Crime and Policing Bill (Seventh sitting)

Harriet Cross Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th April 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Lauren Sullivan (Gravesham) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Lewell. It is a privilege to support the Government’s action to tackle cuckooing through the Bill. As the Member of Parliament for Gravesham, this issue strikes close to home, because people in my constituency who are struggling with addiction, mental health issues or past trauma are being preyed on. Criminals take over their homes, exploit their vulnerabilities and use their properties to conduct criminal activities, in particular drug dealing. These are not abstract concerns. People living real lives in real streets in Gravesham are trapped by fear in what should be the safest place they know—their own homes.

The introduction of the new offence is not only welcome, but essential. For the first time, the Bill offers a clear and focused legal mechanism to tackle an abhorrent practice that existing legislation cannot fully capture. I place on record my strong support for the Government’s action. I will also highlight why the offence is necessary, the real-world impact of the practice on victims, and how the Government’s work helps to close a dangerous and damaging gap in the law that has persisted for far too long.

Why does this offence matter? Cuckooing is one of the most insidious and devastating forms of criminal exploitation in our communities today. It targets those who are already vulnerable, whether due to substance misuse, disability and mental health, poverty, homelessness or previous victimisation. The offender may initially appear as a friend or helper, and may offer company, drugs, money or protection. Very quickly, however, the true nature of that relationship emerges through control, coercion, fear and potentially violence.

Victims find themselves trapped, as they are often too frightened, ashamed or traumatised to seek help. We have heard from frontline services such as Kent police and Gravesham borough council’s community safety unit that victims do not even recognise that they are victims at all. They may blame themselves. They may have rationalised the situation and believe that they have no other choice.

At present, the law does not make it easy to intervene early or decisively. Police often find themselves attending reports of suspicious activity, but have no obvious offence to charge without the victim’s co-operation or an underlying crime, such as drug possession, being proven. The new offence addresses that critical gap. It criminalises the very act of exerting control over someone else’s home for the purpose of criminal activity, without them having to verbalise their non-consent and without demanding that underlying offences must first be proven. The offence acknowledges that controlling a person’s home is itself serious and harmful abuse. It also empowers police, local authorities and safeguarding teams to take earlier, firmer action to protect victims before exploitation escalates further. The Bill listens to communities and acts on their behalf.

The Bill defines such control clearly. Clauses 32 to 34 are framed to show real understanding of the complexities involved. The Bill clearly defines “control” to include subtle and partial takeovers, such as deciding who enters the property, what it is used for and whether the resident can use their own home. The Bill also covers a wide range of structures, including houses, flats, caravans, tents and vehicles, reflecting the reality of vulnerable people. It ensures that supposed consent must be freely given and informed by someone over the age of 18 with full capacity, protecting those most at risk of coercion. The Bill is future-proofed by clause 34, which allows the Home Secretary and the devolved Ministers to add new crimes to the relevant offence list as patterns of exploitation evolve over time—we know that they evolve over time.

To understand why the offence is so urgently is needed, we must listen to survivors. Take the story of James, which was shared by the Salvation Army. James was a young man struggling with addiction. He thought he had made friends, but soon those friends took over his flat. They brought drugs and violence into his home. Strangers came and went at all hours. James was trapped—afraid to leave, but no longer safe inside. When help finally reached him, James was a shell of himself. He had lost control of his life, his space and his dignity. He said later:

“It’s scary. Your house is taken over. You don’t know who’s knocking on your door. People coming to your door every two minutes. Threatening people in your home. Threatening me in my home. It totally takes over your life.”

James’s story is heartbreaking, but far from unique. Housing teams and police officers in Gravesham have listed multiple cases where individuals were forced into drug addiction by their own exploiters to increase their dependency. Homes have been used to store class A drugs without the tenant’s knowledge, which is a clear breach of tenancy guidelines and puts them at risk of eviction. Sheds and garages become secondary sites of exploitation.

