Crime and Policing Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Alex Davies-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 8th May 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment 82.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Pritchard. No pedestrian or other road user should ever feel unsafe. Their safety is a priority for this Government and I know that such sentiments will be shared across the House. Like all other road users, cyclists are required to comply with road traffic law in the interests of the safety of other road users, and that is reflected in the highway code. There are already existing offences within the Road Traffic Act 1988 to prohibit dangerous and careless cycling, which carry a maximum penalty of £2,500 and a £1,000 fine respectively.

In rare, tragic cases that have occurred in recent years, where there has been a death or serious injury caused by a cyclist, the drawbacks of relying on the current offences—notably, the Offences against the Person Act 1861—have been clear. Unlike the penalties available for motoring offences that have the same tragic outcome, that offence carries a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment. The Government do not believe that those current penalties are appropriate in cases where a cyclist’s behaviour is dangerous or careless and results in the death or serious injury of another person.

Therefore, new clause 87 introduces new offences of causing death or serious injury by dangerous or careless cycling, making our streets safer for pedestrians and other road users. Those causing death by dangerous cycling or careless cycling will face a maximum penalty of life imprisonment or five years’ imprisonment respectively. Those who cause serious injury will face a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment or two years’ imprisonment respectively. Government amendment 82 extends these new offences to England, Wales and Scotland.

These penalties ensure that there is parity across the existing framework of motoring-related offences. All road users, whether they are drivers or cyclists, whose behaviour results in the death or serious injury of another road user will face the same penalties. To be clear, it is not our intention to discourage cycling; it is one of this Government’s broader objectives to promote cycling for its health, economic and environmental benefits. However, while the majority of cyclists are responsible and cycle safely, there are rare instances where victims have been seriously or fatally injured by irresponsible and dangerous cyclist behaviour. As a result, these offences will ensure that people who cause serious or fatal harm because of their reckless cycling behaviour are subject to appropriate punishment.

Before commending these measures to the Committee, I pay personal tribute to the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), and to Matthew Briggs, who have campaigned tirelessly for these changes. I had the privilege of meeting Matthew Briggs. We discussed the need for this new offence, and how the devastating impact of the death of his wife Kim in 2016, due to a reckless cyclist, shows the need to create these new offences. For that reason, I commend these measures to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful for the short speech that my hon. Friend the Member for Southend West and Leigh just made. He has spoken to me about the events in Westcliff-on-Sea and their impact on that community. I was also grateful to the shadow Minister for referencing that incident, because it sets out clearly why the provision in new clause 88 is necessary. I welcome that.

The shadow Minister asked whether we will stop legitimate protests, and somehow put the right to religious worship above the right to protest. I want to make it clear that the new clause does not place the freedom of religion above the right to protest. I think we all agree that the right to protest is an important part of our democracy. The new clause seeks to balance those rights by ensuring that protesters do not unduly intimidate or prevent individuals from accessing places of worship.

Although the right to protest remains key and fundamental, the provisions in the new clause clarify police powers to manage those protests near places of worship, ensuring that the freedom of religion is protected without imposing a blanket restriction on demonstrations. The intent is not to curtail protest rights, but to prevent situations where protests create a hostile environment that discourages religious observance. It is important to note that it applies equally to all faiths and all places of worship, not just, as we started off talking about, a specific religious group.

The shadow Minister raised the resource implications for BTP and MDP. The request to bring forward the provisions was because of the operational needs of those police forces. I am expect that they will be able to deal with any costs arising from new clause 90 from their existing budget. The shadow Minister also mentioned training and making sure that police officers understood the introduction of these provisions. I am sure he agrees that there is extensive training of police officers. With public order in particular, we know that there is a very well-worn path of how officers are trained at the right level, depending on the situation.

I recently had the pleasure of meeting Metropolitan police officers, who do a lot of public order work, down at Gravesend to see that training first hand, and I saw the amount of resource that goes in to ensuring that those officers are equipped and know their rights and how most effectively to use them. The new provisions will be part of the continuation of that training for police officers, alongside the work of the College of Policing. On that basis, I commend them to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 88 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 89

Powers of senior officers to impose conditions on protests

“(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 12 (imposing conditions on public processions)—

(a) in subsection (1), for ‘the’, in the first place it occurs, substitute ‘a’;

(b) in subsection (2)—

(i) in the words before paragraph (a) omit ‘the’;

(ii) in paragraph (a) for the words from ‘, the most’ to the end substitute ‘—

(i) the most senior in rank of the police officers present at the scene, or

(ii) in the case of a procession in England and Wales, a police officer authorised by a chief officer of police for the purposes of this subsection, and’.

