First elected: 12th December 2019
Speeches made during Parliamentary debates are recorded in Hansard. For ease of browsing we have grouped debates into individual, departmental and legislative categories.
e-Petitions are administered by Parliament and allow members of the public to express support for a particular issue.
If an e-petition reaches 10,000 signatures the Government will issue a written response.
If an e-petition reaches 100,000 signatures the petition becomes eligible for a Parliamentary debate (usually Monday 4.30pm in Westminster Hall).
These initiatives were driven by Ben Spencer, and are more likely to reflect personal policy preferences.
MPs who are act as Ministers or Shadow Ministers are generally restricted from performing Commons initiatives other than Urgent Questions.
Ben Spencer has not been granted any Urgent Questions
A Bill to create offences relating to repeat breaches of planning controls; to make provision about penalties for planning offences; to establish a national register of persons who have committed planning offences or breached planning controls and make associated provision about planning applications; and for connected purposes.
A Bill to provide for a duty on transport authorities and other specified persons to cooperate to reduce transport disruption and to ensure the effective operation of transport networks; to provide for reporting requirements in connection with that duty; to require the publication of assessments of expected transport disruption resulting from maintenance, construction, and other works related to transport infrastructure and ancillary services; and for connected purposes.
A Bill to make provision for the collection and publication of statistics on mental health hospital admissions; and for connected purposes.
Planning (Flooding) Bill 2024-26
Sponsor - Blake Stephenson (Con)
Government IT, both hardware and software, which is no longer eligible for vendor security updates is categorised as legacy IT. This is outlined in Government’s newly published definition of Legacy IT. In response to recommendation 3a of the Public Accounts Committee's Fifty-eighth Report of Session 2024–26 the then DSIT Permanent Secretary wrote to the Committee on 23 February with the latest available data on legacy systems.
That data, gathered in 2024, assessed systems against criteria including whether technology was out of support or out of vendor contract, the suitability of supporting hardware, and known security vulnerabilities. It does not cover all public sector organisations or systems, so it should not be treated as comprehensive.
The Government is moving away from manual data collection and towards automated data capture and sampling. This will give a more complete and up-to-date picture of legacy technology across the public sector.
Tokens were allocated to participating organisations based on their usage, with regular human review to ensure that expenditure was reasonable and overall usage remained within agreed budgets.
Participating organisations used several different AI models, selected according to the needs of the pilot and the specific tasks being undertaken. We do not provide further detail where doing so could disclose sensitive information relating to operational cyber security activity or commercially sensitive arrangements.
The pilots were funded by the former Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, now the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport.
Tokens were allocated to participating organisations based on their usage, with regular human review to ensure that expenditure was reasonable and overall usage remained within agreed budgets.
Participating organisations used several different AI models, selected according to the needs of the pilot and the specific tasks being undertaken. We do not provide further detail where doing so could disclose sensitive information relating to operational cyber security activity or commercially sensitive arrangements.
The pilots were funded by the former Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, now the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport.
The Government does not disclose details of organisations involved in operational cyber security activity where doing so could reveal information about Government capabilities, assist a potential attacker, or give rise to national security or commercial sensitivities, including by compromising commercially sensitive arrangements. We are therefore unable to provide the identities of the nine organisations involved in this project.
We do not give a running commentary on operational matters or disclose information that could assist an attacker. Those considerations apply whether or not AI is involved.
I refer my Rt. Hon. colleague to the statement provided by the Minister for Artificial Intelligence on 27 September 2026 on this matter, in which he stated that OpenAI informed the Government that one of their AI models accessed publicly available UK government statistics. Our cyber defences were not breached and no personal data was accessed. While the system and all the data accessed in this instance were already freely available to the public, we take any indication of unsanctioned AI activity seriously.
The government is establishing a new National Agentic Security Unit, backed with £40 million pounds of investment. It will develop new capabilities to detect, investigate and respond to cases involving agentic AI, to allow us to protect the public and businesses.
