment, which seeks to meet the concerns that have been expressed in your Lordships’ House in respect of late-term abortions that result from domestic abuse. That is, I am sure, a concern to many of your Lordships. I have addressed that very precisely in paragraph (b), which I hope will reassure noble Lords who have that anxiety.
The remaining part of my amendment addresses the distress that can be caused to a woman by the police investigation. First, I will make just two preliminary points. If it is necessary to create a criminal offence, one has to accept the necessity of an investigation, but one that has to be conducted with great sensitivity, which is the case of course when one is investigating allegations of rape and the victim of the rape has to be examined and talked to. It has to be done with great sensitivity. The second general point I come to is the one with which I began my remarks: is the distress caused to a woman by the investigation a sufficiently compelling reason to justify extinguishing the life of a child about to be born? In my view, the answer to that is no.
However, I accept that concerns remain and my amendment seeks to address those remaining concerns. The amendment provides that no investigation can take place unless authorised by a very senior police officer of the rank of superintendent or above. The superintendent must have regard to the defences set out in my amendment and, to echo a point made by the noble Baroness in moving her amendment, the investigation must be completed within 28 days: the initial authority being for 14 days, with two subsequent extensions of seven days, but no more.
To conclude—
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)
Can I just go back to the point the noble Viscount raised a minute or two ago? He said that such investigations must be undertaken with great sensitivity. He referred to the investigation of rape cases. I put it to him that all experience shows that the police and, indeed, prosecution authorities sometimes find it very difficult to investigate such cases with sensitivity. How is he going to guarantee that?
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
I am not sure that I accept that. It is certainly true that when I started practising at the Bar, which was a very long time ago, investigations were not conducted with great sensitivity, but the police service has advanced a long way from that. So I do not think—I hope the noble Lord will forgive me —that I accept the premise that the police are crude or insensitive in their investigation. There may be individual cases, but in general, no.
I hope I will be forgiven now if I conclude. Clause 208 is a serious departure from existing law and practice. It was passed in the Commons on Report in a time-limited debate without the normal benefit of scrutiny in Committee or of pre-legislation consultation. I have tried to meet your Lordships’ anxieties with a compromise amendment. If there is no taste for that, so be it, and I will vote for the other amendments and clauses that I have identified, but I hope that your Lordships might reflect on the desirability of compromise.
Baroness Monckton of Dallington Forest (Con)
My Lords, my Amendment 424 seeks to remove Clause 208. As my noble friend Lord Hailsham said, this clause passed the Commons without any evidence, scrutiny, public consultation or impact assessment, although it is momentous. It is a radical proposal with implications for the mental and physical health of the woman and lethal consequences for the viable unborn child. Clause 208 would allow mothers to self-administer the abortion of their unborn child for any reason, at any stage of pregnancy right up to full term. This is not just its consequential effect; it is its intended effect. The clause states:
“For the purposes of the law related to abortion … no offence is committed by a woman acting in relation to her own pregnancy”.
The unborn child, in many cases more developed than those successfully looked after in premature baby units, would have no legal protection. As my honourable friend Julia Lopez said in the other place:
“This is not pro or anti life. It is not extremist to want protections for viable babies, and it is not anti-women to say that coercion or dangerous self-medication should not be outside the reach of the law”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/06/25; col. 330.]
This in part was a reference to the fact that a woman may be coerced into having an illegal abortion at home. The law as it stands—
Baroness Ramsey of Wall Heath (Lab)
Is the noble Baroness aware that, if Clause 208 became law, abortion law would continue to apply to doctors and healthcare professionals and they would still be subject to time limits and all other aspects of the current abortion law?
Baroness Monckton of Dallington Forest (Con)
Dr Alison Wright, president of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, has written to Peers protesting that women may continue to face police investigations and criminal charges solely for ending their own pregnancy unless this clause is supported. She, speaking on behalf of the college, makes no distinction whatever between the abortion of a viable child at full term and a first-trimester termination. Indeed, the infant who without the intervention of lethal drugs would be fully a living person at that stage, if born, is completely unmentioned. It is as if this is unmentionable. Dr Wright describes the women concerned as being at the most vulnerable times in their lives. That may be true, but the most vulnerable and defenceless person here is the unborn viable child. Obviously, it is deeply distressing, as we have heard, for the mother to be questioned by the police in the aftermath of an illegal abortion. This should be done with compassion and sensitivity, but the police cannot act as if nothing has happened.
Clause 208 also endangers women by removing the current legal deterrent against administering an abortion away from a clinical setting right up to birth. Women may be incentivised to perform their own life-threatening abortion late in pregnancy. This is particularly the case given how easily women can obtain abortion pills through the pills by post scheme, beyond the legal limit and without a reliable gestational age check. These pills are not meant to be used after the 10th week of pregnancy for a very good reason. I encourage noble Lords to support Amendment 425 from the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, which would reinstate mandatory in-person medical consultations and abolish the pills by post scheme, which was started during Covid lockdowns and should have been rescinded after the pandemic, as was originally intended.
More than 1,000 medical professionals have written to us opposing Clause 208, and I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, former president of the British Medical Association, for her support for my amendment. One letter I received pointed out that—
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
The noble Baroness refers to 1,000 doctors writing, but is she aware that the British Medical Association has sent briefings to Members in support of the Bill as it now stands and that it alone represents more than 200,000 doctors?
Baroness Monckton of Dallington Forest (Con)
The British Medical Association is a trade union, not a royal college.
Baroness Monckton of Dallington Forest (Con)
I am very sorry—I have to carry on or I am going to run out of time. This is Report and I am going to continue.
Lord Katz (Lab)
The noble Baroness is perfectly entitled not to take any interventions. We will make better progress if people just agree to take interventions or not, and then we will be able to hear from everyone.
Baroness Monckton of Dallington Forest (Con)
One letter I received pointed out that 22 week-plus babies aborted in a medical setting are clinically euthanised prior to surgery with a lethal injection into the heart. What would happen, she asked in her letter, to babies aborted at home and born alive? Would the baby be left to die? How would the baby be disposed of? Would the mother be charged with infanticide?
Clause 208, as confirmed by a legal opinion obtained by the Father of the House, Sir Edward Leigh, in the other place, would also make it legal for a woman to perform her own abortion on sex-selective grounds at any time. Data from NHS England shows that there is already an imbalance in the sex of children among certain communities that cannot be explained by pure chance. Do the proposers of this clause want to further facilitate what has been called femicide?
Let me be clear about what Clause 208 does not do. It does not, despite the claims of its promoters, leave the current law intact. If the 24-week limit can no longer be defended when women induce their own abortions, and they can obtain pills through the post via a phone call, the limit set by Parliament in 1990 is rendered meaningless. The reason why it was then lowered from 28 weeks was precisely because of concerns about the termination of viable children.
The most basic justification for all abortions is that the unborn child in question is unwanted. The slogan is that every child should be a wanted child, but we all know that there are so many couples who for medical reasons cannot have families themselves yet desperately want a family. When you think of the fate of a viable baby being aborted as unwanted when there are so many families yearning to provide that love and support via adoption, this clause is morally questionable, even on the purely utilitarian grounds of the greatest happiness of the greatest number.
The preamble to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child states that
“the child … needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth”.
Removing the offence of a woman terminating her own pregnancy, even at full term, would remove the few remaining legal protections for unborn children.
I am sure that the proposers of Clause 208 genuinely believe that they will thereby create a kinder and more civilised society, but I fear that the consequences, if this is passed, will be precisely the opposite.
Baroness Thornton (Lab)
My Lords, it is normal to take questions and interventions as this is a debate so, before the noble Baroness sits down, can I ask her whether she believes that all 50 countries that have decriminalised abortion are wrong?
Baroness Stroud (Con)
My Lords, I support Amendment 424 from the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton, for the reasons that she has so clearly set out. I will not repeat them but instead seek to offer in my Amendment 425 a more judicious response than Clause 208 to the small number of prosecutions that have occurred in recent years.
When we pass laws as parliamentarians, we have a responsibility to ensure that those laws are as safe as possible, while legislating with the most difficult or even most nefarious scenarios in mind. It is with that in mind that I have tabled Amendment 425. The only reason why we are having this debate today and why there has been this push for Clause 208—not from the public but from abortion providers—is that the current law around how women can access abortion is not as safe as it should be and does not protect women in difficult or nefarious situations.
When the abortion pills by post scheme was introduced, I and many others warned of its risks. Sadly, those warnings have proven prescient, with one consequence being that a small number of women have faced prosecution for illegal abortions after the statutory time limit. Those prosecutions have led to the same groups who assured us back in 2020 and 2022 that pills by post was safe to lobby for the introduction of Clause 208, essentially trying to paper over the consequences of that scheme.
While women might no longer be prosecuted under Clause 208, the grave risks to women will not go away. Cases of women administering their own abortions late in pregnancy will likely increase without a legal deterrent. We will then hear calls for the full decriminalisation of abortion up to birth. It would be far safer to reintroduce in-person consultations with a medical professional before women can obtain abortion pills, as was mandatory before the pandemic. Amendment 425 would do this. It is not seeking to reverse the convenience of pills by post. It is only seeking to introduce safeguards for women. The amendment is deliberately moderate. It still permits at-home abortions but requires a prior confidential face-to-face appointment with a medical professional.
I draw colleagues’ attention to three reasons why this is important. First, in-person consultations allow women’s gestational age to be reliably verified. This would protect women because of the dangers associated with abortions away from the clinical context late in pregnancy. Those who argued for the Abortion Act in 1967 did so to prevent the back-street abortion. Under Clause 208, the DIY back-street abortion will be back for any woman who is more than 24 weeks pregnant.
In 2023, Carla Foster was convicted of an illegal abortion after she admitted lying to the abortion provider BPAS about her gestational age, claiming to be seven weeks pregnant when her gestation was actually between 32 and 34 weeks. Carla Foster was both a perpetrator—ending the life of a baby capable of living outside the womb—and a victim. She was a victim of a scheme that meant she could obtain abortion pills with no meaningful safeguards or medical care. After calling paramedics, she described being traumatised by the face of her dead baby. An in-person gestational age check would have both saved the life of her baby and spared the trauma caused by her actions.
Baroness Stroud (Con)
I am not giving way; I am sorry.
Secondly, in-person consultations protect against coercion and abuse. Far from protecting victims of abuse, as is claimed, the lack of such consultations is a traffickers’ charter, allowing traffickers and abusers to cover up the effects of sexual exploitation by coercing their victims to phone up and ask for abortion pills. In-person appointments prior to an abortion in a confidential setting mean that such abuse is more likely to be detected. The disturbing case of Stuart Worby emphasises this need.
Baroness Stroud (Con)
I am just carrying on; I am sorry.
Mr Worby was jailed in December 2024 after arranging for a friend’s girlfriend to pretend to be pregnant and acquire abortion pills for him via the pills by post scheme. He then spiked a woman’s drink with those pills to induce an abortion against her knowledge. Again, he could not have obtained the pills if in-person appointments were still mandatory.
Thirdly, in-person appointments allow for possible health risks to be checked to assess whether it is safe for a woman to undergo a medical, rather than a surgical, abortion.
The problems with the pills by post scheme are well documented, with FoI requests suggesting that one in 17 women requires hospital treatment afterwards. These risks were strikingly drawn to our attention by a letter, which has already been mentioned, from more than 1,000 medical professionals who support Amendments 424 and 425. I am glad too for the support of Dr Caroline Johnson MP, who still practises as a paediatrician and brought forward the same amendment in the other place.
The seriousness of this issue was brought home to me when I had the opportunity, in January, to meet with a woman whose sister tragically died after taking abortion pills via the pills by post scheme, leaving behind young children. The medical conditions the woman had, which meant she should have been deemed high risk, may well have been picked up in a clinical context. However, after a telephone consultation, she was sent pills in the post by BPAS and died suddenly minutes after taking the final set of pills.
Baroness Stroud (Con)
I am sorry; I am going to keep going.
This amendment would ensure that women are offered the best possible care at in-person appointments, where medical history can be discussed with a woman.
Amendment 425 is not about whether we are pro-life or pro-choice; it is about safeguarding women. Polling last summer found that two-thirds of women support the return of in-person appointments; a mere 4% support the status quo. Abortion providers provided abortion services before the pandemic, with no major problems for access. I urge colleagues to support Amendment 425, which is a far more proportionate response to the handful of court cases that have occurred in recent years than that offered by Clause 208, which makes matters worse and removes legal protections for unborn babies up to birth. Amendment 425 would not reduce access to abortion for women, but it would ensure that their health needs are properly catered for.
Baroness Blackstone (Lab)
My Lords, I declare an interest: I am the chair of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists. I hope that the noble Baroness who has just spoken will accept that sometimes the expertise of people who are directly involved on a daily basis with the treatment of women seeking an abortion is really rather important. I found it distressing when the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton, refused to acknowledge that, in fact, many representatives of the medical profession strongly adhere to what lies behind Clause 208. I strongly support that clause because it seeks to ensure that women in England and Wales will no longer be subject to long investigations and criminal charges, which are very often exceedingly distressing.
I also support Amendment 423A to stop ongoing investigations and Amendment 426B to grant historical pardons to women. However, I will focus my comments today on the safety of the telemedicine service for early medical abortion and, in particular, my opposition to Amendment 425, which the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, just spoke to.
There have been extraordinary suggestions that the creation of the telemedicine service is the reason for the increase in criminal investigations. This is not true. There were cases of women being sent to prison before the telemedicine pathway was even created. Since the vote in the House of Commons last year, several women have been investigated, including a woman who experienced a miscarriage when she was 17 weeks pregnant. Surely that is something we should seek to avoid.
I turn to a landmark study of more than 50,000 abortions in England and Wales, which concluded that telemedical abortion is effective, safe and improves access to care. Waiting times fell, the mean gestational age of treatment declined and effectiveness increased, with 98.8% of abortions successfully completed after medication. The scare stories we have just heard are exceedingly rare and we should not take them as a reason for rejecting the telemedical service that exists.
Safety is not only about clinical outcomes; it is also about safeguarding. Women accessing early medical abortion through a licensed provider will speak to a doctor, a nurse or a midwife who follows established safeguarding protocols, asking an agreed list of questions to verify what the woman seeking an abortion has said. In fact, abortion providers operate within one of the most tightly regulated areas of medicine. Where concerns arise, patients are always brought face to face to receive care by that method. Indeed, about 50% have a face-to-face appointment when they seek a telemedical abortion and the drugs that are concerned.
It is important to note that telemedicine has not removed face-to-face care. If a woman chooses to attend a clinic or hospital, she is able to do so. Telemedicine has simply broadened choice for women, and that is something we should also take very seriously as a huge benefit. We must consider what would happen if the option for telemedicine—
Baroness Watkins of Tavistock (CB)
Could I further clarify and ask a question? Is it not true that if any doctor or nurse is doubtful when telemedicine is happening, they will ask that person to come in to be seen?
Baroness Blackstone (Lab)
That is absolutely the case. I was trying to make that point earlier, but I did not do it as clearly as the noble Baroness has just done. Of course that should happen, and it does happen.
If we remove the option, we will find that women, regardless of circumstance, are forced to attend the clinic. I do not think that is sensible. We should allow women the choice to decide what the best route for them is. Some women—for example, those in abusive relationships, those living in rural areas, those with great caring responsibilities and those who cannot travel safely for some reason—may no longer be able to access safe, essential abortion care.
There is widespread support from the medical establishment for the telemedicine service remaining an option for women, including from all the relevant royal colleges, not just the RCOG. It goes across the Royal College of Nursing, the Royal College of Midwives, the Royal College of General Practitioners and the Royal College of Psychiatrists—indeed, all those royal colleges that have a clear and obvious responsibility for providing good services for those women seeking an abortion.
I hope that, in further discussion today, that will be recognised and we will not hear comments—as were made by the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton—that many doctors are opposed to this. That is simply not the case; they are in favour of Clause 208 and of the telemedicine service.
The evidence is clear—
Baroness Watkins of Tavistock (CB)
Could I further clarify and ask a question—
Baroness Blackstone (Lab)
Let me just finish, I am just about to complete what I was going to say. I am happy to take the question.
The evidence is clear that telemedicine has reduced waiting times; enabled earlier treatment, which is a huge advantage; maintained high safety and effectiveness rates; improved privacy, which is something that most women in these circumstances really appreciate; and increased safeguarding disclosures. It expands choice and keeps women within a regulated clinical framework. That in itself is exceedingly important too.
To weaken or remove telemedical abortion would not improve safety; it would instead reduce access, delay care and create barriers for the most vulnerable women. The system works. It is safe, effective and must be maintained.
Captain of the Honourable Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms and Chief Whip (Lord Kennedy of Southwark) (Lab Co-op)
My Lords, views on both sides of the debate are sincerely held. We should all respect each other for that. We had a long debate in Committee. This is Report. Members should make their points. Repeated interventions do not help us at this stage. We need to take the temperature down. The House can make its decision known in the Division Lobbies later on.
Baroness D’Souza (CB)
My Lords, I strongly support abortion on demand but, as we have heard, the danger continues to exist that an almost full-term foetus could be aborted by means of a pill ordered by telephone and delivered by post. I am struck by the extraordinary efforts that this House has gone to in order to provide safeguards for those who are terminally ill and who demand assisted dying, yet we do not afford the unborn foetus or near-term foetus any kind of safeguard at all. The amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, would introduce some kind of safeguard, which perhaps we all owe to that unborn child.
The experience of other countries suggests that late-term abortions are uncommon, and an in-person consultation to determine the stage of pregnancy would ensure that they remain so. We know, too, that women who abort at later stages of pregnancy are more likely to have birthing complications. This, surely, is a further reason for some medical oversight.
As I said, I strongly support abortion on demand. I think that introducing a safeguard such as this to avoid the actual death of a near-term foetus is acceptable, and I hope very much that the noble Baroness will put this to the House.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
My Lords, my Amendment 423ZA would limit the application of Clause 208 to those deemed not to have capacity. I have also added my name to Amendment 426C in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Wolf.
Under the present law, it is an offence for a woman to procure an abortion to end her pregnancy after 24 weeks —the stage when the baby is deemed to be a viable child. Causing the death of the child is a crime, other than in exceptional circumstances. It is also an offence to procure drugs or devices with the intent of an abortion.
Clause 208 is a bad clause. It is constitutionally wrong. It has no manifesto pledge behind it, and no prior consultation has been done on it with the people of this country. No evidence exists that people want abortion up to birth. The clause undermines the constitutional arrangement by which the Government legislate: on the basis of consent by the governed for an announced programme, given freely at the ballot box.
Baroness Thornton (Lab)
My Lords, I wish to speak to Amendment 426B in my name. Before I do that, I want to ask the question that I was trying to ask the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner; it was a perfectly ordinary question. Is the noble Baroness aware that, since 2022, there has been in place national oversight within the Crown Prosecution Service for the prosecution of abortion offences and that, under this framework, multiple women have been prosecuted, despite judges in the cases calling for the CPS to reconsider? That is all I wanted to ask the noble Baroness.
The amendment in my name has been signed by my noble friend Lord Hunt and the noble Baronesses, Lady Watkins and Lady Miller. It would insert a new clause that follows Clause 208 and is consequential on it. It seeks to pardon women who have had a conviction or a caution for the offence that Clause 208 applies to. It would remove their details from police systems, regardless of the outcome of their case. There are women who were convicted, and an even larger group of women who were not convicted but who were investigated. This means that they have permanently to disclose in a DBS check, because abortion offences are classed as violent crimes. When Clause 208 remains in this Bill, this is an issue that the Government will need to address, as they will need to do for the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, because both are technical matters when this clause passes into law. Can my noble friend the Minister confirm that this is indeed the case if this clause reaches the statute book?
I think we all wish to resolve this matter. We have had a significant amount of discussion about this clause, and I think it is safe to say that there is some disagreement between us. I would like to summarise what I think we need to do from the point of view of those of us supporting Clause 208. To protect this clause, we will need to reject Amendment 422E, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner. We will need to oppose Amendment 423, in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. We will need to reject Amendment 423ZA, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor. We will need to reject Amendment 426C, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Wolf. All those amendments seek to continue the criminalisation of women in one form or another: a cruel idea, that women should be punished.
The amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton, seeks to strike Amendment 208 from the Bill. The House has heard arguments, however, about the 50 countries where this works perfectly well, and where it does not increase abortion or offences. As my noble friend has said, all the royal colleges support this. We can safely say that what we are doing here is seeking to bring British law up to the same standard as other countries across the world. Amendment 424 seeks to place limits on a well-functioning, safe and early abortion through telemedicine. As my noble friend has said, it works. The amendment from the noble Baroness would place young people at risk. Women who need to go to a surgery for their medicine, but who live a long way away from it may start their miscarriage on the bus going home. Surely we want to avoid that.
Amendments 426C and 426D seek to restrict access and safeguarding in a way that will harm women, and young girls particularly. We must oppose those as well. I urge the House to reject all those amendments, to support Clause 208 and to support Amendments 423A and 426B.
The Archbishop of Canterbury
My Lords, many noble Lords will know that the Church of England’s view on abortion is one of principled opposition, recognising that there can be limited conditions under which abortion may be preferable to any available alternatives. This is based on the belief of the infinite worth and value of every human life, however old or young, and including life not yet born. The infinite value of human life is a fundamental Christian principle that underpins much of our legal system and has shaped existing laws on abortion. All life is precious. We therefore need to recognise that women confronted with the very complex and difficult decision to terminate a pregnancy deserve our utmost understanding, care and practical support as they face what is often a heart-wrenching decision.
However, I cannot support Clause 208. Though its intention may not be to change the 24-week abortion limit, it undoubtedly risks eroding the safeguards and enforcement of those legal limits and, inadvertently, undermining the value of human life.
I support Amendment 425 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, since it is not clear how the law can function in an enforceable way without in-person consultation before accessing early medical abortion. The risks of medical complications are, as we have heard, much greater if the pills for early abortion are taken beyond the 11-week limit. Although there are benefits to telemedicine—I do not dispute that—there are also flaws, and they are key to the debate on whether Clause 208 should pass.
As I have already said, this is not a debate on whether the legal abortion limit should change, but without the levers necessary to monitor and enforce the law, we are at risk of it becoming exactly that.
In the same vein, I support the amendment in the name of my right reverend friend the Bishop of Leicester, as we have a particular duty of care to those under 18 to ensure that they are properly cared for and supported while making such difficult decisions.
I am reminded of the call of the prophet Micah both to do justice and to love mercy. Balancing justice and mercy is the challenge that we are debating today. I do not think that women who act in relation to their own pregnancies should be prosecuted, but I also do not wish to see any increase in late-term abortions.
Although Clause 208 is well intentioned, it risks making an already imperfect situation worse. Therefore, I support Amendment 424 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton.
Decriminalisation of abortion is a question of such legal, moral and practical complexity that it cannot be properly addressed in an amendment hastily added to another Bill. Consideration of any alteration to the abortion laws needs public consultation and robust parliamentary processes to ensure that every aspect of this debate is carefully considered and scrutinised.
There are many outstanding questions, which deserve greater attention, about the tone of policing in this area, about how we can best ensure that women suffering miscarriages can access the right care when they need it, and about how those who provide abortions outside the law will continue to be held accountable for doing so.
As I have said before in this place, we need a framework that supports women, not one that puts them and their unborn children in the way of greater harm. On that basis, I will support the amendments in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Monckton and Lady Stroud, and my right reverend friend the Bishop of Leicester should they push them to a vote.
Lord Pannick (CB)
It was suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, that Clause 208 would undermine respect for the law. On the contrary, it will enhance respect for the law, because it will express in statutory form compassion for women who have the misfortune to suffer the loss of their baby at late term for whatever reason it occurs, and it will prevent intrusive, distressing police investigations at a most sensitive time in any woman’s life.
It has been suggested that there should be a balance in the law. Clause 208 already includes the necessary balance because it protects the woman but maintains the criminal liability of anyone who assists her to have a late-term abortion, whether it be the abusive partner, the rogue doctor or whoever it may be. That is right and proper, and that is the balance that should be accorded.
As a lawyer, I look for precedents. The precedent that occurs to me is the Suicide Act 1961, in which Parliament recognised that a person who had the misfortune to seek to take their own life should not be prosecuted. You cannot be prosecuted for attempting to end your own life. But the law says—I appreciate that we are currently debating the assisted dying Bill, but my speech has nothing to do with that—that if you assist a person to seek to take their own life, you can be prosecuted. That is the distinction there, and it is the distinction in Clause 208.
Baroness O'Loan (CB)
There is another distinction that the House may wish to consider: under the Suicide Act, it is not a crime to take your own life, but we are talking about taking the life of an unborn baby.
Lord Pannick (CB)
Of course, the unborn baby, until it is born, has no legal identity. That is the law of the land. The unborn baby has no legal identity, and the mother is in the prime position in relation to that baby. We have to balance the interests of all concerned. My view is that Clause 208 does contain the balance that I have suggested to the House.
Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)
My Lords, if we have to balance the needs and rights of all concerned, does that mean that an unborn child that is viable beyond 24 weeks has no rights and should not be considered here? Does it mean that it is only the rights of the mother that matter?
Lord Pannick (CB)
I am not commending late-term abortions. Nobody on either side of this debate is commending late-term abortions. The question addressed by Clause 208 is whether there should be a criminal liability: whether people should be investigated by the police and potentially sent to prison in those circumstances. That seems to me, with all due respect, to be the wrong balance. I say to the House that this is a very difficult issue, but I am afraid that those who oppose Clause 208 simply fail to recognise the arguments on the other side, which need to be balanced.
Baroness Neate (CB)
My Lords, as a former chief executive of Women’s Aid, I will specifically address the comments made about domestic abuse, particularly in relation to telemedicine. It is common for domestic abuse to begin in pregnancy, and it is common for all aspects of pregnancy, including conception, to be tools used by perpetrators of domestic abuse. That is why groups wishing to end violence against women and girls—domestic abuse groups, those who deal with so-called honour-based violence, those who deal with forced marriage, Rape Crisis and many others—have written to parliamentarians saying that creating clinically unnecessary barriers to abortion helps abusers, not survivors. I would really like noble Lords to take note of the fact that, in denying women discrete space for action, they are actually enabling abuse much more than they are preventing it.
Baroness Hazarika (Lab)
My Lords, Amendment 423A in my name would ask the police to cease investigations into women since the other House passed this vote back in June. Since June, in a number of cases women and mothers have been investigated. At Christmas, a woman in her 40s thought she was in her early pregnancy. She delivered a foetus in its gestation sac. She was very distressed. It turned out that that was actually at 24 weeks; she had not realised. She called the ambulance, and it was made clear that she had safeguarding issues. She was a victim of domestic violence. She had children. Then the police came. Her house was searched, including the Christmas presents for the children. It was incredibly distressing. The children had to leave the house. Many noble Baronesses here have talked, rightly, about the effects on the unborn child, but what about the children of the mothers who are taken away for investigation? So this is a very important addition to the other amendments. I very much support the amendment that the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, has tabled.
As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick said, I am sure that nobody, whatever side of this debate they sit on, thinks that anyone has a late-pregnancy abortion for the fun of it. No one is doing it to get some promotion at work or to get a late holiday—some of the excuses that we have heard suggested. This is an incredibly traumatic thing. Actually, I would say that an abortion at any time was an incredibly traumatic thing for a woman. I urge noble Lords to go, if they have not seen the Tracey Emin exhibition at the Tate; she speaks incredibly movingly but in a very harrowing way about her own lived experience of abortion. This is not something that is taken lightly.
For that small number of women who end up doing this at a late stage in their pregnancy, they are not doing it for the fun of it. They are often abused and often in situations of domestic violence; they are often from very marginalised communities, such as my own community—from the Muslim community, or from other more isolated communities. Many of them are from deprived backgrounds; they are not from nice families such as ours, where you can talk about these things. Many of them are told, by the way, that they do not know what is going on with their bodies, by their abusive partners or abusive parents, because coercive control does not just come from the husband or partner —it can come from within the family structure. They are not even told about their bodies; they are not given agency about their body—and they are told that if they dare to go to anyone for help, they will end up in prison, and here is the evidence. While I understand the concerns about coercion and care and making sure that we protect vulnerable women—it is very well intended—this could further push those very isolated women into situations that are ever more dangerous.
The final point that I want to make is that, whatever side of the divide we are on, we know that the police are really struggling with resources right now. We have had many conversations about how we do not think that police are investigating serious sexual assault against women and severe anti-social behaviour. Do we really want our police to be rifling through the bins of women who have just had a stillbirth? Do any of us think that that is a good use of time? Do we honestly want to see vulnerable women put in prison, when there are very few places in prison right now?
Finally, you cannot solve this problem by just prosecuting vulnerable women. I have had many conversations with people on the other side, and I understand that, as the Chief Whip said on our side, these views are profoundly and genuinely held by all of us. But I have heard the argument from people who say that, when the terrible thing happens and there is a late abortion, someone has to pay the price—someone has to go to prison. I would push that back. Throwing women, vulnerable women who have often been beaten and treated violently, into prison, is not the answer. Believe you me: these women need compassion, and their kids also need a mother, so that they do not fall into the patterns that lead to bad outcomes. If anyone thinks that these women need to be punished, trust me—what they will have gone through is punishment enough, which will stay with them for the rest of their lives.
The Lord Bishop of Leicester
My Lords, I shall speak to the amendment in my name, Amendment 426D. I start by thanking the Minister for meeting me a couple of weeks ago to discuss this matter—and I want to be direct at the outset about what the amendment would do and would not do.
The amendment is distinct from Amendment 425, which stands on its own merits, and which your Lordships will consider on its own terms. This amendment says nothing about adult women’s access to abortion, nothing about where medication is taken and nothing about the broader questions that have been part of our debate up till now. It rests entirely on one safeguarding principle—that when a child is the patient, a professional should meet her before prescribing. I believe that that is something that your Lordships can support, regardless of the views that you hold on everything else before the House today.
The amendment is brought on behalf of the National Network of Designated Healthcare Professionals for Children—NHS doctors and nurses who carry statutory safeguarding responsibilities for children across every local safeguarding partnership in England. Its concern is that the needs of children, particularly looked-after children who become pregnant, are not sufficiently accounted for in this clause. Since 2022, a girl of 14 can telephone an abortion service, receive medication by post, take it at home, and no clinician will ever meet her. How does that give confidence that safeguarding risks are being properly assessed? How does the provider of medication know whether there is someone else in the room when they speak to the child on the phone? How do they know whether someone else has suggested that the child should make the phone call? Surely the only safe way to assess risk is to meet in person.
The noble Baroness, Lady Blackstone, says that telemedicine is safe. I fully respect her experience in this field and, in many situations, I would agree, but in the case of children, of which I note she made no mention in her speech, I believe she is wrong. Telemedicine is not safe for children.
Baroness Gerada (CB)
Is the right reverend Prelate aware that coercion can also occur in the consultation room, as I have seen many times? It may actually be safer for the girl—or the child, as he is calling her—to be able to choose the place and the time where she has that consultation.
The Lord Bishop of Leicester
I am very aware that there are risks to all forms of consultation. My argument is simply that the risks are minimised by in-person consultation.
The considered view of safeguarding professionals in the NNDHP is that the current guidance put in place by the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health in 2022 is simply not robust enough. That guidance, I note, requires an in-person meeting for children under 13. Children under 16 are,
“normally … required to complete their consultation in-person, unless there is a compelling indication to do otherwise”.
Evidence, however, suggests that most providers of abortion care are arguing that the option of telemedicine itself is a compelling indication that an in-person consultation is not required. For those aged 16 or 17, the guidance says only that children—and, of course, 16 and 17-year-olds are still children under the Children Act—should “be encouraged” to attend in person. More fundamentally, guidance can currently be changed unilaterally, without parliamentary scrutiny or public consultation, at the discretion of the body that issued it. I believe, therefore, that legislation is required. What Parliament enacts, only Parliament can remove.
The case for this amendment, however, does not rest on my view or the NNDHP’s alone. The Government’s own consultation found that safeguarding organisations specifically identified under-18s as the group for whom in-person assessment was most critical to reduce the risk from those who sexually exploit children, manipulate the system or force their victims to obtain abortion. Indeed, MSI Reproductive Choices has documented that face-to-face appointments are associated with a significant increase in domestic abuse disclosures compared with telemedicine. This is especially significant given that girls and young women face a higher risk of coercive or abusive relationships than those aged over 24, and are often less equipped to ask for help.
The clinical risks compound this. Beyond 11 weeks’ gestation, home management is not appropriate and the risks to the patient increase significantly. As has been mentioned, accurate gestational age assessment is the foundation on which safe prescribing depends, and it cannot be done reliably by telephone. These are not theoretical risks. We have heard stories already. I would simply add that of a 16 year-old who was estimated by the clinic to be under eight weeks pregnant, but the baby she delivered was in fact 20 weeks. She later said, “If they had scanned me and I knew that I was that far gone, I would have had him”. An in-person appointment would have changed everything for that young woman. This amendment would require such an appointment.
I echo the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, in her amendment. Without an in-person consultation, it is unclear how we will ensure that early medical abortions take place within the law. Indeed, challenges around vulnerability and correct gestational assessment apply to adulthood as well, which is why I fully support Amendment 425.
Baroness Hollins (CB)
My Lords, I had prepared a longer speech but I will speak very briefly as most of the points that I wanted to make have been made. Of course, I do not want to see women unduly prosecuted, but I was reassured by the wise remarks in Committee of my noble friend Lord Hogan-Howe, suggesting that the adaptation of police protocols was more suitable than the change in the law proposed by Clause 208. I support Amendments 424 and 425, as indeed do many doctors, including some among the numbers mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton, of obstetricians.
One point, perhaps, has not been raised, which concerns the mental health of women who may be isolated. I am concerned about the possibility that home use, in relative isolation, of a self-induced later abortion may increase the emotional intensity and mental health consequences for some women, particularly if she has limited support or medical complications, which are of course much more common in later abortion. Safeguard support and informed consent become much more critical as gestation advances and care shifts away from in-person supervision. I am not convinced by this clause; it just has not had the depth of thought and preparation required to really understand the complexity of what is being proposed. I ask Members to err on the side of caution and to support the amendments that I have spoken about.
Baroness Wolf of Dulwich (CB)
My Lords, I shall speak to my Amendment 426C and thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Falkner, Lady Spielman and Lady Lawlor, for their support. I will also speak in support of Amendment 422E, to which I have added my name.
Before explaining why we have tabled Amendment 426C, I give a little context. Like, I am sure, all other noble Lords, I have received a great deal of correspondence on Clause 208. One thing repeatedly said by proponents is that, apart from decriminalising all instances of maternal abortion, nothing would change. The Fawcett Society, for example, says that apart from this one change, the Abortion Act 1967 would continue to operate as it always has. However, I think this is quite mistaken. We are not tidying up a small drafting error here; we are making a fundamental change to the law. When you make a fundamental change to the law, you change perceptions and behaviour, and it has knock-on effects.
We have heard, for example, that there has been a marked change in the number of investigations related to abortion. We have also learned—the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, alluded to this—that the changes are a bit more complicated than we might have thought. There has been an increase in the number of investigations related to procuring illegal abortion offences, but at the same time there has been a decrease in the number of investigations for intentional destruction of a viable unborn child. For example, there were seven investigations of intentional destruction of a viable unborn child in 2025, compared with 18 in 2023. Only one person, a male, was proceeded against in the most recent year. Clearly, something is going on but, equally clearly, it seems to be a little more complicated than we might think and the Government do not really know. To repeat the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, made, it is not possible to determine how many investigations there have been that relate to women, including women acting in relation to their pregnancy.
Alongside that we have had another major change, about which we have already heard a great deal this evening, in Committee and at Second Reading, and that is the arrival on the scene of abortifacient pills. They have completely changed the profile of abortion, including whether the foetus is dead before it is delivered. It is not just about telemedicine but about pills by post, which have become much more easily available, not simply within this country but increasingly across country boundaries.
The noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, and others have discussed consultations by pregnant women, and we have had some discussion of whether these should or should not all be in person. Our Amendment 426C has a rather different focus. It would create a new crime of obtaining abortifacients, which for the moment are pills, by false representation. To explain why this is desirable, I will say a bit more about the case of Stuart Worby, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, referred.
In 2025, Stuart Worby was found guilty of poisoning his pregnant wife by administering abortion medication without her knowledge or consent. She very much wanted the baby she was carrying and he did not. A female associate of Worby’s procured the drugs through an online consultation in which she claimed early pregnancy and was duly prescribed and sent the pills. Worby gave his wife the drugs without her knowledge. She suffered a devastating miscarriage and the government website summarising the case notes that she is left unable to bear children. The victim of Worby’s act was not investigated when she miscarried. The crime came to light only when she found messages on her husband’s phone and went to the police.
In another recent case in Scotland the abortion was procured by a paramedic who injected his partner without her knowledge. Again, she was not investigated; the crime only came to light indirectly. There may be many other cases like this, but it is possible and becoming easier to obtain these pills—
Baroness Wolf of Dulwich (CB)
No, I am going to continue. I agree with the Chief Whip on this; we should just keep going.
Baroness Wolf of Dulwich (CB)
That was your choice. I am going to follow instructions.
It is becoming easier to obtain these pills not least because of the balkanisation of American states on abortion issues, which has also turbocharged the use of pills in the United States. If, as seems likely, obtaining and administering an abortifacient without consent is going to increase, then we think there is a good reason to make this a clearly defined offence. Our amendment is drafted in consultation with some experienced KCs based on existing fraud law.
I realise that there will be an obvious objection, which is that there is existing legislation, but as the Government Ministers themselves have made clear when introducing specific legislation to cover retail workers, the fact that there may be legislation is not necessarily a compelling argument against creating a new, clear offence. Sometimes the legislature may want to go further to inform, to highlight particular risks, and to clarify the law in new situations, which is what we are in in this case.
We have drafted this amendment on the assumption that Clause 208 stands, because you have to have to make an assumption, but the fact that it was so difficult to do this, that it is so unsatisfactory and that, if we went forward, we or the Government would have to redraft in the light of what does or does not happen to Clause 208 makes it clear that we are in an unsatisfactory situation. We are making law on the hoof when what is needed is a really good look at the situation we are in and the way that the changes that we might introduce would impact on other behaviour, so that we could take a coherent, holistic view of whether abortion law needs to be rethought.
In that context, I return to Amendment 422E. The first rule of good policy-making is to be clear about the problem. I do not think we are. Amendment 422E therefore proposes an alternative to the unscheduled and unexpected introduction of the sweeping changes in Clause 208. It would require the personal consent of the DPP for an investigation, with a tight time limit. It would address the distressing situations that we have heard about and it would leave us time to discuss properly what changes could usefully be made to current law. It would also ensure that any change that occurred fulfilled the objectives of those who proposed and support Clause 208. I am really concerned at this pulling something out.
I have two final, quick points. Many people will say that lots of other countries have decriminalised, but that does not mean they have a situation that would be exactly like ours if we passed Clause 208. Whether you have full decriminalisation exists in a whole set of different situations, and it certainly does not mean that those countries allow abortion at full term by mothers. The second point is that it is perfectly possible to have a review. The Scots have just done so. They have had a thorough review. One may or may not like what they have done, but that is what we should be doing. Given where we are, I commend my amendment to the House and strongly commend a compromise that would give us time. I hope that the Government are listening to the degree of concern over this and considering whether they might, in the near future, do something serious on this issue.
Baroness Ramsey of Wall Heath (Lab)
My Lords, I wonder whether noble Lords are aware, in spite of what we have heard from some noble Lords, that more than 50 countries around the world, including 29 in Europe, do not criminalise women under abortion law. Going back to the noble Baroness’s comments about Northern Ireland, telemedicine was voted on as lawful by our very House.
Baroness Ramsey of Wall Heath (Lab)
I am sorry, so many Cross-Benchers have just been speaking. I sincerely hope that I can finish my point. I have been waiting ever so patiently.
I agree with my noble friend Lady Hazarika, and I wish to make my comments in the spirit, as she said, of understanding that there are people with very different views across the House. I respect those views, so I hope to be heard similarly.
National and international women’s rights and health groups are proactively calling for decriminalisation in the UK and beyond. That is in addition to the other place—our elected representatives—overwhelmingly voting in support of decriminalisation. I wonder whether we believe that every one of those respected organisations is wrong, that only a section of this House is right and that the other place is wrong. I would find it difficult to ally myself with those who oppose the decriminalisation of abortion.
On Amendment 423A, to which I put my name, along with the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, the noble Lord, Lord Patel, and my noble friend Lady Hazarika, I do not know whether noble Lords have read the excellent article in the Guardian today by Hannah Al-Othman. She has done some extensive research about a number of harrowing cases, one of which was referred to by my noble friend Lady Hazarika, of women being arrested in their hospital bed. Is it seriously the case that we as a House want that situation to continue? The Centre for Women’s Justice has detailed a number of cases that are truly dreadful.
I also support the telemedicine provisions; they seem humane and are also lawful in Northern Ireland. I am not going to say any more. I strongly support decriminalisation and strongly oppose the amendments that other noble Lords have spoken to.
Baroness O’Loan (CB)
Before the noble Baroness sits down, is she aware that there are no telemedicine abortifacients available in Northern Ireland? It is not lawful.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I wanted to sound really definitive in saying that I oppose Amendment 424 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton, which would remove Clause 208, and that I oppose Amendments 425 and 426D. However, the good thing about this place is that I listened to the noble Baroness, Lady Wolf of Dulwich—about whom I am going to say something wonderful. She made me pause and think, and that is what is really useful about this debate. I am absolutely certain on some things, but I am not quite sure about the tangle of amendments that have been proposed. I am therefore going to carry on and voice some of my concerns.
To give a bit of context, abortion in the UK is a safe, normal and common procedure. It is appreciated by women because, when facing an unplanned or unwanted pregnancy, it allows them a legal choice on whether to be a mother—a decision that will alter the whole course of their life. The fact that a third of women in the UK will have a legal and safe abortion at some point in their life—the vast majority of which will happen early on—shows how careful we have to be not to allow this rather fraught, heated and emotional debate impose any unintended barriers to that success story for women’s freedom and rights. I am afraid that some of the well-meaning compromises we have heard about tonight would likely do that. I am particularly worried about undermining telemedicine and pills by post.
I want to reflect on time limits. Many of us will have received a tsunami of emails and letters urging us to oppose Clause 208, stressing emotively—and factually inaccurately—that this clause will legalise abortion until birth, and that that amounts to the state-sanctioned killing of babies, as someone explained to me. We have to restate for the public that this clause does not change the limits for abortion. There is still a 24-week abortion time limit. In fact, abortion itself remains a crime, just as it has been since 1968, unless very stringent conditions are met. I stress again that any medical professional, or anyone else, who assists a woman to get an abortion beyond the legal limit of 24 weeks will be committing a serious crime and will be liable for prosecution.
We have to understand the public backlash, because there is unease about the whole issue of abortion until birth, and time limits per se. As a society, or indeed as a Parliament, we may want to revisit the issue at some stage. For many, the 24-week legal time limit based on viability can feel too arbitrary, especially as surely we all want medical science to make great strides in keeping prematurely born babies alive ever earlier for those women who want their children, but that should not limit the rights of those women who do not want to proceed with their pregnancy.
There are moral issues here about human life—that old chestnut of whether human life starts at conception or birth. There are those who stress that we should focus on the unborn child—we have heard a fair amount of that tonight. They say that, when we talk about more developed foetuses, we are talking about an unborn child, and that the heart that can be seen beating on an ultrasound scan at six weeks is just as much that of an unborn child as one that beats five months later. Is gestational growth a useful guide to the law? Is viability the best guide to what makes us human?
Such difficult discussions should not be shied away from. When you go out and talk to the public about this subject, they talk about time limits and these kinds of issues. Certainly, at the Academy of Ideas, where we work with young people, we consider it is our duty to organise such debates regularly to ensure that new generations rightly ask questions and hear all sides of the argument.
However, Clause 208 is not trying to relitigate the legal time limit debate, even though I welcome the fuller debate we have had tonight. It is important that we acknowledge why it has caused a furore. It removes the threat of criminalisation for a tiny number of women who, for whatever reason, have taken abortion pills to terminate their own pregnancy, but we have to be honest and acknowledge that it brings a risk of abuse—I know that, even though I am supporting it. The notion that decriminalisation will mean that women will gleefully go on a crime spree because it is decriminalised—suggesting that it is only the threat of prosecution that stops women from letting their pregnancies progress carelessly so they can inflict on themselves the horror of self-induced full-term termination —seems far-fetched and lacking in generosity. Legal late abortions are not harmful per se; certainly, they are not more harmful than coercing an unwilling woman to endure a full-time pregnancy and labour against her will.
However, it is also true that late abortions are undoubtedly gruelling for both patient and clinician, which is why the idea that any woman would choose that as an easy or casual option is far-fetched, ludicrous and insulting. The earlier an abortion can be performed, the better it is for women, and that is the reality of the perspective we need for this debate. In 2022, the last year for which figures are available, almost a quarter of a million women in England and Wales had abortions. Almost 90% of those were under 10 weeks and only 1% were at 20 weeks or over. We are not talking about everybody having late abortions or queuing up to have them.
The emergence of telemedicine has allowed access to even earlier abortion. Surely one of the few positives that emerged out of Covid, 2020 and the lockdown was that it changed the abortion regulations to allow medication in early pregnancy to be taken at home. While it is easier, early medical abortion is certainly not a free-for-all or unregulated—it is not like getting a pharmacist to okay your access to Wegovy or Ozempic. It remains regulated under the 1967 Act, which is a hyper-regulated piece of legislation that includes speaking to a doctor and so on. The limit remains at 10 weeks and nothing in Clause 208 changes that. What is positive about pills by post is that it cuts down on the dreaded waiting list times, which means that treatment can be earlier. An insistence on face-to-face appointments, as some of the amendments suggest, would tangle up early abortions in delay, which would undermine the success of 40% of abortions by telemedical methods now being performed at six weeks, versus 25% using traditional access methods.
Finally, one of the arguments used against telemedicine is that it could lead to non-consensual coerced abortions, with abusive men, or even abusive parents, forcing young, vulnerable women to abort. I was glad to hear from the noble Baroness, Lady Neate, about the issue in relation to domestic abuse. Clause 208 does not change the law on this non-consensual coerced abortion. Non-consensual coerced abortion at any gestation remains illegal and is a crime.
However, it is key to note that since telemedicine became legal there has been a major increase in safeguarding disclosures, especially by young women who have felt able to talk about being victims of domestic abuse or sexual violence precisely because they are doing it remotely. It has allowed abortion providers to offer invaluable pastoral intervention beyond abortion services. Telemedicine also enables those vulnerable to coercion to avoid their abusers being involved in the deliberations about their desperate plight of being pregnant.
I will just finish by addressing the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leicester. There are many young girls—I appreciate that they are children—from traditional religious communities. Think of the young Catholic girl, the young Muslim girl and so on, as well as those at risk of honour-based violence. Those kinds of young people actually do not need to be asking their dad to drop them round at the clinic so they can get advice. They are sometimes dependent on other people. With telemedicine, they can go with privacy and talk at their own chosen time and place, without having to answer back to a parent or an abusive partner. In other words, telemedicine offers privacy and can help women stay safe.
Captain of the Honourable Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms and Chief Whip (Lord Kennedy of Southwark) (Lab Co-op)
My Lords, can we please take the temperature down and respect the Clock? There are 10 minutes for Back-Bench contributions. Of course, many people want to get in, but please take the temperature down—there is no need to constantly interrupt others. Everyone can speak. We will come to the Cross Benches first and then go to the noble Baroness opposite.
Baroness Gerada (CB)
My Lords, I would like to pick up some of the safeguarding issues around telemedicine that have been mentioned in the House. To put things in context briefly, I have been a GP now for nearly 40 years, and over the past five years I have been conducting many remote consultations.
First, you can assess safeguarding issues remotely. A paper was published in 2025—very recently—on young girls under 16. More than 600 young girls were involved in the study. It found that 100% of the safeguarding issues—some of these girls then had to be seen face to face—were identified remotely. The conclusion, which is very short, states:
“Requiring in-person adolescent consultation is associated with reduced access to medication abortion without enhancing safeguarding”.
We do want to work with evidence. You might think it is safer to consult face to face, but the evidence shows that it is not safer: it can actually make it more harmful.
Baroness Gerada (CB)
Well, the evidence is there. You either believe in evidence or anecdotes.
The second issue is about ultrasounds. The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence does not recommend ultrasounds for judging gestational age, unless there are problems: for example, if a woman’s menstrual cycle is long or if there are other issues. Again, we have to go by the evidence: not what we think or feel, what we read in the papers or what we discuss with our friends.
I will also comment on assessing competence in younger children under 16. The noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, has an amendment about mental capacity. I am sure that she is aware that the Mental Capacity Act cannot be used in relation to under-16s. Therefore, the noble Baroness’s amendment, if passed, would automatically mean that a 16 year-old would be prosecuted if she had no mental capacity, yet a 17 year-old could use that Act. So it is a nonsense amendment in that respect.
I fully support Clause 208 and I urge the House—on humane reasons, on competence and capacity, and, moreover, on evidence—to support it.
Baroness Spielman (Con)
My Lords, I will speak in support of Amendment 424, tabled my noble friend Lady Monckton, and Amendment 426C, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Wolf. I have put my name to both amendments. I will be brief.
Despite the careful unpacking in Committee of the human and legal problems that Clause 208 will create, no amendments have been put down that address them. As we know, there have been no impact assessments and no public consultation, though third-party polling shows a very large majority opposed to abortion up to the point of birth. No effort has been made to gain insight into the extent to which the existing telemedicine scheme is abused, as its laxness means it must inevitably be to some extent. The lack of real answers to the questions asked in Committee make it all too clear that the Government intend to keep their eyes closed and ears stoppered to shut out evidence of abuses. Sadly, some, though not all, of the medical profession also find it easier not to think about the lives of unborn children, no matter how close to birth.
The status quo is, therefore, profoundly unsatisfactory. If this clause is passed, it will signal to all women that there is zero risk to them personally in abusing the telemedicine scheme or procuring an illegal abortion in another way. So, of course, abuses will increase—that is how humans respond to bad incentives—and each abuse is likely to mean that a viable child is killed with impunity. I recognise that, despite the obvious risks that the clause introduces, it is tempting to support it in order to feel good about yourself and show that you are someone who really cares about women—but this requires suppressing all thoughts of children’s lives.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)
My Lords, I say to my noble friends who will try to come in shortly that we have had a reasonably long debate on this group and we had a very long debate in Committee. I have begun to hear calls for the Front Benches. I offer the House a reminder that this is Report: the stage when we vote to make decisions. I hope that we can quickly begin to move on to hear from the Front Benches.
Lord Winston (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful that the Chief Whip will offer me the chance to speak for a couple of minutes. We have always agreed that this is an expert House, and it helps to make sure that legislation is best addressed by expertise where it can be. One of the things we might want to consider in this debate is that there are at least two Members of this House who have given at least 100 years in total to the management of people having terminations of pregnancy —so we do know quite a lot about it. There is also a large number of people who have not spoken who are fellows of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, who I think have been rather insulted by some of the things they have heard today because they do not represent the views of most members.
Having said that, I just want to say two things very simply. I firmly believe in decriminalisation. There is a great deal of misapprehension, as was just shown by the noble Baroness, Lady Spielman. The fact of the matter is that you cannot induce a pregnancy close to term. In fact, I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Patel, will agree with me that it is virtually impossible to induce labour in a woman who does not have ruptured membranes at term with drugs. It just does not work. In fact, both he and I—numerous times, if I am not wrong—have been faced with caesarean sections that we did not want to do as the only way we could get a baby out of the womb when it was in danger. We could not use drugs to induce labour, because they do not work. That certainly applies to pills but even to drugs given intravenously. It is therefore important to understand that a termination of a pregnancy conducted by a woman herself will be an extremely rare event. It would be very difficult, and the idea that pills will work is nonsensical.
Moreover, we have heard a lot about pills, but nobody has told us yet what pills they are talking about. That is very important. The hormones that are usually used in early pregnancy would not work in late pregnancy. The other thing I have already mentioned is that pretty well all late terminations of pregnancy are done for very serious medical conditions. One of the commonest ones is where there is an extremely deformed baby in the womb. I described this during the earlier stages of the Bill, and I will not go through it again. The indications of these late pregnancies are always very carefully and scrupulously observed. They are not done lightly.
I should also add that, sadly, babies born much after 24 weeks still are very likely to be highly abnormal. Even though people often miscarry them when they do not want to, sometimes it can be the very best thing that can happen because these babies will eventually die early with very severe abnormalities.
Recently, the noble Lord, Lord Patel, chaired a committee on this very issue to see how we could reduce the number of premature births. It is a big problem in medicine because of the risks to the babies when they are born after 28 weeks. I shall say no more except that I firmly believe we should really try to understand this from the woman’s point of view. No woman tries to interrupt her pregnancy except with the deepest grief and the deepest unhappiness.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)
We will have a short intervention, but we need to move on shortly to the Front Benches. That is what the House wants, I believe.
Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)
My Lords, throughout this debate Northern Ireland has been mentioned, yet not one Member from Northern Ireland has been allowed to speak until now. We have had to force the issue to be allowed to speak in this debate. When the new abortion laws, the most liberal and extreme laws in the United Kingdom, were forced on Northern Ireland, few across this House really cared. The lobby for abortion in Northern Ireland was on the basis that women there had fewer rights than in England and Wales. Now that same lobby is using the same arguments for a change in the law in England and Wales. In the previous debate, it was suggested that this would bring England and Wales into line with Northern Ireland, but that is misleading as, crucially, Northern Ireland does not have pills by post.
I genuinely believe that even many of those who support abortion know in their hearts that this is not the way to go about things. This hurried parliamentary process, the rewriting of one of the most sensitive and serious areas of criminal law, is surely unworthy of our democracy. A clause passed in the other House last summer was passed after 46 minutes of Back-Bench debate. Is that what our democracy has come to? If noble Lords think that this is a good idea, why are they not prepared to allow public consultation and pre-legislative scrutiny, instead of rushing it through?
Clause 208 means no justice for the death of a full-term unborn child, even in the most grotesque circumstances. I ask supporters of Clause 208: what would you do if a woman told you that she was taking abortion pills, perhaps obtained from an NHS provider via telemedicine, in the 39th week of pregnancy because she had changed her mind about having a child? What would your conscience say to you, knowing that you made that possible through the support of this legislation?
We heard a great deal about unwelcome investigations, but what do supporters of Clause 208 think the police should do if they discover the dead body of a 39 week-old baby in a rubbish bin? The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, explained in Committee that investigations would often still be required even if Clause 208 passes, as police would need to investigate the circumstances if a deceased full-term baby body is found away from a clinical setting. Is that the option that supporters of Clause 208 really believe in?
To conclude, I could give many reasons why I support Amendments 425 and 426 but, because of time, I am not able to do so. Let us remember that when we are talking about the life of an unborn child, we are talking about not an it but a real, living person with the expectation of being born, being protected by a caring and loving society, and being held in loving arms. I do not think that is too much for a child to ask or expect.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)
We need to move on to the Front Benches.
Baroness Barker (LD)
My Lords, I am the first speaker from these Benches. For us, this is a matter of conscience. My noble friend Lady Smith of Newnham has not had the opportunity to speak. She disagrees with me. She is supportive of the other side. She wished for me to mention that she has been contacted by a young student called Lily, who has contacted a number of other Peers to say that they share her point of view. I hope that Lily and my noble friend will hear that we have acknowledged their sincerely held views, which are very different from mine.
Baroness O’Loan (CB)
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and I have been trying to speak. The noble Baroness has an amendment down. It is not good enough that we are being silenced at a time when the House is being asked to vote to approve something that has not been properly discussed or explored, and the consequences have not been fully considered. It is not good.
Baroness Barker (LD)
My Lords, I do have an amendment, Amendment 423A, which other noble Lords have signed. It is to ask that prosecutions cease and desist. The reason for it is that we have uncovered over these past few months that different police forces are taking entirely different approaches under the current law, and that women and health professionals do not know where they stand. I refer to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and to the speech of our noble colleague who is the chair of the College of Policing, about the fact that there needs to be a clear policy direction from Parliament in order that we can have a consistent approach throughout the medical profession and throughout policing.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, once again we have had a full and passionate debate on a matter of the utmost significance. It is apparent, from both deliberations in Committee and from today, that views on this matter are deeply and sincerely held across your Lordships’ House.
A wide range of points have been raised by noble Lords. Let us consider a variety of them. We have heard about issues around how the police investigate cases, about the interaction of telemedicine and criminal investigation, about the potential for women to face coercion, about issues of safeguarding of younger women and about issues of domestic abuse—to name but a few mentioned tonight. A lot of ground has not yet been covered. Other noble Lords have not yet spoken or have wanted to speak but have not been able to. What this tells us is that the matter is very far from settled. Some noble Lords’ concerns have plainly not been allayed.
