Crime and Policing Bill (Seventh sitting)

Jess Phillips Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th April 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Harriet Cross]

The clause introduces provisions relating to protections for witnesses and the concept of lifestyle offences. The provisions seek to enhance both the effectiveness of our justice system and the protection of vulnerable individuals, but there are also some important concerns that must be carefully considered.

The core purpose of the clause lies in two key areas: providing stronger protections for witnesses involved in criminal investigations and prosecutions; and addressing lifestyle offences, which are crimes that become part of an individual’s habitual way of life, often tied to organised criminality or repeat offenders. One of the main aims of the clause is to offer greater safety and security for witnesses. We all know that witnesses are an essential part of our criminal justice process. Without them, many crimes would go unpunished and justice could not be served. However, witnesses, especially those in cases involving organised crime or serious offences, often face significant risks, including intimidation, threats of violence and retaliation.

The clause seeks to address those dangers by providing stronger legal protections for witnesses, ensuring that they feel safe enough to come forward and testify. This provision is particularly crucial in cases involving organised crime, gang violence or terrorism, where a witness might be particularly vulnerable. The protections include mechanisms to ensure that witnesses’ identities are kept confidential, and in extreme cases, provisions for relocation or even new identities. By making it safer for witnesses to testify, we ensure that those who know the truth can stand up for justice without fear for their life.

Furthermore, the clause allows for alternative means of giving evidence, such as by video link or in written statements, in cases where giving testimony in person would put the witness at risk. The protections are a vital step towards maintaining the integrity of the legal system, particularly when individuals are reluctant to engage due to fears of reprisals. It is the Government’s intention that by ensuring witness safety, the overall effectiveness of criminal investigations and prosecutions will be enhanced.

The second intention behind the clause is to address lifestyle offences—a term that refers to crimes associated with the habitual behaviour of certain offenders. These offences often form part of a broader pattern of criminal activity and are typically linked to individuals involved in organised crime, or those who consistently engage in criminal behaviour as a way of life. The inclusion of lifestyle offences in the Bill aims to target those who commit repeated or ongoing crimes, to disrupt their criminal activities.

The idea behind lifestyle offences is to shift the focus from seeing crime as an isolated act, to understanding that certain individuals or groups are involved in criminal activity as part of their everyday life. Many offenders are involved in organised crime networks, such as drug trafficking, money laundering or human trafficking, and their activities extend far beyond a one-time offence. The intention is to create legal measures that are specifically tailored to address the ongoing nature of their offending. This is not just about punishing individuals for one-off crimes, but intervening in the criminal lifestyles that perpetuate organised crime, breaking the cycle of repeat offending and reducing long-term harm.

By addressing those crimes within the framework of lifestyle offences, the Bill seeks to prevent future crimes and provide opportunities for rehabilitation. It aims to provide intervention strategies for offenders whose lifestyle choices revolve around illegal activity, encouraging them to turn away from crime. This approach seeks to address not just the symptoms of criminal behaviour, but the root causes, whether related to socioeconomic factors, addiction or mental health.

Although the protections for witnesses and the focus on lifestyle offences are both positive steps, several issues must be considered carefully to ensure that the clause is applied fairly and effectively. One significant concern is the potential for overreliance on witness protection schemes. Although it is essential that we offer the best protection possible for vulnerable witnesses, there is a danger that we could rely too heavily on these measures, which may not always be the most appropriate solution.

Witness protection, particularly when it involves relocation or changes of a person’s identity, can be extremely resource-intensive. It is also crucial that the system is not misused. Witnesses should not be encouraged to give evidence under duress or false pretences simply because they are promised protection. The integrity of the justice system must remain intact, and there is a risk that overusing or misusing witness protection could undermine its integrity. I would be grateful for the Minister’s comments on that.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Jess Phillips)]

Could the hon. Lady give us an example of the sort of case she is concerned about?

[Harriet Cross]

It is not beyond belief that, for example, a witness involved in a rival gangs situation could be coerced or forced to give evidence for a gang-related offence, whether or not it is necessarily true. Witnesses can be vulnerable in many different many ways. Witnesses can be completely innocent, but they can also be part of the crime. We need to ensure that the witness protection system is protected, because that is the best way to ensure that our criminal justice system is protected.

