Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Blencathra Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 10th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 3 and 10. Superficially, Amendment 3 may look radical, in seeking to reduce the age from 18 to 14. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, certainly might not like it, but, if we want to tackle the lack of respect or anti-social behaviour of those aged 18-plus, that will not be possible unless we tackle all the anti-social behaviour that has built up from age 10 or even younger.

We cannot get into pre-14 behaviour today, but I discovered some frightening statistics from the Met Police, which it was forced to publish under an FOI request last year. They show that, for the year ending December 2023, 879 crimes were committed by children aged 10 to 17. Of these, 173 were violence against the person, 64 were robbery, 81 were theft, 28 were arson, 385 were drug offences and 81 involved possession of weapons. That is fairly frightening. But if that was not bad enough, the Met also published a breakdown of crimes committed by children aged one to nine, of which there were 653 offences. Some 128 were theft and 95 were arson and criminal damage, but the really frightening statistics were the 85 sexual offences and—the largest group—191 crimes of violence against the person. As I say, we cannot deal with that age group today, but I simply ask what kind of sick society we are becoming when in the Met area alone we have 85 children aged between one and nine accused of sexual offences and 191 accused of violence against the person.

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[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

In the spirit of Committee, I wonder whether I might challenge the noble Lord a little on this epidemic of child criminality to which he so graphically referred. I think we should park these arguably very rare cases of child homicide outside a debate on anti-social behaviour, but would he agree with me that, when it comes to fisticuffs—what would be common assault—or even theft, we know that quite small children in every home in the country are capable of fisticuffs with each other, between siblings, and taking things that are not their own? But is not a crucial difference in our response to those children? Anti-social behaviour on the playing fields of Eton rarely ends up anywhere near the criminal justice system, but looked-after children in particular are more likely to be reported to the police and end up criminalised at a very early age. So does the noble Lord agree that children in, for example, England and Wales are no more malign than children in Scotland, where the age of responsibility is 14? We should look to ourselves as adult society and our responses to these vulnerable children.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

The noble Baroness says that child homicides are very rare, but they have doubled in the past 12 years. All the statistics that I quoted were from the Youth Justice Board and the Office for National Statistics, showing a huge increase in knife crime. Then there are the police forces themselves; there is an article relating to the Met, or a discussion on a blog from yesterday, asking whether knife crime by children was out of control—and those are their words, not mine.

There has been a huge increase in viciousness, knife use and violent crime by children, and I suggest in my amendments that lowering the age to include 14 to 18 year-olds in respect orders might make a difference, if we could hive them off early. Of course, I accept that children in Scotland, as in England, Northern Ireland and Wales, will also have violent tendencies. My concern is that we are failing to intervene early enough to do anything about them; that is the whole cause of the problem in the past 30 years—a lack of early intervention to deal properly with children. For some, that will mean a caution or restorative justice; for others, it could mean better work from social services. But some prolific young offenders may need to be taken out of circulation, for their own benefit and to save the lives of other children.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, accurately pointed out that a respect order may be made merely on the balance of probabilities—the civil standard of proof. Will the Minister confirm my understanding that, if a criminal charge is to be brought for breaching a respect order, it will be brought under new Section I1, and the offence of breach of respect order? It is then for the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt, on the criminal standard, that the person concerned has not merely breached the respect order but has done so without reasonable excuse. That may provide an answer to some of the more graphic and extreme examples that have been given in this debate of when a respect order may apply. I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm whether my understanding is correct.

In this debate we need to take account of the fact that anti-social behaviour occurs in our society with alarming regularity and causes misery to law-abiding citizens. There needs to be some effective means of addressing it. Having said all that, I share some of the concerns that have been expressed as to the width of the powers that we are being invited to endorse. There are two particular concerns that I have.

The first is that in new Section A1(1)(b), it is sufficient for the court to consider it “just and convenient” to impose a respect order. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, referred to that—and I have great sympathy with the argument that that really ought to be a test of “necessary and proportionate”. All the sorts of cases that one would want to see prohibited by law could be brought within a necessary and proportionate test.

The other concern that I have—and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, was the one who mentioned this—is that in new Section A1(9), the test of anti-social behaviour is

“conduct that has caused, or is likely to cause, harassment, alarm or distress to any person”.