This brings me back to the point I made in Committee. This clause has not received anything like adequate scrutiny. It is true that we have now had several hours of debate on this matter in your Lordships’ House. The point I made before, however, still stands: it is a matter of procedure, not substance. In the other place, however, this clause was considered for only 46 minutes of Back-Bench debate. No parliamentary committee has been able to seek views and take evidence, and if ever there was the need for a parliamentary committee to take evidence on a policy, this is it. We need to hear from and test the views of the police, of the CPS, of doctors, of obstetricians, of safeguarders and, if possible and most importantly, of women or their representatives and advocates. This policy was not in the Government’s election manifesto. It has not been subject to pre-legislative scrutiny, public consultation, or an impact assessment. The noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, put it very well in Committee. She said that the clause was passed
“in the other place following a very brief and truncated debate, entirely incommensurate with the gravity of its impact”.—[Official Report, 2/2/26; col. 1336.]
Changes to the law of abortion are and remain issues of conscience. The Opposition do not and will not take an official position on the substance of the clause. There is a multitude of views in my own party, and the issue is in the hands of your Lordships’ House as a matter of conscience. But that does not mean that we are released from our duty to undertake due diligence and rigorous interrogation of the consequences of changing the social law of this country. Whatever one thinks of the substance of the issue itself, the truth is that this clause has been tacked on to the side of a Crime and Policing Bill when it should not have been. That is no way to make law.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, I will be as brief as I can. I shall start, as I did in Committee, by reiterating that the Government maintain a neutral stance on abortion in England and Wales. Many of the amendments in this group are similar or identical to those tabled in Committee. So, save in a very few cases, I shall not repeat the Government’s assessment of their workability. This means that if I do not explicitly mention an amendment, it is either because there are no workability issues or because I set them out fully in Committee. As a shorthand, I will refer to conduct that comes under Sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, and under the Infant Life (Preservation) Act, collectively as “abortion offences”.
I begin with Amendment 423ZA tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor. It is unclear how this amendment is intended to work in practice—in particular, which party would bear the burden of establishing a lack of mental capacity and what the standard of proof would be. Thus, it is possible that it would create confusion for practitioners. Your Lordships may wish to note that the law already takes account of defendants’ understanding of their actions in various ways. It is unclear how this amendment is intended to interact with well-established criminal law principles.
Amendment 422E, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner of Margravine, is similar to that tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, in Committee, but it contains an additional requirement that a prosecution could not be brought any later than 12 months from the date of the alleged offence. Your Lordships will be aware that, other than for summary-only offences, there is, almost without exception, no statutory time limit for prosecuting criminal offences in England and Wales. The reason for that is that evidence may emerge over several years, so a limitation period would remove the ability to prosecute in cases where evidence of guilt came to light much later on. The introduction of a limitation period could lead to differences in outcomes depending on when evidence becomes available, the complexity of the case and the resources of investigating and prosecuting authorities.
Amendment 423, in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, is similar to the one he tabled in Committee, but it differs in three respects: it would broaden the scope of the specified defences; it would make provision for who must bear burden of proof in relation to those defences; and it would introduce additional provisions relating to police investigations. In relation to the workability concerns I raised in Committee, for the second and third of these differences there are some further issues. In relation to the burden of proof, the drafting is ambiguous. If the intention is that the defendant should bear the evidential burden, clarification would be needed. In relation to the proposed new provisions for police investigations, your Lordships may wish to note that decisions on whether to initiate, and the scope of such an investigation, are currently operational matters for the police.
Amendment 423A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, is also similar to one tabled in Committee. While the Government remain neutral on changing the criminal law, it is important that investigations into other offences, such as murder, manslaughter or infanticide under the Infanticide Act, are still carried out. Those offences would continue to be investigated and prosecuted by the Crown Prosecution Service if the test for prosecution is met. Your Lordships may wish to note that this amendment would be likely to trigger a review of any live investigations and prosecutions. However, we would not expect this to carry any significant resourcing implications.
Amendment 426C, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Wolf of Dulwich, is again similar to an amendment tabled in Committee. It might be helpful to remind your Lordships of the point that I made then, namely that the proposed new offence is not limited to obtaining abortifacient drugs for use in the termination of a pregnancy. Abortifacient drugs are not defined in legislation and are also used for non-abortion-related purposes. In addition, further amendments would be needed to clarify whether the offence was one that is to be triable either way, whether the maximum penalty on conviction on indictment should be the same as that on summary conviction and whether the maximum penalty in the magistrates’ court should align with its general powers, which update automatically should the limits on its sentencing powers change in the future.
Baroness Berridge (Con)
I would be grateful for clarification as to whether the Government have considered their own current inquiries into the grooming gangs. There was evidence there that:
“Victims and survivors were also critical about how easy it can be to obtain emergency contraception or abortion services without appropriate questions being asked”.
This evidence has been relied on consistently in Committee and on Report, yet there are concerns. Have the Government looked at that?
Secondly, in relation to the case that I mentioned in Committee, which contradicts much of what has been said, the comments of His Honour Mr Justice Cooke in Leeds Crown Court, in the case of Sarah Catt, very clearly state that this was a “cold calculated” decision that she took for her own convenience and self-interest. She took pills at 39 weeks and gave birth, and it seems she never revealed where the body was. She had a history of deceit and concealment—that is in the judgment of Leeds Crown Court. So have the Government considered, also in relation to other amendments about pardons, that this was conduct not of a victim but of a woman who perpetrated a crime?
Finally—
Baroness Berridge (Con)
It was a crime, and she was given eight years in prison for that.
On the question about the offences that the judge also considered—murder, manslaughter and infanticide —I emailed the Minister about the clarification I asked for in Committee on guidance being given to emergency services that may come across a situation such as that outlined in Sarah Catt. What is their obligation to the woman and the child?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I thank the noble Baroness for her points, which I am sure your Lordships’ House will want to take into account when deciding whether, as a matter of policy, to vote for or against the various amendments. I remind the noble Baroness that these are not government amendments—the Government are neutral—but I am sure that everyone in your Lordships’ House has heard them and will take them into account in various ways.
Amendment 425 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, is identical to one tabled in Committee. I raised at that stage the Government’s concerns about workability and operational difficulties, and they remain. In short, the effect of Amendment 425 might be to reduce access to early medical abortion due to resource constraints on the ability of abortion providers to hold in-person consultations.
Amendment 426D, tabled by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leicester, is new, but it carries similar possible operational effects to those I set out in Committee in relation to Amendment 425, about which I spoke a moment ago. The proposed new clause in Amendment 426D may have a detrimental impact on abortion provision and access for under-18s, including those who live in remote areas or who have difficulties in attending a clinic. It should also be noted that it is unclear whether this amendment would require under-18s to have all consultations face to face, including any initial contact with the service. If so, this would further increase the workability concerns, including resourcing constraints on providers and access to abortion provision for young people.
Amendment 426B, in the name of my noble friend Lady Thornton, is once again very similar to an amendment tabled in Committee. The duty on the Secretary of State, as drafted, poses substantial operational and resourcing implications. There is no centrally held record of women who have been convicted of, cautioned for, arrested for or investigated on suspicion of abortion offences. Therefore, the Secretary of State would be unable to comply with the duty to direct the specified bodies to delete such details from records. If this is the will of Parliament, consideration will need to be given to how to deliver the objectives of this amendment in a way that is operationally workable.
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)
My Lords, I appreciate that the hour is late and very charged emotions have been expressed, so I do not intend to delay the House with a long response. I simply point out to those Members who are not familiar with the Companion and were surprised that so many of us did not take interventions that this was not due to any lack of respect for their positions. The Companion says at 4.29 that a Member
“may justifiably refuse to give way, for instance … in time-limited proceedings”.
I wanted to make that clear.
I have heard what the Minister has said about Amendment 422E. I will go away and consider that. This was meant to be a compromise. I know that Members want to get to other substantive amendments. I therefore do not wish to test the opinion of the House and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Monckton of Dallington Forest (Con)
I thank all noble Lords who have participated in this debate. I have listened to opinions from across the House but am not satisfied that the mother or the unborn baby is protected. I would therefore like to test the opinion of the House.
Baroness Stroud
“Abortion: requirement for in-person consultationIn section 1(3D) of the Abortion Act 1967 (medical termination of pregnancy), omit “, by telephone or by electronic means”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would mean that a pregnant woman would need to have an in-person consultation before lawfully being prescribed medicine for the termination of a pregnancy.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)
My Lords, let me assist the House by saying that we should now be moving on to Amendment 426A on assisted dying, in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton. I understand my noble and learned friend tabled the amendment only to get a particular response from the Government and he has no intention of dividing the House tonight. I suggest that we allow his contribution but do not have a prolonged debate on assisted dying tonight—we have had a number of days on that. Then, when we have had the Minister’s response, we can get back to the other amendments because potentially there are three more votes in this group. I think the House will want to vote on those and this is a way forward for everybody.
Amendment 426A
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
“Providing assistance under assisted dying legislation in Crown Dependencies: criminal liabilityIn the Suicide Act 1961, after section 2A (acts capable of encouraging or assisting suicide) insert—“2AA Assistance provided in Crown Dependencies(1) In sections 2(1) and 2A(1), a reference to an act that is capable of encouraging or assisting suicide or attempted suicide does not include—(a) participating in acts that facilitate the provision of a medically assisted death in Scotland or the Crown Dependencies (the “jurisdictions”) under or in connection with legislation in those jurisdictions (“relevant legislation”),(b) performing any other function under that relevant legislation in accordance with that relevant legislation, or(c) assisting a person seeking to end their own life in accordance with that relevant legislation to access that relevant legislation.(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 2 to prove that they—(a) reasonably believed they were acting in accordance with relevant legislation in those jurisdictions, and(b) took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence.””
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)
I am obliged. Assisted dying feels quite pacific in comparison with the debate we have just had. This is my amendment, which I do not intend to press. It is the product of discussions with the BMA. It was tabled in Committee in my name and in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff. It was withdrawn in Committee because the Isle of Man Government, who have passed a Bill to deal with assisted dying, said they did not want it to be tabled before there had been discussions with them. There have now been discussions between the BMA and the Isle of Man Government and they are content for it to be tabled.
This amendment seeks to provide protections for doctors with patients who live in the Isle of Man or Jersey, where assisted dying Bills have been passed but have not yet received Royal Assent. It is common, for example, for some people resident in the Isle of Man to have doctors in the north-west of England. Those doctors may well give a diagnosis or a prognosis in writing, which might then be used in an assisted dying process in accordance with the laws in those two other jurisdictions. Amendment 426A says that if a doctor does such a thing and they are participating in a process which is strictly in accordance with the law
“in Scotland or the Crown Dependencies”,
And, obviously, Scotland voted against assisted dying yesterday, but the principle is that they will not be breaking the law in this country—
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)
Can I finish my explanation, then hear from the Minister and then take it from there? I have had a very useful discussion with the Minister, who said that the Government took the view that the amendment was premature before Royal Assent in relation to the two jurisdictions, and I accept that. She said that once Royal Assent was given, the Government would consult with Jersey and the Isle of Man Governments and other relevant parties about what the Government would then do. She gave no commitment as to what the Government would do, but I am content with that approach. There will obviously be some degree of urgency, depending on how long it will take for the other jurisdictions to introduce assisted dying, but if the Minister were to confirm that that was the position, and that is what she explained to me, I would be content with that explanation.
Baroness Coffey (Con)
I did not quite hear at the start. Can I just confirm that this amendment was not tabled at the request of the Isle of Man Government?
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)
That is correct. It was tabled after discussions between the BMA, the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, and me, and it was withdrawn because the Isle of Man Government wanted more consultation.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
With the House’s permission, it might be helpful if I set out the Government’s position, and then perhaps we can take it from there, if the noble Baroness is prepared to give way to me at this stage. The Government have some workability and drafting concerns about the noble and learned Lord’s amendment, but I will focus on the central issue so that the House knows what the Government’s position is.
Although the Government remain neutral on the overall issue, we recognise that assisted dying regimes being implemented in different parts of the UK and the Crown dependencies could create practical issues for those in one jurisdiction who are involved, in some way, in the lawful assisted death of a person in another jurisdiction. However, I support what my noble and learned friend said: the Government consider it premature to legislate on this issue. We do not yet know whether assisted dying will become lawful in the various jurisdictions, what the final form of any such regimes may be, or how and when they would be implemented. Legislating now in this unique way to amend the criminal law in England and Wales without clarity about these frameworks risks unintended consequences. The Government do not rule out that, in due course, processes may be agreed between the jurisdictions—or, if necessary, future legislation placed before this House and, potentially, other Parliaments—to achieve these aims.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)
I am grateful to the Minister for that indication. On the basis of that, I am happy to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Thornton
“Provisions for pardons and criminal records of women prosecuted under abortion law(1) The Policing and Crime Act 2017 is amended as followed.(2) After section 165 (Other pardons for convictions etc of certain abolished offences: England and Wales), insert—“165A Pardon and expungement of records for women under the law related to abortion(1) Subsections (2) and (3) apply in respect of a woman (whether living or deceased) who, when acting in relation to her own pregnancy, was convicted of, cautioned for, arrested for, or investigated on suspicion of, an offence under the law related to abortion, including sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929.(2) Where the woman has been convicted of, or cautioned for, an offence detailed in subsection (1), she is pardoned for the offence.(3) The Secretary of State must by notice direct the relevant data controller to delete details, contained in relevant official records, of a conviction, caution, arrest, or investigation detailed in subsection (1).(4) Expressions used in this section or section 167(1) (so far as relating to this section) and in Chapter 4 of Part 5 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 have the same meaning in this section or (as the case may be) section 167(1) as in that Chapter (see section 101 of that Act).”(3) In section 167 (Sections 164 to 166: supplementary)—(a) in subsection (1) after “165” insert “ or 165A”;(b) in subsection (2) after “165” insert “ or 165A”.” Member’s explanatory statement
Abortion offences are classed as violent crimes meaning they will permanently be disclosed as part of a DBS check. This amendment seeks to pardon women who have a conviction or caution for an offence which Clause 208 applies to. It would also ensure the removal of women’s details from police systems, regardless of the outcome of their case.
Baroness Thornton (Lab)
My Lords, I know that the amendment is defective, because my noble friend has said that. However, this is the only opportunity we have to address the issue. Now that we have agreed, as a House, to keep the clause in the Bill, if I press my amendment it will need to be dealt with by the Government between now and Third Reading. Therefore, I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Baroness Wolf of Dulwich
“Offence of obtaining abortifacients by false representation(1) A person commits an offence if they dishonestly makes a false representation and intend by making the representation to obtain any abortifacient drugs for use either by themself or another, whether such drugs have been lawfully prescribed in good faith based on the false representation or not.(2) A person guilty of the offence is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine or both, or on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both.”
Baroness Wolf of Dulwich (CB)
I am grateful to the Minister for her comments, and indeed to everybody who was engaged in the debate. I completely accept that an abortifacient is a drug that can be used for other things. I am not sure what that has to do with my amendment, which is to do with false representation. For all the reasons I spoke about—the fact that we are throwing a bit of a bomb into a changing world rather than a tiny little change—I think this would be helpful. I would therefore like to test the opinion of the House.
“Abortion: requirement for in-person consultation if the pregnant woman or girl is under the age of 18After section 1(3D) of the Abortion Act 1967 (medical termination of pregnancy) insert—“(3E) If the pregnant woman or girl is under the age of 18, any consultation must take place in person.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure that a pregnant woman or girl under 18 years old would need to have an in-person consultation before they could be prescribed drugs to end a pregnancy, so that potential safeguarding needs are identified.
The Lord Bishop of Leicester
I realise that I am going to make myself very unpopular at this hour, but I will make a very brief comment on the couple of comments that were made regarding the amendment in the course of the debate. I remind noble Lords that this is about children who become pregnant and it is about safeguarding risks. Therefore, I was not entirely happy that it should be contrasted between evidence and anecdote. There is plenty of evidence to support the need for this from professionals in the field. Similarly, to those saying that professionals say that children will not come, I am afraid that the professionals that have advised me on this are very clear that children will come when it is necessary. I therefore invite the House to support the amendment and ask for a Division.
Crime and Policing Bill
Wednesday 25th March 2026
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 180-I Marshalled list for Third Reading - (24 Mar 2026)
16:27 - Division on Amendment 2 (to Amendment 1) - Ayes: 306 / Noes: 145 - Amendment 2 (to Amendment 1) agreed.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
My Lords, I would like to make a short statement on the position regarding the legislative consent Motion on this Bill. While the majority of the provisions in the Bill apply to England and Wales only, certain provisions apply also to Scotland and Northern Ireland. The provisions relate to a mix of excepted, reserved and devolved or transferred matters, and as such engage the legislative consent process in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
I am pleased to inform the House that yesterday, 24 March, the Scottish Parliament approved a legislative consent Motion in respect of the Bill put forward and supported by the Scottish Government. The Northern Ireland Assembly approved three legislative consent Motions on 23 June, 2 February and 16 March. However, on 10 March the Welsh Senedd debated a legislative consent Motion put forward and supported by the Welsh Government, but the Motion was not supported by the Senedd. This is regrettable, given the measures in the Bill that engage the legislative consent process include a range of offences, such as assault on a retail worker, mobile phone theft, sexual exploitation and others. I cannot for the life of me understand why Plaid Cymru, Reform, Conservative and Liberal Democrat Members opposed the consent Motion in the Welsh Senedd—but they did, and they will have to be accountable for that.
I believe the Bill should pass. We are in discussion with the Welsh Government and the Wales Office about the way forward, and we will set out the Government’s position when the Bill is next considered by the House of Commons after the Recess. In the meantime, I beg to move that the Bill be read a third time.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“Taking down intimate image content(1) The Online Safety Act 2023 is amended as follows.(2) In section 10 (regulated user-to-user services: safety duties about illegal content) after subsection (3) insert—“(3A) A duty to operate a service using proportionate systems and processes designed to take down—(a) content in relation to which an intimate image content report is made to the provider (see section 20A(2)), and(b) any other content identified by the provider as the same, or substantially the same, as that content,as soon as reasonably practicable, and no later than 48 hours, after the provider receives the report (unless subsection (3B) applies).(3B) This subsection applies if the provider considers that—(a) the content is not intimate image content, or(b) the person making the report is not—(i) the subject of the content, or(ii) a person acting on that person’s behalf.”(3) After section 20 (duty about content reporting) insert—“20A Reporting of intimate image content(1) The duty in section 20(2) includes a duty to operate a service using systems and processes that allow users and affected persons to easily make an intimate image content report to the provider.(2) An “intimate image content report” is a report which—(a) declares that content present on the service is intimate image content,(b) declares that the report is made by—(i) the subject of the content, or(ii) a person acting on that person’s behalf,(c) provides sufficient information about the content for the provider to identify it,(d) provides contact details for the person making the report, and(e) complies with any other requirements specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.(3) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about how the requirements in subsection (2)(a) to (d) are to be met.”(4) In section 21 (duties about complaints procedures) after subsection (2) insert—“(2A) The duty in subsection (2) includes a duty to operate an expedited complaints procedure in relation to complaints within subsection (4)(a), (b)(i) or (b)(ii) that—(a) are made by users or affected persons who have made an intimate image content report (see section 20A(2)), and(b) are about the content to which the report relates.”(5) In section 27 (regulated search services: safety duties about illegal content) after subsection (3) insert— “(3A) A duty to operate a service using proportionate systems and processes designed to ensure that individuals are no longer able to encounter—(a) search content in relation to which an intimate image content report is made to the provider (see section 31A(2)), and(b) any other search content identified by the provider as the same, or substantially the same, as that content,as soon as reasonably practicable, and no later than 48 hours, after the provider receives the report (unless subsection (3B) applies).(3B) This subsection applies if the provider considers that—(a) the search content is not intimate image content, or(b) the person making the report is not—(i) the subject of the content, or(ii) a person acting on that person’s behalf.”(6) After section 31 (duty about content reporting) insert—“31A Reporting of intimate image content(1) The duty in section 31(2) includes a duty to operate a service using systems and processes that allow users and affected persons to easily make an intimate image content report to the provider.(2) An “intimate image content report” is a report which—(a) declares that search content is intimate image content,(b) declares that the report is made by—(i) the subject of the content, or(ii) a person acting on that person’s behalf,(c) provides sufficient information about the search content for the provider to identify it,(d) provides contact details for the person making the report, and(e) complies with any other requirements specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.(3) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about how the requirements in subsection (2)(a) to (d) are to be met.”(7) In section 32 (duties about complaints procedures) after subsection (2) insert—“(2A) The duty in subsection (2) includes a duty to operate an expedited complaints procedure in relation to complaints within subsection (4)(a), (b)(i) or (b)(ii) that—(a) are made by users or affected persons who have made an intimate image content report (see section 31A(2)), and(b) are about the search content to which the report relates.”(8) In section 59 (meaning of “illegal content” etc) after subsection (10) insert—“(10A) “Intimate image content” means content that amounts to an offence under section 66B(1), (2) or (3) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sharing intimate image of a person without consent).””Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause amends the Online Safety Act 2023 to impose new duties about removing content which is reported to providers as intimate image content.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, government Amendments 1, 14 and 18 deliver on the Government’s commitment to ensure that the strongest protections possible on violence against women and girls online are in place. They seek to create a reporting mechanism for non-consensual intimate images and a requirement that processes and systems be in place so that such content, and any content which is
“the same, or substantially the same”,
is removed within 48 hours.
In moving these amendments, I pay tribute to the work of the noble Baroness, Lady Owen of Alderley Edge, in both raising and being a tireless campaigner on this issue in your Lordships’ House.
We all know that non-consensual intimate image abuse is utterly vile, and the Government are very clear that we will not allow the proliferation of demeaning and degrading images online. I believe that the House is united in recognising the profound and lasting harm that this form of abuse inflicts on victims, and we share a common determination to ensure that victims receive meaningful protection. The Government are committed to delivering a strong, clear, enforceable response across the online safety regime. I am very grateful for the constructive engagement that has been crucial in shaping this amendment, both by the noble Baroness and by my noble friend Lady Levitt.
The Online Safety Act already places robust duties on services to minimise illegal content, including intimate image offences, and provides effective reporting and complaints mechanisms for users. However, given the particular and often acute impact of intimate image abuse, the Government have now committed to going further to set out specific expectations of how platforms must respond when this content is reported.
That brings me to Amendment 1, which delivers on the commitment that we have made to ensure that the strongest protections possible on violence against women and girls online are in place. Amendment 1 seeks to create a reporting mechanism for non-consensual intimate images and a requirement that processes and systems be in place so that such content and any content which is the same or substantially the same is removed within 48 hours.
This builds on the work already undertaken to strengthen the Online Safety Act. The House has already agreed amendments that make requesting or making intimate images and sharing or threatening to share them primary offences under the Online Safety Act. This amendment will impose additional duties on all regulated services and will require platforms to prioritise, detect, mitigate and remove this illegal content more quickly and systematically.
Amendment 1 goes further and delivers on the commitment of my right honourable friend the Prime Minister at the end of February to put social media companies on notice to take down any non-consensual intimate images within 48 hours. The Government’s amendment will introduce a clear, enforceable, statutory duty requiring platforms to have systems and processes in place to remove reported information as soon as possible and within 48 hours.
The duty is designed to work with the Online Safety Act’s systems and processes framework, ensuring that Ofcom can enforce it effectively at scale and deliver for victims of intimate image abuse. This also means that the amendment will be subject to the full suite of enforcement powers at Ofcom’s disposal.
I want to tell the House that Ofcom is to consult on additional safety measures to support the removal of re-uploads, including work on a hash-matching regime, which would require relevant services to adopt technology to detect and prevent re-uploads of non-consensual intimate images. Together, the statutory take-down duty and the hash-matching measures will create a joined-up system that delivers a stronger and more sustainable protection for victims than a stand-alone 48-hour rule.
“(3AA) A duty to record and report the average time taken to take down content under the duty in subsection (3A) to OFCOM and to publish the information publicly.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure that internet services must report the average time they take to remove non-consensual intimate images.
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to the government amendments and to the amendments in my name and in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara. In doing so, I declare an interest as receiving pro bono legal advice from Mishcon de Reya on image-based sexual abuse.
I am grateful to the Government for working with me to bring forward their amendment in response to my amendment in Committee on 48-hour take-down. I am pleased they are working with me on the amendments that your Lordships’ House passed on Report on the creation of a centralised hash registry and hash sharing. I must add that it is disappointing that after months of speaking to the Government about the importance of hashing and 48-hour amendments working together that they cannot be scrutinised together.
While I am very pleased that government Amendment 1 addresses the concerns I brought forward on de-indexing and duplicates, I do not believe it is sufficient to achieve the mechanism I set out to create in my original 48-hour take-down amendment in Committee. My intention was to create a system where no victim is left behind. This requires the mechanism to be agile and for internet services to feel the consequence of not acting on each individual instance reported. The government amendment has done the bare minimum and simply updated the Online Safety Act where it already instructed internet services to swiftly take down such content, to now add,
“as soon as reasonably practicable, and no later than 48 hours”.
In reality, this represents very little change as the good actors will still move at pace and the bad actors will continue to ignore. One survivor, Jodie, who many noble Lords have met, responded to the government amendment by saying that
“it is hugely frustrating to see headline grabbing commitments without the substance needed to actually protect victims. A 48-hour deadline sounds strong, especially when delivered by the Prime Minister to millions on breakfast television, but without real enforcement it risks creating false hope”.
Another victim, Daria, said:
“As a survivor, I feel this is quite simply gaslighting”.
We must remember that Ofcom rules are about systems and processes, and not outcomes. If a service has followed the rules but individual violations still occur, an internet service will not be held responsible. Sophie Mortimer at the Revenge Porn Helpline confirmed this, stating:
“While the platforms that already act in good faith will meet these standards, the persistent bad actors who continue to drive the sharing of this content will ignore and the Government amendment does not give Ofcom enough weapons to respond”.
I am deeply concerned that the Government have not specified how Ofcom will even know if a service fails to act within 48 hours. Ofcom has confirmed that there is no automatic mechanism for it to know whether services are not meeting the 48-hour take-down requirement in any given case. Further, the only recourse the Government provide should a service be found to generally not comply are the long and bureaucratic business disruption measures. This means that women will still suffer ongoing trauma when platforms refuse to comply.
My amendments seek to address the gaps in the government amendments, and I will outline them briefly. Amendments 2 and 8 mandate services to publicly report—and report to Ofcom—their average take-down times.
Amendments 3 and 9 strengthen the government wording on finding duplicate images to ensure that services have to take all reasonable steps, instead of simply relying on what a service may identify.
Amendments 4 and 10 incentivise services to act by creating a more agile mechanism whereby they can be fined per violation, and this can increase for every 24-hour period in which they fail to act, thus ensuring there is a consequence for not acting on individual instances of abuse. I believe these amendments create a more agile mechanism and do not rely solely on business disruption measures. This amendment is based on the TAKE IT DOWN Act, which operates under the rules of the Federal Trade Commission in the USA. The sum I have chosen is based on the figure levied under FTC rules for continued instances of violation after companies have been notified.
Amendments 5 and 11 mandate the Secretary of State to create a mechanism whereby individuals can report to Ofcom in cases where the service provider has failed to remove the content within 48 hours. At present, it is not clear what a victim would do if they reported the content to a service which then failed to act after the initial 48 hours.
Amendments 6 and 12 ensure that services have “clear and conspicuous” notices of where victims can report NCII content. This uses the wording from the TAKE IT DOWN Act and gives more clarity to internet services. The government amendment and the Online Safety Act refer simply to being able
“to easily make an intimate image content report to the provider”.
Amendments 7 and 13 add provisions that seek to curb malicious reporting by requiring a statement that the report has been made “in good faith”. Additionally, this provides internet services with further assurances they need to act more quickly upon receiving reports.
I am grateful to the Government for coming to the table on this issue. However, victims deserve so much more than press releases that promise action but in reality represent little practical change in the most traumatic moment of their lives. I implore noble Lords to vote with me so that no victim is left behind. I beg to move.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)
My Lords, at Third Reading it is extraordinarily rare to find issues still in contest, and to be presented, as we have been today, with a choice on which we will have to vote. Normally, by this stage, the issues have been clearly discussed and the parties concerned—the Government on the one side and those proposing amendments on the other—have had enough meetings to be able to get to a point where they can agree on what is going forward.
Having said that, I am sure that the whole House is very grateful to my noble friend the Minister for bringing forward what he has brought forward. These are substantial changes to the Online Safety Act and they are extraordinarily welcome. They cover the ground very well, but, as has been pointed out, they perhaps do not go quite as far as they could do. We are at Third Reading, so it is therefore very difficult to find the time and space to be able to resolve what I think are relatively quite small differences between the two sides.
I point out simply to my noble friend the Minister that this places those of us who support the noble Baroness in her amendments in a difficult position about his amendments, which we want to support; but the only way to get them to resolution is probably to vote with the noble Baroness. I hope he will appreciate that, and I suggest to him that, when he comes to respond, he makes it very clear that the Government are still willing to talk about these issues and still willing to meet those who have concerns and views about what the Government have done. I hope he might be able to promise that action could be taken in the Commons to resolve this.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
My Lords, I too support the noble Baroness, Lady Owen. As ever, she has spoken fantastically convincingly to her amendments, which sit in a broader set of aims that we have heard in Committee and on Report—at many stages. While recognising that the Government have moved considerably, I believe that we are debating this again in the context of a flood of women coming forward as survivors of non-consensual image abuse. As the harms are ever increasing, I am putting my faith in the noble Baroness’s interpretation of what is still necessary. Her amendments do something really important. I have spoken about this before and will do so on a later Bill this afternoon, but we need to tackle the issue of enforcement.
We cannot keep on adding duties to the Online Safety Act and expecting something to be different at the other end. In fact, we are adding a burden for people without giving them the tools by which that burden could be alleviated. The noble Baroness’s amendments have sought to create a more streamlined and agile system by allowing for fines every 24 hours in which an image is not removed. We have to find an incentive for tech to come to terms with the regulator, and the noble Baroness is doing just that. Unless we put a ticking clock on online services for failing to respond to harms to children and women, we cannot hope that women and children will be safe.
Lord Pannick (CB)
I add my support to the noble Baroness, Lady Owen. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, puts her finger on it: enforcement is key here, and it is key because we all know that without serious enforcement, these companies, which will be acting in breach of the law, will simply not comply. What will make them comply are substantial fines to hit them in the pocketbook. That is the only thing that will make them comply, and that is why I support the noble Baroness, Lady Owen.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I point out briefly that the essence of where the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, is coming from is that she speaks directly from the experience of the victims who have suffered from this. It is the victims themselves who have been struggling with the existing system, often in vain and with huge amounts of frustration. It is the victims who have been looking at the Government’s well-intended amendment, and on the basis of their own experience and knowledge, bitterly won, they feel strongly that it does not go far enough. They want others who are being abused at the moment, and trying to get some sort of redress, not to go through the same agony and pain that they have. I implore the Government to listen carefully, because this is the victims speaking directly to them. It is not the regulator; these are the victims, and the victims who are coming through the pipeline should be prioritised above all.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
My Lords, can I add one word? In my experience in dealing with a large number of offences where corporations were responsible, it is only fines—and fines of a substantial amount—that have any real effect. The fines in this Bill are modest, in my view. I hope everyone will realise that unless we put something by way of a fine in, we are making law without effect.
Baroness Bertin (Con)
My Lords, I support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Owen. I will not repeat what others have said eloquently. I will just speak quickly to my amendments, which are procedural. I have tabled Amendments 15 to 17, which I should have formally moved on Report—human error there, apologies. They were agreed by the Government to be consequential on my original Amendment 297AA, which passed with the support of this House, regarding the banning of depictions of step-incest in pornography. I shall simply move them formally and will not revisit the arguments, apart from to say I am pleased that the conversations I am having with the Government are positive. I am hopeful that we will be able to reach an agreement that sees this appalling and abusive content made illegal, as it should be.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, I really wish this Government would listen to common sense sometimes. Can the Minister please go back to No. 10 and explain that this is urgent?
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow noble Lords who have spoken in support of the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Owen of Alderley Edge. I rise to express our firm support on these Benches for Amendments 2 to 13, which the noble Baroness has brought forward and which I have signed, to the Government’s new clause. We also support the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin.
Like the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, we acknowledge that the Government have moved “substantially”, which I believe was the word used by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson. By tabling Amendment 1 they have accepted the principle of a 48-hour statutory take-down limit for non-consensual intimate images. I was also pleased to hear what the Minister said about ongoing hash-matching work.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friends Lady Owen of Alderley Edge and Lady Bertin, and the Minister, for their amendments. As my noble friend Lady Bertin said, her amendments were agreed as a package on Report and should have been moved then. We supported them at that time, and understand that the Government will accept them today.
While it is welcome that the Government have brought their Amendments 1 and 14, as they promised on Report, I join my noble friend Lady Owen in expressing concern about the drafting and the fact that the Government do not seem to know where they are going with this. The Prime Minister announced on 19 February that the 48-hour take-down for non-consensual intimate images would be government policy, but it is very clear that the Government do not actually know how they will implement the policy. My noble friend has explained why she believes that the Government’s amendment is defective. I hope that the Government will listen to her and accept the amendments. If they do not, we will support my noble friend in the Division Lobbies.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the Baroness, Lady Owen, for tabling her amendments and initiating this discussion. I feel like someone who has brought a birthday cake to a party, only to have someone else blow the candles out. On behalf of the Prime Minister, the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office, I have tried my best to bring forward proposals that meet the objectives the Government themselves have set, as well as those of the noble Baroness.
Taken together, Amendments 2 to 13 would amend government Amendment 1 by introducing fixed penalties, public performance reporting and new escalation routes to Ofcom. I note the support for these amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, from the Liberal Democrat Benches; the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower; my noble friend Lord Stevenson of Balmacara; the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron; the noble Lord, Lord Pannick; and the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool. I also note the short, sharp intervention from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, which I very much welcomed.
On the proposal to require services to publish average take-down times, I say to the noble Baroness and others that I recognise the desire for both transparency and public accountability. Ofcom already has the power to request information of this nature, which would also apply to the Government’s amendment. However, publicly benchmarking speed in this way risks hardwiring the wrong incentive into the system. This duty is not intended to be a race to remove any reported content at all costs, including where reports are mistaken, malicious or vexatious. Parliament is asking providers to act quickly and responsibly, which necessarily includes occasionally verifying that reports are valid.
A single, public average-time metric could encourage the unintended removal of lawful content, undermine procedural safeguards and, critically, ultimately undermine confidence in the regime among the very victims this Government wish to stand with the noble Baroness in support of. Ofcom has strong powers to require detailed performance data where there are concerns about systemic compliance. Regulator-led scrutiny is a more effective, credible and proportionate means of accountability that ensures a regime that best delivers for its victims.
Amendments 3 and 9 would require providers to take all reasonable steps to identify duplicates or substantially similar content. I share that objective on behalf of the Government. Providers are already required to take proportionate steps to seek out this illegal content under wider illegal content duties.
On the proposal of specific fines, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, mentioned that it is important that there are financial consequences for any illegal action. I say to them and to the noble Baroness that, as they know, the Online Safety Act already equips Ofcom with very strong enforcement powers. Ofcom can already issue a heavy fine of up to 10% of qualifying worldwide revenue in the event of contravention of regulations that Ofcom is empowered to monitor, and these fines can even be augmented with daily fines on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, it is not necessary to introduce an additional fixed-rate fine mechanism on the face of the Bill, given that a 10% fine on qualifying worldwide revenue is a significant and effective potential punishment from Ofcom, which has those enforcement powers.
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
Can the Minister say what an individual woman should do if her content is not removed within 48 hours? Is the Minister suggesting that, without a mechanism to contact Ofcom, she waits for Ofcom to recognise that a website has failed in its duty, and therefore for the Secretary of State to mandate long and bureaucratic business disruption measures, and for Ofcom to seek 10% of the business’s worldwide revenue—and all the while her intimate image is left online?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The purpose of the regulation is to provide a disincentive to putting content up in the first place. If anybody who places that content on any online platform knows that Ofcom has the power to levy a 10% fine on worldwide revenue, there will be that disincentive. The purpose of that power is to deter people from breaking the law. Coupled with the powers in government Amendment 1, it will provide strong reassurance to anybody who has had illegal content put online by any particular organisation or individual.
There may be an honest disagreement between the noble Baroness and me on this, but I want to prevent any illegal content being put up in the first place. I would argue that a 10% fine of any worldwide revenue for the platform that hosts that content is a significant contribution. It would mean, ultimately, that Ofcom has the power to cause significant damage to any organisation that puts up that illegal content. I accept and understand the concerns that have been raised; I just hope that the noble Baroness can also understand that the Government are trying to support the very victims she speaks about.
We appreciate the intention behind enabling individuals also to report non-compliance. They can raise that concern through Ofcom’s reporting portal, and such reports can signal potential systemic issues and can be used for wider investigations, as I have just mentioned. I also recognise the urgency with which victims rightly expect this content to be removed—the very point the noble Baroness has just made. I consider that a systems and processes approach remains the most effective way to secure consistent compliance and deliver protection at scale.
On the amendment the noble Baroness has brought forward that would require providers to display reporting notices and routes, the 2023 Act already requires platforms to have clear, accessible reporting routes that allow users to easily make intimate image reports. Again, Ofcom is best placed to specify details about this in its code of practice. Turning to proposals for good faith declarations, the government amendment requires reporting individuals to state that the content is intimate image content and that they are the subject of that content or are acting on the subject’s behalf. Additionally, the Secretary of State has regulation-making powers to specify further requirements if needed. I hope that that satisfies the noble Baroness. I hope the House can recognise that the Government have moved significantly on this issue, but we will hear the noble Baroness’s response in due course.
Amendments 15 to 17, proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, are accepted by the Government. They were, as she has said, tidying-up amendments agreed by the House on Report but sadly missed. As such, the Government will not oppose the amendments and will actively support them. This is, however, without prejudice to any further consideration of the substantive amendments carried on Report. We will set out the Government’s position on these and other amendments passed on Report when the Bill returns to your Lordships’ House after the Easter Recess, once it has been considered by the House of Commons.
I have tried to be constructive in my response on behalf of the whole of the Government—from the Prime Minister to the different departments that have contributed to this. I hope they were helpful engagements. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, for her amendments, and I hope that, having heard what has been said—it is, perhaps, with little hope—she will withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
My Lords I thank the Minister for his response. I feel that, on this point, we have not reached an agreement. While 10% of an internet service’s worldwide revenue is great, a more agile system where no woman and no victim is left behind is much better. With that, I wish to test the opinion of the House.
“(3AA) In fulfilling their duty under subsection (3A)(b), the provider must take all reasonable steps to identify any other content that is the same, or substantially the same, as the content in the report.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure that internet services must take all reasonable steps to find non-consensual intimate image content that is a duplicate of (or substantially the same as) reported content.
“(3C) Failure to comply with a duty under subsection (3A) may result in a fine of £39,000 for each 24 hour period following the 48 hours allowed to take the content down, payable to OFCOM.(3D) The fine payable under subsection (3C) may be increased by OFCOM following a review.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment provides an alternative to business disruption measures under the Online Safety Act 2023, so that fines can be levied more quickly, to incentivise content removal to happen faster.
“(3C) The Secretary of State must, by regulations within six months of the day on which the Crime and Policing Act 2026 is passed, establish a process for individuals to report to OFCOM that a service has failed in its duty under subsection (3A).(3D) The process under subsection (3C) must be easily accessible and must be identified by the service provider in their notice under section 20A(1). (3E) OFCOM must take all reasonable steps to ensure that the reporting process under subsection (3C) is easily identifiable and accessible.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure that, where an internet service has failed to act within 48 hours, individuals can report this to OFCOM.
(a) is easy to read and in plain language, and(b) provides information regarding the responsibilities of the service under this section, including a description of how an individual can submit an intimate image content report.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure that internet services have to clearly display notices which explain how non-consensual intimate images can be reported and removed.
“(4) A report made under this section must include a statement that the reporting person or authorised representative makes the report in good faith believing that the content is of the kind specified in section 20 and a statement that the information provided in the report is true to the best of their knowledge and belief.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to curb malicious reporting.
“(3AA) A duty to record and report the average time taken to take down content under the duty in subsection (3A) to OFCOM and to publish the information publicly.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure that internet services must report the average time they take to remove non-consensual intimate images.
“(3AA) In fulfilling their duty under subsection (3A)(b), the provider must take all reasonable steps to identify any other content that is the same, or substantially the same, as the content in the report.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure that internet services must take all reasonable steps to find non-consensual intimate image content that is a duplicate of (or substantially the same as) reported content.
“(3C) Failure to comply with a duty under subsection (3A) may result in a fine of £39,000 for each 24 hour period following the 48 hours allowed to take the content down, payable to OFCOM.(3D) The fine payable under subsection (3C) may be increased by OFCOM following a review.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment provides an alternative to business disruption measures under the Online Safety Act 2023, so that fines can be levied more quickly, to incentivise content removal to happen faster.
“(3C) The Secretary of State must, by regulations within six months of the day on which the Crime and Policing Act 2026 is passed, establish a process for individuals to report to OFCOM that a service has failed in its duty under subsection (3A). (3D) The process under subsection (3C) must be easily accessible and must be identified by the service provider in their notice under section 31A(1).(3E) OFCOM must take all reasonable steps to ensure that the reporting process under subsection (3C) is easily identifiable and accessible.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure that, where an internet service has failed to act within 48 hours, individuals can report this to OFCOM.
(a) is easy to read and in plain language, and(b) provides information regarding the responsibilities of the service under this section, including a description of how an individual can submit an intimate image content report.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure that internet services have to clearly display notices which explain how non-consensual intimate images can be reported and removed.
“(4) A report made under this section must include a statement that the reporting person or authorised representative makes the report in good faith believing that the content is of the kind specified in section 31 and a statement that the information provided in the report is true to the best of their knowledge and belief.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to curb malicious reporting.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“Taking down intimate image content: consequential amendments(1) The Online Safety Act 2023 is amended as follows.(2) In section 10 (regulated user-to-user services: safety duties about illegal content)—(a) in subsection (4) for “and (3)” substitute “to (3A)”;(b) in subsection (5)—(i) the words from “each paragraph” to the end become paragraph (a);(ii) at the end of that paragraph insert“, and(b) subsection (3A).”;(c) in subsection (7) for “subsection (2) or (3)” substitute “subsections (2) to (3A)”.(3) In section 23(5) (record-keeping and review duties) for “or (3)”, in the first place it occurs, substitute “, (3) or (3A)”.(4) In section 27 (regulated search services: safety duties about illegal content)—(a) in subsection (4) for “and (3)” substitute “to (3A)”;(b) in subsection (7) for “subsection (2) or (3)” substitute “subsections (2) to (3A)”. (5) In section 34(5) (record-keeping and review duties), for “or (3)”, in the first place it occurs, substitute “, (3) or (3A)”.(6) In section 59(14) (meaning of “illegal content” etc) for “and “priority illegal content”” substitute “, “priority illegal content” and “intimate image content””.(7) In section 71(2)(a)(i) (duty not to take down content except in accordance with terms of service: exceptions) for “or (3)” substitute “, (3) or (3A)”.(8) In section 136(5) (confirmation decisions: proactive technology)—(a) in paragraph (a) for “or (3)” substitute “, (3) or (3A)”;(b) in paragraph (c) for “or (3)” substitute “, (3) or (3A)”.(9) In section 237 (index of defined terms) at the appropriate place insert—
(10) In Schedule 4 (codes of practice)—(a) in paragraph 9(1) for “or (3)” substitute “, (3) or (3A)”;(b) in paragraph 9(3) for “or (3)” substitute “, (3) or (3A)”;(c) in paragraph 13(3)(a) for “or (3)” substitute “, (3) or (3A)”;(d) in paragraph 13(3)(c) for “or (3)” substitute “, (3) or (3A)”.”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause makes amendments to the Online Safety Act 2023 which are consequential on those made by my new clause (Taking down intimate image content).
Baroness Bertin
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(ma) sections (Taking down intimate image content) and (Taking down intimate image content: consequential amendments);”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment provides for the specified new clauses to have UK extent.
“(z4a) section 207(9);”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment gives UK extent to the specified provision, since it amends an Act which has UK extent.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment (and my other amendment to Schedule 2) corrects an amendment to section 78 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 to refer to a closure notice instead of an extension notice.
Member's explanatory statement
See my other amendment to Schedule 2.
Captain of the Honourable Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms and Chief Whip (Lord Kennedy of Southwark) (Lab Co-op)
My Lords, before we move on to the Motion that the Bill do now pass, I understand that the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, has tabled an amendment. I expect the debate on that to be brief and to be contained to the narrow subject it seeks to address, relating to an impact assessment. This is not the opportunity for another long debate about the general issues which have already been debated at length in this House and on which the House has made its mind very clear. I urge noble Lords to consider carefully whether a contribution is necessary, and to keep any remarks concise and focused on the amendment before us.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to your Lordships’ House for the contributions that have been made on the Bill. We have spent over 88 hours in Committee, we have had a full day’s Second Reading and 44 hours on Report, and we have spent an hour on the Bill now—all of which is good, rigorous scrutiny, and a considerable amount of it. The Bill leaves the House with a few extra pages and some extra government policy based on manifesto commitments. In doing so, it will better support the delivery of the Government’s safer streets mission to halve knife crime and see a reduction in violence against women and girls within a decade.
I am pleased, overall, with the contributions and the degree of cross-party agreement there has been across the House. We will continue to reflect on a number of the amendments that were made, contrary to my advice, and the debates we have had to date. When the Bill returns to the House after the Easter Recess, we will examine what else will be done in relation to the view of the Commons, the Government and this House.
I could not have done this Bill without the unstinting help of my noble friends Lady Levitt and Lord Katz, and I am grateful to them. Scrutiny is a great thing—I have done it myself when in opposition. It is important to test the Government and to put forward alternative ideas. Despite our agreements on some issues and our disagreements on others, I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower, Lord Cameron of Lochiel and Lord Sandhurst, from the Opposition Front Bench, and to the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Brinton, and the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, from the Liberal Democrat Benches, and to all noble Lords who have spoken in this and other debates.
Given that we sat late on a number of occasions, I put on record on behalf of the whole House our thanks to the doorkeepers and staff of the House. There were a few days when I did not know what time I was going home—and neither did they. It is important that we recognise their contribution to our parliamentary scrutiny. I must place on record my thanks to the Home Office team and the Ministry of Justice Bill team, to the policy officials from the Department for Transport, Defra, the Department of Health, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, the Ministry of Defence and DSIT, and to the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, No. 10 Downing Street and our private offices—all of whom have contributed and all of whom I and my fellow Ministers have spoken on behalf of in this Chamber.
This has been the largest justice Bill in a generation, and my goodness, does it not feel like it? It provides a number of measures for the Government on key issues to help prevent harms, to bring offenders to justice and to secure our community in a much safer way. There will be more parliamentary encounters to come after the recess but, in the meantime, I hope that we will help build safer streets, safer communities and a safer Britain. I beg to move that the Bill do now pass.
Amendment to the Motion
Baroness O'Loan
At end insert “but that this House regrets that no impact assessment was conducted in relation to clause 246, and that therefore the House has not been able to assess its potential effects on vulnerable persons, women’s health, criminal law, and policing”.
Baroness O'Loan (CB)
My Lords, the effect of Clause 246 of this Bill is to decriminalise abortion at any stage of the baby’s gestation where the baby’s life is terminated by the mother, but in no other circumstances. It is a matter of concern that we find ourselves today passing a Bill which contains Clause 246, given the dearth of information upon which noble Lords were asked to make a decision—hence my regret amendment.
The Cabinet Office Guide to Making Legislation states that an impact assessment is a vital tool to help Parliament understand the
“consequences of a proposed intervention
and to identify the
“associated risks of a proposal that might have an impact on the public … and wider society”.
Undeniably, Clause 246 required an impact assessment to identify the consequences and risks. That did not happen.
It is possible to be both neutral and objective and to respect conscience while considering policy implications and outcomes. This clause originated as a late Back-Bench amendment. As others have said, there was not enough scrutiny in the other place, or indeed here. Last week, many Peers were denied the opportunity to speak to amendments which they had signed or supported on this most fundamental and important of issues—the life and death of the baby and the danger to its mother.
We have been unable to evaluate adequately the operational impact of Clause 246 on policing. We lack clear evidence on how the removal of existing deterrents will affect the investigation of genuine cases of infanticide or the detection of women being coerced by a third party into dangerous late-term abortion. We have not been able properly to assess healthcare implications. There will surely have to be guidance issued to those who respond to a request for help in connection with such an abortion, which may turn out to require investigation as a criminal offence may have been committed by a third party, be that a coercive partner or a family member or other who does not want any child, or in some cases, unfortunately, a girl child, to be born.
During the debate, I asked the question: how is the mother to kill her child at these late stages so that she can abort it? I never received an answer. It seems to me that the Government must be aware that, if a woman decides to abort a baby herself after 24 weeks, she may need help to do so. Do the Government intend to publicise the fact that it will still be an offence to help a mother abort her baby in these circumstances?
Do they intend to highlight the fact that heavy bleeding, infection, damage to the womb and sepsis are all possible consequences of an abortion? What of the risks of prescription or over-the-counter drug overdoses as a woman seeks to abort her baby and to control her pain and that of her unborn child?
Paramedics responding to a 999 call where a woman is haemorrhaging or where a baby is stuck in the birth canal will have to try to save the life of both mother and baby, unless the baby is already dead. But there are a few precious moments when a baby who does not breathe automatically at birth can be encouraged to live and may well do so. What is the paramedic to do? Presumably, if the woman gets to hospital before delivering, it will be incumbent on nurses and doctors to attempt to save not only the mother but the child. Surely the child will not be left to die uncared for, as happens when babies are born alive after abortion. Guidance will be needed. What additional services—medical and mental health services—might need to be provided in these cases?
Finally, do we need some provision on what the mother can do with her little dead baby? Is she able to bury it? Can somebody else bury it? How will the police be able to determine whether a baby was born alive and killed after death if the baby’s body has been disposed of? What if the trauma of delivering the child is such that the mother is unable to bury the child? What if she was subject to coercion and is torn by grief? What can she do? What is to happen?
Today, I am sending an open parliamentary letter to the Home Secretary and the Minister for Health from some 80 Peers and MPs, articulating these and other concerns. These issues should surely concern His Majesty’s Government. Can the Minister say how the Government intend to take these matters forward to address these life and death issues?
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
My Lords, the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, regrets the failure to conduct an impact assessment in relation to Clause 246. Yet, as we have heard, the clause that decriminalises abortion up to birth will have the gravest of consequences for viable babies—now protected in law—for their mothers’ health and for our society. Including it in this Bill will render the Bill notorious.
Constitutionally, it is wrong. Laws, particularly on controversial and grave matters, are subject to two important conditions in Britain’s constitution. First, they must have a popular mandate, a condition that militated against the arbitrary exercise of executive power for hundreds of years, even before the 20th century brought universal adult suffrage, as Parliaments and leaders respected a popular wish. Secondly, they must meet the more formal requirements now in place for pre-election announcements, manifestos and pre-legislative consultation, including an impact assessment, detailed parliamentary scrutiny in both Chambers, revision, modification and, finally, some sort of legislative agreement.
Clause 246 is a highly controversial measure. Arguably, its consequences are the most serious of any legislation that this Government have passed. It has had neither a popular mandate nor parliamentary scrutiny. Clause 246 has been tacked on to a government Bill by a group of militant abortionists determined to manipulate parliamentary rules. It has had only 46 minutes of debate in the House of Commons. I am afraid it plays to the weakness of a Prime Minister orchestrating the factions of a divided Labour Party as he seeks to stay in power and fend off rival challenges.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
It reveals a Government unequal to the great task of governing the nation with which the electorate has entrusted it.
I particularly regret it because it brings disgrace to the Mother of Parliaments and, indirectly, to a country which, although it had no hand in the matter, could always hold its head high when its neighbours suffered instability, revolution and dictatorship. They could take comfort because, as has so often rightly been said, we have a constitutional way of solving our differences.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I know the noble Baronesses, Lady Lawlor and Lady O’Loan, feel very strongly about this matter, and they are perfectly entitled to do so. But we debated this at length in Committee: we had four hours-worth of debate then. We debated it for two hours last week on Report. Both noble Baronesses expressed their views very powerfully and at length, but the House did not agree with them. The House voted for this clause and I respectfully suggest that it is entirely inappropriate for us to debate it again.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)
Before anyone else comes in, I will just say that we should be addressing only the narrow issue of the impact assessment and nothing else.
Lord Biggar (Con)
My Lords, I rise to speak for no more than 90 seconds in support of the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan.
When we in this House voted through Clause 246 last week, we had failed to consider an important logical effect. In voting to decriminalise abortion by the mother up to the eve of birth, we decriminalised the deliberate killing of a mature, foetal human being. Between the human foetus on the eve of birth and the human infant 24 hours later, there is no significant moral difference. In passing Clause 246, we chose to breathe down the neck of legitimising early infanticide.
The fact that the clause leaves in place a general prohibition of abortion after 24 weeks makes no difference. In declaring that the killing is no crime, we declare that it does not matter. The killing does not matter only because what is being killed does not matter. What applies to the mature foetus applies equally to the early infant.
Our failure to assess that significant implication is highly regrettable, and that is why I support the amendment.
Baroness Deech (CB)
My Lords, I have great respect for the views of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan. We understand where she is coming from. But, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, this has been democratically passed by both Houses. The very graphic descriptions of the physical aspects of abortion are intended to put us off, but those aspects apply to any abortion. Any abortion at any stage could go wrong and result in something very upsetting.
There is an assumption on the part of those who oppose this new law that desperate women will be reading the law in all its detail before they resort to what they do. I suggest that a woman in the very late stage of pregnancy, who has probably been abandoned by the man responsible for it and who has no support, is unlikely to take down the statute book and study what the consequences are. All this new clause does is remove the criminal element. It does not make anything better or worse. It just stops desperate, unsupported women going to prison.
Finally, as I always say in debates about abortion, it is all very well expressing great sympathy, but who is there when the poor woman on her own has to go home with a baby whom she cannot support? She is abandoned and unable to look after it. None of us here is going to volunteer to help her. We have to have compassion for a woman who is in that desperate a state.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, I should have preferred that this particular clause had not been passed, but it was passed and we have to accept it. Following on very closely from what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said, in my view it is time we moved on.
Lord Farmer (Con)
My Lords, I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. We did not debate an impact assessment. We need a proper government impact assessment for this clause before it is made law. There are foreseeable consequences to taking down important guardrails within our abortion law for the sake of a relatively small number of people—
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)
My Lords, will the noble Lord kindly give way?
Lord Farmer (Con)
I would prefer to get a move on so that everybody is happy that this comes to an end. Have we forgotten that hard cases make bad law and public policy should be a consideration? Knowing that she aborted a perfectly viable baby can haunt a woman for years. Even if we start and end with an individual woman, enabling her to procure her own abortion at an extremely vulnerable point in her life—the amendment points to vulnerability—without committing a crime creates a moral hazard.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)
My Lords, I am sorry that the noble Lord did not give way, because I wanted to ask him this question. In his first sentence, he managed to speak to the amendment before us. He then went off on a tangent. In relation to impact assessment, has he, like me and many others, received hundreds of emails with countless papers and briefings about the implications of this clause? Did he observe the Second Reading debate in your Lordship’s House, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick said, and the extensive debates in Committee and on Report? The issue is whether the House has had sufficient information on which to make a judgment. My argument is that we have. We have made a judgment. This is totally unnecessary. We should move on and invite the Front Benches to now wind up.
Lord Farmer (Con)
I am addressing the point of impact assessment, which had not been properly debated.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, this Bill attempted to canter through some profoundly important issues, such as child sexual abuse, which the police have described to me as a “tsunami” and which I do not think is fully understood by most people, including some politicians. The other issue that is misunderstood is the rampaging impact of AI on our daily life. Both issues deserve a Bill on their own. But during the long hours of debate, we were constantly racing the clock. Starting debates at 3 pm, or later, and finishing them at midnight is not a way to make good legislation. If we are serious about effective scrutiny, we must modernise the sitting hours of this House as a matter of urgency. If scrutiny is to be meaningful, there needs to be more scope for the Government Front Bench to agree perfectly rational, sane and good ideas that have been suggested by amendments right the way across the House.
Nevertheless, I would like to thank the Ministers: the ever charming and affable noble Lord, Lord Hanson, who protected the Government with the tenacity that a lion would use to protect his cubs, ably supported by the noble Lord, Lord Katz, and the brilliant forensic skill of the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, whose ability to demolish, as I know from personal experience, a carefully crafted speech in one sentence but always with charm and a disarming smile made me think, “If only she was on our side instead of the Government’s”.
I also thank noble Lords across the House, with special thanks to the Conservative Front Bench, who have been a joy to work with. I also thank my wonderful Bill team, in particular my noble friends Lady Brinton, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Marks on the Front Bench, and Elizabeth Plummer from our Whips’ Office, whose tireless and excellent support on legislation has kept us firmly on track at all times. Finally, my heartfelt thanks go to Barbara Davidson, my researcher, who is one of the most hard-working, efficient and effective people I have ever had the privilege to work with.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this has been an incredibly long time coming. This Bill has endured 15 days in Committee and six days on Report in your Lordships’ House. It has been a mammoth of a task, but throughout the Bill’s passage, I am pleased to say that we have executed our duties in this House as diligently as ever.
