Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 25th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group in my name are substantially the same as those that I tabled in Committee. As the House may recall, I withdrew those amendments following concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, but today I am reintroducing them for the House’s consideration. The amendments relate to the provisions in Clauses 31 to 35, which introduce stricter two-step age verification checks for the sale and delivery of knives and crossbows bought online.

For the House’s convenience I will recap: Clauses 31 and 32, on knives, and Clauses 33 and 34, on crossbows, will require at the point of sale, or point of sale or hire, for crossbows, specific checks to include photographic identity plus a current photograph; and, at the point of delivery, photographic identity checks; and they will create a new offence of delivering a package containing a knife or crossbow to someone other than the buyer—if the buyer is an individual, as opposed to, for example, a company—so that knives and crossbows cannot be left on doorsteps or with neighbours.

These amendments clarify that the passport or driving licence required as proof of age for a remote sale of a knife, or for a remote sale or hire of a crossbow, must be a physical version. We are also again adding provisions that will allow the Secretary of State to make regulations, subject to—I hope this helps the House—the affirmative procedure, prescribing an alternative process for age verification, such as digital ID. These amendments are required to ensure that a digital ID can be used as evidence of identity wherever the physical ID is accepted.

In Committee the noble Lord, Lord Davies, raised concerns that the use of digital ID would be mandatory. However, I assure him that this is not a blanket requirement mandating the use of digital ID to purchase knives or crossbows; it is simply making provision for alternative forms of ID, digital or otherwise, to be used. This is to ensure that the legislation keeps pace with future potential developments in digital ID. I know that the Benches opposite have concerns about the Government’s plans for digital ID, but we have been clear that under those plans it will not be mandatory to have a digital ID. I hope that that helps the noble Lord. These provisions are about giving people a choice in how they verify their identity. It will continue to be possible for the purchaser to present a physical passport or driving licence, where they have one, as an alternative to a specified digital ID.

Furthermore, with the permission and support of the authorities in Scotland and Northern Ireland, these amendments also extend these clauses to Scotland and Northern Ireland.

We are amending the legislation to ensure that all contractors in the delivery chain are responsible for age and ID verification on delivery of bladed products and crossbows to residential premises. This is to account for situations where the delivery company engaged by the seller to deliver the bladed product sub-contracts the delivery to other companies. We believe that it is essential that all companies in the chain are responsible for ensuring that age and identity are verified before the package is handed over to the buyer; otherwise, regulations made under the Bill would be meaningless.

I hope that, having reflected on the debate in Committee, and given the changes and the clarification I have given, the noble Lord, Lord Davies, will be content with these government amendments. There are other amendments in the group. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will, if he so wishes, move Amendment 177. I will respond to the noble Lord once I have heard his speech. For the moment, I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I am not sure whether I am in order. I am looking at the noble Lord, Lord Katz, who is nodding, which is good news. I thank him; it is much appreciated. There is nothing worse than writing a speech and being unable to deliver it.

I welcome the government amendments in this group, brought forward by the Minister, concerning the remote sale and delivery of knives and bladed articles. As I noted in Committee, we on these Benches fully support the intent behind the Government’s measures in this area. We must strengthen accountability for businesses and sellers in tackling online knife sales. We welcome the robust two-step age-verification checks being implemented. It is entirely right that we ensure a consistent UK-wide approach by extending these provisions, including those relating to crossbows, to Scotland and Northern Ireland. It is vital that the law across the home nations is exactly on the same footing, so that criminals cannot exploit cross-border differences to acquire lethal weapons.

I also welcome the amendments that clarify the rules around identity documents. The requirement for a physical identity document to be shown upon the delivery of a bladed product provides a necessary safeguard. Furthermore, we acknowledge the provisions allowing the Secretary of State to prescribe alternative age-verification steps such as digital ID.

As I made clear to the Minister previously, there is no Bench more strongly against compulsory digital ID than the Liberal Democrats’, so we remain highly supportive of the assurance that analogue physical forms of identity will continue to be accepted alongside any new digital alternatives. Embedded among these amendments, however, is our Amendment 177, referred to by the Minister, on the remote sale of knives. This amendment requires that regulations mandate the reporting of bulk knife sales to the police

“in real time, or as soon as is reasonably practicable”.

In Committee, the Minister stated that he was sympathetic to the overall aim of this amendment but argued that the current duty in Clause 36 was sufficient and that exact timeframes would be handled later in regulations, following consultation. Sympathy does not intervene in a crime. We have seen cases where young people effectively act as arms traders, buying huge numbers of illegal weapons online for community distribution. If the police are to effectively track and intercept these bulk purchases, they need that intelligence immediately, not days or weeks later when the weapons are already on the streets. Amendment 177 would ensure that operational effectiveness is guaranteed in the Bill, turning bureaucratic compliance into actionable, life-saving intelligence.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, in Committee, I asked the Government to withdraw their amendments that permitted them to require by regulations the use of digital ID for age verification for the online sale of knives and crossbows. My concern was that permitting this would be the first legislative step towards mandating digital IDs. Since then, of course, the Government have conceded that digital IDs will not be made mandatory and, while I still harbour some reservations, I am now content for the amendments to be made to the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Brady of Altrincham (Con)]

My Lords, I rise very briefly to thank the Ministers on the other side of the House. I am very grateful that they have accepted what I think was an entirely common-sense case, which the Government had already accepted in a report that was previously published. I would just say that, in what I think is now my 29th year in Parliament in one House or the other, the number of occasions when Governments and Ministers accept entirely common-sense arguments from the other side of the House and respond is so small that I cannot think of many others, so I really am grateful. It will help the police and reduce the bureaucratic burden on them. It will reduce costs for a lot of people and does not pose any harm whatever, so thank you.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I warmly welcome the Government’s amendments in this group, which deliver on the commitments made by the Minister during our debate in Committee. As I noted at the time, townies such as myself were being educated during the passage of the Bill on what these items were. However, the logic of this measure was immediately clear when the noble Lord, Lord Brady of Altrincham, introduced his amendments, and we were very pleased to support them when he first championed the cause. We are delighted that the Government have accepted his amendments.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I too thank the Minister for bringing forward these amendments. These measures were rightly pressed for in Committee by my noble friend Lord Brady of Altrincham, so I am glad the Government have taken his points on board and are now implementing them. These amendments will remove an administrative burden currently placed on the police—something we all support—and will pose no threat to the public. They are wholly reasonable, and we support them.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, it is very rare to have both unanimity and common sense break out across the Chamber. I thank all noble Lords for their comments, including those among townies—I associate myself with the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, as a fellow townie. It was an education and I have learned an awful lot. I thank everyone for their support.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I would say to the noble Lord before he sits down that unanimity and common sense do not always go together.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

That is the point that I was struggling to make, which is put more eloquently by the noble Lord.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 25th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak to the amendment tabled in my name. As noble Lords know, I am terrible with the billion rules that we have in this place, so bear with me. This amendment would make a small change that would make a big difference to many residents around the country.

I shall try not to rehearse the arguments that I have made before, but we now need to reflect the reality of the housing situation in this country. With the Government’s mission to build 1.5 million homes, this reality will only become bigger—that many of our housing providers in the social sector are for-profit companies. It is a matter of fairness to make sure that the vulnerable residents that they are responsible for have the same access to the law that any resident would have, regardless of the legal structure of their landlord. To make that happen, I have proposed small changes to remove the particular words “non-profit private”. That would make a massive difference to these companies’ ability to keep people safe.

The law is at its best when it is clear and coherent. Good law should be comprehensive and unambiguous. If Parliament intends these powers to apply to housing providers, as I say, it should apply to all of them. This amendment would not alter the policy intent of the Bill but strengthen it, reinforcing the simple principle that tenants’ safety and accountability must be the same, regardless of where you live in the country. I recommend the amendment to the Government and ask for this tiny change to make sure that we can deliver safety for all our residents countrywide.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak to the amendments in my noble friend Lady Doocey’s name and mine, which seek to ensure that the Government’s new anti-social behaviour powers are grounded in evidence, proportionality and democratic accountability, as well as to other amendments in this group.

On these Benches, we do not dismiss the misery that persistent anti-social behaviour causes, but we remain deeply unconvinced that layering yet another complex civil order on to an already confused ASB framework is the right approach. As Justice has highlighted, respect orders risk duplicating existing powers, come with limited evidence of effectiveness and lack basic procedural safeguards. They rely on a weak civil standard of proof, yet they impose severe restrictions and carry a potential two-year prison sentence upon breach.

First, in Committee, we warned that the threshold of “just and convenient” is far too low for an order that can deprive a person of their liberty and exclude them from their home. I very much welcome what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, had to say in his observations on the European Convention on Human Rights. The Minister in Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, defended that language as “familiar” to the civil courts. However, he offered a chink of light, agreeing to examine the arguments for the wording in Amendment 1, “necessary and proportionate”, to ensure strict alignment with the Human Rights Act. I very much hope that his reflections have led him to accept this higher and safer threshold today, ensuring that these orders are not used merely for administrative expediency. We need an answer to the pilot or not-pilot question raised by my noble friend.

Secondly, I return to the issue of democratic accountability. Our Amendment 2 requires that the terms of respect orders and PSPOs must be subject to a full council vote. In his follow-up letter to me, following Committee, the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, rejected this, claiming that it would introduce delays and unnecessary bureaucracy. But democratic scrutiny of civil liberties is not an administrative delay; it is a constitutional necessity. The Government’s resistance to this directly contradicts the Local Government Association’s own statutory guidance, which recommends as best practice that final approval of a PSPO be undertaken at cabinet or full council level, to ensure openness and accountability.

Currently, research by the Campaign for Freedom in Everyday Life, formerly the Manifesto Club, shows that nearly half of all PSPOs are signed off by a single, often unelected, council officer, without any democratic vote. This lack of scrutiny has led to absurd and stigmatising orders banning innocuous activities. If full council approval is already recommended as best practice by the LGA, standardising it in legislation would not be an arduous delay; it would simply force all councils to meet the standard of transparency that the Government’s own guidance expects.

As regards Amendment 3, as I highlighted in Committee and in correspondence with the Minister, there is currently no formal means to directly appeal a PSPO FPN. Citizens feel pressured into paying unjust fines to avoid financial ruin. The Government’s move to increase the maximum fixed penalty notice for PSPO and CPN breaches to £500 is highly dangerous without statutory safeguards. In Committee, the Minister suggested that, if individuals feel a fine is unreasonable, they can simply make representations to the issuing agency. This is totally inadequate; there should be a formal right of appeal.

I turn to Amendment 7 in my name, which concerns fixed penalty notices for public space protection orders and community protection notices. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for her support in this respect and for her very extensive unpicking of these ASB powers. Under Clause 4, the Government are pushing ahead with a 400% increase to the maximum FPN for these breaches, raising it from £100 to a punitive £500. Without statutory safeguards, this will simply supercharge a system that is already widely abused. This new clause addresses the deeply concerning practice of fining for profit. It stipulates that neither an authorised person nor their employer may retain any financial benefit from the fixed penalty notices that they issue.

The Campaign for Freedom in Everyday Life’s Corruption of Punishment report exposes the grim reality of the modern enforcement market. Environmental and ASB enforcement is increasingly seen as a business. Local authorities are entering into contracts with private companies, boasting of “zero financial risk” while sharing the “surplus revenue” generated by fines. Guidance and formal representations are entirely inadequate when faced with the modern enforcement market. As the Campaign for Everyday Freedom’s research also highlights, 66 councils currently employ private companies to issue FPNs, and the standard model is that these companies retain a percentage of the income, often up to 100% until costs are recovered. This creates a direct perverse financial incentive to issue as many tickets as possible for innocuous actions.

As I have pointed out to the Minister, Defra has already issued strict guidance stating that private firms enforcing littering should not receive greater revenue from increasing the volume of penalties. It is entirely illogical not to apply the same statutory prohibition to anti-social behaviour enforcement. We must ban fining for profit in the Bill. It is a time to a put a statutory end to the revenue collection system masquerading as justice.

Finally, in Amendment 12, we have proposed an annual report on the use of these ASB powers, for all the reasons I have stated that were so well expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. I entirely understand that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, is trying to achieve something very similar in her amendment. We are all aiming for much greater transparency in the use of these ASB powers, and I very much hope that the Government will go for at least one of the proposals.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, it will come as no surprise to the Minister that these Benches maintain our opposition to the Government’s respect orders. We have heard, in Committee and today, many concerns about the new regime. Our concerns are slightly different from some of those expressed by other noble Lords, in that we oppose them because we view them as simply unnecessary.

In Committee, my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower asked the Minister what the true difference would be between respect orders and the current anti-social behaviour injunctions. The response confirmed that, in the Government’s view, the only difference is that breaching a respect order will be a criminal offence, whereas breaching an injunction is not a specified criminal offence. That may seem tougher on the surface, but, in reality, it will not make any difference. A person who breaches an ASB injunction can be prosecuted for contempt of court, as they have defied an order of the court; in addition, the power of arrest can be attached to the injunction under Section 4 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. Where that is the case, a police officer may arrest a person without warrant for breaching the terms of their injunction under Section 9(1) of that Act. Furthermore, an arrest warrant may be made by the court if the person who applied for the injunction believes the person has breached that injunction.

For all those reasons, therefore, a number of avenues exist for enforcement of these injunctions. But, even if the Government believe that creating a specific criminal offence is necessary, why not simply amend the ASB injunction regime to create that offence? Why introduce an entirely new regime? Having said all that, we are where we are. In Committee, the Minister responded to my noble friend’s criticism by stating that it was a manifesto commitment. I do accept this, and that is why I suspect they will pass today unhindered.

I turn briefly to some of the other amendments in this group. I have a rather specific concern about the requirement in Amendment 2, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that a respect order may be applied for only if the local authority has agreed to do so at a meeting of the full council. Subsection (8A) in his amendment states:

“A relevant authority may not make an application for a respect order … unless the relevant local authority has complied with the requirements … in subsection (8B).


However, the definition of relevant authority in new Section B1 includes

“the chief officer of police for a police area … the chief constable of the British Transport Police”,

and a number of other authorities, such as Transport for London. What this means is that, should the police wish to apply for a respect order, they must first seek the approval of the local council. I do wonder whether this might create an overly burdensome and time-consuming requirement.

Amendment 7 from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, is, however, something I do have sympathy for. In 2024, a record 14.4 million parking fines were issued, representing a 13% increase from the previous year. There are widespread concerns about unclear parking signage, faulty machines and companies using quotas to increase the number of fines they collect. Parking firms and, indeed, councils using fines based on spurious violations simply to make money is surely not right. Where a person has violated the rules, of course the use of penalty charge notices is justified, but we should not allow them to unfairly issue fines to those who do not deserve it.

