Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 404, 405, 431 and 432. In the light of the hour and the spirit of my conversations with the Minister, I will not go through my amendments in detail, nor the very long journey it has been to get here. In short, they concern earlier agreements that, in cases where a child has died, the coroner and the police should be equipped and informed to preserve data from online services.

I thank the Minister, and officials from both the Ministry of Justice and DSIT, for their engagement. Before I put on record some of my concerns, I acknowledge that, for the past few weeks at least, we have been trying to get to the same place on this. I am disappointed that we have not quite found a way to do so, and I hope that the Minister will find a way to reassure me and—possibly more importantly—the bereaved parents who have fought hard for these amendments.

Both my Amendment 404 and government Amendment 429A seek to make it automatic that, on being notified of the death of a child, a coroner issues a data preservation notice which means that a regulated service under the Online Safety Act would have to preserve the data of a child within five days. The Government have agreed to this in principle but wanted to exclude children who die in circumstances such as a road accident or in hospital as a result of illness, to which I have agreed. But, in their effort to exclude those children, they have, in proposed new subsection (1)(b) in their Amendment 429A, allowed the coroner to decide

“that no purpose would be served by OFCOM giving a notice”

under the Act

“because such information is of no relevance to a child’s death”.

That is too broad. Giving permission for a coroner to decide what constitutes “no purpose” is a bit like snakes and ladders: we are back to the problem that has plagued bereaved parents, where coroners underestimate the speed necessary to preserve data, or the scope and importance of information that might be preserved in this way. This is not a criticism of coroners. It is far beyond the experience of professionals, across all domains, to understand the range of online material available or its ethereal nature.

My second issue with the government amendment is that they have chosen to reduce the length of time that data is preserved—the preservation notice—from a year to six months. I discussed this with officials earlier today, and I understand that it is extendable, but both I and Ellen Roome, bereaved mother of Jools, feel that it is not long enough. Some 45% of inquests take longer than six months; 18% take more than a year. Reducing the time is deliberately creating a weakness in the system at a time when parents need support and must not be made anxious by watching the clock running down and worrying whether someone, somewhere in the system, will fail to extend the preservation order.

There is also an ongoing issue with conflicts between our laws and those in the US. I received a letter from Minister Narayan this week updating me about the conflict between Section 101 of the Online Safety Act and the US Stored Communications Act. The letter said:

“Interpretation of the SCA is not settled”,


there may be some variety between different US states, and

“discussions between DSIT, Ofcom and service providers are taking a place to find a path forward”.

This regime depends entirely on resolving this issue. We were promised from the Dispatch Box that this was a priority for DSIT nearly two years ago, when the previous Government were in power. It was not done then and it is still not resolved. The letter did not mention anything about discussions between Government Ministers and their counterparts in the US, upon which this finally depends. I hope that the Minister is not surprised at the level of frustration felt by bereaved parents at the lack of speed with which this issue has been pursued.

The Government have put out a press release and made assurances to bereaved parents, and now we are here at a time of night when no vote can reasonably take place. So I would like the Minister to offer to bring pack tighter wording at Third Reading. I believe it is necessary and what parents are expecting. Even if she is not able to make that commitment tonight, it is what should happen and I ask her to try to make it happen. It has been promised and I believe it must be delivered.

I do not intend to pursue my Amendment 405, but I simply ask the Minister to put on the record how the police will be better informed of this regime. I finish by paying tribute all the bereaved families who have campaigned for this change—Jools’ law—and the amendments that preceded it. We in this House are witness to your pain and your generosity in campaigning so that others do not suffer as you have.

I wish to remind the Government of what one father said the day before Committee: “I was happy with the meeting with Liz Kendall until I realised it was the exact same meeting I had with Peter Kyle the year before. Nothing had changed except the size of the room to accommodate the increased number of bereaved parents”. There is a crisis unfolding that the Government are not grasping. Sorting out this amendment is not enough, but it must be done. I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to speak on this vital group of amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, concerning the investigation of child deaths, to which I have been very pleased to add my name. We all absolutely acknowledge that the noble Baroness has been tireless in her campaign and her support for the bereaved parents, and she is no less eloquent or persuasive even at this time of night.

The chink of light provided by the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, in Committee and the movement represented by government Amendments 429A and 454A are very welcome. However, on these Benches, like the noble Baroness we question whether they are as comprehensive as the solutions proposed in her amendments. The government amendments are substantive concessions regarding the principle of automatic data preservation, but they fall short of the immediate statutory certainty and the proactive coronial and police duties sought by the noble Baroness to ensure a comprehensive investigation into digital harms. So, while I welcome in principle the Government’s agreement to make DPNs automatic, their current drafting often leans on secondary legislation and future consultations. These amendments place the duty firmly in the Bill, providing the immediate legal certainty that bereaved families deserve in 2026.

Perhaps the most critical missing piece in the Government’s current approach is addressed by Amendment 404, which requires the police to investigate digital harm as a primary line of inquiry as a matter of routine. We cannot treat the digital environment as secondary to the physical. If a child is found harmed in a public park, the police do not wait for a consultation to decide whether to check the CCTV, yet when a child dies in circumstances which may involve social media, digital forensics are often treated as an afterthought or a secondary consideration. So the noble Baroness’s additional amendments should not be controversial. They should be accepted, fast-tracked and robustly enforced, and I urge the Minister to take them on board today.

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

My Lords, I too will speak very briefly, given the hour. I was also pleased to add my name to Amendment 431. For the benefit of Hansard, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, referred to Amendment 404—but I think she was talking about Amendment 431. Anyway, I am going to try to talk about Amendment 431. I agree with everything the noble Baroness said in her opening remarks.

I too will focus on subsection (4)(i) of the new clause proposed by the Government’s Amendment 429A, which reduces the time for which data would be preserved, from 12 to six months. I have been given to understand that part of the reason for that is because of the ECHR and the need to respect the privacy of those concerned, but it leaves bereaved parents in an unsatisfactory situation, and I wondered why the Government did it this way round and why there could not be a mechanism for automatically deleting any data the minute the inquest was completed and the data was no longer needed, rather than putting pressure on coroners to have to extend, and apply for an extension of, the notices. I would be grateful if the Minister could consider that.

--- Later in debate ---

If the Minister were agreeable, I would be delighted to meet him, or his ministerial colleagues, to discuss the best way to progress this agenda. I have business and Civil Service experience of cutting red tape and would frankly like to help—but obviously at a more civilised hour. I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to this group of amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. With the finishing post in sight, I will be extremely brief.

These amendments correctly identify a crisis at the heart of our police service. There is a consensus that our police are currently drowning in a sea of unnecessary paperwork, and my noble friend Lady Doocey’s policy paper, Policing Fit for the Future, makes the case with devastating clarity. It records the testimony of chief constables, who warn that low morale and heavy workloads are being compounded by

“archaic IT systems—some over 50 years old”

that force highly trained officers to spend more time as data entry clerks than as crime fighters. The Government’s own White Paper, From Local to National: A New Model for Policing, acknowledges this failure. It rightly sets out a mission to “strip away the barriers” that prevent officers focusing on the public’s priorities. We on these Benches welcome the ambition to automate manual processes and deliver millions of hours back to the front line.

I am not going to go into detail on the amendments, but we cannot support them as drafted. They risk micromanaging the police through the statute book and could become relics of a different era within a few short years. However, I urge the Minister to take the spirit of these proposals to heart and ensure that they are reflected in the new national policing model.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for bringing forward this group of amendments. Together, they address a theme that will be familiar to many across the House: the need to ensure that police officers are able to focus their time on policing rather than bureaucracy.

Amendment 409D concerns the publication of enforcement data for a number of offences that have become a source of considerable public concern, including shoplifting, offences involving blades, phone theft and fare evasion. We lend our strong support to the amendment. Greater transparency around enforcement activity can only help to strengthen public confidence and provide a clearer picture of how policing resources are being deployed.

Amendment 409E addresses the volume of paperwork that officers are required to complete. In Committee, it was rightly observed that administrative burdens can too often draw officers away from the front line. A review of the scale of those requirements and how they might be simplified would therefore be a sensible and constructive step.

Finally, Amendment 409F raises the question of data sharing and the efficiency of the systems that underpin case preparation and charging decisions. As many noble Lords will know, delays and inefficiencies in the exchange of information between the police and the Crown Prosecution Service can slow down the progress of cases and place additional strain on already stretched resources.

There is a significant amount of work that goes into the redaction of police documents before they are sent to the CPS, often for the documents simply to be sent back because they are overredacted. Furthermore, many of the cases the police redact may not end up being prosecuted. It is clear that this is a significant waste of police time and money, and my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe is right: it would make more sense for the CPS to take charge of the redaction of documents that may enter the public domain, given that it would have a far smaller number of documents to trawl through.

Taken together, these amendments all speak to a wider objective: ensuring that the system surrounding policing work is as efficient as possible, allowing officers to focus on preventing crime, catching offenders and protecting the public. The police should be spending as much time on the front line as possible, rather than being encumbered by unnecessary paperwork. I hope that the Minister will give them careful consideration and, as always, I look forward to his response.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goudie (Lab)]

My Lords, I support the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, and the noble Lord, Lord Banner. I thank the Minister and his officials for all they have done on this clause. Might the Minister look at this again before Third Reading or at some other point to see whether it is possible to do what we have requested? I am grateful for all the meetings and the help we have had from everybody; let us hope that we can do something.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, we support in principle Amendments 387C and 387D, the first of which was moved by the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Banner.

These amendments address a moral and legal imperative, ensuring that assets confiscated from those who violate our laws, particularly our sanctions regime, are used to provide redress to the victims of those very same violations. My own amendment in Committee focused on a ministerial power to create a fund via regulations but Amendments 387C and 387D would place this power where I believe it properly belongs: with the judiciary. By amending the Sentencing Act 2020 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, these amendments would grant the Crown Court the discretion to award compensation for public interest or social purposes. This would ensure that, when a court deprives a defendant of the benefits of their crime, it can simultaneously direct those funds towards the restoration of the communities or individuals harmed.