To address the regret amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel set out our concerns about the lack of scrutiny of the abortion clause both in Committee and on Report. Our view remains the same: that such a significant change of abortion law should not have been rushed through Parliament, tacked on to a completely unrelated Bill. However, the House has now decided the matter and, as always, we respect that.
I said at Second Reading and again in Committee that I do not believe that a 500-page Crime and Policing Bill is going to bring down crime rates. We have an enormous amount of criminal law. The problem is that much of it is not effectively enforced.
Having said that, there are elements of this Bill that we are happy to see being sent to the other place. The Minister knows the parts of the Bill that I support; indeed, there have been several occasions on which he and I have been on the same page. There are some very good amendments that we passed on Report. I am pleased that the House supported my amendments to allow the police to seize vehicles using fly-tipping offences and to endorse the driving licences of fly-tippers with three penalty points. I am grateful to the Liberal Democrats and a number of non-affiliated and Cross-Bench noble Lords for supporting my amendment to increase the maximum sentence for the possession of a bladed article with intent to commit violence from four to 10 years and to force the Government to review the proscription of the IRGC. It is excellent that my noble friends Lord Young of Acton, Lady Buscombe, Lady Owen of Alderley Edge and Lady Bertin had the support of the House for their amendments as well.
I must, however, express my regret at a number of provisions that have ended up in the Bill. Clause 49, which makes low-value shoplifting triable either way, makes absolutely no sense to me. Clause 251, which gives foreign courts greater powers over the extradition of British citizens, is also undesirable. It is highly regrettable that the Government have inserted Clause 144, on aggravated offences. That clause is completely unnecessary, given Section 66 of the Sentencing Code and the raft of aggravated offences and hate crime legislation that already exists. It will only cause more problems for the police and is not going to contribute to the end of identity politics and a move towards greater social cohesion. When the inevitable happens and more people are arrested for speech offences, let it be known that the Conservatives warned the Government and tried to vote that down.
I am also deeply concerned that the Government’s amendment to grant themselves the mother of all Henry VIII powers passed. The Division was held outrageously late, which is not appropriate given the wide-ranging constitutional implications. Ministers will now be able to amend the entire Online Safety Act 2023 as they wish, and parliamentarians will have no say. This is not the way to regulate for AI chatbots. We should all be deeply troubled by this.
To end on a more positive note, I thank the Minister, genuinely, for engaging with me and with my noble friends Lord Cameron of Lochiel and Lord Sandhurst throughout the passage of the Bill. I am also very grateful to his officials and the Bill team for keeping us up to date with the government amendments. I thank all those in the Government Whips’ Office and in our Whips’ Office for their help, in particular Jamie Tucker in the Opposition Whips’ Office for shouldering most of the heavy lifting on this. And I thank the Lib Dem Front Bench for their co-operation on the Bill.
I sincerely hope that the Government will do some serious thinking over the Recess and take on board the suggestions from noble Lords in this place. When we come back to this Bill for consideration of the Commons amendments, I hope the Minister will be in a conciliatory mood.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, we are almost there. I want to respond to the amendment to the Motion in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan. She had the support of the noble Lords, Lord Biggar and Lord Farmer, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, on that. The noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, mentioned the Labour Party. There are Members on my side of the House who voted on both sides of the abortion debate. It is not a party-political issue. It was a free vote on this issue, certainly from the Government’s perspective and, I think, that of all parties. I reiterate that the Government were entirely neutral on the proposal that was put in Committee and later on Report that now forms Clauses 246 and 247. It is an entirely neutral government position.
I note the comments of the three noble Lords who spoke in support of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan. I also note those of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and I echo what they said in an entirely neutral way. We have to respect the fact that the House of Commons passed that proposal quite considerably and that after many hours of debate this House came to the same conclusion. The Government remain neutral, but that is the position.
We are now looking at the implications of that. The Government have always said that should Parliament pass any abortion amendments, they will ensure the safe and effective implementation of those provisions. This includes any costs associated with the implementation of this provision and this Bill. There are existing processes in the spending review and in future spending reviews to identify funding and around implementation. The Government remain neutral, but I have to say to all Members of the House that both Houses have spoken and that is the position that we find ourselves in today.
Whatever noble Lords’ personal views on the provisions in Part 16, we should not set aside the other parts of the Bill. There are a number of areas of agreement between all sides of the House. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that three amendments were accepted by the Government on Report. We will look at some of the amendments that this House passed and their implications when the Bill returns to the House of Commons after the Recess.
At the end of the day, I am proud of this Bill. I am proud of its position to protect children from sexual abuse. I am proud of the action we have taken on online harm. I am proud of the action on preventing violence against women and girls. I am proud of the action on young men and knife crime. I am particularly proud of the long campaign that my union raised on shop workers and assaults. I am proud of the issues on communities and anti-social behaviour. I am proud of this Bill, and for that reason I commend that this Bill do now pass. With due respect—I spoke to the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, today, and I understand where she is coming from—I ask the noble Baroness not to press her amendment. If she does, I am proud of this Bill as it stands. I am neutral on the issue of abortion on behalf of the Government, but I ask this House to pass the Bill.
Baroness O’Loan (CB)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his comments and for speaking to me earlier today. He talked about the cost implications of the Bill, and there are many, but I am not sure that anybody knows what the cost implications of Clause 246 might be. Be that as it may, my amendment to the Motion was to draw to the attention of the House the fact that things need to be done to let people carry out the jobs for which they are responsible and to help women in this most desperate situation. I do not intend to move the amendment to a vote. I thank those who spoke. We deliberately decided that we would not ask a lot of people to speak and that we would ask people not to speak so as not to delay the House in its other deliberations. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Crime and Policing Bill (Money)
Tuesday 14th April 2026
(3 weeks, 6 days ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Commons Consideration of Lords Amendments as at 14 April 2026 - large print - (14 Apr 2026)
Crime and Policing Bill (Ways and Means)
Tuesday 14th April 2026
(3 weeks, 6 days ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: Commons Consideration of Lords Amendments as at 14 April 2026 - large print - (14 Apr 2026)
Andy McDonald (Middlesbrough and Thornaby East) (Lab)
On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. As you know, I have tabled an amendment to Lords amendment 312 seeking to disagree with their lordships. This House will not be given the opportunity today to vote on this singular matter, notwithstanding that it does—in my view and that of many thousands of people watching our proceedings—represent a dangerous erosion of civil liberties, including those under article 9 on freedom of thought and religion, article 10 on freedom of expression and article 11 on freedom of assembly and the right to protest, which this Parliament has long since immortalised in our celebrations of the cumulative and persistent protests of the suffragettes and the anti-apartheid movement, marked by the plaque in honour of Nelson Mandela in Westminster Hall.
If the Government were confident of their amendment, they would put it to a vote, but in a move that in my view is disrespectful of this House, they have decided to wrap up such a hugely significant constitutional matter among their other, excellent, amendments, which this House will doubtless wish to prevail. Madam Deputy Speaker, I seek your advice as to how I may secure a binding, singular vote on Lords amendment 312, as this key constitutional measure, if not challenged, will inevitably erode and restrict the right to peaceful protest.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
I thank the hon. Member for his point of order, and indeed for giving notice of it. The Government’s programme motion, which the House is about to consider, will establish the time available for today’s debate and the order in which the Lords amendments are to be considered. If Members are not content with the way the Bill has been programmed, it would be for them to express that—for example, by disagreeing to the programme motion. If the programme motion is agreed to by this House, as Chair all I can advise him is that, under the terms of Standing Order No. 83F, a vote on his motion seeking to disagree with Lords amendment 312 would be possible only if it is reached before 7 pm.
Crime and Policing Bill
Tuesday 14th April 2026
(3 weeks, 6 days ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Commons Consideration of Lords Amendments as at 14 April 2026 - large print - (14 Apr 2026)
Crime and Policing Bill
Tuesday 14th April 2026
(3 weeks, 6 days ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Commons Consideration of Lords Amendments as at 14 April 2026 - large print - (14 Apr 2026)
18:29 - The House divided: - Ayes: 307 / Noes: 176 - Question accordingly agreed to.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
I must draw the House’s attention to the fact that Lords amendments 12, 256, 260, 264, 335, 361, 366, 367 and 369 engage the Commons’ financial privilege. If any of those Lords amendments are agreed to, I will cause the customary entry waiving the Commons’ financial privilege to be entered in the Journal.
The Minister for Policing and Crime (Sarah Jones)
I beg to move amendment (a) to Lords amendment 263.
Madam Deputy Speaker
With this it will be convenient to discuss:
Lords amendment 263, and Government amendments (b) to (g) to Lords amendment 263.
Lords amendment 361, and Government amendments (a) to (e) to Lords amendment 361.
Lords amendment 2, Government motion to disagree, and Government amendments (a) to (c) in lieu of Lords amendment 2.
Lords amendment 6, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 10, Government motion to disagree, and Government amendments (a) and (b) in lieu of Lords amendment 10.
Lords amendment 11, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 12, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 15, Government motion to disagree, and Government amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 15.
Lords amendments 256 and 257, Government motions to disagree, and Government amendments (a) and (b) in lieu of Lords amendments 256 and 257.
Lords amendment 258, Government motion to disagree, and Government amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 258.
Lords amendments 259 and 260, Government motions to disagree, and Government amendments (a) to (d) in lieu of Lords amendments 259 and 260.
Lords amendment 264, Government motion to disagree, and Government amendments (a) to (f) in lieu of Lords amendment 264.
Lords amendment 265, Government motion to disagree, and Government amendments (a) to (c) in lieu of Lords amendment 265.
Lords amendment 311, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 333, Government motion to disagree, and Government amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 333.
Lords amendment 334, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 339, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 342, Government motion to disagree, and Government amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 342.
Lords amendment 357, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 359, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendments 360 and 368 to 372, Government motions to disagree, and Government amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendments 360 and 368 to 372.
Lords amendment 439, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 505, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendments 1, 3 to 5, 7 to 9, 13, 14, 16 to 255, 261, 262 and 266 to 299.
Lords amendment 300, and motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 301, and motion to disagree.
Lords amendments 302 to 310.
Lords amendment 312, and motion to disagree.
Lords amendments 313 to 332, 335 to 338, 340, 341, 343 to 356, 358, 362 to 367, 373 to 438, 440 to 504 and 506 to 532.
Sarah Jones
I am delighted to see the return of this Bill—the largest criminal justice Bill in a generation—to this House. The Bill will support the Government’s mission to halve knife crime and violence against women and girls in a decade, and give our police and law enforcement agencies the tools they need to tackle antisocial behaviour, sexual violence, terrorism and online harms. The amendments made in the House of Lords support these aims.
Given the number of Lords amendments, I will focus my remarks on the Government amendments made in response to commitments given on Report in the Commons last June by my predecessor as Policing Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham (Dame Diana Johnson)—she was sitting on the Front Bench earlier—before outlining the Government’s response to the 19 non-Government amendments added in the other place.
First, my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft (Jess Asato) rightly raised concerns about the depiction of strangulation and suffocation in pornography, an issue which was also highlighted by Baroness Bertin’s independent pornography review. As set out in our violence against women and girls strategy last December, the Government have announced our intention to criminalise the possession and publication of pornographic images that depict strangulation and suffocation, and Lords amendments 261 and 262 give effect to that commitment.
Secondly, my hon. Friend the Member for North Warwickshire and Bedworth (Rachel Taylor) rightly pressed the Government on when we would deliver our manifesto commitment to make all existing strands of hate crime an aggravated offence. I am pleased to commend Lords amendment 301, which extends the existing racially and religiously aggravated offences to cover hostility based on sex, sexual orientation, disability and transgender identity.
Thirdly, my hon. Friend the Member for Gower (Tonia Antoniazzi) pointed to the long-term impact, including on employment opportunities, for those convicted of the offences of loitering and soliciting while under 18. Lords amendments 270 and 271 therefore introduce a new disregards and pardons scheme for anyone convicted or cautioned as a child for those offences.
I will now turn to the 19 non-Government amendments added in the other place. First, Lords amendment 2 seeks to bar the issuing of fixed penalty notices by enforcement companies and contractors for profit. The Government do understand the concern about enforcement agencies issuing fixed penalty notices where there may be a financial incentive to do so. To be clear, local agencies are expected to issue fixed penalty notices only when it is appropriate and proportionate to do so. However, Lords amendment 2 risks weakening crucial enforcement action to tackle antisocial behaviour. Our amendments in lieu instead provide that statutory guidance will address the need to ensure that the issuing of fixed penalty notices by authorised persons is proportionate.
On Lords amendments 6 and 10 to 12, I fully appreciate and understand the damage that fly-tipping can do to our communities. The Government’s waste crime action plan, published on 20 March, sets out proposals to radically improve enforcement in this area, including by granting courts the power to impose between three and nine penalty points on the driving licence of those convicted of fly-tipping where driving a vehicle was used in or for the purposes of the offence. Our amendment in lieu implements this commitment.
Turning to Lords amendment 15, on its introduction the Bill provided for a maximum four-year prison term for those convicted of a new offence of possession of a weapon with intent to cause unlawful violence. While this was drafted in line with other possession offences, the Government accept that the intent element of this new offence justifies a higher maximum penalty. Our amendment in lieu therefore provides for a seven-year maximum rather than the 10 years provided for in the Lords amendment, which we believe is disproportionate given that this remains a possession offence.
Lords amendments 255, 256, 258 to 260 and 505, introduced by the Government and by Baroness Owen and Baroness Bertin, all seek to further tackle the proliferation of demeaning and degrading intimate images online. The Government share these aims, and we are clear that intimate image abuse is completely unacceptable.
Lords amendment 255, brought forward by the Government, will criminalise the making, adapting and supplying of nudification tools. These tools use artificial intelligence to create deepfake, non-consensual intimate images, many of women. While creating, sharing and threatening to share non-consensual intimate images is already illegal, this amendment goes further, and criminalises the developers making and supplying these tools. As well as the criminal duties, once this new offence is in force the requirements of the Online Safety Act 2023 will kick in. This means that social media services will be required to take down content that supplies nudification tools, and search engines will have to reduce the visibility of search results linked to these tools.
Dame Caroline Dinenage (Gosport) (Con)
I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way on that point. I am not sure whether she will come on to this, but the Government have tabled amendments on online safety, and have identified that the next frontline in this war is artificial intelligence. As she knows, we have already seen children taking their own lives after interactions with AI chatbots, and we know that tech companies will always prioritise profits over user safety, so there must be more focus on a safety-by-design approach that prevents AI products that could be harmful to users from coming to market. This approach has been suggested by Baroness Kidron in the other place. Why are the Government not supporting her amendment?
Sarah Jones
I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention. She is, of course, right about the growing concern around chatbots and the need for safety by design. I will come on to Baroness Kidron’s amendment and the Government’s response to it later on in my speech.
Furthermore, the Government have brought forward Lords amendment 367 to take a power to extend the scope of the Online Safety Act 2023 to cover unregulated AI chatbots. It means that general-purpose AI chatbots, such as Grok, which allow the creation and sharing of non-consensual intimate images, will have to proactively remove that illegal content from their services or face enforcement from Ofcom. Taken together, the measures will deliver an effective ban on nudification tools. Given that, we do not believe that a separate possession offence, as provided for in Lords amendment 505, would make a meaningful difference, not least as many such tools are accessed online, rather than possessed.
Where a person is convicted of an intimate image offence, we agree that it is vital that those images are deleted from the perpetrator’s devices. Amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 258 enables the courts to make an image deletion order following a conviction for an offence related to intimate image abuse. Breach of the order will be a criminal offence. The amendment also enables the courts to require the deletion of other intimate images of the same victim. This approach gives courts the required flexibility to consider the details of each case when applying their powers, while ensuring that the offenders are held accountable for compliance with the order.
Catherine Fookes (Monmouthshire) (Lab)
I really welcome the Government’s amendment on image deletion orders, which will ensure that after a conviction, courts are properly mandated to destroy those intimate images and film. They will be able to give prison sentences, too; that is incredibly important. Does the Minister agree that this, coupled with the Government’s new requirements for tech firms to delete this horrifying content when it is found, is a crucial step forward in ensuring that non-consensual intimate imagery victims can finally move forward with their life?
Sarah Jones
I thank my hon. Friend for her question, and I agree with her. This is the culmination of a lot of good work in the Lords and the Commons, from Members of all parties. MPs have pushed as hard as we can on this emerging technology, which is so dangerous and so high risk, and we have a Government who are committed to acting and doing the right thing. Everybody has worked really hard, together, to get us to a much stronger place. The power allowing courts to require the deletion of intimate images will also be available for the offence of breastfeeding voyeurism recording, and the new offence of sharing semen-defaced images.
Online platforms need to do more to ensure that non-consensual intimate images are removed quickly, as my hon. Friend said, and not after the 24-hour timeframe envisioned by Lords amendment 256. To that end, amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendments 256 and 257 strengthens platform and senior executive accountability by making it a criminal offence for a service to breach an enforcement decision by Ofcom on duties to deal with and remove reported non-consensual intimate images. That means that senior executives of the service could be criminally liable for the breach. As well as taking this enforcement approach, the Government are also strengthening safeguards against malicious reporting. We will also bring forward regulations under existing powers in the Online Safety Act to amend schedule 8, so that Ofcom can require providers to be fully transparent about both the speed of intimate image removals, and how clearly and effectively platforms enable users to report such content.
Rachel Taylor (North Warwickshire and Bedworth) (Lab)
These provisions are so important. The main thing that witnesses who came before the Women and Equalities Committee said, when talking about the impact of non-consensual intimate image abuse, was that the harm grew and grew, the longer the images stayed online. This measure is vital, and I thank the Government for listening to the Committee’s important work.
Sarah Jones
I thank my hon. Friend, and pay tribute to the Women and Equalities Committee and its work. As I said, this has been a journey, and a lot of Members from both Houses have played a really important role. Ministers in the Ministry of Justice, the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology and the Home Office have been listening very carefully to what MPs have been advising. I am very pleased that we were able to respond.
In addition to bringing in the take-down duty, we will give statutory backing to a register of non-consensual intimate images. Amendments (a) and (d) in lieu of Lords amendments 259 and 260 will enable the Government to designate a trusted flagger, most likely the revenge porn helpline. That will give Government backing to a trusted source of NCII content that can be used by platforms and internet service providers to identify those images. The amendments will also enable the Government to make further provisions, by regulations, on the operation of the register, following a scoping exercise. Those provisions include provision for the Secretary of State to impose requirements on providers to share hashes, and other information deemed necessary, with the register. Hashes, for the benefit of the House, are unique codes used to mark non-consensual intimate images. The scoping exercise will allow us to evaluate the technical requirements, so that we can ensure that the register can be used by victims, platforms and internet service providers to remove or block NCII content. As Lords amendment 260 recognised, proceeding by regulations will enable us to properly evaluate the requirements necessary to ensure that the register operates as effectively as possible.
Turning to two more amendments from Baroness Bertin, Lords amendments 263 and 265, I think we in this place all share her determination to stop the spread of dangerous, demeaning and illegal pornographic content online. On Lords amendment 263, I completely agree that there is a need to curtail the depiction of step-incest pornography, in cases where what it portrays is illegal. The Government’s amendment in lieu will extend the new offence of possession and publication of incest porn to include depictions of step-incest where one of the persons is portrayed as being under 18. Additionally, amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 265 addresses the concerns raised by Lords amendment 265 by criminalising the possession or publication of pornography that depicts an adult credibly role-playing as a child. That makes it clear that content that mimics and risks normalising child sexual abuse will not be tolerated. But we will not stop there. As well as introducing those offences, the Government have committed to producing a delivery plan for how we can close the gap between the regulation of online and offline pornographic content. What is illegal offline should be illegal online.
Lords amendment 264 rightly raises concerns about how we best strengthen safeguards against the sexual exploitation of persons appearing on pornographic websites, an issue raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft on Report. We agree with the principle and the need to address this issue, but further work is required across Government on considering what the most effective approach would be to strengthening arrangements to ensure that persons appearing in pornographic material are aged 18 and over, and consent to the material being shared online. Government amendments (a) to (f) in lieu of Lords amendment 264 place a duty on the Secretary of State to report to Parliament on the outcome of this work within 12 months of the Bill receiving Royal Assent, and introduce a power to make regulations giving effect to that outcome.
Tracy Gilbert (Edinburgh North and Leith) (Lab)
I thank my hon. Friend for reassuring us that these amendments have a timescale of 12 months. What are the Government doing behind the scenes to progress this work as quickly as possible? Can she outline the work that she has undertaken to ensure that the regulations are introduced within those 12 months?
Sarah Jones
There is a powerful group of Ministers working very hard on that. Not least among them is my colleague in the Home Office, the Minister for Safeguarding, who is leading the wider work on violence against women and girls. There is a whole programme of activity, whether by Ministers or officials, across DSIT, the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice to make sure that we get these things right. They are complex, and they involve Departments working together, stepping up and taking responsibility for this work, which is very much ongoing. We want to get this right; that is why we have set the 12-month timescale. The important thing is not only the outcome of that work, but the power to make regulations, as we will, that give effect to that outcome.
Lords amendment 311, introduced by Lord Walney, seeks to grant a power to the Secretary of State to proscribe organisations deemed to be extreme criminal protest groups. The Government understand the concerns expressed in both Houses about the sustained impact of criminal activity by certain protest groups, and, where such conduct meets the threshold for a proscription order under the Terrorism Act 2000, the Government will act, and have already acted. However, we are not persuaded that the introduction of a proscription-lite regime is necessary or proportionate in instances where that threshold is not met. This view is shared by Jonathan Hall KC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, who recently expressed concerns about the adverse consequences of this amendment for the established proscription regime in the Terrorism Act 2000. I urge hon. Members to read the four-page note that he published online last week.
Ms Stella Creasy (Walthamstow) (Lab/Co-op)
My hon. Friend will recognise, though, that many of us are concerned about the integrity of the concepts of terrorism and terrorist organisations, and the importance of people’s ability to protest the concept of proscription. Those are two very different things. Does she recognise that concern, and will she look at how we can better delineate those two things, so that people can express their concerns about the concept of proscription and how it is evolving under this Government without facing arrest for wanting to have that conversation?
Sarah Jones
My hon. Friend will have debated these issues in this place, and I think there will always be a debate about the right to protest and where we draw a line in this country. I am very happy to have further conversations with her on that wider issue. Jonathan Hall set out in his letter—I can pass it on to my hon. Friend, if she has not seen it—why he does not think that this amendment will work, and that is why we are not persuaded on this occasion. I am, of course, happy to have further conversations with my hon. Friend on this.
Turning to Lords amendment 333, tabled by Baroness Buscombe, I fully agree that the Government, local authorities and law enforcement agencies need to do all they can to tackle money laundering and associated criminality on our streets. The high streets illegality taskforce, announced by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer in her most recent Budget, will examine the use of enforcement powers in this light, including the closure power. It will have a £10 million budget to support its work. While we support the principle of extending the duration of closure orders, we should first consult to avoid any unintended consequences on legitimate businesses or residential premises. Accordingly, amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 333 will enable us, following targeted consultation, to extend the maximum duration of closure orders and, if necessary, to make different provision for commercial and residential properties.
I know that my hon. Friends the Members for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes (Melanie Onn), and for Leigh and Atherton (Jo Platt), have been campaigning on high street illegality, and will no doubt speak about it later. I want to assure them and others in this place that we know that we need to go further, as we will, not just on this measure, but on the wider challenge of high street illegality. We will be very keen to work with Members in this place on that work.
Sammy Wilson (East Antrim) (DUP)
Despite the current legislation, in Northern Ireland, not only individuals but Sinn Féin Government Ministers engage in acts and make speeches on an almost monthly basis that not only glorify but encourage terrorism, praise those who took place in bomb attacks on police stations and individuals, and, indeed, name play parks after those individuals. Does the Minister accept that the current legislation does not rule out the possibility of people engaging in acts of glorifying terrorism, which not only impacts the people of the past but poisons the minds of young people in the present?
Sarah Jones
I appreciate the challenge that the right hon. Gentleman is raising, and I know that DUP Members of Parliament in particular have raised these concerns before. The challenge here is that Lords amendment 357 would remove the historical safeguard for statements that glorify acts of terrorism committed by proscribed organisations. Our view is that these statements may not necessarily create terrorist risk and may result in the offence capturing legitimate political and social discourse and debate.
I will say two other things to the right hon. Gentleman. First, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, strongly advised against the removal of the historical safeguard in his review of terrorism legislation following the 7 October attacks in 2023. Secondly, in the light of the concerns that have been raised in the Lords and by Members in this place, the Government will ask the independent reviewer to conduct a more detailed review of the encouragement offence within six months of Royal Assent.
Let me turn to Lords amendment 359. It is a long-standing principle that has been adopted by successive Administrations that the Government do not comment on which organisations are being considered for proscription. Mandating that the Government review whether to proscribe Iranian Government-related organisations would violate this principle and tie the Government’s hands unnecessarily. The Government are already taking decisive action to deter threats from Iran, and we have committed to introducing a new state threats-based proscription tool.
I turn now to Lords amendments 360 and 368 to 372 tabled by Baroness Kidron, which concern chatbots. The Government are clear that we need to act quickly to bring all unregulated AI chatbots within the scope of the Online Safety Act’s requirements on illegal activity. As I mentioned earlier, the Government are seeking to take a regulation-making power to do this, under Lords amendment 367. By taking this power, the Government will be able to remove any ambiguity over whether services like Grok are subject to the Online Safety Act’s provisions to tackle illegal content. This approach also allows us to design regulations that are effective, targeted and informed by necessary consultation with subject matter experts. Amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 372 commits the Government to reporting to Parliament by the end of the year on our progress to develop regulations.
Dame Caroline Dinenage
I don’t mean to bang on about this, but the fact is that the Government’s approach is too narrow. It is focused on taking down illegal content when it should be the responsibility of the company to prevent harms in the first place, rather than to deal with them after the event. We do not design any other sector’s regulation in this way. When designing aircraft, we do not wait until after the plane has crashed to worry about any of the safety features. This should be the same.
During Report stage in the Lords, peers voted overwhelmingly in support of the safety-by-design approach. They also understood that when it comes to the design of something, harm includes building in aspects that are addictive and manipulative, which have been key to some of the very tragic suicides of children who have interacted with AI chatbots. What do the Government have against building safety by design into the very purpose of AI chatbots?
Sarah Jones
The hon. Lady makes her case very clearly, and we can agree that we need to design out those kinds of issues. The challenges are in what we do and how we do it—those are the challenges we had with this particular group of amendments. Obviously there is wider work being done on violence against women and girls and how the Online Safety Act is to be rolled forward, and that work is really important, but we are talking about this particular group of Lords amendments on chatbots and the challenges with them. That is why, through amendment (a) in lieu, we commit to reporting by the end of the year on our progress to develop regulations.
We are clear that regulation is a more effective and proportionate tool than the criminal law for addressing risks from AI chatbots and setting industry best practice. Incorporating currently unregulated chatbots into the scope of the Online Safety Act will ensure that such regulation applies extraterritorially, which is crucial when dealing with international companies.
The Government’s approach is also broader in scope than the content of amendments 360 and 368 to 372. Those amendments would not capture image generators creating non-consensual graphic images of women or online AI chatbot toys such as Gabbo. The Government’s amendment in lieu does capture such services and allows them to be clearly brought under online safety regulations.
Dame Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West) (Lab)
The Science, Innovation and Technology Committee has heard extensive and at times horrific evidence of the harms that AI chatbots can do, such as encouragement to suicide. I welcome Lords amendment 367, which gives the Government the power to amend the Online Safety Act, and I accept that the Government are seeking to reject amendment 368, tabled by the noble Baroness Kidron, to ban chatbots based on their content, but does the Minister accept that the harms of AI chatbots are evident, significant and hugely concerning, and that their regulation is unclear and consistent? Where chatbots are covered by the Online Safety Act, if those chatbots incorporate, for example, search functionality, enforcement is slow and ponderous or non-existent. Will the Minister commit to working with DSIT to take action on AI chatbots before the end of the year?
Sarah Jones
I welcome the work that my hon. Friend’s Committee has done and will continue to do in this space. It is very important that we have good analysis of what the problems are that we need to solve. She is absolutely right that the problems with AI chatbots are evident, significant and concerning, and that more work needs to be done in this space. If there is work that we can do sooner rather than later, I am sure that my colleagues in DSIT will do that, and I commit to working with them to do what we can as quickly as we can.
Finally, hon. Members will recall that on Report, the House decided to disapply the criminal law relating to abortion in respect of women acting in relation to their own pregnancy. Their Lordships agreed amendment 361, which would provide for automatic pardons for women previously convicted or cautioned for an abortion offence in relation to their own pregnancies and for the deletion of certain details from court and police records.
I stress that the Government remain neutral on the substance of clause 191 and Lords amendment 361, but we have a duty to ensure that the law is operationally and legally workable. Accordingly, we have tabled amendments (a) and (e) to Lords amendment 361 to ensure that the deletion of details from relevant official records can operate as intended.
Catherine Fookes
I support Lords amendment 361 because some women, even after being found not guilty, have investigations that show up on their Disclosure and Barring Service checks, which impacts their life and future careers. That is the reality for a young woman named Becca, whose case I raised in the House a year ago. She was investigated at age 19 after giving birth to her son at 28 weeks, and she says that removing the investigation from her records would help her to be able to move on and live a proper family life. Does the Minister agree that this change will help to bring justice for women like Becca?
Sarah Jones
I thank my hon. Friend for raising the challenge that Becca has faced, and I congratulate her on the work that she has done in bringing that to the House. The Government are neutral on this part of the Bill, as is right and proper. What we seek to do with our amendments is ensure that it is legally workable. That is our role in this space.
I hope that I have demonstrated that we have sought to engage constructively with the non-Government amendments carried in the Lords.
Alex Sobel (Leeds Central and Headingley) (Lab/Co-op)
I want to raise the systemic issue of honour-based abuse. The perpetrator is usually not just one person; they are a family, a group or a network of people who believe that an individual has or may bring dishonour or shame to the family or community. My hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft (Jess Asato) has tabled a simple amendment to Lords amendment 300 to insert the word “persons”, which would address the issue. I stand here on behalf of my constituent Fawziyah Javid, who was an incredible woman and member of our community; she was also a victim of domestic homicide and honour-based abuse. My hon. Friend’s amendment shows that honour-based abuse runs deep within communities. I have worked with Karma Nirvana in my constituency on that. Does the Minister agree that honour-based abuse is an issue not just for one person, but for many people, and that that should be acknowledged?
Sarah Jones
I thank my hon. Friend for raising that, as well as my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft, who I suspect will speak to it later. I agree that in many cases honour-based abuse is perpetrated not by a single individual but by an extended family or other group of persons. The challenge we have with the amendment is that the definition in the Bill adopts the usual legislative conventions whereby references to the singular include the plural unless otherwise indicated. Therefore, the statutory definition already applies where abuse is perpetrated by more than one person. However, we do want to develop the statutory guidance so that that is completely clear for everybody.
Andy McDonald (Middlesbrough and Thornaby East) (Lab)
My hon. Friend will remember our discussion, and I hope that she can help me. Lord Macdonald of River Glaven KC was appointed to lead an independent review of laws on public order and hate crime. The review was also to consider the laws around protest, and we were hopeful that we would have that. I am not aware that the review has concluded, so perhaps my hon. Friend can tell us. If it has not concluded, why are we legislating before that?
Sarah Jones
I thank my hon. Friend, who I know feels strongly about this issue, as do many others—I very much respect that position. I met him a few months ago, when the review had just started. The review has yet to conclude, but it will do so in the coming months. The work that Lord Macdonald is undertaking is quite substantial, and I know, having received updates on what he is doing and who he is talking to, that it is wide and is taking a bit longer than expected, but that is in order to get it right.
My hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough and Thornaby East (Andy McDonald) will know that the cumulative disruption amendment was announced by the Home Secretary after the Heaton Park attack. Perhaps we will come to this more in closing the debate, but I think there is a lack of understanding in some quarters—I do not mean my hon. Friend—about the nature of that amendment. To be clear, sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 empower senior police officers to impose conditions on processions and on public assemblies respectively. They can impose conditions only under certain criteria to prevent serious public disorder, serious damage to property or serious disruption. We are not changing sections 12 or 14. At the moment, the police can consider cumulative disruption when looking at whether a protest should have conditions imposed on it.
Kim Johnson (Liverpool Riverside) (Lab)
I thank my hon. Friend for her response to my letter on cumulative disruption, signed by 50 MPs, which would give the police powers to limit strikes and industrial action. Your letter states:
“I have no desire to infringe on—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
Order. I am on my feet, so please be seated. “Your letter states”? I do not think I have corresponded with the hon. Member. Continue.
Kim Johnson
Apologies, Madam Deputy Speaker.
Does the Minister accept that there is a danger that a future Government might be less benevolent towards workers’ struggles and could exploit those powers? Will she please explain to the House why we have not been given the right to debate, discuss and vote on amendment 312?
Sarah Jones
Let me just finish explaining what we are doing and then I will come on to picketing.
If there is a risk of serious public disorder, senior police officers can impose conditions. At the moment, they can consider cumulative disruption as one of the aspects they take into account when deciding whether to impose conditions. To be clear, imposing conditions means things like moving where a march is going, limiting the hours that it can work under or limiting the number of people. They can already take into account cumulative disruption, but we are changing that so that they must take that into account—they must think about it. That does not change the guardrails of sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act; it just says that at the moment they can consider cumulative disruption, but in future they will consider it. That is the amendment.
On this Government’s belief in the right to strike and to protest, of course that is sacrosanct and nothing has changed in our view on that. We do not believe that this legislation will stop the right to picket. I know that lots of Members will have views on that and will not be satisfied, but we will always defend the right to strike, and we have absolutely no desire to infringe lawful picketing at all.
Richard Burgon (Leeds East) (Lab)
Is the Minister aware of the deep alarm, both on the Back Benches and outside Parliament, at what amounts to a further draconian attack by the Government on the right to peaceful protest, which is a civil liberty, and about the fact that the Government are trying to push the measure through without a proper vote for MPs, as they did when they made the huge error of proscribing Palestine Action?
Sarah Jones
I do not agree with my hon. Friend. This was announced by the Home Secretary after the Heaton Park attack, when lots of protests took place immediately after the attack. The cumulative disruption and the impact that had was there for all to see. We have no desire to reduce people’s right to protest, and nor would we ever. There is a lot of misinformation about this change in the law, implying that we are in some way increasing the bans on protest. To be clear, the rules on banning protests are very strong, and bans can be introduced only in very significant circumstances. Indeed, we have no rules to ban assembly, so the idea that we are banning protest is just wrong.
We are responding to communities who have recently been feeling the pain of repeated protests, sometimes outside faith organisations—synagogues, in particular. In those cases, we believe that the police should look at the impact of cumulative disruption when they, and not the Government, are deciding whether to impose conditions on those marches.
Ms Creasy
Many of us recognise the picture of pain that the Minister is painting, especially following the terrorist attack, but good legislation requires debate, scrutiny and specification. One of the concerns that many of us have is the lack of definition of “cumulative”. Will she set out now, on the record, what the Government intend by the concept of “cumulative”, so that people can understand how this proposed test would be met?
Sarah Jones
I am pleased that we are debating this issue today, which is what we should be doing here, and I am sure that hon. Members will be talking about it more in the several hours that we have to debate these issues. This already exists in law, in that the police are able to look at cumulative disruption when considering whether to impose conditions. We are not redefining “cumulative” at all, or changing the parameters of sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act; we are simply saying that when the police are looking at whether to impose conditions, they must look—rather than they can look—at cumulative disruption. That is a small change that will make a big difference to people who are currently scared and intimidated by persistent protests, outside mosques and Jewish places of worship in particular.
Madam Deputy Speaker, I should conclude. I hope that I have demonstrated that we have sought to engage constructively. As I have said, I urge the House to support all the changes that we are suggesting together today with the Government amendments brought from the Lords.
Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)
I thank colleagues in the other place for the work that they have done on strengthening this Bill. The changes made there go some way towards what we should all be aiming for: safer communities, stronger laws and real protections for the public. In Committee, we saw the Government repeatedly reject important amendments from Opposition Members, on fly-tipping, pornography and increasing sentences for knife crime. The Bill could also have provided a real opportunity to tackle the scourge of off-road bikes, to support this country’s tradesmen with real action on tool theft, and to remove yet more knives from our streets by increasing stop and search. Although the Government failed to take up some of those opportunities, I am delighted to see that they have U-turned on some of the measures that Labour MPs previously voted against. That might be a familiar pattern, but it is still right to welcome the fact that they have recognised the value of some of those proposals.
On fly-tipping, for example, giving courts the power to issue penalty points to offenders is a straightforward, common-sense step. If someone uses a vehicle to dump waste and blight our communities, it is entirely right that their ability to drive should be affected. Likewise, even though I would have liked the Government to accept the more significant penalty proposed in Lords amendment 15, it is a welcome step that they have recognised the seriousness of the crime when there is an additional element of intent to use unlawful violence, which rightly should have a greater penalty when compared with possession-only offences. It is right that these measures have progressed, even though a great deal of unfortunate wrangling and rejection occurred before they were incorporated into the Bill.
On that note, I will turn to the proposals that the Government have chosen not to accept from our colleagues across the way. I ask Members of this House to give serious consideration to measures that enhance the powers of the police forces and improve their ability to keep our communities safe. For instance, as I have mentioned, Members do not need to be reminded of the scourge of fly-tipping, as we all recognise the adverse impact it can have on our neighbourhoods. On Sunday I saw an appalling incident in my constituency. A huge volume of waste had been dumped near Sadberge, with appalling consequences for our environment, for wildlife and for anybody who wants to enjoy the countryside.
Amendment 6 would ensure that the guidance issued on the enforcement of offences under section 33 makes it clear that, when a person is convicted of a relevant offence, they will be liable for the costs incurred through loss or damage resulting from that offence. As the Government are already setting out guidance in the legislation, why would they not ensure that this guidance was unequivocal that when a person is convicted of fly-tipping, they—not the victims—are responsible for the costs incurred as a result of their offence? Furthermore, amendment 11 would further enable the police to seize vehicles.
Sammy Wilson
The hon. Member makes an important point. Given the role of criminal organisations in fly-tipping, the costs can be in the hundreds of thousands of pounds to landowners, who are the innocent victims of this crime. If the Government are serious about dealing with fly-tipping, they have to ensure that the sanctions are a deterrent.
Matt Vickers
I could not agree more. We see a selfish and mindless small minority of people who incur huge costs that fall on taxpayers across the country and do huge damage to our communities. It is right that the sanctions should match that. On an issue where there is universal acceptance of the need to do more, we should ensure that there are no unnecessary restrictions on our authorities in cracking down on these offences.
Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)
Fly-tipping is very important, but can I refer my hon. Friend to a matter of life and death? As a result of Lords amendment 361 and the amendments to it, somebody who illegally procures a late-term abortion will receive a free pardon. I refer my hon. Friend to Mr Justice Cooke, who said in the Sarah Catt case that Catt had robbed the baby of the life it was about to have and that the seriousness of the crime lay between manslaughter and murder. At sentencing, the judge told Catt that she clearly thought the man with whom she was having an affair was the father and she had shown no remorse. Is it not a terrible indictment of our society that a human life can be taken when it is about to be born, at 39 weeks, and that there should be a free pardon in such a serious case?
Matt Vickers
I share my right hon. Friend’s concerns—I think many people across the country share them—not only about the issue, however strongly people might feel about it, but about the way that it was added to this Bill after Committee stage, meaning that some of the scrutiny that might otherwise have happened did not, and no evidence on it was given at the evidence sessions. It was slipped into the Bill, and I do not think that there was adequate scrutiny of it. Lots of people across the country share that concern. Such a seismic change in the relationship between the state and individuals should have had more scrutiny in this place.
On fly-tipping, I believe that removing the instrument of this crime is an effective tool, and it could extend beyond the legislative framework set out by the Government in the waste crime action plan.
However, the measures brought forward in the other place are not limited merely to the issue of fly-tipping. There are important proposals relating to non-crime hate incidents. In Lords amendment 334, colleagues in the other place wisely took the step of ending the investigation and recording of non-crime hate incidents and ensuring that any future incident recording guidance has
“due regard to the right to freedom of expression.”
That is a sensible, necessary measure, as the Government’s proposal appears to be a rebranding of the existing scheme with a more restrictive triage system. Reports would still be logged, personal data would still be recorded and disclosure rules would remain unchanged. Officers and staff would still be tied up monitoring incidents that do not meet the criminal threshold at a cost of time and resources. As Lord Hogan-Howe told the Lords,
“we need to move on from the recording of non-crime hate incidents by removing them altogether from police systems.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 20 January 2026; Vol. 852, c. 173.]
I am afraid that unless we agree to the amendment, we risk returning to this issue in the future. It is estimated that 660 hours of police time have been spent on non-crime hate incidents. We can change that and see that time invested back into policing our communities.
On antisocial behaviour and illicit retailers, we hear repeatedly from businesses and local communities about rogue premises causing persistent problems on our high streets. If we are serious about supporting the police to do their job, we must ensure that they have the powers they need to tackle not just crime but the wider public nuisance and disorder that too often accompany it.
A range of organisations, including the Chartered Trading Standards Institute, have been clear that stronger powers are needed to deal with rogue retailers. While the current legal framework does provide tools, in practice they are too often insufficient. The time limits attached to closure notices and orders simply do not go far enough. Instead, we see a revolving door: offenders wait out short closure periods, reopen under a different name and continue their activities, sometimes shifting location before enforcement agencies have the chance to complete proper investigations. That is the crux of the problem: the system does not enable action that sticks.
In the meantime, the impact is clear. Our high streets suffer as legitimate businesses lose trade, confidence declines, and responsible retailers who follow the rules and invest in their communities are left competing against those who operate with impunity. There is also a wider impact on our communities, particularly on young people. Premises linked to that kind of activity can become focal points for antisocial behaviour, drawing in vulnerable individuals and exposing them to harm. If we want safer streets and stronger communities, we cannot allow that cycle to continue. Lords amendment 333 offers a practical solution: it would extend the timeframe for enforcement, giving agencies the ability to take action that is thorough, proportionate and, crucially, effective. It is about ensuring that when action is taken, it delivers real results, not just temporary disruption.
To uphold public safety, we must update the law to reflect the current nature of the crimes our society faces. Lords amendment 311 reflects the worrying growth in the number of protest groups that engage in serious criminal activity to further their aims. However, being organisations, they are often shielded from the full force of the law, as was set out in the other House. The designation in the amendment is not terrorist proscription. It aims to restrict membership, promotion, fundraising, organising and material support, with proportionate penalties that are less significant than those that proscribed terrorist groups attract. Although I understand that the Government believe the proposal to be premature given their ongoing review, they have acted for understandable reasons on cumulative disruption. Why should that not be extended to this provision to ensure that there are restrictions on organisations whose purpose is to break the law?
On extreme ideologies, the Leader of the Opposition and the shadow Foreign Secretary have been clear that the Conservative party would work with the Government to proscribe the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. It is apparent to many Members across the House, and to our counterparts in the EU, that the threat posed by the IRGC is real. However, despite their comments in opposition, the Government have not introduced such measures.
Andy McDonald
The hon. Gentleman is talking about the proscription of the IRGC. Will he explain to the House why the Tory party did not do that in their 14 years in government?
Matt Vickers
The then Opposition told us that they had really strong views about it. They are now in government but are not doing anything about it. The hon. Gentleman need not worry about another day or another week; he has the opportunity today to set the process in motion by voting for Lords amendment 359. It is not enough that Iran is covered by the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme—we must go further. The IRGC is not a theoretical concern. As my colleagues have repeatedly stressed to the Government, it has threatened those in our country and supported armed groups that have killed British and allied troops.
We welcome the Government’s adoption of the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Gosport (Dame Caroline Dinenage) and supported by my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns) to address the depiction of strangulation in pornography. I understand that, through discussions with Baroness Bertin on related subjects, the Government have undertaken to separately progress further measures to tackle pornography featuring 18-plus step-incest—in which one party is the family member of another—and the mimicking of children aged 16-plus, as well as on age verification in pornography. I would be grateful if the Minister clarified those matters further.
I put on record my party’s opposition to Lords amendment 301, which unnecessarily expands the definition of “aggravated offences” to include certain characteristics, even though existing law already covers most of those factors at sentencing, and provides extensive hate crime protections. The change has been introduced late in the legislative process, with minimal scrutiny, raising concerns about transparency. The Law Commission has warned in expert advice that including sex as a protected characteristic in that setting could be ineffective and even counterproductive, as it may complicate prosecutions and create hierarchies of victims. Overall, the amendment appears more symbolic than practical, adding complexity without clear benefit to crime reduction.
The Government have before them amendments that would strengthen our legal system and better protect the public and the police, but we cannot ignore the reality on the ground. Officer numbers have fallen while demand continues to rise, and the Bill will add to that pressure. That is why it matters that, when the police act, they can use the full weight of the law. Without the right powers, higher expectations mean little. Where disorder takes hold, it damages communities and undermines confidence, as we have seen in places like Clapham common.
While parts of the Bill are welcome, there are still gaps. The Lords amendments to which I have spoken would strengthen enforcement and support officers. If we are serious about safer streets, removing them risks falling short of what the public expect.
Tonia Antoniazzi (Gower) (Lab)
I rise to speak in support of Lords amendment 361 and Government amendments to it. I was horrified to learn of the increasing number of cases in recent years of women facing criminal investigations and prosecutions on suspicion of illegal abortion offences. The abject cruelty that more than 100 desperate women have been forced to endure under a 165-year-old law is barbaric and completely unnecessary. That is why I tabled an amendment to the Bill last year to stop this, which was emphatically supported in this Chamber in June. The House of Lords recently supported that change as well. As a Parliament, we took that decision because we listened to the advice of professionals and the evidence gathered over a long period of time from a number of places and we chose to stand up for women.
Alongside the women affected, I am very pleased that once the Bill becomes law, no more women in England and Wales will be subject to the threat of criminal prosecution on suspicion of ending their own pregnancy, but I would welcome clarification from the Minister regarding current investigations. Parliament has been resoundingly clear in its support for removing women from the criminal law related to abortion. Can the Minister confirm that once the Bill becomes law, the expectation is that all current investigations and prosecutions under these offences should be dropped? I would welcome a commitment that she will write to write to police forces in England and Wales, because they clearly have not been listening to the will of Parliament—we are aware of at least three further women having been investigated for ending their own pregnancies since the Commons vote in June.
As well as firmly supporting the decriminalisation of women in cases of abortion, the House of Lords passed an amendment to protect the women already harmed by these outdated laws. I pay tribute to Baroness Thornton, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, Baroness Watkins of Tavistock and Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer for tabling this cross-party amendment. Lords amendment 361 and the Government amendments to it would pardon women found guilty of ending their own pregnancy and expunge the records of investigations, arrests and charges of women under abortion law, whether or not they were found guilty.
That is important. Current law means that abortion offences are classed as serious and violent crimes, so even without a conviction, the fact that a woman has been arrested and interviewed under these offences remains on her Disclosure and Barring Service check for life. That actively harms her job prospects and ability to travel to certain jurisdictions, and it leaves her with a permanent record on police computer systems or, in the case of conviction, a permanent criminal record that she ended her own pregnancy outside the law. Colleagues will remember that the women forced to endure criminal investigations under these offences are overwhelmingly already vulnerable, and are often victims of acute abuse and exploitation. The retention of these convictions and records causes them ongoing harm under a law that Parliament has been clear has no place in modern society.
This includes women whose experiences I spoke of in my speech in this place last year—women like Nicola Packer, who, after experiencing complications in her abortion treatment, was arrested and held for 36 hours in custody, and endured nearly five years of investigation and prosecution. She was found not guilty at trial, but the investigation, arrest and charge remain on her record. It includes women like Laura, a young mother and university student who was criminalised for an abortion using illicit medication forced on her by an abusive partner. She was in a physically, sexually and emotionally abusive relationship, and her partner told her not to go to a doctor. When she was arrested, he threatened to kill her if she told anyone he was involved. She was jailed for two years, and this conviction remains on her criminal record.
Women who have faced investigation or conviction should not have to continue living with the consequences of this outdated legislation—laws that Parliament has finally and rightly decided should no longer apply to women. That is why clause 361 is so needed. While remaining neutral on the issue, the Government have made changes to clause 361 to ensure workability, and I emphatically support them. They take a similar approach to the changes introduced by the Bill for pardons for convictions and cautions for loitering or soliciting when under 18.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.
Max Wilkinson (Cheltenham) (LD)
As the Liberal Democrats made clear at earlier stages, there are parts of the Bill that we can support and parts that we strongly oppose. We welcome a number of the new measures brought forward today. None the less, it is a pity that the Government have overlooked opportunities to take action in some crucial areas, from cracking down on rural crime to supporting a real return to proper neighbourhood policing.
In addition, we are deeply disturbed by the use of the Bill to further erode the protest rights of British people. These are hard-won freedoms that were won by the suffragettes, trade unionists and others over many years, but the previous Government and this one are recklessly taking them away for short-term political expedience, so we strongly oppose those measures. That is happening not just because of the measures in the Bill before us today; it is happening regularly under this Government. We must all consider that at some length in this House.
However, I am pleased that the House will today consider two amendments tabled by Liberal Democrats in the other place. Amendment 2 will ensure that private companies are not incentivised to issue as many fixed penalty notices as possible, so more serious antisocial behaviour is prioritised instead. The Government’s amendment in lieu does not go far enough. It substitutes the clear ban on fining for profit with non- statutory guidance. We must remove this perverse incentive with a ban, not guidance that will inevitably be open to challenge.
Amendment 342, another Liberal Democrat amendment tabled in the other place, will change how youth diversion orders are issued, ensuring courts are given a full account of any alternative interventions that have been tried or considered, why those interventions failed and what consultation took place with the child, as well as relevant agencies. Multi-agency input will help courts better understand why other interventions have failed, leading to higher success rates and time efficiency. Crucially, this amendment will mean better outcomes for young people who would otherwise become embroiled in terrorist activity. We call on Members from across the House to support these measures.
The Liberal Democrats are also supporting several other amendments. We support Government amendments 1 and 4 regarding respect orders, which were concessions secured by our Liberal Democrat colleague Lord Clement-Jones. Respect orders will grant police extended powers to tackle antisocial behaviour, with police chiefs given the power to issue orders without oversight. Lords amendments 1 and 4 require the Secretary of State to make appropriate consultations before issuing or revising those orders.
We are backing several further measures that take action on violence against women and girls. We support Lords amendment 294, a concession thanks to the work of our Liberal Democrat colleague Baroness Brinton, which would replace the power to issue stalking guidance by the Secretary of State with a duty to do so. That follows similar provisions in the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, which places a duty on the Secretary of State to issue guidance.
Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)
There was a discussion earlier about the register of non-consensual intimate images, which is set out in Lords amendment 259. I want to share with the House the experience of one of my constituents, who was subject to the creation of a non-consensual abuse image by her husband while unconscious, having been the victim of spiking. Zoe Watts has chosen very bravely to speak with the media to help to secure legal change and public education, and she points out that there is a disturbing rise in pornography that depicts sex with somebody who is sleeping. Does my hon. Friend share my view that the depiction of non-consensual intimacy in sleep can encourage spiking and sexual abuse and should be banned?
Max Wilkinson
Zoe’s case goes to show that we need to go so much further to protect women, and the depiction of that kind of activity clearly might provoke unintended consequences that none of us in this House want to see. Spiking remains a big problem on high streets and in pubs and bars up and down this country.
With a view to strengthening online protections, we will support Lords amendments 258 and 259, relating to the non-consensual generation and sharing of intimate images. It is crucial that the law catches up to the reality of abuse being faced by women like Zoe every day. We will support Lords amendment 301 to extend the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 to include protections against hostility motivated by a range of characteristics, including sex and disability. The Liberal Democrats will support Conservative Lords amendment 15, which would increase the maximum penalty for possession of a weapon with intent to use unlawful violence against another person to 10 years, in line with the recommendations from Jonathan Hall KC.
To effectively tackle criminal gangs, we must ensure that the legal system can effectively cut off their revenue sources. The current closure notice periods for shops selling counterfeit goods are too short, and criminal gangs are too often able to survive the economic hit, impacting the prosperity of our high streets. That is why we support Lords amendment 333, which would extent the period in which the police and the magistrates courts may make closure notices to seven days and closure orders to 12 months.
We are supportive of the suggestion in Lords amendment 311, proposed by Cross-Bench peers, that an alternative is needed to proscription. That has been made particularly clear by what has happened with Palestine Action. However, we are cautious about voting for such a change while the outcomes of the independent review of public order and hate crime legislation are not yet known.
Finally, Liberal Democrats are vehemently opposed to the Government’s Lords amendment to give the police unprecedented powers to further restrict the right to protest. That follows a pattern started by the previous Conservative Government, who hacked away again and again at the historical right to protest enjoyed by British people. It is an absolute travesty that that has carried on under Labour. The right to protest is a vital component of our democracy, and Liberal Democrats will fight to defend it.
I urge Members on all sides of the House to put aside their personal feelings about certain ongoing protests and seriously consider what the consequences of this change would mean for our right to challenge those who exercise power over us. Members on the Government Benches might be content with that approach while they are in charge, but Labour MPs must ask what might happen under a future Government who might not adhere to liberal democratic principles.
Apsana Begum (Poplar and Limehouse) (Lab)
The right to protest is a basic democratic freedom that was won over centuries of British history. It is not a right that was granted, but one that was hard-won by suffragettes, trade unionists, anti-fascists and many others. Today we are focusing only on the Lords amendments, but I place on record that this Bill is a serious and substantial assault on our democratic freedoms. Indeed, before the Bill was introduced to this House, the Policing and Crime Act 2017, the Public Order Act 2023, and many other anti-protest Bills passed under the last Government had already expanded police powers. Those Bills were widely criticised by legal experts and civil society organisations and faced widespread opposition from Members from across the House. This makes the shambolic process by which these proposals have been brought before the House even more disturbing.
The Bill proposes giving the police even more powers, including to decide where, when, and even whether a protest takes place. At this very late stage, the other place has now proposed amendment 312, which could lead to protests being not just restricted, but banned outright. That should alarm anyone who cares about democracy, because it should not need pointing out that the whole point of protests is that they are supposed to have a cumulative impact. Should the suffragettes or the Chartists have given up after just one attempt? The UN’s special rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association has recently outlined how far out of step this extraordinary expansion of state power is with international norms.
This Bill and Lords amendment 312 exist in the context of one of the largest and most sustained protest movements in modern British political history. The Home Secretary has not obscured the fact that these proposals are a direct response to the demonstrations for Palestine. Indeed, I have been proud to protest alongside hundreds and thousands of constituents in over 30 major national demonstrations demanding an end to the genocide in Gaza—collective actions to stand up for humanity in the face of the gravest acts of inhumanity. In this context, it is absurd that under these proposals, holding repeated protests could justify far-reaching restrictions and even outright bans.
Where does this lead? Trade unions are asking whether picketing during an industrial dispute would make them vulnerable to heavy-handed interventions. I understand that the Government are supporting Lords amendment 312; I oppose it entirely, and will instead be supporting a motion in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough and Thornaby East (Andy McDonald) to disagree with amendment 312. This assault on the right to protest could lead us down an extremely worrying path, where Governments can become totalitarian and are able to silence whomever they choose.
British democracy has been defined by dissent, and social progression has been achieved by diverse groups mobilising for women’s rights, for LGBTQ+ equality, for workers’ rights, and for solidarity across those causes. I reiterate my opposition to clauses 156 and 158, which deal with wearing or using items to conceal identity at protests. There has not been a fundamental assessment or full clarity about how making
“wearing or otherwise using an item that conceals”
a person’s
“identity or another person’s identity”
an offence, as the Bill states, will work in practice. For example, how will it work for Muslim women who observe hijab or niqab? I understand that a defence has been worked in for those concealing their identity at protests for religious purposes, but it is a defence in law, to be proven only after an arrest and during onerous court proceedings. These clauses will only extend the ways in which black, Asian and minority ethnic individuals are over-represented at every stage of the criminal justice system.
If we believe in democratic values, we must defend the space for protest—loudly and with determination—against attempts to shrink it further. At a time when public trust in political institutions is already incredibly fragile, the Government’s decision to weaken one of the few tools people have to hold power to account is, in my view, irresponsible. This Bill draws another line in the sand between those who benefit from the political establishment and those who wish to challenge it. I am with the protesters, who have my solidarity, because I know which side of history I want to be on.
Wendy Morton (Aldridge-Brownhills) (Con)
I rise today to speak to the Lords amendments to the Crime and Policing Bill. I have spoken previously on this piece of legislation, but today I want to focus specifically on Lords amendments 6, 10 and 11, and urge Ministers to accept them. They are on topics on which we Opposition Members have been pushing for action: fly-tipping and littering. Those issues come up in not just my inbox, but the inboxes of Members from all parts of this House, and they affect our residents day in, day out. For those of us in the west midlands, on the edge of Birmingham, where there are bin strikes, thanks to the Labour-run council, fly-tipping is an even greater scourge these days. As I say, this is not the first time I have spoken on these topics; I spoke about them on Second Reading, too.