[Jess Phillips]

I understand the premise of witness protection and the clause that is in the Government Bill. The hon. Lady has raised a concern about witness protection being used to affect the independence of the judiciary. I wondered whether she had an example of that.

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[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful for the very thorough speech that the hon. Member for Gordon and Buchan just made. I am a little concerned that she may have misunderstood what the clause attempts to do, which is to support victims and those who are vulnerable in their ability to give evidence in court, such as by enabling them to give it by video link or behind a screen, because we know that it can be quite intimidating to be in court. As the hon. Lady said, if there are people who victims are concerned or frightened about, and they worry there will be repercussions, then putting in those measures seems to be a sensible way forward.

I have not come across the specific issue with witness protection that the hon. Lady mentioned. She referred to people being relocated and moved away. The provisions within this part of the Bill are reasonable measures to address the vulnerabilities of people who may find themselves subject to child criminal exploitation or cuckooing. We are not doing anything in this clause that goes beyond what is already in place for other vulnerable witnesses in court. It is not doing anything in addition to what is already accepted as good practice for those with vulnerabilities.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 35 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 36

Child sexual abuse image-generators

[Jess Phillips]

I beg to move amendment 11, in clause 36, page 40, line 33, at end insert—

“(3A) In Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (offences to which defence in section 45 does not apply), in paragraph 33 (offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003), after the entry for section 41 insert—

‘section 46A (child sexual abuse image-generators)’.”

This amendment excepts the offence about child sexual abuse image-generators from the defence in section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

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[Jess Phillips]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell.

Clause 36 criminalises artificial intelligence image generators used by offenders to create the most severe child abuse imagery. Child sexual abuse offenders use fine-tuned AI models to generate photorealistic child sexual abuse material. These images often depict the most severe and graphic forms of abuse, and can feature real children. Child sexual abuse offenders also sell those models to other offenders, making significant profits.

Our law is clear that AI-generated child sexual abuse material is illegal, but the fine-tuned models that facilitate the creation of child sexual abuse material are not currently. The Government are therefore making it illegal to possess, make, adapt, supply or offer to supply a child sexual abuse image generator, and that offence will be punishable by up to five years in prison.

Government amendment 11 is a consequential amendment that adds the new image generator offence to schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015—I feel like this will get said a lot over the next few weeks—thereby removing the offence from the ambit of the statutory criminal defence in section 45 of the 2015 Act. We believe that introducing this new offence will give law enforcement the powers it needs to combat the use of AI to create the most severe forms of child sexual abuse material.

[Harriet Cross]

Clause 36 introduces a new criminal offence targeting what are termed child sexual abuse image generators. Simply put, it will make it illegal to make, possess or distribute any tool—an AI model, computer program or digital file—designed to create indecent images of children. It addresses what has been up to now a concerning gap in the legislation. We know that technology is advancing to the point at which artificial intelligence can produce realistic child abuse images without any child being photographed.

If someone deliberately develops or shares software to generate child sexual abuse material, they are enabling heinous crimes, so it is right that clause 36 makes that explicitly illegal and punishable. The clause introduces new sections to the Sexual Offences Act 2023. It defines a CSA image generator in deliberately broad terms, covering any program or data created for producing child sexual abuse images. That breadth is essential to prevent offenders from evading liability through technical arguments about, for example, what constitutes a photograph in the digital age. Whether it is an AI model trained on abusive images, a computer-generated image rendering program or any digital template for indecent images of children, it will fall within this ban.

Government amendment 11 ensures that the offence is added to schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act. That is an important safeguard to prevent offenders from claiming that they were victims of trafficking to escape liability for creating these abhorrent tools. It is entirely appropriate that this offence, like other serious sexual offences against children, should be exempt from the slavery defence. Although we must of course protect genuine victims of trafficking, that exemption is necessary to prevent abuse by removing the defence in cases involving the deliberate facilitating of child sexual abuse.

Clause 36 is a proactive step taken against emerging threats. The previous Conservative Government started focusing on the dangers of AI-generated child abuse images, and I am pleased that the current Government are continuing with that.

