Crime and Policing Bill (Third sitting)

Harriet Cross Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 1st April 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers]

Opposition amendment 31 would lower to 16 the age at which a court can impose a respect order on a person to prevent them from engaging in antisocial behaviour.

[Harriet Cross (Gordon and Buchan) (Con)]

Last Thursday, in the evidence session, we heard that a large number of under-18s engage in antisocial behaviour. Does the shadow Minister agree with me and some of the witnesses we heard from that, without the age being reduced to 16, the measure will have less impact, given where a lot of the antisocial behaviour in our communities is coming from?

[Matt Vickers]

My hon. Friend is entirely right. When you speak to some of the people who are at the sharp end of this antisocial behaviour, many of them will tell you that it is inflicted by those under 18. We heard witnesses’ concerns about where the line should be drawn. Obviously, there is a balance with respect to criminalising young people, but there is a point at which there have to be real consequences, and communities need to know that there are consequences, for those youngsters who engage in this behaviour.

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[Dame Diana Johnson]

Amendment 33 would make a person who has been given more than one respect order liable for a fine of up to £1,000. It is unlikely that a person would be given more than one respect order. An order may be given for a specified period of time or may state that it has effect until further notice. In practice, if changes are needed to a respect order after it has been approved, the applicant would return to court for the order to be varied if, for example, it was considered necessary to include additional requirements or prohibitions, or to extend the period for which a prohibition or requirement has effect. However, a person may be given a separate order where they have engaged in antisocial behaviour that meets the legal test for use of another ASB power—for example, a housing injunction or a criminal behaviour order. Respect orders are preventive orders. They seek to prevent further antisocial behaviour by helping to address the root causes of the person’s behaviour.

[Harriet Cross]

Respect orders are indeed meant to be preventive, and everyone on the Committee wants them to work, but part of prevention is deterrence. Knowing that it will hit them in their pocket if they get a respect order is a huge deterrent for people who otherwise, as the shadow Minister said, wear these things as a badge of honour. It is not that people will receive multiple respect orders at the same time; they may receive them sequentially. They may have had one in the past, but it has lapsed or they have served it—whatever word is used—and then, down the line, they get another one and then another. A fine would ensure that respect orders have a direct financial impact on them, to prevent them from getting into a cycle of receiving one after another.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

As my hon. Friend the Member for Southend West and Leigh pointed out, respect orders deter people from carrying on with their behaviour because a breach can lead to arrest, being brought before a criminal court and, potentially, imprisonment. My expectation is that, if there is a need to make changes to a respect order, the requirements will be changed and the prohibitions will be extended on the respect order that has already been issued, so I am not sure that I take the point about multiple respect orders. What we all want is that, when a respect order is issued, the individual will comply with it and no further steps are necessary by anybody because they will have stopped the antisocial behaviour and dealt with their underlying problems. Simply fining someone for receiving further orders would be a punitive measure and unlikely to help that individual change their behaviour.

Amendment 32 would increase the maximum prison term available for repeated breaches of respect orders to five years. Currently, the maximum sentence for breaching a respect order is up to two years’ imprisonment upon conviction in the Crown court. We believe that is the appropriate level of sanction, and it is in line with the current civil injunction that it replaces.

As I said, respect orders take a fundamentally preventive approach, and it is appropriate that the sentence reflects that. If the offender abides by the terms of the order, there will be no further sanctions. However, it is right that custodial sentences are still available for those who continue to cause havoc to our communities. Other powers, such as criminal behaviour orders, are available on conviction for any criminal offence in any criminal court, and they carry a longer sentence of up to five years’ imprisonment. In the light of that, I hope that the shadow Minister will be content to withdraw his amendment.

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[Matt Vickers]

I am sure they will be in touch and can ask them that question, but I think empowering these organisations in this way is really powerful and will really help them to deal with some of the horrific antisocial behaviour their tenants are subjected to.

[Harriet Cross]

On this amendment and amendment 31, on reducing the age threshold to 16, we heard from the experts and people who gave evidence that we should reduce it to 16 because that is where most of the criminality of the antisocial behaviour comes from. By that same argument, because we are not hearing from housing authorities or experts does not necessarily mean that this is not a good amendment.

