Lord Clement-Jones
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Crime and Policing Bill
Lord Clement-Jones ExcerptsMonday 10th November 2025
(1 day, 12 hours ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Bill 2024-26 View all Crime and Policing Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-I(b) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (10 Nov 2025)
Lord Clement-Jones
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Government to review current anti-social behaviour powers within six months of the Bill becoming law, before the new measures proposed in the Bill take effect.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 1, I will speak to other amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Doocey.
I welcome the start of Committee and the opportunity to engage in detail with Part 1 of the Bill concerning anti-social behaviour. We on these Benches recognise the imperative to make our streets safer, and we support measures designed to tackle genuinely persistent and disruptive anti-social behaviour. However, the Liberal Democrat approach to public safety demands that new laws be not just tough but fair and proportionate. We reject measures which risk the erosion of civil liberties or the criminalisation of the vulnerable. This debate on respect orders goes directly to that principle.
Clause 1 introduces the respect order for adults, which partly replaces the old anti-social behaviour injunction. The fundamental difference is severe. While breach of an ASBI was treated as a civil contempt, breach of a respect order is explicitly categorised as a criminal offence that can lead to an unlimited fine or up to two years’ imprisonment. If the state intends to use a civil tool granted merely on the balance of probabilities to impose prohibitions whose breach results in criminal sanctions, that tool must be subject to the most rigorous safeguards. Unfortunately, respect orders currently risk replicating and arguably worsening the problems and abuses associated with past anti-social behaviour regimes.
The Manifesto Club—I declare an interest as a member of its advisory board—highlights several fundamental flaws in the previous regime under the 2014 Act, which civil liberties advocates argue must be addressed before new anti-social behaviour powers such as respect orders are introduced.
The core legal powers underpinning PSPOs and CPNs are inherently flawed due to their low legal threshold and vague scope. PSPOs can be implemented if activities are deemed to be having a detrimental effect on the quality of life in a defined public area. The Manifesto Club notes that this is an unprecedentedly low legal test for criminal intervention and argues that there is often no requirement to show substantial evidence of this effect. PSPOs are vague and subjective restrictions and are often drafted broadly, which leads to them functioning more as a tool applied at the discretion of officers than as a precise law, and this has resulted in what the Manifesto Club calls
“absurd, stigmatising and authoritarian orders”
that ban diverse and sometimes anodyne non-criminal activities.
A major criticism centres on the weak governance and poor assessment of these powers. Manifesto Club research found that nearly half of all PSPOs issued by local authorities in one year were signed off by a single council officer, without passing through scrutiny procedures within the council, such as approval by cabinet or full council. Despite legal requirements for consultation, the Manifesto Club points out that the legislation requires consultation only with the police chief, the landowner and whatever community representatives the local authority thinks it appropriate to consult, meaning that there is no requirement for any public consultation or minimum standards for one.
There is a significant lack of official data collection and central government scrutiny on the use and effectiveness of anti-social behaviour powers such as CPNs and PSPOs. The broad and unchecked nature of the powers creates inconsistency of enforcement across the country, leading to postcode lotteries for victims, where enforcement depends on location rather than circumstances.
PSPOs and dispersal powers are often unfairly imposed on or enforced against homeless people, including bans on rough sleeping and begging. Homeless individuals report being moved on by police multiple times a day and feeling that the system is set against them. Examples of arbitrary and overzealous enforcement include fines issued to an 82 year-old man for cycling his bike in a town centre, for the feeding of stray cats, for the flying of model aircraft, for keeping a wheelbarrow behind a garden shed and for using foul language. Community protection notices have been issued with restrictions on how people conduct themselves in their own home, sometimes based on weak evidence reliant on hearsay.
There is increasing commercialisation of enforcement of anti-social behaviour powers. Many councils outsource the issuance of fixed penalty notices for PSPOs and CPNs to private companies. The most common contractual arrangement involves companies receiving a percentage of FPN—fixed penalty notice—income, which directly incentivises officers to issue as many penalties as possible.
This practice is explicitly stated to contradict statutory guidance, which notes that enforcement should in no circumstances be used as a means to raise revenue. Private officers employed under this system have been accused of setting daily targets, hiding badges, intimidating people and ticketing minor offences or non-offences. This intensification of busybody offences and penalties risks increasing injustice, particularly for vulnerable people.
