Crime and Policing Bill (Eighth sitting)

Harriet Cross Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th April 2025 Public Bill Committees

Furthermore, these proposed amendments to the 2003 Act are a practical and necessary response to the calls and concerns of those who work on the frontline and see at first hand the devastation that such offending can cause. I therefore commend these provisions to the Committee.

[Harriet Cross (Gordon and Buchan) (Con)]

As we have heard, clause 42 effectively incorporates provisions that had been included in the Criminal Justice Bill and is a key provision concerning sexual offences, specifically focusing on the offence of engaging in sexual activity in the presence of a child.

The clause makes an important amendment to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which forms a core legislative framework addressing sexual offences in the UK. In particular, clause 42 expands on the existing provisions to enhance the protection of children from sexual exploitation and harm.

Under the Sexual Offences Act, certain sexual offences are committed when a child is involved, such as sexual activity involving children, or causing or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity. However, one area that has been highlighted for reform involves situations where a child might be exposed to sexual activity in a way that, while not directly involving them in the act, still results in harm.

Prior to the introduction of clause 42, the law did not adequately address situations where a child was the passive observer of a sexual activity. For instance, in scenarios where an adult or adults engage in sexual activity with each other in the presence of a child, the law might not have captured this activity as an offence, despite the potential psychological harm to the child. Clause 42 seeks to close this gap by making it an offence for an adult to engage in sexual activity in the presence of a child. This means that any sexual activity taking place in the physical presence of a child, even if the child is not directly involved in the sexual conduct, could now result in criminal liability.

The clause expands the scope of existing sexual offence laws to include situations that may not necessarily involve the direct participation of the child, but still expose the child to inappropriate activity or material that could be damaging to their wellbeing.

Clause 42 also sees parallel offences involving sexual activity in the presence of a person with a mental disorder, impeding their choice, and similar provisions in the Sexual Offences Act. Those individuals, too, might not fully understand the sexual nature of what the offender is doing. Previously, there might have been the same issue with the law of requiring awareness. Clause 42 offers a broad safeguard for those who cannot consent or comprehend.

The clause seeks to offer further protection for children by recognising the potential harm caused by exposure to sexual activity, even if it is not directed at them. The law would now acknowledge that witnessing such an act could have a detrimental impact on the child’s emotional, physiological, psychological or developmental health.

Although we support the clause, I seek clarity from the Minister on a couple of points. In situations where sexual activity takes place in private or behind closed doors, it might be difficult to establish whether a child was present or the extent of their exposure to the activity. Proving the impact on the child could also be challenging, particularly where psychological harm or emotional distress is not immediately apparent. What discussions has the Minister had on that matter? I note that, as we have discussed a number of times today, Government amendment 14 carves out an important exception of the offence from the defence in section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

Clause 42 represents an important development in child protection law. At present, as the Minister has said, an offence is committed only where a person knows or believes that the child or person with a mental disorder is aware of the activity, or where a person intends that the child or person with a mental disorder be aware of the activity.

The provisions will amend these offences to capture situations where, for the purpose of sexual gratification, a person intentionally engages in sexual activity in the presence of a child, even if they do not intend for the child to be aware of the activity. The examples covered by this amendment are clearly heinous, and we welcome the clause.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I welcome the hon. Lady’s comments and the fact that the Opposition welcome the clause to close this loophole to protect children and the most vulnerable.

Hopefully I have outlined how we carefully crafted the clause to ensure that we do not capture those who innocently engage in sexual activity in the presence of a child, and not for the purposes of sexual gratification. We do not want to criminalise those who have to share a bedroom with a baby, a young child or somebody with a health condition, and are not seeking sexual gratification from engaging in sexual activity in the presence of a child. We have worked very closely with partners and stakeholders to ensure the law is crafted carefully so that we do not criminalise those people. The clause seeks to criminalise only those perpetrators who seek to gain sexual gratification from the presence of a child, whether the child knows or not.

I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.

Amendment 14 agreed to.

Clause 42, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 43

Child sex offences: grooming aggravating factor

[Harriet Cross]

I beg to move amendment 42, in clause 43, page 48, line 23, at end insert—

“70B Group-based sexual grooming of a child

(1) This section applies where—

(a) a court is considering the seriousness of a specified child sex offences,

(b) the offence is aggravated by group-based grooming, and

(c) the offender was aged 18 or over when the offence was committed.

(2) The court—

(a) must treat the fact that the offence is aggravated by group-based grooming as an aggravated factor, and

(b) must state in court that the offence is so aggravated.

(3) An offence is ‘aggravated by group-based grooming’ if—

(a) the offence was facilitated by, or involved, the offender, who was involved in group-based grooming, or

(b) the offence was facilitated by, or involved, a person other than the offender grooming a person under the age of 18 and the offender knew, or could have reasonably been expected to know that said person was participating, or facilitating group-based grooming, or

(c) the offender intentionally arranges or facilitates something that the offender intends to do, intends another person to do, or believes that another person will do, in order to participate in group-based grooming.

(4) In this section ‘specified child sex offence’ means—

(a) an offence within any of subsections (5) to (7), or

(b) an inchoate offence in relation to any such offence.

(5) An offence is within this subsection if it is—

(a) an offence under section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978 (taking etc indecent photograph of child),

(b) an offence under section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (possession of indecent photograph of child),

(c) an offence under any of sections 5 to 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape and other offences against children under 13),

(d) an offence under any sections 9 to 12 of that Act (other child sex offences),

(e) an offence under section 14 of that Act (arranging or facilitating commission of child sex offence),

(f) an offence under any of sections 16 to 19 of that Act (abuse of position of trust),

(g) an offence under section 25 or 26 of that Act (familial child sex offences), or

(h) an offence under any of sections 47 to 50 of that Act (sexual exploitation of children).

