Crime and Policing Bill (Eighth sitting)

Alex Davies-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th April 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)]

I beg to move amendment 14, in clause 42, page 46, line 31, at end insert—

“(7) In Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (offences to which defence in section 45 does not apply), in paragraph 33 (offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003), after the entry for section 10 insert—

‘section 11 (engaging in sexual activity in presence of child)’.”

This amendment excepts the offence of engaging in sexual activity in the presence of a child from the defence in section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell.

The clause makes a series of important changes to the existing criminal law by amending a number of serious sexual offences in the Sexual Offences Act 2003. Consequently, I am delighted to talk about the clause, to explain what it does and its importance, and to give a little of the interesting history behind the law in the area, which I hope will inform the Committee.

The key legislation, which we will debate throughout the passage of the Bill, is the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which followed a full and extensive consultation entitled, “Setting the Boundaries”, and significantly modernised and strengthened the laws on sexual offences in England and Wales, mainly to provide extra protection for children from sexual abuse and sexual exploitation. The 2003 Act amalgamated and replaced elements of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, the Indecency with Children Act 1960 and the Sex Offenders Act 1997.

The 2003 Act was the first major overhaul of sexual offences legislation for more than a century, and it set out a strong, clear and modern approach to this sensitive area of the law. The Act set clear limits and boundaries about behaviour with children, and reflects what we know today about the patterns and impact of sexual abuse in childhood. It was designed to meet the 21st-century challenges of protecting children, and applies to issues such as internet pornography and grooming children for sexual abuse. The Act also contained measures against abuse by people who work with children, and updated the laws on sexual abuse within families, acknowledging that children can be at risk from within families.

All those measures were designed to provide a clear and effective set of laws to deter and punish abusers, giving the police and the courts the up-to-date offences that they needed to do their job, while ensuring that children have the strongest possible protection under the law. The Act widened the definition of some offences —for example, bringing the non-consensual penile penetration of the mouth within the definition of rape under section 1 of the Act. It created new offences for behaviour that was not previously covered specifically by an offence—for example, the paying for the sexual service of a child and voyeurism. It also extended the age covered by certain offences against children from 16 to 18 and, importantly, gave additional protection to vulnerable adults. The Act provides rightly robust sentences that reflect the seriousness of the offending.

“Setting the Boundaries” was a groundbreaking review, covering some of the most heinous and disturbing areas of offending. The then Home Secretary, Jack Straw, who commissioned the review, stressed that point when he wrote in the review’s foreword:

“Rape and other sexual offences of all kinds are dreadful crimes which deeply affect the lives of victims and their families, and whole communities. Modernising and strengthening the law can make a direct contribution to our aim of creating a safe, just and tolerant society. We give particular priority to the protection of children, and welcome the emphasis the review has given to increasing this protection and also that of vulnerable people.”

He went on to say that he

“set up the review to consider the existing law on sex offences, and to make recommendations for clear and coherent offences that protect individuals, especially children and the more vulnerable, from abuse and exploitation, and enable abusers to be appropriately punished.”

The review’s

“recommendations also had to be fair and non-discriminatory in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act.”

Today, the Government remain of the view that our priority is to ensure that the public, including society’s most vulnerable, are given the full protection that the law is capable of offering. It is vital that society is protected from the scourge of sexual abuse, manipulation and exploitation in all of its forms. Children, of course, require additional protection from that awful offending. It is vital that we ensure that the criminal law is kept fully up to date in this area to ensure the safety of vulnerable young people.

With regards to children, the review itself acknowledged:

“The criminal law performs a vital role in society by setting standards of acceptable and unacceptable conduct. In making certain types of sexual behaviour criminal, the law provides protection, and supports and maintains the boundaries of acceptable behaviour in the family and community. Children need particular protection in the field of sexual relations because they are physically and emotionally dependent and not yet fully physically or psychologically mature. The law has long held that children are not, and should not, be able to consent to any form of sexual activity in the same way as adults.”

Indeed, the response to the review’s initial invitation to contribute ideas as of January 1999 overwhelmingly supported increasing the level of protection from sexual abuse available to children.

In addition, the review found that:

“The victims of sexual violence and coercion are mainly women. They must be offered protection and redress, and the law must ensure that male victims/survivors are protected too…The law must make special provision for those who are too young or otherwise not able to look after themselves and offer greater protection to children and vulnerable people within the looser structures of modern families.”

