House of Commons

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Commons Chamber

Oral Answers to Questions

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Commons Chamber

G20 and Ukraine

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Commons Chamber

12:37

12:48

COP30

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Commons Chamber

14:08

Points of Order

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Commons Chamber

12:49

Waste Incinerators

1st reading
Tuesday 25th November 2025 Commons Chamber

15:26

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Report stage
Tuesday 25th November 2025 Commons Chamber

“(1) In section 100G (principal councils to publish additional information) of LGA 1972, in subsection (5), omit “, in relation to a principal council in Wales,”.

(2) The Localism Act 2011 is amended as follows.

(3) In section 29 (register of interests), in subsection (8), for “section 32(2)” substitute “sections 32(2) and 32A”.

(4) In section 31 (pecuniary interests in matters considered at meetings or by a single member), in subsection (2), for “section 32(3)” substitute “sections 32(3) and 32A(9)”.

(5) After section 32 (sensitive interests) insert—

“32A Residential addresses

(1) This section applies where a member or co-opted member of a relevant authority notifies the authority’s monitoring officer of a disclosable pecuniary interest that includes their usual residential address.

(2) Subject to subsections (3) to (7), the relevant authority’s public register must not include that address.

(3) The member or co-opted member may request that their usual residential address be included in that public register.

(4) The member or co-opted member may withdraw a request made under subsection (3).

(5) A request under subsection (3) or a withdrawal of a request under subsection (4) must be made by written notice to the relevant authority’s monitoring officer.

(6) Where the member or co-opted member withdraws a request under subsection (4), the monitoring officer must remove the member or co-opted member’s usual residential address from the public register.

(7) Withdrawal of a request under subsection (4) does not affect the power of the member or co-opted member to make another request under subsection (3).

(8) Where a member or co-opted member’s usual residential address is excluded from a public register under this section, that public register must state that the member or co-opted member has an interest the address of which is withheld under this section.

(9) If section 31(2) applies in relation to the interest, that provision is to be read as requiring the member or co-opted member to disclose not the interest but merely the fact that the member or co-opted member has a disclosable pecuniary interest in the matter concerned.

(10) For the purposes of this section, a person has no more than one usual residential address.

(11) In this section “public register”, in relation to a relevant authority, means—

(a) a copy of its register that is made available for inspection, and

(b) any published version of its register.””— (Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This would stop the automatic publication of local government members’ and co-opted members’ home addresses. Members’ home addresses would no longer appear in published registers of interests unless a member explicitly requests inclusion in writing.

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15:45

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16:45

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18:00

“Schedule (Extension of the general power of competence to English National Park authorities and the Broads Authority) amends the Localism Act 2011 to extend the general power of competence to English National Park authorities and the Broads Authority.”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This would introduce the new Schedule in NS3 which would amend the Localism Act 2011 to confer the general power of competence on English National Park authorities and the Broads Authority. This new Clause is intended to form a new Chapter 4 of Part of the Bill.

“(1) A “national minimum standard” is a standard prescribed by the Secretary of State under any of sections (Standards relating to the grant of a regulated licence) to (Standards relating to the renewal of a regulated licence).

(2) A licence is “regulated” if—

(a) the licence is—

(i) a taxi driver licence,

(ii) a taxi vehicle licence,

(iii) a PHV driver licence,

(iv) a PHV vehicle licence, or

a PHV operator licence, and

(b) the licensing authority is in England.”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This amendment would define the terms “national minimum standards” and “regulated licence” used in new Sections NC50 to NC57. This new section and new Sections NC50 to NC57 are intended to form a new Chapter 3 of Part 3 of the Bill.

“(1) The Secretary of State may, by regulations, prescribe standards which are relevant to whether it is appropriate for a regulated licence to be granted.

(2) For each national minimum standard prescribed under this section, the Secretary of State may, by regulations, provide for whether the licensing authority—

(a) is required to refuse to grant the licence, or

(b) has a power to refuse to grant the licence,

if the licensing authority is not satisfied that the standard is met.

(3) Regulations under subsection (2) which relate to a standard may include provision—

(a) for the licensing authority—

(i) to be required to give an opportunity to remedy the failure to meet the standard, or

(ii) to have a power to give such an opportunity, and

(b) for the requirement or power to refuse the grant of the licence to cease to apply if the failure is remedied.

(4) Regulations under this section may, in particular, provide for an existing power of refusal to be extended so that the existing power is used, or is treated as being used, to refuse the grant of a licence where the licensing authority is not satisfied that a national minimum standard is met.

(5) In this section “existing power of refusal” means a power to refuse to grant a licence (whenever conferred) which arises otherwise than under regulations under this section.”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This would enable the Secretary of State to prescribe standards which are relevant to whether it is appropriate for a “regulated licence” to be granted.

“(1) The Secretary of State may, by regulations, prescribe standards which are relevant to whether it is appropriate for a regulated licence to continue in force.

(2) For each national minimum standard prescribed under this section, the Secretary of State may, by regulations—

(a) provide for when, or the circumstances in which, a licensing authority must determine whether the standard is met;

(b) provide for which permitted response or responses will be available if the licensing authority is not satisfied that the standard is met;

(c) provide, if both permitted responses are available, for the circumstances in which a particular permitted response is to be made;

(d) provide for whether the licensing authority—

(i) is required to make a permitted response, or

(ii) has a power to make a permitted response,

if the licensing authority is not satisfied that the standard is met;

(e) provide for when, or the circumstances in which, the suspension of a regulated licence is to end, including provision under which the licensing authority has a discretion.

(3) Regulations under subsection (2) which relate to a standard may include provision—

(a) for the licensing authority—

(i) to be required to give an opportunity to remedy the failure to meet the standard, or

(ii) to have a power to give such an opportunity, and

(b) for the requirement or power to make a permitted response to cease to apply if the failure is remedied.

(4) Regulations under this section may, in particular, provide for an existing power of suspension or revocation to be extended so that the existing power is used, or is treated as being used, to suspend or revoke a licence where the licensing authority is not satisfied that a national minimum standard is met.

(5) In this section—

“existing power of suspension or revocation” means a power to suspend or revoke a licence (whenever conferred) which arises otherwise than under regulations under this section;

“permitted response” means—

(a) suspending a regulated licence, or

(b) revoking a regulated licence;

and a reference to making a permitted response is to be read accordingly.”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This would enable the Secretary of State to prescribe standards which are relevant to whether it is appropriate for a “regulated licence” to continue in force.

“(1) The Secretary of State may, by regulations, prescribe standards which are relevant to whether it is appropriate for a regulated licence to be renewed.

(2) For each national minimum standard prescribed under this section, the Secretary of State may, by regulations, provide for whether the licensing authority—

(a) is required to refuse to renew the licence, or

(b) has a power to refuse to renew the licence,

if the licensing authority is not satisfied that the standard is met.

(3) Regulations under subsection (2) which relate to a standard may include provision—

(a) for the licensing authority—

(i) to be required to give an opportunity to remedy the failure to meet the standard, or

(ii) to have a power to give such an opportunity, and

(b) for the requirement or power to refuse the renewal of the licence to cease to apply if the failure is remedied.

(4) Regulations under this section may, in particular, provide for an existing power of refusal to be extended so that the existing power is used, or is treated as being used, to refuse the renewal of a licence where the licensing authority is not satisfied that a national minimum standard is met.

(5) In this section “existing power of refusal” means a power to refuse to renew a licence (whenever conferred) which arises otherwise than under regulations under this section.”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This would enable the Secretary of State to prescribe standards which are relevant to whether it is appropriate for a “regulated licence” to be renewed.

“(1) National minimum standards may relate to any of the following—

(a) persons applying for or holding regulated licences;

(b) other persons;

(c) vehicles;

(d) the types of services provided using taxis or private hire vehicles;

(e) premises;

(f) any other matters which appear to the Secretary of State to be appropriate.

(2) National minimum standards may require action to be taken (for example undertaking training, or installing or using equipment, technology or services).

(3) National minimum standards prescribed under section (Standards relating to the suspension or revocation of a regulated licence) or (Standards relating to the renewal of a regulated licence) may (in particular) relate to regulated licences granted before the regulations come into force.

(4) This section does not limit the kinds of national minimum standards that may be prescribed.”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This would make further provision about the sorts of standards that can be prescribed under new Sections NC50 to NC52.

“(1) The Secretary of State may issue guidance to licensing authorities in connection with the exercise of their functions in accordance with this Chapter.

(2) The Secretary of State may revise or revoke guidance issued under this section.

(3) The Secretary of State must arrange for guidance under this section, and any revision of it, to be published.

(4) A licensing authority must have regard to guidance issued under this section.”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This would enable the Secretary of State to issue guidance to licensing authorities in connection with the exercise of their functions in accordance with new Sections NC49 to NC57.

“(1) Sections (Standards relating to the grant of a regulated licence) to (Standards relating to the renewal of a regulated licence) do not prevent the exercise of any other power or duty of a licensing authority to—

(a) grant,

(b) suspend,

(c) revoke, or

(d) renew,

a regulated licence in a way that is consistent with provision made by regulations under those sections (which includes refusing to grant, suspending, revoking, or refusing to renew a licence when not required or authorised to do so by that provision).

(2) Before section 37 of the Town Police Clauses Act 1847 insert—

“36A National minimum standards for licensing

The provisions of this Act relating to the licensing of hackney carriages are subject to sections (“National minimum standard” and “regulated licence”) to (Interpretation) of the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2025 (national minimum standards for taxi and private hire vehicle licensing).”

(3) After section 45 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 insert—

“45A National minimum standards for licensing

This Part is subject to sections (“National minimum standard” and “regulated licence”) to (Interpretation) of the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2025 (national minimum standards for taxi and private hire vehicle licensing).”

(4) After section 2 of the London Hackney Carriages Act 1843 insert—

“2A National minimum standards for licensing

This Act is subject to sections (“National minimum standard” and “regulated licence”) to (Interpretation) of the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2025 (national minimum standards for taxi and private hire vehicle licensing).”

(5) After section 2 of the Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869 insert—

“2A National minimum standards for licensing

This Act is subject to sections (“National minimum standard” and “regulated licence”) to (Interpretation) of the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2025 (national minimum standards for taxi and private hire vehicle licensing).”

(6) After section 1 of the Private Hire Vehicles (London) Act 1998 insert—

“1A National minimum standards for licensing

This Act is subject to sections (“National minimum standard” and “regulated licence”) to (Interpretation) of the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2025 (national minimum standards for taxi and private hire vehicle licensing).”

(7) After section 1 of the Plymouth City Council Act 1975 insert—

“1A National minimum standards for licensing

This Act is subject to sections (“National minimum standard” and “regulated licence”) to (Interpretation) of the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2025 (national minimum standards for taxi and private hire vehicle licensing).””—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This would make provision about the relationship between new Sections NC49 to NC57 and existing legislation.

“(1) Before making regulations under sections (Standards relating to the grant of a regulated licence) to (Standards relating to the renewal of a regulated licence), the Secretary of State must consult such persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(2) Regulations under this Chapter may amend or repeal provision made by an Act of Parliament (whenever passed).

(3) The first regulations under sections (Standards relating to the grant of a regulated licence) to (Standards relating to the renewal of a regulated licence) are subject to affirmative resolution procedure.

(4) Regulations under this Chapter which amend or repeal provision made by an Act of Parliament (whether or not they also contain other provision) are subject to affirmative resolution procedure.

(5) Any other regulations under this Chapter are subject to negative resolution procedure.”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This would make provision about regulations under new Sections NC49 to NC57.

“In this Chapter—

“licensing authority” , in relation to a regulated licence, means a public authority which has licensing functions under—

(a) sections 37 to 68 of the Town Police Clauses Act 1847;

(b) the Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869;

(c) the Plymouth City Council Act 1975;

(d) Part 2 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976;

(e) the Private Hire Vehicles (London) Act 1998;

“national minimum standards” has the meaning given in section (“National minimum standard” and “regulated licence”);

“PHV driver licence” is a licence under—

(a) section 51 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976,

(b) section 13 of the Private Hire Vehicles (London) Act 1998, or

(c) section 9 of the Plymouth City Council Act 1975;

“PHV operator licence” is a licence under—

(a) section 55 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976,

(b) section 3 of the Private Hire Vehicles (London) Act 1998, or

(c) section 13 of the Plymouth City Council Act 1975;

“PHV vehicle licence” is a licence under—

(a) section 48 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976,

(b) section 7 of the Private Hire Vehicles (London) Act 1998, or

(c) section 5 of the Plymouth City Council Act 1975;

“regulated licence” has the meaning given in section (“National minimum standard” and “regulated licence”);

“standard” includes—

(a) a requirement, and

(b) a condition;

“taxi driver licence” is a licence under—

(a) section 46 of the Town Police Clauses Act 1847, or

(b) section 8 of the Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869;

“taxi vehicle licence” is a licence under—

(a) section 37 of the Town Police Clauses Act 1847, or

(b) section 6 of the Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869.”

This would define certain expressions used in new Sections NC49 to NC57.—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

“(1) The Secretary of State has a duty to ensure that relevant authorities are provided with the resources and support necessary in order to carry out any functions conferred on, or required of, them by virtue of this Act.

(2) Any resources and support provided by the Secretary of State must be sufficient to ensure that there is no delay to the holding of any future local elections resulting from the implementation of, or delay to the implementation of, this Act.”—(Zöe Franklin.)

This new clause would ensure local authorities are provided with the resources and support they need to deliver the content of this legislation with specific regard to preventing any further delays to future local elections.

“(1) The Secretary of State may not make any order or regulations to delay the ordinary elections of councillors of any specified authority if—

(a) the order or regulations result from any change to local government organisation under or by virtue of this Act,

(b) the effect of the order or regulations is to delay any such election by a period exceeding 53 weeks from the date on which it was originally scheduled to be held.