Mr Andrew Snowden (Fylde) (Con)
In rural areas, farmers are often blighted, and end up landed with the costs of significant, often industrial and criminal fly-tipping. Does my right hon. Friend agree that that is deeply unfair, and that the Government should accept the amendments, which would help take the burden away from the victims of these crimes?
Wendy Morton
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. So often when I travel around the constituency, I see gateways where people have fly-tipped, and I have seen piles of fridges and mattresses. It is industrial fly-tipping, and it is disgraceful and disgusting.
Fly-tipping costs around £1 billion to deal with each year. That is £1 billion that could be going to other things, rather than being wasted on clearing up people’s mess. I see that in my constituency, but I want to acknowledge the brilliant work done by so many local volunteer groups to tackle the blight on our doorsteps. I also acknowledge the work of Conservative-run Walsall council, which has taken a zero-tolerance approach, investing in enforcement, expanding CCTV, issuing fines and working with the police to seize vehicles linked to fly-tipping.
Sammy Wilson
Does the right hon. Lady accept that in many instances, action is not taken because of the fear of violence? Much of this tipping is done by criminal gangs, who will stop at nothing because it is a very profitable industry. Organisations such as the Environment Agency, and even sometimes local councils and the police, do not take the action that is required, leading to the accumulation of huge amounts of waste.
Wendy Morton
The right hon. Gentleman is so right. People might ask why I, as a Member of Parliament, am talking about something as simple as litter and fly-tipping, but this criminal activity is costing the taxpayer, costing wildlife and costing our communities. We need strong action—on enforcement and deterrence—to stop this scourge. Walsall, as I have explained, is treating fly-tipping as the crime that it is. The council is gathering evidence and prosecuting offenders, and then the fines can be reinvested in enforcement. All of that together sends a clear message that if people treat our streets as a litter bin, there will be consequences.
That is why I recommend, push, promote and welcome the amendments that would give penalty points to those convicted of fly-tipping offences. We must be clear that if someone uses a vehicle to commit this crime, there will be real consequences. Amendments that would allow vehicles to be seized are a welcome further measure. If we remove the means by which this crime is committed, we strike at the heart of the problem. It is no longer enough to tinker around the edges; we need strong action. Enforcement is key, but so is deterrence. That is why I have long argued for stronger action on littering from vehicles, including putting penalty points on people’s driving licences. If people know that there are real consequences, behaviour will change, because ultimately this is about respect—respect for our communities, for our environment, and for the people who take pride in the place where they live. They are the people who make this country a great place to live, and for their sakes, I urge the Minister to listen, to engage, to take action, and to strengthen the Bill, so that actions once again have real consequences.
Let me end with a slogan from Keep Britain Tidy, which some Members may remember: “Don’t be a Tosser”. I say to the Government: don’t toss this matter to one side. Take some firm action, please.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
Let us make sure that language is always parliamentary. I call Andy McDonald.
Andy McDonald (Middlesbrough and Thornaby East) (Lab)
Follow that, indeed!
Let me begin by making it clear that I welcome the Bill and the many measures that the Government have introduced. There is much here that will strengthen policing, protect communities, and respond to genuine public concern about crime and safety. However, Lords amendment 312 causes me real concern, because protest is not some peripheral irritation in our democracy. It is not an inconvenience to be managed. It is, in truth, part of the lifeblood of the labour movement, and of every movement that has ever expanded rights, protections or dignity in this country. From the earliest trade unionists to the Chartists to those who organised in the streets when they had no voice in this Chamber, progress in this country has never been handed down; it has been demanded, organised, and often disrupted into being—yes, disrupted. Protest exists precisely because Governments of the day, of all political colours, have too often sought to restrict the expression of public opinion when it has become uncomfortable. We should be honest about that.
Public organising—protest—is how people express their view, but expressing a view is not the same as being heard, and it is certainly not the same as achieving change. Change comes when that expression is repeated, sustained, and cumulative—when it builds pressure over time until it cannot be ignored. That was as true for the suffragettes as it was for those in the anti-apartheid movement. Neither succeeded because they protested once, politely, and then went home. They succeeded because disruption accumulated, because pressure mounted, and because their cause could not be quietly set aside. That is the democratic tradition we inherit, and it is one that we should be extremely cautious about constraining—which brings me to Lords amendment 312.
Whatever its intentions, the amendment represents a continuation of, not a departure from, a trajectory set by the last Government. We have in recent years seen a steady expansion of public order powers, through the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 and the Public Order Act 2023. At each stage, concerns were raised—by Members on both sides of the House, by those in the other place and by civil liberties organisations—that the balance between public order and the right to protest was being tilted too far, and we are now being asked to accept a further step in that same direction.
It was not so many weeks ago that Gina Romero, the United Nations special rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, was in this Parliament, expressing horror about the fact that the United Kingdom Government were at the leading edge of these provisions. The rest of the world is looking. Other countries are waiting to see how this plays out in our country, because they intend to copy and paste and do the self-same thing in their jurisdictions. It is perhaps fortunate that Viktor Orbán has gone, because I am pretty convinced that he would be looking to these measures, among others.
Lords amendment 312 does something very specific: it revives, in substance, provisions that were previously rejected. Hon. Members will recall that during the passage of the Public Order Act 2023, the then Government sought, through Lords amendments 48 and 49, to require the police to take account of cumulative disruption when imposing conditions on protests under sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act 1986. Those provisions were defeated in the House of Lords, with opposition from Labour, Liberal Democrat and Cross-Bench peers, yet even before the ink was dry on those proceedings and the 2023 Act had received Royal Assent, the then Government sought to achieve the same outcome through secondary legislation: the Public Order Act 1986 (Serious Disruption to the Life of the Community) Regulations 2023. Those regulations did three things of note: they lowered the threshold of disruption to “more than minor”, introduced the concept of “cumulative disruption”, and expanded police discretion to consider multiple events collectively.
And what happened? The regulations were quashed by the courts in the National Council for Civil Liberties v. the Secretary of State for the Home Department in 2023. They were quashed because the process by which they were brought forward was found to be unlawful. To be fair, the Government have learned from that episode, and Lords amendment 312 is more cautious. It embeds the concept of cumulative disruption in primary legislation, and avoids reopening the broader and highly contentious definition of “serious disruption”, reflecting an incremental approach shaped by judicial intervention and parliamentary resistance. I recognise that, but recognising that the drafting is more careful does not answer the central question: should we be doing this at all? We are being asked to take a concept that was rejected in this House and the other place, and which was unsuccessfully imposed through regulations that were struck down by the courts, and to reintroduce it. It is more carefully packaged but substantively similar.
There is a second concern, which is about the process, because this measure has not come to us in the ordinary way. It has not been introduced as a Government clause in this House, which would make it subject to full debate, amendment and Division; it has been inserted by the Lords. I say gently but firmly that that mirrors the approach that many of us criticised when it was adopted by the previous Government. If we believe that something is important enough to legislate on—particularly something that touches on fundamental rights—it is important enough to be properly scrutinised in this Chamber.
In considering the proposals, we should reflect on very recent events. It has been reported that in the case involving Ben Jamal and Chris Nineham, which I understand is now subject to appeal, the defence argued that at the protest in question, the police relied on powers relating to cumulative disruption that were derived from the 2023 regulations, which were later quashed by the Court of Appeal in the National Council for Civil Liberties v. the Secretary of State for the Home Department. If that account is borne out, it raises serious questions. It means that even without a clear statutory footing, such expansive interpretations are already influencing operational decisions, which underlines the risk that legislating for cumulative disruption may not clarify the law, but instead entrench uncertainty and overreach at the expense of the right to protest.
I say to Ministers that much in this Bill commands support, and there is no need to jeopardise that support by attaching to it a measure that raises serious civil liberties concerns and has not been properly tested in this House. The Government should withdraw Lords amendment 312. If they do not, Members should be clear that this is not a minor or technical issue to be nodded through. It may require the House to divide—if necessary, on a roll-up motion at the end of the proceedings—to ensure that our view is properly recorded and we defend the civil liberties that generations have so proudly fought for.
Gideon Amos (Taunton and Wellington) (LD)
I rise to speak mainly about Lords amendment 333 on illegal trading, but I share the concerns of my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Max Wilkinson) and the hon. Member for Middlesbrough and Thornaby East (Andy McDonald) about the illiberal nature of the crackdown on protests. I never thought I would be entering into a world in which old ladies sitting down in protest would in effect be proscribed as terrorists. We are moving into some kind of Kafkaesque world, and the provisions of this Bill worry me in the same way. However, as I wish to focus on illegal trading, that is what I will do.
I and the Liberal Democrats support Lords amendment 333, which would extend the length of closure notices. We campaigned during the general election for a return to proper community policing and to safer high streets and town centres, and ending the scourge of illegal trading must be part of that. Extending the period over which closure notices may be served by police inspectors or local authority chief executives under section 77 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 to seven days, as set out in Lords amendment 333, would be a move in the right direction. I therefore oppose the Government’s motion to strike out that amendment.
Thanks to local publicans in my Taunton constituency who came forward with vital information, I raised illegal trading in Taunton with Somerset council and the local police about a year ago. I would like to pay tribute to police officers like Andy, the trading standards officers and my Lib Dem Somerset councillor colleagues, such as Mike Rigby, overseeing the work that has led to a number of really high-profile closures. Taunton Market, Mr Taunton and Top Market have rightly been closed down, following just the kind of crackdown that was needed. I have a message for anyone else considering that kind of activity in Taunton and Wellington: “Illegal trading isn’t welcome, you will be closed down and you will be prosecuted.”
We need to go further, though. The Chartered Trading Standards Institute has pointed out that we need properly resourced trading standards services, which means tackling the local government funding crisis, particularly the social care funding crisis that is the main burden under which councils are struggling.
Somerset councillors to whom I have spoken about this also want civil penalties against landlords who knowingly let their premises be used for illegal trading, and that has also raised by the Chartered Trading Standards Institute. Those fines should be given to the council both to support trading standards work and to clean up the town centre environment. I believe that repeat offenders among landlords should forfeit their retail property to the council to allow its reuse or regeneration. Behind too many illegal shops are complicit landlords cashing in on the rent from illegal activity, and right now they face no consequences at all.
As well as supporting Lords amendment 333, the main change I am pressing for, following my visit with police officers around Taunton, is to address their frustration with the reality of tackling illegal sales at one end of the counter while trading continues at the other end of the counter in the shops they are tackling. I understand why the law requires that any closure notice must be followed up, under section 80 of the 2014 Act, with an application to the courts for a closure order. Frankly, however, that requirement is a hugely onerous demand on the time of hard-pressed officers, which too often discourages closure notices being served when they are needed.
I am therefore pressing for section 80 to be amended so that closure notices could be served on the authority of a superintendent or local authority chief executive and be effective for up to 14 days, but, crucially, without the requirement to apply to the courts. To ensure a just approach to retailers, exercising such a power would have to be dependent on evidence of unlawful or illegal trading, such as the sale of stolen goods. The Association of Convenience Stores found that 25% of retailers identified stolen goods being sold locally in their areas, including the under-age sale of alcohol, tobacco, vapes or counterfeit goods, such as cigarettes. Enabling a rapid response of this kind would also help to tackle phoenixing, whereby new ventures open a new company just a few doors down from their closed premises.
I am delighted at the action taken locally in Taunton. I support Lords amendment 333 and I do not really understand why the Government oppose it. Action could be taken and they should take it. Councils and police are too often operating with one hand tied behind their backs. There should be immediate closure where that is needed. Town centre businesses in Taunton and Wellington should not be forced to compete with criminal activity, and I will continue to push the case for stronger powers to stamp that out.
Melanie Onn (Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes) (Lab)
I would like to recognise the work the Government have already undertaken to improve our high streets, including measures announced in the Budget last year: the taskforce to tackle organised crime groups; additional funding made available to trading standards, customs and excise, and His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs; and support for community policing, ensuring that there is a community police officer in every neighbourhood across the country. Those are all welcome and important, and it is right that we acknowledge that context in which this debate sits. I would also like to congratulate the Minister for Policing and Crime. She works incredibly hard. Today, she is working a double shift and we appreciate it.
I rise to speak to Government amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 333, which sought to extend closure orders to 12 months. That has been the subject of some discussion today. I appreciate that the Government understand and recognise the importance and necessity of closure orders, to the point that they have tabled this amendment in lieu. I have to say to the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington (Gideon Amos) that I do not see that as the Government opposing, but rather nudging gently towards the right direction. They are acknowledging the need for closure orders, while recognising the sensitivity that comes with them: the impact they can have in residential areas—this is not just about commercial premises—and on our high streets. In particular, I think about the potential addition of boarded-up, empty homes for 12-month periods and the same for commercial properties on our high streets. That will be a concern and I therefore recognise the need for the Government to consult, but the Minister will know that this draws concern from me and other colleagues who are keen to tackle the scourge of dodgy shops in their communities—and to do so quickly.
Ms Julie Minns (Carlisle) (Lab)
My hon. Friend has been a doughty champion on the issue of dodgy shops. I would go as far to call her a guru on dodgy shops, if she will accept that accolade. Carlisle, like her constituency, is blighted by minimarts, vape shops and so on. I am attracted to Lords amendment 333, but superficially so. I think it is right that we get this correct. Does she agree with me that passing Lords amendment 333 would mark a significant shift in the law? It is important we get this right and consult, and what the Government are doing is extending the power, but with a guarantee to consult.
Melanie Onn
My hon. Friend is right. It is an acknowledgement that action needs to be taken. That is reflected in other areas of action that the Government are already committed to and those we are likely to see further down the track, which I will come to later.
I think we are right to raise the length of the consultation and say that, while we may appreciate the necessity of the Government wanting to consult when the shift up to 12 months is so significant, the consultation period should not be unduly or unnecessarily lengthy.
Matt Vickers
Does the hon. Lady agree that any such consultation should include closure notices, as well as closure orders?
Melanie Onn
The extension to closure notices relates to much shorter time periods, and the periods for notices provided do not therefore necessarily need to fall into the scope of having a consultation—in fact, I would rather avoid having things in consultation unnecessarily over including things in consultation.
We want to drive the changes that communities expect to see, but this consultation has the potential to undermine the seriousness with which the Government take this issue. I wonder whether there is therefore an opportunity for the Government to say that they are aiming for the consultation and the response to coincide with the high streets strategy that we are expecting later this year, hopefully in the summer—whenever summer, in a parliamentary term, actually comes to fruition.
The campaign to stop dodgy shops is not just about not liking the appearance or the proliferation of these businesses, but covers much wider consequences, from money laundering to the sale of illegal goods; there were even suggestions in a recent BBC investigation of these shops harbouring child sexual exploitation activities. Indeed, a gentleman in my constituency called Shaun Tinmurth was sold an illegal vape that exploded in his home, causing thousands of pounds-worth of damage and putting his life and the lives of his family in significant peril. Just last month, we saw national rail infrastructure damaged as a result of a vape shop fire in Glasgow, with a beautiful grade II building seriously damaged. These businesses endanger lives, bring criminal activity to the heart of our towns and fracture community cohesion.
This is happening now. We are seeing damage, threats to life and costs to the public purse because the measures that currently exist are too slow to intervene, because of a lack of the right resources or because these matters are not considered to be a priority by some local authorities or police authorities. We have to ensure that police and local authorities have sufficient resources within their arsenal to provide a deterrent in the very strongest terms to these fake businesses and to make it absolutely clear to any OCG that is behind these commercial outfits that their model will not be tolerated, that they are not wanted and that the strongest available action will be used in such cases.
That is why the Government should not use the consultation as an opportunity not to continue to press ahead. I know that the Secretary of State is being given powers to easily implement this, should the consultation outcome take us in that direction—I really do not want the Government to miss the opportunity to give serious weight to the consequences. I want to ensure the success of the high streets strategy when it comes in the summer, and I really do not think there is any point in investing in our town centres if legitimate businesses are undercut by those operating outside the law or if residents feel unsafe in the very spaces that we are trying to regenerate.
I urge the Government to publish the consultation as soon as possible and to aim to conclude it in support of and around the timeframe of the high streets strategy, in addition to publishing the terms of reference and membership of the OCG high streets cross-departmental group for the purposes of transparency and contribution, and to ensure that every intervention—whether on policing, regeneration or business support—is aligned with the goal of allowing our high streets to breathe again.
Zarah Sultana (Coventry South) (Your Party)
I rise in support of the motion tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough and Thornaby East (Andy McDonald) to disagree with Lords amendment 312.
Today we are being asked to wave through one of the most draconian assaults on democratic freedoms in modern times, and let us be clear who is doing it: not the Tories—they are not even here—but the Labour party. This Labour Government are attacking the right to protest, attacking trial by jury, proscribing a non-violent direct action group, and handing NHS patient data to Palantir—a company that has helps US Immigration and Customs Enforcement tear migrant families apart and that generates kill lists for the Israeli military—and now they are doing this. This is a Government who are increasingly authoritarian day by day. When people take to the streets to fight back and expose this Government’s complicity in genocide, their answer is to ban them.
Jo Platt (Leigh and Atherton) (Lab/Co-op)
When people talk about feeling safe where they live, they are talking not about spreadsheets or crime statistics, but about whether they feel okay walking home at night, whether their local shops can open their doors without worrying about theft or abuse, and whether, when something does go wrong, the law actually backs them up. That is why the Crime and Policing Bill really matters.
I am pleased to welcome the Bill, because it tackles the issues that my constituents raise time and again: antisocial behaviour, abuse of retail workers, the need for visible neighbourhood policing and stronger action on serious harm, including violence against women and girls. They make up one of the most significant packages on crime and policing in decades. This Bill is about restoring public confidence and making our streets safer.
I will speak to Government amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 333, relating to antisocial behaviour and closure powers. In Leigh and Atherton, as in many towns, so-called dodgy shops have become an all too familiar feature of struggling high streets. Illicit premises selling illegal goods, undercutting lawful businesses and operating in plain sight undermine confidence and damage communities, as we have already heard, but what is striking is not the lack of effort from enforcement bodies—far from it—but the limits of the current system. Again and again, action is taken, evidence is gathered and closure orders are secured, only for the same premises to reopen shortly afterwards under a new name. That revolving door problem makes lasting change incredibly difficult.
As we have heard, local authorities, trading standards and police forces often spend months building cases and navigating court processes, yet the maximum closure period remains just three months. For those determined to break the law, that is simply not a sufficient deterrent. Legitimate businesses are left trying to compete fairly while criminals carry on. Communities see it happening and are rightly frustrated, while confidence in enforcement and in the fairness of the system starts to slip.
This issue cannot be solved in isolation. If we are serious about restoring our high streets, we need a joined-up approach that stops illicit operators from taking root in the first place. The Government are moving in the right direction, with Pride in Place funding, strengthened trading standards, the Tobacco and Vapes Bill and the forthcoming high streets strategy all forming important pieces of the puzzle. Government amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 333 is another: it gives the Secretary of State the power through regulations to amend the maximum duration of closure orders, with the flexibility to treat different types of premises differently. That pragmatic step will allow consultation and evidence-led change. However, that flexibility must not become hesitation.
I would welcome clarity from the Government on the timeline for consultation, because enforcement that does not stick is not enforcement at all. Our high streets cannot afford that delay. Will the Minister confirm that the amendment sits within a wider ongoing programme of work bringing together enforcement, regulation and stronger powers where needed so that this is not the end of the conversation but the start of a robust approach? Our high streets deserve nothing less. With that reassurance, the amendment will be a necessary step in restoring credibility to enforcement and signalling that the Government are serious about bringing confidence, fairness and pride back to our high streets.
Clive Jones (Wokingham) (LD)
I will speak to Lords amendment 312 on cumulative disruption. I am deeply alarmed by the amendment, which would require senior police officers to take into account any so-called cumulative impacts of frequent protests on local areas when considering whether to impose conditions on public processions and assemblies. In short, the Government are giving the police unprecedented powers to restrict or prohibit protests that they expect to be too disruptive. That is an unacceptable attack on our democracy. These powers represent a significant expansion of state authority and risk undermining long-standing democratic freedoms. They also set a dangerous precedent for the suppression of dissent and inhibit people’s legitimate right to peaceful protest.
With the rise of the right in this country, that expansion of power leaves the potential for future Governments to misuse them to suppress and stamp out all forms of protest, strikes and demonstrations. Our fundamental right to peaceful protest, which has existed for many years, must be safeguarded against any attempt to constrict it.
Kim Johnson
Although I support many elements of this Bill, I cannot support Lords amendment 312. The Bill has come back to the Commons without the proper scrutiny it requires and, despite repeated requests, Ministers have failed to provide that. The Bill returns to this House with a troubling number of late changes made in the Lords that severely limit our ability to examine major amendments, especially those that impact the fundamental right to protest—a right that has already been significantly eroded in recent years due to a number of pieces of draconian legislation.
I rise in support of my hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough and Thornaby East (Andy McDonald) in his motion to reject amendment 312, which is supported by 30 MPs. We have pushed hard for a vote today on the proposals, which will have a far-reaching, draconian impact on our civil liberties. I am disappointed that the motion will not be reached, demonstrating a fundamental failure of the democratic process.
Lords amendment 312 would give police new powers to restrict protests on the basis of so-called cumulative disruption, but what does that actually mean? It is about giving them the discretion to limit or fully ban a demonstration based on the combined impact of multiple protests over time. The move is the latest in a series of anti-protest measures introduced by successive Governments in recent years, and I have to say that, as a Labour MP, I am very disappointed with the draconian anti-protest proposals being pushed by this Government.
Sammy Wilson
What does the hon. Lady say to the people who become the target of those continual protests? The protesters recognise that there is a vulnerable area, a vulnerable community, part of a city or a piece of the country’s infrastructure, such that, when they protest there on a regular basis, they cause maximum disruption to the lives of the people who live there. What does she say to those people? Should they not have protection?
Kim Johnson
I have to say that I disagree with the right hon. Member.
Although today’s proposals have not come in under the radar through secondary legislation, as the Tory Government tried before they were ultimately defeated in court, amendment 312 has sneakily come in through the back door from the Lords, leaving MPs with no opportunity for scrutiny, debate or vote.
Vikki Slade (Mid Dorset and North Poole) (LD)
Does the hon. Member agree that the vague wording could lead a police force to ban, for example, a Pride protest three months after a farmers’ protest? There is no clarity as to whether a protest is damaging; it is just that the protest is cumulative.
Kim Johnson
The hon. Member makes a valid point, and those are some of the issues that have been raised by civil liberties organisations and disputed by the Minister in the House this afternoon. The situation means that many colleagues who are here today will rely on the Government’s reassurances that the proposals strike a fair balance between permitting protests and preventing disruption, without being given the time to consider what that really means. I therefore ask them to heed my words closely.
The suffragettes protested for decades for women to win the right to vote. It took years of disruption and fighting a patriarchal system for them to win the historic gains from which we all benefit today. Who would condemn their action, or argue that their protests should have been made less impactful, and their struggle for women’s liberation harder and longer? Looking back on the suffragettes’ fight, it is inconceivable that we would support a restriction on their struggle on the basis of “cumulative disruption”. It was exactly that process of sustained pressure that won women the vote.
The same applies to the fight to bring down the evil anti-apartheid regime, during which I was proud to cut my political teeth as a young activist in Liverpool. There, we occupied council buildings and universities, raised money and organised boycotts of goods, sports and culture. We marched and held street stalls and mass demonstrations until that evil regime fell—another victory of the powerless over the powerful, made possible by sustained action and protest. Without sustained protest, we would not have the hard-won employment rights that so many of us benefit from today.
John Milne (Horsham) (LD)
I shall speak to Lords amendments 6 and 333, regarding fly-tipping and vape shop closures respectively. On the face of it, those are very different issues, but they share a common thread, which is that communities are being undermined by people who think that rules do not apply to them, and the victims are being left to shoulder the burden. As chair of the all-party parliamentary group for rural business and the rural powerhouse, and as the MP for Horsham, which is a largely rural area, I hear constantly about rural crime, including theft, livestock worrying and machinery break-ins, but one topic keeps coming up, and that is fly-tipping.
The Country Land and Business Association reports that a single incident can routinely cost a farmer over £10,000 to clear. How bizarre is that? Let us imagine ourselves in the position of the farmer. A criminal dumps a lorryload of waste on our field. We call the authorities and we have to foot the bill. That is offensive to anyone’s sense of natural justice. In my own area, I give credit to Horsham district council for working constructively with farmers to deal with dumping incidents, but even the best councils have to operate within a law that is highly dysfunctional as it stands.
The National Farmers Union, the Countryside Alliance, the Environmental Services Association and Suez Recycling and Recovery all say the same thing: waste crime is spiralling. An astonishing one fifth of England’s waste—that is 38 million tonnes—is thought to be being disposed of illegally. This is a big issue, and successive Governments have failed to rise to the challenge. The cost to the economy is estimated to be between £1 billion and £2 billion a year. The cost to individual landowners is even higher, from their point of view.
Lords amendment 6 would go some way to mitigating this situation. It would make clearing fly-tipped waste a duty of the local authority, not the landowner. It would ensure that the criminal—the tipper—paid, rather than the victim. It would strengthen collaboration between police, councils and the Environment Agency so that offenders could not slip between jurisdictions. In turn, councils would need to be funded by Government for their increased role in enforcement and to protect them against unrecoverable costs. Clearly, this would be an extra spending pressure on the Government, but perhaps that would serve to focus their mind on a problem that has been scandalously overlooked for many years.
Rural crime more broadly needs more focus. In my farmer surveys and surgeries, I hear that farmers are struggling with crimes such as sheep worrying, which has resulted in dead lambs, injured ewes and even the loss of an alpaca. Too often operators on the 101 line simply do not understand why this matters. We need better training, better data collection and a better grasp of rural realities.
The same logic applies to Lords amendment 333 on vape shops and closure notices: enforcement must be effective and swift. Under the current rules, a closure notice can shut an illegal shop for only 48 hours. Many police and crime commissioners have said that that is simply not long enough to prepare their case. Some shops open up again almost immediately, continuing to sell illegal vapes or trading as fronts for criminal gangs.
As it stands, illegal traders are undermining the health of the entire high street. Lords amendment 333 offers a practical fix. It increases closure notices from 48 hours to seven days, giving police and councils the crucial time to build a proper case. It allows courts to impose closure orders for up to 12 months instead of the current three months, and makes them renewable. It gives local authorities more realistic powers to act against shops that they already know are selling illicit vapes or targeting children.
Public faith in the justice system is being undermined because people feel that justice is either too slow or that the authorities lack sufficient powers to deal with modern crime. Sadly, the criminals are innovating much more swiftly than the justice system. The two amendments have a common principle at their heart: victims should not pay for crimes committed against them, and the authorities must be equipped to act decisively when they know that wrongdoing is taking place. The amendments would go some way to help with that, so I urge the Government to support them.
Rachel Taylor (North Warwickshire and Bedworth) (Lab)
I know that feeling safe is very important to my constituents in North Warwickshire and Bedworth, and that is why the Bill is so important for so many people. Today I am immensely proud to welcome the Government’s amendment to equalise hate crime law—Lords amendment 301. I proposed a similar amendment in the House of Commons, and I thank my hon. Friends the Members for Penistone and Stocksbridge (Dr Tidball) and for Burton and Uttoxeter (Jacob Collier) for their support, along with that of over 100 colleagues across the House.
I welcome the Government’s introduction of a new offence of misogynistic hate. I got into politics to fight section 28 and the hate it created. Section 28 attacked the right for people like me to live openly. It stigmatised lesbian, gay and bisexual people. It pushed us out of public life and made us fair game for attack. I got into politics to fight that cruel law and everything it represented. Today I am proud to continue that fight for all LGBT people, for disabled people and for victims of misogyny.
Our politics is becoming increasingly hateful and divisive, and the impacts are heartbreaking. Less than half of LGBT people feel safe holding their partner’s hand in public. As many as 70% of disability hate crimes go unreported. Girlguiding UK revealed that one in 10 girls have missed school to avoid sexual harassment. Hatred towards women and girls, disabled people and LGBT people threatens our entire society. It creates fear—fear to go outside, fear to speak up, fear to be seen. It silences people. It makes all of us afraid.
Lords amendment 301 now shows that whether it is due to someone’s race, religion, sexual orientation or gender identity, or indeed their sex or disability, Britain is a country that will not tolerate hate, that all hatred is equal and that all those who commit vile acts of hatred will face the same grave consequences. Because of this amendment, victims of hate will have more time to report crimes. For victims who may not feel safe reporting hate crime instantly, that is a lifeline. Perpetrators will get tougher sentence and higher maximum penalties. Aggravated offences are often pursued in the Crown court, where better victim support is available, including the ability to keep them apart from defendants.
I know that some people thrive on the politics of hate. Today, I am proud that the Labour Government have stood firmly against hate in all its forms. We will halve violence against women and girls in a decade, we will fight homophobia and transphobia, and we will confront ableism and hate against disabled people. I welcome, in addition to the tougher action on hate crime, the measures on antisocial behaviour, fly-tipping, knife crime, illegal trading, intimate image abuse, violent pornography and the exploitation of children. This Government are clearly standing with victims, creating safer communities and safer streets. I commend the Bill to the House.
Sammy Wilson
I support the amendments on fly-tipping, although some of them do not go far enough. The extent of that crime varies, from the small scale, with people throwing waste on to others’ land, to the scale seen at Hoads wood, about which the APPG for woods and trees heard evidence. The fly-tipping there was so extensive that parts of the wood were cut down. Dumping was undertaken over a six-month period, and the clear-up bill is estimated to be about £15 million. Fly-tipping is so extensive, and, as has been pointed out, the victims are forced to pay for it. The Lords amendments will at least help to impose some penalties on those who engage in that activity.
I support Lords amendment 35 on the sale of knives in Northern Ireland. Given the discussion that we had about the Southport inquiry yesterday, we know that there needs to be greater control of the sale of knives to people who would use them for evil purposes.
Lords amendment 357 was moved in the other place by the former leader of my party, Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee, who of course has a great deal of experience of the Northern Ireland context. Those of us who live in Northern Ireland see on a monthly basis how terrorism is glorified—not by dark individuals lurking in the background, but even by Government Ministers and indeed the First Minister in Northern Ireland. The whole point of glorifying terrorism is to ensure that, even when terrorists are under pressure militarily, their evil message—the poison that they wish to inject into society—can still be perpetuated and spread, whether through physical violence or by using people and getting people to support them.
I say to the House that that is not just an issue for Northern Ireland, which experienced years of terrorism and still has the legacy of that terrorism. This issue increasingly affects Great Britain. We see it on the streets, almost on a monthly basis. We see marches glorifying terrorism and intimidating certain sections of the population. Many people in GB, especially in the Jewish community, now feel that they cannot even walk the streets.
This should worry everyone in the House: surveys have shown that one in five people in GB believe that political violence is justified in certain circumstances. How has that situation arisen? It has arisen because we allow the glorification of terrorism. “The cause is just. The people who do it are heroes. They make great sacrifices. They have no alternative”—those are the kinds of arguments I hear in Northern Ireland all the time, but I also hear them now from some of those who promote terrorism in GB.
Jim Allister (North Antrim) (TUV)
The right hon. Member makes a very valid point. Does he agree that defeating terrorism is about not just the physical defeat of terrorism but ensuring that, through its glorification, the narrative of terrorism is not allowed to radicalise other people? Does that not point to the inadequacy of the Terrorism Act 2006? Section 1 of that Act has contained a provision against the glorification of terrorism for the last 20 years. We have not had one prosecution under it in Northern Ireland, yet we have had endless glorification of terrorism. Does that not put the focus on why Lords amendment 357 is necessary—to make it easier to secure prosecution when faced with self-evident glorification of terrorism?
Sammy Wilson
The hon. and learned Member is absolutely right. The whole point of the amendment is to ensure that there is not the ability to keep on promoting the terrorist message. We do not just need a physical defeat of terrorism but an ideological one. They make their arguments to ensure that if they have to pause their campaign or do not achieve all their objectives, the poison is injected into the next generation, who will have justification for carrying on what they want them to do, to achieve their goal.
Increasingly, the narrative of politics in GB is being infiltrated by sectarian arguments and sectarian division. All of us should be worried that the law is inadequate to deal with those who have evil intent. I know that some will argue, “But people have to be allowed to say what they want. We live in a democracy. We’ve got to have freedom of speech.” That is fine, but when that freedom of speech is abused and the law prevents us from stopping that, we should be concerned. I met with Jewish students recently. Some 49% of Jewish students have heard either directly or in their presence the glorification of Hamas terrorism and what was done on 11 October. We have to bear in mind that this is prevalent in our society. It is prevalent in Northern Ireland.
This is not just about promoting the terrorist message. It is also about the impact it has on the victims of terrorism and the anger it causes when people in public positions are allowed to stand up and praise the actions of those who killed their loved ones and maimed members of their family, arguing, “I’m proud of the people who did it. I honour the people who did it. The people who did it had no alternative.” Apart from the impact on the victims, it also sends a message to those who are listening that maybe this was not a bad thing anyway. If the situation arises in the future, will those young people be easily recruited to commit the same acts?
In the Minister’s response to me, she argued—I hope that I have got this right—that the amendment will prevent legitimate debate on historical events, but reading the amendment shows that nothing can be further from the truth. The amendment says that the offence would occur if the comments relate
“to one or more organisations which are at the time of the statement proscribed”.
Therefore it does not prevent people from saying that something happened in the past or that an event is historical and a debate can be around it. Instead, it says that the offence would occur only if a statement is made in respect of organisations that are currently deemed to be dangerous organisations and are proscribed.
Secondly, the amendment says that the offence would occur if the comment
“glorifies the commission or preparation (whether in the past, in the future or generally) of such acts or offences”.
So the Minister’s argument against the amendment is not correct. The amendment does not open the floodgates to preventing discussion about issues that might be controversial and that people may take objection to. It is very specific.
I urge the House to support the amendment, not just because of the continual hurt experienced by people in Northern Ireland on an almost monthly basis, where commemorations of murderers are held and public figures go and give support to them, but in the interests of society right across the United Kingdom, where we can see that terrorists and terrorist-supporting organisations are using public platforms to glorify terrorism. That has an impact on the victims, but it also has an impact on young people who are vulnerable, easily manipulated and can be persuaded that somehow or other terrorism is something that is normal.
Jess Asato (Lowestoft) (Lab)
I welcome the Bill before us today. It contains a multitude of crucial measures to tackle issues from non-consensual intimate images to retail worker assault, child criminal exploitation and knife crime. I thank the Ministers for Policing and Crime, for Safeguarding and Violence Against Women and Girls and for Victims and Tackling Violence Against Women and Girls, their teams and the whole Government for their work on the Bill. I particularly express my gratitude to the Government for accepting the principle of amendments to the Bill that I first tabled last year, which have been ably taken up more recently by Baroness Bertin in the other place.
Government amendments to Lords amendments 263, 264 and 265 rightly accept that online pornography is a key driver of violence against women and girls, child sexual abuse and commercial sexual exploitation. We know that online pornography is driven by a profit-maximising algorithm that encourages addiction. Like any other addiction, it can spiral. Addicts find themselves having to move towards increasingly extreme content, including illegal content, to get the same fix, or they find that offline, in real-world actions, and we know the impact that that has.
Pornography is not just entertainment; it has become a form of education. It trains brains to link endorphin and dopamine production to violent, degrading and, in some cases, paedophilic-adjacent content. It promotes the idea that pain for women is pleasure for men. It instils the notion that to be close to a woman is to dominate or degrade her. From Wayne Couzens to Dominique Pelicot, we know how the consumption of online sexualised violence can turn into offline violence.
I therefore welcome clauses 105 and 106. They build on my proposed new clause 102, tabled on Report, and will criminalise the possession or publication of strangulation or suffocation in pornography. This is vital given that 36% of women under the age of 34 have been strangled during sex, and strangulation is now the second most common cause of stroke in young women.
I also welcome the Government amendments in lieu before us that build on mine and Baroness Bertin’s amendments to ban pornographic content that features step-incest or performers role-playing as children. Content such as that, which sexualises children, with very young-looking performers dressed in school uniforms, holding lollipops and stuffed toys, very clearly promotes a sexual interest in children. Two pieces of research from 2024 found that between 43% and 63% of those who have committed offences relating to child sexual abuse material began by habitually watching so-called “barely legal” content.
It is right that through the Government’s amendment in lieu to Lords amendment 265, this gateway to paedophilia is swung firmly shut. We know that CSAM consumption and the further child sexual abuse that it can so often encourage largely originate from exposure to online content that is happened across incidentally, rather than with purpose. Offences for online child sexual abuse increased by 26% in 2024.
Content that depicts step-incest—for example, with a stepfather and stepdaughter—likewise eroticises and encourages the sexual abuse of children and those for whom we have or should have a caring responsibility. Sadly, half of all sexual abuse cases against children are perpetrated by a step-parent or family member. Given that we are increasingly living in an age of blended families, permitting the depiction of this abuse is particularly pernicious.
Pornography also has an impact on those who appear in it, and we know that women are all too often coerced or trafficked into the industry. I therefore welcome the Government amendment in lieu of Lords amendment 264, which builds on my amendment and that of Baroness Gabby Bertin to grant the Government the power to require pornography sites to proactively verify the age and consent of those featured on it, rather than just waiting for content to be reported.
The amendment will crucially grant powers to allow performers to withdraw their consent retroactively so that they are not forever trapped into a life in the pornography industry by pictures and videos from perhaps even decades prior. It is of the utmost importance that the Government stick to their timetable to deliver that and work at pace across Departments and with experts from the sector to deliver on it. I am incredibly grateful to UK Feminista, Barnardo’s, CEASE and the APPG on commercial sexual exploitation for their tireless work on these issues and to Ministers who have worked constructively with me and many Members across this House to ensure that we get these vital changes in the Bill.
I am also grateful to the Government for engaging similarly constructively with me on my amendment to Lords amendment 300, which relates to the proposed statutory definition of so-called honour-based abuse. Along with my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel), I was honoured last year to host a screening of the powerful Channel 4 documentary “The Push”, alongside the mother of Fawziyah Javed, who was failed through a series of missed opportunities by statutory bodies to identify her as a victim of honour-based abuse. She was pushed off Arthur’s Seat by her husband, killing her and her unborn child. That is why it is very welcome that this Bill introduces a definition of honour-based abuse. It represents an important step forward and a great win for all the victims and organisations who have campaigned for this for many years.
Nevertheless, I and organisations that work in this space, such as Karma Nirvana, are concerned that the definition as it stands falls short of fully capturing honour-based abuse. The Lords amendment references only a “person”, whereas we know that honour- based abuse is often perpetrated by multiple people as part of a family or community—a feature that distinguishes it from other forms of domestic abuse. I have therefore proposed the addition of “or persons” to Lords amendment 300 in order to reflect that. It is a tiny change, and an amendment sought by Baroness Sugg in the other place. I recognise some may argue that it is already covered by the Interpretation Act, but having spent many years in the domestic abuse sector I know that overstretched and under-resourced multi-agency professionals, particularly the police, may interpret legislation literally and act only within the explicit wording to be set out in Lords amendment 300.
Some have also argued that the use of “persons” would be contrary to the usage and interpretations in other criminal law contexts, yet there are many examples of offences that relate to things such as organised crime, gangs and riot that reference “persons”, including in the Serious Crime Act 2015 and the legislation before us.
A definition of honour-based abuse is the culmination of years of campaigning. I remember working with many people who are still in this House on getting it included in the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, which sadly it was not. I invite the Minister to clarify, in her speech, that the Government intend the amendment to cover multiple perpetrators as well as a sole perpetrator. I would appreciate her and her colleagues’ continued commitment to working with organisations such as Karma Nirvana to ensure that the statutory guidance accurately reflects the true nature of honour-based abuse. Also, there must be funding for training for multi-agency professionals, which will undoubtedly be required if the definition stays as it is.
John McDonnell (Hayes and Harlington) (Lab)
I wholeheartedly support the amendment that my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft (Jess Asato) has tabled to Lords amendment 300. Those of us who have dealt with honour cases recognise the overall family involvement, and there needs to be recognition that we are talking about persons, not a person.
I have listened to a large number of speeches that have done a tremendous job of setting out the principles behind the motion to disagree with Lords amendment 312, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough and Thornaby East (Andy McDonald), which I support. I do not want to talk about the principles; I want to talk about the practicalities, because I am worried that it is when the Government rush to legislate around a particular incident, and do not provide adequate time for debate and individual votes, that Parliament makes significant mistakes. That has been demonstrated in the past.
The Minister referenced the Manchester events, which were absolutely tragic, and the demonstrations that took place then. However, she also mentioned that the powers to deal with such events—to prevent and restrict demonstrations that are causing such distress—already exist. She also mentioned that the cumulative impact is a factor that police officers need to take into account; the change made by the Bill is simply that it will say that police will be required to take the cumulative impact into account. That seems like a simple, small step forward, but I think it will cause immense problems. In particular, it will place a burden on the police, but it will also introduce an element of subjective judgment by a number of senior police officers.
I will give examples from our history. In the 1980s, I was involved in the City of London branch of the anti-apartheid movement, and for two years, we held a permanent demonstration outside South Africa House. I remember being there, singing Christmas carols, on Christmas day. It was disruptive, and people were arrested for individual offences, but that was the whole point. We were there because we said that we would not leave until Nelson Mandela was released. At that time, we were condemned in this House for supporting a terrorist, and for supporting a terrorist organisation called the African National Congress. These days, if we held up the banners that we held up then, we would probably be arrested. The other example I give is from 1985, I think. I was involved in the organisation of the people’s march for jobs. A group of unemployed workers marched from the north all the way to London, and my job was to prepare for their arrival in London, but in every town and city, they were met with a demonstration. On many occasions, those demonstrations were disruptive—that is cumulative.
For me, the other issue is that unfortunately, I think this change is largely targeted at the Palestine Solidarity Campaign demonstrations in London. I have been involved in some of the processes of negotiation with the police on each of those demonstrations—I have been on virtually every one, over two years. I have been advising the organisations involved when they are going into the negotiations, as well as during those negotiations. So that Members understand, what happens is that a date is identified months in advance. As that date gets nearer, discussions take place with the police, and severe restrictions are placed on the route and the timing of the march. The issue of synagogues has come up; I do not think there has ever been a synagogue within half a mile of one of those marches, but the demonstrators themselves have said, “We’ll adjust the times, so that it does not in any way interfere with any service.” Those are the negotiations that go on. It is a thorough process.
However—I do not say this lightly—as a result of my experience of the whole process, I have lost confidence in the judgment of the senior Metropolitan police officers. I say that because I was involved in some of the discussions on the demonstrations in which Ben Jamal and Chris Nineham were arrested. I found then that the use of the restrictions was deliberately provocative. What has been said in court since then has been disingenuous, because I was there on the spot, and I saw what happened. In fact, the next day, I was pulled into the police station and interviewed as a result of the events that day. I have lost that confidence, because we were assured that the Metropolitan Police Commissioner and his senior team would consult with the wider communities in advance of planning for these demonstrations, so that views could be taken on board, particularly the views of the Jewish community. “Consultation with the Jewish community” has largely been interpreted as consultation with the Board of Deputies. The Board of Deputies represents a certain section of the Jewish community. In fact, it has split. Last year, 37 members expressed their concern about how the Board of Deputies was expressing its position on Gaza.
During the demonstrations, I start the march with the Jewish bloc. I have marching beside me Stephen Kapos, the Holocaust survivor who became quite a famous architect. The organisations in the Jewish bloc have never been consulted about the march. The Haredi community, which is the largest Jewish community, particularly in London—the orthodox Jewish community —has never been consulted about these demonstrations. I am sorry, but I have lost confidence in the assurances that we have been given that there are wider consultations with the community.
In the past few weeks, I have lost so much confidence in the judgment of Metropolitan police senior officers. Every year for decades, we have had a march in London for the Palestinians on the anniversary of Nakba, to commemorate the Palestinians being forcibly removed from their own land. Nakba means catastrophe. There is a march in London every year around 16 March. This year, it was going to go ahead as normal. Planning and discussions were taking place, and then the police said, “No, you can’t go on your normal route.” Why is that? Because the police had allocated it to Tommy Robinson. We saw what happened last year in London on Tommy Robinson’s march. There was violence, and there were attacks on police and individuals, yet the Palestinian demonstration was displaced for this far-right group—thugs, in many instances. That demonstrated to me the bias among Metropolitan police senior officers. In many ways, it demonstrates how they could start interpreting the concept of cumulative impact in this legislation, which will go through today.
With every move towards restricting peaceful protest in any way, there is a risk. We have seen in the past, on a number of occasions, that if we deny people the right to peaceful protest, they will riot. There is a risk that, through this legislation, we undermine our historic, real commitment to democratic, peaceful protest. That right has achieved so much in our country; we have achieved so much through the reforms that have been demanded. This legislation puts in peril those rights, and in addition, through it, we could be acting provocatively, undermining the peaceful protest that we want to see. That could result in the potential for riot. That is why we needed more time to debate and discuss the issue, and why we needed a right to vote on the motion to disagree. That is not going to happen tonight, and I think we will regret it in the long term.
Andy McDonald
Does my right hon. Friend share my concern that although Lord Macdonald of River Glaven has been commissioned to carry out a review of the complex public order architecture, we are taking a measure in this arena without the benefit of that review’s findings? Is that not putting the cart before the horse?
John McDonnell
I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. He made the point earlier, and I think it is completely rational and understandable.
What adds to my anxiety is that in the normal run of things, a serious matter such as this would be introduced in the House of Commons, and there would be a proper Commons debate, after which the matter would go off to the Lords, and then come back to us. I feel that we are being bounced into this today, and I did not expect that of my Government on an issue of this sort, because it is so important, and because it will have major consequences for us in the future—and particularly for our movement, which was based on protest from the very beginning. We seem to be undermining our historic tradition, and our commitment to a role that we have played historically and will almost inevitably need to play in the future.
Mary Kelly Foy (City of Durham) (Lab)
There is much in the Bill that is serious and worthy of support. The measures to tackle shop theft, protect retail workers, strengthen the response to exploitation and abuse and deal with knife crime are all important. However, Lords amendment 312 raises a very different prospect. It is not really about violent disorder or intimidation. It is about making it easier to restrict repeated protest. It would require the police, when deciding whether to impose conditions on a protest, to take into account what the Bill calls “cumulative disruption”. That means not just the disruption caused by the protest, but disruption said to arise from other protests in the same area that were held, are being held, or are intended to be held. The organiser does not have to be the same; the cause does not even have to be the same.
That should concern every Member of this House, because effective protest is very often cumulative, and democratic campaigning is nearly always repetitive. The campaigners come back again and again. That is true of the trade union movement, true of the suffragettes, and true of the civil rights tradition more broadly. The cumulative nature of protest is not a flaw in our democracy. It is often the means by which democracy speaks, and that is why amendment 312 is so dangerous in principle. It takes something that has always been central to democratic struggle—persistence—and starts to treat it as a problem to be managed down. It turns the repeated exercise of democratic freedom into a reason for state restriction. Once the House accepts that logic, we move on to very difficult ground indeed.
Laws like this are never drafted only for the Government of the day. They remain on the statute book. They pass into other hands. We would be naive not to ask how a future hard-right Government might use a power like this. As the TUC has warned, broad “cumulative disruption” tests could all too easily be used against trade union demonstrations, against long-running industrial disputes, against repeated pickets, rallies and marches, and against the kind of organised working-class protest that has been central to the Labour movement and to the winning of rights in this country. That is not alarmism. It is exactly why Parliament should be careful about creating broad powers that can later be wielded by Ministers and authorities with far less respect for civil liberties.
Peaceful protest is not an inconvenience to be tolerated only once. It is a democratic right, and one of the clearest tests of whether we truly believe in that right is whether we still defend it when it is persistent, visible and effective. That was true of the Chartists demanding political reform, the match girls and dockers fighting for dignity at work, the anti-apartheid movement that refused to give up, and the suffragettes who were crucial in securing the vote for women.
Sir Ashley Fox (Bridgwater) (Con)
The hon. Lady is making an important speech on the right to protest, but does she accept that many members of the Jewish community feel intimidated by regular marches by the pro-Palestinian brigade, who demonstrate loudly and not always peacefully in the same area, week after week? How does she believe that that community can be protected from such intimidation?
Mary Kelly Foy
I agree that some protests can feel intimidating. On the Palestine protests, people have never protested outside synagogues, and they do not protest outside mosques. Given the proper police protections that already exist, there is no reason for the Jewish community to feel intimidated. But the fact is that this goes far beyond the Jewish community, for all the reasons that I have outlined.
It was said in the past that we should not protest again and again for women’s right to vote, or for trade unions to win their rights against unscrupulous employers. In their name, and in the name of the whole Labour movement, Lords amendment 312 ought to be rejected.
Chris Hinchliff (North East Hertfordshire) (Lab)
There are many important proposals before us today, and I congratulate the Minister on bringing them forward. I wholeheartedly support the Government’s efforts to tackle antisocial behaviour, offensive weapons, fly-tipping, the exploitation of children, and appalling sexual offences. However, Lords amendment 312, which was introduced in the other place, dangerously infringes on civil liberties.
It is incumbent on all Members to jealously guard the rights of our constituents, and any restriction of their civil liberties should only be accepted by this House on the basis of overwhelming evidence that such proposals would strengthen, rather than undermine, the health of our democracy. On this occasion, however, we have had next to no evidence whatsoever, because these significant changes were only introduced after the original passage of the Bill through this House, which is ultimately a pretty sorry way to treat representative parliamentary democracy.
Lords amendment 312 is out of step with the best traditions of this country and of the Labour party, which has always existed to redress the balance of power in favour of ordinary people. The Chartists, the suffragettes, the organisers of the Kinder Scout trespass, those who stood against fascism at Cable Street, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the Jarrow crusade—these were protest movements and campaigns of direct action that were supported and led by giants of our party, and which we should celebrate, not disown. They were advancing Labour’s historic mission to wrest power from the established status quo, so that ordinary people have a real say over their lives. Lords amendment 312 contradicts that impulse, and risks shifting the balance of power in our society towards the vested interests that we ought to take on.
The corrosive influence of the rich and powerful runs through every corner of our politics. It muddies policymaking and leaves our constituents asking whether decisions are made in their interests, or in those of the last donor who paid £2,000 a head at a lobbyist curry night. If tweaks are to be made to defend our democracy and prevent disruption to the life of our communities, that would be a far more apt target than the civil liberties of our constituents. Today, Lords amendment 312 is opposed across the Labour movement and civil society by many organisations that share the progressive instincts that should be guiding this Labour Government. That is hardly surprising, given the way this legislation is drafted. It is vague, with no definition of what is meant by
“serious disruption to the life of the community”.
It is widely drawn, with no necessary link between the events considered to be cumulatively disruptive. It does not define the area in question or the timeframe, and it has the blindingly obvious potential to be abused.
The proposals could easily be used to restrict protests simply because they are considered inconvenient due to their persistence, and not because of their content or messages. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) pointed out, this may place substantial political pressure on the decision making of senior police officers. I want to address the concerns raised by several hon. Members in this debate about the intimidation of specific minority groups. I do understand those concerns and they are legitimate, but the legislation is not drafted tightly enough to address that problem. It is far too vague and far too broad to coherently address that point, and it is not what we will achieve by passing this amendment.
Finally, since we are discussing notions of cumulative impact, whatever the stated intentions today, when these plans are considered alongside the recent restrictions on the right to protest against animal testing, a legally contested proscription and other legislation that I assume means that any of my constituents disobeying these plans would not have the right to a trial by their peers, assertions by the Government that they hold the right to protest sacrosanct are wearing so thin as to be clearly transparent. The case for Lords amendment 312 has not been made, we should not be asked to vote for it en bloc alongside other important but entirely separate changes, and I urge Ministers to drop these plans for good.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
Members who have participated in the debate should be making their way back to the Chamber, because the Minister will be on her feet shortly. I expect those on the Front Benches will be communicating that message to their Back Benchers.
Steve Witherden (Montgomeryshire and Glyndŵr) (Lab)
I shall keep my remarks brief. I welcome the vast majority of this Bill, but given the serious implications for our fundamental rights, Lords amendment 312 on cumulative disruption should be given adequate time to be properly scrutinised and debated. This amendment could be used by future far-right Governments to in effect stamp out protests and even trade union pickets altogether. As we all know, Reform UK would repeal the Employment Rights Act 2025, but I doubt it would repeal what Lords amendment 312 will allow. I strongly support my hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough and Thornaby East (Andy McDonald) in his motion to disagree with the Lords amendment. Sustained peaceful protest is central to the achievement of democratic change.
Madam Deputy Speaker
That was very brief indeed, when the hon. Member had such a huge amount of time. I call the Minister.
Sarah Jones
I welcome the broad agreement across the House with, I think, the great majority of the Lords amendments, particularly those brought forward by the Government. Those amendments further strengthen the powers of the police, prosecutors and partner agencies to tackle violence against women and girls, online harms and hate crimes. We have sought to engage constructively with the non-Government amendments carried in the Lords. As I set out in my opening speech, in many instances we support the intent behind these amendments and our concerns are about their workability, not the underlying objectives. In that spirit, let me turn directly to some of the points raised in the debate.
The Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for Stockton West (Matt Vickers), seeks to disagree with Lords amendment 301. Let me be clear: this is not a move by the Government to police lawful speech, and these provisions do not criminalise the expression of lawful opinions. Extending the aggravated offences does not create any new offence. This amendment extends an existing aggravated offences framework, which operates in relation to race and religion, to cover additional characteristics—namely, sexual orientation, transgender identity, disability and sex.
This framework applies only where specific criminal offences—offences of violence, public order, criminal damage, harassment or stalking—have already been committed and where hostility is proven to the criminal standard. This is not about creating new “speech crimes”; it is about ensuring that where criminal conduct has taken place, and that conduct is driven by hostility towards a protected characteristic, the law can properly recognise the additional harm caused.
That is an important distinction. Freedom of expression, legitimate debate and strongly held views remain protected, but where someone commits an existing criminal offence and does so because of hostility towards a person’s identity, it is right that the criminal law should be able to reflect that seriousness through higher maximum penalties. The hon. Member for Stockton West is simply wrong if he thinks that the same end can be achieved through sentencing guidelines. It is about equality of protection, not the policing of lawful speech.
I will now come to measures debated on the epidemic of everyday crime. Lords amendment 333, on closure powers, was raised by a number of hon. Members. I want to pay tribute to the dodgy shops campaign being run by my hon. Friends the Members for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes (Melanie Onn) and for Leigh and Atherton (Jo Platt). I agree wholeheartedly with their aims. If we do not tackle dodgy shops, it is very hard to do the wider work of bringing back our high streets. I completely share the concerns raised about the rise of illegality affecting so many of our high streets. It is for exactly that reason that the Home Office has established the cross-Government high streets illegality taskforce, which will be backed by £10 million a year for the next three years—£30 million in total. The taskforce is already working at pace to develop a strategic long-term policy response to money laundering and associated illegality on our high streets, including other forms of economic crime, tax evasion and illegal working, and to tackle the systemic vulnerabilities that criminals exploit. The initiative was announced in the 2025 Budget and, as I said, is supported by significant funding.
Strengthening the closure powers available to local partners in tackling criminal behaviour on the high street is part of that mix. Our amendment in lieu accepts that and will enable us to go ahead and do it. The push from my hon. Friends is to do that at pace. We will of course work as fast as we can on the consultation on closure orders that we have agreed to do. I hear the message loud and clear that we need to go fast, but the purpose of the consultation is to ensure that we get this right—that we make the distinction between private and public property, and the complications that might come from that.
Matt Vickers
The Chartered Trading Standards Institute and many of the agencies responsible for dealing with this issue talk about the need to extend—or potentially extend, depending on how tonight goes—not only orders, but notices. That is the 48-hour window, or seven days if we go with this amendment, so that papers can be put in place and the dodgy shops, as the Minister put it, do not have the ability to reopen before the order can be put in place. This does not seem to appear in the amendment in lieu. Will she be looking at notices, as well as orders?
Sarah Jones
We are already, on the face of the Bill, extending the time to up to 72 hours. The point of the notice is to enable the time to get to court and apply for a closure. We are providing the extra time to do just that. We are also extending the powers to registered social landlords, so that they can also be part of that. We are already taking action. Of course, we will always keep these things under review. We will always consider what is said to us—even from the Opposition Front Benches—but the amendment today deals just with closure orders, and we have committed to consult on that.
Matt Vickers
The alternative Lords amendment—the pushback from the Lords—relates to notices and orders. The reason there is a problem with the 72 hours for notices is that, because of court sittings and how that all falls, we end up not getting the order in place, and these shops, which the agencies have jumped through the hoops to close down, get to reopen. I do not think the Chartered Trading Standards Institute or many of the agencies dealing with that would agree with the 72 hours. I ask the Minister to go further still and to perhaps look at the seven days being put forward by the Lords.
Sarah Jones
Through our taskforce, which is funded with £30 million, we will look at a whole range of opportunities on what we can do. I say gently to the hon. Gentleman that the reason we have a situation where people are money laundering and using illegal shops in many different ways on our high streets is because the previous Government failed to do anything about this growing problem, but we have introduced money and action to tackle it. We will also be tackling the huge challenge we have with our high streets more widely, which was left to us by the previous Government, by introducing a high streets strategy, which we will bring out in the summer.