That still remains the case. We must continue to ensure that the criminal law keeps up to date with developments, and ensure that police, prosecutors and the courts are fully equipped to deal with this grave offending. We need to offer full protection to victims of such appalling abuse and exploitation.

The review recommended that as a matter of public policy the age of legal consent should remain at 16. However, to provide further protection for younger children, the review recommended that the law:

“setting out specific offences against children should state that below the age of 13 a child cannot effectively consent to sexual activity”.

As a result, the 2003 Act contains a range of offences that target specifically those who sexually abuse children under the age of 13 years. For example, sections 5 to 8 of the 2003 Act provide a range of offences capturing sexual activity with a child under 13, and it is very clear that consent in these offences is irrelevant. A child under 13 does not, under any circumstances, have the legal capacity to consent to any form of sexual activity.

Those under-13 offences overlap to a very significant extent with the child sex offences at sections 9 to 15 of the 2003 Act, which are designed to protect children under 16. This is to ensure that the criminal law provides the youngest and most vulnerable in society with protection from sexual abuse, and in doing so provides higher maximum sentences for these very serious offences. Under-13 offences are offences of strict liability as to age. The prosecution must prove only two facts: first, that there was intentional sexual activity, and secondly, the age of the complainant at the date of the sexual activity—for example, by a certified copy of a birth certificate, together with evidence of identity.

The principle of strict liability as to age for victims under 13 years old is reflected in the terms of other sexual offences in the 2003 Act. That includes section 11 of the Act, the offence of engaging in sexual activity with a child. That particular offence is one that will be directly amended and affected by provisions proposed in clause 42. While the 2003 Act—and the many amendments and additions to that legislation over the years, rightly championed by Members across this House—provided robust offences to deal with sexual abuse, we are introducing provisions to tighten up the law further to ensure additional protection for those who need it.

Broadly, we are amending and thereby strengthening the current suite of offences that apply where a person engages in sexual activity in the presence of a specified individual, for example child or, in certain circumstances, a person with a mental disorder. Our provisions will amend and toughen up the following offences in the Sexual Offences Act 2003: section 11, “Engaging in sexual activity in presence of child”; section 18, “Abuse of position of trust: sexual activity in presence of child”; section 32, “Engaging in sexual activity in presence of person with mental disorder impeding choice”; section 36, “Engaging in sexual activity in presence, procured by inducement, threat or deception, of person with mental disorder”; and section 40, “Care workers: sexual activity in presence of person with mental disorder”.

For example, it is currently a criminal offence under section 11 of the 2003 Act for a person, “A”, to intentionally engage in sexual activity to gain sexual gratification when a child under the age of 16, “B”, is present or is in a place from which A can be observed, but currently only when A knows or believes that B is aware—or intends that they be aware—that A is engaging in the sexual activity. This offence carries a maximum 10 years’ imprisonment and sexual offender management requirements. Significantly, this offence does not allow a defence of reasonable belief in age if the child is under 13.

The issue of concern here, and with the range of similar offences that I have listed, is the requirement that the defendant should know or believe that the victim is aware of his behaviour, or intend that the victim should be aware of the relevant activity. These requirements may initially appear reasonable. However, they mean this offence would not, for example, capture those who commit sexual activity in the presence of a child for sexual gratification, and who obtain such gratification from the presence of the child—even if the child is apparently unaware of the activity happening in their presence. If the defendant is performing a sexual act in the presence of a child who is asleep and gains sexual gratification from that mere presence, he cannot be charged under the existing section 11 offence; nor, for example, could he be charged for his behaviour if the child was pretending to be asleep—even pretending out of sheer terror—while aware of the appalling behaviour being carried out, if the defendant believed the child to be asleep and therefore unaware of what was going on.

I am sure hon. Members will agree that the criminal law being unable to prosecute such behaviour in this example scenario is unacceptable. The Government strongly believe this flaw must be rectified as a matter of urgency, to ensure that children and other specific groups of the most vulnerable in our society are protected by the criminal law and not denied justice should they become victims of such behaviour.

