Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Lord Weir of Ballyholme Excerpts

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

My Lords, I rise in relation to this group. Picking up the remarks, first of all, of the noble Lord, Lord Jay, I will say that, yes, there is not, perhaps, a single unified position of every single Chagossian. Perhaps we should not be surprised at that. Can we identify an issue in the United Kingdom on which there is a single view which every citizen of the United Kingdom holds? We may indeed have great difficulty in finding many issues within this House on which every single one of us is on exactly the same page. Of course, there would be a way to test that, which is the case of democratic self-determination. That would have been the way to see where the majority of opinion lay within the Chagossian community. It would not be beyond the wit of any Government to do that.

Turning to the amendments in this group, I want to particularly address my Amendments 38C and 55. I have also co-signed a number of my noble friend Lord Hay’s amendments. The thread that very much runs through the amendments in this group, both in content and spirit, is an attempt to actually do something practical, even at this late hour, to support the Chagossian people.

For example, the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, look at employment rights; my noble friend Lord Hay’s amendments look to both employment rights and making some level of provision in terms of flights to the Chagos Islands, and Amendment 50A, from the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, looks at birthright and identification, so that the Chagossians do not become some sort of 21st-century Trotsky, who will suddenly be erased, with their identity being erased from all photographs. They will simply become some sort of non-people. All the amendments are very much in the spirit of trying to provide support to the Chagossian people.

It seems that there are objectively three ways in which the United Kingdom can support the Chagossian people. It is undoubtedly the case. I think it has been acknowledged in earlier parts of this debate, from all sides of the House, that, whatever our views on the present treaty, and whatever our views on a wide range of issues, there does seem to be a common agreement and an acknowledgement that we have had over half a century of poor and shameful treatment of the Chagossian people. Successive Governments of whatever political persuasion have let down the Chagossian people. We cannot turn back the clock to prevent what happened in the late 1960s or the 1970s, or what happened subsequent to then. But what we can try to do is ameliorate the situation.

Again, I would highlight three areas which we could look at. The first is the issue of democracy and self-determination, which was the subject of an earlier debate. The second area, which I think is the principal focus of this group of amendments, is how we can provide financial and practical support for the Chagossians. The third issue is the rights of resettlement of Chagossians. My two amendments deal specifically with the latter two.

Turning first to Amendment 38C, this highlights to the Government that there was an alternative way forward. The KPMG report that was produced in 2015, commissioned by a former Labour Prime Minister, put forward a potential pathway of progress as regards the Chagos Islands. My amendment, in the spirit of trying to be practical in terms of help, does not seek to go fully down that pathway or to reinstate the KPMG report. That is clearly something that the Government would reject, but there were a range of proposals within that report dealing with resettlement.

The cost highlighted in 2015 for implementing that report would, I think, have been about £400 million. Sadly, at that stage, the Government rejected that as being far too expensive. Whatever arguments we may have had at an earlier stage over the broader financial cost of this settlement, it seems to me that a solution which cost £400 million would have been very cheap compared with what we face in practice, no matter what figures we belie.

So it strikes me that, while we still have that sovereignty and control of the Chagos Islands, we should be facilitating that resettlement, because it is clear that the treaty agreement that we have reached does not give a right of resettlement to the Chagossians; it hands that lock, stock and barrel to the Mauritius Government. As I said at an earlier stage, I suspect that those who make the right noises towards the Mauritian Government may be able to resettle, while those who are deemed the “awkward squad” will not be able to go back to their homeland. It seems that the very least we can do is to make that provision while we still can for the resettlement of the Chagossian people.

Finally, Amendment 55 is, again, a probing amendment. We have rehearsed the broader financial position. It is clear that, in stark figures, £101 million will be paid per year to the Mauritius Government. We know that the disparity in terms of what that equates to as a total will vary between the Government’s assessment, using one particular calculation of £3.4 billion, and the main Opposition’s figure of £35 billion, but we know that vast sums will go directly to the Mauritian Government. Where we owe a duty of care in particular is to the Chagos Islanders: they should be our top priority when it comes to finance, but this amendment does not even go quite as far as that. We are simply saying that, financially, we want to ensure that there is at least a determination that what is provided is fair and equal towards the Chagos Islanders compared with Mauritius.