Amendment 1, tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Doocey, and signed by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, would require the implementation of respect orders to be delayed until a comprehensive review of existing anti-social behaviour powers under the anti-social behaviour Act 2014 is conducted and completed by an independent person within six months of Royal Assent.
Before we introduce a new measure, we should assess whether the myriad existing tools—ASBIs, community protection notices and public space protection orders—are truly fit for purpose. The process of anti-social behaviour governance is already widely criticised as confusing, inconsistent and prone to arbitrary enforcement.
Without undertaking this vital review, we risk merely layering a new, complex civil order onto a system that is already confusing, ineffective and unjust, leading to overlapping powers and making enforcement decisions more difficult. Additional support for this delay, and an independent review, comes from key stakeholders, including Justice and the Victims’ Commissioner. We must pause, review what we have and then legislate effectively.
The core legal test for imposing a respect order is dangerously permissive. It rests on two conditions: the civil standard of proof—the balance of probabilities that the individual has engaged in anti-social behaviour—and the judicial belief that it is merely just and convenient to make the order. This is an alarmingly low threshold for an order that can severely restrict an individual’s liberty and lead to imprisonment. We must insist on a higher standard.
Amendment 5, in the name of my noble friend Lady Doocey and signed by me, proposes to replace the vague phrase “just and convenient” with the essential standard of “necessary and proportionate”. This change is essential to ensure that the restrictions imposed align strictly with the principles of the Human Rights Act 1998, ensuring that the conditions are tailored and appropriate to the specific case.
Amendment 4, also in my noble friend’s name, probes the wording that allows an order to be made if a person “threatens to engage in” anti-social behaviour. This vague phrasing gives excessive scope for judicial speculation, allowing the state to impose serious orders based on future suspicion rather than concrete, proven past behaviour.
Amendment 7, also in my noble friend’s name, seeks to specify a maximum length of time for an order, challenging the Bill’s proposals that a respect order can be imposed for an indefinite period. An indefinite order, based on a civil standard of proof, is inconsistent with the framework of other behaviour control orders. We propose a maximum duration, such as two years, to align respect orders with other established orders and requiring judicial review for any extension.
We must ensure that these powers cannot be weaponised against those struggling with homelessness or mental health issues, as seen with past anti-social behaviour powers targeting people for begging, sleeping rough or feeding the birds. Amendment 12—I thank the noble Lord, Lord Meston, for signing it—seeks to remove the power to exclude a person from their home. This power, introduced in new Section C1, is disproportionate; exclusion from one’s home is an extremely severe sanction. While the Bill limits this to cases involving violence or a significant risk of harm, such threats should be handled exclusively through the criminal justice system or specific protection orders to ensure that the necessary safeguards and standards of proof are met. We on these Benches are particularly concerned about the risk of this power being used inappropriately against victims of domestic abuse, potentially leading to their eviction instead of the perpetrator’s detention.
Amendment 18 would remove the provision creating interim respect orders. Interim orders lack proper procedural safeguards and carry the inherent risk of disproportionate interference with liberty, particularly when they are made without notice to the respondent. If a situation is so urgent that it requires immediate prohibition, a more specific or criminal intervention is warranted. Anti-social and behaviour measures must possess strong democratic and public accountability to counter the risk of arbitrary local restriction.
Amendment 9 in my name requires respect orders to pass through full council and be subject to a full public consultation before the relevant authority makes an application to the court. This would ensure that elected representatives approve decisions that directly impact civil liberties, which would mitigate the democratic deficit seen in the implementation of other local orders such as PSPOs.
Amendment 21, in my name and signed by my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, mandates that the Secretary of State must conduct a full public consultation exercise prior to issuing any statutory guidance on respect orders. This guidance must be informed by groups including the police, victims’ interests groups, housing providers and, crucially, homeless persons and legal practitioners. This would prevent guidance aimed at curbing behaviour being developed in a vacuum and ensure that it is practical and trauma-informed, especially when dealing with those struggling with addiction or homelessness.