Finally, and having been somewhat critical of respect orders, I say to the Minister that I welcome his Amendment 4. As much as I may think that respect orders are unnecessary, if we are to have them, it is welcome that the Secretary of State will be required to consult on the guidance they issue.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

As ever, I am genuinely sorry that I have not been able to persuade the noble and right reverend Lord of the Government’s case. We have taken the view that “just and convenient” mirrors the civil injunction regime of the 2014 Act, passed by a Conservative and Liberal Democrat Government. They are not words from a Labour Minister but from an Act passed in 2014 that we are mirroring in the Government’s manifesto commitment to introduce respect orders. I am sorry that I cannot convince the noble and right reverend Lord of that, and that I have not persuaded him accordingly. We may—although I do not know—very shortly have an opportunity to see whether anybody else is persuaded.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I am afraid that I remain unpersuaded. The Minister keeps mentioning the manifesto commitment, but the manifesto makes no mention of the liability threshold for a respect order, so it is surely perfectly legitimate to question the basis on which the respect order the Government are introducing is based.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The basis on which the respect order is introduced, and the phraseology used, is the phraseology his and His Majesty’s Opposition’s Government put in place for previous orders. I am not changing the wording of anything that, presumably, at some point in 2014 he and other Liberal Democrat Peers walked through a Lobby to vote for.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

Actually, I did not.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord has got me there. Let me rephrase my challenge. The noble Lord did not support it, but the coalition Government he supported passed the 2014 Act. I like to be accurate in my barbs at noble Lords, and I hope that accuracy persuades him that, even if he did not vote for it, some of his noble friends in the coalition Government of the time did—a coalition that our side of the House did not look too favourably upon. I accept his personal position, but if there is division of opinion in this House and we test it, I shall move Amendment 4. I hope that other noble Lords will not press their amendments, but if I have not convinced them, they will put them to the test in the House.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, as a final throw, I wonder whether the Minister remembers how the Labour Benches voted in respect of those orders at the time.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Clement-Jones]

7: Clause 4, page 12, line 11, at end insert—
“(5) For the purposes of this section, any authorised person or company issuing fixed penalty notices under the provisions listed in subsection (6) must not receive, directly or indirectly, any financial benefit that is contingent upon—(a) the issuing of a fixed penalty notice, or(b) the number or value of fixed penalty notices issued.(6) The provisions are—(a) section 52, and(b) section 68,of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (fixed penalty notices).(7) For the purposes of subsection (5), a financial benefit includes, but is not limited to—(a) any commission, bonus, incentive payment, or performance-related remuneration;(b) any benefit provided under a contract, arrangement, or understanding that links remuneration to enforcement outcomes;(c) any financial profit accrued by an employer;(d) any non-monetary benefit prescribed by regulations. (8) Any employer or person found to be in breach of subsection (5) may have their arrangements, accreditation or authorisation revoked by the chief officer of police or relevant local authority.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure that any accredited or authorised person, and their employer, may not profit financially from the issuing of fixed penalty notices.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I am afraid that it is no cigar again for the Minister on this amendment. On his promise of consultation on statutory guidance and so on on the question of fining for profit, I really do not think that is going to cut the mustard. On these Benches, we want to put a marker down that fining for profit, using contractors to enforce these powers, must end. We want to test the opinion of the House, so I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 27 in my name and in the name of my noble friend, Lord Davies of Gower, would increase the maximum sentence for the new offence of possession of an offensive weapon with intent to use it to commit unlawful violence from four to 10 years. The Bill rightly introduces this new offence to bridge a gap in existing law. At present, the maximum custodial sentence for offences such as carrying a bladed article or offensive weapon in public is up to four years on indictment, whether or not the person has intent. The new offence, as currently drafted, reflects a more serious scenario: possession with the intention to cause harm. However, this new offence carries the same maximum penalty as the existing offence, meaning that the additional element of meaning to commit damage or harm is not reflected in the prescribed punishment.

In Committee, many noble Lords highlighted this very real concern. I observed that the offence as drafted differentiates between simple possession and intentional violence. I posed a simple question to the Government: why is the maximum sentence the same for both? If the law is to distinguish between those who might cause harm and those who intend to do so, that distinction should be mirrored in sentencing as a matter of logic. Similarly, my noble friend Lord Blencathra emphasised that possession of an offensive weapon with intent to use it to commit violence or to cause fear is a profoundly serious act. He noted that:

“Such intent demonstrates a premeditated willingness to inflict harm, intimidate or destroy property”.—[Official Report, 17/11/25; col. 655.]


When these concerns were raised in Committee, the Government expressed opposition on the grounds of proportionality in raising the maximum sentence. The Minister said that four years aligns with maximum penalties for existing weapons-related offences, and that the offence sits logically between simple possession and actual use or threat. Yet this rationale effectively treats two objectively different states of mind and conduct as of equivalent seriousness in law: possessing without harmful intent, and possessing with the intent to unleash unlawful violence.

This amendment does not advocate arbitrary maximums or mandatory sentences. In fact, we have met the Minister half way in a spirit of compromise and lowered our original proposed threshold of 14 years to 10 years. I also respectfully remind your Lordships’ House that we are advocating a 10-year ceiling, not a default outcome; it is a maximum sentence only. Sentencing of course remains a matter of discretion for a court in an individual specific case. A higher maximum sentence would not mandate a longer sentence in every case. Amendment 27 would simply give the courts the discretion to impose sentences that more appropriately reflect the gravity of offences involving violent intent. This would enhance judges’ ability to differentiate between levels of culpability and send a clearer signal that society treats premeditated threats of violence more seriously than mere unlawful possession. If the Minister will not accept this amendment, I am minded to divide the House. I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I rise to express the support of these Benches for Amendment 27, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, which seeks to increase the maximum sentence for the new offence of possessing a weapon with intent. We entirely support the creation of this new offence, which rightly bridges the gap between the simple possession of a knife in public and actually using it to threaten or harm someone. Creating a separate category for those who carry weapons with violent intent is the right approach, to target the most dangerous individuals in our society. However, as my noble friend Lady Doocey made clear in Committee, if we are to treat carrying an offensive weapon with violent intent as a distinctly more serious crime than simple possession, that distinction must logically be reflected in the punishment.

As the Bill is drafted, the new law carries the exact same maximum four-year sentence as the blanket offence of carrying a bladed article. This fails to give the courts the means to sufficiently differentiate between those who might pose a threat and those who actively intend to inflict damage or harm. As the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, stated, this is not merely a theoretical sentencing debate. We agree with the stark assessment made by Jonathan Hall KC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, in his review following the horrific Southport attack. He made it clear that four years in prison is simply insufficient when there is clear evidence of an intention to cause mass fatalities. He recommended substantially tougher maximum penalties for possessing a weapon with intent to use unlawful violence, using the Southport attack as a case study. In his March 2025 independent review on the classification of extreme violence used in the Southport attack, Mr Hall argues that where someone arms themselves with a weapon intending serious violence, this is properly comparable to terrorism-style preparatory conduct, and that the maximum sentence should be very significantly higher than existing norms for simple possession offences.

In short, post Southport, Mr Hall has been arguing that possession with intent to use a weapon in serious violence should carry far higher maximum penalties than the traditional four-year ceiling, and that a new preparation for mass killing offence, up to life, is needed to close the pre-attack gap. By raising the maximum penalty to 14 years, this amendment would provide a ceiling, not a mandatory minimum—and we would, of course, expect the Sentencing Council to issue clear guidance around how to categorise levels of seriousness, to guard against general sentence inflation. Nevertheless, the court must have the full weight of the law behind it in those, hopefully rare, cases where a lengthy sentence is deemed absolutely necessary for public protection. We cannot treat violent premeditated intent as a mere secondary factor. The punishment must be reflective of the severity of the crime, so we welcome this amendment to give the judiciary the vital tool that they need.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, for tabling the amendment, and to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, for moving it. I do believe that sentences should be proportionate to the offence. That is why the maximum sentence for the new offence of possession of a bladed article or offensive weapon with intent to use unlawful violence has been set at four years’ imprisonment. That, I have to say to the House, is in line with penalties for other weapons offences.

Such offences currently carry a maximum penalty of four years, including other more serious offences, such as threatening with an offensive weapon and repeat possession of offensive weapons. It is also worth noting that even though the maximum penalty is four years, the courts—judges in court after trial—are currently not giving sentences anywhere close to the upper range on the sentencing scale, which seems to indicate that judges view the maximum penalty of four years as adequate. A maximum penalty of 10 years for the possession with intent offence would therefore, in my view, be out of line with other possession offences and potentially disproportionate, given where we are.

This is not meant to be a tennis-ball political point, but I say to the noble Lord that the new offence was included in the previous Conservative Administration’s Criminal Justice Bill, and the then Policing Minister, who is now the shadow Home Secretary, spoke eloquently in Committee on that Bill in support of the four-year maximum penalty. So there has been a change; that might be legitimate and right, but the Member for Croydon South, Chris Philp, spoke in favour of the four-year penalty that the Government are seeking only a couple of years ago. That is an interesting fact, but not one that I am intending to use aggressively; I simply want to put it on the record.

The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation has given a recommendation, which the Government have accepted, in his review into the Southport attacks: that the penalty for new possession offences at Clause 27 be kept at four years if the Government consider introducing a new offence of planning a mass-casualty attack. Let me reassure noble Lords that we are considering how best to close the gap identified. However, I do not believe that there is a case for increasing the maximum penalty for the offence in Clause 27 as proposed by the amendment.

I hope the noble Lord will agree with what the Conservative shadow Home Secretary said when he was the Policing Minister and will withdraw the amendment.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 5th February 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Clement-Jones]

464: Clause 192, page 223, line 33, at end insert—
“(4A) Before the appropriate national authority makes regulations under subsection (1) for the purpose of implementing a new international agreement, or significantly altering an existing agreement, the authority must conduct and publish a comprehensive Privacy Impact Assessment.(4B) The Privacy Impact Assessment required under subsection (4A) must analyse and report on—(a) the necessity and proportionality of the information sharing arrangements,(b) the mechanism by which individual rights, including those under Article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998, will be safeguarded,(c) the risks of non-compliance with the data protection legislation or of unintended consequences arising from the sharing of personal data, and(d) the nature and volume of personal data intended to be shared or accessed under the agreement.(4C) The appropriate national authority must lay before Parliament, no later than 12 months after the first regulations are made under this section, and annually thereafter, a report on the operation of regulations made under this section.(4D) The annual report required under subsection (4C) must include, in particular—(a) an assessment of the overall volume and categories of information shared under the regulations,(b) a detailed analysis of the impact of the regulations on the privacy and data protection rights of individuals, and(c) a summary of any internal reviews, audits, or legal challenges relating to information sharing under the agreements implemented by the regulations.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment requires a privacy impact assessment to be carried out before regulations are made under this section.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 464 I will speak to Amendments 467, 468 and 503, in my name. These amendments collectively address the governance of Clauses 192 to 194, which grant the Secretary of State broad powers to make regulations giving effect to international law enforcement information-sharing agreements. Following the recent passage of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025, we are now operating in a new legal landscape, where the statutory threshold for protecting data transferred overseas has been lowered. These amendments are not just desirable; they are essential safety mechanisms to fill that gap.

Amendment 464 would be a safeguard of, so to speak, look before you leap. It stipulates that, before regulations are made under Clause 192 to implement a new international agreement, the authority must publish a comprehensive privacy impact assessment. The necessity of this assessment has intensified following the enactment of the Data (Use and Access) Act. The UK’s new test for onward transfers of data has lowered the bar. It no longer requires foreign protections to be essentially equivalent to ours, but merely not materially lower. This creates a dangerous new risk profile. The European Data Protection Board has explicitly noted that this new test omits key safeguards against foreign government access and removes redress mechanisms for individuals. If the general statutory floor has been lowered, Amendment 464 becomes the essential safety net. We must assess these specific risks via a privacy impact assessment before we open the digital borders, to ensure that we are not exposing UK citizens to jurisdictions where they have no legal remedy.

This brings me to Amendment 467, which addresses the nature of the data being shared. Where regulations authorise the transfer of highly sensitive personal data, such as biometrics, genetics or political opinions, this amendment would require enhanced protective measures. All this highlights the illusion of data protection when transferring data to high-risk jurisdictions that lack the rule of law. We know that in authoritarian states domestic intelligence laws will always override the standard contractual clauses usually relied on for data transfers. Because the Data (Use and Access) Act has removed the requirement for foreign safeguards to be essentially equivalent, we cannot rely on the general law to protect highly sensitive biometric or health data. My amendment would restore the requirement that transfers of such sensitive data must be demonstrated to be strictly necessary and proportionate. We cannot allow efficiency of data sharing to deny the reality that, in some jurisdictions, once data arrives, the state will have unrestricted access. Transparency must follow these powers.

Amendment 468 would mandate the production of an annual report on international law enforcement information sharing. This is vital because we are entering a period of divergence. The European Commission, at the urging of the European Data Protection Board, will be monitoring the practical implementation of the UK’s revised data transfer regime. If the EU will be monitoring how our data laws operate, surely Parliament should be doing the same. We need an annual report to track whether these law enforcement transfers are inadvertently exposing UK citizens to jurisdictions where they have no effective legal redress. Without this feedback loop, Parliament is legislating in the dark.

Finally, Amendment 503 would ensure that regulations made under Clause 192 are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. Given that the primary legislation governing data transfers has been loosened, it is constitutionally inappropriate for these specific law enforcement agreements to slip through via the negative procedure. Amendment 503 would ensure that these regulations, which may involve the transfer of our citizens’ most sensitive biometric data to foreign powers, must be actively debated and approved by both Houses of Parliament.

We support international co-operation in fighting crime, but it must not come at the cost of lowering our standards. These amendments would restore the safeguards that recent legislation have eroded. I beg to move.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, we thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his amendments and the importance that he has obviously placed on the right to privacy of the general public.

I support the principle behind Amendment 464. Sharing information often carries a risk with it, particularly when it is for the purposes of law enforcement, and especially when this is done internationally. Law enforcement data contains information that is far more personal to the individual or case in question than the norm. Any data of this sort must be handled with the highest discretion. Ensuring that the sharing of this data respects the right to privacy carries no unintended consequences and, most importantly, is necessary and should be the benchmark from which regulations are made.

If this amendment is accepted, I do not see the additional need for Amendment 468. At the very least, the privacy impact assessment under Amendment 464 should form the basis of any annual report that Amendment 468 would mandate. Less is more when it comes to admin and reports, so I am hesitant to support a new report that is not necessarily needed.

I think Amendment 467 is sensible. In general, internationally shared data should not include information prejudicial to any individual, let alone domestic citizens. This particularly extends to the sharing of biometric data for the purpose of unique identification or genetic identification.

These categories of data are obviously vital for the purposes of law enforcement, but law enforcement extra territorially risks placing this data in the wrong hands. This and similar data should therefore be particularly protected, which is the aim of the noble Lord’s amendment. I hope that the Minister can outline what the Government intend to do to ensure that the international sharing of personal data is undertaken in the most discreet and protected manner.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to kick off what I very much hope will be the last day in Committee—not to jinx it. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for setting out the case for these amendments, which relate to the provisions in Clauses 192 to 194.

International law enforcement information-sharing agreements are a vital tool that provide law enforcement officers with access to new intelligence to fight crime, increase public protection and reduce the threat of societal harm posed by international criminality. To clarify, these measures provide the appropriate national authority with the power to make regulations to implement both new and existing legally binding international law enforcement information-sharing agreements. Such regulations may, for example, make provision for the technical and, where appropriate, operational detail to facilitate the information sharing provided for in a particular agreement.

The UK is recognised globally for having one of the most robust data protection regimes, anchored in the Data Protection Act and UK GDPR, which ensure that privacy is protected even in the most complex areas of law enforcement and international co-operation. This Government are committed to maintaining these high standards and ways of working to ensure that data protection and privacy are not compromised as we strengthen cross-border security. UK law already requires data controllers to conduct a data protection impact assessment for any activity that is likely to result in a high risk to individuals’ rights and freedoms. Public bodies and law enforcement authorities are bound by the Human Rights Act, the European Convention on Human Rights and the Equality Act, and they must duly assess activities accordingly.

Existing data protection principles and statutory requirements, particularly data protection impact assessments, already cover the concerns raised by the noble Lord’s amendments, making new duties duplicative and unnecessary. As is required under Article 36(4) of the UK GDPR, regulations made under this power as they relate to the processing of personal data will require consultation with the Information Commissioner’s Office.

The international law enforcement information-sharing agreements preceding the making of regulations under Clause 192 are subject to the usual treaty ratification procedures, including the provisions regarding parliamentary scrutiny provided for in Part 2 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. Any such agreement will be laid before Parliament with an Explanatory Memorandum, which would include the background to why the Government are entering into the agreement, its implementation and a note of any existing domestic legislation and human rights considerations. Additionally, an overseas security and justice assistance assessment will be required. Introducing additional scrutiny requirements would risk duplication and provide no additional substantive information to Parliament beyond what is currently available.

We must also consider the operational sensitivity of such processing. Law enforcement data sharing involves sensitive systems and procedures. Publication of such assessments may inadvertently expose vulnerabilities or methods that criminals or adversarial parties may seek to exploit.

Ministers regularly update Parliament on international law enforcement co-operation, including data sharing. I have a long list of examples before me—I will not detain your Lordships with too many of them. The Cabinet Office issued the Government’s response to the EAC report Unfinished Business: Resetting the UK-EU Relationship on 23 January this year and published it shortly thereafter. A couple of days before, on 21 January, my noble friend Lord Hanson appeared before the EAC to discuss the UK-EU reset, which focused on the LEJC, migration and the border partnership. You do not have to go far back for another example: on September 8, the Foreign Affairs Committee questioned the Cabinet Office and FCDO Ministers on post-summit implementation, co-ordination and future UK-EU co-operation frameworks. That is just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to parliamentary oversight of these matters.

Law enforcement authorities and government departments work closely together to assess international law enforcement capabilities and their effectiveness. Such assessments, by their very nature, are operationally sensitive and would not be suitable for publication. Specifically singling out international law enforcement data sharing also risks presenting a skewed picture of wider domestic operational activity, given that law enforcement outcomes are often the result of multiple capabilities and instruments being used. Owing to the breadth of law enforcement authorities that may be engaged in such information-sharing activity, and the likely multiple data systems, sourcing and collating operational data that would be suitable for inclusion in a published annual report would create significant demand and risk diverting resource from other critical law enforcement priorities.