(2) For the purposes of this section, “any order or regulations” includes—

(a) an order under section 87 (Power to change years in which elections held) of the Local Government Act 2000;

(b) an order under sections 7 (Implementation of proposals by order), 10 (Implementation of recommendations by order of the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007; or

(c) any other delegated power exercisable by order or by regulations in relation to the scheduling of ordinary elections of councillors.”—(David Simmonds.)

This new clause would prevent the Secretary of State from delaying by more than one year any local government election, if the delay results from local government reorganisation under this Act.

“(1) The Secretary of State must undertake a consultation on updating requirements about the publication of notices under the following sections of the Local Government Act 2000—

(a) subsection (2) of section 9KC (resolution of local authority), and

(b) subsection (7) of section 9MA (referendum: proposals by local authority).

(2) The consultation must consider the impact of requirements for the publication of notices, and of proposed changes to arrangements for the publication of notices, on the following matters—

(a) the economic viability of local newspapers,

(b) access to information for local authority residents, and

(c) local democracy and accountability.

(3) The consultation must be opened within six months of the passage of this Act.”—(David Simmonds.)

“(c) payment to the members of allowances, expenses, gratuities or pensions.”

This amendment and Amendment 120 would give the Secretary of State a broader power to make regulations about allowances and other sums payable to audit committee members, in place of the current power limited to combined authorities and combined county authorities.

“(7) Regulations under subsection (5)(c) may, in particular, make provision applying provision made, or corresponding to any provision that could be made, under section 18 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 or section 100 of the Local Government Act 2000.

(7A) Subsection (5)(c) does not affect the application of the enactments referred to in subsection (7), or provision made under them, in relation to members of an audit committee.

(7B) In the case of a relevant authority within subsection (2)(a), the powers of the authority in relation to its committees are to be taken to include (so far as they would otherwise not)—

(a) the powers necessary to give effect to regulations under subsection (5), and

(b) the power to appoint to its audit committee persons who are not members of the authority (even where not required by regulations under subsection (5)).”

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 119. This amendment would also clarify that audit committee regulations can make provision different from that applicable to other committees of a relevant authority, and that audit committees can always include independent members.

This amendment would make the Mayor of London alone responsible for appointing an audit committee for the Greater London Authority.

“(1A) Section (Charges payable by undertakers executing works in maintainable highways) (and Schedule (Charges payable by undertakers executing works in maintainable highways)) do not come into force in accordance with subsection (1)(c).”

This would exclude new Clause NC43 and new Schedule NS1 from the scope of clause 79(1)(c) (which provides for royal assent commencement for provisions which confer powers to make subordinate legislation. As a result the Clause and Schedule would come into force by commencement regulations, in accordance with clause 79(5).

“(1A) No provision of sections (“National minimum standards” and “regulated licences”) to (Interpretation) comes into force in accordance with subsection (1)(c).”.

This would exclude new Clauses NC49 to NC57 from the scope of clause 79(1)(c) (which provides for royal assent commencement for provisions which confer powers to make subordinate legislation. As a result, the Clauses would come into force by commencement regulations, in accordance with clause 79(5).

This would limit the royal assent commencement of section 20 and Schedule 4 to those provisions so far as they relate to mayoral combined authorities/CCAs. Those provisions would commence otherwise 2 months after royal assent (see Amendment 136).

“(z2) section (publication of addresses of members etc in authority registers).”.

This would provide for Amendment NC45 to come into force two months after Royal Assent.

“(z2) section (Extension of general power of competence to English National Park authorities and the Broads Authority) (and Schedule (Extension of general power of competence to English National Park authorities and the Broads Authority)) (extension of general power of competence to English National Park authorities and the Broads Authority).”.

This would provide for Amendment NC46 and Amendment NS3 to come into force two months after Royal Assent.

“(ga) section 20 (and Schedule 4) (extension of general power of competence to strategic authorities), except so far as they relate to mayoral combined authorities and mayoral CCAs;”.

This would provide for section 20 and Schedule 4 to commence 2 months after royal assent so far as they do not relate to mayoral combined authorities/CCAs. Those provisions would commence on royal assent so far as they relate to such authorities (see Amendment 135).

“(oa) section (Licensing functions of the Mayor of London) (licensing functions of the Mayor of London);”.

This provides for new clause NC44 to come into force two months after Royal Assent.

“section 57 (and Schedule 25)”.—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This would be consequential on Amendment 156.

“Introduction

1 The Localism Act 2011 is amended in accordance with this Schedule.

Amendment of section 1

2 In section 1 (local authority’s general power of competence), in subsection (1), after “CCA” (inserted by Schedule 4) insert “, or English National Park authority, and the Broads Authority,”.

Amendment of section 2

3 (1) Section 2 (boundaries of the general power) is amended as follows.

(2) After subsection (2B) (inserted by Schedule 4) insert—

“(2C) If exercise of a pre-commencement power of an English National Park authority, or of the Broads Authority, is subject to restrictions, those restrictions apply also to exercise of the general power so far as it is overlapped by the pre-commencement power.

(2D) The general power does not enable an English National Park authority, or the Broads Authority, to do—

(a) anything which the authority is unable to do by virtue of a pre-commencement limitation, or

(b) anything which the authority is unable to do by virtue of a post-commencement limitation which is expressed to apply—

(i) to the general power,

(ii) to all of the authority's powers, or

(iii) to all of the authority's powers but with exceptions that do not include the general power.”.

(3) After subsection (5) (inserted by Schedule 4) insert—

“(6) In this section, in relation to an English National Park authority or the Broads Authority—

“post-commencement limitation” means a prohibition, restriction or other limitation expressly imposed by a statutory provision that—

(a) is contained in an Act passed after the end of the Session in which the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2025 is passed, or

(b) is contained in an instrument made under an Act and comes into force on or after the commencement of section (Extension of general power of competence to English National Park authorities and the Broads Authority) of the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2025;

“pre-commencement limitation” means a prohibition, restriction or other limitation expressly imposed by a statutory provision that—

(a) is contained in this Act, or in any other Act passed no later than the end of the Session in which the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2025 is passed, or

(b) is contained in an instrument made under an Act and comes into force before the commencement of section (Extension of general power of competence to English National Park authorities and the Broads Authority) of the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2025;

“pre-commencement power” means power conferred by a statutory provision that—

(a) is contained in this Act, or in any other Act passed no later than the end of the Session in which the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2025 is passed, or

(b) is contained in an instrument made under an Act and comes into force before the commencement of section (Extension of general power of competence to English National Park authorities and the Broads Authority) of the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2025.”

Amendment of section 3

4 In section 3 (limits on charging in exercise of general power), in subsection (1)(a), after “CCA” (inserted by Schedule 4) insert “, or English National Park authority, or the Broads Authority,”.

Amendment of section 4

5 (1) Section 4 (limits on doing things for commercial purpose in exercise of general power) is amended in accordance with this paragraph.

(2) In subsections (1), (2) and (3), after “CCA” (inserted by Schedule 4) insert “, or English National Park authority, or the Broads Authority,”.

Amendment of section 5

6 (1) Section 5 (powers to make supplemental provision) is amended in accordance with this paragraph.

(2) In subsections (1), (3) and (4) after “CCAs” (inserted by Schedule 4) insert “, or English National Park authorities, or the Broads Authority,”.

(3) In subsections (5)(a) and (b) and (7)(a) after “CCAs” (inserted by Schedule 4) insert “, or English National Park authorities”.

(4) In subsection (5)(c), after “CCA” (inserted by Schedule 4) insert “, or English National Park authority”.

(5) After subsection (7) insert—

“(7A) Before making an order under subsection (1), (2), (3) or (4) in relation to the Broads Authority, the Secretary of State must consult the Authority if the Secretary of State considers it appropriate.”

Amendment of section 8

7 In section 8 (interpretation), after the definition of “combined authority” (inserted by Schedule 4) insert—

““English National Park authority” means a National Park authority for a National Park in England;”.”.—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This would amend the Localism Act 2011 to confer the general power of competence on English National Park authorities and the Broads Authority.

(a) a local authority may operate a committee system only—

(i) if it is operating a committee system immediately before section 57 of the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2025 comes into force, and

(ii) for as long as the operation of a committee system is consistent with the provisions of section 9K; and

(b)”.

This would amend section 9B LGA 2000 to make clear that a committee system can only be operated by a local authority that is already operating that system and where the new section 9K (in Amendment 153) allows it to continue to operate it.

“(2) For section 9K (changing from one form of governance to another) substitute—

“9K Committee system: change to leader and cabinet executive (England)

Introduction

(1) This section sets out the circumstances in which a local authority that is operating a committee system must or may move to a leader and cabinet executive.

Committee system not protected

(2) If the local authority’s committee system is not protected, it must move to a leader and cabinet executive; and no resolution is needed and no referendum is to be held (despite any other provision of this Chapter which would otherwise require or authorise a resolution or referendum).

The local authority must comply with that duty so that it moves to a leader and cabinet executive before the end of the period of one year beginning with the commencement day.

Protected committee system

(3) If the local authority’s committee system is protected, it must undertake and publish a review of whether the local authority should move to a leader and cabinet executive.

(4) The review—

(a) must be undertaken and published before the end of the 1 year decision period;

(b) must have regard to the need to secure effective and convenient local government for the area of the local authority;

(c) if it concludes that the local authority should not move to a leader and cabinet executive, must include the reasons why the committee system is an appropriate form of governance for the local authority.

(5) After the review is published, the local authority must act in accordance with subsection (6), (7) or (8).

The local authority must have regard to the review when choosing how to act.

(6) The local authority may pass a resolution to continue to operate the committee system.

Any such resolution must be passed before the end of the 1 year decision period.

(7) The local authority may act in accordance with this Chapter to hold a referendum on moving to a leader and cabinet executive (and then, following the referendum, must act in accordance with this Chapter).

Any such action must be taken so that—

(a) the referendum is held before the end of the 1 year decision period, and

(b) if the result of the referendum approves the move, the local authority moves to a leader and cabinet executive before the end of the period of 1 year beginning with the day of the referendum.

(8) The local authority may act in accordance with this Chapter to move to a leader and cabinet executive without holding a referendum (despite any other provision of this Chapter which would otherwise require a referendum).

Any such action must be taken so that—

(a) the resolution to move to a leader and cabinet executive is passed before the end of the 1 year decision period, and

(b) the local authority moves to a leader and cabinet executive before the end of the period of one year beginning with the date of the resolution.

(9) If a local authority’s committee system is protected, a petition cannot require a local authority to hold a referendum in accordance with regulations under section 9MC until both—

(a) the relevant protection period has ended, and

(b) the local authority has—

(i) passed a resolution in accordance with subsection (6),

(ii) acted in accordance with subsection (7) by holding a referendum which does not approve the move to a leader and cabinet executive, or

(iii) acted in accordance with subsection (7) or (8) by completing the move to a leader and cabinet executive.

Subsequent move to leader and cabinet executive

(10) If the local authority’s committee system is protected, and it retains the committee system after acting in accordance with subsections (3) to (8), it may subsequently move to a leader and cabinet executive in accordance with this Chapter.

Local authority subject to dissolution

(11) This section—

(a) does not apply to a local authority if a dissolution order has been made in relation to the local authority before the commencement day;

(b) ceases to apply to a local authority if a dissolution order is made in relation to the local authority on or after the commencement day.

Accordingly the local authority is not to move to a leader and cabinet executive in accordance with any provision of this section after the commencement day or (as the case may be) on or after the day when the dissolution order is made.

Interpretation

(12) For the purposes of this section, a local authority’s committee system is “protected” if the committee system—

(a) became or remained the local authority’s governance arrangements following a referendum, and the 10 year referendum protection period has not ended on the commencement day, or

(b) became or remained the local authority’s governance arrangements by virtue of a resolution (but not following a referendum), and the 5 year resolution protection period has not ended on the commencement day.

(13) In this section—

“commencement day” means the day on which section 57 of the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2025 comes into force;

“dissolution order” means an order under section 7 or 10 of the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 providing for the dissolution of a local authority;

“move to a leader and cabinet executive” means—

(a) cease to operate the committee system, and

(b) start to operate a leader and cabinet executive (England);

and related expressions are to be construed accordingly;

“protected” has the meaning given in subsection (12);

“relevant protection period” , in relation to a local authority whose committee system is protected, means whichever of the—

(a) 5 year resolution protection period, and

(b) 10 year referendum protection period,

applies to the local authority;

“1 year decision period” means the period of one year beginning with the day immediately after the last day of the relevant protection period;

“5 year resolution protection period” , in relation to a resolution by virtue of which the committee system became or remained the local authority’s governance arrangements, means the period of 5 years beginning with the day on which the resolution was passed;

“10 year referendum protection period” , in relation to a referendum following which the committee system became or remained the local authority’s governance arrangements, means the period of 10 years beginning with the day on which the referendum was held.””.

This would enable a local authority to continue to operate the committee system if it has been adopted by resolution within the five years before commencement, or following a referendum within the 10 years before commencement.

“(2A) In section 9KC (resolution of local authority), after subsection (3) insert—

“(3A) Subsection (4) also applies if a local authority passes a resolution to continue to operate the committee system in accordance with section 9K(6); and, in such a case, “Resolution A” means the resolution to continue to operate the committee system.””.

This would ensure that a resolution under new section 9K(6) LGA 2000 (in Amendment 153) would trigger the application of section 9KC(4) LGA 2000.

This is consequential on Amendment 153.

Amendment 153 would enable certain local authorities to continue to operate the committee system and so paragraph 7 (which repeals legislation about the committee system) is no longer needed.