(3) In section 14 (imposing conditions on public assemblies)—

(a) in subsection (1), for ‘the’, in the first place it occurs, substitute ‘a’;

(b) in subsection (2)—

(i) in the words before paragraph (a) omit ‘the’;

(ii) in paragraph (a) for the words from ‘, the most” to the end substitute ‘—

(i) the most senior in rank of the police officers present at the scene, or

(ii) in the case of an assembly in England and Wales, a police officer authorised by a chief officer of police for the purposes of this subsection, and’;

(c) in subsection (2ZB), for ‘reference in subsection (2)(b) to a chief officer of police includes’, substitute ‘references in subsection (2) to a chief officer of police include’.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause allows the powers in sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 to impose conditions on public processions and public assemblies to be exercised by a police officer authorised to do so by a chief officer of police.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 90

Amendments relating to British Transport Police and Ministry of Defence Police

“(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) and (3).

(2) In section 14A(9) (prohibiting trespassory assemblies), in the definition of ‘land’, after ‘“land”’ insert ‘, except in subsections (4A) to (4C) of this section,’.

(3) In section 16 (interpretation), in the definition of ‘public assembly’, for the words from ‘wholly’ to the end substitute ‘—

(a) wholly or partly open to the air, or

(b) within any of paragraphs (a) to (f) of section 31(1) of the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003;’.

(4) The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 is amended in accordance with subsections (5) and (6).

(5) In section 60 (powers to stop and search in anticipation of or after violence), after subsection (9A) insert—

‘(9B) So far as they relate to an authorisation by a member of the Ministry of Defence Police—

(a) subsections (1) and (9) have effect as if the references to a locality in a police area were references to a place in England and Wales among those specified in section 2(2) of the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987, and

(b) subsection (1)(aa)(i) has effect as if the reference to a police area were a reference to the places in England and Wales specified in section 2(2) of the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987.’

(6) In section 60AA (powers to require removal of disguises)—

(a) for subsection (8) substitute—

‘(8) So far as subsections (1), (3) and (6) relate to an authorisation by a member of the British Transport Police Force, those subsections have effect as if the references to a locality or a locality in a a police area were references to a place in England and Wales among those specified in section 31(1)(a) to (f) of the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003.

(8A) So far as subsections (1), (3) and (6) relate to an authorisation by a member of the Ministry of Defence Police, those subsections have effect as if the references to a locality or a locality in a police area were references to a place in England and Wales among those specified in section 2(2) of the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987.’;

(b) in subsection (9) omit ‘and “policed premises” each’.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause extends certain powers under Part 2 of the Public Order Act 1986 to land which is not open to the air; allows Ministry of Defence Police to issue authorisations under section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994; and allows British Transport Police and Ministry of Defence Police to issue authorisations under section 60AA of that Act.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 91

Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences

“(1) This section applies where in criminal proceedings in a court in England and Wales, or in proceedings (anywhere) before a service court, a person (‘D’) is charged with a qualifying offence.

(2) An offence is a ‘qualifying offence’ if—

(a) it is alleged to have been committed by D acting in the exercise of functions as an authorised firearms officer,

(b) the conduct alleged to constitute the offence involved the use by D of a lethal barrelled weapon to discharge a conventional round, and

(c) D was, at the time of the alleged offence, authorised by the relevant authority to use that weapon with that round.

(3) The court must—

(a) cause the following information to be withheld from the public in proceedings before the court, in each case unless satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so—

(i) D’s name;

(ii) D’s address;

(iii) D’s date of birth;

(b) give a reporting direction (see section (Authorised firearms officers: reporting directions)) in respect of D (if one does not already have effect), unless satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so.

(4) The court may, if satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so, make an anonymity order (see section (Authorised firearms officers: anonymity orders)) in respect of D.

(5) If D is convicted of the offence—

(a) subsections (3) and (4) cease to apply in respect of D, and

(b) any restriction put in place under subsection (3)(a) and any reporting direction given, or anonymity order made, under this section in respect of D cease to have effect at the time D is sentenced for the offence.