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[Jess Phillips]

I am pleased that the hon. Lady supports the measure, and that there has been a change of heart, as has been pointed out, on the Opposition Front Bench. Although they are not in this group, if she looks at the series of clauses that relate to AI child sexual abuse material, she will see that there is quite a lot in them specifically on the Home Secretary having the power to allow certain AI companies to use such technology to discover child abuse. We do not want to inhibit GCHQ or—I wish I knew the name of some big, lovely, benevolent AI company; I am sure one exists. They might develop materials that would help us, because so much of how we find child sexual abuse material online is through things like the caching of images. An image database that the Government fund is used to identify known child sexual abuse material that can then be searched for online.

I have no technical knowledge of AI; as I stray into this area, I can picture my husband’s eyes rolling firmly into the back of his head, as a man who works in tech. However, I know that on CSAM we always look proactively for—I am already going to say something that might be totally stupid—a certain kind of code and a certain kind of people, based on intelligence, and we have intelligence officers who work undercover in this space to go out and look for them. I hope that answers the hon. Lady’s questions.

I give credit to the Internet Watch Foundation and the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, which have campaigned fiercely over the years for these measures to become law. They have been trying to sound the alarm on AI imagery, which uses real children and has real-world consequences. It is very easy for people to think that because an image is not of a real child, it does not cause real problems. Those organisations have been sounding the alarm, so I give credit to them.

Amendment 11 agreed to.

Clause 36, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 37

Possession of advice or guidance about creating etc CSA images

[Jess Phillips]

I beg to move amendment 12, in clause 37, page 42, line 11, at end insert—

“(6) In Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (offences to which defence in section 45 does not apply), for paragraph 35A (offences under the Serious Crime Act 2015) substitute—

‘35A An offence under any of the following provisions of the Serious Crime Act 2015—

section 69 (possession of paedophile manual)

section 75A (strangulation or suffocation).’.”

This amendment excepts the offence of possession a paedophile manual from the defence in section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

Government amendments 20 to 22.

[Jess Phillips]

Clause 37 amends section 69 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 to criminalise the possession of advice or guidance on using artificial intelligence to create child abuse imagery. So-called paedophile manuals that contain guidance for offenders about how to abuse children sexually or create indecent photographs or pseudo-photographs are illegal under the existing offence in the 2015 Act. However, the Act does not cover guidance for offenders about how to use AI to create illegal images of children, because back in 2015 we did not know what “AI” meant.

Our law is clear that AI-generated child sexual abuse material is illegal. Clause 37 strengthens that law to include guidance on using AI to create child sexual abuse images. As now, the maximum penalty for the expanded offence is three years’ imprisonment and a fine. Government amendment 12 adds the paedophile manual offence to schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act, thereby removing the offence from the ambit of the statutory criminal defence in section 45 of that Act. Amendments 20 to 22 are consequential on amendment 12. We believe that this extension of the paedophile manuals offence will close a legislative gap and give law enforcement the powers that it needs to combat the use of AI to create the most severe forms of child sexual abuse material.

[Harriet Cross]

Clause 37 strengthens the existing law to address evolving predator behaviours. It extends section 69 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, the offence commonly known as possessing a paedophile manual, to explicitly include any advice or guidance about creating child sexual abuse material. The current law, which was pioneered by the Conservative Government in 2015, rightly criminalises possession of written materials that facilitate child abuse. As depraved individuals find new ways to offend—perhaps sharing online how-to guides on generating child abuse images—we must ensure that the law clearly encompasses those too, and that is what clause 37 does.

From the Opposition’s perspective, closing this loophole is entirely sensible. It would be inconsistent for our legal system to prosecute someone for possessing instructions on how to groom a child, and yet provide no recourse against someone with detailed guidance on creating computer-generated child abuse images. The two things are equally repugnant and dangerous.

Government amendment 12 will ensure that the offence is added to schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act, which will mean that the defence for slavery and trafficking victims does not apply. It is completely right that someone who possessed a guide to creating child abuse images should not be able to claim that they had it because they were being coerced. That complements the approach taken in amendment 11 to clause 36.

