Baroness Doocey
Main Page: Baroness Doocey (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Doocey's debates with the Home Office
(1 day, 12 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am grateful to the speakers in this debate so far. This Committee stage will be a long haul, but I hope that we can continue this level of discussion and scrutiny throughout. Sorry.
No problem.
My Lords, I rise to speak very briefly to Amendments 4, 5 and 7 in my name. My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones has made a very clear case for each one, so I will speak briefly. I put on record my thanks to Justice, which has gathered insights from so many people working in this field and it has been really interesting reading case studies that are backed up by very clear evidence.
These amendments would provide essential safeguards, ensuring the powers contained within respect orders are proportionate. Amendment 4 would require orders to be made only where there is evidence of actual conduct, not speculation about what a person might do in future. Amendment 7 would ensure that an order is imposed with a clear end date, capped at two years. In my opinion, it is wrong that an individual could be subject to potentially serious restrictions in perpetuity as a result of behaviour that falls below the criminal threshold. In Amendment 5, we want to change the “just and convenient” threshold generally applied in civil proceedings to “necessary and proportionate”. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, put a very good case for this—much better than I could ever do, so I will not try.
Amendment 1, moved by my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones, calling for an independent review of existing anti-social behaviour powers before respect orders are rolled out, would improve the Bill considerably, because precisely what laws are already used, and what works in practice, is critical to their success.
On the subject of likely success, I welcome the fact that respect orders can include positive requirements that people have to, for example, attend rehabilitation—perhaps to deal with addictions to drugs or drink or both. However, such requirements can work only if every region has capacity in drug and alcohol treatment programmes. I am sure the Minister is aware that only 12 of the 43 police forces returned data last year on how many cases were referred for such treatment. Without that information, we cannot know how such rehabilitation can work. I would be grateful to hear from the Minister, when he responds, about what efforts are being made to ensure there are places available. Legislation alone is no good without resources.
My Lords, we must ensure that courts can operate within their means. If we issue them with new responsibilities, we have to be sure that they have the capacity to fulfil them. Unfortunately, in restricting respect orders to the High Court and county courts, the Government risk not providing the bandwidth to deal with new orders.
At the end of Labour’s first year in office, the Crown Court backlog suffered an annual increase of 11%. There are over 74,000 cases waiting to be judged. Of course, that burden is not entirely at the door of the Crown Courts, but a considerable number of the outstanding cases will require their use. County courts are in a better—but still not ideal—state. The average time for justice to be delivered is just over 49 weeks. Reflecting on this, it makes sense for the Government to divide the responsibilities for the new respect orders as widely as possible. The logical conclusion is to permit an application for a respect order to be made to a magistrates’ court.
If respect orders were confined to the serious criminality that we expect to be dealt with by the High Court and county courts, I would accept placing additional pressures on to them and excluding magistrates’ courts. It is right that those facing serious harassment or other forms of anti-social behaviour have the ability to make application to these courts, but the scope for respect orders is far wider than that. The definition of anti-social behaviour is to include actions causing alarm and distress. These are two very subjective metrics: they are fundamentally different from harassment and more serious forms of anti-social behaviour. So I see no reason why magistrates’ courts should not be available to deal with these less serious and potentially menial forms of anti-social behaviour. This is the reasoning behind Amendments 8 and 16, tabled in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie.
There is also precedent for this. When the last Labour Government introduced anti-social behaviour orders in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, they could be made only by a magistrates’ court. This recognised that anti-social behaviour should be the purview of summary justice. The Minister might argue that the Government are simply replicating the application process for anti-social behaviour injunctions and that they were the action of the previous Government. That may be a fair criticism, but that would not mean that the Government are right. Simply following the case of previous legislation does not automatically mean that the legislation before us today is following the right path; nor does it acknowledge the very different state of the backlog in the High Court and county courts today, as opposed to 2014. It makes far more sense to permit the use of magistrates’ courts for this purpose today, given the historic case burden.
Finally, I can see no downside to this. It will permit burden-sharing between three types of courts. It would not alter the nature of the orders, nor the process by which they are made. But it would make some progress toward reducing the waiting time for the making of a respect order. Surely the Government do not want to see a 49-week wait for a respect order to be made. Would that not hamper the effectiveness of these supposedly tough new respect orders? I hope the Minister will consider these amendments carefully and sensibly.