18:38

18:41

Business without Debate

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Commons Chamber

PETITION

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Commons Chamber

18:55

[Bradley Thomas (Bromsgrove) (Con)]

The Government’s housing targets are forcing a city template on to rural communities against the will of locals and with minimal consideration for infrastructure or environmental impact. That is why my “Save Our Greenbelt” petition has so far received 5,936 signatures. Bromsgrove and the villages, a 79% rural constituency composed of 89% green belt land, has been burdened by an 85% housing target increase, while our neighbouring city, Birmingham, has had its targets slashed by over 30%.

The petition states:

“The petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons urge the Government to justify the flawed formula used to calculate the local housing need for Bromsgrove District, reverse the planned reduction in Birmingham's housing target to ensure the burden is shared in a fair and proportionate way and only allow new houses to be built when the accompanying infrastructure is provided.”

Following is the full text of the petition:

[The petition of residents of Bromsgrove District,

Declares that it is wrong for rural Bromsgrove District’s housing targets to be increased by 82% while neighbouring urban Birmingham's targets are reduced by 31%; while noting that Bromsgrove District is 89% green belt and 79% rural and that at least 140 hectares of brownfield land in the south of Birmingham are already available for development.

The petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons urge the Government to justify the flawed formula used to calculate the local housing need for Bromsgrove District, reverse the planned reduction in Birmingham's housing target to ensure the burden is shared in a fair and proportionate way and only allow new houses to be built when the accompanying infrastructure is provided.

And the petitioners remain, etc.]

[P003130]

[Tonia Antoniazzi (Gower) (Lab)]

I rise to present a petition on behalf of my constituents regarding pornography. On International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women and day one of the United Nations’ 16 days of activism, the reach and influence of online pornography is bigger than ever. We know that sexual coercion is inherent to its production, and violence against women is mainstream within its content. Its use is fuelling misogyny and sexual violence, conditioning generations that abuse is a normal part of sexual encounters.

The petition states:

“The petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons urge the Government to extend safeguards applied to pornography offline to pornography distributed online”

and

“to verify the age and permission of every individual featured on their platform—and give performers the right to withdraw their consent at any time”.

Following is the full text of the petition:

[The petition of residents of the constituency of Gower,

Declares that pornography use is fuelling sexual violence; violence against women is prolific in mainstream pornography; and sexual coercion is inherent to the commercial production of pornography.

The petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons urge the Government to extend safeguards applied to pornography offline to pornography distributed online; and to legally require all pornography websites accessed from the UK to verify the age and permission of every individual featured on their platform – and give performers the right to withdraw their consent at any time to the continued publication of pornography in which they appear.

And the petitioners remain, etc.]

[P003135]

[Rachael Maskell (York Central) (Lab/Co-op)]

I rise to present a petition on the two-child benefit cap. Tomorrow we all trust will be a turning point for children living in poverty, as the third child and subsequent children in a family have been denied vital support since 2017 unless proved to be conceived by rape. To lift 540,000 children out of poverty with the removal of the two-child limit and a further 80,000 with the removal of the benefit cap is something 578 of my constituents have called for through a paper and digital petition against the hardship which they endure.

The petition states:

“The petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons urges the Government to consider the impact of the two-child benefit cap in developing a strategy to end child poverty.”

Following is the full text of the petition:

[The petition states:

The petition of residents of the constituency of York Central,

Declares that the Two Child Benefit Cap results in parents of families with three or more children born after April 2017 can only claim benefit for the first two children, unless they prove that further children have been conceived by rape; and further that this is a major reason for child poverty, causing larger families hardship, and that this has impacted on 1.6m children since its introduction.

The petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons urges the Government to consider the impact of the two-child benefit cap in developing a strategy to end child poverty.

And the petitioners remain, etc.]

[P003137]

Bromsgrove District housing targets

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Commons Chamber

18:55

[Bradley Thomas (Bromsgrove) (Con)]

The Government’s housing targets are forcing a city template on to rural communities against the will of locals and with minimal consideration for infrastructure or environmental impact. That is why my “Save Our Greenbelt” petition has so far received 5,936 signatures. Bromsgrove and the villages, a 79% rural constituency composed of 89% green belt land, has been burdened by an 85% housing target increase, while our neighbouring city, Birmingham, has had its targets slashed by over 30%.

The petition states:

“The petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons urge the Government to justify the flawed formula used to calculate the local housing need for Bromsgrove District, reverse the planned reduction in Birmingham's housing target to ensure the burden is shared in a fair and proportionate way and only allow new houses to be built when the accompanying infrastructure is provided.”

Following is the full text of the petition:

[The petition of residents of Bromsgrove District,

Declares that it is wrong for rural Bromsgrove District’s housing targets to be increased by 82% while neighbouring urban Birmingham's targets are reduced by 31%; while noting that Bromsgrove District is 89% green belt and 79% rural and that at least 140 hectares of brownfield land in the south of Birmingham are already available for development.

The petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons urge the Government to justify the flawed formula used to calculate the local housing need for Bromsgrove District, reverse the planned reduction in Birmingham's housing target to ensure the burden is shared in a fair and proportionate way and only allow new houses to be built when the accompanying infrastructure is provided.

And the petitioners remain, etc.]

[P003130]

Pornography and violence against women

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Commons Chamber

[Tonia Antoniazzi (Gower) (Lab)]

I rise to present a petition on behalf of my constituents regarding pornography. On International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women and day one of the United Nations’ 16 days of activism, the reach and influence of online pornography is bigger than ever. We know that sexual coercion is inherent to its production, and violence against women is mainstream within its content. Its use is fuelling misogyny and sexual violence, conditioning generations that abuse is a normal part of sexual encounters.

The petition states:

“The petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons urge the Government to extend safeguards applied to pornography offline to pornography distributed online”

and

“to verify the age and permission of every individual featured on their platform—and give performers the right to withdraw their consent at any time”.

Following is the full text of the petition:

[The petition of residents of the constituency of Gower,

Declares that pornography use is fuelling sexual violence; violence against women is prolific in mainstream pornography; and sexual coercion is inherent to the commercial production of pornography.

The petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons urge the Government to extend safeguards applied to pornography offline to pornography distributed online; and to legally require all pornography websites accessed from the UK to verify the age and permission of every individual featured on their platform – and give performers the right to withdraw their consent at any time to the continued publication of pornography in which they appear.

And the petitioners remain, etc.]

[P003135]

Two-child benefit cap

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Commons Chamber

[Rachael Maskell (York Central) (Lab/Co-op)]

I rise to present a petition on the two-child benefit cap. Tomorrow we all trust will be a turning point for children living in poverty, as the third child and subsequent children in a family have been denied vital support since 2017 unless proved to be conceived by rape. To lift 540,000 children out of poverty with the removal of the two-child limit and a further 80,000 with the removal of the benefit cap is something 578 of my constituents have called for through a paper and digital petition against the hardship which they endure.

The petition states:

“The petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons urges the Government to consider the impact of the two-child benefit cap in developing a strategy to end child poverty.”

Following is the full text of the petition:

[The petition states:

The petition of residents of the constituency of York Central,

Declares that the Two Child Benefit Cap results in parents of families with three or more children born after April 2017 can only claim benefit for the first two children, unless they prove that further children have been conceived by rape; and further that this is a major reason for child poverty, causing larger families hardship, and that this has impacted on 1.6m children since its introduction.

The petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons urges the Government to consider the impact of the two-child benefit cap in developing a strategy to end child poverty.

And the petitioners remain, etc.]

[P003137]

Uckfield Community Hospital Surgical Unit

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Commons Chamber

19:00

19:16

19:22

Draft Infrastructure (Wales) Act 2024 (Consequential Amendments) Order 2025

Tuesday 25th November 2025 General Committees

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chair: Sir Jeremy Wright

† Brandreth, Aphra (Chester South and Eddisbury) (Con)

† Chadwick, David (Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe) (LD)

† Charalambous, Bambos (Southgate and Wood Green) (Lab)

† Cross, Harriet (Gordon and Buchan) (Con)

† Davies, Jonathan (Mid Derbyshire) (Lab)

† Fox, Sir Ashley (Bridgwater) (Con)

† German, Gill (Clwyd North) (Lab)

† Hack, Amanda (North West Leicestershire) (Lab)

Hoare, Simon (North Dorset) (Con)

† Jones, Gerald (Merthyr Tydfil and Aberdare) (Lab)

† Kitchen, Gen (Wellingborough and Rushden) (Lab)

† Leishman, Brian (Alloa and Grangemouth) (Lab)

† MacDonald, Mr Angus (Inverness, Skye and West Ross-shire) (LD)

† Ranger, Andrew (Wrexham) (Lab)

† Stevens, Jo (Secretary of State for Wales)

† Taylor, Alison (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (Lab)

† White, Jo (Bassetlaw) (Lab)

William Opposs, Committee Clerk

† attended the Committee

Second Delegated Legislation Committee

Tuesday 25 November 2025

[Sir Jeremy Wright in the Chair]

Draft Infrastructure (Wales) Act 2024 (Consequential Amendments) Order 2025

09:25

[The Secretary of State for Wales (Jo Stevens)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the draft Infrastructure (Wales) Act 2024 (Consequential Amendments) Order 2025.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy. The draft order, which was laid before the House on 27 October, will make changes to UK legislation that are necessary as a consequence of the Welsh Government’s Infrastructure (Wales) Act 2024. That Act establishes a new consenting process for major devolved infrastructure projects in Wales, including significant energy, waste, water and transport projects. The Act unifies the decision-making process for devolved infrastructure projects, with a number of existing consents, authorisations and licences integrated into the new process. That means that devolved projects that were previously consented under various pieces of legislation, including the Electricity Act 1989 and the Transport and Works Act 1992, will now require infrastructure consent under the Welsh Government’s 2024 Act.

The Welsh Government will commence the 2024 Act and bring the new consenting process into force on 15 December. The amendments to UK legislation in the draft order fall outside the legislative competence of the Senedd and are necessary to ensure that the 2024 Act can take effect as intended; therefore, they need to be made in advance of the new process coming into force. As infrastructure consent under the Welsh Government’s new Act has not existed before now, it is not reflected in UK legislation in the same way that other consenting processes are. The draft order ensures that infrastructure consent is treated consistently with those existing consenting arrangements by updating relevant UK legislation.

Article 2 of the draft order amends the Nuclear Installations Act 1965, which provides that an applicant for a nuclear site licence may be directed to notify the relevant public authorities about their application. However, that power of direction does not apply to applications for nuclear generating stations that require consent under the Electricity Act 1989, which has its own requirements for consultation with public authorities. In line with that, article 2 of the draft order ensures that the power of direction in the 1965 Act does not apply to projects that require infrastructure consent under the Infrastructure (Wales) Act 2024, because the 2024 Act also places its own requirements on applicants to consult with public authorities.

When granting infrastructure consent under the new Welsh process in circumstances in which hazardous substances consent is also required, the Welsh Ministers will be able to deem hazardous substances consent to be granted, without the need for a separate application. Article 3 of the draft order amends the Planning (Hazardous Substances) Act 1990 to create a requirement for the Health and Safety Executive to be consulted before hazardous substances consent can be deemed to be granted in that way. That replicates the process for other consenting regimes, including under the Electricity Act 1989, which require consultation with the Health and Safety Executive in such circumstances.

Article 4 of the draft order amends the Finance Act 2013. Section 130 of that Act, which relates to the annual tax on enveloped dwellings, makes provision about the conversion of a dwelling for non-residential use. It provides that buildings will be regarded as suitable for use as a dwelling until any planning permission, or development consent under the Planning Act 2008, required for the conversion is granted. Article 4 of the draft order ensures that buildings that require infrastructure consent under the new Welsh system will also still be regarded as suitable for use as a dwelling until the point at which consent is granted.

I welcome the Welsh Government’s Infrastructure (Wales) Act and I hope it will have a positive impact on the consenting process for devolved infrastructure projects. The draft order will make the necessary consequential amendments to reserved legislation, helping to ensure that the Welsh Government’s legislation can take effect as intended.

09:29

[Harriet Cross (Gordon and Buchan) (Con)]

As we have heard from the Secretary of State, the draft order will seemingly simplify the infrastructure consent processes in Wales for infrastructure projects, including those related to energy, electricity, transport, waste and water, by moving from the current multinational-level agencies process to an approvals process monitored and applied by the Welsh Government.

The explanatory notes to the Infrastructure (Wales) Bill published by the Welsh Government in June 2023 stated that it would ensure

“timely and effective delivery of major infrastructure and low carbon development in the right locations”.

Of course that is welcome, but it cannot and should not be at the expense of local and community voices and input. Any centralisation of planning processes and decisions must remain sympathetic to the needs and concerns of communities who will be most impacted by the new infrastructure, especially that of the scale and nature covered by the draft order. Any changes that are made —even those as relatively limited as those we are considering—must be to the benefit of the people, businesses and communities of Wales, and should not add a route to silence legitimate concerns.

Of course we want a simplified approach to infrastructure and planning that is business, community and, importantly, growth friendly and will help Wales catch up with the rest of the UK. However, given the scale of what needs to be achieved in Wales to make real, tangible change, we on the Opposition Benches are not convinced that these measures represent the change necessary to stimulate and truly accelerate Wales’s economy.

We will not oppose the draft order, but I would be grateful if the Secretary of State could address the following questions. Is there any scope for the Senedd or a future Welsh Government to propose changes to regulations that would make Wales unaligned with the rest of the UK, causing complications? Are the Government confident that the relevant agencies in Wales have the capacity to deal with applications under these licences? What projects does the Secretary of State feel will be most impacted, or benefit most, from these changes in the next five years? Does she see the draft order as a gateway for further devolution? Has she assessed whether the legislation might make consent easier to obtain in Wales than in other devolved nations, and the knock-on effect that could have on projects in other parts of the United Kingdom? What cross-Government work is being done on that?