These amendments are not mere technicalities, nor are they addressing pseudo-philosophical “What if?” scenarios. They are a direct and swift response to concerns expressed by those on the frontline: the police, who have to come face-to-face with the consequences of this disturbing and damaging offending.

We have listened carefully to those on the frontline who are dealing with this awful behaviour. They have provided us with evidence of the difficulties in prosecuting a small number of nevertheless worrying cases, in which it was clear that the perpetrator engaged in the sexual activity because they obtained sexual gratification from a child’s mere presence, but where there was insufficient evidence that the perpetrator knew, believed, or intended that the child was aware of the sexual activity.

These things are happening now. Such offenders are slipping through the net. It may only be in small numbers, but that is irrelevant when dealing with this level of offending and exploitation. This disturbing, unpleasant and damaging behaviour must not go unchecked by the justice system or by the law. It must not go unpunished. Our provisions will ensure that the law is able to make sure that it does not.

We believe it is entirely wrong that, for example, a defendant masturbating while standing next to a child’s bed—to obtain sexual gratification from the child’s presence—cannot be convicted if they successfully argue they did not believe the child was aware of the sexual activity. In such a case we think it is entirely right that the person should be guilty of a criminal offence. We also want to ensure that these behaviours are capable of being prosecuted in future. This is not just to bring offenders to justice but, importantly, to be able to manage these sexual offenders when they are eventually released into the community, and to prevent further offending, where there is specifically potential for further sexual offences against children or vulnerable adults.

It is clear that some people may legitimately engage in sexual activity in the presence of a child—say a couple who live in a one-bedroom flat and by necessity have to sleep with a baby or very young child in the room. Others may have to have a young child in the room for the monitoring of health problems and so forth. We can all think of legitimate examples. I must make it clear that we do not want to criminalise those people who engage in sexual activity in the presence of a child but not for the purposes of obtaining sexual gratification from the child’s presence. In those circumstances, the presence of the child is purely incidental. We have deliberately drafted our provisions to ensure that those people will not be criminalised.

To exclude such behaviour from being captured within the relevant range of offences, we have retained the requirement for a direct link between the purpose of obtaining sexual gratification and the activity occurring in the child’s presence. I hope that that assures hon. Members that our provisions have been carefully crafted to rightly exclude those who may legitimately engage in sexual activity when a child is merely present. The Government’s intention with this clause is to capture the criminally culpable, not the innocent.

Government amendment 12 seems a relatively modest amendment but, again, it is an important one. It adds the offence of sexual activity in the presence of a child at section 11 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to schedule 4 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. The effect of this amendment is to thereby remove the section 11 offence from the ambit of the statutory criminal defence available at section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. I hope that I have convinced hon. Members of the importance of these provisions and of the necessity for swift action on our part.

Sexual offending, particularly against children and the most vulnerable, is a deeply distressing area of the law, and one that I know affects even legislators when considering reform, as we are today in this Committee. Over the years, the nature of sexual abuse, offending, manipulation and exploitation has changed, and it continues to change. Alongside the changing nature of offending, with which the law must keep up, gaps in the existing law are coming to light, highlighting those cases where serious offenders may be able to slip through the net of even the most well-intentioned and crafted drafting.

--- Later in debate ---

[Harriet Cross (Gordon and Buchan) (Con)]

As we have heard, clause 42 effectively incorporates provisions that had been included in the Criminal Justice Bill and is a key provision concerning sexual offences, specifically focusing on the offence of engaging in sexual activity in the presence of a child.

The clause makes an important amendment to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which forms a core legislative framework addressing sexual offences in the UK. In particular, clause 42 expands on the existing provisions to enhance the protection of children from sexual exploitation and harm.

Under the Sexual Offences Act, certain sexual offences are committed when a child is involved, such as sexual activity involving children, or causing or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity. However, one area that has been highlighted for reform involves situations where a child might be exposed to sexual activity in a way that, while not directly involving them in the act, still results in harm.

Prior to the introduction of clause 42, the law did not adequately address situations where a child was the passive observer of a sexual activity. For instance, in scenarios where an adult or adults engage in sexual activity with each other in the presence of a child, the law might not have captured this activity as an offence, despite the potential psychological harm to the child. Clause 42 seeks to close this gap by making it an offence for an adult to engage in sexual activity in the presence of a child. This means that any sexual activity taking place in the physical presence of a child, even if the child is not directly involved in the sexual conduct, could now result in criminal liability.