The other amendments in this group seek to minimise the pressure placed on our courts by the new measures and ensure that our shared principles of justice are upheld. Interim respect orders interact with the principle of innocent until proven guilty. They can be made following a court adjournment up until the final court hearing. They have the same function as a regular respect order and can impose the same restrictions. I am conscious that this may sometimes be necessary. I reiterate the debilitated state of our courts and the fact that adjournment is sometimes out of their hands, even if the defendant is likely to engage in further anti-social behaviour. In these occasional instances, I can understand the need for an interim respect order.
Amendment 15 aims to find a balance, creating a presumption against issuing an interim order, while still leaving the option open. Amendment 19 exists to forward the argument that these orders can be issued to prevent only further harassment, and not the vague concepts of alarm and distress. These amendments aim to ease the administrative burden on the courts. Amendment 17 seeks to ensure that, if an appeal is made against a decision to refuse to issue an interim respect order, the defendant is notified. It is right that a person should know when they might be subjected to a respect order, especially when they have not yet been proven guilty. I beg to move Amendment 8.
My Lords, I have just a few comments. I am quite concerned that the latest figures show that the magistrates’ courts’ backlog of cases to be heard reached 361,000 as of September 2025, a record high and a significant increase on previous years. In the other place, the Minister said the legal test for respect orders was being kept “broad and flexible” to enable them to be used for a wide range of anti-social behaviours. Again, this suggests significant extra pressure on courts. Jamming up the system further is not going to help victims. Can the Minister say what the Government’s assessment is of the impact on the wider criminal justice system?
Giving evidence in the other place, the Police Federation also pointed to the pressure these orders would put on custody places, saying that infrastructure was needed to make new legislation “effective and believable”. Perhaps the Minister could also address that.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for their comments. I am sorry: I am just getting my pages in order; it came slightly more quickly than I expected. I thought we would have a few more contributions.
The amendments all relate to the role of the courts in the Government’s new respect orders, and it is fair and proper that they do so. These new orders will enable courts to ban offenders from engaging in formal, harmful anti-social behaviour and—again, as we have discussed—tackle the root cause. Amendments 8 and 16 seek to allow magistrates’ courts to issue respect orders. I have been clear that the respect orders are civil behaviour orders intended to prevent further anti-social behaviour occurring. They also aim to encourage rehabilitation through the positive requirements that I discussed in the previous group of amendments. Because they are civil in nature, applications should be heard in the civil courts, which have the appropriate procedures and expertise for handling these types of orders.
Magistrates’ courts deal primarily with criminal matters and summary offences. Hearing civil applications in a magistrates’ court would risk treating preventive orders as punitive measures, when, actually, as I mentioned, they are designed either to try to stop people undertaking negative behaviour or to encourage people to undertake what I will term positive behaviour, such as anger management or alcohol awareness courses.
Amendment 15 seeks to ensure that the interim respect orders are not issued by the courts unless specifically said otherwise, and where an application has been made without notice. Again, anti-social behaviour can escalate quickly and cause great harm, and an interim respect order enables rapid protection in urgent cases involving immediate risk. Judges can make decisions based on the individual facts of the case and ensure that victims receive immediate relief in cases which they deem to be appropriate. On occasion, these will have to be issued without giving notice to the respondent, and it is important that judges retain the ability to do so on or without request from the relevant agency. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that the court would be required to apply itself to the question of whether it was appropriate to make an interim order. There is no question of one being made without an express determination to that effect, but speed is still required.
Amendment 17 seeks to ensure that, if an appeal is made against the decision by the courts to refuse an interim respect order, the respondent is duly notified. I reiterate that interim respect orders are designed to provide urgent temporary relief to protect victims and the public from serious harm before a full hearing. If the respondents were notified of an appeal, it could undermine the immediacy and effectiveness of the interim order, and doing so would likely complicate proceedings, prolonging risk to victims and communities. I come back to the fact that all the measures in the Bill are designed to tackle anti-social behaviour at source and provide either interventions to prevent or interventions to encourage positive behaviour. The law allows appeals without notice to maintain speed and efficiency in safeguarding measures.