The Government is aware of the disruption affecting Google Cloud's London-based europe-west2 region on 20 October 2026. The Government Digital Service, the Government Cyber Unit, relevant departments and Google monitored the incident closely and worked together to assess any impacts on public services. While a small number of services experienced disruption, no widespread impacts across central government services were identified. Google has confirmed that affected cloud services have been restored and has published information on the incident and recovery actions.
The Government's March 2026 report and impact assessment on copyright and artificial intelligence recognised that copyright law may influence where AI developers choose to train their models, alongside other factors.
Since March, we have continued to build the evidence base on the impact of different copyright approaches on AI development and investment in the UK, including through stakeholder engagement and our work on creator control and input transparency. This work will inform whether there is an appropriate role for Government.
The Digital and Technologies Jobs Plan sets an ambition, shared by government and industry, to open around 200,000 entry-level digital and technology jobs over ten years, equivalent to around 20,000 a year on average. The Government will report annually on progress towards this ambition.
We are unable to disclose advice relating to individual procurements. The Department for Digital, Culture Media and Sport has robust processes to assess the security, technical, and commercial implications of technology, drawing on a range of advice from experts including in the Government Digital Service and Government Cyber Unit in DCMS, and the NCSC. This ensures that any procured technology, including AI products, models, and services, complies with established commercial, security, and technology frameworks.
The Department for Digital, Culture Media and Sport also has a role in strengthening the supply chain resilience of government, for example by embedding cyber security considerations into procurement activity and promoting recognised cyber security standards, including the AI Code of Practice and equivalent international standard EN 304 223.
The responsibility for Government cyber security was moved to the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport in July 2026. Within DCMS and under Baroness Lloyd of Efra, Minister for Cyber, Space and Regulatory Reform the Government Cyber Unit is developing a suite of guidance to support departments in planning migration to post-quantum cryptography. The Government Cyber Unit will be monitoring departmental progress.
The appropriate reporting route depends on the nature of the incident. For example, incidents involving personal data may need to be reported to the Information Commissioner’s Office, while qualifying serious incidents involving AI medical devices must be reported to the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency. AI developers must also satisfy themselves that they have met any reporting duties under their contractual requirements. For cyber incidents, AI developers should promptly and transparently notify affected organisations, including government and public sector bodies, using the GOV.UK signposting tool at https://www.gov.uk/guidance/where-to-report-a-cyber-incident.
AI developers bear full responsibility for keeping their tools under safe control, and we expect prompt, transparent reporting whenever unexpected behaviour occurs.
In September 2026, OpenAI informed us that one of their AI models accessed publicly available UK government statistics. Our cyber defences were not breached and no personal data was accessed. While the system and all the data accessed in this instance were already freely available to the public, we take any indication of unsanctioned AI activity seriously.
We do not give a running commentary on operational matters or disclose information that could assist an attacker. Those considerations apply whether or not AI is involved. We are closely observing AI incidents in order to continually assess and improve government defences.
The Government Cyber Unit (GCU) in DCMS is publishing guidance recommending departments produce a post quantum cryptography (PQC) migration action plan by April 2027, and complete discovery of cryptographic assets by 2028. This is in line with the National Cyber Security Centre’s guidance. Following the publication of the Government PQC Migration guidance, GCU will ask departments to regularly update on progress of their migration planning.
There is not yet a central estimate of the total cost of migrating government systems to post-quantum cryptography. Costs will vary according to departments’ technology estates and supplier. In line with the National Cyber Security Centre’s guidance, departments will conduct a discovery to identify their cryptographic assets by 2028. Departments will be expected to incorporate costs of migration using the established spending processes.
The total spend on artificial intelligence (AI) tokens for both pilots was £24,000. The Government Cyber Unit worked with departments to ensure that all critical findings were remediated, and remaining vulnerabilities have been transitioned into business-as-usual processes for departments to address in line with their existing risk and vulnerability management policies.
The UK Government does not currently operate a centrally funded programme to migrate all government systems to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). Responsibility for planning, funding and implementing PQC migration plans rests with individual departments, as they manage their own technology estates, cyber risks and funding (including for 2026-27).
