Crime and Policing Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Alex Davies-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 8th May 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Luke Taylor]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

As things stand, there is no specific criminal offence of domestic abuse in England and Wales. Instead, such cases are prosecuted under a patchwork of broader offences: common assault, actual bodily harm and coercive control. While those charges may reflect elements of abuse, they too often fail to capture the sustained pattern nature of domestic violence.

The legal ambiguity has far-reaching consequences. Under the Government’s own SDS40—standard determinate sentences 40%—scheme, high-risk offenders, especially those who pose a continued threat to public safety, should be exempt from early release, but owing to the lack of specific domestic abuse offences, perpetrators charged under more general categories, such as common assault, remain eligible for early release. In effect, abusers walk free while their victims live in fear. That is not a technical oversight; it is a systemic failure, and it has rightly been challenged by Women’s Aid, Refuge, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner and other voices we cannot afford to ignore.

That is why I welcome both the proposed amendment to the SDS40 scheme and the Domestic Abuse (Aggravated Offences) Bill, brought forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Eastbourne (Josh Babarinde). That Bill would create a defined set of domestic abuse aggravated offences, recognising the context of abuse and making such offences clearly identifiable in the criminal justice system. If adopted, the reform would not only enhance the visibility of domestic abuse, but close the dangerous loopholes in relation to early release. It would bring the law into alignment with the lived experiences of victims and send a clear message: domestic abuse is not a private matter; it is a public crime and will be treated as such.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)]

I personally thank the hon. Member for Eastbourne for his tireless commitment to, and campaigning on, tackling domestic abuse. He is right to highlight the need to identify and track domestic offenders better in our justice system. It is a crucial issue. I welcome this important discussion and the many conversations that I have had with him in my ministerial office about how best to collaborate to achieve this.

New clause 12 seeks to introduce a new label, “domestic abuse aggravated”, which will apply to any offence where the offender and victim are personally connected and both aged 16 or over. Offences ranging from assault to fraud would be designated as domestic abuse aggravated where they met the statutory definition of domestic abuse. We recognise the intent behind the new clause and are deeply sympathetic to it; we agree that better categorisation and management of domestic abuse offenders is crucial. However, there are a number of important considerations that need to be carefully worked through to ensure that any new approach is effective and workable, and that it will actually help victims.

There are significant questions that need to be answered if we are to ensure that any reform strengthens, rather than complicates, our response to domestic abuse. While the new clause introduces a new label, it does not set out a clear mechanism for how the designation would be applied in practice. As proposed, it creates a category of domestic abuse offender by virtue of their offence, but does not set out legal or operational implications for charging or sentencing. Without clarity about its function, there is a risk that the provision will introduce unnecessary complexity in the legal framework, in particular through how it operates alongside the Sentencing Council’s existing guidelines, in which domestic abuse is already recognised as an aggravating factor. Courts therefore already consider imposing tougher sentences when an offence occurs in a domestic setting.

Despite those concerns, the hon. Gentleman raises an important issue, and one that I have discussed at length with the hon. Member for Eastbourne. I assure both hon. Members that work is under way across Government on how we can better identify domestic abuse offenders. This is a complex issue, and it is right that we take the time to ensure that any changes are robust and deliver meaningful improvements, but we are on the case.

The hon. Member for Eastbourne can rest assured that the Government are actively considering the issue. I would be glad to work with him—I extend that invitation to any Member of the House—on identifying the most effective way forward. While we do not believe the new clause is the right solution at this time, we welcome ongoing discussions on how best to improve the categorisation and tracking of domestic abuse offenders within the justice system. For those reasons, I ask that new clause 12 be withdrawn.

[Luke Taylor]

We would like to press the new clause to a vote, please.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

New clauses 27, 96 and 98 seek to tackle the real and growing problem of tool theft from tradesmen. At this point, I declare an interest as the son of a builder. This country is built on the back of tradesmen. They are the small businesses that make a huge contribution to our economy and build the world around us. I have seen at first hand the nightmare that occurs when guys or girls in the trade get up at daft o’clock to go to work and earn a living, only to find that their van or lock-up has been broken into and their equipment stolen. They lose the equipment, their vehicle gets damaged and they lose a day’s work. In fact, they can lose days or weeks of work, and the nature of their employment often means that that is a real financial loss.

Not only do these hard-working people suffer that loss, but they know that little is done to stop this ever-increasing problem. I have spoken to tradesmen and key campaigners on this issue, such as Shoaib Awan and the team at Fix Radio, who have been standing up for tradesmen across the country, organising a rally in Westminster and ensuring that their voice is heard. Many people will have seen my good friend the shadow Justice Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick), raising this issue on GB News and talking about the failure of agencies to tackle it.

Shoaib has highlighted the fact that not only do people wake up to the consequences and costs of such thefts, but all too often, they go to a car boot sale at the weekend to see the thieves selling the stolen goods in broad daylight with little, if any, action from the police and trading standards. I ask anyone who does not think that these amendments are necessary to listen to Shoaib or watch the coverage on GB News, should they so wish. As more thieves get away with and profit from this crime, so its prevalence continues to increase. Since Sadiq Khan became mayor, tool theft in London has gone up by 60%. I hope Members will consider these amendments.

New clause 27 strengthens the deterrent effect of the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023 by aligning financial penalties with the real-world losses experienced by tradespeople and small businesses when their tools or equipment are stolen. The current enforcement provisions may result in fines that are disconnected from the actual harm caused, particularly to self-employed individuals or small and medium-sized enterprises, where the loss of equipment can be financially devastating. The new clause introduces a fairer and more effective approach by unequivocally requiring courts to impose fines that reflect the full replacement cost of the stolen equipment, the cost of repairing any damage done during the theft and the trading loss incurred while the equipment was unavailable, whether it be cancelled jobs, lost contracts or reputational harm.

Tool theft has reached crisis levels in the UK, with one in 10 tradespeople expected to experience tool theft this year alone. Many of the victims have already endured multiple incidents and, alarmingly, self-employed tradespeople are 38% more likely than their employed counterparts to fall victim to this type of crime. Yet, despite the prevalence of this crime, only 1% of stolen tools are ever recovered.

The consequences of tool theft go far beyond the immediate loss of equipment. Victims face an average cost of £2,730 to replace stolen tools, £1,320 in vehicle or property repairs and £1,900 in lost work and business disruption—a combined blow of nearly £6,000. More than four in five victims report a negative impact on mental health, with over one third describing it as “major”. That is no small issue, especially in an industry already suffering one of the UK’s highest suicide rates. More than 40% of victims say the theft has damaged their business reputation, and one in 10 say the reputational impact was significant. Frustration with the police and the legal response is widespread. Nearly one quarter of tradespeople—22.7%—do not even bother reporting tool theft to authorities, citing poor outcomes and a lack of follow-up.

According to figures from CrimeRate, Bristol has the highest rates of general crime, with 106 crimes per 1,000 residents, followed by West Yorkshire, Tyne and Wear and West Midlands. Those rates correlate with high levels of tool theft. The persistent threat of crime means that, for 68% of tradespeople, worrying about such theft is a daily reality. The new clause would not only ensure that victims are properly compensated, but send a strong message to offenders that equipment theft is not a low-risk crime. For many tradespeople, a single incident can lead to thousands of pounds in losses and days or weeks of missed work. The clause reflects a growing recognition that crimes affecting livelihoods must be met with penalties that match the seriousness and consequences of the offence. It supports victims, reinforces respect for the law and helps to protect the economic wellbeing of skilled workers across the country.

New clause 96 seeks to amend the Sentencing Act 2020 to make the theft of tools from a tradesman an explicit aggravating factor when courts are considering the seriousness of a theft offence under section 7 of the Theft Act 1968. The intention is to recognise the disproportionate harm caused when essential work tools are stolen from skilled tradespeople, many of whom rely entirely on their tools to earn a living. By requiring courts to treat such thefts more seriously and state that fact in open court, the clause ensures that sentencing properly reflects the real-world impact of those crimes. It improves public confidence in the justice system and sends a clear message that targeting workers in such a way will not be tolerated.

The UK’s skilled trade sector is essential to infrastructure, housing and national economic recovery, yet, when they are targeted by thieves, many tradespeople feel unprotected and underserved by the criminal justice system. By introducing this aggravating factor, Parliament would send a clear message that these crimes are taken seriously and that the justice system stands on the side of workers who keep our country running. The provision would also help to restore public confidence in sentencing, ensuring that punishment better reflects the real impact on victims.

New clause 96 would also bring greater consistency and transparency in sentencing by obliging courts to state in open court when a theft is aggravated by the fact that tools were stolen from a tradesman. The system reinforces public accountability and the principle that sentencing should consider not only the value of items stolen, but the importance to the victim’s life and work.

New clause 98 addresses a growing concern about the sale of stolen tradespeople’s tools at car boot sales and other temporary markets. Requiring local councils or trading standards authorities to implement an enforcement plan would ensure a more proactive and consistent approach to tackling the issue. Car boot sales and temporary markets, although important parts of local economies and communities, have become a common outlet for the sale of stolen tradesmen’s tools. These informal settings often have minimal regulatory oversight, making them attractive to criminals seeking to quickly offload high value items. Requiring councils to create enforcement plans would close this enforcement gap, helping to dismantle a key part of the stolen goods supply chain.

Tradespeople, many of whom are self-employed, are among those most affected by tool theft. Their tools are not just possessions; they are the means by which individuals earn a living. Stolen tools being resold at car boot sales with little oversight reinforces the cycle of crime and undermines legitimate business. A local enforcement plan will support hard-working tradespeople by increasing the risk for those attempting to profit from their misfortune.

Any Member who has taken the time to speak to affected tradespeople will have heard their overwhelming frustration at the lack of the lack of action at car boot sales, watching tools stolen from them being sold in front of their face in broad daylight with no action from the agencies. This new clause seeks to put that right. By requiring councils to plan enforcement at temporary markets, it would encourage more responsible behaviour among market organisers and set a baseline for due diligence, including vendor checks, co-operation with law enforcement and public awareness initiatives. Such expectations could help to preserve the integrity and trustworthiness of community markets without disrupting legitimate trade.

This is a common-sense, low-cost policy that leverages existing local authority structures. Many councils already have trading standards and enforcement teams in place able to take this on. This measure simply ensures that they will turn their attention to this persistent and growing problem. Enforcement plans could include scheduled inspections, information sharing with police and targeted education for both vendors and shoppers. This preventive approach could reduce the frequency of thefts by making it more difficult for criminals to profit.

The Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023 set an important precedent in efforts to crack down on the theft of high-value tools and equipment. However, legislation is only effective when matched by local enforcement. This clause bridges the gap between law and local action, giving councils a clear duty and direction to enforce the law where the illicit trade is happening on the ground.

Local residents and small business owners often feel powerless in the face of persistent tool theft. Seeing their local councils take meaningful and visible action, such as regular enforcement of markets, could help to build trust in the system, sending a message that this type of crime is taken seriously and that steps are being taken at every level to protect those most vulnerable to its effect.

The new clause would help deter the resale of stolen goods, protect legitimate tradespeople from further victimisation and send a clear message that theft and resale will be actively policed at all levels. This targeted local action complements broader sentencing reforms and supports efforts to reduce tool theft across the UK.

New clause 32 seeks to amend the Sentencing Act 2020 and specifically targets the growing issue of rural crime by making the theft of high-value farming equipment a statutory aggravating factor in sentencing decisions. Under the proposed provision, when a court is considering the seriousness of a theft offence under section 7 of the Theft Act 1968, and the theft involves farming machinery or tools valued at £10,000 or more, it must treat the value and nature of the stolen property as an aggravating factor.

The theft of high-value farm equipment has a profound and often devastating impact on rural communities and agricultural businesses. These machines, such as tractors, GPS systems, harvesters and other specialised tools, are not only expensive to replace, but also critical to daily operations. When they are stolen, the immediate financial loss can exceed £10,000, but the broader consequences go much further. Farmers face significant disruption to their work, delayed harvesting or planting and reduced productivity, which can affect the entire food supply chain.

Many rural businesses operate on tight margins and such thefts can push them into financial instability or force them to cease operations temporarily. Beyond economics, these crimes erode confidence in rural policing and leave victims feeling vulnerable and targeted, especially in remote areas where support and security may already be limited.

The new clause would also require courts to explicitly state in open court that the offence has been aggravated by this factor. The intent is to reflect the serious disruption and financial harm caused by the theft of vital agricultural machinery such as tractors, GPS units or harvesters, which are essential for productivity and food security in rural communities. By making that an aggravating factor, the new clause aims to ensure that sentencing reflects the full impact on victims and serves as a more effective deterrent. I hope that the Government will consider backing our farmers and backing this new clause.

My hon. Friend the Member for Mid Buckinghamshire (Greg Smith) has undertaken a significant amount of work to help tackle tool and equipment theft, including the introduction of the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023 as a private Member’s Bill, to address the escalating issue of equipment and tool theft affecting tradespeople, farmers and rural businesses across England and Wales.

The 2023 Act empowers the Secretary of State to mandate that all new all-terrain vehicles such as quad bikes come equipped with immobilisers and forensic marking before sale. The measures aim to make stolen equipment less attractive to thieves and easier to trace. The Act could make a real and meaningful difference to the issues we are debating here. It received Royal Assent and is designed to deter theft and facilitate the recovery of stolen equipment. I would be grateful if the Minister could comment on the progress of enacting the measures set out in that Act.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I would be happy to do so, but first I must say how grateful I am to the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset and to the hon. Member for Stockton West for setting out the rationale behind these new clauses.