That means any person, however vulnerable they may be, or weak-minded, which is a purely subjective test. I suggest in this context that there really needs to be some objectivity written into the definition, whether or not by referring to a reasonable person; other types of drafting mechanism could be adopted. I share some of the concerns, but I also see the need for an effective and functioning system in this context.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I have great respect for the noble Lord’s contributions. I have heard what he said, but I believe that this is the right way forward. We can always examine his comments again and I appreciate the way in which he has contributed to the debate.

Amendment 6, from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, seeks to ensure that any positive requirements placed on the recipient of a respect order are restricted to those which would prevent a future breach of the order. Positive requirements to address the underlying causes of the behaviour are an important aspect of the respect order. That is a key point that I want to impress on noble Lords today. While the legislation sets out a number of restrictions on how positive requirements can be used, it is the Government’s view that the amendment is unnecessarily restrictive and that courts and agencies should have the discretion to tailor positive requirements to the particular needs of each case.

Amendment 7, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and also spoken to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, would limit the amount of time that a respect order may be in effect to two years. As it stands, there is no limit on the time a respect order might be in effect for, and I think that is the right thing to do. Again, there will be secondary action under the respect order only in the event of a breach taking place. If, for example, someone has previously been a persistent offender and the order puts in place an unlimited time, that would be reasonable until such time as the behaviour is noted. Implementing a two-year time limit might be of some difficulty and would not necessarily tailor against the individual’s behaviour. I come back to the central point that, ultimately, no action is taken against the individual if they do not breach the order.

The duration of a respect order is dependent on the specific circumstances of each case. That will be determined by the courts. I do not expect that every respect order will be imposed for an indefinite period, but that option should be available if there are relentless adult ASB perpetrators. The legislation makes provision for respect orders to be varied or discharged depending on the circumstances of the case.

Amendment 9, again tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would make it a requirement that an applicant must gain full council approval for all local authority-led applications for a respect order. It is proper quite that, while some councils may seek full council approval for PSPOs, there is no legislative requirement for them to do so. It should be noted that respect orders, unlike PSPOs, are granted by the courts, which provides additional safeguards to ensure that respect orders are used proportionately—this goes back to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. Whereas PSPOs impose prohibitions on the general public, respect orders will be for individuals who have a history of disruptive, anti-social behaviour.

I return to the fact that, if individuals do not breach an order, the matter will go no further. It is the Government’s view that, given this distinction, it would not be appropriate to require full council approval for all respect orders—which quite honestly is self-evident. I have been a councillor and spent time in council committees, so I know that there is potential for delay. It might take a long time to make an order, which would risk us not taking action quickly and supportively for the benefit of victims and communities at large. The amendment might also require a full public consultation when applying for a respect order, but I do not believe that that is the way to run respect orders or to impact on individuals.

Amendment 10, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, seeks to add non-crime hate incidents to the definition of anti-social behaviour. I respectfully say to him that we are going to use the phrase “non-crime hate incidents” during the course of the Bill in relation to a number of amendments, including those tabled by his noble friend, the noble Lord, Lord Young. As I have previously said publicly in the House, the College of Policing—under the chairmanship of his noble friend, the noble Lord, Lord Herbert of South Downs—will very shortly produce a review of non-crime hate incidents. There has also been discussion by the Metropolitan Police on what it is doing. I hope that the review will help inform later stages of the Bill. At this stage, I believe that, while we should not kick Amendment 10 down the line—we will come back to the subject of the amendment—we should not deal with it in relation to Clause 1.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I may have misheard the Minister, but if I heard him correctly, I want to correct what he said. I do not want to add it to the Bill; I want to add to the Bill a provision that it is not included under prevention orders.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I appreciate that. If I have misunderstood his intention, I apologise. None the less, the principle is still the same for me. There are specific amendments about this downstream. By the time we reach them, I hope that we will have further enlightenment from the College of Policing and that we can determine government policy on non-crime hate incidents in the light of that review. That is what I have said on a number of occasions in response to similar questions. Therefore, I respectfully suggest that Amendment 10 is slightly premature at this stage, and we will discuss that matter in full detail downstream.