As the organisation Redress has highlighted with great clarity, the UK is currently an outlier. Both the United States and the European Union have already established mechanisms to repurpose seized assets. In 2023, the US successfully transferred over $4 million seized from a Russian oligarch to support war veterans in Ukraine. Here in the UK, we have frozen assets on an unprecedented scale following the invasion of Ukraine, yet we operate in a regulatory lacuna where we can freeze and eventually confiscate but we cannot compensate effectively. Without these amendments, we are, in effect, telling the victims of state-sponsored aggression and human rights abuses that, although we will punish the perpetrator, we will do nothing for the survivor.

This is not about the convenience of the state; it is about clarity of justice. We must move away from a system that treats the proceeds of sanctions violations as a windfall for the Treasury and instead treat them as a resource for reparations. I urge the Minister to recognise that there is cross-party unanimity on this issue. Sympathy at the Dispatch Box in Committee was a start, but sympathy does not stop crime—and it certainly does not provide reparations.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, first, I thank my noble friend Lord Banner for tabling these amendments, which, as we have heard, raise questions around how the proceeds of crime may be used to benefit victims. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, for stepping into the breach today to speak to these amendments in my noble friend’s absence.

My noble friend Lord Banner has tenaciously pursued this matter for many months. The intention behind his amendments is clear: to ensure that, where criminal assets are confiscated, the courts have flexibility to direct those funds towards compensation for victims or towards wider public interest purposes linked to the harm caused. In Committee, I spoke sympathetically on these amendments. I shall not seek to repeat the points I made then but other noble Lords explored how these proposals would interact with the existing confiscation and forfeiture regimes under the Sentencing Act 2020 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. Those are complex frameworks, and any changes to them must be carefully considered, but these amendments make an important point about ensuring that justice is not only punitive but restorative. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 9th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

This is another context where there has to be a fair balance between competing interests. One can easily see that the use of live facial recognition is a vital policing tool. However, as has been explained, it has an adverse impact on privacy. What concerns me is that the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act require not merely that steps taken are necessary and proportionate, which the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, rightly referred to, but it is a requirement that any restrictions or provisions in such a context must be prescribed by law.

I am very concerned that having police authorities and police officers exercising a pure discretion, without any statutory guidance or code of practice, may well fail that legal test of prescribed by law, because of the uncertainty and the excess of discretion. Therefore, the Government would be well advised in this sensitive context to ensure that there is statutory guidance and a statutory code of practice. The Minister may be unable to accept this amendment, but I hope he will be able to tell the House that steps will be taken to provide clear guidance to police authorities as to the use of this technology.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 374, which I have signed, but also to Amendment 430, which I tabled.

The use of live facial recognition in our public spaces is an extraordinary expansion of state power that currently exists in a legal vacuum. We are not Luddites on these Benches; we recognise the utility of technology, but we must ensure that live facial recognition is a targeted tool used under the rule of law and not a blanket surveillance net that chills the right to move freely and anonymously in our streets. The use of live facial recognition technology in public spaces poses a profound challenge to our civil liberties that cannot be met purely by internal police guidance. We are witnessing a fundamental shift in the nature of British policing—a shift, if you like, from the line-fishing of traditional human observation to the deep ocean trawling of automated mass surveillance.

Amendments 374 and 430 collectively seek to provide the democratic and judicial safeguards currently missing from what the experts have called a regulatory lacuna or legislative void. Amendment 374 prohibits the use of LFR during public assemblies or processions, unless a specific code of practice has been approved by both Houses of Parliament, as my noble friends have explained. In a free society, individuals should not have to pay the price of handing over their sensitive biometric data just to engage in democratic protest. We must safeguard public privacy and civil liberties by requiring democratic oversight before this technology is deployed against those exercising their right to assembly. We cannot have policing by algorithm without democratic oversight.

The current lack of oversight creates a documented chilling effect. Research by the Ada Lovelace Institute indicates that nearly one-third of the public are uncomfortable with police use of LFR, and up to 38% of young Londoners, for instance, have stated they would stay away from protests or public events if they knew that this technology was being used. We cannot allow our public squares to become spaces where citizens are treated as walking barcodes or a nation of suspects.

Critically, Amendment 430 would establish that the use of LFR in public spaces must be limited to narrowly defined serious cases and require judicial approval. It would provide the fundamental safeguards our society requires. It would prohibit the use of LFR by any authority unless it was for the investigation of serious crimes and had received prior judicial authorisation specifying the scope and duration of its use. We must ensure that this technology is used as a targeted tool, not a blanket surveillance net.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Wednesday 4th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Clement-Jones]

366: After Clause 132, insert the following new Clause—
“Digital identity theft(1) A person commits an offence of digital identity theft if—(a) the person obtains, or attempts to obtain, personal or sensitive information relating to an individual, including but not limited to passwords, identification numbers, credit card numbers, national insurance numbers, biometric data, or other unique digital identifiers, and(b) the person intends to use this personal or sensitive information to impersonate that individual, or to enable another person to impersonate that individual, with the purpose of carrying out any transaction, activity, or communication in their name without their consent or lawful authority.(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)—(a) “personal or sensitive information” refers to any data, whether digital, physical, or otherwise, that can be used to identify, authenticate, or impersonate an individual;(b) “obtains” includes acquiring, accessing, collecting, or otherwise coming into possession of such information.(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a fine, or both;(b) on conviction on indictment in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to a fine, or both.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment creates an offence of digital identity theft.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 366 also stands in the name of my noble friend Lady Doocey. I have been a persistent—or is it insistent?—advocate for a specific offence of digital identity theft for many years. There is currently no criminal offence of identity theft in England and Wales—none. A fraudster can harvest your biometric data, clone your digital identity and impersonate you across multiple platforms, and at the moment of those acts they have committed no specific crime. The law does not intervene until after the damage is done.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

While I understand the point the noble Baroness is making, I do not want to presage the content of the fraud strategy, which will be upon us really quite soon, or indeed what is in the legislation that will introduce national digital ID. I absolutely take the point that some people want to encourage digital ID because it gives security of identity in a digital form for deployment in a number of different areas, whether claiming a benefit, voting or whatever use it may offer—I will stop there because my expertise on digital ID does not extend much further. All I will say is that, given the comments I have already made about the Fisher review and the forthcoming fraud strategy, which will address emerging fraud risks, including identity theft, I hope that the noble Lord is content to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, and very much appreciate what she had to say. In particular, I thought the phrase “precious digital identity” was extremely important, as well as her reference to deepfakes. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for his support. As he rightly identified, I said 59% and he rounded it up to 60%. That is the figure for the percentage of identity fraud in our landscape.

The noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, said that the Government need to answer what they are planning to do. The Minister threw the kitchen sink at that question but did not really answer it. We have police training in AI and digital, but I am not sure what I am expected to understand when he starts off by saying there is perfectly adequate criminal law on this, but then tells me that they will look very carefully at this as part of the Fisher review. Which one is the answer that I should take from the Minister—that he is taking it seriously or that he is not?

We seem to keep getting the same answer. The Minister starts off by saying that there is enough criminal law to cover this—completely contradictory to the Fraud Act Select Committee—and on the other hand he says that the review will consider this very carefully. That is a series of mixed messages, quite apart from the fact that the police will prioritise their response to digital crime. How will they prioritise their response to digital crime without the tools they need—i.e. a proper criminal offence of digital identity theft?

There is some confusion on the part of the Government. I still think they have not taken this seriously, and our citizens will suffer as a result, particularly in the age of AI, which both the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies, were clear about.

If I wanted to talk to the Chief Whip or the government roster at this time of night, or if we were in prime time, I might push it to a vote. But I will not; I will withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 366 withdrawn.

Moved by

[Lord Clement-Jones]

367: After Clause 132, insert the following new Clause—
“Defences to charges under the Computer Misuse Act 1990(1) The Computer Misuse Act 1990 is amended as follows.(2) In section 1, after subsection (2) insert—“(2A) It is a defence to a charge under subsection (1) to prove that—(a) the person’s actions were necessary for the detection or prevention of crime, or(b) the person’s actions were justified as being in the public interest.”(3) In section 3, after subsection (5) insert—“(5A) It is a defence to a charge under subsection (1) to prove that—(a) the person’s actions were necessary for the detection or prevention of crime, or(b) the person’s actions were justified as being in the public interest.””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment creates defences to charges under the Computer Misuse Act 1990.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 367 is also in the name of my noble friend Lady Doocey, and there is rather better news on this amendment as a result of conversations with the Minister. I warmly welcome the significant movement the Government have made in this area. This is reflected both in the recent policy paper on introducing statutory defences into the Computer Misuse Act, which they have shared with me, and in the constructive meeting I recently held with the noble Lord, Lord Katz, for which I thank him.

The principle we have long championed, that a cyber security researcher’s intent and motivation should be a relevant factor in law, has finally been acknowledged. As the industry has told us for decades, the 1990 Act is a relic of a different era. It was drafted when only 0.5% of people used the internet. It is now being asked to govern a world of generative AI and industrialised cyber warfare. Its current blanket prohibition on unauthorised access makes no distinction between a malicious hacker and a white-hat security researcher. Under current law, our cyber defenders are forced to operate with one hand tied behind their backs, fearing prosecution for the very activities that keep our national infrastructure resilient. This is not just a legal anomaly; it is a direct threat to UK resilience.

However, while the policy paper is a major step forward, we must ensure that it results in robust statutory protection, not just a vague promise of prosecutorial discretion. Reliance on the good faith of prosecutors is not a long-term solution for an industry that requires absolute legal certainty. Our amendment would provide that framework—a defence where actions were necessary for the detection or prevention of crime or justified in the public interest.

I ask the Minister to address some of the following critical concerns arising from the Government’s own policy paper. Because of the time of night, I am going to abbreviate it to give him the headings and write to him subsequently. First, the accreditation bottleneck is a national security risk. The whole question of having to have chartered-level UK Cyber Security Council accreditation will create a bottleneck. The definition of “suitably qualified” suggests that only those with membership of professional bodies such as the UK Cyber Security Council will be valid, but will it recognise in due course that those with established industry experience, who may not hold formal academic credentials, will also qualify? The “no supervision” rule is operationally unworkable, and the scope of non-intrusive activity seems somewhat random.

