Crime and Policing Bill (Sixth sitting)

Harriet Cross Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 3rd April 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. In the majority of these cases, I would hazard a guess that offenders are likely to receive sentences that could have been delivered more swiftly and cost-effectively by magistrates. I am not suggesting that the proposed law will directly hinder the police in their work, or directly lead to worse outcomes; however, I can see no likely benefit to come from additional costs and additional delays being introduced to the system.

Shoplifting cases below £200 can be—and are—dealt with effectively by the police. If that is not case in some areas, it should be a matter for operational improvement, not new legislation. Does the Minister know a single police force in the country that has a policy of not pursuing shoplifters for products under £200 in value? Also, do the Government believe that trying crimes under £200 as summary offences, or in the magistrates court, meant that they were effectively decriminalised? If so, why is the offence of assaulting a retail worker a summary-only offence?

I am sure we can play the politics of the backlog in the Crown court and have a long discussion about the cause and effect. I know that Government Members appreciated my brevity this morning, so I am keen to focus on the important measures in the Bill. The backlogs are real, and making them worse will have real consequences. At the end of September 2024, the backlog stood at an unprecedented high of 73,105 open cases. The Public Accounts Committee report examined that issue, with the Ministry of Justice acknowledging that

“unless action is taken, the backlog will continue to increase for the foreseeable future, even with the courts system working at maximum capacity.”

During oral evidence, there were significant discussions about the impact of clause 16, particularly on the Crown court. Oliver Sells spoke about the clause during the evidence session and he stated:

“I recognise that there is a great public anxiety about this particular issue. Shoplifting has become endemic and almost non-criminal at the same time. It is a curious dichotomy, it seems to me, but I do not think for a moment—I am sorry to be critical—that making theft from a shop, irrespective of value, triable either way is the right answer. What that will do, inevitably, is push some of these cases up into the Crown court from the magistrates court.

I understand the reasons behind it and the concerns of the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers and the like. However, I think it is the wrong way. One of the things we must do now in this country is reinforce the use and the range of magistrates courts, and bring them back to deal with serious low-level crimes that are very frequent in their areas. They know how to deal with them. They need the powers to deal with them. I still do not think their range of powers is strong enough. You need to take cases such as these out of the Crown court, in my judgment. I think it is a serious mistake. I can see why people want to do it”––[Official Report, Crime and Policing Public Bill Committee, 27 March 2025; c. 17, Q25.]

[Harriet Cross (Gordon and Buchan) (Con)]

At the evidence session last Thursday, the witnesses that we spoke to about this issue said that the magistrates court was the most appropriate place for these cases to be heard. Given they are the people who know the system best, we should certainly take that evidence onboard.

[Matt Vickers]

I think the measure probably comes from a very good place, if the Government really believe that police forces are not taking the action that they should on the theft of goods whose value is under £200, which people have described as being decriminalised. I do not think there is any evidence for that actually being the case, because 90% of such charges relate to goods under the value of £200. All police forces in the country, as far as I understand, have a policy of still going after people, even if the value of the goods is under £200. I do not know that this clause will solve the problem, but it could well create a problem in pushing so much to the Crown court.

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(ab) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine or both.”—(Jo Platt.)

[Harriet Cross]

Amendment 1, tabled by the hon. Member for Neath and Swansea East (Carolyn Harris), seeks to increase the increase the penalty on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for life. That would bring the punishment for child criminal exploitation in line with the maximum sentences for crimes such as murder, hostage taking, armed robbery, or possession of a class A drug with intent to supply. Life imprisonment is typically reserved for the most serious crimes, where society wishes to ensure public safety, deliver justice for victims and sufficiently punish perpetrators. Amendment 1 seems a reasonable amendment considering the devastating impact that CCE has on individual children, communities and crime levels across the UK.