We are also dealing with the fact that neighbourhood policing collapsed under the previous Government, which has meant that the epidemic of everyday crime is not being tackled as it should be—
Sarah Jones
I will not give way again on this point. We have already delivered 3,000 additional officers and police community support officers on to our streets and into our neighbourhoods—an 18% increase in neighbourhood policing since we came to power.
Wendy Morton
Does the Minister not accept, however, that when the Conservatives left government, we left 3,000 more police officers in post than when we came into government?
Sarah Jones
I do not know how many times we have to rehearse this: the previous Government cut police numbers by 20,000 and decimated neighbourhood policing. They then had a sudden change of heart and said that they would replace those 20,000 police officers, who were recruited with such haste that several forces, including the Met, have sadly—
Sarah Jones
I am just in the middle of a sentence. Several forces have sadly recruited people without the proper vetting processes that should have happened. By the time the previous Government left office, they had recruited the 20,000, but how many of them are sitting behind desks? Twelve-thousand of them are. If the right hon. Lady thinks that is where those officers should be, that is fine, but we believe that our officers should be in our neighbourhoods, which is what we are ensuring.
We are also getting rid of the burden of bureaucracy, built up under the previous Government, that wastes so much police time. In the next couple of years we will free up the equivalent of 3,000 full-time police officers just through use of new technology, AI and new processes will bring this ancient system, which lots of police officers are still working under, into the modern age.
Wendy Morton
The hon. Lady seems to have missed my point completely, even though it was quite simple. Does she not accept that when the Conservatives left office, there were 3,000 more police officers than when we took office? Does she not also accept that her Government and her police and crime commissioners, such as Simon Foster, are actually cutting police stations as well as officer numbers?
Sarah Jones
I accept that there were more officers—not by population, but in terms of actual numbers—when the Conservatives left office than when they took office. [Interruption.] But let me ask the House about something else that happened: by how much did shoplifting rise in the last two years of the Conservative Government? It rose by 60%—
Sarah Jones
The rise is much slower and the charge rate has gone up by 21%. Clearly, action is more important than numbers, and this Government are taking action. That is why, for example, the shoplifting charge rate has increased by 21%.
Many Members have spoken about fly-tipping. I absolutely accept the strength of feeling on fly-tipping. I think it is repulsive, and most of our communities are affected by it. Whether it is the large fly-tipping in our rural communities that is driven by serious organised crime or the everyday fly-tipping that we see in our cities, we need to do more to tackle it. The Government have published the waste crime action plan, which will make a substantial difference to how we approach waste crime, including the Government paying for the removal of the most egregious sites. In parts of the country we have seen reports in the press of huge waste sites.
We are also committed to forcing fly-tippers to clean up their mess. Under this Bill, people who use their vehicle to fly-tip will potentially get nine points on their licence. That goes further than what the Opposition had previously suggested. So we are acting, as we should. We did not agree with the Lords amendment that proposed that local authorities should have to clear all sites, including private sites, because of the very significant costs that would be required to undertake that. We do not think that can be put on to local authorities just like that. But I assure hon. Members across the House that we are taking significant action on fly-tipping and we will continue to do so.
Matt Vickers
Can the Minister tell me why the Government are opposing the Lords amendment that would allow police officers to seize the vehicles of the vile criminals who fly-tip in communities across the country?
Sarah Jones
There are already powers for the seizure of vehicles, and that is already happening, including in my area. Vehicles can be seized and crushed, and I think we should be doing more of that, not less, when it comes to antisocial behaviour.
I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Gower (Tonia Antoniazzi), who spoke about Lords amendment 361 and our amendment to make it legally sound. As I said, the Government do not have a view on this, because it is an issue to do with abortion, and it would not be correct to take a view on that. She asked when it would come into effect, and I can tell her that it will apply as soon as the Bill receives Royal Assent. Obviously, decisions on particular cases up until that point are for local police, but I heard what my hon. Friend said.
I want to touch on the comments from my hon. Friend the Member for North Warwickshire and Bedworth (Rachel Taylor) about aggravated offences. Building on what I said to the Opposition spokesperson—
Sarah Jones
Yes, he is a shadow Minister—I am very happy to give him his correct title.
Britain is a country that will not tolerate hate, as my hon. Friend the Member for North Warwickshire and Bedworth said. She spoke about aggravated offences relating to disability, trans and sex, and bringing those into line with the existing aggravated offences. That will support victims, and not just in terms of potential sentencing and justice; it will mean that victims can access more support, which I very much welcome, and I am glad that she does too.
Turning to the right hon. Member for East Antrim (Sammy Wilson) and the issue of the glorification of terrorism—oh, I see he is not in his place; I will come back to that issue.
My hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft (Jess Asato) has been doing so much work on a number of different areas, not least all of the Lords amendments that relate to porn. She gave a really powerful speech about how pain for women is increasingly perceived as equalling pleasure for men, and she spoke of the need to tackle that in many different ways, because sexualised violence online can become violence in real life. I am glad that she welcomed the step-incest amendments, which are absolutely right, as well as those on people trying to look like children, which she called “barely legal content”. I heard her message about proactively verifying age and consent and about bringing in the timetable to deliver that as soon as we can.
My hon. Friend also talked about honour-based abuse. We understand and agree with her, as well as other hon. Members who raised the importance of realising that often it is not a single crime but involves a whole group of people. We need to ensure that is clear in all the training done on identifying and responding to this form of abuse. Therefore, alongside the statutory guidance, we are developing additional free learning modules for professionals who work with victims and perpetrators of honour-based abuse. That includes a general module as well as dedicated modules on multi-agency responses. Together, those modules will strengthen statutory professionals’ ability to recognise the signs and to manage cases appropriately and safely in practice. I hope that is reassuring to my hon. Friend.
I turn to Lords amendment 312, which many hon. Members spoke to. There are a number of things to say on our cumulative disruption amendment. First, I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough and Thornaby East (Andy McDonald), who talked powerfully about his position, which I respect. I agree that protest and the right to protest is part of the lifeblood of the Labour movement, and that progress is rarely—if ever—handed down without first having been campaigned for. I understand his concern, and the concern of everyone in the House, that we balance the right to protest with the impact of protest. We have had many debates on that in this place over the past few years.
The Home Secretary asked Lord Macdonald to review public order legislation and hate crime legislation, because we have had lots of different pieces of legislation and there is a need to take a holistic look at that to see whether it is right. Lord Macdonald has not reported yet; he will do so within a few months, and we very much look forward to what he has to say. I hope that when he does report we can consider his recommendations in this place and discuss all his findings together.
Andy McDonald
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. Given what she has just said, would it not have been wiser to await the outcome of the review, so that we could have seen Lord Macdonald’s view of the entire scene before taking yet further legislative measures that will move the dial even further? Would that not have been the right course of action?
Sarah Jones
I completely understand my hon. Friend’s point, which we have discussed before. As he knows, the announcement that the amendment would be made was given by the Home Secretary after the Heaton Park attack and the protest that followed. It has not come from nowhere; it has been debated and suggested by policing colleagues for some time. The Government’s view was that this Bill is a vehicle we could use to introduce this legislation, and that we should take the opportunity to do so. I know that he disagrees with that decision, but we made it because we feel this is a necessary step, given the situation in which we find ourselves.
I want to be really clear again about what the amendment does and does not do. Marches can only be banned in very, very specific circumstances, as happened with the al-Quds march recently—the first time a march had been banned since 2012. The amendment will make no difference to that whatsoever. It will make no difference to what march can and cannot be banned. An assembly cannot be banned at all, as there is no legislative basis for that, so again, the amendment will make no difference at all.
It already is the case, and it has been since 1986 when the Public Order Act was introduced, that the police can consider cumulative disruption when they look at imposing conditions on a protest. A condition could be the time that the protest is allowed to take place, the route that the protest can go down or the number of people allowed on that protest. Since 1986, the police have had the ability to consider cumulative disruption when they look at whether they should impose conditions. The amendment means that they have to look at and consider the impact of cumulative disruption when they look at imposing conditions.
Apsana Begum
I note what the Minister has just said—she said the same to our hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy)—that she derives the assessment of cumulative disruption from the Public Order Act 1986, in that the police must, rather than can, consider cumulative disruption. However, the definition of “cumulative” does not exist in the law as it stands; indeed, the bulk of the text of amendment 312 creates a definition of “cumulative disruption”. Will the Minister clarify where else in the law does that definition already exist, because it is not in the Public Order Act?
Sarah Jones
My point was that the basis of cumulative disruption has been in the law from the Public Order Act 1986. In terms of the definition, the police use their discretion on the definition—that is absolutely the case—and they have done so since 1986, when they were able to consider that.
I will say a couple of things on that basis. The police have to balance the rights of freedom of assembly and speech that are enshrined in the European convention on human rights—they have to do that. When they are considering what they do with protests, they have to balance and consider those rights, and if they are going to impose conditions, that has to be done under specific areas, which might be serious public disorder, serious damage to property or serious disruption to the life of the community. When and if this Bill is passed and we move forward, I will commit to working with the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council to make sure that the guidance is as clear as it can be. However, the definition of cumulative disruption is just its natural meaning, and the police have had that power since 1986.
Andy McDonald
Just on that, if she is going to consult with the College of Policing and others, where is the role for this House to have its voice in that discussion? There are many people here who would like to positively input into that discussion.
Sarah Jones
The role of this House is to debate, which is exactly what we are doing now. I listened, for example, to my right hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell), who talked about his experience with the Metropolitan police in recent times and his sense that he had lost confidence with the way that they were making decisions on protests. I hear all those things and am happy to have more conversations. I am sure that the police would be happy to as well.
I will just say—this does not have an impact on anything that I think about what the law should be on protests—that there has been a 600% increase in the number of protests over the last couple of years. There has been a huge increase in the number of people protesting and the physical ability of the police to just deal with that in terms of resources is not insubstantial. They spend a huge amount of time on this, as we all know, and our neighbourhood officers are often abstracted. That is right and proper—I am not suggesting otherwise—but it is a challenge for the police, particularly in the big urban parts of our country, to have to manage the impact of these protests.
To repeat, the cumulative disruption amendment does not change the guardrails of the powers to impose conditions. It does not change anything about the need to balance the right to protest in the European convention on human rights with the Public Order Act. None of those things will change. What is changing is that we are saying that the police will consider cumulative disruption, rather than that they can consider cumulative disruption.
John McDonnell
I think it would be really helpful if the Minister brought the guidance before the House at some stage, once it is completed, so that we could have some clarity about it. There will be protests in the future. A third runway at Heathrow has been threatened again, and there will be a cumulative impact of protests in my constituency. I want to know if I will have to hand myself in at some point in time as a result of that.
Sarah Jones
I cannot tell whether my right hon. Friend will have to hand himself in at some point in time. I think probably not, but I can remember debating that particular issue when the previous Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, said that he was going to lie down in front of bulldozers. We have debated these issues on protests many, many times. Guidance does not normally come to this House for approval. That would not be appropriate. I need to stress that the police take the definition as it is, in terms of its natural meaning, but I take the point. The point is that we need to ensure that we get these things right, and I will work with the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council on getting this right. I would also ask the House that, when Lord Macdonald has looked at this plethora of emerging legislation, we should consider that and look at what he recommends. Of course, if he recommends that we accept changes to the law, we will debate those things in the proper way in this House if we introduce that legislation.
Chris Hinchliff
Can I just seek clarity from the Minister? If Lord Macdonald comes forward with recommendations to go back in the opposite direction, will the Government then consider those and remove the restrictions they are currently proposing?
Sarah Jones
We do not know what Lord Macdonald is going to recommend. He has terms of reference that we have agreed, which are to look at public order legislation and hate crime legislation and to consider whether it is fit for purpose or whether it needs amending. Of course, we will consider carefully whatever he brings forward and we will act according to what we think is right. He is a man of great note who has done a lot of things in his past—he is a former Director of Public Prosecutions—and we will of course listen to whatever he says.
Max Wilkinson
The Minister seems to be arguing that there is not very much to see here, and that the difference is between “can” and “must”. Is there evidence that when police are having problems policing protests at the moment, they are not assessing the cumulative impact and the problems that that causes?
Sarah Jones
Yes, and that is why we are introducing this amendment; we want to provide clarity that it should be considered. We have a community—in particular, the Jewish community—who are suffering and afraid, and they have spoken to us and to many people many times about the impact of cumulative protests outside places of worship and other places. We are responding to that. This is one change in the grand scheme of public order legislation, but it is a very important one for that community.
Max Wilkinson
I thank the Minister for being generous with her time. Earlier, she said that the right to protest was sacrosanct in this country. My understanding of the definition of “sacrosanct” is that it describes something that is too important to be trifled with. In making this argument, the Government are suggesting that the right to protest should be trifled with, and that the police must do more to restrict the right to protest, aren’t they?
Sarah Jones
This Government believe in the fundamental right to protest. We will never change our view on that. It does have to be balanced with the responsibility to look after our communities. This Government are seeking to get that balance right. We are making a change to the cumulative disruption legislation through this Bill, which we brought forward in the Lords, and several Members asked about that. Of course, normally legislation is introduced here, but amendments are introduced in the Lords by Government and have been by this Government—it is not uncommon. We have had an opportunity to debate the issue today, and I have listened carefully to all the speeches that hon. Members have made.
Apsana Begum
I thank the Minister for giving way once again. Because it is Lords amendments, I want to get full clarity on the definition of cumulative. She mentioned the natural definition of cumulative. If I may borrow the example given by my right hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell), who actually was interviewed under caution for laying flowers for dead children just over a year ago, would it be seen as unnatural or natural if he were to lay down in front of Heathrow runway? What would happen? Is it the expectation that the police would determine what is cumulative, as the Minister said it would be the natural definition?
Sarah Jones
As I have said, the police have had the power to consider cumulative disruption since 1986. If right-wing protesters were protesting every day outside a mosque, that would be my definition of cumulative disruption. The police balance every day the powers they are given from the laws we pass. We are increasing the training that our public order police officers get. We are ensuring that they have access to the right training and resources because that was a problem identified under the previous Government. We are trying to clarify through this piece of legislation that cumulative disruption is an important factor and should be considered when the police consider whether to impose restrictions on protesters. To repeat, we are not banning protests; it is about the imposition of restrictions, and that is all.
The other place has properly asked this elected House to think again about a number of issues. Let us send a clear message back to their lordships: we have listened and agreed a number of further changes to the Bill, but after some 14 months of debate, it is now time for this Bill to complete its passage, so we can get on with the task of implementing the Bill and making all our communities safer.
Amendment (a) made to Lords amendment 263.
Amendments (b) to (g) made to Lords amendment 263.
Lords amendment 263, as amended, agreed to.
Amendments (a) to (e) made to Lords amendment 361.
Lords amendment 361, as amended, agreed to, with Commons financial privileges waived.
Clause 4
Fixed penalty notices
Motion made, and Question put, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 2.—(Sarah Jones.)
Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)
Before we continue, I advise the House that there is a technical fault with the pass reader system for voting. It is still working, but it is slow to start at the beginning of each Division. The Clerks are looking into it, but I ask Members to wait for the readers to activate before trying to vote.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)
Order. I must inform Members that unfortunately the pass readers in the Lobbies are not working. Clerks will shortly take their place at the Division desks in the Lobby to record Members’ names on paper. Members who have already voted will have had their names recorded.
We are ready to resume the Division. Members who have not yet voted should pass through the Lobby to give their names to the Clerks. If a Member has already been through the Lobby in this Division, their vote has been counted and they should not pass through the Lobby again. If Members are in any doubt about whether their name has been recorded, they should email the Public Bill Office.
The House having divided: Ayes 301, Noes 157.
[Division No. 471, 7.31 pm]
Question accordingly agreed to.
Lords amendment 333 disagreed to.
After Clause 144
Duration of closure notices and orders: extension
Government amendment (a) made in lieu of Lords amendment 333.
Motion made, and Question put, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 334.—(Sarah Jones.)
The House divided: Ayes 356, Noes 90.
[Division No. 472, 7.53 pm]
Question accordingly agreed to.
Lords amendments 334 and 339 disagreed to.
Clause 167
Power to make youth diversion orders
Motion made, and Question put, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 342.—(Sarah Jones.)
The House divided: Ayes 281, Noes 70.
[Division No. 473, 8.13 pm]
Question accordingly agreed to.
Lords amendment 342 disagreed to.
Government amendment (a) made in lieu of Lords amendment 342.
After Clause 185
Glorification of terrorism: removal of emulation requirement
Motion made, and Question put, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 357.—(Sarah Jones.)
The House divided: Ayes 278, Noes 73.
[Division No. 474, 8.28 pm]
Question accordingly agreed to.
Lords amendment 357 disagreed to.
After Clause 190
Proscription status of Iran-related entities: review
Motion made, and Question put, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 359.—(Sarah Jones.)
The House divided: Ayes 277, Noes 158.
[Division No. 475, 8.43 pm]
Question accordingly agreed to.
Lords amendment 359 disagreed to.
Lords amendments 360 and 368 to 372 disagreed to.
Government amendment (a) made in lieu of Lords amendments 360 and 368 to 372.
Lords amendments 439 and 505 disagreed to.
Clause 1
Respect orders
Motion made, and Question put, That this House agrees with Lords amendments 1, 3 to 5, 7 to 9, 13 and 14, 16 to 255, 261 and 262, 266 to 310, 312 to 332, 335 to 338, 340 and 341, 343 to 356, 358, 362 to 367, 373 to 438, 440 to 504 and 506 to 532.
The House divided: Ayes 247, Noes 21.
[Division No. 476, 9 pm]
Question accordingly agreed to.
Lords amendments 1, 3 to 5, 7 to 9, 13 and 14, 16 to 255, 261 and 262, 266 to 310, 312 to 332, 335 to 338, 340 and 341, 343 to 356, 358, 362 to 367, 373 to 438, 440 to 504 and 506 to 532 agreed to, with Commons financial privileges waived in respect of Lords amendments 335, 366 and 367.
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83H(2)), That a Committee be appointed to draw up Reasons to be assigned to the Lords for disagreeing with their amendments 6, 11, 12, 311, 334, 339, 357, 359, 439 and 505;
That Sarah Jones, Stephen Morgan, Adam Thompson, Matt Bishop, Alex McIntyre, Matt Vickers and Clive Jones be members of the Committee;
That Sarah Jones be the Chair of the Committee;
That three be the quorum of the Committee.
That the Committee do withdraw immediately.—(Lilian Greenwood.)
Question agreed to.
Committee to withdraw immediately; reasons to be reported and communicated to the Lords.
Crime and Policing Bill
Thursday 16th April 2026
(3 weeks, 4 days ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 186-I Marshalled list for Consideration of Commons Reasons and Amendments - (15 Apr 2026)
12:38 - Division on Motion A1 (as an amendment to Motion A) - Ayes: 216 / Noes: 141 - Motion A1 agreed.
12:50 - Division on Motion D1 (as an amendment to Motion D) - Ayes: 225 / Noes: 144 - Motion D1 agreed.
15:07 - Division on Motion Q1 (as an amendment to Motion Q) - Ayes: 142 / Noes: 192 - Motion Q1 disagreed.
15:20 - Division on Motion R1 (as an amendment to Motion R) - Ayes: 135 / Noes: 154 - Motion R1 disagreed.
15:31 - Division on Motion S1 (as an amendment to Motion S) - Ayes: 192 / Noes: 142 - Motion S1 agreed.
15:43 - Division on Motion U1 (as an amendment to Motion U) - Ayes: 186 / Noes: 144 - Motion U1 agreed.
16:07 - Division on Motion V1 (as an amendment to Motion V) - Ayes: 115 / Noes: 121 - Motion V1 disagreed.
Lord Hanson of Flint
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 2 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 2A to 2C in lieu.
“(3A) In section 56 (guidance), after subsection (1) insert—
“(1A) Guidance issued under this section may include guidance about the issue of fixed penalty notices under section 52 by authorised persons (within the meaning of section 52(1)).””
“(5) In section 73 (guidance), after subsection (1) insert—
“(1A) Guidance issued under this section may include guidance about the issue of fixed penalty notices under section 68 by authorised persons (within the meaning of that section).””
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
My Lords, in speaking to Motion A, I will speak also to Motions B, F and P in this group.
Amendment 2 is intended to ensure that accredited or authorised persons or their employers may not profit financially from fixed penalty notices issued for breaches of community protection notices or public spaces protection orders. I have had discussions with the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, on a number of occasions and I fully understand the concerns he has raised that fixed penalty notices could be issued disproportionately where there is a financial incentive to do so. However, I must stress that this amendment risks weakening crucial enforcement action taken to address those who breach community protection notices or public spaces protection orders, and such a bar would, in effect, put an end to all outsourcing and could significantly reduce enforcement capacity.
Therefore, I have tabled our Amendments 2A to 2C in lieu, which seek to ensure that statutory guidance is issued that addresses the need for proportionality in the issuing of fixed penalty notices. I have had an opportunity to discuss that with the noble Lord outside the Chamber, and I await his comments in due course. It would mean a statutory presumption in the Bill that the guidance addresses the use and proportionality of such fixed penalty notices.
I turn to Amendments 6, 10, 11 and 12, and the very important issue of fly-tipping; I know that noble Lords have been exercised about it. I emphasise that I understand and recognise the problem and believe that waste crime is an issue that confronts us. The Government are committed to taking firm action. We recently published our new waste crime action plan, which is the toughest-ever crackdown on illegal waste and targets the problem at its root. Lords Amendment 6 is unnecessary as, where sufficient evidence is available, local authorities already have the power to prosecute fly-tippers and, on conviction, a cost order can be made by the court so that the landowner’s costs can be recovered from the perpetrator. If available evidence is not sufficient to secure a successful prosecution, it is unclear how addressing this issue through statutory guidance would help in recovering those clean-up costs.
Amendment 11 is also unnecessary as, under Section 34B of the Environmental Protection Act 1990, local councils have the power to seize vehicles if they have reason to believe that the vehicle is being used or is about to be used to commit a fly-tipping offence. Where the police stop and search a vehicle under their PACE powers, on the basis of reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is used for the committing of fly-tipping offences, they can also call on local authority officers who can then impound the vehicle under the Environmental Protection Act 1990, as I have mentioned.
Amendment 12 would place a duty on waste authorities to clean up waste from fly-tipping, including on private land. I have had what I hope were constructive discussions with the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, but, as I have said to him outside the Chamber, the amendment would place a substantial unfunded burden on local councils and represents a significant departure from current practice. As such, it would infringe also on Commons financial privilege. I trust that, on that basis, the noble Viscount will consider not pursuing the amendment further.
Having said all that, I say to the House that the waste crime action plan sets out a zero-tolerance approach to prevent waste crime. We will look at pursuing criminals responsible and accelerating the clean-up effort. We are committed to working with the insurance industry in particular to explore any barriers to an accessible insurance market that will allow farmers, businesses and landowners to be indemnified against illegal waste dumping on their land.
We are also taking further action. The Government agree with the need for tougher penalties for those convicted of fly-tipping. As drafted, Amendment 10 seeks to amend the wrong legislation. Driving licence endorsements are set out in the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. Our Amendment 10A in lieu enables the addition of penalty points to the driving licence of an offender following conviction for fly-tipping offences where that offender was driving a motor vehicle used in or for the purposes of committing the offence. This may ultimately lead to disqualification from driving. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for tabling his earlier amendments on this. I hope that he will now look at the amendment that we have tabled and see that, by allowing a range of three to nine points to be added, Amendment 10A would go even further than the amendment that he tabled initially.
Regarding Lords Amendment 15, I understand the concerns raised by noble Lords across the House about the four-year custodial term’s reflection of the elements of culpability in the new offence of possession of a weapon with intent to cause unlawful violence. Again, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for tabling his initial amendment. We have reflected on it and tabled Amendment 15A in lieu, which, with cross-government support from my colleagues in the MoJ and the Home Office, raises the maximum term to seven years’ imprisonment from the current four-year custodial term. I hope that noble Lords will accept this as a sensible compromise. It is a movement by the Government which reflects the additional intent element of the new offence.
Finally, I turn to Lords Amendment 333, which would extend the duration of closure notices from 48 hours to seven days and of closure orders from six months to 12 months. Clause 3 already extends the duration of closure notices from 48 hours to 72 hours. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, is not able to be in her place today and the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, may be speaking to this set of amendments. I say to him, and to the noble Baroness through him, that I acknowledge the sentiment of the amendment. I agree that it is vital that we tackle money laundering, organised crime and other criminal activities. On Report I extended my view on how police should be doing that in the street, and indicated my support for very strong action on these issues.
However, it is important that, if we support the principle of extending the duration of closure orders, we first should consult to avoid any unintended consequences. Stronger enforcement powers should be used only proportionately; therefore, the government amendment in lieu will enable us, following targeted consultation, to extend the maximum duration of closure orders and make different provision for commercial and/or residential properties. I assure the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, and the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, that the consultation will focus not on whether to exercise the regulation power but on how to exercise it.
I realise that this grouping has covered ASB, fly-tipping, unlawful weapons and the closure of premises—it is quite a wide group. Those things have been grouped under the issue of anti-social behaviour, but I hope that noble Lords will see that the Government have moved where we can. There is significant movement with some of the amendments in lieu, and I commend them to the House and await contributions from noble Lords on these matters. I beg to move.
Motion A1 (as an amendment to Motion A)
Lord Clement-Jones
At end insert “, and do propose Amendment 2D as an amendment to Amendment 2B, and Amendment 2E as an amendment to Amendment 2C—
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, while I welcome that the Government have acknowledged the widespread concern over how these powers are being enforced, I must express my profound disappointment that they have chosen to strip out the robust amendment from the Bill which would have banned fining for profit in primary legislation. The Government should have retained that original amendment, which would have implemented a strict statutory ban preventing private companies from receiving financial benefits contingent on the number or value of the fixed penalty notices they issue. The Government have argued that a statutory ban risks weakening enforcement action and prefer to rely on statutory guidance to “ensure proportionality”.
We are not talking about legitimate enforcement; we are talking about a cowboy enforcement economy that preys on the public. Under the Bill, the maximum fine for breaching a public spaces protection order or a community protection order will rise by 400% from £100 to a staggering £500. Without a firm legal prohibition, that drastic increase will only supercharge an industry that profits from punishing our citizens for anodyne actions. As we know from the damning new report from the Campaign for Freedom in Everyday Life, the surge in penalties is driven overwhelmingly by councils that employ private companies, which issue a staggering 75.7% of all penalties, despite making up only 11.2% of the responding councils.
If your local authority employs a private contractor, companies that typically retain 80% to 90% of the fine income, you are 25 times more likely to be fined. Let us take the London Borough of Redbridge as a cautionary tale. In 2022, it issued just 163 penalties; in 2023, after hiring a private company, that number exploded to 3,550. When it stopped employing the company, the number of fines dropped to zero. What are these incentivised wardens fining the public for in these local authority areas? It is not for serious anti-social behaviour; they are issuing penalties for feeding the birds, for swimming, for lacking a dog poo bag and for simply standing in groups or loitering, Disgracefully, this system is also being used to target the most vulnerable, with multiple councils issuing fines for begging and rough sleeping.
By rejecting the original amendment, the Government are protecting a corrupt enforcement industry that uses financial incentives to issue unfair penalties. The Government’s replacement amendment under Motion A is simply too weak: it states only that the Secretary of State may include guidance about the issue of fixed penalty notices by authorised persons. The word “may” is not a guarantee, and general guidance about issuing notices will not stop the aggressive, profit-driven tactics that we are seeing on our streets. That is why we have tabled new amendments under Motion A1 today.
These vital new amendments demand two things. First, they change the permissive “may” to a mandatory “must”, ensuring that the Secretary of State is legally obligated to address this issue in guidance. Secondly, they ensure that this guidance cannot merely offer vague platitudes about proportionality but must explicitly tackle the practice of incentivising the giving out of fixed penalty notices. If the Government insist on regulating this through guidance rather than a direct statutory ban on profit sharing, that guidance must be mandatory, and its prohibition on financial incentives must be explicit. I urge the House to support Motion A1.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, I have involvement with two Motions in this group. The first is Motion E, which relates to Amendment 12, which would transfer the responsibility for dealing with fly-tipping from landowners to the local waste authority. When we considered the amendment on Report, there was strong support for the measure from around the House and it was carried.
On Report, the House accepted the strong logic of the argument that dealing with illegal waste is a complex system, with government in all its facets—central, agency and local—holding the levers for the push factor: the landfill tax, approved facilities, disposal, and investigation, policing and prosecution. However, responsibility for dealing with the aftermath of a dump lies with the landowner and, through no fault of their own, they could face a huge bill—in a recent case, £40,000 for clearing up 200 tonnes. That is fundamentally unfair.
This position was supported in a joint letter sent to the Minister for Food Security and Rural Affairs on 19 March from Tim Bonner, the chief executive of the Countryside Alliance; Gavin Lane, president of the Country Land and Business Association; Robyn Munt, vice-president of the National Farmers’ Union; Tim Passmore of the National Rural Crime Network; and John Read, founder of Clean Up Britain. That is a powerful and knowledgeable coalition, united in support of the approach set out in that amendment.
However, I recognise that this is a complex issue, and indeed the Minister has, on behalf of the Government, stressed the financial privilege element, which is an unarguable point. Clearly, my amendment would represent a fundamental change. Therefore, at this stage, and in the context of this Bill, I will not be opposing Motion E. None the less, given the support around the country and from important stakeholder organisations for this potential change, the story does not end at this point.
I certainly support the move that the Government have made on licence points for fly-tipping. I support my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower’s Motion D1 with regard to seizure of vehicles.
The other Motion with which I have an involvement is Motion P, which deals with Amendment 333, originally tabled by my noble friend Lady Buscombe on Report and carried by the House. Unfortunately, my noble friend is unable to attend your Lordships’ House today, so I will address the Motion in her stead.
The amendment, as the Minister has mentioned, is designed to provide a further tool to deal with the epidemic of fake cash-only businesses which have taken over our high streets up and down the land, masquerading as barbershops, nail bars, vape retailers and many other businesses. There are, of course, a great many legitimate, genuine businesses providing the public with these services, and they should be supported, but there are legions that are simply fronts for money laundering, the sale of illicit goods, drug smuggling and immigration crime, among other things.
These are not individual operations but co-ordinated networks—in other words, organised crime. They are operating in plain sight, but, despite that, we have collectively been slow to do anything about that situation. We require a co-ordinated, tough and aggressive multi-agency approach geared towards one objective: the destruction of these gangs. I welcome the initiatives that the Government have brought forward, including Operation Machinize under the auspices of the National Crime Agency, but much larger-scale and tougher action needs to be taken.
My noble friend’s amendment represents a small but important measure to amend the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 to enable the police to close premises. The amendment itself stresses that the time limits are too short for appropriate action to be taken. My noble friend’s amendment would extend the time limits, for both notices and closure orders, with the latter being extended from three to 12 months. The Bill recognises the importance of getting additional time, and I am pleased that the Minister has recognised the power of the argument from my noble friend and those who supported her and proposed an amendment in lieu to allow regulations to be made to extend the duration period of closure orders.
This is an important move and an important concession, and we welcome it. I particularly welcome the Minister’s assurance and undertaking that the consultation that he described will not be about whether but about how. With that in mind, we will not be opposing that Motion.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I do not need to repeat his excellent exposition of why Motion A1 is needed, although I stress that his original amendments were better, but we are where we are.
It is important to note that this is not about preventing enforcement at all. We can all agree on the need to clamp down on the problem of anti-social behaviour. In a situation where fixed penalty notices for PSPOs are presently at record levels—they have gone up 32.5% in a couple of years—the public might believe that councils are doing their best to stamp down on anti-social behaviour. However, that would be misleading and misinformation, because, where we have private companies, they are paid a commission of that penalty income, which can be up to 80% to 90% of the fine paid. That gives them a direct incentive to issue as many penalties as possible. Motion A1 tries to ensure that we protect the public from unscrupulous incentivised enforcement agencies, which I think are corrupt.
The main thing—if I can appeal to the Government—is that this does not actually tackle anti-social behaviour at all. If you live in an area with a private company, you might think that because everyone is being fined then the council are doing something about anti-social behaviour, but that is not true. I stress that those of us who support Motion A1 want to tackle anti-social behaviour and want a fair and just enforcement regime, but do not think that the private companies employed by some councils are tackling anti-social behaviour or delivering justice or fairness. I hope that the Government will reconsider.
Earl Russell (LD)
My Lords, I will respond to the amendments in this group on waste crime and fly-tipping. As we know, nearly one-fifth of all our waste ends up in the hands of criminals. The rising number of mega tips and the speed at which they are now appearing show the increasingly sophisticated nature of criminal networks and that they are operating with impunity, making vast profits at little risk. That causes direct costs to our economy of more than £1 billion annually, with devastating effects on the environment, communities and individuals. Since our last debate, as the Minister mentioned, the Government have published their 10-point plan on waste crime. More must be done, but I record my thanks to the Minister and the Government, because this is a very welcome step forward.
We support the amendments before us, but none alone would shift the dial on this problem. Amendment 6, from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, rightly seeks to make the polluter, not the landowner or the community, liable for clean-up costs. The Commons rejected this on the grounds that sufficient powers already exist. However, with 1.26 million fly-tipping incidents recorded in 2024-25, an increase of 9%, any conversation with any landowner or farmer in this country would show that the powers we have now are not adequate. The “polluter pays” principle remains unmet and clean-up costs can reach tens of thousands of pounds, which is simply bankrupting many individuals. In a similar vein, Amendment 12 would require waste authorities to collect fly-tipped waste and recover costs from offenders. The Commons dismissed this as a public cost.
In truth, these amendments would address only part of a much larger system. Real solutions require systemic reform, prevention, adequate local authority funding and compensation for local authorities where they do clear sites. Without turning off the supply tap and properly resourcing councils, responsibility is merely passed down the chain. Mentions of local authority compensation in the 10-point plan are encouraging, although the details remain missing. Treasury receipts from landfill tax need urgently to be allocated to the clean-up of sites.
Amendment 10 proposes penalty points on licences for fly-tipping convictions. Although that was rejected, the two government amendments in lieu are welcome. Amendment 11 would add fly-tipping to the list of offences allowing vehicle seizures, which is a proportionate step since vehicles are the primary means of committing these crimes. My party supported this measure in the other place and, if it is pressed to a Division, we will support it today. I would, however, prefer roadworthy seized vehicles to be reused or sold rather than crushed.
In conclusion, the 10-point plan makes some real progress, but this Bill largely remains a missed opportunity to tackle waste crime decisively. Serious organised waste crime should be treated as serious organised crime. The Environment Agency lacks specialist skills and technology to counter these networks effectively. The Government’s plans to strengthen its powers is welcome, but questions remain. The plan says:
“On enforcement, we are committing further funding. We are exploring giving the Environment Agency police-style powers”.
The Bill could have given the Environment Agency the police-style powers that it so desperately needs to improve enforcement and make it more effective and speedy. The truth is that those powers have not been given.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, Motions C, D and E relate to the several amendments on fly-tipping the Conservatives tabled on Report. I thank the Government for their amendment on points on licences for fly-tipping offences. Although our previous arguments in support of this policy were opposed by the Government, I welcome their Amendments 10A and 10B, even if it has taken us some time to get to this point. I also thank my noble friend Lord Goschen for his Amendment 12. We on these Benches wholly agree with the principle that it should be the responsibility of and the burden on the offenders who fly-tip to clean up the waste they deposit.
I was disappointed to see the Government tabling Amendment D opposing the amendment that provides police the powers to seize vehicles involved in fly-tipping offences. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, pointed out on Report that this is a business. That is why we need to disrupt the business model by confiscating the means to conduct this criminality. I simply cannot understand why the Government remain reluctant to take firm and decisive action on fly-tipping. They were reluctant to impose penalty points for the offence until they were defeated on Report. It is deeply disappointing that it is their intention to resist my amendment which would put into statute powers for the police to seize vehicles used for fly-tipping. If the Government oppose my Motion D1, I will test the opinion of the House.
On the issue of knife crime, Amendment 15 increased the maximum term of imprisonment for the new offence of possession of a bladed article with intent to use unlawful violence from four to 10 years. As I explained in Committee and on Report, the offence of simple possession of a bladed article under the Criminal Justice Act 1988 carries four years, so it did not make sense to create a new, more serious offence of possessing an article with the intent to do harm to another that carried the same maximum sentence. For both offences to carry the same maximum sentence would be entirely inconsistent with how the criminal law has always approached the issue of intent. That is why we sought, successfully, to amend the maximum term of imprisonment on Report. However, since then the Government have tabled an amendment in lieu that would increase the maximum term of imprisonment for the offence of possessing an article with the intent to harm another to seven years. I thank the Minister for recognising the arguments that the Conservatives made both in Committee and on Report.
I thank my noble friend Lady Buscombe for tabling her amendment regarding closure notices on Report. Recent investigations have exposed businesses that plague our high streets, selling counterfeit and illegal goods as well as unregulated products. In doing so, she has raised important issues which have clearly resonated with your Lordships. It is therefore welcome to see that, despite opposing my noble friend’s amendment on Report, the Government now recognise the importance of this issue, and their amendment in lieu would give the Secretary of State powers to change the maximum duration of closure orders, as well as the maximum period for which such an order may be extended. They also recognise that different provisions may be required for different circumstances, such as whether a building is commercial or residential, so I thank the Government for their Amendment 333A in lieu and I look forward to when the Secretary of State uses the powers conferred by this amendment to lay regulations on closure notices.
As previously stated, if the Government oppose my Motion D1 concerning seizure of vehicles involved in fly-tipping, I will test the opinion of the House.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful for the contributions that have been made in response to this group of amendments, both those in lieu from the Government and the amendments tabled by Members here today. I stress that the Government agree with the sentiments behind the amendments in this group. On Amendments 2D and 2E, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, I assure the noble Lord that while the amendments say that the statutory guidance “may” include guidance about the issue of fixed penalty notices, it is our firm intention to issue such guidance. Indeed, I will be happy to share a copy of the guidance in draft form with the noble Lord at an appropriate time when it is ready.
The issue of fly-tipping has permeated through the discussions we have had in the last half an hour or so and I understand the strength of feeling on all sides of your Lordships’ House. That is why we have tabled the amendments in lieu to introduce penalty points for fly-tippers and I emphasise again to noble Lords that, in relation to Amendments 6 to 11, local authorities already have the power to seize vehicles used for fly-tipping, and courts can already impose cost orders on those convicted of fly-tipping. I should add, if I may, that Defra, with the support of the Home Office, is going to explore how the Environment Agency’s powers to address waste crime can be bolstered. We are going to consider how additional measures within the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, the Proceeds of Crime Act and other relevant legislation could achieve this. This work will ensure that the Environment Agency has much stronger powers and tools to bring criminals to justice, intervene earlier and disrupt criminal finances undermining the waste system.
Again, I am sympathetic to Amendment 12 in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, and I understand and welcome the comments from the noble Earl, Lord Russell, in relation to the Waste Crime Action Plan. We are looking at how we improve enforcement around fly-tipping. However, as I have mentioned and as I think the noble Viscount acknowledged, the amendment breached Commons financial privilege, and I thank him for accepting those arguments and not pursuing the amendments further.
I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for accepting Amendment 15A in lieu.
On Amendment 333, it is right that the Government fully consult on any changes to closure powers before making significant changes, and our amendment in lieu does that. Again, I thank the noble Viscount and the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, for their pressure in raising these issues, because it is important. I confirm what I have said to the noble Viscount already, which is that the issue is not how but when we strengthen those closure powers.
I hope I have been able to offer reassurances to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, on his amendments and to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, on his. I suspect that I may not have done to the extent that they would wish, but I can only try. We have moved significantly on some of the areas in this group. I welcome the support for the changes that we have made, but I do hope that, in moving Motion A, noble Lords will listen to my wise counsel and not press their amendments.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, during the passage of this Bill, I have greatly admired the Minister’s geniality and stamina, but, sadly, this is not always matched by his delivery. I am afraid that the Government’s current approach really does not cut the mustard, and a number of mixed metaphors occur in the circumstances. The Minister said that they have a “firm intention”, but that is something of a pig in a poke and I will be asking the Government, as we proceed, to show rather more leg in this legislation, so with apologies for the metaphors, I would like to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Moved by
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 6, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 6A.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Moved by
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 10 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 10A and 10B in lieu.
“An offence under section 33 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 (unauthorised disposal of waste) committed by the driver of a motor vehicle used in or for the purposes of the commission of the offence. | Discretionary | Obligatory | 3-9” |
Lord Hanson of Flint
Moved by
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 11, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 11A.
Lord Davies of Gower
Moved by
leave out from “House” to end and insert “do insist on its Amendment 11.”
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, fly-tipping is a scourge on our society. We on these Benches recognise it, the public recognises it and landowners recognise it. We consider that the addition of vehicle seizure is an important one, so I beg to move Motion D1 and test the opinion of the House.
Lord Hanson of Flint
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 12, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 12A.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I have already spoken to Motions E and F. With the leave of the House, I beg to move.
Lord Hanson of Flint
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 15 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 15A in lieu.
Baroness Levitt
That this House do not insist on its Amendments 256 and 257 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 257A and 257B in lieu.
“Taking down intimate image content
(1) The Online Safety Act 2023 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 10 (regulated user-to-user services: safety duties about illegal content) after subsection (3) insert—
“(3A) A duty to operate a service using proportionate systems and processes designed to take down—
(a) content in relation to which an intimate image content report is made to the provider (see section 20A(2)), and
(b) any other content identified by the provider as the same, or substantially the same, as that content, as soon as reasonably practicable, and no later than 48 hours, after the provider receives the report (unless subsection (3B) applies).
(3B) This subsection applies if the provider considers that—
(a) the content is not intimate image content, or
(b) the person making the report is not—
(i) the subject of the content, or
(ii) a person acting on that person’s behalf.”
(3) After section 20 (duty about content reporting) insert—
“20A Reporting of intimate image content
(1) The duty in section 20(2) includes a duty to operate a service using systems and processes that allow users and affected persons to easily make an intimate image content report to the provider.
(2) An “intimate image content report” is a report which—
(a) declares that content present on the service is intimate image content,
(b) declares that the report is made by—
(i) the subject of the content, or
(ii) a person acting on that person’s behalf,
(c) declares that the report—
(i) is made in good faith, and
(ii) to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person making the report, is true,
(d) provides sufficient information about the content for the provider to identify it,
(e) provides contact details for the person making the report, and
(f) complies with any other requirements specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(3) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about how the requirements in subsection (2)(a) to (e) are to be met.”
(4) In section 21 (duties about complaints procedures) after subsection (2) insert—
“(2A) The duty in subsection (2) includes a duty to operate an expedited complaints procedure in relation to complaints within subsection (4)(a), (b)(i) or (b)(ii) that—
(a) are made by users or affected persons who have made an intimate image content report (see section 20A(2)), and
(b) are about the content to which the report relates.”
(5) In section 27 (regulated search services: safety duties about illegal content) after subsection (3) insert—
“(3A) A duty to operate a service using proportionate systems and processes designed to ensure that individuals are no longer able to encounter—
(a) search content in relation to which an intimate image content report is made to the provider (see section 31A(2)), and
(b) any other search content identified by the provider as the same, or substantially the same, as that content, as soon as reasonably practicable, and no later than 48 hours, after the provider receives the report (unless subsection (3B) applies).
(3B) This subsection applies if the provider considers that—
(a) the search content is not intimate image content, or
(b) the person making the report is not—
(i) the subject of the content, or
(ii) a person acting on that person’s behalf.”
(6) After section 31 (duty about content reporting) insert—
“31A Reporting of intimate image content
(1) The duty in section 31(2) includes a duty to operate a service using systems and processes that allow users and affected persons to easily make an intimate image content report to the provider.
(2) An “intimate image content report” is a report which—
(a) declares that search content is intimate image content,
(b) declares that the report is made by—
(i) the subject of the content, or
(ii) a person acting on that person’s behalf,
(c) declares that the report—
(i) is made in good faith, and
(ii) to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person making the report, is true,
(d) provides sufficient information about the search content for the provider to identify it,
(e) provides contact details for the person making the report, and
(f) complies with any other requirements specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(3) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about how the requirements in subsection (2)(a) to (e) are to be met.”
(7) In section 32 (duties about complaints procedures) after subsection (2) insert—
“(2A) The duty in subsection (2) includes a duty to operate an expedited complaints procedure in relation to complaints within subsection (4)(a), (b)(i) or (b)(ii) that—
(a) are made by users or affected persons who have made an intimate image content report (see section 31A(2)), and
(b) are about the search content to which the report relates.”
(8) In section 59 (meaning of “illegal content” etc) after subsection (10) insert—
“(10A) “Intimate image content” means content that amounts to an offence under section 66B(1), (2) or (3) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sharing intimate image of a person without consent).”
(9) In section 133 (confirmation decisions: requirements to take steps)—
(a) in subsection (4) after paragraph (c) insert—
“(ca) specify which of those requirements (if any) have been designated as intimate image content requirements (see subsections (7A) and (7B)),”;
(b) after subsection (7) insert—
“(7A) If the condition in subsection (7B) is met in relation to a requirement imposed by a confirmation decision which is of a kind described in subsection (1), OFCOM must designate the requirement as an “intimate image content requirement” for the purposes of section
138(3A) (offence of failure to comply with confirmation decision).
(7B) The condition referred to in subsection (7A) is that the requirement is imposed (whether or not exclusively) in relation to—
(a) a failure to comply with a provision listed in column 1 of the table, which
(b) where there is an entry for the provision in column 2 of the table, is in respect of a matter listed in column 2.
Provision | Failure in respect of |
Section 10(2)(a) | (1) Intimate image content (2) Priority illegal content which includes intimate image content |
Section 10(2)(b) | (1) An offence under section 66B of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (2) Priority offences which include an offence under that section |
Section 10(3)(a) Section 10(3)(a) | (1) Intimate image content (2) Priority illegal content which includes intimate image content |
Section 10(3)(b) | (1) Intimate image content (2) Illegal content which includes intimate image content |
Section 10(3A) | |
Section 27(3)(a) | (1) Intimate image content (2) Priority illegal content which includes intimate image content |
Section 27(3)(b) | (1) Intimate image content (2) Illegal content which includes intimate image content |
Section 27(3A)”; |
(10) In section 138 (offence of failing to comply with requirements imposed by confirmation decision) after subsection (3) insert—
“(3A) A person to whom a confirmation decision is given commits an offence if, without reasonable excuse, the person fails to comply with an intimate image content requirement imposed by the decision (see section 133(7A) and (7B)).””
“Taking down intimate image content: consequential amendments
(1) The Online Safety Act 2023 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 10 (regulated user-to-user services: safety duties about illegal content)—
(a) in subsection (4) for “and (3)” substitute “to (3A)”;
(b) in subsection (5)—
(i) the words from “each paragraph” to the end become paragraph (a);
(ii) at the end of that paragraph insert “, and
(b) subsection (3A).”;
(c) in subsection (7) for “subsection (2) or (3)” substitute “subsections (2) to (3A)”.
(3) In section 23(5) (record-keeping and review duties) for “or (3)”, in the first place it occurs, substitute “, (3) or (3A)”.
(4) In section 27 (regulated search services: safety duties about illegal content)—
(a) in subsection (4) for “and (3)” substitute “to (3A)”;
(b) in subsection (7) for “subsection (2) or (3)” substitute “subsections (2) to (3A)”.
(5) In section 34(5) (record-keeping and review duties), for “or (3)”, in the first place it occurs, substitute “, (3) or (3A)”.
(6) In section 59(14) (meaning of “illegal content” etc) for “and “priority illegal content”” substitute “, “priority illegal content” and “intimate image content””.
(7) In section 71(2)(a)(i) (duty not to take down content except in accordance with terms of service: exceptions) for “or (3)” substitute “, (3) or (3A)”.
(8) In section 136(5) (confirmation decisions: proactive technology)—
(a) in paragraph (a) for “or (3)” substitute “, (3) or (3A)”; (b) in paragraph (c) for “or (3)” substitute “, (3) or (3A)”.
(9) In section 237 (index of defined terms) at the appropriate place insert—
“intimate image content (in Part 3) section 59”.
(10) In Schedule 4 (codes of practice)—
(a) in paragraph 9(1) for “or (3)” substitute “, (3) or (3A)”;
(b) in paragraph 9(3) for “or (3)” substitute “, (3) or (3A)”;
(c) in paragraph 13(3)(a) for “or (3)” substitute “, (3) or (3A)”;
(d) in paragraph 13(3)(c) for “or (3)” substitute “, (3) or (3A)”.”
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, in moving Motion G, I will also speak to Motions H, J, K, L, M, W and Y.
I will start with the collection of intimate image abuse-related amendments in lieu. These all flow from the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen of Alderley Edge, on Report. I say once more, with feeling, that I thank the noble Baroness for engaging with us over the past few weeks, which she has done extensively. It is in the best traditions of your Lordships’ House. We have worked together to ensure—I hope—that the Government have taken the right direction with these amendments across the piece.
I turn to the take-down powers. Amendments 257A and 257B in Motion G build on the Government’s existing provisions. They do that by making failure to comply with an Ofcom enforcement decision relating to the new take-down duties a criminal offence. That means that senior executives of the service could be personally criminally liable for the failure. Alongside that enforcement approach, the Government are also strengthening safeguards against malicious reporting. We will bring forward regulations that will enable Ofcom to scrutinise both the speed of intimate image removals and how clearly and effectively platforms enable users to report such content. We are determined that victims of non-consensual intimate image abuse should see swift action, clear routes for redress and transparency from platforms.
Therefore, in addition to these amendments, the Government are working with Ofcom to create a clear route for reporting complaints regarding compliance with the NCII duty, signposting to specialist organisations. We will also use existing powers under the Online Safety Act to strengthen transparency, enabling Ofcom to require services to report on and publish their average NCII take-down times. I reiterate my thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, for her continued advocacy on this important topic.
I turn to deletion orders and Motion H. The Government recognise the serious harm caused by perpetrators retaining copies of intimate images. We have listened to the will of the House on Report, which is why we have brought forward a new deletion order that will be available on conviction for a broader range of offences. This new order can be made for all intimate image abuse offences, including breastfeeding voyeurism recording and the new sharing of semen-defaced images offences, which I will refer to throughout my speech as “intimate image-related offences”.
It will enable courts to order the deletion and destruction of all copies of a relevant image. It does that by requiring the court to give reasons if it declines to make a deletion order for images related to the offence. This mirrors the criminal law in relation to compensation orders. It strikes the right balance between protecting victims and preserving judicial discretion in appropriate cases. Importantly, it will enable courts to order the deletion and destruction of all copies related to a specified offence in the offender’s possession or control, as well as any other relevant images of the same victim. Breaching such an order will be a separate criminal offence, itself carrying a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment.
On hashing and the non-consensual intimate image register, the Government will give statutory backing to a register of non-consensual intimate images. Amendments 260A to 260D in Motion J enable the Government to designate a trusted flagger—which will most likely be the Revenge Porn Helpline—and, following a scoping exercise, to make further provisions by regulations about the operation of a statutory register. That includes provisions for the Secretary of State to impose requirements on providers to share hashes and any other information deemed necessary with the register. As Lords Amendments 260A to 260D recognise, proceeding by regulations will enable us properly to evaluate the requirements necessary to ensure a register operates as effectively as possible.
I turn to the question of pornography. I again thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, for the time she has taken over the past few weeks to meet many Ministers, who really are grateful to her for the time she has spent with us, making sure that we get this right. I stress to your Lordships that the changes to which I now turn are just the start, and the Government mean it when we say that we look forward to working with the noble Baroness even more in future.
I will speak briefly to the parity sprint. This is a key piece of ongoing work that will build on the provisions in the Bill, and the discussions have already started. This work will identify the best way to fix the gap between the regulation of pornography online and offline. It will address content that is not caught by our proposed offences that would otherwise be illegal offline. This could include, for example, pornography where there is a suggestion that a person is under 18, a relationship is portrayed as abusive, or there is a clear exploitative power imbalance or breach of trust, including some examples of depictions of step-incest between adults, or a teacher and a student. At the end of this work, the Government are fully committed to implementation. If regulators need to be assigned, this will happen. If legislation is needed, this will happen. This Government are serious about this.
In a similar vein, on the verification of age and consent, we agree with the sentiment that underlies the amendment: non-consensual intimate images and child sexual abuse have no place online, and the tech platforms need to do more to prevent this type of illegal content. Having said this, further work is needed to identify the most effective approach. For this reason, the Government’s amendments in lieu, Amendments 264A to 264F in Motion L, provide for a further statutory sprint to test which mechanisms will be most effective for tackling this kind of content. It will also place a duty on the Secretary of State to report to Parliament within 12 months of the Bill receiving Royal Assent on the outcome of this work and will provide a power to make regulations to give effect to its outcome.
Given the existing criminal and regulatory legal frameworks, we need carefully to consider the gaps and how best they can be addressed. Upon completion of the review, we have the option of putting in place regulations to impose new duties on providers of internet services relating to verification of age and consent. The power would allow the appointment of a regulator to oversee these duties.
With regard to adults role-playing as children in pornography, we have listened to the concerns that were raised. We must protect the legislative regime that protects actual children from harm, which is why we cannot support Lords Amendment 265. However, we absolutely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, that content that mimics child sexual abuse must be tackled. That is why we have brought forward amendments in lieu, Amendments 265A to 265H in Motion M, which will criminalise the possession and publication of pornographic images portraying sexual activity between persons where one person is or is pretending to be under 16. This will be a priority offence under the Online Safety Act. Our intention with these amendments is clearly to signal that content which mimics, and thus risks normalising, child sexual abuse is totally unacceptable and should not be available online.
I need to make clear what the provision criminalises. It includes pornographic depictions of any sexual activity where one party is pretending to be under 16. It is intentionally wide and will capture harmful content that we know exists. I apologise for being graphic here, but there is no way of avoiding it. I can see the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, laughing as I say this—I am here again talking about rather graphic acts. This provision will capture images such as an actor role-playing as an underage girl, where, for example, her underwear has been moved aside, or male genitals are in shot.
As I have just said, this offence is just the start. Content that is illegal offline but not caught by this offence will be addressed through the Government’s work on parity.
Similarly, in relation to pornography depicting incest, we have listened to the concerns about the extent to which the Government’s Lords Amendment 263 should cover other troubling relationships, such as sex between step-relations. We completely agree with the need to curtail the depiction of step-incest pornography in cases where it portrays conduct that is illegal in the real world. To that extent, the Government’s amendments in lieu, Amendments 263A to 263G in Motion K, will restore and extend the new offence of possession and publication of incest pornography. They will list the relevant family relationships and expand this to include step-parents and children, step-siblings and foster parents, and children where one of the persons is or is pretending to be under the age of 18. Where there are grey areas, such as step-relationships over 18, that show a clear power imbalance and would be illegal offline, this will be addressed through the parity sprint, about which I have already spoken.
Through Lords Amendments 255 and 395, the Government are criminalising the making, adapting and supplying of the nudification tools and are bringing chatbots into the scope of the Online Safety Act. This means that the requirements of the Online Safety Act will kick in. Social media services will be required to take down content that supplies nudification tools, and search engines will have to reduce the visibility of search results linked to these tools. When chatbots come into the scope of the Online Safety Act, they will also have to ensure that illegal nudification tools and images cannot be made, supplied or appear on those services. Taken together, these measures will deliver an effective ban on nudification tools.
Given this, we do not believe that a separate possession offence, as provided for in Lords Amendment 505, would make a meaningful difference, not least as many such tools are not possessed in the technical legal sense, but rather are accessed online. For this reason, we are seeking its removal via Motion Y, but we are very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, for engaging with us on this and for supporting the approach that we have discussed at length with her and finally fixed upon.
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge
At end insert “, and do propose Amendments 257C, 257D, 257E and 257F as amendments to Amendment 257A.
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
My Lords, I will also speak to Motions H and J. In doing so, I declare an interest, as having received pro bono legal advice on intimate image abuse from Mishcon de Reya.
Amendments 257C and 257E in Motion G1 seek to ensure that internet services record, collect and publish data on the proportion of content they remove in 48 hours. I am aware that Ofcom has transparency powers under Schedule 8 to the Online Safety Act to gather information from internet services and that these regulations can be developed further. I am keen that the Government address any remaining gaps to ensure that all internet services that Ofcom defines as being high-risk or medium-risk of sharing intimate image content, as Ofcom will outline in its hashing measures, are required to publicly report their takedown times.
I was disappointed by the Government’s removal of the fine per day per account of £39,000 that noble Lords so overwhelmingly voted to support. While I acknowledge that Ofcom has the power to issue daily fines, I still believe that we must be more agile in our approach to ensure that no victim is left behind. I am keen to return to this issue in future legislation, when we have further information on how regularly Ofcom is issuing daily fines in response to this.
I am very grateful for the vast movement the Government have made by introducing their amendments under Motions G, H and J in response to my amendments at Report and Third Reading. We have made huge progress on the deletion of content after conviction and on the hashing of intimate content to prevent re-upload. I very much look forward to working with the Government and the charities as the centralised hash registry is developed.