We must also consider the implications for the international parties to such agreements, who may have concerns about the publication of such data and assessment, particularly where it may relate to operationally sensitive matters. That, in turn, may affect and limit the negotiability of future agreements. Such reports could potentially expose operational practices that it may not be appropriate to place in the public domain. We must be mindful that agreements will vary in scope with international partners; to publish detail on the volumes of data exchanged may inadvertently cause concern from international partners on differing operating scopes.

Finally, as to whether regulations made under Clause 192 should be subject to the draft affirmative procedure, I simply point the noble Lord to the report on the Bill by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which made no such recommendation. We are usually held to the high standards of that committee and admonished when it finds us wanting. In this case, we were not found wanting, which I think is a very good tick that I pray in aid.

I understand the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, about these clauses, but I hope that I have reassured him that data protection remains at the heart of our approach. With that in mind, I ask him to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his detailed reply. It was very cheerful, which I find quite extraordinary in the circumstances. It is almost as though he has been reading Voltaire’s Candide: everything is for the best in all possible worlds. I will read carefully what he said, but there was an extraordinary amount of complacency built into his response about the nature of sharing data across borders—specifically that the existing regime is sufficient to safeguard these transfers and that my amendments would introduce unnecessary friction into law enforcement co-operation. That is because the rules of the game have changed since the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025.

The Information Commissioner can operate only within the legislation provided, which is no safeguard in those circumstances. I have the highest regard for the Information Commissioner and his office, but they have to operate within the bounds of the law, which have changed since the Act was passed. I mentioned the European Data Protection Board and so on. The Minister has performed some kind of parliamentary jujitsu by seeming to say that sensitive data, which I cited as being one of the reasons why I tabled my amendments, makes it far too difficult to do what I am proposing. I admire his speechwriting but I must say that I do not think that is an answer.

I will withdraw my amendment, but I believe that the Act that we spent so long debating has changed the rules of the game and that these amendments are necessary to ensure that international co-operation does not become a backdoor for the erosion of privacy. I will come back to this but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 464 withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Lords Chamber

To be clear, these amendments would achieve a third, very important thing. They would give clarity and confidence to parents that they will get answers to their questions about the death of their child that relate to their social media usage. It is a disgrace that we still have a gap in legislation that potentially puts parents through more pain as they open a page where the first line says, “In rare cases”. The Government can simplify this system immediately by accepting these amendments. I hope the Minister will say yes when she comes to respond.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, these Benches support Amendments 474, 475, 438ED and 438EE, which all stand in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and to which I am pleased and privileged to have added my name alongside the noble Baronesses, Lady Morgan of Cotes and Lady Barran. I pay tribute to the relentless campaigning on behalf of bereaved families by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and to her utterly moving and convincing introduction today. I also pay tribute to all those bereaved families who have fought for these provisions.

I associate myself with everything the noble Baroness said about the implementation of and the intent behind the Online Safety Act, which has not achieved what we all set out for it to do. Together, these amendments address a singular, tragic failure in our current justice system: the loss of vital digital evidence following the death of a child. There has been powerful testimony regarding what is called the suspension gap. That occurs when a coroner investigating the death of a child feels unable to issue a data preservation notice because a police investigation is technically active, yet the police might not have prioritised the securing of digital evidence. During this period of hesitation, data held by social media companies is deleted and the opportunity to understand the child’s final interactions is lost for ever.

Currently, many coroners remain unaware that they can request data preservation notices in the early stages of an investigation. We have heard heartbreaking reports from bereaved parents that coroners feel unable to act while police investigations are active. Because inquests are routinely suspended during these investigations, the data is often deleted due to account inactivity or routine system operations before the coroner can issue an information notice.

The Molly Rose Foundation and the 5Rights Foundation have been clear. Automatic preservation is essential, because data is the key to joining the dots in these tragic cases. We cannot allow another child’s digital history and the truth about their death to vanish because of bureaucratic delay. As Ofcom has recently clarified, service providers are not required to retain data they do not already hold. They simply need to notify the regulator if information is missing. During recent consultations, major providers such as Meta and Microsoft did not object to preserving data from further back, provided it was still within their systems.

Too often, police seize a physical device but fail to notify Ofcom of potential breaches of the Online Safety Act. These amendments work in tandem. Amendments 474 and 475 would freeze the evidence automatically and provide the legal mechanism to preserve data. Amendments 438ED and 438EE would ensure that the police and coroners are fully aware of their responsibilities and protocols to collect that evidence. Together, they would ensure that potential online harm is treated with the same priority as a physical weapon in every investigation into a child’s death.

These amendments are about ensuring that our coroners system is fit for a digital age. They provide the speed and technical certainty required to support bereaved families in their pursuit of justice. We cannot continue to allow a lack of process to obscure the truth about why a child has died. We cannot allow the deletion of evidence to become the enemy of justice. I urge the Minister, as have the noble Baronesses, to accept these amendments as a necessary modernisation of our investigatory framework.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, if I needed persuading—and I am not sure I did—the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and her supporters have certainly persuaded me that there is a serious problem here. As legislators who spend hours in this Chamber, we all know that law without enforcement is a dead letter in a sealed book, and not what anyone wants to be spending their lives on. If, as it seems, there are gaps of responsibility and agency between coroners, the police, Ofcom and, dare I say it, the great big untouchable tech imperium that monetises our data and effectively monetises our lives, those gaps need to be dealt with.

Just as I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, not just for her commitment but for her expertise on online harms, I will say that my noble friend the Minister is probably one of the most expert and experienced criminal lawyers in your Lordships’ House. If these precise amendments are too broad and too onerous for catching children who, for example, were too young to have a device, I am sure that my noble friend the Minister will be able to address that. Between these noble Baronesses and other noble Lords of good faith, something can be done.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, powerful AI tools are transforming policing and reshaping how forces investigate, patrol and make decisions, often with profound implications. This amendment would make it a legal requirement for forces to disclose any algorithmic tool used in this way that might affect a person’s rights or freedoms.

The Government’s algorithmic transparency recording standard, ATRS, provides a consistent way for public bodies to explain how their algorithmic tools work, what data they use and how human oversight is maintained. Its goal is a public, searchable record of these systems. Use of the ATRS is mandatory for arm’s-length bodies delivering public services, though the previous Government did not extend that to the police, despite calls from the Committee on Standards in Public Life and from the Justice and Home Affairs Committee.

The College of Policing has now integrated the ATRS into its authorised professional practice. Forces are expected to complete an ATRS report for all relevant tools. That is welcome progress. The hope is that forces will increasingly comply to build public trust and meet their equality and data protection duties. However, while compliance is now expected, failure to record a tool is still not a legal requirement. A force could still choose not to use the ATRS, citing operational necessity, and it would not be breaking any law.

Transparency is vital across public services but nowhere more so than in policing, where these systems have the power to alter lives and restrict liberty. That is why Justice and civil liberties groups such as the Ada Lovelace and Alan Turing institutes want police use of these tools to be publicly declared and for this to be placed on a statutory footing. What is ultimately needed is a national register with real legal force—something the NPCC’s own AI lead has called for.

Government work on such a register is under way. I welcome that project but it will take time, while AI capabilities advance very rapidly indeed. The ATRS is the mechanism we have for now. This amendment would immediately strengthen it, requiring every operational AI tool from facial recognition to predictive mapping to be publicly declared.

Why does this matter? Take gait analysis, identifying people by how they move. No UK force has declared that it uses it, but its potential is recognised. Ireland is already legislating for its use in serious crime. Without a legal duty here, a UK force could deploy gait analysis tomorrow, with no public knowledge or oversight, just as facial recognition pilots proceed today with limited transparency.

This year, forces will spend nearly £2 billion on digital technology and analytics. With growing demand and limited resources, it is no surprise at all that forces turn to AI for efficiency. Yet, without total transparency, this technological shift risks further eroding public trust. Recognition of that need is growing. No one wants to return to the Met’s unlawful gangs matrix, quietly risk-scoring individuals on dubious grounds. For that reason, I urge the Government to accept this vital safeguard. It is a foundation for accountability in a field that will only grow in power and in consequence. I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, as my noble friend Lady Doocey explained, Amendment 431 seeks to place a statutory duty on every police force in England and Wales to disclose its use of algorithmic tools where they affect the rights, entitlements or obligations of individuals.

We are witnessing a rapid proliferation of algorithmic decision-making in policing, from predictive mapping to risk assessment tools used in custody suites. Algorithms are increasingly informing how the state interacts with the citizen, yet too often these tools operate in a black box, hidden from public view and democratic scrutiny. As we have discussed in relation to other technologies such as facial recognition, the deployment of advanced technology without a clear framework undermines public trust.

This amendment requires police forces, as my noble friend explained, to complete entries in the algorithmic transparency recording standard. The ATRS is the Government’s own standard for algorithmic transparency, developed to ensure public sector accountability. My Private Member’s Bill on public authority algorithmic and automated decision-making allows for a more advanced form of reporting. In my view, the ATRS is the bare minimum required for accountability for AI use in the public sector.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 431 deals with the use of algorithmic tools in policing. While the Government agree on the importance of transparency in the use of algorithmic tools by police forces, we do not believe that the amendment would be the optimal means of delivering either meaningful improvements in public confidence or operational benefits for policing.

The proposed duty would require police forces to disclose all algorithmic tools through the Algorithmic Transparency Recording Standard—the ATRS. The ATRS was designed for government departments and arm’s-length bodies, not for operationally independent police forces. While it is an effective tool for those organisations, its high level of technical detail and lack of narrative explanation mean that disclosures would not provide the clarity expected by the public and would risk burying key information in jargon. More importantly, mandating disclosure of all tools beyond the exemptions policy of the ATRS could inadvertently compromise operational security and policing tactics.

The Government are, however, keen to encourage transparency in the use of algorithmic tools by police forces in England and Wales to maintain the support of the public for their use and in keeping with the core tradition of policing by consent. In line with this, the Government have commissioned work on transparency measures for police use of AI and are working closely with the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s AI portfolio and the National Policing Chief Scientific Adviser to develop policies encouraging and supporting appropriate levels of transparency while safeguarding operational integrity. This approach will ensure that transparency is meaningful, proportionate and does not undermine the effectiveness of policing.

It is important to recognise that we are listening to the public in dealing with concerns that have been raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, around policing encroaching on civil liberties. Indeed, the Government commissioned and published research into public attitudes on the police’s use of AI last year. The research demonstrated strong support for AI use by the police. There are rightful concerns about the need for AI use to be underpinned by rigorous oversight, humans always being clearly involved in decision-making and transparency. These findings have been supported elsewhere; for example, in recently published research by CENTRIC, which surveyed 10,000 members of the public. That is why we are working closely with the NPCC to build upon and implement the principles of the covenant for the use of AI in policing, to which all forces in England and Wales have signed up. Of course, it is important.

The noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, referred to the use of gait analysis, and there was a comparison to live facial recognition. It is important that we understand the risks of bias and discriminatory outcomes from using any policing tool.

To be clear, police deployments must comply with the Equality Act 2010 and data protection law. Forces are required to assess potential discrimination risks and should be able to evidence that tools are necessary, proportionate and fair. Humans remain clearly involved in decision-making, and forces are expected to monitor performance against protected characteristics so that any bias is identified and addressed. Where tools cannot meet these standards in practice, they should not be deployed or must be withdrawn pending remediation.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, referred to black box systems. To be clear, we are not comfortable with black box systems being used in policing. Policing requires—

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I thank the Minister. Much of what he said about developing an alternative to the ATRS has been encouraging, but, obviously, quite a lot will also depend on—and he went on to talk about data protection—whether officers are trained in how Article 22 of the GDPR operates in terms of automated decision-making. What assurance can the Minister give about the level of knowledge and training in that area?

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

As I said, police deployments must comply with the Equality Act 2010 and data protection law, which, of course, include the latest data protection law under the GDPR. In relation to that specific point on Article 22 of the GDPR, I will have to write to the noble Lord to give him the full details, but, as I say, the general principle of compliance applies.

Just to finish the point I was making in reference to the noble Lord’s point about black box systems, where a system is inherently opaque, forces must have compensating controls such as rigorous testing, performance monitoring and strong human review, or not use that system.

Given these assurances—and I am grateful to the noble Lord for saying that he was encouraged, and we will wait to hear from his colleague as to whether she is encouraged by these responses—I hope the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I want to make a very brief contribution—cheekily, because I have not taken any role in this Bill. My noble friend’s amendment, what she said in support of it and the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, are highly pertinent to the debate on the Government’s proposal to restrict jury trials. On the Tube in, I read an account of the report from the Institute for Government, which has looked at the Government’s proposals and concluded that the time savings from judge-only trials would be marginal at best, amounting to less than 2% of Crown Court time. It suggests, pertinently, that the Government

“should instead focus on how to drive up productivity across the criminal courts, investing in the workforce and technology required for the courts to operate more efficiently”.

As others who know the situation much better than I do have said, it sounds dire. One is used to all these problems of legacy systems—lack of interoperability and so on. I remember all that being debated at EU level. It is difficult and probably capital-intensive work—at least, initially—but instead of promoting these headline-grabbing gestures about abolishing jury trials, the Government need to fix the terrible lack of efficiency in the criminal justice system. I am not sure that the civil justice system is any better. Having, unfortunately, had a modest involvement in a case in the county court, I found that it was impossible to phone any staff. You might be lucky to get a response to an email after a week.

Making the system work efficiently, with all bits interacting with each other, would do a great deal more to increase productivity and save the time of all those people who are running around. One hears accounts from people who work in the criminal courts of reports not being available, files being lost and staff being absent, let alone the decrepit state of court buildings. All this investment needs to go in before the Government resort to gesture politics and things such as abolishing jury trials.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 432 was so well introduced by my noble friend Lady Doocey. This lack of appropriate technology and how it is handicapping our police services is something that she feels very strongly about. I was delighted to hear what the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and my noble friend Lady Ludford had to say, because this lack of the appropriate technology extends beyond the police services into the wider criminal justice system. This proposed new clause would address the desperate state of police data infrastructure by requiring the Secretary of State to publish a national plan to modernise police data and intelligence systems within 12 months.

As mentioned in the explanatory statement, this is not an abstract bureaucratic request. It is a direct response to, among other things, recommendation 7 of the National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey. The audit painted a damning picture of the current landscape: intelligence systems that do not talk to one another, vital information trapped in silos and officers unable to join the dots to protect vulnerable children. It is unacceptable that, in 2025, we still rely on fragmented, obsolete IT systems to fight sophisticated networked criminality. This amendment seeks to mandate a coherent national strategy to ensure that antiquated police technology is replaced, that intelligence regarding predatory behaviour is shared effectively across police borders in real time and that we finally close the capability gaps that allow perpetrators of group-based child sexual exploitation to slip through the net.

Amendment 432 would ensure that, when the police hold vital intelligence, they have the systems to use it effectively. We cannot claim to be serious about tackling child exploitation if we do not fix the digital infrastructure that underpins our investigations.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for bringing forward this amendment, which seeks to require the Government to publish a national plan to modernise police data and intelligence systems in England and Wales. At its heart, this amendment speaks to a very practical and pressing concern: that our policing infrastructure must stay up to date with modern crime, particularly the most harmful and insidious forms of abuse.

Outdated and fragmented information systems can frustrate effective policing. That point was raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, in the National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, which noted that some police forces are still operating antiquated legacy systems that inhibit real-time data sharing and hinder co-ordinated action across forces and with partner agencies.

Group-based child sexual exploitation is a complex crime. Our response must therefore be equally networked and technologically capable. Recommendation 7 from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, made it clear that improving data systems is essential—I emphasise that word—to ensuring children’s safety and enabling earlier intervention and more efficient information exchange. I look forward to the Minister’s outline of the steps the Government have already taken to address this issue.

This amendment seeks to take that recommendation forward by requiring a national plan with clear steps and milestones to modernise police data and intelligence systems. We strongly support the idea of having clear milestones not just for police forces and agencies but for the public and Parliament. Transparent targets allow for progress to be measured and debated, and provide operational leaders with something concrete and tangible to work towards.

We also welcome the requirement for annual progress reports to be laid before Parliament until the plan’s objectives are achieved. That level of ongoing scrutiny is important if we truly want to drive systemic improvement rather than to allow good intentions to gather dust. I therefore echo the helpful contributions of my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford; we really must do better.