In 2015 the Conservative Government set the maximum sentence for the paedophile manual offence at three years. Given that we are expanding the offence, and given public abhorrence of the facilitation of child abuse, did the Government consider increasing the maximum penalty? If not, does the Minister still feel that three years remains sufficient deterrent and punishment?

Clause 37 is a targeted tightening of the law. It aligns with the previous Conservative Government-led efforts to eliminate materials to facilitate abuse. I expect that all Committee members will agree that those who seek out and hoard advice on creating indecent images of children are among the lowest of the low, and we must remove any ambiguity that they could hide behind in the face of prosecution.

[Jess Phillips]

The shadow Minister posed a question about sentencing. Clause 37 amends section 69 of the Serious Crime Act, in which, as she pointed out, the previous Government set the maximum sentence at three years and an unlimited fine. I do not want to cut across the sentencing review—the Ministry of Justice would not thank me for that—but it is really important that, as part of that review, consideration is given to how sentencing in cases of sexual violence, abuse and other areas of interest to me and everyone else in the House came about. At the moment, we are simply amending the existing law to include AI manuals in the previous Government’s measure on hard-copy manuals.

Amendment 12 agreed to.

Clause 37, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 38

Online facilitation of child sexual exploitation and abuse

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Schedule 6.

Clauses 39 and 40 stand part.

Government amendment 13.

Clause 41 stand part.

Government amendment 18.

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[Jess Phillips]

Online child sexual abuse offending is often underpinned by networking between offenders. Offenders create groups on both the clear and the dark web to facilitate their crimes against children. These groups can legitimise or escalate the abuse of children and allow offenders to commercialise child sexual abuse. Offenders within the groups assist each other in evading detection by law enforcement.

Clause 38 creates a new offence of carrying out relevant internet activity with the intention of facilitating child sexual exploitation and abuse, punishable by up to 10 years’ imprisonment. Schedule 6 specifies the offences that constitute child sexual exploitation and abuse. Under clause 39, this offence will apply to activities carried out outside the UK. Under clause 40, it will also extend to corporate bodies, including the relevant persons who control them, which will ensure that offenders who commercialise child sexual abuse cannot evade liability by conducting their crimes through a company. Clause 41 ensures that any individual convicted of the offence will be subject to requirements to notify certain information to the police, to enable them to manage the risk of the sex offender reoffending.

As with earlier Government amendments, amendment 13 will add the clause 38 offence to schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act—I often used to think that I could replace myself as a parent with a tape recording of me saying a wide variety of things about shoes, like, “Tidy your shoes” or “Clean them up”; maybe I could be replaced as a Minister with a tape recording of me saying, “This will amend schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act”—thereby removing the offence from the ambit of the statutory criminal defence at section 45 of that Act. Amendment 18 is consequential on amendment 13.

This new offence will give law enforcement agencies the power they need to prosecute some of the most prolific and powerful offenders who facilitate child sexual abuse, with a maximum penalty that fits the severity of the crime.

[Harriet Cross]

Clause 38 establishes a new offence addressing those who intentionally facilitate child sexual exploitation and abuse online. It marks an important development in the approach to child protection, targeting individuals who, while perhaps not directly abusing children themselves, none the less provide the digital infrastructure that enables others to commit such abuse. In essence, if someone runs or substantially assists an internet service with the intention of facilitating child sexual abuse, they will commit a serious crime under the clause. The maximum penalty is 10 years’ imprisonment, reflecting the gravity of the conduct.

The clause defines the offence as engaging in “a relevant internet activity” such as providing an online service, administrating or moderating a website or chat group, controlling who can access certain content, or helping users share material, with the intention of facilitating child sexual abuse or exploitation. For example, someone who runs a hidden online forum specifically for paedophiles to exchange images or grooming tips, or a web administrator who knowingly allows child abuse live streams on their platform, will be committing a distinct criminal offence.