That is the story of James and many others in Gravesham, but the national statistics show the sheer scale of the problem. One in eight people across the UK has seen signs of cuckooing in their community. During just two weeks of national police action, nearly 1,700 cuckooed addresses were visited and hundreds of victims exposed. In 2021 alone, 33% of all modern slavery referrals include criminal exploitation, much of it linked to cuckooing. County lines exploitation, where cuckooing is rampant, now accounts for a staggering 16% of national referral mechanism cases.

This change to the law is not only needed; it is desperately needed. I could go on, but I know other hon. Members wish to speak. I am proud to stand here to support the new measures on cuckooing. Hopefully, we may now put those criminals behind bars, where they belong.

[Harriet Cross (Gordon and Buchan) (Con)]

I rise to speak to clauses 32 to 34 and amendment 5. Clause 32 in part 4 of the Bill seeks to address cuckooing by introducing a new criminal offence targeting those who exert control over another’s home for criminal purposes. Cuckooing is a deeply exploitative crime that targets some of the most vulnerable people in society, including the elderly, those with disabilities and individuals struggling with addiction or mental health issues. Criminals manipulate or threaten people to take over their home, or do it forcibly, using the home as a base for illegal activities such as drug dealing, human trafficking or weapons storage. Victims often live in fear and isolation, unable to escape due to coercion or physical violence.

In 2022, London saw a significant rise in the number of recorded cuckooing incidents, with 316 cases reported, marking a stark increase from just 79 in 2018. That alarming trend in the city underscores the increasingly widespread nature of criminal exploitation targeting vulnerable individuals. The impact extends beyond individuals, affecting communities by increasing crime rates, disrupting social housing and straining law enforcement resources. Cuckooing is not just a property crime; it is a form of exploitation that strips people of their safety, dignity and control over their lives, making it essential to impose strict penalties and provide robust support for victims.

Clause 32 is a welcome step forward in tackling the exploitative nature of cuckooing and the vulnerable individuals impacted by it. However, while the clause’s intentions are commendable, it is crucial that we examine the provisions thoroughly, not only to understand its strengths but to ensure that it does not inadvertently create unintended legal or practical challenges. The clause seeks to criminalise the act of exercising control over another person’s dwelling without their consent with the intent of using a dwelling to facilitate specific criminal activities. That is designed to target individuals who exploit vulnerable occupants by taking over their homes to conduct illegal operations.

Looking at the key provisions of clause 32, an individual commits an offence if they exercise control over another person’s dwelling without legitimate consent and intend to use it for criminality. The clause is accompanied by schedule 5, which lists the criminal activities associated with cuckooing, such as drug offences, sexual exploitation and the possession of offensive weapons. The Secretary of State holds the authority to amend this schedule as necessary. For consent to be considered valid, the occupant must be over the age of 18, possess the mental capacity to consent, be fully informed and provide consent freely without coercion or manipulation. Consent obtained through deception or intimidation is not deemed valid.

On conviction, the offence carries significant penalties. On summary conviction, an individual may face imprisonment of up to six months, a fine or both. On indictment, the penalty can extend to imprisonment of up to five years, a fine or both. The primary objective of clause 32 is to safeguard individuals from criminals who commandeer their houses for illegal purposes. By establishing a specific offence of cuckooing, the legislation aims to deter perpetrators and provide law enforcement with clear authority to intervene and prosecute these exploitative practices.

Although the intentions behind clause 32 are commendable, we must look at areas of possible contention. On determining genuine consent, assessing whether consent is freely given with full understanding can be complex. Vulnerable individuals may be subject to subtle forms of coercion or manipulation that are not immediately evident, making it challenging to establish the presence of genuine consent. Furthermore, effective enforcement of the clause requires adequate training and resources for law enforcement agencies to identify instances of cuckooing, to support victims and to gather sufficient evidence for prosecution. Without proper investment, the practical application of the law may be hindered.