New clause 13 seeks to extend the scope of the 2023 Act to include the theft of GPS equipment. Such equipment is often used in agricultural and commercial settings. We know the significant impact of thefts of agricultural machinery, in particular all-terrain vehicles, on individuals and businesses in rural areas, and the disruption to essential farming when these thefts occur. That is why we are committed to implementing the 2023 Act to help prevent the theft and resale of high-value equipment. We intend to introduce the necessary secondary legislation later this year, and we will be publishing the Government’s response to the call for evidence soon to confirm the scope of that legislation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Luke Taylor]

The premise of the Minister’s point is effectively that sufficient legislation is already in place to combat these crimes. The response to an freedom of information request that I submitted to the Met police showed that in London, in the last five years, nine in 10 tool thefts went unsolved. The fact that that failure has been allowed to continue under the existing legislation suggests that legislation is not sufficient. I support the proposed new clauses because something needs to change to stop these incredibly damaging crimes, which are affecting not just the livelihoods, but the mental health of our valuable, essential tradespeople and their families.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I welcome that comment from the Liberal Democrat spokesperson. I and this Government recognise that theft is a crime, and that victims are immensely impacted by it—we heard earlier about the hon. Member’s own circumstances—but the legislation is adequate. As I have already said, we have robust legislation to tackle these crimes. What has been apparent over the last 14 years is a decimation of our public services, including our policing, which has meant that police do not have the resources that they need to investigate these crimes effectively. I am glad to say that this Government are changing that by recruiting and funding more police officers, including for the Met police, to ensure that we have the police to go after these criminals.

[Luke Taylor]

The Minister has set me up nicely with that point, and I will come back to it later. The Met police are going to reduce their staff—including officers and police community support officers—by 1,700 next year. The Government are attempting to present a case that the legislation is sufficient at present, and that they are providing more officers and resources to police forces to combat the increase in these crimes. Whoever’s fault it was—and we all make points about the cause, the cuts, when the cuts started, and what conditions were prior to them—if the Met police will suffer the loss of 1,700 officers next year due to the funding situation, and the legislation is currently letting down tradespeople, I would gently push back that either the measures in the legislation or the resources are insufficient to solve an issue that we all generally agree exists today.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

The Policing Minister assures me that that figure for the number of cuts being made by the Met police is not correct. We are happy to debate that. I and this Government are still sufficiently certain that the legislation is robust in this area. We can debate the means that we have to tackle that but, as I have stated, this Government are funding more police resources to ensure that those who commit these crimes are being sought. In an earlier sitting of the Committee, we debated why it is so important to clarify and get right provisions for shop theft, so that the police have adequate equipment and resources to go after the perpetrators. These thefts are illegal but, for whatever reason, the crimes are not being pursued. We are determined to ensure, through our safer streets mission, that that problem is tackled, but the legislation that we have in place is robust.

Regarding the courts and the justice system, the Government do consider that the courts are already considering the impacts of such crimes when sentencing. The addition of the measures in the proposed new clauses would add unnecessary complications to the sentencing framework. Moreover, sentencing in individual cases should as far as possible be at the discretion of our independent judiciary, to ensure that sentences are fair, impartial and proportionate.

Finally, as I have already set out, any changes to the sentencing framework should take into account the sentencing review’s recommendations, which are due to be published shortly.

On new clause 98, I understand the frustration that many individuals feel when they see stolen equipment being sold at car boot sales and other informal markets. I reassure the shadow Minister that the Government take this issue seriously. However, we cannot support the clause in the absence of further policy work and engagement with relevant authorities to explore the best way to ensure that stolen equipment is not sold in informal market settings or at car boot sales.

Overall, I am sympathetic to the spirit of the new clauses, but I do not believe them to be necessary at this time. I reassure the Committee that this Government are fully committed to implementing the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023 to tackle the theft and resale of equipment.

[Matt Vickers]

Can I take it that there is a commitment to doing something to clamp down on the situation with temporary markets and car boot sales? Also, will the Minister meet with Shoaib Awan, the gas fitter who has been campaigning on the issue, to discuss what that might look like and to hear the sector’s frustrations?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Yes, we are happy to meet with Shoaib Awan to discuss this, and yes, we have a commitment to looking at the situation more widely and at the issue directly. As someone who loves a car boot sale, I am keen to explore the question further.

I ask the shadow Minister to be patient for a little while longer as we finalise our plans for the implementation of the 2023 Act, and as we look into the issues in more detail to get the policy work right. On that basis, I ask hon. Members not to press their new clauses.

[Anna Sabine]

I seek a quick clarification from the Minister. Was she saying that under the plans to implement the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act, there may be scope within some secondary legislation to look at GPS thefts specifically? Did I understand that correctly?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Yes.

[Luke Taylor]

I rise to speak in support of new clause 13, as well as Conservative new clauses 27, 96 and 98. We had a long discussion on this issue, but it is worth repeating as often as possible that tool theft is a devastating crime that cost tradespeople more than £94 million last year.

Research from NFU Mutual shows that one in three tradespeople now live in constant fear of violent thieves. Some have been attacked with crowbars and other weapons just for trying to protect their tools from being ripped out of their vans. At the February rally in Parliament Square organised by Trades United, I heard from campaigners about tradespeople not letting their vehicles out of their sight, and about thieves cutting off the roofs of their vans to steal tools. It was heartbreaking. We hear about the impact on those tradespeople and their families, including suicides and mental health problems.

Despite the back and forth, I think we should make it absolutely clear that this issue needs to be addressed, and that powers must be given to the police and courts to treat it with the seriousness that it deserves. Tool theft is more than just standard assault or theft; it is an assault on tradespeople’s hard work and their livelihoods. It is time to acknowledge that danger to their entire livelihoods and lifestyles.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I thank the hon. Member for Stockton West for tabling new clause 33.

It might be helpful for hon. Members if I briefly explain how the Criminal Damage Act 1971 works. The Act criminalises a range of activities, but the offence we are focused on today is the act of destroying or damaging property belonging to another without lawful excuse. “Lawful excuse” is not defined. However, section 5(2)(a) makes it clear that if the defendant honestly believes that the person who was entitled to consent to the destruction or damage has given consent, or would have consented if they knew of the circumstances, the defendant has a lawful excuse. For example, it could be said that someone has a lawful excuse if the owner of a car would have consented to their damaging it to help a person who was trapped in it to get out.

Additionally, under section 5(2)(b) of the 1971 Act, if the defendant damages property to protect their own or someone else’s property, and they honestly believe both that the property needs immediate protection and that their actions are reasonable, they have a lawful excuse. Section 5(3), to which the new clause relates, specifies that it does not matter whether a person’s belief is reasonable or justified. It just needs to be honest, even if it is an honest belief induced by intoxication, stupidity or forgetfulness.

The new clause seeks to change the law so that where a defendant seeks to rely on belief in consent, or belief in the necessity of protecting property as a lawful excuse for criminal damage, their belief must be “reasonable” as well as honest. This would narrow the application of the defence, and we consider doing so unnecessary. The law is already designed to strike the right balance and ensure that a wide variety of factors are taken into account, without widening the law too far.

For example, if a defendant tries to argue that a person would have consented to the damage of their property if they had known the circumstances, they need to demonstrate how that relates specifically to the damage caused. Some assessment of the wider context will be necessary to determine whether someone has a lawful excuse.

Recent cases involving damage to property following protests have also interpreted the operation of this defence narrowly. For example, acting in furtherance of a protest cannot be used as a lawful excuse where the damage caused is more than minimal for public property. We cannot see any evidence or rationale that suggests that the defence is being used in spurious contexts or abused in any way. Of course, if the hon. Member has specific evidence or examples, we would, of course, consider them. Until then, there is no justification or need to restrict the operation of the defence further. For that reason, I urge him to withdraw the new clause.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

Crime and Policing Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Alex Davies-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 8th May 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment 82.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Pritchard. No pedestrian or other road user should ever feel unsafe. Their safety is a priority for this Government and I know that such sentiments will be shared across the House. Like all other road users, cyclists are required to comply with road traffic law in the interests of the safety of other road users, and that is reflected in the highway code. There are already existing offences within the Road Traffic Act 1988 to prohibit dangerous and careless cycling, which carry a maximum penalty of £2,500 and a £1,000 fine respectively.

In rare, tragic cases that have occurred in recent years, where there has been a death or serious injury caused by a cyclist, the drawbacks of relying on the current offences—notably, the Offences against the Person Act 1861—have been clear. Unlike the penalties available for motoring offences that have the same tragic outcome, that offence carries a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment. The Government do not believe that those current penalties are appropriate in cases where a cyclist’s behaviour is dangerous or careless and results in the death or serious injury of another person.

Therefore, new clause 87 introduces new offences of causing death or serious injury by dangerous or careless cycling, making our streets safer for pedestrians and other road users. Those causing death by dangerous cycling or careless cycling will face a maximum penalty of life imprisonment or five years’ imprisonment respectively. Those who cause serious injury will face a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment or two years’ imprisonment respectively. Government amendment 82 extends these new offences to England, Wales and Scotland.

These penalties ensure that there is parity across the existing framework of motoring-related offences. All road users, whether they are drivers or cyclists, whose behaviour results in the death or serious injury of another road user will face the same penalties. To be clear, it is not our intention to discourage cycling; it is one of this Government’s broader objectives to promote cycling for its health, economic and environmental benefits. However, while the majority of cyclists are responsible and cycle safely, there are rare instances where victims have been seriously or fatally injured by irresponsible and dangerous cyclist behaviour. As a result, these offences will ensure that people who cause serious or fatal harm because of their reckless cycling behaviour are subject to appropriate punishment.

Before commending these measures to the Committee, I pay personal tribute to the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), and to Matthew Briggs, who have campaigned tirelessly for these changes. I had the privilege of meeting Matthew Briggs. We discussed the need for this new offence, and how the devastating impact of the death of his wife Kim in 2016, due to a reckless cyclist, shows the need to create these new offences. For that reason, I commend these measures to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful for the short speech that my hon. Friend the Member for Southend West and Leigh just made. He has spoken to me about the events in Westcliff-on-Sea and their impact on that community. I was also grateful to the shadow Minister for referencing that incident, because it sets out clearly why the provision in new clause 88 is necessary. I welcome that.

The shadow Minister asked whether we will stop legitimate protests, and somehow put the right to religious worship above the right to protest. I want to make it clear that the new clause does not place the freedom of religion above the right to protest. I think we all agree that the right to protest is an important part of our democracy. The new clause seeks to balance those rights by ensuring that protesters do not unduly intimidate or prevent individuals from accessing places of worship.

Although the right to protest remains key and fundamental, the provisions in the new clause clarify police powers to manage those protests near places of worship, ensuring that the freedom of religion is protected without imposing a blanket restriction on demonstrations. The intent is not to curtail protest rights, but to prevent situations where protests create a hostile environment that discourages religious observance. It is important to note that it applies equally to all faiths and all places of worship, not just, as we started off talking about, a specific religious group.

The shadow Minister raised the resource implications for BTP and MDP. The request to bring forward the provisions was because of the operational needs of those police forces. I am expect that they will be able to deal with any costs arising from new clause 90 from their existing budget. The shadow Minister also mentioned training and making sure that police officers understood the introduction of these provisions. I am sure he agrees that there is extensive training of police officers. With public order in particular, we know that there is a very well-worn path of how officers are trained at the right level, depending on the situation.

I recently had the pleasure of meeting Metropolitan police officers, who do a lot of public order work, down at Gravesend to see that training first hand, and I saw the amount of resource that goes in to ensuring that those officers are equipped and know their rights and how most effectively to use them. The new provisions will be part of the continuation of that training for police officers, alongside the work of the College of Policing. On that basis, I commend them to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 88 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 89

Powers of senior officers to impose conditions on protests

“(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 12 (imposing conditions on public processions)—

(a) in subsection (1), for ‘the’, in the first place it occurs, substitute ‘a’;

(b) in subsection (2)—

(i) in the words before paragraph (a) omit ‘the’;

(ii) in paragraph (a) for the words from ‘, the most’ to the end substitute ‘—

(i) the most senior in rank of the police officers present at the scene, or

(ii) in the case of a procession in England and Wales, a police officer authorised by a chief officer of police for the purposes of this subsection, and’.

(3) In section 14 (imposing conditions on public assemblies)—

(a) in subsection (1), for ‘the’, in the first place it occurs, substitute ‘a’;

(b) in subsection (2)—

(i) in the words before paragraph (a) omit ‘the’;

(ii) in paragraph (a) for the words from ‘, the most” to the end substitute ‘—

(i) the most senior in rank of the police officers present at the scene, or

(ii) in the case of an assembly in England and Wales, a police officer authorised by a chief officer of police for the purposes of this subsection, and’;

(c) in subsection (2ZB), for ‘reference in subsection (2)(b) to a chief officer of police includes’, substitute ‘references in subsection (2) to a chief officer of police include’.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause allows the powers in sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 to impose conditions on public processions and public assemblies to be exercised by a police officer authorised to do so by a chief officer of police.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 90

Amendments relating to British Transport Police and Ministry of Defence Police

“(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) and (3).

(2) In section 14A(9) (prohibiting trespassory assemblies), in the definition of ‘land’, after ‘“land”’ insert ‘, except in subsections (4A) to (4C) of this section,’.

(3) In section 16 (interpretation), in the definition of ‘public assembly’, for the words from ‘wholly’ to the end substitute ‘—

(a) wholly or partly open to the air, or

(b) within any of paragraphs (a) to (f) of section 31(1) of the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003;’.

(4) The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 is amended in accordance with subsections (5) and (6).

(5) In section 60 (powers to stop and search in anticipation of or after violence), after subsection (9A) insert—

‘(9B) So far as they relate to an authorisation by a member of the Ministry of Defence Police—

(a) subsections (1) and (9) have effect as if the references to a locality in a police area were references to a place in England and Wales among those specified in section 2(2) of the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987, and

(b) subsection (1)(aa)(i) has effect as if the reference to a police area were a reference to the places in England and Wales specified in section 2(2) of the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987.’

(6) In section 60AA (powers to require removal of disguises)—

(a) for subsection (8) substitute—

‘(8) So far as subsections (1), (3) and (6) relate to an authorisation by a member of the British Transport Police Force, those subsections have effect as if the references to a locality or a locality in a a police area were references to a place in England and Wales among those specified in section 31(1)(a) to (f) of the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003.

