Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 16th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I will talk about one specific issue in the Bill, which has been referred to by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hazarika and Lady Royall, which is the limitation period for child sexual abuse claims. Child sexual abuse is abhorrent, and unfortunately it has been shown, over the past 20 or 30 years, to be much more widespread than was once believed to be the case.

It has always been possible for the victim of child abuse to sue the perpetrator or, more commonly, the institution where the perpetrator worked or to which they were closely connected, the limitation period being three years. However, there are exceptions, the most important and relevant of which is that time does not start to run until the claimant reaches the age of 18. Even after three years, there are various ways in which to extend the limitation period. The first is when a claimant did not have the necessary knowledge or awareness of the abuse, which is quite often relied on. But the most important extension was provided by Section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980, which gave the court complete discretion to disapply the limitation period. The section sets out in detail all sorts of sensible factors that guide the exercise of the discretion, but the discretion is in fact unfettered, so that other factors not listed can be taken into account. Although it is for the claimant to persuade the court, the courts generally disapply the limitation period as it happens, unless there are particular circumstances where it would be unfair for the case to go on.

Noble Lords might think that it would never be unfair for the victim of child sexual abuse to be able to bring a claim, and I have some sympathy for that, but the reality is that the claims are not against the perpetrators—they are against institutions, educational or religious, and those run by local authorities or government, where the abuse has taken place. The law on vicarious liability was changed by the courts so that an institution could not argue that the abuse was outside the scope of employment, with the result that compensation often had to be paid, sometimes even by the taxpayer or insurers, without any fault on their part.

I should make it entirely clear that I have a relevant interest to declare. Over the years, as a barrister, I have acted for institutions that have been sued for what is known as historic child abuse. I have also acted for victims and been involved in a number of cases that have reached the higher courts on the questions of limitation.

My query to the Government is essentially this: what was wrong with the existing law in practice, and how do the relevant provisions change it? My current view is that, if these provisions become law, there is a risk of satellite litigation just at a time when the law seemed relatively settled. There are some cases where it is simply impossible for there to be any meaningful trial. For example, the claimant’s own recollection may be very hazy; the perpetrators, or alleged perpetrators, of the abuse may be dead; there may be no records of any sort; and the relevant institution may have closed and any insurance may be untraceable. The intention presumably—and the way it is framed in the Bill is something of a compromise—is to make it very difficult for the defendant to defeat a claim on grounds of limitation, but what sort of cases would now be in time that would not be under the current law?

Some other features need to be raised in Committee, some already referred to: what is the proper definition of sexual abuse, and what about other forms of abuse that may properly be described as sexual? What if there are mixed abuse claims? There will also be uncertainty as to what constitutes “settled by agreement”. Does that include prelitigation settlements? What about claims that have been discontinued or settled informally?

My current view is that the law is fair to both parties. These changes will breed uncertainty and litigation—good for lawyers, but not a beneficial advance in the law. The proposed changes are not the result of a Law Commission report, nor of a large piece of legislation such as the Limitation Act. Rather, they seem to be the result of a general recommendation from the IICSA inquiry and a rather modest consultation. That is not a good way in which to make law; it will result in uncertainty and much litigation. In a wholly natural desire to help the victims of abuse, we should be careful not to make bad law.