The vulnerability duty creates a legal trap. The paper requires a researcher who discovers a vulnerability to make all reasonable efforts to report it to the system owner as soon as practicable, but the paper itself acknowledges the difficulty of identifying system owners.

The bug bounty market is under threat. The paper prohibits permitted persons from requesting or demanding payment for reporting a discovered vulnerability. The global bug bounty market, where organisations invite researchers to find and responsibly disclose flaws in exchange for payments, is worth hundreds of millions of pounds and is a cornerstone of modern cyber defence. The paper’s drafting risks chilling this entire ecosystem.

Then we have statutory versus non-statutory protections. The paper acknowledges that reliance on the good faith of prosecutors is not a solution. Can the Minister commit to placing these defences in the Bill during this Session? If not, what vehicle do the Government envisage? Could the upcoming Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill accommodate this reform? We need a clear answer on the legislative timetable.

The paper does not seem to cover the public sector—the National Cyber Security Centre itself—yet the proposed defence appears directed entirely at privately accredited individuals. That is a question that needs answering.

We cannot allow technological development to race ahead of democratic deliberation. Our cyber security professionals need the clarity of the law to protect the UK in 2026 and beyond. I very much hope that this is a moment of genuine policy momentum, so let us produce legislation that is workable, inclusive and legally certain. I am very hopeful that the Minister will continue the dialogue over this policy paper. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

Yes.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I thank the Minister for his response, and the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, and noble Lord, Lord Fuller, for their contributions. As the Minister says, this defence is at the behest of the cyber security industry. That is a very important point. This is not just a group of hackers who have decided that they need to cover their tracks; this has long been demanded by the cyber security industry. I very much hope that when the industry sees the policy paper produced by the Government, it will see that the movement towards a defence is constructive and particular and does not have the kind of loopholes that it fears.

I thank the Minister for his reassurances about future legislation. I am obviously in very good company with my noble friend in providing temptation for the Minister about the King’s Speech. We look forward to the future legislative opportunities that the Minister has described. In the meantime, I withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 367 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

I rise briefly to support this amendment. This country has been good at reducing fires. It has done it by designing things and places not to burn. We have never had the same determination about designing things not to be stolen. This is all about preventing crime by design. The secondary feature is that people do not tend to steal things that have no value. There are a lot of negatives, but fundamentally, if it has value, people will steal it. They do not steal it to deprive you of it but to sell it, often to fund their drug habit. This amendment is all about taking the value out of the stolen phone.

There is some success at the moment, in that some of these phones cannot be reactivated on UK systems, but as we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, they are getting activated abroad. It is hard to stop them going abroad; very small portable devices put in containers are hard to discover. Although it was mentioned that the Met and others are having good success with drones and chasing, I guarantee that one day somebody will get badly hurt—either one of the people being chased or one of the cops. Chasing is, inevitably, dangerous. This is about stopping the chase and stopping the crime.

The 70,000 crimes mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, will be a bare minimum. Many people do not bother reporting them. There is no need to report them for many people. Sometimes they lose them in embarrassing situations, and they certainly do not report it then. We are talking about a large amount of crime that can have something done to prevent it.

My final points are these. There is no incentive at the moment for the phone companies to stop this crime, because when you lose your phone or have it stolen, you buy another one from them. The £50 million-worth of phones that the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, mentioned means £50 million more for the providers of the phones. So why would they stop it? All they have is more business coming through the door. The business model is not helpful to preventing crime.

It is a common-sense measure. It is well thought out. The amendment looks like it will work, given its extent and comprehensiveness, and nobody has a better idea; or, if they have, I have not heard it. This does not cost the Government anything. It will possibly cost the manufacturers, but it will be marginal to the costs and profits they have already. It is a really good idea. It helps the police a bit, but it mainly helps the victims as it reduces their number. It means that you can walk down the street, come out of the Tube, take your phone out and not have somebody whip it out of your hand.

My final point is that it is not just about theft. Often people are injured when their phone is taken—it is violence as well as theft. Particularly with vulnerable victims, nobody knows where it will end. It can end up with a murder or a very serious crime. If we can do something about this, it will have an impact. It is achievable, and I recommend that the Government, if they do not accept the amendment, try to find a way to do it in the future.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to support Amendment 368 from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, on which he has campaigned so strongly. It addresses a crime that has become a blight on our streets: the industrialised theft of mobile devices. We must remove the profit motive from street crime. If a phone is useless the moment it is stolen, the thefts will stop. California proved it and the technology exists; the only thing missing is the will to legislate. I urge the Minister to move beyond collaboration and accept the amendment.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, I agree with that proposal.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 25th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group in my name are substantially the same as those that I tabled in Committee. As the House may recall, I withdrew those amendments following concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, but today I am reintroducing them for the House’s consideration. The amendments relate to the provisions in Clauses 31 to 35, which introduce stricter two-step age verification checks for the sale and delivery of knives and crossbows bought online.

For the House’s convenience I will recap: Clauses 31 and 32, on knives, and Clauses 33 and 34, on crossbows, will require at the point of sale, or point of sale or hire, for crossbows, specific checks to include photographic identity plus a current photograph; and, at the point of delivery, photographic identity checks; and they will create a new offence of delivering a package containing a knife or crossbow to someone other than the buyer—if the buyer is an individual, as opposed to, for example, a company—so that knives and crossbows cannot be left on doorsteps or with neighbours.

These amendments clarify that the passport or driving licence required as proof of age for a remote sale of a knife, or for a remote sale or hire of a crossbow, must be a physical version. We are also again adding provisions that will allow the Secretary of State to make regulations, subject to—I hope this helps the House—the affirmative procedure, prescribing an alternative process for age verification, such as digital ID. These amendments are required to ensure that a digital ID can be used as evidence of identity wherever the physical ID is accepted.

In Committee the noble Lord, Lord Davies, raised concerns that the use of digital ID would be mandatory. However, I assure him that this is not a blanket requirement mandating the use of digital ID to purchase knives or crossbows; it is simply making provision for alternative forms of ID, digital or otherwise, to be used. This is to ensure that the legislation keeps pace with future potential developments in digital ID. I know that the Benches opposite have concerns about the Government’s plans for digital ID, but we have been clear that under those plans it will not be mandatory to have a digital ID. I hope that that helps the noble Lord. These provisions are about giving people a choice in how they verify their identity. It will continue to be possible for the purchaser to present a physical passport or driving licence, where they have one, as an alternative to a specified digital ID.

Furthermore, with the permission and support of the authorities in Scotland and Northern Ireland, these amendments also extend these clauses to Scotland and Northern Ireland.

We are amending the legislation to ensure that all contractors in the delivery chain are responsible for age and ID verification on delivery of bladed products and crossbows to residential premises. This is to account for situations where the delivery company engaged by the seller to deliver the bladed product sub-contracts the delivery to other companies. We believe that it is essential that all companies in the chain are responsible for ensuring that age and identity are verified before the package is handed over to the buyer; otherwise, regulations made under the Bill would be meaningless.

I hope that, having reflected on the debate in Committee, and given the changes and the clarification I have given, the noble Lord, Lord Davies, will be content with these government amendments. There are other amendments in the group. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will, if he so wishes, move Amendment 177. I will respond to the noble Lord once I have heard his speech. For the moment, I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I am not sure whether I am in order. I am looking at the noble Lord, Lord Katz, who is nodding, which is good news. I thank him; it is much appreciated. There is nothing worse than writing a speech and being unable to deliver it.

I welcome the government amendments in this group, brought forward by the Minister, concerning the remote sale and delivery of knives and bladed articles. As I noted in Committee, we on these Benches fully support the intent behind the Government’s measures in this area. We must strengthen accountability for businesses and sellers in tackling online knife sales. We welcome the robust two-step age-verification checks being implemented. It is entirely right that we ensure a consistent UK-wide approach by extending these provisions, including those relating to crossbows, to Scotland and Northern Ireland. It is vital that the law across the home nations is exactly on the same footing, so that criminals cannot exploit cross-border differences to acquire lethal weapons.

I also welcome the amendments that clarify the rules around identity documents. The requirement for a physical identity document to be shown upon the delivery of a bladed product provides a necessary safeguard. Furthermore, we acknowledge the provisions allowing the Secretary of State to prescribe alternative age-verification steps such as digital ID.

As I made clear to the Minister previously, there is no Bench more strongly against compulsory digital ID than the Liberal Democrats’, so we remain highly supportive of the assurance that analogue physical forms of identity will continue to be accepted alongside any new digital alternatives. Embedded among these amendments, however, is our Amendment 177, referred to by the Minister, on the remote sale of knives. This amendment requires that regulations mandate the reporting of bulk knife sales to the police

“in real time, or as soon as is reasonably practicable”.

In Committee, the Minister stated that he was sympathetic to the overall aim of this amendment but argued that the current duty in Clause 36 was sufficient and that exact timeframes would be handled later in regulations, following consultation. Sympathy does not intervene in a crime. We have seen cases where young people effectively act as arms traders, buying huge numbers of illegal weapons online for community distribution. If the police are to effectively track and intercept these bulk purchases, they need that intelligence immediately, not days or weeks later when the weapons are already on the streets. Amendment 177 would ensure that operational effectiveness is guaranteed in the Bill, turning bureaucratic compliance into actionable, life-saving intelligence.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, in Committee, I asked the Government to withdraw their amendments that permitted them to require by regulations the use of digital ID for age verification for the online sale of knives and crossbows. My concern was that permitting this would be the first legislative step towards mandating digital IDs. Since then, of course, the Government have conceded that digital IDs will not be made mandatory and, while I still harbour some reservations, I am now content for the amendments to be made to the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Brady of Altrincham (Con)]

My Lords, I rise very briefly to thank the Ministers on the other side of the House. I am very grateful that they have accepted what I think was an entirely common-sense case, which the Government had already accepted in a report that was previously published. I would just say that, in what I think is now my 29th year in Parliament in one House or the other, the number of occasions when Governments and Ministers accept entirely common-sense arguments from the other side of the House and respond is so small that I cannot think of many others, so I really am grateful. It will help the police and reduce the bureaucratic burden on them. It will reduce costs for a lot of people and does not pose any harm whatever, so thank you.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I warmly welcome the Government’s amendments in this group, which deliver on the commitments made by the Minister during our debate in Committee. As I noted at the time, townies such as myself were being educated during the passage of the Bill on what these items were. However, the logic of this measure was immediately clear when the noble Lord, Lord Brady of Altrincham, introduced his amendments, and we were very pleased to support them when he first championed the cause. We are delighted that the Government have accepted his amendments.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I too thank the Minister for bringing forward these amendments. These measures were rightly pressed for in Committee by my noble friend Lord Brady of Altrincham, so I am glad the Government have taken his points on board and are now implementing them. These amendments will remove an administrative burden currently placed on the police—something we all support—and will pose no threat to the public. They are wholly reasonable, and we support them.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, it is very rare to have both unanimity and common sense break out across the Chamber. I thank all noble Lords for their comments, including those among townies—I associate myself with the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, as a fellow townie. It was an education and I have learned an awful lot. I thank everyone for their support.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I would say to the noble Lord before he sits down that unanimity and common sense do not always go together.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

That is the point that I was struggling to make, which is put more eloquently by the noble Lord.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 25th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak to the amendment tabled in my name. As noble Lords know, I am terrible with the billion rules that we have in this place, so bear with me. This amendment would make a small change that would make a big difference to many residents around the country.