09:32

[Jo Stevens]

I am pleased that the hon. Lady confirmed that there is no opposition to the draft order. On her main point, about local community input, the Welsh Government have undertaken extensive consultation on the 2024 Act. Both the Act and the regulations were subject to extensive engagement. Two consultations were undertaken, one by the Welsh Government and one by the Senedd. The Welsh Government have also disseminated information on the changes to industry through various events. The Act provides a process that enables local communities to engage in decisions that affect them, as well as flexibility to capture the consenting arrangements for developing technologies. The Welsh Government have attended and presented at events targeted at different key stakeholders involved in the process, including developers, local authorities and the community.

Several of the other matters that the hon. Lady raised relate to what the Welsh Government will do, and I suggest that she writes to the Welsh Ministers on those points. On which projects we expect to be most affected by the draft order, she referred in her own speech to water, transport and energy as examples.

Question put and agreed to.

09:34

Committee rose.

Draft Education (Scotland) Act 2025 (Consequential Provisions and Modifications) Order 2025

Tuesday 25th November 2025 General Committees

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chair: Wera Hobhouse

† Baxter, Johanna (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)

† Bowie, Andrew (West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine) (Con)

† Cooper, John (Dumfries and Galloway) (Con)

† Cross, Harriet (Gordon and Buchan) (Con)

† Dickson, Jim (Dartford) (Lab)

† Evans, Chris (Caerphilly) (Lab/Co-op)

Jogee, Adam (Newcastle-under-Lyme) (Lab)

† MacDonald, Mr Angus (Inverness, Skye and West Ross-shire) (LD)

† McNeill, Kirsty (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Scotland)

Mundell, David (Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale and Tweeddale) (Con)

† Murray, Susan (Mid Dunbartonshire) (LD)

Nichols, Charlotte (Warrington North) (Lab)

† Poynton, Gregor (Livingston) (Lab)

Rimmer, Ms Marie (St Helens South and Whiston) (Lab)

† Stainbank, Euan (Falkirk) (Lab)

† Taylor, Alison (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (Lab)

† Welsh, Michelle (Sherwood Forest) (Lab)

George James, Committee Clerk

† attended the Committee

Third Delegated Legislation Committee

Tuesday 25 November 2025

[Wera Hobhouse in the Chair]

Draft Education (Scotland) Act 2025 (Consequential Provisions and Modifications) Order 2025

14:30

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Scotland (Kirsty McNeill)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the draft Education (Scotland) Act 2025 (Consequential Provisions and Modifications) Order 2025.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Hobhouse. I am grateful for the opportunity to debate this order today. Like all the Scotland Act orders we have considered since the start of this Parliament, this is a result of collaborative working between the UK and Scottish Governments. The order before us will be made under section 104 of the Scotland Act 1998 which, following an Act of the Scottish Parliament, provides the power for consequential provisions to be made to the law relating to reserved matters, or to the laws elsewhere in the UK.

Scotland Act orders are a demonstration of devolution in action, and I am pleased to say that the Scotland Office has taken through 10 orders in the past 12 months. This order makes provisions in consequence of the Education (Scotland) Act, which received Royal Assent earlier this year. That Act of the Scottish Parliament provides for the establishment of a new qualifications body, Qualifications Scotland, to replace the existing Scottish Qualifications Authority. It also creates the office of His Majesty’s chief inspector of education in Scotland, removing the inspection function from Education Scotland, which is an Executive agency of the Scottish Government.

The UK Government have worked collaboratively with the Scottish Government on the draft order, which is needed to commence some of the provisions of the Act. The order is necessary to ensure that the functions currently exercised by the SQA can be fully transferred to the new body being set up, Qualifications Scotland. This will enable Qualifications Scotland to deliver all the services and products that are currently delivered by the SQA, maintaining the same functional and geographic scope.

The order also makes a number of consequential amendments in reserved areas and to UK, Welsh and Northern Ireland regulations to reflect replacement of the SQA with Qualifications Scotland. These are needed so that existing provisions across numerous regulations can continue to operate in the way they do now. Finally, the draft order is also needed to designate the newly created office of His Majesty’s chief inspector of education in Scotland as a non-ministerial office holder in the Scottish Administration for the purposes of the Scotland Act 1998. That change is needed to ensure that the person appointed to this role is a civil servant, which is required to support the delivery model for the inspectorate that is being set up by the Education (Scotland) Act.

The order changes the law in a very limited way and only so far as is necessary to give full effect to the provisions of the education Act of the Scottish Parliament. While the order’s provisions extend to the whole of the UK, its practical effect is limited to Scotland. Without the order, there is a risk of disrupting the education system in Scotland and the hard work of teachers and young people across Scotland. It is an example of devolution in action—the UK Government working with the Scottish Government to deliver for the people of Scotland.

14:33

[Andrew Bowie (West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Hobhouse. This instrument follows the Education (Scotland) Act 2025, which was passed by the Scottish Parliament in June this year and gained Royal Assent in August. As the Minister set out, that Act dissolved the Scottish Qualifications Authority, established Qualifications Scotland to replace it, and established the role of His Majesty’s chief inspector of education in Scotland. This statutory instrument enables that Act by amending references to the SQA in UK legislation, ensuring that the qualifications are recognised throughout the United Kingdom. Importantly, that allows the body to operate and be adequately recognised throughout the UK, which is outside the scope of the Scottish Parliament; hence we are here today.

I take this opportunity to thank my MSP colleagues in the Scottish Parliament for their work in challenging the Education (Scotland) Act and holding the Scottish Government to account on poor educational outcomes. I pay particular tribute to my friend Miles Briggs, the Scottish Conservative MSP for the Lothian region, for highlighting the limitations of the Scottish Parliament’s Bill. There are significant questions about whether the legislation makes progress on the wider educational reforms that are so desperately required. We believe that it is a missed opportunity to enact genuine and meaningful reform of Scottish education.

While the order we are considering today is unobjectionable, it would be remiss of me not to take the opportunity to raise the state of the Scottish education system. Once the pride of the country, the Scottish education system has suffered poorer and poorer outcomes. The Conservative legacy in education saw students in England climb the international league tables from 27th to 11th in the world in maths in 2022, while Scottish students continued to slip down the programme for international student assessment rankings in maths and science under the Scottish National party Government—it is a shame that none of its Members could join us this afternoon. Earlier this year, the head of Scotland’s second-largest teaching union said that “education is broken” and that the school system

“has passed the tipping point leading to crisis”.

The “Curriculum for Excellence” is anything but.

At the core of this is the Scottish National party’s desperation to be different for difference’s sake. It is exceptionalism gone too far, and nowhere is that more evident than in the Scottish education system. For once, the SNP Government should take a look at what works south of the border, put their pride and politics aside and emulate best practice for the sake of Scottish students. The SNP has something—lots—to learn from the Conservative party’s legacy, especially in the English school system. However, that is a debate for another day and another place, so I will leave it at that. His Majesty’s Opposition will not stand in the way of this instrument.

14:35

[Kirsty McNeill]

I thank the hon. Member for his contribution. While he might not be surprised to discover that I disagree with his assessment of the Conservative educational legacy south of the border, we can all agree as Scots that it is absolutely appalling that a full 42% of Scottish young people today are leaving Scottish education without a single higher or equivalent qualification to their name. For an education system that was once the envy of the world, that is a burning national shame.

This instrument demonstrates the UK Government’s continued commitment to work with the Scottish Government to deliver for Scotland. I therefore commend the draft order to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

14:36

Committee rose.

Petition

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Petitions

Road safety in Ward End, Birmingham

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Petitions

Westminster Hall

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Westminster Hall

Immigration Reforms: Humanitarian Visa Routes

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Westminster Hall

09:30

09:46

09:49

09:52

09:57

10:00

10:04

10:07

10:10

10:13

10:15

10:19

10:21

10:24

10:28

10:32

10:37

10:42

10:59

Level 7 Apprenticeships

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Westminster Hall

11:00

11:00

11:11

11:24

Violence against Women and Girls: London

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Westminster Hall

14:30

14:45

14:52

14:57

15:02

15:09

15:15

15:20

15:25

15:31

15:40

15:45

15:59

Bike Theft: Loughborough

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Westminster Hall

15:57

16:09

16:23

Pension Investment in UK Equities

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Westminster Hall

16:30

16:49

16:52

16:58

17:03

17:07

17:14

16:04

16:04

Written Correction

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Written Corrections

Ministerial Correction

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Written Corrections

Business and Trade

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Written Corrections

Written Statements

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Written Statements

UK-India Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement: Agricultural Products Report

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Written Statements

NHS Investment: Neighbourhood Health Centres and Digital

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Written Statements

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures: 1 June 2025 to 31 August 2025

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Written Statements

Overnight Visitor Levy

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Written Statements

Airports National Policy Statement: Heathrow

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Written Statements

Carer's Allowance Overpayments Review

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Written Statements

Grand Committee

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Grand Committee

Tuesday 25 November 2025

Grand Committee

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Grand Committee

Tuesday 25 November 2025

Arrangement of Business

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Grand Committee

Announcement

15:45

Road Vehicles (Type-Approval) (Amendment) Regulations 2025

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Grand Committee

Motion to Take Note

15:45

Moved by

16:00

I submit that urgent and decisive action is required, and two steps have become essential. First, there must be an immediate extension of the transition timeline. This extension must bridge the period between the current position and the point at which we reach a long-term solution that will endure whichever Government are in power. When the Government say—and they do it relation to not just these regulations but across a range of issues—“Don’t worry about friction because what we are going to do is adopt the EU standards and converge with the Windsor Framework requirements”, that is all well and good as long as this particular Government have that particular policy. But if a new Government come in and decide to change course, which they may well do, we are back to square one. So we need to have something that is enduring and sustainable.

A transition extension is not about delay but about preventing further damage while a credible pathway to resolution is established. That solution is clear and has been called for by politicians, businesspeople and consumer groups in Northern Ireland. It is that Northern Ireland must be fully and unequivocally restored to the United Kingdom internal market so that GB type approval must apply to all four countries of the United Kingdom.

As one witness from the NFDA succinctly stated last week to the Assembly’s committee, Northern Ireland needs to be in the UK internal market, not in some hybrid market that does not exist. The current arrangements leave Northern Ireland suspended between two systems. If the Government maintain the current position, from next year there is going to be a massive hit to the car sales sector, a reduction in investment and serious damage to consumer confidence.

This is not a commercial challenge for car manufacturers or dealers that they can adapt to and come to terms with. It is a policy failure on the part of government which is making life difficult for businesses and consumers in Northern Ireland. It entrenches inequality within the United Kingdom and places Northern Ireland consumers and businesses at a permanent disadvantage. These are real problems affecting real people, real businesses and real communities. Everyone is going to be affected by lack of choice, and higher prices. It is incompatible with the principle of the UK internal market and unworkable for those trying to do business on the ground.

I finish by saying simply that this needs to change. It needs to change quickly, and I hope the Minister can give some reassurance to people in Northern Ireland that the Government will at least address these issues in a detailed way. I beg to move.

16:15

I ask my noble friend the Minister to work with his colleagues in the Department for Transport and in the Northern Ireland Office to ensure that the blockages and challenges are resolved as quickly as possible, in order to bring succour and comfort to those in car dealerships in Northern Ireland who have endured unending problems over the last number of months.

16:30

I have a few specific questions for the Minister. Is it the Government’s intention to continue to align themselves with EU regulations in this sector, not least in light of the arguments of the noble Lord, Lord Dodds? Does the Minister agree that it would be desirable to keep the differences between GB and NI in this sector to an absolute minimum? Does he agree that not only would that be for the benefit of business but, as other noble Lords have said, it would ensure the highest standards of safety in this sector?

Finally, and perhaps this goes a little beyond the scope of the regulations, does the Minister accept, as we—correctly, in my view—increasingly continue to align with EU regulations, that the current parliamentary oversight provisions, particularly in the House of Commons, are inadequate, and that new and better ways should be found, much earlier in the process, to ensure that UK concerns are addressed and to provide a much greater element of parliamentary oversight?

16:45

Let me turn to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Dodds of Duncairn. He gave a long list of manufacturers, as did other noble Lords. I will go away and check on that because the information I have is about models; it is not a whole list of products of complete manufacturers. We will look at that closely in order to ensure that our joint understanding is right in terms of what models are and are not offered there. I am certainly happy to say that, if the list is anything like correct—I am not suggesting for a moment that the noble Lord is not correct, but we obviously need to check for ourselves—we certainly have more work to do in this area. As I have already said, and as I am sure I will say more times before we finish this debate, it is our intention that the offer of models in Northern Ireland is the same as in the rest of Great Britain. I cannot confirm the statistics but, as I say, I am not suggesting for a moment that the noble Lord is incorrect; we just need to do that work in the department.

17:00

This debate has given us the opportunity to raise a number of wider issues. The noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, rightly raised issues regarding UN standards and the role that that might play in solving some of these problems. The noble Lord, Lord Bew, raised the wider issue that if this matter is not sorted out then it is just another example of greater regulatory divergence that will ultimately—a point that I have been making—cause political instability in Northern Ireland. This is just part of a jigsaw of various issues that are causing friction and could lead to real problems for the stability of the political process. We do not want to see that happening, so we need to get these issues sorted out. We may differ to some extent on what our ultimate fundamental solutions are, and we will continue to argue about that, but solutions need to be found.