I have to say that there is deep concern over the £40 million trust fund. No doubt the Government will say that it is very well intended to provide direct support to the Chagossian people. However, by providing it in such a way that it is entirely within the Mauritian Government’s control, while Chagossians appear to have no particular leverage as to how it is spent, we do not know on what projects or on whom it will be spent. This is one opportunity, at least, to probe the Government on what actions are going to be taken to at least try to ensure equality of provision on that basis.

I look forward to the Minister’s summing up to see what practical measures the Government can take. For instance, will they accept that we monitor the situation closely through an equality assessment, or ensure that there are Chagossians put on any board that deals with the distribution of the money? The noble Baroness, Lady Foster, has suggested that there should be a reference group of Chagossians who could at least monitor this. If it simply becomes, effectively, a slush fund for the Mauritian Government to indulge whatever pet projects they want, under the guise of providing for the Chagossian people, without any direct input or control from them, we will simply have repeated the mistakes of history and let down the Chagossian people again.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 78 and in support of the amendments of the noble Lords, Lord Hay and Lord Weir, the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, and my noble friend Lord Callanan. The crux of this debate is about ending the dream of return for most British Chagossians. As long as they were British citizens, there was always the possibility of resettlement, but we know that Mauritius denies their nationality, treats them as so many Mauritian citizens and is certain not to allow a general right of return to the Chagossian population.

One or two Chagossians who have said all the right things, as the noble Lord, Lord Weir, says, may be allowed back as part of that general migration, but we can be pretty certain that they will not be our fellow subjects watching now from the Gallery, stoical and silent, ignored and overlooked in a grisly symbol of these past five decades.

My amendment deals specifically with the rights of employment at the base, but I want to widen it a little to what would make an economically viable community in the Chagos Islands. The Minister has said several times at the Dispatch Box that our priority is maintaining the base and that by implication, therefore, we cannot do the right thing by the Chagossian population. I do not believe there is a contradiction. Maintaining sovereignty would meet both our strategic and our moral obligations of stewardship as the sovereign power and the focus of loyalty of the Chagossian population, and it is economically viable. We heard in our last debate that it could not happen because it was too far away, too distant and too expensive, but as we have just heard from the noble Lord, Lord Weir, it is a fraction of what we are paying in direct transfers to Mauritius, let alone any associated costs. We can take the Minister’s figures and say that it is six times more expensive to hand the archipelago away, or we can take my noble friend Lady Noakes’s figures and say that it is more like 60 times as expensive. Either way, it is extraordinary that we are not considering the option of resettlement.

I want to explore how that would work. I mentioned last week that the Falklands War was, paradoxically, the beginning of the economic revival of that archipelago because the regular link to the UK and the impact on the economy, as well as our readiness to start exploiting some of the resources, made an island that until then had been suffering from emigration viable and hugely attractive. It has nearly doubled its population since. At the moment we are flying in civilian contractors for all the non-military jobs on an occasional flight from Singapore. These contractors come from the Philippines, Sri Lanka or India, and they do the many non-military jobs on a base of that size—the construction, cooking, cleaning and so on. There is no reason why those jobs could not be done by local people. It would make sense both economically and in security terms, as well as giving a viable economic option to the British Chagossians who return.

But I would not want to leave your Lordships with the thought that this would be a population wholly dependent on the existence of the military base. That is not a position that anyone wants in the long term. It is not a position that the Falkland Islands would want to be in. We will come on to our other overseas territories in a later group, but the economy of Gibraltar has been transformed since the 1980s. Having been almost completely dependent for GDP on our naval base there, it has now become a hugely successful territory through private enterprise. There are lots of other things. What would those other things be? I have said before in this House that it is not for politicians to second-guess the private sector and I am conscious of sitting next to my noble friend Lord Moynihan, who has written a wonderful book making this point at greater length, but here are some ideas off the top of my head after conversations with British Chagossians who had been kicking around a couple of these ideas. Here are seven or eight ideas. Maybe one or two of them might be viable. That is all you would need.