In conclusion, these amendments collectively seek to address the historical weaknesses of the ASBI regime —weak judicial thresholds, arbitrary enforcement, indefinite application and a lack of accountability—before they are codified in a new measure that carries the full weight of the criminal law. If respect orders are to succeed where previous civil orders failed, they must be founded on evidence, necessity and transparency. I urge the Minister to recognise the fundamental importance of these safeguards. I beg to move.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I think it is the Matterhorn at this stage, rather than Everest, but we will see. I thank the Minister for his very full reply, and I thank all noble Lords for their support for this set of amendments that I and my noble friend Lady Doocey put forward. The Minister has set out his stall; he is clearly very wedded to the current wording, and that will merit careful consideration. I recognise the point he made about this being a manifesto commitment, but Amendment 1 is not designed to negate respect orders; it is designed to review the existing suite of anti-social behaviour legislation in order to make sure that it is effective.
I recognise the point the Minister made about the 1 million incidents, but we do not know at this stage, other than from the Minister’s assertions, that the respect orders are going to be effective in dealing with those, or, indeed, whether existing powers would have themselves been effective.
The Minister did not really explain why the current legislation is inadequate. He also did not for one second admit that the current regime of PSPOs and CPNs had its faults.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The real difference between this legislation and the existing legislation is that action can be taken immediately. I think I did touch on that point, but if it was not to the noble Lord’s satisfaction, I apologise. We can take action immediately on a breach.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
I think we are going to need some more convincing that that is the case, compared to anti-social behaviour injunctions. So, we remain somewhat unconvinced.
We have the common aim across the House of achieving an effective system that is fair and proportionate. The one chink in the Minister’s armour was that he was prepared, in response to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to consider the wording “necessary and proportionate”. I very much hope that he will consider that as a possible amendment to his proposal.
I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, that Governments reach for the statute book; we need to consider whether existing legislation is sufficient. The noble Lord, Lord Hacking, called for a pause. Whether it is a pause or a review, we will definitely want to return to this on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 1.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
Just briefly, because this is a very important aspect of the enforcement of respect orders, I ask whether the Minister is saying that all that is needed is that it is shown beyond reasonable doubt that the respect order has been breached, or does one go back to the original decision on the civil balance of probabilities—the reasons for the respect order? Is it purely that you have to show beyond reasonable doubt that the respect order has been breached, in which case it is still a civil balance of probabilities requirement for the original respect order to be enforced?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
There is a determination, and I believe the legislation before us today is clear on that matter. We will debate this still further, undoubtedly, but there is essentially a respect order where the court will consider the potential breach and will make a judgment on it, and having examined that, it will determine the issue in relation to that breach. The noble Lord raises that issue now, but as regards Amendment 19 before us today, which is the point I am making now, limiting the scope of where an interim respect order can be issued risks further harm for communities as a whole.
I will just focus on the points that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, mentioned. She covered in the last series of amendments the same issue, in a sense, about capacity, which is important. It will be a matter for discretion of the applicant and the court to determine what requirements will be most suitable in line with the resources and options that are available in a given area. So, again, that discretion is there at a local level to determine; for example, if an alcohol awareness course is required, then self-evidently an alcohol awareness course has to be available for the individual to take up that course. Those judgments will be made at a local level by the local individuals who are determining these matters.
Again, I refer noble Lords to the economic impact assessment that we have published. The ASB package is expected to lead to
“an overall reduction in prison places”.
The respect order replaces the civil injunction, and we are not expecting additional cases per se. Once in a steady state, annual prison places for respect orders will stay more or less the same, and we expect respect orders to have a neutral impact on prison places, given that they are replacing civil injunction powers. So I hope that that again reassures the noble Baroness in relation to the resource question of the additional impact of these matters. With those comments, I respectfully request the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, the Minister mentioned in his remarks on the first group that there are over a million instances of anti-social behaviour in the United Kingdom, and he is seeking broad new powers in the early part of the Bill. Can he give the House any guidance as to what sort of effect, if the House were to give the Government these powers, will be seen in terms of a projected reduction in anti-social behaviour as a result?
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I will seize the opportunity to agree with the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, while the going is good and before I have to disagree with him on future groupings. I entirely agreed with what he had to say, as indeed I did with the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower.