There is a concern that victims of cuckooing might themselves be implicated in criminal activities conducted in their dwellings. It is crucial to ensure that the law distinguishes between perpetrators and victims, providing support and protection to the latter, rather than subjecting them to prosecution. Criminal networks may adapt their methods to circumvent the provisions of clause 32. Continuous monitoring and potential amendments to the legislation may be necessary to address emerging forms of exploitative activities efficiently.

Clause 32 represents a significant step forward in addressing the pernicious issue of cuckooing. By criminalising the exploitation of individuals through the unauthorised control of their homes for illicit purposes, the clause aims to detect vulnerable members of society and uphold the integrity of private dwellings. Careful attention must, however, be given to the implementation of the provision, ensuring that genuine consent is accurately assessed, enforcement agencies are adequately resourced, victims are protected from criminalisation, and the law remains responsive to the evolving tactics of criminal enterprises. Through vigilant application and ongoing evaluation, clause 32 can serve as a robust tool in the fight against the exploitation of vulnerable individuals and for the preservation of community safety.

Clause 33 is interpretative, as its primary objectives are to provide clear definitions for terms in the Bill. It ensures that all stakeholders have a consistent understanding of the terminology. Although the intention behind the clause is to provide clarity, certain challenges may arise. If a term is defined too broadly, it may encompass behaviours or actions beyond the intended scope, leading to potential overreach. Conversely, overly narrow definitions may exclude certain areas from being covered, creating loopholes. Differences in interpretation can arise between various stakeholders, especially if definitions are not comprehensive, which can lead to the inconsistent application of the law across different jurisdictions.

For example, a dwelling is defined as being any structure or part of a structure where a person lives, including yards, garages, gardens and outbuildings. The definition also extends to temporary or moveable structures such as tents, caravans, vehicles and boats. Through the wide definition of dwelling, including not just the traditional home but temporary and moveable structures, the clause ensures that cuckooing can be addressed in a wider range of living situations. That is particularly important, given that vulnerable people may live in non-traditional housing and still fall victim to such exploitation.

Clause 34 grants the Secretary of State the authority to amend the definition of “relevant offence” through a statutory instrument. This provision is designed to provide flexibility and responsiveness to the legal system, enabling it to evolve with the changing landscape of criminal activity and societal needs. The primary purpose of clause 34 is to offer the Government the flexibility to adapt the law where needed. As we know, crime is constantly evolving; new tactics, methods and forms of criminal activity emerge regularly. In recent years, we have seen a rise in cyber-crime, human trafficking, online fraud and terrorist activity. Those types of crime often involve technologies or methods that are not always immediately recognised or understood by the legislation at the point it is being made.

Laws must remain relevant and effective to protect the public. For example, if new criminal activities or trends emerge that were not originally accounted for in the Bill, clause 34 allows for a quick amendment to qualify what is a relevant offence. That flexibility means that rapid changes can be made without having to wait months for a new Act of Parliament to be passed. Over time, societal attitudes, technologies and criminal methods change, so what is considered a relevant offence now may not necessarily apply in future. Clause 34 allows the legal framework to be adjusted to ensure that the law can keep pace with such changes.

In addition to providing flexibility, clause 34 ensures that the law remains consistent in its approach to new forms of crime. Although the definition of “relevant offence” can change, the core intention is to maintain fairness, clarity and public safety. By allowing for a timely and consistent updating of legal definitions, clause 34 helps to ensure that criminal offences are properly recognised across the country. That is important because inconsistent definitions for offences can create legal confusion and undermine effective enforcement across jurisdictions. A standardised approach ensures that law enforcement agencies in different areas can uniformly apply the law, thereby strengthening the overall criminal justice system.

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[Harriet Cross]

The clause introduces provisions relating to protections for witnesses and the concept of lifestyle offences. The provisions seek to enhance both the effectiveness of our justice system and the protection of vulnerable individuals, but there are also some important concerns that must be carefully considered.