The clause expands the scope of existing sexual offence laws to include situations that may not necessarily involve the direct participation of the child, but still expose the child to inappropriate activity or material that could be damaging to their wellbeing.

Clause 42 also sees parallel offences involving sexual activity in the presence of a person with a mental disorder, impeding their choice, and similar provisions in the Sexual Offences Act. Those individuals, too, might not fully understand the sexual nature of what the offender is doing. Previously, there might have been the same issue with the law of requiring awareness. Clause 42 offers a broad safeguard for those who cannot consent or comprehend.

The clause seeks to offer further protection for children by recognising the potential harm caused by exposure to sexual activity, even if it is not directed at them. The law would now acknowledge that witnessing such an act could have a detrimental impact on the child’s emotional, physiological, psychological or developmental health.

Although we support the clause, I seek clarity from the Minister on a couple of points. In situations where sexual activity takes place in private or behind closed doors, it might be difficult to establish whether a child was present or the extent of their exposure to the activity. Proving the impact on the child could also be challenging, particularly where psychological harm or emotional distress is not immediately apparent. What discussions has the Minister had on that matter? I note that, as we have discussed a number of times today, Government amendment 14 carves out an important exception of the offence from the defence in section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

Clause 42 represents an important development in child protection law. At present, as the Minister has said, an offence is committed only where a person knows or believes that the child or person with a mental disorder is aware of the activity, or where a person intends that the child or person with a mental disorder be aware of the activity.

The provisions will amend these offences to capture situations where, for the purpose of sexual gratification, a person intentionally engages in sexual activity in the presence of a child, even if they do not intend for the child to be aware of the activity. The examples covered by this amendment are clearly heinous, and we welcome the clause.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I welcome the hon. Lady’s comments and the fact that the Opposition welcome the clause to close this loophole to protect children and the most vulnerable.

Hopefully I have outlined how we carefully crafted the clause to ensure that we do not capture those who innocently engage in sexual activity in the presence of a child, and not for the purposes of sexual gratification. We do not want to criminalise those who have to share a bedroom with a baby, a young child or somebody with a health condition, and are not seeking sexual gratification from engaging in sexual activity in the presence of a child. We have worked very closely with partners and stakeholders to ensure the law is crafted carefully so that we do not criminalise those people. The clause seeks to criminalise only those perpetrators who seek to gain sexual gratification from the presence of a child, whether the child knows or not.

I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.

Amendment 14 agreed to.

Clause 42, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 43

Child sex offences: grooming aggravating factor

[Harriet Cross]

I beg to move amendment 42, in clause 43, page 48, line 23, at end insert—

“70B Group-based sexual grooming of a child

(1) This section applies where—

(a) a court is considering the seriousness of a specified child sex offences,

(b) the offence is aggravated by group-based grooming, and

(c) the offender was aged 18 or over when the offence was committed.

(2) The court—

(a) must treat the fact that the offence is aggravated by group-based grooming as an aggravated factor, and

(b) must state in court that the offence is so aggravated.

(3) An offence is ‘aggravated by group-based grooming’ if—

(a) the offence was facilitated by, or involved, the offender, who was involved in group-based grooming, or

(b) the offence was facilitated by, or involved, a person other than the offender grooming a person under the age of 18 and the offender knew, or could have reasonably been expected to know that said person was participating, or facilitating group-based grooming, or

(c) the offender intentionally arranges or facilitates something that the offender intends to do, intends another person to do, or believes that another person will do, in order to participate in group-based grooming.

(4) In this section ‘specified child sex offence’ means—

(a) an offence within any of subsections (5) to (7), or

(b) an inchoate offence in relation to any such offence.

(5) An offence is within this subsection if it is—

(a) an offence under section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978 (taking etc indecent photograph of child),

(b) an offence under section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (possession of indecent photograph of child),

(c) an offence under any of sections 5 to 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape and other offences against children under 13),

(d) an offence under any sections 9 to 12 of that Act (other child sex offences),

(e) an offence under section 14 of that Act (arranging or facilitating commission of child sex offence),

(f) an offence under any of sections 16 to 19 of that Act (abuse of position of trust),

(g) an offence under section 25 or 26 of that Act (familial child sex offences), or

(h) an offence under any of sections 47 to 50 of that Act (sexual exploitation of children).