First is the extraordinary marine resource. What about establishing a marine and oceanographic university on Peros Banhos? There has been a lot of interest from academic institutions here and elsewhere. Lancaster University, the University of Exeter, the University of Western Australia in Perth and Dalhousie in Canada have all been involved in ecological and maritime projects around the archipelago. Is it so unthinkable to have a permanent base there that in time could take visiting students and have accommodation for them?

Secondly, the obvious one is tourism. People put a great premium on both novelty and isolation. Here is the last undiscovered tourist archipelago. It can be reached by seaplane from the Maldives which, it is worth reminding ourselves, is closer to the Chagos Archipelago than either the Seychelles or Mauritius. It is perfectly feasible to see snorkelling, birdwatching, scuba-diving and exploration of the marine fauna becoming viable. There are wealthy people who would spend a great deal of money for the additional seclusion and the new frontier.

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Amendment 81C, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Kempsell, seeks to put the Chagossian contact group on to a statutory footing. The Government welcome the challenges to increase the participation of Chagossians in the political process. The noble Lord made some really good points about this. We have already established the contact group to give Chagossians a role in the UK Government’s support for their community. Following debates in Parliament, we have already announced that we will explore opportunities for enhancement to this group, as he suggests, including increasing its transparency and frequency; it is meeting quarterly at the moment. However, we are clear that any decisions about the contact group must be made in agreement with existing members of the group, and we do not want to impose things that we think would be right for them. This is one of the reasons why we are resisting this amendment, but it is a good opportunity to raise this, and the noble Lord made his case well.

[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

On the amendments that the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, and I put forward, as was alluded to in a number of speeches, including by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, the reason why we raised equality issues as regards financial payments is the potential role of Chagossians within the trust fund. There is a widespread concern at present that we are simply hoping that Mauritius does the right thing with that. I appreciate that the Minister is perhaps not in the position today to give any level of direct assurances. However, can she at least go away and come back before Report with the Government’s thoughts or information—perhaps after discussions with the Mauritian Government—as to how we can inject a level of Chagossian direct involvement and control over that trust fund? That would be very helpful for whenever we reach Report.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

That is not too much to ask. We are talking to the Mauritian Government about this, because we want the same thing as the noble Lord. I had hoped that we would be able to say something a little bit more detailed about that by now. We have not quite got there, but we will use best endeavours to get there before Report. I understand the motivation behind this, and it is right that we do what we can to make sure that noble Lords have the assurances they need by Report.

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In conclusion, I very much look forward to listening to the Minister’s response to these points. Having engaged with the question of the domestic processes in the UK between signing and possible ratification, will she inform the Committee about the domestic processes of the Republic of Mauritius in this regard? I would appreciate her commenting on that. We hear that there is now some uncertainty on the Mauritian side, which she could perhaps comment on today. Will she also tell the Committee what secondary legislation must be brought forward before ratification? If she is not able to do so today, will she please write to us ahead of Report, setting out the planned secondary legislation and what it will do? I would also value the Minister’s comments on my other amendment, Amendment 20H. I look forward to hearing from her.

[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

My Lords, I rise to deal with Amendments 58, 61 and 62, which are, largely speaking, probing amendments.

My noble friend Lord Morrow raised the question of whether the Government have breached their manifesto; far be it from me to suggest that. There are even some scurrilous rumours that they will raise taxes, but that will clearly not be the case, and such rumours will obviously be disproved in the next few hours.