The core purpose of the clause lies in two key areas: providing stronger protections for witnesses involved in criminal investigations and prosecutions; and addressing lifestyle offences, which are crimes that become part of an individual’s habitual way of life, often tied to organised criminality or repeat offenders. One of the main aims of the clause is to offer greater safety and security for witnesses. We all know that witnesses are an essential part of our criminal justice process. Without them, many crimes would go unpunished and justice could not be served. However, witnesses, especially those in cases involving organised crime or serious offences, often face significant risks, including intimidation, threats of violence and retaliation.

The clause seeks to address those dangers by providing stronger legal protections for witnesses, ensuring that they feel safe enough to come forward and testify. This provision is particularly crucial in cases involving organised crime, gang violence or terrorism, where a witness might be particularly vulnerable. The protections include mechanisms to ensure that witnesses’ identities are kept confidential, and in extreme cases, provisions for relocation or even new identities. By making it safer for witnesses to testify, we ensure that those who know the truth can stand up for justice without fear for their life.

Furthermore, the clause allows for alternative means of giving evidence, such as by video link or in written statements, in cases where giving testimony in person would put the witness at risk. The protections are a vital step towards maintaining the integrity of the legal system, particularly when individuals are reluctant to engage due to fears of reprisals. It is the Government’s intention that by ensuring witness safety, the overall effectiveness of criminal investigations and prosecutions will be enhanced.

The second intention behind the clause is to address lifestyle offences—a term that refers to crimes associated with the habitual behaviour of certain offenders. These offences often form part of a broader pattern of criminal activity and are typically linked to individuals involved in organised crime, or those who consistently engage in criminal behaviour as a way of life. The inclusion of lifestyle offences in the Bill aims to target those who commit repeated or ongoing crimes, to disrupt their criminal activities.

The idea behind lifestyle offences is to shift the focus from seeing crime as an isolated act, to understanding that certain individuals or groups are involved in criminal activity as part of their everyday life. Many offenders are involved in organised crime networks, such as drug trafficking, money laundering or human trafficking, and their activities extend far beyond a one-time offence. The intention is to create legal measures that are specifically tailored to address the ongoing nature of their offending. This is not just about punishing individuals for one-off crimes, but intervening in the criminal lifestyles that perpetuate organised crime, breaking the cycle of repeat offending and reducing long-term harm.

By addressing those crimes within the framework of lifestyle offences, the Bill seeks to prevent future crimes and provide opportunities for rehabilitation. It aims to provide intervention strategies for offenders whose lifestyle choices revolve around illegal activity, encouraging them to turn away from crime. This approach seeks to address not just the symptoms of criminal behaviour, but the root causes, whether related to socioeconomic factors, addiction or mental health.

Although the protections for witnesses and the focus on lifestyle offences are both positive steps, several issues must be considered carefully to ensure that the clause is applied fairly and effectively. One significant concern is the potential for overreliance on witness protection schemes. Although it is essential that we offer the best protection possible for vulnerable witnesses, there is a danger that we could rely too heavily on these measures, which may not always be the most appropriate solution.

Witness protection, particularly when it involves relocation or changes of a person’s identity, can be extremely resource-intensive. It is also crucial that the system is not misused. Witnesses should not be encouraged to give evidence under duress or false pretences simply because they are promised protection. The integrity of the justice system must remain intact, and there is a risk that overusing or misusing witness protection could undermine its integrity. I would be grateful for the Minister’s comments on that.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Jess Phillips)]

Could the hon. Lady give us an example of the sort of case she is concerned about?

[Harriet Cross]

It is not beyond belief that, for example, a witness involved in a rival gangs situation could be coerced or forced to give evidence for a gang-related offence, whether or not it is necessarily true. Witnesses can be vulnerable in many different many ways. Witnesses can be completely innocent, but they can also be part of the crime. We need to ensure that the witness protection system is protected, because that is the best way to ensure that our criminal justice system is protected.

[Jess Phillips]

I understand the premise of witness protection and the clause that is in the Government Bill. The hon. Lady has raised a concern about witness protection being used to affect the independence of the judiciary. I wondered whether she had an example of that.