(8A) So far as subsections (1), (3) and (6) relate to an authorisation by a member of the Ministry of Defence Police, those subsections have effect as if the references to a locality or a locality in a police area were references to a place in England and Wales among those specified in section 2(2) of the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987.’;

(b) in subsection (9) omit ‘and “policed premises” each’.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause extends certain powers under Part 2 of the Public Order Act 1986 to land which is not open to the air; allows Ministry of Defence Police to issue authorisations under section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994; and allows British Transport Police and Ministry of Defence Police to issue authorisations under section 60AA of that Act.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 91

Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences

“(1) This section applies where in criminal proceedings in a court in England and Wales, or in proceedings (anywhere) before a service court, a person (‘D’) is charged with a qualifying offence.

(2) An offence is a ‘qualifying offence’ if—

(a) it is alleged to have been committed by D acting in the exercise of functions as an authorised firearms officer,

(b) the conduct alleged to constitute the offence involved the use by D of a lethal barrelled weapon to discharge a conventional round, and

(c) D was, at the time of the alleged offence, authorised by the relevant authority to use that weapon with that round.

(3) The court must—

(a) cause the following information to be withheld from the public in proceedings before the court, in each case unless satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so—

(i) D’s name;

(ii) D’s address;

(iii) D’s date of birth;

(b) give a reporting direction (see section (Authorised firearms officers: reporting directions)) in respect of D (if one does not already have effect), unless satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so.

(4) The court may, if satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so, make an anonymity order (see section (Authorised firearms officers: anonymity orders)) in respect of D.

(5) If D is convicted of the offence—

(a) subsections (3) and (4) cease to apply in respect of D, and

(b) any restriction put in place under subsection (3)(a) and any reporting direction given, or anonymity order made, under this section in respect of D cease to have effect at the time D is sentenced for the offence.

(6) In subsection (1), ‘authorised firearms officer’ means—

(a) a member of a relevant police force who is authorised by the relevant chief officer to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round in the exercise of functions as a constable,

(b) a National Crime Agency officer who is authorised by the Director General of the National Crime Agency to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round in the exercise of functions as a National Crime Agency officer,

(c) a member of the Police Service of Scotland or the Police Service of Northern Ireland who—

(i) is provided under section 98 of the Police Act 1996 for the assistance of a police force in England and Wales, and

(ii) is authorised by the relevant authority to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round in the exercise of functions as a constable, or

(d) a member of the armed forces who—

(i) is deployed in support of a relevant police force or the National Crime Agency, and

(ii) is authorised by the Secretary of State to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round for the purposes of that deployment.

(7) In this section—

‘conventional round’ means any shot, bullet or other missile other than one designed to be used without its use giving rise to a substantial risk of causing death or serious injury;

‘lethal barrelled weapon’ has the meaning given by section 57(1B) of the Firearms Act 1968;

‘member of the armed forces’ means a person who is subject to service law (see section 367 of the Armed Forces Act 2006);

‘relevant authority’ means—

(a) in relation to a member of a relevant police force, the relevant chief officer;

(b) in relation to a National Crime Agency officer, the Director General of the National Crime Agency;

(c) in relation to a member of the Police Service of Scotland, the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland;

(d) in relation to a member of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland;

(e) in relation to a member of the armed forces, the Secretary of State;

‘relevant chief officer’ means—

(a) in relation to a police force in England and Wales, the chief officer of police of that police force;

(b) in relation to the British Transport Police Force, the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force;

(c) in relation to the Ministry of Defence Police, the Chief Constable of the Ministry of Defence Police;

(d) in relation to the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, the Chief Constable of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary;

‘relevant police force’ means—

(a) a police force in England and Wales,

(b) the British Transport Police Force,

(c) the Ministry of Defence Police, or

(d) the Civil Nuclear Constabulary;

‘service court’ means—

(a) the Court Martial, or

(b) the Court Martial Appeal Court.

(8) This section does not apply in relation to proceedings begun before the coming into force of this section.”.—(Alex Davies-Jones.)

This new clause provides for a presumption of anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with (but not convicted of) an offence relating to the discharge of their firearm in the course of their duties

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government new clause 92—Anonymity for authorised firearms officers appealing convictions for qualifying offences.

Government new clause 93—Authorised firearms officers: reporting directions.

Government new clause 94—Authorised firearms officers: anonymity orders.

Government amendment 83.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Currently, in criminal courts, adult defendants do not have a general right to anonymity, which reflects the principle of open justice. However, judges may impose reporting restrictions where the disclosure of identifying information could hinder the administration of justice, or impact fair trial rights. Armed police officers perform a unique and dangerous role. They are trained to use lethal force on behalf of the state to protect the lives of our citizens. Their work requires them to confront situations that demand split-second decisions that can have profound legal and personal ramifications. They respond to major crimes involving high-risk individuals, often linked to organised crime groups. That inherently dangerous role naturally increases the risk of retribution for both officers and their families, which was a risk highlighted by the police accountability review.

The Government’s plan to introduce the measures set out in new clauses 91 to 94 was originally announced to the House by my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary on 23 October. The proposed new clauses address specific concerns raised during the police accountability review, and following the trial of Sergeant Martyn Blake. They will help deliver our commitment to rebuild the confidence of police officers in their vital work to keep the public safe.

Proposed new clause 91 creates a presumption of anonymity for firearms officers who are charged with offences related to the discharge of their weapon during their official duties. That presumption does not extend to other police officers who use force in their duties or to firearms officers if force is used in the line of duty that does not involve discharging a firearm. The starting point for the court will be that anonymity should be granted in these cases, and that such anonymity will remain in place until the defendant is sentenced.

New clause 91 requires that the court must withhold identifying details from the public during proceedings and give a “reporting direction”. The terms of the reporting direction are set out in new clause 93 and prevent the publication of any material that may lead to the identification of the defendant. New clause 91 also gives the courts statutory powers to ensure that the defendant’s identity is protected in the courtroom, if it is

“in the interests of justice to do so”.

New clause 94 sets out the types of measures that can be used, such as screens or voice modulation. It will be for the court to decide whether these are required.

Judicial discretion is preserved under the new provisions, which enable courts to disclose identifying details or lift reporting restrictions, where considered necessary, taking into account the specific circumstances of the case and the overall interests of justice.

New clause 92 provides courts with the statutory authority to extend in-court anonymity measures and reporting restrictions beyond sentencing, should the defendant wish to appeal their conviction. However, it does not establish a presumption, nor does it apply if a firearms officer convicted of an offence seeks only to appeal their sentence. When a firearms officer is convicted, their right to anonymity ceases at the point of sentencing. However, the court may order that anonymity continues pending the outcome of an appeal. If the conviction is upheld on appeal, the right to anonymity will cease upon the finalisation of that appeal.

Conversely, when an officer is exonerated, their right to anonymity will continue, allowing them to resume their professional and personal lives without fear of stigma or threats to their safety. Ensuring national safety and security is a top priority for this Government and the role of firearms officers is essential to achieving that. They serve in their difficult and demanding role voluntarily and we cannot expect them to perform their duties effectively without providing adequate safeguards to protect them and their families. Amendment 83 provides for the new clauses to come into force two months after the Bill is passed. I commend the new clauses, and the amendment, to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Government new clauses 91 to 94 provide anonymity protections for authorised firearms officers in legal proceedings involving qualifying offences. New clause 91 ensures that officers charged with offences related to their authorised use of lethal weapons discharging a conventional round will have their personal details withheld and reporting directions issued, unless contrary to justice. Such measures would protect them from public scrutiny and potential threats during sensitive investigations. They would foster officers’ confidence in performing high-risk duties because they would be shielded from premature exposure before conviction.

Government new clause 92 extends the protections to convicted officers, pending appeals. That would allow courts to maintain anonymity if necessary for justice, and would support fair appeal processes by preventing irreversible reputational damage if convictions are overturned.

Government new clauses 93 and 94 provide clear mechanisms for reporting directions and anonymity orders to enforce the protections, while ensuring that judges and juries retain access to the officer’s identity. That balances transparency with safety. As the Minister has said, Members will be all too aware of the case of Sergeant Martyn Blake, who was acquitted in October 2024 of murdering Chris Kaba after a 2022 shooting in London. Blake faced death threats, including a £10,000 bounty, forcing him into hiding and highlighting the need for anonymity to protect officers and their families from retribution during trials.

These measures will help to ensure that officers who act in good faith under dangerous circumstances are protected from such vindictive attacks while the judicial process is under way—as well as ensuring recruitment and retention in firearms roles, and public safety—while also allowing the courts to lift protections when justice demands. Will the Minister comment further on how the Government will ensure that courts balance anonymity protections with the public interest in transparent justice? In particular, what guidance will be provided to courts to assess when anonymity is contrary to the interests of justice?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I welcome the tone in which the Opposition spokesperson has presented his comments and the fact that he shares our concern about the need for these new measures. Judges will of course have all relevant information in balancing the need for open justice with the need to protect firearms officers in these specific instances. The measures recognise the exceptional circumstances of defendants in such cases and create a presumption of anonymity. The starting point for the courts will be that anonymity should be granted in such cases, unless it is contrary to justice to do so.

Let me add that open justice and the freedom of the press to report on these cases continue to be important principles of our justice system, and this legislation will respect those key principles. A court may already order anonymity measures or reporting restrictions in a case where it judges that disclosure of a defendant’s identity would give rise to a real and immediate risk to life. The measure is being introduced in recognition of the unique responsibilities that firearms officers have, as I have said, and the potential risks associated with their identification during court proceedings. It is really important that judges and the courts get the balance right here, but this measure is absolutely necessary.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 91 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 92

Anonymity for authorised firearms officers appealing convictions for qualifying offences

“(1) This section applies where a person (‘D’) is convicted of a qualifying offence in proceedings in a court in England and Wales, or proceedings (anywhere) before a service court.

(2) The court by or before which D is convicted may, if satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so—

(a) cause any or all of the information mentioned in section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences)(3)(a)(i) to (iii) to be withheld from the public in proceedings before the court;

(b) give a reporting direction in respect of D (see section (Authorised firearms officers: reporting directions));

(c) make an anonymity order in respect of D (see (Authorised firearms officers: anonymity orders)).

(3) Any reporting direction given, or anonymity order made, under subsection (2) ceases to have effect at the end of the appeal period unless, before the end of that period, D brings an appeal against the conviction.

(4) Where, before the end of the appeal period, D brings an appeal against the conviction, the court dealing with the appeal may, if satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so—

(a) cause any or all of the information mentioned in section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences)(3)(a)(i) to (iii) to be withheld from the public in proceedings before the court;

(b) give a reporting direction in respect of D;

(c) make an anonymity order in respect of D.

(5) The court dealing with the appeal must at the earliest opportunity determine the issue of whether to exercise any or all of the powers under subsection (4).

(6) Any reporting direction given, or anonymity order made, under subsection (2) ceases to have effect upon the making of the determination mentioned in subsection (5) (whether or not the court dealing with the appeal gives a direction or makes an order).

(7) Any reporting direction given, or anonymity order made, under subsection (4) ceases to have effect if the appeal against conviction is abandoned or dismissed.

(8) In this section—

‘appeal period’ in relation to a person convicted of a qualifying offence, means the period allowed for bringing an appeal against that conviction, disregarding the possibility of an appeal out of time with permission;

‘qualifying offence’ has the meaning given by section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences)(2).

(9) This section does not apply where the proceedings in which D was convicted were begun before the coming into force of section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences).”—(Alex Davies-Jones.)

This new clause, which is related to NC91, provides courts with a power to preserve the anonymity of authorised firearms officers convicted of an offence relating to the discharge of their firearm in the course of their duties, pending any appeal against that conviction.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 93

Authorised firearms officers: reporting directions

“(1) A reporting direction, in relation to a person (‘D’) charged with (or convicted of) a qualifying offence, is a direction that no matter relating to D may be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify D as a person who is, or was, alleged to have committed (or who has been convicted of) the offence.

(2) The matters relating to D in relation to which the restrictions imposed by a reporting direction apply (if their inclusion in any publication is likely to have the result mentioned in subsection (1)) include in particular—

(a) D’s name,

(b) D’s address,

(c) the identity of any place at which D works, and

(d) any still or moving image of D.

(3) A relevant court may by direction (‘an excepting direction’) dispense, to any extent specified in the excepting direction, with the restrictions imposed by a reporting direction if satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so.

(4) An excepting direction—

(a) may be given at the time the reporting direction is given or subsequently;

(b) may be varied or revoked by a relevant court.

(5) A reporting direction has effect—

(a) for a fixed period specified in the direction, or

(b) indefinitely,

but this is subject to subsection (5)(b) of section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences) and subsections (3), (6) and (7) of section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers appealing convictions for qualifying offences).

(6) A reporting direction may be revoked if a relevant court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so.

(7) In this section—

‘publication’ has the same meaning as in Part 2 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (see section 63 of that Act);

‘qualifying offence’ has the meaning given by section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences)(2);

‘relevant court’, in relation to a reporting direction, means—

(a) the court that gave the direction,

(b) the court (if different) that is currently dealing, or that last dealt, with the proceedings in which the direction was given, or

(c) any court dealing with an appeal (including an appeal by way of case stated) arising out of the proceedings in which the direction was given or with any further appeal.”—(Alex Davies-Jones.)

This new clause, which supplements NC91 and NC92, makes provision about reporting directions that may be given under either of those new clauses.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 94

Authorised firearms officers: anonymity orders

“(1) An anonymity order, in relation to a person (‘D’) charged with (or convicted of) a qualifying offence, is an order made by a court that requires specified measures to be taken in relation to D to ensure that the identity of D is withheld from the public in proceedings before the court.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the kinds of measures that may be required to be taken in relation to D include measures for securing one or more of the following—

(a) that identifying details relating to D be withheld from the public in proceedings before the court;

(b) that D is screened to any specified extent;

(c) that D’s voice is subjected to modulation to any specified extent.

(3) An anonymity order may not require—

(a) D to be screened to such an extent that D cannot be seen by—

(i) the judge or other members of the court (if any), or

(ii) the jury (if there is one);

(b) D’s voice to be modulated to such an extent that D’s natural voice cannot be heard by any persons within paragraph (a)(i) or (ii).