This stand part debate goes to what might be called the heart of legislative utility. Why do we need a new tool if the old tools are sufficient? We must ask: does Clause 1 solve a problem or does it merely create complexity and risk? The Bill, as we have heard, introduces respect orders, but it also retains anti-social behaviour injunctions. Many of us already feel that the new respect orders, as we debated in the first group, are unnecessary and largely either replicate powers already available under the 2014 Act, or, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, made very clear, add undesirable elements to those powers.
We have seen with ASBIs that there have been some proposals to include positive requirements tailored to underlying causes of behaviour. If the goal of the Government is to better address the underlying causes of persistent anti-social behaviour, we could be strengthening the existing injunction framework, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said, focusing resources on effective enforcement and mandating psychological or therapeutic interventions, rather than introducing a confusing, duplicated power.
Our preference on these Benches is very clear. We should focus on accountability, review and proportionality to ensure that the existing framework works effectively, rather than adding a potentially flawed new tool that invites mission creep and targets the vulnerable.
Lord Clement-Jones
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes the subsections increasing the level of fines attached to FPNs, aiming to address concerns that existing notices and orders are being imposed in inappropriate circumstances.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 23 would remove subsections that increase the maximum level of fines attached to fixed penalty notices for breach of public space protection orders and community protection notices. The core proposal of Clause 4 is to increase the maximum FPN for these breaches from £100 to a punitive £500. This represents a 400% increase in the penalty for infractions often issued without judicial oversight.
The Manifesto Club—a body which I mentioned previously and with which I have engaged extensively on these powers—rightly labels this increase as a
“grossly out-of-proportion penalty”.
We must look at the nature of the offences that these fines target. The Home Office claims that this increase shows a “zero-tolerance approach” to anti-social behaviour, but that ignores the actual activities being punished. Manifesto Club research, relying on freedom of information data, shows that the vast majority of penalties are issued for innocuous actions that fall far outside anyone’s definition of serious anti-social behaviour. This is leading to what the Manifesto Club calls
“the hyper-regulation of public spaces”.
For instance, in 2023, Hillingdon Council issued PSPO penalties largely for idling—leaving a car engine running for more than two minutes. This affected 2,335 people, including a man waiting to collect his wife from a doctor’s surgery. Other commonly banned activities that face this grossly increased penalty include loitering, swearing, begging, wild swimming, busking and feeding birds.
The Manifesto Club has documented community protection notices that target non-harmful behaviours, which are also subject to the increased fine. Orders have been issued banning two people from closing their front door too loudly, prohibiting a man from storing his wheelbarrow behind his shed and banning an 82 year-old from wearing a bikini in her own garden. The increase in fines to £500 for these so-called busybody offences appears to be simply a form of message sending, rather than a proportionate penalty designed to resolve community harm.
The second, and perhaps most corrosive, effect of Clause 4 is that it will spark a boom in the enforcement industry and intensify the practice of fining for profit. The Manifesto Club found that 75% of PSPO penalties in 2023 were issued by private enforcement companies. These companies are typically paid per fine issued, which creates an overt financial incentive to pursue volume regardless of genuine harm or proportionality. They target easy infractions rather than the most serious offenders.
Increasing the financial reward fivefold heightens this perverse incentive to issue as many FPNs as possible for anodyne activities. Crucially, while Defra has published guidance stating that environmental enforcement should never be a means to raise revenue, the Home Office has not prohibited fining for profit for anti-social behaviour offences such as PSPO and CPN breaches, nor even formally acknowledged the issue. I have raised this many times in the House.
Rather than authorising this increase in fines, we should be prohibiting incentivised enforcement for all ASB penalties in primary legislation or statutory guidance. The system of FPNs is already heavily criticised for undermining due process. They are issued solely based on the decision of an official and do not involve the production of evidence in court. This lack of judicial scrutiny means that, when innocent people are fined for innocuous actions, they often feel completely helpless, lacking the means to appeal a decision made by incentive-driven officers.