I shall try not to rehearse the arguments that I have made before, but we now need to reflect the reality of the housing situation in this country. With the Government’s mission to build 1.5 million homes, this reality will only become bigger—that many of our housing providers in the social sector are for-profit companies. It is a matter of fairness to make sure that the vulnerable residents that they are responsible for have the same access to the law that any resident would have, regardless of the legal structure of their landlord. To make that happen, I have proposed small changes to remove the particular words “non-profit private”. That would make a massive difference to these companies’ ability to keep people safe.

The law is at its best when it is clear and coherent. Good law should be comprehensive and unambiguous. If Parliament intends these powers to apply to housing providers, as I say, it should apply to all of them. This amendment would not alter the policy intent of the Bill but strengthen it, reinforcing the simple principle that tenants’ safety and accountability must be the same, regardless of where you live in the country. I recommend the amendment to the Government and ask for this tiny change to make sure that we can deliver safety for all our residents countrywide.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak to the amendments in my noble friend Lady Doocey’s name and mine, which seek to ensure that the Government’s new anti-social behaviour powers are grounded in evidence, proportionality and democratic accountability, as well as to other amendments in this group.

On these Benches, we do not dismiss the misery that persistent anti-social behaviour causes, but we remain deeply unconvinced that layering yet another complex civil order on to an already confused ASB framework is the right approach. As Justice has highlighted, respect orders risk duplicating existing powers, come with limited evidence of effectiveness and lack basic procedural safeguards. They rely on a weak civil standard of proof, yet they impose severe restrictions and carry a potential two-year prison sentence upon breach.

First, in Committee, we warned that the threshold of “just and convenient” is far too low for an order that can deprive a person of their liberty and exclude them from their home. I very much welcome what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, had to say in his observations on the European Convention on Human Rights. The Minister in Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, defended that language as “familiar” to the civil courts. However, he offered a chink of light, agreeing to examine the arguments for the wording in Amendment 1, “necessary and proportionate”, to ensure strict alignment with the Human Rights Act. I very much hope that his reflections have led him to accept this higher and safer threshold today, ensuring that these orders are not used merely for administrative expediency. We need an answer to the pilot or not-pilot question raised by my noble friend.

Secondly, I return to the issue of democratic accountability. Our Amendment 2 requires that the terms of respect orders and PSPOs must be subject to a full council vote. In his follow-up letter to me, following Committee, the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, rejected this, claiming that it would introduce delays and unnecessary bureaucracy. But democratic scrutiny of civil liberties is not an administrative delay; it is a constitutional necessity. The Government’s resistance to this directly contradicts the Local Government Association’s own statutory guidance, which recommends as best practice that final approval of a PSPO be undertaken at cabinet or full council level, to ensure openness and accountability.

Currently, research by the Campaign for Freedom in Everyday Life, formerly the Manifesto Club, shows that nearly half of all PSPOs are signed off by a single, often unelected, council officer, without any democratic vote. This lack of scrutiny has led to absurd and stigmatising orders banning innocuous activities. If full council approval is already recommended as best practice by the LGA, standardising it in legislation would not be an arduous delay; it would simply force all councils to meet the standard of transparency that the Government’s own guidance expects.

As regards Amendment 3, as I highlighted in Committee and in correspondence with the Minister, there is currently no formal means to directly appeal a PSPO FPN. Citizens feel pressured into paying unjust fines to avoid financial ruin. The Government’s move to increase the maximum fixed penalty notice for PSPO and CPN breaches to £500 is highly dangerous without statutory safeguards. In Committee, the Minister suggested that, if individuals feel a fine is unreasonable, they can simply make representations to the issuing agency. This is totally inadequate; there should be a formal right of appeal.

I turn to Amendment 7 in my name, which concerns fixed penalty notices for public space protection orders and community protection notices. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for her support in this respect and for her very extensive unpicking of these ASB powers. Under Clause 4, the Government are pushing ahead with a 400% increase to the maximum FPN for these breaches, raising it from £100 to a punitive £500. Without statutory safeguards, this will simply supercharge a system that is already widely abused. This new clause addresses the deeply concerning practice of fining for profit. It stipulates that neither an authorised person nor their employer may retain any financial benefit from the fixed penalty notices that they issue.

The Campaign for Freedom in Everyday Life’s Corruption of Punishment report exposes the grim reality of the modern enforcement market. Environmental and ASB enforcement is increasingly seen as a business. Local authorities are entering into contracts with private companies, boasting of “zero financial risk” while sharing the “surplus revenue” generated by fines. Guidance and formal representations are entirely inadequate when faced with the modern enforcement market. As the Campaign for Everyday Freedom’s research also highlights, 66 councils currently employ private companies to issue FPNs, and the standard model is that these companies retain a percentage of the income, often up to 100% until costs are recovered. This creates a direct perverse financial incentive to issue as many tickets as possible for innocuous actions.

As I have pointed out to the Minister, Defra has already issued strict guidance stating that private firms enforcing littering should not receive greater revenue from increasing the volume of penalties. It is entirely illogical not to apply the same statutory prohibition to anti-social behaviour enforcement. We must ban fining for profit in the Bill. It is a time to a put a statutory end to the revenue collection system masquerading as justice.

Finally, in Amendment 12, we have proposed an annual report on the use of these ASB powers, for all the reasons I have stated that were so well expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. I entirely understand that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, is trying to achieve something very similar in her amendment. We are all aiming for much greater transparency in the use of these ASB powers, and I very much hope that the Government will go for at least one of the proposals.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, it will come as no surprise to the Minister that these Benches maintain our opposition to the Government’s respect orders. We have heard, in Committee and today, many concerns about the new regime. Our concerns are slightly different from some of those expressed by other noble Lords, in that we oppose them because we view them as simply unnecessary.

In Committee, my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower asked the Minister what the true difference would be between respect orders and the current anti-social behaviour injunctions. The response confirmed that, in the Government’s view, the only difference is that breaching a respect order will be a criminal offence, whereas breaching an injunction is not a specified criminal offence. That may seem tougher on the surface, but, in reality, it will not make any difference. A person who breaches an ASB injunction can be prosecuted for contempt of court, as they have defied an order of the court; in addition, the power of arrest can be attached to the injunction under Section 4 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. Where that is the case, a police officer may arrest a person without warrant for breaching the terms of their injunction under Section 9(1) of that Act. Furthermore, an arrest warrant may be made by the court if the person who applied for the injunction believes the person has breached that injunction.

For all those reasons, therefore, a number of avenues exist for enforcement of these injunctions. But, even if the Government believe that creating a specific criminal offence is necessary, why not simply amend the ASB injunction regime to create that offence? Why introduce an entirely new regime? Having said all that, we are where we are. In Committee, the Minister responded to my noble friend’s criticism by stating that it was a manifesto commitment. I do accept this, and that is why I suspect they will pass today unhindered.

I turn briefly to some of the other amendments in this group. I have a rather specific concern about the requirement in Amendment 2, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that a respect order may be applied for only if the local authority has agreed to do so at a meeting of the full council. Subsection (8A) in his amendment states:

“A relevant authority may not make an application for a respect order … unless the relevant local authority has complied with the requirements … in subsection (8B).


However, the definition of relevant authority in new Section B1 includes

“the chief officer of police for a police area … the chief constable of the British Transport Police”,

and a number of other authorities, such as Transport for London. What this means is that, should the police wish to apply for a respect order, they must first seek the approval of the local council. I do wonder whether this might create an overly burdensome and time-consuming requirement.

Amendment 7 from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, is, however, something I do have sympathy for. In 2024, a record 14.4 million parking fines were issued, representing a 13% increase from the previous year. There are widespread concerns about unclear parking signage, faulty machines and companies using quotas to increase the number of fines they collect. Parking firms and, indeed, councils using fines based on spurious violations simply to make money is surely not right. Where a person has violated the rules, of course the use of penalty charge notices is justified, but we should not allow them to unfairly issue fines to those who do not deserve it.