(4) The court that made an anonymity order may vary or discharge the order if satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so.

(5) In this section—

‘qualifying offence’ has the meaning given by section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences)(2);

‘specified’ means specified in the anonymity order concerned.” —(Alex Davies-Jones.)

This new clause, which supplements NC91 and NC92, makes provision about anonymity orders that may be made under either of those new clauses.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 5

Pornographic content: online harmful content

“(1) A person commits an offence if they publish or allow or facilitate the publishing of pornographic content online which meets the criteria for harmful material under section 368E(3)(a) and section 368E(3)(b) of the Communications Act 2003.

(2) An individual guilty of an offence is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine or both.

(3) A person who is a UK national commits an offence under this section regardless of where the offence takes place.

(4) A person who is not a UK national commits an offence under this section if any part of the offence takes place in the UK.

(5) The platform on which material that violates the provisions in this section is published can be fined up to £18 million or 10 percent of their qualifying worldwide revenue, whichever is greater.

(6) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the Act receiving Royal Assent, make regulations appointing one or more public bodies (the appointed body) to monitor and enforce compliance by online platforms with this section.

(7) Regulations made under subsection 6 may provide the appointed body appointed by the Secretary of State with the powers, contained in sections 144 and 146 of the Online Safety Act 2023, to apply to the court for a Service Restriction Order or Access Restriction Order (or both).

(8) The appointed body must, within six months of being appointed by the Secretary of State, lay before Parliament a strategy for monitoring, and enforcing, compliance with the provisions in this section.

(9) The appointed body must lay before Parliament an annual report, outlining the enforcement activity undertaken in relation to this section.”—(Matt Vickers.)

This new clause extends safeguarding requirements for pornography distributed offline to pornography distributed online, making it an offence to publish online harmful material under section 368E(3)(a) and section 368E(3)(b) of the Communications Act 2003.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Matt Vickers]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Matt Vickers]

New clause 6 would introduce a safeguard to ensure that all individuals featured in pornographic content online were verified as adults. By requiring verification before content was created and before it was published, the new clause would strengthen protections against the inclusion of minors, whether through coercion, deception or manipulation, and ensure that no content involving under-age individuals was ever legally uploaded in the first place. This is a clear and necessary step to combat child sexual exploitation online, and one that aligns with wider public expectations about safety and decency on digital platforms.

My hon. Friend the Member for Reigate (Rebecca Paul) has raised this issue in the House on multiple occasions, reflecting deep concern over the ease with which harmful and unlawful content can slip through the cracks of unregulated online platforms. The new clause takes that concern seriously and would place a firm legal duty on content hosts to verify the age and consent of all individuals involved. It would shift the burden on to platforms—where it rightly belongs—to adopt robust age verification measures and uphold basic standards of safety and legality. The new clause would not only protect children from exploitation, but help to rebuild public trust in the digital environment by demonstrating that the law was keeping pace with technology.

The new clause’s suggestion that pornographic content can be uploaded without the age of the individuals involved being verified is very disturbing. I would be grateful if the Minister could comment on that and why she feels that the new clause might not be necessary. What is in place to prevent content featuring minors from being uploaded?

The pornography review led by Baroness Bertin has recommended that individuals who feature in pornography should have the right at any time to withdraw their consent to the continued publication of that content. The review states:

“Even if a performer or creator has provided consent for the initial recording and sharing of pornographic content, they should have every right to withdraw consent at a later point…and have that content removed.”

I am keen to hear the Minister’s view and, in particular, why she thinks that that recommendation is wrong.

New clause 51 seeks to update section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 by expanding the definition of extreme pornographic material to include depictions of non-fatal strangulation where it constitutes an act of battery and affects a person’s ability to breathe. The purpose of the new clause is to reflect growing concern from victims’ groups, criminal justice professionals and law enforcement about the increasing normalisation and distribution of such harmful content. Depictions of strangulation, even when simulated, have been linked to increased risk of real-world violence, especially against women. It has been suggested that strangulation is a strong predictor of future domestic homicide and normalising its portrayal in pornography risks reinforcing abusive behaviour.

Currently, the law prohibits extreme pornography that portrays serious injury or life-threatening acts. However, non-fatal strangulation, although deeply dangerous and traumatic, is not consistently covered by the existing legal framework. The new clause would close that gap by providing clarity to police and prosecutors and sending a clear message that depictions of life-threatening violence for sexual gratification are unacceptable. By targeting depictions in which the act affects a person’s ability to breathe and amounts to battery, the new clause is narrowly focused to avoid capturing consensual and legal adult activity while still addressing that which represents serious harm. It would bring the law into line with recent legislative steps such as the introduction of the offence of non-fatal strangulation in the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, acknowledging the real risk and impact of that conduct. Ultimately, this change would strengthen protections for the public and uphold standards of decency, particularly in safeguarding against material that eroticises violence and coercion.

I do not wish to divide the Committee on new clause 6, but would like us to divide on new clause 51, which I understand will be decided on later.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I want to make it very clear to hon. Members that I have immense sympathy for the sentiments behind all the new clauses in this group. All of us in the House wish to make society a safer place for women and girls. Indeed, this Government were elected with a commitment to halving violence against women and girls. I am sure we all agree that the fight against the proliferation of extreme pornography and access to harmful material is one step to achieving that goal, so before I respond to new clauses 5 to 7 and 51, I want to share a few thanks.

First, I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft (Jess Asato) for tabling new clauses 5 to 7 and for tirelessly campaigning to raise awareness of online harm. I also thank the hon. Member for Stockton West for tabling new clause 51. Importantly, I thank Baroness Bertin, whose independent report on pornography provides us with invaluable insight into pornography and online harm, which the Government continue to consider carefully. All the new clauses shed light on serious issues, and I welcome their being brought to the fore today.

New clause 5 aims to equalise the treatment of pornography regulation online and offline, by making legal but harmful content prohibited online. It seeks to give effect to a recommendation made by Baroness Bertin in her review, which makes the case for parity in the regulation of pornography online and offline. She recommends achieving that through either a new pornography code under the Online Safety Act 2023, or a publication offence, which would render illegal a variety of currently legal pornography content. That approach is similar to what new clause 5 aims to do.

Before I respond to the new clause, I will set out the current legislative framework. Both online and offline pornography is subject to criminal and regulatory legislation and enforcement. The Video Recordings Act 1984 makes it an offence to distribute pornography in a physical media format that has not been classified by the British Board of Film Classification. The BBFC will not classify any content in breach of criminal law or certain other types of pornography. Section 368E of the Communications Act 2003 builds on that framework by prohibiting on-demand programme services, such as ITVX or Prime Video, from showing “prohibited material”, which includes any video that has been refused classification certification by the BBFC and any material that would be refused a classification certificate if it were considered by the BBFC. That is enforced by Ofcom as a regulatory matter.

In addition, the Online Safety Act treats certain pornography or related material offences as priority offences, which means that user-to-user services must take proactive measures to remove extreme pornography, intimate image abuse and child sex abuse material from their platforms. The Act also places a duty on user-to-user service providers to take steps to prevent such material from appearing online in the first place. Those provisions apply to services even if the companies providing them are outside the UK, if they have links to the UK.

The criminal law also prohibits the possession of extreme pornography and the publication of obscene material, either online or offline. The Obscene Publications Act 1959 extends to the publication of obscene material other than pornography. The Video Recordings Act 1984, the Licensing Act 2003 and section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 criminalise the simple possession of extreme pornographic images.

New clause 5 would make the publication, or facilitation of publication, of such content online a criminal offence, with regulatory enforcement of the new criminal regime where the person publishing the content is an online platform. The criminal offence created by the new clause would rely on the definition in section 368E of the Communications Act 2003, which requires a judgment to be made about whether the BBFC would classify content that has not been subject to the classification process. Creating this style of criminal offence would require a clearer and more certain definition of such content, as any individual would need to be able to clearly understand what conduct may result in their conviction. Extensive further work would be needed to consider and define what currently legal online pornography cannot be published with sufficient certainty to ensure that any offence was enforceable and workable as intended.

New clause 6 also attempts to give effect to the recommendations made by Baroness Bertin in her review of pornography. It seeks to create additional requirements for websites hosting pornographic material to verify that all individuals featured were over 18 before the content was created, consented to the publication of the material, and are able to withdraw that consent at any time. It would further regulate the online pornography sector and create a new criminal offence for individuals who publish or facilitate the publishing of content online, where the age and valid consent of the individuals featured have not been verified. The underlying conduct depicted if a person is under 18 or non-consenting would include child sexual abuse, sexual assault, non-consensual intimate image abuse and potentially modern slavery offences.

The existing criminal law prohibits the creation, distribution and possession of child sexual abuse material, and the possession of extreme pornographic material, which includes non-consensual penetrative sexual acts. The law on the distribution of indecent images of children is very clear. Under the Protection of Children Act 1978, the UK has a strict prohibition on the taking, making, circulation and possession with a view to distribution of any indecent photograph or pseudo-photograph of a child under 18, and these offences carry a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment. Section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 also makes the simple possession of indecent photographs or pseudo-photographs of children an offence, which carries a maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment. In addition, all published material is subject to the Obscene Publications Act 1959.

Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Alex Davies-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 29th April 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair this afternoon, Ms Lewell. Clause 104 seeks to build on existing polygraph testing powers by making an express provision to enable the Secretary of State to impose mandatory polygraph testing as a licence condition for the most serious offenders who commit historic offences connected to terrorism, or who pose a risk of sexual offending.

Polygraph tests are used to monitor compliance with licence conditions. The information obtained from a test is used by probation practitioners to refine and strengthen risk management plans, thereby providing probation practitioners with additional risk-related information that they otherwise would not have known. Without this clause, these serious offenders would remain excluded from polygraph testing while on licence. Polygraph tests have been successfully used by the Probation Service in the management of sexual offenders since January 2014. Initially, it was as a successful pilot and later, a national programme. More recently, it was extended to terrorist offenders by the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021.

Subsection (3) of the clause extends eligibility for polygraph testing to offenders who have been convicted of murder and are assessed as posing a risk of sexual offending on release. It also extends to those who are serving multiple sentences alongside a sentence for a sex offence, to make sure that they can be polygraph tested for the duration of their licence.A gap in existing powers means that currently, for example, someone can be polygraph tested on licence when they have been convicted of rape, but if they have raped and murdered the victim, they are unlikely to be able to be polygraph tested because the sentence for rape is likely to have ended prior to their release on licence.

Subsections (4) to (8) of the clause extend polygraph testing to a cohort of individuals who committed a non-terrorism offence, such as conspiracy to murder, that would have been considered terrorist connected, but their offence was committed before the relevant legislation came into force enabling the court to make a formal determination of a terrorist connection.We refer to this cohort as historic terrorism-connected offenders. Following the changes introduced, where it is determined by the Secretary of State that an offence was an act of terrorism, took place in the course of an act of terrorism or was committed for the purposes of terrorism, individuals will become eligible to have the polygraph condition applied to their licence, subject to meeting the relevant policy criteria.

The polygraph testing licence condition is a vital tool for probation practitioners who are managing individuals who have been convicted of terrorism offences, yet it cannot currently be applied to historic terrorism-connected offenders. That means that polygraph is not available as a tool to manage the risk posed by this cohort, whereas it is available for an individual who commits the same offence today. The clause will therefore fill the gap in legislation and contribute to the consistent and effective risk management of historic terrorism-connected offenders in the community, seeking to close those small but significant operational gaps. Taken as a whole, clause 104 will ensure that polygraph testing can be used to strengthen the management of those who committed historic terrorism-related offences, and those who pose a risk of sexual offending.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 104 broadens the use of polygraph testing for offenders by amending the Offender Management Act 2007. It allows polygraph testing for individuals convicted of murder upon release if they pose a risk of committing a sexual offence, and are 18 or over. It also applies to offenders who have served time for a relevant sexual offence, provided they are 18 or older at release. Additionally, the definition of “relevant offence” is expanded to include terrorism-related offences, including those committed for terrorist purposes. The provision functions as a preventive safeguard.

Polygraph testing can act as a deterrent, encouraging compliance with licence conditions or reminding offenders that their conduct and disclosures will be monitored. That is especially significant where there are concerns about future harmful behaviour, even if the original offence did not relate to sexual offending. The clause provides tools to manage individuals involved in terrorism-related offences, helping authorities gather intelligence and make informed decisions on their supervision. It also promotes consistency and supervision, as polygraph conditions are already used for sexual and terrorist offenders, ensuring a balanced approach to risk management across high-risk groups.

What safeguards ensure that the Secretary of State’s discretion in determining risk is transparent and fair? Given that polygraph evidence is not admissible in trials, why is it being increasingly used as a post-sentence supervision condition? Will there be an independent review of its effectiveness in reducing reoffending among the newly included categories?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I thank the shadow Minister for his questions. He asked me about the basis of the Secretary of State’s decision; if a Secretary of State decides that, for the purpose of extending polygraph testing, an offence was an act of terrorism or was committed for the purpose of terrorism, but a court does not reach the same decision, the Secretary of State will review their decision in the light of the court’s findings. That is an important backstop. Guidance will be produced on the process of the Secretary of State designating terrorist connections and for the court for the different management changes in the Bill.

Polygraph testing is one of many tools available to the Probation Service when managing offenders in the community and when they are out on licence. It is not the only tool available in its arsenal to ensure the public are kept safe.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 104 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 105

Duty of offender to notify details

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

This clause will create a new duty on offenders serving a sentence in the community and supervised by probation or a youth offending team, requiring them to inform the responsible officer if they change their name, use a different name or change their contact information. I thank my very good friend, my hon. Friend the Member for Newport West and Islwyn (Ruth Jones), for her work in the previous Parliament on this issue, and I am delighted to be bringing forward this proposal.

The clause will improve the ability of probation and youth offending teams to monitor offenders in the community and will ensure that the public are protected. A significant number of offenders serve sentences in the community, and responsible officers must have the information that they need to keep tabs on those individuals, including if they change their name and contact information. The provisions in this clause are robust. Contact details can change for any reason, but the offender must report any difference from what is kept on file. The clause captures not just formal legal changes of name by deed poll but, for example, the use of an online alias.