I do not intend to test my Motion today. I am grateful to the Government, particularly to the Minister, and to the noble Lords across this House who have worked with me so constructively on these issues. I also wish to thank the survivors who have worked alongside me, Professor Clare McGlynn KC, and Sophie Mortimer from the Revenge Porn Helpline, for their steadfast support. We have made huge strides towards protecting victims from this appalling form of abuse. I beg to move.
Baroness Bertin (Con)
Very briefly, I welcome the Government’s Amendments 263A to 263G, 264A to 264F, and 265A to 265C. I put on record how grateful I am to the Government for the constructive conversations that we have had to get to this place. I also put on record my view that these amendments mark the beginning of a new era in the regulation of harmful pornographic content in this country.
I welcome the Government’s commitment to act swiftly on the outcome of this work, particularly the online/offline parity sprint, and I assure Ministers that we will hold them to account on that commitment. In reaching this point, I also echo my noble friend Lady Owen’s point about thanking the cross-party and team effort there has been to get to this point. In particular, I thank my team, Gemma Kelly in particular, and Clare McGlynn, who have been at the helm of these reforms and pushing this work through for a lot longer than I have.
I quickly turn to Amendments 264A and 264F, which address duties on pornographic providers to ensure age and consent verification, and enable performers to withdraw consent. This process must not be about revisiting whether action is needed. The case for action has been made conclusively and the focus must now be on effective delivery, enforcement and regulation. Although I am wary of “review”—allergic to it, even—I accept that a tightly timed statutory process with a clear duty to return to Parliament and the power to act strikes the right balance between urgency and rigour. We know that this industry is rife with coercion and trafficking, and falling short here would be a grave failure to victims.
Amendments 265A and 265C address adults role-playing children in pornography. The purpose of this offence is clear: to ensure that material which simulates, normalises or encourages an interest in child sexual abuse is illegal to host online. This is not theoretical harm; this content acts as a gateway to a very real and dangerous interest, and it is right that the law intervenes decisively. I am very grateful that the Government are moving on that.
Very briefly, though, I offer reassurance to communities that have raised concerns. This offence is carefully and deliberately drawn—I thank officials for doing that—with clear exclusions for genuinely fanciful depictions involving unambiguously adult participants. This is not about criminalising benign fantasy but about drawing a firm line at the point where content begins to replicate the dynamics, power imbalance and harms of child sexual abuse.
I also welcome Amendments 263A to 263G, which extend offences to include step-incest and foster relationship pornography involving children. For far too long, pornography has been allowed to normalise and incite sexual abuse within the household, and these amendments begin to close a deeply troubling gap in the law. However, I appreciate the Minister saying that this is only the beginning.
On nudification tools, criminalising their creation and supply and bringing them within the scope of the Online Safety Act is a proportionate and necessary step, but we must emphasise that platforms and search engines must not be allowed to direct users or to profit from this software. We saw just today reports from Bloomberg that Apple and Google have profited heavily from nudifying apps, which only underlies the need for urgent action and how specific it must be to stop search engines allowing these kind of apps to remain possible to find.
This work matters far beyond this Chamber. Harmful pornography is a global problem requiring a global response. Regulation and law change are not an end in themselves but, used properly, can raise awareness, disrupt profit and accelerate change. These amendments are not the final word but they are a decisive and long overdue step forward. I welcome them.
Baroness Thornton (Lab)
My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend the Minister on the work that she has done on the issues that have been raised in the House about pornography and online harm. I add my thanks to my noble friend and her honourable friend the Minister in the other place for the very competent amendment they have made in Motion W to the pardons on the decriminalisation of abortion.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, thanks should certainly be paid to the Minister for all her hard work in this area, but the House will also wish to thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Bertin and Lady Owen, for their hard work over many years, their persistence, their judgment and their success in a very difficult area of law and society. I suggest that although this House is very often criticised—sometimes with justification—the debates on this issue and the way we have moved the law forward with the very great assistance of the Government show this House working at its very best.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, both noble Baronesses have spoken extremely eloquently today. It has been a privilege, from these Benches, to be part of the cross-party coalition for both their campaigns. I pay tribute, as others have, to both of them for their persistence throughout the passage of the Bill.
In particular, these Benches have strongly supported the comprehensive framework introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen of Alderley Edge, who has tirelessly campaigned on non-consensual intimate images, and we welcome—this is a tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt—the Government’s concessions today under Motion G, in particular the move to place the 48-hour take-down requirement firmly into the Bill. We also welcome the Government’s decision in Motion J to include a statutory non-consensual intimate image register. As the South West Grid for Learning and the Revenge Porn Helpline rightly stated this week, embedding this register in law is a “transformative move” and a “hugely important step forward” in protecting victims at scale. Again, I congratulate the noble Baroness on securing this.
However, although we celebrate this progress, the Government’s amendments will continue to require scrutiny in two crucial areas. First, on the new statutory NCII register, the devil will be in the detail. As the SWGfL has highlighted, key questions remain around how this register will be operated in practice and, most importantly, enforced. Secondly, the Government’s amendments on image deletion orders under Motion H still fall somewhat short. During the debate in the other place on Tuesday, a Government Back-Bencher praised these amendments, believing that they would ensure that
“courts are properly mandated to destroy those intimate images”.—[Official Report, Commons, 14/4/26; col. 740.]
However, the Government’s amendment explicitly uses “may”, leaving deletion entirely at the judge’s discretion. Nevertheless, I believe that the noble Baroness has achieved a huge amount through this process. We on these Benches entirely understand why she may choose not to press Motion G1, and she should take the greatest possible pride in what has been achieved so far.
On the second half of this group, on the regulation of online pornography, I likewise pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, who has worked tirelessly to expose the appalling loopholes that currently allow commercial pornography platforms to operate with light-touch self-regulation. The Government’s amendments in lieu under Motions K and L may be said to fall short of the robust statutory safeguards that this House originally agreed on. On age and consent verification, the House voted to make it a requirement for platforms to verify the age and permission of everyone featured on their sites. The Government have taken this out, replacing an immediate duty with a
“duty to review and report”
to Parliament within 12 months, followed by unspecified regulating powers. I very much accept that the noble Baroness is somewhat wary, but I accept her view on the way forward.
Furthermore, the Government’s amendments dilute the ban on step-incest pornography. They have caveated the offence so that it applies only to depictions of step-incest where one of the persons is portrayed to be under the age of 18. This misses the point of establishing parity with the offline Sexual Offences Act, where sexual relations between stepparents and stepchildren are illegal regardless of age due to the inherent power imbalances.
The Government have also failed to match the ambition of Amendment 505, which brings us to Motion Y. In the other place on Tuesday, the Minister claimed that Amendment 505 was unnecessary. She argued that the Government’s new offence of “supplying” nudification tools, combined with future powers to regulate chatbots via Ofcom, is sufficient, but a promise to eventually introduce secondary legislation to tell search engines to reduce the visibility of these apps does nothing to stop individuals possessing, downloading and using these tools to abuse women right now.
Great weight is being placed on the “sprint” delivery plan within six months of Royal Assent to achieve greater parity between the regulation of online and offline pornography. We very much hope that this will bear fruit in due course. On the mimicking of children, as the noble Baroness has indicated, this has been quite a battle with government. She has settled on the criminalisation of the depiction of children under 16. I know that she would have preferred that it was 18, but the Government have claimed that widening it is operationally difficult and would put too much pressure on law enforcement. However, they have promised that they will commit, on the Floor of the House, to address this in the parity work via regulation but not the criminal law.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friends Lady Owen and Lady Bertin, on behalf of all noble Lords on the Conservative Benches, for their sustained efforts on these important issues. Their work and amendments will surely help to protect women and girls, whether through legislation on the taking down of intimate images or greater protection for age verification in pornographic content. I also thank the Government, particularly the Minister, for their continued engagement on these topics. These Motions are evidence of what this Chamber can achieve through collaborative and productive dialogue.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions not just today but during the passage of this Bill, and for the thoughtful and constructive way in which everybody has engaged with these issues.
I shall be brief and address only one or two of the points that were raised. The first is in relation to Motion G1, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen. Motion G strengthens accountability where platforms fail to comply with their duties to deal with non-consensual intimate images. Regarding Motion G1, we recognise the noble Baroness’s concern and want transparency beyond just the biggest platforms. That is why every regulated user-to-user service must be clear with users about how it is meeting the 48-hour takedown duty, while Ofcom can require detailed reporting where it will make the biggest difference. Through Schedule 8, the Online Safety Act allows Ofcom to require detailed information about how providers identify, deal with and take down illegal content. We will amend this through regulations to make it clear that these requirements cover compliance with the new NCII takedown duty, including average takedown times.
Turning to the verification of age, again the Government recognise the concerns raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. We are not intentionally delaying these important changes for the sake of it. I think that the noble Baroness recognises that we all agree that this issue is important, but we cannot shy away from the complex legal and practical issues that it presents. These considerations must be made alongside and flowing from the existing six-month review into parity, closing the gap between regulation of online and offline pornography. For this reason, the 12 months is needed to ensure that we get it right. We are grateful to the noble Baroness for supporting this approach.
On the issue of adults role-playing as children and the question of step-incest, in relation to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, as to the differential in age, it is to ensure that the online offences mirror the underlying offline criminal offences so that there is parity between the two. I should stress that for both these offences, adult role-playing and the extension to step-incest offences, this is a first step. The provisions in this Bill create significant changes already in the criminal law and the parity work to which we have all referred will build on this to address the grey areas where it is illegal offline but difficult to address online via the criminal law.
It remains for me only to thank once again the two noble Baronesses, Lady Bertin and Lady Owen. I genuinely look forward to continuing to work with them in future.
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
I thank the Minister for her response and am assured by it. I beg leave to withdraw Motion G1.
Baroness Levitt
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 258 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 258A in lieu.
“Image deletion orders
(1) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows.
(2) In Part 7 (financial orders and orders relating to property), after Chapter 4 insert—
“CHAPTER 4A
IMAGE DELETION ORDERS
161ZA Image deletion orders
(1) In this code “image deletion order” means an order under this Chapter which—
(a) is made in respect of an offender for an offence,
(b) relates to a photograph or film which is in the offender’s possession or under their control, and
(c) requires the offender to take steps specified in the order to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that the photograph or film is put beyond use.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(c), a photograph or film is put beyond use if—
(a) in the case of a physical item, it is destroyed;
(b) in the case of data stored by any means by or on behalf of the offender, it is deleted;
(c) in the case of content on an internet service, it is removed from the service or permanently hidden.
(3) For the purposes of this section—
(a) something is “deleted” if it is irrecoverable;
(b) “content”, in relation to an internet service, has the meaning given by section 236(1) of the Online Safety Act 2023;
(c) “internet service” has the meaning given by section 228 of that Act (and section 204(1) of that Act applies).
161ZB Image deletion orders: availability
(1) This section applies where a person commits an offence under any of the following provisions of the Sexual Offences Act 2003—
(a) section 66AA (sharing semen-defaced image);
(b) section 66AA (taking or recording intimate photograph or film);
(c) section 66AD (creating a copy of intimate photograph or film shared temporarily);
(d) section 66B (sharing or threatening to share intimate photograph or film);
(e) section 66E (creating purported intimate image of adult);
(f) section 66F (requesting the creation of purported intimate image of adult);
(g) section 67A(2B) (recording a person breast-feeding child).
(2) This section also applies where a person commits an inchoate offence in relation to an offence specified in subsection (1).
(3) The court by or before which the offender is convicted of the offence may make an image deletion order in respect of—
(a) a photograph or film to which the offence relates, and
(b) any other photograph or film—
(i) which shows, or appears to show, a person who is the subject of the photograph or film to which the offence relates in an intimate state,
(ii) which is a semen-defaced image of a person who is the subject of the photograph or film to which the offence relates, or
(iii) which shows a person who is the subject of the photograph or film to which the offence relates breast-feeding a child.
(4) The following provisions of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 apply for the purposes of this section—
(a) section 66AA(2) (meaning of “semen-defaced image”);
(b) section 66D(5) to (9) (meaning of “showing, or appearing to show, another person in an intimate state”);
(c) section 67A(3A) and (3B) (meaning of references to a person breast-feeding a child), ignoring references to the intention of the person who recorded the photograph or film.
(5) In relation to an offence under section 66F of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, a photograph or film is a photograph or film to which the offence relates for the purposes of this section if—
(a) it appears to be of a person who was the subject of the request to which the offence relates (whether or not it is what was requested), and
(b) it was in the offender’s possession, or under the offender’s control, as a result of that request.
(6) An image deletion order is not available if the offence was committed before the day on which section (Image deletion orders) of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 comes into force.
161ZC Period for complying with requirements
(1) An image deletion order must specify, in respect of each step the order requires the offender to take, the date by which the step must be taken (and different dates may be specified in respect of different steps).
(2) Where the order requires the offender to take a step in relation to a photograph or film that would result in the offender being unable to recover the photograph or film—
(a) the order must not require the step to be taken before the end of the period for giving notice of appeal against the conviction or order, and
(b) where notice of appeal against the conviction or order is given, the offender is not required to take the step until the appeal is finally determined or withdrawn.
161ZD Offence of failing to comply with an image deletion order
(1) It is an offence for a person in respect of whom an image deletion order made under this Chapter is in force to fail without reasonable excuse to comply with any requirement included in the order.
(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court, or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or a fine, or both.
161ZE Image deletion orders: interpretation
(1) This section applies for the purposes of this Chapter.
(2) “Photograph” includes the negative as well as the positive version.
(3) “Film” means a moving image.
(4) References to a photograph or film also include—
(a) an image, whether made or altered by computer graphics or in any other way, which appears to be a photograph or film,
(b) a copy of a photograph, film or image within paragraph (a), and
(c) data stored by any means which is capable of conversion into a photograph, film or image within paragraph (a).”
(3) In Chapter 5 of Part 3 (duties to explain or give reasons), after section 55 insert—
“55A Duty to give reasons where image deletion order not made
Where—
(a) a court is dealing with an offender for an offence, and
(b) an image deletion order is available, the court must give reasons if it does not make an image deletion order in respect of a photograph or film to which the offence relates (see section 161ZB(3)(a)).””
Baroness Levitt
That this House do not insist on its Amendments 259 and 260 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 260A to 260D in lieu.
That this House do not insist on its Amendments 259 and 260 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 260A to 260D in lieu.
“Intimate image material: reporting and registration
Schedule (Intimate image material: reporting and registration) makes provision about the reporting and registration of intimate image material.”
“(ja) section (Intimate image material reporting and registration) and Schedule (Intimate image material: reporting and registration);”
“SCHEDULE
INTIMATE IMAGE MATERIAL: REPORTING AND REGISTRATION
PART 1
TRUSTED FLAGGERS
Duty to designate trusted flagger
1 (1) The Secretary of State may by regulations designate persons as suitable to make intimate image reports to—
(a) providers of internet services, and
(b) providers of internet access services, for the purpose of assisting the providers to make judgments about whether content is intimate image content.
(2) An intimate image report is —
(a) a report that—
(i) content identified in the report is a photograph or film which shows, or appears to show, a person (P) in an intimate state, and
(ii) P, or a person acting on P’s behalf, has informed the person making the report that P does not consent to the sharing of the photograph or film, or
(b) a report of information provided to the person making the report by virtue of regulations under paragraph 2.
(3) The Secretary of State must exercise the power in sub-paragraph (1) to designate at least one person.
(4) The duty in sub-paragraph (3) ceases to apply if Secretary of State makes regulations under paragraph 3.
(5) Terms used in sub-paragraph (2)(a) and in section 66B of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 have the same meaning in sub-paragraph (2)(a) as in section 66B.
Duties to report intimate image content to trusted flagger
2 (1) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend the Online Safety Act 2023 for, or in connection with, the imposition on providers of regulated services of duties relating to the provision of intimate image information to a person designated under paragraph 1.
(2) In this paragraph “intimate image information” means information generated by the provider for the purposes of identifying content which the provider considers to be intimate image content
(3) The regulations may require intimate image information to be provided in a particular form (for example, a hash code).
(4) The provisions of the Online Safety Act 2023 that may be amended by regulations under this paragraph include, but are not limited to, section 131(2) (enforceable requirements).
PART 2
THE INTIMATE IMAGE REGISTER
The intimate image register
3 (1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for or in connection with a register of intimate image material (the “intimate image register”).
(2) “Intimate image material” means material which—
(a) is intimate image content, or
(b) would be intimate image content if it were shared on an internet service.
(3) In this Part of this Schedule “intimate image content” has the meaning given by section 59 of the Online Safety Act 2023, except that section 59 applies as if subsections (13) and (14) (“intimate image content” on user-to-user services limited to user-generated content) were omitted.
The registrar
4 (1) The regulations may provide for the intimate image register to be maintained by—
(a) a person specified in the regulations,
(b) an individual appointed by the Secretary of State in accordance with the regulations, or
(c) the Secretary of State.
(2) Regulations under sub-paragraph (1)(b) may make provision about the terms on which an individual is appointed, including provision—
(a) for the payment of remuneration, allowances and expenses by the Secretary of State;
(b) for staff, accommodation and other facilities to be provided by the Secretary of State.
(3) The person who maintains the intimate image register is referred to in this Schedule as the registrar.
Operation of intimate image register
5 The regulations may make provision about—
(a) the form in which information is to be recorded on the intimate image register (which may in particular include hash codes);
(b) how material is to be reported to the registrar;
(c) how the registrar is to make judgments about whether material is intimate image material (which may in particular include provision similar to section 192(5) and (6) of the Online Safety Act 2023);
(d) how the registrar is to deal with reports that the registrar considers to be frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith;
(e) appeals against decisions of the registrar;
(f) the sharing of information on the intimate image register with—
(i) providers of internet services and internet access services, and
(ii) other persons, for purposes specified in the regulations.
Payment of fees to registrar
6 (1) The regulations may require providers of internet services and internet access services to pay fees to the registrar, as a means of recovering the costs incurred by the registrar in exercising functions under the regulations.
(2) The regulations may in particular make provision—
(a) for fees to be paid in respect of specified periods;
(b) for different fees to be payable by different providers.
Duties of providers of internet services and internet access services
7 (1) The regulations may make provision for or in connection with imposing on providers of internet services duties relating to—
(a) the provision of intimate image information to the registrar;
(b) taking down content recorded on the intimate image register;
(c) preventing persons from encountering content recorded on the intimate image register.
(2) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for or in connection with imposing on providers of internet access services duties relating to preventing access to content recorded on the intimate image register.
(3) In this paragraph “intimate image information” means information generated by the provider for the purposes of identifying intimate image material.
(4) Regulations under sub-paragraph (1)(a) may—
(a) make provision about how a provider is to make judgments about whether material is intimate image material (which may in particular include provision similar to section 192(5) and (6) of the Online Safety Act 2023);
(b) require intimate image information to be provided in a particular form (for example, a hash code).
Enforcement
8 (1) The regulations may make provision for or in connection with the enforcement of requirements imposed on providers of internet services and internet access services (“providers”) by or under the regulations.
(2) The regulations may include provision conferring functions on one or more persons specified in the regulations (each of whom is an “enforcement authority”).
(3) The persons who may be specified in the regulations include the registrar and the Secretary of State.
(4) The functions which may be conferred on an enforcement authority include—
(a) powers to require providers to provide information to the enforcement authority;
(b) powers to impose monetary penalties on providers for failure to comply with requirements;
(c) powers to issue notices (“compliance notices”) requiring providers to take steps specified in the notice for the purposes of complying with, or remedying a failure to comply with, a requirement.
(5) If the regulations provide for the imposition of monetary penalties they must provide—
(a) that a penalty (or, where more than one penalty is imposed in respect of a failure, those penalties taken together) may not exceed a maximum amount specified in the regulations (which may not be more than £3 million);
(b) for the amount of a penalty imposed on a provider to be appropriate and proportionate, having regard to—
(i) the failure to comply in respect of which it is imposed;
(ii) any penalties previously imposed on the provider in respect of that failure or other failures;
(iii) the size and financial resources of the provider.
(6) The regulations may provide for requirements imposed by a compliance notice to be enforceable, on the application of the enforcement authority, by injunction.
(7) The regulations—
(a) must make provision for appeals against the imposition of a monetary penalty and the issue of a compliance notice (if they provide for those things);
(b) may make provision for appeals against other decisions of an enforcement authority.
Payment of fees to enforcement authority
9 (1) The regulations may require providers of internet services and internet access services to pay fees to enforcement authorities, as a means of recovering the costs incurred by enforcement authorities in exercising their functions under the regulations.
(2) The regulations may in particular make provision—
(a) for fees to be paid in respect of specified periods;
(b) for different fees to be payable by different providers.
Guidance
10 The regulations may provide for the issue of guidance by—
(a) the registrar;
(b) enforcement authorities;
(c) the Secretary of State.
Duties of OFCOM
11 The regulations may require OFCOM to have regard to the intimate image register when—
(a) preparing a code of practice under section 41 of the Online Safety Act 2023;
(b) exercising its functions under Article 5(1) of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 laying down measures concerning open internet access and retail charges for regulated intra-EU communications and amending Directive 2002/22/EC and Regulation (EU) No 531/2012, and the regulations may amend that Act or that Regulation for or in connection with that purpose.
PART 3
INTIMATE IMAGE REGISTER: POWER TO AMEND ONLINE SAFETY ACT 2023
12 (1) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend the Online Safety Act 2023 for or in connection with the imposition on providers of regulated services of duties relating to—
(a) the provision of intimate image information to the registrar;
(b) taking down content recorded on the intimate image register;
(c) preventing persons from encountering content recorded on the intimate image register.
(2) In this paragraph “intimate image information” means information generated by the provider for the purposes of identifying intimate image content.
(3) Regulations under sub-paragraph (1)(a) may require intimate image information to be provided in a particular form (for example, a hash code).
(4) The provisions of the Online Safety Act 2023 that may be amended by regulations under this paragraph include, but are not limited to, section 131(2) (enforceable requirements).
PART 4
SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISION
Extra-territoriality
13 (1) References in this Schedule to an internet service include an internet service provided from outside the United Kingdom—
(a) which has a significant number of United Kingdom users, or
(b) one of the target markets of which (or the only target market of which) is United Kingdom users.
(2) A user of an internet service is a “United Kingdom user” if—
(a) where the user is an individual, the individual is in the United Kingdom;
(b) where the user is an entity, the entity is incorporated or formed under the law of any part of the United Kingdom.
Interpretation
14 (1) This paragraph applies for the interpretation of this Schedule.
(2) The following terms have the same meaning as in the Online Safety Act 2023—
“content” (see section 236 of that Act);
“internet service” (see section 228 of that Act);
“intimate image content” (see section 59 of that Act), except in Part 2 of this Schedule (see paragraph 3(3));
“provider”, in relation to an internet service of any kind (see section 226 of that Act);
“regulated service” (see section 4(4) of that Act).
(3) “Internet access service” means a service that provides access to virtually all (or just some) end points of the internet.
(4) The following terms have the meaning given by the specified provision of this Schedule—
enforcement authority | paragraph 8 |
intimate image register | paragraph 3 |
intimate image material | paragraph 3 |
the registrar | paragraph 4” |
Baroness Levitt
That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 263A to 263G.
(1A) That A and B were related, or pretending to be related, such that A was related to B as parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, brother, sister, half-brother, half-sister, uncle, aunt, nephew or niece.
(1B) That—
(a) A and B were related or had been related, or were pretending to be related or to have been related, such that A was or had been related to B as step-parent, step-child, stepbrother, stepsister, foster parent or foster child, and
(b) at least one of A and B was, or was pretending to be, under 18.”
“(4A) For the purpose of subsections (1A) and (1B), A and B are not to be taken as pretending to be related if it is fanciful that they actually were or had been related in the way pretended.
(4B) In subsection (1A)—
(a) “parent” includes an adoptive parent;
(b) “child” includes an adopted person within the meaning of Chapter 4 of Part 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002;
(c) “uncle” means the brother of a person’s parent, and “aunt” has a corresponding meaning;
(d) “nephew” means the child of a person’s brother or sister, and “niece” has a corresponding meaning.
(4C) In subsection (1B), “step-parent”, “stepbrother”, “stepsister” and “foster parent” have the meanings given by section 27(5) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003; and “step-child” and “foster child” have corresponding meanings.”
“(iii) the person was not or had not been related to person B or A (as the case may be) in a way mentioned in section 67E(1A) or (1B).”
“(iii) the person was not or had not been related to person B or A (as the case may be) in a way mentioned in section 67E(1A) or (1B), and”
Baroness Levitt
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 264 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 264A to 264F in lieu.
“Online pornography (age and consent verification): duty to review and report
(1) The Secretary of State must conduct a review of the role of providers of internet services in—
(a) verifying the age of individuals appearing in pornographic content published or displayed on their services;
(b) verifying whether individuals appearing in pornographic content published or displayed on their services consent to the content being published or displayed.
(2) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament, and publish, a report of the review.
(3) The Secretary of State must comply with subsections (1) and (2) before the end of the 12 month period beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.
(4) In this section the following terms have the same meaning as in the Online Safety Act 2023—
“internet service” (see section 228 of that Act);
“pornographic content” (see section 236 of that Act);
“provider”, in relation to an internet service of any kind (see section 226 of that Act).”
“Online pornography (age and consent verification): power to amend Online Safety Act 2023
(1) The Online Safety Act 2023 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 217 insert—
“Power to amend Act: pornographic content
217A Power to impose duties about pornographic content
(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend this Act for or in connection with the imposition, on providers of regulated services or regulated services of a particular kind, of duties relating to—
(a) verifying the age of individuals appearing in pornographic content published or displayed on those regulated services (“age verification duties”);
(b) verifying whether individuals appearing in pornographic content published or displayed on those regulated services consent to the content being published or displayed (“consent verification duties”).
(2) Age verification duties and consent verification duties may include duties relating to the systems and processes used to operate regulated services, or regulated services of a particular kind.
(3) Consent verification duties may include duties relating to cases where consent previously given is withdrawn.
(4) Regulations under this section may make provision requiring OFCOM to issue guidance to providers of regulated services, or regulated services of a particular kind, to assist them to comply with age verification duties and consent verification duties.
(5) The provisions of this Act that may be amended by the regulations in connection with the imposition of age verification duties and consent verification duties include, but are not limited to, section 131(2).”
(3) In section 225(1) (regulations subject to affirmative procedure) after paragraph (g) insert—
“(ga) regulations under section 217A,”.”
“Online pornography (age and consent verification): power to make regulations
(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for or in connection with the imposition on providers of specified internet services of duties relating to—
(a) verifying the age of individuals appearing in pornographic content published or displayed on those internet services (“age verification duties”);
(b) verifying whether individuals appearing in pornographic content published or displayed on those internet services consent to the content being published or displayed (“consent verification duties”).
(2) Age verification duties and consent verification duties may include duties relating to the systems and processes used to operate specified internet services.
(3) Consent verification duties may include duties relating to cases where consent previously given is withdrawn.
(4) The regulations may confer functions on— (a) a body established by the regulations, or (b) another body specified in the regulations, (“the regulator”).
(5) The regulations may make provision—
(a) establishing or modifying the constitutional arrangements of the regulator; (b) establishing or modifying the funding arrangements of the regulator.
(6) The functions which may be conferred on the regulator include—
(a) powers to, by notice, require providers of specified internet services to provide information to the regulator;
(b) powers, in relation to requirements imposed by or under the regulations, corresponding or similar to those conferred on OFCOM by or under Chapter 6 of Part 7 of the Online Safety Act 2023 in relation to enforceable requirements, including provisions conferring power to impose monetary penalties.
(7) The provision which may be made under subsection (6)(a) includes provision corresponding or similar to that made in relation to requirements to provide information to OFCOM by—
(a) section 109 of the Online Safety Act 2023 (offences in connection with information notices), and
(b) section 113 of that Act so far as relating to section 109 (penalties for information offences).
(8) If the regulations make provision under subsection (6)(b) corresponding or similar to provision in relation to which an appeal lies under section 168 of the Online Safety Act 2023, they must make corresponding or similar provision for an appeal.
(9) The regulations may make provision for appeals against other decisions of the regulator.
(10) The regulations may make provision requiring providers of specified internet services to pay fees to the regulator.
(11) The provision which may be made under subsection (10) includes provision corresponding or similar to that made in relation to the payment of fees to OFCOM by or under Part 6 of the Online Safety Act 2023.
(12) The regulations may make provision requiring the regulator to issue guidance to providers of specified internet services to assist them to comply with age verification duties and consent verification duties.
(13) References in this section to an internet service include an internet service provided from outside the United Kingdom—
(a) which has a significant number of United Kingdom users, or
(b) one of the target markets of which (or the only target market of which) is United Kingdom users.
(14) In this section the following terms have the same meaning as in the Online Safety Act 2023—
“internet service” (see section 228 of that Act);
“pornographic content” (see section 236 of that Act);
“provider”, in relation to an internet service of any kind (see section 226 of that Act);
“United Kingdom user” (see section 227 of that Act).
(15) In this section “specified” means specified, or of a description specified, in the regulations.”
“(ja) sections “(Online pornography (age and consent verification): duty to review and report), (Online pornography (age and consent verification): power to amend Online Safety Act 2023), (Online pornography (age and consent verification): power to make regulations),””
“(ba) sections “(Online pornography (age and consent verification): duty to review and report), (Online pornography (age and consent verification): power to amend Online Safety Act 2023), (Online pornography (age and consent verification): power to make regulations),””
Baroness Levitt
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 265 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 265A to 265C in lieu with the following amendments to Commons Amendment 265A—
“Pornographic images of sexual activity with child under 16
(1) After section 67G of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 insert—
“67H Possession or publication of pornographic images of sexual activity with child under 16
(1) It is an offence for a person (P) to be in possession of an image if—
(a) the image is pornographic, within the meaning of section 63,
(b) the image portrays, in an explicit and realistic way, a person (A) engaged in sexual activity with another person (B),
(c) a reasonable person looking at the image would think that A and B were real, and
(d) a reasonable person—
(i) looking at the image, and
(ii) taking into account any sound or information associated with the image, would think that at least one of A or B was, or was pretending to be, under 16.
(2) It is an offence for a person to publish an image of the kind mentioned in subsection (1).
(3) Publishing an image includes giving or making it available to another person by any means.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (1)(d)—
(a) the reference to sound or information associated with the image is—
(i) when subsection (1)(d) applies for the purpose of an offence under subsection (1), to sound, or information, associated with the image that is in P’s possession, and
(ii) when subsection (1)(d) applies for the purpose of an offence under subsection (2), to sound, or information, associated with the image that the person in subsection (2) publishes with the image, and
(b) a person is not to be taken as pretending to be under 16 if it is fanciful that they are actually under 16 in the way pretended.
(5) In this section “image” has the same meaning as in section 63.
(6) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to excluded images, within the meaning of section 64.
(7) Proceedings for an offence under this section may not be instituted except by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
67I Defences to offences under section 67H
(1) Where a person is charged with an offence under section 67H(1), it is a defence for the person to prove any of the matters mentioned in subsection (2).
(2) The matters are—
(a) that the person had a legitimate reason for being in possession of the image concerned;
(b) that the person had not seen the image concerned and did not know, nor had any cause to suspect, it to be an image of the kind mentioned in section 67H(1);
(c) that the person—
(i) was sent the image concerned without any prior request having been made by or on behalf of the person, and
(ii) did not keep it for an unreasonable time;
(d) that—
(i) the person directly participated in the act portrayed as person A or person B mentioned in section 67H(1)(b),
(ii) the act did not involve the infliction of any non-consensual harm on any person, and
(iii) neither A nor B was under 16.
(3) Where a person is charged with an offence under section 67H(2), it is a defence for the person to prove any of the matters mentioned in subsection (4).
(4) The matters are—
(a) that the person had a legitimate reason for publishing the image concerned to the persons to whom they published it;
(b) that the person had not seen the image concerned and did not know, nor had any cause to suspect, it to be an image of the kind mentioned in section 67H(1);
(c) that—
(i) the person directly participated in the act portrayed as person A or person B mentioned in section 67H(1)(b),
(ii) the act did not involve the infliction of any non-consensual harm on any person,
(iii) neither A nor B was under 16, and
(iv) the person only published the image to person B or A (as the case may be).
(5) In this section “non-consensual harm” has the same meaning as in section 66.
67J Penalties for offences under section 67H
(1) A person who commits an offence under section 67H(1) is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or a fine (or both).
(2) A person who commits an offence under section 67H(2) is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine (or both).”
(2) In section 68 of that Act (special rules relating to providers of information society services), after “67E” insert “and 67H”.
(3) In Schedule 14 to that Act (special rules relating to providers of information society services), in paragraphs 3(1), 4(2) and 5(1) after “67E” insert “or 67H”.
(4) In Schedule 34A to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (child sex offences for the purposes of section 327A), after paragraph 13ZB insert—
“13ZC An offence under section 67H of that Act (possession or publication of pornographic images of sexual activity with child under 16) in relation to an image showing a person under 18.”
(5) In Schedule 7 to the Online Safety Act 2023 (priority offences), in paragraph 29 after paragraph (c) insert—
“(d) section 67H (possession or publication of pornographic images of sexual activity with child under 16).””
“(ja) section (Pornographic images of sexual activity with child under 16)(5);”
(1A) The conditions are—
(a) the image portrays, in an explicit and realistic way, a person (A) engaged in sexual activity with another person (B),
(b) A and B are real, and
(c) at least one of A or B is, or is pretending to be, under 16.
(1B) A person is not to be taken as pretending to be under 16 if it is fanciful that they are actually under 16 in the way pretended.”
Lord Hanson of Flint
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 311, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 311A.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, in moving Motion N, I will also speak to Motions S, T, U and X. Amendment 311, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Walney, seeks to introduce a proscription regime for extreme criminal protest groups. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss the amendment with the noble Lord—before Report, during Report formally and informally since then. I understand the concerns that led to the adoption of Amendment 311. However, it remains the case that the Government cannot support this amendment.
The amendment aims to minimise the risk of Palestine Action-style sign holders being arrested to challenge a proscription decision. I want to inform the House of the views of Jonathan Hall KC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, who has noted that supporters will still seek arrest to challenge the regime and the same disproportionality arguments would arise because the new offences closely mirror—and in some respects, go beyond—those under terrorism legislation.
There is a broader risk, which again I have shared with the noble Lord, Lord Walney, privately, and which has been identified by the independent reviewer, that the proscription regime is undermined by the proposal and the threshold for proscription will naturally increase if there is an alternative designation available. The Government may be pressured not to proscribe terrorist organisations and instead pursue a less forceful and less effective measure.
The designation test set out in the amendment is unclear, particularly the concept of serious harm to the rights of others, which sadly, I fear, will create uncertainty for the police, for prosecutors and for the courts. The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, KC, as the House will know, is currently undertaking a review of public order and hate crime legislation. I fully expect him to report to the House and to Parliament as a whole in May. It would be appropriate to wait for the outcome of that review before committing to any further legislation. I hope that, with those comments, the noble Lord, Lord Walney, will not wish to pursue his amendment.
Turning to Motion S and Amendment 342, I agree with the sentiments in our earlier debates expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. Multi-agency engagement is essential to the success of youth diversion orders in practice. However, I would argue to her—and she is at liberty to accept it or not—that this has already been reflected in current drafting of the legislation. There is a duty on the police under Clause 174 of the Bill to consult youth offending teams in England and Wales, or their equivalents in Scotland and Northern Ireland, where the respondent is under the age of 18.
I want to emphasise that youth offending teams are necessarily multi-agency in nature and include representation from probation, local council social services, health, education and others. This means that the police will already need to ensure there is a wide range of expertise considered at the start of any process.
The department is also currently drafting statutory guidance, which will support the police in applying for youth diversion orders and management of the orders when in place. This will include guidance for police on the consultation process, and consideration of alternative interventions before the police can even apply for an order. The guidance will be laid before Parliament in due course. I have explained to the noble Baroness that, unusually for statutory guidance, in this instance we have provided that the guidance is subject to scrutiny by both Houses through the negative resolution procedure. That is an abnormal procedure for the type of activity before the House today. Further, the legislation dictates that the police must consider the necessity and proportionality of the order and the measures within it on a case-by-case basis, and this would need to include consideration of alternative options.
However, given the concerns in Committee and on Report, the Commons has agreed Amendment 342A in lieu. This amendment will clarify that the statutory guidance may include guidance about matters to be taken into account by the police prior to making an application for a youth diversion order, including, crucially, consideration of alternative interventions and guidance on their duty to consult partners under Clause 174, including youth justice services. I know there has been a bit of debate on this outside the Chamber and in my discussions with the noble Baroness. To be clear, the guidance in this case will use “may”, but that reflects usual practice. I hope that the amendment in lieu offers sufficient assurance and that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, knows that the spirit of the original amendment has been met. It is our intention to address these matters in the guidance, and I hope that will assist her.
I turn to Motion T and Amendment 357 on the glorification of terrorism. I am pleased that the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, is available to examine this issue. I have had a great opportunity to discuss these matters with her in informal discussions outside the Chamber. I have previously set out that I fully recognise the harm that can be caused by the glorification of terrorism. The offence in Section 1 of the Terrorism Act was designed to prevent terrorist risk by criminalising statements that could lead to individuals being encouraged to carry out acts of terrorism themselves. Such statements not only increase the risks to public safety but potentially legitimise terrorist actors if left unchecked.
However, as I set out at on Report and have discussed with the noble Baroness outside the Chamber, the offence of encouraging terrorism is already very wide, and I believe it strikes the right balance between freedom of speech and criminalising statements, which may even increase terrorist risk. Amendment 357 would remove an important safeguard requiring that the glorification be understood to mean that the conduct should be emulated in current circumstances. Put simply, that safeguard aims to prevent the inadvertent criminalisation of statements about historic acts of terrorism, where those statements do not carry the same risk of those acts being repeated nowadays. I pray in aid statements around such high-profile figures as the former President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, who may well have had arguments around terrorism activities in the past.
I recognise that the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, has attempted to limit her changes to statements that concern acts of terrorism carried out by proscribed organisations. However, this does not fully mitigate the risk of overreach I have described, and it does not recognise the existence of a separate terrorist offence—the offence of inviting support for a proscribed organisation—which the amendment would arguably overlap with.
Nevertheless, I understand and appreciate the strength of feeling on this issue, so I am proposing to the House that the Government will ask the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to carry out a targeted review of the encouragement offence. As Members of your Lordships’ House will know, the independent reviewer’s role is to review the operation of terrorism legislation in practice, so this commission by the Government will be an opportunity for the reviewer to undertake a detailed review of the use of the encouragement offence in practice and to identify any issues that may warrant further consideration by the Government. As I explained to the noble Baroness in our private discussions, I will of course discuss the terms of reference for that review with the independent reviewer, and I understand that Jonathan Hall KC is ready to meet with the noble Baroness as part of the review, including a prior discussion on the terms of reference for any review. I hope that assists in what is a genuine attempt by the noble Baroness to clarify this issue, and I hope that I have at least attempted to meet that Motion half way.
Lord Walney
Leave out from “House” to end and insert “do insist on its Amendment 311.”
Lord Walney (CB)
My Lords, I was disappointed that the Government directed their Members in the Commons to vote down Amendment 311, which would have created a limited power for the Government to designate as an extreme criminal protest group organisations that attempt to influence public policy through a limited number of offences, including criminal damage, without labelling them as terrorists or criminalising simple expressions of support, such as holding up signs.
I am grateful for the time that the Minister has taken to meet me directly on this matter on a number of occasions, as he said. He has characterised the Government’s objections in two areas. The first is the observations made by the Government’s Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall, which were published on 31 March and the second is the review of public order legislation by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, which he assures me is due to report shortly.
I shall deal with both those issues briefly. Jonathan Hall makes important points that we should all reflect on. He summarises his objections as: first, that the power potentially overlaps with terrorism proscription, but the relationship is unclear; secondly, that the existence of the new power will be used to undermine terrorist proscription; and, thirdly, that it is doubtful whether new offences are suitable for groups operating below the national security threshold. I shall take these three objections in turn.
On the first point, if that is a genuine concern to the point that the Government believe that there is genuine potential for a proscribed group to be able legally to contest the proportionality of a full terrorism proscription because of the existence of a lower form of designation, then it is surely within the Government’s power to insist that the one does not preclude the other. That is a safeguard that could be put into legislation that the Government bring forward.
On the second point—the idea that this will be used to undermine terrorist proscription—it is important to make the point that we are dealing with a narrow and quite unusual form of proscription here that uses the part of the definition of terrorism that relates to economic damage. A group that is to be designated as terrorist because it used violent methods to target individuals or groups to kill has never been under the scope of this extreme criminal protest group designation. We are dealing with the relatively narrow issue of a group that uses methods such as Palestine Action has used, where there has been a level of violence that the Government have asserted as part of its proscription, but it is undoubted that the main part of what it has done has been intimidation and attempts to influence public policy through criminal damage. Jonathan Hall suggests that, if you move the goalposts, these groups would find new ways to break the law proportionately; even if that were not holding up signs, they would find a new way to do that. That is, of course, a possibility. We could never devise legislation that could guarantee against people performatively trying to clog up the court system in the way that is happening at the moment with the Palestine Action protesters. The key point here is that, while there will always be a hard core of people who are determined to contest this, what has made Palestine Action’s terrorist proscription so controversial is not that people agree with what it is doing but the fact of labelling it as terrorism.
I agreed with the proscription of Palestine Action, which I know is not universal in the House. I hope that the Government’s appeal against the High Court judgment is successful. Nevertheless, it cannot be seen as good public policy and it cannot be seen that this framework is working if the Government took five years to reach the judgment that the sustained campaign of criminal damage and vandalism that was carried out by Palestine Action reached the terrorism threshold. This measure would enable faster action to deal with that. I know that the Minister will not say that the Government would be deterred from designating another group that eventually reached the terrorism threshold primarily through criminal damage. They will not admit that, but I suggest that they would be highly wary of repeating this with the next Palestine Action group because of the level of controversy that this has generated. Therefore, there is a gap in the legislative framework that is not being filled.
That leads to the third point, where Jonathan Hall says that he contests whether the powers are appropriate, given that they are relatively severe. They are significantly less severe than terrorist proscription but still relatively severe. I respectfully disagree with him on that point. I hope that he, and the Government, will reflect, given the nature and severity of the problem of extreme protest groups using criminal damage in a systematic way, which is causing huge amounts of economic damage and damage to the public realm.
That ties into the second of the Government’s objections, which is, as the Minister has stated a number of times and again today, my noble friend Lord Macdonald’s upcoming review. We are all looking forward to that, and I hope that I am able to persuade my noble friend Lord Macdonald of the merits of this, but the fact is that the Government have acted ahead of this review in other areas and could do so now. There is a need to do so now, rather than to wait for when the next legislative opportunity comes along, which may be years down the track.
There is a growing epidemic of these tactics being used to frighten the public and try to deter businesses from carrying out legitimate, lawful activity. I had a meeting with a major insurance supplier yesterday, which does not want at this point to be public because of the fear of further reprisals. It spelled out that because of being tangential—at one, two or three removes from—to a defence company that may have some relationship with Israel’s conflict in Gaza, though that is highly debatable, it is repeatedly attacked. Its windows are being smashed, red paint is being daubed over its offices and its employees are frightened to go to work. It is spending literally millions of pounds per year on preventive measures and the clean-up operations. That is one single insurer, and this is spreading. It is completely unacceptable that the defence industry is being subjected to this, but it is spreading far beyond the defence industry into the insurance and financial sectors, and other sectors.
The framework we have is not adequate to deal with this. It would not be disproportionate to put in place this limited measure to be able to restrict the activities of such organisations and send a message of greater deterrence, to protect businesses, workers and the public from this sustained intimidation. I beg to move.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, Motion S1 is in my name. On Report, your Lordships supported Amendment 342 for one overriding reason: to make sure that the tragic failures of the past are not built into future law.
Three days ago, the Fulford report into the Southport tragedy was published. I had hoped that it might lead to a change of heart by the Government, but, regrettably, it has not. Fulford’s findings are stark: the tragedy was not caused by a lack of powers but by systemic failure. Risk information was mishandled, lost or watered down as it passed between agencies. No one was responsible for pulling the full picture together. Referrals went unanswered. Officers often acted without knowing what help or interventions were available, and some decisions were taken outside the bounds of what could reasonably be expected because the system had failed them.
These failures cost lives. Fulford makes it clear that, unless the way agencies share and account for risk is strengthened, such failures will happen again. These were not one-off mistakes; they were the result of weak information management and an absence of co-ordinated leadership. The danger was not properly recognised because no one joined up the information and acted upon it. That is precisely the gap which my amendment is designed to close.
The Government tell us that this should be left to guidance. They say that a statutory duty for multi-agency consultation would make the law too rigid and prevent judges exercising discretion. Surely that gets things the wrong way round. Judges can use their discretion properly only if they have had all the relevant information before them. A few minutes ago, the Minister said that the police have a duty to consult, and they do, but that duty is narrow. It is limited to the youth offending team. It leaves out the schools, health professionals and social services who often know the child best. Amendment S1 would not reduce discretion; it would support informed decision-making and, as a result, better public protection.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I will say a few words in relation to Motion N1, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, on extreme criminal protest groups. The House should be thanking the noble Lord for his enormous efforts and dedication in relation to this important subject over many years.
There is no doubt about the gravity of the mischief that the United Kingdom is facing. There are extreme criminal protest groups and, sadly, people who believe that the way to advance their political views—to which they are perfectly entitled—about Gaza, Israel and other subjects is impermissibly to use violence against people and to smash up property. It is disgraceful, and the law needs to deal with these people powerfully and effectively. It is symptomatic of a malaise in our society: we saw this the other night at Finchley Reform Synagogue, and with the setting fire to ambulances in north-west London. It is all disgraceful, and every effort must be made by the law to ensure that this type of action can be addressed and remedied.
I supported the noble Lord, Lord Walney, in his amendment on Report, which has now been considered by the Commons. However, I understand—and hope it is the case—that he will not be pressing his Motion today to divide the House. I am sure that is right, and it is right for the reasons the Minister gave.
Jonathan Hall, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, has made some powerful points that need to be considered carefully in relation to how we deal with extreme criminal protest groups. We have heard that the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, will be reporting next month.
There is also the appeal relating to the proscription of Palestine Action, which will be heard in the Court of Appeal the week after next. I very much hope—it is a matter for the court, of course—that the Court of Appeal will give judgment before the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, issues his report. He will obviously wish to take account of that judgment, as will the Home Office.
It is important to stress that there are two important issues raised by the Motion tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Walney. The first is whether the law is at its most effective if it requires that, before proscription can occur, a particular body has to be labelled as terrorist. I entirely understand that the actions of Palestine Action have been recognised by the Government to fall within the statutory definition of a terrorist group. The Divisional Court judgment, which has been much criticised, accepts that Palestine Action is indeed a terrorist group. However, there is a real issue here: does it undermine the efficacy of proscription for a body such as Palestine Action to be labelled as terrorist given that, for most people, terrorism has a connotation that many people would not regard as satisfied by a protest group, objectional and damaging though it is? That is something the Home Office needs to give further thought to.
Secondly, the other point which the noble Lord, Lord Walney, emphasised in his Motion—it is a real point—is that the current law does not just proscribe organisations such as Palestine Action; it makes it unlawful for people to stand in a public place and say, “I support Palestine Action”. That has led to hundreds of otherwise law-abiding individuals being arrested, which poses real problems for the administration of justice in this country. It may be better to have a proscription law that does not criminalise the mere expression of support for a body such as Palestine Action, however objectional and unlawful the conduct of that organisation is. Perhaps we should confine the illegality to those who organise such a group, finance it and do more by way of support than simply sitting in a public place saying that they sympathise with that organisation. Those are difficult questions. Jonathan Hall has made some powerful points in relation to them. I am simply saying that I hope the Home Office will give further thought to these matters. I am sure it will.
I thank the Minister because he has laboured hard on this Bill, which covers so many areas. He has responded with sensitivity, tact and courtesy to a wide range of subjects, for which he has all our thanks. He will no doubt be pleased to know that it is absolutely inevitable that these subjects will return to the House. We very much look forward to hearing his further comments under future legislation.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I sincerely apologise to the Minister for not being here for the beginning of his speech. He will be glad to know my athleticism, as I was running down the corridor, allowed for me to be in time for his reference to Motion T, which I will speak to briefly. It deals with the glorification of terrorism. I thank all those who supported the amendment on Report. I believe that, in doing so, we have collectively underlined the importance of dealing with this issue, which is becoming a gateway to extremism and, worse, terrorism.
I thank the Minister in particular for his engagement and that of his officials, and for the constructive way in which they have engaged around the whole issue. As a result, I will not push Motion T1 to a vote today but look forward to engaging in the review that will be put in place after the Bill becomes law. I particularly welcome the opportunity to engage around the review’s terms of reference. I hope it will take the approach of engaging widely to ascertain how a narrative is taking hold in our society here in the UK that it is somehow acceptable to glorify terrorism to effect change, and look at the real damage it can cause to society.
I also hope the review will take note of the fact that there has not been a single prosecution in Northern Ireland, despite the obvious ongoing glorification of terrorism there. I know that the Minister, and many in this House, recognise that this is a growing issue. If there is any doubt that it is very much a real and live issue, a brief glimpse at my social media feeds following Report in this House will confirm this to be the case. One particularly brazen poster said that he wished
“the provos had killed your da when they attacked him. Up the Ra”.
That is a reference to the attempted murder of my father by the IRA in 1979. Of course, that is something that I have become quite resilient to, but it is entirely unacceptable that people can glorify terrorism as a way to make change happen.
Over Easter, when many of us were relaxing with our friends and family, some of those who are content to glorify the actions of the IRA broke into a Church of Ireland Sunday school in a village near to where I live and ransacked it. We know that they were supporters of the IRA because they wrote “Up the Ra” over the 10 commandments. I was pleased to see the local Roman Catholic community condemn that vandalism, but there was complete silence from the political wing of the IRA—in other words, Sinn Féin—and nothing from its local representatives or the self-appointed “First Minister for all”.
As we have said throughout this debate, this is not just a Northern Ireland issue. Here in London, just yesterday, Finchley Reform Synagogue endured what police are calling an antisemitic hate crime, when the shul was attacked in an attempted break-in and firebombing incident. This shul is not only a place of worship for the Jewish community; it also hosts a nursery, a homeless shelter and a safe place for refugees to gather.
Those are two attacks that happened very recently in two different parts of the United Kingdom, in two different faith buildings, both motivated by hate. As Sarah Sackman, the MP for Finchley and Golders Green, said yesterday, we cannot
“allow this to become the ‘new normal’”.
There is a definite need to deal with the glorification of terrorism. It has real consequences for young people being led into extremism and thinking that terrorism is somehow cool and edgy, rather than learning about the fact that it leads to division, pain and hurt, mostly to their neighbours. The radicalisation of children should concern us all in this House.
I thank again all noble Lords who supported the amendment on Report, for highlighting the issue. I thank the Government for responding positively with the announcement of the review led by Jonathan Hall; I look forward to engaging with him. Therefore, I will not move Motion T1.
Lord Polak (Con)
My Lords, I supported the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, throughout, and I continue to do so. I also thank the Minister for the time he has taken to engage on the issue and for recognising that this is a serious and pertinent problem. The glorification of terrorism has real consequences, as we have been hearing. It contributes to the normalisation of extremism, and that in turn makes us all less safe.
I particularly welcome the Minister’s agreement to commission a review by Jonathan Hall KC. He seems to be rather busy and to have a lot on his plate, and I hope that this is a quick look at something. It is important that the review looks at all forms of glorification, including the very significant rise we have seen since 7 October 2023. We saw, for instance, young people in the days after 7 October wearing images of parachutes on their backs, imagery clearly associated with those Hamas terrorists who entered Israel and carried out the brutal attacks on civilians. That kind of conduct is not incidental; it reflects a climate in which acts of terror are being referenced in ways that risk admiration or endorsement.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
I follow the noble Baroness by apologising to your Lordships that I was not here for the commencement of the Minister’s speech, but I heard the great majority of what he said, and I was also present for the speeches of the noble Lords, Lord Walney and Lord Pannick.
I want to emphasise my considerable support for subsection (4) of the new clause proposed by Amendment 311, which deals directly with the concerns that I expressed in Committee and on Report. I am deeply troubled by the fact that people who are expressing support for Palestine Action in the streets of London are in fact using shorthand simply to protest at what they think is going wrong in Gaza and the West Bank. I do not think that those people should be charged with or arrested for terrorism. The proposed new subsection deals directly with that, and I think it is a very useful way forward. I very much hope that in the review, or if any amendment to the Terrorism Act is brought forward, the provisions of that subsection would be incorporated into any change of law, because that subsection makes it plain that, unless somebody is doing something which is really in furtherance of a criminal offence, they are not to be treated as a terrorist simply for demonstrating.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
Before we have any other contributions, I remind your Lordships that there is a very clear rule here, that if one is not present in the Chamber for the beginning of a group it is unacceptable to participate. Apologising and then proceeding is not the way that we do it.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)
My Lords, just before we progress, while the noble Lord on the Woolsack is absolutely right in what he has just argued, I have just witnessed three Members of this House not complying with the Companion. While my noble friend was wrong to do what he did, it is not for the noble Lord on the Woolsack to point out failures of procedure—it is for the Government Chief Whip or Deputy Chief Whip, who is present, to do so. If we all start not meeting our own individual responsibilities or discharging them properly, none of us is going to be complying with the Companion.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I feel as though I have entered into a slightly surreal moment there, but I thank noble Lords for that clarification. I speak very briefly in support of what the noble Lord, Lord Walney, is trying to do—having opposed it at an earlier stage, which is why I thought it was important to speak. The comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Walney, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, were very helpful in outlining what we are confronting and what we face at the present time.
I just raise some queries for the Minister to help me understand. One point that seems to have been made is that, if the proposal from the noble Lord, Lord Walney, were accepted, it would mean raising the threshold for proscribing an organisation. That did not make any sense to me because I would hope that, as legislators, we could make the finer distinctions between thresholds. We need some nuance here; otherwise, I fear that we will use a sledgehammer to crack a nut, which is what I fear has happened in relation to Palestine Action, potentially.
The notion of an extreme criminal protest group is a new phenomenon and therefore one that requires new thinking. The intimidation and criminal damage are not spontaneous; they are organised by organisations that proclaim that they are organisations. That needs to be tackled but they are not terrorist organisations. The point about supporting Palestine Action, which I thought the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, explained very well in terms of holding up a sign, is that we do not want to be soft on who is proscribed, but we have to be careful that we do not undermine what is meant by terrorism by turning to those people who are holding up the sign and treating them as though they are terrorists. That does not help anybody. I have spoken to a lot of young people and I have found that they are now cynical about the label “terrorist” precisely because of those people who are being arrested under an anti-terrorist proscription for holding up a sign. I cannot see that that helps. In the meantime, it does not make any sense for that to be the case, while the IRGC is still not proscribed. That seems completely contradictory.
The damage that this is doing is immense. The insurance example was given by the noble Lord, Lord Walney, but I know that people from Gail’s coffee shops have been specifically targeted. I was told by some young people that if you go to Gail’s, they have got it in for you—they are going to draw a map of Gail’s coffee shops. What has happened here is quite serious. This is very different from going out on a protest in support of Palestine or whatever else. We have to acknowledge that there is a new world with new problems and new legislation is needed.
Just finally, I commend the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for her amendment. I am not sure entirely what I think about it but, importantly, she drew our attention to the lessons of Southport and the fact that, whatever happens—and as the Minister rightly said yesterday—the Government need to be given time to read the inquiry’s report and decide what to do. I hope that some of the points that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, raised, particularly in relation to how youth diversion orders will be used and the need for different agencies to talk to each other, were very powerful and important. Her comments could at the very least feed into the Government’s discussions in relation to not just learning lessons from Southport but preventing it happening again.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I entirely accept the point made by the noble Lord on the Woolsack about the inadequacy of an apology for late arrival in the Chamber, and I am bound to say it is not something I have ever had to make before, but I was late into the Chamber today and I apologise to the House, after others, that I was late for the start of this group. I will speak briefly, if the House permits. The Motion from the noble Lord, Lord Walney, to permit designation—
Captain of the King’s Bodyguard of the Yeomen of the Guard and Deputy Chief Whip (Baroness Wheeler) (Lab)
I stress that the Deputy Speaker made it clear that people who arrive late for the debate are not allowed to speak. I think it is difficult for the noble Lord, having heard the explanation and the discussion, to stand up and speak. I am sorry.
Lord Pannick (CB)
We are a self-governing House. If it is the will of the House that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, speak briefly from the Front Bench, I suggest that we should hear him.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I hope I will be permitted to speak briefly. I have followed the arguments on all these matters throughout these proceedings.
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)
My Lords, my understanding of the Companion is that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is correct in what he said: if it wishes, the House can set aside the Companion and hear from a noble Lord, but in that case a Motion has to be put and voted upon.
Lord Walney (CB)
My Lords, I do not know whether this is helpful in any way—probably not—but as the proposer of the Motion, I really would appreciate hearing what the noble Lord on the Front Bench has to say on it.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, on that basis, unless I am stopped, I will speak briefly.