The clause plugs a gap. While existing laws might catch some of those behaviours, a clear, dedicated offence of online facilitation will send a strong signal and make prosecution more straightforward. Regrettably, it is evident that online platforms have become primary channels through which predators identify vulnerable children and distribute unlawful material. Law enforcement often finds that behind instances of abuse there are online platforms—sometimes private networks—that give offenders the means to commit or plan their crimes. Frankly, it is not enough to punish the individual abuser; we have to go after the enablers—the people who provide the online meeting places or technical help for abusers— too. Clause 38 will drag them into the light of criminal liability. Ten years in prison and a heavy fine should make any would-be facilitator think twice about operating an abuse forum or an encrypted sharing site for paedophiles.

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[Joe Robertson]

I also rise to support the clauses. As we have heard, artificial intelligence poses one of the biggest threats to online child safety in a generation. It is too easy for criminals to use AI to generate and distribute sexually explicit content of children.

As the UK’s frontline against child sexual abuse imagery, the IWF was among the first to sound the alarm about AI being used in this way. In October 2023, the IWF revealed the presence of more than 20,000 AI-generated images, 3,000 of which depicted criminal child sexual abuse activities. The creation and distribution of AI-generated child sexual abuse is already an offence under UK law, but AI’s capabilities have far outpaced our laws. My concern is that they will continue to do so. We must continue to keep the law in this area under review.

Offenders can now legally download the tools that they need to generate these images and produce as many as they want offline, with the high level of anonymity that can be achieved through open-source technology. Herein lies a problem: software created for innocent purposes can be appropriated and used for the most grim and hideous purposes. It is all very well making the activity illegal—I support the Government in tackling it—but the Government must also take steps, as indeed they are, to limit, curtail and disrupt criminals’ access to the tools used to carry out their crimes. The Government would do so with regard to any other crime, and it so happens that this is a particularly evil crime that uses cutting-edge and developing technology.

I am concerned about detection in this area. The Minister has been asked to confirm—I am sure she will—that social media companies carrying out lawful activity will not be captured by this law. I do not think it is controversial to say that, in other areas, social media companies have not lived up to their responsibilities to detect crime, support law enforcement agencies in detecting crime and detect criminals who are using their platforms to enhance and enable their own criminal activities.

I hope and am sure that the Government are bringing pressure to bear on social media companies to help with detection of these crimes. It is all very well for social media companies, which are probably exclusively very large, international or multinational companies, to say that they are not the perpetrators of crime, but they do provide platforms and they have huge capabilities to enable detection. I would expect them to step up and put all the resources that they have into detecting or helping law enforcement to detect these vile and horrible crimes.

[Jess Phillips]

I completely agree with the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East that there is a real responsibility on our tech giants. The hon. Member for Windsor talked about the Internet Watch Foundation; the basis of its model is a partnership with social media firms whereby they provide it with huge amounts of the data, so they are not without efforts in the space of child abuse detection—they have been partners in it for many years. However, I think that it is uncontroversial to say that more needs to be done. We as policymakers and lawmakers have to keep a constant eye on how things change.

The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Gordon and Buchan, asked a series of questions. She asked, “What if someone uses electronic services without the knowledge of the service provider?” An individual must have the intention of facilitating child sexual exploitation and abuse to be convicted under this offence. Where an internet service is used without the knowledge or intention of a service provider to carry out child sexual exploitation and abuse, the service provider will not be criminally responsible.

The shadow Minister also asked about the interplay with the Online Safety Act. These criminal offences are designed to ensure that we can better counter the threat of AI-generated CSAM offences. Offences that criminalise the individual user are not in scope of the Online Safety Act. However, the interplay would be in relation to the content created where these measures are in scope. Companies and platforms would then fall under the OSA. I hope that that answers the hon. Lady’s questions.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 38 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 6 agreed to.

Clauses 39 and 40 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 41

Notification requirements for offence under section 38

Amendment made: 13, in clause 41, page 46, line 7, at end insert—

“(6) In Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (offences to which defence in section 45 does not apply), in paragraph 36D (inserted by section 17), after the entry for section 17 insert—

“section 38 (online facilitation of child sexual exploitation and abuse)”.”—(Jess Phillips.)

This amendment excepts the offence of online facilitation of child sexual exploitation and abuse from the defence in section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

Clause 41, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Keir Mather.)