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[Harriet Cross]

I do not have a specific example, but it is not beyond the realms of possibility. None of what we are dealing with is necessarily a reaction to individual cases. We create law in order to pre-empt things that may happen. It is reasonable for the Opposition to pre-empt something that may happen to ensure that it is considered when drafting a Bill. It is a completely reasonable concern for the Opposition to raise.

Finally, there are concerns about potential for witness protection schemes to undermine the right to a fair trial. If a witness is protected to such an extent that their testimony cannot be scrutinised or cross-examined fully, it could raise issues about the fairness of the trial. Clause 35 does aim, however, to offer much-needed protections for witnesses, particularly those involved in cases of organised crime or serious criminal activity. The inclusion of lifestyle offences recognises the ongoing nature of certain types of criminality, targeting habitual offences and providing opportunities for intervention.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful for the very thorough speech that the hon. Member for Gordon and Buchan just made. I am a little concerned that she may have misunderstood what the clause attempts to do, which is to support victims and those who are vulnerable in their ability to give evidence in court, such as by enabling them to give it by video link or behind a screen, because we know that it can be quite intimidating to be in court. As the hon. Lady said, if there are people who victims are concerned or frightened about, and they worry there will be repercussions, then putting in those measures seems to be a sensible way forward.

I have not come across the specific issue with witness protection that the hon. Lady mentioned. She referred to people being relocated and moved away. The provisions within this part of the Bill are reasonable measures to address the vulnerabilities of people who may find themselves subject to child criminal exploitation or cuckooing. We are not doing anything in this clause that goes beyond what is already in place for other vulnerable witnesses in court. It is not doing anything in addition to what is already accepted as good practice for those with vulnerabilities.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 35 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 36

Child sexual abuse image-generators

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[Jess Phillips]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell.

Clause 36 criminalises artificial intelligence image generators used by offenders to create the most severe child abuse imagery. Child sexual abuse offenders use fine-tuned AI models to generate photorealistic child sexual abuse material. These images often depict the most severe and graphic forms of abuse, and can feature real children. Child sexual abuse offenders also sell those models to other offenders, making significant profits.

Our law is clear that AI-generated child sexual abuse material is illegal, but the fine-tuned models that facilitate the creation of child sexual abuse material are not currently. The Government are therefore making it illegal to possess, make, adapt, supply or offer to supply a child sexual abuse image generator, and that offence will be punishable by up to five years in prison.

Government amendment 11 is a consequential amendment that adds the new image generator offence to schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015—I feel like this will get said a lot over the next few weeks—thereby removing the offence from the ambit of the statutory criminal defence in section 45 of the 2015 Act. We believe that introducing this new offence will give law enforcement the powers it needs to combat the use of AI to create the most severe forms of child sexual abuse material.

[Harriet Cross]

Clause 36 introduces a new criminal offence targeting what are termed child sexual abuse image generators. Simply put, it will make it illegal to make, possess or distribute any tool—an AI model, computer program or digital file—designed to create indecent images of children. It addresses what has been up to now a concerning gap in the legislation. We know that technology is advancing to the point at which artificial intelligence can produce realistic child abuse images without any child being photographed.

If someone deliberately develops or shares software to generate child sexual abuse material, they are enabling heinous crimes, so it is right that clause 36 makes that explicitly illegal and punishable. The clause introduces new sections to the Sexual Offences Act 2023. It defines a CSA image generator in deliberately broad terms, covering any program or data created for producing child sexual abuse images. That breadth is essential to prevent offenders from evading liability through technical arguments about, for example, what constitutes a photograph in the digital age. Whether it is an AI model trained on abusive images, a computer-generated image rendering program or any digital template for indecent images of children, it will fall within this ban.