(6) An offence is within this subsection if it is—

(a) an offence under any of sections 1 to 4 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape, assault and causing sexual activity without consent),

(b) an offence under any of sections 30 to 41 of that Act (sexual offences relating to persons with mental disorder),

(c) an offence under any of sections 61 to 63 of that Act (preparatory offences), or

(d) an offence under any of sections 66 to 67A of that Act (exposure and voyeurism),

and the victim or intended victim was under the age of 18.

(7) An offence is within this subsection if it is an offence under section 71 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sexual activity in a public lavatory) and a person involved in the activity in question was under the age of 18.

(8) For the purposes of this section—

(a) ‘group-based grooming’ is defined as a group of at least three adults whose purpose or intention is to commit a sexual offence against the same victim or group of victims who are under 18, or could reasonably be expected to be under 18.”.

This amendment would introduce a specific aggravating factor in sentencing for those who participate in, or facilitate, group-based sexual offending.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

New clause 47—National statutory inquiry into grooming gangs—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 3 months of the passing of this Act, set up a statutory inquiry into grooming gangs.

(2) An inquiry established under subsection (1) must seek to—

(a) identify common patterns of behaviour and offending between grooming gangs;

(b) identify the type, extent and volume of crimes committed by grooming gangs;

(c) identify the number of victims of crimes committed by grooming gangs;

(d) identify the ethnicity of members of grooming gangs;

(e) identify any failings, by action, omission or deliberate suppression, by—

(i) police,

(ii) local authorities,

(iii) prosecutors,

(iv) charities,

(v) political parties,

(vi) local and national government,

(vii) healthcare providers and health services, or

(viii) other agencies or bodies, in the committal of crimes by grooming

(f) identify such national safeguarding actions as may be required to minimise the risk of further such offending occurring in future;

(g) identify good practice in protecting children.

(3) The inquiry may do anything it considers is calculated to facilitate, or is incidental or conducive to, the carrying out of its functions and the achievement of the requirements of subsection (2).

(4) An inquiry established under this section must publish a report within two years of the launch of the inquiry.

(5) For the purposes of this section—

‘gang’ means a group of at least three adults whose purpose or intention is to commit a sexual offence against the same victim or group of victims;

‘grooming’ means—

(a) activity carried out with the primary intention of committing sexual offences against the victim;

(b) activity that is carried out, or predominantly carried out, in person;

(c) activity that includes the provision of illicit substances and/or alcohol either as part of the grooming or concurrent with the commission of the sexual offence.”

This new clause would set up a national statutory inquiry into grooming gangs.

New clause 48—Annual statement on ethnicity of members of grooming gangs—

“The Secretary of State must make an annual statement to the House of Commons on the ethnicity of convicted members of grooming gangs.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to make an annual statement to the House on ethnicity data of convicted members of grooming gangs.

New clause 49—Publication of sex offender’s ethnicity data—

(1) The Secretary of State for the Home Office must publish—

(a) quarterly; and

(b) yearly;

datasets containing all national data pertaining to the ethnicity of sex offenders.

(2) For the purposes of this section, a ‘sex offender’ is anyone convicted of—

(a) an offence under section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978 (taking etc indecent photograph of child),

(b) an offence under section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (possession of indecent photograph of child),

(c) an offence under any of sections 5 to 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape and other offences against children under 13),

(d) an offence under any sections 9 to 12 of that Act (other child sex offences),

(e) an offence under section 14 of that Act (arranging or facilitating commission of child sex offence),

(f) an offence under any of sections 16 to 19 of that Act (abuse of position of trust),

(g) an offence under section 25 or 26 of that Act (familial child sex offences), or

(h) an offence under any of sections 47 to 50 of that Act (sexual exploitation of children),

(i) an offence under any of sections 1 to 4 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape, assault and causing sexual activity without consent),

(j) an offence under any of sections 30 to 41 of that Act (sexual offences relating to persons with mental disorder),

(k) an offence under any of sections 61 to 63 of that Act (preparatory offences), or

(l) an offence under any of sections 66 to 67A of that Act (exposure and voyeurism),

(m) an offence under section 71 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sexual activity in a public lavatory) and a person involved in the activity in question was under the age of 18.”

This new clause would introduce a requirement that ethnicity data of sex offenders be published on a quarterly and a yearly basis.

[Harriet Cross]

Clause 43 establishes a new statutory aggravating factor in sentencing. Where an adult offender commits a specified child sexual offence and that offence involves or was facilitated by the grooming of a child, courts will be required to treat that as an aggravating factor. This provision is a powerful statement that grooming, the insidious process in which predators prepare and manipulate children for abuse, makes a crime even more heinous, and the Opposition support it. In fact, the clause is substantially the same as a provision in the Criminal Justice Bill and aligns with key recommendations of the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse. Courts already often consider grooming as an aggravating factor, but putting it on a statutory footing ensures consistency and emphasis.

The clause sets out a list of specified child sexual offences, including the crimes of sexual assault of a child, rape and causing a child to engage in sexual activity, among others. If an offender being sentenced for one of these offences is 18 or over and the evidence shows that they groomed the child—for example, by establishing an emotional connection, buying gifts, building dependencies or systematically desensitising the child—the judge must regard that as making the crime more serious. It does not dictate the extent of the sentence, but it mandates that sentencing guidelines account for the aggravating factor.

Child grooming offenders may pose as friends, mentors or even pseudo-parental figures to their victims. By the time they commit the sexual abuse, they have already isolated the child from help and normalised horrendous behaviour. It is calculated evil on every level and deserves a heavy hammer of justice, so clause 43 ensures that judges explicitly account for that aspect when allowing justice to be served.