I look forward to the Minister’s response to this amendment. I would be grateful if he would outline how the Government intend to address the problems identified in the national audit and how they will respond to the constructive challenge that this amendment presents.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I also very much support this amendment as, I hope, a nudge towards an opening door that the Government are already looking at. Following on from the powerful speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, it seems that, quite apart from the recipients of these NCHIs, there are two further issues: the waste of time and the waste of money. The police are always short of money and of time. That is obvious and has been said by the noble Lords, Lord Young and Lord Hogan-Howe. If this was removed, they could get on and do their job. They would save a great deal of money and something even more important, because they would be dealing with the crimes that people really need them to deal with.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, this is already proving to be a crucial debate in the passage of this Bill. I support Amendment 416E, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton. Sadly, my noble friend Lord Strasburger is unable to be with us to support the amendment, which he has signed, but I hope that I reflect his views in speaking today.

Non-crime hate incidents, although born from the well-intentioned Macpherson report in 1993—which the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, called “an honourable start”—have morphed into a mechanism that frequently harasses and silences legitimate debate. In doing so, they consume prodigious quantities of police time, as we have heard—time that is desperately needed to investigate the crimes that we have discussed throughout Committee. Non-crime hate incidents, which started from benign motivations in 1993, have morphed into an ugly and frequently used technique for harassing and silencing somebody whose views the complainant does not like. In the process, prodigious quantities of police time are being wasted on non-criminal matters, meaning that real crimes that would otherwise be investigated are being ignored.

The seeds of what has gone wrong were sown by the Macpherson inquiry into the murder of Stephen Lawrence. The inquiry concluded that a racist incident should be defined as being

“any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person”.

In essence, that means that anyone—whether involved in an incident or not, whether a reasonable person or otherwise—would be able to determine that an incident, no matter how harmless, was racist in nature. The inquiry went on to recommend that

“the term ‘racist incident’ must be understood to include crimes and non-crimes in policing terms. Both must be reported, recorded and investigated with equal commitment”.

It is remarkable that the inquiry concluded that incidents which are not criminal offences as defined by Parliament should be investigated by the police with equal vigour as those which are criminal offences. That raises fundamental questions about the purpose of the police and what their priorities should be, particularly in a world of potentially limitless demand and highly constrained resource.

Nevertheless, Macpherson’s recommendations relating to racist incidents and their recording were rapidly accepted and implemented by the police and government. Following a 2006 review by Sir Adrian Fulford, a shared definition of hate crimes and non-crime hate incidents was adopted across the criminal justice system, including by the police and the Crown Prosecution Service. This expanded the recording of NCHIs beyond purely racist incidents to cover all those characteristics that are covered by hate crime legislation in England and Wales—race, religion, disability, sexual orientation and gender identity.

Key to the expansion of alleged NCHIs was the creation, in 2014, of the College of Policing’s Hate Crime Operational Guidance for police forces. Perhaps recognising that the guidance was likely to cause grave concerns to many, the College of Policing made a pre-emptive defence of their policy, saying:

“The recording of, and response to, non-crime hate incidents does not have universal support in society. Some people use this as evidence to accuse the police of becoming ‘the thought police’, trying to control what citizens think or believe, rather than what they do”.


The guidance goes on to say, in relation to hate incidents:

“Where any person, including police personnel, reports a hate incident which would not be the primary responsibility of another agency, it must be recorded regardless of whether or not they are the victim, and irrespective of whether there is any evidence to identify the hate element”.


The use of “must” in the guidance leaves no latitude for police discretion or the balancing of rights exercise, which would be necessary in considering the subject’s right to freedom of expression under Article 10.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

With the advent of social media, the number of NCHIs being recorded has rocketed. Policy Exchange reported in 2024 that over 13,000 are being logged annually in England and Wales, consuming 60,000 police hours a year. Some keyboard warriors with an axe to grind have made a full-time occupation out of submitting prolific quantities of NCHI complaints with little or no justification. These include a disgraced former policeman who prodigiously exploits the system to frequently harass his political opponents. Some incidents have hit the press, such as when Graham Linehan, the co-creator of “Father Ted”, was arrested on the tarmac at Heathrow over an NCHI.

However, many victims of spurious NCHIs are not even aware that a complaint has been logged against their name. One campaigner found out only when the complainant launched a judicial review of the police’s refusal to take the matter further. As we have heard, the impact of having an unproven NCHI secretly logged against your name can be severe and mean that you are refused a visa to visit certain countries, including America, or that you fail an enhanced DBS check for a job in areas such as education or health.

Freedom of information requests to 43 police forces found zero examples of NCHIs preventing crime. The Metropolitan Police announced last October that it has stopped investigating NCHIs entirely. Last month, the National Police Chiefs’ Council and the College of Policing reported to the Government that NCHIs are “not fit for purpose”.

NCHIs must go. The Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, stated during our debates on the seventh day in Committee that the College of Policing is reviewing this guidance and that we would see this review before Report. I hope that the Minister can confirm whether that review will address the chilling effect on free speech identified in the Miller judgment and whether he accepts that the police must prioritise actual criminality over the recording of NCHIs.

I support this amendment as a necessary check on the expansion of the surveillance state. When will the Government act to abolish NCHIs? If the Minister cannot answer that question, we will have to return to this matter on Report.

[Lord Herbert of South Downs (Con)]

My Lords, I draw attention to my declaration in the register of interests that I am chair of the College of Policing.

As I said at Second Reading, we need to remember that there were benign reasons for the introduction of this regime over three decades ago; what the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, said in this regard was helpful. The purpose was to ensure that the police would pursue intelligence that could build a pattern of behaviour that would result in harm to an individual. That was the case not just in relation to the dreadful murder of Stephen Lawrence but subsequently in the case of Fiona Pilkington, where a repeated pattern of anti-social behaviour had been ignored. It was not criminal behaviour—it fell below that threshold—but it nevertheless resulted in a tragic loss of life.

Nevertheless, as has been noted, there has been considerable change over that three decades, with the advent of social media, smartphones and a much more contested policy space in many of the areas relating to hate crimes or alleged hate crimes. There is the risk of a number of consequences. Those have been drawn attention to by noble Lords, but they include the chilling effect on free speech, the tying up of resources unnecessarily —I will come to that—and, I suggest, at least as serious, damage to the reputation of the police, if it is perceived that they are prioritising the wrong things and getting themselves involved in matters that they should not be.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 15th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

When I observed these deployments of facial recognition and looked at the 20 policemen standing around, it occurred to me that they would probably find a lot more of the people they were looking for if they just went round to their houses and knocked on the door, rather than working on the off-chance that they might walk past them in the high street.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Doocey for eliciting a very useful debate, as was the intention. I particularly welcome some of the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, but say to him that a Crime and Policing Bill might possibly be the place for discussion of the use of live facial recognition in policing. Maybe we can make some progress with the Government, we hope, responding or at least giving an indication ahead of their consultation of their approach to the legislative framework around live facial recognition. I very much hope that they will take this debate on board as part of that consultation.

As my noble friend Lady Doocey clearly stated, these amendments are necessary because live facial recognition currently operates, effectively, in a legislative void, yet the police are rolling out this technology at speed. There is no explicit Act of Parliament authorising its deployment, meaning that police forces are in effect, as my noble friend Lord Strasburger indicated, writing their own rules as they go. This technology represents a fundamental shift in the relationship between citizen and state. When LFR cameras are deployed, our public spaces become biometric checkpoints where every face is indiscriminately scanned. By treating every citizen as a suspect in a permanent digital line-up, we are abandoning the presumption of innocence. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, made that point very well. As a result, there is a clear issue of public trust.

Amendment 379 would prohibit the use of LFR during public assemblies or processions unless a specific code of practice has been formally approved by resolution of both Houses of Parliament. This is essential to protect our freedoms of expression and assembly under Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR. The pervasive tracking capability of LFR creates what the courts have recognised as a chilling effect, as described by my noble friend Lady Doocey and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. Law-abiding citizens are discouraged from attending protests or expressing dissenting views for fear of permanent state monitoring. We know that police forces have already used this technology to target peaceful protesters who were not wanted for any crime. People should not have to hand over their sensitive biometric data as the price of engaging in democratic processes. Without explicit parliamentary consent and an approved code of practice, we are sleepwalking into a surveillance state that bypasses democratic oversight entirely.

Amendment 471 would establish that LFR use in public spaces must be limited to narrowly defined serious cases—such as preventing major crimes or locating missing persons—and requires prior judicial authorisation specifying the scope and purpose of each deployment. The need for this oversight was made absolutely clear by the 2020 Court of Appeal ruling in R (Bridges) v Chief Constable of South Wales Police, which found LFR use unlawful due to fundamental deficiencies in the legal framework. The court identified that far too much discretion is left to individual officers regarding who ends up on a watchlist and where cameras are placed. We must replace operational discretion with judicial scrutiny.

The Government themselves now acknowledge the inadequacy of the current framework, which they describe as a “patchwork framework” and say it is

“complicated and difficult to understand”.

Well, that is at least some progress towards the Government acknowledging the situation. They say that the current framework does not provide sufficient confidence for expanded use—hear, hear. The former Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner made clear his concerns about the College of Policing guidance, questioning whether these fundamental issues require

“more than an authorised professional practice document from the College of Policing”

and instead demand parliamentary debate. The former commissioner raised a profound question:

“Is the status of the UK citizen shifting from our jealously guarded presumption of innocence to that of ‘suspected until we have proved our identity to the satisfaction of the examining officer’?”


Such a fundamental shift in the relationship between citizen and state cannot, and should not, be determined by guidance alone.

The College of Policing’s APP on LFR, while attempting to provide operational guidance, falls short of providing the robust legal framework that this technology demands. It remains non-statutory guidance that can be revised without parliamentary scrutiny, lacks enforceable standards for deployment decisions, provides insufficient detail on bias testing and mitigation requirements, and does not establish independent oversight mechanisms with real teeth.

Most critically, the guidance permits watch-list compilation based on subjective assessments without clear statutory criteria or independent review. This leaves fundamental decisions about who gets surveilled to operational discretion rather than judicial oversight. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, who was keen on one bit of our amendment but not the other, I say that this intelligence-led tool effectively delegates it to a senior police officer and they, in a sense, have a conflict of interest. They are the ones who make the operational decisions.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. It seems that he and his noble friends keep talking about the police and the restrictions which will be imposed on the police. But Amendment 471 seems to extend facial recognition to hundreds and hundreds of public authorities, provided they adhere to a code or comply with certain practices. Does he still stand by the idea that facial recognition should be extended to hundreds of public authorities, in addition to the police?

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

If the noble Lord accepts the fact that controls are required, which he did not in his earlier comments, I think he would be greatly reassured if you had to have judicial oversight of the use of live facial recognition, which is useful in circumstances other than purely policing. What we are talking about is a greater level of control over the deployment of live facial recognition. We can argue perfectly satisfactorily about whether or not it should be extended beyond the police, but we are suggesting that, alongside that greater deployment, or possible greater deployment, there should be a much greater degree of oversight. I think that effectively answers the noble Lord.

The Metropolitan Police’s own data from recent LFR operations shows a false alert rate requiring officers to make numerous stops of innocent people. Even with claimed accuracy improvements, when a system processes thousands of faces, even a small error translates to significant numbers of misidentifications affecting law-abiding citizens.

More concerning is the evidence on differential performance, and that is where I fundamentally agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. The National Physical Laboratory’s 2020 testing of facial recognition systems found significant variation in performance across demographic groups. While contemporary LFR systems used by UK police show better performance than earlier algorithms, independent research continues to identify measurable differences in accuracy rates across ethnicity and gender. The Court of Appeal in Bridges ruled that South Wales Police breached the public sector equality duty by failing to satisfy itself that the software was free from racial or gender bias, yet current deployment practices suggest insufficient progress in addressing these equality obligations.

We should also address the secrecy surrounding police watch-lists. The Justice and Home Affairs Committee of this House recommended that these lists be subject to compulsory statutory criteria and standardised training. There is no independent review of watch-list inclusion, no notification to those placed on lists and no clear route for challenge or removal.

I also very much appreciated what the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, had to say about the problems with software. But the chilling sentence he delivered was “Technology has to take over”. That is precisely the problem that we are living with. If technology is to take over, we need a legal framework to govern it. The current patchwork of overlapping laws addressing human rights, data protection and criminal justice is not fit for purpose.

These amendments provide the democratic and judicial guard-rails needed to contain this technology, and we cannot allow the convenience of new tools to erode our established civil liberties. Only Parliament should determine the framework for how LFR is used in our society, and only the courts should authorise its deployment in individual cases.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

Before the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, sits down, can he address an issue that none of us has addressed yet? These amendments concern the state’s use of facial recognition, for all the reasons that we have talked about. But the private sector is far in advance of this. Some 12 or 13 years ago, it was using a product called Facewatch, which was started at Gordon’s Wine Bar because Gordon was sick of people walking into the bar and either violently assaulting his patrons or stealing things. He put a clever camera on the door and patrons did not get into the bar if they had been accused of something in the past. That product has moved right around the world, and certainly it is extensively used in the UK in different settings.

I am not arguing that that is good or bad; I merely observe that, if we end up in a position where the police have less access to something that can be a good technology, and private commerce is getting benefits that presumably it is able to justify, that inequality of arms does not benefit anyone. It should at least be considered in the consultation that the Government started, which is particularly focused on the police. But as well as the police, we should consider airports, railway stations, et cetera.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

Very briefly, I do not think that the noble Lord is making a bad case at all. Live facial recognition, whether in the hands of the public sector or the private sector, needs a proper legal framework: there is no doubt about that. My noble friend made it clear that we believe it is a useful technology, but, the more useful it is, the more we need to make sure that it is under proper control.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, this group of amendments touches on how the police should deal with modern threats and how we balance civil liberties with the clear duty of the state to protect the public.

I listened very carefully to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, when she introduced her Amendment 379, which, as she said, would prevent the police using live facial recognition when imposing conditions on public processions or assemblies under the relevant provisions of the Public Order Act, unless and until a new statutory code of practice had been approved. If we accept—as we on these Benches and, I think, others in your Lordships’ House do—that live facial recognition can be a legitimate and valuable policing tool in preventing crime, identifying suspects and protecting the public, it is difficult to justify singling out its use in this specific context for an additional and likely onerous layer of bureaucracy. The police already operate within an extensive framework of legal safeguards, such as data protection law. To require a further code of practice, subject to affirmative approval by both Houses of Parliament, risks delaying or deterring the deployment of technology precisely where it may be most needed. So, regretfully, we cannot support the amendment.

Amendment 471, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, goes further in seeking to affect the Government’s ability to use live facial recognition technology. It would restrict the circumstances in which live facial recognition could be used; it would require prior judicial authorisation in the specific circumstances of its use; and it would create an extensive new enforcement and oversight architecture. Public order situations are often fast-moving and unpredictable. Senior officers must be able to make operational decisions quickly, based on risk and intelligence on the ground. Introducing additional procedural hurdles at the point of use risks undermining that agility. We should focus on rolling out effective technology at pace to combat crime and disorder, while ensuring robust safeguards and scrutiny.

In particular, the requirement for prior judicial authorisation is, in our view, particularly problematic. One of the principal advantages of live facial recognition is its speed and flexibility. It can be deployed rapidly in response to emerging intelligence, acute threats or serious risks to public safety, and requiring prior judicial approval risks rendering the technology ineffective in precisely the circumstances where it could prevent serious harm. In dynamic operational scenarios, such as events of violent disorder, knife crime hot spots or rapidly evolving threats, delay can mean failure.

I was particularly taken by the speech of my noble friend Lord Moynihan, who spoke about the position in New York, where, because of there being fewer police on the streets, the technology had to take over. He was right to say that.

We on these Benches are concerned by the attempt to narrow the scope of live facial recognition to a tightly defined set of purposes, because, if Parliament accepts the use of this technology in principle, it makes little sense to confine it to only a small number of scenarios. Crime does not present itself neatly within statutory categories. Policing requires judgment and discretion. Artificially restricting the use of a tool that has demonstrated value risks depriving the police of one of the most effective capabilities available to them.

We of course recognise the need for appropriate safeguards to be implemented in the use of this technology. This new and expanded use of people’s data, even if to facilitate an objective that we support, must be enacted with transparency and proportionality. But these amendments would constrain the police’s operations and weaken our ability to respond to modern threats. At a time when criminals are increasingly sophisticated and technologically adept, Parliament should be empowering the police to use lawful, proportionate and effective tools rather than tying their hands.

--- Later in debate ---

The Conservatives and the Government have the same aim. I hope that the Minister will understand why we believe our measures would improve effectiveness in tackling theft. I very much look forward to hearing his reply. For now, I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, this group addresses the extension of warrantless search powers for electronically tracked stolen goods to the service police, in Clause 129, alongside civilian police, in Clause 128. While we recognise the need for police to tackle high-tech crime, such sweeping powers, particularly warrantless searches, must be meticulously governed to avoid abuse and uphold civil liberties. I have tabled Amendments 386 to 389, which would ensure that robust governance and accountability mechanisms are embedded in these provisions.