Child criminal exploitation is a coward’s crime committed by those willing to engage in criminal activities such as drug and weapon dealing yet unprepared to get their own hands dirty. They instead prefer to put children, often very vulnerable and impressionable ones, in harm’s way, exposing them to crime and in many cases sentencing them to a life of crime. The impact on these children is multifaceted, up to and including their own death. Of course, consideration is needed of the impact of life imprisonment on prison places and resources, but it is vital where there is a need to, first, properly punish and, secondly, deter perpetrators of child criminal exploitation with a sentence commensurate to the scale of the crime.

[Matt Vickers]

This amendment would significantly increase the maximum penalty for offences outlined in clause 17 by removing the existing penalties in subsections (3)(a) and (3)(b) and replacing them with stricter sentencing provisions. The amendment would introduce life imprisonment as the maximum penalty for those convicted on indictment in the Crown court, while maintaining the ability of the magistrates court to impose a sentence up to the general limit, a fine, or both for summary convictions.

The effect of the amendment would be to significantly strengthen the legal consequences for those found guilty of child criminal exploitation, the worst of the worst offences. By allowing for life imprisonment, the amendment underscores the grave nature of these offences, bringing them in line with other serious criminal acts that warrant the highest level of sentencing. Punitive measures play a crucial role in both deterring criminal behaviour and ensuring the protection of society, particularly when dealing with serious offences, such as child criminal exploitation. Strong sentencing frameworks serve as a clear warning that such crimes will not be tolerated, dissuading potential offenders from engaging in illegal activities due to the fear of severe consequences. By imposing harsh penalties, including lengthy prison sentences, the justice system sends an unambiguous message: those who exploit, coerce or harm others, especially vulnerable individuals such as children, will face the full force of the law.

The amendment would act as a preventive mechanism, discouraging not only the individuals directly involved in criminal activity but those who may be considering engaging in similar offences. Punitive measures are essential for protecting victims and the wider public. By ensuring that offenders face substantial consequences, the justice system helps to incapacitate dangerous individuals, preventing them from reoffending and reducing the risk to others. That is particularly important in cases where offenders pose a long-term threat, such as organised criminal networks involved in child exploitation.

Furthermore, the retention of the magistrates court’s ability to impose a lesser penalty ensures there is proportionality in sentencing, allowing for differentiation between varying levels of criminal involvement. This approach ensures that although the most serious offenders may face life imprisonment, lesser offenders are still subject to significant penalties without overburdening the Crown court system. Ultimately, the amendment seeks to deliver a strong message of deterrence, making it clear that child criminal exploitation will not be tolerated and that those who commit such offences will face the harshest legal consequences available under UK law.

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I reassure the Committee and other Members indirectly that the Government fully support the intention behind new clause 8, and are committed to taking steps to ensure that victims of child exploitation are identified and receive the support they need. However, we simply do not consider that a statutory definition is the best way to achieve that aim.

[Harriet Cross]

Clause 17 creates a new stand-alone offence to prosecute adults committing child criminal exploitation, to prevent exploitative conduct committed by adults against children from occurring or re-occurring. Child criminal exploitation is a heinous crime targeting young, vulnerable and impressionable children in a range of ways, which too often leads to the child being criminalised, endangered, injured or even killed.

The 2018 serious violence strategy defined child criminal exploitation as occurring where

“an individual or group takes advantage of an imbalance of power to coerce, control, manipulate or deceive a child or young person under the age of 18… The victim may have been criminally exploited even if the activity appears consensual. Child Criminal Exploitation does not always involve physical contact; it can also occur through the use of technology.”

As per that definition, the criminal exploitation of children often sees them coerced, compelled, groomed or forced to take part in the supply of drugs and transportation of the associated money and weapons for the perpetrator. In England, the latest children in need census data for assessments in the year ending 31 March 2024 recorded 15,750 episodes in which child criminal exploitation was identified as a concern. There were 10,180 episodes in which children being part of a street or organised crime gang was identified as being a concern.

Perhaps the example of child criminal exploitation that is referred to most frequently involves county line gangs. County lines is a risky, violent and exploitative form of contraband distribution, largely and mainly of drugs. County lines commonly uses children, young people or even vulnerable adults, who are perceived as being either indebted to or misled by those running the operation. They are instructed to deliver and/or store drugs, weapons, and money for dealers or users locally, across established county lines, or on to anywhere that can be considered as “not their turf”.