Finally, and having been somewhat critical of respect orders, I say to the Minister that I welcome his Amendment 4. As much as I may think that respect orders are unnecessary, if we are to have them, it is welcome that the Secretary of State will be required to consult on the guidance they issue.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

As ever, I am genuinely sorry that I have not been able to persuade the noble and right reverend Lord of the Government’s case. We have taken the view that “just and convenient” mirrors the civil injunction regime of the 2014 Act, passed by a Conservative and Liberal Democrat Government. They are not words from a Labour Minister but from an Act passed in 2014 that we are mirroring in the Government’s manifesto commitment to introduce respect orders. I am sorry that I cannot convince the noble and right reverend Lord of that, and that I have not persuaded him accordingly. We may—although I do not know—very shortly have an opportunity to see whether anybody else is persuaded.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I am afraid that I remain unpersuaded. The Minister keeps mentioning the manifesto commitment, but the manifesto makes no mention of the liability threshold for a respect order, so it is surely perfectly legitimate to question the basis on which the respect order the Government are introducing is based.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The basis on which the respect order is introduced, and the phraseology used, is the phraseology his and His Majesty’s Opposition’s Government put in place for previous orders. I am not changing the wording of anything that, presumably, at some point in 2014 he and other Liberal Democrat Peers walked through a Lobby to vote for.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

Actually, I did not.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord has got me there. Let me rephrase my challenge. The noble Lord did not support it, but the coalition Government he supported passed the 2014 Act. I like to be accurate in my barbs at noble Lords, and I hope that accuracy persuades him that, even if he did not vote for it, some of his noble friends in the coalition Government of the time did—a coalition that our side of the House did not look too favourably upon. I accept his personal position, but if there is division of opinion in this House and we test it, I shall move Amendment 4. I hope that other noble Lords will not press their amendments, but if I have not convinced them, they will put them to the test in the House.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, as a final throw, I wonder whether the Minister remembers how the Labour Benches voted in respect of those orders at the time.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Clement-Jones]

7: Clause 4, page 12, line 11, at end insert—
“(5) For the purposes of this section, any authorised person or company issuing fixed penalty notices under the provisions listed in subsection (6) must not receive, directly or indirectly, any financial benefit that is contingent upon—(a) the issuing of a fixed penalty notice, or(b) the number or value of fixed penalty notices issued.(6) The provisions are—(a) section 52, and(b) section 68,of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (fixed penalty notices).(7) For the purposes of subsection (5), a financial benefit includes, but is not limited to—(a) any commission, bonus, incentive payment, or performance-related remuneration;(b) any benefit provided under a contract, arrangement, or understanding that links remuneration to enforcement outcomes;(c) any financial profit accrued by an employer;(d) any non-monetary benefit prescribed by regulations. (8) Any employer or person found to be in breach of subsection (5) may have their arrangements, accreditation or authorisation revoked by the chief officer of police or relevant local authority.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure that any accredited or authorised person, and their employer, may not profit financially from the issuing of fixed penalty notices.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I am afraid that it is no cigar again for the Minister on this amendment. On his promise of consultation on statutory guidance and so on on the question of fining for profit, I really do not think that is going to cut the mustard. On these Benches, we want to put a marker down that fining for profit, using contractors to enforce these powers, must end. We want to test the opinion of the House, so I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 27 in my name and in the name of my noble friend, Lord Davies of Gower, would increase the maximum sentence for the new offence of possession of an offensive weapon with intent to use it to commit unlawful violence from four to 10 years. The Bill rightly introduces this new offence to bridge a gap in existing law. At present, the maximum custodial sentence for offences such as carrying a bladed article or offensive weapon in public is up to four years on indictment, whether or not the person has intent. The new offence, as currently drafted, reflects a more serious scenario: possession with the intention to cause harm. However, this new offence carries the same maximum penalty as the existing offence, meaning that the additional element of meaning to commit damage or harm is not reflected in the prescribed punishment.

In Committee, many noble Lords highlighted this very real concern. I observed that the offence as drafted differentiates between simple possession and intentional violence. I posed a simple question to the Government: why is the maximum sentence the same for both? If the law is to distinguish between those who might cause harm and those who intend to do so, that distinction should be mirrored in sentencing as a matter of logic. Similarly, my noble friend Lord Blencathra emphasised that possession of an offensive weapon with intent to use it to commit violence or to cause fear is a profoundly serious act. He noted that:

“Such intent demonstrates a premeditated willingness to inflict harm, intimidate or destroy property”.—[Official Report, 17/11/25; col. 655.]


When these concerns were raised in Committee, the Government expressed opposition on the grounds of proportionality in raising the maximum sentence. The Minister said that four years aligns with maximum penalties for existing weapons-related offences, and that the offence sits logically between simple possession and actual use or threat. Yet this rationale effectively treats two objectively different states of mind and conduct as of equivalent seriousness in law: possessing without harmful intent, and possessing with the intent to unleash unlawful violence.

This amendment does not advocate arbitrary maximums or mandatory sentences. In fact, we have met the Minister half way in a spirit of compromise and lowered our original proposed threshold of 14 years to 10 years. I also respectfully remind your Lordships’ House that we are advocating a 10-year ceiling, not a default outcome; it is a maximum sentence only. Sentencing of course remains a matter of discretion for a court in an individual specific case. A higher maximum sentence would not mandate a longer sentence in every case. Amendment 27 would simply give the courts the discretion to impose sentences that more appropriately reflect the gravity of offences involving violent intent. This would enhance judges’ ability to differentiate between levels of culpability and send a clearer signal that society treats premeditated threats of violence more seriously than mere unlawful possession. If the Minister will not accept this amendment, I am minded to divide the House. I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I rise to express the support of these Benches for Amendment 27, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, which seeks to increase the maximum sentence for the new offence of possessing a weapon with intent. We entirely support the creation of this new offence, which rightly bridges the gap between the simple possession of a knife in public and actually using it to threaten or harm someone. Creating a separate category for those who carry weapons with violent intent is the right approach, to target the most dangerous individuals in our society. However, as my noble friend Lady Doocey made clear in Committee, if we are to treat carrying an offensive weapon with violent intent as a distinctly more serious crime than simple possession, that distinction must logically be reflected in the punishment.

As the Bill is drafted, the new law carries the exact same maximum four-year sentence as the blanket offence of carrying a bladed article. This fails to give the courts the means to sufficiently differentiate between those who might pose a threat and those who actively intend to inflict damage or harm. As the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, stated, this is not merely a theoretical sentencing debate. We agree with the stark assessment made by Jonathan Hall KC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, in his review following the horrific Southport attack. He made it clear that four years in prison is simply insufficient when there is clear evidence of an intention to cause mass fatalities. He recommended substantially tougher maximum penalties for possessing a weapon with intent to use unlawful violence, using the Southport attack as a case study. In his March 2025 independent review on the classification of extreme violence used in the Southport attack, Mr Hall argues that where someone arms themselves with a weapon intending serious violence, this is properly comparable to terrorism-style preparatory conduct, and that the maximum sentence should be very significantly higher than existing norms for simple possession offences.

In short, post Southport, Mr Hall has been arguing that possession with intent to use a weapon in serious violence should carry far higher maximum penalties than the traditional four-year ceiling, and that a new preparation for mass killing offence, up to life, is needed to close the pre-attack gap. By raising the maximum penalty to 14 years, this amendment would provide a ceiling, not a mandatory minimum—and we would, of course, expect the Sentencing Council to issue clear guidance around how to categorise levels of seriousness, to guard against general sentence inflation. Nevertheless, the court must have the full weight of the law behind it in those, hopefully rare, cases where a lengthy sentence is deemed absolutely necessary for public protection. We cannot treat violent premeditated intent as a mere secondary factor. The punishment must be reflective of the severity of the crime, so we welcome this amendment to give the judiciary the vital tool that they need.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, for tabling the amendment, and to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, for moving it. I do believe that sentences should be proportionate to the offence. That is why the maximum sentence for the new offence of possession of a bladed article or offensive weapon with intent to use unlawful violence has been set at four years’ imprisonment. That, I have to say to the House, is in line with penalties for other weapons offences.

Such offences currently carry a maximum penalty of four years, including other more serious offences, such as threatening with an offensive weapon and repeat possession of offensive weapons. It is also worth noting that even though the maximum penalty is four years, the courts—judges in court after trial—are currently not giving sentences anywhere close to the upper range on the sentencing scale, which seems to indicate that judges view the maximum penalty of four years as adequate. A maximum penalty of 10 years for the possession with intent offence would therefore, in my view, be out of line with other possession offences and potentially disproportionate, given where we are.

This is not meant to be a tennis-ball political point, but I say to the noble Lord that the new offence was included in the previous Conservative Administration’s Criminal Justice Bill, and the then Policing Minister, who is now the shadow Home Secretary, spoke eloquently in Committee on that Bill in support of the four-year maximum penalty. So there has been a change; that might be legitimate and right, but the Member for Croydon South, Chris Philp, spoke in favour of the four-year penalty that the Government are seeking only a couple of years ago. That is an interesting fact, but not one that I am intending to use aggressively; I simply want to put it on the record.

The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation has given a recommendation, which the Government have accepted, in his review into the Southport attacks: that the penalty for new possession offences at Clause 27 be kept at four years if the Government consider introducing a new offence of planning a mass-casualty attack. Let me reassure noble Lords that we are considering how best to close the gap identified. However, I do not believe that there is a case for increasing the maximum penalty for the offence in Clause 27 as proposed by the amendment.

I hope the noble Lord will agree with what the Conservative shadow Home Secretary said when he was the Policing Minister and will withdraw the amendment.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 5th February 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Clement-Jones]

464: Clause 192, page 223, line 33, at end insert—
“(4A) Before the appropriate national authority makes regulations under subsection (1) for the purpose of implementing a new international agreement, or significantly altering an existing agreement, the authority must conduct and publish a comprehensive Privacy Impact Assessment.(4B) The Privacy Impact Assessment required under subsection (4A) must analyse and report on—(a) the necessity and proportionality of the information sharing arrangements,(b) the mechanism by which individual rights, including those under Article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998, will be safeguarded,(c) the risks of non-compliance with the data protection legislation or of unintended consequences arising from the sharing of personal data, and(d) the nature and volume of personal data intended to be shared or accessed under the agreement.(4C) The appropriate national authority must lay before Parliament, no later than 12 months after the first regulations are made under this section, and annually thereafter, a report on the operation of regulations made under this section.(4D) The annual report required under subsection (4C) must include, in particular—(a) an assessment of the overall volume and categories of information shared under the regulations,(b) a detailed analysis of the impact of the regulations on the privacy and data protection rights of individuals, and(c) a summary of any internal reviews, audits, or legal challenges relating to information sharing under the agreements implemented by the regulations.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment requires a privacy impact assessment to be carried out before regulations are made under this section.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 464 I will speak to Amendments 467, 468 and 503, in my name. These amendments collectively address the governance of Clauses 192 to 194, which grant the Secretary of State broad powers to make regulations giving effect to international law enforcement information-sharing agreements. Following the recent passage of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025, we are now operating in a new legal landscape, where the statutory threshold for protecting data transferred overseas has been lowered. These amendments are not just desirable; they are essential safety mechanisms to fill that gap.