Amendment 386 would require the Secretary of State to produce a code of practice for the operation of Clause 129, specifically mandating consultation with civil liberties and human rights organisations and relevant service police bodies. This would ensure due process regarding the authorisation, seizure, retention and disposal of evidence.

Amendment 388 would require the Secretary of State to provide appropriate training for service police personnel on how to exercise these powers proportionately and lawfully.

Amendment 387 would mandate the establishment of an independent mechanism for handling, investigating and reviewing public complaints arising from the exercise of these powers, giving complainants similar statutory rights to victims reporting to the Independent Office for Police Conduct.

Amendment 389 would mandate that the Secretary of State produces an annual report detailing the exercise of these warrantless search powers under Clause 128, ensuring transparency and accountability to Parliament. Further, these new obligations would require the affirmative procedure for their governing regulations, ensuring full parliamentary debate before they are enacted, as sought in Amendments 499 to 501.

We on these Benches are opposed to Amendments 383 to 385 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies, which seek to remove the requirement, as we have heard from the noble Lord, for an officer to even possess electronic tracking data before conducting a warrantless search. By stripping away this technologically justified threshold, these amendments would transform a specific investigative tool into an arbitrary power of entry, undermining the core principle that a person’s home is his castle.

In contrast, Amendments 386 to 389 provide the necessary basis for these intrusive powers to be overseen. Specifically, Amendment 386 mandates a statutory code of practice for the Armed Forces to ensure that their exercise of these powers is necessary, proportionate and strictly compliant with the Human Rights Act. Furthermore, Amendment 387 would establish an independent mechanism for handling public complaints, ensuring that any misuse of power is investigated by a body demonstrably independent of the service police.

Finally, my amendments would require post-implementation reporting to Parliament every 12 months. We must see the data on the demographic profile of those targeted and the subsequent criminal justice outcomes to guard against disproportionate application or mission creep. Without these safeguards, we risk creating a shortcut—as other provisions might do—to a surveillance state, where convenience is prioritised over constitutional protection.

The safeguards that I have proposed in Amendments 386 to 389 regarding service police are only as strong as the parliamentary scrutiny that would underpin them. We must ensure that these powers are exercised with not just efficiency but a regular check of parliamentary accountability.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, this group of amendments addresses Clauses 128 and 129 granting new powers to the police to enter premises to search for and seize stolen items that can be electronically tracked there, without the need to first apply to a court for a warrant. I welcome the welcome given to these new clauses by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, on behalf of the Opposition.

These new powers are intended, as he said, to be exercised where a stolen item is electronically tracked to a specific location. This is in direct response to public concern that the police are not able to act swiftly in response to crimes such as mobile phone theft, even when victims have clear, real-time electronic evidence of the phone’s location. It will reduce the risk that stolen goods are quickly moved on or used to facilitate other crime. I suggest to the Committee that the main benefit of these clauses is ensuring that mobile phone theft is addressed and combated.

The noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, is no longer in his place, but when speaking to an earlier group he suggested that there is an impression that the police do not prioritise criminal behaviour such as mobile phone theft but instead concentrate on other issues, which I will not go into. I suggest that the police being able to more quickly and effectively tackle very common criminal behaviour such as mobile phone theft would also very much enhance the reputation of the police. As the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, said, it is sometimes at risk of being downplayed.

I will first address the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. Amendments 383 to 385 would remove the requirement in Clause 128 that the power may be exercised by police only in relation to stolen goods electronically tracked to specified premises. They would also remove the condition that before the use of power is authorised by a senior police officer, he or she must be satisfied that there is electronic tracking data linking the stolen item and a specific premises. These amendments would significantly broaden the scope of the proposed powers and remove important safeguards.

Powers of entry are inherently intrusive, and there is a balance to be struck between ensuring that the police can act quickly and decisively against thieves, and retrieve victims’ stolen property, and safeguarding the right to a private and family life. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, put it very well when he referred to it as a technically justified threshold. I contend to the Committee that people generally accept the need for warrants to be used in detecting stolen goods, but some devices can be tracked electronically in real time. The police turn around and say, “We can’t do anything about this because we have to go and get a warrant”, but you can point to the address where you know that phone is and you know that, if the police do not act quickly, there is a good chance that phone will be moved out of the country. It is only right that we use that as an apposite threshold to introduce these powers, rather than saying that they should be used for any stolen good of whatever nature, where there is no electronic tracking data involved. It will do much to improve confidence in the police in catching up with the 21st century and current technology, but we do not see the need to go further.

The requirement for electronic tracking data linking at least one stolen item to the premises before powers can be exercised provides a further layer of reliability in their use, while ensuring, as I said, that the police can act swiftly when they need to. I say again that removing these requirements would dilute the safeguards intended to ensure that police officers use these powers lawfully, proportionately and only in specific circumstances.

That brings me neatly to Amendments 386 to 389 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I commend his intent to ensure that there is strong accountability, independent oversight and scrutiny of the use of these powers. As I have said, the Government recognise that these new powers are intrusive by their nature, particularly as they can be exercised by officers without them first needing to seek authorisation from a court by obtaining a search warrant. We have, accordingly, built in appropriate safeguards to ensure that the new powers are used appropriately and within well-established independent oversight and scrutiny mechanisms.

Amendment 386 would require the Secretary of State to issue a statutory code of practice to which the service police must have regard when exercising the new powers. I stress to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that these new powers will be subject to the relevant provisions in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and its codes of practice. The Government will amend PACE Code B, and Code B of the service police codes of practice, to reflect the new powers, providing clear and detailed guidance around their use for both territorial and service police. These revisions to the codes will be completed before the powers are commenced. This will provide robust statutory guidance to police and will be complemented by the College of Policing’s authorised professional practice.

Amendment 387 would require the creation of an independent oversight mechanism to investigate public complaints about the use of these powers by service police. Any complaints about their use by territorial police would be addressed in the normal way through internal police complaints procedures and referrals to the Independent Office for Police Conduct, where required.

The service police are the focus of the noble Lord’s amendment, and any complaints would be dealt with under the complaints system for service police. As set out in the Service Police (Complaints etc.) Regulations 2023, this is overseen by the Service Police Complaints Commissioner, whose role is similar to that of the IOPC. The commissioner is independent of the service police and the MoD, and has a statutory duty to secure, maintain and review arrangements for procedures that deal with complaints and conduct. They deal with the most serious complaints and set the standard by which service police should handle complaints. The Service Police Complaints Commissioner has the same powers as the service police where it has been determined that they will carry out an investigation, and they can also determine that a complaint can be reinvestigated, if they are satisfied that there are compelling reasons to do so.

Amendment 388 would require service police to undertake training before they could exercise the new powers. All members of the service police undergo training that addresses each element set out in the noble Lord’s amendment, including on the legal requirements and limitations of search and seizure powers, proportionality, maintenance of clear records and compliance with Article 8 of the ECHR and the Human Rights Act 1998. Service police trainees are tested on arrest, entry, search and seizure before they can exercise these powers. Training is updated in response to any change in legislation that would affect service police officers’ exercise of their powers. Specifically, training will be updated in light of the new powers in this Bill.

Finally, Amendment 389 would require the Secretary of State to make an annual report to Parliament on the police’s exercise of these new powers. Noble Lords will recognise that statutory powers are already subject to regular review and rigorous scrutiny. The well-established parliamentary arrangements enable members of both Houses to examine the exercise of these and other statutory powers through Written and Oral Questions, Select Committees and other means. Police accountability is ensured through a variety of statutory and non-statutory oversight and scrutiny mechanisms, including the Independent Office for Police Conduct, the service police—

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt. The Minister is clearly getting to the end of what he has to say. What raised my eyebrows reading Clause 129 is the fact that these powers have been given to the service police in the first place. What is the rationale for them having these powers in particular, how much mobile phone theft are the service police dealing with, and why are we putting them on all fours with the civilian police? The Minister will have noticed that I have not tried to amend Clause 128; all my focus is on the service police. If a military policeman turned up on my doorstep and asked to check out my house, I certainly would be rather concerned, hence the need for safeguards. But there seems to be no rationale for the service police being brought into this and being given these pretty extensive powers.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, the bad news is that not all service personnel are absolute angels: it could be one junior soldier stealing a mobile phone from another junior serviceman. These arrangements are very sensible, and I agree with everything that the Minister has had to say. My only question for him, while I am on my feet, is this: is there any evidence that the service police make mistakes on the procedures when they are exercising their powers? I am not aware of any problem.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I will take the last one first. I am not sure there is any evidence; I would have to look into that. To answer the more substantive intervention by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, as to why service police need the powers to deal with electronically tracked stolen goods, while service police deal with crime in the defence context, it is important that they are equipped to respond effectively to current and future trends in criminal behaviour. Obviously, the provisions in the Bill help to ensure that service police can respond with lawful, fair and proportionate action, now and in the future, to the full spectrum of criminality that threatens the cohesion and operational effectiveness of our Armed Forces. These new powers will give officers more chance of quickly finding and retrieving stolen items that are electronically tracked at premises, and reduce the risk they are lost or moved on. Maybe put it down to an overabundance of caution but also an acknowledgement that crimes that affect and have to be investigated by civilian forces can also affect and be investigated by the Armed Forces.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, all I will say is that, faced with an abundance of caution—that is to say, if in doubt— “give the police powers” is not an approach that is particularly favoured on these Benches.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

That is a point well made and well taken. I add that the powers would, of course, be exercised only within the jurisdiction of the service police, so service police would not suddenly be moving into areas of activity that you would expect the territorial police to be pursuing.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, anticipated that I was winding up. I hope that my comments have reassured the noble Lord that the spirit and intention behind his amendments have been incorporated within the proposals in the Bill. In the light of my remarks, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, will withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, these amendments build on Clauses 130 to 137, which confer powers on law enforcement agencies to extract information from online accounts as part of their investigations into immigration crime and sexual abuse cases, and to protect national security and our borders. Taken together, Amendments 441 to 444, 452, 393 and 394 ensure that the police can access information held in the online accounts of individuals subject to national security-related civil orders. These include terrorism and state threat prevention and investigation measures, as well as youth diversion orders, which are being introduced by clauses earlier in this Bill.

It is increasingly common for individuals to store data in the cloud for various reasons, such as to free up space on devices and, increasingly, because of the way devices or applications are designed, but also, regrettably, in some cases deliberately to make it less accessible to law enforcement. This is particularly the case with young people: police operational experience has shown that this cohort will regularly store data in online accounts. This data can be critical in supporting law enforcement to manage terrorist and broader national security risks. The increasing reliance on cloud data means that the police are likely to have an increased need to access cloud data as part of compliance checks where an individual—this is the important thing for the Committee—is subject to online restrictions as part of a civil order, such as the youth diversion order. These amendments will provide a clear statutory basis for officers to access cloud data when conducting a compliance check for an individual—again, this is the important point—who is subject to either a youth diversion order or a terrorism, state threat prevention or investigation measures order.

The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 contains a provision allowing for the extraction of information from electronic devices in cases where the user has died. Amendment 392 will clarify that this power also now applies to online information, as long as the authorised person is satisfied that the power is proportionate and there is no other practical way of obtaining the information.

Lastly, Amendments 389A to 389F are small but important drafting changes to Clause 132. The clause before the Committee identifies which senior officers may authorise the use of a power in Clause 130, which provides for a general extraction power for law enforcement agencies to obtain online information. Currently, the table refers to “Navy”, “Military” and “Force” but does not explicitly mention the police. I think noble Lords would wish the police to be mentioned, and therefore the amendments insert the term “Police” after each of those references to correct the omission. I hope that is clear to the Committee. This is in the specific circumstances that I have outlined in my speech, and I hope that noble Lords can accept the amendments at the appropriate time.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, this grouping deals with the complex landscape of remotely stored electronic data, or what is commonly known as cloud access. Government amendments in this group, such as Amendments 393, 394 and 441, significantly expand the ability of the state to inspect online accounts through seized devices, including the interception of authentication codes. We acknowledge that, as evidence shifts from hardware to the cloud, the law must evolve. However, we remain deeply concerned by the widened scope for investigation, which carries an inherent risk of excessive prying.

These powers go beyond merely searching a phone. They allow law enforcement to walk through the digital doors of a person’s entire life—their private communications, financial history and medical records. As the Minister said, under Clause 169 these intrusive inspections can now be included as conditions of a youth diversion order. While the Government maintain that these are necessary to identify harmful online activity early, we must ensure that they are used only when strictly necessary and proportionate to protect the public from serious harm.

I ask the Minister to clarify the oversight mechanisms for these powers. We cannot allow the inspection of a child’s entire digital history to rest on a subjective belief, rather than a rigorous, objective assessment of risk. The digital ecosystem must not be a safe haven for perpetrators, but neither can it become a borderless opportunity for state surveillance.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I thank the Minister for tabling, and setting out the rationale behind, this group of government amendments. Amendments 393 and 394 authorise the interception of certain communications in order to access online accounts. These amendments represent an additional measure to youth diversion orders on top of the existing powers provided to the authorities under the current drafting of the Bill.

Public safety is and should be the first priority of any Government. Youth diversion orders exist in order to curb and prevent young people from engaging in terrorist activity or associating with those affiliated to terrorist groups that seek to radicalise children. We are supportive of the measures in the Bill to increase the scope and applicability of youth diversion orders, such as Clause 167, which enables chief officers of police with the power to apply for a youth diversion order. These are necessary and proportionate measures that should be implemented in order to mitigate terrorist risk.

We on these Benches are equally supportive of the amendments in this group that are aimed at ensuring that, when youth diversion orders are made, they contain the necessary provisions to enable authorities to carry out their operations as effectively as possible. There is no point in making a youth diversion order if the provisions of that order do not sufficiently provide police with the ability to execute its objective. Terrorists and extremist groups are increasingly turning to online forums and communities in order to identify individuals for radicalisation and to spread misinformation. Therefore, where the courts deem it necessary to issue a youth diversion order, it is right that a provision of such an order can contain the inspection of any online account. Not only will that ensure that young people are kept safe from dangerous and hateful rhetoric, but it will enable authorities to understand who is targeting children and their methods of radicalisation.

It is also important that the imperative to keep the public safe is counterbalanced with appropriate regard for individual liberty. Youth diversion orders contain a number of provisions which impact on people’s daily lives, so it is right that they are sanctioned only where it is considered strictly necessary. I therefore seek assurances from the Minister that these amendments, and youth diversion orders more generally, are accompanied by having the appropriate safeguards in place to mitigate state overreach and the unnecessary deprivation of people’s freedoms and, of course, their right to privacy.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group are designed to probe a proposed extension of counterterrorism and national security powers, usable only at ports, airports and places near the land border with Ireland, that are among the very strongest of all those powers vested in the police. I have consistently supported those powers, controversial though they once were, and I support the extension of them to data on the cloud by Clause 137. The issue raised by these amendments is whether those powers and their extension should be attended by improved but streamlined safeguards. My amendments suggest two simple and modest ways of achieving this.

Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 and Schedule 3 to the National Security Act 2023 authorise counterterrorism police to stop any person passing through a port or airport, on a no-suspicion basis, for the purpose of determining whether they are or have been involved in terrorism or hostile activity. Such persons may be searched; they may be detained and questioned for up to six hours; they are denied the right of silence in the face of the officers’ questions; indeed, they are liable to be prosecuted if they refuse to speak. All these powers are exercisable, I repeat, on a no-suspicion basis.

There are some thousands of Schedule 7 examinations every year—well down from the peak, but still a significant number. That is not all: any “thing” that a traveller has with them can be seized and inspected, again without any need for suspicion. That power has its origins in the historical power to rummage through hand baggage, and there are all kinds of “things” in there. Thanks to modern technology, such “things” now include laptops and mobile phones. Under the existing law, the contents of these electronic devices may be copied and retained for as long as the examining officer believes that they may be needed for use as evidence in criminal proceedings, or in connection with deportation. That is fair enough in my book. In addition, however, and relevant to my proposed amendments, the contents may be copied and retained

“for as long as is necessary for the purpose of determining”

whether a person is or has been involved in terrorism or hostile activity.