(6) In subsection (1), ‘authorised firearms officer’ means—

(a) a member of a relevant police force who is authorised by the relevant chief officer to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round in the exercise of functions as a constable,

(b) a National Crime Agency officer who is authorised by the Director General of the National Crime Agency to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round in the exercise of functions as a National Crime Agency officer,

(c) a member of the Police Service of Scotland or the Police Service of Northern Ireland who—

(i) is provided under section 98 of the Police Act 1996 for the assistance of a police force in England and Wales, and

(ii) is authorised by the relevant authority to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round in the exercise of functions as a constable, or

(d) a member of the armed forces who—

(i) is deployed in support of a relevant police force or the National Crime Agency, and

(ii) is authorised by the Secretary of State to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round for the purposes of that deployment.

(7) In this section—

‘conventional round’ means any shot, bullet or other missile other than one designed to be used without its use giving rise to a substantial risk of causing death or serious injury;

‘lethal barrelled weapon’ has the meaning given by section 57(1B) of the Firearms Act 1968;

‘member of the armed forces’ means a person who is subject to service law (see section 367 of the Armed Forces Act 2006);

‘relevant authority’ means—

(a) in relation to a member of a relevant police force, the relevant chief officer;

(b) in relation to a National Crime Agency officer, the Director General of the National Crime Agency;

(c) in relation to a member of the Police Service of Scotland, the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland;

(d) in relation to a member of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland;

(e) in relation to a member of the armed forces, the Secretary of State;

‘relevant chief officer’ means—

(a) in relation to a police force in England and Wales, the chief officer of police of that police force;

(b) in relation to the British Transport Police Force, the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force;

(c) in relation to the Ministry of Defence Police, the Chief Constable of the Ministry of Defence Police;

(d) in relation to the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, the Chief Constable of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary;

‘relevant police force’ means—

(a) a police force in England and Wales,

(b) the British Transport Police Force,

(c) the Ministry of Defence Police, or

(d) the Civil Nuclear Constabulary;

‘service court’ means—

(a) the Court Martial, or

(b) the Court Martial Appeal Court.

(8) This section does not apply in relation to proceedings begun before the coming into force of this section.”.—(Alex Davies-Jones.)

This new clause provides for a presumption of anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with (but not convicted of) an offence relating to the discharge of their firearm in the course of their duties

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government new clause 92—Anonymity for authorised firearms officers appealing convictions for qualifying offences.

Government new clause 93—Authorised firearms officers: reporting directions.

Government new clause 94—Authorised firearms officers: anonymity orders.

Government amendment 83.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Currently, in criminal courts, adult defendants do not have a general right to anonymity, which reflects the principle of open justice. However, judges may impose reporting restrictions where the disclosure of identifying information could hinder the administration of justice, or impact fair trial rights. Armed police officers perform a unique and dangerous role. They are trained to use lethal force on behalf of the state to protect the lives of our citizens. Their work requires them to confront situations that demand split-second decisions that can have profound legal and personal ramifications. They respond to major crimes involving high-risk individuals, often linked to organised crime groups. That inherently dangerous role naturally increases the risk of retribution for both officers and their families, which was a risk highlighted by the police accountability review.

The Government’s plan to introduce the measures set out in new clauses 91 to 94 was originally announced to the House by my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary on 23 October. The proposed new clauses address specific concerns raised during the police accountability review, and following the trial of Sergeant Martyn Blake. They will help deliver our commitment to rebuild the confidence of police officers in their vital work to keep the public safe.

Proposed new clause 91 creates a presumption of anonymity for firearms officers who are charged with offences related to the discharge of their weapon during their official duties. That presumption does not extend to other police officers who use force in their duties or to firearms officers if force is used in the line of duty that does not involve discharging a firearm. The starting point for the court will be that anonymity should be granted in these cases, and that such anonymity will remain in place until the defendant is sentenced.

New clause 91 requires that the court must withhold identifying details from the public during proceedings and give a “reporting direction”. The terms of the reporting direction are set out in new clause 93 and prevent the publication of any material that may lead to the identification of the defendant. New clause 91 also gives the courts statutory powers to ensure that the defendant’s identity is protected in the courtroom, if it is

“in the interests of justice to do so”.

New clause 94 sets out the types of measures that can be used, such as screens or voice modulation. It will be for the court to decide whether these are required.

Judicial discretion is preserved under the new provisions, which enable courts to disclose identifying details or lift reporting restrictions, where considered necessary, taking into account the specific circumstances of the case and the overall interests of justice.