Amendment 464 would be a safeguard of, so to speak, look before you leap. It stipulates that, before regulations are made under Clause 192 to implement a new international agreement, the authority must publish a comprehensive privacy impact assessment. The necessity of this assessment has intensified following the enactment of the Data (Use and Access) Act. The UK’s new test for onward transfers of data has lowered the bar. It no longer requires foreign protections to be essentially equivalent to ours, but merely not materially lower. This creates a dangerous new risk profile. The European Data Protection Board has explicitly noted that this new test omits key safeguards against foreign government access and removes redress mechanisms for individuals. If the general statutory floor has been lowered, Amendment 464 becomes the essential safety net. We must assess these specific risks via a privacy impact assessment before we open the digital borders, to ensure that we are not exposing UK citizens to jurisdictions where they have no legal remedy.

This brings me to Amendment 467, which addresses the nature of the data being shared. Where regulations authorise the transfer of highly sensitive personal data, such as biometrics, genetics or political opinions, this amendment would require enhanced protective measures. All this highlights the illusion of data protection when transferring data to high-risk jurisdictions that lack the rule of law. We know that in authoritarian states domestic intelligence laws will always override the standard contractual clauses usually relied on for data transfers. Because the Data (Use and Access) Act has removed the requirement for foreign safeguards to be essentially equivalent, we cannot rely on the general law to protect highly sensitive biometric or health data. My amendment would restore the requirement that transfers of such sensitive data must be demonstrated to be strictly necessary and proportionate. We cannot allow efficiency of data sharing to deny the reality that, in some jurisdictions, once data arrives, the state will have unrestricted access. Transparency must follow these powers.

Amendment 468 would mandate the production of an annual report on international law enforcement information sharing. This is vital because we are entering a period of divergence. The European Commission, at the urging of the European Data Protection Board, will be monitoring the practical implementation of the UK’s revised data transfer regime. If the EU will be monitoring how our data laws operate, surely Parliament should be doing the same. We need an annual report to track whether these law enforcement transfers are inadvertently exposing UK citizens to jurisdictions where they have no effective legal redress. Without this feedback loop, Parliament is legislating in the dark.

Finally, Amendment 503 would ensure that regulations made under Clause 192 are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. Given that the primary legislation governing data transfers has been loosened, it is constitutionally inappropriate for these specific law enforcement agreements to slip through via the negative procedure. Amendment 503 would ensure that these regulations, which may involve the transfer of our citizens’ most sensitive biometric data to foreign powers, must be actively debated and approved by both Houses of Parliament.

We support international co-operation in fighting crime, but it must not come at the cost of lowering our standards. These amendments would restore the safeguards that recent legislation have eroded. I beg to move.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, we thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his amendments and the importance that he has obviously placed on the right to privacy of the general public.

I support the principle behind Amendment 464. Sharing information often carries a risk with it, particularly when it is for the purposes of law enforcement, and especially when this is done internationally. Law enforcement data contains information that is far more personal to the individual or case in question than the norm. Any data of this sort must be handled with the highest discretion. Ensuring that the sharing of this data respects the right to privacy carries no unintended consequences and, most importantly, is necessary and should be the benchmark from which regulations are made.

If this amendment is accepted, I do not see the additional need for Amendment 468. At the very least, the privacy impact assessment under Amendment 464 should form the basis of any annual report that Amendment 468 would mandate. Less is more when it comes to admin and reports, so I am hesitant to support a new report that is not necessarily needed.

I think Amendment 467 is sensible. In general, internationally shared data should not include information prejudicial to any individual, let alone domestic citizens. This particularly extends to the sharing of biometric data for the purpose of unique identification or genetic identification.

These categories of data are obviously vital for the purposes of law enforcement, but law enforcement extra territorially risks placing this data in the wrong hands. This and similar data should therefore be particularly protected, which is the aim of the noble Lord’s amendment. I hope that the Minister can outline what the Government intend to do to ensure that the international sharing of personal data is undertaken in the most discreet and protected manner.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to kick off what I very much hope will be the last day in Committee—not to jinx it. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for setting out the case for these amendments, which relate to the provisions in Clauses 192 to 194.

International law enforcement information-sharing agreements are a vital tool that provide law enforcement officers with access to new intelligence to fight crime, increase public protection and reduce the threat of societal harm posed by international criminality. To clarify, these measures provide the appropriate national authority with the power to make regulations to implement both new and existing legally binding international law enforcement information-sharing agreements. Such regulations may, for example, make provision for the technical and, where appropriate, operational detail to facilitate the information sharing provided for in a particular agreement.

The UK is recognised globally for having one of the most robust data protection regimes, anchored in the Data Protection Act and UK GDPR, which ensure that privacy is protected even in the most complex areas of law enforcement and international co-operation. This Government are committed to maintaining these high standards and ways of working to ensure that data protection and privacy are not compromised as we strengthen cross-border security. UK law already requires data controllers to conduct a data protection impact assessment for any activity that is likely to result in a high risk to individuals’ rights and freedoms. Public bodies and law enforcement authorities are bound by the Human Rights Act, the European Convention on Human Rights and the Equality Act, and they must duly assess activities accordingly.

Existing data protection principles and statutory requirements, particularly data protection impact assessments, already cover the concerns raised by the noble Lord’s amendments, making new duties duplicative and unnecessary. As is required under Article 36(4) of the UK GDPR, regulations made under this power as they relate to the processing of personal data will require consultation with the Information Commissioner’s Office.

The international law enforcement information-sharing agreements preceding the making of regulations under Clause 192 are subject to the usual treaty ratification procedures, including the provisions regarding parliamentary scrutiny provided for in Part 2 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. Any such agreement will be laid before Parliament with an Explanatory Memorandum, which would include the background to why the Government are entering into the agreement, its implementation and a note of any existing domestic legislation and human rights considerations. Additionally, an overseas security and justice assistance assessment will be required. Introducing additional scrutiny requirements would risk duplication and provide no additional substantive information to Parliament beyond what is currently available.

We must also consider the operational sensitivity of such processing. Law enforcement data sharing involves sensitive systems and procedures. Publication of such assessments may inadvertently expose vulnerabilities or methods that criminals or adversarial parties may seek to exploit.

Ministers regularly update Parliament on international law enforcement co-operation, including data sharing. I have a long list of examples before me—I will not detain your Lordships with too many of them. The Cabinet Office issued the Government’s response to the EAC report Unfinished Business: Resetting the UK-EU Relationship on 23 January this year and published it shortly thereafter. A couple of days before, on 21 January, my noble friend Lord Hanson appeared before the EAC to discuss the UK-EU reset, which focused on the LEJC, migration and the border partnership. You do not have to go far back for another example: on September 8, the Foreign Affairs Committee questioned the Cabinet Office and FCDO Ministers on post-summit implementation, co-ordination and future UK-EU co-operation frameworks. That is just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to parliamentary oversight of these matters.

Law enforcement authorities and government departments work closely together to assess international law enforcement capabilities and their effectiveness. Such assessments, by their very nature, are operationally sensitive and would not be suitable for publication. Specifically singling out international law enforcement data sharing also risks presenting a skewed picture of wider domestic operational activity, given that law enforcement outcomes are often the result of multiple capabilities and instruments being used. Owing to the breadth of law enforcement authorities that may be engaged in such information-sharing activity, and the likely multiple data systems, sourcing and collating operational data that would be suitable for inclusion in a published annual report would create significant demand and risk diverting resource from other critical law enforcement priorities.

We must also consider the implications for the international parties to such agreements, who may have concerns about the publication of such data and assessment, particularly where it may relate to operationally sensitive matters. That, in turn, may affect and limit the negotiability of future agreements. Such reports could potentially expose operational practices that it may not be appropriate to place in the public domain. We must be mindful that agreements will vary in scope with international partners; to publish detail on the volumes of data exchanged may inadvertently cause concern from international partners on differing operating scopes.

Finally, as to whether regulations made under Clause 192 should be subject to the draft affirmative procedure, I simply point the noble Lord to the report on the Bill by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which made no such recommendation. We are usually held to the high standards of that committee and admonished when it finds us wanting. In this case, we were not found wanting, which I think is a very good tick that I pray in aid.

I understand the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, about these clauses, but I hope that I have reassured him that data protection remains at the heart of our approach. With that in mind, I ask him to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his detailed reply. It was very cheerful, which I find quite extraordinary in the circumstances. It is almost as though he has been reading Voltaire’s Candide: everything is for the best in all possible worlds. I will read carefully what he said, but there was an extraordinary amount of complacency built into his response about the nature of sharing data across borders—specifically that the existing regime is sufficient to safeguard these transfers and that my amendments would introduce unnecessary friction into law enforcement co-operation. That is because the rules of the game have changed since the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025.

The Information Commissioner can operate only within the legislation provided, which is no safeguard in those circumstances. I have the highest regard for the Information Commissioner and his office, but they have to operate within the bounds of the law, which have changed since the Act was passed. I mentioned the European Data Protection Board and so on. The Minister has performed some kind of parliamentary jujitsu by seeming to say that sensitive data, which I cited as being one of the reasons why I tabled my amendments, makes it far too difficult to do what I am proposing. I admire his speechwriting but I must say that I do not think that is an answer.

I will withdraw my amendment, but I believe that the Act that we spent so long debating has changed the rules of the game and that these amendments are necessary to ensure that international co-operation does not become a backdoor for the erosion of privacy. I will come back to this but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 464 withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Lords Chamber

To be clear, these amendments would achieve a third, very important thing. They would give clarity and confidence to parents that they will get answers to their questions about the death of their child that relate to their social media usage. It is a disgrace that we still have a gap in legislation that potentially puts parents through more pain as they open a page where the first line says, “In rare cases”. The Government can simplify this system immediately by accepting these amendments. I hope the Minister will say yes when she comes to respond.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, these Benches support Amendments 474, 475, 438ED and 438EE, which all stand in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and to which I am pleased and privileged to have added my name alongside the noble Baronesses, Lady Morgan of Cotes and Lady Barran. I pay tribute to the relentless campaigning on behalf of bereaved families by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and to her utterly moving and convincing introduction today. I also pay tribute to all those bereaved families who have fought for these provisions.