Clause 43 is one of several measures implementing the IICSA recommendations. Mandatory reporting, which we will come to when we debate clause 45 onwards, is another. It is heartening to see progress on these fronts. The Conservative party has remained committed to enacting all reasonable recommendations from the child abuse inquiry. We want to live up to the promise to survivors that their testimonies will spur real change. This aggravating factor is one such change, so I commend the Government for including it. We will do everything we can to support its swift passage.

Amendment 42 would create a specific aggravating factor for group-based sexual grooming. It addresses a particularly abhorrent phenomenon, which we have seen in places such as Rotherham, Rochdale and Telford, where groups of at least three adults work together to systematically groom and abuse children. Such group-based offences show a truly chilling level of organisation and premeditation.

The amendment would ensure that courts treat group-based grooming as an aggravating factor when sentencing offenders who have participated in or facilitated that type of group-based sexual offending. This would send a clear message that gangs who collaborate to abuse children will face enhanced punishments, reflecting the organised nature of their crimes.

Amendment 42 defines group-based grooming as involving at least three adults whose purpose is to commit sexual offences against the same victim or group of victims under the age of 18. It would apply in three scenarios: where the offender participated in group-based grooming; where an offence was facilitated by another person’s grooming that the offender knew about; or where the offender arranged or facilitated another person’s participation in group-based grooming.

The Opposition support clause 43, as I said. We will watch to ensure that it is implemented efficiently—for instance, we will check whether sentences for grooming-related offences increase as expected. The feedback loop is crucial, because it should not be just words on paper; it must translate to tangible justice.

New clause 47 states that, within three months of the Bill’s passage, the Secretary of State must set up a statutory inquiry into grooming gangs to seek to identify: common patterns of behaviour between grooming gangs; the type, extent and volume of crimes committed by grooming gangs; the number of victims of crimes committed by grooming gangs; the ethnicity of members of grooming gangs; and any failings, by action, omission or deliberate suppression, by a range of bodies or organisations.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Jess Phillips)]

I just wonder what exactly the hon. Lady is outlining. I forgot to bring the report with me—I left it on my desk downstairs. What is she seeking to add with new clause 47 that was not in Alexis Jay’s two-year report into grooming gangs? It sounds exactly the same to me, so I wonder what was missing from the report that she thinks the new clause would achieve.

[Harriet Cross]

As the Minister will realise, there is a lot in that report. The reason for putting something in a Bill is to enshrine it in law. It makes it an absolute duty on us, as elected representatives, and the Government to ensure that these things happen. It is an important provision, and I fully support the idea of making sure it is in the Bill.

New clauses 48 and 49 look at the ethnicity of grooming gang members. We cannot be squeamish or sensitive when it comes to protecting our children. Without adequate data, we cannot act with full understanding of what is happening across the country and where resources would be most effectively targeted.

[Jess Phillips]

I just want the hon. Lady to know that she is stepping on the toes of the statutory inquiry, which has already asked for better data collection on exactly these things. I am not sure why she seeks a provision that will say the same thing as the report in February 2022. Nothing was done about it then, so why does she want something else to say it again?

[Harriet Cross]

The Minister seems to be on the same ground as us. She has said many times that she agrees with the implementation of what Alexis Jay suggested, and there should therefore be no issue with it being included in the Bill—she should be welcoming this at every step. As I said, grooming is one of the most insidious and harmful forms of child exploitation. We welcome clause 43, and we hope that our amendments will be supported to ensure that this type of crime is tackled as strictly as possible.

[Jack Rankin (Windsor) (Con)]

I rise to express my strong support for clause 43, which is an essential provision that strengthens our ability to combat the abhorrent crimes of child sexual exploitation, particularly by making grooming an aggravating factor. For too long, this country has witnessed devastating failures in the protection of our most vulnerable. Clause 43 represents not just a legal tool but a moral commitment to never again allow these failures to go unanswered.

Let us remember the victims in Rotherham, where at least 1,400 children were sexually exploited over a 16-year period. Vulnerable girls were raped, trafficked, threatened and dismissed, and perhaps most disturbing was the silence of those in authority who feared speaking out. Clause 43 confronts that silence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I thank the Opposition Front Benchers for tabling amendment 42 and new clauses 47 to 49. I also thank hon. Members for their contributions to the debate—in particular, the hon. Member for Windsor, who gave a thoughtful contribution, and my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff West, a good friend who has worked his entire career to ensure that victims get the justice they deserve. His passionate contribution to the debate reminds us all exactly why we are here in this place: to deliver for victims of these heinous crimes, to make sure that the perpetrators receive the full force of the law, and to ensure that any gaps in legislation and recommendations of inquiries are followed through with. That is exactly what we are doing today.

Before I respond to the amendments, I will explain the rationale for clause 43. I am pleased to speak to it, and I know that its provisions have been welcomed by hon. Members across the House. In recent years, there have been a number of high-profile cases involving so-called grooming gangs—groups of offenders involved in heinous child sexual exploitation—including those in Rotherham, Telford, Newcastle, Rochdale and Oxford. In February 2022, the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse recommended

“the strengthening of the response of the criminal justice system by…amending the Sentencing Act 2020 to provide a mandatory aggravating factor in sentencing those convicted of offences relating to the sexual exploitation of children.”

The Government want to ensure that the sentencing framework reflects the seriousness of child sexual abuse and exploitation. In January, the Home Secretary committed to

“legislate to make grooming an aggravating factor in the sentencing of child sexual offences, because the punishment must fit the terrible crime”.—[Official Report, 6 January 2025; Vol. 759, c. 632.]

Clause 43 will require courts to consider grooming an aggravating factor when sentencing for specified child sex offences, including rape and sexual assault. It will capture offenders whose offending is facilitated by, or involves, the grooming of a person under 18. The grooming itself need not be sexual.