Work on PQC migration is delivered alongside broader improvements to Government cyber resilience under the Government Cyber Action Plan, which illustrates departmental responsibilities. The Government Cyber Unit, which moved to the new Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport in July 2026, is developing a suite of guidance to support departments with their migration planning. The guidance follows timelines set out by the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) to complete planning by 2027, migrate high-priority systems by 2031 and all remaining systems by 2035.
The Government Cyber Action Plan (GCAP), published in 2026, sets out the responsibilities for improving cyber resilience within Government departments and arm's length bodies. Under the GCAP, Accounting Officers are accountable for ensuring their organisations meet agreed cyber resilience outcomes, including for the transition to post-quantum cryptography. The Government Cyber Unit is developing a suite of guidance to support departments' migration planning, in line with NCSC timelines, and a performance framework to monitor progress against GCAP outcomes across government, strengthening accountability for delivery.
The UK Government will follow the National Cyber Security Centre’s (NCSC) recommendations on post-quantum cryptography standards. Currently, the NCSC's recommended algorithms include those standardised by NIST in 2024. The Government Cyber Unit is developing a suite of guidance to support departments' migration planning, in line with NCSC timelines and will ask departments to complete a discovery of their cryptographic assets to understand the proportion that will require migration. This will include if assets require hardware replacement.
Following Machinery of Government changes, the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport has assumed responsibility for the Women in Tech Taskforce. As Minister for Digital Skills and Inclusion, Vicky Foxcroft co-chairs the Taskforce alongside Dr Anne-Marie Imafidon, the Government’s Women in Tech Envoy.
The Women in Tech Taskforce last met on 6 July 2026 and is scheduled to meet again in the coming weeks. Taskforce members and officials meet regularly to develop and advance interventions that government and industry can implement together to address the systemic barriers that prevent women from entering, remaining in, and progressing within the technology sector.
In March we published a report and impact assessment on AI and copyright, which included an initial assessment of this issue. As set out in this report, we are continuing to gather evidence regarding the extent to which the copyright regime influences training location (amongst other factors). We will also continue to monitor international developments and engage with copyright owners, AI developers, and others, to understand the impacts of the existing copyright regime.
In March we published a report and impact assessment on AI and copyright, which included consideration of the Getty judgment. The Getty judgment is subject to appeal, and we will consider any further implications following the outcome of that appeal. We are continuing to engage with stakeholders to build our understanding of the issues surrounding creator control and input transparency and whether there is an appropriate role for government in addressing them. We will not rush to legislate until we are confident the approach works for creators, consumers and the wider economy.
The Government recognises the importance of understanding the cryptographic assets that support central government systems as part of preparations for migration to post-quantum cryptography. Guidance is being developed to support departments in identifying and documenting their cryptographic assets. The timetable will follow the National Cyber Security Centre’s guidelines be embedded in a shared strategic migration approach. The Government will decide what information to publish once timetables and security considerations are clear.
The Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill strengthens the UK’s existing cyber resilience framework for essential services and equips the Secretary of State with powers to update that framework as needed in the future. These powers will enable the Government to set clear expectations on how regulated entities should manage the risks which new technologies pose to their systems, including (but not limited to) the risks posed by quantum computing.
In addition, the Bill makes provision for a Statement of Strategic Priorities that will set overarching objectives for the regulators. We intend, subject to public consultation, for these objectives to be framed to ensure that regulators fully engaging with the latest technological development and reflecting this in their guidance to regulated entities
DCMS engages closely with the NCSC and regulators on the topic of Post-Quantum Cryptography. DCMS is working to produce a series of guidance documents to support organisations in managing their transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography in line with guidance and deadlines set by the NCSC. The first of these guidance documents is due to be published later this year.
DCMS is responsible for monitoring post-quantum cryptography (PQC) readiness across critical national infrastructure (CNI).