I associate myself with everything the noble Baroness said about the implementation of and the intent behind the Online Safety Act, which has not achieved what we all set out for it to do. Together, these amendments address a singular, tragic failure in our current justice system: the loss of vital digital evidence following the death of a child. There has been powerful testimony regarding what is called the suspension gap. That occurs when a coroner investigating the death of a child feels unable to issue a data preservation notice because a police investigation is technically active, yet the police might not have prioritised the securing of digital evidence. During this period of hesitation, data held by social media companies is deleted and the opportunity to understand the child’s final interactions is lost for ever.

Currently, many coroners remain unaware that they can request data preservation notices in the early stages of an investigation. We have heard heartbreaking reports from bereaved parents that coroners feel unable to act while police investigations are active. Because inquests are routinely suspended during these investigations, the data is often deleted due to account inactivity or routine system operations before the coroner can issue an information notice.

The Molly Rose Foundation and the 5Rights Foundation have been clear. Automatic preservation is essential, because data is the key to joining the dots in these tragic cases. We cannot allow another child’s digital history and the truth about their death to vanish because of bureaucratic delay. As Ofcom has recently clarified, service providers are not required to retain data they do not already hold. They simply need to notify the regulator if information is missing. During recent consultations, major providers such as Meta and Microsoft did not object to preserving data from further back, provided it was still within their systems.

Too often, police seize a physical device but fail to notify Ofcom of potential breaches of the Online Safety Act. These amendments work in tandem. Amendments 474 and 475 would freeze the evidence automatically and provide the legal mechanism to preserve data. Amendments 438ED and 438EE would ensure that the police and coroners are fully aware of their responsibilities and protocols to collect that evidence. Together, they would ensure that potential online harm is treated with the same priority as a physical weapon in every investigation into a child’s death.

These amendments are about ensuring that our coroners system is fit for a digital age. They provide the speed and technical certainty required to support bereaved families in their pursuit of justice. We cannot continue to allow a lack of process to obscure the truth about why a child has died. We cannot allow the deletion of evidence to become the enemy of justice. I urge the Minister, as have the noble Baronesses, to accept these amendments as a necessary modernisation of our investigatory framework.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, if I needed persuading—and I am not sure I did—the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and her supporters have certainly persuaded me that there is a serious problem here. As legislators who spend hours in this Chamber, we all know that law without enforcement is a dead letter in a sealed book, and not what anyone wants to be spending their lives on. If, as it seems, there are gaps of responsibility and agency between coroners, the police, Ofcom and, dare I say it, the great big untouchable tech imperium that monetises our data and effectively monetises our lives, those gaps need to be dealt with.

Just as I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, not just for her commitment but for her expertise on online harms, I will say that my noble friend the Minister is probably one of the most expert and experienced criminal lawyers in your Lordships’ House. If these precise amendments are too broad and too onerous for catching children who, for example, were too young to have a device, I am sure that my noble friend the Minister will be able to address that. Between these noble Baronesses and other noble Lords of good faith, something can be done.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, powerful AI tools are transforming policing and reshaping how forces investigate, patrol and make decisions, often with profound implications. This amendment would make it a legal requirement for forces to disclose any algorithmic tool used in this way that might affect a person’s rights or freedoms.

The Government’s algorithmic transparency recording standard, ATRS, provides a consistent way for public bodies to explain how their algorithmic tools work, what data they use and how human oversight is maintained. Its goal is a public, searchable record of these systems. Use of the ATRS is mandatory for arm’s-length bodies delivering public services, though the previous Government did not extend that to the police, despite calls from the Committee on Standards in Public Life and from the Justice and Home Affairs Committee.

The College of Policing has now integrated the ATRS into its authorised professional practice. Forces are expected to complete an ATRS report for all relevant tools. That is welcome progress. The hope is that forces will increasingly comply to build public trust and meet their equality and data protection duties. However, while compliance is now expected, failure to record a tool is still not a legal requirement. A force could still choose not to use the ATRS, citing operational necessity, and it would not be breaking any law.

Transparency is vital across public services but nowhere more so than in policing, where these systems have the power to alter lives and restrict liberty. That is why Justice and civil liberties groups such as the Ada Lovelace and Alan Turing institutes want police use of these tools to be publicly declared and for this to be placed on a statutory footing. What is ultimately needed is a national register with real legal force—something the NPCC’s own AI lead has called for.

Government work on such a register is under way. I welcome that project but it will take time, while AI capabilities advance very rapidly indeed. The ATRS is the mechanism we have for now. This amendment would immediately strengthen it, requiring every operational AI tool from facial recognition to predictive mapping to be publicly declared.

Why does this matter? Take gait analysis, identifying people by how they move. No UK force has declared that it uses it, but its potential is recognised. Ireland is already legislating for its use in serious crime. Without a legal duty here, a UK force could deploy gait analysis tomorrow, with no public knowledge or oversight, just as facial recognition pilots proceed today with limited transparency.

This year, forces will spend nearly £2 billion on digital technology and analytics. With growing demand and limited resources, it is no surprise at all that forces turn to AI for efficiency. Yet, without total transparency, this technological shift risks further eroding public trust. Recognition of that need is growing. No one wants to return to the Met’s unlawful gangs matrix, quietly risk-scoring individuals on dubious grounds. For that reason, I urge the Government to accept this vital safeguard. It is a foundation for accountability in a field that will only grow in power and in consequence. I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, as my noble friend Lady Doocey explained, Amendment 431 seeks to place a statutory duty on every police force in England and Wales to disclose its use of algorithmic tools where they affect the rights, entitlements or obligations of individuals.

We are witnessing a rapid proliferation of algorithmic decision-making in policing, from predictive mapping to risk assessment tools used in custody suites. Algorithms are increasingly informing how the state interacts with the citizen, yet too often these tools operate in a black box, hidden from public view and democratic scrutiny. As we have discussed in relation to other technologies such as facial recognition, the deployment of advanced technology without a clear framework undermines public trust.

This amendment requires police forces, as my noble friend explained, to complete entries in the algorithmic transparency recording standard. The ATRS is the Government’s own standard for algorithmic transparency, developed to ensure public sector accountability. My Private Member’s Bill on public authority algorithmic and automated decision-making allows for a more advanced form of reporting. In my view, the ATRS is the bare minimum required for accountability for AI use in the public sector.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 431 deals with the use of algorithmic tools in policing. While the Government agree on the importance of transparency in the use of algorithmic tools by police forces, we do not believe that the amendment would be the optimal means of delivering either meaningful improvements in public confidence or operational benefits for policing.

The proposed duty would require police forces to disclose all algorithmic tools through the Algorithmic Transparency Recording Standard—the ATRS. The ATRS was designed for government departments and arm’s-length bodies, not for operationally independent police forces. While it is an effective tool for those organisations, its high level of technical detail and lack of narrative explanation mean that disclosures would not provide the clarity expected by the public and would risk burying key information in jargon. More importantly, mandating disclosure of all tools beyond the exemptions policy of the ATRS could inadvertently compromise operational security and policing tactics.

The Government are, however, keen to encourage transparency in the use of algorithmic tools by police forces in England and Wales to maintain the support of the public for their use and in keeping with the core tradition of policing by consent. In line with this, the Government have commissioned work on transparency measures for police use of AI and are working closely with the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s AI portfolio and the National Policing Chief Scientific Adviser to develop policies encouraging and supporting appropriate levels of transparency while safeguarding operational integrity. This approach will ensure that transparency is meaningful, proportionate and does not undermine the effectiveness of policing.

It is important to recognise that we are listening to the public in dealing with concerns that have been raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, around policing encroaching on civil liberties. Indeed, the Government commissioned and published research into public attitudes on the police’s use of AI last year. The research demonstrated strong support for AI use by the police. There are rightful concerns about the need for AI use to be underpinned by rigorous oversight, humans always being clearly involved in decision-making and transparency. These findings have been supported elsewhere; for example, in recently published research by CENTRIC, which surveyed 10,000 members of the public. That is why we are working closely with the NPCC to build upon and implement the principles of the covenant for the use of AI in policing, to which all forces in England and Wales have signed up. Of course, it is important.

The noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, referred to the use of gait analysis, and there was a comparison to live facial recognition. It is important that we understand the risks of bias and discriminatory outcomes from using any policing tool.

To be clear, police deployments must comply with the Equality Act 2010 and data protection law. Forces are required to assess potential discrimination risks and should be able to evidence that tools are necessary, proportionate and fair. Humans remain clearly involved in decision-making, and forces are expected to monitor performance against protected characteristics so that any bias is identified and addressed. Where tools cannot meet these standards in practice, they should not be deployed or must be withdrawn pending remediation.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, referred to black box systems. To be clear, we are not comfortable with black box systems being used in policing. Policing requires—

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I thank the Minister. Much of what he said about developing an alternative to the ATRS has been encouraging, but, obviously, quite a lot will also depend on—and he went on to talk about data protection—whether officers are trained in how Article 22 of the GDPR operates in terms of automated decision-making. What assurance can the Minister give about the level of knowledge and training in that area?

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

As I said, police deployments must comply with the Equality Act 2010 and data protection law, which, of course, include the latest data protection law under the GDPR. In relation to that specific point on Article 22 of the GDPR, I will have to write to the noble Lord to give him the full details, but, as I say, the general principle of compliance applies.

Just to finish the point I was making in reference to the noble Lord’s point about black box systems, where a system is inherently opaque, forces must have compensating controls such as rigorous testing, performance monitoring and strong human review, or not use that system.

Given these assurances—and I am grateful to the noble Lord for saying that he was encouraged, and we will wait to hear from his colleague as to whether she is encouraged by these responses—I hope the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I want to make a very brief contribution—cheekily, because I have not taken any role in this Bill. My noble friend’s amendment, what she said in support of it and the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, are highly pertinent to the debate on the Government’s proposal to restrict jury trials. On the Tube in, I read an account of the report from the Institute for Government, which has looked at the Government’s proposals and concluded that the time savings from judge-only trials would be marginal at best, amounting to less than 2% of Crown Court time. It suggests, pertinently, that the Government

“should instead focus on how to drive up productivity across the criminal courts, investing in the workforce and technology required for the courts to operate more efficiently”.