The measure will capture models of exploitation not currently directly addressed by existing culpability factors. It will create an obligation on courts to aggravate sentences where the offence has been facilitated by grooming undertaken by either the offender or a third party, for example where an offender assaults a victim who has been groomed by another member of a grooming gang. It will also capture instances where grooming is undertaken against a third party, for example where a victim has been groomed to recruit others.

The measure requires the courts to consider grooming an aggravating factor when sentencing in relation to any of the listed child sex offences. However, I must be clear that it will be in the court’s discretion to consider grooming an aggravating factor when sentencing for any offence, where it is relevant to the offending, regardless of the age of the victim.

I understand that the Opposition’s intention with their amendment 42 is to require courts to consider group-based grooming as a specific aggravating factor when sentencing sexual offences committed against children. Clause 43 already requires courts to consider grooming an aggravating factor when sentencing for specified child sex offences. This includes, but is not limited to, offences facilitated by or involving the group-based grooming of a child. An aggravating factor makes an offence more serious and must be considered by the court when deciding the length of the sentence.

The Sentencing Council’s overarching guidelines make

“offence committed as part of a group”

an aggravating factor. That means that, when sentencing for grooming gang offences, a court will be able to aggravate the offence to take into account the grooming behaviour, and then additionally aggravate the offence to take into account the fact that the offending was committed as part of a group. An aggravating factor for group-based grooming, as proposed in amendment 42, would be likely to have a more limited application, as the court could not apply the factor unless it was satisfied that the offender was a member of a group, which may be difficult to prove.

Clause 43 will go further than existing sentencing guidelines, by capturing models of group-based exploitation that are not currently directly addressed by grooming high-culpability factors. It will create an obligation on courts to aggravate sentences in instances where the offence has been facilitated by grooming undertaken by either the offender or a third party, for example where an offender assaults a victim who has been groomed by another member of a grooming gang or group. It will also capture instances where grooming is undertaken against a third party, for example where a victim has been groomed to recruit others. For that reason, I urge Opposition Members not to press amendment 42.

New clause 47 seeks to establish a statutory national inquiry into grooming gangs. It therefore seeks to revisit the questions considered by the seven-year-long independent inquiry into child sexual abuse. During the passage of the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill, the Opposition tabled similar amendments—maybe even identical ones—on the basis that the independent inquiry “barely touches on” grooming gangs.

IICSA, as is common practice for a public inquiry, involved a series of smaller inquiries and investigations of different strands. One of those inquiries was on child sexual exploitation by organised networks—the entire focus of that inquiry was grooming gangs. It took two years and reported three years ago, in February 2022. It is clear from cross-refencing new clause 47 with the scope of the previous investigations into grooming gangs that it seeks to revisit questions already examined by the inquiry. For example, subsection (2)(a) of the new clause seeks an inquiry into grooming gangs to

“identify common patterns of behaviour and offending”.

However, the scope of the previous grooming gangs inquiry states that it will investigate “the nature” of sexual exploitation by grooming gangs. I could go on and on.

If we continue to call for inquiry after inquiry along the same lines, we will undermine the whole system of public inquiries, including public trust in them and public tolerance for the resources of the state that they demand. Therefore, rather than engage in gesture politics by re-running inquiries without the evidence and data that we need, it makes sense to take the Government’s approach, with Baroness Louise Casey’s audit there to fill in the gaps that have already been identified by the previous inquiry. That audit is well under way, as we heard today in the Chamber from my hon. Friend the Safeguarding Minister, and it will report in due course.

The Government are also setting up a new victims and survivors panel, not just to guide Ministers on the design, delivery and implementation of the plans of IICSA, but to produce wider work on child sexual exploitation and abuse. Elsewhere in the Bill, we are making it mandatory to report child sexual abuse, and we will be making it an offence to prevent such reports from being made, as well as introducing further measures to tackle those organising online child sex abuse. As I have set out, we are legislating to make grooming an aggravating factor in sentencing for child sexual offences.

New clause 48 seeks to identify the ethnicity of members of grooming gangs and require regular reporting on the same. The 2022 inquiry into grooming gangs identified widespread failure to record the ethnicity of perpetrators and victims, and inconsistency of definitions in the data, which has meant that the limited research available relies on poor-quality data. The child sexual exploitation police taskforce already collects and publishes ethnicity data on group-based child sexual exploitation. However, we are committed to improving that data, and we have asked the taskforce to expand the ethnicity data that it collects and publishes. Baroness Casey’s audit will also look to uncover the gaps in current knowledge and understanding of grooming gang crimes, including ethnicity, which will inform our future work.

Finally, new clause 49 would require ethnicity data on sex offenders to be published on a quarterly and yearly basis. The ethnicity of those convicted of sex offences is already available in the “outcomes by offence” data tool. The data is published by the Ministry of Justice quarterly, and it is available in the public domain. The new clause would, in effect, require the duplication of data that is already available pertaining to the ethnicity of convicted sex offenders.

In conclusion, not only are new clauses 47 to 49 unnecessary, but they detract from the Government’s vital work to tackle the crimes of grooming gangs and other sex offenders. On that basis, I respectfully ask the hon. Member for Gordon and Buchan not to move them when they are reached later in our proceedings.

[Harriet Cross]

I will keep my comments brief. I thank everyone who has contributed; I appreciate that this issue raises tensions. I know that no matter what side of the House we are on and no matter what angle we come at this from, everyone wants what is best for children and to prevent any sort of gang-based grooming or sexual violence against them. Any approach we can take to prevent that is one that we should consider. I listened to every word that the hon. Member for Cardiff West said and I understand it, but anything we are able to do to make a difference, I want done. I do not care which side of the House does it—I really do not.