I am grateful to everyone who has contributed to this debate, which has been a positive one. I look forward to hearing further from the Minister, as I know the motor trade in Northern Ireland will, and so will all the people out there who are thinking of changing their car and buying a new Vauxhall, a new Fiat or a new Peugeot, whatever it is—I am not advertising. The point is that they should have the freedom to access the model that they wish to in the same way as people in England, Scotland and Wales do.

The Minister said at the end that people in the UK should be free to buy and use cars throughout the UK. The truth of the matter is, of course, that people in Great Britain are free to buy and use them throughout the entirety of the United Kingdom, but not people in Northern Ireland. That is a totally unnecessary position for the citizens of this United Kingdom who live in Northern Ireland to be placed in. I thank Members for their contributions and for their attention to this matter.

Motion agreed.

Road Vehicles (Type-Approval) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2025

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Grand Committee

Motion to Take Note

17:02

Moved by

Motion agreed.

Committee adjourned at 5.02 pm.

House of Lords

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

Tuesday 25 November 2025

14:30

Prayers—read by the Lord Bishop of Leeds.

House of Lords

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

Tuesday 25 November 2025

14:30

Prayers—read by the Lord Bishop of Leeds.

Introduction: Baroness Gerada

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

14:38

Dame Clare Mary Louise Frances Gerada, DBE, having been created Baroness Gerada, of Kennington in the London Borough of Lambeth, was introduced and took the oath, supported by Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws and Lord Patel of Bradford, and signed an undertaking to abide by the Code of Conduct.

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Democratic Resilience

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

Question

14:42

Asked by

Wales: Further Devolution

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

Question

14:53

Asked by

Schools: Funding

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

Question

15:03

Asked by

Forthcoming Fiscal Changes

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

Question

15:13

Asked by

Russian Ship “Yantar”

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

Commons Urgent Question

The following Answer to an Urgent Question was given in the House of Commons on Thursday 20 November.

“I would like to make some comments on the Russian main directorate of deep-sea research programme, known as GUGI. As the Secretary of State for Defence described yesterday, the Russian research vessel ‘Yantar’ is part of this programme, and is used for gathering intelligence and mapping undersea infrastructure, not just in the United Kingdom but across many other nations, both in Europe and across the globe. The UK understands that the ‘Yantar’ is but one ship in a fleet of Russian vessels designed to threaten our critical national underwater infrastructure and pose a threat to our economics and our way of life.

Russia has been developing a military capability to use against critical underwater infrastructure for decades. GUGI is developing capabilities. It is deployed from specialist surface vessels and submarines that are intended to be used to survey underwater infrastructure during peacetime, but then damage or destroy infrastructure in deep water during a conflict. Russia seeks to conduct this type of operation covertly without being held responsible. Such capabilities can be deployed from surface vessels like the ‘Yantar’. That is why Defence directed a change in the Royal Navy’s posture, so that we can better track and respond to the threats from this vessel and many others.

The ‘Yantar’ has been operating once again—for the second time this year—in and around the UK’s exclusive economic zone. During that time, she was continuously monitored by Royal Navy frigate HMS “Somerset” and the RAF’s P-8s.

We will ensure that the ‘Yantar’ is not able to conduct its mission unchallenged or untracked. But that has not been without difficulties: a laser assessed to be originating from the port side of the “Yantar” was directed at British personnel operating one of our P-8s in a highly dangerous and reckless attempt to disrupt our monitoring. The P-8 continued to monitor the ‘Yantar’s’ activity. Post incident, when its personnel arrived back safe in the UK, they were medically assessed. No injuries were sustained and no damage was sustained to the aircraft or her equipment.

Russia does not want us to know what it is doing or what the ‘Yantar’ is up to; it does not want the world to know what it is doing. But we will not be deterred; we will not let the ‘Yantar’ go unchallenged as it attempts to survey our infrastructure. We will work with our allies to ensure that Russia knows that any attempt to disrupt or damage underwater infrastructure will be met with the firmest of responses. I finish by saying a great thank you to the brave men and women of our Royal Navy and RAF who continue to keep us safe at home and abroad”.

15:25

Separation Centres: Terrorist Offenders

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

Commons Urgent Question

The following Answer to an Urgent Question was given in the House of Commons on Thursday 20 November.

“The right honourable Gentleman raises a very important question. Separation centres are a vital part of our strategy to manage those who pose the most significant terrorist risk. Following the horrific attack at HMP Frankland in April this year, we took immediate action to ensure safety in our separation centres. Today, everyone is safe and a stringent regime remains in place.

Our prison officers are some of the hardest working and bravest public servants in this country. It is right that they feel safe as they work to protect the public. That is why, following the attack at Frankland, we mandated the use of protective body armour in our highest-risk units, including our SCs, for the first time. The Deputy Prime Minister has recently announced a further £15 million investment in safety equipment, including to roll out up to 10,000 pieces of body armour to up to 500 staff trained in the use of Tasers.

The Abu judgment is very fact-specific and does not threaten the integrity of the separation centres themselves. This Government take the judgment and others that were referenced very seriously. We are clear that any decision regarding segregation must comply with prison rules and human rights obligations, including under the European Convention on Human Rights. We are working to ensure that our referral process is robust and are strengthening our ability to defend against legal challenges. Specialist staff continue to assess referrals rigorously, and placements are made only where the criteria are met.

Let me be clear: the Government will always put national security first. Separation centres remain an essential operational tool, and we will continue to use these specialist units to protect the public from the most dangerous offenders”.

15:36

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

Committee (2nd Day)

15:47

Relevant documents: 37th Report from the Delegated Powers Committee and 14th Report from the Constitution Committee

Clause 1: Commencement of Treaty and main provisions of this Act

Amendment 17

Moved by

16:00

This cannot go unchecked. The amendment would require three simple, just and necessary things. First, that the Secretary of State must intervene through diplomatic and international channels to ensure that the birthplace of Chagossian natives continues to be recognised accurately. Secondly, that all official documents, birth records, passports and identity papers must reflect the truth of a person’s origins. Thirdly, that Parliament must be informed annually of any attempts by any state to alter or erase this information. The Chagossians are one of the most dispossessed people in the modern British story. They were removed without their consent, they were misrepresented in official papers, they were denied self-determination, and their history has often been told without them. Now, even their birthplace is being overwritten. We cannot allow that to happen. I hope that Amendment 50A will gain support.

Finally, Amendment 81A calls for a report within three months of the Bill becoming law on the impact of the transfer of sovereignty, particularly on the preservation and the right to access sites of Chagossian heritage. It is a very minimalist requirement and the very least we can do. I ask the Minister to give a sympathetic ear and due consideration to this amendment, and indeed to all the other amendments I have spoken to.

16:15

16:30

Then there is the straightforward question of physical exports. Obviously the old economy of the archipelago was based heavily on coconuts; I am all in favour of coconuts, but they are not really going to be the high-value product today. What about some of the products they have that can be used in pharmaceutical or herbal remedy industries? The archipelago is rich in herbs and plants with curative properties, such as Madagascar periwinkle, which is known locally as bitter rose, Indian nettle, which is known as lerb chat, lemongrass, sage, catnip and so on. There are all sorts of things that could be brought into cultivation.

What about a civilian marine search and rescue operation, instead of relying on the British and US navies? Given the confluence of shipping routes in that part of the world, is there not some capacity there? What about a night sky observatory? You will not get much clearer skies than in an archipelago as remote as that one. What about a marine plastics recycling operation? We have all this polluted water and all these plastics floating in great maelstroms. There is the capacity to serve both an ecological and an economic purpose. What about a filming location? There would be plenty of interest in going to a new place. The audio-visual sector has taken over some very unlikely places, including in my old constituency when I was an MEP, and I suspect in the former constituencies of some of the Northern Irish Members who spoke earlier. What about the wider issues of sports and culture? I can see people wanting to go for an annual regatta around the archipelago, as they do in other places.

My point is not that all these things would happen; it is not even that most of them would happen, but some of them might. Then think of all the ideas I have not had, which local people will. This is always the way in which the private sector second-guesses and outperforms politicians. There are all sorts of things that may happen if we give people the opportunity, but none of these things can happen if we deny people the right to return.

16:45

That comment only a few weeks ago gets to the heart of this. The effect of this Bill does nothing to advance the interests of Diego Garcia or the Chagossians. It is certainly not about advancing the British interest. It sacrifices the rights of Chagossians, while harming our own national security, which flows from Cyprus and Diego Garcia in combination, both of which bookend the Suez Canal and underpin our ability to trade globally and generate wealth in our islands. Mauritius has never had a claim on the Chagos—it is the same distance apart as we are from Gibraltar. They are only coupled together on the basis that they were sort of generally in the same direction, and the 19th century desk clerk in the Foreign Office thought they might as well be dealt with together. That is the truth.

The Bill confects a link between the two places. By advancing the self-interest of Mauritius over the interests of our own nation and our subjects in the British Overseas Indian Territories, we see in sharp relief the cowardice of a Prime Minister who will not or cannot stand up to his chums in the legal profession. They think it is rather a good idea to pay to give up land and then ask permission from our enemies to use it, having been kidded that international law requires it, from a case in which the UK was not even a participant, citing approval from maritime and marine bodies that have no nexus over our sovereignty and no business pushing us around.

I thank the Library for pointing out so clearly that the legal basis for giving up the Chagos is not a judgment but an “advisory opinion”. The Government are playing by absurd rules that defy logic and common sense, and are not even rules anyway. This deal is all about Mauritius, in an arrangement where we will pay billions to give away our land so we can pay off their debts and pave their streets with gold, when we do not even have enough money to pay our pensioners their winter fuel allowance. It beggars belief.

Even at this stage, these amendments try to put lipstick on the pig—a reference to the domestic pigs that formerly roamed freely on the islands of the Chagos Archipelago before that base was established. After 200 years of protection, the British Indian Ocean Territory will be ceded to a country in bed with our enemies, and the citizenship rights of the Chagossians will be limited. It is down to us at least to ensure that the trust fund will be used to benefit all Chagossians, to ensure that they have a say in how it is spent to benefit our former subjects, and to ensure that the Chagossians, and their issue, are not just eligible to be employed on the base on an equitable basis, but also have preference for employment. They can then play a role in protecting their ancestral home, in the hope that, one day, it may be returned to them.

This short debate is named for the trust fund. But when we talk about trust, the trust that the British people have placed in this Government to do the right thing has been unnecessarily and inexplicably squandered and abused. In June, the noble Baroness, Lady Liddell, told your Lordships that this was a good deal for the Mauritians, who are truly getting something for nothing and being paid for the privilege. But being good for the Mauritians is not the test. The question is whether it is a good deal for the Chagossians and whether this Bill, which weakens both them and us, can at least safeguard an endowment that will be used for its intended purpose, with the control and consent of those who will benefit from it.

To govern is to choose. The Prime Minister has made a choice: to stand with his learned north London, prosecco-drinking friends, against the wishes of his plain-talking, pie-and-pint caucus in his wider party and the wider interests of the British people and our kinsmen on the Chagos. This is a bad Bill and we should fight it as hard as we can.

17:00

Amendment 81C, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Kempsell, seeks to put the Chagossian contact group on to a statutory footing. The Government welcome the challenges to increase the participation of Chagossians in the political process. The noble Lord made some really good points about this. We have already established the contact group to give Chagossians a role in the UK Government’s support for their community. Following debates in Parliament, we have already announced that we will explore opportunities for enhancement to this group, as he suggests, including increasing its transparency and frequency; it is meeting quarterly at the moment. However, we are clear that any decisions about the contact group must be made in agreement with existing members of the group, and we do not want to impose things that we think would be right for them. This is one of the reasons why we are resisting this amendment, but it is a good opportunity to raise this, and the noble Lord made his case well.

Amendment 17 withdrawn.

Amendment 18

Moved by

17:15

We need to know whether both Governments agreed on the interpretation of “expeditiously inform”. If they agree on that interpretation then my concerns are allayed, but if they are not agreed then this needs to be ironed out before the treaty is brought into legal effect. If Mauritius does not agree that we can inform it after an attack then I foresee a scenario whereby the United Kingdom or the United States launches an attack on a third party, informs Mauritius afterwards, and then Mauritius raises an objection and initiates a dispute mechanism.

If I appear to be nitpicking here, it is because if the base is to operate securely and effectively, as stated in the agreement—and I fully accept the beliefs and undertakings that the Minister and her colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, are giving—then these issues cannot be left for later discussion when incidents arise and a huddle of lawyers and diplomats try to work out what the treaty provisions actually mean. It would be a supreme irony if a treaty that is intended to remove legal uncertainty ends up perpetuating it.

The way the base operates is that ships and aircraft come and go. There is a possibility, albeit small, that a British or American aircraft or vessel might leave the base and then be attacked or put under danger by a third state. I want to be clear, if it has left the base and then perhaps engaged in hostile activity against a third state or the assets of a third state, that there is no obligation on the UK under Annex 1 to inform Mauritius. This was not clarified in the Minister’s letter, and I am asking for this to be confirmed by the Secretary of State before the Bill can come into force.

Amendment 87 also relates to Annex 1(2) of the treaty. It would require the Secretary of State to make explicit before Sections 2 to 4 of the Bill come into force that this obligation to “expeditiously inform” Mauritius in the treaty does not extend to action taken by the UK to defend the base—in other words, to disable hostile aircraft, drones, ships or other devices which present a threat to the base. This is particularly relevant given the evolving threat presented by drones. We have only to look at the actions by the Houthis in the Red Sea and their use of drones to target western ships to see what future threats to the base might look like. To adequately protect the base, the United Kingdom needs to be able to disable any such threats in any way possible. If they had been launched by a third state and we shot them down, would this be considered an armed attack on a third state? Again, I would be grateful for a clarification.