We have a separate youth justice system, but it is equally important that services are able to maintain contact with children and have the right information about them to do their jobs. This policy therefore applies equally to offenders of all ages and will create consistency across offenders on licence and those serving sentences in the community, overseen by probation services or youth offending teams.

Probation and youth offending teams will have discretion about whether an offender is returned to court if they fail to comply with this requirement. It is right that the enforcement provisions for this clause are robust and reflect the seriousness of non-compliance. It is right that probation officers and youth offending teams have the same powers to deal with non-compliance with this duty as they have for any other case of non-compliance with a sentence requirement. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 105 requires certain offenders, including those under referral orders, youth rehabilitation orders, community orders and suspended sentence orders, to provide up-to-date contact information to relevant authorities. Offenders must notify their responsible officer or panel member of any changes in names, phone numbers or email addresses as soon as reasonably practicable after the relevant order is made or after they begin using new contact details. For youth offenders under referral orders, the clause adds a new section to the sentencing code, mandating them to inform a youth offending team member of any aliases and their current contact details as soon as reasonably practicable.

Similar requirements apply to offenders under future and existing orders. The overarching aim of the clause is to close a monitoring gap by ensuring that responsible authorities are kept fully informed of how to reach the offender. That is particularly important for managing compliance with rehabilitative requirements and preventing individuals from circumventing supervision through undisclosed identities or means of communication. Will the Minister clarify what threshold is intended by the term “reasonably practicable” in this context? Given that it is open to interpretation, will statutory guidance be issued to ensure consistent application by youth offender panels and responsible officers?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I thank the shadow Minister for his questions. We will of course ensure that guidance is available for this new measure. We will provide the responsible officers with all the tools they need to protect public safety, and ensure that they have all the relevant information available to manage offenders on licence in the community.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 105 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 106

Accelerated investigation procedure in respect of criminal conduct

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clauses 107 to 109 stand part.

New clause 23—Previous conduct as factor in deciding whether to investigate a complaint—

“(1) The Police Reform Act 2002 is amended as follows.

(2) In Schedule 3, paragraph 1(6B)(d), at end insert ‘or

(e) the complaint is made about a person serving with the police who has previous convictions or has had previous complaints made against them.’”

This new clause would make previous complaints or convictions a factor in determining how to handle a new complaint against a police officer.

New clause 31—Automatic dismissal of officers who fail vetting—

“(1) The Police Act 1996 is amended in accordance with subsection (2).

(2) In section 39A (Codes of practice for chief officers), after subsection (1) insert—

‘(1A) Without prejudice to subsection (1) and subject to subsection (1B), a code of practice may provide for an officer to be dismissed without notice where—

(a) the officer fails vetting, and

(b) it is not reasonable to expect that the officer will be capable of being deployed to full duties within a reasonable timeframe.

(1B) Subsection (1A) does not apply where a chief officer concludes that—

(a) the officer, notwithstanding his vetting failure, is capable of being deployed to a substantial majority of duties appropriate for an officer of his rank; and

(b) it would be disproportionate to the operational effectiveness of the force for the officer to be dismissed without notice.’”

This new clause would ensure police officers who failed their vetting can be dismissed.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss schedule 17.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

The clause will bring the offence of breaching a foreign travel restriction order, under paragraph 15 of schedule 5 to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, within scope of the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020, known as TORER.

TORER was emergency legislation passed in 2020 following the horrific terrorist attacks at Fishmongers’ Hall and in Streatham, committed by terrorist offenders on licence. TORER restricts the eligibility of terrorist prisoners for release on licence. It ended the automatic early release—in other words, release without Parole Board approval—of individuals who have committed a terrorist offence carrying a maximum penalty of more than two years’ imprisonment, and increased their release eligibility date from the halfway point of their sentence to the two-thirds point.

The offence of breaching a foreign travel restriction order is not currently covered by TORER, despite having a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment and being a terrorism-specific offence, and despite offences for breaching other terrorism-related orders being within scope of TORER. The clause will add breaching a foreign travel restriction order to TORER, ensuring greater consistency.

Since the introduction of TORER in 2020, a number of other changes have been made to the counter-terrorism legislative framework to strengthen the risk management of individuals who commit a terrorism offence carrying a maximum penalty of more than two years. We are seeking to apply those changes to this offence too, in order to ensure that consistency remains.

Specifically, we are ensuring that the offence of breaching a foreign travel restriction order is capable of attracting a sentence for offenders of particular concern, and the equivalent sentence in Northern Ireland and Scotland. We are also making the offender eligible for certain specialist management on licence, including eligibility for personal search conditions, which will be UK-wide, and a polygraph condition, which will be for England and Wales only. We will also ensure that the offence is incapable of being found by the court at the point of sentencing to have been committed with a terrorist connection, on the basis that it is in fact a terrorist offence. Given that the offence of breaching a foreign travel restriction order applies UK-wide, the clause also makes the equivalent changes for Scotland and Northern Ireland.

This change will ensure that sentencing and release arrangements are commensurate with the risk that the individual is considered to pose, and that eligibility for terrorism management conditions is consistent with other terrorist offences. I commend clause 125 and schedule 17 to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 125 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 126

Length of terrorism sentence with fixed licence period: Northern Ireland

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Clause 126 makes a minor amendment to ensure that sentencing for terrorist offenders in Northern Ireland remains consistent with that in England and Wales. The sentencing and release regime for terrorists who commit offences attracting a maximum penalty of more than two years’ imprisonment is designed to be consistent throughout the United Kingdom.

However, as currently drafted, the relevant legislation in Northern Ireland—the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008, and specifically article 15A—makes it possible for judges to hand down incommensurate sentences. The purpose of the amendment is to ensure consistency, so that where a sentencing court in Northern Ireland hands down such a sentence, known as the terrorism sentence with a fixed licence period, the length of the sentence is commensurate with the seriousness of the offending. That will then be comparable to the equivalent sentence in England and Wales, namely the sentence for offenders of particular concern.

Action is necessary to ensure consistency and fairness across UK jurisdictions. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 126 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedules 16 and 17 agreed to.

Clause 127

Implementation of international law enforcement information-sharing agreements

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 128 and 129 stand part.

Crime and Policing Bill (Eighth sitting)

Alex Davies-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th April 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)]

I beg to move amendment 14, in clause 42, page 46, line 31, at end insert—

“(7) In Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (offences to which defence in section 45 does not apply), in paragraph 33 (offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003), after the entry for section 10 insert—

‘section 11 (engaging in sexual activity in presence of child)’.”

This amendment excepts the offence of engaging in sexual activity in the presence of a child from the defence in section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell.

The clause makes a series of important changes to the existing criminal law by amending a number of serious sexual offences in the Sexual Offences Act 2003. Consequently, I am delighted to talk about the clause, to explain what it does and its importance, and to give a little of the interesting history behind the law in the area, which I hope will inform the Committee.

The key legislation, which we will debate throughout the passage of the Bill, is the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which followed a full and extensive consultation entitled, “Setting the Boundaries”, and significantly modernised and strengthened the laws on sexual offences in England and Wales, mainly to provide extra protection for children from sexual abuse and sexual exploitation. The 2003 Act amalgamated and replaced elements of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, the Indecency with Children Act 1960 and the Sex Offenders Act 1997.

The 2003 Act was the first major overhaul of sexual offences legislation for more than a century, and it set out a strong, clear and modern approach to this sensitive area of the law. The Act set clear limits and boundaries about behaviour with children, and reflects what we know today about the patterns and impact of sexual abuse in childhood. It was designed to meet the 21st-century challenges of protecting children, and applies to issues such as internet pornography and grooming children for sexual abuse. The Act also contained measures against abuse by people who work with children, and updated the laws on sexual abuse within families, acknowledging that children can be at risk from within families.

All those measures were designed to provide a clear and effective set of laws to deter and punish abusers, giving the police and the courts the up-to-date offences that they needed to do their job, while ensuring that children have the strongest possible protection under the law. The Act widened the definition of some offences —for example, bringing the non-consensual penile penetration of the mouth within the definition of rape under section 1 of the Act. It created new offences for behaviour that was not previously covered specifically by an offence—for example, the paying for the sexual service of a child and voyeurism. It also extended the age covered by certain offences against children from 16 to 18 and, importantly, gave additional protection to vulnerable adults. The Act provides rightly robust sentences that reflect the seriousness of the offending.

“Setting the Boundaries” was a groundbreaking review, covering some of the most heinous and disturbing areas of offending. The then Home Secretary, Jack Straw, who commissioned the review, stressed that point when he wrote in the review’s foreword:

“Rape and other sexual offences of all kinds are dreadful crimes which deeply affect the lives of victims and their families, and whole communities. Modernising and strengthening the law can make a direct contribution to our aim of creating a safe, just and tolerant society. We give particular priority to the protection of children, and welcome the emphasis the review has given to increasing this protection and also that of vulnerable people.”

He went on to say that he

“set up the review to consider the existing law on sex offences, and to make recommendations for clear and coherent offences that protect individuals, especially children and the more vulnerable, from abuse and exploitation, and enable abusers to be appropriately punished.”

The review’s

“recommendations also had to be fair and non-discriminatory in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act.”

Today, the Government remain of the view that our priority is to ensure that the public, including society’s most vulnerable, are given the full protection that the law is capable of offering. It is vital that society is protected from the scourge of sexual abuse, manipulation and exploitation in all of its forms. Children, of course, require additional protection from that awful offending. It is vital that we ensure that the criminal law is kept fully up to date in this area to ensure the safety of vulnerable young people.

With regards to children, the review itself acknowledged:

“The criminal law performs a vital role in society by setting standards of acceptable and unacceptable conduct. In making certain types of sexual behaviour criminal, the law provides protection, and supports and maintains the boundaries of acceptable behaviour in the family and community. Children need particular protection in the field of sexual relations because they are physically and emotionally dependent and not yet fully physically or psychologically mature. The law has long held that children are not, and should not, be able to consent to any form of sexual activity in the same way as adults.”

Indeed, the response to the review’s initial invitation to contribute ideas as of January 1999 overwhelmingly supported increasing the level of protection from sexual abuse available to children.

In addition, the review found that:

“The victims of sexual violence and coercion are mainly women. They must be offered protection and redress, and the law must ensure that male victims/survivors are protected too…The law must make special provision for those who are too young or otherwise not able to look after themselves and offer greater protection to children and vulnerable people within the looser structures of modern families.”

That still remains the case. We must continue to ensure that the criminal law keeps up to date with developments, and ensure that police, prosecutors and the courts are fully equipped to deal with this grave offending. We need to offer full protection to victims of such appalling abuse and exploitation.

The review recommended that as a matter of public policy the age of legal consent should remain at 16. However, to provide further protection for younger children, the review recommended that the law:

“setting out specific offences against children should state that below the age of 13 a child cannot effectively consent to sexual activity”.

As a result, the 2003 Act contains a range of offences that target specifically those who sexually abuse children under the age of 13 years. For example, sections 5 to 8 of the 2003 Act provide a range of offences capturing sexual activity with a child under 13, and it is very clear that consent in these offences is irrelevant. A child under 13 does not, under any circumstances, have the legal capacity to consent to any form of sexual activity.

Those under-13 offences overlap to a very significant extent with the child sex offences at sections 9 to 15 of the 2003 Act, which are designed to protect children under 16. This is to ensure that the criminal law provides the youngest and most vulnerable in society with protection from sexual abuse, and in doing so provides higher maximum sentences for these very serious offences. Under-13 offences are offences of strict liability as to age. The prosecution must prove only two facts: first, that there was intentional sexual activity, and secondly, the age of the complainant at the date of the sexual activity—for example, by a certified copy of a birth certificate, together with evidence of identity.

The principle of strict liability as to age for victims under 13 years old is reflected in the terms of other sexual offences in the 2003 Act. That includes section 11 of the Act, the offence of engaging in sexual activity with a child. That particular offence is one that will be directly amended and affected by provisions proposed in clause 42. While the 2003 Act—and the many amendments and additions to that legislation over the years, rightly championed by Members across this House—provided robust offences to deal with sexual abuse, we are introducing provisions to tighten up the law further to ensure additional protection for those who need it.

Broadly, we are amending and thereby strengthening the current suite of offences that apply where a person engages in sexual activity in the presence of a specified individual, for example child or, in certain circumstances, a person with a mental disorder. Our provisions will amend and toughen up the following offences in the Sexual Offences Act 2003: section 11, “Engaging in sexual activity in presence of child”; section 18, “Abuse of position of trust: sexual activity in presence of child”; section 32, “Engaging in sexual activity in presence of person with mental disorder impeding choice”; section 36, “Engaging in sexual activity in presence, procured by inducement, threat or deception, of person with mental disorder”; and section 40, “Care workers: sexual activity in presence of person with mental disorder”.

For example, it is currently a criminal offence under section 11 of the 2003 Act for a person, “A”, to intentionally engage in sexual activity to gain sexual gratification when a child under the age of 16, “B”, is present or is in a place from which A can be observed, but currently only when A knows or believes that B is aware—or intends that they be aware—that A is engaging in the sexual activity. This offence carries a maximum 10 years’ imprisonment and sexual offender management requirements. Significantly, this offence does not allow a defence of reasonable belief in age if the child is under 13.

The issue of concern here, and with the range of similar offences that I have listed, is the requirement that the defendant should know or believe that the victim is aware of his behaviour, or intend that the victim should be aware of the relevant activity. These requirements may initially appear reasonable. However, they mean this offence would not, for example, capture those who commit sexual activity in the presence of a child for sexual gratification, and who obtain such gratification from the presence of the child—even if the child is apparently unaware of the activity happening in their presence. If the defendant is performing a sexual act in the presence of a child who is asleep and gains sexual gratification from that mere presence, he cannot be charged under the existing section 11 offence; nor, for example, could he be charged for his behaviour if the child was pretending to be asleep—even pretending out of sheer terror—while aware of the appalling behaviour being carried out, if the defendant believed the child to be asleep and therefore unaware of what was going on.