Amendment 19 seeks to ensure that the interim respect orders are made only when the court considers the respondent likely to engage in harassment. Again, I just say to the noble Lord that the definition of anti-social behaviour is broad: it is intended to capture behaviours that may not meet the criminal threshold but which can cause severe harm to victims and communities. As I pointed out, interim respect orders are a necessary thing to provide immediate relief, preventing harmful behaviour from escalating and causing further damage to victims and communities. I would have thought that the noble Lord would have supported that general direction of travel. They are a preventative order, not a punitive order; they are punitive only in the event of a breach. Again, the purpose of the order is not to have that breach in the first place but to send a signal that says, “This behaviour is unacceptable”, or “This support mechanism is required”, and if you do not attend the support mechanism or if you breach the preventive mechanism, you are facing a potential criminal sanction.
Before the Minister sits down —I love that expression—can I just check? I think he said that respect orders were not going to be piloted. Is that correct? Diana Johnson, the Policing Minister in the other place, in the third session in Committee, said:
“We will pilot respect orders to ensure that they are as effective as possible before rolling them out across England and Wales”.—[Official Report, Commons, Crime and Policing Bill Committee, 1/4/25; col. 104.]
So, what has changed between then and now that the Government have changed their mind?
The Government have considered the reflections in another place, and we have now determined that we want to get on with this. Remember that the Bill has 12 days in Committee, and then Report, and we have a long way to go before Royal Assent. The Government want to have a manifesto commitment that they made in July 2024 implemented in good time. Even now, that manifesto commitment will take us potentially nearly two years to put in place. That is a reasonable process, we have consulted widely on the respect orders and that is the Government’s position now.
Can the Minister say whether anything else has changed that we would not be aware of because it has not been written down anywhere?
That is a very wide question, my Lords. Let me say that the purpose of Committee is to provide a significant number of days for Members from all sides of the House—as we have had today, from the government side as well as from the Opposition and the Liberal Democrats—to test Ministers and raise points. If the noble Baroness has points she wishes to raise during the passage of the Bill, as ever, I will try to answer them, either on the Floor of this House or in writing afterwards.
The noble Baroness asks whether things have changed. Even today, there are a number of amendments that the Government have brought forward in the groups of amendments that we are deliberating on today. Things move; the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, was saying with regard to the immigration Bill that a number of things have changed over the course of time, and things move. It is now 16 months since the King’s Speech which introduced this legislation. We continue to monitor and move; where necessary we bring forward amendments, and I am open to testing on all matters at all times. But I would welcome the noble Lord withdrawing his amendment today.
My Lords, of course I support the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, opposing the increases in these fines, but I think we need to go further and for a variety of reasons abolish these on-the-spot penalties per se, which is why I have tabled this clause stand part notice.
You cannot overestimate how much public space protection orders and community protection notices trivialise what we understand to be dealing with anti-social behaviour. We have just had a long discussion about what anti-social behaviour is. These orders are part of the toolkit to deal with anti-social behaviour and they end up targeting individuals for the most anodyne and mundane activities, and banning everyday freedoms.
The use of fines has, in a way, led us to not take seriously what real anti-social behaviour is, because these fines are given out for such arbitrary, eccentric reasons. PSPOs and CPNs can be issued on a very low threshold, are entirely subject to misuse—there is lots of evidence showing that—and often criminalise, as I said, everyday activities. For example, PSPOs are often used to ban young people gathering in groups—which seems to me to be a dangerous attack on our right to assembly—despite the fact that the statutory guidance states that PSPOs should target only activities that cause a nuisance and should not criminalise
“everyday sociability, such as standing in groups”.
That is what it says, yet they are constantly used in that way and seem to be unaccountably doled out.
There are now over 2,000 PSPOs in England and Wales, and each of them contains up to 35 separate restrictions. That means that tens of thousands of new controls are being issued on public spaces all the time. As we heard earlier, they are imposed in different geographic areas, making prohibitions on different types of activities for different citizens from one place to another. You can be in one town where an activity is legal and then go to the next town and the same activity is illegal. We discussed some of that earlier.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, pointed out and as Justice has drawn our attention to, the inconsistent use of PSPOs creates a “postcode lottery” for victims but also for perpetrators. Justice says that this
“undermines the rule of law by making enforcement dependent on the victim’s location rather than the circumstances”.