On the first Motion I was going to address, that of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, we have a great deal of sympathy for his proposal. Indeed, we would go so far as to say that it seems like a good idea. Its principal appeal is that it would permit a step falling short of proscription of an organisation, which would not involve anyone peacefully expressing support for that organisation at a demonstration or a protest being arrested, charged and possibly convicted of an offence under the Terrorism Act. In that, I fully agree with the points made by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley.
I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Walney, does not intend to press his Motion to a vote, and we on these Benches think he is right in that because our reservations remain. We abstained on Report, and our principal reason for doing so was that the amendment leaves in place the present law on proscription and does not oblige the Government to make a designation of a group as an extreme criminal protest group where the existing threshold for proscription is met, so we would be left with the position that the Government would have two alternative designations as options: one with consequences that we consider to be undesirable, far too severe and damaging; and the other with far less serious consequences. We think that risks introducing an element of muddle and a lack of clarity into this very difficult but important area of the law. It is important for civil liberties and the rights of the citizen, and important for the control of terrorism and of public criminal behaviour more generally.
As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, mentioned, we await the decision of the Court of Appeal and any possible appeal to the Supreme Court on the proscription of Palestine Action, and we also await the review of public order law by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. We are not persuaded that it would be sensible now to introduce a compromise that would address a very real difficulty with the Terrorism Act as it stands but would leave the law uncertain. It is better by far, we suggest, to wait and trust that a more comprehensive and credible solution to the difficulties presented by the present law can be found that does not involve leaving the law unamended and available on proscription alongside an alternative system introduced as a partial answer only to the weaknesses of the law as it stands. We applaud the noble Lord, Lord Walney, for the work he has done on this and we think he has a sensible way forward, but it needs further work and we agree that it should not be pressed at this stage.
On Motion S1, I have nothing to add to what was said by my noble friend Lady Doocey, except that these Benches are fully behind everything she said in approving of her Motion.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for returning with her amendment. I understand the Government are offering to include alternative interventions in youth diversion order guidance, but I agree with the noble Baroness that these considerations should be consistently applied to ensure proportionality. We therefore support the original measure.
Motion U1, standing in my name, returns once again to the issue of proscription of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the IRGC. I am sure that the Minister will once again attempt to use the fact that the last Government did not proscribe the IRGC as a justification for this Government’s position, and I recognise that fact. But the international situation is radically different now from that when we left government. Before this war even started, it was clear that the Iranian regime was ramping up its aggressive activities. At home, it wilfully oversaw the murder of over 40,000 protestors. Overseas, it continued to extend its influence through its backing of terrorist cells. In the UK alone, in 2025, security services tracked more than 20 potentially lethal Iran-backed plots.
This threat has only been exacerbated following the outbreak of war. Just last month, an Iranian man suspected of being a regime spy was arrested for attempting to break into a nuclear naval base in Scotland. We have seen the streets of our capital city filled with regime apologists on so-called Al-Quds day, leading to 12 arrests and countless lost police hours. Proscribing the IRGC would not only give the police more powers to counteract these actions but would send a signal that we do not bow to pressure from oppressive and authoritarian regimes.
I once again anticipate that the response from the Minister will be that this is constantly kept under review—but that is now not good enough. We know what this group is capable of, especially when it has the apparatus of an OPEC state behind it, and now with the current war, we must strengthen our resolve further. The Iranian regime is blocking the Strait of Hormuz, erratically attacking neighbours and, most importantly, influencing—if not sanctioning—potential attacks on British soil.
Quite independently of our national approach to the United States, this Iranian regime is one for which we should have no regard and no tolerance. The Government must now be pragmatic. Their policy must now reflect the international situation—they must undertake this review and proscribe the IRGC. If the Minister still does not agree with this conclusion, I will seek to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful for the discussion we have had to date on these matters. As I made clear in my opening remarks—for those who heard them, at least—the Government cannot accept Amendment 311 as drafted. I fully appreciate the work of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, on these issues, but as I have set out to the House already, and as I set out to the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, in particular, the independent reviewer has made clear his view that this would undermine the existing proscription regime. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, also recognised that, and I say also to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that this was the position. With the review of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, coming forward, it is right that this amendment not be accepted today. I particularly welcome the recognition of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, of that. That is not to undermine the arguments he has made, but we are where we are at the moment.
On Amendment 359, I stress that both this and previous Governments do not comment on organisations that are being assessed for proscription. As I mentioned in my opening remarks—for those who heard them—we have sanctioned 550 Iranian individuals, including members of the IRGC, so we are holding the Iranian regime to account. We have also put them in the foreign influence registration scheme.
If I may say so, I take objection to the suggestion from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that our not proscribing the IRGC somehow supports the Iranian regime—it does not. I will not accept that we should give a running commentary on proscription. With due respect to the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, they have not had intelligence in front of them on these issues from the intelligence services. We are making judgments as a Government, and we are not going to give a running commentary on what and when we proscribe, because that is a very dangerous position to take.
I remind the House—without commenting on the IRGC in particular—that any eventual proscription order on anybody is voted on by both Houses of Parliament, where it can be tested at that time. I am not in a position today to give a running commentary on the possible proscription of the IRGC, nor will I accept in principle the fact that both Opposition Front Benches think it right to do so. That may be their view, but the Government have to take a view on these matters in due course. It is not for us to give a running commentary on those matters. I say that to the House as a whole.
I stress again that I understand and accept the concerns that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, put before the House today. We will make it clear in statutory guidance that authorities must consider a range of options and interventions before deciding whether to apply for a youth diversion order. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, also stressed that it was important to do so. I stress to both noble Baronesses that the police are under a duty to consult multi-agency youth offending teams, which comprise health, education, probation and police services. I am happy to share a draft of the guidance with the noble Baroness in due course, but at the moment I cannot accept the amendment.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, for her work on her amendment on glorifying terrorism, and for giving her own personal experiences. It is very difficult to do that, and I understand the circumstances that she and others find themselves in. I support the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Polak, on glorification in general. On the incident in Finchley that has been mentioned today, individuals are under arrest and in custody for the alleged offence. We should obviously allow the police to do their job and determine whether charges should be put forward to the CPS for consideration. None the less, that type of incident—whether or not the individuals under arrest are responsible—is simply not acceptable. The Government and others should stand with the community as a whole.
I was pleased to hear and welcomed the contributions of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, and the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, but I cannot accept the Motions in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. I ask—in anticipation and hope rather than aspiration and agreement—that they be content not to press their Motions. In the meantime, I beg to move my Motion N, and I hope the House will agree to it.
Lord Walney (CB)
My Lords, I thank everyone for their insight on and support for the principle behind this matter, which is that urgent action is needed. In the light of what has been said, I am reluctantly content to withdraw my Motion. In doing so, I will leave the Minister with two thoughts.
First, this will not go away. I hope the Minister will take away the urgent need to deal with this matter and bring forward a solution—this debate has shown that that is possible—in order to address the concerns set out in this Chamber and outside it. Secondly, I hope he will agree to meet with me and others to look in the meantime at an array of protections for the affected businesses, in advance of any legislative change. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the motion.
Lord Hanson of Flint
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 333 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 333A in lieu.
“(5) After section 83 insert—
“83A Power of Secretary of State to change maximum duration of closure orders
(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend this Chapter so as to alter—
(a) the maximum period that a closure order under section 80 may specify as the period for which access to the premises is prohibited;
(b) the maximum period for which a closure order may be extended under section 82;
(c) the maximum duration of a closure order extended under section 82.
(2) Regulations under this section may make different provision for different purposes.
(3) Before making regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must consult such persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”
(6) In section 182(2) (orders and regulations), after paragraph (b) insert—
“(ba) regulations under section 83A,”.”
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion P. I beg to move.
Lord Hanson of Flint
That this House do not insist on its Amendmentusb 334, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 334A.
Lord Young of Acton
Leave out from “House” to end and insert “do insist on its Amendment 334.”
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
My Lords, I urge noble Lords to support Amendment 334 and declare my interest as the director of the Free Speech Union. The Minister will tell noble Lords that the amendment is unnecessary because the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council have recommended the abolition of the non-crime hate incident regime and the Government have amended the Bill to repeal the statutory NCHI code of practice.
However, we knew all this when we voted for the amendment on Report. The Minister stood where he is about to stand and said all this a few weeks ago. The amendment repealing the code of practice had already sailed through unopposed. He told us what was going to be in the joint report and, lo, that is what is in the joint report. This was all priced in when this House decided to vote for the amendment. Nothing has changed, so there is no reason why any noble Lords should change their minds about supporting it.
I have already set out the case for the amendment, which I remind noble Lords was co-sponsored by the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, a Liberal Democrat, and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, a former Metropolitan Police commissioner, so I will not waste your Lordships’ time by repeating those arguments, but I would just like to make a couple of points.
The joint report, while welcome, has left some loose ends, such as: what will become of historic non-crime hate incidents sitting on police databases? Is there a risk that they will be disclosed in enhanced criminal record checks if a person applies for a job as a teacher or carer, as there was under the old regime? I remind noble Lords that one person had a NCHI recorded against his name for whistling the theme tune to “Bob the Builder” every time he saw his neighbour. Another was recorded for someone claiming that a newly elected independent councillor cared more about the people of Gaza than the people in his ward. That comment was recorded as a non-crime hate incident. The joint report had nothing to say about what would become of these historic NCHIs, and there are still tens of thousands, if not more, sitting on police databases.
Our amendment made some very modest demands to deal with this outstanding problem. The first version, which we tabled in Committee, asked for all historic NCHIs to be deleted, but at a meeting between the co-sponsors of the amendment and Sir Andy Marsh, the CEO of the College of Policing—and I am grateful to the Minister for arranging that meeting—we were told that for the police to go through all their databases and delete historic NCHIs would be a huge administrative undertaking and a waste of the police’s time.
We accepted that and revised our amendment. The version before noble Lords and on Report asks only that any NCHIs that the police come across in the course of their work be deleted, and not all of them but just those that do not meet the new, higher recording threshold of the successor regime. It would also ensure that if a member of the public discovered that an NCHI had been recorded against them via a subject access request—I remind noble Lords that members of the public are not always informed when they have NCHIs recorded against their names—and they requested that the NCHIs be deleted, the police acted on that request, provided that the NCHIs in question did not meet the new, higher recording threshold of the successor regime. These are modest demands. The noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Strasburger, and I listened to Sir Andy Marsh, and we came up with what we believe is a reasonable compromise.
The same is true when it comes to disclosure. Originally, our amendment asked the police to stop disclosing non-crimes in enhanced DBS checks altogether. No one, we thought, should be prevented from getting a job because they have committed a non-crime. But Sir Andy Marsh persuaded us that there are some very limited circumstances in which chief constables should disclose information about non-crimes in enhanced DBS checks: things employers should know—a point also made by several noble Lords during the debate in Committee. We accepted that too. So our amendment—the one we voted for on Report and which is before this House today—seeks to limit disclosure only to those historic NCHIs that do not meet the new, higher recording threshold. It is, we think, another reasonable compromise.
We listened to the College of Policing. We listened to noble Lords who expressed reservations about our original amendment. We listened to the Minister when he made valid points in Committee. We listened, and we revised our amendment accordingly. I think the fact that what we were asking for is so modest and so reasonable is why our amendment won a Division in this House. It won not because it attracted any support from Labour or the Lib Dems but because it commanded such wide support among the Cross-Benchers and the non-affiliated, who I believe recognised the reasonableness of what we were asking for.
However, the Government have not listened. They have not tabled an amendment in lieu or offered any concessions in the run-up to this debate. They have just cast our amendment aside and have dismissed the concerns of this House as beneath consideration. They have acted, in a word, unreasonably. I think I now have no choice but to move this amendment again so that the Government will be forced to engage with our concerns and to come back with their own reasonable compromise. I beg to move.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, is taking part remotely. I invite the noble Baroness to speak.
Baroness Brinton (LD) [V]
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, has set out his reasons for insisting on his Motion Q1, which would delete records that the police hold non-crime hate incidents in certain circumstances which he outlined, even when the police had a concern about the pattern of behaviour and that it might lead to a crime.
I take issue with the comments that the noble Lord has made in that the whole Motion talks only about this very narrow area of what should be held and reviewed. The concerns that we have from these Benches are about the repetition of proposed new subsections (1) and (2), which say that non-crime hate incidents
“must not be recognised as a category of incident by any police authority in the United Kingdom”,
and that:
“No police authority or police officer may record, retain or otherwise process any personal data relating to a NCHI”.
Noble Lords will remember that we were lucky enough to have the noble Lord, Lord Herbert, with us after the College of Policing report was published, and he pointed out that there is a balance between free speech and the targeting of vulnerable people. Other noble Lords spoke movingly about this balance too, including the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, from her and her family’s own experience. So from these Benches, we were pleased when the Government laid their amendments on Report, which set out that balance between freedom of speech, which must be protected, and threats to vulnerable people. Their proposal to use anti-social behaviour mechanisms to record in the future is understandable and appropriate, and we hope that it will work out well. We will wait and see whether it really works.
We on these Benches believe that the combination of the Government’s amendment that is now in the Bill and the new guidance in the College of Policing report provide the balance that is needed to ensure that there is freedom of speech. However, the police will have the capability under the anti-social behaviour legislation to protect the most vulnerable in our community, especially if they are targeted by someone whose behaviour is escalating and the course of that pattern of behaviour could in itself become a crime such as harassment or, even worse, just progress more severely into an actual crime.
If there was nothing on any records up to the moment that a crime was committed, the police would not have been involved. For many vulnerable people who have harassment and other things going on, waiting that long deters and delays police action. There is a difference between that and passing the information on about the files. I believe that the Government’s amendments have dealt with that. On these grounds, we will not support Motion Q1.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Young of Acton for returning to the important issue of NCHIs. Our position as a party has not changed. With 60,000 annual police hours and a quarter of a million cases recorded, which is over 65 a day, this is the extent to which our police forces are having to go to record non-crimes.
The Government have stated that they are not accepting my noble friend’s amendment, as the College of Policing has now published its review into the instrument, complete with recommendations. I welcome this review and that the Government have accepted its conclusions, but it bears no requirements for action. Similarly, while the statutory code of practice addressing the recording of NCHIs has been revoked, there is little reassurance that this will be replaced by a more satisfactory system. This amendment seeks to commit the Government to necessary action now. This measure needs to be on the statute book. Should my noble friend wish to test the opinion of the House, we will wholly support him.
My Amendment 339B in lieu is a redrafted version of the amendment that I tabled on Report concerning the investigation of police officers for misconduct. I thank the IOPC for its engagement with me concerning this amendment. The version before your Lordships now is a more comprehensive drafting, but the underlying point remains the same. Where police officers are acquitted of criminal charges, all misconduct proceedings concerning that specific offence should be dropped.
I want to be clear about how this amendment would operate in practice. It would not mean that acquittal would shield an officer from any potential misconduct proceedings. For example, if the police officer was acquitted of manslaughter, he could still be liable for misconduct proceedings if due process was not followed on a related procedural matter such as filling in correct paperwork concerning the incident. However, the amendment would mean that the police officer, where he is acquitted of criminal charges concerning the use of force, could not then be subject to misconduct proceedings on that same question. As I said on Report, it is wrong that in the absence of my amendment, police officers can be investigated by the IOPC, referred to the CPS, dragged through the courts, acquitted only then to be reinvestigated. If it is the Minister’s intention to oppose this amendment, I will seek to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I moved Motion Q at the beginning of the debate but was, I confess, slow out of the blocks. I should have spoken to Motion Q before Motion Q1 was moved, but I was concentrating on the Marshalled List and missed my opportunity. But the principles are the same.
The Government cannot support Motion Q1 but will support Motion Q, because there has been careful consideration on the recording of non-crime hate incidents since Report. I have appreciated the opportunity to engage formally and informally with the noble Lord. However, he will know that since your Lordships’ House last considered this matter on 31 March, the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council published their joint review of non-crime hate incidents, a review that was commissioned by the UK Government as well. The review recommended ending the current system and replacing it with a new national standard for incident recording and assessment. Under that approach, non-crime hate incidents would no longer exist as a stand-alone category. Instead, hate-related behaviour short of the criminal threshold would be recorded only where there are clear policing purposes within the established anti-social behaviour framework. The threshold for recording would be higher, more tightly defined and supported by trained police assessment and triage practices.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am very relaxed about that, because this side of the House—and I now see the support of Liberal Democrats—are happy to ensure that we have changed the regime, but we are also keeping information that will help safeguard and protect. If the noble Lord wishes to vote against that today and remove it, then it would be on his head if any consequences come from that.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
I thank the Minister for giving away. I think the argument he has just made was a bit of a non sequitur. The only thing asked for in this amendment is that any NCHIs that the police come across in the course of their work which would not meet the new higher recording threshold be deleted. If they would meet the new higher recording threshold—if there is a legitimate policing purpose for retaining that information—then that would not be stopped by this amendment. The College of Policing and the joint council have agreed that the old regime is not fit for purpose and the recording threshold was far too low—which is why, as my noble friend said, over 65 a day have been recorded on average over the last 10 years. Given that, why not allow for those NCHIs which do not meet the new higher recording threshold—not all NCHIs, just those—to be deleted?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am not willing to take that risk. It is a matter for noble Lords opposite. We are making a recommended change—we have accepted every recommendation from the College of Policing—but such an approach from the noble Lord risks removing information that may still be relevant. I am not willing to take that risk.
The noble Lord’s amendment also, if I may say so, overstates the impact of non-crime hate incidents on Disclosure and Barring Service checks. Such records do not appear on basic or standard DBS certificates. They can be disclosed only on an enhanced check, and only where a chief officer reasonably considers the information to be relevant, applying statutory Home Office guidance and strict tests of seriousness, relevance and proportionality. Enhanced checks are used solely for the most sensitive roles involving children or vulnerable adults, and there is no evidence of systemic or inappropriate use of non-crime hate incident information in that context.
I pray in aid that the House of Commons has disagreed with the noble Lord’s amendment for clear reasons. Its objectives are being met through the accepted review undertaken by police experts, and a blanket deletion requirement would be potentially harmful, removing information that—I say this again, and slowly—may be relevant to safeguarding vulnerable persons and communities. Everybody in this House, every noble Lord who walks through a Lobby today to support the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, is going to be potentially—I emphasise “potentially”—removing information that may still be relevant to safeguarding vulnerable persons and communities.
I am not willing to do that. I urge noble Lords to recognise the Government’s approach, which has effected and is effecting real change. We have accepted the recommendations of the College of Policing, chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Herbert, who is a member of the Conservative Party and a Peer with that knowledge.
Turning to Motion R and Amendment 339, the Government take police accountability very seriously. We believe it is right to strike a balance between allowing appropriate scrutiny of the police and ensuring that they can carry out their powers. I know that noble Lords opposite agree with that. We made a commitment in the police reform White Paper to commission an independent end-to-end review of the police accountability system. We will confirm who will lead this review and publish the terms of reference very shortly. I assure the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, that he will have input into that review.
We cannot support Amendment 339 as it stands because it would introduce a blanket presumption that any case involving a police officer that has resulted in an acquittal in the criminal court and subsequently been closed should not be reopened to go forward to misconduct proceedings. Such a blanket presumption would not be appropriate in all cases—for example, in allegations of serious wrongdoing, such as sexual offences or corruption by police officers. Anybody in this House today who votes for Motion R1 and the noble Lord’s Amendment 399B will be leaving open the opportunity that allegations of serious wrongdoing, such as sexual offences or corruption by police officers, will be potentially not able to be taken.
We will have honest disagreements in this House, but I say to noble Lords, particularly those opposite—and I am grateful for the support from the Liberal Democrats—that the changes we are making are important and effective. There is a risk in both amending Motions of potential safeguarding issues and compromise for the future, around not being able to look at cases of sexual abuse and others by the police. I am very happy to have a debate about that, but I suggest to my noble friends, and to anybody who wishes to join us, that we vote those Motions down and support Motion Q, in my name.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
On Motion R1, I agree with the Minister, not with my noble friend Lord Davies. It is important to remember—
Captain of the Honourable Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms and Chief Whip (Lord Kennedy of Southwark) (Lab Co-op)
We have wound the debate up, and apparently the noble Viscount was not present at the start of the debate. We have had the wind-up by the Minister. We now need to proceed to divide or not divide the House.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
The risk we draw attention to is that information has been recorded against people’s names that the police would not today record under the new regime because they regard it as posing no risk. That is a risk that I and my noble friends are not prepared to take, so I would like to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Hanson of Flint
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 339, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 339A.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion R. I beg to move.
Motion R1 (as an amendment to Motion R)
Lord Davies of Gower
At end insert “, and do propose Amendment 339B in lieu—
“IOPC investigations where officer acquitted
(1) The Police Reform Act 2002 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) to (5).
(2) In section 13B—
(a) in subsection (1), at end insert—
“but this is subject to the exception in section 13BA.”;
(b) in subsection (2), at beginning, for “The” substitute “Unless the exception in section 13BA applies, the”.
(3) After section 13B, insert—
“13BA No re-investigation on acquittal for the same conduct
(1) Where this section applies, the Director-General may not make a determination under section 13B(2) to re-investigate the complaint, recordable conduct matter or DSI matter.
(2) This section applies where—
(a) the Director-General, appropriate authority or relevant review body (as the case may be) has made a determination under paragraphs 23(2)(c), 24(2)(b) or 25(4G) of Schedule 3,
(b) as a result of the determination mentioned in paragraph (a), the Director of Public Prosecutions has brought criminal proceedings against the relevant person, and
(c) the relevant person has been acquitted in those criminal proceedings.
(3) The exception in subsection (1) does not apply only if—
(a) the relevant authority has come into possession of new and compelling evidence relating to the conduct that was the subject of the investigation, and
(b) the relevant authority is of the reasonable opinion that the new evidence would, if considered, be likely to lead to a finding of misconduct or gross misconduct.
(4) In subsection (3)—
(a) evidence is new if it was not adduced in the proceedings in which the person was acquitted (nor, if those were appeal proceedings, in earlier proceedings to which the appeal related);
(b) evidence is compelling if—
(i) it is reliable,
(ii) it is substantial, and
(iii) in the context of the outstanding issues, it appears highly probative of the case against the acquitted person.
(5) For the purposes of subsection (4)(b)(iii), the outstanding issues are the issues in dispute in the proceedings in which the person was acquitted and, if those were appeal proceedings, any other issues remaining in dispute from earlier proceedings to which the appeal related.
(6) For the purposes of subsection (3), it is irrelevant whether any evidence would have been admissible in earlier proceedings against the acquitted person.
(7) In this section—
(a) “relevant person” means the person to whose conduct the investigation related;
(b) “relevant authority” means the Director-General, appropriate authority or relevant review body (as the case may be).”
(4) After paragraph 24C of Schedule 3, insert—
“Investigation where person acquitted in criminal proceedings
24D(1) This paragraph applies where—
(a) an investigation of a complaint, conduct matter or DSI matter (“the index investigation”) under paragraphs 16, 18 or 19 has concluded,
(b) the final report has been submitted to the relevant authority under paragraph 22,
(c) the relevant authority has made a determination under paragraphs 23(2)(c), 24(2)(b) or 25(4F),
(d) as a result of the determination mentioned in sub-paragraph (b), the Director of Public Prosecutions has brought criminal proceedings against the relevant person, and
(e) the relevant person has been acquitted in those criminal proceedings.
(2) In this paragraph—
(a) “relevant person” means the person to whose conduct the index investigation related;
(b) “relevant authority” means the Director General, appropriate authority or relevant review body (as the case may be).
(3) Where this paragraph applies, the relevant authority may not—
(a) initiate a new investigation,
(b) re-open an investigation,
(c) continue an investigation, or
(d) order a re-investigation under paragraph 25,
against the relevant person in relation to the same complaint, conduct matter or DSI matter that was the subject of the index investigation.
(4) Sub-paragraph (3) does not apply only if—
(a) the relevant authority has come into possession of new and compelling evidence relating to the conduct that was the subject of the investigation, and
(b) the relevant authority is of the reasonable opinion that the new evidence would, if considered, be likely to lead to a finding of misconduct or gross misconduct.
(5) In sub-paragraph (4)—
(a) evidence is new if it was not adduced in the proceedings in which the person was acquitted (nor, if those were appeal proceedings, in earlier proceedings to which the appeal related);
(b) evidence is compelling if—
(i) it is reliable,
(ii) it is substantial, and
(iii) in the context of the outstanding issues, it appears highly probative of the case against the acquitted person;
(6) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4)(b)(iii), the outstanding issues are the issues in dispute in the proceedings in which the person was acquitted and, if those were appeal proceedings, any other issues remaining in dispute from earlier proceedings to which the appeal related.
(7) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4), it is irrelevant whether any evidence would have been admissible in earlier proceedings against the acquitted person.”
(5) In paragraph 25—
(a) after sub-paragraph (4D) insert—
“(4DA) The Director-General may not direct that the complaint be re-investigated under sub-paragraph (4C)(b) if paragraph 24D applies in relation to that investigation.”;
(b) after sub-paragraph (4E) insert—
“(4EA) The local policing body may not make a recommendation to the appropriate authority that the complaint be re-investigated if paragraph 24D applies in relation to the conduct to which the investigation related.”
(6) The Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 are amended in accordance with subsections
(7) to (10).
(7) In regulation 23 (referral of case to misconduct proceedings)—
(a) in paragraph (3)—
(i) in sub-paragraph (b), for “(whatever the outcome of those proceedings)”, substitute “and the officer concerned has been found guilty”;
(ii) before second “regulation” insert “regulation 23A,”;
(b) in paragraph (9), after “10(3)” insert “and regulation 23A”.
(8) After regulation 23, insert—
“Prohibition on misconduct proceedings where officer has been acquitted
23A.—(1) This regulation applies where—
(a) the appropriate authority has made a determination that misconduct proceedings should be brought against the officer concerned under regulation 23(1)(b), (2)(c) or (3),
(b) the misconduct proceedings have been suspended by virtue of regulation 10(3),
(c) any criminal proceedings have concluded, and
(d) the officer concerned has been acquitted in those criminal proceedings.
(2) This regulation also applies where—
(a) the Director General has given the appropriate authority a direction to bring misconduct proceedings against a person under paragraph 23(5A)(e) of Schedule 3 to the 2002 Act,
(b) the appropriate authority has brought misconduct proceedings against the officer concerned in compliance with the direction mentioned in sub-paragraph (a),
(c) those misconduct proceedings have been suspended by virtue of regulation 10(3),
(d) any criminal proceedings have concluded, and
(e) the officer concerned has been acquitted in those criminal proceedings.
(3) Where this regulation applies—
(a) regulations 23(3) and (9) do not apply,
(b) the Director General must withdraw the direction to the appropriate authority to bring misconduct proceedings against the officer concerned, and
(c) the appropriate authority must direct that the misconduct proceedings be withdrawn.
(4) The Director General must withdraw the direction to bring misconduct proceedings under paragraph (3)(b) as soon as the Director General receives notification that the officer concerned has been acquitted in any criminal proceedings.
(5) The appropriate authority must terminate the misconduct proceedings under paragraph (3)(c) as soon as the Director General receives notification that the officer concerned has been acquitted in any criminal proceedings.
(6) Paragraph (3) does not apply only if—
(a) the appropriate authority or the Director General has come into possession of new and compelling evidence relating to the conduct that was the subject of the investigation, and
(b) the appropriate authority or the Director General is of the reasonable opinion that the new evidence would, if considered, be likely to lead to a finding of misconduct or gross misconduct.
(7) In paragraph (6)—
(a) evidence is new if it was not adduced in the proceedings in which the person was acquitted (nor, if those were appeal proceedings, in earlier proceedings to which the appeal related);
(b) evidence is compelling if—
(i) it is reliable,
(ii) it is substantial, and
(iii) in the context of the outstanding issues, it appears highly probative of the case against the acquitted person;
(8) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (7)(b)(iii), the outstanding issues are the issues in dispute in the proceedings in which the person was acquitted and, if those were appeal proceedings, any other issues remaining in dispute from earlier proceedings to which the appeal related.
(9) For the purposes of paragraph (6), it is irrelevant whether any evidence would have been admissible in earlier proceedings against the acquitted person.”
(9) In regulation 49 (referral of case to accelerated misconduct hearing)—
(a) in paragraph (3)—
(i) in sub-paragraph (b), omit “(whatever the outcome)”,
(ii) after “determination,” insert “subject to regulation 49A”;
(b) in paragraph (4), after “10(3)”, insert “and 49A”.
(10) After regulation 49, insert—
“Prohibition on referral of case to accelerated hearing where officer acquitted
49A.—(1) This regulation applies where—
(a) the appropriate authority has made a determination that is within paragraph (2),
(b) the appropriate authority has referred the case to an accelerated misconduct hearing under regulation 49(4) or (7),
(c) the accelerated misconduct hearing has been suspended by virtue of regulation 10(3),
(d) any criminal proceedings have concluded, and
(e) the officer concerned in those criminal proceedings has been acquitted.
(2) A determination is within this paragraph if—
(a) it is a determination that the special conditions are satisfied under regulation 49(1), or
(b) it is a further determination that the special conditions are satisfied under regulation 49(3).
(3) Where this regulation applies—
(a) regulations 49(3) and (7) do not apply, and
(b) the appropriate authority must withdraw the referral of the case to accelerated misconduct proceedings.
(4) Paragraph (3) does not apply only if—
(a) the appropriate authority has come into possession of new and compelling evidence relating to the conduct that was the subject of the investigation, and
(b) the appropriate authority is of the reasonable opinion that the new evidence would, if considered, be likely to lead to a finding of misconduct or gross misconduct.
(5) In paragraph (4)—
(a) evidence is new if it was not adduced in the proceedings in which the person was acquitted (nor, if those were appeal proceedings, in earlier proceedings to which the appeal related);
(b) evidence is compelling if—
(i) it is reliable,
(ii) it is substantial, and
(iii) in the context of the outstanding issues, it appears highly probative of the case against the acquitted person;
(6) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (5)(b)(iii), the outstanding issues are the issues in dispute in the proceedings in which the person was acquitted and, if those were appeal proceedings, any other issues remaining in dispute from earlier proceedings to which the appeal related.
(7) For the purposes of paragraphs (4) to (6), it is irrelevant whether any evidence would have been admissible in earlier proceedings against the acquitted person.”””
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I beg to move and test the opinion of the House.
Lord Hanson of Flint
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 342 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 342A in lieu.
“(1A) The guidance may in particular include guidance about—
(a) matters to be taken into account by chief officers of police before making an application for a youth diversion order, including alternatives to making an application;
(b) how chief officers of police are to comply with their duties to consult under section 174.”
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion S, and I beg to move.
Motion S1 (as an amendment to Motion S)
Baroness Doocey
Leave out from “House” to end and insert “do insist on its Amendment 342.”
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I move Motion S1, and I would like to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Hanson of Flint
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 357, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 357A.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion T and I beg to move.
Lord Hanson of Flint
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 359, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 359A.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion U—there is a pattern here—and I beg to move.
Motion U1 (as an amendment to Motion U)
Lord Davies of Gower
Leave out from “House” to end and insert “do insist on its Amendment 359.”
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I listened very carefully to what the Minister had to say about the intelligence that the Government have, but I think the evidence has been very clear, on our news channels, about the terror that the IRGC has caused in its own country. The threat to the UK from the IRGC is evident to all but the Government, it seems, so I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Hanson of Flint
That this House do not insist on its Amendments 360, 368, 369, 370, 371 and 372 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 372A in lieu.
“Section (Power to amend Online Safety Act 2023: AI): duty to make progress report
(1) The Secretary of State must, no later than 31 December 2026, lay before Parliament a report about the progress that has been made towards making regulations under section 216A of the Online Safety Act 2023 (power to amend Act in relation to illegal AI-generated content).
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if a draft of a statutory instrument containing regulations under that section is laid before Parliament before 31 December 2026.”
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, we return to the extremely important subject of the regulation of chatbots, and I am grateful to all those who have engaged constructively on this issue throughout the Bill’s passage. We all share a determination to keep people, especially children, safe in what is a fast-changing online world. Noble Lords from across the House, but most notably the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, to whom I pay tribute, have spoken powerfully about the risks arising from AI chatbot services, particularly for children, and about the pace at which these technologies are being deployed.
On many occasions, the noble Baroness has raised her concerns that there are gaps in the Online Safety Act regarding unregulated AI chatbots. The Government agree with this assessment, which is why we tabled on Report Amendment 367, to which the House has agreed, granting the Government the power to address that gap. The Online Safety Act provides a strong and workable foundation for tackling illegal content online; updating it to bring unregulated chatbots in scope is the most effective way of ensuring that these risks are addressed quickly and effectively. Building on the Act, rather than creating an overlapping and duplicative criminal regime, will be the most effective route to enforcing clear rules. Our power will ensure that all relevant services, including those operating from overseas, have to comply with illegal content duties, and will place them in scope of Ofcom’s considerable enforcement toolkit where they fail to act.
I also recognise the strength of feeling expressed in the House about the need for urgency and appropriate scrutiny. Our Amendment 372A now includes a clear duty on the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament, no later than 31 December 2026, a report on the progress made towards making regulations with this power. This report will set out what work the Government have undertaken to develop and deploy the regulations. That is a clear and concrete demonstration of the Government’s intention to close this gap—and we will act quickly to do that.
In recognition of the valuable scrutiny that Parliament would provide of these powers, I also confirm that the Government intend to share draft regulations with the relevant Select Committees in both Houses, opposition spokespeople and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, in advance of them being laid, for any constructive—and, I hope, positive—comments. These powers will create a much clearer and more effective approach than the criminal offences proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. Creating a new criminal regime would create new legal uncertainty and inconsistent enforcement, and, crucially, it would not apply overseas.
The Government’s concern is that the proposed criminal framework risks being disproportionate, legally uncertain and, in practice, less effective than a clear regulatory approach under the Online Safety Act. It would create uncertainty about what compliance looks like and risk capturing those acting in good faith, while failing to focus enforcement on the most culpable for high risk conduct. Most importantly, criminal offences of this kind would, in practice, be far less effective against overseas services, which is precisely where we see some of the greatest risks. One of the strengths of the Online Safety Act framework is its reach and the regulator’s ability to take action in ways that are designed to be effective across borders.
The Government are putting forward a coherent package to address these risks. We have a clear route to close regulatory gaps and to ensure that unregulated AI services can be brought within scope of the Online Safety Act. We have strong enforcement mechanisms through Ofcom. We have a commitment not only to action but to appropriate parliamentary scrutiny in the exercise of these powers. Strengthening our existing approach will be far preferable to the confusion and delay of creating a new parallel regime. I hope that noble Lords will support Amendment 372A. I beg to move Motion V.
Motion V1 (as an amendment to Motion V)
Baroness Kidron
Leave out from “House” to end and insert “do insist on its Amendments 360, 368, 369, 370, 371 and 372.”
Baroness Kidron (CB)
My Lords, the supporters of Motion V1 have decided, in the interest of time, not to speak, but they are very keen to indicate that there is passionate support across the House for what I will say now. Also, I have cut my speech very short, so that we can get to the vote.
I am grateful to the Minister and Minister Narayan from the other place for their time last night, but I am disappointed that they agreed to meet only after they had already laid their amendment. At every point during the passage of the Bill, I have tried to get the Government to address the substance of the issues—the presence, right now, of chatbots that are grooming and coercing children, and that parents with a child in crisis have no one to turn to—but I have been met with process, not action. The Government’s amendment in lieu that offers a report by the end of the year to say what they have or have not done is an indication of process not action.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, we have heard harrowing evidence in this House on AI chatbots, including the tragic case of Sewell Setzer, a high-achieving child who was captured, coerced and encouraged to commit suicide by a companion chatbot. Today, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, gave another example. She has brought forward essential amendments to tackle this head-on by creating strict offences for supplying chatbots that produce harmful material, outlawing coercive design and holding senior tech executives personally liable. I pay tribute to her campaigning skills and absolute determination to hold these tech companies to account.
The Government’s response is entirely inadequate. They have replaced targeted primary legislation with a sweeping, open-ended Henry VIII power for the Secretary of State to amend the Online Safety Act via secondary legislation at a later date and a statutory duty to write a progress report by December 2026. The progress report will protect absolutely no one today.
Crucially, the Government’s approach focuses exclusively on illegal AI-generated content. It completely omits the harmful but technically non-illegal coercive designs that mimic human relationships and foster emotional dependency in children, and it abandons the principle of senior management liability. We need immediate ex ante risk assessments and clear statutory duties, not delayed reports and the convenience of executive powers. I urge the House to reject the Government’s Motion V and insist on the robust protections drafted by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, by supporting Motion V1.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, the Government are clearly very well meaning. They are very strong on discussion but weak on action. It is very sad that they should be so weak, and I strongly support the speeches that have been made so far.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
First of all, I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, who has been an indefatigable campaigner on this issue. I share the objective of trying to ensure that we protect children from chatbots, and I want to be clear that the Government share the House’s objective as a whole. We are aligned on the need to address the harms that arise from AI-generated illegal content. This is a disagreement about the question of what is the most effective and enforceable way in practice. The amendment in lieu reflects the balance the Government wish to bring. Our regulatory approach maintains a coherent approach under the Online Safety Act and reinforces Parliament’s ability to scrutinise delivery. For those reasons, I urge the House to support the amendment in lieu.
I know we are going to have a Division on this, but I hope that whatever the outcome of that Division, we can agree after it that this House is committed to ensuring that we protect children through regulation on chatbots. I hope the noble Baroness will not press her Motion V1, but if she does, I urge my noble friends to vote against it.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
My Lords, there will indeed be a Division. I am grateful to the Minister for suggesting that he will bring to the House, to the committees and to me personally his regulations. But those regulations do not extend to enforcement or to redress, and they do not give parents and children anywhere to go. I am absolutely willing to work with the Government, but I will give them one more opportunity to work with me on this, and the only way I have is to send these amendments the other place so that they can bring forward plans for real change. For that reason, I ask the House to agree with Motion V1.
Lord Hanson of Flint
That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 361A to 361E.
“(3) A relevant data controller must delete from relevant official records, so far as reasonably practicable, any details of which they are aware of a conviction, caution, arrest or investigation detailed in subsection (1).
(3A) In subsection (3)—
(a) “relevant data controller” and “relevant official records” have the same meaning as in section 95 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012;
(b) “delete”, in relation to relevant official records prescribed for the purposes of the definition of “delete” in that section, means record with the details of the conviction, caution, arrest or investigation concerned a statement that the details are to be treated as deleted under this section.
(4) Other”
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Levitt has already spoken to Motion W. I beg to move.
Lord Hanson of Flint
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 439, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 439A.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion X. I beg to move.
Motion X1 (as an amendment to Motion X)
Lord Davies of Gower
Leave out from “House” to end and insert “do insist on its Amendment 439.”
Lord Hanson of Flint
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 505, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 505A.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion Y. I beg to move.
Crime and Policing Bill
Monday 20th April 2026
(3 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Commons Consideration of Lords Message as at 20 April 2026 - (20 Apr 2026)
20:52 - The House divided: - Ayes: 293 / Noes: 159 - Question accordingly agreed to.
21:06 - The House divided: - Ayes: 294 / Noes: 156 - Question accordingly agreed to.
21:20 - The House divided: - Ayes: 294 / Noes: 61 - Question accordingly agreed to.
21:32 - The House divided: - Ayes: 292 / Noes: 158 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Minister for Policing and Crime (Sarah Jones)
I beg to move,
That this House disagrees with the Lords in their Amendments 2D and 2E but proposes in lieu of those amendments Amendment (a) to its Amendment 2B and Amendment (b) to its Amendment 2C.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)
With this it will be convenient to consider the following Government motions:
That this House insists on its disagreement with the Lords in their Amendment 11 but proposes Amendments (a) to (d) to the Bill in lieu of the Lords Amendment.
That this House agrees with the Lords in their Amendments 265D to 265H.
That this House insists on its disagreement with the Lords in their Amendment 342, but does not insist on its Amendment 342A in lieu and proposes Amendments (a) and (b) to the Bill in lieu of the Lords Amendment 342.
That this House insists on its disagreement with the Lords in their Amendments 359 and 439 but proposes Amendments (a) and (b) to the Bill in lieu of the Lords Amendments 359 and 439.
Sarah Jones
I hope we are on the home straight with this enormous piece of legislation. I start by welcoming the fact that the House of Lords has heeded many of the arguments and votes in this House last week—of the 19 issues that I went through in my speech last Tuesday, we are now down to just four. As for those four, we have again listened carefully to the points raised in the Lords and tabled further amendments in lieu.
Let me turn first to amendments 2D and 2E on fining for profit, tabled by Liberal Democrat Front Benchers. I again recognise the concerns expressed about enforcement agencies potentially issuing fixed penalty notices for antisocial behaviour offences where there may be a financial incentive to do so. We have listened to those concerns, and hon. Members will recall that last week we agreed amendments making clear that the statutory guidance issued under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 may, among other things, address the issue of the proportionate issuing of fixed penalty notices by authorised persons for breaches of community protection notices and public space protection orders. The Liberal Democrat Front-Bench spokesperson in the other place said that discretion to issue such guidance was not good enough, and that there should be a duty to do so. The amendment in lieu now provides for just such a duty. I hope this will persuade hon. Members that the Government are committed to addressing this issue.
Turning to the question of fly-tipping, the Government again recognise the strength of feeling on this issue. Our recent waste crime action plan has set out our zero-tolerance approach to prevent waste crime, pursue the criminals responsible and accelerate the clean-up effort. On the specific issue of vehicle seizure powers, I want to be clear that local authorities already have powers to seize vehicles if they have reason to believe the vehicle is being used, or is about to be used, to commit a fly-tipping offence. However, to further support local authorities, we have tabled an amendment in lieu that makes clear what the statutory guidance on fly-tipping should cover. For example, it must include advice on collecting strong evidence against the offender that can help to secure a successful conviction and advice on what action can be taken, including the seizure of vehicles.
Local authorities are the lead agency for tackling fly-tipping, and it is right that they lead on enforcement, so the power to seize and dispose of vehicles used in fly-tipping properly rests with them. The police already have general powers of seizure under section 19 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, where they have reasonable grounds to believe that the item is evidence in relation to an offence. That power can be used to seize vehicles involved in fly-tipping. Where the police seize a vehicle, they would be expected to liaise with the local authority, which would then take action to dispose of that vehicle. As such, Lords amendment 11 seeks to close a gap in the law that, in practice, just does not exist.
I turn next to youth diversion orders. We were disappointed by the Lords’ decision last week to reject the Government’s amendment in lieu, which was tabled in response to Baroness Doocey’s amendment 342. Baroness Doocey raised concerns regarding the lack of a requirement for police to consult organisations beyond criminal justice services, flagging that this missed an opportunity to legislate for consultation with other agencies such as health, education and social services.
We respectfully disagree with Baroness Doocey that her amendment would directly respond to the recommendations made by Sir Adrian Fulford in his recent report on the horrific Southport attack. Multi-agency engagement will be critical to the success of these orders, which is why the Bill already includes a duty on the police to consult youth justice services. In England and Wales, this will be through local youth offending teams, which are multi-agency in nature—they include representatives from health, education, social services and probation, as is underpinned in statute by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. They may also extend beyond those mandated agencies to include child and adolescent mental health services, education inclusion teams, voluntary and community organisations, and local early help services. We are therefore confident that youth diversion order applications will be made following consultation with a wide variety of agencies, and will benefit from the expertise of those agencies in working with young people.
Baroness Doocey also raised concerns regarding the police’s consideration of alternative interventions. The statutory guidance, which will be developed by the Home Office and laid before Parliament for scrutiny ahead of publication, will include guidance on alternative interventions that police may wish to consider instead of, or alongside, a youth diversion order.
Mr Joshua Reynolds (Maidenhead) (LD)
The Minister is using words such as “may”. What she has outlined is incredibly important, but Lords amendment 342 obviously goes further than “may”—it insists that diversion orders will involve those necessary consultations. Will the Minister commit today to making sure that the police will have all these statutory duties, not just that they may have them, and that the consultation will be required?
Sarah Jones
The hon. Gentleman has anticipated what I was going to say. I will explain what we want to see as we go forward. It is important to recognise that the court will need to consider the necessity and proportionality of the order when making its decision, and that will necessarily include consideration of alternative options where relevant. All that being said, in the light of the most recent decision by the Lords, we have tabled a further amendment in lieu that builds on the previous Government amendment. It offers further reassurance on the role of wider organisations, and we hope it addresses their lordships’ concerns.
The amendment in lieu extends the list of considerations that the statutory guidance may advise the police to consider as part of a youth diversion order application to include the circumstances in which it may be appropriate for the police to consult others, beyond the youth justice teams mandated in clause 174 of the Bill. That will extend to applications for an order, as well as when the police are considering a variation or discharge of a youth diversion order. It will go further and make it a requirement for the statutory guidance to include guidance on these matters, rather than there simply being a power to do so, as the previous amendment provided for. I trust that with these changes, the Liberal Democrats will now be content that we have met the intent of their amendment.
Lastly, Lords amendment 359 relates to the proscription of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. It is disappointing, to say the least, that the Opposition seek to return to this issue yet again. Successive Governments have adopted the position that it would be wrong in principle to give a running commentary on which organisations are being considered for proscription under section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000. The decision to proscribe an organisation is a serious matter, requiring careful analysis of whether the test in section 3 has been met. To suggest, as the amendment provides, that the Government should review every organisation related to the Iranian Government within one month of Royal Assent is simply not a serious proposition. To help the Opposition and others to understand the proscription process, we have instead brought forward an amendment in lieu that requires the Government to lay before Parliament within six months of Royal Assent a statement about the general policies and procedures of the Secretary of State in relation to their powers under section 3 of the 2000 Act.
Before I conclude, let me briefly explain Lords amendments 265D to 265H. Members will recall that last week we agreed amendments to criminalise the possession or publication of pornography that depicts sexual activity involving an adult credibly role-playing as a child. This new offence is intended to capture content that mimics child sex abuse and risks normalising such horrific conduct. The Government amendments agreed in the Lords clarify the drafting of the new offence. The revised drafting makes the offence clearer, ensuring that context can be taken into account, where it is relevant to whether the person is being depicted as a child under 16 and whether the content is showing sexual activity. That will ensure that the offence can, for example, capture a scenario of one person on camera being directed by another behind the camera to engage in sexual acts.
I fully respect the role of the House of Lords as a revising Chamber. It is entitled to ask this House to think again. On each of these four issues I am addressing today, we have already done that once.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
I thank the Minister, as always, for her hard work. In the other place, Lord Weir of Ballyholme highlighted freedom of speech in relation to the Public Order Act 1986. Within the Bill coming forward tonight, there is a fine line in terms of the expression of belief, such as through street preaching. Does the Minister believe that the legislation will ensure that people in this Christian nation can publicly speak the word of God in every corner? Some of us believe that it cannot. Can the Minister confirm that, please?
Sarah Jones
As the hon. Gentleman said, there is a fine line to tread throughout public order legislation. We come back to these issues time and again, and it is right that we do so. As times change, the nature of protests changes and the nature of the risks changes. We have new debates about public order. This Home Secretary felt strongly that it was time for a more fundamental look at our public order legislation. That is what we are going through with the review of our public order legislation and our hate crime legislation that Lord Macdonald is undertaking. He will look at whether it is in the right place and doing the right things. I have every confidence in the legislation we are passing today, but the hon. Gentleman knows that there is a review to follow. It perhaps will have more to say, and we will bring it back to this place.
Last Tuesday, this House voted on all four issues that we are debating today and emphatically rejected the Lords amendments. We should again send these amendments back to their lordships with a clear message that they have done their duty but the elected House is clear and unequivocal in its own mind, and the time has come to let this Bill pass. The time for debate has ended. It is now time that this Bill goes to His Majesty for Royal Assent, so that we can get on with implementing the provisions and making our streets, communities and country safer.
Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)
Once again, I thank the other place and right hon. and hon. Members across the House for their work on this Bill. The Government had an opportunity with this Bill to create a safer society and to protect people from harm. As I outlined previously, I would like to have seen them tackle off-road bikes and dodgy shops and take a tougher approach to those who carry knives. The first duty of any Government is to protect the public and to crush the crimes that make people’s lives a misery.
I will begin by speaking to Lords amendment 11. Fly-tipping is a scourge on our communities, ruining our environment and our countryside. Today we are asked to consider whether the law as it stands is sufficient to tackle this scourge, or whether we are prepared to admit, as communities across the country already know, that it is not. More than a million fly-tipping incidents are recorded each year, yet only a tiny fraction result in any meaningful enforcement.
Vehicle seizure, which is one of the most effective tools in our armoury, is vanishingly rare, so when Ministers tell us that powers already exist, the obvious question is this: if they exist, why are they not being used? The answer is simple. It is because a power that is fragmented, unclear and buried across multiple statutes is not a power that works in practice. It is a power that sits there, too complicated to implement, while fly-tipping continues to blight our communities. Lords amendment 11 would address that failure directly.
Let us not forget that for most offenders it is their vehicle that enables the crime. That is the means and method by which they are able to act and profit. Remove the vehicle and we disrupt their criminality immediately. Fail to do so and we send a different message: that this is a low-risk, high-reward activity where the chances of serious consequences are low. That is the message that the system is sending, and our communities are paying the price. Ultimately, this is about whether we are content with a system that works in theory, or whether we are prepared to put in place one that works in practice. For that reason, we on the Opposition Benches support the amendment, and I urge right hon. and hon. Members to do the same.
Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (North Cotswolds) (Con)
Lords amendment 11 relates to the police powers to crush vehicles, which are rarely used for fly-tipping. I remind my hon. Friend and the House that similar powers exist for hare coursing. Once one or two high-profile hare coursing cases had been handled that way, it had a dramatic effect on reducing that crime.
Matt Vickers
My hon. Friend is entirely right. Rural communities across the country know only too well the consequences of hare coursing, and making an example of it and that being seen in our community sends a real message to those who would offend in such a way.
Lords amendment 359 relates to proscription of the IRGC. There is simply no suitable argument as to why the Government should refuse to proscribe the IRGC and associated organisations. I am sure that the Home Secretary and Ministers will once again, as justification for inaction, point to the fact that the previous Government did not proscribe the IRGC. The reality is that the international situation is now radically different from when we left office almost two years ago. Even before the current conflict began, it was clear that the IRGC was ramping up aggressive activity. It oversaw the deaths of more than 40,000 protesters, and overseas it has continued to extend its influence through the backing of terrorist cells. In 2025 alone, the security services tracked more than 20 potentially lethal Iran-backed plots. The IRGC is a dangerous and lethal organisation.
Jim Shannon
Just yesterday, two young men in their 20s and 30s who had stood up for freedom in Iran were hanged by the IRGC, because it is in charge there at the moment. Four weeks ago, six people whose only crime was fighting for freedom by protesting on the streets were hanged by the neck until they were dead. Is it not now time, regardless of what is happening in the world, immediately to proscribe the IRGC, given everything it has done that is despicable, wicked and evil?
Matt Vickers
I could not agree more. When such evil and such vileness is on display, we need to act, and we need to act in our national interest to protect our people from some of the horrors that we have seen perpetrated abroad by these sick individuals.
Gavin Robinson (Belfast East) (DUP)
I will support the hon. Gentleman’s request for us to back the amendment and not disagree with it, as the Government have asked, although I could easily be convinced that Governments should be making these decisions themselves, rather than Parliament making decisions on proscription or otherwise. Does he think that in the past two years, since the election in July 2024, there has been any indication that this Government will take action on the IRGC?
Matt Vickers
We have seen significant developments on that front. Only this afternoon we were debating the issue of antisemitism and where that has got to, and the real-world consequences for people in this country of the actions of the IRGC and associated groups—in other words, state-backed terrorism. The Government need to act. They need to wake up. In fact, they could just vote for the Lords amendment this evening.
In 2025 alone, the security services tracked more than 20 potentially lethal Iran-backed plots. The IRGC is a dangerous and lethal organisation. We must act against groups that pose a threat to our national security. Ministers have said that the proscription of the IRGC will be kept under constant review, but given the situation that we face now, that is simply not good enough. Many other countries have acted to proscribe, including the USA, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and even the European Union.
Let us remind ourselves of our Government’s record. When it was in opposition, the Labour party said that it would proscribe the IRGC. The now Foreign Secretary said that it was behaving like a terrorist organisation and must be proscribed—“must” not “might”; not “We will keep it under review”; not “should.” What has changed is that those who once demanded action now sit on the Government Benches and have chosen inaction. Now we are told that it is too complicated. Now we are told that it is legally difficult. Now we are told that it would be symbolic. We are told that there are challenges because the IRGC is part of a state, but the whole point of proscription is to confront organisations that operate through intimidation, violence and terror, regardless of the flag behind which they hide. We are told that sanctions are enough, but sanctions have existed for years and the IRGC continues its activities: intimidation, plots, proxies and repression.
Let us be clear: Lords amendment 359 does not ask the Government to take a leap into the unknown; it asks them to do precisely what they themselves argued for, repeatedly and on the record. If it was the right policy then, why is it not the right policy now? If the IRGC met the threshold then, why does it not meet it now—or was that position merely convenient Opposition politics? Today the Government have a choice: they can stand by their previous convictions, or confirm that those convictions were never truly held at all. I urge Members to support the Lords amendment.
The Bill is a missed opportunity to take back our streets. Perhaps that is no surprise from a party that has already removed 1,318 police officers from our streets and begun releasing criminals from prison early, but we can still improve the Bill by supporting these sensible, pragmatic amendments to crack down on fly-tipping and strengthen our national security. Given that these Ministers are so used to U-turning, I hope that they will do it again today.
Chris Vince (Harlow) (Lab/Co-op)
I thank the Minister and the shadow Minister for opening the debate.
I oppose Lords amendment 11, but I do recognise its merits. Let me begin, however, by talking about the wider issue of fly-tipping, which is an absolute bugbear of mine. When I go canvassing, or indeed when I visit Harlow Town football club, I am often recognised not for being the local MP, but for being the guy who goes out litter-picking with my mate Neil. Neil is the bloke who lives around the corner from me, and apparently he is considerably more popular than me, because everyone knows who he is.
I absolutely recognise the impact of fly-tipping, particularly what I would describe as industrial fly-tipping. Vans full of rubbish are being dumped on an industrial scale. In Harlow, this often involves bin cupboards. When I was a councillor in the fantastic part of Harlow that is called Little Parndon—I hope it will re-elect a Labour councillor in two weeks’ time—fly-tipping was a huge issue, and local residents would contact me about getting their bin cupboards locked up, often at great expense to the council. However, in more rural parts of my constituency such as Nazeing, Hatfield Heath and Hatfield Broad Oak, which I visited this weekend, the problem of fly-tipping is even worse, with farmers genuinely facing intimidation and threats. One farmer told me of a worrying incident when he confronted some of the fly-tippers, only to be told by one of them, “Get out of my way. I know where your family lives.” I think we would all agree that no one deserves that sort of intimidation.
I recognise what Lords amendment 11 seeks to do, but I want to emphasise the Minister’s point that the police and local authorities already have the power to search and seize vehicles under section 33 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990. The shadow Minister made some interesting points about the reasons why that does not happen very often. Personally, I think it is partly down to the previous lack of a rural crime strategy, and I am delighted that this Labour Government are ensuring that we have such a strategy, because it is hugely important that we tackle the issue of fly-tipping. The hon. Member for North Cotswolds (Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown) mentioned the importance of tackling hare coursing as well, because that too is a huge issue for farmers. We must bear in mind that this is where they live and where their families live. We take that sort of intimidation very seriously.
Adam Jogee (Newcastle-under-Lyme) (Lab)
We all enjoyed listening to my hon. Friend talk about Neil, and he is right to talk about the impact of fly-tipping in rural communities—not just in Essex, but in Staffordshire too. He said that one of the reasons why the powers have not been used was the lack of a rural crime strategy, but is it not also the case that many police and crime commissioners have simply been missing in action, as has happened in Staffordshire?
Chris Vince
I do not know much about Staffordshire’s police and crime commissioner, but I absolutely take on board what my hon. Friend says. If that is the case, it is hugely disappointing. It is hugely important that police and crime commissioners across the country take seriously all parts of the areas they represent, including rural areas.
Chris Vince
To return my hon. Friend’s compliment, I often like hearing what he has to say. I would say that more is more.
Adam Jogee
The problem is that I am not sure that my police and crime commissioner would like to hear what I have to say.
Chris Vince
I would say that he is not here, so my hon. Friend can carry on. I thank him for his contribution.
Having a rural crime strategy and having community police officers in place are both hugely important. I have often joked with the shadow Minister about this, so he will know that I have previously taught a number of my community police officers, which is something I am very proud of. It is hugely important that we have frontline neighbourhood police officers, and not just in urban communities. Obviously, they are really important in Harlow, but also in rural communities.
It is also important that we ensure that the police have teeth, so I absolutely welcome the Government’s move to put up to nine points on the driving licences of people who are caught fly-tipping. I really believe that this will make those who are thinking about doing that—perhaps as a favour to their mates—think twice about fly-tipping, which has a huge impact on communities. I recognise that there has been a bit of back-and-forth with the Lords on the issue of fly-tipping, and our noble Friends and Members of the other place came back and said, “We hope this matter has been discussed further,” in this place. I hope that my speech and the contribution from the shadow Minister have ensured that we have continued to discuss the issue of fly-tipping, because I take it very seriously. I hope that you do not see this particular speech as being a rubbish contribution, Madam Deputy Speaker.