In this regard, I also welcome Amendments 20D and 20E from my noble friend Lord Kempsell. Both amendments address similar issues: namely, the fact that Mauritius is to have a say on the presence of non-UK and non-US military personnel at the base. If the treaty permits the operation of the base to continue as it does currently, which is what the Government have claimed, then why should we have to consult with Mauritius on the presence of our allies at the base? Surely whether French forces are welcome at the base is a matter for the United Kingdom, not Mauritius. Similarly, why should Mauritius have any say over the placement of installations if those are related to the defence of the base? I look forward to the Minister’s response.

17:30

In regard to this, we should not treat the Salisbury convention as a one-way street. Not only are we free to oppose the Bill, as no commitment to it was made in the Labour manifesto—at least, I cannot find such a commitment—but we have a responsibility to oppose it because it stands in direct contradiction to the relevant provisions in Labour’s July 2024 general election manifesto, which commits the Government to

“protecting the British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies, including the Falklands and Gibraltar. Labour will always defend their sovereignty and right to self-determination”.

That statement was made by Labour. It was not made by the Tories, the Cross-Benchers or anybody else in this House. It was the Labour Party that chose to make self-determination for the British Overseas Territories an issue for its term in office, not me, and nor have I heard anyone else say that. It is the standard in relation to all the British Overseas Territories to which the Government have chosen to hold themselves.

The British Overseas Territory in relation to which the imperative for the provision of a self-determination referendum is plainly greatest is the Chagos Islands, because its people have been denied all self-government for over 50 years as a result of having been forcibly removed from their territory. It is there that the self-determination deficit is uniquely total and the need to fulfil the self-determination obligation most pressing. While all the other overseas territories enjoy a measure of self-government—usually, in most matters apart from defence—the Chagossians have been denied it completely.

The extraordinary thing about this is that not a single reference was made in another place to the way in which the Bill violates the Labour manifesto. This is perhaps not surprising given that it was afforded only a few hours in Committee, Report was not bothered with and Third Reading was dispatched in less than an hour. It was all done the same day; if you had blinked, you would probably have missed it. In this context, far from it being a done deal, your Lordships’ House not only has the power to reject this Bill and thereby prevent treaty ratification, but a duty to do so, out of respect for self-determination and, indeed, the Labour Party manifesto. The best outcome would be that the UK Government and the Republic of Mauritius would then recognise that this is not a treaty to ratify, and that they must seek an alternative solution that makes provision for self-determination for the people of the Chagos Islands.

In conclusion, I very much look forward to listening to the Minister’s response to these points. Having engaged with the question of the domestic processes in the UK between signing and possible ratification, will she inform the Committee about the domestic processes of the Republic of Mauritius in this regard? I would appreciate her commenting on that. We hear that there is now some uncertainty on the Mauritian side, which she could perhaps comment on today. Will she also tell the Committee what secondary legislation must be brought forward before ratification? If she is not able to do so today, will she please write to us ahead of Report, setting out the planned secondary legislation and what it will do? I would also value the Minister’s comments on my other amendment, Amendment 20H. I look forward to hearing from her.

17:45

18:00

18:15

It is quite tricky to look into the future and to think about every single thing that may occur. All you can do, as has been the history of nations, is to negotiate agreements you then try to hold people to account for. You say, “These are the obligations you have accepted and agreed to in a treaty” and, through international law, you try to ensure that they abide by them. That is one of the things I say to the noble Lords, Lord Hannan and Lord Kempsell.

I say in answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, that we are seeking to ensure the long-term, secure and effective operation of the base. I will come to some of the other points that she and the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, made in a little while, particularly on notification and permission.

Amendment 35 from the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, seeks to impose a statutory requirement on the Secretary of State for Defence to ensure the continued operation of the base on Diego Garcia at all times. It should be stressed that the Defence Secretary is already performing these duties to the full extent of his powers. Defence of the realm is one of the most fundamental tasks of any Government, as the noble Baroness knows because she has done it, as has the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad.

The amendment seeks to place duties on the Defence Secretary that more properly sit with the Government as a whole, rather than just with the Defence Secretary. It would also create statutory duties that displace the defence prerogative and would inhibit the Government’s freedom of manoeuvre and ability to take strategic decisions over the lifetime of the treaty. Proposed new subsection (3) in the noble Baroness’s amendment is not required as Article 14 of the treaty already sets out the dispute settlement mechanism for the treaty, including the role of the joint commission. It is unnecessary, therefore, for a request to be made to establish one.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, made the point very well about seeking to ensure that Parliament approves any future defence or security use of the Chagos Archipelago by any country other than the UK or United States. The Government’s argument is that Annex 1(3) deals with the Chagos Archipelago beyond Diego Garcia and sets out all the obligations as to what can happen. The key word in Annex 1(3)(d) is the first one: “except”. It lays out one small but important area where there could be some move away from what is laid out in the rest of the treaty; in other words, where there is a humanitarian emergency or natural disaster. I would point the noble Baroness to that as to why her amendment is not necessary in those circumstances, although it gives me the chance to clarify that.

Amendment 58 from the noble Lord, Lord Weir, seeks to stipulate that we produce a report alongside the US on the security scenarios regarding the leasing of the other islands. This is born from misinformation about the ability of China to establish a military base on another island in the Chagos Archipelago. The provisions we have agreed under the treaty expressly prevent any action such as this. The treaty lays out that it cannot happen without agreement. There are security review provisions which are engaged by any proposal for development in the land territory of the Chagos Archipelago beyond Diego Garcia. Other provisions require UK consent to the presence of any non-UK security forces.

With reference to Amendments 61 and 62, also from the noble Lord, Lord Weir, on the necessity of consulting the US Air Force and US Navy on the treaty, as I said at the beginning, all of this was tested and done with respect to the US and with its agreement. The International Relations and Defence Committee also noted that the agreement will allow for the continued military use of the island for the next 99 years, with the option of extension.

Amendments 67, 86 and 87, from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, and the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, concern the obligation to “expeditiously inform” Mauritius. This is a really important point. To clarify, the obligation to inform Mauritius is engaged only if an armed attack on a third state directly emanates from the base on Diego Garcia.

The analysis of such a question is context specific, and it would not necessarily be wise or useful for the Government to speculate on a hypothetical situation, but I will address this point further, since the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, and the noble Lords, Lord Beamish, Lord Ahmad and Lord Weir, raised it. We have stated on numerous occasions—and I put it on the record again for clarity—that the obligation to notify does not require us to notify Mauritius in advance of any armed attack, and no sensitive details of military activities would ever be passed on. No notifications will therefore present a risk to the operations of the base.

The International Agreements Committee agreed with our view that the obligation to notify requires the UK to inform Mauritius of an armed attack but not of a decision to launch such an attack. I hope that clarification is helpful to noble Lords. The committee concluded that

“‘expeditiously’ means as soon as reasonably practicable in the circumstances and that in the case of a military attack this would entail a consideration of the essential security concerns and the need for military plans to be kept secret”.

I hope that helps clarify some of the points that the noble Baroness and others raised.

The deal will protect our national security for generations by ensuring that the UK maintains vital capabilities to respond to threats in the Indian Ocean and beyond. The base is a prime example of the unique transatlantic defence and security partnership that we have.

Amendment 69, from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, seeks to ensure that the UK

“shall not notify Mauritius of the location of equipment in the Chagos Archipelago beyond Diego Garcia”.

Notwithstanding the fact—as the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, helpfully pointed out—that this is directly in conflict with the provisions of the treaty and cannot be accepted, it is remiss of the noble Lord to propose a course of action that prevents us being able to access and maintain equipment in the archipelago. Co-operation with Mauritius on this front is mutually beneficial and would not jeopardise equipment. I remind the Committee of the binding obligation on Mauritius under the treaty not to undermine or jeopardise the operation of the base.

Amendments 83 and 85, again from the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, and others, seek clarity on whether Annex 1(1)(b)(viii) requires the UK to seek the consent of Mauritius to permit access, basing and overflight to non-UK, non-US aircraft and vessels to Diego Garcia. I am happy to assure the noble Baroness, and other noble Lords who are concerned about this, that it does not. The treaty clearly distinguishes between notification and permission. The noble Baroness can see the definition of “unrestricted” rights in Annex 1(11). I hope it is helpful to clarify the distinction between notification and permission.

Amendments 20D, 20E and 20F, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Kempsell, seek to oblige the Government to reopen negotiations on certain aspects of the treaty. On Amendment 20D, the UK already has the “unrestricted ability” under the treaty to

“authorise the installation, operation and repair of … electronic systems”

on Diego Garcia and within the surrounding 12 nautical miles. We also have the unrestricted ability to

“manage, use and develop the land and surrounding waters and seabed for defence purposes”.

This is clearly set out in Annex 1(1)(b)(v) and (ix) respectively. Paragraph (3)(f) concerns the placement of maritime installations in the buffer zone. This will serve as a protective ring around Diego Garcia, where the UK has the ability to prevent activities that could jeopardise base operations. I hope that goes some way towards reassuring the noble Lord.

On Amendment 20E, as clearly set out in Annex 1(1)(b)(iii), the UK already has the unrestricted ability to

“control the deployment to Diego Garcia of military, civilian and contract personnel”.

Annex 1(3)(d) refers to activity in the Chagos Archipelago beyond Diego Garcia and the 12 nautical mile zone surrounding it. It requires UK consent for third parties to deploy security forces in the wider archipelago.

Amendment 20F seeks to oblige the Government to renegotiate Annex 1 of the treaty. The annex provides for the UK’s complete operational freedom of the base. It also places significant restrictions on the use of the outer islands to ensure that any resettlement activity does not carry security risks to the base. A number of noble Lords were concerned about that point, and I hope this offers some reassurance.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Weir, that these provisions have been discussed and approved at the highest levels of the US security apparatus. Both the IAC and the IRDC have scrutinised them. This treaty specifically confers—

18:30

Amendment 18 withdrawn.

Amendment 19

Moved by

Amendment 19 withdrawn.

Amendment 20 not moved.

House resumed. Committee to begin again not before 7.25 pm.

Migration: Settlement Pathway

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

Statement

18:45

The following Statement was made in the House of Commons on Thursday 20 November.

“With your permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will make a Statement on a fairer pathway to settlement for migrants.

The story of migration in this country is woven through my own. My father came here in the early ’70s, my mother a little less than a decade later. Both came to seek a better life, and they found one here. In time, while always proud Kashmiris, they became British citizens themselves—Brummies, too—and brought up four children just as proud as them to be a part of this country and that great city. This is not just my story; it is the story of many of my constituents in Birmingham Ladywood, and of many millions more across this country.

Like so many others like me, I am a patriot. Mine is a love of a country that is for ever changing, while something essential about us always endures. It is a patriotism that finds room for those who trace their roots back many generations and for those who, like me, do not. However, I worry that for some, that broad patriotism is narrowing, and that a vision of a greater Britain is giving way to that of a littler England, as anger turns to hate. Some will choose to scorn this analysis; they would rather that we simply wished it away, but those who look like me do not have that luxury. Our lives and those of our families are more dangerous in a country that turns inwards, so we have no choice but to ask what the cause of our division is, and how this country might be united.

As I said earlier this week, the pace and scale of migration in this country has been destabilising. I spoke on Monday of the 400,000 people who have claimed asylum since 2021, but that figure pales in comparison with the net migration figure for the same period. In that time, 2.6 million more people moved to Britain than left. To place that in perspective, around one in every 30 people in this country arrived in those four years. This is the result of the extraordinary open- border experiment conducted by the last Conservative Government.

In that period, now sometimes called the Boriswave, immigration controls were drastically lifted. This was most notable in the case of the health and care visa, for which minimum salary requirements were dropped. An attempt to fill between 6,000 and 40,000 jobs led to the arrival of 616,000 individuals between 2022 and 2024. Over half of those individuals were not even filling jobs in the sector—rather, they were dependants of those who were—and as any Member of Parliament could tell us, abuse was rife.

I would have thought that my support for migration did not need to be stated, but after some of the questions I faced on Monday, I think I had better do so. Migrant communities have been woven into the tapestry of British life for generations. While I will never believe in assimilating communities, we have achieved cohesion because different communities have integrated, retaining their distinction within a single, pluralistic whole. This makes demands of those who are already here to remain open to new arrivals, but more than that, it demands something of those arriving. To settle in this country for ever is not a right, but a privilege, and it must be earned. Today, that is not the case; settlement, or indefinite leave to remain, comes almost automatically after five years’ residence in this country. At that point, a migrant gains access to many of the rights of a British citizen, including to benefits.

As a result of the unprecedented levels of migration in recent years, 1.6 million people are now forecast to settle between 2026 and 2030, with a peak of 450,000 in 2028—around four times higher than the recent average. That will now change. As this Government announced in their immigration White Paper, the starting point for settlement will move from five years to 10. To ensure that this is earned, new criteria will be added, which will act as a disqualifying bar for those who do not meet them. First, the applicant must have a clean criminal record; secondly, they must speak English to A-level standard; thirdly, they must have made sustained national insurance contributions; and finally, they must have no debt in this country.

While these criteria set the bar that everyone must meet, there are a series of other tests, which today have been published for consultation. These either add to, or subtract from, the 10-year qualifying period. To recognise the particular value to society they play, the Government propose that those who speak English to a degree-level standard could qualify for a nine-year path to settlement; those paying the higher rate of tax could qualify at five years; and those on the top rate could qualify after three, the same as those on global talent visas. Those who work in a public service, including doctors, teachers and nurses, would qualify after five years, while those who volunteer—subject to this consultation—could qualify at between five and seven years. Not subject to consultation, the partners of British citizens will continue to qualify at five years, as is the case today. This is also true of British nationals overseas from Hong Kong, who will qualify at five years in honour of our unique responsibilities to them. All grants under the Windrush and EU settlement schemes will also remain unchanged.