Police data published by the National County Lines Co-ordination Centre in its county lines strategic threat risk assessment showed that 22%—more than one in five—of individuals involved in county lines in 2023-24 were children, which is equivalent to 2,888 children. The risk assessment also found that most children involved in county lines are aged 15 to 17, and that they are mainly recorded as undertaking the most dangerous runner or workforce roles in the drugs supply chain and linked to exploitation. However, such exploitation can be difficult to identify, so we welcome any move to crack down on child criminal exploitation, shine a light on this crime, and better equip those working on the frontline to identify, tackle and prevent more children from being exploited for criminal intent.

Clause 17 makes it an offence for anyone over the age of 18 to engage

“in conduct towards or in respect of a child, with the intention of causing the child to engage in criminal conduct”,

or where the child is under 13 or where the perpetrator

“does not reasonably believe that the child is aged 18 or over.”

A person who commits an offence will be tried with child criminal exploitation being an either-way offence and will be liable for an imprisonment or a fine, or both.

I ask the Minister to reflect on the suitability of using the age of 13 and under. Why was that age chosen, rather than an older age—say, 15 or 16? What discussions has she had with the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Assembly in the light of the fact that CCE—especially county lines—does not recognise or care about internal land or maritime borders?

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This is a comprehensive set of provisions to prevent the criminal exploitation of children and ultimately help to safeguard those at risk. I commend them to the Committee.

[Harriet Cross]

Clause 18 creates a new regime for child criminal exploitation prevention orders. A CCEPO is a new civil order that enables prohibitions or requirements to be imposed by courts on individuals involved in CCE to protect children from harm from criminal exploitation by preventing future offending.

A CCEPO will be obtained via a number of routes, including an order from a magistrates court following an application by a chief officer of the police—including the British Transport police and the Ministry of Defence police—or the director general of the NCA. An order may also be made by a court—for example, a magistrates court, the Crown court or, in limited cases, the Court of Appeal—on its own volition at the end of criminal proceedings in situations where the defendant has been acquitted of the offence, the court has made a finding that the defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity, or the defendant is under a disability such that they are unfit to be tried but has done the act charged.

CCEPOs will be reserved for defendants aged 18 and over where the court is satisfied that they have engaged in CCE. According to subsection (5), for a court to hand down a CCEPO, it must also consider that there is a risk that the defendant will seek to cause children, or any particular children, to engage in criminal conduct. Will the Minister confirm whether a defendant can therefore be given a CCEPO only if it is considered that they will repeat offend—that is, re-engage in CCE—or can a CCEPO be handed down regardless of the potential for or expectation of future offending? Is having previously engaged in CCE enough of an indicator to suggest a risk of future offending?

Clause 19 details what a CCEPO is and what it does and does not do. The nature of any condition imposed is a matter for the court to determine. These conditions could include limiting a defendant’s ability to work with children, contact specific people online or in person, or go to a certain area, as well as requiring them to attend a drug awareness class. The conditions may also require the defendant to comply with a notification order, as detailed in clause 24, which I will address later.

We must be clear that no one can accidentally engage in child criminal exploitation. Those receiving a CCEPO will have knowingly endangered, threatened, misled and vilified children in pursuit of their own criminality, and there will be a risk to the public that they will do so again. These people are ruthless and the full force of the law is needed to prevent future offending.

Subsection (4) states:

“A prohibition or requirement applies throughout the United Kingdom”.

I welcome that, but can the Minister detail how this will be enforced across the devolved nations? If extra resource is required, will it be made available to the devolved nations? What conversations has she had with our devolved Parliaments, Assemblies and police forces about this?