Clause 137 would extend this power so that it applies not only to data that can be extracted from the phone itself but—as touched on in the previous group—to data that is accessible from the phone and stored on the cloud. This includes, for example, the entirety of a person’s Gmail account and all their iCloud photos. The operational logic of the extension is faultless: cloud storage is a fact of life. I have no problem with Clauses 130 to 134, which apply the same principle to powers that are already well attended by safeguards. But Clause 137 gives us an opportunity to reflect, not least in the light of comments from the courts, on whether the Government and your Lordships are content for data that has been seized without the need for suspicion—and which, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, said in the previously group, increasingly encapsulates every aspect of a person’s private life—should be retained by the police without clearer parameters.

We are urged to take that opportunity to reflect by Jonathan Hall KC, my successor but one as the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. In a note published last October, he suggested that Parliament might want to consider: what safeguards will prevent excessive data being extracted and copied; how journalistic and legally privileged material on an online account will be protected; and, given the quantity of personal data that members of the public knowingly or unknowingly hold on the cloud, accessible from their device, whether, as he put it,

“merely travelling through a port or border”

is

“a sufficient reason to surrender so much of their privacy”.

Jonathan Hall does not say for how long data is, in practice, retained for the purpose of determining whether a person is involved in terrorism or hostile activity. The experience of the old management of police information, or MoPI, regime suggests, however, that personal data may be retained in police systems for very long periods indeed, particularly when the grounds for doing so are very broadly and vaguely expressed.

As one would expect, powers as strong as these have attracted legal challenge. The leading case was brought by Mrs Beghal, who was questioned under Schedule 7 at East Midlands Airport in 2011. The essentials of Schedule 7, as it then stood, were found, in 2015, to be compatible with the European convention by a majority of the Supreme Court. Lord Kerr, followed by a unanimous first section of the European Court of Human Rights, found otherwise. Fortunately, for those tasked with defending the power in the courts, Mrs Beghal was not subject to the inspection, copying, or retention of data on her phone, let alone, of course, on the cloud, but the Supreme Court was sufficiently troubled by this aspect of the power to address the issue anyway. It did not object to the suspicionless seizure, copying and retention of data belonging to a person going through a port or airport, but it did express the view, by way of obiter dictum, in paragraph 58 of its judgment that retention beyond an initial period for the purposes of determining whether a person is involved in terrorism should require objective grounds for suspicion.

My Amendment 390 would act on that dictum of the Supreme Court in relation to the existing Schedule 7 power and the proposed amendment to it. It would fix the initial period during which no suspicion is required at three months. This might be considered rather generous to the police, given that the Supreme Court appears provisionally to have had a period closer to seven days in mind. Should Amendment 390 find favour with your Lordships, a similar amendment to Schedule 3 to the National Security Act could be tabled alongside it on Report.

My Amendment 391 is directed exclusively to the National Security Act 2023. Its Schedule 3 allows an even broader basis for retaining cloud data than the Terrorism Act. As proposed by the Government, it will be sufficient reason for retaining such data that

“the constable believes it necessary … in the interests of national security”

or the

“economic well-being of the United Kingdom”—

national security being a concept that is famously undefined in our legislation.

The test of subjective belief on the part of a constable in relation to these weighty matters is about the least onerous threshold that could be imagined. Amendment 391 would replace it with an objective test—the same objective test proposed in relation to the alternative ground for retention in new paragraph 22B(a) in the Bill. This is keyhole surgery of the most minor kind, but I suggest it is the least this situation requires.

These are probing amendments, but they go some way to meeting the challenge we have been posed by the independent reviewer. They invite discussion of a question that is surely significant by any measure: are we or are we not prepared to contemplate meaningful limits on police retention of the most extensive private details of the lives of people who have done nothing more suspicious than pass through a port or airport? I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I support Amendments 390 and 391 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, which I have signed. As he has explained, these amendments are designed to probe the proposed extension of border powers. These are powers which are already among the strongest vested in the police, which are useable at ports, airports and near the land border with Ireland.

The Committee needs very little reminder of the pedigree of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, as the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. This informs his view of these new powers under Clauses 135 to 137, which represent a major extension of state reach. They extend the existing power to seize a physical device to include data that is accessible from a phone but stored in the cloud. We are no longer talking about just a handset, but the entirety of a person’s Gmail account, iCloud photo library and private digital history. Although the operational logic of following data in the cloud is understandable, we should reflect that this information is seized without the need for prior suspicion of an offence. As the successor of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, has asked,

“is merely travelling through a port of border a sufficient reason”

for a citizen

“to surrender so much of their privacy?”

As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said, Amendment 390 would introduce a vital safeguard based on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Beghal v DPP, which stipulates that if the police wish to retain the extracted cloud data for longer than three months they must have reasonable grounds to suspect the individual is involved in terrorism or hostile activity. We cannot allow the digital core of an innocent traveller to be duplicated and kept indefinitely by the state simply because they pass through a port of entry, as the noble Lord said.

As the noble Lord said, Amendment 391 is directed at the National Security Act 2023. As it is currently drafted, the Government would allow the retention of cloud data based on the purely subjective test that the constable believes that it is necessary. This is perhaps the least onerous threshold imaginable in our law. Amendment 391 would perform what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, described as minor “keyhole surgery” by replacing this subjective belief with an objective test of necessity, which would ensure that the retention of highly sensitive personal data, which may include journalistic or legally privileged material, was governed by an actual legal standard that can be scrutinised, rather than a mere hunch or the personal belief of an individual officer.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I hope I can help the noble Lord. The Schedule 7 and Schedule 3 powers are exercised at pace. Some investigations, particularly those involving complex or sensitive matters, could well extend beyond three months. Evidence often emerges gradually and may be fragmented.

Statutory codes of practice provide a flexible and responsive mechanism for setting out detailed safeguards and allow for timely updates on operational and legal contexts. If we embed such details in primary legislation, with due respect to the noble and learned Baroness, that would create inflexibility and mean that we may not keep pace with changing threats or operational realities. The codes are subject to parliamentary scrutiny; they can be revised as needed and ensure robust protection. That is why I have put that argument before the Committee. If it feels that that argument is not acceptable, we will have to have that discussion later on. That is my defence against having keyhole surgery at this time.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, will respond shortly, but I am sure the Minister realises that he cannot sit down quite yet. He talked about the process, the statutory guidance and so on, but does he accept the substance of the amendments and has he given an assurance to the Committee that, if it were agreed hypothetically that the statutory code guidance was an acceptable way forward, the substance of these amendments would be incorporated into it? Does he accept the case made so eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I think I have said that the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, are worthy of reflection, but we will put the discussion ultimately into the code of practice. The final settlement will be a consultation on the code of practice. I have heard what has been said today. There will be a consultation and an opportunity for the noble Lord, with his former hat on and his position in this House, and others to comment on it. That is the case I am making and I hope I have convinced the Committee. If not, methods are available. Given the late hour and the amendment target we are trying to reach, I will rest my case.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I am afraid that noble Lords are going to get the full set today. I support my noble friend’s Amendment 396, which is the meat of this group of amendments. It was proposed by my noble friend Lady Doocey and signed by me, and it addresses the profound privacy implications of Clause 138. While the Government describe the clause as a technical clarification of access to DVLA records, we on these Benches and groups such as Big Brother Watch see it as the foundation for a vast national facial recognition database. It is also a massive pre-emption, in our view, of the consultation on live facial recognition which is currently being conducted by the Government.

This amendment provides a specific and essential statutory bar. Authorised persons may not use DVLA information for biometric searches using facial recognition technology. Members of the public applying for driving licences do so to drive cars, not to be placed in a permanent digital lineup without their consent—and we know that facial recognition technology is demonstrably biased, as we discussed earlier today. Expanding its use to a database of tens of millions of law-abiding citizens would be a grossly disproportionate interference with the right to privacy under Article 8 of the ECHR. The Government claim that this is not their intention, yet they have not put that promise in the Bill.

If the Minister is sincere that this power will not be used for mass biometric surveillance, he should have no objection to this amendment. We cannot allow the end of anonymity in public spaces to be achieved through a legislative back door. We are being asked to buy into a massive extension of police access to biometric information. The technology represents a monumental shift in the relationship between the citizen and the state. Such a shift must be governed by Parliament, not by secret police watch lists. As my noble friend Lady Doocey said, this can only lead to further erosion of public trust in the police unless these safeguards are installed.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this group of amendments raises important questions about the use of data, modern policing techniques and the appropriate safeguards that must accompany them. We are sympathetic to the principle that underpins government Amendment 394A. It respects the devolution settlement in Northern Ireland and the constitutional and operational sensitivities around policing. There is a careful balance that must be struck between maintaining consistency across the United Kingdom, respecting the powers of devolved Administrations and ensuring that law enforcement agencies have the tools they need to keep the public safe.

There is also a parallel balance that must be struck between safeguarding individual liberties and being robust in tackling crime. While we recognise the intent behind the amendment, we also acknowledge that the Government must retain sufficient flexibility to ensure effective and coherent law enforcement arrangements across all parts of the UK. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response in addressing both these issues.

Amendment 396 would prohibit the use of the DVLA database for searches using live facial recognition technology. It will probably come as no surprise that we are firmly opposed to that restriction, as it would undermine one of the key inputs on which the success of live facial recognition hinges. Live facial recognition is an important and increasingly effective tool in modern policing. Used lawfully and proportionately, it has already demonstrated its value in identifying serious offenders, locating wanted individuals and preventing violent crime before it occurs. It is particularly effective in high-crime environments and transport hubs, where the risk of serious harm is elevated and where rapid identification can make a decisive difference.

Equally, across the DVLA, using driver licensing data for law enforcement purposes is not new: nor is it unregulated. Clause 138 ensures that the use of this is accompanied by safeguards, regulation-making powers to the Secretary of State, consultation requirements, a statutory code of practice and annual reporting to Parliament. These measures are designed to ensure proportionality and accountability. To carve out facial recognition from this framework would unnecessarily impede law enforcement’s ability to use the technology effectively. It would also deny the police the ability to use accurate and targeted technology to identify individuals suspected of serious criminality, even where strong safeguards are in place.

I therefore welcome the opportunity for the Minister to expand on how facial recognition fits within this framework and on the safeguards that will ensure that its use is proportionate and effective. But we should be clear that this technology, which can save lives, disrupt violent crime and protect the public, should not be ruled out by default.

Computer-generated Child Sexual Abuse Material

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The simple answer to the noble Lord is yes. The Government expect Ofcom to exercise its powers under Section 121 of the Online Safety Act where needed. A consultation ran to March 2025. We expect advice to the Home Secretary by April this year, and we will act when that advice comes forward.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, given the recent experience with AI platforms such as Grok generating unacceptable non-consensual sexual images and the warnings from the Internet Watch Foundation, I welcome recent comments from the Secretary of State for DSIT about Grok. However, what discussions are senior Ministers having with technology companies directly to ensure that they understand their duties under the Online Safety Act and will comply?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord should know that my view is that Grok is creating degrading non-consensual images, that that is an absolute disgrace and that Grok should take action on it. It is simply not acceptable. Ofcom has powers to tackle this. I will give a similar answer to the noble Lord that I gave to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile: there is a consultation on this. Ultimately, though, it is not acceptable. Ofcom will act, and if it does not the Government will.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Morgan of Cotes (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I will briefly speak to Amendment 358. It is a pleasure to follow the noble Lords, Lord Vaux and Lord Young of Cookham. Because we are going to be discussing this and a later amendment on fraud, I declare my interest as a director of Santander UK.

It was a huge pleasure and privilege to chair the Lords inquiry into online and digital fraud, which reported in 2022, and I would like to think that we had some impact in raising the issues, which are of huge importance to the public. Fraud is one of the crimes that people are most likely to be victims of. I know the Minister knows that because he is the Anti-Fraud Minister in the department.

Noble Lords have already spoken about the importance of this amendment, the need for the law to be kept up to date as the technology develops, and the fact that allowing as much flexibility in legislation as possible to enable that to happen is important. The reason we talked about the “fraud chain” in the report is that, obviously, people encounter fraud in myriad ways. Fraudsters are, as we have heard, incredibly flexible, and entrepreneurial—for all the wrong reasons. Of course, telecoms—people’s smartphones or phones—is where many people will first encounter the fraudster, who will then try, as we heard in our evidence, to get them away from technology and strike up some kind of relationship which unfortunately ends in people often losing life-changing amounts of money.

I do not want to pre-empt the debate on Amendment 367, which I hope we will also reach today, but the question, perhaps now or for later, is whether the Minister is confident that the previous Government’s and this current Government’s ask of the telecoms industry is strong enough given the frequency with which the public encounter fraud via their telephones. I will ask the question now, but I am sure we will come back to it. We are all waiting for the forthcoming fraud strategy from the Government, which we understand is—I hope—close. Can the Minister give us a little precursor of whether that will impose tougher asks and potential penalties on the telecoms companies for the reasons that we have already heard?

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, we strongly support Amendment 358 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Vaux, Lord Young of Cookham and Lord Holmes of Richmond, and the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, who have made the case extremely well today. I pay tribute to the Fraud Act committee chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, and I shall quote from it extensively in the next group.

This amendment would rightly ensure that the definition of a specified article included devices capable of using virtual subscriber identity modules, not just physical SIM cards. As we have heard, the criminal landscape evolves rapidly. If we legislate only for plastic SIMs, criminals will simply pivot to readily available virtual SIM technology. By incorporating virtual SIMs into the definition now, we will help to future-proof these provisions and make them genuinely effective against highly scalable, technology-enabled fraud.

Clauses 112 to 117 quite rightly seek to address the serious and growing problem of SIM farms being used at scale to perpetrate fraud and other abuses—it was very interesting to hear the quotes of the noble Lord, Lord Young, from the Select Committee’s report, which demonstrates that the problem has been with us for several years now—but, as drafted, Clause 114 risks being a technological step behind the criminals. As we have heard, it refers to devices capable of using physical SIM cards, but the market is already rapidly moving towards virtual or embedded SIMs. Indeed, I have an iPad in my hand that has a virtual SIM inside it—no physical SIM card at all. If the Bill focuses only on the plastic card and not the underlying functionality, it will leave an obvious loophole that organised criminals will quickly exploit.

The noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, spoke of “entrepreneurial” but not in a good way. We know that fraudsters are highly adaptive. As mobile operators deploy more robust controls on physical SIMs—I suspect not enough for the noble Lord, Lord Vaux—and as handsets and routers increasingly use eSIMs or other virtual identities, those intent on running industrial-scale smishing and scam operations will migrate to those platforms. If we legislate today for yesterday’s technology, we will simply displace the problem from one category of device to another and be back here in a few years’ time having the same debate. I hope the Minister will be able either to accept the amendment or to confirm that the Government will bring forward their own wording—there is always a bit of “not invented here” with these things. Without that assurance, there is a real risk that this part of the Bill will be lacking in force from the day it comes into effect.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, for speaking to this group. On his Amendment 358, I agree that the Government should look to make provisions that account for all forms of SIM cards used in SIM farms. As the noble Lord stated, the current drafting of Clause 114 does not encompass eSIM cards in the devices used for SIM farming. Given the number of mobile phones that now use eSIMs, this really should be amended.

This speaks to the larger issue of defining provisions ahead of legislation coming into force. When changes are being made to the legality of certain products, suppliers and consumers should be made aware well in advance; behaviours will have to change with reform. This is a case of not just courtesy but constitutional propriety. That is the reasoning behind my Amendments 358A and 538A.

Legislating for the criminalisation of specific devices and software related to fraud should not be done on a whim. Individuals should not wake up one day and possess an illegal device or software that was considered legal a day before, with no warning of the coming change. Some notice must be given. Currently, the Bill simply permits Ministers to specify a device whenever they wish. There is no requirement for those regulations to come into force before the new offences of possession and supply come into force. My amendments would ensure, in the interests of fairness and the rule of law, that the new offences could not come into force until at least three months had passed from the making of the regulations defining the articles.

I believe that a period of three months before the possession and supply of certain articles becomes illegal is sufficient for people to change their habits and businesses to change their models. We in this House would be doing the public a disservice if we did not provide them with the necessary time to adapt. I hope the Minister agrees with this reasoning. I hope he will consider the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, and, as always, I look forward very much to hearing his reply.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Clement-Jones]

359: After Clause 117, insert the following new Clause—
“Digital identity theft(1) A person commits an offence of digital identity theft if—(a) the person obtains, or attempts to obtain, personal or sensitive information relating to an individual, including but not limited to passwords, identification numbers, credit card numbers, national insurance numbers, biometric data, or other unique digital identifiers, and(b) the person intends to use this personal or sensitive information to impersonate that individual, or to enable another person to impersonate that individual, with the purpose of carrying out any transaction, activity, or communication in their name without their consent or lawful authority.(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)—(a) “personal or sensitive information” refers to any data, whether digital, physical, or otherwise, that can be used to identify, authenticate, or impersonate an individual;(b) “obtains” includes acquiring, accessing, collecting, or otherwise coming into possession of such information.(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a fine, or both;(b) on conviction on indictment in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to a fine, or both.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment creates an offence of digital identity theft.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, my Amendment 359 would create a new offence of digital identity theft. I am very pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, has signed and supports it.