Max Wilkinson (Cheltenham) (LD)
Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I will try not to talk too much rubbish, although those on the Treasury Benches will object, as usual. As I stated last week, the Liberal Democrats support many aspects of this Bill, but we have some concerns about the lack of a proper rural crime strategy, and about some of the motions relating to protest and freedom of speech that were voted on, and indeed not voted on, last week.
I turn to today’s amendments. The Liberal Democrats in the other place tabled two amendments, which the Minister referred to earlier, that would strengthen this Bill’s provisions on crime and antisocial behaviour—issues that have plagued communities for too long. The Liberal Democrat-backed amendments will help refocus enforcement action towards those offences, and improve outcomes for young people who are already caught up in the criminal justice system. First, we will again support our amendment to prevent enforcement companies issuing fixed penalty notices on behalf of councils from making a profit. A clear ban would remove an incentive that drives lower-level offences to be punished instead of more serious antisocial behaviour. The Government amendments tabled in lieu are significantly weaker than the ban we have suggested, so we will continue to support the amendment today. I urge Members from across the House to support an outright ban on fines for profit.
Secondly, we will again support our amendment on youth diversion orders. This will ensure that when considering a youth diversion order, courts are given a full account of any alternative interventions that have been tried or considered, and of what consultation took place with the child and other relevant agencies. The Government amendment in lieu suggests that guidance “may” include matters to be taken into account by the police before applying for a youth diversion order. Again, that does not go far enough. Ensuring that all previous interventions are considered will improve the court’s understanding of the relevant factors in each case and bring efficiencies in the longer term. Most importantly, the amendment will result in better outcomes for the young people involved, who might otherwise become entangled in terrorist activity. On matters relating to protests, the Government took a firm line on the difference between the terms “may” and “must” last week, and perhaps they will do the same again today.
The Liberal Democrats will also support two Conservative amendments, the first of which adds fly-tipping to the list of offences for which vehicles may be seized. Fly-tipping is a blight on our communities. It undermines the pride that people should feel in their neighbourhoods, and in some cases causes significant damage to the local environment. This was highlighted in Oxfordshire by my hon. Friend the Member for Bicester and Woodstock (Calum Miller), and in some cases it is linked to criminal gangs. If we are to take fly-tipping seriously, we must increase the penalty for the offence, so empowering the police to confiscate vehicles that are used to dump rubbish illegally is a sensible improvement to this Bill. Sadly, no Government concession was proposed on this specific amendment. We supported the amendment in the Commons last time, and we will do so today.
Finally, the Liberal Democrats will also support the Conservative amendment requiring a review of whether to prescribe Iranian Government-backed organisations. We have a long-standing record of calling for past Governments to proscribe the IRGC. There is increasing concern that attacks on our Jewish community are being funded by the IRGC, and it is beyond time that the Government took action to protect British citizens against the threat it represents. This amendment would require the Government to review any organisations related to the Iranian Government. In the interests of our national security, our economy and our Jewish community, we will back the amendment today.
Amanda Martin (Portsmouth North) (Lab)
I am very proud of my city and proud to be a resident, but my constituents tell me at my coffee mornings, at “Pint with your MP” events, at surgeries and on the doorsteps that they find it very difficult to feel pride when antisocial behaviour, fly-tipping, abandoned vehicles and electric scooters blight their everyday lives, the places where they live, the parks in which their kids play, and the high streets that they use. We should all feel and be able to feel pride in the place we live, so I am proud that this Labour Government are taking that very seriously not just with initiatives such as the Pride in Place funding, of which I was very fortunate for Paulsgrove to receive £20 million, and the impact funding, of which we have £1.5 million coming to my city, but with legislation and with action.
I therefore welcome the opportunity to speak in the final stages of this Bill, because it has genuinely significant consequences for communities such as mine in Portsmouth, but I want to start by thanking my neighbourhood police teams for the work they do and for allowing me to be involved when I go out on the beat with them on night shifts and day shifts. I would like to highlight some of the amendments to the Bill that will have the greatest impact on my constituents.
On fixed penalty notices and the fining for profit question—Lords amendments 2D and 2E—I understand why the other place has continued to press on this, and the underlying concern is legitimate. However, if residents in Portsmouth believe that authorised bodies are issuing fixed penalty notices to generate revenue rather than from a desire to deter antisocial behaviour, public trust and enforcement will collapse entirely. So I am glad that the Government have tabled amendments (a) and (b) in lieu, and I would like the Minister to confirm that they will directly address the issue of proportionality and ensure that no institutional financial incentive can distort enforcement decisions.
On fly-tipping, which other Members have talked about—Lords amendment 11—I simply note that this blights communities across Portsmouth. Only on Friday night, while I was out knocking on doors in Stamshaw, I saw evidence of this across the whole ward. So the Government’s offer of four amendments in lieu represents a substantive package in response to the Lords’ concerns. As we have heard, local authorities do have the powers they need, but I think there is a need for clarity and confidence to ensure the use of vehicle seizure powers. That will do two things: it will stop this crime in Portsmouth; and it will put beyond doubt whose responsibility it is, giving the local authority no excuse but to enforce the powers it has. To remove any doubt about this responsibility, I hope that the Minister will confirm that the statutory guidance accompanying these provisions will be issued promptly after Royal Assent, so councils can act without delay.
I am glad the Government are agreeing to the amendments about pornographic content depicting adults role-playing as under-16s. I said on Second Reading that this Bill needed to go further on child protection, and these amendments do exactly that. Content that mimics child sexual abuse, even when the individuals depicted are adults, normalises a deeply harmful behaviour, and it is abhorrent.
This Bill has been long in the making, as has been felt by residents across my city, and the remaining points of disagreement are very narrow. I hope that the other place will now accept the Government’s position, so that this landmark legislation can receive Royal Assent swiftly, and start delivering for my constituents and for communities right across the country. Further delays are felt every day and, indeed, every night on our streets and our coastlines, and in our parks and our housing estates. As someone elected to make my community a safer and cleaner place to live, I know this is what democracy is about and what democracy should do.
Adam Jogee
Thank you very much, Madam Deputy Speaker, and I can tell by your smile that you were not expecting to call me, but I am very grateful that you spied me in this corner at the back of the Chamber.
You will know because I have said it before, Madam Deputy Speaker, that waste crime, fly-tipping and the rest have, sadly, had too much of an impact in Newcastle-under-Lyme. I am thinking of Walleys quarry landfill site and the other examples that continue to blight my community, which I have talked about since my election to this place. As my hon. Friend the Member for Harlow (Chris Vince) noted, the impact fly-tipping can have on rural communities and our constituents’ lives speaks for itself not just in our surgeries, but in our inboxes. I am thinking of all the people in Betley, Bradwell and Audley who have shared with me the corrosive impact that fly-tipping, industrial crime and waste crime have on communities such as mine.
Conscious of the fact that you did not plan to call me, Madam Deputy Speaker—and judging by the looks of Members, they are keen to get to the votes—
Adam Jogee
It was very well said, but it is also important that my constituents are heard in the fight against fly-tipping and keeping our communities safe, clean and green.
When the Minister winds up, I hope she will provide confirmation to Members of the House and to my constituents in Newcastle-under-Lyme that strengthening the statutory guidance on enforcement, including the use of vehicle seizure powers, will help councils. This is important because the people of Newcastle-under-Lyme will be voting in the Newcastle district borough council elections on Thursday 7 May, and I really hope that people in my community vote for the excellent Labour candidates on the ballot paper that day. It is also important because we need our councils to take tougher, more visible action against the fly-tippers who blight our communities. I hope the Minister will provide that confirmation when she winds up, because it is important not just to me, but to the good people of Newcastle-under-Lyme.
Sarah Jones
In the interests of transparency, Madam Deputy Speaker, my glasses are reading glasses, but they also happen to be sunglasses. I will try not to put them on, but my eyes are beginning to go. I do not want to pretend to the House that I am trying to be cool if I put on my glasses; it is just so that I can read the words in front of me.
I want to start by thanking all hon. Members who have spoken in this short but very interesting debate on a wide variety of issues. In particular, I thank my hon. Friends the Members for Harlow (Chris Vince), for Portsmouth North (Amanda Martin) and for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Adam Jogee).
Chris Vince
I thank the Minister for giving way. I realise she has only just started her speech, but what I did not do in my speech was pay massive tribute to the Harlow Wombles. They are not little creatures from Wimbledon, but representatives of the Harlow community who go out week in, week out to collect rubbish in their local community. I want to thank them for what they do to ensure that our local community stays clean and tidy.
Sarah Jones
I thank my hon. Friend for that excellent intervention. We all thank the Harlow Wombles for the work they do. I do not think we have Croydon Wombles, but we probably need to get some. We do, however, have many very good people who go out and collect rubbish, like my hon. Friend in Harlow.
All three Back-Bench speeches showed the strength of commitment from our 2024 intake in this place. They are debating the issues that matter to local people and which are important. The Government are already taking action on all fronts, and the Bill will help us to tackle the scourges of everyday crime that my hon. Friends touched on.
Turning to the four issues before us today, I am disappointed, coming first to fixed penalty notices, that the Liberal Democrat Front Bench is not persuaded. Lords amendments 2D and 2E amended the Government’s amendment that allows the Secretary of State to issue guidance addressing the issue of fixed penalty notices by enforcement companies and contractors for profit. The amendments specify that the guidance must, rather than may, address that point. The Government have had many conversations on that, both with our colleagues in the Lords and in this place, and I hope those on the Liberal Democrat Front Bench recognise that engagement.
We believe that a provision for private companies to collect and support the Government and local government in their public spaces protection orders and other such measures is fundamentally important to ensure that people abide by the rules of the land. The Government brought forward an amendment in lieu to provide that the statutory guidance issued under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 must, as opposed to may, address the issue of fixed penalty notices by authorised persons, so I had hoped that the Liberal Democrats would recognise that that is going some distance and I am disappointed that they have not on this occasion.
We have had many debates on fly-tipping in this place, and we inherited from the Conservatives a shocking situation where it was not seen to be the serious crime that it is. As a consequence, many of our communities are blighted by it, and my hon. Friends have talked about it in this debate. I am disappointed that the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton West (Matt Vickers) continues to argue for Lords amendment 11. I hope he accepts that the police are not the lead agency for enforcing all criminal offences. They work in partnership with the National Crime Agency, the Serious Fraud Office, the Environment Agency, the Gambling Commission and many others, including local councils in their guise as waste authorities.
The police do have the powers to remove a vehicle. In fact, when I was out with the police in Kent only last week, we seized a vehicle because a crime was being committed. Four young men were in a car that was not properly insured, so the men had to get out of the car and we took it away. We were very glad to do so, although the men were not very pleased. It is within the police’s power to stop a car if a criminal offence is occurring and to take that car away.
Matt Vickers
Of the million fly-tipping offences that take place in the country every year, how many does the Minister think end in the seizure of a vehicle?
Sarah Jones
When it comes to fly-tipping, if a crime is being committed, the police can take away the car; the issue we are talking about is the subsequent removal and disposal of that car—taking it away permanently—which the local authority can already do. I encourage all local authorities to make use of this power. This debate arises because in the years in which the Opposition were in government, they did not put enough resources into local government, as I think everyone would agree, to allow it to enforce the laws already in place. There are already powers for local authorities, and we are building on those powers in this legislation.
Sarah Jones
I will give way in one moment.
If someone is caught using a vehicle to fly-tip, we can, as a result of this legislation, add up to nine points to their licence, which is surely a really powerful disincentive against fly-tipping. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman would like to explain why he did not bring this in, when he was in government.
Matt Vickers
I will explain more than that. I was delighted to put forward an amendment in Committee proposing just that, and the Ministers sat on either side of the Minister—the Under-Secretaries of State for the Home Department, the hon. Members for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips) and for Dover and Deal (Mike Tapp) —voted against penalty points for that offence. I do not think the Minister heard me when I asked this question before: how many of the million fly-tipping offences that take place in this country does she think result in the seizure of a vehicle? In a year’s time, when we come back and have this discussion again, how many does she think will have been seized?
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Jess Phillips)
More than under his Government.
Sarah Jones
I suspect, as my hon. Friend says, that there will be a lot more than were seized under the previous Government. This Government encourage our police and local authorities to investigate any crime, and to ensure proper punishment. That is why we are introducing this very substantial piece of legislation, which also increases the punishment for a whole raft of criminal activities.
Many people are profiting from fly-tipping and making it their business; perhaps they are doing a house clearance, and want to avoid paying fees to get rid of the furniture, so they just dump it on our streets. It is right that we encourage our local authorities to ensure that those people are punished, and that, where necessary, we crush their vans, rather than just taking them away, so that they can never be used by those people again. That is what we are keen to do. That is why my right hon. Friends in the Cabinet have prioritised tackling fly-tipping in all its forms, from very small to very large cases. We have organised criminal gangs fly-tipping across the country, leading to vast fly-tips; this Government will fund their removal, through the legislation we are bringing in.
I move on to youth diversion orders. Again, I am disappointed that the Liberal Democrats do not feel that they can support our further amendments in lieu. We have further strengthened the provisions in the Bill in respect of statutory guidance, which must now expressly address the circumstances in which it may be appropriate for chief officers to consult persons other than youth offending teams before making an application for a youth diversion order or the variation or discharge of such an order. This squarely addresses the concerns raised in the other place. We do not feel that we need to go as far as the other place suggests. I am disappointed that the Liberal Democrats have not listened to us today, and that they feel it necessary to continue to push the issue.
Returning to the fourth issue that we are debating today—the proscription of the IRGC—it is a long-standing principle, adopted by successive Administrations, that the Government do not comment on which organisations are being considered for proscription. It would violate that principle if we mandated the Government to review whether to proscribe Iranian Government-related organisations. The shadow Minister knows that that is the case. The Government cannot support Lords amendments 359 and 439.
Matt Vickers
Was the Foreign Secretary wrong when she said that the IRGC must be proscribed?
Sarah Jones
As we have said, we know the horrors that the Iranian Government and the IRGC have inflicted on their people, and the work that they have done. Of course, we must do all we can. As we have said in this place, we already sanction hundreds of Iranians, who cannot come to this country as a result, and who have had their assets seized. However, the shadow Minister knows that legislation must be passed to enable us to do this piece of work. As a responsible Government, committed to protecting the safety and security of this country, we will not deviate from that position.
Sarah Jones
We are now.
The time has come for the will of the elected House to prevail. We have listened and responded positively to the great majority of amendments put forward by the House of Lords. We should send these amendments back in the hope, and indeed the expectation, that it will be for the last time. We have been debating the Bill for long enough—14 months—so it is time to stop talking. It is time to deliver the changes wrought by the Bill to protect all our communities.
Question put.
Crime and Policing Bill
Wednesday 22nd April 2026
(2 weeks, 5 days ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Commons Consideration of Lords Message as at 22 April 2026 - (22 Apr 2026)
16:37 - Division on Motion A1 (as an amendment to Motion A) - Ayes: 282 / Noes: 184 - Motion A1 agreed.
16:51 - Division on Motion D1 (as an amendment to Motion D) - Ayes: 281 / Noes: 190 - Motion D1 agreed.
Lord Hanson of Flint
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 2D to Commons Amendment 2B and its Amendment 2E to Commons Amendment 2C, and do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 2F to Commons Amendment 2B and Amendment 2G to Commons Amendment 2C in lieu.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
My Lords, in moving Motion A, I will speak to Motions B, C and D.
Before I begin my main remarks, today marks Stephen Lawrence Day, 33 years to the day since the loss of Stephen. My noble friend Lady Lawrence of Clarendon is in the Chamber today, and I pay tribute to her for her campaigning activity over those 33 years. I was pleased to join my noble friend earlier today for an event at the King’s Trust in Southwark to continue the campaigning work of the Stephen Lawrence Day Foundation. Today is a good opportunity for us to remember Stephen and to recommit to continue to make a stand against racism in all its forms. I wanted to place that on record on behalf of the whole House before we commenced the Crime and Policing Bill, which in itself deals with a number of issues that are important in combating racism and tackling knife crime.
As I said last week, I am grateful for the engagement that I have had with the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, on these matters. There are a number of amendments to deal with and I am pleased that they are all to be considered now in one group.
As I also said last week, I understand the concern, particularly in relation to Motion A, about enforcement agencies potentially issuing fixed penalty notices for anti-social behaviour offences where there may be a financial incentive to do so. However, I remain of the view that it is not appropriate to put in place a blanket ban on the issuing of fixed penalty notices by enforcement companies and contractors. Introducing such a ban would be disproportionate and would significantly weaken enforcement capability. Contracting enforcement to third parties is a common arrangement, and it is for the local authority to ensure that the use of powers remains just and proportionate. It is for this reason that the Government last week tabled Amendments 2A to 2C in lieu, which would rightly ensure that statutory guidance addresses the very points that noble Lords are concerned about.
I recognise that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has moved on this and tabled amendments in lieu to ensure that such guidance must, not may, address the need to ensure proportionality in the use of fixed penalty notices. I therefore hope that he is content with the further government amendments in lieu, Amendments 2F and 2G, which also seek to ensure that any guidance issued must address the issuing of fixed penalty notices by authorised persons.
In addition, in discussions with the noble Lord I have mentioned the Defra statutory guidance on litter enforcement powers. That guidance includes various entries relating to the need to exercise enforcement powers proportionately. It also addresses the use of contractors. I can give an undertaking to the noble Lord that we will adopt similar language in the guidance to be issued in respect of anti-social behaviour enforcement powers under the Bill. We commit to include a passage in the guidance which says:
“Where external contractors are used, private firms should not be able to receive greater revenue or profits just from increasing the volume of penalties”.
I will ensure that the statutory guidance reminds local authorities that contracted agencies are not expected to issue fines purely for profit, and, if they are found to do so, that local authorities may take appropriate remedial action, such as revocation, in line with the terms of their contract. I hope that provides the noble Lord with the reassurance he needs not to press Motion A1.
On Motion B, as I have said throughout the passage of this Bill, the Government fully agree with noble Lords on the need to do more to tackle fly-tipping. Our recently announced waste crime action plan, which I referred to in our last round of ping-pong and which was published over the Easter Recess, does just that.
On Amendment 11, I stress that local authorities already have powers to seize vehicles if they have reason to believe that the vehicle is being used, or is about to be used, to commit a fly-tipping offence. This is in addition to the police’s general power under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and its associated codes, to seize items as evidence if they believe they are being used in the commission of a criminal offence.
The Government want local authorities to use their powers fully to tackle fly-tipping. To that end, I have tabled Amendments 11C to 11F in lieu, which make it clear that the statutory guidance to be issued to waste authorities in England under Clause 9 must, not may, include advice to local authorities on exercising their powers, including the seizure of vehicles. I am grateful for the gentle discussion that we have had with the noble Lord on these matters and for the pressure that he has put. I hope that reassures the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, on that matter.
On Motion C, we return to the issue of “must” versus “may”. Last week, the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, reiterated her concerns that the police are required to consult with youth offending teams only when applying for a youth diversion order. As I mentioned last week, multi-agency engagement will be crucial to the success of these orders. I want to be clear to the House that youth offending teams are already multi-agency by statute, and include representatives from health, education, social services and probation, as mandated by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. Youth offending teams may also engage with child and adolescent mental health services, education inclusion teams, voluntary and community organisations, and local early help services.
I recognise that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, has raised concerns about the involvement of parents. I would like to reassure her that engagement with parents or carers is a routine and integral part of the work of youth offending teams, beginning at assessment stage and continuing through any intervention. This engagement is led by practitioners who are trained to work with families, understand family dynamics and assess what engagement is appropriate, safe and in the child’s best interests. The nature and extent of parental involvement is therefore nuanced and individualised. I hope that the noble Baroness will recognise that it would not be right to prescribe a one-size-fits-all process for what could and very often will be complex and varied cases.
Lord Clement-Jones
At end insert, “and do propose Amendment 2H as an amendment to Amendment 2F, and Amendment 2J as an amendment to Amendment 2G—
(A2) Any person found to be in breach of the guidance under subsection (A1)(b) may have their designation revoked by the relevant local authority.”
(A2) Any person found to be in breach of the guidance under subsection (A1) may have their designation revoked by the relevant local authority.””
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, before I speak to the Motion, I thank the Minister for reminding us of the anniversary of the tragic death of Stephen Lawrence. I join him in his tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, and join these Benches with his commitment to combating racism in all its forms.
While I welcome the fact that the Government have acknowledged the widespread concern over how these powers are enforced, I must express my profound disappointment that they have chosen again to strip out a robust amendment passed by this House only last Thursday that would have implemented a strict statutory ban on fining for profit. The Government’s replacement amendment under Motion A is simply too weak, offering only that the Secretary of State must issue guidance.
In recent days, the Minister—I thank him for his engagement—has sought to reassure me that this will be sufficient because the Home Office intends to draw directly on the recently published Defra statutory guidance on litter enforcement to update the anti-social behaviour guidance. Incorporating the language of the Defra guidance will not solve this problem. That Defra guidance states that
“private firms should not be able to receive greater revenue or profits just from increasing the volume of penalties”.
As Josie Appleton, the director of the Campaign for Freedom in Everyday Life—which has done so much to highlight the problems with the way in which fines are collected for PSPOs and CPNs—has rightly pointed out to me, relying on this guidance framework is fundamentally flawed. She has highlighted three crucial points that explain why primary legislation is vastly preferable. First, if the Government genuinely intend to do as they say and stop this cowboy practice, they should have absolutely nothing to fear from passing my amendment in primary legislation. Secondly, she rightly asks whether the Government are actually going to ban payment per fine and the use of tacit or explicit targets or whether they will simply fudge the issue with fine words about proportionality. The Defra guidance relies on the permissive word “should”, rather than a legally binding “must”, leaving the door wide open for these lucrative contracts to continue. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, what is the enforcement mechanism for this guidance? As Ms Appleton asks, would somebody be able to appeal an FPN—a fixed penalty notice—on the basis that it was issued under payment-per-fine arrangements? The answer is no. To mean something, the law needs to have teeth. Guidance is not strictly legally binding; local authorities and private agencies simply have a duty to have regard to it.
We cannot regulate a multi-million pound industry built on aggressive, incentivised ticketing by politely suggesting what it should do in non-binding guidance. The scale of this issue is immense. The surge in penalties is overwhelmingly driven by the 31 councils that employ private companies, which issued a staggering 75.7% of all PSPO penalties last year. With the Government pushing ahead to increase the maximum fine for these breaches by 400% from £100 to £500, this industry is about to be supercharged. We cannot allow a system that financially incentivises the punishment of our citizens to masquerade as justice. That is why I hope the House will fully support Motion A1 today.
Motion A1 puts the necessary teeth into the Government’s proposals. It would ensure that the guidance must explicitly set out how authorised persons
“can be disincentivised from issuing fixed penalty notices for the purpose of generating any direct or indirect financial benefit”.
Crucially, it would provide a real enforcement mechanism by stating in the Bill:
“Any person found to be in breach of this guidance … may have their designation revoked by the relevant local authority”.
If we are to rely on guidance-based frameworks, its prohibition on financial incentives must be explicit and there must be statutory consequences for breaching that. I urge the House to support Motion A1. I beg to move.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I will speak to Motion C1. I thank the Minister for Amendments 342C and 342D. I also thank the Minister and his officials for the time that they have spent with me during the passage of the Bill.
I am pleased that the Government have taken on board a number of the concerns that I have raised. Amendment 342C ensures that the guidance is now mandatory. The police must have due regard to it, and it must address alternative interventions. The Minister has confirmed that the police will be required to present evidence to the court on what alternatives were tried or considered and has also provided helpful clarity on the broader consultation process beyond youth offending teams. These are important technical steps towards the informed justice that I have sought.
However, it is a matter of regret that the Government did not feel able to go further. We debate these powers in the immediate wake of the Southport inquiry, where Sir Adrian Fulford identified a “fundamental failure” by agencies to take ownership of risk, and an “inappropriate merry-go-round of referrals”.
The Government argue that it would be premature to codify the inquiry’s lessons before a fuller review of its recommendations this summer. However, we have seen before how recommendations from vital inquiries, such as the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse and the Manchester Arena Inquiry, can be accepted in principle yet delayed in practice. The families in Southport deserve more than a watching brief. They deserve the certainty of law. I also hope that these concerns will be reflected in the Home Office guidance for youth diversion orders. I welcome the Minister’s offer to share the guidance in advance and trust that it will be as clear and unambiguous as he has indicated.
In light of the concessions made, and the Minister’s assurance on parliamentary oversight via the negative procedure, I am prepared to accept the Government’s position today and will not divide the House on Motion C1. However, let me be clear: this is not the end of the matter. We will watch closely for the guidance to be laid before Parliament. The Home Secretary has already admitted that past guidance failed because it was applied inconsistently. If the new guidance is lacking, or the Government’s response to the Fulford report is diluted, I will not hesitate to table a Motion to ensure that this House can fully debate those failings. We are legislating for powers designed to prevent mass-casualty tragedies so safety must be built on the full multi-agency picture, not on administrative hope.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, on pushing Motion A1, which I will be supporting.
After the previous ping-pong debate on the issue of on-the-spot fines by private enterprises, I was inundated with complaints about egregious harassment by these very bodies, these enforcement agencies. People were outraged at what they saw as an abuse of the system. I quote one, who said, “Not only you have have to, as you walk down the high street, look out for phone-snatchers, but you also have to look out for official muggers after your money, and then find out that they are employed by the contract. They are just as illegitimate and just as anti-social”.
I emphasise that this abuse of the public’s understandable frustration and concern about anti-social behaviour—and the Government’s completely correct focus on tackling it—is made worse by an enforcement regime that is discredited. That is why enforcement matters: if the legitimacy of the enforcement response is weak, it means that we are not tackling anti-social behaviour and the public just become cynical about the whole enterprise.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, regarding Motion A1, moved so ably by my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones, on disincentivising fining for profit and, importantly, ensuring that contractors found to be profiteering from fixed penalty notices may risk losing their contracts, I have nothing to add to what he said.
On Motions C and C1, to which my noble friend Lady Doocey spoke, it is encouraging that she has accepted the assurances the Government have given on the future guidance on youth diversion orders, but I hope to hear from the Government that they take note of her reference to possible future parliamentary action on this if the guidance does not work.
I turn to the Conservatives’ Motion D1, to be moved by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, relating to the proscription of Iran-related entities. We accept that, on some readings, the Marshalled List could be taken to suggest that the government and opposition parties are not dramatically far apart on Motions D and D1. Motion D1, the Conservative Motion which we support, calls for a review within one month of whether any organisations related to the Iranian armed forces should be proscribed, whereas the Commons Amendment in lieu, in favour of which the Minister spoke, would require only a statement about the general policies and procedures of the Secretary of State relating to proscription orders. However, those differences mask an important point of constitutional principle.
When the issue of proscribing the IRGC was considered by this House last Thursday, the Minister said, as he said again today, that the Government would not give a running commentary on proscription—as has been the position of previous Governments—and would keep the issues of proscription under review. The noble Lord’s approach was, and is, that because the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and I, and by implication everyone not privy to government intelligence briefings, have not had the intelligence that the Government have received from the intelligence services, it follows that it is the Government’s right to make these judgments, as a Government, on which organisations are proscribed and when. The Minister’s approach was largely echoed by Minister Sarah Jones in the other place on Monday of this week.
We understand the Government’s approach. In particular, we are not seeking a running commentary on ongoing consideration of the proscription of possible organisations. Nevertheless, we contend that the Government’s approach misunderstands the constitutional position. Decisions on orders proscribing organisations are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure and such orders cannot take effect unless approved by both Houses of Parliament, so they are ultimately decisions for Parliament. If these decisions were for the Executive alone, the requirement for a vote of both Houses would be meaningless and contradictory of the legislation.
Furthermore, the Government’s position would mean, inconsistently, that while parliamentary approval is required to approve a proscription recommended by the Executive, Parliament is not entitled to take a view on the proscription of any organisation that the Government do not recommend for any reason for proscription, whether that reason be good or bad. That is constitutionally unsustainable. Just as a sovereign Parliament would be entitled to legislate to require a proscription so this Parliament is quite entitled to take the far more modest step of insisting on a report—not just about the general principles of proscription to enable us to understand the procedure, as the Minister would have us accept, but on the Government’s reasoning in relation to the IRGC and other organisations related to the Iranian military.
Considerations such as those spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, are important for Parliament and government in considering whether to proscribe organisations, just as they might be on a Motion to approve an order laid by the Government for a positive proscription. The noble Baroness referred to David Lammy’s and Yvette Cooper’s support in opposition for proscription of the IRGC, and those are relevant considerations for Parliament. We will vote solidly in support of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and we commend it to the House.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for the Motions in his name, and I am pleased to see the government Amendments 11C to 11F to include guidance on evidence collection and the exercise of seizure powers in the Secretary of State’s statutory guidance. We are happy to accept these. But I add that it is over a year ago now that my honourable friend Matt Vickers brought these to the attention of the other place, and they were rejected at that point by the Government. It is regrettable that the Government were against our amendments here, and we have only just arrived at this point as a result of the persistence of this side of the House.
I am pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has tabled his Motion. We support this and, if he decides to divide the House, we will be with him. I tabled Motion D1 to disagree with the Commons amendments and to offer my own amendment in lieu, which is only slightly altered from the previous version. The only change I have made is to narrow the language to mention groups linked to the Iranian armed forces, as opposed to focusing on groups linked to the Iranian Government as a whole.
It is peculiar how one’s opinion can change so greatly when one enters government. As was alluded to by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, the Labour Party used to stand on this side of the House urging Conservative Ministers to proscribe the IRGC. In fact, on 7 March 2023, during the Report stage debate on the National Security Bill, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, then the opposition Home Office shadow Minister, moved an amendment with the express purpose of requiring the Government to proscribe the IRGC. The noble Lord stood at this very Dispatch Box and said:
“It is in the national security interests of this country for the IRGC to be proscribed as soon as possible”.—[Official Report, 7/3/23; col. 753.]
That was the view of the Labour Party in 2023, but clearly it no longer believes that that is the case.
Instead, the Government have offered us a Statement within six months outlining the process of proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000. When speaking to the Government’s amendment in the House of Commons, the Minister, Sarah Jones MP, said that this was to
“help the Opposition and others to understand the proscription process”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/4/26; col. 104.]
We do not need to be patronised by this Government. We can all read the conditions in Section 3 of the Terrorism Act. We know what the process is. Our contention is that the Government are not willing to use that process effectively. We can see plainly and clearly that the IRGC meets that threshold. I say to the Minister: put yourselves in our shoes. If he were standing where I am today, would he accept a Statement on the process as sufficient to prevent him pressing this to a Division? I doubt he would.
We should be in no doubt that the IRGC poses a significant threat to our country. When we have seen in 2025 alone more than 20 potentially lethal Iran-backed plots on British soil, when we have seen numerous antisemitic attacks carried out in Britain, and when we have seen the IRGC ramping up its plots and attacks across the Middle East and beyond, then we know we have a problem. The IRGC is a dangerous and lethal organisation. Just today, we have seen how it has fired at merchant vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz. We must act against groups that pose a threat to our national security. The United States has banned the IRGC, as have Canada, New Zealand, Australia and even the European Union. If they can, why can we not? Surely it is time for the Government to listen to the British people, listen to Parliament and listen to themselves, and proscribe the IRGC as soon as possible.
Before I sit down, I align myself with the comments on the appalling events that led to the death of Stephen Lawrence, which I remember only too well.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to noble Lords who spoke in this short debate, and I will respond to their comments. On fixed penalty notices, I had genuinely hoped that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would have accepted that we have moved significantly towards his position. Everybody wants to see fixed penalty notices issued fairly and proportionately, and the Government’s amendments would have helped and will help to ensure that this is the case. But we also need to accept that there is a continuing role for external contractors in the enforcement of ASB orders, and I do not believe we should close the door to that, which is what in our assessment the noble Lord’s amendment would do.
I recognise that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, is not happy. However, before we move to a potential Division on this, I recommit to what I said in my opening remarks: we commit to a passage in the guidance, which I will produce on behalf of the Home Office, that will say:
“Where external contractors are used, private firms should not be able to receive greater revenue or profits just from increasing the volume of penalties”.
I think that meets the noble Lord’s objective. If he remains unhappy, that is the way these things work, so we will have to examine that in a moment.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
I come at this from a somewhat naive point of view perhaps, but I cannot understand, having heard the Minister, why on earth the Government have not done it already.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
Again, if I answered that question, I would stray into the very issues that I do not wish to talk about, because they are issues which we have to keep under consideration. I will say to the noble and learned Baroness what I said in my opening remarks: we have sanctioned Iranian officials. We have put visa sanctions on Iranian officials. We have Iran under FIRS for registration of foreign interests. We have taken action, as is self-evident, in relation to the current crisis. I will not comment on those matters, not because I do not want to but because whatever I say on them gives an indication of what the Government might wish to do at any particular time on any particular topic, and it is not right that we give a running commentary.
I say to those noble Lords who have spoken in this debate that I welcome their support for the government amendments in lieu. I hope I have convinced the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, on his amendments relating to fixed penalty notices—I suspect that I have not—and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, will not push Motion D1, for the arguments that I have put.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and his colleagues on the Conservative Benches for their consistent and solid support on the issue of fining for profit. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for her consistent support throughout on the same issue. I add my thanks again to the Minister for his engagement: I do not think there has been a lack of engagement, but he is shuffling towards the finishing line; he could still do more, and more quickly, to address the concerns expressed in Motion A1. I urge him to take his department by the scruff of the neck and get this matter done with a bit more creative thinking—that is all it requires. For the reason I set out earlier, I wish to test the opinion at the House.
Lord Hanson of Flint
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 11 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 11C to 11F in lieu.
“(a) the collection by those authorities of evidence to support representations to the court about an order under section 33C (forfeiture of vehicles), and
(b) the exercise by authorised officers of their powers under section 34B (search and seizure of vehicles).
(1A) The Secretary of State may issue guidance to English waste collection authorities about”
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion B. I beg to move.
Lord Hanson of Flint
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 342 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 342C and 342D in lieu.
“(A1) The Secretary of State must issue guidance to chief officers of police about—
(a) matters to be taken into account by chief officers of police before making an application for a youth diversion order, including alternatives to making an application,
(b) how chief officers of police are to comply with their duties to consult under section 174, and
(c) the circumstances in which it may be appropriate for chief officers of police to consult persons other than those mentioned in section 174 before making an application for a youth diversion order or the variation or discharge of such an order.”
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion C. I beg to move.
Lord Hanson of Flint
That this House do not insist on its Amendments 359 and 439 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 439C and 439D in lieu.
“Duty to make statement about proscription regime
(1) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament, and publish, a statement about the general policies and procedures of the Secretary of State in relation to the Secretary of State’s powers under section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (power to amend list of proscribed organisations).
(2) The Secretary of State must comply with subsection (1) within six months of the day on which this Act is passed.”
“(ca) section (Duty to make statement about proscription regime);”
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion D. I beg to move.
Motion D1 (as an amendment to Motion D)
Lord Davies of Gower
Leave out from “439” to end and insert “, do disagree with the Commons in their Amendments 439C and 439D in lieu, and do propose Amendments 439E and 439F in lieu—
“Proscription status of Iran-related entities: review
(1) The Secretary of State must, within one month of the day on which this Act is passed, review whether any organisations related to the Iranian Armed Forces should be proscribed under section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (proscription).
(2) The Secretary of State must publish the outcome of the review under subsection (1), and this must include the reasons for the Secretary of State’s decision.”
“(ca) section (Proscription status of Iran-related entities: review);””
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am very grateful to Members who have spoken in support of this Motion. I have listened carefully to the Minister, but I am afraid I do not accept his argument. I therefore beg leave to test the opinion of the House.
Crime and Policing Bill
Wednesday 22nd April 2026
(2 weeks, 5 days ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Commons Consideration of Lords Message as at 22 April 2026 - (22 Apr 2026)
18:51 - The House divided: - Ayes: 253 / Noes: 143 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Minister for Policing and Crime (Sarah Jones)
I beg to move,
That this House disagrees with the Lords in their amendments 2H and 2J, but proposes in lieu of those amendments amendment (a) to their amendment 2F and amendment (b) to their amendment 2G.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following Government motion:
That this House insists on its amendments 439C and 439D and disagrees with the Lords in their amendments 439E and 439F in lieu.
Sarah Jones
It is with regret that we return to the Lords amendments to this Bill. The elected House has made its views crystal clear on the issues before us. We have already voted twice, by substantial margins, to reject the Lords amendments. It is time for the considered views of this House to prevail. Let me deal briefly with the two remaining issues before us.
In our earlier debates, I have been clear that the Government agree that the enforcement of public spaces protection orders and community protection notices must be proportionate. Fixed penalty notices must never simply be seen as a money spinner for enforcement agencies, but as an appropriate and proportionate means of tackling antisocial behaviour in our communities. We will make this distinction absolutely clear in our statutory guidance. To this end, we have already agreed amendments to provide that the statutory guidance issued under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 must address the proportionate use of fixed penalty notices by authorised persons. I know the Liberal Democrats want early action on this, so we have brought forward a further amendment to provide that such guidance must be issued within six months of Royal Assent.
It is particularly regrettable that the Opposition have returned yet again to Lords amendment 359, albeit in modified form. The amendment is simply unworkable, and it is wholly contrary to the approach taken by successive Governments to the exercise of the powers in the Terrorism Act 2000 to proscribe terrorist organisations. There is no more important duty on the Government than to safeguard this country from terrorist attack, but requiring the Government to in effect give a running commentary on whether any organisation linked to the Iranian armed forces should be proscribed does not for one moment add to our security. Their lordships can keep insisting on this amendment, but our response will be the same. This is not an amendment that any responsible Government can or should entertain.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
In the papers today, there are pictures of six ladies who are going to be executed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is in charge in Iran, because they protested in the streets for liberty and freedom. For those six ladies whose lives are on the line and for the millions of people in Iran who want freedom, I think the Government should proscribe the IRGC, and they should not delay in doing so. I say respectfully to the Minister that it is time to face the realities we have in this world.
Sarah Jones
None of us would say for one second that we are anything other than appalled by what we see happening in Iran. None of us supports the Iranian Government and none of us supports the IRGC. We have sanctioned over 550 individuals and organisations, including the IRGC, to prevent them from coming here and to take their assets where we can do so. The point is that this Parliament is not the place for a Government to say one way or the other what they are going to proscribe or not proscribe. That is not the way government is done in this country, and it is not the way we are going to operate now. However, I get the hon. Gentleman’s point for sure. None of us supports the IRGC or anything it does, and we are appalled by the very significant, awful number of deaths we have seen in recent times and, indeed, over many years.
In conclusion, we are reaching the stage where the issue before the House is no longer the detail of the various Lords amendments, but whether the unelected Lords should continue to disregard the clearly and unequivocally expressed views of the House of Commons and delay the enactment of the Bill. We have already rejected the Lords amendments on two occasions, with majorities of well over 100. Let us send these amendments back to the Lords, hopefully for one last time.
Joy Morrissey (Beaconsfield) (Con)
Those in the other place have asked us to reconsider Lords amendments 439E and 439F, which compel the Home Secretary to review the proscription of groups linked to the Iranian armed forces, including the IRGC.
There can be absolutely no doubt about the threat that Iran and its proxies pose to this country and our national security. In 2015, terrorists linked to Iran were caught stockpiling explosives on the outskirts of London. In 2020, amid protests in Iran, the IRGC sought to assassinate two journalists on British soil. Just last year, the IRGC was linked to an attempted attack on the Israeli embassy in Kensington, which was foiled by counter-terrorism police. The organisation has been linked to at least 20 credible threats in the UK.
Even beyond the direct risk posed by IRGC terrorism, the organisation is responsible for funding and supporting other extreme groups in this country, and has worked closely with criminal gangs to undermine our national security. We will be able to combat that threat only if we are willing to tackle it head-on, using every power available to us to do so. To that end, the very least we can do is make it harder for Islamist extremist groups to operate legally in this country. By proscribing the IRGC and other groups linked to the Iranian armed forces, Ministers would be able to protect not only those being attacked—actually, it is our Jewish community that we are really thinking about at this difficult time. These Lords amendments can only be a good thing. They would help to strengthen those protections.
When Labour Members were on the Opposition Benches, many of them agreed. In April 2024, the now Foreign Secretary called for exactly this policy. Yet now, they are refusing even to review the proscription of groups such as the IRGC, which fuel the Islamist cause and are directly linked to the Iranian armed forces. I urge the Minister and her colleagues on the Government Benches to change their minds and accept the Lords amendments. The threat is far too grave to be ignored. By burying their heads in the sand, they will not make the problem go away; they will only put our country and its people more at risk.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.
Max Wilkinson (Cheltenham) (LD)
I recognise that, since the last round of ping-pong, a concession was made on youth diversion orders in the other place and we welcome that. We are disappointed that the Government have not made suitable concessions on fixed penalty notices. However, we do not seek to force that to a vote this evening. We hope to work with the Government and we will pursue other avenues.
The shadow Minister set out the case very well for the motion on the proscription of Iran-linked groups. Recent activities in this country give us further cause for concern. The rise in antisemitic sentiment on our streets and the way in which Iran is clearly seeking to foment discontent on our streets by funding activities that further antisemitic hatred and terrorist outrages should give us pause for thought. I would hope that Members on both sides of the House recognise that—I know that they do. Even though the Government are clearly not going to vote for the motion this evening, we will.
Sarah Jones
I hope that we are here debating this Bill for the last time. I know that Government Members earnestly want to see the Bill enacted so that we can deliver safer streets for all our communities. I thank the Liberal Democrats for not pushing their amendments to a vote on this occasion.
On the issue of the IRGC, I have been clear that no responsible Government who put the safety and security of the country first can give a running commentary on whether or not this organisation will be proscribed, and it is time to close down this debate. The hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Joy Morrissey) was absolutely right to mention the Jewish community; we are all deeply concerned by what we have seen happen to our Jewish friends and colleagues across the country in recent days, particularly in London. We are doing all we can to ensure that our Jewish community is kept safe. As the hon. Lady will know, we are investing to ensure that we have protections for synagogues and other Jewish spaces where we need it, and we are working with them to do everything that we can. The hon. Lady is right on that matter—I agree with her on it.
However, as to the question of whether the Government can be told in this place that we must immediately proscribe an organisation—that is not the way that this Government work. It is not the way that any Government have worked. I respectfully suggest to the other place and to Members in this place that the time has come to call it a day and to let this Bill pass.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That this House disagrees with the Lords in their amendments 2H and 2J, but proposes in lieu of those amendments amendment (a) to their amendment 2F and amendment (b) to their amendment 2G.
After Clause 190
Proscription status of Iran-related entities: review
Motion made, and Question put,
That this House insists on its amendments 439C and 439D and disagrees with the Lords in their amendments 439E and 439F in lieu.—(Sarah Jones.)
Crime and Policing Bill
Monday 27th April 2026
(2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Act 2026 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 194-I Marshalled list for Consideration of Commons Reason and Amendments - (24 Apr 2026)
Lord Hanson of Flint
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 2H to Commons Amendment 2F and its Amendment 2J to Commons Amendment 2G, and do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 2K to Commons Amendment 2F and Amendment 2L to Commons Amendment 2G in lieu.
“(d) after subsection (3) insert—
“(4) The Secretary of State must comply with the duty in subsection (A1)(a) and (b) within 6 months of the day on which the Crime and Policing Act 2026 is passed.””
“(c) after subsection (3) insert—
“(4) The Secretary of State must comply with the duty in subsection (A1) within 6 months of the day on which the Crime and Policing Act 2026 is passed.””
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
My Lords, in moving Motion A, I will speak also to Motion B. We have had just over 18 months in both Houses on this Bill. I very much hope that we are now debating the Crime and Policing Bill for the very last time. Your Lordships’ House has quite properly discharged its role as a revising Chamber on a number of occasions. We have now asked the Commons to consider and reconsider the two outstanding issues before us today not once, not twice but on three occasions. The Commons, as is its right, made its views perfectly clear on 14 April, 20 April and 22 April. On each occasion it has rejected the Lords amendments by majorities exceeding 100. I suggest, respectfully, to your Lordships’ House that the time has come to heed the clearly and repeatedly expressed views of the elected House.
I know the issue of fixed penalty notices has been one of importance, and I have listened very carefully to the well-made arguments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. Indeed, we have acknowledged some of the concerns he has raised about the actions of some contractors. We have now enshrined in the Bill a requirement to issue statutory guidance about the use of fixed penalty notices to enforce public spaces protection orders and community protection notices. We are also committed, thanks again to pressure from the noble Lord and others, to issuing such guidance within six months of Royal Assent, and I have already said I will share the guidance with the noble Lord before it is issued.
I know the noble Lord is disappointed we have not gone further, but we have concerns that his amendments would, effectively, terminate the legitimate use of private contractors to enforce anti-social behaviour civil orders, to the detriment of the safety and security of local communities who want to see effective action to tackle anti-social behaviour. I also welcome the fact that, when the Bill was again debated in the Commons last Wednesday, Max Wilkinson, speaking for the Liberal Democrat Front Bench, indicated that he would not press the issue further. I do not know what the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will do today, but I hope he would similarly now agree to be content and agree Motion A.
Turning to proscription of the IRGC, we have had several opportunities to discuss the stall on this matter, and there is little more to be said. I have been very clear that Amendment 439 is not one the Government can accept, but I have also been very clear that this Government have and will continue to take strong action to hold the Iranian regime to account by sanctioning Iranian individuals and entities, including the IRGC, as well as placing Iran on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme. Indeed, the Prime Minister reiterated last week that we are also committed to introduce legislation to provide for a proscription-like power to address the threat of hostile activity posed by the state and state-linked bodies. Work on this legislation is well under way and, without pre-empting the King’s Speech, your Lordships can expect to see more soon.
The Commons has now endorsed the Government’s position in voting to reject the Lords amendment on three separate occasions over the past two weeks. There can be no doubt about where the elected House stands on this issue, and I respectfully submit that there is nothing to be gained from sending the amendment back to the Commons. I hope the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and the whole House will agree to Motion B and, in doing so, I also hope that he will recognise that the Government have a strong view on the situation in Iran and the Iranian regime, which I have outlined. With those comments, I beg to move.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I rise to respond to the Government’s Motion A regarding the issuing of fixed penalty notices for anti-social behaviour. I thank the Minister for all his efforts. Throughout this process, he has demonstrated good will but, without making any great classical allusions, this has felt very much like pushing a boulder uphill. At each stage of the Bill’s passage, we have had to push the Government incredibly hard to recognise the sheer scale of the problem regarding the cowboy enforcement economy that has been preying on the public. However, I am pleased to say that this persistence has finally paid off, and genuine progress has been made.
By accepting the Government’s latest amendment today, we are securing the necessary safeguards, through statutory guidance which must be delivered within six months of Royal Assent, to make sure that local authorities cannot incentivise private contractors to fine for the breach of public spaces protection orders and community protection notices. For far too long, the system has allowed a revenue collection industry to masquerade as justice, with private companies retaining the vast majority of fine income and aggressively targeting people for anodyne actions. With this amendment now in place, our citizens will be much better protected against the cowboys who have sought to abuse these enforcement powers for their own financial gain.
While the journey to get here has required relentless pressure from these Benches and across the House—and I sincerely thank the Conservative Benches for their solid support throughout—the outcome is a significant victory for fairness and proportionality in our justice system, and I am content, therefore, to accept the Government’s latest amendment.
I was pleased to hear from the Minister that the Government will share the draft statutory guidance before it is issued. We know roughly what wording the Home Office has in mind—that of the Defra guidance on litter—but the consultation process on the new guidance will be important. I hope that the Minister can doubly assure us that the Home Office will consult not only with local government but with those who have been instrumental in raising this fining-for-profit issue during the passage of the Bill, such as myself and the Campaign for Freedom in Everyday Life, formerly the Manifesto Club.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, despite everything that the Minister has said on proscription of the IRGC, we are now in something of an Alice in Wonderland world. The Prime Minister has told the media in recent days that the Government propose to introduce further legislation to address state threats. Such legislation has been reported by the BBC, among others, as enabling the Government to ban state-related organisations such as the IRGC. The Prime Minister has said that the King’s Speech next month will commit to such legislation. Yet the Terrorism Act already permits such a ban: Section 1(4) states that terrorist action includes action outside the UK; the public affected includes the public of a country outside the UK; and the Government affected means the Government of another country as well as the Government of the UK. Therefore, terrorism is specifically international. Section 3, as we know, permits the proscription of terrorist organisations without limiting them to UK organisations or UK terrorism.
The Government know this. As we heard last week, the Deputy Prime Minister, David Lammy, and the present Foreign Secretary, Yvette Cooper—herself a former Home Secretary—specifically called for proscription of the IRGC while in opposition, just as we on these Benches have consistently called for it. Nobody but nobody has said that there has been no power to proscribe the IRGC because it is state-related.
The EU, led by France and Italy, as well as Australia, the United States, Canada and several of the Gulf states, have all proscribed the IRGC. Yet the Government, despite previous Labour policy, have promised Parliament only an anodyne statement about
“the general policies and procedures of the Secretary of State in relation to the Secretary of State’s powers under Section 3”.
Last week, the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, called that patronising. It is worse than that. Despite their previous policy, the Government rely only on the repeated mantra that they will not give a running commentary on decisions on proscription.
The IRGC is connected, on very substantial evidence, not only to the appalling oppression and murder of protesters in Iran in December and January, but to multiple acts of terrorism in the UK and abroad. There are clear links with antisemitic attacks here and elsewhere in Europe and the world, including on synagogues. The UK Maritime Trade Operations Centre, responsible for monitoring and assisting international shipping, has reported on large numbers of attacks on cargo ships in and around the Strait of Hormuz, which are carried out by the IRGC or connected entities.
We recognise, of course, that the Government have a strong view on the Iranian regime, as the Minister rightly said, yet they have said to Parliament that we are not entitled to an explanation of why the IRGC is not to be proscribed but must wait for further legislation targeted at state-related organisations for such proscription. Yet, if indeed the new legislation is to involve the implementation of the recommendations of Jonathan Hall KC, in his recent report updated in January, that was aimed at improving legislation on state threats under the National Security Act and the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act. For the proscription of the IRGC under Section 3 of the Terrorism Act, such new legislation is unnecessary and a red herring.
We should continue to demand a proper and timely explanation of what the Government intend to do and when, subject, we agree of course, to the provision of confidential information being restricted to the Intelligence and Security Committee. We support the Conservative Motion B1, and if the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, wishes to test the opinion of the House, we will vote for his Motion.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, the House should take account of two factors. My understanding of the advice from the much-respected Jonathan Hall, the Government’s adviser on terrorism legislation, is that specific new legislation is required to ensure that malign state actors can be proscribed and dealt with.
Secondly, the House should take account of the fact that, on a visit to Kenton synagogue last Thursday—one of the synagogues that has been subjected to a disgraceful firebomb attack—the Prime Minister gave what I understand to be a very clear commitment:
“We go into a new session in a few weeks’ time, and we’ll bring that legislation forward”.
It is true that the Prime Minister has not specifically committed to proscribe the IRGC, but my understanding is that that is because the Government never give advance notice of who they are going to proscribe. If the Government do not carry out these commitments, do not bring forward legislation and do not implement it very speedily, I would regard that as a very serious breach of faith and this House will no doubt have much to say about it.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, we return to this highly important matter once again. I know that the Government will not appreciate this, but it is our duty in this House to hold them to account for their promises.
When in opposition, the Labour Party committed to proscribing the IRGC; it has now voted against this six times. On Wednesday, the Minister for Policing and Crime, Sarah Jones, said that
“we are reaching the stage where the issue before the House is no longer the detail of the various Lords’ amendments, but whether the unelected Lords should continue to disregard the clearly and unequivocally expressed views of the House of Commons and delay the enactment of the Bill”.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/4/26; col. 398.]
I take particular exception to this. It is wrong and entirely incorrect to claim that this House is somehow acting inappropriately. There is nothing out of the ordinary for this House to insist on an issue as important as this. I remind the Minister how many rounds of ping-pong we had on the safety of Rwanda Bill: this House sent the Bill back to the Commons five times. That is not a criticism but a fact: it is this House’s right to do so. It is not acceptable to have Ministers in this Government seeking to delegitimise the important work of this House. I hope the Government will reflect on that.
There has been a consistent thread of criticism of this amendment from the Government, which I would like to address. Last week, the Minister said
“the Government do not provide a running commentary on which organisations are being considered for proscription”,—[Official Report, 22/4/26; col. 692.]
but this completely misunderstands the argument. I am not asking the Minister to give a “running commentary” on proscription nor am I asking the Government to air sensitive information in public. All I am asking is for the Government to get on with it and proscribe the IRGC. The Minister does not need to provide a running commentary; he just needs to agree the amendment.
I note that there has been some progress now. The Prime Minister said on Friday that the Government will move to proscribe the IRGC in the new Session, so it seems that he is now willing to give us a running commentary on organisations being considered for proscription. That is good news—providing he remains in post, of course.
I welcome that the Government have finally remembered the promises they made in opposition. It is testament to the determined campaigning on this matter from organisations around the country and opposition parties in this Parliament. However, why has it taken the Government so long? It is an incomprehensible position. They have had ample opportunity, during the passage of the Bill, simply to say what the Prime Minister said on Friday. This is disappointing. Regardless of that, the Government have said that they will now move to proscribe the IRGC, and all that remains is to press the Minister on timelines. This cannot wait for months and months; we are all united in our support for this.
I have sought assurance on when the Government will bring forward the legislation. Unfortunately, they have refused to tell us when. This is completely unacceptable at a time when we need strong and decisive leadership in the national interest. We have a Government and a Prime Minister who take months to make a decision and, once they have made that decision, then cannot commit to even a basic deadline. We have seen this time and time again with the Government: refusal to give Parliament even the most basic of assurances on when they will do things that they have promised to do. It is time for the Government to put their money where their mouth is and get on with the promises they made. It is with some trepidation that I accept what the Minister said, but he should be sure that we will hold the Government to account.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am not quite sure whether the noble Lord intends to press his Motion or not.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
That is very gracious. I will keep an eye out for it.
I am pleased that we have made some progress. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his pragmatic approach. I know that he would have liked the Government to go further on the issue of fixed penalty notices. I know he will be holding me to account on the question of statutory guidance and monitoring. But we have achieved some form of settlement and I am grateful to him for agreeing that today.
On the question of proscription, as I said, I am not quite clear whether the noble Lord intends to press his Motion, but I say to him that the elected House has made its views known by significant majorities on a number of occasions now. It has made its views known, supporting the argument that I have deployed in this House: that we do not give a running commentary on proscription. I point to what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has just said: the Prime Minister said last week that the Government understand the need for action, the second Session starts very shortly, and we will be looking to bring forward this legislation as soon as we can. By “this legislation” he does not mean a running commentary on proscription under the powers in the 2000 Act; he means legislation on the potential for a revised state threats proscription-like regime, as recommended by Jonathan Fisher KC—
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I got my Fishers and Halls mixed up. It was recommended by Jonathan Hall KC in his recent report to the Government.
We cannot anticipate what the King’s Speech will say, but I repeat to the noble Lord, for clarity, that the Prime Minister said the Government understand the need for action, the second Session starts very shortly and we are looking to bring legislation forward.
The noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, made a strong case for proscription. But I put to him that the Government have made their view clear. They will share information on state threats with the ISC in due course, but I will not comment on what the Government will do on proscription according to a random deadline set by a Motion in this House without the full facts being examined in a public way.
In the past, on organisations proposed for proscription, we have tabled Motions in both Houses of Parliament and argued why we wanted to table those Motions. We have done that without giving prior knowledge to the organisations we are seeking to proscribe. We have done that under the 2000 Act.
My right honourable friend the Prime Minister said what he said on the visit to the synagogue last week. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, will give the Government the opportunity to fulfil that, because, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, we will be held to account on an article of faith in relation to what the Prime Minister said. But I cannot today, in this House, give either an agreement to proscribe the IRGC within the timescale that the noble Lord has put in his Motion, nor can I pre-empt the King’s Speech later next month, because that is what the King’s Speech is for. So I hope that, on reflection, the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, will not press his Motion.
Lord Hanson of Flint
That this House do not insist on its Amendments 439E and 439F and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 439C and 439D.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I have already spoken to Motion B. I beg to move.
Motion B1 (as an amendment to Motion B)
Lord Davies of Gower
Leave out from “House” to the end and insert “do insist on its Amendments 439E and 439F and do insist on its disagreement with the Commons in their Amendments 439C and 439D.”
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the opposition parties for their support, particularly the Liberal Democrats for their unswerving support and appreciation of the seriousness of the issue. I would have preferred to have something more positive from the Minister, and we will hold the Government to account, but for now, I beg leave to withdraw the Motion.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, as we are still awaiting the Minister for the next business—we moved a little faster than we were expecting—we will adjourn during pleasure for five minutes, until the Minister arrives.
Royal Assent
Wednesday 29th April 2026
(1 week, 5 days ago)
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