As others who know the situation much better than I do have said, it sounds dire. One is used to all these problems of legacy systems—lack of interoperability and so on. I remember all that being debated at EU level. It is difficult and probably capital-intensive work—at least, initially—but instead of promoting these headline-grabbing gestures about abolishing jury trials, the Government need to fix the terrible lack of efficiency in the criminal justice system. I am not sure that the civil justice system is any better. Having, unfortunately, had a modest involvement in a case in the county court, I found that it was impossible to phone any staff. You might be lucky to get a response to an email after a week.

Making the system work efficiently, with all bits interacting with each other, would do a great deal more to increase productivity and save the time of all those people who are running around. One hears accounts from people who work in the criminal courts of reports not being available, files being lost and staff being absent, let alone the decrepit state of court buildings. All this investment needs to go in before the Government resort to gesture politics and things such as abolishing jury trials.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 432 was so well introduced by my noble friend Lady Doocey. This lack of appropriate technology and how it is handicapping our police services is something that she feels very strongly about. I was delighted to hear what the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and my noble friend Lady Ludford had to say, because this lack of the appropriate technology extends beyond the police services into the wider criminal justice system. This proposed new clause would address the desperate state of police data infrastructure by requiring the Secretary of State to publish a national plan to modernise police data and intelligence systems within 12 months.

As mentioned in the explanatory statement, this is not an abstract bureaucratic request. It is a direct response to, among other things, recommendation 7 of the National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey. The audit painted a damning picture of the current landscape: intelligence systems that do not talk to one another, vital information trapped in silos and officers unable to join the dots to protect vulnerable children. It is unacceptable that, in 2025, we still rely on fragmented, obsolete IT systems to fight sophisticated networked criminality. This amendment seeks to mandate a coherent national strategy to ensure that antiquated police technology is replaced, that intelligence regarding predatory behaviour is shared effectively across police borders in real time and that we finally close the capability gaps that allow perpetrators of group-based child sexual exploitation to slip through the net.

Amendment 432 would ensure that, when the police hold vital intelligence, they have the systems to use it effectively. We cannot claim to be serious about tackling child exploitation if we do not fix the digital infrastructure that underpins our investigations.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for bringing forward this amendment, which seeks to require the Government to publish a national plan to modernise police data and intelligence systems in England and Wales. At its heart, this amendment speaks to a very practical and pressing concern: that our policing infrastructure must stay up to date with modern crime, particularly the most harmful and insidious forms of abuse.

Outdated and fragmented information systems can frustrate effective policing. That point was raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, in the National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, which noted that some police forces are still operating antiquated legacy systems that inhibit real-time data sharing and hinder co-ordinated action across forces and with partner agencies.

Group-based child sexual exploitation is a complex crime. Our response must therefore be equally networked and technologically capable. Recommendation 7 from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, made it clear that improving data systems is essential—I emphasise that word—to ensuring children’s safety and enabling earlier intervention and more efficient information exchange. I look forward to the Minister’s outline of the steps the Government have already taken to address this issue.

This amendment seeks to take that recommendation forward by requiring a national plan with clear steps and milestones to modernise police data and intelligence systems. We strongly support the idea of having clear milestones not just for police forces and agencies but for the public and Parliament. Transparent targets allow for progress to be measured and debated, and provide operational leaders with something concrete and tangible to work towards.

We also welcome the requirement for annual progress reports to be laid before Parliament until the plan’s objectives are achieved. That level of ongoing scrutiny is important if we truly want to drive systemic improvement rather than to allow good intentions to gather dust. I therefore echo the helpful contributions of my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford; we really must do better.

I look forward to the Minister’s response to this amendment. I would be grateful if he would outline how the Government intend to address the problems identified in the national audit and how they will respond to the constructive challenge that this amendment presents.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I also very much support this amendment as, I hope, a nudge towards an opening door that the Government are already looking at. Following on from the powerful speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, it seems that, quite apart from the recipients of these NCHIs, there are two further issues: the waste of time and the waste of money. The police are always short of money and of time. That is obvious and has been said by the noble Lords, Lord Young and Lord Hogan-Howe. If this was removed, they could get on and do their job. They would save a great deal of money and something even more important, because they would be dealing with the crimes that people really need them to deal with.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, this is already proving to be a crucial debate in the passage of this Bill. I support Amendment 416E, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton. Sadly, my noble friend Lord Strasburger is unable to be with us to support the amendment, which he has signed, but I hope that I reflect his views in speaking today.

Non-crime hate incidents, although born from the well-intentioned Macpherson report in 1993—which the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, called “an honourable start”—have morphed into a mechanism that frequently harasses and silences legitimate debate. In doing so, they consume prodigious quantities of police time, as we have heard—time that is desperately needed to investigate the crimes that we have discussed throughout Committee. Non-crime hate incidents, which started from benign motivations in 1993, have morphed into an ugly and frequently used technique for harassing and silencing somebody whose views the complainant does not like. In the process, prodigious quantities of police time are being wasted on non-criminal matters, meaning that real crimes that would otherwise be investigated are being ignored.

The seeds of what has gone wrong were sown by the Macpherson inquiry into the murder of Stephen Lawrence. The inquiry concluded that a racist incident should be defined as being

“any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person”.

In essence, that means that anyone—whether involved in an incident or not, whether a reasonable person or otherwise—would be able to determine that an incident, no matter how harmless, was racist in nature. The inquiry went on to recommend that

“the term ‘racist incident’ must be understood to include crimes and non-crimes in policing terms. Both must be reported, recorded and investigated with equal commitment”.

It is remarkable that the inquiry concluded that incidents which are not criminal offences as defined by Parliament should be investigated by the police with equal vigour as those which are criminal offences. That raises fundamental questions about the purpose of the police and what their priorities should be, particularly in a world of potentially limitless demand and highly constrained resource.

Nevertheless, Macpherson’s recommendations relating to racist incidents and their recording were rapidly accepted and implemented by the police and government. Following a 2006 review by Sir Adrian Fulford, a shared definition of hate crimes and non-crime hate incidents was adopted across the criminal justice system, including by the police and the Crown Prosecution Service. This expanded the recording of NCHIs beyond purely racist incidents to cover all those characteristics that are covered by hate crime legislation in England and Wales—race, religion, disability, sexual orientation and gender identity.

Key to the expansion of alleged NCHIs was the creation, in 2014, of the College of Policing’s Hate Crime Operational Guidance for police forces. Perhaps recognising that the guidance was likely to cause grave concerns to many, the College of Policing made a pre-emptive defence of their policy, saying:

“The recording of, and response to, non-crime hate incidents does not have universal support in society. Some people use this as evidence to accuse the police of becoming ‘the thought police’, trying to control what citizens think or believe, rather than what they do”.


The guidance goes on to say, in relation to hate incidents:

“Where any person, including police personnel, reports a hate incident which would not be the primary responsibility of another agency, it must be recorded regardless of whether or not they are the victim, and irrespective of whether there is any evidence to identify the hate element”.


The use of “must” in the guidance leaves no latitude for police discretion or the balancing of rights exercise, which would be necessary in considering the subject’s right to freedom of expression under Article 10.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

With the advent of social media, the number of NCHIs being recorded has rocketed. Policy Exchange reported in 2024 that over 13,000 are being logged annually in England and Wales, consuming 60,000 police hours a year. Some keyboard warriors with an axe to grind have made a full-time occupation out of submitting prolific quantities of NCHI complaints with little or no justification. These include a disgraced former policeman who prodigiously exploits the system to frequently harass his political opponents. Some incidents have hit the press, such as when Graham Linehan, the co-creator of “Father Ted”, was arrested on the tarmac at Heathrow over an NCHI.

However, many victims of spurious NCHIs are not even aware that a complaint has been logged against their name. One campaigner found out only when the complainant launched a judicial review of the police’s refusal to take the matter further. As we have heard, the impact of having an unproven NCHI secretly logged against your name can be severe and mean that you are refused a visa to visit certain countries, including America, or that you fail an enhanced DBS check for a job in areas such as education or health.

Freedom of information requests to 43 police forces found zero examples of NCHIs preventing crime. The Metropolitan Police announced last October that it has stopped investigating NCHIs entirely. Last month, the National Police Chiefs’ Council and the College of Policing reported to the Government that NCHIs are “not fit for purpose”.

NCHIs must go. The Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, stated during our debates on the seventh day in Committee that the College of Policing is reviewing this guidance and that we would see this review before Report. I hope that the Minister can confirm whether that review will address the chilling effect on free speech identified in the Miller judgment and whether he accepts that the police must prioritise actual criminality over the recording of NCHIs.

I support this amendment as a necessary check on the expansion of the surveillance state. When will the Government act to abolish NCHIs? If the Minister cannot answer that question, we will have to return to this matter on Report.

[Lord Herbert of South Downs (Con)]

My Lords, I draw attention to my declaration in the register of interests that I am chair of the College of Policing.

As I said at Second Reading, we need to remember that there were benign reasons for the introduction of this regime over three decades ago; what the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, said in this regard was helpful. The purpose was to ensure that the police would pursue intelligence that could build a pattern of behaviour that would result in harm to an individual. That was the case not just in relation to the dreadful murder of Stephen Lawrence but subsequently in the case of Fiona Pilkington, where a repeated pattern of anti-social behaviour had been ignored. It was not criminal behaviour—it fell below that threshold—but it nevertheless resulted in a tragic loss of life.

Nevertheless, as has been noted, there has been considerable change over that three decades, with the advent of social media, smartphones and a much more contested policy space in many of the areas relating to hate crimes or alleged hate crimes. There is the risk of a number of consequences. Those have been drawn attention to by noble Lords, but they include the chilling effect on free speech, the tying up of resources unnecessarily —I will come to that—and, I suggest, at least as serious, damage to the reputation of the police, if it is perceived that they are prioritising the wrong things and getting themselves involved in matters that they should not be.