The amendment is deliberately tightly framed. It targets the foundational act that underpins so much modern fraud and serious criminality: the deliberate harvesting of someone else’s personal and sensitive information with the intent to impersonate them and conduct transactions, activities or communications in their name without their knowledge or consent. It is about criminalising the act of stealing and weaponising a digital identity before the fraud or other downstream offending takes place.

As things stand—and I hope the Minister will confirm this and, indeed, that the promised fraud strategy will recognise—the act of identity theft is not recognised in our law as a criminal offence in its own right. The Fraud Act 2006, the Computer Misuse Act 1990, the Data Protection Act 2018 and subsequent data protection Acts all play an important role, but they are concerned primarily with what happens after the identity has been stolen—after the account has been opened, the loan has been taken out or the money has been moved. They address the fraud, the unauthorised access or the misuse of data. What they do not do is grapple squarely with the initial acquisition of personal and sensitive information with the purpose of impersonation.

Indeed, as the House of Lords Fraud Act 2006 and Digital Fraud Committee, chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, heard in evidence, identity theft is still formally regarded in much official material as a social rather than a legal concept. That might have been tolerable in a predominantly analogue world, but it is simply not credible in the age of data breaches, credential stuffing, deepfakes and synthetic identities. Treating identity theft as a mere background condition rather than as a legal wrong in itself leaves people’s most intimate identifiers—biometric data, passwords, national insurance numbers and digital credentials—fundamentally underprotected.

The effect in practice is that law enforcement may feel it has limited tools to intervene at an early stage, even where there is clear evidence that large quantities of personal data have been harvested and traded with a view to impersonation. Instead, the system waits for the fraud, money laundering or other downstream crime to crystallise. By then, the victim’s credit record may be shredded, their bank accounts compromised and their reputation damaged. Yet the initial act of stealing their identity remains conceptually elusive.

The scale and nature of digital identity theft make this gap increasingly untenable. We now know that organised criminals and fraudsters operate, in effect, industrial-scale harvesting operations, feeding on the constant stream of data breaches and leaks from both public and private sector systems. Those databases of stolen credentials are then traded, refined and recombined, very often on the dark web, to facilitate mass impersonation and fraud. This activity is not just an adjunct to fraud. It is, as the Fraud Act 2006 and Digital Fraud Committee rightly described it, a “predicate action”—a necessary precursor to a great deal of online financial crime and, in some cases, to other serious and organised criminality, including terrorism financing.

The threat is being turbocharged by new technologies. Large language models enable highly convincing phishing and social engineering communications at scale and with very low cost. Deepfake audio and video systems allow criminals to mimic a person’s voice or image in ways that can be all but indistinguishable from the real thing. When those tools are combined with rich stolen identity data, criminals can construct synthetic identities or impersonate genuine individuals to open bank accounts, obtain credit cards, register mobile phones and pass remote know your customer checks with alarming ease. In that ecosystem, the act of stealing and collating identity data is itself a sophisticated, harmful criminal enterprise, not simply background noise.

The Bill is rightly concerned with modernising a range of policing and crime powers for the digital age. It updates police powers in relation to electronic devices and remotely stored data and seeks to equip the criminal justice system to deal with contemporary threats, yet it does not deal with this most basic of digital harms: the theft of a person’s identity. That is why this amendment would define a clear, free-standing offence of digital identity theft.

The test that the amendment proposes is straight- forward and proportionate. A person would commit the offence if

“the person intends to use this personal or sensitive information to impersonate that individual, or to enable another person to impersonate that individual, with the purpose of carrying out any transaction, activity, or communication in their name without their consent or lawful authority”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for tabling the amendment, which would introduce a bespoke criminal offence of digital identity theft. I know that he has tabled similar amendments—he was persistent on these matters during the Data (Use and Access) Bill. I heard the support from the noble Lords, Lord Holmes of Richmond, Lord Fuller and Lord Blencathra, and note that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, put forward a number of caveats to his broad support. These are caveats I share.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, asked whether I would read out a number of amendments to previous legislation. I may disappoint him by reaffirming those issues, as he would expect. Although digital identity theft is not a stand-alone offence, there are, as he recognises, several criminal offences already in existence to cover the behaviour targeted by his amendment. The Fraud Act 2006 made it a criminal offence to gain from the use of another person’s fraud. Cases where accounts or databases are hacked into are criminalised under the Computer Misuse Act 1990. I could read him the offences captured in Sections 2 and 6 of the Fraud Act, Sections 1 and 2 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990, and Section 170 of the Data Protection Act 2018. All apply to the online sphere.

My argument, which the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, might have some sympathy with, is that to create a new criminal offence could be unnecessary duplication. The Fraud Act 2006 captures cases where someone uses another person’s identity and there is an equivalent common-law offence in Scotland. The Fraud Act establishes the offence of someone having in their possession or control an article which includes data or programmes in electronic form. The Computer Misuse Act criminalises unauthorised access and Section 170 of the Data Protection Act covers the deliberate or reckless obtaining, disclosing and procuring of personal data.

That is not to downplay the issue that the noble Lord mentioned. It is important and I recognise the concerns he raised. I hope that the Government will act decisively on these matters. We are currently in the process of transitioning from the Action Fraud service to a new, upgraded platform that will provide a better reporting tool for victims, stronger intelligence flows for police forces and enhanced support for victims. We are looking at doing what the noble Lord wants and upskilling police officers. We have completed a full review of police skills and the recommendations are being delivered through updated police training on this important matter. He will know that this Government have made sure that His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services has now updated the strategic police requirement. That will be published this year and will drive forces to upskill their staff on wider police reform on fraud matters. We want to try to upscale and upskill capability, to ensure the police keep pace with the challenges that the noble Lord has rightly identified.

It is important to take on board the points that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, mentioned in his supportive critique of the proposals in the amendment. The Home Office has commissioned an independent review into disclosure and fraud offences. Part 1 of the review, which addressed disclosure, has been conducted; part 2, with Jonathan Fisher KC leading for the Government, will examine whether the current fraud offences are fit for purpose, and specifically whether they meet the challenges of investigating and prosecuting fraud, and whether existing penalties remain proportionate. I am awaiting that report, which may cover the areas that the noble Lord has mentioned. It is important that we have proper examination of that, and that is currently ongoing.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

Without wishing to interrupt the Minister, could he give us an idea of the timescale? Would it be deliriously possibly to see this report before Report?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I should have tattooed on my forehead the words, “due course”. As ever, the commitment I can give is that it will be produced in due course. Report on the Bill will be some significant time away. We have another five days of Committee, with a gap for recess, and we will have a statutory gap before our consideration on Report after Committee has finished. It is some while away. The noble Lord is very adept at tabling further amendments on Report, should he so wish.

Part 2 of the report is being considered by the Government; we want to examine that and will publish in due course. I expect that, in the very near future, we will be producing the newly updated fraud strategy, which will address the evolving threat of fraud, including the harm caused by identity theft. Before the noble Lord intervenes, I cannot yet give him a date for that either, but I will try to help the Committee by saying that it will be soon. I will bring the fraud strategy to the House in due course, which will potentially cover some of the areas that the noble Lord has mentioned.

There is a lot going on, but there is existing legislation. I anticipate and understand that this is a genuine issue, and I very much welcome the fact that the noble Lord has brought it before us. I hope that on the basis of what I have said, he will—today, at least—withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister and I will respond in a second.

First, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, for agreeing with the thrust of the amendment, in his words, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for his in principle support. I entirely accept the points that he made—indeed, if the additions are not there, they should be. Any amendment that is brought back on Report should definitely take heed of the reservations he raised.

For the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, I was anticipating that, in a sense, there might be too much continuity. During the Data (Use and Access) Bill, his colleagues pushed back on the idea of a digital identity theft offence in rather more adamant terms than the Minister has today. I am grateful for his in principle support, with all the reservations that he had.

The noble Lord, Lord Holmes, encapsulated quite a lot of this. As we move into the world of digital ID, having your digital identity stolen is an issue of digital and financial exclusion. It is going to be increasingly important. I was very interested that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, dug out the figures on this; the scale of digital identity theft is huge, so the number of people affected by what is effectively financial and digital exclusion is only going to grow.

However, I did take some comfort. There was a glimmer of light coming out of the Home Office, and I am not always used to that. I celebrate that, particularly in view of the fact that a review is taking place that may well report in the near future. Whatever the Minister has stamped on his forehead, I am sure he is impatient to see it, given his specific role as the Fraud Minister.

I agree with the Minister about the need for the police to have specific powers and skills. I welcome what he said about the upgraded platform in terms of understanding the evidence that is going to be under- pinning any move towards creating an offence. I think, almost inevitably, I am going to come back with something more refined on Report in the hope that the Home Office review of current fraud offences will come up with the goods. I live in hope, but often where the Home Office is concerned my hopes are only too frequently dashed. I live in hope, and I beg to withdraw Amendment 359.

Amendment 359 withdrawn.

Moved by

[Lord Clement-Jones]

360: After Clause 117, insert the following new Clause—
“Defences to charges under the Computer Misuse Act 1990(1) The Computer Misuse Act 1990 is amended as follows.(2) In section 1, after subsection (2) insert—“(2A) It is a defence to a charge under subsection (1) to prove that—(a) the person’s actions were necessary for the detection or prevention of crime, or(b) the person’s actions were justified as being in the public interest.”.(3) In section 3, after subsection (5) insert—“(5A) It is a defence to a charge under subsection (1) to prove that—(a) the person’s actions were necessary for the detection or prevention of crime, or(b) the person’s actions were justified as being in the public interest.”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment creates defences to charges under the Computer Misuse Act 1990.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 360 seeks to introduce statutory defences to charges under the Computer Misuse Act 1990. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, again for his support. He has tabled a number of amendments which are companions to this amendment.

The Computer Misuse Act 1990 is widely recognised as outdated. It inadvertently criminalises legitimate and beneficial cyber security research, making the UK a difficult place for cyber experts to operate in. There has been a very vigorous campaign, as I am sure the Minister is aware, the CyberUp campaign, which has made the case very clearly. This anomaly risks undermining our national cyber resilience and the ability of researchers proactively to detect vulnerabilities. This amendment would address this by inserting a statutory defence where unauthorised access was demonstrably necessary for the detection or prevention of crime or carried out in the public interest.

This reform is vital for supporting responsible cyber research and aligning our laws with the needs of the 21st century digital landscape. The CMA was passed in 1990, when cyber security, as we know it today, simply did not exist. At the time, only 0.5% of the UK population regularly used the internet. Critics, including 93% of cyber security professionals surveyed, believe the Act is no longer fit for this century. The current criminal law criminalises unauthorised access irrespective of the good intentions or defensive motivations of the professional.

This has created a perverse situation in which the UK’s cyber defenders are forced to act with one hand tied behind their back. Threat intelligence researchers investigating criminal infrastructure, for instance, are often unable to obtain the explicit consent required under the Act. This has resulted in 80% of surveyed cyber security professionals having worried about breaking the law while investigating cyber threats. This ambiguity and restriction deters a large proportion of the research needed to assess and defend against emerging threats posed by organised criminals and geopolitical actors.

It also limits the UK industry’s capability compared with foreign competitors in countries such as France, Israel and the US, which already offer more permissive legislative regimes. Consequently, the UK cyber industry is held at a competitive disadvantage. This is a clear economic issue, not merely a legal one. Reform of the CMA is essential to securing a robust digital economy. Updating the Act is estimated to unlock up to £2.4 billion in additional annual sector revenue and support the creation of thousands of highly skilled jobs.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I say to the noble Lord—and I hope that he takes this in the way in which I respond—that the review commenced in 2021, and it is now 2026. That is a long time for a review, and I would want to ensure that we come to some conclusions on the 1990 Act. However, at this stage, I cannot give him a timescale for the reasons that I have mentioned, about the complexity of this matter. I along with Minister Jarvis have had custody in the Home Office of these issues since July 2024; that is still three years into a review that was commissioned in 2021. I cannot give him a definitive timescale today, but I hope that the House can accept that there is active consideration of these very important matters raised by Members and that the Home Office plans to reform the Act. I hope that I will demonstrate that we are progressing this work at pace, but we need to get it right. Sadly, we are not going to be able to legislate in this Bill, but there is scope to examine issues at a later date. With those reassurances, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, unusually, light is flooding through the windows of the Home Office, and I thank the Minister, but I shall come back to what he had to say. First, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, for her support. As the Minister said, her huge experience in this area is valuable, and it is really valuable to have her support in those circumstances.

I also say a big thank you to the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, who thinks these things through in a very eloquent fashion. He more or less reminded me that, back in 1990, the thing that I was using was a dial-up Apple Mac Classic—probably a Classic II—which just shows how long ago the Act was.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I do not wish to disturb the noble Lord in full flow, but I have just remembered that I missed an important point for the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, who requested a meeting with either me or another appropriate Minister. I will take that request away and get back to the noble Lord in due course about a meeting with me or my colleague, Minister Dan Jarvis—or both of us—and anybody the noble Lord wishes to bring with him.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

That is a very useful offer for those who are involved in or have an interest in pushing this agenda forward. As the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, also emphasised following the speech from the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, it is not just about being out of date; it is positively harmful. The Home Office appears to be aware of that, despite the stately progress on the review. The fact that the Minister has said there is a recognition of the need to update the Act is very helpful. He said that they have made progress in formulating a limited defence, but I am not quite so sure about that—let us see when it arrives. I am sure that he has engraved across his forehead the phrase “an update at some point”. That is not quite as good as “shortly”, but it is perhaps better than “in due course”. One has to take away the crumbs of comfort that one can.

What I take most comfort from is the fact that we have a cyber security and resilience Bill, which will come to this House after hitting the Commons, where it had its Second Reading yesterday. If the Home Office picks up a bit of pace, there might well be the opportunity to produce a clause there to provide the kind of defence that we are talking about today. I understand that the Minister has a rather Trappist vow at this point, in terms of being limited in what can be said, but we very much hope that he can be let loose at some stage in the future. We look forward to that but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 360 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

The level of smartphone thefts and the associated crime wave is a blot on Britain, and especially on London. I urge the Minister to agree to our amendments, which seek to ensure that technology companies use technical measures, such as cloud-based blocking and IMEI-linked device locks, to make the resale of stolen mobile phone devices abroad more difficult, and to bring this into effect six months after Royal Assent. Only this action will materially reduce the incidence of phone thefts in the UK. I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I am pleased to support Amendments 366 and 538, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, and introduced so cogently by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. I thank her for the reference to my honourable friend Martin Wrigley, who helped to identify this particular issue, which addresses the growing problem of mobile phone and device theft, often fuelled by the profitability of reselling these stolen goods overseas.

We are currently facing an epidemic of mobile phone theft, as the noble Baroness said, with reports indicating that phone snatches have increased by as much as 150% in certain areas. Every single day, approximately 200 mobile phones are stolen across the country, with many being destined for a lucrative resale market abroad. These stolen devices remain valuable criminal assets, because, currently, they often can still be accessed or resold even after being reported.

We support Amendment 366 because it seeks to strike at the heart of this criminal profit model. The amendment would ensure that technology companies actively employ technical measures, specifically cloud-based blocking and IMEI-linked device locks, as the noble Baroness described, to deter the resale of stolen mobile phone devices. Without compulsory co-operation from cloud service providers and manufacturers, stolen data and devices will remain valuable criminal assets, even if the physical device is recovered. This is an essential step towards forcing technical solutions from technology companies to counter the incentives for theft.

Amendment 538 would provide the industry with a necessary and reasonable lead-in period, specifying that these cloud service access restrictions will come into force six months after the Act is passed. This would ensure that technology companies have the time required to implement the necessary technical standards and administrative processes.

For too long, the manufacturers and cloud providers have treated device theft as a secondary concern. It is time that they work in a much more customer-friendly manner, in the way that the noble Baroness described, and use their immense technical capabilities to simply turn these devices into mute bricks the moment they are stolen, thereby removing the incentive for the crime altogether. I very much hope that the Minister will accept these common-sense measures to protect our property and safety.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, ably explained by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. I may cover some of the same ground—I was only grateful that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, intervened, because people might have forgotten some of the points made, but if I amplify them too much I am sure that somebody will remind me. I was particularly keen to support the amendment because, in the past, I have criticised the police for a lack of enforcement and detection—but of course, they cannot do everything.