While some people will be able to qualify for settlement earlier than 10 years, others will be forced to wait longer. Once again, these proposals are subject to consultation, but the Government propose that those who have received benefits for less than 12 months would not qualify for settlement until 15 years after arrival. For those who have claimed benefits for more than 12 months, the duration would rise to 20 years, and to encourage the use of legal routes into this country, those who arrive illegally could see settlement take up to 30 years. As has already been set out, refugees on core protection will qualify for settlement after 20 years, although those who move to a work and study visa could earn settlement earlier, and those arriving by a safe and legal route would earn settlement at 10 years. This consultation is open regarding settlement rights for some cohorts of special interest, including children, members of the armed forces and victims of certain crimes.

As well as considering the responsibilities that are expected of those who seek a permanent life in this country, the consultation also raises the question of the rights that will be provided. Specifically, it proposes that benefits might not be available to those who have settled status, reserving them instead for those who have earned British citizenship. Finally, the consultation addresses the question of the so-called Boriswave, specifically the cohort of lower-qualified workers who—along with their dependants—entered the country through the health and care visa, and some of whom are never expected to be net economic contributors. It is right that we apply more stringent controls for this group. For that reason, we propose they should wait 15 years before they can earn settlement. Crucially, for these people and for every other group mentioned, we propose that these changes apply to everyone in the country today who has not yet received indefinite leave to remain, although we are seeking views on whether some transitional arrangements should be available.

May I make one thing absolutely clear, though? We will not change the rules for those with settled status today. These are people who have been in our country for years, or even decades. They have families here—wives, husbands and children. They have worked in our hospitals and taught in our schools, and have been contributing to our society for years. Fairness is the most fundamental of British values. We made a promise when we gave those people settlement, and we do not break our promises.

The Reform Party—whose Members, I note, are not in the Chamber today—has said that it will do this most un-British of things. The Tories have said that they will, but then said that they will not; I am left in as much of a muddle about their policy as they are, although perhaps the shadow Home Secretary might enlighten the House today. But I can be clear that this Government will not change the rules for those with settled status.

As this consultation shows, we listen to the British public, and I encourage all those interested to make their voices heard. Today I have set out what we propose and, perhaps more importantly, why. I love this country, which opened its arms to my parents around 50 years ago, but I am concerned by the division I see now, fuelled by a pace and scale of change that is placing immense pressure on local communities. For those who believe that migration is part of modern Britain’s story and should always continue to be, we must prove that it can still work, with those who come here contributing, playing their part and enriching our national life. While each will always retain something of who they were and where they came from, they become a part of the greatest multi-ethnic, multi-faith democracy in the world. I commend this Statement to the House”.

19:04

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

Committee (2nd Day) (Continued)

19:25

Amendment 20A not moved.

Amendment 20B had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.

Amendments 20C to 20H not moved.

Amendment 20J

Moved by

19:30

If the court looked at the difficulty without full regard for the Chagossian people because they were not fully represented then it is clear that it could work on the basis that the territorial integrity of the pre-November 1965 colony should not have been changed by the UK prior to decolonisation. However, given the Tuvalu-Ellice Islands precedent, there is still a difficulty because of the caveat in the judgment which states that the separation was wrong unless based

“on the freely expressed and genuine will of the people of the territory concerned”.

The detached territory was the Chagos Islands. The people of the detached territory were, by definition, plainly no one other than the people of the islands.

Moreover, we must factor into the equation that, first, the Chagossian people did not live on the islands because we wronged them twice in forcibly removing them between 1968 and 1973 and then refusing from 1973 until the present to return them to their islands. They continue to live in countries that are members of the UN as a growing community in exile. Secondly, the biggest survey of Chagossian opinion, covering over a third of Chagossians living today, shows that more than 99% support becoming a resettled British Overseas Territory and less than 1% want the islands to be made part of the Republic of Mauritius. Thirdly, with the precedent arising from the UK Government offering the Ellice Islands self-determination before the decolonisation of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, there is another legal way forward.

Crucially, it is our duty to explore that alternative legal way forward. It is likely to provide a greater measure of legal certainty for the United States, because, if this Bill becomes law and the treaty is implemented, the United States will just exchange one legal uncertainty for another. Instead of the legal uncertainty pertaining to the Diego Garcia base arising from the Republic of Mauritius claiming sovereignty over the islands in defiance of the UK, we will be confronted by an alternative dispute. The Chagossian people are, for reasons that I will pick up when speaking to other amendments, likely to obtain a form of international personality. They will instead claim sovereignty over the islands in defiance of the claim of the Republic of Mauritius.

Rather than allowing the opinions of legal certainty to be constrained by the circumstances of the non-legally binding judgment, the Government’s approach going forward should be fully animated by appreciation of the following truths. First, it was just as wrong of us to split the colony that covered Mauritius and the islands before decolonisation without consulting the Chagossians, let alone providing them with self-determination, as it would have been to refuse to split the Gilbert and Ellice Islands before decolonisation after having afforded the Ellice Islands a self-determination referendum in which they elected to separate. Secondly, it was profoundly wrong for us to forcibly remove the Chagossians from the Chagos Islands between 1968 and 1973. It was and is profoundly wrong that, from 1973 until today, we have refused to return the Chagos Islands to the Chagossians. In this context, the Government should produce a report that considers all the legal ways forward. I submit that the one best equipped to provide unassailable legal certainty is to afford the Chagossian people a self-determination referendum and to implement its results. I beg to move.

Amendment 20J withdrawn.

Amendment 20K

Moved by

19:45

If a new state emerges that seeks recognition from other states, a question that those states will want to ask, in the context of the absence of a global Executive, legislature and judiciary, is whether that state has the capacity and the power to govern its territory. If the state does not have that capacity to govern its territory, it is likely to become, to that extent, a failed state. Other countries that believe it is in their interest to uphold international peace and stability will question the appropriateness of recognising a state without the wherewithal for self-government. They will fear the destabilising consequences of creating a failed state, arising from the power vacuum left in its wake. Of course, in some contexts there may be no alternative way of governing a territory such that the international community might determine that it is in its interests to try to build capacity to help the polity in question move from the territory of being a failed state to being a fully functional state. I am not questioning for a moment the capacity of the Republic of Mauritius to provide effective government for its current territorial integrity, but I have huge questions about the capacity of the Republic of Mauritius to govern the territorial integrity proposed by the Bill before us today.

Furthermore, in the context of dealing with international relations, which is a question not just of rules but of power, we cannot afford to abstract questions about colonial territorial integrity as legal principles from questions of power and capacity, any more than we can afford to abstract them from other important principles like self-determination, without risking international peace and security.

The Bill, however, will facilitate the coming into force of a treaty that will extend the Republic of Mauritius to cover 60 additional islands located some 1,330 miles away. Not only that but the islands are of immense geostrategic significance and the treaty proposes that they are transferred from a country that is a nuclear power with a navy to a country that does not even have a navy. This was brought home forcefully by the publication of an article on 11 September by the news site Devdiscourse. It states:

“Mauritius Prime Minister Navinchandra Ramgoolam disclosed on Thursday that the nation chose an Indian vessel to hoist its national flag over the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia … Addressing a joint press briefing with Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Ramgoolam asserted, ‘We want to visit Chagos to put our flag there, including Diego Garcia. The British offered us a vessel, but we said we preferred one from India because symbolically it would be better’”.

My point is not that we should be offended at the rejection of a British vessel, but rather that it was so obvious that the Republic of Mauritius did not have the capacity to even get to these islands that our Government offered a British vessel to take them there, as did the Indian Government.

It can seem right to transfer the Chagos Islands on the basis of the principle of territorial integrity, abstracted from questions of power and capacity, which is itself already a hopeless abstraction even at the level of principle to the extent that it has been abstracted from the critical principle of self-determination, only if we have lost all sense of international relations. This is deeply troubling, especially given that it is not 2000 but 2025, and we are now engaging with Cold War II.

The fact is that, today, all 60 of these islands of immense geostrategic importance are under the sovereignty of a nuclear power with a navy. But, if we pass the Bill and enable the implementation of the Mauritius treaty, every one of them will pass to the sovereignty of a country that cannot even get there under its own steam for a flag-raising ceremony. This, incidentally, is why Article 6 of the treaty only references in principle the possibility of the resettlement of the islands: it would plainly be impossible for Mauritius to settle the islands if it cannot even get there for the flag-raising ceremony.

Some might say, “Don’t worry, it’ll be okay because the US base will remain on Diego Garcia”. If one were to make that assertion in defence of this arrangement, one would have to jump from operating on the basis of principle abstracted from power to power abstracted from principle. In my opinion, both postures are international relations disasters waiting to happen. Yes, US and British-American forces would have power to engage with any other force that sought to come to one of the other islands if they wished to, but we would much rather not: such an engagement could start a major war. For so long as the islands remained unambiguously under British sovereignty—which they would if we granted the Chagossians self-determination and if they elected to be a British Overseas Territory, as the survey material suggests they overwhelmingly would—they would be protected not only at the power level but at the principle level. We desperately need both.

As things stand, if we pass the Bill, we will facilitate the coming into force of a treaty that will create a power vacuum in relation to at least 59 islands of immense geostrategic importance, which threatens instability. This would be a catastrophic international relations error. I beg to move.

20:00

Amendment 20K withdrawn.

Amendment 20L

Moved by

20:15

20:30

20:45

On Amendment 20N, I can be brief on this point, because we discussed it during the debate on the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act that we had at Second Reading and on the previous day in Committee. The simple reality is that the statutory process under CRaG 2010 and the procedural conventions of the two Houses of Parliament should afford the other place less power to scrutinise treaties than it does your Lordships’ House. That was never meant to be the case; it is a perverse outcome from an attempt to enshrine the Ponsonby rule, as it was, in statute—and of course that has not worked. The Government were supposed to have allowed a substantive debate in the other place on the treaty, and it is appalling that they did not. It shows that, for all their high-minded talk of values before the general election, this Government are unwilling to adhere to long-established conventions on treaty scrutiny. I shall not dwell on this any further, other than to remind the Minister that the Ponsonby rule was established under a Labour Government and it is ironic that it is now a Labour Government who have effectively killed it.

On the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, I agree with him that the Government should provide more clarity on the plans for Mauritian administration of the islands and plans to manage the democracy there. As we discussed in the previous group, Ministers must have done at least some work assessing Mauritius’s plans and capabilities in respect of the archipelago. I hope that the Minister will be able to provide the Committee with a full answer to that.

On the increased legal risk, my noble friend is absolutely right that the international law case is definitely not cut and dried. There are agreements that confirm British sovereignty, and we do not understand why the Government are ignoring those agreements. With that, I look forward to the Minister’s response.

Amendment 20L withdrawn.

Amendment 20M

Moved by

21:00

In the case of the Chagos Islands, it is not immemorial. There are Chagossians alive today who can still remember the azure and indigo seas around the archipelago. For them, this is a very real and immediate issue. But the only way they maintain their nationality, sundered as they are from their ancestral homeland, is through what it now says on their passports. They have the identity of citizens of the British Indian Ocean Territory. That is what risks being dissolved into wider nationalities in the Seychelles, Mauritius or here.

I mentioned last week that I had the honour of representing Crawley when I was a Member of the European Parliament. I never ceased to be impressed by the tenacity of Chagossians in this country when it came to preserving their folkways and language—their ancestral customs of cuisine, dress and so on, and the melodious Bourbonnais Creole that they speak, which is almost incomprehensible if you speak only standard French but has a very beautiful sound. We heard it not long ago on the streets of Port Louis, when some very brave Chagossians in Mauritius demonstrated against this deal, shouting in the creole of their homeland: “Chagos pour British”. They made it very clear, despite the dangers and disadvantages in that country of asserting Chagossian sovereignty, that they still felt themselves linked to the wider community of Chagossians around the world.

I do not believe that ending the technical, legal citizenship of British Indian Ocean Territory will lead to people dissolving their innate sense of nationality. Whatever happens to the islands and whoever ends up being settled there, it is inconceivable that it will be treated as a final settlement and that there will be no further disputes, because Chagossians who feel themselves to be citizens of the BIOT will continue to regard themselves, quite properly, as the legal heirs and custodians of that territory. They will continue to press their claim in the hope that a future British Government might take it up on their behalf. They would not be the first or last dispossessed people in history to do so. By the way, they may very well be rewarded in hoping for a change of attitude in a future British Government.

We are told that this must be done because it stabilises the territory, removes uncertainty and doubt, and reassures our allies. It will not remove uncertainty. A dispute—a rather monetary one, let us be honest—with a country that had very little emotional attachment to this archipelago will be replaced by a new dispute with people who do feel attached to it, who refuse to recognise Mauritian sovereignty, and who will urge this country to take up its ancestral responsibilities and press their claim on their behalf. I hope that a future Government will act on that, since this one obviously will not. Either way, let us not pretend that the issue will be quelled simply by the stroke of a pen. You cannot efface people’s sense of nationality and belonging by bureaucratic fiat. I beg to move.

21:15

Since their expulsion, this civic identity has been kept alive in that the British Indian Ocean Territory has continued to exist. Though the Chagossians have shamefully been denied residency of their home jurisdiction, their home jurisdiction has endured. In this context, they have been able to aspire to return to their islands and become the populated, largely self-governing British overseas territory that they desire to be. To understand the force of this, we must always keep in mind the precedent of the UK Government’s conduct regarding the Gilbert and Ellice Islands and what it means today, applied specifically to the disastrous consequences for Chagossian civic identity of this Bill and the Mauritius treaty.