New clause 92 provides courts with the statutory authority to extend in-court anonymity measures and reporting restrictions beyond sentencing, should the defendant wish to appeal their conviction. However, it does not establish a presumption, nor does it apply if a firearms officer convicted of an offence seeks only to appeal their sentence. When a firearms officer is convicted, their right to anonymity ceases at the point of sentencing. However, the court may order that anonymity continues pending the outcome of an appeal. If the conviction is upheld on appeal, the right to anonymity will cease upon the finalisation of that appeal.

Conversely, when an officer is exonerated, their right to anonymity will continue, allowing them to resume their professional and personal lives without fear of stigma or threats to their safety. Ensuring national safety and security is a top priority for this Government and the role of firearms officers is essential to achieving that. They serve in their difficult and demanding role voluntarily and we cannot expect them to perform their duties effectively without providing adequate safeguards to protect them and their families. Amendment 83 provides for the new clauses to come into force two months after the Bill is passed. I commend the new clauses, and the amendment, to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Government new clauses 91 to 94 provide anonymity protections for authorised firearms officers in legal proceedings involving qualifying offences. New clause 91 ensures that officers charged with offences related to their authorised use of lethal weapons discharging a conventional round will have their personal details withheld and reporting directions issued, unless contrary to justice. Such measures would protect them from public scrutiny and potential threats during sensitive investigations. They would foster officers’ confidence in performing high-risk duties because they would be shielded from premature exposure before conviction.

Government new clause 92 extends the protections to convicted officers, pending appeals. That would allow courts to maintain anonymity if necessary for justice, and would support fair appeal processes by preventing irreversible reputational damage if convictions are overturned.

Government new clauses 93 and 94 provide clear mechanisms for reporting directions and anonymity orders to enforce the protections, while ensuring that judges and juries retain access to the officer’s identity. That balances transparency with safety. As the Minister has said, Members will be all too aware of the case of Sergeant Martyn Blake, who was acquitted in October 2024 of murdering Chris Kaba after a 2022 shooting in London. Blake faced death threats, including a £10,000 bounty, forcing him into hiding and highlighting the need for anonymity to protect officers and their families from retribution during trials.

These measures will help to ensure that officers who act in good faith under dangerous circumstances are protected from such vindictive attacks while the judicial process is under way—as well as ensuring recruitment and retention in firearms roles, and public safety—while also allowing the courts to lift protections when justice demands. Will the Minister comment further on how the Government will ensure that courts balance anonymity protections with the public interest in transparent justice? In particular, what guidance will be provided to courts to assess when anonymity is contrary to the interests of justice?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I welcome the tone in which the Opposition spokesperson has presented his comments and the fact that he shares our concern about the need for these new measures. Judges will of course have all relevant information in balancing the need for open justice with the need to protect firearms officers in these specific instances. The measures recognise the exceptional circumstances of defendants in such cases and create a presumption of anonymity. The starting point for the courts will be that anonymity should be granted in such cases, unless it is contrary to justice to do so.

Let me add that open justice and the freedom of the press to report on these cases continue to be important principles of our justice system, and this legislation will respect those key principles. A court may already order anonymity measures or reporting restrictions in a case where it judges that disclosure of a defendant’s identity would give rise to a real and immediate risk to life. The measure is being introduced in recognition of the unique responsibilities that firearms officers have, as I have said, and the potential risks associated with their identification during court proceedings. It is really important that judges and the courts get the balance right here, but this measure is absolutely necessary.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 91 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 92

Anonymity for authorised firearms officers appealing convictions for qualifying offences

“(1) This section applies where a person (‘D’) is convicted of a qualifying offence in proceedings in a court in England and Wales, or proceedings (anywhere) before a service court.

(2) The court by or before which D is convicted may, if satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so—

(a) cause any or all of the information mentioned in section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences)(3)(a)(i) to (iii) to be withheld from the public in proceedings before the court;

(b) give a reporting direction in respect of D (see section (Authorised firearms officers: reporting directions));

(c) make an anonymity order in respect of D (see (Authorised firearms officers: anonymity orders)).

(3) Any reporting direction given, or anonymity order made, under subsection (2) ceases to have effect at the end of the appeal period unless, before the end of that period, D brings an appeal against the conviction.