Amendment 11, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, seeks to remove the provision for the Secretary of State to amend, by regulations, the list of relevant authorities that can apply for a respect order. The Secretary of State needs that power to look at the range of contexts, and a multiagency approach is often needed to tackle anti-social behaviour. To ensure that we have that, I believe that the Secretary of State needs to retain that power—that may be a source of disagreement between us, but that is where I think we stand. The Secretary of State should be able to add an agency to the list. It would not be done unilaterally; new regulations would have to be laid. Those made under new Section B1 of the 2014 Act would be subject to the draft affirmative procedure and, as such, subject to debate and approval in both Houses. It is not an unfettered power for the Secretary of State.

A number of important issues have been raised in relation to Amendment 12, which seeks to remove the power to exclude a person from their home as part of a respect order in cases of violence or risk of harm. As noble Lords have said, including the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Meston, excluding a person from their home is of course not something that should be taken lightly. However, we know that anti-social behaviour is not always trivial and can escalate into violence. We also know that, sadly, in some cases, anti-social behaviour is accompanied by domestic abuse. The ability to exclude perpetrators from their homes in such scenarios is a valuable safeguard in protecting vulnerable victims and ensuring that they do not face eviction for the wrongs of their perpetrator.

The key point on Amendment 12—this goes to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Meston—is that an exclusion can happen only when there is a significant risk of violence or harm. This will be key for protecting vulnerable victims who live with perpetrators or are in the same building. The applicant for the respect order will be able to make a proper risk assessment; that is the purpose and focus of that. The power to exclude remains a decision for the court and will be used only when it considers it necessary, in order to protect victims from the risk of violence or harm. I do not know whether that satisfies the noble Lord, but that is the Government’s rationale for the discussions we are bringing forward today.

This is a long group of amendments, so I apologise to the Committee for continuing to deal with them. Amendment 13 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies, seeks to ensure that

“the appropriate chief officer of police”

is specified where a respect order has been issued. The Bill also provides that a supervisor must provide details of the respondent’s compliance with positive requirements to the chief officer of police. While the police are among the agencies that can apply for these orders, the operational responsibility for enforcing requirement lies with the designated supervisor and not with the chief officer of police. It is intended that positive requirements would be managed by those closest to the respondent’s circumstances.

Amendment 14 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, seeks to ensure that the supervisor does not make the final decision on who the relevant chief officer of the police would be, where it appears that the respondent lives in more than one police area. Supervisors are directly involved in managing the positive requirements of respect orders. They have first-hand knowledge of the respondent’s living arrangements and which police areas are most impacted by the respondent’s behaviour. Specifying the chief officer of police prior to issuing a respect order could be an unnecessary burden on police forces that have minimal involvement, and therefore it is appropriate that the supervisor makes the final decision on these matters.

Amendment 18 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, seeks to remove the provision enabling courts to make interim respect orders. Again, I highlight that interim court orders are not a novel concept; they are generally available to courts in exceptional cases. There is currently the possibility for a civil injunction, and it remains the case for the respect order where it is necessary for the courts to grant an interim respect order to prevent serious harm to victims.

Victims are central to the proposals we are bringing forward. If an interim order has been granted, it is because there has been a case made to a court that victims need some assistance to prevent serious harm to them. An interim respect order can be granted by the court only when all the relevant legal duties and safeguards that that entails are met, and it requires the court to be satisfied that it is just to make an order. That goes back to the point the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made. If that order is placed, it is because the court has determined on the evidence before it that there is a real risk of threat to an individual and therefore that order has to be made.

Amendment 20 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, seeks to ensure that a respect order is based on a risk assessment. The introduction of the risk assessment offers a further safeguard in ensuring that respect order applications consider contextual vulnerabilities and agencies take a joint multilateral approach. I hope I can make it clear to the noble Lord that this is a statutory requirement, and all agencies must complete a risk assessment prior to applying for a respect order, so we have met the provisions that he wants in Amendment 20 to date.

Amendment 21 from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, would place a duty on the Home Secretary to conduct a public consultation before introducing new statutory guidance for practitioners on respect orders. I make it clear to the Committee that any updates or additions to the ASB statutory guidance are already subject to extensive consultation with relevant stakeholders. That will include the front-line practitioners for whom the guidance is intended. This will be the case for statutory guidance on respect orders, and I hope that satisfies the noble Lord. As respect orders partially replace an existing power, the civil injunction, a large portion of the guidance will therefore already be familiar to practitioners.