DCMS and NCSC are working closely with lead government departments to assess the readiness of operators of critical national infrastructure to meet the post-quantum cryptography migration milestones. Readiness varies both across and within CNI sectors, but all are aware of the need for PQC migration and planning is underway. Lead government departments will continue to work with their sectors to monitor readiness, and DCMS will monitor the overarching readiness in order to assess progress and the need for any potential future interventions.
As per published Cabinet Office guidance, details of Ministers’ and Senior Officials’ meetings with external organisations are published quarterly in arrears on GOV.UK. This guidance is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/how-to-publish-central-government-transparency-data.
The Incubator for Artificial Intelligence (i.AI) tools currently in production use are Consult, Extract, Minute and Parlex. Since September, these tools have together recorded more than 1,000 sign-ins each week. These products are developed and operated through shared multidisciplinary teams and infrastructure, meaning costs are not separately attributable to individual products. Evaluations of Consult and Extract have been published on the i.AI website. https://ai.gov.uk/insights].
GOV.UK Chat is in early Beta stage and available in the GOV.UK App. GOV.UK Chat has been developed within the Government Digital Service by a multidisciplinary team of civil servants, with the costs of development forming part of GDS’s wider budgets. It has answered questions from more than 36,000 users since its release in April 2026. The Government Digital Service plans to further scale up usage of GOV.UK Chat in 2027, adding agentic capabilities that make it easier for citizens to get what they need from government.
The Incubator for Artificial Intelligence (i.AI) tools currently in production use are Consult, Extract, Minute and Parlex. Since September, these tools have together recorded more than 1,000 sign-ins each week. These products are developed and operated through shared multidisciplinary teams and infrastructure, meaning costs are not separately attributable to individual products. Evaluations of Consult and Extract have been published on the i.AI website. https://ai.gov.uk/insights].
GOV.UK Chat is in early Beta stage and available in the GOV.UK App. GOV.UK Chat has been developed within the Government Digital Service by a multidisciplinary team of civil servants, with the costs of development forming part of GDS’s wider budgets. It has answered questions from more than 36,000 users since its release in April 2026. The Government Digital Service plans to further scale up usage of GOV.UK Chat in 2027, adding agentic capabilities that make it easier for citizens to get what they need from government.
The Government has been working to define the detailed form of the API mandate announced in the Blueprint for Modern Digital Government. We intend to publish this mandate, including requirements on exposing data and functionality where necessary, in early 2027 following a pilot phase working with a selection of public sector organisations.
As announced at Budget 2025, the government will require all VAT invoices to be issued in a specified electronic format from April 2029, known as “e-invoicing”. An Implementation Roadmap will be published at Budget 2026 which will provide more clarity on the timelines.
The Government recognises the importance of secure and resilient supply chains for telecommunications infrastructure, including fibre and copper cabling. Whilst The Government has not run product-specific interventions for these specific fibre cabling products, The Government works with industry to improve the resilience, security and diversity of fixed and mobile telecoms supply chains.
The AI Security Institute (AISI) shares the findings of its pre-release evaluations with Canada’s AI Safety Institute in line with our individual agreements with AI developers. The renewed UK-Canada AI security agreement has also established regular exchanges on frontier AI capabilities, emerging risks, evaluation methodologies and best practice.
The AI Security Institute (AISI) does not apply a fixed threshold. It uses the term for models where testing is most likely to change our understanding of emerging AI capabilities and risks. AISI evaluates this on a case-by-case basis and reviews its approach regularly as the technology develops. Through its trusted relationships with the world's leading AI developers, AISI continues to ensure its evaluations focus on the models that matter most.
The AI Security Institute (AISI) has been allocated £360 million from 2026-27 to 2029-30. This includes the additional £120 million over 2026-27 to 2029-30 announced at Budget 2026, on top of the £240 million set out in my response of 15 October 2026 to PQ 33991. The additional funding will strengthen the UK’s frontier AI evaluation and testing capability and support the development of technical standards to ensure risks are mitigated.