(6) An offence is within this subsection if it is—

(a) an offence under any of sections 1 to 4 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape, assault and causing sexual activity without consent),

(b) an offence under any of sections 30 to 41 of that Act (sexual offences relating to persons with mental disorder),

(c) an offence under any of sections 61 to 63 of that Act (preparatory offences), or

(d) an offence under any of sections 66 to 67A of that Act (exposure and voyeurism),

and the victim or intended victim was under the age of 18.

(7) An offence is within this subsection if it is an offence under section 71 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sexual activity in a public lavatory) and a person involved in the activity in question was under the age of 18.

(8) For the purposes of this section—

(a) ‘group-based grooming’ is defined as a group of at least three adults whose purpose or intention is to commit a sexual offence against the same victim or group of victims who are under 18, or could reasonably be expected to be under 18.”.

This amendment would introduce a specific aggravating factor in sentencing for those who participate in, or facilitate, group-based sexual offending.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I thank the Opposition Front Benchers for tabling amendment 42 and new clauses 47 to 49. I also thank hon. Members for their contributions to the debate—in particular, the hon. Member for Windsor, who gave a thoughtful contribution, and my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff West, a good friend who has worked his entire career to ensure that victims get the justice they deserve. His passionate contribution to the debate reminds us all exactly why we are here in this place: to deliver for victims of these heinous crimes, to make sure that the perpetrators receive the full force of the law, and to ensure that any gaps in legislation and recommendations of inquiries are followed through with. That is exactly what we are doing today.

Before I respond to the amendments, I will explain the rationale for clause 43. I am pleased to speak to it, and I know that its provisions have been welcomed by hon. Members across the House. In recent years, there have been a number of high-profile cases involving so-called grooming gangs—groups of offenders involved in heinous child sexual exploitation—including those in Rotherham, Telford, Newcastle, Rochdale and Oxford. In February 2022, the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse recommended

“the strengthening of the response of the criminal justice system by…amending the Sentencing Act 2020 to provide a mandatory aggravating factor in sentencing those convicted of offences relating to the sexual exploitation of children.”

The Government want to ensure that the sentencing framework reflects the seriousness of child sexual abuse and exploitation. In January, the Home Secretary committed to

“legislate to make grooming an aggravating factor in the sentencing of child sexual offences, because the punishment must fit the terrible crime”.—[Official Report, 6 January 2025; Vol. 759, c. 632.]

Clause 43 will require courts to consider grooming an aggravating factor when sentencing for specified child sex offences, including rape and sexual assault. It will capture offenders whose offending is facilitated by, or involves, the grooming of a person under 18. The grooming itself need not be sexual.

The measure will capture models of exploitation not currently directly addressed by existing culpability factors. It will create an obligation on courts to aggravate sentences where the offence has been facilitated by grooming undertaken by either the offender or a third party, for example where an offender assaults a victim who has been groomed by another member of a grooming gang. It will also capture instances where grooming is undertaken against a third party, for example where a victim has been groomed to recruit others.

The measure requires the courts to consider grooming an aggravating factor when sentencing in relation to any of the listed child sex offences. However, I must be clear that it will be in the court’s discretion to consider grooming an aggravating factor when sentencing for any offence, where it is relevant to the offending, regardless of the age of the victim.

I understand that the Opposition’s intention with their amendment 42 is to require courts to consider group-based grooming as a specific aggravating factor when sentencing sexual offences committed against children. Clause 43 already requires courts to consider grooming an aggravating factor when sentencing for specified child sex offences. This includes, but is not limited to, offences facilitated by or involving the group-based grooming of a child. An aggravating factor makes an offence more serious and must be considered by the court when deciding the length of the sentence.

The Sentencing Council’s overarching guidelines make

“offence committed as part of a group”

an aggravating factor. That means that, when sentencing for grooming gang offences, a court will be able to aggravate the offence to take into account the grooming behaviour, and then additionally aggravate the offence to take into account the fact that the offending was committed as part of a group. An aggravating factor for group-based grooming, as proposed in amendment 42, would be likely to have a more limited application, as the court could not apply the factor unless it was satisfied that the offender was a member of a group, which may be difficult to prove.