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[Harriet Cross]

For clarity, will the threshold at which a youth injunction is given be at the same sort of level as for a respect order, but with the age element added in, or will there be a different threshold for the level of antisocial behaviour, or the sort of disruption caused?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

We are retaining the existing provisions for civil injunctions. As I set out previously, the balance of probabilities, the test and the categorisation of the antisocial behaviour will all remain the same. We are just renaming it a “youth injunction” because we are focusing the respect order on the persistent antisocial behaviour of adults over 18. The youth injunction remains exactly as it is in law now.

I am conscious of the profound problems that housing-related nuisance ASB can cause, as we have heard again in this debate. The housing injunction therefore retains the lower legal threshold of

“conduct capable of causing nuisance or annoyance”

in a housing context—as previously discussed. Again, we heard from practitioners that the existing power is effective and proportionate for housing-related ASB, and the housing injunction therefore retains the effect of the current power in that context.

Government amendments 6 to 8 and 24 to 28 make further technical and consequential amendments to existing antisocial behaviour legislation as a result of the introduction of respect orders. In relation to the 2014 Act, that means ensuring that definitions of antisocial behaviour are captured accurately elsewhere, under the existing powers, to account for the new respect orders and injunctions in part 1 of the Act. Consequential amendments are also needed to the Housing Acts 1985 and 1988 so that the breach of a respect order, a youth injunction or a housing injunction continues to be a ground for possession under those Housing Acts, as is the case with the current civil injunction.

We know that taking possession of a property is an important tool for landlords to use to provide swift relief to victims when antisocial behaviour or criminality has already been proven by another court. It is therefore right to retain that tool with the new respect order. In addition, amendment 28 amends the Localism Act 2011 to ensure that landlords can refuse to surrender and grant tenancies on the basis that a tenant, or a person residing with the tenant, has been issued with a respect order.

Finally, amendment 28 also amends the Police Reform Act 2002 to ensure that constables in uniform can continue to require a person engaging in antisocial behaviour to give their name and address. I commend the provisions to the Committee.

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[Dame Diana Johnson]

Clause 3 provides for extensions to the maximum timeframes for dispersal directions and closure orders under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, and I will address each of these in turn.

The clause extends the maximum period for which a dispersal order can be in place from 48 to 72 hours and introduces a mandatory review at 48 hours. We know that the dispersal power is an effective tool that police can use in a range of situations to move on individuals who are committing, or who are likely to commit, antisocial behaviour. Despite that, feedback from police and from police and crime commissioners has highlighted operational challenges in implementing this power.

Under current legislation, the police can issue a dispersal order to require a person to leave an area for a maximum of only 48 hours. That makes no allowance or and allows no extensions for weekends or bank holidays, when incidents of antisocial behaviour are often high. The 48-hour window also allows little time for relevant authorities to identify the root causes of the issue in order to implement longer-term solutions. Extending the timeframe of the dispersal power to up to 72 hours will ensure that police can effectively cover these problem periods, such as bank holidays. It will also give local agencies more time to come together to develop long-term solutions to tackle antisocial behaviour.

[Harriet Cross]

Although I completely agree with the need to extend the power, why was 72 hours chosen? Was there work or analysis behind that figure?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am very pleased to hear that the shadow Minister supports the 72-hour limit, because it was in the Criminal Justice Bill that her Government brought forward and that, because of the general election, never got on to the statute books. Work was done with stakeholders on what would be required. Clearly we do not want to extend it too far, but 72 hours seemed to be the best period of time to take into account what I was just saying about weekends and bank holidays in particular.

Let me move on to closure orders. The clause extends the timeframe that the relevant agencies, after issuing a closure notice, can apply to a magistrates court for a closure order from 48 hours to 72 hours. Again, that is based on feedback from practitioners who have noted operational challenges in applying for a closure order. The 48-hour window is not always enough time to prepare evidence and serve it to the courts, particularly on weekends or bank holidays. The closure order is an important power that agencies can use to provide immediate respite to the local community, so we must ensure that it is practicable and viable for practitioners to use.

Extending the timeframe to 72 hours will allow practitioners adequate time to gather evidence and inform interested parties. It also allows respondents more time to seek legal advice, in turn reducing the number of cases adjourned by the courts. In short, the provisions will help to address operational challenges, allowing local agencies to tackle antisocial behaviour more efficiently and effectively.