Subsection (7) provides that where a person is made subject to a new CCEPO, any existing CCEPO will cease to exist. We strongly believe that anyone being handed multiple concurrent or successive CCEPOs must be subject to stronger conditions and punishments—otherwise, what is to deter them from reoffending? Will the severity of successive CCEPOs be at the discretion of the court? How does the initial CCEPO lapsing on receipt of the second deliver justice for victims of the initial offence for which a CCEPO was handed down? What is the punishment for breaking the terms of a CCEPO, and how will it be enforced? How long can CCEPOs be handed down for? The Bill prescribes a minimum of two years. What is the escalation should a single defendant receive repeated CCEPOs?

Clause 20 sets out the practical mechanisms for obtaining these new prevention orders. It sensibly restricts the power to apply for a CCEPO to our law enforcement bodies—chiefly, the police and the National Crime Agency. That is appropriate, because decisions to seek an order will rely on police intelligence about who is grooming children into crime, and we would not want just anyone to be able to drag individuals to court without solid evidence. Placing this responsibility with senior officers looks as though it will ensure that applications are vetted by those with the expertise to judge the risk someone poses.

I note that the clause specifically includes British Transport police and MOD police alongside regional forces. That is welcome; exploitation is not confined by geography—for example, gangs use railways to move children along county lines. The British Transport police must be empowered to act if it identifies a predator using the train network to recruit or deploy children. Likewise, the National Crime Agency might come across sophisticated networks exploiting children across multiple force areas. Clause 20 lets those forces and the NCA go to court directly. Crucially, if they do so, they must inform the local police force for the area where the suspect lives, so that there is no gap in knowledge. That co-ordination will be vital, as local officers will likely be the ones monitoring the order on a day-to-day basis.

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[Joe Robertson]

I thank my hon. Friend for her quick canter through the clauses, particularly the provisions on interim orders and without-notice orders. I worry that once someone has an interim order, given some of the court backlogs, it may take some time for them to come back to the court for a full order. Does she share that concern?

[Harriet Cross]

Of course. In all cases, it is a balance between getting an interim order in place to protect children in the immediate term, and ensuring that we get true justice through the system. It is something that we need more information on, but we also need a balance, and, on balance, the interim orders seem reasonable.

Another point is the serving of the interim order. If the person was not in court when the order was made—for example, if it was made after a without-notice application—it will kick in only once it is served. That is understandable; we cannot expect someone to comply with an order that they do not know about. However, I wonder whether there are provisions to use all reasonable means to serve it quickly, potentially with police involvement to hand it to the person if needed, since a child’s safety could hinge on getting a bit of paper into the right hands.

Interim orders seem to be a sensible procedural tool. They align with how other orders, such as interim injunctions, work, and they will ensure continuity of protection. However, I reiterate that interim measures should not become semi-permanent due to procedural or court delays. The ultimate goal is to get to a full hearing and a long-term solution. Interim orders are the bridge to that, but they need to be a short, sturdy bridge, not a lingering limbo.

Can the Minister address what guidance or expectations will be set to ensure that, where an interim CCEPO is issued, the full hearing occurs as soon as possible? Is there an envisaged maximum duration for an interim order before it is reviewed? Clause 22(3) limits interim orders to prohibitions and the notification requirement. Can the Minister clarify why? Is it primarily because positive requirements, such as attending a course, might be burdensome to enforce in the short term? The explanatory notes mention that an interim order can be varied or discharged, just like a full order. Can the Minister confirm that if circumstances change—for example, if new evidence shows the risk is either higher or lower—the police or subject can apply to adjust the interim order even before the final hearing? Lastly, if an interim order is made in the absence of the defendant, what steps will be taken to ensure that it is served promptly?

Clause 23 empowers courts to consider making a CCEPO at the conclusion of certain criminal proceedings, even if the police have not applied for one. Effectively, it provides for judicial initiative, allowing courts to consider a CCEPO even without a formal application. This is quite a significant provision. It means that, if someone is prosecuted for drug trafficking involving children, for example, and they escape conviction—perhaps the jury was not 100% satisfied or there was a technicality—the court does not have to throw its hands up on the case. It can say that it has heard enough to worry that the person might exploit children, so it will consider a prevention order.