Clause 43 will go further than existing sentencing guidelines, by capturing models of group-based exploitation that are not currently directly addressed by grooming high-culpability factors. It will create an obligation on courts to aggravate sentences in instances where the offence has been facilitated by grooming undertaken by either the offender or a third party, for example where an offender assaults a victim who has been groomed by another member of a grooming gang or group. It will also capture instances where grooming is undertaken against a third party, for example where a victim has been groomed to recruit others. For that reason, I urge Opposition Members not to press amendment 42.

New clause 47 seeks to establish a statutory national inquiry into grooming gangs. It therefore seeks to revisit the questions considered by the seven-year-long independent inquiry into child sexual abuse. During the passage of the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill, the Opposition tabled similar amendments—maybe even identical ones—on the basis that the independent inquiry “barely touches on” grooming gangs.

IICSA, as is common practice for a public inquiry, involved a series of smaller inquiries and investigations of different strands. One of those inquiries was on child sexual exploitation by organised networks—the entire focus of that inquiry was grooming gangs. It took two years and reported three years ago, in February 2022. It is clear from cross-refencing new clause 47 with the scope of the previous investigations into grooming gangs that it seeks to revisit questions already examined by the inquiry. For example, subsection (2)(a) of the new clause seeks an inquiry into grooming gangs to

“identify common patterns of behaviour and offending”.

However, the scope of the previous grooming gangs inquiry states that it will investigate “the nature” of sexual exploitation by grooming gangs. I could go on and on.

If we continue to call for inquiry after inquiry along the same lines, we will undermine the whole system of public inquiries, including public trust in them and public tolerance for the resources of the state that they demand. Therefore, rather than engage in gesture politics by re-running inquiries without the evidence and data that we need, it makes sense to take the Government’s approach, with Baroness Louise Casey’s audit there to fill in the gaps that have already been identified by the previous inquiry. That audit is well under way, as we heard today in the Chamber from my hon. Friend the Safeguarding Minister, and it will report in due course.

The Government are also setting up a new victims and survivors panel, not just to guide Ministers on the design, delivery and implementation of the plans of IICSA, but to produce wider work on child sexual exploitation and abuse. Elsewhere in the Bill, we are making it mandatory to report child sexual abuse, and we will be making it an offence to prevent such reports from being made, as well as introducing further measures to tackle those organising online child sex abuse. As I have set out, we are legislating to make grooming an aggravating factor in sentencing for child sexual offences.

New clause 48 seeks to identify the ethnicity of members of grooming gangs and require regular reporting on the same. The 2022 inquiry into grooming gangs identified widespread failure to record the ethnicity of perpetrators and victims, and inconsistency of definitions in the data, which has meant that the limited research available relies on poor-quality data. The child sexual exploitation police taskforce already collects and publishes ethnicity data on group-based child sexual exploitation. However, we are committed to improving that data, and we have asked the taskforce to expand the ethnicity data that it collects and publishes. Baroness Casey’s audit will also look to uncover the gaps in current knowledge and understanding of grooming gang crimes, including ethnicity, which will inform our future work.

Finally, new clause 49 would require ethnicity data on sex offenders to be published on a quarterly and yearly basis. The ethnicity of those convicted of sex offences is already available in the “outcomes by offence” data tool. The data is published by the Ministry of Justice quarterly, and it is available in the public domain. The new clause would, in effect, require the duplication of data that is already available pertaining to the ethnicity of convicted sex offenders.

In conclusion, not only are new clauses 47 to 49 unnecessary, but they detract from the Government’s vital work to tackle the crimes of grooming gangs and other sex offenders. On that basis, I respectfully ask the hon. Member for Gordon and Buchan not to move them when they are reached later in our proceedings.

[Harriet Cross]

I will keep my comments brief. I thank everyone who has contributed; I appreciate that this issue raises tensions. I know that no matter what side of the House we are on and no matter what angle we come at this from, everyone wants what is best for children and to prevent any sort of gang-based grooming or sexual violence against them. Any approach we can take to prevent that is one that we should consider. I listened to every word that the hon. Member for Cardiff West said and I understand it, but anything we are able to do to make a difference, I want done. I do not care which side of the House does it—I really do not.