We know that organised crime, which I will come to later, is about money; it is just another form of business. Theft is driven by people trying to make a profit. The amendment is all about the commercial business of mobile phone sales—some of it legal but some of it criminal. Apparently, there are about 88 million mobile phones in this country. They can be about £1,000 each, so that is a market of about £88 billion or something of that order. It is a massive market. In 2023, the purchase of these devices totalled £5.8 billion, and there is another £2.5 billion-worth of services that they provide and that we all pay for, from data to the general use of a mobile phone. This, by any measure, is a massive business.

The value of the phones stolen, as the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, mentioned, was about £20 million, with a reinsurance value of £50 million. The number of phones stolen in the UK is about 120,000, with two-thirds of this happening in London. It is a big city, and there are an awful lot of targets for the criminals wandering about. As they leave the Tube, people take their phone out to get a signal, as we all want, and to check on the messages they have not received while they were on the Tube. That is where the criminals spot them, and they then follow them to a place where they relieve them of their phone. I suspect that is one reason why we see so much of this in London. Clearly, the business model works very well here.

These are the crimes that are reported. An awful lot of phones that are stolen are never reported. I have talked to people in this place who have not reported their phone as stolen because there has been a level of embarrassment about the fact that it has happened to them on the street—they have just got another phone. We only know about the bare minimum of the number of phones that have been stolen in the course of a year.

On many occasions, violence is used. Just the ripping of a phone from a hand can lead to somebody trying to hold on to it, and we never know where that contest might end. If somebody ends up on the floor, violence can follow and the physical consequences can be quite severe.

As far as the mobile phone industry is concerned, £20 million is a very small number compared to an £88 billion market. More importantly, as the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, pointed out, the industry benefits, because when you have your phone stolen you go back to get another one. So why would it stop this? There is no financial incentive to actually do anything about it. There might be a moral one, but I am afraid it looks as though the moral incentive is not having an awful lot of effect. Of course, none of the manufacturers or the networks tries to lead in the market by saying that if their phone is stolen then it cannot be used. There is no market incentive for one manufacturer to say that its phone is better because it cannot be stolen, or, alternatively, that if it is stolen then it has no value. There is no effect on the market that is helping to prevent the theft of phones.

It is all to do with organised crime. There are some fancy definitions—one or two people in the Chamber may know of them—of organised crime and what is it all about. It is about money. It is about being organised enough to steal things in such a volume and have somebody to buy them which means that they have been worth stealing in the first place. The market they are involved in is enforced by violence. There is no monopolies commission supervision of this market, whether it be drugs or mobile phones; it is enforced by violence to ensure that they succeed and that other people fail. It is therefore really important that we get this right.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, said, the resale value of a mobile phone that has been stolen is about £300 to £400. The thief does not get £300 to £400, but, by the time it has gone through a few hands, that is the return that they are expecting. To pay everybody out, they need to get £300 to £400 to make sure that it works.

The problem is that 78% of the phones that are stolen are going abroad, as has been said, and we cannot seem to stop them at the border. This is not entirely surprising. Phones are very small items and some 90% of the world’s goods travel by sea, in containers. Without intelligence, the chance of finding mobile phones is very limited. Therefore, we are not able to physically stop the phones leaving the country and going to places such as Algeria and China. At the moment, the police are fighting a losing battle to catch the thieves, who are low down the organised crime chain, and trying to prevent the export of stolen phones. As I said, given the size of a phone, that is quite difficult: they are looking for a very small needle in a very large haystack.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 15th December 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Clement-Jones]

317: Clause 87, page 100, line 34, at end insert—
“(aa) if the name change is by deed poll, seven days prior to submitting an application for change of name (if that day is earlier than the day specified in paragraph (a)), or” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that if a person is changing their name by deed poll, they must notify a new name to the police prior to submitting the application.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, this group of amendments addresses a vital aspect of public protection, closing the loopholes that allow registered sex offenders to evade detection and monitoring by changing their identity. Effective management of offenders in the 21st century requires a justice system that is not only legally robust but properly resourced and technologically capable.

On these Benches, we strongly welcome Clause 87, which requires sex offenders to notify the police of a name change seven days before using that new name, in the words of the clause. This is a significant improvement on the current retrospective notification regime, which has allowed offenders to disappear from the radar of the authorities. However, my Amendment 317 seeks to tighten this provision further regarding deed polls. As currently drafted, an offender could theoretically go through the legal process of obtaining a deed poll to change their name without the police being aware until the moment they intend using it, again using the language of Clause 87.

My amendment specifies that if a name change is by deed poll, the offender must notify the police seven days prior to submitting the application. This would ensure that the police are alerted at the very start of the administrative process of changing identity rather than at the end. It provides authorities with the vital time needed to conduct appropriate risk assessments and, if necessary, intervene before a new legal identity is formally established. This proposal has been championed by campaigners such as Sarah Champion MP in the other place, and it is a common-sense safeguard to ensure that the police are always one step ahead.

I stress that the management of offenders today is not just about physical monitoring but about digital monitoring. Just as we have seen criminal recruitment drives for money mules take place on social media platforms, we know that the internet provides avenues for offenders to reoffend or breach their conditions. Although Amendment 317 seeks to tighten the management regime legislative framework, I urge the Government to ensure that the police and relevant agencies have the digital resources and data-sharing capabilities required to enforce these new powers effectively rather than relying on a fragmented system that allows offenders to slip through the net. This measure would strengthen the safety net around our communities immeasurably. I hope that the Minister will accept this amendment as a logical extension of the Government’s own objectives in Clause 87. I beg to move.

[Baroness Maclean of Redditch (Con)]

My Lords, the Gender Recognition Act 2004 was designed for a world with low demand for gender recognition certificates and did not anticipate modern safeguarding realities. I believe that that context has fundamentally changed, and that creates a serious gap that my amendment seeks to close. The system is no longer confined to a small number of older adults. New Ministry of Justice data shows that almost 10,000 GRCs have been issued. Last year alone, over 1,169 were granted. That is the highest number on record and more than triple the annual figure five years ago. This is quite a dramatic generational shift: almost a quarter of new certificates now go to people born since the year 2000. Demand has changed but safeguarding has not kept up.

I recently tabled a Written Question to the Government after I had seen multiple cases of male-born sex offenders changing their gender identity, so by the time they appeared in court or were sent to prison they identified as women. I was curious, so I asked the Government what safeguards would prevent a convicted rapist or sex offender going on to obtain a gender recognition certificate and being legally recognised as a woman. First, I was troubled that this Question, when it came to be answered, had been transferred to the Minister for Equalities rather than being answered by the Home Office. I believe it is fundamentally a matter of safety and not about equality. It should have been answered by the Home Office, so I worry that that demonstrates a confusion at the heart of the Government on this issue. Rape and sex offences are not about equality or identity but about safety.

Moreover, and more importantly, the response ignored the core issue. While of course we welcome the measures on name changes, passports and police notification, they do not prevent a convicted sex offender, if I understand it correctly, changing their legal sex under the Gender Recognition Act and going on to live the remainder of their life legally as a woman. To me, that highlights a serious safeguarding gap, and this amendment seeks to close that.

Noble Lords may ask why this is necessary and what this risk is that I speak about. We must be frank—sexual predators cannot be cured. The risk may be managed but it is not eliminated. That is why we have the lifelong monitoring regimes we have. That is why MAPPA exists and why I believe that the law must ensure that those who pose a permanent risk to women and girls, and men and boys, cannot access a legal mechanism that alters their status in ways that Parliament never intended.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I remind the Committee that the position of any of these individuals—as the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, mentioned in her initial contribution—will be subject to consistently heavy management. These are serious offenders. There is a Probation Service. There is a MAPPA process. There is the registration. I have given the assurance that both names will be included in that registration.

Every piece of legislation that any House of Commons and House of Lords passes is subject to people breaking it. That happens, but there will be significant consequences in the event of that occurring. I am simply saying to the noble Baroness who has proposed this amendment, and to the proposals in the Bill that are genuinely welcome across the Committee, that there is significant supervision of sex offenders, and the requirements are as I have outlined to the Committee already. I hope that on that basis, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. I am glad he focused on risk mitigation, and I think we got there in the final few paragraphs of his response. We need to take very seriously what he said, and I hope that if anything he said needs qualification, he will write to us subsequently, because this is a really important area.

--- Later in debate ---

Prolonged and sustained abuse, particularly where it involves coercive control and psychological harm, can be the catalyst for the deepest despair and ultimately for the loss of life. The amendment would recognise this and encourage judges, coroners and police to investigate these cases thoroughly so that victims are no longer failed in death as they were in life. I urge the Government to consider it carefully and I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I follow my noble friend Lady Doocey in this small but perfectly formed group of amendments. My Amendment 335 would mandate a statutory consultation on the guidance to accompany the new encouraging or assisting serious self-harm offences contained in Clauses 102 and 103.

On these Benches we welcome the underlying intention of Clauses 102 and 103 to implement the Law Commission’s recommendations for a broader offence covering encouragement or assistance of serious self-harm, expanding beyond digital communication to include direct assistance. However, offences that involve encouraging self-harm must be handled with the utmost care, given the vulnerabilities inherent in such cases. The critical issue here is the risk of inadvertently criminalising legitimate support services, which has been raised with us by a number of support organisations.

The offence requires a specific intention to encourage or assist serious self-harm. This is intended to ensure that charitable organisations and mental health professionals who advise sufferers on how to moderate or manage self-harming behaviour are not criminalised. My amendment addresses this directly by requiring the Secretary of State to produce guidance and consult extensively with representatives of self-harm support charities and organisations; mental health professionals, including those providing trauma-informed care; and legal experts—prosecutors and defence practitioners—regarding the application of the specific intent requirement. This mandatory consultation is essential, in our view, to ensure that the statutory guidance clearly differentiates between criminal encouragement and legitimate therapeutic activity. Without ensuring that this guidance is informed by experts and laid before Parliament, we risk confusion among front-line practitioners and the inadvertent penalisation of those working hardest to help vulnerable people. I hope the Government will give serious consideration to this amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I fully appreciate the general principle behind these proposals. This is an incredibly serious subject, and I appreciate the sincerity with which the noble Baronesses have approached the debate.

On the amendment in the name of the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Blower, everyone wants to reach a scenario where all possibilities are accounted for, and there are no loopholes through which those who either encourage or abet self-harm can jump. It is for that reason that I cannot offer my support for proposed subsection (6) in the noble Baronesses’ amendment. First, I am sceptical of the need for more aggravating factors. The general offences that fall under loosely defined so-called honour-based abuse are crimes themselves, so I am unsure why there is a need to create an aggravating offence when a criminal will already be able to be tried for those offences individually.

Primarily, though, I do not think this is the right time to be incorporating new definitions into our legal framework. There is guidance for Crown prosecutors as to what might fall under honour-based abuse and examples as to how that might look, but it is yet to be enshrined in law and it is a rather broad and non-exclusive term within our law. That is not to say that it is not easy to spot—it often is—but it should have its own delineated legal definition before it is made an aggravating factor. I agree with the noble Baroness that honour-based abuse is an increasing issue that we must tackle head on, but that cannot be done with a single amendment. However, I offer my support to the principle behind proposed subsection (6)(b).

I welcome the sentiment behind Amendment 335 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. Policy rooted in pragmatism is crucial, and consultation and guidance are one of the primary ways to achieve that. The Government should base all the policy that they bring forward on the testimonies of people who dedicate their lives to the subjects that we legislate on, and that it is especially important for a policy in such a sensitive area as this. I hope the Minister agrees, and I look forward to her response.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for tabling Amendments 334A and 335 respectively.

I am aware of the cases that have motivated the desire to have an amendment such as Amendment 334A, and I completely understand; the stories that the noble Baroness outlined cannot fail to move anyone listening to them. Having said that, the Government will not be supporting either of these amendments today, for the following reasons.

I shall deal first with the amendment by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. When a defendant has previous convictions, including those relating to a history of domestic abuse, that is already recognised as a statutory aggravating factor in sentencing. In addition, aggravating factors that are associated with honour-based abuse, such as abuse of trust or targeting vulnerable victims, are already covered in the domestic abuse guidelines. The presence of aggravating factors such as these should therefore already result in the sentence reflecting those factors, and in my experience it always would. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies, about not adding an ever-increasing list of statutory aggravating factors. This is certainly the third group of amendments that I have dealt with that has proposed different forms of offences.

On the second aspect of the amendment, proposed subsection (6)(b) raises a sensitive and important issue. The Government wholeheartedly agree that, when it can be proved that suicide was the result of abuse or encouragement, the abuser should be held accountable. There are existing offences that cover this situation, such as manslaughter or encouraging or assisting suicide offences, which have maximum penalties of life imprisonment and 14 years’ imprisonment respectively. However, imposing a requirement for the court to sentence the defendant in those circumstances as though they had been convicted of murder, when in fact they have not been convicted of murder, would be at odds not only with the current sentencing approach but with the principle that people are sentenced only for matters that have been proved to the satisfaction of the court. I also make the perhaps obvious comment that there is no range of sentences for murder; there is only one sentence, which is life imprisonment. For those reasons, amending Clause 102 in this way would not be appropriate.

However, I reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that the Law Commission is currently undertaking a review of homicide offences and of sentencing for murder, and this will include a review of the use of, and the obstacles to using, manslaughter offences where abuse may have driven someone to suicide. I hope that the noble Baroness will understand why the Government are reluctant to make any piecemeal amendments in advance of the Law Commission reporting.

I turn to Amendment 335, from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I thank the noble Lord for his welcome of the offence. As to the guidance that he proposes in the consultation, as many in this Committee are aware, I was principal legal adviser to a rather well-known former Director of Public Prosecutions—I spent five years working for the Crown Process Service—so it is important to me to emphasise that it is in fact for the independent Crown Prosecution Service to update guidance on prosecuting offences under this new provision. It may well be that many noble Lords know this but, while the statutory Code for Crown Prosecutors governs in general terms how prosecutors make decisions on which cases to prosecute and which not, sitting underneath that is a raft of legal guidance that is published and publicly available. It exists for two reasons: the first is so that members of the public can see the basis on which the CPS makes its decisions, but the second is so that the CPS can be held to account. If it fails to follow its own guidance, that will often provide a ground for challenging the decision made.

I understand that the noble Lord’s amendment aims to ensure that legitimate support or therapeutic activity is not criminalised, so I reassure him that the offence has been carefully drafted to avoid capturing vulnerable individuals or those providing mental health support. The offence as drafted in the Bill was recommended by the Law Commission in its 2021 malicious communications report and contains two key safeguards: first, that the person must intend to encourage or assist serious self-harm and without such intent no offence would be committed; and, secondly, that serious self-harm is defined as harm amounting to grievous bodily harm. These safeguards ensure that the offence targets only the most serious and culpable behaviour and protects those who are, for example, sharing personal experience or discussing self-harm but not encouraging it.

The offence also does not cover the glorification or glamorisation of self-harm. The Law Commission found that that was too broad and would potentially capture vulnerable people who might then be exposed to prosecution: so, taking on board the commission’s comments, the Government have not included that.

In our view, this approach ensures that the offence is necessary, proportionate and focused on genuinely harmful acts. There is also a further protection for the vulnerable, which is provided by the public interest stage of the full code test. This requires that, even where there is sufficient evidence, prosecutors must consider whether or not a prosecution is required in the public interest, and plainly the vulnerabilities of the potential defendant would come into play at that stage.

I hope that the reasons I have provided clearly set out why the Government do not support either of these amendments today, and I ask that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, do not press their respective amendments.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I thank the Minister, who has carefully taken us through three limbs, as far as I tell: first, there will be CPS guidance in terms of the specific offence, in the way that it decides whether or not to prosecute; secondly, the way that the offence itself has been drafted; and, thirdly, the public interest test. However, will she engage with the organisations that are concerned about the offences? I think I understand what she is saying about intent, grievous bodily harm and the other limbs that mean we will not see the kinds of prosecutions that people are concerned about, but will the MoJ engage with the organisations that have concerns?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. As far as the first of the three protections is concerned, obviously I cannot bind the Crown Prosecution Service—the whole point about it is that it is independent of government. However, based on my own experiences, where there are areas of the law that plainly need clarification as to when the Crown Prosecution Service would prosecute and when it would not, it usually issues guidance. As regards engaging with the organisations, of course, it is sometimes not easy to explain the law and the thinking behind it. It is in everyone’s interests that the organisations which are concerned for vulnerable people understand that the Government have those interests very much at heart. I would welcome the opportunity to explain to them.