Reading the debate from the first day in Committee, I was pleased to see that the precedent provided by the Gilbert and Ellice Islands was mentioned—as it should have been—following the publication of the Chagossian statement of self-determination the day before. Although reference was made to the Gilbert and Ellice Islands precedent, it is worth hearing direct from the Chagossians as I seek to apply its significance to the question of civic identity raised by my amendment. I make no apology for quoting them at some length in Committee after the way that we have treated them. I am glad to see that some are in the Gallery this evening. I welcome them.

The relevant part of the Chagossian statement on self-determination says:

“In order to appreciate the acute moral failure attending the present Government’s policy, it is important to consider what happened to another British colony that also comprised two sets of islands, separated by a great distance, the Gilbert and Ellice Islands … The parallels are striking … While the distance between what were then called the Gilbert and Ellice Islands was just over 800 miles, the islands were populated by peoples of different dominant ethnicities, one set of island Polynesian, the other Micronesian, and the population of the former far greater than the latter, the distance between Mauritius and the Chagos Islands was 1,339 miles, the dominant ethnicity of the former Indian, while the latter is Black African, and the ‘numbers disparity’ even more profound, the Mauritians greatly outnumbering the Chagossians … When the British Government talked to the Gilbert and Ellice Islands about decolonisation the representatives of the Ellice Islands said that they were nervous about the idea of being part of a sovereign independent state comprising both the Ellice Islands and the Gilbert Islands, not simply because they constituted different nations, separated by great distances, but also because they were concerned that their voice would necessarily be lost in a polity dominated by the far larger number of residents of the Gilbert Islands. The UK responded by providing a self-determination referendum for the people of the Ellice Islands giving them the option to freely choose either to be part of the same unit as the Gilbert Islands or to separate. They voted to separate from the Gilbert Islands, 3,799 votes to 293. The UK honoured this by making provision for the colony to first be divided into two new colonies and then, two years later, for the Ellice Islands to become the independent monarchy of Tuvalu, while the following year the Gilbert Islands became the independent Republic of Kiribati”.

Crucially, they go on to state, and I think it is important this should be said:

“Had we been afforded the treatment the judgment says we should have been afforded before moving to detach, namely ‘the freely expressed and genuine will of the people of the territory concerned’ in a ‘self-determination referendum’, it is no more likely that the people of the Chagos Islands would have self-determined to be part of Mauritius, a country 1,339 miles away with which, in 1965, we had virtually no contact, than it was that the Ellice Islands would have voted to remain joined to the Gilbert Islands”.

If we pass this Bill and enable the treaty to come into force, then far from alleviating the great crimes we committed between 1968 and 1973, we will greatly compound them. We will create a situation in which, while the Chagossians will continue to exist as a people, we will have taken from them one of the last remaining supports that have underpinned them as a civic people and a small nation. We will make provision for their absorption into the countries where they live, becoming Mauritian citizens, British citizens and Seychelles citizens. The existing foundation for their hopes as a civic nation, the existence of their jurisdiction, will be extinguished.

This will add to our crimes against these people: first, the detachment of their islands without affording them the dignity of self-determination, which ironically would almost certainly have mandated detachment from Mauritius; secondly, the forced removal of the peoples from their islands between 1968 and 1973; and, thirdly, the ongoing crime of keeping them out of their jurisdiction from 1973 until now, notwithstanding the fact that we are content to pay Mauritius more money to lease just one island than KPMG says it would take to resettle the islands. The final insult is the removal of the jurisdictional basis of their identity.

The critical point for the report proposed by my amendment is that the Chagossian people are very determined. Sometimes being treated very badly, rather than causing the offended party to retreat and give up, can have the unintended consequence of provoking in the people concerned an even greater determination than before to stand up and say no.

In that sense, what assessment have the Government made of the potential for their policy to have the unintended consequence that, rather than helping to cause the Chagossian civic identity to melt away, it may serve as a rallying call to the Chagossian people? Is it not likely that in these circumstances they will seek to form another basis for their civic identity through the pursuit of some form of international personality at the UN level? Is it not likely that they will then challenge the Mauritian claim to the islands, simply exchanging one legal uncertainty for the Americans for another?

Finally, given the commitment of the British people to fair play and their predisposition to support the weaker party, what assessment have the Government made of the potential impact of such a development on British public opinion?

21:30

I should also say that the Government—I have said this before, but I do not think that we can ever say this enough—deeply regret the way that the Chagossians were removed from the islands. That is one of the reasons why the Government are committed to building a new relationship with the Chagossian community that is built on respect and an acknowledgement of the wrongs of the past.

It is right—the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, made this point and reminded me that I have said this—that we have, and I do not think there is any point trying to shy away from this, prioritised in our decisions the need to secure the legal basis of the military base.

The issue about identity that she raises matters. Recognition in official documents matters to people. It is identity. I can see why it matters. Decisions on that do not have any bearing on our ability to operate the base securely. I was hoping that the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, would be in her place. I want to make clear to the Committee and place on record that the Mauritian Government have now said that they will record the place of birth as “Islands of the Chagos Archipelago” and that, where this has not happened, they will review and amend any documents as necessary.

Amendment 20M withdrawn.

Amendments 20N to 20R not moved.

Amendment 20S

Moved by

Amendment 20S withdrawn.

21:45

Amendment 20T

Moved by

Amendment 20T withdrawn.

Amendments 20U to 22 not moved.

Clause 1 agreed.

Amendments 23 to 32 not moved.

Clause 2: Dissolution of the British Indian Ocean Territory

Debate on whether Clause 2 should stand part of the Bill.

22:00

My Amendment 51 is a probing amendment that seeks to understand why Ministers have kept the drafting of Clause 5 so broad. In its current form, the Bill grants:

“An Order under this section may amend, repeal or revoke any legislation of any of His Majesty’s dominions passed or made before commencement”.

Why does this apply to

“any of His Majesty’s dominions”

when the Bill is supposed to relate to Diego Garcia specifically? Does the Minister agree that the language here could be tightened?

Turning to the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Lansley, he is seeking to prevent an Order in Council under this section from amending, repealing or revoking any legislation unless it has been approved by a resolution of each House. My understanding of my noble friend Lord Lilley’s Amendment 51BA is that he is seeking to achieve a similar outcome. Yet again, I will be interested to hear my noble friend’s arguments and I certainly want to avoid pre-empting them at this stage.

Clause 2 agreed.

Clause 3: Continued administration of Diego Garcia

Amendments 33 and 34 not moved.

Clause 3 agreed.

22:15

Amendments 35 to 38C not moved.

Clause 4: Citizenship of persons connected with the Territory

Amendments 39 to 44 not moved.

Clause 4 agreed.

Amendments 45 and 46 not moved.

Amendment 47

Moved by

22:30

Though Creole and French translations of the questions are provided, the survey then insists that all answers must be written in English—for people who cannot write English, let alone speak it. This makes no sense. Many Chagossians, especially in Mauritius and the Seychelles, do not write English fluently. They cannot meaningfully participate in a process that forbids them from using their own language or providing answers in the same language used to frame the questions. A consultation that, in effect, excludes the non-English speaking majority of the diaspora cannot claim to speak for the Chagossian people.

Throughout the survey, simple grammatical errors appear multiple times. The repeated phrase “Please do not, do not provide any personal or identifying information” is one example. The misspelling of “Chagos islands” without capitalisation appears repeatedly. These are not minor lapses. They show a lack of proofreading, a lack of quality control and a lack of respect for the seriousness of the task. A community that has been displaced and silenced for decades should not be given a survey that looks rushed, inconsistent and poorly constructed.

The survey closes on 1 December. This deadline makes serious analysis impossible. The committee must report by 18 December. That gives 12 working days in the busiest period of the year to read and analyse what could be thousands of unverified, multilingual responses. The same committee has taken months to analyse witnesses in other inquiries. Now, it proposes to process a global consultation in 12 days. This is not realistic; it is not credible, and it absolutely suggests that the survey is a procedural box to be ticked rather than a genuine attempt to listen.

The survey misses the issues the Chagossians raise repeatedly. Despite decades of advocacy, it does not ask a single direct question about British nationality and citizenship, British Indian Ocean Territory status, rights of descendants, legal recognition and long-term guarantees. These issues are central to Chagossian life. Their total absence shows that Chagossian voices were not meaningfully involved in designing the consultation in the first place. You cannot claim to capture a people’s views when you avoid the very questions they have been asking for years.

We must be clear. This survey is insecure, unverifiable, exclusionary, misleading, incomplete, hurried and now reportedly subject to foreign interference. It cannot be taken as a legitimate or accurate reflection of Chagossian opinion. It cannot guide policy, it cannot guide legislation, and it certainly cannot be used to claim that the Chagossian people support a treaty that many do not. If Britain truly wishes to honour its responsibilities, it must create a new process that is codesigned with the Chagossians, secure, linguistically accessible, transparent, verifiable and grounded in the dignity of the people whose lives it affects.

Can I ask the Minister how much weight the Government will attach to this survey? If, as I hope I have demonstrated, the survey is not worth the paper it is written on, will the Minister undertake a proper referendum among the Chagossians and their diaspora?

Finally, I draw your Lordships’ attention to page 120 of the Labour Party’s election manifesto, which states:

“Defending our security also means protecting the British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies, including the Falklands and Gibraltar. Labour will always defend their sovereignty and right to self-determination”.

There is an amazing lack of self-awareness on the part of this Government. So ideologically wedded are they to their perception of past colonial wrongs that they do not see how the Bill looks to the British voter. They are spending millions on this deal, giving these millions to Mauritius, a country with a hugely corrupt governing class, while at home, tomorrow, the Chancellor is going to raise taxes on hundreds of thousands of British voters.

Amendment 47 withdrawn.

Amendments 48 to 50B not moved.

Clause 5: Further provision: Orders in Council

Amendments 51 to 51C not moved.

Clause 5 agreed.

Amendments 52 to 62 not moved.

Amendment 63

Moved by

22:45

If we are saying that we are increasing the security of this base by handing it over to Mauritius but it turns out that the use of the base will be compromised, that is a very important matter. If it turns out that it will not be compromised only if Mauritius is tacitly going to break the treaty, that is a very odd thing from a Government who believe that you should never break a treaty because treaties have the power of international law. I would like to know what the Government are proposing on this. Are they saying that we shall turn a blind eye and just not mention to Mauritius that we are contravening their treaty obligations?

Noble Lords are doubtless now very familiar with the treaty of Pelindaba, even though they were not—even the Government, apparently, were not when they first entered into this agreement. The treaty refuses the right to any signatory to resile from any part of that treaty subsequently. You could resile from the whole of it, but you cannot resile from part of it. So the only way the Mauritius could not extend the Pelindaba treaty to Diego Garcia, as far as I understand it, is if it resiles from the Pelindaba treaty. We need to know: are we going to require it to do so? Do the Americans want to require it to do so? Are the Americans happy that the treaty should apply but be regularly broken?

This is an extremely important matter, which goes to the very heart of what the Government are about. Are they about the rigorous adherence to international law—even when it does not apply—and at the same time ignoring it when it does, or are they actually about upholding Britain’s interests, in which case handing over a base to a country, rendering it part of a nuclear-free zone, cannot be in the interests of ourselves, our allies or the defence of the West. I beg to move.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Coaker) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, for their amendments. I appreciate that they have questions about how the treaty protects the full operation of the base, and I want to reassure them that the treaty enables the continued operation of the base to its full capability. The treaty and the Bill we are debating today will have zero impact on the day-to-day business on Diego Garcia. Importantly, it will not reduce our ability to deploy the full range of advanced military capabilities to Diego Garcia. I am putting some of this on the record, and the noble Baroness, as a former Defence Minister, will know the careful calibration of the language that I am using: I am putting it on the record so that we are all clear.

As I say, noble Lords will understand that I pick my words with care in this particular context. I cannot and will not discuss operational matters on the Floor of this place, but I am confident that the Chamber would not necessarily want me to. The long-standing UK position of neither confirming nor denying the location or presence of nuclear weapons must stand. But let us talk about the hypothetical. The amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, concern the application of the Pelindaba treaty. Mauritius is a signatory, as the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness said, to the treaty. The UK is not a signatory to the treaty but is a signatory to Protocols 1 and 2. I can confirm to the Chamber that the Governments of the UK and Mauritius are both satisfied that the Diego Garcia treaty is compatible with these existing obligations.

I also remind colleagues, because this is important—again, I think the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, if I remember rightly from his remarks, and, indeed, the noble Baroness raised this—that we are not alone in the matter. The Government of the United States have also tested all aspects of the Diego Garcia treaty in depth and at the highest levels of the security establishment. They, too, are satisfied that it protects the full operation of the base. Indeed, when I was talking about the earlier amendments in answer to that, I quoted the remarks of Secretary of State Marco Rubio and his comments about being satisfied with the treaty in every aspect.

Amendments 63 and 88 therefore are not necessary. We do not need a review of the impacts of nuclear treaties on the future operation of the base, as the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, has proposed, because the future operation of the base has been protected. I say to the noble Baroness that we do not need to reopen paragraph 1.a of Annex 1 to the treaty, as has been suggested, because this already provides for unrestricted —that is the key word—access for UK and US vessels to enter the sea of Diego Garcia. Paragraph 1.b.i provides for unrestricted ability to control the conduct and deployment of lethal capabilities.

Amendment 63 withdrawn.

Amendments 64 to 70 not moved.

Amendment 71 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.

Amendments 72 to 79 not moved.

23:00

Amendment 80

Moved by

Amendment 80 withdrawn.

Amendments 81 and 81A not moved.

Amendment 81B had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.

Amendments 81C to 81K not moved.

Clause 6: Commencement and short title

Amendments 82 to 90 not moved.

Clause 6 agreed.

House resumed.

Bill reported without amendment.

House adjourned at 11.17 pm.