Finally, Amendment 22, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, seeks to add for-profit registered social housing providers to the list of relevant agencies that can apply for a respect order. For-profit social housing providers have grown in prominence since the 2014 Act came into force, and I recognise the importance of the relevant agencies having the powers needed to tackle anti-social behaviour. That is why, for example, we are giving both for-profit and non-profit social housing providers the power to apply for and issue closure notices. However, these are powerful tools, and it is also important that further challenges to the agencies that can use the powers, including respect orders, are considered carefully. But the noble Lord has raised some very important issues, and we will consider them carefully. I really appreciate his bringing them to the Committee today.

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These are quite draconian challenges to our civil liberties regime and we do not even know whether they work. We are told by the Minister that the pilot scheme has been put off because it is urgent that we get on with using these orders. I would suggest that what is urgent is that we get on with enforcing the laws that we have and ensuring that those laws are used to punish wrongdoing, rather than creating a whole new legislative framework that also will probably not be enforced, but none the less gives the state a lot of powers that I would rather it did not have without much more scrutiny. I do not want this clause to stand part of the Bill, and I do want to get rid of respect orders altogether.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I am prompted to rise following the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, with which I largely agree. I am not sure whether I should be offended or pleased by some of the other remarks she made about me, but I think her crucial point is that anti-social behaviour orders have been around for years.

We heard from the Lib Dems that they are worried that orders may be imposed inappropriately on people who should not have them. The Government are worried that they do not have enough powers; therefore, they want respect orders instead. People generally know what anti-social behaviour orders are. My question to the Minister is: why not amend the anti-social behaviour orders to tighten them up as the Lib Dems want and impose the penalties the Government want?

I know the Government will say they used the word “respect” in their manifesto and have to stick to it, but it would seem to me to be introducing, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, has said, a whole new concept which people maybe do not understand—they may think it is more magical than it actually is. Why not use the existing system and amend it to make it work the way the Government want it, the way the Lib Dems want it and the way my noble friends in the Official Opposition want it to? That is all I ask.

[Viscount Goschen (Con)]

My Lords, the Minister mentioned in his remarks on the first group that there are over a million instances of anti-social behaviour in the United Kingdom, and he is seeking broad new powers in the early part of the Bill. Can he give the House any guidance as to what sort of effect, if the House were to give the Government these powers, will be seen in terms of a projected reduction in anti-social behaviour as a result?

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 23 would remove subsections that increase the maximum level of fines attached to fixed penalty notices for breach of public space protection orders and community protection notices. The core proposal of Clause 4 is to increase the maximum FPN for these breaches from £100 to a punitive £500. This represents a 400% increase in the penalty for infractions often issued without judicial oversight.

The Manifesto Club—a body which I mentioned previously and with which I have engaged extensively on these powers—rightly labels this increase as a

“grossly out-of-proportion penalty”.

We must look at the nature of the offences that these fines target. The Home Office claims that this increase shows a “zero-tolerance approach” to anti-social behaviour, but that ignores the actual activities being punished. Manifesto Club research, relying on freedom of information data, shows that the vast majority of penalties are issued for innocuous actions that fall far outside anyone’s definition of serious anti-social behaviour. This is leading to what the Manifesto Club calls

“the hyper-regulation of public spaces”.

For instance, in 2023, Hillingdon Council issued PSPO penalties largely for idling—leaving a car engine running for more than two minutes. This affected 2,335 people, including a man waiting to collect his wife from a doctor’s surgery. Other commonly banned activities that face this grossly increased penalty include loitering, swearing, begging, wild swimming, busking and feeding birds.

The Manifesto Club has documented community protection notices that target non-harmful behaviours, which are also subject to the increased fine. Orders have been issued banning two people from closing their front door too loudly, prohibiting a man from storing his wheelbarrow behind his shed and banning an 82 year-old from wearing a bikini in her own garden. The increase in fines to £500 for these so-called busybody offences appears to be simply a form of message sending, rather than a proportionate penalty designed to resolve community harm.