I am sure hon. Members will agree that the criminal law being unable to prosecute such behaviour in this example scenario is unacceptable. The Government strongly believe this flaw must be rectified as a matter of urgency, to ensure that children and other specific groups of the most vulnerable in our society are protected by the criminal law and not denied justice should they become victims of such behaviour.

These amendments are not mere technicalities, nor are they addressing pseudo-philosophical “What if?” scenarios. They are a direct and swift response to concerns expressed by those on the frontline: the police, who have to come face-to-face with the consequences of this disturbing and damaging offending.

We have listened carefully to those on the frontline who are dealing with this awful behaviour. They have provided us with evidence of the difficulties in prosecuting a small number of nevertheless worrying cases, in which it was clear that the perpetrator engaged in the sexual activity because they obtained sexual gratification from a child’s mere presence, but where there was insufficient evidence that the perpetrator knew, believed, or intended that the child was aware of the sexual activity.

These things are happening now. Such offenders are slipping through the net. It may only be in small numbers, but that is irrelevant when dealing with this level of offending and exploitation. This disturbing, unpleasant and damaging behaviour must not go unchecked by the justice system or by the law. It must not go unpunished. Our provisions will ensure that the law is able to make sure that it does not.

We believe it is entirely wrong that, for example, a defendant masturbating while standing next to a child’s bed—to obtain sexual gratification from the child’s presence—cannot be convicted if they successfully argue they did not believe the child was aware of the sexual activity. In such a case we think it is entirely right that the person should be guilty of a criminal offence. We also want to ensure that these behaviours are capable of being prosecuted in future. This is not just to bring offenders to justice but, importantly, to be able to manage these sexual offenders when they are eventually released into the community, and to prevent further offending, where there is specifically potential for further sexual offences against children or vulnerable adults.

It is clear that some people may legitimately engage in sexual activity in the presence of a child—say a couple who live in a one-bedroom flat and by necessity have to sleep with a baby or very young child in the room. Others may have to have a young child in the room for the monitoring of health problems and so forth. We can all think of legitimate examples. I must make it clear that we do not want to criminalise those people who engage in sexual activity in the presence of a child but not for the purposes of obtaining sexual gratification from the child’s presence. In those circumstances, the presence of the child is purely incidental. We have deliberately drafted our provisions to ensure that those people will not be criminalised.

To exclude such behaviour from being captured within the relevant range of offences, we have retained the requirement for a direct link between the purpose of obtaining sexual gratification and the activity occurring in the child’s presence. I hope that that assures hon. Members that our provisions have been carefully crafted to rightly exclude those who may legitimately engage in sexual activity when a child is merely present. The Government’s intention with this clause is to capture the criminally culpable, not the innocent.

Government amendment 12 seems a relatively modest amendment but, again, it is an important one. It adds the offence of sexual activity in the presence of a child at section 11 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to schedule 4 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. The effect of this amendment is to thereby remove the section 11 offence from the ambit of the statutory criminal defence available at section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. I hope that I have convinced hon. Members of the importance of these provisions and of the necessity for swift action on our part.

Sexual offending, particularly against children and the most vulnerable, is a deeply distressing area of the law, and one that I know affects even legislators when considering reform, as we are today in this Committee. Over the years, the nature of sexual abuse, offending, manipulation and exploitation has changed, and it continues to change. Alongside the changing nature of offending, with which the law must keep up, gaps in the existing law are coming to light, highlighting those cases where serious offenders may be able to slip through the net of even the most well-intentioned and crafted drafting.

--- Later in debate ---

[Harriet Cross (Gordon and Buchan) (Con)]

As we have heard, clause 42 effectively incorporates provisions that had been included in the Criminal Justice Bill and is a key provision concerning sexual offences, specifically focusing on the offence of engaging in sexual activity in the presence of a child.

The clause makes an important amendment to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which forms a core legislative framework addressing sexual offences in the UK. In particular, clause 42 expands on the existing provisions to enhance the protection of children from sexual exploitation and harm.

Under the Sexual Offences Act, certain sexual offences are committed when a child is involved, such as sexual activity involving children, or causing or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity. However, one area that has been highlighted for reform involves situations where a child might be exposed to sexual activity in a way that, while not directly involving them in the act, still results in harm.

Prior to the introduction of clause 42, the law did not adequately address situations where a child was the passive observer of a sexual activity. For instance, in scenarios where an adult or adults engage in sexual activity with each other in the presence of a child, the law might not have captured this activity as an offence, despite the potential psychological harm to the child. Clause 42 seeks to close this gap by making it an offence for an adult to engage in sexual activity in the presence of a child. This means that any sexual activity taking place in the physical presence of a child, even if the child is not directly involved in the sexual conduct, could now result in criminal liability.

The clause expands the scope of existing sexual offence laws to include situations that may not necessarily involve the direct participation of the child, but still expose the child to inappropriate activity or material that could be damaging to their wellbeing.

Clause 42 also sees parallel offences involving sexual activity in the presence of a person with a mental disorder, impeding their choice, and similar provisions in the Sexual Offences Act. Those individuals, too, might not fully understand the sexual nature of what the offender is doing. Previously, there might have been the same issue with the law of requiring awareness. Clause 42 offers a broad safeguard for those who cannot consent or comprehend.

The clause seeks to offer further protection for children by recognising the potential harm caused by exposure to sexual activity, even if it is not directed at them. The law would now acknowledge that witnessing such an act could have a detrimental impact on the child’s emotional, physiological, psychological or developmental health.

Although we support the clause, I seek clarity from the Minister on a couple of points. In situations where sexual activity takes place in private or behind closed doors, it might be difficult to establish whether a child was present or the extent of their exposure to the activity. Proving the impact on the child could also be challenging, particularly where psychological harm or emotional distress is not immediately apparent. What discussions has the Minister had on that matter? I note that, as we have discussed a number of times today, Government amendment 14 carves out an important exception of the offence from the defence in section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

Clause 42 represents an important development in child protection law. At present, as the Minister has said, an offence is committed only where a person knows or believes that the child or person with a mental disorder is aware of the activity, or where a person intends that the child or person with a mental disorder be aware of the activity.

The provisions will amend these offences to capture situations where, for the purpose of sexual gratification, a person intentionally engages in sexual activity in the presence of a child, even if they do not intend for the child to be aware of the activity. The examples covered by this amendment are clearly heinous, and we welcome the clause.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I welcome the hon. Lady’s comments and the fact that the Opposition welcome the clause to close this loophole to protect children and the most vulnerable.

Hopefully I have outlined how we carefully crafted the clause to ensure that we do not capture those who innocently engage in sexual activity in the presence of a child, and not for the purposes of sexual gratification. We do not want to criminalise those who have to share a bedroom with a baby, a young child or somebody with a health condition, and are not seeking sexual gratification from engaging in sexual activity in the presence of a child. We have worked very closely with partners and stakeholders to ensure the law is crafted carefully so that we do not criminalise those people. The clause seeks to criminalise only those perpetrators who seek to gain sexual gratification from the presence of a child, whether the child knows or not.

I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.

Amendment 14 agreed to.

Clause 42, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 43

Child sex offences: grooming aggravating factor

[Harriet Cross]

I beg to move amendment 42, in clause 43, page 48, line 23, at end insert—

“70B Group-based sexual grooming of a child

(1) This section applies where—

(a) a court is considering the seriousness of a specified child sex offences,

(b) the offence is aggravated by group-based grooming, and

(c) the offender was aged 18 or over when the offence was committed.

(2) The court—

(a) must treat the fact that the offence is aggravated by group-based grooming as an aggravated factor, and

(b) must state in court that the offence is so aggravated.

(3) An offence is ‘aggravated by group-based grooming’ if—

(a) the offence was facilitated by, or involved, the offender, who was involved in group-based grooming, or

(b) the offence was facilitated by, or involved, a person other than the offender grooming a person under the age of 18 and the offender knew, or could have reasonably been expected to know that said person was participating, or facilitating group-based grooming, or

(c) the offender intentionally arranges or facilitates something that the offender intends to do, intends another person to do, or believes that another person will do, in order to participate in group-based grooming.

(4) In this section ‘specified child sex offence’ means—

(a) an offence within any of subsections (5) to (7), or

(b) an inchoate offence in relation to any such offence.

(5) An offence is within this subsection if it is—

(a) an offence under section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978 (taking etc indecent photograph of child),

(b) an offence under section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (possession of indecent photograph of child),

(c) an offence under any of sections 5 to 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape and other offences against children under 13),

(d) an offence under any sections 9 to 12 of that Act (other child sex offences),

(e) an offence under section 14 of that Act (arranging or facilitating commission of child sex offence),

(f) an offence under any of sections 16 to 19 of that Act (abuse of position of trust),

(g) an offence under section 25 or 26 of that Act (familial child sex offences), or

(h) an offence under any of sections 47 to 50 of that Act (sexual exploitation of children).

(6) An offence is within this subsection if it is—

(a) an offence under any of sections 1 to 4 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape, assault and causing sexual activity without consent),

(b) an offence under any of sections 30 to 41 of that Act (sexual offences relating to persons with mental disorder),

(c) an offence under any of sections 61 to 63 of that Act (preparatory offences), or

(d) an offence under any of sections 66 to 67A of that Act (exposure and voyeurism),

and the victim or intended victim was under the age of 18.

(7) An offence is within this subsection if it is an offence under section 71 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sexual activity in a public lavatory) and a person involved in the activity in question was under the age of 18.

(8) For the purposes of this section—

(a) ‘group-based grooming’ is defined as a group of at least three adults whose purpose or intention is to commit a sexual offence against the same victim or group of victims who are under 18, or could reasonably be expected to be under 18.”.

This amendment would introduce a specific aggravating factor in sentencing for those who participate in, or facilitate, group-based sexual offending.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I thank the Opposition Front Benchers for tabling amendment 42 and new clauses 47 to 49. I also thank hon. Members for their contributions to the debate—in particular, the hon. Member for Windsor, who gave a thoughtful contribution, and my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff West, a good friend who has worked his entire career to ensure that victims get the justice they deserve. His passionate contribution to the debate reminds us all exactly why we are here in this place: to deliver for victims of these heinous crimes, to make sure that the perpetrators receive the full force of the law, and to ensure that any gaps in legislation and recommendations of inquiries are followed through with. That is exactly what we are doing today.

Before I respond to the amendments, I will explain the rationale for clause 43. I am pleased to speak to it, and I know that its provisions have been welcomed by hon. Members across the House. In recent years, there have been a number of high-profile cases involving so-called grooming gangs—groups of offenders involved in heinous child sexual exploitation—including those in Rotherham, Telford, Newcastle, Rochdale and Oxford. In February 2022, the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse recommended

“the strengthening of the response of the criminal justice system by…amending the Sentencing Act 2020 to provide a mandatory aggravating factor in sentencing those convicted of offences relating to the sexual exploitation of children.”

The Government want to ensure that the sentencing framework reflects the seriousness of child sexual abuse and exploitation. In January, the Home Secretary committed to

“legislate to make grooming an aggravating factor in the sentencing of child sexual offences, because the punishment must fit the terrible crime”.—[Official Report, 6 January 2025; Vol. 759, c. 632.]

Clause 43 will require courts to consider grooming an aggravating factor when sentencing for specified child sex offences, including rape and sexual assault. It will capture offenders whose offending is facilitated by, or involves, the grooming of a person under 18. The grooming itself need not be sexual.

The measure will capture models of exploitation not currently directly addressed by existing culpability factors. It will create an obligation on courts to aggravate sentences where the offence has been facilitated by grooming undertaken by either the offender or a third party, for example where an offender assaults a victim who has been groomed by another member of a grooming gang. It will also capture instances where grooming is undertaken against a third party, for example where a victim has been groomed to recruit others.

The measure requires the courts to consider grooming an aggravating factor when sentencing in relation to any of the listed child sex offences. However, I must be clear that it will be in the court’s discretion to consider grooming an aggravating factor when sentencing for any offence, where it is relevant to the offending, regardless of the age of the victim.

I understand that the Opposition’s intention with their amendment 42 is to require courts to consider group-based grooming as a specific aggravating factor when sentencing sexual offences committed against children. Clause 43 already requires courts to consider grooming an aggravating factor when sentencing for specified child sex offences. This includes, but is not limited to, offences facilitated by or involving the group-based grooming of a child. An aggravating factor makes an offence more serious and must be considered by the court when deciding the length of the sentence.

The Sentencing Council’s overarching guidelines make

“offence committed as part of a group”

an aggravating factor. That means that, when sentencing for grooming gang offences, a court will be able to aggravate the offence to take into account the grooming behaviour, and then additionally aggravate the offence to take into account the fact that the offending was committed as part of a group. An aggravating factor for group-based grooming, as proposed in amendment 42, would be likely to have a more limited application, as the court could not apply the factor unless it was satisfied that the offender was a member of a group, which may be difficult to prove.

Clause 43 will go further than existing sentencing guidelines, by capturing models of group-based exploitation that are not currently directly addressed by grooming high-culpability factors. It will create an obligation on courts to aggravate sentences in instances where the offence has been facilitated by grooming undertaken by either the offender or a third party, for example where an offender assaults a victim who has been groomed by another member of a grooming gang or group. It will also capture instances where grooming is undertaken against a third party, for example where a victim has been groomed to recruit others. For that reason, I urge Opposition Members not to press amendment 42.

New clause 47 seeks to establish a statutory national inquiry into grooming gangs. It therefore seeks to revisit the questions considered by the seven-year-long independent inquiry into child sexual abuse. During the passage of the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill, the Opposition tabled similar amendments—maybe even identical ones—on the basis that the independent inquiry “barely touches on” grooming gangs.

IICSA, as is common practice for a public inquiry, involved a series of smaller inquiries and investigations of different strands. One of those inquiries was on child sexual exploitation by organised networks—the entire focus of that inquiry was grooming gangs. It took two years and reported three years ago, in February 2022. It is clear from cross-refencing new clause 47 with the scope of the previous investigations into grooming gangs that it seeks to revisit questions already examined by the inquiry. For example, subsection (2)(a) of the new clause seeks an inquiry into grooming gangs to

“identify common patterns of behaviour and offending”.