Government amendment 11 ensures that the offence is added to schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act. That is an important safeguard to prevent offenders from claiming that they were victims of trafficking to escape liability for creating these abhorrent tools. It is entirely appropriate that this offence, like other serious sexual offences against children, should be exempt from the slavery defence. Although we must of course protect genuine victims of trafficking, that exemption is necessary to prevent abuse by removing the defence in cases involving the deliberate facilitating of child sexual abuse.

Clause 36 is a proactive step taken against emerging threats. The previous Conservative Government started focusing on the dangers of AI-generated child abuse images, and I am pleased that the current Government are continuing with that.

[David Burton-Sampson]

The former Conservative Member for Chelmsford tabled an amendment on this matter to the Criminal Justice Bill, which Labour supported in opposition, but unfortunately it was not added. Is the hon. Lady now happy that this measure is being added to the Crime and Policing Bill?

[Harriet Cross]

Yes, I think I just said that. I am pleased that the Government are continuing with this measure.

The clause aligns with the Conservative approach to zero tolerance for child exploitation technology. We built the foundations of that in 2015 through the paedophile manuals offence, and the law is now being updated for the digital age.

I have two quick questions for the Minister. What plans are in place to identify and intercept CSA image generators online once this offence is enacted? Will there be proactive efforts, working with internet companies, for example, and internationally, to root out these tools before they are spread? How do the Government plan to ensure that legitimate AI research and development is not inadvertently captured by this offence, while ensuring that all genuinely harmful tools are prohibited?

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[Jess Phillips]

Clause 37 amends section 69 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 to criminalise the possession of advice or guidance on using artificial intelligence to create child abuse imagery. So-called paedophile manuals that contain guidance for offenders about how to abuse children sexually or create indecent photographs or pseudo-photographs are illegal under the existing offence in the 2015 Act. However, the Act does not cover guidance for offenders about how to use AI to create illegal images of children, because back in 2015 we did not know what “AI” meant.

Our law is clear that AI-generated child sexual abuse material is illegal. Clause 37 strengthens that law to include guidance on using AI to create child sexual abuse images. As now, the maximum penalty for the expanded offence is three years’ imprisonment and a fine. Government amendment 12 adds the paedophile manual offence to schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act, thereby removing the offence from the ambit of the statutory criminal defence in section 45 of that Act. Amendments 20 to 22 are consequential on amendment 12. We believe that this extension of the paedophile manuals offence will close a legislative gap and give law enforcement the powers that it needs to combat the use of AI to create the most severe forms of child sexual abuse material.

[Harriet Cross]

Clause 37 strengthens the existing law to address evolving predator behaviours. It extends section 69 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, the offence commonly known as possessing a paedophile manual, to explicitly include any advice or guidance about creating child sexual abuse material. The current law, which was pioneered by the Conservative Government in 2015, rightly criminalises possession of written materials that facilitate child abuse. As depraved individuals find new ways to offend—perhaps sharing online how-to guides on generating child abuse images—we must ensure that the law clearly encompasses those too, and that is what clause 37 does.

From the Opposition’s perspective, closing this loophole is entirely sensible. It would be inconsistent for our legal system to prosecute someone for possessing instructions on how to groom a child, and yet provide no recourse against someone with detailed guidance on creating computer-generated child abuse images. The two things are equally repugnant and dangerous.

Government amendment 12 will ensure that the offence is added to schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act, which will mean that the defence for slavery and trafficking victims does not apply. It is completely right that someone who possessed a guide to creating child abuse images should not be able to claim that they had it because they were being coerced. That complements the approach taken in amendment 11 to clause 36.

In 2015 the Conservative Government set the maximum sentence for the paedophile manual offence at three years. Given that we are expanding the offence, and given public abhorrence of the facilitation of child abuse, did the Government consider increasing the maximum penalty? If not, does the Minister still feel that three years remains sufficient deterrent and punishment?

Clause 37 is a targeted tightening of the law. It aligns with the previous Conservative Government-led efforts to eliminate materials to facilitate abuse. I expect that all Committee members will agree that those who seek out and hoard advice on creating indecent images of children are among the lowest of the low, and we must remove any ambiguity that they could hide behind in the face of prosecution.