[Mr Barros-Curtis]

I reiterate that I am grateful for the tone that the hon. Lady adopted when she congratulated Ministers on the progress that has been made. It is just a shame that other members of her team, so to speak, did not do the same in the Chamber earlier. The Government are committed to this cause, as I would expect every Member of the House to be. Perhaps she will reflect, in discussion with her team, on what my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Justice said about redundancies in the new clauses, and their duplicating work that has already been done or detracting from work that is under way, but I just put it on the record that I think we are all singing from the same hymn sheet on this point.

[Harriet Cross]

I thank the hon. Member for that.

We will press amendment 42 to a vote. Although I heard what the Minister said on the matter, we feel that the wording of the clause is not conclusive. It refers to “offender” in the singular, not to “offenders” in the plural, and we want to make sure that anything involving a gang or group is reflected in the law.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Harriet Cross]

Clause 44 provides Border Force officers with a new power to scan electronic devices for child sexual abuse images at UK borders under specific conditions. The measure addresses the documented issue of certain offenders transporting indecent images of children on various devices when entering or leaving the country. Currently, detecting the contraband at the border is challenging without seizing devices and performing time-consuming forensic examinations. Clause 44 streamlines the process by allowing officers to act when they have reasonable grounds to suspect someone has child abuse imagery. I note that clause 45(1) references reasonable grounds. Can the Minister expound further on which instances will be classed as reasonable grounds?

I draw attention to new clause 28, which seeks to strengthen the UK’s response to foreign nationals found in possession of child sexual abuse images by mandating their deportation. Any foreign national charged with an offence under section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978, which criminalises the possession, making or distribution of indecent images of children, or found carrying an electronic device containing such images would automatically be subject to deportation.

Possession of child sexual abuse images is a serious, awful and heinous crime.

[Joe Robertson]

Does my hon. Friend agree that the mandatory requirement to deport foreign nationals would need to be implemented in a proper and sensitive way? Criminals leaving the country should be handed over to law enforcement in the country they go to, if appropriate, rather than just released into the world.

[Harriet Cross]

Yes, absolutely. I do not think any Member present wants to act unlawfully or be seen to do so in any way. We want to ensure that if someone is deported, it is done properly and efficiently so that the deportation works as planned.

Every image represents a real child who has been subject to abuse, and the act of possessing, viewing or sharing such material fuels a cycle of harm and victimization. This crime is not victimless. Children depicted in these images are subject to unimaginable trauma, and the continued circulation of such material prolongs their suffering and prevents them from fully recovering from their abuse, if that is at all possible.

The psychological and emotional harm caused by these crimes extends far beyond the individual victims. Families and communities are devastated when offenders are discovered, and public trust is severely damaged when such crimes occur. Law enforcement agencies worldwide are engaged in an ongoing battle against child exploitation, investing significant resources into identifying offenders, rescuing victims and preventing further harm.

Given the severity of the crime, strong legal measures are necessary to deter offenders and hold them accountable. Those found in possession of child sexual abuse images must face strict penalties. Given the severity of the crime and its devastating impact on victims, I hope the Government will support new clause 28 and share in our strong belief that foreign nationals convicted of possessing child sexual abuse images should never be allowed to remain in the UK.

[Jess Phillips]

I will first answer the hon. Lady’s question about how Border Force officers will decide what reasonable grounds of suspicion are. Officers will rely on various indicators of reasonable suspicion. Those could include whether the individual is a registered sex offender—which is quite clear—frequent travel to destinations included on the list of countries under section 172 of the Police, Crime and Sentencing Act 2022, or the presence of child abuse paraphernalia in their luggage. Unfortunately, I have seen some of the seizures in such cases, and some really horrendous stuff gets found in people’s luggage, so if someone had some of those terrible things—child-like dolls, for example—that would be reasonable suspicion.

For the purposes of this clause specifically, I give particular thanks. My right hon. Friend the Minister for Policing, Fire and Crime Prevention thanked Holly Lynch earlier, and I thank a former Conservative Member of Parliament. Pauline Latham was a brilliant campaigner, a brilliant woman, who I worked alongside many times on issues such as this. She tried to get this clause into a number of different private Members’ Bills and so on. She was definitely trying to help, but the previous Government, I am afraid to say, were resisting this clause, perhaps because of time—we have already had this Bill once, and I am not sure why the clause was being resisted, but that is what I found when I entered the Home Office. I am therefore proud to commend the clause to the Committee, and I thank Pauline Latham for always speaking up frankly—regardless of who she was speaking up to—about what was right.

New clause 28 seeks to extend the automatic deportation provision in section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007 to foreign nationals charged with an offence under section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978, or found in possession of sexual abuse images. Where foreign nationals abuse this country’s hospitality by committing crimes, it is right that we consider taking deportation action against them. I could not disagree with the sentiment of the hon. Member for Gordon and Buchan, although I would not put it down to just those who use child abuse imagery, rather than those who might have had contact offences with children or those who commit domestic abuse, for example. To see that in such small isolation is fairly problematic for a system that needs some serious attention.

The UK has existing powers to deport foreign nationals who commit sexual offences. Under the UK Borders Act, a foreign national must be deported if they are convicted of any offence in the UK and sentenced to at least 12 months’ imprisonment, unless an exception applies. As someone who has worked in the field for many years, however, I recognise that some of the most heinous crimes—the ones that worry us the most and those that the Government are really keen to tackle—are those that frequently get a sentence of less than 12 months. My hon. Friends at the Ministry of Justice are looking, in the sentencing review, at how and why we have a situation where some of the worst crimes against the vulnerable end up with such small sentences.

I therefore recognise the point that the hon. Lady is making. However, I would say that that is automatically the case with more than 12 months; where that threshold is not met, a foreign national can already be deported on the grounds that their deportation is conducive to the public good, under section 3 of the Immigration Act 1971. The power to deport under the 1971 Act can also be used to deport a foreign national even where they have not been convicted of an offence.