The second, and perhaps most corrosive, effect of Clause 4 is that it will spark a boom in the enforcement industry and intensify the practice of fining for profit. The Manifesto Club found that 75% of PSPO penalties in 2023 were issued by private enforcement companies. These companies are typically paid per fine issued, which creates an overt financial incentive to pursue volume regardless of genuine harm or proportionality. They target easy infractions rather than the most serious offenders.

Increasing the financial reward fivefold heightens this perverse incentive to issue as many FPNs as possible for anodyne activities. Crucially, while Defra has published guidance stating that environmental enforcement should never be a means to raise revenue, the Home Office has not prohibited fining for profit for anti-social behaviour offences such as PSPO and CPN breaches, nor even formally acknowledged the issue. I have raised this many times in the House.

Rather than authorising this increase in fines, we should be prohibiting incentivised enforcement for all ASB penalties in primary legislation or statutory guidance. The system of FPNs is already heavily criticised for undermining due process. They are issued solely based on the decision of an official and do not involve the production of evidence in court. This lack of judicial scrutiny means that, when innocent people are fined for innocuous actions, they often feel completely helpless, lacking the means to appeal a decision made by incentive-driven officers.

If we are serious about addressing serious anti-social behaviour, the enforcement should focus on serious criminality and nuisance, not extracting revenue from arbitrary restrictions. We must resist measures that intensify arbitrary law enforcement and injustice. This increase in penalties must be abandoned. I therefore urge the Government to support Amendment 23 and reject subsections (3) and (4) of Clause 4. I beg to move.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to my Amendments 24 and 25. In some aspects, I take a slightly different view from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, because I approve of the increased £500 penalty, provided it is for real anti-social behaviour. I accept the noble Lord’s point that there seem to have been quite a few ASBOs granted for “busybody offences”, and that is not right.

However, my concern here is making sure that the fines are properly paid. If we give the rise to £500, what will be the punishment if criminals do not pay it? Imprisonment is not important. In the words of the great capitalist Del Boy, it is “cushty”, and most criminals, from the smallest to the greatest, regard a term of imprisonment as factored into the crime. What about fines? No problem, they will simply not pay them, and with sufficient sob stories to the court, they will probably get away with a ridiculously low payment plan. Then, when they go outside and drive away in their BMW while texting on their new iPhone, that is great.

Only one thing works as proper punishment—they hate it—and gives the state and victims proper recompense: that is the confiscation of their ill-gotten gains or of any part of their property, which will cover the amount of any unpaid penalty. Of course, there are compensation orders, which can be made for most crimes, but, again, the convict will probably not pay up and nothing more will be done about it.

We must expand confiscation orders to all crimes where a penalty has not been paid, and my amendments are, I would suggest, a tiny but good example. We seem to go out of our way to make compensation orders as difficult as possible to obtain and deliver. Confiscation orders in the UK can be issued for any crime that involves financial gain, not just specific offences. They are used to take away profits from criminal activity, with the court determining the amount of the order based on the defendant’s benefit from their criminal conduct. The common crimes involve fraud, drug trafficking, theft and organised crime, but any offence where a financial element is present can trigger an order.

How do confiscation orders work? First of all, a conviction is required. Even I would agree with that. A confiscation order can be made only after the defendant is convicted of a crime. The Crown Court decides whether to issue an order after gathering information from both the prosecution and defence. The court’s goal is to recover the benefit—they stress “benefit”—the defendant gained from the criminal conduct. The court considers whether the defendant has a criminal lifestyle, which can be established by their conduct over time. The ultimate aim is to disrupt criminal activity by making the crime unprofitable and preventing future offences.

Why on earth stop with that tight confiscation concept about ill-gotten gains? If someone has committed a crime and gets a financial penalty or a fine and he does not pay up, he has benefited from that crime. He has made a financial gain in that he has saved the money he should have spent on a fine. In those circumstances, it is only just and right that the court’s bailiff can confiscate all and any property of the convict to recover the fine he has refused to pay or says that he cannot pay.

In this case, we are looking at confiscation of his goods and property up to a value of £500 plus a small administration fee. My amendment advocates automaticity, and that is essential. We do not need all the evidence of ill-gotten gains that prosecutors have to go through to prove that the superyacht, Bentleys and five homes all over the world came from drug running or ripping off a pension fund, since we would be collecting only on a known fine imposed by a court.