(4) Where, before the end of the appeal period, D brings an appeal against the conviction, the court dealing with the appeal may, if satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so—

(a) cause any or all of the information mentioned in section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences)(3)(a)(i) to (iii) to be withheld from the public in proceedings before the court;

(b) give a reporting direction in respect of D;

(c) make an anonymity order in respect of D.

(5) The court dealing with the appeal must at the earliest opportunity determine the issue of whether to exercise any or all of the powers under subsection (4).

(6) Any reporting direction given, or anonymity order made, under subsection (2) ceases to have effect upon the making of the determination mentioned in subsection (5) (whether or not the court dealing with the appeal gives a direction or makes an order).

(7) Any reporting direction given, or anonymity order made, under subsection (4) ceases to have effect if the appeal against conviction is abandoned or dismissed.

(8) In this section—

‘appeal period’ in relation to a person convicted of a qualifying offence, means the period allowed for bringing an appeal against that conviction, disregarding the possibility of an appeal out of time with permission;

‘qualifying offence’ has the meaning given by section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences)(2).

(9) This section does not apply where the proceedings in which D was convicted were begun before the coming into force of section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences).”—(Alex Davies-Jones.)

This new clause, which is related to NC91, provides courts with a power to preserve the anonymity of authorised firearms officers convicted of an offence relating to the discharge of their firearm in the course of their duties, pending any appeal against that conviction.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 93

Authorised firearms officers: reporting directions

“(1) A reporting direction, in relation to a person (‘D’) charged with (or convicted of) a qualifying offence, is a direction that no matter relating to D may be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify D as a person who is, or was, alleged to have committed (or who has been convicted of) the offence.

(2) The matters relating to D in relation to which the restrictions imposed by a reporting direction apply (if their inclusion in any publication is likely to have the result mentioned in subsection (1)) include in particular—

(a) D’s name,

(b) D’s address,

(c) the identity of any place at which D works, and

(d) any still or moving image of D.

(3) A relevant court may by direction (‘an excepting direction’) dispense, to any extent specified in the excepting direction, with the restrictions imposed by a reporting direction if satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so.

(4) An excepting direction—

(a) may be given at the time the reporting direction is given or subsequently;

(b) may be varied or revoked by a relevant court.

(5) A reporting direction has effect—

(a) for a fixed period specified in the direction, or

(b) indefinitely,

but this is subject to subsection (5)(b) of section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences) and subsections (3), (6) and (7) of section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers appealing convictions for qualifying offences).

(6) A reporting direction may be revoked if a relevant court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so.

(7) In this section—

‘publication’ has the same meaning as in Part 2 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (see section 63 of that Act);

‘qualifying offence’ has the meaning given by section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences)(2);

‘relevant court’, in relation to a reporting direction, means—

(a) the court that gave the direction,

(b) the court (if different) that is currently dealing, or that last dealt, with the proceedings in which the direction was given, or

(c) any court dealing with an appeal (including an appeal by way of case stated) arising out of the proceedings in which the direction was given or with any further appeal.”—(Alex Davies-Jones.)

This new clause, which supplements NC91 and NC92, makes provision about reporting directions that may be given under either of those new clauses.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 94

Authorised firearms officers: anonymity orders

“(1) An anonymity order, in relation to a person (‘D’) charged with (or convicted of) a qualifying offence, is an order made by a court that requires specified measures to be taken in relation to D to ensure that the identity of D is withheld from the public in proceedings before the court.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the kinds of measures that may be required to be taken in relation to D include measures for securing one or more of the following—

(a) that identifying details relating to D be withheld from the public in proceedings before the court;

(b) that D is screened to any specified extent;

(c) that D’s voice is subjected to modulation to any specified extent.

(3) An anonymity order may not require—

(a) D to be screened to such an extent that D cannot be seen by—

(i) the judge or other members of the court (if any), or

(ii) the jury (if there is one);

(b) D’s voice to be modulated to such an extent that D’s natural voice cannot be heard by any persons within paragraph (a)(i) or (ii).

(4) The court that made an anonymity order may vary or discharge the order if satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so.

(5) In this section—

‘qualifying offence’ has the meaning given by section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences)(2);

‘specified’ means specified in the anonymity order concerned.” —(Alex Davies-Jones.)

This new clause, which supplements NC91 and NC92, makes provision about anonymity orders that may be made under either of those new clauses.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 5

Pornographic content: online harmful content

“(1) A person commits an offence if they publish or allow or facilitate the publishing of pornographic content online which meets the criteria for harmful material under section 368E(3)(a) and section 368E(3)(b) of the Communications Act 2003.