I and others have been very critical of the deal, the legislation and the approach that has been taken by the Government. We have been critical of the treatment of the Chagossian people on issues such as the right to self-determination and the ceding of sovereignty. It seems to me that the response that the Government will offer as a rationale is essentially that, whatever the position on those issues—and I appreciate the Government will dispute the position that I and others have put forward—the outweighing factor is the securing of our strategic defence within the area and, if that is got right, that will trump everything else.

That is why the amendments in this group are so important, as they try to put that to the test. My amendments and, indeed, a number of the others, try to seek assurances. I am using the word “assurances” as I am reminded of a phrase that a friend of mine would use when talking of “clarification”. He would say that the purpose of clarification is often not to make things clear but to put yourself in the clear. Instead, I will ask the Government for assurances on the issue of defence. Is what is being put forward—what is said on the tin—being met by what is delivered in respect of assurances?

As regards the amendments, I want to deal with three issues that are interrelated. First, I want to probe the position as regards the potential. We know what has been secured directly on Diego Garcia itself, but I want to probe on the potential for the Mauritius Government to enter into arrangements with third countries, to have a movement by those countries towards other islands by way of a leasing or some other arrangement, which may then descend into some form of military activity, with monitoring bases and things of that nature.

Earlier today, in answer to an Oral Question, the Minister rightly indicated that it would be wrong to speculate on potential future events. However, this is not an issue that simply appears in a vacuum. We know that the Mauritius Government have had relatively close relationships with Russia, for example, and have been in discussions with India, and that there are ongoing discussions with China. Indeed, it is reported in relation to one of the islands—Peros Banhos, if I am pronouncing that correctly—that there are discussions around a leasing arrangement. It is clear that Mauritius will look towards the Chagos Islands as an opportunity to work with a range of other Governments to lever in what they have been given.

Specifically, the concern is with regard to China. Where arrangements have been made between other jurisdictions and China, they have led, in a military sense, to a level of mission creep. We have seen that these things are beginning to happen. There are a number of examples, from Sri Lanka to Djibouti to the Solomon Islands. We need a belt and braces approach to how we are going to prevent any level of development around that side of things.

I know that the Minister will respond in part by saying that there is provision within the treaty that, should there be any sort of military arrangement, Mauritius would then have to notify the UK Government and that, effectively, the UK Government could say no to such an arrangement. However, there are a couple of concerns in relation to that. Amendment 58 therefore looks to see what practical measures can be taken. We need to flesh out in very clear-cut terms what we can do. The concern, of course, is that any notification by Mauritius might be post the event. We might see a situation in which something is, for example, leased to the Chinese, who then develop their own mission creep. Mauritius could then turn round and say that, “Actually, this has been leased out to them, and we do not know what they are doing, and they have gone beyond that”. We need to tease out from the Government what they intend to do in practice in a situation where, for example, a listening station was placed on one of the islands or there was a range of other realistic possibilities.

[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

What the noble Lord is saying is very interesting, but the treaty protects the outer islands from development. Mauritius is one of only two African countries that is not part of the belt and road initiative, so its main interlocuter is not China but India.

[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

We can pick which Government are looking to lever in additional influence in the area. I am simply saying that China has a particular record of reaching agreements with other countries to—

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

Will the noble Lord confirm that, although it is true that Mauritius is not part of the belt and road initiative—the road thing would not really work, if you think about the geography—it was the first African country with which China signed a free trade agreement, and it has received a state visit from the President of China, which, given the population of Mauritius, would suggest something a little more unspoken than just trade between those two territories.

[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

It is clear that the Chinese interests—and indeed those of other countries, which I think goes to the heart of why we are seeing this as a key strategic point of view—go beyond simply trying to create trading relationships. We know that Mauritius has around 1.3 million people, much smaller than even my own beloved Northern Ireland—but President Xi is not beating down the doors for a state visit to Belfast any time soon, as far as I am aware. Whether it is China, India or anyone else, whatever the assurances that are there, what are the practical implications and what can we do to assure ourselves that there will not be a level of mission creep?

