Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Royall of Blaisdon Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 16th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)]

My Lords, as the Minister has so clearly set out, there is much to welcome in this Bill to improve the law where needed and to make us safer. I look forward to following it closely. To the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, I say that I also look forward to following the implementation when it is an Act. It will have a profound impact on the lives of many, including the most vulnerable. I particularly support the clauses relating to countering violence against children, women and girls.

Following the report of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, the IICSA, I welcome the abolition of time limitations in historical cases of child sexual abuse with Clause 82. The importance of this clause was brought home to me by a very courageous survivor, who, following years of sexual abuse by his priest, has lived a life with incapacitating mental illness, of which the origin was that trauma. The last Government refused to act on this specific issue, so I am proud that this Government have conceded the fundamental legal principle. However, as drafted, it has limited benefit to those who have fought for the change and whose sufferings make it necessary to fight. I ask the Minister to discuss this with me further, together with survivors.

The IICSA recommendations should be adopted without change or qualification. However, the clause adds a new “substantial prejudice”, especially for historical cases, which creates uncertainty, delays and an extra hurdle for survivors. As I understand it, the IICSA’s final report did not include any changes regarding the introduction of “substantial prejudice”. Its inclusion in the Bill could be interpreted as reintroducing the status quo. The impact of narrowing the court’s focus to a fair trial, with the burden on defendants, should make out-of-time CSA claims easier overall, but ambiguity remains around what count as “claims arising”.

New Section 11ZB(3)(b) and (c), introduced by Clause 82, introduce the novel legal idea of “substantial prejudice”, adopted from Scottish legislation, but they are unjustified, as there is no provision for relitigation in these cases in England and Wales. I suggest that if cases fail in civil courts then the legislation has failed in its aims, and these new paragraphs should be removed.

The testimony of witnesses to the IICSA shows institutional discouragement and the extended, often ineradicable psychological harm of abuse, underscoring the need for these reforms to remove barriers. One witness said to me, “Attending the IICSA was the second most dramatic thing in my life and the trauma of it has lasted seven years so far. If subsection (3)(b) and subsection (3)(c) remain, then preparing for a court case which could be dismissed on these grounds would be as traumatic as that, and with little personal benefit”. While survivors are relieved that, through this legislation, time limitations in historical cases of child sexual abuse will be abolished, the “substantial prejudice” clauses need to be deleted for better access to justice.

The clauses on the management of sex offenders are hugely important for the victims of violence against women and girls, and I am delighted, with my long-term interest in countering stalking, that the Government are seeking both to implement their manifesto commitments and to respond to the invaluable super-complaint made by the Suzy Lamplugh Trust. Following discussions with those most concerned, I will wish to probe Part 6. I also know from campaigning on doorsteps that the new offence of cuckooing will be of great benefit, especially to those living in social housing.

Finally, I wholeheartedly support Clause 191 on the removal of women from the criminal law related to abortion. I pay tribute to my colleague, Tonia Antoniazzi.