(2) An individual guilty of an offence is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine or both.

(3) A person who is a UK national commits an offence under this section regardless of where the offence takes place.

(4) A person who is not a UK national commits an offence under this section if any part of the offence takes place in the UK.

(5) The platform on which material that violates the provisions in this section is published can be fined up to £18 million or 10 percent of their qualifying worldwide revenue, whichever is greater.

(6) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the Act receiving Royal Assent, make regulations appointing one or more public bodies (the appointed body) to monitor and enforce compliance by online platforms with this section.

(7) Regulations made under subsection 6 may provide the appointed body appointed by the Secretary of State with the powers, contained in sections 144 and 146 of the Online Safety Act 2023, to apply to the court for a Service Restriction Order or Access Restriction Order (or both).

(8) The appointed body must, within six months of being appointed by the Secretary of State, lay before Parliament a strategy for monitoring, and enforcing, compliance with the provisions in this section.

(9) The appointed body must lay before Parliament an annual report, outlining the enforcement activity undertaken in relation to this section.”—(Matt Vickers.)

This new clause extends safeguarding requirements for pornography distributed offline to pornography distributed online, making it an offence to publish online harmful material under section 368E(3)(a) and section 368E(3)(b) of the Communications Act 2003.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Matt Vickers]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Matt Vickers]

New clause 6 would introduce a safeguard to ensure that all individuals featured in pornographic content online were verified as adults. By requiring verification before content was created and before it was published, the new clause would strengthen protections against the inclusion of minors, whether through coercion, deception or manipulation, and ensure that no content involving under-age individuals was ever legally uploaded in the first place. This is a clear and necessary step to combat child sexual exploitation online, and one that aligns with wider public expectations about safety and decency on digital platforms.

My hon. Friend the Member for Reigate (Rebecca Paul) has raised this issue in the House on multiple occasions, reflecting deep concern over the ease with which harmful and unlawful content can slip through the cracks of unregulated online platforms. The new clause takes that concern seriously and would place a firm legal duty on content hosts to verify the age and consent of all individuals involved. It would shift the burden on to platforms—where it rightly belongs—to adopt robust age verification measures and uphold basic standards of safety and legality. The new clause would not only protect children from exploitation, but help to rebuild public trust in the digital environment by demonstrating that the law was keeping pace with technology.

The new clause’s suggestion that pornographic content can be uploaded without the age of the individuals involved being verified is very disturbing. I would be grateful if the Minister could comment on that and why she feels that the new clause might not be necessary. What is in place to prevent content featuring minors from being uploaded?

The pornography review led by Baroness Bertin has recommended that individuals who feature in pornography should have the right at any time to withdraw their consent to the continued publication of that content. The review states:

“Even if a performer or creator has provided consent for the initial recording and sharing of pornographic content, they should have every right to withdraw consent at a later point…and have that content removed.”

I am keen to hear the Minister’s view and, in particular, why she thinks that that recommendation is wrong.

New clause 51 seeks to update section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 by expanding the definition of extreme pornographic material to include depictions of non-fatal strangulation where it constitutes an act of battery and affects a person’s ability to breathe. The purpose of the new clause is to reflect growing concern from victims’ groups, criminal justice professionals and law enforcement about the increasing normalisation and distribution of such harmful content. Depictions of strangulation, even when simulated, have been linked to increased risk of real-world violence, especially against women. It has been suggested that strangulation is a strong predictor of future domestic homicide and normalising its portrayal in pornography risks reinforcing abusive behaviour.

Currently, the law prohibits extreme pornography that portrays serious injury or life-threatening acts. However, non-fatal strangulation, although deeply dangerous and traumatic, is not consistently covered by the existing legal framework. The new clause would close that gap by providing clarity to police and prosecutors and sending a clear message that depictions of life-threatening violence for sexual gratification are unacceptable. By targeting depictions in which the act affects a person’s ability to breathe and amounts to battery, the new clause is narrowly focused to avoid capturing consensual and legal adult activity while still addressing that which represents serious harm. It would bring the law into line with recent legislative steps such as the introduction of the offence of non-fatal strangulation in the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, acknowledging the real risk and impact of that conduct. Ultimately, this change would strengthen protections for the public and uphold standards of decency, particularly in safeguarding against material that eroticises violence and coercion.