The hon. Member for Isle of Wight East—is that like “Wicked”, with a Wicked Witch of the West and of the East? [Interruption.] Oh, the hon. Gentleman is the Good Witch. He certainly made an important point about child abuse, especially online, which new clause 28—this comes from a very good place—seeks to determine: it is not that child abuse knows any border, but child abuse imagery especially knows no border. The idea that British children would be made safer by deporting somebody to another country is not something I would recognise. The system of then handing people over, so that actually people serve their sentences here, is probably something that we would be keen to see.

The power to deport can be used when somebody has not been convicted of an offence, so actually the powers in the new clause already exist. The Government take the matter of foreign nationals committing criminal offences in the UK extremely seriously. We deport foreign national offenders in appropriate cases, including all offenders sentenced to more than 12 months. New clause 28 is therefore unlikely to result in any more deportations, given these existing powers.

The Government do, however, recognise that the automatic deportation regime does not capture some offenders, who get shorter sentences. I recognise that and it bothers me. We intend to bring forward proposals later this year to simplify the deportation regime and address lower-level offending. I am not calling child sex abuse lower-level offending, but if we think of the most famous case of child sex abuse offending that we have had in recent years, I believe it resulted in a suspended sentence of eight weeks. While I certainly do not think it is lower-level offending, that is often is how it is treated.

At this time, we do not advocate taking a piecemeal approach to making changes in the Bill that would mandate the deportation of every foreign national charged with an offence under section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978. However, this is absolutely something that we are keenly looking at, and I imagine that when there is future legislation, largely on immigration, we will have these debates again.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 44 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 45

Duty to report suspected child sex offences

[Harriet Cross]

I beg to move amendment 43, clause 45, page 50, line 8, leave out subsection (7).

This amendment would keep an individual under the duty to report child abuse despite the belief that someone else may have reported the abuse to the relevant authority.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 46, clause 45, page 50, line 20, at end insert—

“(10) A person who fails to fulfil the duty under subsection (1) commits an offence.

(11) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.”

This amendment would implement part of recommendation 13 of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse that a failure to report a suspected child sex offence should be a criminal offence.

Amendment 47, clause 45, page 51, line 5, at end insert “or

(c) an activity involving a ‘position of trust’ as defined in sections 21, 22 and 22A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.”

This amendment would implement part of recommendation 13 of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sex Abuse that any person working in a position of trust as defined by the Sexual Offences Act 2003, should be designated a mandatory reporter.

Clause stand part.

Schedule 7.

Clause 46 stand part.

Amendment 48, clause 47, page 52, line 11, at end insert—

“(7) The sixth case is where P witnesses a child displaying sexualised, sexually harmful or other behaviour, physical signs of abuse or consequences of sexual abuse, such as pregnancy or a sexually transmitted disease, to an extent that would cause a reasonable person who engages in the same relevant activity as P to suspect that a child sex offence may have been committed.

(8) The seventh case is where P witnesses a person (A) behaving in the presence of a child in a way that would cause a reasonable person who engages in the same relevant activity as P to suspect that A may have committed a child sex offence.

(9) A failure to comply with the duty under subsection (1) is not an offence where the reason to suspect that a child sex offence may have been committed arises from subsection (7) or subsection (8).”

This amendment would implement part of recommendation 13 of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sex Abuse that there should be a duty to report where a person recognises the indicators of child sexual abuse. Failure to report in these instances would not attract a criminal sanction.

Clause 47 stand part.

[Harriet Cross]

Clause 45, alongside clauses 46 and 47 and schedule 7, introduces a duty to report suspected child sex offences, and in doing so fulfils a major recommendation of the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse. In essence, clause 45 will require professionals and volunteers working in roles closely connected to children to notify the authorities if, in the course of their work or duties, they have reason to suspect that a child has been sexually abused.

Time and again, inquiries into abuse scandals—whether involving institutions, schools, churches, sports clubs or grooming gangs—have found that people around the victim knew or suspected something was going wrong but did not report it, perhaps out of fear, confusion, misplaced loyalty or uncertainty. Clause 45 sends an unequivocal message: if you know or suspect a child is being sexually abused, you must tell the police or a local authority.

Opposition amendment 43 would remove subsection (7) of clause 45, which currently exempts someone from reporting if they believe that another person has already made the notification. Our amendment would maintain every individual’s duty to report suspected abuse, regardless of whether they think someone else has already done so. This is a sensible amendment and seeks to avoid incidences or suspected incidences of child sexual abuse slipping through the net on account of someone assuming, even in all good conscience, that someone else has already reported the matter. We cannot be careful enough, and repeated notifications of the same offence can only add to the evidence base for such a crime. Too much information is always better than no information. We cannot stand back and leave a child’s safety to chance or hope that someone else has taken the appropriate action.

The notification may be made to a relevant police force, local authority or both, as soon as is practicable. It is detailed in clause 46 that

“‘Relevant local authority’ means—

(a) if a relevant child resides in England or Wales, the local authority in whose area the child is believed to reside, or

(b) if the person making the notification does not know the local authority area in which any relevant child resides, such local authority as the person making the notification considers appropriate.”

That is a sensible approach. The first port of call is to report to the local authority that will be reasonably responsible for the vulnerable child; that is the obvious and correct place to start. However, where the notifying adult is unsure or unaware of the vulnerable child’s living arrangements, it is still vital that notification is made to a local authority, no matter where in the country the child lives, as local authorities are better placed than the notifying person to direct the report to the appropriate channels. A similar provision is outlined in clause 46 relating to the definition of a “relevant police force.” Again, we consider that to be a sensible approach.

--- Later in debate ---

I commend this clause to the Committee.