I hope we can send the Minister the research done by Justice and by the Manifesto Club that has already been referred to so that he can see from the freedom of information requests to local authorities just what kind of activities are being issued with PSPOs and CPNs, and therefore what these fines are being used to tackle. I assure the Committee that it is innocuous activities, not anti-social behaviour. There are councils that are banning kite-flying, wild swimming, as we have heard, and using camping stoves.
I thought it was interesting that, recently, the Free Speech Union forced Thanet District Council to scrap its imposition of a sweeping public spaces protection order that would have banned the use of foul or abusive language in a public space in the Thanet area, so you would have been able to swear in one area but not in another. I understand that it might have raised a lot of money, but that is not necessarily the same as dealing with anti-social behaviour.
Actually, the councils themselves do not do the dirty work of enforcement. Instead, they outsource that to private companies, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has explained so well the dangers of using these private firms. We have a geographic breakdown of the national way of dealing with anti-social behaviour, and now we have an almost feudal way of collecting fines from it. These kinds of fines mean that orders might well be issued for all the wrong reasons—for income-generating, commercial purposes to meet targets that are about raising money rather than tackling anti-social behaviour—and increasing the fines will surely only incentivise that practice further.
I urge the Minister to consider that the noble cause that the Government are associated with here is dealing with anti-social behaviour, but using private companies to fine people in such a cavalier way discredits the whole cause. It is damaging the reputation of that noble cause. There is no transparency or oversight mechanism for these companies. There is one ban that I would like to bring in, and that is fining for profit. I hope the Minister will consider at least reviewing this and looking at it closely.
My Lords, I do not intend to rehearse the arguments already put so effectively by my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones. Suffice to say that we on these Benches fully support Amendment 23, as £500 is an extortionate amount of money for the type of behaviour that fines are designed to address and will simply result in private companies making even greater profits than they do at the moment while pushing those already struggling further into debt. For these reasons, we have serious reservations about the implications of the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra.
The orders create a postcode lottery for victims. Charities warn that, in some parts of the country, orders are handed out like confetti. This undermines public trust by making enforcement dependent on the victim’s location.
Overall, the use of these powers needs to be subject to much stricter safeguards. The Government must ensure that there is proper oversight of their use and that the law is applied equally, openly and proportionately.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this thoughtful debate on Clause 4 and associated amendments. The discussion has reflected the balance that must be struck between proportionate enforcement and ensuring that penalties remain effective and fair. As anti-social behaviour seems to be increasingly present on our streets, it is right that the clause is given careful consideration.
The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, raised concerns in Amendment 23 about the overuse or inappropriate issuance of fixed penalty notices. Those are indeed legitimate points for consideration, and I am sure that all noble Lords agree that such powers should be exercised carefully and with a proper sense of proportion. Fixed penalty notices are designed and intended to deal swiftly with low-level offending without recourse to the courts, but they must always be used responsibly and in accordance with proper guidance. However, it seems that Clause 4(3) and (4) will help to act as a proper deterrent to anti-social behaviour, as they will play an important part in ensuring that the penalty levels remain meaningful. I look forward to hearing the Government’s thoughts on this matter.
I turn to the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Blencathra. We are grateful to my noble friend for his focus on practical enforcement. His Amendments 24 and 25 seek to strengthen the collection of fines by introducing automatic confiscation provisions and modest administrative charges for non-payment. It is right that those who incur penalties should expect to pay them, and that local authorities are not left to have to chase persistent defaulters at the public’s expense. We therefore view my noble friend’s proposals as a constructive contribution to the debate in order to ensure that enforcement is both efficient and fair.
The noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, has given notice of her intention to oppose the Question that Clause 4 stand part of the Bill. We respect this view, but we cannot agree to the removal of the clause. Clause 4 contains a number of sensible and proportionate measures that are designed to improve compliance and to strengthen the effectiveness of penalties. Many of these reforms build on the Criminal Justice Bill brought forward by the previous Conservative Government.
This debate has underlined the importance of maintaining confidence in the fixed penalty system, ensuring that it is used appropriately and enforced consistently. The system exists to fulfil the wider aim of upholding law and order in our communities. In these endeavours, we on our Benches will always be supportive.