However, the scope of the previous grooming gangs inquiry states that it will investigate “the nature” of sexual exploitation by grooming gangs. I could go on and on.

If we continue to call for inquiry after inquiry along the same lines, we will undermine the whole system of public inquiries, including public trust in them and public tolerance for the resources of the state that they demand. Therefore, rather than engage in gesture politics by re-running inquiries without the evidence and data that we need, it makes sense to take the Government’s approach, with Baroness Louise Casey’s audit there to fill in the gaps that have already been identified by the previous inquiry. That audit is well under way, as we heard today in the Chamber from my hon. Friend the Safeguarding Minister, and it will report in due course.

The Government are also setting up a new victims and survivors panel, not just to guide Ministers on the design, delivery and implementation of the plans of IICSA, but to produce wider work on child sexual exploitation and abuse. Elsewhere in the Bill, we are making it mandatory to report child sexual abuse, and we will be making it an offence to prevent such reports from being made, as well as introducing further measures to tackle those organising online child sex abuse. As I have set out, we are legislating to make grooming an aggravating factor in sentencing for child sexual offences.

New clause 48 seeks to identify the ethnicity of members of grooming gangs and require regular reporting on the same. The 2022 inquiry into grooming gangs identified widespread failure to record the ethnicity of perpetrators and victims, and inconsistency of definitions in the data, which has meant that the limited research available relies on poor-quality data. The child sexual exploitation police taskforce already collects and publishes ethnicity data on group-based child sexual exploitation. However, we are committed to improving that data, and we have asked the taskforce to expand the ethnicity data that it collects and publishes. Baroness Casey’s audit will also look to uncover the gaps in current knowledge and understanding of grooming gang crimes, including ethnicity, which will inform our future work.

Finally, new clause 49 would require ethnicity data on sex offenders to be published on a quarterly and yearly basis. The ethnicity of those convicted of sex offences is already available in the “outcomes by offence” data tool. The data is published by the Ministry of Justice quarterly, and it is available in the public domain. The new clause would, in effect, require the duplication of data that is already available pertaining to the ethnicity of convicted sex offenders.

In conclusion, not only are new clauses 47 to 49 unnecessary, but they detract from the Government’s vital work to tackle the crimes of grooming gangs and other sex offenders. On that basis, I respectfully ask the hon. Member for Gordon and Buchan not to move them when they are reached later in our proceedings.

[Harriet Cross]

I will keep my comments brief. I thank everyone who has contributed; I appreciate that this issue raises tensions. I know that no matter what side of the House we are on and no matter what angle we come at this from, everyone wants what is best for children and to prevent any sort of gang-based grooming or sexual violence against them. Any approach we can take to prevent that is one that we should consider. I listened to every word that the hon. Member for Cardiff West said and I understand it, but anything we are able to do to make a difference, I want done. I do not care which side of the House does it—I really do not.

Crime and Policing Bill (Sixth sitting)

Alex Davies-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 3rd April 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers]

It is good to get rid of the perception, but it is all about the real-world consequences. As it stands, if there is such a perception, we need to smash it. People need to know that 90% of such charges relate to goods under the value of £200; it needs to be pushed out that this is a thing. When we look at retail crime overall, the biggest problem, which we tried to solve with our amendment to clause 15, is not only changing perceptions but ensuring that police forces realise that retail crime has huge consequences and needs to be prioritised. That is the fundamental problem, so it is about ensuring that the priorities are right. I do not think that changing the legislation in this space will solve that problem.

I want to go back to Oliver Sells, because I think he is a fascinating guy. He said:

“I think it is a serious mistake. I can see why people want to do it, because they want to signify that an offence is a very important in relation to shop workers. I recognise that; I have tried many cases of assaults on shop workers and the like, which come up to the Crown court on appeal, and we all know the difficulties they cause, but you will not solve the problem.”––[Official Report, Crime and Policing Public Bill Committee, 27 March 2025; c. 17, Q25.]

Sir Robert Buckland, the former Lord Chancellor, added:

“First of all, just to build on Mr Sells’s point on clause 16, I understand the huge concern about shoplifting and the perception among many shop proprietors in our towns and cities that, in some ways, it was almost becoming decriminalised and that action has to be taken. But the danger in changing primary legislation in this way is that we send mixed messages, and that the Government are sending mixed messages about what its policy intentions are.

Sir Brian Leveson is conducting an independent review into criminal procedure. We do not know yet what the first part of that review will produce, but I would be very surprised if there was not at least some nod to the need to keep cases out of the Crown court, bearing in mind the very dramatic and increasing backlog that we have. I think that anything that ran contrary to that view risks the Government looking as if it is really a house divided against itself.

It seems to me that there was a simpler way of doing this. When the law was changed back in 2014, there was an accompanying policy guideline document that allowed for the police to conduct their own prosecutions for shoplifting items with a value of under £200, if the offender had not done it before, if there were not other offences linked with it, if there was not a combined amount that took it over £200 and if there was a guilty plea.

What seems to have happened in the ensuing years is that that has built and developed, frankly, into a culture that has moved away from the use of prosecuting as a tool in its entirety. I think that that is wrong, but I do think that it is within the gift of Ministers in the Home Office and of officials in the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice to say, ‘That guidance is superseded. We hope, want and expect all offences to be prosecuted.’ That would then allow offences of under £200 to be prosecuted in the magistrates court. There is nothing in the current legislation that prevents any of that, by the way, and I think it would send a very clear message to the police that they are expected to do far more when it comes to the protection of retail premises.”––[Official Report, Crime and Policing Public Bill Committee, 27 March 2025; c. 18, Q26.]

The economic note for the legislation estimates that repealing the existing provision will result in approximately 2,100 additional Crown court cases in the first instance. It further states that, in the low scenario, cases entering the Crown court will not see an increase in average prison sentence length. In the high scenario, it assumes that these cases will now receive the average Crown court prison sentence, leading to an increase of 2.5 months per conviction. The central estimate falls between those extremes at 1.3 months, based on the assumption that cases involving theft under £200 are unlikely to receive the same sentences as those over £200.

That is reflected in a relatively wide range of possible prison sentences between the low and high estimates. What level of confidence can the Minister therefore provide on the number of people who will end up in prison, or end up in prison for longer, as a result of this move to the Crown court? Given that evidence, does this move, which appears to have a limited effect or outcome, outweigh the risk of prolonging the time it takes for victims to get justice, in the Minister’s view?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)]

Let me address some of the points made by the shadow Minister, specifically on perception. There is a misconception that the threshold is used by police forces to determine whether to respond to reports of shoplifting, and that is simply not true. Police forces across England and Wales have committed to follow up on any evidence that could reasonably lead to catching a perpetrator, and that includes shoplifting; however, as we have heard, the measure has impacted the perception of shop theft among retailers, and would-be perpetrators who believe that low-value shoplifting will go unpunished and that the offence is not being taken seriously. The clause will send a clear message to those planning to commit shop theft of goods worth any amount that this crime will not be tolerated and will be met with appropriate punishment.

Let me turn to the impact on our courts. It was quite heartening to finally hear the Opposition mention their concern about the impact on our Crown court backlogs, given how we got there in the first place. The Government recognise that the courts are under unprecedented pressure, and we have debated why that is on separate occasions; however, we do not anticipate that the measure will add to that impact. The vast majority of shop theft cases are currently dealt with swiftly in the magistrates court, and we do not expect that to change as a result of implementing the measure. Even with the current £200 threshold in place, defendants can elect for trial in the Crown court, but they do so infrequently. Removing the threshold and changing low-value shop theft to an either-way offence will not impact election rights, and is therefore unlikely to result in increased trials in the Crown court.

Separately, as the shadow Minister noted, in recognition of the courts being under unprecedented pressure due to the inheritance we received from the Tory Government, we have commissioned an independent review of the criminal courts, led by Sir Brian Leveson. It will recommend options for ambitious reform to deliver a more efficient criminal court system and improved timeliness for victims, witnesses and defendants, without jeopardising the requirement for a fair trial for all involved.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

I want to understand the logic of what the Minister is saying. She seems to be saying that the change to allow cases to be heard in the Crown court will be a deterrent, but she does not envisage an increase in cases being heard in the Crown court. Is she aware—I am sure she is—that it is up to the defendant to elect where their case is heard, and that the conviction rate is actually lower in the Crown court? I am concerned about the unintended consequences that more cases could be heard in the Crown court, which is more expensive, and involves a judge and a jury, for stealing perhaps a bottle of wine. It is quite extraordinary.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I recognise the hon. Member’s concerns; he has pre-empted my next point. To confirm, it is already currently an electable either-way offence and the vast majority of cases are tried in the magistrates court, but I will come to the modelling and the percentages right now.

Based on current data from the magistrates courts, an average of 5% of individuals in the last three years charged with shop theft—of any value—proceed to trial or are committed for sentencing in the Crown court. Around 88% of shop theft cases involved goods valued at £200 or less. For cases of theft over £200, approximately 40% of cases went to the Crown court. We have modelled a low, central and high scenario within the published economic note on this measure. The low scenario assumes that 1% of charges for shop theft under £200 would proceed to the Crown court, with the central and high scenarios assuming 8% and 14% respectively. It is also important to note that we have expanded the sentencing powers of the magistrates court and extended sitting time in the Crown court to reduce the backlog. The increased sentencing powers in magistrates courts have freed up the extent of 2,000 further sitting days in Crown courts to enable them to be used for the most serious cases, which is what they are they for.

[Joe Robertson]

Will the Minister give way?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I will not give way because I am conscious of time.

Let me turn to the final point on the impact on prison places, because the shadow Minister also raised concerns about that. Again, it is important to note that the Opposition are now raising concerns about the impact on our prisons after the inheritance we received from them. Prisons almost ran out of places last summer, which was a complete dereliction of duty and responsibility; they ran the prison system to the point of our entire criminal justice system collapsing. We, as a Government, have taken action to address that, and have carefully assessed how the change can be managed to ensure that we do not place further pressure on our prisons. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 16 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

Just before we proceed, I am conscious that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East stood up, very late. I cannot make an exception, though he is pretty new here. When the Chair has called the Minister to wind up, there are then no further speeches. Prior to that, Members may intervene as often as they like. I am afraid we do have to stick by the rules.

Clause 17

Child criminal exploitation

Crime and Policing Bill (Fifth sitting)

Alex Davies-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 3rd April 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 25—Requirements in certain sentences imposed for third or subsequent shoplifting offence—

“(1) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows.

(2) In section 208 (community order: exercise of power to impose particular requirements), in subsections (3) and (6) after ‘subsection (10)’ insert ‘and sections 208A’.

(3) After that section insert—

‘208A Community order: requirements for third or subsequent shoplifting offence

(1) This section applies where—

(a) a person is convicted of adult shoplifting (“the index offence”),

(b) when the index offence was committed, the offender had on at least two previous occasions been sentenced in respect of adult shoplifting or an equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence, and

(c) the court makes a community order in respect of the index offence.

(2) The community order must, subject to subsection (3), include at least one of the following requirements—

(a) a curfew requirement;

(b) an exclusion requirement;

(c) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.

(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if—

(a) the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which—

(i) relate to any of the offences or the offender, and

(ii) justify the court not including any requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2), or

(b) neither of the following requirements could be included in the order—

(i) an electronic compliance monitoring requirement for securing compliance with a proposed curfew requirement or proposed exclusion requirement;

(ii) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.

(4) In subsection (1)(b), the reference to an occasion on which an offender was sentenced in respect of adult shoplifting does not include an occasion if—

(a) each conviction for adult shoplifting for which the offender was dealt with on that occasion has been quashed, or

(b) the offender was re-sentenced for adult shoplifting (and was not otherwise dealt with for adult shoplifting) on that occasion.

(5) In this section—

“adult shoplifting” means an offence under section 1 of the Theft Act 1968 committed by a person aged 18 or over in circumstances where—

(a) the stolen goods were being offered for sale in a shop or any other premises, stall, vehicle or place from which a trade or business was carried on, and

(b) at the time of the offence, the offender was, or was purporting to be, a customer or potential customer of the person offering the goods for sale;

“equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence” means—

(a) in Scotland, theft committed by a person aged 18 or over in the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of “adult shoplifting”, or

(b) in Northern Ireland, an offence under section 1 of the Theft Act (Northern Ireland) 1969 committed by a person aged 18 or over in those circumstances.

(6) Nothing in subsection (2) enables a requirement to be included in a community order if it could not otherwise be so included.

(7) Where—

(a) in a case to which this section applies, a court makes a community order which includes a requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2),

(b) a previous conviction of the offender is subsequently set aside on appeal, and

(c) without the previous conviction this section would not have applied,

notice of appeal against the sentence may be given at any time within 28 days from the day on which the previous conviction was set aside (despite anything in section 18 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968).’

(4) After section 292 insert—

‘292A Suspended sentence order: community requirements for third or subsequent shoplifting offence

(1) This section applies where—

(a) a person is convicted of adult shoplifting (“the index offence”),

(b) when the index offence was committed, the offender had on at least two previous occasions been sentenced in respect of adult shoplifting or an equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence, and

(c) the court makes a suspended sentence order in respect of the index offence.

(2) The suspended sentence order must, subject to subsection (3), impose at least one of the following requirements—

(a) a curfew requirement;

(b) an exclusion requirement;

(c) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.

(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if—

(a) the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which—

(i) relate to any of the offences or the offender, and

(ii) justify the court not imposing on the offender any requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2), or

(b) neither of the following requirements could be imposed on the offender—

(i) an electronic compliance monitoring requirement for securing compliance with a proposed curfew requirement or proposed exclusion requirement;

(ii) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.

(4) Section 208A(4) (occasions to be disregarded) applies for the purposes of subsection (1)(b).

(5) In this section “adult shoplifting” and “equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence” have the meaning given by section 208A.