[Harriet Cross]

I do not have much to say, other than to welcome the clause. It was part of the Criminal Justice Bill, so we are very happy to see it replicated here. I appreciate what the Minister said, but we will be pressing our amendment to a vote, because no matter how many people think that an offence has or has not been reported, we can never be too careful. Over-reporting is so much better than under-reporting, so anything that ensures it gets reported at any time is vital. Otherwise, I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Windsor for his contribution.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jess Phillips]

Clauses 48 to 51 establish a limited number of situations in which the mandatory duty to report can be disapplied to avoid unintentional consequences for child safeguarding.

Clauses 48 and 49 set out that consensual relationships between young people should not be considered child sexual abuse in the absence of coercion or significant differences in age or maturity, and that an exception can therefore be made to the duty in such circumstances. This avoids situations such as two kissing teenagers having to be reported to the authorities by a teacher who knows them both well. That is not something I want to have to deal with—teenagers kissing in halls. I suppose it is better working here. Well done to the teachers of the world. For the record, I do not want to see anyone kissing in the corridors—teenagers or otherwise.

Nor do we want to discourage young people from accessing services that are designed to offer support in addressing their own harmful sexual behaviour. Clause 50 gives reporters some discretion in this area, by making it clear that a disclosure by a child can be dealt with outside of the mandatory duty to report.

We know that, notwithstanding the introduction of this duty, young people may need some safe spaces to explore disclosures at their own pace or with a trusted adult. Clause 51 therefore confers a regulation-making power on the Home Secretary to exempt specific services from the duty on the exceptional basis where their function relates to the safety or protection of children, and where confidentiality is considered absolutely essential. This may be required to prevent services that provide confidential support and advice to children from closing ahead of the duties’ commencement, leaving significant gaps in safeguarding provision.

[Harriet Cross]

As we have heard, clause 48 introduces a carve-out to the reporting duty. It recognises that not all sexual activity involving under-18s is a cause for alarm or state intervention. Specifically, it lets professionals refrain from reporting consensual sexual activity between older teenagers when they believe there is no abuse or exploitation at play. It is basically a Romeo and Juliet exemption.

Sexual activity for under-16s is, as we know, illegal in law but without this clause, a teacher who learns of two 15-year-olds in a consensual relationship would legally be bound to report that as a child sexual offence. The clause empowers the teacher to use their professional judgment, but the exemption applies only where the reporter is satisfied that the relationship really is consensual and not appropriate to report given the circumstances.

The bar for not reporting should be high. As a safeguard, the clause explicitly says to consider the risk of harm. If there is any indication of harm or imbalance, the duty to report remains. For example, if a 14-year-old girl is sexually involved with a 17-year-old boy, even if she says she has consented, a teacher or adult might rightly feel uneasy about the power dynamic and the possible impact of grooming. The adult might decide that it is appropriate to report in that case. On the other hand, two 14-year-olds would likely fall under the exemption.

The exemption is not about condoning under-age sex; it is about proportionality. We know that in reality about one third of teens have some form of sexual contact before the age of 16. We do not want to criminalise young people unnecessarily or deter them from seeking healthcare or advice. For example, if a 15-year-old girl is pregnant by her 16-year-old boyfriend, without this exemption a doctor might feel compelled to report the boyfriend to the police. Clause 48 means that the doctor can exercise their judgment and focus on providing healthcare instead of a police report, as long as the relationship seems consensual and caring.

That approach aligns with what many safeguarding experts recommend: to include a competent, consensual peer exemption so that mandatory reporting does not overreach. It mirrors, for instance, the approach in some Australian states where similar laws exist. Those states carve out consensual peer activity from mandatory reporting to avoid inundating child protection with consensual cases.

Clause 49 is a twin provision to clause 48, addressing the fact that young people sometimes arrange sexual encounters with each other or share things such as intimate images. By the letter of the law, those actions can be offences, but it is not the intention of the mandatory reporting regime to treat those young people as perpetrators or victims of sexual abuse if it was consensual or equal. Clause 48 says that if a child is essentially facilitating a consensual act with another child of a similar age and there is no sign of harm or coercion, a professional is not obliged to report it.

Clause 50 acknowledges that children are sometimes the ones committing sexual harm and that in certain cases, the best way to protect everyone is to allow those children to seek help rather than immediately branding them as criminals. In short, if a teenager confides that they have done something sexually wrong with another teen, a teacher or counsellor can handle that sensitively without jumping straight to calling the police—as long as everyone involved is over the age of 13 and there is no acute risk requiring immediate intervention.

The guardrails are important. The exemption kicks in only if the other child involved in the incident is 13 years old or over. If a teenager admits harming a younger child who is 12 years old or under, that is considered so serious and a younger child so vulnerable that it must be reported.

The exemption is not a green flag to do nothing, but it gives an option to not report to the police. The expectation is that professional judgment will take precedent. How does the Minister envisage that professionals will handle such disclosures in practice? Obviously, if a child confesses to something such as date rape, even if that is not reported to the police, the school or agency must ensure that the victim is safe and supported. How will those situations be monitored?

--- Later in debate ---

[Jess Phillips]

Clause 52 introduces a separate criminal offence reserved for anyone who deliberately prevents or deters an individual from carrying out the duty through, for example, destroying or concealing evidence or applying pressure on an individual to prevent them reporting. The offence is punishable by up to seven years’ imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine. That will ensure that those with the greatest responsibility for organisational failures or cover-ups face the appropriate penalty for their action.

Hon. Members on both sides of the House have raised concerns about the lack of a criminal offence for people who fail to report. We do not think it appropriate or proportionate to create such a sanction, which may create a chilling effect where people are reluctant to volunteer with children or to enter certain professions because they fear being criminalised for making a mistake in an area that many people find very difficult to understand.