The AI Security Institute does not routinely comment on which specific models it has evaluated. It uses a variety of signals to decide which models to test and approaches this on a case-by-case basis. Rather than testing every model released to the public, AISI focuses on those that suggest a step-change in its understanding of the risks.
Announcements from 24 and 26 October confirmed an additional £23 million in funding for the AI Economics Institute, taking its total confirmed funding profile to £34 million over this year and the subsequent three years. The funding will underpin the Institute’s comprehensive research agenda on how AI is affecting productivity, growth, jobs and living standards.
Prior to the announcements the AIEI’s funding profile was as follows:
2026/27: £4m
2027/28: £7m
Total: £11m
Following the announcements the AIEI’s funding profile is now:
2026/27: £4m
2027/28: £10m
2028/29: £10m
2029/30: £10m
Total: £34m
In line with Civil Service policy, AISI has no plans to commission an independent evaluation of the outcomes of grants awarded under the Alignment Project. The appropriate approach to grant scheme evaluation is determined on a scheme by scheme basis, taking account of the nature, scale and objectives of the intervention and ensuring that evaluation activity is proportionate to the grant.
The AI Security Institute (AISI) AISI routinely shares the findings of its pre-release evaluations with the NCSC. AISI collaborates closely with the national security community, including NCSC as the UK's technical authority on cyber security. Earlier this year, AISI and NCSC co-authored a publication on harnessing frontier AI for cyber defence.
The AI Security Institute (AISI) has built trusted, voluntary relationships with the world's leading AI developers, giving it privileged access to frontier models. These partnerships support AISI's world-leading research into the risks these models pose. AISI's current collaboration agreements are all with developers based in the UK and the US.
The AI Security Institute (AISI) notified all affected individuals and organisations where it was possible to do so. This included notification of the GitHub users the model interacted with.
I refer the Hon. Member to the technical report AISI published on its website on 4 August 2026. It sets out in detail how AISI detected, contained and responded to the incident, including a timeline of its notifications.
Yes. The £100 million committed to the AI Biosecurity Lab forms part of the £115 million committed to strengthen the UK’s defences against risks arising from advanced AI, including the use of AI to improve biosecurity.
I refer the Hon. Member to the answer given on 22 October to Question 28819.
The Government has also published the AI Cyber Security Code of Practice which is supported by additional guidance from the National Cyber Security Centre. The UK Code of Practice informed ETSI EN 304 223, the first global standard to define baseline cyber security requirements for AI models and systems, covering the entire lifecycle - design, development, deployment, maintenance, and decommissioning.
The United Kingdom and the United States share a strong partnership rooted in our shared values and people-to-people links, and demonstrated by our close collaboration on security, defence, trade and technology.
Ministers and officials have regular discussions with US counterparts on a range of technology and security issues. However, details of confidential government-to-government discussions are not routinely disclosed.
On 1 October 2026 the AI Security Institute had no secondees from AI developers. The AI Security Institute has trusted, voluntary relationships with the world’s leading AI developers. This collaborative approach lets us keep pace with a fast-moving technology and adapt as it evolves.
I refer the Hon. Member to the answer I gave on 19 September 2026 to question UIN 31698.
Funding for the Taskforce is expected to come from prioritisation of existing departmental budgets.
The AI Security Institute (AISI) is able to identify vulnerabilities in frontier models through pre-deployment testing. AISI does not recommend specific changes to models. Instead, testing results are shared with developers so that they can improve their safeguards. By conducting safeguards red-teaming, AISI supports developers to incrementally improve models by strengthening their overall defensive systems.
The AI Security Institute spent £3.34 million on compute in the 2025-26 financial year (April 2025 to March 2026). This covered cloud compute for research including GPUs; the supporting infrastructure, tooling and services needed to run the Institute's technical work; and access to AI models through paid application programming interfaces (APIs). Compute is essential to the Institute's world-leading research and testing of frontier AI. Expenditure varies from year to year and is expected to grow as the Institute's research expands to keep pace with advancing model capabilities.