If we are serious about addressing serious anti-social behaviour, the enforcement should focus on serious criminality and nuisance, not extracting revenue from arbitrary restrictions. We must resist measures that intensify arbitrary law enforcement and injustice. This increase in penalties must be abandoned. I therefore urge the Government to support Amendment 23 and reject subsections (3) and (4) of Clause 4. I beg to move.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I rise to speak to my Amendments 24 and 25. In some aspects, I take a slightly different view from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, because I approve of the increased £500 penalty, provided it is for real anti-social behaviour. I accept the noble Lord’s point that there seem to have been quite a few ASBOs granted for “busybody offences”, and that is not right.
However, my concern here is making sure that the fines are properly paid. If we give the rise to £500, what will be the punishment if criminals do not pay it? Imprisonment is not important. In the words of the great capitalist Del Boy, it is “cushty”, and most criminals, from the smallest to the greatest, regard a term of imprisonment as factored into the crime. What about fines? No problem, they will simply not pay them, and with sufficient sob stories to the court, they will probably get away with a ridiculously low payment plan. Then, when they go outside and drive away in their BMW while texting on their new iPhone, that is great.
Only one thing works as proper punishment—they hate it—and gives the state and victims proper recompense: that is the confiscation of their ill-gotten gains or of any part of their property, which will cover the amount of any unpaid penalty. Of course, there are compensation orders, which can be made for most crimes, but, again, the convict will probably not pay up and nothing more will be done about it.
We must expand confiscation orders to all crimes where a penalty has not been paid, and my amendments are, I would suggest, a tiny but good example. We seem to go out of our way to make compensation orders as difficult as possible to obtain and deliver. Confiscation orders in the UK can be issued for any crime that involves financial gain, not just specific offences. They are used to take away profits from criminal activity, with the court determining the amount of the order based on the defendant’s benefit from their criminal conduct. The common crimes involve fraud, drug trafficking, theft and organised crime, but any offence where a financial element is present can trigger an order.
How do confiscation orders work? First of all, a conviction is required. Even I would agree with that. A confiscation order can be made only after the defendant is convicted of a crime. The Crown Court decides whether to issue an order after gathering information from both the prosecution and defence. The court’s goal is to recover the benefit—they stress “benefit”—the defendant gained from the criminal conduct. The court considers whether the defendant has a criminal lifestyle, which can be established by their conduct over time. The ultimate aim is to disrupt criminal activity by making the crime unprofitable and preventing future offences.
Why on earth stop with that tight confiscation concept about ill-gotten gains? If someone has committed a crime and gets a financial penalty or a fine and he does not pay up, he has benefited from that crime. He has made a financial gain in that he has saved the money he should have spent on a fine. In those circumstances, it is only just and right that the court’s bailiff can confiscate all and any property of the convict to recover the fine he has refused to pay or says that he cannot pay.
In this case, we are looking at confiscation of his goods and property up to a value of £500 plus a small administration fee. My amendment advocates automaticity, and that is essential. We do not need all the evidence of ill-gotten gains that prosecutors have to go through to prove that the superyacht, Bentleys and five homes all over the world came from drug running or ripping off a pension fund, since we would be collecting only on a known fine imposed by a court.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lord, I thank the Minister for his reply, disappointing though it is, but that is probably a pattern that will continue as the Bill carries on.
I did not even get an acknowledgement from the Minister that there are flaws in the existing PSPO/CPN system; often, it is just busybody offences that receive fixed penalty notices. He just recited a number, at perhaps the outer edge of anti-social behaviour, which of course should attract fixed penalty notices. He also prayed in aid the fact that environmental offences can have fixed penalty notices at a higher level, but we have heard quite a lot of anecdotal evidence about those being misused. The chances are that these new higher penalties will be misused as well.
I also did not seem to get any acknowledgement that the fining-for-profit aspect of this by local government is a problem. I do not know whether the new statutory guidance the Minister mentioned will include something along those lines. I very much hope so, and that he can reassure us that there will be a reaffirmation of the need for proper democratic oversight of PSPOs and CPNs. The current guidance recommends that councils, either in full council or in cabinet, approve these orders but that appears not to be the case currently, with all the consequences that the Baroness, Lady Fox, has outlined.
I hope that, if we are going to learn from the experience of the current anti-social behaviour powers, the Government take on board some of this debate and the points made in previous groups. We will probably return to this on Report, but for now, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 23.