(6) Nothing in subsection (2) enables a requirement to be imposed by a suspended sentence order if it could not otherwise be so imposed.

(7) Where—

(a) in a case to which this section applies, a court makes a suspended sentence order which imposes a requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2),

(b) a previous conviction of the offender is subsequently set aside on appeal, and

(c) without the previous conviction this section would not have applied,

notice of appeal against the sentence may be given at any time within 28 days from the day on which the previous conviction was set aside (despite anything in section 18 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968).’”

This new clause imposes a duty (subject to certain exceptions) to impose a curfew requirement, an exclusion requirement or an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement on certain persons convicted of shoplifting, where the offender is given a community sentence or suspended sentence order.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)]

I thank the hon. Member for Stockton West for tabling new clause 25. As he will be aware, under the previous Government shop theft was allowed to increase at an alarming rate—it was up 23% in the year to September 2024—and more and more offenders are using violence and abuse against shop workers, as we have just debated.

This Government have committed to taking back our streets and restoring confidence in the safety of retail spaces, which is why we have brought in measures to address what is essentially immunity for so-called low-value shop theft, which the previous Conservative Government introduced. Shop theft of any amount is illegal, and by repealing section 22A of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, we will help to ensure that everyone fully understands that.

Under section 22A, theft of goods worth £200 and under from shops is tried summarily in the magistrates court. The previous Government argued the legislation was introduced to increase efficiency, by enabling the police to prosecute instances of low-value theft. However, it has not worked. Both offenders and retailers perceive this effective downgrading of shop theft as a licence to steal and escape any punishment. Clause 16 therefore repeals section 22A.

Let me be unequivocal: shoplifting of any goods of any value is unacceptable, and it is crucial that the crime is understood to be serious. With this change, there will no longer be a threshold categorising shop theft of goods worth £200 and under as “low-value”. By removing the financial threshold, we are sending a clear message to perpetrators and would-be perpetrators that this crime will not be tolerated and will be met with appropriate punishment. The change also makes it clear to retailers that we take this crime seriously and they should feel encouraged to report it.

I turn to the shadow Minister’s new clause 25. The Government take repeat and prolific offending extremely seriously. I remind the Committee that sentencing in individual cases is a matter for our independent judiciary, who take into account all of the circumstances of the offence, the offender and the statutory purposes of sentencing. The courts have a broad range of sentencing powers to deal effectively and appropriately with offenders, including discharges, fines, community sentences, suspended sentences and custodial sentences where appropriate. In addition, as the Minister for Policing, Fire and Crime Prevention has already said, previous convictions are already a statutory aggravating factor. Sentencing guidelines are clear that sentencers must consider the nature and relevance of previous convictions, and the time elapsed since the previous conviction, when determining the sentence.

The Ministry of Justice continues to ensure that sentencers are provided with all tagging options, to enable courts to impose electronic monitoring on anyone who receives a community-based sentence if they deem it suitable to do so. It is important to note that electronic monitoring is already available to the courts when passing a community or suspended sentence. However, it may not always be the most appropriate requirement for an offender’s sentence. We believe that the courts should retain a range of options at their disposal, to exercise their discretion to decide on the most appropriate sentence and requirements.

We cannot consider this issue in isolation. This is why we have launched an independent review of sentencing, chaired by former Lord Chancellor David Gauke, to ensure that we deliver on our manifesto commitment to bring sentencing up to date and ensure the framework is consistent. The review is tasked with a comprehensive re-evaluation of our sentencing framework, including considering how we can make greater use of punishment outside of prison and how sentences can encourage offenders to turn their backs on a life of crime. The review has been asked specifically to consider sentencing for prolific offenders, to ensure that we have fewer crimes committed by those offenders. It is vital that we give the review time to finalise its recommendations, including on prolific offenders, so that we are able to set out our plans for the future of sentencing in the round.

On this basis, I commend clause 16 to the Committee and ask the hon. Member for Stockton West not to move his new clause when it is reached later in our proceedings.

[Matt Vickers]

Shop thefts are on the increase, with recorded crime data showing 492,124 offences in the year—a 23% increase on the previous year. The British Retail Consortium 2025 retail crime report suggests that despite retailers spending a whopping £1.8 billion on prevention measures, such crime is at record levels, with losses from customer theft reaching £2.2 billion.

As things stand, shop theft is not a specific offence but constitutes theft under section 1 of the Theft Act 1968. It is therefore triable either way—that is, either in a magistrates court or the Crown court. Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980, inserted by the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, provides that where the value of goods is £200 or less, it is a summary-only offence. Clause 16 amends the 1980 Act, the 2014 Act and others to make theft from a shop triable either way, irrespective of the value of the goods.

Crime and Policing Bill (First sitting)

Alex Davies-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers]

Q As you will have seen, we get lots of people in here who are very familiar with this place, and then every now and again we get people who are brave, committed and dedicated to making a change and making the world a better place. Thank you for coming and for all your campaigning on this issue. All power to your elbow.

How important are the measures in the Bill, and why? Is there anything that you think the Government should be doing beyond what is in the Bill?

Colin Mackie: I think this is majorly important. It is a giant step forward. Up until now, spiking has been a very grey area. It is charged as assault, theft, poisoning or whatever; it has been such a grey area that it has been hard to process it. That has the knock-on effect of putting victims off coming forward, because they do not know where they are going to go or what is going to be talked about, and they are unsure. Perpetrators of spiking feel, “Well, nothing’s really happening over this. I don’t hear of anybody getting charged for it, and it’s only a bit of fun; we don’t think we’re going to do any harm,” so they carry on doing it.

Having a stand-alone offence is beneficial for the victims, and I also think it is beneficial for the police. I feel that once a law is in place, you are going to get a co-ordinated response from police. Currently, victims in Newcastle are treated differently from victims in Newquay, and it is the same across the whole country. That is one of the major problems that victims tell us about all the time: some forces are great, while others are not so good. I have had one victim tell me that the police said they did not have the manpower or the time to go in and check the CCTV at the club where they were spiked. Another victim told me that uniformed officers turned up and were not sure how to deal with it, but half an hour later, the CID were there and straight into the club. We cannot have that inconsistency; we need to move forward with that.

You were asking earlier, “What can we do to help?” In bringing in the Bill, we have to involve A&E, because A&E has a big part to play in this as well. All too often, as you know, it is the job of the police to gather the evidence, but a spiking victim is likely to appear at a hospital—at A&E—unconscious or confused and not sure what is going on. They are not going to think about asking for a police officer to attend—they are not in a state to do that—so unless they have a family member or a friend there, that is not going to happen. By the time they get maybe two days down the line and think, “Yeah, this is what’s happened to me; I want to report this,” there is a good chance that a lot of the evidence has gone. We need that in the Bill as well: for A&E to play a bigger part by gathering evidence and holding it for the police. Then, if the victim wants to take it forward, it is there.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)]

Q Thank you, Colin, for coming in today and, to echo the words of the shadow Minister, for all of the work that you do on this; it is really appreciated.

You mentioned that you welcome the clarification in the Bill, which will create a specific offence of spiking by using the word “spiking”. Can you expand on why that will make such a difference for victims? You mentioned some of the issues with the police using different types of offences. Why will it make such a difference to have a specific offence?

Colin Mackie: A victim will recognise that spiking is an offence when they approach the police. Currently they are not sure if they can report it. They are nervous and they are not sure if it is an offence. That has been a big thing that we get fed to us. Away from just the girls, there is a lot of spiking going on with boys now. Males are being spiked as well. It is possible that anybody could be spiked. That is a big thing, because we find that a lot of males think it is a girls’ problem. They think it is tied in with a sexual assault or whatever. If you just say “spiking” males will think, “Yeah, I have been spiked,” and that is it—it is the fact that they have been spiked.

A lot of spiking is now taking place and nothing else is happening. People are not being sexually assaulted or robbed; they are just being spiked. It is what we call prank spiking. People are doing it because they can. I think the ability for someone to come forward and just say, “Yes, I have been spiked and there is a law on spiking,” is the way forward.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Q Thank you for that. One of the other things that you touched on—it was referenced by the previous witnesses—is the importance of not just making legislative change, but having a package of support available with the other agencies around it. What can you recommend beyond legislative changes—you mentioned A&E, but I am also thinking about training, guidance and so on—to really make sure that this is a package for spiking offences?

Colin Mackie: We certainly want to get the night-time industry more involved and get stewards more aware, because all too often one of the first things said to someone who has been spiked or their friends is, “They’re drunk. I want them out the club. They’ve had too much to drink.” When we talk to nightclubs, bars and so on, we say to the stewards, “Listen to what their friends are saying. Don’t make the assumption that that person’s drunk just because they look drunk. If their friends are saying, ‘We’ve had one or two drinks,’ take on board what they’re saying. Don’t just think, ‘Oh, no, I’ve got to get this person out of here.’” They have a duty of care to look after people, and we want them to take on that responsibility.

Just at the weekend, I was reading an article on the BBC and it was talking about nightclubs in general and how footfall is falling. One of the examples was that youngsters are stopping going to nightclubs because of the fear of spiking. The industry has to look at the bigger picture and realise that if it puts in lids and deterrents, better security and better CCTV, and, as we hope with this Bill, if we start to see people being prosecuted, the numbers will come back up. People will have the confidence to come out. If they think they are going to a venue where they feel they are going to be safe, they are more likely to come, whereas currently they are walking away and finding something else to do. It is going to affect the night-time industry as well, so it really has to take it more seriously.

[Luke Taylor]

Q Thank you again for coming along and for your campaigning. You must be proud that you have got this leap—this legislation—to try to combat some of the trauma that you experienced.

I have a broader question. Do the measures included in the Bill cover all the issues that you see around the offence? Do you think the Bill is a comprehensive measure to enable action to be taken to combat the horrible offence of spiking?

Colin Mackie: It is moving forward to that level where I think it is good. I would like to see a wee bit more on the sentencing side of it. Just listening to the previous witnesses, I know that there is a backlog through the courts and everything, and I can see that being a problem. If the people who want to report spiking, especially young women, think it is going to last two years, how much of a deterrent is it going to be for them to come forward if they think it is going to drag on? That is one bit: when it comes to the sentencing and how quickly it will be processed, will that put people off reporting it?

Assisted Dying

Alex Davies-Jones Excerpts

Monday 29th April 2024 Westminster Hall

[Tonia Antoniazzi]

I fully accept the right hon. Gentleman’s point that the law is changing in other countries and in parts of the UK. It is important to consider that, and to look at what is done well and not so well. It is for us in this place to consider this matter fully when the opportunity arises.

“Choice” is a key word for Dame Esther and for many of those who have signed the petition. This is about having the choice to die under their own conditions, with dignity and without struggle.

[Alex Davies-Jones (Pontypridd) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. I was here for the last debate that she introduced on the issue and I am pleased to see this debate overwhelmingly supported today. The fact of the matter is that people can have a good death if they can afford it and are physically able to fly to Switzerland. That is grossly unfair. This is completely out of reach for the vast majority of my constituents in Pontypridd and the vast majority of people in the United Kingdom, so it is absolutely right that we have the debate, because if people can afford it and are physically able to do so, they can have a good death.

[Tonia Antoniazzi]

I thank my hon. Friend for her intervention, particularly because she raises a very valid point about the cost of that option for those who can afford to travel, and the discrepancy that there is in our healthcare system.

Oral Answers to Questions

Alex Davies-Jones Excerpts

Monday 15th April 2024 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Minister.

[Alex Davies-Jones (Pontypridd) (Lab)]

Thank you, Mr Speaker, and on behalf of the whole shadow Home Affairs team may I place on record our sincere condolences on the loss of your father?

Following the horrific killing of Kulsuma Akter in Bradford, who was tragically stabbed to death in broad daylight while pushing her three-year-old son in a pram, West Yorkshire and Greater Manchester police have referred themselves for investigation because of prior contact with Kulsuma and her husband, who has since been arrested for her murder. Cases of multiple contact with the police before violent escalation are all too common. Labour will mandate domestic abuse and wider violence against women and girls training for every police officer in the country and we will introduce Raneem’s law to overhaul the policing response when reports are first made. So I ask the Minister, how many more women will have to die before the Government can do the same?

[Laura Farris]

The hon. Lady is right to mention the case of Kulsuma Akter. What happened to her was appalling. I obviously cannot comment on any specifics in relation to the case, but the hon. Lady will know that the bail conditions that the perpetrator had been released under contained restrictions that were breached themselves. So it was not a case of the court refusing to apply conditions; he breached them. In relation to her wider point, of course every single one of these cases is a tragedy. She will know, because we have worked on a cross-party basis in the past, how much time and attention we dedicate to this at the Home Office, but I simply say this. We now have domestic abuse training that has been rolled out to over 80% of forces and the Home Secretary and I are working very closely with the nine outstanding ones. They are on a timetable for delivery—I want to reassure the hon. Lady of that—and we now, this month, have trained rape specialists in every single police force in England and Wales.

Oral Answers to Questions

Alex Davies-Jones Excerpts

Monday 15th January 2024 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Minister.

[Alex Davies-Jones (Pontypridd) (Lab)]

We welcome the safer streets fund, which will go some way to supporting the night-time economy that has been badly hit over 14 years. The Government’s efforts to tackle spiking have been completely undermined by the Home Secretary. Spiking is a serious and devastating offence. Why did the Home Secretary think it was appropriate to joke about spiking his own wife, and can he confirm exactly how many drops of Rohypnol he considers to be illegal?

[Laura Farris]

I thank the hon. Lady for her question. I think it has been widely reported that the Home Secretary was making a joke about not being good enough for his wife. The point is that we are the first Government who have done something about spiking—it is not a new offence, and the measures to change the statutory provisions in the Offences against the Person Act 1861 could have been taken by the last Labour Government. The reason we have sought to clarify the matter in law is that we do not think that enough victims are coming forward, and the reason there are not enough prosecutions is the time lag in getting effective toxicology reports. That is why we are investing so much money in rapid drinks testing kits, so that hopefully we will be able to get the test done on site on the night, and get more of those offenders behind bars.