I do not wish to divide the Committee on new clause 6, but would like us to divide on new clause 51, which I understand will be decided on later.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I want to make it very clear to hon. Members that I have immense sympathy for the sentiments behind all the new clauses in this group. All of us in the House wish to make society a safer place for women and girls. Indeed, this Government were elected with a commitment to halving violence against women and girls. I am sure we all agree that the fight against the proliferation of extreme pornography and access to harmful material is one step to achieving that goal, so before I respond to new clauses 5 to 7 and 51, I want to share a few thanks.

First, I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft (Jess Asato) for tabling new clauses 5 to 7 and for tirelessly campaigning to raise awareness of online harm. I also thank the hon. Member for Stockton West for tabling new clause 51. Importantly, I thank Baroness Bertin, whose independent report on pornography provides us with invaluable insight into pornography and online harm, which the Government continue to consider carefully. All the new clauses shed light on serious issues, and I welcome their being brought to the fore today.

New clause 5 aims to equalise the treatment of pornography regulation online and offline, by making legal but harmful content prohibited online. It seeks to give effect to a recommendation made by Baroness Bertin in her review, which makes the case for parity in the regulation of pornography online and offline. She recommends achieving that through either a new pornography code under the Online Safety Act 2023, or a publication offence, which would render illegal a variety of currently legal pornography content. That approach is similar to what new clause 5 aims to do.

Before I respond to the new clause, I will set out the current legislative framework. Both online and offline pornography is subject to criminal and regulatory legislation and enforcement. The Video Recordings Act 1984 makes it an offence to distribute pornography in a physical media format that has not been classified by the British Board of Film Classification. The BBFC will not classify any content in breach of criminal law or certain other types of pornography. Section 368E of the Communications Act 2003 builds on that framework by prohibiting on-demand programme services, such as ITVX or Prime Video, from showing “prohibited material”, which includes any video that has been refused classification certification by the BBFC and any material that would be refused a classification certificate if it were considered by the BBFC. That is enforced by Ofcom as a regulatory matter.

In addition, the Online Safety Act treats certain pornography or related material offences as priority offences, which means that user-to-user services must take proactive measures to remove extreme pornography, intimate image abuse and child sex abuse material from their platforms. The Act also places a duty on user-to-user service providers to take steps to prevent such material from appearing online in the first place. Those provisions apply to services even if the companies providing them are outside the UK, if they have links to the UK.

The criminal law also prohibits the possession of extreme pornography and the publication of obscene material, either online or offline. The Obscene Publications Act 1959 extends to the publication of obscene material other than pornography. The Video Recordings Act 1984, the Licensing Act 2003 and section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 criminalise the simple possession of extreme pornographic images.

New clause 5 would make the publication, or facilitation of publication, of such content online a criminal offence, with regulatory enforcement of the new criminal regime where the person publishing the content is an online platform. The criminal offence created by the new clause would rely on the definition in section 368E of the Communications Act 2003, which requires a judgment to be made about whether the BBFC would classify content that has not been subject to the classification process. Creating this style of criminal offence would require a clearer and more certain definition of such content, as any individual would need to be able to clearly understand what conduct may result in their conviction. Extensive further work would be needed to consider and define what currently legal online pornography cannot be published with sufficient certainty to ensure that any offence was enforceable and workable as intended.

New clause 6 also attempts to give effect to the recommendations made by Baroness Bertin in her review of pornography. It seeks to create additional requirements for websites hosting pornographic material to verify that all individuals featured were over 18 before the content was created, consented to the publication of the material, and are able to withdraw that consent at any time. It would further regulate the online pornography sector and create a new criminal offence for individuals who publish or facilitate the publishing of content online, where the age and valid consent of the individuals featured have not been verified. The underlying conduct depicted if a person is under 18 or non-consenting would include child sexual abuse, sexual assault, non-consensual intimate image abuse and potentially modern slavery offences.

The existing criminal law prohibits the creation, distribution and possession of child sexual abuse material, and the possession of extreme pornographic material, which includes non-consensual penetrative sexual acts. The law on the distribution of indecent images of children is very clear. Under the Protection of Children Act 1978, the UK has a strict prohibition on the taking, making, circulation and possession with a view to distribution of any indecent photograph or pseudo-photograph of a child under 18, and these offences carry a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment. Section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 also makes the simple possession of indecent photographs or pseudo-photographs of children an offence, which carries a maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment. In addition, all published material is subject to the Obscene Publications Act 1959.