The purpose of mandatory reporting is to improve the protection of children while helping to create a culture of knowledge, confidence and openness among those most likely to be alerted to child sexual abuse. Its introduction is not intended to criminalise those working and volunteering with children, often in challenging circumstances, but we are determined for it to set high, consistent standards in identifying and responding to such abuse wherever it is found. That is why we consider it more appropriate for those who fail to discharge their duty to face referral to the Disclosure and Barring Service and the professional regulators where applicable. Those bodies can prevent individuals from working with children, so they potentially lose their livelihood, which is still a very serious consequence. That approach will reserve the greatest impact for the right cohorts of people.

[Harriet Cross]

Clause 52 makes it a serious criminal offence to cover up child sexual abuse by blocking a report. If any person—be it a headteacher, coach, priest or director of a care home—tries to stop someone else reporting suspected abuse, that person can be prosecuted and potentially imprisoned for up to seven years. We know from countless inquiries in the past that often the issue was not that frontline staff did not suspect; it was that they were silenced or ignored by those higher up.

Clause 52 squarely targets that kind of misconduct. Instead of being able to threaten or cajole an employee into staying silent, now the one doing the threatening will face severe consequences. The clause is not aimed at someone who, for example, in good faith decides to wait until tomorrow, when the child is in a safer place, to file a report. There is a defence precisely for making suggestions about timing when motivated by the child’s best interests. That covers a situation where, for example, immediate reporting might tip off an abuser and endanger a child. A supervisor might decide to first secure the child before reporting. That is okay—they can argue that that is in the child’s best interests, not an attempt at covering up. But anything beyond those well-intentioned timing considerations—any attempt to outright stop a report or permanently delay it—has no defence.

Clause 52 will apply not just within organisations but potentially to abusers themselves. If an abuser tries to threaten a mandated reporter into silence, that is also preventing a report. The clause should create a cultural backstop: everyone in an organisation will know that ordering a cover-up could land them in prison. It should therefore act as a strong deterrent.

[Jess Phillips]

I thank the hon. Lady for her support.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 52 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 53

Modification of Chapter for constables

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Jess Phillips]

The duty to report will apply to the police in a slightly different way, as they are both a category of reporter and a potential recipient of reports under the duty. There are also scenarios in which a police officer may encounter child sexual abuse in the course of a covert investigation, or be required to review a large volume of child sexual abuse material. Clause 53 therefore provides for some modifications to the new duty to ensure operational flexibility for police officers.

Clause 54 provides the ability to future-proof the mandatory reporting duty against the emergence of new functions or settings that it may be appropriate for the Government to consider. That is essential in recognition of the unique nature of child sexual abuse as a constantly evolving threat, including through the utilisation of technology and the internet.

Finally, Government amendment 15 adds the offence of preventing a report to schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015, removing the offence from the ambit of the statutory criminal defence in section 45 of that Act.

[Harriet Cross]

Clause 53 acknowledges that police officers operate under a different framework when it comes to responding to crimes. Quite sensibly, it modifies the mandatory reporting duty to fit their role. After all, we would not expect a police officer to file a report with themselves. If an officer learns of abuse, they are already empowered, and indeed obliged by their oath, to take investigative action directly.

The Bill here is technical, but the result is likely that a constable who has reason to suspect child abuse is considered to have complied with the duty so long as they handle it through the proper police channels, for example by recording it on their system, notifying their child protection unit or initiating an investigation. They would not have to make a separate notification to, for example, the local authority, as a teacher or doctor would. The police already have established protocols for involving social services in joint investigations.

Clause 54 is essentially a future-proofing and housekeeping part of the chapter. It gives the Secretary of State the ability, with Parliament’s approval, to amend the reporting regime as necessary. It also ties up loose ends by integrating new offences into related legislation. The regulation-making power means that if a list of relevant activities needs to be expanded, that can be done relatively easily. Of course, it is important that any changes undergo parliamentary scrutiny. Although we want flexibility, we must also ensure democratic oversight, given the sensitivity of the obligations. I note amendment 15, as I have the other Government amendments.

[Jess Phillips]

I am going to miss making amendments to put things in the schedule to the Modern Slavery Act when this is all done. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to

Clause 53 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 54

Powers to amend this Chapter, and consequential amendment

Amendment made: 15, in clause 54, page 55, line 31, at end insert—

“(3) In Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (offences to which defence in section 45 does not apply), in paragraph 36D (offences under the Crime and Policing Act 2025) (inserted by section 17), after the entry for section 38 (inserted by section 38), insert—

‘section 52 (preventing or deterring a person from complying with duty to report suspected child sex offence)’.”—(Jess Phillips.)

This amendment excepts the offence of preventing or deterring a person from complying with the duty to report a suspected child sex offence from the defence in section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

Clause 54, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 55

Guidance about disclosure of information by police for purpose of preventing sex offending

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Jess Phillips]

Clause 55 creates a power for the Secretary of State to issue statutory guidance to the police regarding their disclosure of information to prevent sexual offending.

Currently, the child sex offender disclosure scheme, also known as Sarah’s law, is the only guidance for the disclosure of information to prevent sexual harm. The clause will place the scheme on a statutory footing, bringing it in line with the domestic violence disclosure scheme. In so doing, it will help ensure greater consistency in the operation of the scheme across police forces. The Secretary of State will be able to use the power in clause 55 to issue further statutory guidance regarding the police’s disclosure of information to prevent sexual harm to other kinds of victim or in other circumstances.

[Harriet Cross]

Clause 55 includes guidance for disclosure of information to the police for the purpose of preventing sexual offending. It is vital that the police are able to obtain all information as quickly as possible to ensure that offences are prevented. Prevention is always better than cure, and that goes as much for sexual offences as it does for any other offence. We welcome this provision, in order to ensure that sexual offences can be prevented and to give police the necessary powers.

[Jess Phillips]

I thank the hon. Lady for her comments, and I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 55 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Keir Mather.)