[Jess Phillips]

The shadow Minister posed a question about sentencing. Clause 37 amends section 69 of the Serious Crime Act, in which, as she pointed out, the previous Government set the maximum sentence at three years and an unlimited fine. I do not want to cut across the sentencing review—the Ministry of Justice would not thank me for that—but it is really important that, as part of that review, consideration is given to how sentencing in cases of sexual violence, abuse and other areas of interest to me and everyone else in the House came about. At the moment, we are simply amending the existing law to include AI manuals in the previous Government’s measure on hard-copy manuals.

Amendment 12 agreed to.

Clause 37, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 38

Online facilitation of child sexual exploitation and abuse

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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[Jess Phillips]

Online child sexual abuse offending is often underpinned by networking between offenders. Offenders create groups on both the clear and the dark web to facilitate their crimes against children. These groups can legitimise or escalate the abuse of children and allow offenders to commercialise child sexual abuse. Offenders within the groups assist each other in evading detection by law enforcement.

Clause 38 creates a new offence of carrying out relevant internet activity with the intention of facilitating child sexual exploitation and abuse, punishable by up to 10 years’ imprisonment. Schedule 6 specifies the offences that constitute child sexual exploitation and abuse. Under clause 39, this offence will apply to activities carried out outside the UK. Under clause 40, it will also extend to corporate bodies, including the relevant persons who control them, which will ensure that offenders who commercialise child sexual abuse cannot evade liability by conducting their crimes through a company. Clause 41 ensures that any individual convicted of the offence will be subject to requirements to notify certain information to the police, to enable them to manage the risk of the sex offender reoffending.

As with earlier Government amendments, amendment 13 will add the clause 38 offence to schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act—I often used to think that I could replace myself as a parent with a tape recording of me saying a wide variety of things about shoes, like, “Tidy your shoes” or “Clean them up”; maybe I could be replaced as a Minister with a tape recording of me saying, “This will amend schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act”—thereby removing the offence from the ambit of the statutory criminal defence at section 45 of that Act. Amendment 18 is consequential on amendment 13.

This new offence will give law enforcement agencies the power they need to prosecute some of the most prolific and powerful offenders who facilitate child sexual abuse, with a maximum penalty that fits the severity of the crime.

[Harriet Cross]

Clause 38 establishes a new offence addressing those who intentionally facilitate child sexual exploitation and abuse online. It marks an important development in the approach to child protection, targeting individuals who, while perhaps not directly abusing children themselves, none the less provide the digital infrastructure that enables others to commit such abuse. In essence, if someone runs or substantially assists an internet service with the intention of facilitating child sexual abuse, they will commit a serious crime under the clause. The maximum penalty is 10 years’ imprisonment, reflecting the gravity of the conduct.

The clause defines the offence as engaging in “a relevant internet activity” such as providing an online service, administrating or moderating a website or chat group, controlling who can access certain content, or helping users share material, with the intention of facilitating child sexual abuse or exploitation. For example, someone who runs a hidden online forum specifically for paedophiles to exchange images or grooming tips, or a web administrator who knowingly allows child abuse live streams on their platform, will be committing a distinct criminal offence.

The clause plugs a gap. While existing laws might catch some of those behaviours, a clear, dedicated offence of online facilitation will send a strong signal and make prosecution more straightforward. Regrettably, it is evident that online platforms have become primary channels through which predators identify vulnerable children and distribute unlawful material. Law enforcement often finds that behind instances of abuse there are online platforms—sometimes private networks—that give offenders the means to commit or plan their crimes. Frankly, it is not enough to punish the individual abuser; we have to go after the enablers—the people who provide the online meeting places or technical help for abusers— too. Clause 38 will drag them into the light of criminal liability. Ten years in prison and a heavy fine should make any would-be facilitator think twice about operating an abuse forum or an encrypted sharing site for paedophiles.