I will continue very briefly, as I suppose time is moving on. Amendments 61 and 62 probe the position as regards airspace and maritime assurances. Again, this has been sold particularly on the basis of it being not simply the British position but the US position, so I think we need to see some level of joint assurance in relation to that. There has been a concern—and some level of suspicion, which I seek assurances that the Government can allay—that the position of the Americans has been effectively to go along with this treaty. There was, I think, a level of reluctance. It was reported initially that the Americans had given a level of lip service. I think we want to get a much greater level of reassurance that they have bought into this, rather than simply acquiescing with something that one of their allies has asked for. Specifically, as highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, there are some restrictions in terms of notification that seem to undermine the security implications.

For instance, if we look at the airspace side of things, there is a 12-mile zone around Diego Garcia, but airspace around the rest of the Chagos Islands is simply with Mauritius. On a maritime basis, we know that the treaty details that the archipelago waters, the territorial seas and the EEZ around the Chagos Islands are all within the control of Mauritius. Where there can be a level of restriction or interference on airspace or maritime boundaries, that can also create a concern. We seek assurances from government that what is being proposed—and this is a question of belt and braces—is actually going to provide the genuine level of defence. If so much else is potentially being sacrificed to bring about this deal, we need to make sure that we have something that is ironclad as regards our defences.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

It is probably best to let the Americans be the judge of their own best interests. They seem to be rather keen on this treaty and its ratification. The Secretary of State in Washington, who is also currently head of the National Security Council, called its conclusion a “monumental achievement”. He does not seem to be concerned that it might open the road to Chinese influence; nor do the Indians, who are, of course, close friends of the Mauritians and are as concerned as we and the Americans are about Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean. The treaty is seen as a barrier to that, not an opening to it.

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[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

I am not sure what remarks the noble Lord is referring to. I am talking about the position taken by the current Administration of the United States.

[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

I appreciate what the noble Lord has said in relation to the response in the public sphere by the American Government. Whatever one’s views—and there will be a range of views towards the current American Government across this Chamber—it is a fair accusation that they occasionally lapse into a certain level of hyperbole. It is either the greatest thing that has ever happened or the worst disaster. We should not necessarily take an enthusiastic apparent public endorsement as something being a great thing from the Secretary of State or the current President as a full reassurance of the American position.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

I think it is probably best to take what they say at face value. They probably mean what they say.

I will now attempt to address the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, and surprise her by saying that I think they are extremely sensible. I understand the thinking behind them. I understand her concerns that are encapsulated in Amendments 83 and 85 to 87, but I think the amendments are probably unnecessary. I suspect that the statements the noble Baroness is calling for could be made today. I suspect that we will hear them before the debates on this Bill are over, but it seems to me important that we should hear them, so I understand what the noble Baroness is saying.

I would like briefly to refer to the consistent and cogent arguments from the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, for a sovereign base area solution rather than the solution that is written into the treaty. I do not know why the last Government looked at it but decided not to pursue it. I do not know what the reasons were. They were probably, I would guess, topographical—we are talking about a very large area, rather than the two restricted areas on Cyprus—but I do not know, and I think it is a valid question to ask.

The big point, surely, is that we are where we are. We have a treaty, and we cannot ratify it until we pass this Bill. That is why I disagree strongly with the four amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kempsell. He comes straight out and says that he wants renegotiation. He wants the treaty renegotiated in four separate respects, but we are where we are. The treaty exists. If we were to decide to reopen the negotiation, I think we could expect a rather hostile reaction in the United States. The principal concern of the United States is security of tenure and the continuing co-operation of third countries over supply chains. That is what they are concerned about—not our blue eyes but security of tenure of the base. Given that, some in Washington would argue that it is time for the United States to switch sides, to ditch us and do a direct deal with the Mauritians. That argument has been made in Washington and could be made again if we get ourselves into such a mess that, having secured a treaty that the Conservative Government sought and the Labour Government have concluded, we were to decide, after all, that it was not a treaty we wanted and that we wanted to go back to the start and negotiate something different. I can imagine the United States losing patience with us.